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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."







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Given By 
y- S, SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK .. . 
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES ... 



SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



,^6 
S. Con. Res. 27 /"tjl^ 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 32 
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTAC 



HEARINGS 

DEFOKE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEARL HAKBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE INITED STATES^ 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS "P ^ 

FIRST SESSION / A^ 

PURSUANT TO 4 ^V3l 

So Con. Reso 27 vJLTr. 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 32 
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT CF INQUIRY 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attacli 




UNITED STATKS 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 194G 






Ft, 32^ 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOI'ER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Micbi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. ]\Iasten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate .General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistatit Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF. JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


Xo. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 9S2 


1059- 2586 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 


3 


983-1 5S3 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2003 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exliibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-IIkistrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



rv 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






^3 

ai-; 









Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

"'5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 J 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
"471-516" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


iiTfitiiiiiiriiiiiiiiiTficOi 
iiCOiiitr)iii(iiiii)ii(j50i 

1:1 :::;:::::;: 1 ; 1 ;;; r^ ! 
(? ; ; ; 1 1 : ; ; : ; ; ! ; i ; ; ; i 1 1 "^ ; 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


I 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 llN 

^ ; 1 i 1 i ; ; i i i i i i 1 i i i 1 ; ; r 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
"660-688' 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120' 

2479-2491' 

4022-4027' 
148-186 

2567-2580' 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643' 

3720-3749' 
1186-1220 

1413-1442' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

"391-398' 
"115-134' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721' 

1219-1224' 

"886-951" 
1382-1399 

"377-389' 
1224-1229 

"314-320' 


% 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens ^__ 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

194G 


Pages 

5080-5089 
'""3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

""418-423" 
"451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

"8"7"-"b" 
205 

"B22S-224' 
B 65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


M 1 : ; 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

179-184 
""105-114" 

96-105 

■ 74-85 



""368-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

CommissioB, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180' 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

'"812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 
365-368 

1747-1753' 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Duseuburv, Carhsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

1946 


I I IrS 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ! ! ! ! I It-'o'ic^l ; |5ooco(n 

E ! ! iti 1 1 ; 1 1 ! : 1 i ; ; ! iwi^g"? i i^^^^oo 
111 1 1 ; 1 ; i 1 1 ; 1 1 1 ; "^ i i ^oJi 

III 1 1 1 !! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '^'^'> 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


iiiiiiiCOi'-i(N ^1 iiii 

lllllllr-^lOC0lllllOl IIII 

S (Mii-(rtiiiiiT-Hi IIII 

g. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII 
o 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(M 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 IIII 
Oi T-iiO iiliiOi IIII 

IlllllllMlr-l ^I IIII 

1 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 ! 1 1 1 I 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914: July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


S i i i i i i i i ! i i i i i i i i i iiii 

1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 IIII 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944)- 


Pages 
1070-1076 

461-469 
""763-772" 

816-851 


Joint 

Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2636-2696" 
3957-3971 

""241-274" 

""267-246" 
2934-2942 

2266-2214 
1914-1917 

""745-778" 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 

1 1 1 ICO 1 

« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r)^ 1 

^11111 1 1 1 1 

(^ 1 1 1 1 ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 I 1 1^ I 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tt< 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 194'2) 


Pages: 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"'469-473" 


Witness 

• 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

HiU, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, .Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

IngersoU, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to Mav 31, 

1946 


C-. 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _r -0 1 1 

coiiiiiiocoiii iiSlI^oii 

lOiiiiiiOCOiiiiiiiiii i^S^c^ ' 1 

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t?io 1 1 1 1 1 icico 1 1 S£t>. 1 1 

AhloiiiiiiOO iiiiiiiiiii2^£,-iii 
10 ^ iiiiiiiiiiig^iOii 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


IiIiIcoI(mIIIIIIIII!c?II 11 
iiiiiiOiOSiii ii-t<ii II 

« 1 1 1 1 iiO 1 CI r-H 1 1 II 

0. 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' i 111 1 1 1 1 1 11 

B 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 CI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , ci 1 1 II 

"iiiiiirfiOOilliiiiiiiTjHil II 

llllllOli-HIIIIIIIIII,-lll II 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1,1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 v-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 
^0 ' I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 II 

1 1 1 1 1 1 ; 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904-918 

628-643 

""734-740" 
""852-885" 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2605-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374' 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1^13 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214^225 
363-3(57 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 2:3, 1942) 


iiCOi—iiC^iOiiiiOiiii-tiiiiLO iCJIOi 
1 iiO il> ICOC3 1 1 IQO 1 1 1 iC 1 1 lO iiOOOiO 

« 1 1 ,-( 1 1-1 1 1 1 1 1 C3 1 1 1 1 LO 1 1 1 GO 1 CO ^ 

0, 1 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 ■* '-I 1 1 1 --( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .-1 1 ICOrH 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 --H 

R, 1 iCO ICO 1 GO 1 1 1 Ca 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 CQ 
iiTtHiiOi COiiit^-iiiiiOiiiO ICQ 

IIT-Hl-Hl OlllC<l Ilt^ 1 


a 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN *__ 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, .Ir 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 






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XII 



CONGRE.SSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1915) 


Pages 

""387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investicration, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
45-46 

""179-181" 

232 

76^77" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


Q 1 1 1 III III 1 III 1 1 1 1 
•^ 1 ' ' III III ' III 1 ' ' ' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 
of Inquiry, 
July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 liO 111 111 -^-„-C-ft^"(M 1 lo 1 loo 00 
1 tOi III III Z^fZiZ'XiCOiCi 1 1^ 1 lOO 

1 1 IT 111 III V^f^s^:: 1 It ; 1^=: 

« 1 ItJ. Ill III <^i, 1 1 1 T 1 It^ 1 lob7 

I ITt< 111 111 g^f^OOCOlO 1 ITJH 1 11005 

II 111 111 i-Hi— li-HIl llr-H 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to .Tan. 23, 1942) 


1 if_-t^^ 1 1 o i,--,--oo 1 1 ico^ 1 1 1 1 

1 i^OOOi 1 1 lO iS2<^ 1 ' '<^=^ 1 1 1 1 
« 1 i^iMiO 1 1 CO iSn^Tt< 1 1 il>GO 1 1 1 1 

(S 1 \ii4< ! i i :s§ 1 ; icis 1 1 1 1 


"Witness 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, WiUard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

PoweU, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, WiUiam S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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o3 .i; .Coo 



XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


i« 1 1 1 1 igss 1 1^ 1 ;?f^'i2§s 1 lo^ ! : : 

« 17 1111 :""? 1 l'? ; :?^?5SS7 ; i;^^ i i ; 

»3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 > 1 I 1 1 1 II tlj tX^ 1 I 1 

0,ir-l lllllj^— lllOJll-IA-L-LCOllll III 
-«'<N lllll^<MllOliS2^f2§'*i:«brHIII 

(sici iiiii^ioiiOiigl^^S-oii^^iii 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
4-9 

"335-375' 

411-413 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69' 
195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


11 1 1 1(M 1 1 1 1 1(N 1 1 111 ill 

[p 1 [ II' II III II III III 
1^ ' ' ' I III II III III 

1 1 111 II III ' ' 111 1 I I 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lO liiiilN .-hIIII ^-_J-0 111 III 

1 i^ i ; i i ;^ 1 i i i if s» i i i : ; i 

<3iO iiiiioo iiiiii-!,-* Ill III 

ft, i(N 1 1 1 1 iC^ 1-. 1 1 1 i<^St^ III 111 

i(N lllliiOt^illi^J> 1 

1 IIIII 1 1 1 1 "^ 111 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

3265-3236' 

1539^1575' 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

32-65' 
323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

'"37-169,' 
1617-1647 
452-455 

1738-1742 

1186-1190' 
1805-1808 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isnac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

StOphen, Benjamin L 

Stimsou, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



O 

O 



H 

O 

M 

w 

ij 

H 

w 



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H 

o 

o 

w 

H 
O 

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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to Mav 31, 

1940 


I : : ; : ,o : : : 1 : : : : ; : ; :^^ : 

1 ^ X^coi 

2 1 ' 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 , iCO 1 , 

S, i i 1 1 i ico 1 1 1 1 CO 1 

' N N li- i i i i N i i \\\^\ 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""389^410" 

376-386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 
105-10(3 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944: July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


" 1 '1 1 1 '1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1083-1096 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007" 
2456-2478 

1345-1381" 

910-931 
3063-3665 

3677-3683' 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""279-288" 
379-382 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Doc. 18. 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


CiCiiM 1 lO i iC3 II lOOiO 1 

(MC»Tt<ii^iiO iiiCOO 1 

?:CO-^00 1 iCO i l(M 1 1 i«Tt^ 1 

^,,-H |^||,_||,| 1,,,,, ,,1,^^ , 

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CO 00 1 1 CO 1 1 lO CD 1 


S 
a 

s 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen 

Av'fst, Melbourne II., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Ilea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 146 



[secret] 



RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY 
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHING- 
TON, D. C, BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE 
NAVY 



To Inquire Into the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces on 
Peari. Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 

24 July 1944 

[1] COURT OF INQUIRY 

To inquire into the attack made by Japanese aimed forces on Pearl 
Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, convened at Navy 
Department, Washington, D. C, 24 July 1944, pursuant to precept 
of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 13 July 1944. 

INDEX 

Page ' 

Organization of court 1 

Introduction of counsel 1,4,5,13,185 

Members, judge advocate, and reporters sworn 1, 2 

Interested parties named 4 

Adjournments 1, 

12, 57, 77, 109, 143, 184, 218, 270, 309, 362, 411, 476, 510, 555, 573, 
608. 659, 688, 732-A, 772-A, 815-A, 851, 885, 918-A, 948, 987-A, 1024, 
1051-A, 1082, 1109, 1150, 1155 

Judge advocate desires no further witnesses 1149 

Interested parties desire no further witnesses 1152 

Court desires no further witnesses 1155 

Conclusion of testimony 1151 

Termination of inquiry 1155 

Findings of Fact 1156 

Opinion 1201 

Recommendation 1208 

Testimony 



Name of witness 


Direct and Re- 
direct 


Cross and Recross 


Court 


Corrected 


Harold R. Stark, Admiral, USN.. 
Robert D. Powers, Jr., Lt. 


2, 14, 18-1, 319, 774.. 

9, 10, 271, 572, 691, 
741, 903, 1081, 
109], 1136, 1151. 

194, 311,692, 732.. _ 

220,269 


6, 7, 8, 78, 185, 192, 

322,781,792,803. 

11 


187, 193, 320, 784, 

793, 802, 809. 
10 .. 


323, 324. 


Comdr., USNR. 

R. E. Schuirmarui, Rear Ad- 
miral, USN. 
Walter 0. Short, Lt. General, 


207,314, 717,732... 
256, 266 


217,316,728.. 

263,268,270 




U. S. Army (Ret). 









' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 2 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Testimont — Continued 



Name of witness 



Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Ad- 
miral, USN (Ret). 

Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, USN 
(Ret). 

William S. Pye, Vice Admiral, 
USN (Ret). 

Kermit A. Tyler, Lt. Col., 
USAAF. 

William A. Heard, Captain, 
USN. 

Joseph John Rochefort, Com- 
mander. USN. 

Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, 
USA. 

Walter S. DeLany, Rear Ad- 
miral, USN. 

Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Ad- 
miral, USN. 

William W. Smith, Rear Ad- 
miral, USN. 

Logan C. Ramsey, Captain, 
USN. 

WUliam E. G. Taylor, Com- 
mander, USNR. 

Joseph L. Locard, 1st Lt., AUS... 

George E. Elliott, Sergeant, AUS. 

P. N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral, 
USN. 

[Ill] 

George W. Lynn, Lt. Comdr., 

USNR. 

L. F. Saflord, Captain, USN 

Stanley K. Hombeck (Civilian).. 
Alfred V. Pering, Lt. Comdr., 

USNR. 

Ingersoll, Admiral, 



Marshall, General, 



Royal E. 

USN. 
George C, 

USA. 
C. H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, 

USN. 
Edwin T. Layton, Captain, 

USN. 
F. M. Brotherhood, Lt. Comdr., 

USNR. 
W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, 

USN. 
C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, USN... 
A. D. Kramer, Comdr., USN.... 
R. K. Turner, Vice Admiral, 

USN. 
Leigh Noyes, Rear Admiral, 

USN. 
James O. Richardson, Admiral, 

USN. 
Joseph Clark Grew (Ambassa- 
dor). 

[IV] 

Maxwell M. Hamilton, (Civil- 
ian). 

H. H. Smith-Hutton, Captain, 
USN. 

Thomas Withers, Rear Admiral, 
USN. 

Joseph R. Redman, Rear Ad- 
miral, USN. 



Direct and Re- 
direct 



273, 325, 382, 1110, 
1117,1122,1135. 

385-A, 403, 412, 
1139. 

417. 



446,460 

461... 

470 

477 

495 

511 

528, 567, 569. 

575,602 

609,617 



628, 642. 
644, 658. 
660 



734. 

744- 
763. 
812- 

816. 

852. 



904,916 

919-^, 926, 930- 
931,943 



947 

950, 966, 967. 



1026, 1050- 

1052 

1062 



1070 

1077 

1083, 1089. 
1091, 1108. 



Cross and Recross 



335,381,1116,1122, 

1134, 1135. 
402,416 



431,445 

453, 459, 460. 

464 

474 

490 

500,509. 

517, 521, 526. 

541,551. 

589, 599, 603. 
614 



636, 643. 

651 

674, 687. 



738- 



754, 761. 

771 

813 



831,843 

874.. 

893,901 

907, 911, 917. 

923 

937 



971 

999, 1000, 1005, 1006, 

1007. 
1039,1048, 1049.... 



1066. 



1080. 
1088. 
1102. 



Court 



363,383, 1134- 
405,415,417.. 

434 

457,460 

468 

474 

491.... 

504.-. 

521 

556,568,569-. 

594,604 

615 



638, 643. 

653 

680, 687. 



739. 
757. 



814 

840, 847. 
882 



909, 912, 917. 
927 



947... 

966,967,976 

1002, 1005, 1006, 

1018. 
1043, 1048 



1054. 



1072. 



1083, 1089. 
1106, 1108. 



Corrected 



a] 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 
Exhibits 



Character of— 



Admitted 
In evi- 
dence 



General Order No. 142. _._ 

General Order No. 143 

General Order No. 170 

Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow Number 5 (WPL-46) 

U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five (WP 

Pac-46) 



Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935 Document No. FTP-155 

14ND Plan 0-4 called Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater 
(JCD-42) 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, dated 14 October 1941, subject, Secu- 
rity of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas __ 

Copy of letter dated 24 January 1941 from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary 
of War. 



Memorandum dated 4 June 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral 
Harold R. Stark 

Letter dated 28 August 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband 

E. Kimmel. ^ 

Letter dated 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Ilusband 

E. Kimmel. 

Dispatch dated 16 October 1941, date time group 162203, from the Chief of Naval 

Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 

Letter from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral Harold R. Stark, dated 22 

October 1941 

Dispatch dated 24 November 1941, date time group 242005, from the Chief of Naval 

Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. 

Letter dated 25 November 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband 

E. Kimmel 

Dispatch dated 27 November 1941, date time group 273337, from the Chief of Naval 

Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 

Dispatch dated 26 November 1941, date time group 270038, from the Chief of Naval 

Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 

Dispatch dated 28 November 1941, date time group 290110, from the Chief of Naval 

Operations to the Commander-m-Chief, Pacific 



Dispatch dated 3 December 1941, date time group 031850, from Naval Operations 

to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, et al 

Dispatch from Naval Operations to Naval Station, Quam, dated 4 December 1941 , 

date time group 042017.. _ 

Dispatch dated 6 December 1941, date time group 061743, from Naval Operations 

to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. 

Two enclosures of letter dated 1 May 1941 from Commandant, 14th Naval District, 

to the Chief of Naval Operations 

Letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 7 February 

1941, subject. Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii ._ 

Fitness report on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 1 October 1941 to 17 December 

1941 



Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson, dated 27 May 
1940 

Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, 

dated 22 October 1940, subject. War Plans— Status and readiness of in view of the 

current international situation 

Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, 

dated 7 January 1941, subject. Situation concerning the Security of the Fleet, etc. 
Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 10 

February 1941.. 

Letter from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral Harold R. Stark, dated 18 

February 1941 

Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 25 

February 1941 - 

Letter dated 22 March 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. 

Kimmel 

Letter dated 26 May 1941 from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to the Chief of 

Naval Operations, signed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel 



Letter dated 26 July 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral Harold R. 

Stark 

Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 22 

August 1941 

Letter dated 12 September 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral 

Harold R. Stark , 

Letter dated 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband 

E. Kimmel 

Letter dated 17 October 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. 

KimmeL 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Exhibits — Continued 



Exhib- 
it 



Character of- 



39 
39A 
40 
41 
42 

43 
44 

[d] 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

V 50 
51 

52 

53 

54 



[/] 



Letter dated-14 November 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark'to Admiral Husband 
E. KimmeL__ , ," _. 

Memorandum from the War and Navy Departments to the President, dated 5'No- 
vember 1941, Serial Oi;-i0012, subject, Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.. 

Dispatch from the Chief of- Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 
date time group 270040, dated 26 November 1941 

Letter dated 7 May 1941 from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief 
of Naval Operations, subject. Local Defense Measures of Urgency 

Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval 
Operations,' dated 20 May 1941, subject, Fourteenth Naval District — Local De- 
fense Forces 

Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, 
dated 23 June 1941, subject. Fourteenth Naval District — Local Defense Forces 

Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated 15 August 
1941 from the Commander-in-Chief.'U. S.! Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy via 
the Chief of Naval Operations 



Commimication of August 1941 (date obscure) from the Chief of Naval Operations 
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, subject, Fourteenth Naval District — Local 
Defense Forces _.. 

Basic letter dated 17 October 1941 from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to 
the Chief of Naval Operations, subject. Reappraisal of Local Defense Forces, 
Ila wa iian Coastal Frontier 

Letter dated 25 November 1941 from the^Chief of Naval Operations to' the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Comm.andant, Fourteenth Naval District, subject, 
Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier 

Memorandum of dispatch dated 7 Decemlier 1941, time 12:17, from War Department 
to various ofiicers, including Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shafter, Hawaii 

Letter dated 15 February 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, subject. Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against tor- 
pedo plane attacks. Pearl Harbor 

lyetter dated 2 December 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark 

Letter dated 2 December 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, subject, Defense of Outlying Bases . 

Pacific Fleet confidential let ter 14CL-41 dated 31 October 1941 , subject, Task Forces— 
Organisation and IVTissions 

Operations Plan 1-41 dated 27 February 1941, with annexes (a) to (e) inclusive, 
issued by Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Naval Base Defense Officer, Commandant 
Fourteenth Naval District 

Letter dated 17 February 194! from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandants 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth. Sixth, Seventh. Eigh h, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts & to Com- 
mandant Naval Station Guantanamo, subject. Anti-torpedo baffles for Protection 
against torpedo plane attacks Pearl Harbor - 

Letter dated 13 June 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandants of 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, 
Thirteenth. Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, subject. Anti- 
torpedo Baffles for Protection acainst Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor 

Letter dated 11 February 1941, Serial No. 07830, from the Chief of Naval Operations 
to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, subject. Experimental and Development 
Work on Nets and Booms 

Fortnightly summary of current National Situation prepared by ONI dated 1 
December 1941, signed by T. S. Wilkinson 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter 23CL-42 dated 6 May 1942, signed by Admiral 
C. W. Nimitz, and enclosure A thereof signed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
subject. Battle Organization and Condition of Readiness Watches at Sea 

Letter issued by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Fleet, signed by Admiral C. W. Nimitz and enclosure ComPatWing Two, Secret 
letter 0033, dated 30 December 1941. subject. Airplane situation, Hawaiian Area.. 

Work sheet showing dispositions of vessels in Pearl Harbor on morning of 7 Decem- 
ber 1941 

Extracts from official report of Com.mander-in-Chief, Pacific of the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, serial 0479, dated 15 February 1942 

Memorandum nf minutes made by Commander. William E. G. Taylor of a meeting 
called by him on 24 November 1941 at the information center, Oahu, T. H 

File of copies of documents on file in office of the Chief of Naval Operations, pre- 
pared at request of the Judge Advocate 

File of copies of dispatches on file in office of the Chief of Naval Operations, prepared 
at request of the Judge Advocate.. 

File of documents assembled by the Federal Communications Commission, on 18 
August 1944, certified over signature of Secretary of Commission 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 
Exhibits — Continued 



Exhib- 
it 



Ctiaracter of- 



Admitted 
in evi- 
dence 



66 

67 

68 

69A & 

69B 

70 



77 



Disptach dated 3 December 1941 from Naval Operations to tlit Commander-in-Chief, 
Asiatic and Commandant, 16ih Naval District for action; Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific, and Commandant, 14th Naval District for information 

Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, dated 
1 February 1941. .•_ 

File of documents prepared for interested party Admiral Harold R. Stark, at re- 
quest of the Judge Advocate, by the Director of Naval Communications 

Memoranda of 30 November 1941 and 6 December 1941 submitted by War Plans 
Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 

Letter from Admiral James O. Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 
25 January 1941, subject, Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG 

Letter from the Chief.of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, dated 24 
July 1941, together with enclosure of letter from Chief of Naval Operations to 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic 

Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 
dated 2 August 1941, with enclosure of letter from the Chiefiof Naval Operations to 
Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., dated 31 July 1941 

Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-m-Chief, Pacific, 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, dated 3 April 
1941, subject. Observations on the Present International Situation 

Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 
dated 7 November 1941., 

Dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 
date time group 2S2054 

Dispatches 2i;0027, dated 28 November 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 
to the Chief of Naval Operations; 300419, dated 30 November 1941, from the Chief 
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific; 212155, dated 21 January 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet; and 070645, dated 7 December 1941, 
from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to the Chief of Naval Operations.. 

Dispatch 292350, dated 30 November 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 
to the Chief of Naval Operations; and 301709, dated 30 November 1941, from the 
Chief of Naval Operations, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 



Page 

903 

1081 
1091 

nil 

1112 
1113 
1114 
1115 

1116 
1136 



1137 
1137 



[A (i)] Department OF THE Navy, 

Washington £5, D. C, 13 July 1944- 
From : The Secretary of the Navy. 
To : Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, Retired. 
Subj : Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese 

armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 

December 1941. 
Ends : 

(A) Keport of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 

18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japa- 
nese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 De- 
cember 1941. 

(B) Copy of examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary 

of the Navy, 12 February 1944. 

1. A court of inquiry, consisting of yourself as president and of 
Admiral Edward C. Kalbf us, U. S. Navy, Retired, and Vice Admiral 
Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy, Retired, as additional members, and 
of Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, as judge advocate, is 
hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, 
D. C, at 10 a. m., on 17 Jlily 1944, or as'soon thereafter as practicable, 
for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the 
attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of 
Hawaii, on 7 December 1941. 

•2. The attention of the court is particularly invited to sections 734 
and 735, Naval Courts and Boards. The judge advocate is authorized 



6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to summon such witnesses believed to have knowledge of facts per- 
tinent to the subject matter and whose attendance can be had without 
interruption to or interference with the war effort, and to obain all 
document relating to the said attack that may be required for intro- 
duction into evidence. 

3. Orders for travel of witnesses must be approved by the conven- 
ing authority prior to the issuance thereof. 

4. The court will thoroughly inquire into the matter hereby sub- 
mitted to it and will include m its findings a full statement of the 
facts it may deem to be established. The court will further give its 
opinion as to whetht^r any offenses have been committed or serious 
blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval serv- 
ice, and in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or 
serious blame incurred, will specifically recommend what further pro- 
ceedings should be had. 

[A (2) ] 5. The court will be held with closed doors. 

6. The Chief of Naval Personnel is hereby directed to furnish the 
necessary clerical assistance for the purpose of assisting the judge 
advocate in recording the proceedings of this court of inquiry. 

FoRRESTAL. 



[B] Department of the Navy, 

Washington, D. 0., 24- '^uly 1944- 

To : Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. N. R. 

Sub : Orders as counsel to assist judge advocate. 

Ref : (a) Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese 
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 
December 1941, convened by SecNav, 13 July 1944. 

1. You are hereby directed to report to the president of the court of 
inquiry, ordered to convene at the Navy Department, as counsel to 
assist the judge advocate during the inquiry set forth in reference (a). 

FoRRESTAL. 



Navy Department, 
Washingto7i, D. O., 24 July 1944- 
First Endorseinent 

From : President, Court of Inquiry. 

To : Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, USNR. 

1. Reported. 

Orin G. Murfin, 
Orin G. Murfin, 
Admiral, USN {Ret). 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 7 

[C] Department of the Navy, 

Washington, D. C, July 15, 1944' 

To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R. 

Subj : Orders as counsel to assist judge advocate. 

Ref : (a) Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Jap- 
anese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, 
on 7 December 1941, convened by SecNav, 13 July 1944. 

1. You are hereby directed to report to the president of the court of 
inquiry ordered to convene at the Navy Department, as counsel to 
assist the judge advocate, during the inquiry set forth in reference (a). 

Ralph A. Bard, 

Acting Secretary/ of the Navy. - 



First Endorsement 
15 July 1944 
To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., USNR. 

1. Reported this date. 

Orin G. Murfin, 
Orin G. Murfin, 

Admiral, USN {Ret), ^ 
President Court of Inquiry. 



[Z>] The Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington, M Septeniber, 19Ji4' 
From : Secretary of the Navy. 

To: Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate of 
Court of Inquiry to inquire into attack made by Japanese armed 
forces on Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 December 1941. 

Sub: Request for Attendance of Witnesses before Court of Inquiry 
Convened by SecNav Precept 13 July 1944. 

Ref: (a) Ltr. from Judge Advocate, Court of Inquiry, dtd. 21 Sep- 
tember 1944. 

1, The Secretary of the Navy has determined that the attendance of 
the following officers as witnesses before the Court of Inquiry con- 
vened by my precept of 13 July 1944, cannot now be made available 
for attendance on the Court without interruption to or interference 
with the war effort. 

Rear Admiral T. S. WILKINSON, USN. 

Captain A. H. McCOLLUM, USN. 

FORRESTAL, 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[iB'] Navy Department, 

Washington 25, D. C.^ 30 August 19U. 
Pers-3215-amf 
Jacket No. 
16977 

To : Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy. 
yia: Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN, Ketired, President, Court of 

Inquiry. 
Subject: Appointment for temporary service. 
Reference : 

(a) Act of Congress approved July 24, 1941 (U. S. Code (Supp. 

1), Title 34, Sees. 350-350] ). 

(b) Section 5, Act of Congress approved June 30, 1942 (Public 

No. 639— 77tli Congress). 

1. Pursuant to the provisions of reference (a), the President of 
the United States hereby appoints you a 

Captain 

In the Navy for temporary service, to rank from the 10th day of 
June, 1943. ' 

2. By reference (b), this appointment, unless expressly declined, 
is regarded for all purposes as having been accepted on the date of 
this letter, without formal acceptance or oath of office. The date of 
rank stated in this appointment is for the purpose only of establishing 
your order of precedence. 

3. Acknowledgement of receipt is requested. 
For the President : 

S/ James Forrestal, 

Secretary of the Navy. 
Registered No. 13. The lowest number of same date takes rank 

S/ F. J. SCHITYLER, 

Registrar. 



Navy Department, 
Washington 25^ D. C, 2 Sei)temher lOItJf.. 
First Endorsement 
From : Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN, Retired, President, Court of 

Inquiry. 
To : Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy. 
1. Delivered, with congratulations. 

S/ Orin G. Murfin. 
A True Copy. Ateest : 

Harold Biesemeier, 
Captain^ V. S. Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAYY COURT OF INQUIRY 



MONDAY, JULY 24, 1944. 

[1] First Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. G. 

The court met at 10 : 10 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy, (Ret), President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphiis Andrews, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate. 

The judge advocate read orders from the convening authority, orig- 
inals prefixed marked "B" and "C" detailing Lieutenant Commander 
Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Lieutenant Wil- 
liam M. Whittington, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, to act as counsel to 
assist the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Powers and 
Lieutenant Whittington took seat as such. 

The judge advocate introduced Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve ; Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve; and Charles O. Manahan, yeoman third class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, as reporters. 

The court was cleared and the judge advocate read the precept, 
original prefixed hereto, marked "A". 

All matters preliminary to the inquiry having been determined and 
the court having declared that pursuant to the instructions contained 
in the precept it would sit with closed doors, the court was opened. 

Each member, the judge advocate, and the reporters were duly 
sworn. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

The court was cleared. 

The court was opened. 

The court then, at 11 : 45 a. m., adjourned subject to the call of the 
president. 



PROCEEDINfSS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY H 



PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUET OF INQUIRY 



MONDAY, JULY 31, 1944. 

[^] Second Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The court met at 10 : 00 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, (Ret) , President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret) , Member. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, and 
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porters. 

The judge advocate introduced Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first 
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman 
first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, was duly sworn as reporter. Frank 
L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Frederick 
T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporters, withdrew. 

The record of proceedings of the first day of the inquiry was read 
and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and 
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 
Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station? 

A. Harold JR. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval 
Forces, European waters. 

2. Q, What duties of major importance have been assigned to you 
since attaining flag rank? 

A. Chief of Bureau of Ordnance; Commander of Division of Cruis- 
ers, Battle Force ; Commander Cruisers, Battle Force ; Chief of Naval 
Operations; and present duty. 

8. Q. During what period of time was your tenure of office as Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

_ A. 1 August 1939 to March 25, 1942. I will check that. That's 
right. 

\3'] 4. Q. On 7 December 1941, what was the echelon of the 
strategical, tactical, and administrative command, between the Navy 
Department and the 14th Naval District? 

A. Strategically, I would say there was none. Administratively, it 
^^as largely direct between the De])artment and the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict. Tncticallv, any relations we had were through the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, who was also Commander-in-Chief, IJ. S, Pacific 
Fleet, and through him to the District Commandant, 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5. Q. Then am T to imderstancl that the chain of tactical command 
was the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
U. S. Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and 
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District; is that correct? 

A, Yes, sir, theoretically. Practically, I would say it would be very 
largely between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the 
Commandant of tlie District. I have not been able to check any bear- 
ing of that with War Plans, but that, I believe, would be generally 
accepted. 

6. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions during the period from August 1, 1939, to March 25, 1942. 
What is the name of the officer who was in command of the U. S. Fleet 
on 7 December 1941? 

A. Admiral Kimmel. 

7. Q. What is the name of the officer who had command of the U. S. 
Pacific Fleet on 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Admiral Kimmel. 

8. Q. Could you tell us the full name of Admiral Kimmel? 

A. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. I don't know what the "E" stands 
for. 

9. Q. That is sufficient. Can you tell the court the name of the 
officer who was assigned the duties of commandant, 14th Naval District, 
on 7 December 1941? 

A. Admiral Claude Bloch. 

10. Q. Did any event of national importance occur on 7 December 
1941? 

A. Yes, sir. 

11. Q. Without elaborating your answer, please state what this event 
was. 

A. A surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. 

12. Q. At the time of this event was the United States in a state of 
war with any other nation ? 

A. No. 

13. Q. Wlien had the United States last been in a state of war ? 
A. 1918. 

[4-] The judge advocate stated that he did not desire further 
to examine this witness at this time. The court not desiring further 
to examine this witness at this time, the judge advocate requested 
that the court be cleared. 

The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to 
the inquiry entered. 

Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy : Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret) ; and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), were called before the court. 

The court stated as follows : 

The judge advocate of tlie court has made a request that Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy 
(Ret) ; and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), 
be named as interested parties in this inquiry for the reason that the 
scope of the inquiry would appear to cover an extensive field ; there 
would also appear to be many complicated details of evidence ; much 
time at this critical period of the war effort could be saved if it does 
not become necessary to read long extracts of testimony already before 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 13 

the court and to recall witnesses for cross-examination who may have 
returned to their duties in combat areas and other important war 
work; that the evidence before the court is that Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), and 
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), were in the 
key positions of the echelon of naval command between the Navy De- 
partment and the 14th Naval District at the time, the Japanese made 
an armed attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December lOll and therefore 
have a direct interest in the proceedings of this court. 

The court informed Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral 
Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ; and Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , that they had been named as interested 
parties. 

The court informed each of the interested parties of his rights. 

Each of the interested parties examined the precept and stated that 
he did not object to any member of the court. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), with the permission of the court, introduced Charles B. 
Rugg, Esquire, civilian; Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy 
(Ret) ; and Lieutenant (junior grade) Edward B. Hanify, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, as his counsel, and stated that he would also have as 
counsel Admiral Harry A. Yarnell, U. S. Navy (Ret), and Com- 
mander W. C. Chambliss, U. S. Naval Reserve, neither of whom was in 
attendance at this session. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, with the 
permission of the court, introduced Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), and Admiral Royal E. Inger- [5] soil, U. S. 
Navy, as his counsel. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), 
with the permission of the court, introduced Rear Admiral C. J. Row- 
cliff, U. S. Navy, and Captain Fred A. Ironside, Junior, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, as his counsel. 

The interested' party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U, S. Navy (Ret), 
with the permission of the court, made the following statement (read- 
ing:) 

The fact that I have been named an interested party comes as a surprise, 
particularly in view of the published findings of an investigation made on the 
spot, within a few weeks of December 7, 1941. 

I am much concerned because of the baneful implications and presumptions 
which may be attached to the term "interested party". 

I have had no reason to suppose that it was incumbent upon me to preserve 
evidence or to keep unimpaired my recollection of the details and circumstances 
surrounding and prior to December 7th. Nor have I had reason over this inter- 
vening time, even if I could, to keep those details and circumstances precisely 
separated from what they subconsciously may api)ear to have been, in order to 
be able to recapture and reconstruct them as they were. 

I desire to be helpful to the court and to expedite its business, but I feel sure 
that you appreciate the difficulties which now confront me as an "interested 
party." 

I have been informed only very recently that I would be an "interested party" 
and I have had scant time to prepare myself, if indeed, reconstruction of the 
facts, full and uncolored, is possible of human accomplishment at this time. 

While I have no desire to burden the court with legal technicalities, I feel con- 
fident that the court does not expect me to waive any rights that I have. 

So that the record may be clear in this respect, I wish it understood and I 
understand that I am not waiving any of my rights, whatever they are or may 
be. 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The witness who was on the stand prior to the clearing and opening 
of the court, resumed his seat as witness. 

[6'] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. 
Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret): 

14. Q. Admiral Stark, you have testified as to the chain of the 
administrative, tactical, and strategical command which is between the 
Navy Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. 
Do I understand strategical and tactical are different from military 
command ? 

A. No, I would say not. 

15. Q. Then in substance your answer was that the chain of mili- 
tary command was from the Navy Department to the Commander-in- 
Chief of Pacific Fleet and thence to the Commandant, 14th Naval 
District? 

A. Yes. 

16. Q. And the chain of administrative command — may I inquire 
exactly what you mean by that? 

A. I was thinking largely of the civilian employees and the bearing 
of furnishing the 14th Naval District its personnel, and so forth. 

17. Q. Mr. President, I have here General Order 142, date January 
10, 1941, which is a statement of the status of the 6'th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 
and 15th Naval Districts. I merely want to state that in General 
Order 142, January 10, 1941, which was in effect on 7 December 1941, 
that the status of the Commandant of the 14t]i Naval District is 
clearly defined; and I wonder if I might ask Admiral Stark to read 
this order and ask him if this wasn't the chain of Command he is 
endeavoring to establish by the questions propounded. 

With the court's permission, the question was withdrawn. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude Charles Bloch. U. S. Navy, 
made the following motion : "Inasmuch as it appears that the chain 
of command and responsibilities are fixed in documents, I move to 
strike out that testimony on the ground that the documents themselves 
are the best evidence of what that authority is. Number two, on the 
further ground that the questions put by the judge advocate them- 
selves presuppose an answer to the very question at issue here as to 
what the command was. I mean, they were conclusions in themselves, 
and I think it would make for time to strike out that testimony and 
stick with the documents — and I make such a motion." 

The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to 
the inquiry entered. The court announced that the motion was not 
sustained. 

18. Q. Admiral Stark, there is in existence General Order Number 
142, Navy Department, dated 10 January 1941, defining [7] 
the status of the Commandants of the 5th, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th 
Naval Districts. This order was in effect on December 7, 1941, and 
prior thereto. Are you familiar with this order? 

A. Generally, but I have had no time to go into the details. If it 
is the same order that was in existence, generally, yes. I would 
like to refreshen on the order if I may be cross-examined. 

19. Q. According to this Order, and I read: "The Commandants 
of the Tenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts, the Com- 
mandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United 
States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Ber- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 15 

muda, and the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far 
as pertains to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, are hereby assigned a 
dual status as follows : (a) xVs Commandants of their repective Naval 
Ditricts, operating under the orders of the Navy Department, (b) 
As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those 
of a Senior Officer Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such, 
and (2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and 
as directed by its Commander-in-Chief." Is this the command rela- 
tion that you described in the previous questions propounded by the 
judge advocate of the court of inquiry? 
A. It is. 

20. Q. Admiral Stark, I have in my hand U. S. Navy Kegulations 
1920, corrected in so far as I am able to ascertain, to date. Articles 
1480 and following, and including 1486 — these I interpret to be the 
regulations governing the business of the naval districts as prescribed 
in the first part of the General Order, just referred to in paragraph 
(2), which says that the Commandants of their respective naval dis- 
tricts operate under the orders of the Navy Department. Are these 
regulations, governing the naval districts, given in the articles of the 
Navy Regulations above quoted, the orders of the Navy Department in 
regard to the duties of the Commandant ? 

A. They are. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class. U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold E. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

21. Q. Admiral, referring to your answer to the jud^e advocate's 
questions which have been read and which have been subject to cross- 
examination by Admiral Bloch : Did you feel that you fully under- 
stood the language of the judge advocate's questions in which he 
brought in the words in the official orders and regulations such as 
"strategic", "tactical", and so on ? 

A. The question was no too clear and I gave the best general answer 
to it that I could. The regulations and general orders are specific and 
I think the best answer to *-\iq judge advocate's question. 

[8] Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral 
■Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

22. Q. In the provisions of General Order No. 142 and the Navy 
Regulations that have been cited, the only instructions dealing with 
the chain of command and the responsibilities of the command of the 
14th Naval District, were there not certain directives in the war plans 
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, and in the joint action of the 
Army and the Navy ? 

A. In answering the original question, I stated that they might be 
affected by the war plans and that I have not had an opportunity to 
look over them to answer your question. My recollection is that they 
may have been somewhat modified by war plans or special letters and 
which I would like an opportunity to check up on to answer your 
question. 



16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

23. Q. As a matter of fact, might not the provisions of these publi- 
cations have vitally changed the provisions of General Order 142 in 
the Navy Regulations? 

A. If you mean, would it have been possible to have issued such 
instructions, it would. Wliether or not anything that was issued did, 
I would like an opportunity to check up. 

24. Q. Well, then, you cannot give a complete answer to this ques- 
tion until you have further refreshed your memory ? 

A. That is correct. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anj'^thing relating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection 
therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his previous 
questioning. 

The witness made the following statement : If I may state, I have 
been pretty busy on the other side. I was not told why I was called 
to Washington, did not know definitely until I arrived what I was 
coming here for, obtained counsel only this morning, have had no 
chance to refresh on testimony which has been given and other docu- 
ments which have been made available to other interested parties, and 
I should like time to check up and prepare myself to answer the ques- 
tions which I feel will probably be asked me. 

The witness resumed his seat as an interested party. 

The judge advocate requested the court to take judicial notice of 
General Order 142, 143, and 170, and stated that they would be 
maintained in the custody of the judge advocate and would be avail- 
able for ready reference by the interested parties or the court if and 
when required, and the court stated that it would take judicial notice 
thereof. 

[9] General Orders Nos. 142, 143, and 170 were submitted to the 
interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered 
in evidence. 

There being no objection, they were received in evidence and marked 
"EXHIBITS 1, 2 and 3," respectively, copy appended. 

One of counsel for the judge advocate was called as a witness by 
the judge advocate, was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry, 
and was duly sworn. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station ? 

A. Robert D. Powers, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, United States 
Naval Reserve, counsel for the judge advocate of this court. 

2. Q. Are 3^ou the legal custodian of an official copy of Navy Basic 
War Plan, Rainbow Number 5, also known as WPL--46 ? If so, pro- 
duce it. 

A. I am ; here it is. 

The official copy of Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow Number 5, also 
known as WPL-46, was submitted to the interested parties and to 
the court, and hj the judge advocate offered in evidence for the pur- 
pose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom 
as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 17 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, re- 
quested the judge advocate to state whether these documents were 
being offered in evidence, or were being offered for identification only. 

The judge advocate replied that they were being offered for identi- 
fication only for the purpose of hereafter reading into the record such 
extracts therefrom that might become pertinent to the inquiry before 
the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
4," for reference. 

3. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of U. S. Pacific 
Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five, also 
known as WP Pacific 4G ? If so, will you produce it ? 

A. I am ; here it is. 

The official copy of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, 
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five, also known as WP Pac-46 was submit- 
ted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate 
offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the 
record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry 
before the court. 

[lO] There being no objection, it was so received and marked 
"EXHIBIT 5", for reference. 

4. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Joint Action 
of the Army and Navy, 1935, document number FTP155? If so, 
please produce it. 

A. I am ; here it is. 

The official copy of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, docu- 
ment number FTP155, was submitted to the interested parties and to 
the court, and by the judge advocate offiered in evidence for the 
purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts, 
therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 6", for reference. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, re- 
quested information as to whether FTP155 was corrected up to Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, or as of what date. 

5. Q. Will you answer the question ? 

A. The copy shows that all changes have been made up to and 
including 26 July, 1944. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated 
that that leaves the document in a condition that it can't be identified 
as it was on the 7th of December, 1941, because there have been 
numerous pages taken out and new pages put in. 

The witness requested permission to correct his last answer. The 
witness stated as follows : The answer which I gave to the last question 
was incorrect. This document is corrected up to and including July 
14, 1941 ; the date of July 26, 1944, which I gave, being the date upon 
which it was corrected. In other words, that is the entry of the man 
who made the correction, that he made it on July 26, 1944. 

Examined by the court : 

6. Q. Is the judge advocate prepared to submit a copy of that 
publication in effect on December 7, 1941 ? 

79716 — i6— Ex. 146. vol. 1 3 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I have been assured by the registrar of this document that it 
stands corrected as in effect on December 7, 1941, as I have handed 
it to the judge advocate. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

7. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of the 14th 
Naval District Plan 0-4, called the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan, Hawaiian Theater, also sometimes known as JCD-42? If so, 
please produce it. 

A. I am ; here it is. 

[11] 8. Q. Is this the plan that was in effect on 7 December, 
1941? 

A. It is. 

The official copy of 14th Naval District Plan 0-4, called the Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, also known as 
JCD-42, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, 
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of 
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent 
to the inquiry before the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 7", for reference. 

9. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Pacific Fleet 
Confidential Letter Number 2CL-41 (Revised), subject. Security of 
Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas ? 

A. I am ; here it is. 

The official copy of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter Number 
2CL-41 (Revised) , subject. Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating 
Areas, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by 
the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter 
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to 
the inquiry before the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 8", for reference. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Block, 
U.S. Navy: 

10. Q. As assistant to the judge advocate, will you certify that all 
the documents which have just been listed will lie as they were in 
effect on 7 December, 1941 ? 

A, I do, sir. 

The interested parties, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and 
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire 
to cross-examine this witness. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in 
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his 
previous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate. 

The court then, at 11 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which 
time it reconvened. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 19 

[1£] Present: 

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties 
to the inquiry, and their counsel. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he was not ready to proceed and requested a continuance in order 
to familiarize himself with the subject matter of the inquiry. 

The interested parties, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.) , and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) , joined 
in the request for continuance. 

The judge advocate stated that he was ready to proceed but that he 
considered the request for continuance reasonable and did not object 
thereto. 

The court announced that the request of the interested parties for a 
contiimance would be granted and that the next meeting of the court 
would be held at 10 a. m., August 7, 1944. 

With the permission of the court. Rear Admirad Husband E. Kim- 
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: I should like 
to have what I am about to say put on the record, if it is pertinent 
to put it on. I have been branded throughout this country as the one 
responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. I feel that this investiga- 
tion should go far enough to disclose all the facts in connection with 
the matter and that witnesses from the Army, from the State Depart- 
ment, or from any other federal department ought to be called before 
this court in order to establish the facts that are necessary. It will 
be a long time before I am afforded any other opportunity to refute 
the statements made in the report of the Roberts Commission. Peo- 
ple may die who can make statements before this court sufficient to 
establish the facts and to refute the utterly false and misleading state- 
ments made throughout the Roberts Commission. 

The court stated : The court assures you that we will make every 
effort to obtain any witness that you may care to call for the primary 
purpose of establishing all the facts as demanded by the precept. 

The court then, at 2:20 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. August 7, 
1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 21 



PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INOUIRY 



MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944. 

[13] Third Day 

Navy Department. 

Washington, D. G. 
The court met at 10 : 00 a. m. 
Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Eet) , President. 
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S.Navy (Ret), Member. 
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 
Commander Harold Biesemeier, JJ. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, 
and his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, IT. S. Navy (Ret), inter- 
ested party, and his counsel. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, 
and his counsel. 
The record of the proceedings of the second day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 
With the permission of the. court. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, introduced Liteutenant D. W. Richmond, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
and Lieutenant R, L. Tedrow, U. S. Naval Reserve, as additional 
counsel for himself as interested party. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.) , stated that it was his understanding that the judge advo- 
cate had requested access to certain secret files in the Navy Depart- 
ment, to which he also would like to have access, and that as yet the 
matter had not been acted upon. 

The judge advocate replied that he had written the Secretary of 
the Navy, setting forth the request of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim- 
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret) that he have access to said documents, but 
that up to a half hour before the court convened it had not been acted 
upon by the Secretary of the Navy. The judge advocate further 
stated that he did not consider the said documents immediately neces- 
sary to the proceedings of the court. 

[i^] Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, a witness for the 
judge advocate, was recalled and warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, with the 
permission of the court, made the following statement prior to his 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

examination: Before my examination begins, before my further ex- 
amination proceeds, I wish to state that although there has been a 
week's adjournment, I have not been able to devote all of it to prepara- 
tion. Considerable of my intervening time has been necessarily em- 
ployed on the duties of my present station. It is difficult to throw back 
over two and one-half years and testify about many things. I have 
not been able to study over the full field which may be opened. I can 
testify as to broad matters of policy and plans, though I may have 
to ask for further time to refresh my memory. I suggest where evi- 
dence as to matters of lesser degree is sought, it can be better obtained 
from those of my subordinates who were in OpNav in 1941 and con- 
sequently more familiar with detail, or from custodians of records 
and documents in the department's files. I also wish to say that I am 
appearing as the first witness before this court, having been declared 
to be an interested party before any other testimony was taken. I 
make no particular point of that unusual sequence and shall strive to 
answer questions so far as my memory serves, fully and without re- 
serve. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. During the period of two or three months preceding Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, who were your principal advisers, assistants, or aides in 
the Navy Department? 

A, My assistants and advisers at that time were the Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations; Head of War Plans; Head of Office of Naval 
Intelligence; the Districts; Central Division: Ship Movements; Ship 
Maintenance; Fleet Training; Commander Wellborn, my Flag Secre- 
tary. Those are the principal ones that I i-ecall at the moment. 

2. Q. What is the name of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations? 
A. Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll. 

3. Q. Will you state in general the principal duties of this officer? 
A. Admiral Ingersoll's principal duties a.ii Assistant Chief of Naval 

Operations were to advise me in a general way, and for me to keep 
him in touch with all matters of general importance. He took off 
my shoulders many matters of detail which he settled himself. Mat- 
ters of major importance, matters regarding policy, matters regarding 
talks and so forth with other departments of the government were 
considered by me, though he was largely acquainted with them, and 
I accepted such letters. Many dispatches which we sent [161 
over together he released after I had cleared them. In general, he was 
a very close assistant. 

4. Q. Did the major problems arising in the Pacific Fleet in the 
14th Naval District come within his view ? 

A. Thev did. 

5. Q. Who wfis your Chief of War Plans? 
A. Admiral Kelly Turner. 

6. Q. Will you tell the court in general what the principal duties 
of Admiral Turner were? 

A. Admiral Turner, as head of the War Plans Division, was charged 
with the drawing up of plans for the use of the Fleet in war. He 
worked very closely with Army War Plans. Ke kept in very close 
touch with the dispositions made in connection with War Plans. I 
think that may cover the broad outline of it. 

7. Q. Did you ordinarily call Admiral Turner in for conferences on 
your principal military problems? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 23 

A. I tliink there is no exaggeration to state that we were in what 
might be called constant conference on important military problems. 
I saw him not only daily — frequently a number of times daily. 

8. Q. Did he have anything to do with making estimates of the 
situations as matters progressed? 

A. Yes, a great deal to do, because of his position. 

9. Q. Would you say that he was familiar with the military prob- 
lems and policies in the Pacific Area, so far as the Chief of Naval 
Operations had anything to do with these plans and was concerned? 

A. I would say he was thoroughly familiar with them. We dis- 
cussed them together with all their aspects, and it was a matter of his 
constant concern and that of his Division. 

10. Q. What is the name of the officer who was in charge of the 
General Division? 

A. Captain Schuirmann. 

11. Q. What were the principal duties that he performed in rela- 
tion to your office as Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. Captain Schuirmann was the officer particularly charged with 
the liaison with the State Department. Central Division handled 
matters of outlying possessions, but one of his principal duties, if 
not the most important duty, was his connection with the State De- 
partment. 

12. Q. Did you consider him as an adviser or a liaison officer, or 
an aide — or exactly in what capacity would you [16] state he 
performed his duties ? 

A. He was certainly a liaison officer with the State Department. 
Many matters I asked him to take up with the State Department. 
He obtained information on many matters from the State Department, 
and naturally I asked his opinions to that extent, and to that extent 
his advice on problems where it was required. 

13. Q. What were the names of some of your principal aides? 
A. Commander Wellborn was my Flag Secretary. My Flag Lieu- 
tenant was Lieutenant Smedberg. 

14. Q. Will you tell the court whether they acted in an advisory, 
administrative, or in what capacity ? 

A. Lieutenant Smedberg acted largely in the capacity of regular 
Flag Lieutenant's duties; Commander Wellborn as Flag Secretary. 
Most matters concerning the Department which come to the Chief of 
Naval Operations Office or Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Office, 
go over his desk. He was probably as familiar as anyone with corre- 
spondence which I handled and which Admiral Ingersoll handled. 
He brought me mail to sign, and he frequently was responsible for 
diverting mail for Admiral Ingersoll's signature, which Admiral 
Ingersoll of course would sign or send back to me, as he saw fit ; but 
his liaison with me was very close. 

15. Q. Do you know a Captain John L. McCrae ? 

A. Yes, John L. McCrae to all intention and purposes also served 
as an aide. 

16. Q. Did you ever have him appointed in any special capacity? 
A. Yes. I felt the need for a capable officer to follow up matters 

for me which I did not have the time to follow up, but which I more 
or less continuously checked. For example, a letter might come in 
affecting several bureaus. I would have McCrae follow up the action 
of the bureaus, and he was check-up and follow-up officer. Li addi- 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK . 

tion, he sat in on a great many conferences which I had, to keep him 
generally familiar with a good many matters. 

17. Q. Adverting to problems that may have arisen in the Pacific 
area, did he ever perform any special duties in connection therewith? 

A. He did. I sent Captain McCrae — I do not recall just the date, 
sometime in 1941 — with two sets of War Plans, which I was anxious 
for more personal touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific 
than I could get by simply mailing them. He first went to the 
Hawaiian Islands, left a copy of these with the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific, with the request that while he was on his way to the 
Asiatic and back, Commander-in-Chief would have opportunity to 
study these plans, and [17] McCrae could pick up any sug- 
gestions or comments and bring them back to me. In the Asiatic he 
delivered the plans to Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic, remained 
there in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic on 
these plans, and brought back to me his reaction. Likewise, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific, when he stopped on his return. I 
might add that Captain McCrae, of course, was made familiar with 
these plans before he left, in order that he might perform his duty 
more effectively. 

18. Q. Who was your Director or Naval Intelligence? 
A. I had three directors of Naval Intelligence. 

19. Q. I would like the one for the period of three or four months 
preceding December 7 ? 

A. At that time Captain Wilkinson was Director of Naval 
Intelligence. 

20. Q. What were his principal duties as related to the function of 
Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. His principal duty was collecting and dessemination of infor- 
mation, and of course keeping me informed of what was regarded as 
important and pertinent. 

21. Q. What was the general nature of information that he fur- 
nished you ? 

A. Well, it was broad in scope. For example, such matters as he 
became cognizant of in connection with the war in Europe, not only 
with regard to what he might obtain from his attaches in operational 
matters, but a great deal also in technical matters. 

22. Q. Were you kept currently informed? 
A. Yes, I feel that I was. 

23. Q. What method did he employ in transmitting this informa- 
tion to you ? 

A. Usually by w^ord of month. Sometimes by memorandum. 

24. Q. What was your estimate of the efficiency of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence in keeping you informed of international and mili- 
tary developments in the Pacific area for the three months preceding 
Pearl Harbor? 

A. My estimate was that he gave me the best obtainable. I might 
say in that regard, if you refer to what we knew as to what military 
measures, particularly construction and so forth, were going on in 
Japan, the data could not be considered accurate. It had to be sur- 
mised. Someone once remarked, "The accurate information stopped 
outside the three-mile limit." I may add also that the British had no 
more information in regard to that than we did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 25 

25. Q. I refer principally, Admiral, to information on political de- 
velopments in the. Orient, and military information [181 ^^ 
disposition of possible enemy ships and matters of that nature. 

A. In regard to the political situation they made estimates from 
time to time from what they had. I think they were reasonably good 
at the time. As far as disposition of the enemy forces, I would have 
to go back to the records to check their accuracy. The dispositions 
were supplemented by information received from the Commander-in- 
Chief in the Pacific, Commander-in-Chief in the Asiatic. The poli- 
tical developments, I would also have to check back my memorandum 
to really check their accuracy. I couldn't recall accurately at the mo- 
ment how much they corroborated with other information that we 
had. 

26. Q. I only wanted a general statement. Admiral, and I am satis- 
fied with what you have given. Did you have any direct dealings 
with the State Department? 

A. Yes, I did. 

27. Q. Will you state to the court the details as to the manner in 
which you may have conducted any business of the Navy Department 
with the State Department ? 

A. My direct dealings with the State Department were on meet- 
ings which took place approximately weekly with the Under-Secretary 
of State. I had many conferences with Mr. Hull, in addition. Mr. 
Hull frequently called me by telephone, and in the latter part of '41, 
while negotiations were going on, he was particularly anxious that 
we were kept fully informed. It was not unusual for him to call me 
up about C : 00 o'clock in the evening and report any matters of the 
day's developments which he thought might be of interest to the Navy 
Department. 

28. Q. Did you have any dealings with the War Department? 
A. Yes. 

29. Q. With what officers did you ordinarily transact your business ? 
A. Well, primarily with General Marshall, but I saw the War Plans 

Division of the War Department occasionally. I saw the Secretary 
of War occasionally, particularly where matters of priorities and so 
forth were concerned. 

30. Q. Did you consult with him as to military matters in the 
Pacific area, also ? 

A. With General Marshall ? 

31. With General Marshall. 
A. Yes. 

32. Q. Could you give the court any idea of the frequency of these 
conferences? In other words, were they a weekly affair, monthly, 
or ? 

A. The Joint Board met weekly, but in addition to that, [19] 
I was in very frequent communication with General Marshall. We 
worked very closely together, by telephone, or when the matter was 
too secret for telephone, by running over to his office, and he to mine. 

33. Q. Did your duties as Chief of Naval Operations require any 
consultations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy? 

A. They did. 

34. Q. Were these consultations daily, weekly, monthly, or how 
would you characterize them 2 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I would certainly characterize them as frequent, not only by per- 
sonal visits, which were very frequent, but also by telephone, some- 
times maybe two or three times in a day, frequently on matters of in- 
formatory interest, of great length, at the end of the day. 

35. Q. Was the subject of our military problems in the Pacific a 
part of these discussions ? 

A. Very decidedly so. 

36. Q. I show you, sir, a document which has been marked for 
identification "EXHIBIT 4." Do you recognize this document? 

A. I do, as Navy Basic War Plan Eainbow Number 5, U. S. Navy, 
WPL-46. 

37. Q. Was the document in effect on December 7, 1941 ? 

A. The document had been promulgated. I might say that it was 
in effect, but had not been executed. 

38. Q. On what date had it been promulgated ? 
A. 26 May 1941. 

Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Number 5, U. S. Navy, WPL-46, 
was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the 
judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into 
the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received. 

39. Q. Please refer to this document and read to the court such 
portions as show how it was to be put in effect. 

A. (Reading:) 

Upon receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will 
proceed with this plan in its entirety, including acts of war : 

"EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5" 

40. Q, Wlien might mobilization be directed ? 
A. (Reading:) 

The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise 
designated. 

[^6>] 41. Q. What provision was made for executing the plan in 
part? 
A. (Reading:) 

Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or 
any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. This 
plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nation that is to be 
considered the enemy, the tasks to be executed or accepted, and the preliminary 
measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan, or 
additional tasks thereof. 

42. Q. Was the major task of the Pacific Fleet assigned in this War 
Plan? 

A. (Reading:) 

The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II), will be organized into 
task forces as follows : 

a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET ; 

b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA; 

c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM. 

The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC 
AREA. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 27 



a. TASK. 



Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting 
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and cap- 
ture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea com- 
munications and positions : 



b. TASK. 



Prepare to capture and establish cantrol over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk : 

c. TASK. 

Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels 
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy: 

d. TASK. 

Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far 
west as longitude 155° east : 

[21] e. TASK. 

Defend Samoa in category "D" ; 

f. TASK. 

Defend Guam in category "F" ; 

g. TASK. 

Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, 
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying 
enemy raiding forces (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) ; 

h. TASK. 

Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the western hemi- 
sphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air 
forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere ; 

i. TASK. 

Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces ; 

j. TASK. 

Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as 
circumstances require. 

k. TASK. 

Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones. 

43. Q. Had a copy of this War Plan been issued the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

A. It had. 

44. Q. Had this War Plan, "EXHIBIT 4", been placed in effect, 
either in full or in part prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. It had not been executed. 

45. Q. When did Admiral Kinnnel assume command of the Pacific 
Fleet? 

A. In February, '41. I do not recall the exact date. 
[22] 46. Q! What was the theater of operations of the Pacific 
Fleet during the year 1941 ? 
A. Central Pacific. 

47. Q. Where did the fleet normally base? 

A. The fleet normally bases in West Coast ports. Generally speak- 
ing I would say, in answer to your question, Southern California. 

48. Q. Do you recall if a directive had been issued basing the Pacific 
Fleet in the Hawaiian area ? 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I do not recall a specific directive. In 1939, shortly after I be- 
came Chief of Naval Operations, I established what might be termed 
a Cruiser Force in the Hawaiian Islands. After the spring maneuvers 
in 1940, the fleet was based in the Hawaiian Islands. 

49. Q. Will you tell the court what were the broad underlying con- 
siderations for basing the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands ? 

A. If the court will permit me, I should like to read from a letter 
which I wrote Admiral Richardson, a reply to a question of his which 
in effect was, "Why am I here?" That reply, which is well-backed 
and which I gave as a considered answer, I think, would be the best 
thing I could give for the record. 

There being no objection, with the court's permission, the witness 
continued : This letter is dated 27 May 1941. The second paragraph 
states: (Reading:) 

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area? 

The next paragraph starts : 

Answer. You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your 
presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I 
have hoolied this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that 
with Italy in, it is thought that the Japs might feel just that much freer to take 
independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told 
the Japs that so far as they are concerned, she (Japan) has a free hand in the 
Dutch East Indies. 

That paragraph is on page one. Now going over to page two, I 
again quote : 

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or inci- 
dental result, regardless, such as solving the logistics problems involved, including 
not only supplies from the United States, but their [23] handling and 
storage at Pearl Harbor. 

Training, as you might do under war conditions. 

c. Familiarity of task forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, 
Samoa, general area, in so far as practicable. 

d. Closer liaison with the Army in the common defense of the Hawaiian Area 
than has ever previously been exhibited between the Army and Navy. 

e. Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army 
and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications. 

f. Security of the Fleet at anchor. 

g. Accenting the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably 
more than just Oahu. 

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating 
base, but that will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up 
against. 

50. Q. Do you remember if there ever had been any official protest 
made by anyone in the naval service to you regarding basing the Pacific 
Fleet in that area ? 

A. I recall no what might be called official protest. I do have let- 
ters from Admiral Richardson in which he — personal letters — in which 
he advised a return of the Fleet to the Pacific Coast ; and I am perfectly 
willing, if the court so desires, to place these letters on the record. 

51. Q. Could you tell the court. Admiral, in very general terms, 
about how many units of each of the following types there were with 
the Pacific Fleet when Admiral Kimmel took over command in Feb- 
ruary, 1941 ? The categories are, first, battleships. 

A. That is a matter of detail. It can be taken accurately from the 
records. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 29 

52. Q. I am asking generally. 

A. And I would prefer it be from the record. I made out a mem- 
orandum on it, the accuracy of which I would not vouch for, and it 
should be checked with the record, but if the court would like to have 
it, I will give it, I think the record for matters of that sort is the best 
evidence. 

53. Q. About how many patrol planes were assigned to the Hawai- 
ian Area at that time, in February 1941 ? 

A. I would have to check that from the record. 

[^4] 54. Q. During the year 1941, were any naval units de- 
tached from the Pacific Fleet? 

A. There were. That also is a matter of record. There was a 
detachment sent to the Atlantic. 

55. Q. Do you remember the reasons for the detachment of this 
unit? 

A. The movement conformed in general to dispositions required 
by WPL-46. Now there is a matter which I would like to give the 
court off the record. I strongly question the advisability of putting 
it in the record, but I have no objection to Admiral Kimmel and Ad- 
miral Bloch and all hands having it. I would like to make it off the 
record and then get your opinion. 

The judge advocate requested that the statement be made by the 
witness, and that the court direct that it not be included as a perma- 
nent part of the record, but be made in the form of an exhibit which 
could be placed in tlie secret files of the Navy Department for refer- 
ence to by any person with authority to look at the record. 

The interested party, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 
(Ket), stated that he objected to such procedure with regard to the 
statement which might be made by the witness, and that he preferred 
that the entire proceedings be made a matter of record. 

The judge advocate replied. 

The witness added these words to his answer: "I may add that 1 
think making this matter public would be detrimental to the best 
interests of the United States." 

The interested party, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 
(Ret), replied. 

[26] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

The court was cleared. 

The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The 
court announced that it would hear the answer to the question and 
then make its decision. 

56. Q. Will you answer the question, please. Admiral ? 

A. My first answer — my answer in part, to the question, was that 
the movement was in general conformance with WPL-4:6. My second 
part of the answer involves a matter of timing. The movement was 
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations at that particular time 
because I was given orders for an amphibious operation in the At- 
lantic which, in my opinion, and in that of my advisers, required this 
force to be in the Atlantic to insure its success. 

The court announced that the answer would go in the record. 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

57. Q. What, in your opinion, was the adequacy of the Pacific 
Fleet during the period October to December, 1941, to carry out 
WPL-46? 

A. In general, it was considered adequate for the tasks outlined. 
Obviously — I will let the answer stand; that is, it was considered 
generally adequate for the tasks outlined. The disposition was drawn 
up to be realistic. 

58. Q. Does that complete your answer, sir? 
A. Yes. 

59. Q. I show you, sir, a copy of a letter duly authenticated under 
official seal of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War 
dated January 24, 1941. Can you identify this? 

A. Yes. I identify this as a letter signed by Col. Knox of January 
24, 1941, then Secretary of the Navy, to Col. Stimson, then Secretary 
of War. 

The copy of a letter dated January 24, 1941, from the Secretary 
of the Navy to the Secretary of War, was submitted to the interested 
parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 9". 

60. Q. Will you read the letter, please? 

A. This is a letter dated January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of 
the Navy to the Secretary of War. 

The witness read Exhibit 9. 

[£6] 61. Q. Admiral, do you know who prepared this letter for 
the Secretary of the Navy's signature ? 

A. The original draft was prepared in War Plans, We worked on 
it several days. AVhen I say "we", I mean Admiral Turner (then 
Captain Turner), Admiral Ingersoll, and myself. We finally 
rounded it up in the form in which it has just been read. 

62. Q. Did this letter represent the view of the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations on the question of military defenses of the Pearl Harbor Naval 
Base on the date of the letter, January 24, 1941 ? 

A. It did. It didn't go into complete details but it covered, in our 
opinion, the main points which were in our minds which we believed 
were generally accepted main points and we decided to put them before 
the Army. 

63. Q. Admiral, in order to make this whole letter more clear to the 
court, I will ask you to refer to Exhibit 9 and state what dangers were 
envisaged, in the order of their importance, as set out in this letter. 

A. The order of importance as set out is: (1) Air bombing attack; 
(2) Air torpedo plane attack; (3) Sabotage; (4) Submarine attack ; 
(5) Mining; (6) Bombardment by gun fire. 

64. Q. What views did the Navy Department express as regards the 
then existing defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against the 
forms of attack set out in Paragraphs 1 and 2? 

A. With regard to 1 and 2, the solution of which the letter stated 
was considered to be of primary importance, the following paragraphs 
particularly apply. Both types of air attack are possible. They may 
be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any 
of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy 
effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and a minimum at 
two. Attacks may be launched from a striking force of carriers and 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY 31 

their supporting vessels. Tiie countermeasures to be considered are : 
(A) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting ves- 
sels before air attack can be launched; (B) Location and engagement 
of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives; (C) Repulse of 
enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire ; (D) Concealment of vital installa- 
tions by artificial smoke; (E) Protection of vital installations by bal- 
loon barrage. The operations set forth in (A), namely, location an' 
engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack 
can be launched, are largely functions of the Fleet but quite possibly 
might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without 
warning prior to a declaration of war. Is that part of your question '{ 
[^] 65. Q. Yes. On Page 3 of the letter contained in Exhibit 
9, please read into the record the proposals of the Secretary of the 
Navy to remedy the problems as set out in this letter. 

A. The Secretary of the Navy offered the following proposals : ( 1 ) 
That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit 
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air 
warning net in Hawaii ; that the Ai'my give consideration to the ques- 
tions of balloon barrage, the employment of smoke, and other special 
devices for improviiig the defense of Pearl Harbor; that local joint 
plans be drawn for efltective cooperation of naval and military aircraft 
operations and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire against surprise 
aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree to the 
appropriate degrees of joint readiness for in;imediate action in defense 
against surprise aicraft raids against Pearl Harbor; that joint exer- 
cises designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense 
against surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as 
the present uncertainty continues to exist. He requested that concur- 
rence in these proposals and the rapid implementation of the measures 
to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the 
security of the Fleet, be met by the highest cooperation from the War 
Department. 

66. Q. Admiral, I show you an official document entitled "Joint 
Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", which has been marked 
"EXHIBIT 6" for identification. If you recognize this document, 
state as what you identify it ? 

A. I identify it as Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, 
sometimes referred to as FTP155. It is a confidential document. 

The document entitled "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 
1935", was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by 
the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of here- 
after reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be perti- 
nent to the inquiry before the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received. 

67. Q. On Page 5, for the record will you read to the court Para- 
graphs 8 and 9 ? 

A. (Reading:) 

8. Methods of coordination. — 

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by one of the following 
methods : 

a. Mutual cooperation. 

b. The exercise of unity of command. 

9. Determination of the method of coordination. 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual 
cooperation. 

b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of 
unity of command in the following cases : 

[28] (1) When ordered by the President ; or 

(2) When provided for in joint agreements !)etwecn the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of the Navy ; or 

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation re- 
quires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that 
shall exercise such command. 

68. Q. Wliat method of coordination was in effect in the 14th 
Naval District on December 7, 1941 ? 

A. The method of coordination in effect at that time was one of 
mutual coordination, except that I would say the method for coordi- 
nation of the air effort was one of, if not outright unity of com- 
mand, that it very closely approached it, and one which I thought 
was so splendid that I sent it to the commanders-in-chief of our prin- 
cipal fleets and to all district commandants. It was the best thing 
I had seen and I highly concurred in it. If the court would like to 
have the two principal paragraphs of that document I would be 
glad to insert them in the record at this time. 

69. Q. Is that from this book? 

A. No, I took them out of a paper. Shall I go ahead with them ? 

70. Q. Yes. 

A. (Reading:) 

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action 
of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides" — I am reading from a 
document which gives me two paragraphs sent to me by Admiral Kimmel, which 
paragraphs are taken out of an agreement which was previously arrived at 
in the Hawaiian Islands. The date of this memorandvim of Admiral Kimmel 
to me is 4 June, 1941. The date of the document from which these extracts 
are quoted, as I recall, is sometime in March, 1941. I quote : 

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against 
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps, 
assisted by Navy fighters which may be available. 

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command 
shall bo vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the base. Briefly, 
when an alarm is sounded, the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy 
ships, and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy 
bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Re- 
tired, requested that the document from which the witness was read- 
ing be better identified. 

The memorandum dated 4 June 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to 
Admiral Stark, was submitted to each of the interested parties and 
to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the 
purpose only of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as 
may be pertinent to the inquiry [29] before the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 10", for reference, description appended. 

The judge advocate stated that the documents to which the mem- 
orandum referred would be later offered in evidence. 

71. Q. Will you read the rest of the memorandum. Admiral? 

A. The thircl paragraph is: (Reading) "The liaison betwixt the 
Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly 
drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 33 

held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the con- 
ditions are steadily improving and it is felt that they are in much 
better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions 
will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been 
supplied and the personnel drilled in its use. There are about 140 
light Army planes (fighter and light bombers) and 21 heavy bomb- 
ing airplanes now" — "now" being as of 4 June 1941 — "in the Is- 
lands. These are in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fight- 
ers. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands 
should be at least four times the number that they have there now 
and it is felt that these planes should be sent out as soon as it is 
practicable to do so. There are not now a sufficient number of 
Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands." Signed, 
"H. E. Kimmel." Copies of this were sent to General Marshall, 
Admiral King, and Admiral Towers — Admiral king then being in 
the Atlantic and Admiral Towers being Chief of the Bureau of Aero- 
nautics, Navy Department. 

72. Q. Had this method of coordination of aircraft actually been 
put in effect? 

A. It was put in effect in March, 1941. As I noted, correspond- 
ence or papers from which this extract was made were forwarded 
to the commanders-in-chief of the three principal fleets — the At- 
lantic, Pacific, and Asiatic — and to the commandants, as I recall, of 
all districts. 

73. Q. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, give any thought to 
putting in effect the exercise of unity of command for the whole 
Hawaiian area? 

A. Much thought had been given to the proposition of unity of 
command. We had not arrived at a satisfactory solution or de- 
cision to put it into effect so far as the Navy Department was concerned 
at that time. 

74. Q. Am I to infer that you had discussions with the Army chief 
of staff, or other higher authorities, in this study ? 

A. You are to infer that. It had been the subject of many con- 
versations with the chief of staff of the Army. I may state with ref- 
erence to the amphibious operation which was referred to in the 
testimony a little while back, that operations of that nature which we 
were considering, we anticipated having unity of command for them. 

[30] 75. Q. Will you read into the record. Article 25 on Page 
27 of Exhibit 6? 

A. Article 25, Page 27, FTP155, reads as follows (reading) : 

25. Purpose of coastal frontier defense. 

a. The purpose of a joint organization and measures for coastal frontier 
defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense. 

b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are 
for the purpose of : 

(1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones; 

(2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities; 
(3 Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas ; 

(4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which 
are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations. 

76. Q. Will you read into the record Article 26 on Page 28, para- 
graphs a. to e., both inclusive? 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 4 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I quote (reading) : 

a. A coastal frontier is a geographical division of our coastal area established 
for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective co- 
ordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The 
coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or 
shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and 
command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval 
officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively, 
assigned for the defen.se of tliese divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for 
command purposes into sectors and subsectors. 

b. Coastal irontier defense is the organizntiitn of the foi-ces and materiel of 
the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of 
continental United States and its overseas possessions. 

c. The naval district is a military and administrative connnand ashore estab- 
lished for the purijose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with 
respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities 
outside the Navy Department proi^er, and for the further purpose of centralizing 
under one command within the district and the waters thereof: 

(1) For militai'y coordination, all naval activities; and 

(2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific ex- 
ceptions. The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and 
logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint 
organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal 
zones. The limits of the naval districts ai'e laid down in the Navy Regula- 
tions. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes. 
Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the 
direct [SI] representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus 
and offices, in all matters affecting district activity. 

d. Naval local defense forces consist of naval forces, including Coast Guard 
and Lighthouse Service, afloat and a.shore, attached to a naval district and 
under the command of the commandant of the district. These forces are not 
a part of the Fleet. 

e. A naval base is a center from which men-of-war can operate and be main- 
tained. 

77. Q. On Page 31, will yon read into the record Paragraphs o. 
to v., both inclusive? 
A. I quote (reading) : 

o. The outer harbor area is the war area which extends to seaward from 
the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within 
the range of the harbor defense batteries. 

p. The harbor channel area is the water area which lies between the outer 
harbor area and the inner harbor area, and which comprises all the entrance 
channels to the harbor. 

q. The inner harbor area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside 
the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor. 

r. An inshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating 
generally within a defensive coastal area and controlling shipping within a 
defensive sea area. 

s. An offshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating 
and patrolling the coastal zone outside of those areas assigned to the inshore 
patrol. 

t. An escort force is a part of the n"aval local defense forces charged with 
the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters. 

u. A coastal force is a naval force which may be organized to operate within 
the coastal zone to meet a specific situation in which naval local defense forces 
are inadequate to carry out the Navy's functions in coastal frontier defense. 

V. A harbor defense is an administrative and tactical Army command, com- 
prising the armament and accessories, including anti-aircraft armament, con- 
trolled mines and supporting aircraft, with the personnel for manning, pro- 
vided for the defense of a harbor or other water area. Harbor defenses exist 
to provide on the outbreak of war an effective seaward defense of important 
strategic points, such as large centers of population, important commercial 
centers, navy yards, coaling or fueling stations, locks and dams; to deny the 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 35 

enemy entrance to or occupation of a harbor or other waters which might serve 
as a base for land or naval operations, or both ; and to keep the enemy at such 
distance from the entrance to a waterway that our naval forces may debouch 
therefrom and take up a battle formation with the least hostile interference. 

[S2] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

78. Q. Will you read into the record paragraph "z" on page 32 
of Exhibit 6? 

A. [Reading:] 

Tlie aircraft warning service is a communication and an intelligence service 
which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier 
defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public 
utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile 
aircraft and to alert Air Corps units and Antiaircraft artillery units. It con- 
sists essentially of observers of information centers for plotting the courses and 
distributing information of approaching hostile planes and of the necessary 
communications. 

79. Q. I ask you to turn to page 13 and read Article 19, paragraphs 
a, b, and c. 

A. [Reading:] 

a. Attacks against our coastal frontiers may be classiiied as follows: (1) 
Major oi>erations, i. e., those executed for the purpose of invasion; and (2) 
Minor operations, i. e., raids against shipping or shore objectives. 

b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct 
military operations in direct defense of United States territory. 

c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are: (1) To 
provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the direct 
defense of the coast. (2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor 
defenses. 

80. Q. What, in general, comprised the Hawaiian coastal frontier? 
A. It is shown in chart WPL 46. Subject to the correction of my 

testimony, in general, it comprises a zone around the Hawaiian Is- 
lands, including Midway, Palmyra, Johnson, and Kingston reef, and, 
to the best of my recollection. Wake. The boundary, as I recall, is 
some 500 miles outside the Hawaiian Islands group. 

81. Q. Will you turn to page 14 and read Article 19-d in its en- 
tirety? 

A. (Reading:) 

In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or main- 
tain — 

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and 
tire-control installations. 

[33] (2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general 
coastal frontier defense ; in support of or in lieu of naval forces. 

(3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning 
service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt 
exchange of information or instructions with the Navy. 

(4) Controlled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels neces- 
sary for their installation and maintenance. 

(5) A system of underwater listening posts. 

(6) Beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, main- 
tenance, and patrol. 

(7) Fixed underwater obstructions in connection with controlled mine bar- 
rages. 

(8) Additional mobile forces required in accordance with the situation. 

82. Q. Adverting to paragraph 1, which you have just read, Ad- 
miraL which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and 
fire-control installations." Do you know whether the Army had lived 
up, in general, to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to 
December?, 1941? 

A. The Army had the defenses mentioned installed. I would not 
care to say that they were sufficient. In a general way, I knew and 
had been told by the Chief of StaiOP of the Army that subject to a 
complete breakdown in training, he was sending what he could to 
the Hawaiian Islands. That does not mean that "what he could" 
was sufficient, and without reference to the record, I could not state 
what was there, and there are those whose testimony would be much 
more direct than mine on that point; but I did know from frequent 
conversation with Marshall that he stated he was doing the best he 
could. He was up against it, to a considerable degree. 

83. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (2), which you read a few mo- 
ments ago and which states that the Army will provide and operate 
or maintain "aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in 
general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval 
forces." Do you know, in a general way, whether the Army had lived 
up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 
1941? 

A. I know, in a general way, that the Army had increased their 
. air units out there to a considerable degree. This also was a matter 
of frequent conversation between General Marshall and me, and as 
I recall — and my recollection may be faulty — the Army had something 
over 200 planes in Hawaii at that time. Just how many of them 
were fighters and what were bombers and so forth I could not state. 

[34-1 84. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (3), which you have just 
read and which states that the Army will provide and operate or 
maintain "a communication and intelligence system to include an air- 
craft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with 
provision for the prompt exchange of inforaiation or instructions 
with the Navy." Do you know whether the Army had lived up to its 
commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I knew that the Army — again from conversations with General 
Marshall, some of which I recollect with great clarity, because of an 
amusing incident not necessary to put on the record — was making great 
endeavor to get a warning system for the' island of Oahu, and thought 
it was such that when installed and properly manned it should have 
been a very effective system — at least, so far as we could make it with 
the equipment developed up to that time. As regards getting the 
information from that warning system properly distributed to those 
to whom it was essential to make proper use of the information, that 
will have to come from people out there. I could look up and read 
what there was available, but I do not recollect clearly, after a lapse of 
time, just what this was. 

85. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (4) , which you have just read and 
whicH'states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "con- 
trolled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels necessary 
for their installation and maintenance," do you know whether the 
Army had lived up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior 
to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I did not concern myself so much with the mining situation as I 
did with the material in your immediately preceding questions, be- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 37 

cause of the fact that, in general, the Hawaiian area hasn't good mine- 
able waters, and the details of that I do not have. 

86. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (5), which states that the Army 
will provide and operate or maintain "a system of underwater listen- 
ing posts," do you know whether, in a general way, the Army had lived 
up to its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 
1941? 

A. Again my previous answer would largely apply. I considered it 
more of a local affair and do not recall anything particular with 
respect thereto. 

87. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (6), which states that the Army 
will provide and operate or maintain "beach defense, together with 
vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol," do you 
know whether, in a general way, the Army had lived up to its commit- 
ments prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. Again my general answer applies. Beach defenses are some- 
thing with which I am very familiar, so far as German installations 
are concerned, which are largely local affairs, and there again I do not 
have any recollection. 

[S5] 88. Q. Paragraph d (7) states that the Army will pro- 
vide and operate or maintain "fixed underwater obstructions in con- 
nection with controlled mine barrages." Do you know whether, in 
a general way, the Army lived up to its commitments prior to 
December 7, 1941? 

A. My previous answer applies. 

89. Q. Paragraph d (8) states that the Army will provide and 
operate or maintain "additional mobile forces required in accord- 
ance with the situation." Do you know, in a general way, whether 
the Army had lived up to this commitment prior to December 7, 
1941? 

A. Can you tell me just what was intended by that question? 

90. Q. Other than that set out in "Joint Action of the Army and 
the Navy", I don't know. 

A. Well, I don't either. 

91. Q. Adverting to paragraph g, which I shall read: "In carry- 
ing our these functions the Navy will: (1) provide and operate — 
(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warn- 
ing of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy 
forces in the vicinity of the coast. Do you know, in a general way, 
whether the Navy had lived up to its commitment in a reasonable 
manner prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. If by that question is meant that the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific, or, if you would like to put it, the District Commander,' 
had the patrol planes which I would like to have had him have for 
the business in question, he did not. I had made a distribution from 
what w^as available to me and which I considered the best I could 
do and, as I recall, based on the provisions of WPL 46. I would 
like to reserve the right to correct that statement if my memory 
is faulty. I might add I was moving Heaven and earth for in- 
creasing our patrol planes, not only for the Pacific but for prob- 
lems which I envisaged elsewhere, particularly also in the Atlantic. 

92. Q. I quote from paragraph g (b) : "The Navy will provide 
and operate a communication and intelligence system among the 
elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt ex- 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

change of information or instructions with the Army." Can you 
state whether or not, in your estimation, the Navy had lived up to 
its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941? 

A. There again I feel I am not competent to give any detailed 
information, I had absolute confidence in our people in the Hawaiian 
Islands. I still have confidence in them. I knew they were drill- 
ing and working on these subjects, and I left it to them. I con- 
sider that the conditions existing with regard to your question could 
be much better testified to by them. 

[S6] 93. Q. In order to save time. Admiral, with respect to the 
provisions of paragraph g (d), would your answer be the same as to 
inshore patrols for the protection of mine fields and underwater ob- 
structions other than beach defenses? 

A. Generally, yes. In regard to mines and going back to when 
I was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, I made mines one of my par- 
ticular subjects of study with regard to outlying possessions, the 
Hawaiian groups and the Philippines; and my recollection is that 
they all had more mines than they could use. I cannot, however, state 
that those mines were 100%, nor do I know just what their condition 
was. That testimony can be obtained from more competent wit- 
nesses or from the record of the department. 

94. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (e), which states that the Nav^^ 
will provide and operate "underwater listening posts for naval use 
where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts." 
Have you any knowledge whether the Navy adequately lived up to 
this commitment prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. That, too, I put in the local class, and I think better testimony 
could be had from people who were charged with it on the spot. I 
might add that we were doing all we could to develop this type of 
listening in the way of buoys and so forth. Just what the situation 
was in Hawaii I do not recollect. 

95. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (f), which states that the Navy 
will provide and operate "through the Lighthouse Service, when 
turned over to the Navy, coastal lights, buoys, and aids to naviga- 
tion, and to change them as necessary." Was this commitment lived 
up to by the Navy prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. We took over the Coast Guard and, along with it, the Light- 
house Service, and as regards to how they lived up to their commit- 
ments, in that respect again it is a local affair. I do not know. I as- 
sume they lived up to it, and if they had not been doing it, they would 
have been required to. 

96. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (g), which states that the Navy 
will provide and operate "an information system through the Coast 
Guard stations when turned over to the Navy, and through lighthouses 
and light vessels." Do you know whether this commitment was lived 
up to prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I do not have a clear remembrance on that subject. 

97. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (h) which states that the Navy 
will provide and operate "necessary mine-sweeping vessels." Was 
this commitment lived up to prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I believe it was. 

[S7] 98. Q. Paragraph g (2) states that the Navy will provide 
and maintain "such fixed underwater obstructions as are component 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 39 

parts of Navy barrages ; including the vessels necessary for their in- 
stallation and maintenance." Was this commitment lived up to prior 
to December 7, 1941? 

A. Again mj^ previous reinark applies about Hawaiian waters gen- 
erally not being subject to mining on a large scale. I do not recall 
just what was done. I had no apprehension from that standpoint. 

99. Q. Paragraph g (3) states that the Navy will "operate gates 
through nets.'' Was this commitment lived up to by the Navy prior 
to December 7, 194:1? 

A. I believe it was. 

100. Q. Paragraph g (4) states that the Navy will "conduct ship- 
ping through channels in mine fields or obstructions." Was this com- 
mitment lived up to 23rior to December 7, 1941? 

A. To the best of my recollection, it was. 

The court then, at 12 : 25 p. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at w^hicn 
time it reconvened. 

Present : 

All tlie members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to 
the inquiry and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the 
oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony. 

101. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 6 before this court, which 
is "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", and ask you to read 
from Section 3, Article 30, sub-])aragraph "d". 

A. Before reading that, may I refer to my last question? I made 
a pencil note when I had passed a previous question on the strength 
of forces and their sufficiency. This question again refers to coastal 
zones. I would like to state, in answer to a previous question, that 
in my opinion there were not sufficient forces for the coastal work 
in the Hawaiian Islands. To remedy this defect and as a compromise, 
of course, it would be necessary to draw on the Pacific Fleet, and to 
that extent the Pacific Fleet would be just so much under the original 
qualification. I wanted to get that into the record. [S8] Sec- 
tion 3 refers to the categories of defense and requirements and means 
to be provided. (Reading) "Category D — Coastal frontiers that 
may be subject to major attack, tinder this category, the coastal 
defense areas sliould, in general, be provided with the means of de- 
fense, both Arm}^ and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations 
preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will 
generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more ex- 
tensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than Category C, will be re- 
quired. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be estab- 
lished. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense 
of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; 
general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate 
prompt reinforcement of the frontiers ; and plans should be developed 
for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of opera- 
tions. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made 
for use of the GHQ air force." 

102. Q. On December 7, 1941, do you know what category of defense 
was in effect on the island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii? 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. The article just read was the article prescribed for Oahu. 

103. Q. Do you know when it had been put in effect? 

A. Well, it was stated in WPL 46. As I recall that, a category 
"D" was the category prescribed, which means a category toward 
which one works. I would say it was in effect at that time. 

104. Q, Do you know what plans were in effect on and before 
December 7, 1941, for the use of the General Headquarters Air Force 
for long-range reconnaissance in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii? 

A. Can you define to me just what you mean by the General Head- 
quarters airplanes? 

105. Q. I mean by General Headqualrters aircraft, the General 
Headquarters aircraft that are referred to in Article 31, sub-para- 
graph "d", which you have just read. 

A. I will speak from recollection on that. My remembrance is 
that the GHQ Air Force is the air force which is handled directly 
from Washington and which may be sent from one location to an- 
other to augment or strengthen a local area, but I'm not sure of this 
and would have to refresh on it. That is my remembrance. There 
have been some recent articles about the GHQ, and I am not certain 
as to just what is meant, but I think it is a mobile force subject to 
direct orders from the War Department. 

106. Q. Admiral, I refer you again to Exhibit 6 and ask you to 
read from Chapter 2, Article 9. 

A. The heading of the article is 

Deteemination of the Method of Coordination 

a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual" 
cooperation. 

[39] b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the 
exercise of unity of command in tlie following cases : 

(1) When ordered by the President; or 

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of the Navy ; or 

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation 
requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service 
that shall exercise such command. 

107. Q. Could you, as Chief of Naval Operations, with mutual 
agreement with the Chief of Staff of the Army have placed unity of 
command in effect in Hawaii ? 

A. We could arrange for such, and subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, put it into effect. 
Paragraph 2 states, "When provided for in joint agreements be- 
tween the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy." 

108. Q. Adverting to paragraph 9b (3), which states, "When com- 
manders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires 
tlie exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service 
that shall exercise such command." Could Admiral Kimmel, as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with 
the Commanding General of the 9th Corps Area, have placed unity 
of command in effect in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii? 

A. They could had they agreed to do so. 

109. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph, which I have just read, 
could Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, 
in mutual agreement with the Commander of the 9th Corps Area, 
have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 41 

A. I couldn't answer that question 100%. 

110. Q. I will correct the last two questions to read, instead of 
Commander of the 9th Corps Area, Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department? 

A. I don't know whether he could have done it independent of 
Admiral Kimmel's O. K, As I understand it, he was a task force 
under the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. My guess would 
be that he could, but I would hesitate to say so, not Knowing their 
relationships with regard to such matters. 

111. Q. Admiral, I again refer you to Exhibit 4, which is WPL-46 
and has been introduced in evidence before this court for the purpose 
of reading such extracts as may be pertinent to the record. I ask 
you to read therefrom a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, 
dated July 1, 1941. 

A. ( Reading:) "Navy Department, Office of the Chief of 
[40] Naval Operations, Washington. Op-12B-McC/(SC)A16- 
(R-5) Serial 071912, Secret, July 1, 1941. 

From : The Chief of Naval Operations. 

To : The Distribution List for WPL 46. 

Subject : The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

Reference: (a) GO No. 142. 

(b) GO No. 143. 

(c) WPL-46. 

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 
of WPL-46 are hereby established. 

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex 
I, Appendix I, WPL-46. 

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and 
Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in 
accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of 
General Order No. 142 are suspended. 

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General 
Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and 
Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, 
new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, 
rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval 
Local Defense Forces. 

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional 
duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated : 
Commandant, 3rd Naval District — Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal 

Frontier ; 

Commandant, 6th Naval District — Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier ; 

Commandant, 10th Naval District — Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal 
Frontier ; 

Commandant, 15th Naval District — Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier ; 

[^i] Commandant, 12th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Southern Naval 
Frontier ; 

Commandant, 13th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Fron- 
tier ; 

Commandant, 14th Naval District — Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier; 

Commandant, 16th Naval District — Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal 
Frontier. 

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the 
commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of 
the Naval Coastal Frontiers remains in a SECRET classification. Correspond- 
ence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its 
nature. 

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental 
limits of the United States is authorized. 

/s/ H. R. Stakk. 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), 
made the following statement: May there be read into the record 
so much of the War Plan as was put in effect? It is this very direc- 
tive, to wit : Chapter 2, Part 3, Section 4. 

112. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 4, Part 3, Section 4, and 
ask you to read into the record Articles 3241, 3242, and 3245, sub- 
paragraphs "a" and "b". 

A. (Reading) 

Section 4. Command Relations. 

3241. In order to provide for imity of command of task groups of the U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET and of tlie PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTH- 
ERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in tlie execution of tasliS requiring 
mutual support, the following provisions shall apply : 

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and 
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual 
status as follows : 

[42] 1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLI]ET, in conuuand of task groups of 
that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof. 

b. The commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require 
the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, tem- 
porarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking 
temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks 
assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task 
groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their re- 
spective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the 
provisions of this paragraph are in effect. 

3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command rela- 
tions of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, 
HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances 
under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution 
of tasks requiring mutvial support, but appl.v in all circumstances. 

3245a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily, to 
the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft 
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. 

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of 
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by 
the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense 
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

[4'3] 113. Q. Admiral, in addition to official or written or printed 
instructions, regulations, war plans, joint agreements, and orders which 
have been introduced as exhibits before this court, had you, as Chief 
of Naval Operations, issued either orall}^ or by personal letters any 
instructions to the Commander-in-Chief from time to time during the 
period of six months preceding December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I carried on with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
personal correspondence, which is a good deal of a Navy custom, but 
to the best of my recollection, orders were given through official corre- 
spondence or dispatch, and my personal correspondence was informa- 
tory and for the purpose of background and explanation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 43 

114. Q. The judge advocate understands, then, from your answer 
that none of these personal letters modified or changed the official writ- 
ten or printed instructions, war plans, directives, orders, or joint agree- 
ments ? 

A. To the best of mj^ belief, they did not modify any official orders. 
There mnj have been amplification of official orders — correspondence 
of mutual interest to both of us — but I do not recall modifying any 
official order by an unofficial letter. 

115. Q. Do you have a record of such letters in case they are re- 
quired before this court? 

A. Yes, I do. 

116. Q. Do 3'ou remember the approximate date of the executive 
order freezing Japanese assets in the United States ? 

A. It was in the early summer, as I recall. I think in July, 1941. 

llT. Q. Can you recall if the Navy Department had been consulted 
as to its ability to keep in step with this international move ? 

A. My remembrance of that event is that while we knew of it, we 
were not particularly consulted, it being a matter the ramifications of 
which the department had no organization to study. It was more eco- 
nomic than otherwise, and as I recall, it was put in effect without 
asking us whether we objected or not. The outstanding thing in my 
memor}' as regards my stand so far as the Navy Department is con- 
cerned, with reference to pressure on Japan, was in reference to 
petroleum — was in reference to oil, I made it known to the State 
Department in no uncertain terms that in my opinion if Japan's oil 
were shut off, she would go to war. I do not mean necessarily with 
us, but I mean if her economic life had been choked and throttled by 
inability to get to oil, she would go soinewhere and take it, and I stated 
if I were a Jap, I would. I did state in that connection that unless 
we were prepared for war — I do not mean prepared in the sense of 
complete readiness for war, but unless we were ready to [M] 
accept a war risk, we should not take measures which would cut oil 
down to the Japanese below that needed for what might be called their 
normal peace time needs for their industry and their ships. I never 
waivered one inch on that stand. 

118. Q. Do you recall any military or diplomatic action by Japan 
between the date of the executive order, July 26, 1941, and October 
16, 1941, which caused you to believe that war between the United 
States and Japan was becoming more imminent than it had been as 
of the time of the freezing of Japanese assets ? 

A. I note that in your question you used the term "war between the 
United States and Japan." I would like to invite attention to the 
fact that in my previous answer I indicated that while Japan might 
make an aggressive movement under certain circumstances, it need not 
be confined to the United States or might not even include the United 
States. The situation in the Far East during that particular period 
I do not recall. Sometimes it was a little bit brighter, and sometimes 
it dropped, but on the date you mentioned, October 16, I recall that 
a cabinet change took place in Japan, which, in my opinion, indicated 
that relations with the United States were no better and perhaps indi- 
cated a more aggressive attitude by Japan. I include as possible 
objects of this aggressive attitude, the N. E. I., Britain, China, and 
the United States." 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

119. Q. Did you write any letters, notes, or memoranda to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, between July 26, 1941, and October 16, 
1941, setting forth the views of the Navy Department on the proba- 
bility of war between the United States and Japan ? 

A. May I refer to my letters to Admiral Kimmel? 

120. Q. I just want to know whether you did, as a general proposi- 
tion? 

A. I am not sure between those dates. I corresponded with Admiral 
Kimmel whenever I thought it would be helpful to him or helpful to 
us, but I have to check between those dates. That was when ? 

121. Q. July 26, 1941, and October 16, 1941? 

A. I wrote Admiral Kimmel on August 2, I think. I will be per- 
fectly glad to have Admiral Kimmel check that letter, if he has a copy 
of it, so as to agree with me that the letter has no particular bearing 
on the subject under discussion. On August 21 1 again wrote Admiral 
Kimmel, which again, I would say, does not bear on the particular 
question of our relations with Japan. It is more personnel and mate- 
rial. I wrote again on August 23. This is a long leter — 21 pages — 
the bulk of it being devoted to specific answers to material questions 
which Admiral Kimmel had asked me. There is some discussion 
of Russian war matters, but I think of no particular enlightenment on 
the question. I have [^5] no objection to placing this letter 
in the file if desired. I again wrote on the 29th of August. There 
are matters of material and ships. There is also a paragraph in that 
letter regarding a visit to me from Admiral Nomura, the Japanese 
Ambassador. 

[46] Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. 
S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

A letter dated August 28, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was sub- 
mitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge 
advocate offered in evidence, for the purpose of reading such extracts 
into the record as might be pertinent to the inquiry. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E, Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), suggested that the entire letter should be entered as an 
exhibit, rather than reading extracts therefrom. 

The judge advocate replied that the entire letter had been offered 
in evidence, but that only such extracts as he considered pertinent to 
the inquiry would be read by the witness in response to the questions 
of the judge advocate. 

The letter dated August 28, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was 
received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 11," for reference, de- 
scription appended. 

122. Q. Please read from Exhibit 11, the matter relating to the 
visit of Admiral Nomura. 

A. I will read from the letter extracts, not confining myself to that 
one paragraph. (Reading:) 

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is the 
Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only 
intimate to you that spme very strong messages have Jbeen sent to them, but just 
what they are going to do, I don't know. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 45 

Another paragraph. (Keading:) 

I told one of their statesmen this morning I felt another move such as the 
one in- Thailand would go a long way toward destroying for the American public 
what good will still remains. As you know, I have had some extremely frank 
talks with them. I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, 
but I wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. There 
is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. 

123. Q. Do you have something in the letter of August 23, 1941 ? 
A. Yes. 

[i?] A letter dated August 23, 1941, from Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, 
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of read- 
ing therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the inquiry, to be 
marked "EXHIBIT 12." 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret) , stated that he suggested that the entire letter be entered 
in the record as an exhibit, rather than that extracts therefrom be read. 

The judge advocate replied that the entire letter had been offered 
in evidence, but that he was asking the witness to read only such ex- 
tracts as were considered by the judge advocate to be pertinent to the 
inquiry. 

The witness stated that he withdrew his answer regarding the letter 
of August 23, 1941. 

The judge advocate, with the permission of the court, withdrew the 
proposed Exhibit 12, and a letter dated September 23, 1941, from Ad- 
miral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted' to the interested parties 
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence, for 
the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as 
might be pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 
12", for reference, description appended. 

124. Q. Will you read from the exhibit extracts which are respon- 
sive to the question ? 

A. (Reading:) 

Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked about an hour. 
He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope. There is 
not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before, but whether I can this 
time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. 
If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow 
more tense. I have talked with Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. 
He keeps me pretty well informed, and if there is anything of moment I will, of 
course, hasten to let you know. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), stated that he suggested again that the entire letter be 
read, rather than extracts therefrom. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he did not consider it necessary to read the entire letter. 

[4^] The court announced that only the pertinent extracts of the 
letters just read by the witness would be read into the record at this 
time. 

The witness continued his answer, as follows : I have covered up 
until 16 October, I think. I will check these letters more carefully to 
see if there is anything more in there which throws useful light. 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

125. Q. Sir, I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated 
under official seal, of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the Commander-in-Chief, of the Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, 
dated 16 October 1911, date time group 16220;^ If you recognize this 
document, please state as what you identify it. 

A. I identify it as the dispatch from the Navy Department, from 
the Chief of Naval Operations, to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. 

The photostatic copy of the dispatch, duly authenticated under 
official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941, 
date time group 162203, was submitted to the interested parties and to 
the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked 
"EXHIBIT 13." 

126. Q. Please read this document to the court. 
The witness read "EXHIBIT 13" to the court. 

127. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that the dispatch was re- 
leased by Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. 
Did you authorize the release ? 

A. I did. That w^as not an unusual procedure, because we went over 
these dispatches. J'inal form might have a number of interlineations 
in my own handwriting, the note, "HRS O. K." Thereafter they 
would be turned over, probably to Admiral Ingersoll, by my Flag 
Secretary, and he would release it, knowing that he had my full 
approval. 

128. Q. In this dispatch there is noted what appear to be inter- 
lineations or changes in the original wording of the dispatch. In 
whose handwriting are those changes made ? 

A. It looks like — I can't identify it. It is too illegible. 

129. Q. What special circumstances prompted your sending this 
dispatch on 16 October 1941 to your Commanders-in-Chief? 

A. The special event prompting it was the event which the dispatch 
related; namely, the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, which the 
dispatch states, which did in our opinion create a grave situation. 

[4^] 130. Q. Was the resignation of the Japanese cabinet then 
the principal information upon which you sent this dispatch ? 

A. I would say it precipitated the dispatch. There may have been 
other things in the back of our heads at that time that made the dis- 
patch advisable. I do not recall just what else we had in mind. The 
event was the primary reason for the dispatch. 

131. Q. Will you read the next to the last sentence of this dispatch? 
A. (Reading:) 

In view of these possibilities you will take clue precautions including such 
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute 
provocative action against .Japan. 

132. Q. State what deployments were contemplated by the Chief of 
Naval Operations in this directive? 

A. We had general thought on the security, of course, of tlie ships 
in port and at sea, and of the Islands ; and I may say that Admiral 
Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, reported what he 
had done, and I placed an O. K. on it. It seemed to us that it was 
very satisfactory. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel reported what he 
had done in official correspondence I do not recall. I know that he 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 47 

did in personal correspondence, and in personal correspondence I 
O. K.'d it. I have an extract here from that letter — from Admiral 
Kimmel's letter — which I O. K.'d. 

A letter from Kear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ket) , 
to Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, dated October 22, 1941, was 
submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge 
advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom 
such extracts as may be pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
14" for reference, description appended. 

The witness read the following extracts from "EXHIBIT 14" : 

Am in receipt of your dispatches tlie cliange in tlie Japanese cabinet. We made 
the following dispositions : 

Continued to maintain the patrol of the two submarines at Midway. 

Dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway. 

Dispatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October. 

Dispatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to John.ston and Wake with addi- 
tional marhies, ammunition, and stores. 

[50] The CURTIS arrives at WAKE on 21 October with gas, lube oil, and 
bombs. 

Prepared to send G patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the 6 at 
Midway from Pearl Harbor. 

Dispatched additional marines to Palmyra. 

Placed Admiral Pye with the ships making a health cruise on 12 hours' notice 
after 20 Octobei*. 

Had submarine prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. 

Put additional security measures in effect in the areas outside Pearl Harbor. 

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when 
she is going for an overhaul to Puget Sound, and deferred final decision until 
that time. 

133. Q. I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under 
official seal, of a secret dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations 
to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific and other addressees, dated 24 
November 1941, date time group 242005. If you recognize this, please 
state as what you identify it. 

A. Yes, I recognize this dispatch as dispatch from Chief of Naval 
Operations to CinCPac, CinCAsiatic, Comll, Coml2, Coml3, Coml5, 
under date of November 24, 1941. 

The copy of the dispatch, secret, duly authenticated under official 
seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific, and other addressees, dated 24 November 1941, date time group 
242005, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and 
by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 15". 

134. Q. Please read the document to the court. 

The witness read the document, Exhibit 15, to the court. 

135. Q. Admiral, did you authorize the release of this dispatch? 
A. I did. 

136. Q. What special circumstances prompted you sending it ? 

A. The special circumstances are embodied in the dispatch — pri- 
marily, that it looked less and less as though favorable outcome of the 
negotiations with Japan would be forthcoming. It had been over a 
month since I had sent war [51] information to the fleet, and 
in my opinion the situation was deteriorating. In addition, the Japs 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were moving forces into Formosa, and to the southard. You will note 
if you leave out the words in that dispatch "in any direction", that it 
would read, "a surprise, aggressive movement, including an attack on 
the Phillippines or Guam is a possibility". I remarked that while 
that phrase "including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a pos- 
sibility" did not exclude an attack in another direction, but I thought 
it ought to be included, and I personally wrote into the dispatch the 
words "in any direction", which I intended would convey to the re- 
cipient that it might come in any direction, and particularly did I have 
the Hawaiian Islands in thought, and so remarked when I wrote it. 

[52] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

Examined by the court : 

137. Q. Why did you specifically mention the Phillippines and 
Guam, and specifically leave out the Hawaiian Islands? 

A. Because the weight of evidence, by movements of which we were 
cognizant at that time, showed a southern movement into Formosa 
and on to the southern. We knew that; is was definite, and the 
■ ( dispatch) - information came in that way. -( Now that, m itaolfj di4 
ftot include the Hawaiian lolanda ; *fe didn't include them bccauao it 
was ftet mentioned, ft»d: feeling tha* we should fee eft guard e^ tihe 
poaoibility ol ftft attack coming from ft«y direction^ i wrote these 
wordg iftte that dispatch myself. I remember it very distinctly.) 

[Notation in margin] "See correction page 323." 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

138. Q. Do you consider that this dispatch, Exhibit 15, conveyed 
the full import of the international developments as you knew them 
on November 24, 1941 ? 

A. It was a very condensed picture. I didn't pass, for example, 
•(eft mentioning) or mention the details of the movements other than 
to indicate them because, as I recall, they were known to both the 
commander-in-chief, Atlantic^ Asiatic and the commander-in-chief, 
Pacific. I thought it was a reasonably accurate picture as I saw it. 
You will note that I used the word "possibility". I didn't use a strong- 
er term. 

139. Q. In order to make clear for the record I shall ask you, what 
movements of Japanese naval and military forces did you refer to in 
this dispatch ? 

A. I would have to refresh from the records on that. They were, 
as I recall, expeditionary forces, the details of which are a matter of 
record. 

140. Q. You speak of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direc- 
tion. What did you mean by this term "surprise, aggressive move- 
ment"? 

A. The Japanese had announced no intention as to where this 
movement would strike. Obviously, from her past history, what she 
did was likely to be a surprise. It could hardly be assumed to be 
other than for aggressive purposes and we assumed that it was to be 
a surprise, aggressive movement. As I recall, my own thoughts were 
that its most probable objective was the Kra Peninsula, which subse- 
quently turned out to be one of the objectives. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 49 

141. Q. What action did you expect the commander-in-chief of the 
Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, now 
before the court ? 

A. It was largely informatory. He had previously taken measures 
regarding which testimony has been given, which I considered appro- 
priate. I considered that if in his judgment, with what he had been 
doing in the course of the month, he thought any additional tightening 
up as necessary [53] he would do it. I was trying to acquaint 
him with the picture as I saw it and that there was a possibility of a 
surprise attack. I left that to his good judgment. And the same 
way in the Far East; I sent no specific instructions. It was not 
my general habit to do so. 

142. Q. The language of the dispatch is, and I quote : "A surprise, 
aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility". "Was your 
information at the time sucli as would have warranted your using 
language indicating that the aggressive movement was stronger than 
a possibility ? 

A. I didn't feel — I wasn't ready to go to an all-out at that time. 
Admiral Kimmel was confronted with problems, and very difficult 
problems, of training. He was making a so-called health cruise which 
I had initiated. As I recall, they were originated with Admiral Rich- 
ardson and Admiral Kimmel, which I was not yet ready to interrupt. 
I didn't feel at that time that he was ready needed to start using 
everything he had on a war basis, and the word "possibility" was 
used advisedly, though I knew the situation was certainly no better, 
and if anything, deteriorating. 

143. Q. Did you have any other information from any source re- 
garding Japan which prompted the sending of this dispatch. 
Exhibit 15? 

A. That is a broad question. 

144. Q. Tliat prompted your sending the dispatch, that is. 

A. Not that I recall. Certainly the main-spring was the thought 
that the negotiations were deteriorating. I might state that Mr. Hull 
sometimes thought they might go through; sometimes he was pessi- 
mistic. He didn't give up hope until the last. He was striving as 
hard as he could. He knew how I felt about it ; he knew how General 
Marshall felt about it ; and even though the chances were slender, he 
held on to whatever chance there was in the hope of arriving at a 
solution with the Japs which would prevent, or at least delay, war 
with Japan. 

145. Admiral, in both your dispatches of October 16, 1941, and 
November 24, 1941, you speak of a possible attack on the United States, 
or territory belonging thereto. 

A. Yes. 

146. Q. Do you recall whether you felt at the time an attack on Pearl 
Harbor was a possibility on this later date, November 24, 1941? 

A. Yes, I thought it was a possibility. That was the reason that I 
wrote the words "in any direction". I don't Imow that they were 
necessary as regards a possibility. But having used the words "Philip- 
pines or Guam", I thought it very desirable to convey, so far as I could, 
the fact that the possibility was that the Jap would strike anywhere, 
if he struck. 

79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 5 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[54.] 147. Q. I note that Exhibit 15 was released by Admiral 
Ingersoll. Does this bear your authorization? 
A. Yes. 

148. Q. After directing the release of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, did 
you amplify it by any letters or notes or memorandum to the com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

A. Which one is that ? November 24th ? 

149. Q. That is November 24th, yes. 

A. Yes, I did. Yes, I have the letter of the 25th. 

A letter dated November 25, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral 
Kimmel, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and 
by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 16". 

150. Q. Will you please read the letter, Exhibit 16? 
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 16. 

151. Q. Were there any other communications from you to Admiral 
Kimmel ? 

A. The letter of the 25th of November is the last copy of a letter to 
Admiral Kimmel of which I have record and think there was no 
other letter. 

152. Q. Admiral, I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated 
under ofHcial seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated No- 
vember 27, 1941, date time group 273337. Do you identify this docu- 
ment as such ? 

A. I recognize it as such. 

153. Q. Do you identify it as a dispatch released from your office? 
A. Yes. 

The certified, photostatic copy of secret dispatch dated November 27, 
1941, date time group 273337, was ubmitted to the interested parties 
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 17". 

154. Q. Please read the dispatch. 

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 17. 

[SS] 155. Q. It is noted that this dispatch. Exhibit 17, bears a 
date three days later than Exhibit 15, which is your dispatch of 
November 24, 1941. What additional information had you received 
between November 24 and November 27, 1941, that prompted your 
sending Exhibit 17? 

A. Negotiations with Japan had come to an impasse; they were 
stopped. The long months of endeavor to arrive at a solution had 
brought us nowhere except a complete inability to agree. The situa- 
tion looked very critical. It looked like a certain break was to occur. 
If you want me to amplify that, I can. 

156. Q. The answer is yours, sir. 

A. I have answered it, with the additional information which 
l)rompted it. I may say with regard to that disi^atch that, as you 
can readily imagine, I pondered a great deal over the expression "this 
is a war warning", with my principal advisers, and with Col. Knox. 
We went into the picture as we saw it, and we thought there was 
grave danger of Japan striking somewhere and we wanted the outlying 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 51 

stations to know and we used language which we thought was strong 
eiiougli to indicate to them that Japan was going to strike. 

157. Q. It is noted that in two previous dispatches, namely, the 
one of October 16, 1941, and the one of November 21, 1941, the dis- 
patch expresses Japanese aggressive actions being a possibility. In 
this dispatch of November 27, 1941, you characterize the Japanese 
aggressive action as being expected. Was this a deliberate choice of 
words ? 

A. It was. As I have previously testified, we had not gone stronger 
than '"possibility" in previous dispatches. This is the first dispatch 
where I definitely inclicated war as likely to take place at any time, 
and as I stated, we pondered almost an entire forenoon on that phrase, 
whether it was strong enough, whether it would convey what w^e felt, 
whether it was too strong. We felt that we must be prepared. 

158. Q. Did you consider war between the Japanese and the United 
States more imminent on tlie 27th of November than vou did on the 
24th of November, 1941? " 

A. Yes. 

159. Q. I note that the dispatch of November 27, 1941, fails to 
mention Guam as a possible objective of the Japanese attack, as did 
the dispatch of November 24, 1941. Did you intentionally omit Guam 
from this dispatch of November 27, 1941, as a possible objective? 

A. Not as I recall. We expected Guam to be attacked and fall 
almost immediately, I do not recall just why it wasn't included. 
I attach no serious importance to the omission. 

[S6] 160. Q. Your dispatch of November 24, 1941, indicated 
the possibility of a Japanese aggressive movement in any direction. 
It is noted in the dispatch of November 27, 1941, that certain Japanese 
possible actions are indicated but you omitted the words ''in any direc- 
tion" from your dispatch of November 27, 1941. Was this done 
advisedly ? 

A. I do not recall. We had previously stated "in any direction", 
and there was nothing to indicate that that still did not hold. I re- 
iterated what seemed to us as the most probable objectives in this 
dispatch from the definite information we had, where the blow might 
come. We couldn't forecast. Previouslv having put in "in any direc- 
tion", I think it still held. 

161. Q. What was your information of a favorable outcome of 
negotiatio'.s with Japan on November 27, 1941, as contrasted with your 
information on November 24, 1941? 

A. They were still under way on November 24th. As long as we 
coidd keep them going, there w^as some hope. I might add, we were 
struggling to keep them going. On November 27th, they ceased. 

162. Q. In your dispatch of October 16, 1941, you directed the 
commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet to take due precautions, in- 
cluding such preparatory deployments that will not constitute provoc- 
ative action. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you directed 
addressees to execute an appropriate defense de]:)]oyment pre])aratory 
to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Now, what additional 
dispositions of the forces assigned the commander-in-chief of the 
Pacific Fleet were intended by this last directive that were different 
from the deployments that you had ordered in your dispatch of 
October 16, 1941, which was more than a month previous? 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Keeping in mind the words "war warning", you asked me what 
I anticipated as a result of the dispatch, I would assume full security 
measures, not only for ships in port but for ships at sea; measures 
regarding the safety of Pearl Harbor ; anti-submarine measures ; dis- 
tant reconnaissance ; and that the Army would do its utmost to carry 
out its obligations to protect Pearl Harbor, certainly including a con- 
dition of readiness of its aircraft and the full manning of such devices 
as it had for locating trouble coming in from the sea, with watches to 
insure any information they got would be sent to those who needed to 
have it; and that they should be fully alive to the possibility of war, 
and that watches would be placed on such a basis. 

163. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you set out as a 
possible objective of the Japanese, the Philippines. I do not see any 
other reference to United States territory or objectives. Did you 
intentionally omit any reference to any other United States territorial 
objectives ? 

A. I mentioned the Philippines because of the primary objectives, 
other than Guam perhaps, I considered the Philippines one of their 
most likely objectives for the [57] reason that if Japan were 
going to make an attack to the southern — and to which the evidence 
all pointed — the Philippines lay squarely on her flank and called for 
a major attack on her part to take them, in my opinion. Whether 
she would or not, I could not tell, but with our continually increasing 
our strength on the Philippines, with our continuing our support of 
China, with our employing continued increasing economic pressure 
against her, our relations were not good and we stood, in a measure, 
so far as her work to the southern, as a thorn in her side continually 
getting stronger. Roughly and briefly, those are some of the reasons, 
plus the material evidence at hand which was available to both the 
commander-in-chief. Pacific, and the commander-in-chief, Asiatic, 
which indicated that the Philippines was a probable and logical point 
of attack and surprise. 

164. Q. The point I am trying to make. Admiral, is that in previous 
dispatches, namely those of October 16, 1941, and November 24, 1941, 
other objectives of United States territory were mentioned, and in 
the one of November 27, 1941, you have omitted them all with the 
exception of the Philippines. Had you considered that this might 
confuse an addressee of other messages as to possible Japanese objec- 
tives ? 

A. Did you go back to 24 November ? 

With the court's permission, the judge advocate withdrew the 
question. 

The court then, at 4 : 05 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., August 
8, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 53 



PEOCEEDINGS OF NAYY COUET OF INaUIKY 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944. 

[68] FouETH Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 

The court met at 9 : 30 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U- S. Navy (Eet.), President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolplius Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U, S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yoeman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his 
counsel. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) , interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the third day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

The procedings following directly hereafter. Page 58-A, have, 
by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited 
with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest 
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war. 

[59] The court was cleared. 

The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The 
court announced that it would hear the statement of the interested 
party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), continued his statement as follows: On 28 July re- 
presentation was made to the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry 
that the dispatches which were the basis of this testimony should 
be introduced before the court. On August 1, my counsel, with a 
copy of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy dated December 7, 
1943, called on the Director of Naval Communications with the judge 
advocate of the Court of Inquiry and requested permission to see the 
confidential files. This permission was refused on the ground that the 
Director of Naval Communications would not release them without a 
statement as to individual numbers and contents, which was impossible 
to supply; whereupon my counsel called on the Director of Naval 
Intelligence and went with the Director of Naval Intelligence to the 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Home, who stated that a 
letter should be addressed to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the 
release of these dispatches. A letter was written by the judge advocate 
of the Court of Inquiry on 1 August, and delivered to the Judge 
Advocate General of the Navy, w^ho was designated by Admiral Home 
as the proper officer to process the request. On Friday, 4 August, 
upon inquiry of the Judge Advocate General, informal information 
was given that the letter had been misplaced in the office of the Sec- 
retary of the Navy. On 8 August, yesterday, the judge advocate of 
the Court of Inquiry informed me that the letter had been returned 
to him with the request that the classification be changed from 
SECKET to TOP SECKET. Both the judge advocate and my 
counsel have done all within their power to have this information 
available to the court. My counsel feel it imperative that this infor- 
mation be available before the conclusion of the cross-examination 
of Admiral Stark. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret) , requested permission of the court to add other data which 
he had obtained from the testimony given before Admiral Hart. 

The court announced that such permission was not granted. 

The judge advocate made the following reply: The factual situa- 
tion with regard to requests for permission to examine the records of 
the Navy Department are correct — that in compliance with Admiral 
Kimmel's request, the judge advocate did submit on 1 August an official 
letter to the Secretary of the Navy in which he requested that the in- 
formation desired by Admiral Kimmel be made available to the judge 
[60'] advocate. This was done for the reason that the Acting 
Director of Naval Communications declined to permit access to the 
files of the Director of Naval Communications without first being 
informed specifically of the dispatches or correspondence that was 
desired. The judge advocate has checked up daily since that time with 
the office of the Judge Advocate General, who was designated by the 
Chief of Naval Operations to process his request for this information, 
and it was not until this morning at about 0900 that the letter came 
back from the Secretary of the Nav3^ The judge advocate immediat- 
ely sat down and wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in 
which he requested, in conformance with the Secretary's directive, 
that the files of the Director of Naval Communications be made avail- 
able to Captain R. A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, for the purpose of obtain- 
ing the information which the interested i^arty, Admiral Kimmel, 
requested. I sent Lieutenant (junior grade) Spavor, of my office, 
to the Chief of Naval Operations office with that letter just before 
entering the court this morning. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the adjournment was taken* on Monday, August 7, 1941, 
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

With the permission of the court, the witness made the following 
statement prior to his further examination : 

I request to lay before the court some considerations concerning my personal 
letters. 

I corresponded with several officers in high places and the general purpose was 
informatory — keeping in touch. I myself wrote frankly and since the letters 
were confidentially personal! paid little attention to discretion. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 55 

I don't desire to liold buck from those personal letters anything whatever 
which is really pertinent to this In(|nir.\. There is contained in them, however, 
some passages which certainly should not be disclosed. There are passages con- 
cerning foreign nations, other than Japan, and perhaps foreign officials, which 
are not pertinent to this Inquiry. On the other hand, certain disclosures could 
easily become very inimical to the country's future interest. 

It is of course for the court to .iudge how those letters are to be used. If they 
are to become a part of the court's records. I can't too strongly urge that those 
passages be deleted. In fact, I must go farther and ask that I myself be absolved 
from all responsibility if those deletions are not made. I am responsible for 
having written them, representing what I thought at the time, but I can't share 
the responsibility for their disclousure 

One thing more: The letters contain a few criticisms [Gl] of individuals 
and of non-naval organizations which, also, are not pertinent to this Inquiry. 
I request, as a matter of personal privilege, that those passages also be deleted 
from any letters which may be made a pail of the court's records. 

I request a ruling at the court's earliest convenience. 

(The foregoing statement was read by the witness.) 
The judge advocate st;Ued that the method suggested in the state- 
ment of the witness was in accordance with the policy of the judge 
advocate to introduce only such parts of letters as might pertain to 
the subject matter of the Inquiry. 

The court made the following statement: If the letters re- 
ferred to are introduced in accordance with the statement -of 
the judge advocate, that is, only pertinent parts are read into the 
record — pertinent to this investigation — then if any other parts 
are desired by anybody, then the court will at that time decide 
whether or not they will be allowed in the record. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, inquired 
of the court as to whether or not the complete letters would in any way 
be attached to the record. 

The court announced that this question would be decided as it came 
before the court in the instances involved. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 

165. Q. At the time of releasing the dispatch of 27 November 1941, 
which is "EXHIBIT 17" before this court, had you considered any 
further action, such as mobilization? 

A. I considered the Navy at that time practically mobilized. As I 
recall, we had not a ship left on the Navy's list which could be useful 
which had not been placed in commission. To all intents and purposes, 
I believe we were fully mobilized. 

166. Q. Did you consider any further action such as affecting unity 
of command in the Hawaiian area? 

A. I don't recall whether or not at that particular time we went 
over the question of unity of command in the Hawaiian area. I have 
already testified to that subject in general terms. 

167. Q. Were you familiar with the information that was being 
made public, in the newspapers and radio broadcasts about 27 Novem- 
ber 1941, relative to the progress of negotiations with the Japanese 
diplomatic officers then in Washington? 

A. Generally 

168. Q. What was this information? 

A. Generally, I did not listen to all the broadcasts [62] nor 
read all the papers — and on your next question, "What was the infor- 
mation?" — I don't recall and would have to refreshen on reading the 



56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

papers at that time, of those dates. I would say the best evidence 
would be to introduce the papers. I was relying primarily on informa- 
tion which I had from sources available to me, and which I considered 
responsible information. 

169. Q. Do I understand that it is your desire to state to the court 
now that you have no present recollection of what information was 
being given to the public by newspapers and broadcasts on the subject 
of the progress of negotiations with the Japanese diplomatic repre- 
sentatives in Washington ? 

A. After going on three years, I certainly would hesitate to state 
categorically what was then being written and said in the newspapers. 

170. Q. In your dispatch of 27 November 1941, you employed the 
words, "Negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the 
Pacific have stopped." Did these words express the factual situation 
as you knew it at that time ? 

A. They did. 

171. Q. Can you state what action you expected the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of your dispatch of 
27 November 1941? 

A. Very briefly, I expected fully readiness measures ashore and 
afloat, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures. I as- 
sumed that all measures with the Army, particularly those which had 
been previously agreed upon for emergency, would be implemented, 
and which are a matter of record. I think those could be recited 
without reference to hindsight. 

172. Q. Did you require the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet to make any report to you of the action that he had taken in 
response to your dispatch of 27 November 1941 ? 

A. I did not. He was on the spot and had detail beyond what was 
available to me. I had every confidence in him, and I left the matter 
entirely to him, after giving him a war warning, and informing him 
that an aggressive move by Japan was expected in the next few days. 

173. Q. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated 
under official seal, of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations 
to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, dated 26 November 1941, date 
time group 270038. If you recognize this dispatch, please state as 
Avhat you identify it. 

A. Yes, I identify it as a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

The photostatic copy of the dispatch, duly authenticated under 
official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 26, [6S] 1941, date 
time group 270038, was submitted to the interested parties and to the 
court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked 
"EXHIBIT 18." 

174. Q. Please read the dispatch. 

The witness read the dispatch, "EXHIBIT 18." 

175. Q. Adverting to "EXHIBIT 18" which has just been read, 
in executing the directive to station twenty-five pursuit planes at 
Wake, what means of transporting these planes to that area was 
indicated in the dispatch ? 

A. The dispatch was not a directive of execution. It distinctly 
puts up a proposition and states, "Provided you consider it feasible 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 57 

and desirable." And furthermore, it requests that after conference 
with the Commanding General, the Department be advised. 

176. Q. What surface units would you estimate would be required 
to escort the carrier on such a mission, if she were sent under the con- 
ditions as you knew them at that time ? 

A. I should say cruisers and destroyers. 

177. Q. What prompted the directive to transfer these pursuit 
plants to Wake at this time ? 

A. This was one of many subjects under constant study with a view 
to strengthening our position in the Central Pacific, covering forces 
in those areas, strengthening Hawaii. It had been in the mill, as I 
recall, some days, and it was more or less of a routine procedure which 
was going on. 

178. Q. In your dispatch of 24 November 1941, you stated in sub- 
stance, "The situation indicates a Japanese surprise aggressive move- 
ment in any direction." Did you at the time of releasing this dispatch 
of 26 November 1941, consider that the carrier and escorting force were 
running any hazards to themselves in carrying out a movement to 
deliver planes to Wake ? 

A. Again I would point out that the movement was not directed. 
We were asking CinCPac's advice. Were it to be made, the usual 
hazards of war would be accepted, if war were suddenly to arrive. As 
regards the dispatch of the 24th, I again invite attention to the fact 
that we said such a movement was a possibility. 

179. Q. Does that complete your answer ? 
A. Yes. 

[64] 180. Q. At the time of releasing this dispatch of 26 Novem- 
ber, 1941, had it occurred to you that this action of the Commander- 
in-Chief in sending a carrier to Wake might or might not influence 
his views of the imminence of an outbreak of war? 

A. May I ask if you mean by that, the mere fact that I brought it 
up might indicate that it would influence previous messages in which 
I had indicated an outbreak of war? I don't just understand the 
question. I repeat, he was not directed to do it. The arrangement 
which could be made was made known to him, in an area which, of 
cours'e, was vital to him. We told him what could be done. We 
asked his advice as to whether or not it should be done, after con- 
ference with his Army opposite. 

181. Q. I shall rephrase the question. At the time of releasing this 
dispatch of 26 November 1941, had it occurred to you that the sug- 
gestion in your dispatch of 26 November 1941, relative to sending a 
carrier to Wake, might or might not influence the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific's estimate of the imminence of an outbreak of war? 

A. To the best of my recollection that did not cross my mind. 

182. Q. In your dispatch of 24 November 1941, you stated in sub- 
stance, "The situation indicates, in our opinion, a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction." I ask you with relation to your dispatch 
of 26 November 1941, in which you suggested sending a carrier to Wake 
with her escort, would this carrier and her escort, under the circum- 
stances as you knew them, be running any extraordinary hazard ? 

A. I wouldn't say so. The task force would have been a fast one, 
ostensibly on guard against surprise, and then and ever since then 
there are matters besides safety to be considered. We figured that if 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

anything these movements were more or less in conformance with 
strengthening against the danger threatening in that ui'ea. 

183. Q. In your directive of 26 — in your suggestion of 26 November 
1941, relative to sending these planes to Wake, it is noted that no 
limitation of time is prescribed for delivering the planes. What were 
your intentions with regard to the urgency of the delivery at this time? 

A. I again — I woukl invite attention to the fact that there was not 
a directive to send these planes to Wake. 

At the direction of the judge advocate, the question was repeated 
by the reporter. 

A. We were endeavoring to strengthen covering forces in the area. 
I do not recall just what time element we had in mind, if any was, 
except that we were ready to go ahead if the Commander-in-Chief 
in the Pacific advised us to that effect, which advice we requested 
of him. 

[6S] 184. Q. Had you formed any estimate of the time that 
would be required for the carrier to execute the task of delivering 
planes to Wake and the task force returning within supporting dis- 
tance of the United States Pacific Fleet, if and when your suggestions 
were executed ? 

A. I do not recall the estimate. One may have been made. I simply 
do not recall that feature of it. 

185. Q. Did you ever cancel or modify the suggestion to send planes 
to Wake? 

A. I do not recall that we did. A search of the files might disclose 
something, but the cancellation of this particular message I do not 
recall. I also do not recall receiving a reply regarding the message. 

186. Q. Can you remember whether the suggested task was ever 
carried out? 

A. To the best of my recollection the task was not carried out, so 
far as Wake is concerned. 

187. Q. I will ask you again, Admiral, remembering your sugges- 
tion in the dispatch of 26 November, 1941, to send a carrier wnth planes 
to Wake as still being something to be done, and that on the next day, 
27 November 1941, you dispatched the message which contained the 
phrase, "This is a war warning" — did you consider this situation as 
you set out in your dispatch of 27 November as having any weight on 
the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet's evaluation of the information 
of the imminence of a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet? 

A. I do not recall feeling that the message asking for his advice 
about sending this increase to Wake would influence any interpretation 
of my message of the 27th. 

188. Q. I show you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under 
official seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Com- 
mander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, 1941, date time 
group 290110. If you recognize this, please state as what you iden- 
tify it. 

A. Yes, I recognize the dispatch as one from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to Pacific Naval Northern Coastal Frontier, to the Pacific 
Southern Naval Coastal Frontier, and info to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific, and ComPanama Naval Coastal Area. 

[66~\ Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Keserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 59 

The photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a 
dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of 
Pacific Fleet, dated 28 November, 1941, date time group 290110, was 
submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge 
advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 
19," copy appended. 

189. Q. Please read the dispatch. 

The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 19. 

190. Q. Did this dispatch relate entirely to matters coming under 
the cognizance of the War Department? 

A. Well, it is a directive from the War Department to their people, 
but in directing them to take reconnaissance and other measures, it 
obviously affects our operations and this message was repeated to 
our people in order that they might know what the Army had sent, 
and what they directed. 

191. Q. This dispatch. Exhibit 19, contains the following words: 
"To all practical purposes negotiations with Japan appear to be ter- 
minated with only barest possibilities that Japanese government might 
come back and offer to continue." Did you intend these words to 
convey to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet any informa- 
tion about the progress of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese 
at that time? 

A. I was merely repeating a dispatch to him for information which 
had been sent by the Army. I did not intend to convey that. I gave 
them the Army's thought and I think the statement in the dispatch 
that hostile action was possible at any moment would convey, cer- 
tainly, imminence of such. However, I repeat, I sent it as a matter 
of information to C-in-C, Pacific, telling him what the Army had 
sent out. 

192. Q. What is the time group on this dispatch. Exhibit 19? 
A. 290110. 

193. Q. What is the time group on the dispatch of 27 November, 
1941, Exhibit 17? 

A. 272337. 

194. Q. Approximately how much difference in time is there between 
sending the dispatch of 29 November, and the one of 27 Novem- 
ber, 1941 ? 

A. About 26 hours. 

[67] 195. Q. In your message of November 24, 1941. you used 
the words "chance of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan 
very doubtful." In your dispatcli of November 27, 1941, you stated, 
"Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of' conditions 
in the Pacific have stopped." In this message of November 28, 1941, 
which you have characterized as being of an informatory nature, you 
quote the War Department's dispatch, "To all practical purposes, 
negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only barest pos- 
sibilities that Japanese government might come back and offer to 
continue." Do you consider this last information, which appears to be 
the War Department's estimate as to the possibility of continuing 
negotiations with Japan, to be more, or less optimistic than your own 
where you used the words in your message of November 27, 1941, 
"Negotiations have stopped"? 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I would consider the terms "barest possibilities" as being barest 
optimistic portent over the message that I had sent that "negotiations 
have stopped". But that message did not modify my message, nor did 
I modify my message. I sent it for information of CinCPac, and I also 
sent to the addressees the information which you have quoted, along 
with the direction which it contains to undertake such reconnaissance 
and other measures as they deemed necessary, et cetera. I didn't con- 
sider it modified my message. To the best of my recollection, that did 
not enter my head. 

196. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under 
official seal, of a message dated December 3, 1941, from OpNav to 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; 
and other addressees, date time group 031850. If you recognize this 
document, please state as what you identify it. 

A. I identify it as a message from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, 
Asiatic, Pacific, Coml4 and Coml6. 

The photostatic copy, duly autlienticated under official seal, of a 
message dated December 3, 1941, from OpNav to Cominch, Asiatic, 
Pacific, and other addressees, date time group 031850, was submitted 
to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate 
offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
20", copy appended. 

197. Q. Please read this dispatch. 

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 20. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.), suggested that the dispatch be read as it appears and 
not as it was sent ; that a portion of the message was crossed out which 
appears on the formal exhibit. 

[681 The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, stated that this was a matter for cross-examination. 

The judge advocate replied that the exhibit as introduced in evi- 
dence is a certified copy of a dispatch that was transmitted from the 
Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees ; it has been certified 
as such by the acting director of Naval Communications, and that the 
dispatch was being offered as it stands. 

The court announced that it would accept the dispatch. Exhibit 
20, in evidence as it was read, for the time being. 

198. Q. It is noted that the officer releasing this dispatch is T. S. 
Wilkinson. Did he do so by your authority ? 

A. I do not recall. 

199. Q. It is noted that the last sentence as it appears in the photo- 
static copy has a line run through it. Can you state of your own 
knowledge whether or not this line was omitted from the dispatch as 
it was released? 

A. No, I cannot from my own personal knowledge. 

200. Q. Did you have any information as to whether the directive 
in this dispatch applied to all codes and ciphers, or only to certain 
ones? 

A. No, I do not recall that. The message is broad, but I do not 
recall. 

201. Q. What was the usual disposition of outdated or compro- 
mised codes and ciphers? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 61 

A. Destruction; and usually by burning, 

202. Q. From the information you had were there any circum- 
stances that led you to believe that this particular directive for code 
and cipher destruiction might not be a routine matter ? 

A. Coupling the incident with other information at hand, I con- 
sidered that their destruction of codes and secret documents at that 
time was one of the most telling and confirmatory things that had 
happened; supporting our previous dispatches. It made a very deep 
impression on me when I learned of it. 

203. Q. Did the information which you sent to the Commander-in- 
Qiief between October 16, 1941 and December 6, 1941, express your 
estimate of the progress of United States-Japanese negotiations as 
you interpreted them based on all the information you had at the 
time? 

A. Yes. 

204. Q. Did the information which you sent to the Commander-in- 
Chief between October 16, 1941 and December 6, 1941, express your 
estimate of the probable objectives of a Japanese attack as you evalu- 
ated the information you had at the time ? 

A. Yes, very briefly. 

[69] 205. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy of a dispatch 
from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam, with information copies to 
CinCAF, CinCPac, Coml4, Coml6, date time group 042017. If you 
recognize this document, please state as what you identify it. 

A. I recognize it as a dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam, 
info, C-in-C, Pacific ; C-in-C, Asiatic, Coml4 and Coml6, released by 
Admiral Ingersoll. 

The photosatic copy of dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station, 
Guam, with information copies to CinCAF, CinCPac, Coml4 and 
Coml6, date time group 042017, was submitted to the interested parties 
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 21", copy appended. 

206. Q. Please read this dispatch. 

The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 21. 

207. Q. It is noted that this dispatch is released by Admiral Inger- 
soll. Was that done with your authority ? 

A. Yes. 

208. Q. Adverting to your dispatch of December 3, 1941, which is 
Exhibit 20 before this court, had you received any new information 
that warranted your sending this dispatch of December, 1941, to Guam, 
with a directive for the disposal of secret and confidential matter ? 

A. Not that I recall. 

209. Q. Can you recall whether or not your estimate of the situation 
at this time included an attack on Guam as a possibility ? 

A. Yes, we always considered a nattack on Guam a possibility. 
Also, in Guam there was danger of sabotage. The position was out- 
lying and exposed. 

210. Q. It is noted that the commandant of the 14th Naval District 
is not made an action addressee on this dispatch of 4 December 1941, 
to the Naval Station Guam. Was there any reason for omitting the 
Commandant, 14th Naval District, as an action addressee ? 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. We thought it unnecessai-y to send such a message to Coml4. 
We thought it would be left to his discretion. We felt that he was 
in no such dangerous situation as was Guam. 

211. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy, duly authenticated 
under official seal, of a dispatch dated December 6, 1941, from OpNav 
to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, date time group 061743. If 
you recognize this, please state as what you identify it. 

A. It is a message from OpNav to C-in-C, Pacific; info C-in-C, 
Asiatic. 

[70] The photostatis copy of dispatch from OpNav to Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated December 6, 1941, date time 
group 061743, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, 
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 22", copy appended. 

212. Q. Please read the dispatch. 

The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 22. 

213. Q. It is noted that Exhibit 22 has been released by Admiral 
IngersoU. Was this done with your authority ? 

A. To the best of my recollection, it was. 

214. Q, At the time you released this dispatch. Exhibit 22, did you 
have any additional information on the imminence of an attack by 
the Japanese that you did not have on December 4, 1941, at the time 
of sending the dispatch to Guam ? 

A. Not that I recall. 

215. Q. By "the outlying Pacific Islands" in Exhibit 22, what places 
did the you mean to be included ? 

A. Generally those under CinCPac's cognizance outside the innne- 
diate Hawaiian group. 

216. Q. Was the Philippine area intended in the words "Outlying 
Pacific Islands"? 

A. No. 

217. Q. Why did you not issue a directive for the destruction of the 
codes and ciphers in the outlying islands at the same time you sent 
your dispatch to Guam to do this on December 4, 1941 ? 

A. I do not recall just the reason. I could make a supposition in 
my answer. So far as my direct memory as to just why we didn't 
do it at exactly the same time, I don't recall. 

The court then, at 11:20 a. m., took a recess until 11:30 a. m., 
at which time it reconvened. 

Present : All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the in- 
terested parties and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and 
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

[71] Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

218. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 20, which is the dispatch from the 
Chief of Naval Operations dated December 3, 1941, from which you 
have testified that the message was released by T. S. Wilkinson. Do 
you desire to correct that statement? 

A. The message bears Admiral Ingersoll's initials showing his 
release. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 63 

219. Q. Is that then to be considered a release by you ? 
A. It is a release by Admiral Ingersoll. 

220. Q. On either the 6th or 7th of December, 1941, did you receive 
any further information than you have testified to on diplomatic 
developments with the Japanese government? 

A. On Sunday forenoon, the 7th, there was information to the 
effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to call on the Secretary of 
State at exactly loOO. I was talking over this information with Cap- 
tain Schuirman when General Marshall called me asking me if I had 
it. I told him "yes," and he asked me what I thought about sending 
it on to the Hawaiian Islands. To the best of my memory, my first 
answer to him was that we had sent them so much already and of such 
a character that I rather questioned sending this information. I 
hung up the 'phone and I think w^ithin a minute, if not within 30 
seconds, I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar 
significance to the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at exactly 
1300, and that I would go along with his hunch that it might be a 
good thing to send that information to the Pacific. I asked him if 
his communications were such that he could get it out in the very 
minimum of time because I knew our communications were efficient 
and rapid when we wanted to push them very quickly. He replied 
that he felt tiiat he could get it out just as quickly as I could. I told 
him to go ahead and be sure and embody in his dispatch to inform our 
people, that is, the Army's naval opposite. 

221. Q. 1300 Washington time is what time in Honolulu? 
A. 0730. 

222. Q. At the time of receiving this information from both Gen- 
eral Marshall and the sources in the Navy Department, did you form 
any personal estimate of the significance of the hour 1300? 

A. We didn't know. We thought that there might be something, 
and in view of this "might," that we ought not to take the chance and 
that it would be better to send the message than not to send it. That 
was the reason it was sent. 

[72] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

223. Q. Do you recall if there was any other information that you 
received other than the fact that the Japanese were presenting certain 
information at 1 : 00 p. m. ? 

A. I recall no other information. 

224. Q. During the period from October 16, 1941, to December 7, 
1941, what was your estimate at that time of the reliability of the 
information being furnished you concerning Japanese diplomatic and 
military matters? 

A. The information was quite reliable. 

225. Q. Do you know who was the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Japanese Fleet on December 7, 1941 ? 

A. Admiral Yamamoto, as I recall. 

226. Q. Did you have any knowledge of his military character- 
istics ? 

A. I would be guessing if I were to testify on that at this time. I 
do not recall any particular thoughts that influenced me in anything 
I did by the characteristics of Yamamoto. 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

227. Q. I refer to Exhibit 15, which is the dispatch from OpNav 
dated 24 November 1941, and which states in substance that "in our 
opinion a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an 
attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility." Did you esti- 
mate at this time that an attack on Pearl Harbor was one of these 
possibilities ? 

A. Yes. 

228. Q. Did you form any estimate of the manner in which this 
attack might be made ? 

A. We wrote down our estimate of that form in the letter which 
Secretary Knox signed in January, and we had had no reason to alter 
the form expressed therein by the intervening time. 

229. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 9, which is the letter from the Secre- 
tary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, will 
you read therefrom the dangers envisaged in the order of their 
importance ? 

A. (Reading) 

"(1) air bombing attack: (2) air torpedo plane attack; (3) sabotage; (4) 
submarine attack; (5) mining; (6) bombardment by gun fire." 

[7«?] 230. Q. When and by what means did you first learn of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

A. To the best of my remembrance, by a dispatch received from 
Pearl Harbor on the 7th. 

231. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 9, which is the letter of the 
Secretary of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, did the Secretary of 
War reply to this letter ? 

A. He did. 

232. Q. In this letter of January 24, 1941, an air torpedo plane 
attack was placed No. 2 in the list of dangers envisaged. Assuming 
that an air torpedo attack was imminent, what do you consider the 
relative merits of the safety of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor as 
contrasted with a similar attack on the Fleet at sea ? 

A. I would consider that the danger to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor 
would be greater than it would be against the Fleet at sea. 

233. Q. Can you remember if there was any information during the 
period from November 27, 1941, to December 7, 1941, on the geographi- 
cal location of the major units of the Japanese Fleet? I mean by 
major units, battleships and carriers. 

A. I recall that there was conflicting information regarding the 
presence of the units which you mention. Our naval people in Pearl 
Harbor had made one dignosis. Our people at Manila had made an- 
other. They didn't agree. .Each knew the conclusions the other had 
reached. As I recall, the information from one indicated strength in 
the Mandates and the information from the other did not. As I fur- 
ther recall, the information which indicated strength in the Mandates 
came from the Pearl Harbor estimate. I may ask to correct my testi- 
mony on that later, but that is the best of my remembrance. 

234. Q. Do you remember what the estimate of the Chief of Naval 
Operations was on these same matters ? 

A. We had both estimates, and I do not recall to which one, if either, 
we gave the greater weight. CNO, CincPac, and CincAsiatic all had 
the same information, as I recall. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 65 

235. Q. During the year 1041 did you know whether or not the 
Bureau of Ordnance had expressed any opinion on the practicability 
of launching torpedoes from aircraft on water of the depth to })e found 
in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. Yes, the Bureau did express an opinion on that subject and later 
modified the opinion, which opinions can be obtained from the 
Bureau's letters if desired. 

236. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was 
supplied this information ? 

A. Yes, as I recall, we sent those letters to CincPac. 

[74] 237. Q. Can you recall. Admiral, whether on December 7, 
1941, there was a protected Fleet anchorage outside of Pearl Harbor? 

A. To the best of my remembrance, there was not, if you are refer- 
ring to the immediate Hawaiian area. 

238. Q. Assuming that schedule operations provided for ships to be 
at the island of Oahu, in your opinion, would these ships be safer inside 
Pearl Harbor or safer anchored outside Pearl Harbor? 

A. I would say if they were anchored or, in other words, immobile, 
they would be safer inside than outside. 

239. Q. Since you were Chief of Naval Operations, I am assuming 
that during the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941, you 
had some information on the attitude of the people of the United 
States toward a war with Japan, had you not? 

A. Yes, very conflicting views, I would say. 

240. Q. Would you like to state briefly and in general what your 
information was on this subject? 

A. No, I would not. 

241. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, had you, as Chief of Naval 
Operations, made any estimate of what might be the reactions of the 
people of the United States to a Japanese attack on the Nether>nds 
East Indies or on Thailand ? 

A. That, too, would have been very difficult. It would have cer- 
tainly created some reactions in certain quarters very different from 
those in others. I would not forecase what, if any, wave of opinion 
such an attack might have caused. 

242. Q. Independently of the information upon which you based 
your dispatches to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to 
matters concerning impending Japanese action between October 16, 
1941, and December 7 of the same year, what was your own estimate 
in regard to Japanese intentions to attack the United States? 

A. My own estimate in the later period was that we had irreconcil- 
able differences which sooner or later were bound to lead to war. I 
might add that opinion had been smouldering over a considerable 
period of time. 

243. Q. What was your own estimate of Japanese intentions to 
attack the United States at the time you sent your last message con- 
cerning the destruction of codes on or about December 6, 1941 ? 

A. I thought the probability was very strong that she would strike. 

[75] 244. Q. Did you make an estimate of the locality in which 
she would most probably strike? 

A. Yes, I thought she was more likely to strike in the Philippines 
than elsewhere, so far as United States territory is concerned. I also 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 6 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

felt that Guam would probably fall shortly after hostilities com- 
menced. 

245. Q. As contrasted with mere intention, what was your estimate 
of Japan's capacity to make a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor 
Naval Base at the time she did? 

A. We always recognized a surprise attack as a possibility. Do you 
mean by that, actually make a surprise atack or to attempt it? 

246. Q. Her capacity to make the attack. 

A. We knew, of course, .that they had the force to attempt such an 
attack. We had often envisaged such an attempt and means to repel 
it. I also assumed that there was certainly some chance, if not a good 
chance, of getting some advance warning of such an attack by alerting 
measures available to minimize the surprise or to intercept such an 
attack or to reduce its effectiveness or even to break it up. I am refer- 
ring particularly to air attack. 

247. Q. Admiral, we have asked you the duties of all your principal 
aides as Chief of Naval Operations, but I have neglected to ask you 
what your assigned duties were at the time you held that office. 

A. Chief of Naval Operations? 

248. Q. Yes, office of Chief of Naval Operations. Will you enu- 
merate, to the best of your ability, what those duties are? 

A. They are in the regulations, and the principal part of them is 
summed up in the very first sentences on that. If you have a copy of 
the regulations, they could be introduced into the record. 

249. Q. The court may take judicial notice of Navy Regulations. 
Anything else besides Navy Regulations ? 

A. I think that covers it. 

250. Q. Is there anything in statute law which you remember, de- 
scribing the duties of Chief of Naval Operations other than those in- 
corporated in Navy Regulations? 

A. There may be. I will have to check that. 

251. Q. Between November 25, 1941, which is also the date of Ex- 
hibit 16, a letter addressed by you to Admiral Kimmel, and December 
7, 1941, did you send any further letters, dispatches, or memoranda 
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, giving him any infor- 
mation on diplomatic or [76] military developments with the 
Japanese Government ? 

A. What is the date of my last letter ? 

252. Q. November 25. 

A. I don't recall any? I have none on file. Admiral Kimmel 
might supplement jfty memory upon that4. 
[Notation in margin :] See correction page 324. 

253. Q. Admiral, I will ask you to look back to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor (and consider therewith the attitude of the people of the 
United States resulting from this attack. How would you charac- 
terize the decision of the Japanese Government in this action? 

A. I thought the Japanese Government made the greatest mistake 
they possibly could have made when they attacked Pearl Harbor, ftftd; 
i may add that i teid Admiral Nomura, t4^ Japanese Ambagoador, 

4- l-k f\ -J- -1 4- J- l-> r\~tT /-] 1 /-I ii-'j^ ITT i^T -I I ^I l-\i»j^r> I ^ 4- N i^-*-fc-\ |-\y-k4-i^>»^-\ t^r r\ r\*r^4' 4-l^-t'*^~^t-i rvl-^ »/-\ ^^ii*c\ -r^z-J 
TTTTTTTC TT VIIL" V vTTTT« TTT^ TTTTTTTTT IJL t^'ttl^ "IlL/llx TTtTTTTrT? TTT? STxtT Llll Utllill* 1 tJl' Itl \X 

T^TTTkj vTT TTTTt* 1 ^ ^ 1 1 gT^ TC TTTTTxvT 

[Notation in margin:] See correction page 324. 

At the request of the judge advocate, the court was cleared. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 67 

The court was opened, and all parties to the mquiry entered. 

254. Q. Admiral, in response to a previous question of the judge 
advocate in ^Yhich he asked you to enumerate your duties as Chief of 
Naval Operations, your reply, in substance, was that they were set 
forth generally in Navy Regulations. The court has taken judicial 
notice of Navy Regulations. I therefore shall ask you to read the 
duties of the Chief of Naval Operations, as set out in Article 392. 

A. (Reading) : 

(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointerl by the President by and with 
the advice and consent of tlie Senate from among oificers of tlie Line of the Navy, 
not below the grade of eaptaiii, for a period of four years. He is charged, under 
the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, with 
the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordina- 
tion of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the deter- 
mination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or 
about to be commissioned. 

(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title 
of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and 
allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 .June 1922. All orders issued 
by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are 
performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are 
considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. 
[77] To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in iierforming the duties of his 
office there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifieen 
officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of 
the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, 
be retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be 
retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest 
grade or rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations. 

(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary when 
serving, and the A.ssistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations 
is next in succession to act as Seci'etary of the Navy. 

The court announced that it would take a recess until 2 : 00 p. m. 
The interested party. Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., requested that 
the court adjourn until 2 : 00 p. m., August 9, 1944, in order that he 
might have additional time to review his files dealing with the subject 
matter of the inquiry, so that he might be prepared to answer ques- 
tions propounded in cross-examination. This interested party fur- 
ther stated that he had been recalled from foreign duty recently and 
that as the events which are the subject of the inquiry occurred almost 
three years ago, he desired an opportunity to fully refresh his mem- 
ory. The court announced that it would adjourn until 10 a. m. 
August 9, 1944. 

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. August 
9. 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 69 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVYICOUET OFillNaUIRY 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944. 
[76'] Fifth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The court met at 10 : 00 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfiis, U. S. Navy (Ret), INIember. 

Vice Admiral Aclolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his 
counsel. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested p)arty, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the fourth day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-. 
tion when the adjournment was taken on Tuesday, August 8, 1944, re- 
sumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

255. Q. Admiral Stark, I hand you Exhibit 4, which is Navy Basic 
War Plan Rainbow Number 5, for the purpose of reading certain ar- 
ticles into the record. Will you please read articles 0101, 0102, and 
0104? 

(A. (Reading:) 

This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction 
of the Cliief of Naval Operations. 

It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations 
(Short Title ABC-1), the [T^J Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan 
(Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan^Rainbow 
No. 5. 

This plan provides for the initial organization, a composition of forces, and 
tasks for the Naval Establishments in a Rainbow No. 5 War. 

256. Q. Article 0102, which you have just read, states that this plan 
was based upon the report of the U. S. -British Staff conversations 
and gives the short title ABC-1. What is ABC-1 ? 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. ABC— 1 was American, British, Canadian conversations and 
the resuks thereof. 

257. Q. Who approved tlie Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan 
Kainbow 5 ? 

A. It was approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 
iSavy, and the President. 

258. Q. Will you please read the concept of war as laid down in the 
Joint Basic War Plan Rainbow 5, which you will find in appendix 1, 
section 4, and it is necessary to read only articles 10 and 13, subpara- 
graphs a, cl, and e, on page 5, appendix 1 ? 

A. (Reading:) 

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of 
ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraphs 13(h) is quoted as modified by 
the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staffs secret letter Serial 
039412 of April 5, 1941. 

10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the de- 
feat of Germany and her Allies. 

11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense 
policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take ac- 
count are : 

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the At- 
lantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The prin- 
cipal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and opera- 
tions of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a man- 
ner as to facilitate that effort. 

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their 
forces in a mannei- to guard against Japanese [SO] intervention. If 
Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East v»ill be defensive. 
The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the 
Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet Offensively in the 
manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the 
defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. 
The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediter- 
ranean areas that the British Conmionwealth will be in a position to release the 
necessary forces for the Far East. 

(e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers 
at any or.e time will be decided with regard to the Military sitiiation in all 
theaters. 

259. Q. From what you read then. Admiral Stark, the decisive 
theater was considered to be in the Atlantic and the European area, 
and the principal United States military effort w^as to be exerted in 
that area, and the operation of other forces would be cut in such 
manner as to facilitate that effort ; is that correct? 

A. It is. 

260. Q. Will you read that part of Joint Plan, Rainbow 5, per- 
taining to the Navy tasks in the Far East and in the Pacific area? 
That is section VII of the Appendix, Articles 35 and 36 only. 

A. (Reading:) _ • 

35. Navy tasks. 

a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far E-ast l)y diverting 
enemy strength awa.v from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture 
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications 
and positions. 

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the 
Pacific Area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 71 

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west 
as Longitude 155° East. 

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, 
by destroying hostile expeditions and [81] by supporting land and air 
forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere. 

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area. 

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Guam. 

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified 
localities in categories of defen.se presci-ibed in paragraph 47. 
i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area. 

261. Q. 36? 
A. (Keading:) 

36. Navy Forces. 

a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments. 

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. 

262. Q. Admiral Stark, since the Joint Army and Navy Basic 
Rainbow 5 was, as you have stated, approved by the Secretaries of 
War and Navy and by the President, was that plan then the binding 
directive on you in the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rain- 
bow 5? 

A. It w^as. 

263. Q. You have previously testified regarding the tasks assigned 
to the Pacific Fleet in that Navy Basic Plan. Were the tasks which 
you assigned in that Plan, and those in the Joint Army and Navy Plan, 
consistent ? 

A. They were. They were practically identical. 

264. Q. I show you a letter. Can you identify it ? 
A. Yes. 

265. Q. Will you state what it is, please ? 

A. I identify it as a letter from the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 1 May 1941, Subject, 
Air Defense of Pearl Harbor. 

The letter, file_ number S-Al6-3/A7-3(3) ND14 (0410), dated 
May 1, 1941, Subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, from the Com- 
mandant, 14th Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations, was sub- 
mitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to 
the court, and by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the 
record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 
23," for reference, description appended. 

[82] 266. Q. Will you identify Enclosure (C) of this letter? 

A. Enclosure (C) of this letter is an enclo.sure dated 31 March 
1941, is an addendum to Naval Base Defense Air Force, Operation 
Plan Number A-1-41, on a joint estimate covering joint Army and 
Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu 
or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area, and is signed by Rear Admiral 
P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander Naval Air Base, Defense Air Force, 
Commander Patrol Tw^o, and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. 
Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Defense Force. 

267. Q. Admiral, w^ill you read from that. Appendix C, Article 3, 
sub-paragraphs a. and b? 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. (Reading:) 

Article 3. Possible enemy action. 

a. A declaration of war might be proceeded by; 

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. 

(2) A surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl 
Harbor. 

(3) A combination of these two. 

b. It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would 
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely 
be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside 
of 300 miles. 

268. Q, Do you recall having read what yon have just quoted, or, in 
fact, the entire estimate at any time during the spring or early summer 
of 1941? 

A. I could not say definitely that I read this particular letter. I 
am under the impression that I did, or that I knew about it. It is 
contamed in that file, which was forwarded by the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District. It contains the paragraph to which I have 
previously testified, and which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet showed me in his memorandum of June 4, and after which I 
sent a considerable portion of this file out to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, Commander-in- 
Chief of the Asiatic, and to all Naval Districts. It is approximately 
three years since then, and to state whether I read the particular 
enclosure I could not definitely state. 

269. Q. In conection with the difficulty in remembering, do you 
recall it from the standpoint of having had any reaction as regards 
it in measures which you had previously taken? 

A. The reaction I got on this file was one of considerable satisfac- 
tion, because it is along the line of the letter signed by the Secretary 
of the Navy of January 24. 

[SS] Examined by the court : 

270. Q. What year? 
A. '41. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy (continued) : 

271. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter. Can you identify it? 

A. Yes, this is a letter dated 7 February 1941, on the subject of Air 
Defense of Pearl Harbor, Haw^aii, by the Secretary of War, Henry L. 
Stimson, in reply to the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 
1941. 

The letter from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to the 
Secretary of the Navy, dated February 7, 1941, was submitted to the 
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the 
interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in 
evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copv appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 24". 

272. Q. Please read the letter. 

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 24. 

273. Q. Admiral, do you recall any other urging of the War De- 
partment, formal or otherwise, between the date of that letter and 
7 December 1941, on that point? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 73 

A. The matter of anti-aircraft defense and of planes to Hawaii 
for defense was a subject of frequent conversations between myself 
and General Marshall, and my offers were to transport them when- 
ever and as quickly as thej^ could be made ready. There might have 
been some particular time when we couldn't have transported, but in 
general we stood ready to get out to the Hawaiian Islands anything 
which the Army could make available in that connection. 

274. Q. When you sent your war warning dispatch of 27 Novem- 
ber, 1941, which is Exhibit 17, did you know that the Chief of Staff, 
Army, had sent a similar dis^Datch to Commanding General Hawaiian 
Department ? 

A, I did, and the dispatch so states. 

275. Q. What steps did you expect the Hawaiian Department to 
take upon their receipt of this dispatch from the Chief of Staff? 

A. I expected the Army to utilize its warning system to the utmost, 
with all accessories thereto, in the way of communications. I ex- 
pected them to make ready a maximum [S4\ number of planes 
possible. I expected them to man their anti-aircraft defense, both 
fixed — I expected them to man tb.eir batteries, both fixed and mobile. 
I expected them to imx^lement arrangements which they had with the 
Navy in joint agreements. I expected them to take some sabotage 
measures. In other words, I ex])ected them to assume a maximum 
state of readiness in defense of Pearl Harbor. The defense of the 
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor was an Army responsibility. That base 
was vital to the prosecution of a war in the Pacific. That was com- 
mon knowledge, also that we were rushing as fast as possible every- 
thing we could to make that base more useful. It made no dilference, 
so far as the Army's responsibility for the defense of that base was 
concerned, whether the Fleet was all at sea, or all in harbor, or any 
part thereof. It made no difference whether the Commander-in-Chief 
of that Fleet was in Pearl Harbor or whether he was at sea. In par- 
ticular, I would have expected the Army to have ready their pursuit 
planes, some of them certainly in instant readiness, and full alert- 
edness with regard to others, to man these pursuit planes in the ear- 
liest possible time in emergency. These were the principal or certainly 
the primary weapon of defense against an air attack coming in from 
tlie sea. 

276. Q. Admiral, were the measures by which the Battle ot Britain 
was won and the repeated German attempts to win the war by m«ans 
of bombing defeated — matters of technical and general knowledge — 
known to the Navy Department, and, in so far as you know, to tne War 
Department, in early 1941? 

A. I'o a very considerable extent they were to the Navy Department, 
and I am not familiar with how many observers, operational, tecn- 
iiical, and otherwise, the Army employed in this connection. 

277. Q. Admiral, in your testimony of yesterday you stated that, 
in answer to a question, that you considered that there was greater 
danger to the ships in the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area while in 
port than at sea. When you said that, did you envisage the conditions 
that were found to actually obtain on 7 December, or those which you 
have stated you expected to obtain? 

A. I was thinking of the conditions which did obtain. 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

278. Q. Admiral, your dispatch of 28 November, which is Exhibit 
19, and was sent to the Commanders of the Pacific Coastal Frontiers — 
what was your purpose in fully quoting an Army disjiatch? 

A. I quoted the Army's dispatch to our people that they might 
know the information and the instructions their Army opposites 
in their area had. 

[S5] 279. Q. What else did your dispatch contain? 

A. It also contained a directive to our peo])le to be prepared to carry 
out the tasks assigned in WPL— 46 so far as they applied to Japan and 
in case of hostilities. The entire dispatch, therefore,, was mostly 
informator}' and contained a directive. 

280. Q. On what basis was CinCPac an informatory addressee? 
A. He was made an informatory addressee that he might know that 

this information and this directive had been given to the Pacific 
Coastal Frontiers, which automatically came under him in case of 
hostilities with Japan. 

281. Q. Admiral, the extract from WPL— 46 which you have read 
this morning mentioned tasks or commitments in connection with th.e 
defense of Guam. What, in late November 1941, was the actual situa- 
tion as regard to the possibility of holding Guam, and what was really 
expected in case Japan went to war with us? 

A. We had little or no hope of holding Guam in case of war with 
Japan, at that time. 

282. Q. In your testimony of yesterday you stated you thought the 
information which had been placed before you concerning Japan, in 
the period 16 October to 7 December Avas quite reliable. What 
variety of information were you referring to ? 

A. I was referring to political information. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : " 

283. Q. When Admiral Kimmel Avas appointed Commander-in- 
Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet about 1 February, 1941, did 
you have and express any o])inion about his selection? 

A. I strongly recommended his appointment. He was my choice, 
my recommendation. I do not mean by that, that he was not recom- 
mended by others. He was. 

284. Q. After 7 December '41, did you cause a note to be inserted 
in Admiral KimmeFs fitness report ? 

A. Yes. 

[86] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first 
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

285. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it? 

A. I identify this as a report of fitness on Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, from the 
period 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941. 

The fitness report on Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 
the period 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941, was submitted to 
each of the other interested parties, to the judge advocate, and to 
the court, and by the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence for the jiurpose only 
of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may 
be pertinent to the inquiry before the court. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 75 

There beino; no objection, the document wap so received and marked 
"EXHIBIT 25", for reference, description appended. 

286. Q. Please read the answer to Question No. 9, Admiral Stark? 
A. (Reading:) 

No. 9: Has the work of this officer been reported on either in a commenda- 
tory way or adversely dnring the period of this report? The answer: (Read- 
ing) Has been reported on adversely by the Commission appointed by the 
President to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the 
Territory of Hawaii, December 7, 1941. (Copy of report attached.) 

287. Q. Please read the answer to Question No. 14? 

288. A. (Reading:) 

No. 14. Is this officer professionally qualified to perform ALL the duties 
of his grade? The answer: (reading) I have always considered Admiral 
Kimmel an outstanding officer in ability, integrity, and character. I still do. 

288. Q. Admiral J. O. Richardson was Commander-in-Chief of 
th6 United States Fleet from approximately one year prior to Ad- 
miral Kimmel's appointment, was he not? 

A. He was. 

289. Q. And during Admiral Richardson's command, the Fleet 
sailed from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor for maneuvers in 
March or April of 1940, did it not ? 

A. That is right. 

290. When the Fleet went to Pearl Harbor from the West Coast 
on that occasion, did you have any thought or plan that the Fleet 
would stay at Pearl Harbor longer than was necessary to carry out 
the maneuvers that were immediately planned for it ? 

A. Just when that thought developed, I would hesitate to say. 
I couldn't answer specifically "j^es". 

[87] The witness requested permission to refresh his memory 
from documents he had in his possession. 

The court granted the permission. 

291. Q. When the Fleet sailed from the West Coast to Hawaiian 
waters in the spring of 1940, Admiral Stark, did you have any 
thought or plan that it would continue in Hawaiian waters longer 
than for the execution of the maneuvers currently planned? 

A. The question is very broad as to whether or not I had any 
thought on the subject. To the best of my recollection no decision 
had been reached at that time but I do not recall; and I do not 
recall of any particular discussion at that time. 

292. Q. Do I understand that it is your present recollection that 
when the Fleet sailed from the West Coast, probably in March of 
1940, for Hawaiian waters, that the Navy Department as personified 
by the Chief of Naval Operations, had concluded the intention of 
keeping the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor for an indefinite time? 

A. To the best of my recollection, we had not come to such a con- 
clusion when the Fleet sailed. 

293. Q. Had Admiral Richardson been advised of the possibility 
of his remaining indefinitely at Pearl Harbor when he sailed ? 

A. Not that I recall, and I would have to search any correspond- 
ence I may have to see if that answer should be changed. 

294. Q. When was the decision made to keep the Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor after the conclusion of the spring maneuvers of 1940? 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. The decision was made in early May to retain it there for the 
time being. 

295. Q. What do yon mean by "the time being", Admiral? 

A. Well, to continue it there. To the best of my remembrance, 
there was no decision made at that time, for example, to keep it there 
for the period which it was kept there. 

296. Q. Well, is it fair to say that the immediate return was post- 
poned with no definite conclusion reached as to when, if ever, it 
should return? 

A. The decision was reached at that time to keep it there for a 
short period. 

297. Q. And what do you mean by "a short ]3eriod" ? 
A. I mean a couple of weeks. 

298. Q. And at the conclusion of that couple of weeks, what de- 
cision was reached? 

[88] The witness requested permission to refresh his memory 
from documents he had in his possession. 

The court granted the permission. 

A. The decision was reached to continue the Fleet in Hawaii again 
for the time being. To the best of my recollection we didn't then, and 
for some time afterwards, decide that the Fleet was going to remain 
there continuously. The question came up from time to time with the 
result that the Fleet was kept there 

299. Q. At some time was there a definitive decision reached that 
the Pacific Fleet should be kept more or less permanently based at 
Pearl Harbor? 

A. Well, in effect, it was kept there. When we state "permanently", 
which would mean regardless of all else, I could not say "yes" to that. 
Under the conditions which then existed we did keep it there. Had 
they been considerably altered, we might have changed our decision. 

300. Q. At some time during tlie late summer or fall of 1940, did 
Admiral Richardson make either one or two official visits to Washing- 
ton? 

A. He did. 

301. Q. And during one or both of those visits, did you have con- 
versations with him relative to continuing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor? 

A. That question was undoubtedly one which we talked about. 

302. Q. And do you recall that Admiral Richardson protested with 
strength and vigor the continued maintenance of the Pacific Fleet 
at Pearl Harbor under the then existing conditions ? 

A. I recall his desire to bring the Fleet back to the Coast. 

303. Q. Did he advance any reasons to you for that desire? 
A. Yes, he supported them with reasons. 

304. Q. Do you recall what the reasons were, as stated to you ? 
The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from docu- 
ments he had in his possession. 

The court granted the permission. 
A. I can give you some of the reasons. 

305. Q. Can you state generally your present recollection? 

A. I recall one reason which Admiral Richardson gave which was 
in connection with morale, namely, that the fleet [SO] on the 
Pacific Coast would have better opportunity for recreation, visits with 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 77 

their families. I am not sure, but as I recall the question of re-enlist- 
ments was brought up in that same connection, but as to any material 
reason which he might have given, I do not recall specifically at the 
moment. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, sug- 
gested that this line of questioning is based upon events that are a 
long distance back and i-equested that the documents be introduced in 
evidence. 

306. Q. You understood. Admiral Stark, that in these questions I 
have been referring to basing the wliole Pacific Fleet, rather than any 
particular section of it, at Pearl Harbor ? 

A. Yes, I understand that. 

307. Q. Do you recall whether Admiral Eichardson based his pro- 
test on the fact that he considered the Fleet was not secure at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. I do not recall that, no, nor any official communication to that 
effect. 

308. Q. Do you recall whether one of the factors behind Admiral 
Richardson's protest was that strategically and logistically, war op- 
erations could not be conducted, either actually or in training, from 
Pearl Harbor because of inadequate train then attached to the Fleet? 

A. I remember a discussion of inadequate train came up and we 
were endeavoring to meet the needs of the Fleet to make Pearl Harbor 
suitable for some of these purposes, if not all of them. 

309. Q. Yesterday you read from a letter dated, I think, in May of 
1940, to Admiral Richardson, in which you discussed some of the 
factors for maintaining the entire Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

A, Right. 

310. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it ? 

A. I identify it as a copy of a letter from me to Admiral Richard- 
son dated 27 May, 1940. 

The letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark, to Admiral J. O. Rich- 
ardson, U. S. Navy, dated May 27, 1940, was submitted to the judge 
advocate, each of the other interested parties, and to the court, and 
by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret) , offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter read- 
ing into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to 
the inquiry before the court. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
26", for reference, description appended. 

[90] Q. I should like to read two of the paragraphs, Admiral 
Stark (reading) : 

Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask, 
"Suppose the Japs do go into tlie East Indies'? What are we going to do about 
it?" My answer to that is, "I don't know"', and I think there is no one on 
God's green earth that can tell. I do know my own arguments with regard to 
this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the 
thoughts contained in your recent later. I would point out one thing, and that is 
that even if the decision here were for the United States to take no decisive 
action, if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not 
breathe it to a soul as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for 
your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know 
what we are going to do and so long as they don't know, they may hesitate or 
be deterred. The above, I think, will answer the question "why you are there". 
It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. 
Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have been asked the question, and 
also like you, I have been imable to get the answer. 

There is stated in that letter, in substance, that one of the reasons for 
maintaining the entire Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was because of 
the deterrent effect on the Japanese, or the anticipated deterrent effect 
on the Japanese from going into the Netherlands East Indies ; is that 
correct ? 

A. Yes. 

312. Q. At that time, as Chief of Naval Overations, was it your 
opinion that the Pacific Fleet was strong enough and adequately 
equipped with train and repair facilities to'be a genuine and realistic 
threat to the Japanese on that basis ? 

A. Well, they certainly were a threat. 

313. Q. A genuine and realistic threat, I said, Admiral. 

A. Asking that from the standpoint of the Japanese, I certainly 
would say that it w^ould have been taken into consideration very 
seriously. It was a considerable fleet and if the question means 
whether it would have stopped them going down as a surprise, if they 
intended to do so, I would say the chances are it wouldn't. But it 
did have the chance of serving as a deterrent by its presence. 

314. Q. Was it your decision to keep the Fleet based at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. Major movements and major dispositions of the Fleet were 
taken up with the Commander-in-Chief, who made the final decision. 

[91] 315. Q. Was it your decision to keep the Fleet based at 
Pearl Harbor? 

A. I have answered the question that the decision to keep it there, 
which was effected, was that of the Commander-in-Chief. 

Examined by the court: 

316. Q. Commander-in-Chief of what? 

A. Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. 
Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (continued) : 

317. Q. To a non-military man, that means the President of the 
United States? 

A. Yes; I mean by that the President of the United States: 

318. Q. Do you recall any other factors in addition to those stated 
in Exhibit 20, the letter of 27 May, 1941, that influenced the decision 
to keep the entire Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor ? 

The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from docu- 
ments he had in his possession. 

The court granted the permission. 

The court then, at 11 : 40 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 50 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the 
reporter, the interested parties and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and 
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel (Ret.) (continued) : 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 79 

319. Q. Admiral Eichardson did not agree with your estimate of 
the readiness of the Pacific Fleet as stated in your letter of 27 May 
1941, Exhibit 20, did he, Admiral Stark? 

A. Did not agree with what ? 

320. Q. Your estimate and evalution of the readiness of the Fleet 
to accomplish some of the purposes which were among the factors for 
basing the P'leet at Pearl Harbor. 

A. I would say that Admiral Richardson could testify to that better 
than I could. 

[9^2] 321. Q. I ask you if you can identify the document which I 
now hand you, Admiral Stark? 

A. This letter is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, 
to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22 October 1940, Subject, War 
Plans, status and readiness of in view of current international situa- 
tion. 

322. Q. You received that letter as Chief of Naval Operations ? 
A. I haven't read it. I certainly assume that I did. 

The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, dated 22 October 1940, was submitted to the judge 
advocate, each of the interested parties, and to the court, and by the 
interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 
(Ret) , offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
'^EXHIBIT 27". 

Frederick T. La chat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

323. Q. Willyoureadtheletter, Admiral Stark? 
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 27. 

The court then, at 12 : 15 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 15 p. m., at which 
time it reconvened. 



[93] Present: 

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to 
the inquiry and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, IT. S. Navy, the witness under cross- 
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that 
the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (Continued) : 

324. Q. Admiral Stark, would you like to make any comments on 
Exhibit 27, which was read just before adjournment? 

A. Yes, I would be glad to say that I think it a very good letter. I 
was delighted to receive it. I was in accord with most of what it had to 
say, particularly with regard to war plans, and the very reasons which 
he gave in his criticism of the situation at that time were some of the 
causes of the development of Rainbow 5. For example, I would like to 
read Admiral Richardson's paragraph 10, in which he says : 

The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows : 

(a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present develop- 
ment of Naval Establishment ; 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II) ; 

(c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. Ill) based on 
present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known 
or can be predicted at the present time ; (2) coordination of plans developed with 
National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy; 

(d) In tlie light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief 
is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody : 

(1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere; 

(2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce; 
[OJf] (3) Threats and raids against the enemy; 

(4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establish- 
ment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up 
to support them. 

I should also like to read from page 19, Appendix 1, of Exhibit 
4, the Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5. Recalling the four 
provisions which Admiral Richardson recommended, the following 
are what Rainbow 5 prescribes : 

(Reading:) 

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a 
sustained air offensive; 

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and 
air offensive; 

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers ; 

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or 
Asiatic military power; and by 

e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance 
against land, air, or sea-borne attack. 

In anotlier part of Admiral Richardson's letter appears this para- 
graph : "It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 
that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective 
(BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some 
six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment." 

Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, to which I have just re- 
ferred, among its tasks requires the Commander-in-Chief of the Pa- 
cific Fleet to prepare the following plans : "A plan for the execution 
of Task B of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approxi- 
mately 30.000 armed troops, in addition to forces of the U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, and assuming that the task will be executed under 180 M, which 
is six months. , 

325. Q. Was one of the other factors supporting the retention of the 
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the fall of 1040 a proposed plan to 
stop all trade between Japan and the Americas by means of the main- 
tenance of a patrol line west from Honolulu to the Philippines and 
south from Samoa to Singapore? 

A. Not that I recall at that time. 

[95] 320. Q. Was there under discussion a program to maintain 
a life force line in those directions for the purpose of controlling 
commercial traffic to Japan? 

A. Not at that time that I recall, 

326a. Q. Was there at any time? 

A. The war plan which has been put in evidence speaks about in- 
terrupting Japan's commerce. 

327. Q. Do you recall a discussion with Admiral Richardson when 
he was in Washington in the fall of 1940 relative to such a patrol 
line? 

A. No, I don't recall it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 81 

328. Q. You recall no discussions with Admiral Richardson about 
that subject matter? 

A. Not about establishing a line at that time to stop Japan's — 

320. Q. To stop or control ? 

A. To stop or control Japan's traffic. We may have discussed mat- 
ters of the future in connection with war plans as to what we would 
do and how we would do it, but I don't recall the conversations at this 
time. 

330. Q. I will ask j^ou to read a letter from Admiral Richardson, 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Asiatic Fleet and see if jour memory is refreshed. 

A. I had forgotten this particular paper and don't particularly 
recall it at this time. 

331. Q. Do I understand you have no recollection of a discussion 
with Admiral Richardson over the proposition I outlined in my 
earlier question ? 

A. I would say that I have forgotten that completely. 

332. Q. After reading the letter, you say that your memory is not 
adequately refreshed to testify concerning that? 

A. That's correct. 

333. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it, 
Admiral Stark? 

A. Yes, I can identify this document as a letter from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 
7 January 194:1, on the subject of the situation concerning the security 
of the Fleet and the present ability of the local defense forces to meet 
a surprise attack. 

[96] The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the 
interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear 
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence 
for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom 
as ma}- be considered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked 
"EXHIBIT 28", copy appended. 

334. Q. Was this letter, Exhibit 28, the basis and initiating thought 
in the preparation of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the 
Secretary of War, previously introduced in evidence, dated January 
24,1941? 

A. I couldn't say whether it w^as the basis, but it is in some respects 
along the sam.e line. It may have been. I don't recall. "Wliere I 
said, "It may have been," it may have influenced ; I don't remember. 

335. Q. I ask you if you can identify this as a photostatic copy of 
a letter which you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 10 Februarv 
1941? ^ ' . . . 

A. Yes, I can identify this as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, 
dated 10 February 1941. 

The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested 
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the 
purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may 
be considered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked 
"EXHIBIT 29", copy appended. 

79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 7 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

336. Q. I ask you if you cau identify this as a photostatic copy of 
a letter written by Admiral Kinimel to you dated 18 February 1941 ? 

A. I recognize this letter as one from Admiral Kimmel to me, dated 
18 February 1941. 

The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested 
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for 
the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as 
may be considered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked 
•'EXHIBIT 30", copy appended. 

[1)7] 337. Q. After the receipt of this letter from Admiral Kim- 
mel did you make an effort to ascertain who was responsible for the 
transmission of secret information ? It was between O. N. I. and 
Operations. 

A. I unquestionably did. I don't recall just the action taken. 

338. Q. Did you understand from this postscript which I have just 
read that the Commander-in-Chief requested to be currently and 
promptly advised as to information of a secret character? 

A. Which would be of use to him, yes. 

339. Q. What did you understand was included in information of 
a secret character, as used in the letter? 

A. Well, I would understand that technical matters, which would 
be of assistance to the Pacific Fleet, should be sent; also operational 
matters or other matters which would be of use and of interest to him. 
When I say "technicaF', if we received word of some particular method 
of mine-sweeping or of some particular mines that ought to be used, 
that information certainly might be of some future use to him. When 
I say "operational", we had many observers in England sending in 
data as to how they operated, and if I found something that might be 
of use to him, I would consider that it ought to go to him. There are 
many subjects of which these two are just samples. 

340. Q. Did you understand it to include all information relative 
to diplomatic and international developments affecting the Pacific 
Area ? 

A. I would not say all matters. We aimed to keep the Commander- 
in-Chief in the Pacific acquainted with these subjects, so far as we 
thought he would have a vital interest, but to have sent him a mass 
of everything that came in without evaluation, which we were more 
or less ]3i'epared to do, it might have been more of a hindrance than 
help to him. 

341. Q. The only reason you would not send him information in that 
category was that you felt it too trivial to be worthy of his attention? 

A. Well, I wouldn't send him that which I thought to be trivial of 
his attention. 

342. Q. Did you send him anything which you did not consider 
trivial affecting international and political developments in the Pa- 
cific area? 

A. It was my aim to keep Admiral Kimmel abreast of wortlnvhile 
developments. 

[9S] 343. Q. I ask you if you can identify what I now hand you 
as a photostatic copy of a letter which you wrote Admiral Kimmel 
under date of 25 February 1941, enclosing copies of two memoranda 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 83 

to the President, one dated 11 February 1941 and the other February 
5, 1941. I shall call attention only to the first memorandum to the 
President. 

A. I identify this as a letter to Admiral Kimmel from me dated 25 
February 1941. 

The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested 
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the 
purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be 
considered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked 
"EXHIBIT 31", copy appended. 

3444. Q. When you said. Admiral, in that memorandum to the Pres- 
ident that the Pacific Fleet is now weaker in tonnage and aircraft, did 
you mean the entire U. S. Fleet in the Pacific, minus the Asiatic, or 
only that portion of it which was based at Pearl Harbor? 

A. My recollection is that I was referring to that which was under 
command of .Admiral Kimmel, but I may have taken the other into 
consideration. I don't recall. 

345. Q. At that time how much weaker was the U. S. Pacific Fleet 
under Admiral Kimmel than the Japanese Fleet? 

A. That can be obtained from the record. 

346. Q. Have you any general knowledge on it? 

A. I had general knowledge of it, but numbers, tonnages, etc., are a 
matter of record. 

347. Q. At that time had any portion of the Pacific Fleet which 
was based at Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Richardson took it to 
Pearl Harbor in March, 1940, been diverted to the Atlantic? 

A. I would have to check the record on that. The record can be 
checked on that. 

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, 
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, withdrew. 

[9,9] 348. Q. Would that be tedious for you to do before to- 
morrow or would it be practicable? 

A. The answer to the question is that the CINCINNATI and MIL- 
WAUKEE were transferred between the dates you mentioned. 

349. Q. And those were the only diversions from the Pacific Fleet 
from March of 1940 until 11 February '41? 

A. Those are the only diversions of which I have access to the rec- 
ord here at this time, and I think they are accurate. 

350. Q. Isn't it a matter of fact that up to 11 February 1941, there 
had been no substantial change in the strength of the Pacific Fleet 
from the time that it went to Pearl Harbor under Admiral Richard- 
son in the spring of 1940? 

A. I think that is correct. 

351. Q. And yet, with no substantial change, you considered in 
February 1940 that the Pacific Fleet was weaker than the Japanese 
Fleet? 

A. That's right. 

352. Q. In February '41 ? 
A. Yes. 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

353. Q. You say that it remains a constant, serious, and real threat 
to the Japanese Fleet in the memorandum? 

A. That's right. 

354. Q. Did you mean by that that the strength of the U. S. Pacific 
Fleet was such that it was only a threat and that it did not possess 
the power to initiate a frontal offensive against the Japanese Fleet 
in February of 1941? 

A. Yes. 

355. Q. In May of 1941, there was diverted under your orders, from 
the Pacific Fleet, a substantial quota of vessels, was there not? 

A. In May, 1941 ? 

356. Q. Yes. That would have been in connection with the am- 
phibious operation to which you made reference yesterday, in the 
Atlantic. 

A. I would have to refer to the record as to just when it was made. 
The information that I have shows transit through the Canal in June. 
I think your statement is probably correct. 

357. Q. What was the strength of that diversion in June of 1941? 
A. To the best of my recollection, three battleships, four cruisers, 

the YORKTOWN, at approximatelv that date. 
[100] 358. Q. That is a carrier? 
A. Carrier. And a squadron of destroyers. 

359. Q. Now how many destroyers would be in a squadron? 

A. I think there were nine in that squadron. I would have to 
check the record. 

360. Q. How much did that diversion to the Atlantic reduce the 
striking force or the fighting value of the Pacific Fleet as compared 
with what it was before that diversion ? 

A. It reduced it by just so much as was detached. 

361. Q. Were there any transports diverted at about that time? 

A. My answer is that it is not sufficiently clear in my memory to 
give an answer. 

362. Q. Now you say the diversion of this force of three battle- 
ships, four cruisers, and a carrier and squadron of destroyers re- 
ducecl the striking force or the fighting value by — what was the phrase 
you used? 

A. By just so much as was detached or transferred. 

363. Q. Wliat is the square rule about fighting forces or striking 
power of a fleet ? 

A. Wliat is that, may I ask you ? 

The question was repeated. 

A. Well, the greater the strength, the greater its striking power, 
but: it should be borne in mind in connection with these transfers 
that they were laid down in accordance with plans which had been 
approved and which had been promulgated, and that it left the 
Fleet with forces which were in these plans to accomplish certain 
tasks. The forces transferred were in accordance with the previous 
directive, Rainbow. V. 

364. Q. Was the comparative number of vessels diverted in June 
of 1941, consisting of three battleships, four cruisers, and accom- 
panying escorts, approximately a quarter of the forces of the Pacific 
Fleet originally there at Pearl Harbor ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 85 

A. Well, we had twelve battleships. A quarter of twelve would 
be three; we had nine left. So far as the battleships were con- 
cerned, that would be true. As I recall, we had four carriers. We 
took one. That would be a quarter. As far as the destroyers, 
speaking from recollection, we had approximately fifty, according 
to my recollection. If we took nine, it would be approximately 20%. 

365. Q. And four cruisers? 

A. As I recall, we had about fourteen cruisers out [^01^ 
there. That is recollection, and if we took four, it would be ap- 
proximately 25%, maybe a little over. 

36'6. Q. This is it fair to say that this diversion of three battle- 
ships, four cruisers, nine destroyers, and one carrier, constituted 
apj)roximately 25% of the Pacific Fleet as it originally moved to 
Hawaii under Admiral Richardson? 

A. Xo, I wouldn't say that. That statement, according to my recol- 
lection, is true except as regards destroyers and submarines. 

367. Q. It was 20% of the destroyers instead of 25? 
A. Approximately. 

368. Q. Slightly more than 25%, of the cruisers? 
A. Yes. 

369. Q. I kind of balanced those differences. 
A. Yes. 

370. Q. No submarines were diverted to the Atlantic? 
A. Not that I recollect. 

371. Q. At any time? 

A. I don't want to guess on that question and I don't recall clearly, 

372. Q. Admiral Kimmel advises that no submarines were trans- 
ferred to the Atlantic. 

A. Yes. 

373. Q. Now how would you evaluate by fractions the force which 
you have described as passing through the Canal in June in relation 
to the force moving out to Pearl Harbor under Admiral Eichard- 
son? I suggested a quarter. You felt that I was a little extravagant 
in my estimate. 

A. You mean would I evaluate it as a 20% reduction? 

374. Q. Yes, or a 25% reduction. 

A. I think the figures in the record speak for themselves. 

375. Q. They speak for themselves except for the submarine fac- 
tor. No submarines were moved. How do you evaluate the sub- 
marine force in the Pacific as part of the whole? 

A. You mean as part of the whole Pacific Fleet ? 

376. Q. That's right. 

A. I never evaluate in that way. 

377. Q. 'Wliat I am getting at is, what fraction of the [102] 
Pacific Fleet was diverted in June of 1941 to the Atlantic ? 

A. The composition of the Fleet, I believe, is in the record in pre- 
vious testimony. The detachments are, approximately, in the record. 
The figures as to what remained are in the record. If one started to 
evaluate, you can't evaluate by numbers alone. You have got to 
evaluate by types. 

378. Q. With exception of the submarmes, it was practically 25%? 
A. With reference to number alone ? 

379. Q. Yes. 



86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. To the best of my recollection that would be a fair estimate, 

380. Q. Now would you explain what is the application of the 
square rule to the diversion of a fraction of a fleet, in its fighting 
force ? 

A, I don't know what you mean, 

381. Q. That means nothing — that phrase? 
A, No, it doesn't to me, sorry, 

382. Q. Is there any section or paragraph of WPL-46, Admiral 
Stark, where the term ''War Warning" is used? 

A. Not that I recall. 

383. Q. Has the term any more significance in naval parlance than 
in ordinary speech? 

A. Well, to me it was a very glaring phrase — to me and to those 
of us who went over that dispatch, 

384. Q. Has it any more significance than it has in ordinary 
speech ? 

A. I would say used as it was, that it did. ^ 

385. Q. The phrase "mobilize" does have a very definite meaning 
under WPL-46, does it not ? 

A, Yes, 

386. Q. Is it not accurate to say that there is a regularly established 
procedure for putting the Navy on a war basis under Rainbow 5, and 
tliat that procedure is to issue orders to mobilize or to execute WPL-46 
in whole or in part? 

A. It is so far as directing execution in total or in part. I don't 
recall for the moment with regard to the mobilization, but I may state, 
and- 1 think it is repetition, that we were practically mobilized at that 
time. I had nothing else left to mobilize, as I recall. 

387. Q. You never at any time prior to December 7 sent out any 
orders to mobilize under WPL-46 ? 

A. No. 

388. Q, Did you ever keep any record of your conversations 
[103] with the President, during the year 1941 ? 

A, No, I did not. 

389. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you omitted the 
phrase, "in any direction", which you used to characterize a surprise 
aggressive move by Japan in the dispatch of Novembar 24, did you 
not? 

A. Yes, Let me check that. I will make sure. Yes, I did omit 
it. I did not put it in. 

390. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, you particularized the 
description of objectives of a Japanese amphibious ex]3edition as the 
Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo, did you not? 

A, I stated in that dispatch that the number and the equipment 
of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces 
indicated — repeat "indicated" — an amphibious expedition against 
either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, 

391. Q. In this respect, then, your dispatch of November 27 re- 
stricted the geographical area from "any direction" to specific areas, 
did it not? 

A, I do not consider that it restricted it to the areas mentioned. 
I stated that the organization of the Naval task forces indicated cer- 
tain objectives, but the fact that I didn't mention others does not 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 87 

necessarily exclude them, particularly in view of the preceding dis- 
patch to which you have referred. I make mention in that connec- 
tion, if I may, with reference to the previous dispatch to which you 
referred, in which the phrase, "in any direction", was used, that that 
message, in addition to being sent to CinCAF and CinCPac was also 
sent to Comll, Coml2, ComlS, and ComlS. I meant to invite atten- 
tion to it at the time we were talking about it, but it slipped my 
mind. In other words, I not only w^anted, as I then mentioned, to 
put forth the thought that Hawaii might be an objective, but that 
the attack might come anywhere, on the Canal, or the whole coast. 

392. Q. Well, will you agree, Admiral Stark, that the addressee of 
such dispatches as those of November 24 and November 27 could 
reasonably conclude that your last-stated expectation of the direc- 
tion of the Japanese movement, in your dispatch of November 27, was 
designed to be more precise that the directions indicated in your 
dispatch of November 24? 

A. The dispatch of the 24th mentioned the Philippines or Guam 
as a possibility, and stated that it might be in any direction. The 
dispatch of the 27th stated that the information we had indicated 
an amphibious expedition to the southward, including the Philip- 
pines, and it was confirmatory. It was not intended to limit the 
previous notice of the addressees in the November 24 dispatch — that 
they were immune. It simply showed the information that we had. 

Frank L. Middleston, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[10 Jf] 393. Q. The question was, whether you did not agree 
that the addressee of these two dispatches could, and probably did, 
reasonably conclude that the last dispatch was much more precise in 
the direction indicated than the earlier message. 

A. I am perfectly willing, and have tried to answer the question 
as to what the dispatch meant to me, namely, as to what information 
we had indicating where it might fall, but it was far from my mind 
as to making that exclusive. We had data indicating these points; 
lack of data regarding other points didn't necessarily mean that they 
could not be attacked. And in the previous dispatch, the words "iii 
any direction" were put in there to show that while we were giving 
what we had, that w^e did consider that it might come anywhere, even 
so far to the eastward as the United States. 

394. Q. And in your mind the message of the 27th did not limit 
or change the breadth or the scope indicated in the message of the 
24th? 

A. No, it did not. 

395. Q. At the time of your dispatch of November 24th, you testi- 
fied in your direct testimony, Admiral Stark, that the words "in any 
direction" expressed your thought that an attack on Pearl Harbor 
was a possibility. 

A. That is right. And to broaden that, I have just brought up 
the question showing where that dispatch was addressed. 

39r). Q. Now, if you thought that Pearl Harbor was a possibility 
as a point of attack, th.ere was no reason why, in your dispatch to 
Admiral Kimmel, you couldn't have said so explicitly, was there? 

A. No, there was no reason why I could not have. 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

397. Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you consider an attack on Pearl 
Harbor as no more than a possibility, even on November 27tli ? 

A. I considered it as a possibility. 

398. Q. But a rather remote possibility? 

A. Well, I went between "remote possibility" and "probability". 
It is a little difficult to differentiate. I considered it a possibility. 

399. Q. You did not consider it a probability ? 

A. No, I didn't consider it a probability ? If I had thought it was 
a probability I might have mentioneTl it. I thought it a possibility. 

400. Q. If you had thought that Pearl Harbor was a probability 
on November 27th, you would have doubtless included that in the 
specific mention of the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly 
Borneo ? 

A. No, I don't know that I would have. We were giving a war 
warning that Japan might strike. We gave the best UOS] in- 
formation we had indicating points which might be struck. We 
didn't exclude anything else, and the fact that other places were 
possibilities was intended to stand. 

401. Q. My question was, If you had conceived Pearl Harbor to 
be a probable point of attack, you would have included it specifically 
in your message of November 27 ? 

A. If I had had information that indicated that Pearl Harbor was 
a point of attack, I certainly should have included it. 

402. Q. I think you testified in your direct examination. Admiral 
Stark, that after the dispatch of November 24th, you did not intend 
Admiral Kimmel to interrupt his training or discontinue his health 
cruises for all-out security measures? 

A. I think it was with reference to the dispatch of October 16th 
that I mentioned that. 

The court then, at 4 : 05 p. m., took a recess until 4 : 10 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the 
interested parties and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and 
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, (Ret) (Continued) : 

403. Q. I refer you to Page 52 of the record of Monday, August 7, 
1944, question No. 141, which reads : 

141. Q. What action did you expect the commander-in-chief of the Pacific 
Fleet to take on the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, now before the court? 

A. It was largely informatory. He had previously taken measures regarding 
whicli testimony lias been given, which I considered appropriate. I considered 
that if in his judgment, with what he had been doing in the course of the month, 
he thought any additional tigtening up was necessary he would do it. I was 
trying to acquaint him with the picture as I saw it and that there was a possi- 
bility of a surprise attack. I left that to his good judgment. And the same 
way in the Far East ; I sent no specific instructions. It was not my general 
habit to do so. 

[106] 142. Q. The language of the dispatch is, and I quote: "A surprise, 
aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility." Was your information 
at the time such as would have warranted your using language indicating that 
the aggressive movement was stronger than a possibility? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 89 

A. I didn't feel — I wasn't ready to go to an all-out at that time. Admiral 
Kimmel was confronted with problems, and very difficiUt problems, of training. 
He was making a so-called health cruise which I had initiated. As I recall, 
they were originated with Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, which I 
was not yet ready to interrupt. I didn't feel at that time that he was ready 
needed to start using everything we had on a war basis, and the word "possi- 
bility" was used advisedly, though I knew the situation was certainly no better, 
and if anything, deteriorating. 

A. You are referring to the dispatch of November 24th, now? 

404. Q. I will repeat my question. After November 24th, you 
have already testified, have you not, that you did not intend Admiral 
Kimmel to interrupt his training or discontinue health cruises for 
all-out security measures? 

A. I wrote Admiral Kimmel after the dispatch of October 14th 

405. Q. No, no ; November 24th. 

A. I was thinking of the dispatch of October 17 with reference 
to your question, but I am willing to let it stand for the 24th. 

406. Q. And yet, after the dispatch of November 27th, you have 
testified you expected Admiral Kimmel to institute full security 
measures ? 

A. That is right. 

407. Q. At the time you sent both dispatches, however, in your 
own mind an attack on the Hawaiian area was a possibility and not 
a probability ; is that correct ? 

A. Yes, except that the war warning message certainly gave a 
picture of very much more gravity than anything else, anything 
previous which had been sent. 

408. Q. But you considered an attack on Pearl Harbor a possi- 
bility at the time you sent the message on November 24 ? 

A. Yes, that is right^ 

409. Q. And you considered it only a possibility when you sent 
your message of November 27th ? 

A. I considered war far more probable on the sending of the mes- 
sage of the 27th, and to that extent was more likely to happen. 

[107] 410. Q. But you have been very definite. Admiral, that 
on the 27th you considered an attack on Pearl Harbor only a possi- 
bility as distinguished from a probability. 

A. Yes. 

411. Q. You so testified before the Roberts Commission. 

A. Yes. I don't recall about the Roberts Commission but I say 
"yes" to that. 

412. Q. And you so testify now? 
A. Yes. 

413. Q. After the dispatch of November 24th, did you have a con- 
ference with the President and Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State? 

A. After November 24th? I did. 

414. Q. That is referred to in the postscript of your letter of No- 
vember 25th, which was introduced as an exhibit yesterday, or the 
day before. 

A. Yes; that is right. 

415. Q. Do you recall when that conference was? 

A. No, I don't. I think it was shortly after — it was probably the 
25th, or very close to it, as I recall. The postscript is not "dated. 

416. Q. In Exhibit 16, this letter of November 25th, you state in 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the postscript, "I held this up pending a meeting with the President 
and Mr. Hull today." Now, the letter is dated the 25th. Do you 
recall whether you held it more than one day ? 

A. No, I do not recall. I think it was just about the time the letter 
was written, but I don't recall. It may have been the next morning; 
it may have been that afternoon. I don't remember. I have no means 
of remembering, 

417. Q. That postscript represented your very recent and prob- 
ably extremely accurate impression of the conference, did it not? 

A. Yes. 

418. Q. Did your estimate of the situation, namely, that an attack 
on Pearl Harbor was a possibility and not a probability, remain the 
same after the conference as it had been when you sent (Tie dispatch 
of November 24th ? 

A. I don't recall that I changed my opinion any, I stated in the — 
that is in the record, isn't it, that postscript? 

419. Q, Yes, that was read in the vec/)rd before. 

A. I gave the thouglit of the President and Mr. Hull in it, and 
I gave the thought with regard to Russia in it. 

[JOS] 420. Q. But your own mental reaction with respect to the 
over-all situation did undergo some change prior to the 27th of 
November ? 

A. Yes. On the 27th of November when negotiations ceased, that 
made, in my opinion, quite a difference in the whole set-up. It brought 
it to a head. 

421. Q. As I understand it, the basic factor of your personally hav- 
ing a more alarming view in the interval between November 24 and 
November 27, was the fact that negotiations between our Secretary 
of State and Admiral Nomura had ceased ? 

A. That is right. 

422. Q. You knew, did you not, that on November 26th the United 
States had given Japan a note which stated certain basic proposals for 
Japanese-American relations? That note is now printed on Page 768 
of Volume 2 of Foreign Relations, 1931-1041 ? 

A. I don't know whether I did or not, but if you will read the note 
it may refresh my memory. 

Tlie witness requested jjermission to refresh his memory from 
Volume 2 of Foreign Relations, 1931-1941. 

The court granted the permission. 

423. Q. My inquiry was, Did you know if such was a fact ? 
A. I don't recall ever having seen that note. 

424. Q. The question is whether or not you knew, on November 26th, 
that the United States had given Japan a note which stated certain 
basic proposals for Japanese-American relations. I am not asking 
whether you knew the precise contents of it. 

A. No, I don't remember that note. I do recollect a conference in 
the White House at which were present, Mr. Hull, the Japanese Am- 
bassador, and myself, when certain items were discussed looking 
toward peace. I do not recall the date of that meeting. 

425. Q. I think that was quite a bit earlier. 

A. But I remember rather distinctly some of the President's pro- 
posals. But tliis document which you have given me, I do not recall 
ever having seen that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 91 

426. Q. That wasn't the question. Did you know that a document, 
a message, a note, was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese 
Ambassador on the 2Gth of November? 

A. 1 do not recall such, no. 

427. Q. Where did you get your information that diplomatic rela- 
tions had broken off? Bear in mind that a note looking forward to 
peaceful relations had been handed by the Secretary of State to the 
Japanese Ambassador on the day before you sent your message of 
November 27th. 

A. Yes. Wliere did I get the information that negotiations had 
been broken off? 

[100] 428. Q. Yes. 

A. To the best of my recollection and belief, I got it from Mr. Hull. 

429. Q. At that time did Mr. Hull tell you that he had handed a note 
the day before, on the 2()th, to the Japanese Ambassador? 

A. Not that I recollect. 

430. Q. You learned nothing from the State Department to indi- 
cate that any proposal that might have been made on November 27 was 
not intended in good faith by the Secretary of State and that it at least 
was not possible of acceptance? 

A. On the 26th? 

431. Q. Yes. 

A. I don't recall the note which you asked me to read, of having 
seen it or having heard anything about it. As to whether or not it 
Avas made in good faith, you would have to ask the State Department. 
Sometimes things are made for the record in the hopes that they will 
get through as a last hope. 

432. Q. As I understand it, you leave it that although on November 
27 you were advised by the Secretary of State that negotiations had 
broken off, you never were advised that on the 2Gth a note had been 
1 landed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador? 

A. I do not recall it, and I have so stated. I haven't the slightest 
recollection of that note. 

The court then, at 4: 32 p. m., adjounvd until 10 a. m., August 10, 
1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 93 



PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIKY 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 10, 1944. 

[110] Sixth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 

The court met at 10 :00 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews. U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman, first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his 
counsel. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), 
interested party. 

The record of tlie proceedings of the fifth day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

The judge advocate stated that during the proceedings of the fourth 
day of the inquiry he had requested the court to take judicial notice 
of Navy Regulations and particularly called attention to Article 392, 
regarding the Chief of Naval Operations. The judge advocate fur- 
ther stated that at this time he desired to call the court's attention 
further to Article 433 of Navy Regulations, which more particularly 
sets forth the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the adjournment was taken on Wednesday, August 9, 1944, 
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) (continued:) 

433. Q. I show you a document. Admiral Stark, apparently a 
[iii] photostatic copy of a letter that you wrote Admiral Kimmel 
under date of 22 March 1941, and ask you if you may identify it? 

A. I do, as a letter to Admiral Kimmel, from me, dated 22 March. 

A letter dated March 22, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was 
submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to 
the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim- 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

me], U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading 
into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the 
inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 
32," for reference, description appended. 

434. Q. Will you read the last paragraph on page five? 
A. (Reading:) 

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and 
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs 
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately 
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal ele- 
ments within the ITnited States. He further says that information concerning 
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to 
you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent 
to despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade 
routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of 
shipping which moves over each route. 

435. Q. I show you a letter from Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May 1941, and ask 
you if you can identify it. I propose to offer it for the purpose of 
reading portions thereof. 

A. I recognize it as a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, dated 26 May, to the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by 
Admiral Kimmel. 

A letter dated May 26, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by Rear Ad- 
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted to the 
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the 
interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 
(Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record 
such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 
33," for reference, description appended. 

[113] 436. Q. Will you read. Admiral Stark, paragraphs seven 
and eight of Exhibit 33 ? 

A. (Reading:) 

7. Information. 

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is 
far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing 
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, 
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is nnable to 
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of 
what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically 
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is 
disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition whicla directly contra- 
venes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so 
necessary to the conduct of military operations. 

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the internationlal 
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge 
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of 
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked 
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objec- 
tives, even though necessarily late at times," would enable the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of 
action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the 
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a par- 
tially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of inter- 
ruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impend- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 95 

injr eventualities. ^Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the 
Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particul'arly 
with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it 
even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacihc Fleet be guided by 
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instnictions. 

It is suggested that it be m'ade a cardinal principle that the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as 
they occur and by the quickest secure means available. 

S. Public Opinion. 

As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our 
people, as reflected in the \ll-i] newsp'apers and magazines, is utterly 
wrong. To back into a war, unsupivorted, or only half-heartedly supported by 
public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a 
very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and tirmness of 
national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands 
that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and 
available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must 
go wi'th ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. 
To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only 
be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution. 

Tlie interested party, Kear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, IT. S. 
Navy (Ret), stated tliat he reserved the right to read further from 
Exhibit 83 at such time as lie. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy (Ret), might be a witness before the court of inquiry. 

437. Q. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he 
visited Washington officially in June of 1941, did he not, Admiral 
Stark ( 

A. Yes, that's right. Whether he sent it on before that I don't 
recall, but I do recall our having gone over it during his visit. 

438. Q. And the subject matter of the important paragraphs were 
discussed between you and him i 

A. Yes. 

439. Q. June of 1941, here in Washington? 
A. That's right. 

440. Q. And those were official discussions? 

A. Yes, discussions on that letter between him and me. 

441. Q. Now, do you recall what the discussion was relative to par- 
agraph 7, which was the first of the two paragraphs that you read? 

A. Which was about — do you wish me to comment on that para- 
o;raph ? 

442. Q. Yes, will you state to the court what that discussion was ? 
A. The discussion covered many things as regard policy. There 

are some definite questions which Admiral Kimmel would like to have 
answered, which I would like to have answered — which were never 
answered until war was declared. For example, [114] and I 
think these specific things were asked : What would we do if Japan 
attacked Russia ? What would we do if Japan attacked the N. E. I. ? 
What would we do if Japan attacked Britain? What would we do 
if she attacked any combination of these? He asked those questions, 
and as I recall, in one letter I stated to Admiral Kimmel that so far 
as I knew, nobody on God's green earth could answer them. It was 
impossible to get an answer. In fact, I don't think anybody knew. 
Those were definite guides which he simply would like to have had. 
They simply were not available. Now as regards current events, I 
kept Admiral Kimmel acquainted with them as I knew them, gen- 
erally speaking by personal letter. It may have been official letters 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

at times, but it certainly was my aim to give him the picture pretty 
much as I had it. This paragraph states that he was "not even sure 
of what force woukl be available to him and has little voice in matters 
radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks." My 
recollection is that I wrote Admiral Kimmel at one period that I did 
not intend to detach any further forces from his command and that 
his command would stand practically as outlined in Rainbow 5, which 
was definite, and which was based on a world estimate. Admiral Kim- 
mel did not have all the forces he would like to have had for an open 
Pacific campaign, but for what was assigned we gave him what we 
thought he needed. I might call attention to the fact that there just 
were not enough forces available to the Associated Powers to wage 
war all-out in all oceans. We simply didn't have it. Bearing this in 
mind, and of the tasks possibly ahead, we gave to him what we thought 
would meet his task he was assigned to do. He said, "This lack of 
information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty." It was 
disturbing to us. Nobody knew what was going to happen. He states 
that it created ^'a condition which directly contravenes that singleness 
of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary 
to the conduct of military operations." I only reply to that, that 
we gave him a directive, we gave him forces which we thought, with 
all the other problems we were confronted with, were the best suited 
to the situation. 

443. Q. What do you mean by "gave him a directive"? 
A. In.WPL-46. 

444. Q. On the part that you have commented on. Admiral Stark, 
did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel in June of 1941 rela- 
tive to the withdrawal from the Pacific Fleet of another battleship 
division ? 

A. (Yes), we discussed every question which was facing them. 

445. Q. There was then imminent the question of a withdrawal of 
an additional battleship division from the Pacific Fleet, [i^^] 
was there not ? 

A. I don't recall anything but one division. 

446. Q. Do you recall any discussion concerning the withdrawal of 
an additional division at that time? 

A. There may have been. I don't recall it. I do recall, whether 
it was then or later, telling him that I didn't expect to withdraw 
anything further. 

447. Q. Do you recall telling Admiral Kimmel in June of 1941 that 
at that time, approximatel}', within a day or two previous to the con- 
versation, that you had been told by the Secretary of the Navy that 
the President had directed the withdrawal of another battleship 
division wih accompanying support, from the Pacific Fleet to the 
Atlantic Fleet? 

A. No, I do not. 

448. Q. Do you recall telling Admiral Kimmel, in connection with 
the possible discussion of that character, that you had protested to 
Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, to such a movement, and 
the matter hacl been held over for a day or two; and that during that 
interval you met Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, on the street, 
and he had asked you in peremptory tones whether you had already 
started the movement of that division of battleships from the Pacific 
to the Atlantic ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 97 

A. I recall talking about Colonel Stimson, either then or later, in 
relation to some movement. I think it was with reference to the 
movement which we talked about yesterday, the movement to the 
Philippines. At the moment I do not recall specifically another bat- 
tleship division under discussion. There ma}^ have been talk of 
further withdrawals. They were not made; and I remember telling 
him in my opinion they wouldn't be made. 

449. Q. Would it reJfresh your recollection to have recalled to you 
the fact that Admiral Kinunel later told you that he had taken the 
matter up with the President and tliat he had been able to persuade 
the President that it was an unwise move ? 

A. No, I just don't remember the incident. I know that we didn't 
send anything. There were many tilings that came up in the course 
of conversation — the whole world over — but I do not recall the par- 
ticular incident to which you refer. 

450. Q. Now will you continue your comment on paragraph num- 
bered 7 ? 

A. Admiral Kimmel states, in the first sentence of the following 
paragraph, that "tlie rapid developments in the international picture, 
both diplomatic and military, and perhaps, even the lack of knowl- 
edge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the 
furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation 
is susceptible to marked improvement." As regards that, I would say 
that I did the best I could. 

[116] 451. Q. Did you inaugurate any different or better method 
after and as a result of that letter from Admiral Kimmel, and con- 
'sersation al)out it? 

A. Only to keep him informed as well as I could. As with regard 
to the O. N. I. information, I might say the O, N. I. papers have, 
usually in the margin, notations as to whom the information has been 
sent. I believe it was Admiral Ingersoll's custom to look at that. 
Commander Wellborn's papers were brouglit to me. I invariably 
checked it. I still do, to see whether those wlio should have the in- 
formation received it, and if not, to see that they got it ; and as regards 
what I knew myself, I kept him. as 1 say, acquainted the best I could. 
I wrote him frequently. He goes on to state that, "This is particu- 
larly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities 
for an intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be care- 
fully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training 
by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventuali- 
ties. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the 
Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, 
particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island 
development, thus making it even more necessary that the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and ob- 
jectives rather than by categorical instructions." If there is one thing 
which I have l)een immune from, it has been the issuance of categorical 
instructions — and leaving to those, particularly at a distance, what to 
do after I give them such information as I have. 

452. Q. Have you any comments on the last sentence of the last 
paragraph of 7 ? 

A. About being guided bj^ broad policy and objectives rather than 
by categorical instructions ? I just covered that. You mean the next 
paragraph ? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 8 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The interested party, Eear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), entered. 

453. Q. Yes. 
A. (Reading:) 

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as 
they occur and by the quiclvest secure means available. 

I was in complete concurrence with him on that, and that was one 
of my objectives. 

454. Q. You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that Commander- 
in-Chief of Pacific Fleet should be, in so far as you were able, im- 
mediately informed of all important developments as they occurred, 
and by the quickest secure means available? 

A. Yes. The other paragTaph which has been referred to is, "The 
current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in 
the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. [^iT'] To back 
into a war, unsupported, or only half-heartedly supported by public 
opinion, is to court losing it. A lefthanded, vacillating approach to a 
very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and 
firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The 
situation demands that our people be fully infoirned of the issues in- 
volved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of 
success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, 
men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our peo- 
ple anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be 
reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution." I was told 
that I was the first person in the United States to 'take this tack in 
talking with responsible bodies and over the radio. I could elaborate 
a good deal on that as to what I said and when I said it, but world 
preparedness was a thing that stressed completely — not just getting 
appropriations and money and slapping our hands and say, "Well, let 
somebody else do it." As for telling our people what the conditions 
were we were in, I became Chief of Naval Operations in the Fall of 
1939, late summer. Congress met in 1940, in January. I went up, I 
think, almost the day they met. I was on the stand with the House 
Naval Committee, as I recall, nine consecutive days. I was told by 
many people in Congress that no man ever took such a grilling. Those 
were morning and afternoon sessions. I laid out our whole picture 
with regard to the Pacific. It got much publicity and hit headlines. 
That was not what I was seeking. I was asking for a 25% increase 
in the strength of the Navy, pointing out our weaknesses in every re- 
spect. It was a searching analysis of our condition. I thought the re- 
quest would carry through because of its modesty, although it involved 
a considerable sum of money. It was based, not only on our needs, 
but on the capacity of our yards, as they then existed, to take up this 
construction. I got 111/2%, which started the program. I may say 
that I went back in June and asked for what is generally known as a 
70% increase. It was about a 73% increase, involving a great deal of 
mone^. I may say that Congress was then scared. France had fallen. 
What I had striven hours and hours for in the earlier meetings, I got 
almost in a matter of minutes, by telling them that it was impossible 
to confront the situation which we miglit face with what we had. Now, 
as regard to personnel, which has been mentioned here frequently, I 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 99 

went before the Congressional Committees, and I was told, particularly 
by the House Naval Appropriations Committee, that no man had ever 
talked to them as I did. I portrayed what I considered a very critical 
situation. The Fleet was 85% manned. I said it should be a minimum 
of 115%, particularly with the increases that were coming. They cut 
what I asked for. Struggling for personnel was one of the toughest 
things I had. Admiral Kimmel, I think, may recall some of those mat- 
ters, as he was a budget officer at that time. When they said that they 
had never had \JJS^ the personnel situation jammed down 
their throats as I jammed it down, I invited their attention to the 
remarks of some previous chiefs of the Bureau of Navigation, showing 
how much of it was on the record, if I recall, Andrews being one of 
them. 

455. Q. Did you agree with Admiral Kimmel's statement of policy 
set forth in paragraph 8, Exhibit 33? 

A._Yes, I did. 

456. Q. One other question about the last paragraph, preceding 
paragraph 8: after you had agreed with Admiral Kimmel that you 
would immediately inform him of all important developments as they 
occurred and by the quickest secure means available, did you do so 
between tlien. and 7 December '41 ? 

A. To the best of my conscience I did, perhaps not always by the 
quickest means but what I considered sufficiently, quick means, some- 
times by personal letter, sometimes when I thought it was critical, by 
dispatch. 

457. Q,. You are now conscious of no important development of 
which Admiral Kimmel was not advised as it occurred by the quickest 
secure means then available? 

A. I have searched my brain, my conscience, my heart, and every- 
thing I have got, since Pearl Harbor started, to see wherein I was 
derelict or wherein I might have omitted something. There is only 
one thought — that doesn't mean that I am right — in my mind there is 
only one thought that I regretted. What the effect would have been, I 
don't know — and that was the dispatch which was sent by the Army 
on the morning of December 7, that I had not paralleled it with my own 
system, or that I had not telephoned it. I may be reminded, before 
this investigation is over, of other things where I may realize that 
t^iere was something more I could have done, but that is the one con- 
scious realization I remember and regret, that I have had. 

458. Q. You considered the letter, Exhibit 33, so good, did you not. 
Admiral Stark, that you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in 
a restricted area upon its receipt, among important officers in the 
Navy Department ? 

A. Yes, it was our general custom to do that, and I mimeographed 
this, sent it to all hands who were concern^'cl, followed it up, and as I 
recall, assembled all concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself 
in my office. 

459. Q. There was no written and specific, categorical reply to that 
Jetter, Exhibit 33 ? 

A. No, when Admiral Kimmel left I asked him, as I recall, in view 
of all our conversations and what I had made Ijid] available 
to him, the picture as I saw it and the disposition of ships and person- 
nel, if he had been sitting where I was, w^ould he give us a fairly clean 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

bill of health. As I recall, he smiled and said he would, which was a 
matter of ^reat satisfaction to me. 

4G0. Q. I ask you whether you can identify this document, which I 
now hand you, as a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to you under 
date of 26 July 1941, for the purpose of reading portions therefrom 
into the record. 

A. Yes, I do identify it as a letter from Admiral Kimmel to me, 
dated 2(> July 1941? 

A letter dated July 20, 1941, from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy (Ret), to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was sub- 
mitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, 
and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the 
record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the 
inquiry. 

There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
34" for reference, description appended. 

[1£0] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

461. Q. I will read. Admiral Stark, certain portions of this letter, 
Exhibit 34: (Reading:) 

(1) The importance of keeping the Comir.ander-in-Chief advised of Depart- 
ment policies and decisions and tlie clianges in policies and decisions to meet 
changes in the international situation. 

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to tlie U. S. attitude 
towards Russian participation in the war. particularly as to the degree of coop- 
eration, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become 
active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for 
coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. 
The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and 
full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions 
are :— 

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if .Japanese attack Maritime Provinces? 

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively 
provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore? 

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint 
action, mutual support, etc.? 

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will 
ours be? 

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard 
Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc? 

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to 
offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particu- 
larly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, 
.Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Soiithern adven- 
tures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for 
providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German 
success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with 
consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion 
we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the 
Philippines. The Russo-Axis [J 21] war may give us more time. 

That portion of the letter that I have just read, Admiral Stark, indi- 
cated to you, did it not, that Admiral Kimmel was keenly alert as to 
not only the military, but also the international developments, and was* 
implei^Tenting the over-all general request in his letter of 26 May, 
Exhibit 33, to keep himself fully advised as to developments in that 
field? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 101 

A. Yes. 

462. Q. I ask you if you can identify what I now liand you as a 
letter from yourself to Admiral Kimmel dated 22 August, 1941, 
enclosing a long draft of a letter dated 19 August 1941? 

A. Yes. I recognize this as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, 
22 August 1941. I recognize the enclosure. 

The letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, dated 22 August, 1941, was submitted to the 
judge advocate, each of the other interested parties, and to the court, 
and by the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter 
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent 
to the inquiry before the court. 

There being no objection it was so received and marked "Exhibit 
35" for reference, description appended. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, suggested that the 
entire letter be used in the interest of saving time in the future. 

The interested party, Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) requested 
information as to whethei- all the exhibits introduced before the court 
would be appended to the record in their entirety. 

The judge advocate requested a recess. 

The court then, at 11 : 05 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 35 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present : All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the 
interested parties and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was 
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

[122] The judge advocate made the following statement: 
There appears to be some confusion in the minds of the interested 
parties, and also in the minds of the court, as to the exact procedure 
the judge advocate proposes to follow in writing up this record of 
proceedings in its final form. This question arises out of certain 
letters which are considered by interested parties to be their own pri- 
vate property. Initially, I would like to point out that when these 
documents are offered in evidence they are required to be offered in 
evidence as a whole. At such time, having been offered in evidence 
as a whole, these documents become the property of the convening 
authority. The next point that I would like to make is the system 
that the judge advocate proposes to follow in appending these exhibits 
to the actual record of proceedings itself. For example, we will take 
Exhibit 34, which has been offered in evidence before the court. Only 
certain extracts have been read to the court. The judge advocate 
pro)5oses in such cases to append to the record the extracts as read, or 
set tliem out in the record as they were read, which ever seems to be 
the more appropriate. But in the event that the matter is appended 
to the record and not copied into the record the extracts as read will be 
the appended matter and will bear the exhibit number, and a full 
description of the document from which the extracts were made will 
be attached as a description, and the place where the complete docu- 
ment is filed for future reference will also be set out. In the event 
that the extracts are copied directly into the record in response to a 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

question put, abviously it is not necessary to again attach the same 
matter as an exhibit, but a description of the exhibit will be appended 
marked with the same number as a description, and its disposition put 
on this page in a manner similar to that which I have just described. 

The court made the following statement : The court, in brief, 
would like to ask if its understanding, which is as follows, is correct :. 
Tlie procedure in Courts and Boards shows in places the introduction 
of such things as a ship's log. Extracts from the log are read and then 
the record will show that that extract is appended to the record with 
an exhibit number. Your method is practically the same thing with 
the exception that where counsel has it read directly into the record 
it will, of course, not be necessary to again copy it and attach it as an 
exhibit, but that the letter from which the reading was made will be 
described so that it can be perfectly identified so that we w^ill know 
where it is filed, and that will then become the exhibit number which 
you have previously given. 

The judge advocate replied that that was correct. 

[123] The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. 
Navy (Ret) requested information as to whether or not at the time 
a document is marked as an exhibit, at that ]Doint of time the entire 
document becomes beholden to the court for all purposes and whether 
the court becomes the final repository for each such document in toto. 

The judge advocate replied that he would follow in all cases the 
procedure as he had just outlined it. 

The interested partj^. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, re- 
cjuested information as to how that affected the proposition that certain 
passages in his personal letters not be made a matter of record. 

The court replied that a letter which Admiral Stark may have 
written to Admiral Kimmel was also the property of Admiral Kimmel 
and could be introduced by Admiral Kimmel as a part of the record. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
as follows : It was not our intention to advance such a proposition, but 
■what we asked was that by agreement, those parts which we con- 
sidered to be inimical to the public interests, if they were disclosed, 
would be left out of the record. We are not asking the court to 
rule, as a matter of law, in opposition to Admiral Kimmel's position 
if he wishes to introduce them. What we wished to make plain was 
that we consider some small parts of those letters inimical to the pub- 
lic interests and it was not our intention to take the responsibility 
for their disclosure. If someone else wishes to take that respon- 
sibility that is up to them. But if we could agree at this time that 
those letters simply be copied again, leaving out these rather important 
sentences, which are small in number, and use those exhibits as re- 
copied, tliat would be the proposition to be put. 

The court replied that it could not agree to have a letter rewritten 
with ])a]'ts left out, and attached to the record; that the only thing 
that could be clone would be to describe the letter in the exhibit and 
state that they are secret papers and should not be available to any- 
body but the convening authority. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, re- 
quested clarification as to whether the record was clear that he 
(Admiral Stark) refused to take the responsibility for having any of 
these passages made public. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 103 

The court replied that it was entirely vip to the convening authority ; 
that if it is so described in the record and specified to that effect, the 
convening authority was then the one responsible. 

[124'] The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, requested that vvdien any of these letters are considered inimical 
to the public interest, he simply make a statement to that effect to 
he noted in the record and noted on the description of the exhibit. 

The court made the folloAving statement: I shall direct the judge 
advocate now, that when that point is raised, when any of those letters 
comes up where secrecy is involved, that he will specify on the exhibit 
so that the convening authority tlioroughly understands that it is a 
secret document and involves state secrets that should not be made 
public. 

The judge advocate replied that he would do it not only on the record 
but on the exhibit itself when it is placed in the file. 

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-' 
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, witlidrew. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel. U. S. Navy (Ret.) (continued) : 

463. Q. Admiral will j^ou please read pages 1 to 11 of Exhibit 35? 

The witness read pages 1 to 11, both inclusive, of Exhibit 35, copy 
appended, marked "EXHIBIT 35-A". 

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

[7^5] Present : 

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to 
the inquiry and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross- 
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that 
the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (continued) : 

With the permission of the court, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim- 
mel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), made the following statement: I have today 
been informed that certain vital, pertinent data physically available 
now in the ofHce of the Chief of Naval Operations are to be denied 
this court. These data are among that which the judge advocate of 
this court has endeavored to obtain at my request. Their availability 
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy. They are now being 
denied this court by order of the Acting Secretary of the Navy. With- 
out these data it is impossible for this court to develop the full story of 
the disaster at Pearl Harbor. What the motives are prompting the 
denial of these data to the court, guarded as it is by the security of 
its secret proceedings, I can only surmise, but I can state unequivocally 
that the result of this denial is to render impotent this court in its 
effort to find the truth of the matter, which constitutes he burden of 
its precept. Without a full and fair disclosure of all known and avail- 
able evidence, this inquiry is futile. Against such evasion of the clear 
mandate of Congress and the demands of simple justice, I most sol- 
emnly protest. 

The judge advocate stated: The judge advocate has proceeded dili- 
gently through the proper channels of the Navy Department to secure 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tlie documents requested by the interested party, Rear Admiral Kim- 
mel. His request for that information is still in the hands of the 
Secretary of the Navy (1 believe the Director of Naval Comnmnica- 
tions). To date, he has had no answer to that letter. He therefore 
cannot tell the court whether or not the request has been acceded to or 
denied until he receives a reply to that letter. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, IT. S. 
Navy, (Ret.) stated: The information I have given the court was 
supplied to me by Admiral King this forenoon. 

[126] The court stated : The court has nothing to do with the 
collection of evidence. That is in the judge advocate's hands. 

The interested party. Real Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.) stated: I suggest most respectfully that it might be ap- 
propriate for the court to take up this matter with the convening au- 
thority to determine whether this development permits it to comply 
with its precept. The situation I have described affects very materially 
the adequate cross-examination of the witness now testifying, Admiral 
Stark. 

The court then, at 2 : 35 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 40 p. m., at which 
ime it reconvened. 

Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the 
interested parties and their counsel. Frederick T. Lachat, j^eoman 
first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was 
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

The court stated (addressing the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) ) : On what do jou base your 
assumption that the request has been refused ? 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.) stated : I base my assumption that it has been refused on 
a conversation I had with Admiral King, who stated that he would 
recommend that it be not made available, and he was sure that the 
Acting Secretary would approve it. May I make a further statement ? 
These data are vital to me and my counsel for the examination of the 
witness now on the stand. We have been waiting since the 1st of 
August, when this request was submitted by the judge advocate of 
this court at my request, attempting to get this data. One of my 
counsel. Captain Lavender, inspected this data by permission of the 
Secretary of the Navy and designated the parts that he wished to have 
produced before this court. My information is that it will now be 
denied. If the court deems it necessary to have further evidence than 
that which I have given, I suggest that Admiral King be called before 
this court to testify on this point. It is a point which can be readily 
established ; it should be established now. 

The court stated : The court will aAvait the action of the Secretary 
of the Navy on the official request for those papers. If it is denied, 
then, we will be better able to act. In the meantime, the judge advocate 
should make every effort to obtain a reply to that letter. 

[127] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated: I fear that there will be further delays. 
The witness has stated to the court as an apparently approved state- 
ment that he expects to leave for London the latter part of this week 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 105 

or early next week. That is the primary reason for nn^ insistence on 
an answer in regard to these data at this time. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: 
If I may say so, I do not recall having stated that I was going to leave 
at the end of this week. I hope to finish, if posible, with what Admiral 
Kimmel wants of me, but I do not think I can stay much beyond 
this week. 

The court stated (addressing Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy) : The interested party, it is assumed, understands that he will 
remain an interested party whether or not he is liere and that his 
interest will continue if he leaves. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: 
I do understand that. That is why it was rather a surprise to me when 
I w^as brought over here, in the first place. I had no knowledge of it, 
I was told to come here for a short time and get back. My interest 
will be left in the hands of counsel. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.), stated: May I give the basis of my statement that I 
understand Admiral Stark is returning to London ? In a letter signed 
by Admiral King, dated 20 July 1944, there is a memorandum for the 
Chief of Naval Personnel, which was supplied to me by the Chief of 
Naval Personnel: (Reading) "Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll 
are being made available immediately for witnesses. It is assumed 
that their presence will be required only for a limited period. Neither 
of tliese two admirals, or any other officer on active service on im- 
portant duty, can be brought to Washington for an indefinite period 
without interfering with the war effort. 

The court stated : We Avill proceed with the testimony of this witness. 

464. Q. When you wrote Exhibit 35, Admiral Stark, on the date of 
22 August 1941, you had just returned to Washington from a so-called 
Atlantic Charter conference in the North Atlantic, had you not ? 

A. That is right. 

465. Q. There were present at that conference, among others, the 
President 'and Mr. Churchill? 

A. Yes. 

[l£8l 466. Q. You stated in your letter : "Thaidc God we should 
have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. 
It has clianged so many times, but now I think we at last have some- 
thing fairly definite — maybe." Did you tell Admiral Kimmel what 
"something fairly definite" was ? 

A. In the rest of my letter I gave him such information of that con- 
ference. I did not state what was in full swing in the Atlantic, as I 
recall. The letter covers some of the points of that conference. 

467. Q. Did some of the fairly definite thinjzs have reference to 
(lie Pacific? 

A. Tlie discussion was broad. It may have included the Pacific, 
but as I recall, not a great deal. Russia was mentioned, I believe, 
wit]i regard to some aid, but so far as any commitment of what we 
'iiight do in case Japan attacked Russia or"the British or the N. E. I., 
I do not recall. 

468. Q. By that do you mean that no such commitments were made 
or that currently you have no memory of them ? 

A. To the best of my belief, and so far as I know, no commitments 
were made. 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

469. Q. Did you think that you did know of any commitments 
which were made at that Athxntic conference ? 

A. Up to the moment of your question, I thought I did, but there 
were conversations at which I was not present, where I have no idea 
of what might have been said. I was given no understanding of any 
commitments made regarding what I have just testified to. 

470. Q. On the 27th of January, 1942, Mr. Churchill made a speech 
in the House of Commons, which I quote: "On the other hand, the 
probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these 
matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself 
attacked, would come into a war in the Far East and tlius make final 
victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expecta- 
tion has not been fulfilled by the events. It fortified our British deci- 
sion to use our limited resources on the actual fighting front." 

The court stated : From what are you reading? 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.) stated: The speech of Mr. Churchill to the House of 
Commons. 

This question was objected to by the judge advocate and by the 
interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, on the ground 
that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. 

[129] The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim- 
mel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), replied. 

The court announced that the objection was sustained. 

471. Q. At any time between the date of the Atlantic Conference 
and December 7 were you advised of any commitments made by the 
United States to Britain in the eventuality of war breaking out in the 
Pacific between Japan and Britain ? 

A. Absolutely none. 

472. Q. Do you recall receiving a dispatch, probably on 7 December 
1941, from Admiral Hart bearing a Greenwich time date of December 
7, which I am advised by those more familiar with astronomical time 
than I, means December 6' in Manila, the substance of which was, "Cine- 
Asiatic reports to OpNav that he has learned from Singapore that the 
United States had assured Britain armed support under several eventu- 
alities. I have received no corresponding instructions from you," 
copy of that dispatch having been sent to Admiral Kimmel for 
information ? 

A. Yes, I have some remembrance of that dispatch. 

473. Q. At that that time did you know of any assurances that 
Britain would receive armed support from the United States under 
any eventuality ? 

A. No. 

474. Q. Did you understand at any time prior to the receipt of that 
message that the United States had given Britain assurance that it 
would come to its armed support if Japan attacked Britain in the 
Pacific? 

A. I did not, nor did I understand it after receipt of the dispatch, 

475. Q. If any such commitment had been made b}' a higher author- 
ity than you, you had no information concerning it? 

A. None whatsoever. 

476. Q. I ask if you can identify this, Admiral, as a letter written by 
Admiral Kimmel to you under date of 12 September 1941, which 1 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 107 

would like to offer in evidence for the purpose of reading portions into 
the record. 

A. Yes. I note it is unsigned, but I recall it. 

The letter of 12 September 1941 from Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was 
submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the 
court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading' 
into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent 
to the inquiry. 

[130] There being no objection, it was so received and marked 
"EXHIBIT 36" or reference, description appended. 

477. Q. Will you read from it? 
A. (Reading:) 

Dear "Betty", 

We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and 
King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic 
is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific? 

I noticed that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for 
surface raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as 
raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting 
offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility 
of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improb- 
able, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat 
of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.- 
Japanese rapprochement and tlie absence of any specific reference to tlie Pacific 
in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation 
out here is. Specific questions that arise are: 

(a) What orders' to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic 
and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present 
escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them 
have been to protect their convoy from interference ; to avoid use of force if 
possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, 
preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive 
measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature 
of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I 
feel that you are the only one who can answer this question. 

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese 
situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the 
vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to 
bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb con- 
tacts, without waiting to be attacked? 

478. Q. That will be enough of that letter. Did you write Ad- 
miral Kimmel under date of 23 September 1941 in response to the 
letter which you just read, Exhibit 36? 

A. Yes. 

\_131] 479. Q. The document I show you is the letter which you 
wrote to him under that date ? 

A. Yes, it is a letter to Kimmel from me, dated 23 September 1941. 

The letter of 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R, Stark, 
U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was 
submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to 
the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copv appended marked 
"EXHIBIT 37". 

480. Q. Will you please read this exhibit ? 

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 37. 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

481. Q. You intended by the second postscript, which you have 
just read, Admiral, to indicate to Admiral Kimmel that you would 
keep him fully and promptly informed as to all diplomatic develop- 
ments which you learned, at least from the Secretary of State? - 

A. That's right. 

482. Q. Can you identify the document I now hand j^ou as a letter 
you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 17 October 1941? 

A. Yes, I recognize it as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, dated 
17 October 1941. 

The letter of 17 October 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy^, was sub- 
mitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, 
and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into 
the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to 
the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
38" for reference, description appended. 

483. Q. Will you read the first three paragraphs of that letter? 
A. (Reading:) 

Dear Kimmel : Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours 
but from our despatches you know about all that we do. 

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message 
I sent you merely stated the "possil)ility" ; in fact I tempered the message 
handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case 
after long pow-wov.'s in tlie White House it was felt we should be on guard, at 
least until something indicates the trend. 

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of 
the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura 
and gave the dope as I saw it. 

484. Q. Enclosed with that letter was a copy of a memorandum 
under the date of 17 October 1941, signed by R. E. Schuirmann, and 
addressed to C.N.O. Will you read the last paragraph in the enclosed 
paragraph ? 

A. (Reading:) 

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and 
no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or 
may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the 
military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by 
what cabinet is in power. 

485. Q. In your dispatch of 16 October you stated : 

* In either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. 
Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her 
present desperate situation, there is a possibility that Japan may attack these 
two powers. 

In Exhibit 15, your dispatch of November 24, you state: 

The situation, coupled with statements of the Japanese Government and 
movements of their naval and military forces, indicates, in our opinion, a 
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philip- 
pines or Guam as a possibility. 

A. That is November 24? 

486. Q. Yes. Did you use the word "possibility" in your message 
of November 24 in the same sense in which you used it in your message 
of October 16, as interpreted in your letter of October 17? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 109 

A. What you are asking me, as I understand it, is if the letter which 
I wrote following the dispatch of October IG qualified the dispatch 
of November 24^ I would say the correspondence and the dispatch 
of October IG and the letter of October 17 stand as an entity. 

487. Q. When j^ou used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of 
October IG, you wrote Admiral Kimmel that you personally did not 
believe that the Japs were going to sail into us ? 

A. I did. 

488. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of 
November 24, did j^ou use it in the same connotation ? 

A. I still was not convinced that it was more than a possibility, and, 
as I have already testified, after reading [■i'^o] the dispatch of 
October IG, I wanted to make sure that Admiral Kimmel, so far as I 
was concerned, was not to read into that dispatch that he was to stop 
his training or his cruises to the coast. 

489. Q. When you used "possibility" in your dispatch of October 
16, you told him in your letter that you personally did not mean by 
that any individual thought that the Japanese were going to sail into 
us? 

A. I stated at that time that I did not believe the Japs were going 
to sail into us ; that is right. 

490. Q. Although the word in the dispatch referring to that thought 
was "possibility"? 

A. Yes. 

491. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of 
November 24, did you use it in the same sense in which you used it in 
the dispatch of October 16, namely, that you did not personally ex- 
pect a surprise aggressive move or attack on the Philippines or 
Guam ? 

A. Well, I stated it as a possibility. I still considered it only a 
possibility. 

492. Q. When you used "possibility" on October 16, you said that 
although it was a possibility in the sense that anything might be a 
possibility, you personally did not believe anything would happen ? 

A. Yes. 

493. Q. Did you use the word "possibility" in your dispatch of 
November 24 with the same connotation? 

A. In the message of November 24 I still maintained it was a possi- 
bility, and I was not convinced at that time that the Japs were going 
to sail into us from the evidence I had. 

494. Q. That was when? 

A. The message of the 24th which you are questioning me about, 
but there was that possibility. I had thought they might, and in any 
case, I sent the message, to be on guard. I made it a possibility be- 
cause I felt that was what it was. If I had felt that it had been a 
strong probability, I would have stated so. 

[134] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered, Frederick T. Lachat, j^eoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdreM'. 

495. Q. Do I understand that you used the word "possibility" in the 
same sense on November 24th as you did on October 16th ? 

A. Generally speaking. I qualified it in the message of the 16th, 
and I also wrote regarding the message of the 24th, but it was a possi- 



'110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

bility. The word "possibility", as far as I am concerned, stands in 
these. dispatches. 

496. Q. But when you used "possibility" in October, you frankly 
stated to Admiral Kinimel that you didn't expect the possibility to 
eventuate ? 

A. I said I didn't expect Japan to sail into us at that time. I didn't 
say that it wouldn't eventuate. 

497. Q. The wording of the message was: "Since the U. S. and 
Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situa- 
tion there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers", 
and you wrote and said as you used the word in that message you 
personally did not believe the Japanese were going to sail into us. 

A. At that time ; that is right. 

498. Q. Now, when you used "possibility" in your clispatch of No- 
vember 24, did you personally believe that the Japanese were not going 
to sail into the Philippines and Guam? 

A. I thought there was a possibility of it. I don't know how differ- 
ently to express it. 

499. Q. Did you think there was any more possibility of the Japa- 
nese sailing into the Philippines and Guam on November 24th than 
you thought on October 16th there was a possibility of Japan attacking 
Britain and the United States? 

A. Well, we had further evidence about the movements of forces, 
again indicating that possibility ; and the negotiations certainly were 
getting no better, and in fact, looked less likely of favorable outcome, 
and the two circumstances combined caused me to reiterate that possi- 
bility and keep it in front of Admiral Kimmel. 

500. Q. Then do I gather that on November 24th you did feel there 
was more of a possibility of an attack by Japan on the Philippines and 
Guam than you felt on October 16th there was a possibility of an attack 
on the United States and Britain? 

A. Well, I thought it sufficient to again warn Admiral Kimmel. 
[135]- 501. Q. Yes. I understand that, but did you think there 
was more possibility on November 24th than you did on October 16th ? 
A. Generally speaking, I would say '"yes", that we had more evidence. 

502. Q. Then why didn't 3'ou use words that would clearly indicate 
that change of thought on your part, Admiral Stark ? 

A. I gave him the evidence I had, and I gave him my interpretation 
of it. 

503. Q. In your letter of November 25th, you mean ? 
A. In the dispatch of 24 November. 

504. Q. But you used the same words relative to the possibility of an 
attack that 7/ou used in October when you said that you personally 
didn't believe that it would happen? 

A. Yes, and I added in the dispatcli of November 24th, "in any direc- 
tion", as well as including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. 

The judge advocate objected to the line of questioning on the ground 
that it was haznig the witness. 

The court announced that the objection was not sustained. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 
(Ret.) stated that he v^'ould not pursue this line of questioning further. 

505. Q. I show you that which appeals to be a letter from yourself 
to Admiral Kimmel dated November 14, 1941, enclosing a memorandum 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 111 

from yourself and General Marshall to the President. Do you identify 
that as a letter that you wrote, with the enclosure ? 

A. I do. 

The letter of November 14, 1941 from Admiral Harold K Stark, 
U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Eet.) 
enclosing a memorandum to the President, was submitted to the judge 
advocate^, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the inter- 
ested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), 
offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such ex- 
tracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection it was so received and marked '"EXHIBIT 
39" for reference, description appended. 

[J36] 506. Q. Will you read, Adiniral Stark, the fourth para- 
graph of the letter, the letter beginning "Dear Mustapha"? 

A. (Reading) : "Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be 
seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently 
submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see 
from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be 
followed remains to be seen. 

507. Q. T shoAv you a document which is attached to the letter en- 
titled "]\lemorandum for the President"'. Can you identify this docu- 
ment ? 

A. Yes. This is a Memorandum for the President from the War and 
Navy Departments, Washington, dated November 5. 1941. 

The memorandum from the War and Navy Departments, Washing- 
ton, dated November 5, 1941, Serial 0130012, was submitted to the judge 
advocate, to the interested pai'ties, and to the court, and by the inter-^ 
ested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. U. S. Navy, (Ret.) , 
offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 39 (A)!" • 

508. Q. Will vou read the memorandum. Admiral Stark? 
The witness read the memorandum. Exhibit 39(A). 

509. Q. In the memorandum of November 5th. you and General 
Marshal! jointly stated to the President that military action agaiiist 
Japan should be undertaken — this is under (b) on Page 4 — only in one 
or more of the following eventualities. No. 1 of which is, "A direct act 
of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated 
territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the 
Netherlands East Indies'-. At the time you made that recommendation 
to the President in conjunction with General Marshall, were you aware 
of any agreement or understanding between the United States and 
Britain by which this country had agreed to do that? 

A. No. 

510. Q. Was this recommendation in the niemorandum of Novem- 
ber 5th the original initiation of that thought so far as you know ? 

A. Tliat ])oint had been discussed, as I recall, as to just what its effect 
would be if concluded at this time. I don't recall it having been set 
down before. . 

511. Q. What do you mean by "set down"? 

A. I mean that it was formulated into a definite proposition. 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1S7] 512. Q. How long had that problem been under discus- 
sion ? You said it had been discussed before November 5th. 

A. Well, I couldn't recall that. We discussed that entire Far East- 
ern situation for a matter of months. 

513. Q. Had it been discussed as far back as August of 1941? 
A. I couldn't recall. 

514. Q. With whom were these discussions to which you have made 
reference ? 

A. The War Plans discussed them. I don't remember ever having 
discussed them with the British. 

515. Q. There had been conversations with the British, not only in 
the North Atlantic in August, but earlier in 1941 in Washington. 
Was that called the Chief s-of-Staff conference, of Staff conferences? 

A. Yes. 

516. Q. On either of those occasions, do you recall any discussion of 
what the United States would do if Japan attacked eitlier the Neth- 
erlands or Bi^itain in the Pacific? 

A. Not so far as giving the slightest commitment, and as regards 
this particular point I do not recall any definite proposition on this 
until we formulated it here. 

517. Q. Do you recall how long the matter had been under discus- 
sion between you and General Marshall? 

A. No. Mr. Hull's request brought this thing to its present form. 
I couldn't recall the time of that. 

518. Q. What was Mr. Hull's request? 

A. Whether we volunteered this to Mr. Hull, or 

, 519. Q. This memorandum is to the President. 
A. I will take that back regarding Mr. Hull. 

520. Q. Had there been any discussion with the President about 
this point prior to the memorandum? 

A. Yes. I don't know about this memorandum as it stands but 
theer were many discussions with the President about the Far Eastern 
situation. 

521. Q. I know, but the possibility of your firm recommendation 
contained in (b) (1) on Page 4 

A. You mean, had there been any discussion on that particular line 
before this was formed? 

522. Q. Yes. 

A. I do not recall. 

523. Q. This was sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 14th of November, 
some nine days after it was dated, and at that time you stated that 
you were not informed whether your advice v/ould be followed or not? 

A. Right. 

[138] 524. Q. Did you ever get any advice as to that? 

A. Not to my recollection. 

525. Q. You stated yesterday afternoon that the new information 
which you got which prompted the dispatch of November 27th, advised 
that the Japanese-United States negotiations were about to be stopped? 

A. I said they had ceased. 

526. Q. Had ceased. Do you recall when — and by "when" I mean 
in the morning or afternoon of November 27th — you got that infor- 
mation? 

A. It would be during the working day. I would hesitate to say 
whether it was morning or afternoon. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 113 

527. Q. Well, now, does the symbol on this Exhibit 17 assist you 
in locating that at all, 272337 ? 

A. Yes. From that it would appear that it might have been in the 
late afternoon, but I couldn't say that it was. I don't remember just 
what time of day that message was cleared. It is a priority dispatch. 

528. Q. Do these symbols, 272337, refer to Greenwich Mean Time, 
or Eastern War Time? 

A. I think tliat was GMT. I'm not sure. 

529. Q. That fact will be ascertained? 

A. Yes, I shall be glad to find that out. May I add that when you 
asked me what time of day, the question was whether you had intended 
asking me what time we first considered it, or wdien we cleared it. 

530. Q. What time of day, Admiral, did you learn about the cessa- 
tion of negotiations? 

A. What time of day we decided on it ? 

531. Q. No, the question was, What time of day you learned about 
the cessation of negotiations, when the Secretary informed you? 

A. Of course, it was prior to the sending of this dispatch, but I don't 
recall just what time of day it was. 

532. Q. Now, do you recall how you learned that ; from whom you 
got the information? 

A. No. Whether it came direct from Mr. Hull, or whether it came 
through Captain Schuirmann, or just how it came, I do not recall. 

533. Q. If it came direct from Mr. Hull, would it have come by 
telephone, or would you have gone up to the State Department? 

A. It might have come either way He frequently telephoned me. 

[13d] 534. Q. Since j^esterday, did you go over the note that 
was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on 
the 26th of November. We had some conversation about that yes- 
terday afternoon. 

A. No, except that I went over it when you handed it to me. 

535. Q. I didn't hand it to you. 

A. You gave it to me, pointed it out, aild asked me if I had seen it. 

636. Q. And you still have no memory of either having seen or 
heard of that note or the fact that a note had been handed to the 
Japanese Ambassador the day before your message was dispatched 
on November 27th ? 

A. No, I have no recollection of that long note. 

537. Q. Until I mentioned it yesterday, you had no recollection 
of it? 

A. Correct. 

538. Q. Did you attend a conference with the President at the 
White House with Admiral Nomura between the 27th of November 
and December 7th ? 

A. Between what ? 

539. Q. Between November 27th and December 7th? 

A. I don't recall but I might be able to find out if I can find the 
record of my visits to the White House. If I did it should be in 
the record which was kept in the CNO office. I recall being in the 
White House with the President and Mr. Hull and Admiral Nomura, 
the Japanese Ambassador. 

540. Q. Well, you followed the international situation very closely, 
as indicated by this joint memorandum that you and General Marshall 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 9 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

submitted on the 5th of November, particularly with reference to the 
Far Eastern situation ? 

A. Particularly with reference to the Japanese situation, yes. 

541. Q. Again, doesn't it appear to you that you must have hej^rd 
of the substance of this message on November 26th at or about the 
time it was sent? 

A. No, I didn't. The message that I started to tell you about 
yesterday, and which you interrupted and said that was an earlier 
message, from which I assumed you had a record of my visits and 
knew something of what had been discussed. 

542. Q. I have no such record. 

A. I am sorry. We had a conference in the White House — and I 
give you this only from recollection ; it should not be taken as strictly 
accurate but I am perfectly [-?-4<^] willing to give you my 
recollection of what transpired. And I might mention, the State 
Department officials could probably give you exact information. 
There was a proposition made, in effect, to the Japanese Ambassador 
by which the President, so far as he was possibly able, would see that 
the Japanese were guaranteed rice from the south — I have forgotten 
whether it was Indo-China, or not — but that he would undertake to 
see that she got rice. Whether other raw materials were included, 
I do not recall at the moment — provided she would stop where she 
was and, as I recall, send no more troops into Indo-China, and hold the 
status quo at least for the time being. I rather hesitate to testify 
to that because it is not clear. The matter was later made a record 
of to be sent. It was a fair offer showing the President's desire to 
maintain peace and get Japan to stop further building up in the south, 
and if she did, he was willing — ^lie couldn't guarantee it, but so far 
as he was able as President of the United States — to guarantee her 
certain things. I recall Admiral Nomura stating that one of the 
things they were going south for was to insure their food supply. 
That was about this time, I would say. 

543. Q. Might it have been the preparation of this very message 
of November 26 about which I am speaking ? 

A. Well, the message you showed me goes way, way beyond the 
subject of the conversation that afternoon; it covered a very large 
field which was not discussed at that time. It sort of opened up 
and hashed over the whole subject. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew, 

[i^-?] 544. Q. Was the information you received relative to the 
cessation of negotiations, that there would be no more talks between 
Admiral Nomura or the Japanaese? 

A. At that time? 

545. Q. Yes. 

A. Oh, no, we were endeavoring to continue. 

546. Q. I am talking about November 27 now. 

A. My information as of November, 27 was to the effect that the 
conversations had ceased. 

547. Q. There was no more talk? 
A. That is what it meant to me. 

548. Q. There were no more formal conferences ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 115 

A. Yes. 

549. Q. Well now you know that there were more conferences ; you 
knew that at the time, didn't you ? 

A. Well, the official discussions which had been taking place were— 
at least I was so "nformed — terminated. They had not been able tQ 
agree on a solution. 

' 550. Q. What I am getting at is, just what, in the way of talks, 
if any, may have occurred after that ? 

A. Except the one at 1300 on 7 December, I do not recall. I was 
told that the negotiations had failed, that they were over. 

551. Q. Was it the negotiations had failed, or the negotiations had 
ceased ? 

A. They had ceased. 

552. Q. Well, you knew then that there were further conversations 
after November 27, and you knew that fact from reading the public 
press, in addition to what official information you may have had, 
didn't you? 

A. I just don't recall after that what was said and what wasn't 
said. 

553. Q. In Volume II of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1931-1941," on page 772, there appears a memorandum of conversa- 
tion on December 1 between the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Kurusu 
and the Secretary of the State. State whether or not that refreshes 
your recollection as to your knowledge at that time, either officially or 
from the newspapers, that the negotiations between the State Dej)art- 
ment and the Japanese representatives in this country were continuing 
after November 27? 

A. You give it from the record. I can onlj^ assume that it took 
place. What I am stating is that the thing, so far as we were con- 
cerned, spelled failure on the 27th, or at least that we had no hope of 
a favorable solution. 

[142] 554. Q. But the message you sent to Admiral Kimmel 
said nothing about failure of negotiations. It merely said that nego- 
tiations with Japan, looking to a stabilization of conditions in the 
Pacific, have ceased. Now I am directing your attention, Admiral 
Stark, to whether you knew that negotiations in fact were continuing, 
however phantom they may have been. 

A. I assume by ceasing, that they had failed. I will stand on the 
message as it was sent, that the negotiations with Japan, "looking 
toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific, have ceased." 

555. Q. Well, did you mean when you used that word "ceased" to 
convey the impression to Admiral I^mmel that there would be no 
tnore negotiations in fact, or that in spirit and in theory they had 
become spent, and nothing more in reality could be accomplished, 
November 27 had been dissipated somewhat ? 

A. The message meant to me that all the efforts which had been 
spent looking toward stabilization had ceased, and the conversations 
were over, and I stated that an aggressive move was expected. It 
mean't to me, failure. 

556. Q. And if Admiral Kimmel saw in the public press on the 
days following the receipt of this message that there were continued 
negotiations, continued conversations, continued meetings between 
Admiral Nomura and Secretary of State, did you think that he would 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

have the reasonable impression that the basis of your message of 
November 27 had been dissipated somewhat ? 

A. I would have thought that if he was in doubt, after receiving 
both a war warning — and saying, "an aggressive move by Japan is 
expected" — that if he was worried by the message as to what it meant, 
he might have asked me for a clarification. 

557. Q. Well, do you agree that there is some doubt in view of 
possible continuation of negotiations, as to how the message might 
have been reasonably interpreted by Admiral Kimmel ? 

A. The message of the 27th ? 

558. Q. Yes. 

A. Well, you are asking me how Admiral Kimmel interpreted it. 

559. Q. I am asking you how you might assume that Admiral 
Kimmel reasonably could have interpreted it ? 

A. I can tell you what I had in mind when I sent it. 

560. Q. Please do. 

A. I think I have already testified to it, but anyway, (Reading) : 
"This is a w^ar warning." To me that was about as strong as I could 
make it. It was followed by the [^4^] statement that "an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected." The words, "war warning," 
coupled with the expectation within the next few days of a (war 
warning) looked to me definite that Japan was going to make an 
aggressive move and strike somewhere. I further stated, giving him 
what information we had as to where we thought her set-up, as we 
knew it, indicated. 

561. Q. Well, you now" know the true facts to be that on November 
26, the United States had made a proposition to Japan which Japan 
had not rejected on November 27? You know now, do you not, that 
so far as negotiations were concerned, the status was that on Novem- 
ber 26, the United States had made a proposition to Japan which 
Japan had not rejected, and which had been transmitted to Tokio 
for deliberation ? 

A. Yes, from what you have shown me in the book. 

562. Q. Did that situation constitute an end of negotiations ? 
A. You mean the sending of that dispatch ? 

563. Q. The handing of this message to the Japanese Government; 
did that situation as I have stated, indicate to you negotiations with 
Japan had ceased? 

A. I am confused. 

564. Q. So far as the negotiations with Japan were concerned their 
status on November 26 and on November 27 was that the United 
States had made a proposition to Japan, embodied in the note of 
November 26, which Japan had not rejected and which ostensibly 
had been submitted to Tokio for deliberations. I now ask you 
whether that situation constituted a cessation of negotiations as 
stated in your message of November 27? 

A. Well, until the answer was received or rejected — I suppose it 
might be questioned whether or not it was to be a sign-off or "here 
is the last thing" — knowing that it couldn't be accepted. As to that, 
I don't know. 

565. Q. From your reading of the note yesterday. Admiral, would 
you term this note of November 26 an ultimatum ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 117 

A. Reading that, I would not say that it would be considered an 
ultimatum. 

666. Q. In the sense of which you used "ultimatum" in your memo- 
randum to the President of November 5 ? 
A. No. 

The court then, at 4 : 27 p. m., adjourned until 10 a.m., Auirust 11 
1944. ^ ' 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 119 



PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INaUIKY 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944. 

[144] Seventh Dat 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 

The court met at 10 a.m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Eet), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Adovcate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his 
counsel. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the sixth day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the Inquiry were 
present. 

The judge advocate asked the court to take judicial knowledge of 
"Communication Instructions 1939", as in effect on December 7, 1941, 
calling particular attention to paragraph 935 a., and c. 

At the direction of the court, paragraph 935 a., and c, of "Com- 
munication Instructions 1939", were read by the judge advocate. 

With the permission of the court, the interested party. Rear Ad- 
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following 
statement: I have been informed that the judge advocate of this court 
has received a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, denying 
to this court, and to tlie judge advocate, and to me, certain data which 
is on file in the Navy Depaitment. If it be true that he has received 
this letter, denying to this court this data, I wish to [^4^] state 

that this data is essential to the establishment of the facts in connection 
with this case, and I am respectfully suggesting to the court that if 
the data is of such a highly secret nature that it cannot be presented 
to this court, that full consideration be given by the court to taking 
steps whereby they, the members of the court, can inspect this data. 
I also respectfully request the letter received by the judge advocate 
of the court be made a part of the record of proceedings of this court, 
the letter on this subject, I mean. 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The judge advocate replied : Admiral Kimmel, under date of 1 
August 1944, made a request upon the judge advocate that he be sup- 
plied with certain documents on file in the Navy Department, relating 
to a subject matter which the judge advocate does not consider it 
necessary for him to set out in his reply. The judge advocate on the 
same day wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, setting out the 
general subject matter of the dispatches that he had been requested 
to obtain for the interested party, Admiral Kimmel. The judge ad- 
vocate was informed by the Secretary of the Navy, under date of 2 
August 1944, that "it appears that Admiral Kinnnel had not been 
made available to have copies of certain dispatches which could be 
construed as warnings of hostilites. The Secretary of the Navy's 
orders in this matter are set out in enclosure (A), which you will 
please show to those concerned." Enclosure (A) was a letter from 
Admiral Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of 27 De- 
cember 1943, in which Admiral Kimmel had requested that the Navy 
Department make available to him certain documents and letters in 
its possession. Accordingl}', in response to the Secretary of the Navy's 
directive, the judge advocate prepared two letters under date of 9 
August 1944, in which he made a request on the Secretary of the Navy 
that he be supplied with certain documents, the file numbers of which 
he set out in these two letters. The Secretary of the Navy replied 
under date of 10 August 1944, that the material requested "cannot be 
furnished as it is not in the public interest to introduce this type of 
material in evidence before the court of inquiry of which you are judge 
advocate." The file number of this letter is. Secret, serial number 
01662416, dated 10 August 1944. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), stated: I respectfully request that all of the corespond- 
ence on this subject which the judge advocate has just read be made 
a part of the record of this court. 

The court stated: With reference to that last request, it will be 
pertinent, at such time as you call your own witnesses, to introduce 
those documents as a part of the record if you wish. It is at present 
the province of the judge advocate as to whether he wishes to make it 
a part of the [^4^] record or not. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), stated: I don't wish to be too insistent in this matter, 
and I don't want to be in any sense disrespectful, but I think I must 
emphasize the fact that this data which I have requested is essential 
for proper examination of the witness now on the stand, Admiral 
Stark, that what I have requested is to show affirmatively in the record 
that I have exhausted every means at my command to accomplish the 
introduction of this data at this time. 

The court stated : The court might state for all practical purposes 
the letter is now in the record because the judge advocate just read it. 
As to whether or not it will be appended is entirely a question as to 
whether the judge advocate wishes to do it now, or you do it later. 
The court has taken notice of the statement of the interested party, 
Admiral Kimmel, and that is now a matter of record. The court will 
now proceed with such testimony as is available. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), stated : Just a suggestion — that the decision made by the 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 121 

Secretary is now an accomplish fact. It has been decided that this 
data is denied this conrt. 

The judge advocate stated: Denied you, sir. There wasn't any 
request for it by the court. 

Tlie court stated : It isn't the option of the court to make requests 
for any documents, except that if the court is not satisfied at the end 
of the introduction of evidence by the judge advocate and the inter- 
ested parties — if the court at that time "wants any further informa- 
tion — it is up to it to decide at that time. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), stated: I most respectfully insist on my wording, "it is 
denied this court", because it is denied to me, and because it is denied 
to the judge advocate of the court. Denial to me and to the judge 
advocate is not nearly as important in my mind as denial to this court, 
in order to arrive at a proper verdict; and that is the burden of every 
statement I have made on this subject. I would respectfully like to be 
informed of the decision of the court as to how they will proceed in 
this matter. The counsel has called my attention to the paraphrase 
of the data. The Secretary of the Navy, under August 10, 1944, states 
that "the material requested, as it is not in the public interest to intro- 
duce such material before the court of which you are judge advocate." 
Before the court. 

The judge advocate stated: The judge advocate would like to ad- 
vise the court, in his capacity as legal adviser [-^-^T"] to them, 
that, in response to Admiral Kimmel's request that they view this 
evidence themselves in the files of the Navy Department, it would be 
highly irregular and illegal for the reason that it does not permit of 
usual cross-exantination by other interested parties or the judge 
advocate, and the court would be receiving the information from a 
source not set forth in the record. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband' E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), stated: I admit that extraordinary conditions require 
extraordinary procedures. 

The court announced that it would proceed with the Inquiry. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the adjournment was taken on Thursday, August 10, 1944, 
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

The interesting party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), asked the court to take judicial notice of the note, so- 
called, about which there was testimony on the sixth day of the in- 
quiry, dated November 2(), 1941, that was handed b}'^ the Secretary 
of State to the accredited representatives of the Japanese Govern- 
ment, which appears in an official printed document, "Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States", 1931-1941, Volume 2. 

The court announced that it would accede to the request. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), (Continued), 

567. Q. One consequence "of your testimony yesterday. Admiral 
Stark, relative to your lack of knowledge of the note of November 26, 
would be, of course, that so far as you know. Admiral Kimmel was not 
advised of the delivering of that note, at least prior to December 7. 
1941 ? 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. So far as I know, he was not. 

5G8. Q. In your dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of November 27, '41, 
you state tliat an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the 
next few days. What did you mean by the phrase, "next few days"? 

A. Well, I meant the next few days. I meant that it might be ex- 
pected at any time. 

569. Q. Well, would twenty days be a few days, the next few days ? 

A, No, my thought was that it was imminent, and that it might 
happen in the next few days. 

[14^] 570. Q. That would be something less than ten days ? 

A. I would like to stand on the phrase "the next few days." I think 
to attempt to define it as three days, a week, or ten days, would be very 
futile. 

571. Q. Did you intend to connote imminence of the possibility of 
action ? 

A. I did. 

572. Q. Have you any recollection. Admiral Stark, whether publicly 
in the press and on the radio there was carried news, between November 
27 and December 7, of the ostensible resumption of negotiations or the 
continuation of negotiations between the Secretary of State and the 
Japanese Ambassador in Washington? 

A. I do not recall such at this time. 

673. Q. Have you no recollection of it one way or the other. 

A. No, I simply don't recall that. It is nearly three years ago, and 
for me to testify as to what the press carried at that time would be 
difficult. I have testified as to what I knew from official conversations. 

574. Q. The primary basis of the message of November 27, as dis- 
closed in the message, was that negotiations, I quote, "negotiations 
with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the 
Pacific have ceased" — was it not ? 

A. That's right. 

575. Q. And you have no recollection whether the public, available 
information subsequent to the sending of that dispatch indicated that 
the assumption of the dispatch had ceased to be effective? 

A. I have stated that I do not recollect what the press carried at 
that time. I can't go back on that statement. I think it stands for 
itself. 

576. Q. You have read "Peace and War" ? 

A. I have read about two paragraphs in "Peace and War". I have 
not read the document. 

577. Q. Are you familiar with that portion of "Peace and War" 
which indicates that negotiations, genuine or apparent, between the 
Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador, were continued 
between November 27, 1941, and December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I am familiar with one paragraph in "Peace and War", which I 
would like to read if it is permissible, and which I think would be 
very clarifying to the line of questioning. 

It was pointed out by the judge advocate that the \JW] 
book, "Peace and War", was a public document issued by the State 
Department, of which the court had taken judicial notice. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated, 
with the permission of the court, and for clarification, that "Peace and 
War" was a condensation of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 
■ 1931-1941", of which the court had taken judicial notice. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 123 

The witness continued his answer (reading) : 

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this 
Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of 
this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility 
of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese 
were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquests by force ; and 
that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the liands of the 
Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for 
our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make 
the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack 
at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense 
and of coordination for purposes thereof. 

578. Q. In the paragraph beyond the paragraph that you read, 
Admiral Stark, there appears the sentence, "Secretary Htill conferred 
with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on December 1"? 

A. That's right. 

579. Q. That now at least indicates to you that negotiations were 
in progress on December 1, 1941 ? 

A. That indicates that he was conferring with them; it does not 
indicate to me that the extract which I read, and which states, "there 
was practicallj^ no possibility of an agreement being achieved with 
Japan ; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any 
time with new acts of conquest by force" had been affected. 

580. Q. Of course you did not advise Admiral Kimmel that Secre- 
tary Hull bad advised you that there was practically no possibility 
of agreement being achieved with Japan, and I quote from the state- 
ment that you read ? 

A. 1 gave Admiral Kimmel my message of 27 November, and I 
stated in it that a similar warning is being sent by the War Depart- 
ment. I repeated that warning of the War Department in which the 
War Department stated — when I say "repeated" it to Admiral Kim- 
mel, I mean I made him an info addressee — of the message of the 29th 
which has been before this court: "negotiations with Japan appear to 
be terminated, to all practical purposes, with only the barest possi- 
bility [JSO] that the Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue. Japanese future action is unpredictable, but 
hostile action possible at any moment." That was the War Depart- 
ment's independent estimate, so far as their size-up of the negotiations 
situation. 

581. Q. But you did not advise Admiral Kimmel that, "there was 
practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan"? 

A. I stated that, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabil- 
ization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive 
move by Japan is expected." I think the message is plain, and the 
forecast made therein was borne out. 

• 582. Q. But you now know that negotiations with Japan in fact 
continued, either genuinely or in phantom fashion, on December 1? 

A. From what you have shown me in official documents from the 
State Department, I know that conversations took place, but I do not 
think, after reading these, that it changed the reasons from which 
my dispatch of November 27 was drawn, namely : "That negotiations 
with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific 
have ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within 
the next few days", which, I repeat, is very much in line with the 
extract I read from "Peace and War", previously referred to. 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[JSJ] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

583. Q. On November 27th, had yon been furnished with a copy 
of the message that- General Marshall sent General Short? 

A. I stated in my message of November 27th that a similar warn- 
ing is being sent by the War Department. I knew it was being sent. 
I felt that General ^Marshall, who had the same facts that I had, was 
in accord. Whether or not I had seen it at that time I do not recall. 
I saw it subsequently. 

584. Q. You certainly saw it not later than November 29th when the 
copy was dispatched to 

A, I repeated it for action to certain addressees, and info to Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific. 

585. Q,. Did you inquire of General Marshall subsequent to Novem- 
bei: 27th whether he had heard from General Short in response to 
the request in his message, of the action taken by the Army in Hawaii ? 

A. Not that I recall. 

586. Q. General Marshall did not tell you that the alert assumed 
by the Army was an anti-sabotage alert? 

A. I do not recollect that. I have no recollection of it until it 
was brought to my attention considerably later. 

587. Q. Do you identify a document I hand you, Admiral, as a 
dispatch sent by you to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? 

A, I identify it as a document from the Chief of Naval Operations 
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, released by Admiral 
Ingersoll, bearing time group 2700-10, November 26, 1941. 

The dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, released by Admiral Ingersoll, 
date time group 270040, dated November 26, 1941, was submitted to 
the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and 
by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret) , offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 40". 

588. Q. Will you read the dispatch, Admiral? 
The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 40. 

[1S2] 589. Q. Now, Admiral, this proposed relief in whole or 
in part of garrisons at Midway and Wake, did it not? 

A. The message reads, "Army has offered to make available some 
units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station 
if you consider this desirable.'" It goes on to state, "Army also pro- 
poses to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advanced bases which 
you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft 
units. Take this into considei'ation in your plans and advise when 
practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament." 
It is offering to make available infantry battalions now on station 
and looking forAvard to helping in case of advanced bases which he 
might occupy. 

590. Q. You testified a day or so earlier that among the defensive 
measures that you anticipated. Admiral Kimmel would inaugurate as 
a result of your dispatch of November 27, were anti-submarine meas- 
ures, did you not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 125 

A. I believe I did, yes. 

591. Q. Did you ever modify, cancel, or recall the instructions that 
you gave Admiral Kimmel in your letter of 23 September which was 
introduced in evidence yesterday, Exhibit 37, which was the answer 
to Admiral Kimmel's request for authority to bomb submarines? 

A. Not that I recall. 

592. Q. Then the statement in the letter of September 25rd, and 
I quote, "The existing orders, that is, not to bomb suspected sub- 
marines in defensive sea areas, are appropriate," still stood, unqualified, 
until December 7th? 

A. Considerable has gone over the dam since 23 September when 
I invited attention to the Navy Regulations regarding instances in 
the Pacific, and I mentioned what was being done elsewhere. In view 
of the warning he had just received, I think he could have exercised 
his own judgment as to what latitude to take. 

593. Q. Which communication from you to Kimmel subsequent 
(o September 23rd qualified the injunction relative to not bombing 
submarines? 

A. Well, the war warning, I would say, certainly would give the 
picture of things, if not the previous warning. And as I recall, Ad- 
miral Kimmel had written me, or had notified me that he would bomb 
under certain circum.stances, and I took no exception to it. 

594. Q. That was after the first of December? 

A. I have forgotten just what the date of that information was. 

595. Q. Referring to Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the Secretary 
of the Navy to the Secretary of War of 21 January, 194:1? 

A. Yes. 

[ISS] 596. Q. The counter-measures to possible Japanese attack 
enumerated are (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and 
supporting vessels before air attack can be launched. At any time 
prior to December 7th, Admiral Stark, did you authorize Admiral 
Kimmel to engage enemy carriers before an attack could be launched ? 

A. No. 

597. Q. In fact, in the Army message which you incorporated as 
your own on the 29th of November and sent to Admiral Kimmel 
for information, it is said, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United 
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." When you sent 
the Army message to Admiral Kimmel you intended him to be gov- 
erned by that injunction therein, did you not? 

A. He was ail info addressee on that dispatch. If your question 
implies that had carriers appeared in the proximity of Hawaii after 
his war warning and that he was not to do anything about it, I 
wouldn't be prepared to go that far; I would have left it to his judg- 
ment. I had told him in the dispatch, in my own dispatch, that an 
attack was expected. The appearance of carriers in position to at- 
tack Oahu would, in my opinion, have justified his attacking them and 
I would have stood back of him if he had. I would have considered 
such appearance practically an overt act. 

598. Q. By the Army message, the action was further restricted 
by the caution, and I quote, "But these measures" — referring to recon- 
naissance — "should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil popula- 
tion or disclose intent". You intended Admiral Kimmel to be re- 
stricted by that caution and injunction, did you not? 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, I wouldn't say that I did. He was not an action addressee. 
I can sum up the whole thing by saying that with the warning, I left 
it up to Admiral Kimmel with regard to such matters. There is judg- 
ment required there which can't be specifically set out. 

599. Q. Well, what effect did you intend this clause in the Army 
message which you sent Admiral Kimmel to have on him ? 

A. I repeated it for information, particularly for information, and 
I particularly sent it as a directive showing that we had given the 
coastal frontiers this information and directed the commanding of- 
ficers thereof that in case of hostilities they should be prepared to 
carry out their tasks, as they came under Admiral Kimmel in case 
of hostilities. 

[1S4-] 600. Q. Well, there can't be any doubt but what the two 
phrases in the Army message which I have just read had the effect 
of minimizing an all-out effort on Admiral Kimmel's part, can there ? 

A. Knowing Admiral Kimmel as I do I would not have expected 
him to minimize his own judgment in accordance with the directive 
that the dispatch sent him for action, which I sent him on November 
27th. The message you are now referring to, namely, the repeated one 
from Marshall, was addressed for action to the Pacific Naval Northern 
Coastal Frontier and the Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier 
showing them the tenseness of the situation, showing them what their 
Army opposites had, and directing them to carry out WPL-46 in case 
of hostilities, and I wanted Admiral Kimmel to know that they had 
received such direction as they came under him. It was not in any 
way intended to modify anything I had said on the 27th. I should 
like to add to that answer, or to invite attention to what has already 
been brought forth, that when Admiral Kimmel issued orders to 
bomb submarines and made me an info addressee, I took no exception 
to it and that wasn't qualified by whether the submarines struck 
first, or not. 

601. Q. I will read to you. Admiral Stark, Paragraph IV of Exhibit 
23, sub-paragraph (a) : '^Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward 
through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air sur- 
prise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained 
with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a 
practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other in- 
telligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow 
time limits." Did you send Admiral Kimmel any intelligence which 
indicated that a surface raid on Pearl Harbor was probable within 
rather narrow time limits ? 

A. No intelligence to that effect. 

[1S5] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second 
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

602. Q. Both the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Commu- 
nications were under you as Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. Yes. 

603. Q. The Office of Naval Intelligence collected all the intelli- 
gence which the 'Navy Department had concerning everything, par- 
ticularly the Japanese and Pacific Ocean situation ? 

A. Generally speaking, but there were occasional outside sources 
available to us. I collected some myself, for example, from the State 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 127 

Department and our so-called Central Division. Generally speaking, 
they were the central agency for such work. 

604. Q. During the fall of 1941 was all important Japanese intelli- 
gence brought to your attention ? 

A. I assume that what was important was brought to my attention. 
I could not say definitely, but the question of importance might even 
be decided by subordinates who were responsible for dissemination. 
Intelligence was responsible for collection and dissemination. It was 
their job, but certainly if they had something which they deemed of 
real importance for me to know, it was up to them to bring it to my 
attention. 

605. Q. Had you issued any informal instructions to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence about advising you personally on Japanese Intelli- 
gence during the fall of 1941 ? 

A, I recall no special instructions. That was their job. 

606. Q. To whom, other than you, as a routine matter, was intelli- 
gence distributed concerning the Japanese situation in the fall of 
1941? 

A. I would say, generally, to War Plans and to the Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations. They worked, of course, closely with Com- 
munications. Are you referring to just within the Navy Department ? 

607. Q. No, to the entire list of agencies. 

A. Of course, they disseminated it to people outside the Navy De- 
partment like Hawaii, the Far East, and the Commanders-in-Chief 
not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic. They sent a great deal 
to London. 

608. Q. Were there any other routine distributees in Washington 
other thail those you enumerated in the Navy Department ? 

A. It was up to the Officer in Charge of the Central [i66] 
Division to keep the State Department informed of information which 
would be of use to them. There was an exchange going on there all 
the time. There was an exchange of information between F. B. I. 
and Naval Intelligence on certain matters. There would be an ex- 
change between the Treasury if it was pertinent, but on routine 
matters, I would say, the State Department was the distributee. 

609. Q. Were there routine 'distributions of important intelligence 
concerning the Japanese situation to the White House? 

A. I would not say routine, but we certainly gave the White House 
any information which we thought was of worthwhile interest. The 
White House's primary collection of that would be from the State 
Department, but if either War or Navy or anybody else got vital infor- 
mation, I assume it would go to the Wliite House. 

610. Q. That distribution would take effect on important matters 
without your personal direction in a particular instance ? 

A. No, I would not say so. If your question means that the White 
House is marked on information copies as a distributing point, to the 
best of my recollection it was not. I might say that the White House 
aide at times attended conferences, but the White House was not a 
regular distributee. 

611. Q. Do I understand that the White House would not receive 
any particular item of intelligence without your specific direction ? 

A. No, I would not say that. The Naval Aide to the President 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

might have picked up something, but, generally, if there was some- 
thing of interest to the White House, I would note it or Intelligence 
would note it. We aimed to give them everything of importance, of 
course. 

612. Q. Either the Director of Naval Intelligence or the head of 
C. N. O. had authority to send to the White House anything they felt 
was of importance? 

A. Yes. There was no denial of any such thing. If they thought 
anything should go to the White House, th'ey would tell me, and it 
would probably go. 

613. Q. Who was the head of Naval Intelligence during the Fall 
of 1941 ? 

A. I think at the time you refer to Captain Wilkinson was director 
of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

614. Q. Was there a section known as the Far Eastern Section? 
A. Yes. 

[157] 615. Q. Was that the Central Division to which you refer ? 
A. No, the Central Division is a separate division. 

616. Q. Who was the head of the Far Eastern Section of Naval 
Intelligence in the fall of 1941 ? 

A. I would have to refresh my memory on that. I think it was 
McCallum, but I'm not certain. If that answer is incorrect, I will 
change it in. the record. 

617. Q. You testified, in substance, that the basis of the dispatch 
to Admiral Kimmel on October 16, 1941, was the fall of the Japanese 
Cabinet but that there might have been other background factors 
prompting the sending of that dispatch. Do you recall what those 
other background factors were? 

A. Not specifically. Wliat might be termed deterioration of rela- 
tions. They were certainly getting no better. My letters show that, 
some of which have been i-eferred to. 

618. Q. Do you recall whether on or about 15 October 1941 you 
received an unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions 
of the conquest of Southeastern Asia ? 

A. At the moment, I don't recall that. 

619. Q. That would have been of important enough character to 
have been called to your attention, if such intelligence report had been 
received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, would it not ? 

A. If Intelligence has a document of sufficient importance, it would 
have. 

620. Q. I am asking you if information of that character was of 
sufficient importance ? 

A. It would depend on the value they put on it. They might have 
regarded it as poor or good information. From the source from 
which they got it, they might have considered it not worthwhile. I 
could not say whether they would have sent it. 

621. Q. You have no recollection of hearing about that about the 
16th of October? 

A. I do not recall. 

622. Q. Do you recall in the month of October, 1941, receiving in- 
telligence reports that Japanese consuls were directing and advising 
the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines, 
Hawaii, America, and Europe? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 129 

A. I do have some recollection of that. 

623. Q. When did that information come, before or, after the 15th 
of October? 

A. I could not say. 

[1S8] 624. Q. That was brought to your attention? 

A. As I recall, that was. I have some remembrance of that. 

625. Q. Was that information forwarded to Admiral Kimmel? 
A. I don't recall. 

626. Q. You have no recollection? 

A. No, it may have been sent out automatically. ii €-fe pkkia 

4ey©«7 i-fe sheeid ber I was not the forwarding agency for Admiral 

Kimmel. It was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

I could not possibly go over everything that was sent out, and many 

things they undoubteclly sent out which I did not see. 

[Notation in margin :] See correction page 324. 

627. Q. There were some things that were of such grave importance 
that you personally saw to their transmission to Admiral Kimmel? 

A. Well, I would check anything of grave importance — that I 
considered of grave importance, and certainly if it were of interest to 
him, it would have been my first thought to get it to him. 

628. Q. Do you recall wiiether on or about 4 November 1941, you 
received intelligence information that the internal situation in Japan, 
both politically and economically, since the American embargo had 
become so desperate that the Japanese Government had concluded 
that it was necessary to distract popular attention, either by foreign 
war or by a diplomatic victory ? 

A. Yes, I recall that. 

629. Q. That was called to your attention ? 
A. I recall that incident. 

630. Q. Do you recall whether that information was forwarded 
to the White House? 

A. I couldn't say definitely that it was. That is all material three 
years old. I assume the White House had it. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, ob- 
jected to the line of questioning on the ground that it was immaterial 
and that the information could be obtained directly from other 
people. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.), replied. 

The court announced that the objection was overruled. 

[iS9] 631. Q. Do you recall any discussions at the White House 
concerning that information? 

A. The discussions in the White House were broad and wide and 
continuous on the entire Japanese situation. 

632. Q. Do you recall whether you yourself forwarded that infor- 
mation to Admiral Kimmel ? 

A. No, not at the moment. 

The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 159-A through 
162, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record 
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken 
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of 
the war. 

79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 10 



130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[163] The court then, at 12 : 40 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 00 
p. m., at which time it reconvened. 

Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the 
parties to the inquiry and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross- 
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that 
the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, (Ret), (Continued) : 

With the permission of the court, the interested party. Rear Ad- 
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) made the following 
statement: May it please the court: Admiral Kimmel has stated to 
the court the necessity of obtaining certain documents now in the pos- 
session of the Navy Department which are absolutely essential as 
evidence if a thorough and impartial investigation of all the facts 
in the Pearl Harbor affair is to be made. In Paragraph Two of the 
Precept of the Secretary of the Navy, appointing this court, there is 
the statement that the judge advocate is authorized "to obtain all 
documents relating to the said attack that maay be required for intro- 
duction into evidence. This morning, a letter was read from the 
Secretary of the Navy to the judge advocate of this court denying 
the availability of certain evidence on the ground that it was contrary 
to the public-interest. Obviously, as Admiral Kimmel pointed out, 
the court will be unable to arrive at any correct conclusions unless 
these documents are admitted. They are absolutely essential if Ad- 
miral Kimmel is to make a full presentation of the evidence in the 
matter regarding which he is an interested party. For two and one- 
half years, due to the report of the Roberts Commission, he has been 
pilloried by the press and the Congress and before the people of this 
country. It is now time that the true facts in this matter be brought 
out, and that Admiral Kimmel have a full opportunity to exonerate 
himself of the unsupported charges that wer^ made against him in the 
report of the Roberts Commission. May I take the liberty of pointing 
out to the court the importance, not only to the interested parties but 
to the Navy and to the people of this nation, that this court make its 
hearings and findings as full and complete a report of all the circum- 
stances which are within its power to develop. I can imagine the 
widespread unfavorable repercussions on the Navy if it subsequently 
develops that this has not been done. It is obvious that in due time 
the proceedings [J64] of this court, and all of the evidence it 
might have secured will be a matter of open record, available to the 
public. May I recommend to the court the following procedure: 
First, that the court itself endeavor to secure from the Secretary of 
the Navy the documents which have now been denied; second, that 
the proceedings of this court be considered as of a secrecy that now 
governs in the case of the documents to which Admiral Kimmel has 
been denied access. This would enable the Secretary of the Navy to 
hold the proceedings of this court in the same degree of secrecy as that 
of the documents. It is inevitable that as soon as the public interests 
permit the documents which are now being withheld will become 
public property. When that time comes, I feel that the whole Naval 
Service will feel the effects of the public disapprobation which will 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 131 

undoubtedly arise if this court is not furnished all evidence that is now 
available to arrive at just and proper findings. 

The proceedings following directly hereafter, page 164-A, have, by 
direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited 
with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest 
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war. 

[166] 673. Q. Do you recall any discussion with anyone con- 
cerning the sending of additional messages or dispatches to Admiral 
Kimmel ? 

A. No, I do not. 

674. Q. During the week preceding 7 December, 1941 ? 
A. No, I do not. 

675. Q. Do you recall ever having declined to approve the sending 
of a dispatch concerning intelligence information during that week 
to Admiral Kimmel ? 

A. No. 

676. And I assume that you have no recollection of any conversa- 
tion with Admiral Wilkinson to that effect? 

A. With whom? 

677. Q. Captain Wilkinson. 

A. Captain Wilkinson ? No, I do not. 

678. Q. What was the incident that prompted the sending of the 
message of December 4th by you to Admiral Kimmel relative to Guam, 
something to do with the disposition of United States codes on 
Guam? 

A. We considered war to be imminent, as noted in our previous dis- 
patches. We knew that Guam was practically defenseless and we 
wanted to make certain that confidential publications which might 
be useful to the enemy did not fall into the enemy's hands in case 
Guam were captured. Guam was sort of a step-child of the Navy 
Department. It was under, as I recall, the 14th Naval District for 
matters of construction that were going on. 

679. Q. When the message was sent on 4 December to Guam, or rela- 
tive to Guam, did you consider war imminent? 

A. Yes. We were looking for Japan to strike any day. We didn't 
know where. 

680. Q. Did you consider war imminent. Admiral ? 
A. Yes. 

681. Q. You never advised Admiral Kimmel in so many words 
that war was imminent? 

A. Well, I thought I had ; I had intended to. 

682. Q. The words "imminence of war" were not included in any of 
Admiral Kimmel 's dispatches, were they ? 

A. Well, I think the equivalent was. The dispatch stated that this 
was a war warning and that an aggressive move by Japan was ex- 
pected within the next few days, and from the best indications we had 
it would be the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo — 
that being after a message which indicated she might strike in any 
direction. 

[J66] 683. Q. Between 27 November and 4 December, do you 
recall any intelligence information that you had received changing 
your conception of the situation as it was on the 27th of November? 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. To me, one of the most telling pieces of information that we had 
that confirmed our suspicions and that gave me the distinct impression 
that war was possible, that war was probable, was the information 
that the Japs here and in London had orders to destroy most of their 
codes and ciphers at once, and also to burn all other important con- 
fidential and secret documents. That message was a beacon light to 
me at that time and it still is. I considered it extremely important. 

684. Q. That message was sent with no priority. Admiral Stark. 
I refer to Exhibit 21, which is a photostatic copy of the original. 

A. There is no priority indicated on this dispatch. 

685. Q. That means that it went deferred, or routine ? 

A. Yes, unless some other personal direction was concerned. By 
the record it would mean that it was sent routine. I should like to 
correct my testimony because I was given the wrong dispatch. The 
dispatch to which I referred is marked "priority". 

686. Q. What is the date of that dispatch. Admiral Stark? 

A. The date of that dispatch is 031850, and it has a priority rating. 

687. Except for the intelligence that you received relative to the 
destruction of Japanese codes as you have stated, did you receive any 
other intelligence indicating more probability of war between Japan 
and the United States between November 27th and December 6th ? 

A. To the best of my remembrance, I received nothing indicating 
more probability than the messages to which I have referred. 

688. Q. Do you recall two accasions on either the 4th or 5th of 
December when Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCallum came 
to your office to confer about intelligence relative to the Pacific and 
Japanese situation that you considered of such import that you called 
a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral 
Noyes ? 

A. No, I don't recall. 

689. Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941 ? 
A. No. 

690. Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine 
day, the time in the afternoon or evening? 

A. No, I do not. 

[167 \ 691. Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday eve- 
ning, 6 December ? 

A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remem- 
brance is — I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall 
clearly. 

692. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever you were, 
between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence infor- 
mation brought by an officer messenger? 

A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort 
on that evening. 

693. Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Com- 
mander Kramer stationed in Naval Communications or ONI? 

A. Yes, there "vvas. 

694. Q. You knew him? 

A. Yes ; he used to deliver messages in the office. 

695. Q. Do you recall whether he. delivered a message at your home? 
A. I haven't tlie slightest recollection of any message bearing on 

this, or any other subject, being given to me between the time I left 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 133 

the office and the distinct recollection next morning of my talking over 
with Cajjtain Schuirmann the dispatch to which reference has already 
been made, namely, the dispatch which the Army sent. 

(^^Kk Q. Do you recall receiving by telephone any information of 
intelligence that had been received by the Navy Department on Satur- 
day night ? 

A. No, I say I don't recall. I don't w^ant to make it stronger than 
that. Mv remembrance is that I did not ; that I had nothino- until that 
message next morning. 

697. Q. Do you recall wdiat time you came to the office on Sunday, 
7 December 'i 

A. It was in the forenoon. I don't recall what time. Probably 
rather late in the forenoon but I do not recall the hour. 

698. Q. AVere you in your office by 0800 Sunday morning, 7 
Decembei' ^ 

A. No, I was not, and I don't recall what hour I did get there. I 
say I was not; I don't recall. I would be very much surprised if I 
had been there. 

699. Q. Do you recall receiving by telephone or officer messenger 
any intelligence information at your home Sunday morning? 

A. No. 

[168] 700. Q, Before you came to the Navy Department? 

A. No, I do not. 

701. Q. Is your recollection rather clear that you did not receive 
any message at home that Sunday morning ? 

A. My recollection is that I did not but I couldn't say 100 per cent. 
I just don't recall having received anything from the time I left Sat- 
urday night until the message Sunday mornin,g. 

702. Q. Do you recall any telephone conversations on Saturday 
night with either Secretary Knox or Captain Wilkinson? 

A. No. My remembrance is rather distinct that I didn't have, but 
it is going on three years and I haven't the slightest recollection of any 
such conversations. 

703. Q. But the events of Saturday and Sunday, or at least Sunday, 
were tremendously important ? 

A. Yes ; the events of Sunday were. 

704. Q. What is your best recollection as to the time that you 
arrived at the Navy Department Sunday morning ? 

A. I don't know. It may have been around — I don't recollect but it 
may have been around half past ten, or 11 : 00. It may have been 
earlier. I don't recollect the hour but my Sunday moniing arrivals 
were rather late, generally. 

705. Q. Will you tell the court in as detailed manner as you can 
recall all that you did when you arrived at your office on Sunday 
morning ? 

A. The one point that I remember about that Sunday morning, and 
which I have already testified to, is the message which the Army sent. 

706. Q. Didn't you have any intelligence information yourself of 
the Navy Department brought to your attention before you talked to 
General Marshall? 

A. i^e* tfea* i f eeaUr ^ 

[Notation in margin :] See correction p. 324. 

707. Q. Did General Marshall call you, or did you call him? 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. He called me. 

708. Q. Do you recall what he told you ? 

A. Yes. He asked me if I had seen the message. I said, "I have it 
in front of me." 

709. Q. What message ? 

A. He brought up the subject of information which required the 
Japanese Ambassador to see Mr. Hull at exactly 1300. It stressed 
the exact time ; told him, as I recall, not to be late. The thing that 
stands out was the [^^^] exact time. And General Marshall, 
as I have testified, said there might be something in that and asked 
me if I didn't think it would ge a good thing to send it on. Shall I 
go on and repeate the testimony ? 

710. Q. No. Before General Marshall called you, did you have 
information concerning the events that were to happen at 1300, De- 
cember 7th? 

A. As I recall, I had similar information about that same time. I 
have forgotten for the moment whether it was in the form of a dis- 
patch, or what it was. 

711. Q. Wliat was the substance of the information that you had 
before General Marshall called? 

A. It was the 1300 appointment of the Japanese Ambassador with 
the Secretary of State. 

712. Q. At that time did you have any information as to the na- 
ture of the appointment between the Japanese Ambassador and the 
Secretary of State at 1:00 o'clock? 

A. I do not recall that I knew what it was about except that he 
was to see him exactly at that time. 

713. Q. You have no memory as to whether the subject of the dis- 
cussion between the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Hull was the 
subject of the information which you had ? 

A. No; I don't recall. Of course, this is in the light of hind- 
sight — I may be in error — but I thought it was a reply to Mr, Hull on 
something. I just don't know. I know that he had this appointmisnt 
with Mr. Hull at that time. Obviously, it was on something with 
reference to relations between the two countries. 

714. Q. Well, we now all know, and we knew Monday morning, that 
the Japanese Ambassador delivered a note closing relations between 
Japan and the United States ? 

A. That is right. 

715. Q. Did you have any information that a note of that char- 
acter was to be delivered at 1 : 00 o'clock. 

A. No, r did not. 

716. Q. Do you j-ecall v» ho gave you the information that you did 
receive about the 1 : 00 o'clock appointment ; who in your department? 

A. No ; I don't recall just how that came in. 

717. Q. Have you any recollection that anyone in the Navy De- 
partment suggested to you that 1 : 00 o'clock Washington time was ap- 
proximately sunrise in Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila? 

A. I don't recall about the sunrise in Pearl Harbor. I knew about 
what time it would be in Pearl Harbor. 

[170] 718. Q. Well, do you recall anyone suggesting it to you, 
either by note or orally? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 135 

A. No. Captain Schiiirmann and I talked that over and we dis- 
cussed the time element, and of course it was apparent that we 
needed speed to get that message tlirough if it could possibly be 
gotten through in time. 

719. Q. Do you recall anyone other than Captain Schuirmann with 
whom vou were talking about that at that time ? 

A. No ; I recall only Captain Schuirmann. 

720. Q. Do you have any recollection of the suggestion having 
been made to you that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl 
Harbor? 

A. No, I don't recall that. 

721. Q. How long after you had the information in the Navy De- 
partment was it before General Marshall telephoned you ? 

A. There again, I don't recall just what time I got down. I simply 
recall that when he called I was talking that message over with Cap- 
tain Schuirmann. It was on my desk at that time. I cannot recall 
the time. 

722. Q. Do you have any recollection when the information about 
which you were talking with Captain Schuirmann was received in 
the Navy Department? 

A. No. - 

723. Q. You have no recollection of making any inquiries as to 
when that was received in the Navy Department ? 

A. No, I haven't. 

724. Q. After you talked with General Marshall, did you tele- 
phone anyone else concerning that subject matter? 

A. I do not recall telephoning anyone else. 

725. Q. Do you recall talking about it with Colonel Knox? 
A. I don't recall it. 

726. Q. Do you know whether Colonel Knox was in conference 
with the Secretary of State and Secretary of War at 10 : 00 o'clock 
on that morning? 

A. No, I do not remember that. Of course, I remember the events 
very clearly later on, talking with Colonel Knox late that evening. 
It was my wont to keep him informed of anything of this sort which 
was important, but whether or not I telephoned, I can't recall. I' 
am rather under the impression that I did, but I couldn't say so. 

727. Q. Do you recall talking with Captain Wilkinson and Com- 
mander McCallum on that Sunday morning? 

A. No, I do not. 

[171] 728. Q. Do you recall telephoning the ^Yliite House after 
you had had your talk with Captain Schuirmann, or while you were 
talking with him? 

A. No. I have no clear recollection of telephoning anyone. 

729. Q. What did you do after vou had talked with General 
Marshall? 

A. I went on about my routine work, knowing that the dispatch 
was on its way. 

730. Q. You stayed at the Department, then, through the day? 
A. Yes; and most of the night. 

731. Q. But you didn't go home after 11:00 or 11:30, whenever 
3^ou talked to General Marshall, until you had word of the attack? 

A. No, I didn't go home. 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

732. Q. And except for the message that was sent via the Army, 
you did not communicate with Admiral Kimmel on Saturday or 
Sunday ? 

A. You mean prior to 1300 ? 

733. Q. Prior to 1300? 
A. No, I did not. 

734. Q. Do I understand that General Marshall read the dispatch 
that he proposed and did send, over the telephone to you ? 

A. Well, my recollection is that he did. I am not sure. I knew 
what he was going to send. 

735. Q. But you didn't have any copy of it when you were talking 
to him? 

A. No. He wrote it out, as I recall, in his own hand and read it 
to me. What we were wondering was, if by any chance that particular 
hour and the clearness with which it was set forth, the preciseness, 
might possibly mean a strike and, as I have testified, after having said 
"We have sent so much ; I don't know that we could send much more," 
I thought, well, there might be something to it; let's not take the 
chance. I called him back, I think within 30 seconds, almost as soon 
as I hung up the 'phone, and asked him to go ahead and send it, and 
that I would be glad to put it over our system if he didn't feel that 
his was just as rapid as could be made. 

736. Q. Have you a copy of the dispatch that General Marshall sent ? 
A. Yes, I have it in front of me. 

[172] 737. Q. Would you read that in the record, please ? 

A. I say I have the dispatch; I have a dispatch which is marked 
"paraphrased". I would be glad to read it if you would like to have it. 

The judge advocate stated that he had made a written request to 
the Secretary of War for a duly certified copy of this dispatch, but 
that it had not yet arrived. 

738. Q. I should like" to have you read it. 

A. I would like to add to my previous testimony, if I didn't put 
it in in the first place, that I asked Marshall to make sure that our 
people were informed ; that had gotten to be more or less a habit of ours. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he liad no assurance as to the exactness of the paraphrased dis- 
patch but that there was no objection to reading it into the record. 

739. Q. Would you read the paraphrased dispatch, please? 

A. This message is a paraphrase of a message sent from the War 
Department to the C. G., Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941. 
It starts out with : 

5297. Japanese are presenting at one p. m., Eastern Standard Time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code 
machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communi- 
cation. 

740. Q. Well, that would indicate that at least General Marshall 
had intelligence of something more than the requested appointment 
at 1:00 o'clock? 

A. Yes. 

741. Q. Did you have anything additional? 

A. I don't recall just what that information we had was. What 
stands out in my memory clearly is the 1 : 00 o'clock time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 137 

742. Q. And you have no recollection that the 1 : 00 o'clock appoint- 
ment was for the delivery of an ultimatum ? 

A. Not other than is contained in this dispatch. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.) stated that he had no further questions of this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

743. Q. Admiral Stark, from January, say, of 1941, down to Decem- 
ber 7th, the Chief of Naval Operations did receive certain communi- 
cations and letters from Pearl Harbor about conditions there; isn't 
that the fact? 

A. Yes. 

[173 j 744. Q. Now, Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 24 have been introduced 
and read in full, this being the exchange of correspondence in January 
between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Prior to 
that time. Exhibit 28 was received in the Navy Department; is that 
not correct ? 

A. Yes. 

745. Q. Now, Admiral, may I ask you to read this document, Ex- 
hibit 28? 

The witness read the document, Exhibit 28, copy appended. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[174] 746. Q. By the way, if you know, was consideration given 
to that letter at the time the letter was written from the Secretary 
of Navy to the Secretary of War in January ? 

A. Well, there is a similarity there that would certainly suggest 
that it was. 

747. Q. But you can't recall? 

A. No, the subject was one of conversations. This sets forth many 
needs. 

748. Q. So you may have that before you, I desire to ask just a 
couple of questions about it, sir. Admiral Bloch was a Rear Admiral 
at the time this letter was written, do you recall? 

A. He was. 

749. Q. Now Admiral, in paragraph 2 there is the statement that — 
paragraph 2 of Admiral Bloch's letter — there is a statement about the 
necessity for large planes. Specifically, the statement: "It is my 
opinion that neither numbers or types are satisfactory for the purposes 
indicated." Admiral, were any such plans sent to the Fourteenth 
Naval District, or caused to be sent to them, prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. Yes, plans were sent out there, as I recall. I don't remember 
as to numbers and types. 

750. Q. To the Fourteenth Naval District? 

A. No, I am glad you brought that question up because when I read 
the letter I got the impression that this does not take into account the 
air forces which we had there, which was under an air officer, not 
directly under Admiral Bloch. 

751. Q. Are you referring to Rear Admiral Bellinger ? 
A. Yes. 

752. Q. My question was only, if you knew, were any planes of this 
character, to wit: the large planes — sent or caused to be sent to the 
Fourteenth Naval District prior to December 7 ? 



138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. As distinct from the Air Command ? 

753. Q. Yes. 

A. I do not recollect that any were sent directly to be under the Com- 
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. That was a local arrange- 
ment out there. 

754. Q. Yes, Admiral. At the foot of that same page there is a 
discussion of new fighters, and there were 185 projected for Hawaii 
at that time. Now do you recall whether or not any such planes were 
sent or caused to be sent to the Fourteenth Naval District prior to 
December 7 ? 

A. Not to the Fourteenth Naval District. 

[175] 755. Q. Yes, sir. On the following page . 

A. Those are Army planes. 

756. Q. Yes, in connection with the statement that "I am of the 
opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range wiH be re- 
quired for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian Area," I ask you, 
Admiral, if you know — were these guns sent or caused to be sent prior 
to December 7, to Hawaii ? 

A. There were some guns sent to the Hawaiian Area. It being an 
Army obligation, I have forgotten the number. 

757. Q. Would it be anything like 500? 

A. I don't recall. My reaction is that it was considerably short of 
that, but I couldn't say positively. 

758. Q. In paragraph 3, Admiral, the statement there is in con- 
nection with patrol vessels and aircraft in connection with patrol 
vessels. Were there sent or caused to be sent to the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict any further patrol vessels prior to December 7, if you recall ? 

A. I'd have to check the record. 

759. Q. You have no recollection of it now, sir ? 

A. My recollection is that some vessels were sent or offered. I know 
they were short. 

760. Q. Well, that would also cover the vessels needed for mine- 
sweeping. Admiral, too. I take it that they would be short, too, to 
your recollection, as you recall ? 

A. To my recollection, all districts were short of what we thought 
was necessary. 

761. Q. Admiral, I'd like to show you this paper and ask you if you 
recognize it as a communication of 7 May 1941, from the Comman- 
dant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. Yes, I recognize it as a letter of 7 May from Commandant, 14th 
Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations. 

The letter from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief 
of Naval Operations, dated May 7, 1941, was submitted to the judge 
advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the inter- 
ested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ket), offered in 
evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 41." 

762. Q. Will you please read it. 

The witness read the letter. Exhibit 41. 

763. Q. Admiral, I hand you a paper and ask you if you [J76] 
recognize it as a letter dated May 20, 1941, from the Commander-in- 
Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 139 

A. I do. 

The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the 
Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 20, 1941, was submitted to the 
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the 
interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered 
in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 42." 

764. Q. Will you be good enough. Admiral, to read it. 
The witness read the letter. Exhibit 42. 

765. Q. I hand you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize 
it as a letter of June 23, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet? 

A. I do. 

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, dated June 23, 1941, was submitted to the judge 
advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the inter- 
ested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in 
evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 43." 

766. Q. Please read it. Admiral. 

The witness read the letter. Exhibit 43. 

767. Q. I will show you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recog- 
nize it as a report dated August 15, 1941, from the Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Chief of Naval 
Operations? 

A. I do, 15 August. 

The report, dated August 15, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, 
U. S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Chief of Naval 
Operations, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested 
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. Admiral Claude 
C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of 
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered 
pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
44" for reference, description appended. 

[177] 768. Q. Please read, Admiral, from page 20 of the report, 
starting with "remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is 
not being made," through to the end of subparagraph (2) . 

A. (Reading:) 

Remaining deficiencies, on wliich satisfactory progress is not being made, are: 

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a 
large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general 
stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh 
water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to 
contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need. 

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in 
harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other require- 
ments of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard 
to such forces is as follows : 

(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types. 

(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the air- 
craft expansion program. 

(3) Insufficient Army anti-aircraft gxins actually available. 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

769. Q. I hand you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize 
it as a communication in August, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet? 

A. I do. 

The communication of August, 1941 (date obscure), from the Chief 
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to 
the court, and by the interested party. Admiral C. Bloch, U. S. Navy 
(Ret), offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 45." 

770. Q. Will you please read it. 

The witness read the communication. Exhibit 45. 

771. Q. I show you a paper. Admiral, and ask you if you recognize 
it as an endorsement, together with the basic from the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, the basic 
being of 17 October 1941 ? 

A. I do. 

[178] Basic letter dated October 17, 1941, from the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, with 
endorsement thereon, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the 
interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. 
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 46". 

771. (a) Q. Will you read the letter, please? 
A. The witness read the letter. Exhibit 46. 

[179'} Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdraw. 

772. Q. I show you a paper dated November 25, 1941, and ask you 
if you recognize it as being from the Chief of Naval Operations to the 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District? 

A. I do. 

The letter of November 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and the Com- 
m^dant, Fourteenth Naval District, was submitted to the judge ad- 
vocate, to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Admiral 
Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the pur- 
pose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be con- 
sidered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 47" for reference, description appended. 

773. Q. Will you read paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of that letter? 

A. (Reading:) 

1. The request of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in reference 
(e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of 
VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full con- 
sideration by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

2. A previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference 
(a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d)- 

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Pacific Fleet, in his war plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 141 

responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and 
Local Defense Forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, 
will, of course, indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be 
assigned to local defense tasks. 

5. The augmentation of the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval 
District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, ma- 
terial and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be 
summarized as follows : 

[180] (a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert 
four small and ten larger types of privately owned vessels for the Naval 
Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District. These are generally 
of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of under- 
water detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority 
for such gear assigned these vessels, 

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is progessing slowly, 
and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May, 1942. Eight 
of these, due for completion in May, 1942, are tentatively assigned to the 
Fourteenth Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. sub-chasers 
(PC) is indefinite due to the engine situation. 

(c) The Commandant now has under his command the Coast Guard of 
the Fourteenth Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his com- 
mand, the following are equipped with depth charges and underwater detec- 
tion gear : TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER. 

(d) Ten YMS, expected to have depth charges and sound gear when avail- 
able, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. Two of these 
are due for completion in the third quarter. 

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assign- 
ment to the Fourteenth Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squad- 
rons which become available in the near future will be determined by the 
requirements of the strategic situation as it develops. 

774. Q. In connection with WPL-46, the judge advocate and your 
own counsel have had you read certain portions of it. In some of that 
reading there was mention made of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier Forces. Now, is it correct to say that so far as Hawaii was con- 
cerned there never did exist any naval coastal forces other than those 
four old destroyers and four old mine-sweepers up until December 7, 
1941? 

A. I guess that is right. 

775. Q. Of course, they did not have the aircraft? 
A. That is right. 

776. Q. They did not have any PC vessels or PT boats? 
A. No, the PC's were not yet available. 

[181] 777. Q. Admiral, in connection with your testimony, 
about the November 27 message, am I accurate in saying that you 
considered the Navy to be mobilized at that time ? 

A. No order had been given for mobilization. I stated that the 
Navy was practically mobilized. We had put in everything from 
the oldest submarines and destroyers and tankers — practically every- 
thing we had, including even old boats built by Ford in the preceding 
war — Eagle boats. I had to accept the responsibility for their turn- 
ing over. We were in a desperate situation for craft in all districts. 

778. Q. When you use mobilization that way, you did not mean us 
to understand mobilization in the very technical and precise military 
sense, such as "M" day? 

A. That is correct ; I did not mean that. 

779. Q. "M" day carries with it a particular and definitive mean- 
ing throughout the naval establishment, isn't that so ? 

A. Yes. 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

780. Q. A mobilization or partial mobilization definitely establishes 
an "M" day, isn't that true ? 

A. Well, you can establish "M" day or mobilization day any time 
you would like to. 

781. Q. Isn't "M" day the time for execution of certain supporting 
plans, for instance, frontier defense plans and coast defense plans? 
They go into effect on "M" day, isn't that correct ? 

A. There are certain measures to be taken on "M" day. 

782. Q. Which you would say go automatically into effect on "M" 
day? 

A. Yes. 

783. Q. In WPL-46, which is exhibit 4, I shall direct your atten- 
tion to these provisions on page 7 : (Reading :) 

0221. The preliminary jieriod of strained relations of a certain duration is 
anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this 
plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 0222. Mobilization may 
be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. 
The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. 0223. This plan may be 
executed in part by a dispatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy. 
The tasks to be executed are accepted, and the preliminary measures to be 
taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or the additional tasks 
thereof. 

Now, those provisions, Admiral, were established for a certain pur- 
pose, that is, to establish an "M" day and to prevent surprise under 
this plan? 

A. If it were thought expedient to do so. 

{JS2] 784. Q. Those provisions, of course, came to the eye of 
every holder of WPL-46 and were to know to all commands that had 
that document? 

A. Yes, sir. 

785. Q. Am I correct in this? There isn't any definition in 
WPL— 46, or any of its predecessor plans, going back to Rainbow 1, 
as to war warning or what was to be done? 

A. Not that I recall that it was specifically laid down. I would 
say it would be regarded as unnecessary. 

786. Q, At any rate, it is not in the document ? 
A. No. 

787. Q. That would be true for the phrase "defensive deployment" ? 
That is not used in the document either ? 

A. No, I do not think it is defined. I think it has a rather definite 
meaning to an officer who would receive it. 

788. Q. As far as the plan is concerned, that is not there, as you 
recall ? 

A. No, I think not. 

789. Q. Would you say, during the period from October 16 to De- 
cember 7, that this country had strained relations with Japan? 

A. Well, it all depends upon your definition. The relations cer- 
tainly w^ere not what could be desired. 

790. Q. What I am trying to ascertain is whether the conditions 
which existed between October 16 and November 30 were strained in 
the sense mentioned in WPLf-46 ^ 

A. In the sense of ordering mobilization ? 

791. Q. In the sense that the words were used in WPL-46? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 143 

A. Well, it is a matter of degree. I would hesitate to say. We 
did not mobilize, but conditions certainly were strained toward the 
finish. 

792, Q. Now, Admiral, am I correct that the establishment of 
mobilization or partial mobilization by the Navy Department under 
such circumstances as provided in WPL-46 would have been clearly 
understood by the entire service? 

A. I don't know that it would have meant much more than what 
we were doing, depending on how you would look at it. It would have 
been rather difficult to order and explain such a set-up. Politically, 
for us to have mobilized might have precipitated what we were trying 
to avoid. European nations mobilize frequently, as we know. Some- 
times it is a drill; sometimes it is a cover to war. For us to have 
ordered mobilization at that time would have been a very difficult 
thing to do, I think. 

[18S] 793. Q. But, Admiral, would you make the same answer 
in connection with a partial mobilization, as contemplated by 
WPL-46? 

A. I think it would have been very difficult to have explained it 
and put into effect. Everything we had was in commission. We had 
sent messages as to the seriousness of the situation, but to have sent 
word out to mobilize probably would have meant to the country and 
to Japan a preliminary declaration of intention to go to war. I think 
it would have been a very difficult thing to have done. 

794. Q. That would also have applied if it were a partial mobiliza- 
tion, contemplated by WPL-46, in your opinion ? 

A. More or less, yes. 

795. Q. Well, in any event that procedure which was provided in 
WPL-46 for the establishment of the doing of certain things prior to 
hostile acts was not used in the dispatches of October 16 or November 
24 or November 27 ? 

A. No, it was not. Again I repeat, we were practically mobilized. 
We had a full convoy system going in the Atlantic, so that there would 
be no rupture. What we had was manned in the Pacific, extremely 
short as it was and of which I was very consciously cognizant. I do 
not see where it would have availed us much, and I would say it 
would have been inadvisable from many standpoints. 

796. Q. I believe your counsel identified Exhibit 7, but it has not 
been offered in evidence, and I should like to ask you whether you 
recognize this document. Exhibit 7, as being the Joint Coastal Fron- 
tier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Area, effective 11 April 1941? 

A. Yes, I recognize it. 

797. Q. I want you to read from page 8, paragraph C-2, this being 
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 
Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District. 

A. (Reading:) 

M-day is the first day of mobilization, and it is the time origin for the execution 
of this plan. M-day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary 
measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain 
features of their respective plans prior to M-day. Such parts of this plan as 
are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-day, as ordered by the 
War and Navy departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders. 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

798. Q. The procedure there indicated, Admiral, in JCD-42 was 
not used in the messages up to November 30 ? 

A. I would say there was nothing whatever to prevent the authori- 
ties on the spot from taking any readiness measures [184] 
which they thought their directives may have given them, but for us 
to have declared it would very likely have been construed as an overt 
act — to publicly declare mobilization. 

799. Q. I take it that on or before December 7, 1941, the Navy De- 
partment did not use any of the established procedures to place in 
full or partial effect WPL-46 or JCD-42, or any other war plan, nor 
did they direct full or partial mobilization under either of those 
plans, isn't that a fact ? 

A. In the message of November 27 appropriate defensive deploy- 
ment was ordered to be executed. It stated that it was preparatory to 
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, but the answer to your 
question is that we did not specifically order any mobilization, but we 
did indicate. I would like to add one thing with reference to the lack 
of air. The record should show that while the 14th Naval District 
of itself had no aircraft, the Fleet did have patrol craft under its com- 
mand stationed in Oaliu. 

Reexamined by the judge advocate: 

800. Q. Do you remember who was the Naval Aide to the President 
on or about December 1, 1941? 

A. Captain John McCrea. 

801. Q. In Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Operations dis- 
patch of 28 November 1941, there appears the sentence, "If hostilities 
cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the 
first overt act." This is the message which repeated General Mar- 
shall's message for information of CincPac. To clear up a situation, 
do you feel tliat you are in a position to state what an overt act on 
the part of the Japanese might be ? 

A. An attack on us or on any of our craft anywhere. 

802. Q. Are you prepared to say that the presence of a Japanese 
force, consisting of carriers and escorts, within, say, a thousand miles 
of the Hawaiian Islands would be an overt act ? 

A. That certainly is one hypothetical question. I think if I were 
out there and saw them, I would keep them under surveillance and 
probably tell them to stand off when I thought the time had come. 
^ 803. Q. Do you know if the intelligence bulletins which you men- 
tioned in your testimony this morning and which I understand were 
prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence were forwarded to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as a matter of routine ? 

A. Yes. 

The court then, at 4 : 20 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m. August 
12, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 145 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAYY COURT OF INaUIRY 



SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944. 

[185] Eighth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 

The court met at 9 : 30 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphns Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his 
counsel. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral "Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the seventh day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

With the permission of the court, the interested party. Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, introduced Commander W. R. Smedberg, 
U. S. Navy, as additional counsel. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the adjournment was taken on Friday, August 11, 1944, 
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

804. Q. I hand you Exhibit 7, which is known as JCD-42, and is 
the Joint Local Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the 
14th Naval District. On page 8, paragraph C, (2), what do you find 
as regards putting that plan in effect oy action of local authorities? 

A. It may be put in as mutually agreed upon by the local com- 
manders. 

805. Q. Admiral, you have given some testimonv about the relative 
strengths of the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese IS'avy, Other than 
num.erical comparisons, what other factors must enter in order to make 
any such comparison of forces really useful ? 

A. Geography was a primary factor — bases. It has been [^5^] 
estimated, for example, that to carry the war to the Far East and to 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol.1 11 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Japanese homeland, that we should be two to three times as strong 
as she is, in Navy. I repeat, bases and geography are important 
factors. 

806. Q. I hand you Exhibit 35, which is your personal note to the 
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet of 22 August 1941. A portion 
of that has been read in court. About what percentage of it was read 
by your own counsel ? 

" A. Approximately half. 

807. Q. What was the subject of the rest of the letter? 
A. Largely technical, and training. 

808. Q. Did the rest of the letter have much to do with materiel 
deficiencies? 

A. It did. 

809. Q. Wliat was your purpose, Admiral, in going into such long 
detail on such subjects in your informal letter to the Commander-in- 
Chief? 

A. The letter was in reply to a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, 
and I was anxious that he have from me a detailed reply so far as 
information was available. 

810. Q. Admiral, during 1941, did you receive from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, or from any other authoritive sources, 
any expressions of opinion that the effect of the long-continued stay of 
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was adverse in any respect ? 

A. On the contrary, I received word from the Commander-in-Chief 
that morale was good, that gunnery was better than it had any right 
to be, and in fact was very good by any standards. Also, I might 
add that the facilities for supporting the Fleet were becoming in- 
creasingly good. 

811. Q. Were your official dispatches of 16 October and 24 Novem- 
ber — Exhibits 13 and 15, respectively — your own personal drafting, 
and if they were not, what did they represent as they were actually 
drafted? 

A. They represented a concensus of opinion of myself and my most 
trusted advisers. As finally drafted they had my O. K., and of course 
I stood completely responsible for them. 

812. Q. Referring to your considerable testimony concerning the 
phraseology of the several dispatches, those two and also [1871 
the one of 27 November, which is Exhibit 17, most of all of which 
testimony that you have given concerning them being properly con- 
fined to the Hawaiian area alone — those dispatches had several ad- 
dressees, did they not? 

A. They did. 

813. Q. Look at your dispatch of 16 October. To whom was it 
addressed ? 

A. CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCASIATIC. 

814. Q. Look at the one of 24 November, Exhibit 15. To whom was 
it addressed ? 

A. CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMll, C0M12, C0M13, SPENAVO, 
London, and CINCLANT. 

815. Q. Look at your dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 17. To 
whom was it addressed ? 

A. To CINCASIATIC, CINCPAC, info to CINCLANT, and 
SPENAVO, London. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 147 

816. Q. Admiral, at any time, and particularly during the ten days 
which elapsed between 27 November and 7 December, did you receive 
from any of those addressees any request whatever for clarification 
of any of those three dispatches ? 

A. No. 

The judge advocate stated that he did not wish to examine the 
witness further. 

Examined by the court : 

817. Q. Admiral, referring to your testimony concerning unity of 
command in the Hawaiian area, you stated that this was under discus- 
sion between the Navy Department and the War Department, and 
that no decision had been arrived at up to December 7, 1941 ; is that 
correct ? 

A. That is correct. 

818. Q. Wliat prevented a decision on this appointment being 
reached ? 

A. We were never able to come to a satisfactory agreement. May I 
make that answer — we had not arrived at a solution. 

819. Q. Will you state in general the position of the two depart- 
ments on this subject during the discussions? 

A. The discussions, as I recall, were general in character about unity 
of command in general. We had not gotten very far with it and had 
reached no conclusions. 

820. Q. Wliat was the stumbling block preventing such conclusion, 
if any? 

A. Well, I think it might be said they may not have been pushed 
as hard -as they might have been. We simply U88] hadn't 
followed through with it. 

821. Q. What was your personal attitude and your recommendation 
with reference to unity of command in the Hawaiian area ? 

A. As I stated, the discussion of unity of command, I think, prior 
to Pearl Harbor, was more of a general nature on unity of command 
in general. We discussed it specifically on projects which might be 
take place, such as amphibious operations for example, and arrived at 
definite conclusions, but with regard to Pearl Harbor, canal, and other 
places, we had not pushed those discussions. I do not recall anything 
specific with regard to Pearl Harbor — with regard to the Hawaiian 
Islands. The discussion was general. 

At the direction of the court, the question was repeated. 

A. (Continued.) I won't add anything to it. I do not recall 
specific recommendations with regard to the Hawaiian Islands. 

822. Q. Does the court understand that you do not at this time 
remember your attitude or recommendations that you may have made 
on this question ? 

A. My remembrance is that, except for definite operations which we 
discussed, such as amphibious operations where we had come to definite 
unity of command, the discussions as regards outlying bases was gen- 
eral in nature and we didn't really get down to buiness on it. 

823. Q. Admiral, your answer is still the same. I am talking about 
you. 

A. I grant the answer is not definite, but as I recall, the conversa- 
tions were general, and as to my specific recommendation regarding 
Pearl Harbor, I don't recall making any specific recommendations 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

regarding the Hawaiian Islands. We were operating, as has been 
testified, under mutual cooperation. 

824. Q. Then the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor 
Naval Station lay with the Army or with the Navy ? 

A. It lay with the Army. 

825. Q. Was there ever any opinion on the part of either Army or 
Navy that part or all of this responsibility rested with the Navy ? 

A. No, not that I ever heard of. 

826. Q. Referring to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and Navy to base the fleet in the Hawaiian area, did you 
recommend such action ? 

A. Originally, and — yes. 

827. Q. Referring to your testimony with reference to you [iS9^ 
and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, not having thoroughly 
information or directives as to action to be taken in case Japan attacked 
England or Russia, or Dutch East Indies, or a combination of these, 
who had the responsibility for formulating policies in this respect? 

A. Well, in the last analysis it would rest with the White House. 

828. A. It has been testified that the assigned mobilization stations 
of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet were in the several ports of the 
Pacific Coast — the mobilization stations. 

A. Yes. 

829. Q. It has also been testified to that one of the reasons for 
moving these battleships to the Hawaiian area in May, 1940, was that 
their presence there — of the vessels of the Fleet — would act as a deter- 
rent on Japan. As matters progressed during the autumn of 1941, 
and particularly at the time of your war warning message, -was any 
consideration given to the return of these battleships to their assigned 
mobilization stations? 

A. Not at that time. 

830. Q. When on November 27, 1941, you issued a war warning and 
stated that the negotiations had ceased, did you still consider that the 
presence of United States battleships in Hawaiian waters would have 
a deterrent effect upon Japan ? 

A. I would consider that witlidrawing them might have had the 
opposite effect. 

831. Q. On December 7 and just previous thereto, were the ships 
of the fleet allocated or based in accordance with your views and 
recommendations ? 

A. Yes. 

832. Q. With your knowledge of what the Commander-in-Chief 
Pacific was doing regarding training of the Fleet, and in view of the 
critical situation existing in November 1941, did you ever give any 
orders to assume a condition of readiness, even though it meant that 
this would have curtailed the training? 

A. I gave no specific orders, but the dispatches contained all that 
I gave in that connection. 

833. Q. Referring to your testimony that no designation of M Day 
was made because of the effect it might have on Japan, who was 
responsible for not designating an M Day ? 

A. I assumed that responsibility in that I didn't recommend it. 

834. Q. On November 27, 1941, was not the situation sufficiently 
critical to have justified you in conferring with the Commander-in- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 149 

Chief of the Pacific by phone, giving him U^O] a full picture 
of the situation and checking up as to what he had done, even at the 
risk of jeopardizing the security of communications? 

A. I didn't consider it. I thought my dispatch gave him the warn- 
ing which I felt he should have, and briefly, such information as it 
was based on. 

835. Q. Did you make use, during this critical period, of the tele- 
phone for communicating to the Hawaiian area ? 

A. I did not prior to December 7, and then only after Japan had 
struck. 

836. Q. Had any conflict of opinion, or lack of cooperation between 
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and the Army Commander of 
Hawaii come to your notice ])rior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Not that I recall. 

837. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you consider that your con- 
tact with the State Department was full and complete, and that you 
received from them all essential information regarding conditions in 
the Pacific? 

A. I felt that I was receiving, certainly, sufficient to acquaint me 
with the picture. I could not say I received all. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
entered, as reporter. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[191] 838. Q. From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, did 
you continue to receive this information ? 

A. I recall receiving no information which in any way altered what 
I had sent on November 27th, at which time I stated that negotiations 
had ceased. I recall nothing which would change the dispatch. 

839. Q. Admiral, in comparing the strength of the Pacific Fleet 
as of the autumn of 1941 with that of the Japanese Navy at the same 
time, did not the fact that Japan had been engaged in hostilities for 
some time previously and was therefore presumably war minded and 
geared for war enter as a factor favorable to Japan ?- 

A. Yes. 

840. Q. Wlien, in your opinion, or from your knowledge, was it 
first conceived that the United States might have to engage in hos- 
tilities in both the Atlantic and the Pacific contrary to the existing 
policy, which policy had existed for some years prior to the outbreak 
of war in Germany? 

A. In 1939, I definitely thought so. On the Hill in 1940, on the 
record, I stated that in my opinion there was in the making another 
world conflagration. I told the Senate Committee that there cer- 
tainly was the possibility of our coming in ; that if we c^me in there 
certainly was no doubt as to which side we would come in with, and 
that in my opinion we should be prepared to depend only on ourselves 
and we should build accordingly. My first letter to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific, which I think he has introduced — perhaps not 
but that is immaterial — gave the thought that we might some day have 
a surprise attack by Japan. I didn't see how we could avoid it and 
I endeavored to carry that tone consistently through every action I 
took. It certainly animated everything that I was doing here in the 
Department. Much has been said about the small boat program, dis- 
trict craft. It was one of the worst headaches I had. It was difficult 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to get through. We were terribly delayed in construction, particu- 
larly due to engines after it was started. But I felt certain we were 
headed for collision and I think I made that certainty of thought 
known. The Department was animated by it. 

841. Q. In the period subsequent to 1939, did you notice from your 
contacts with the Congress of the United States any change in the 
attitude which had become fixed to the effect that there was no need 
for an increase in the Naval strength? 

A. Wellj I could only judge them by their acts. The real change 
in the sentmient of Congress came when France fell. 

842. Q. That was in 1940, was it not? 
A. That was in June^ as I recall, 1940. 

[1931 843. Q. You stated, Admiral Stark, that originally you 
recommended that the Pacific Fleet be based on Hawaii. Did you, 
during the latter part of 1941, or any time prior thereto, recommend 
a continuance of basing this fleet on Hawaii? 

A. Not during the latter part. I originally recommended, when 
they went out there, not having in mind originally retaining them 
right through. Once they were there, there was frequent discussion 
regarding keeping them there. It was a close question and the deci- 
sion was always the same, to keep them there. Later on we had just 
settled into it. 

844. Q. "Was it in accordance with War Plans that in event of a 
critical situation in. the Pacific, vis-a-vis Japan or any other nation, 
that the battleships of the Pacific Fleet would be based in Hawaii? 

A. I do not recall any such provision. 

The court announced that it had no further questions of this 
witness. 

Recross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy (continued) : 

845. Q. Admiral, your war warning dispatch. Exhibit 17: What 
are the three most essential, vital phrases of that dispatch ? 

A. I would say, first, that this dispatch is to be considered a war 
warning; second, that an aggressive move by Japan was expected 
within the next few days; third, execute an appropriate defensive 
deployment preparatory of carrying out the tasks in WPL-46. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R, Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he had no further questions of this witness. 

Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

846. Q. On Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, did you consider 
using the telephone for conference with Admiral Kimmel ? 

A. No. J have already testified that I did not. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 
(Ret.), stated that he had no further questions of this witness. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry which he thought should [IdS] be a matter of record 
in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by 
the previous questioning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 151 

The witness stated as follows : In the question which I believe was 
asked as to whether the Army was responsible in part or in whole for 
the defense of Pearl Harbor, I stated the Army was responsible, and 
the Army was. There were certain responsibilities which I assume 
the Navy had of a minor nature in cooperation with the Army, but 
in my opinion it was the Army's responsibility. I don't want to 
weaken my answer at all but I assume that certain arrangements were 
made which it was up to us to carry out when the Army took that 
responsibility, which was hers. 

Questioned by the court : 

847. Q. Admiral, the court has a few more questions to ask in order 
that one of your answers may be cleared up. You have stated that 
the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor rested with the 
Army ; is that correct ? 

A. That is correct. 

848. Q. Was Pearl Harbor considered a first-class Naval base ? 
A. Yes, I would say it was. 

849. Q. What was the responsibility of the Fleet with reference to 
the defense of Pearl Harbor ? 

A. The Fleet primarily was in no way responsible for the defense of 
Pearl Harbor. It was supposed to be completely foot-free and their 
presence or absence, in my opinion, neither lessened nor changed in 
any way the Army's responsibility. 

850. Q. In line with that answer, what was the responsibility of the 
14th Naval District for the defense of Pearl Harbor, generally ? 

A. Generally, it was a task force of the Fleet. The responsibilities, 
I would say, were subsidiary. 

851. Q. To what? 

A. To the Army's primary responsibility regarding such local 
arrangements as might be made. This, in my opinion, in no way less- 
ened the Army's responsibility. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre- 
vious questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

[19 ^i] The court stated as follows : I think it would be proper 
if I would restate what I have said before; that the court is finished 
with you as a witness for the time being ; that you will take your seat 
as an interested party, subject to further call as a witness for such 
exarnination or re-examination as may be desired by the court or any 
parties to the inquiry. 

The witness was ektiy warned and resumed his seat as an interested 
party. 

[Initialed in margin :] H. B. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made 
the following statement : May it please the court : I am under orders 
to return to my command post without delay, and must do so as soon 
as I can verify my testimony. I am therefore unable to resume my 
status as an interested party before this court at this time. My counsel 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

will remain to represent me as best they may and I assume that they 
will have all the same rights as though I were actually present. My 
absence from the court's proceeding is beyond my control. I am 
obliged to state that I waive no rights whatsoever in consequence 
thereof. 

The court then, at 10: 50 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the in- 
terested parties and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, 
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station ? 

A. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirman, Assistant Chief, Combat In- 
telligence ; and additional duties of Director of Naval Intelligence. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 
1941? 

A. Director of Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. 

3. Q. Will you explain in detail what these duties were? 

A. Thev are a variety of duties, some of which were specified which 
included Liaison with the State Department, and other duties not 
under the cognizance of any other division of Naval Operations. 

[195] 4. Q. Can you state what duties you performed directly 
with the Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. Directly with the Chief of Naval Operations, the principal duty 
was liaison with the State Department. 

5. Q. In performing those duties that brought you in contact with 
the State Department, what was the routine for carrying them out ? 

A. The liaison duties with the State Department were conducted 
by personal visits with those handling matters of mutual concern in 
both departments, by telephone and through a so-called liaison com- 
mittee which was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval 
Operations, which consisted of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Chief 
of Naval Operations ; and Under Secretary of State. I accompanied 
the Chief of Naval Operations to these meetings in order to make notes 
so that on my return I could implement any action decided upon. 

6. Q. What was the division of the State Department that conducted 
matters pertaining to Asiatic countries? 

A. The Far Eastern Division. 

7. Q. What officers in the State Department did you usually contact 
in the performance of your duties in connection with Far Eastern 
affairs ? 

A. Generally Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Joseph 
Ballantine, and a number of others ; and Secretary Hull, and on occa- 
sion. Under Secretary Welles direct. 

8. Q. Did you keep any file of conferences with officials of the State 
Department, either official or private? 

A. In regard to the liaison meetings, prior to about the middle of 
May, 1941, 1 kept a resume of the meetings which was, I believe, kept 
by the Liaison Division of the State Department, and after the middle 
of May a stenographer was present to record these meetings. In addi- 
tion to the matters on the record, there were certain matters discussed 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 153 

off the record, and on occasions I did make a memorandum of the pro- 
ceedings after returning from the State Department. However, I do 
not believe that there was a complete record of these meetings and I 
do not know of any complete record of the meetings which were held 
from time to time with Secretary Hull or a record of the conversations 
with Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and others. All records that I 
know of are in the Central Division of the Navy Department. I have 
none in my own possession. 

9. Q. Adverting to this liaison committee that you speak of: Did 
I understand you to say that there were probably minutes kept by this 
committee ? 

A. Yes. This committee, however, was mainly occupied with mat- 
ters other than those pertaining to the Far East, although on occa- 
sions, especially when Mr. Hull was [196] absent from the 
city, or incapacitated, matters concerning the Far East were discussed. 

10. Q. Could you tell the court where it could probably find the 
minutes of these meetings ? 

A. I believe those that are in the Navy Department are in the files 
of the Central Division. 

11. Q. Would you think that there are probably minutes also filed 
in the State Department? 

A. Yes. 

12. Q. Do you consider that you were present at most of the con- 
ferences in the State Department of major importance when matters 
dealing with the Navy Department were being discussed? 

A. Generally so, yes, but they were high-level conferences which 
occurred, I believe, between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Secre- 
tary Hull, and probably Admiral Stark and Gener^al Marshall, at 
which I was not present. Undoubtedly there were meetings at the 
White House on matters concerning the Far East, none of which I 
attended. 

13. Q. Did you have access to intelligence information of the Navy 
Department ? 

A. Yes. 

14. Q. "Wliat was the system of keeping your currently informed 
on matters of Naval Intelligence? 

A. I do not believe there was any set system ; none that I can remem- 
ber. I generally got the information from various people in Naval 
Intelligence, or picked it up from 

15. Q. What I am trying to find out, Admiral, is whether or not 
you had to go around and search for this information yourself, or 
was there some system whereby at stated intervals, or when anything 
important occurred, persons responsible in the Naval Intelligence 
Division sought you out and delivered the information to you ? 

A. I believe that they either telephoned it or somebody dropped in 
and told me things which were of particular importance. In addition, 
the Secretary of the Navy had, for some time preceding Pearl Harbor, 
had a practically daily round up in his office at 9 : 00 o'clock where tha 
general war situation was presented much the same as it is now pre- 
sented in Room 3621, where the military situation was discussed and 
the Japanese troops movements were discussed, et cetera. 

16. Q. Do you feel that you attended most of these conferences, or 
not? 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. The morning conferences? 

17. Q. Yes. 

A. Yes 

[197] 18. Q. Wliat contact did you have with the Navy War 
Flans Division ? 

A. My contact with the Navy War Plans Division was generally 
to keep them informed of what was going on in the State Depart- 
ment, and on occasions when proposals were under discussion or 
various courses of action were being considered in the State Depart- 
ment, to inform the War Plans Division and obtain their reactions. 

[198] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke- 
serve; reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

19. Q. Admiral, that tells what information you gave the War 
Plans Division. What I would like to know is, did the War Plaiis 
Division keep you currently informed on its estimates of the situa- 
tion, especially with regard to the Japanese situation? 

A. There was no regular system. What I learned as to the War 
Plans estimate situation, I believe I learned at meetings, such as the 
one described this morning and such meetings as I attended in Ad- 
miral Stark's office, which were occasional, at which members of the 
War Plans Division were present and listening to them express their 
views. 

20. Q. Who was the officer in War Plans Division who generally 
attended these conferences that you speak of ? 

A. Generally, Captain Turner was present, and if he were too busy 
to attend, some alternate was present. 

21. Q. Can you recall who his principal alternates were ? 
A. No. 

22. Q. Do you know, from your attending these conferences and 
hearing the discussions, whether or not the War Plans Division kept 
a current estimate of the situation, so far as the Japanese situation was 
concerned ? 

A. I believe they did. 

23. Q. Commencing with the Executive Order which was issued in 
the latter part of July, 1941, the subject matter of which dealt with 
freezing Japanese assets in the United States, do you know, from your 
many contacts, what the rejoercussions were in Japan as a result of the 
issuance of this order? 

A. None other than there was a bitter press campaign in the Jap- 
anese press against the United States. 

24. Q. In your capacity as the Director of the Central Division 
and because of your many contacts with the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions in these morning conferences which you have discussed, do you 
feel that the Chief of Naval Operations was supplied currently with 
information on developments in Japan about this time? 

A. I believe he was. 

25. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what the current Navy De- 
partment estimate was of the effect of this order on United States- 
Japanese relations ? 

A. I know of no specific estimate having been made. There may 
have been one. Naturally, the Navy Department knew the freezing 
order was not helpful to United States-Japanese relations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 155 

[IPP] 26. Q. I show you Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the 
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 
1941, which deals with matters of security and defenses in the Pearl 
Harbor area. I will ask you to glance at this letter and state 
whether or not you have any recollection that the general subject 
matter of this letter was brought to the knowledge of the State 
Department ? 

A. Insofar as I know, it w as never brought to the attention of the 
State Department, and I did not see the letter until after December 
7, 1941. 

27. Q. From your liaison duties with the State Department, do 
you or do you not feel that the State Department was kept reason- 
ably well informed on the Navy Department's estimate of the situa- 
tion, so far as developments with the Japanese Government were 
concerned ? 

A. I think that they were reasonably well informed, yes. 

28. Q. And do you have any idea of whether the State Depart- 
ment was informed currently on matters relating to the capacity of 
the U. S. Navy to cope with the situations as they were developing? 

A. It is difficult to answer that question, because when you state 
the Navy Department, I do not know who was speaking on behalf 
of the Navy Department. I imagine Secretary Knox would be the 
one to express the point of view of the Navy Department. 

29. Q. As liaison officer, did you transmit any such information to 
the State Department that you can remember ? 

A. I cannot remember specifically, but I attempted to keep them 
informed, naturallj^, on how we viewed the various steps that were 
being taken, and on occasions we were asked specificall}^ to obtain 
the views of other people, including the War Plans Division. 

30. Q. I show you Exhibit 13, which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions dispatch of October IG, 1941. I ask you to look at the dispatch 
and tell the court if you remember having seen the draft of the dis- 
patch prior to its transmission or prior to its being released by the 
Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. I don't remember having seen it prior to transmission to the 
Chief of Naval Operations. I may have. 

31. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the source of information 
on which this dispatch was based? 

A. No. I imagine it is an estimate of taking into consideration 
what was known as to the character of the members of the new 
Japanese cabinet. 

32. Q. Do you know in what office of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions this dispatch was prepared? 

A. No. I presume it was prepared in the War Plans Division. 

[200] 33. Q. Were you present at any discussion of this dis- 
patch before it was released? 

A. Not that I remember. 

34. Q. From your liaison duties in the State Department, can you 
recall any expression of opinion by the officials with whom you dealt 
over there as to what their views on this cabinet shift were? 

A. As I remember, there were varying views of the members of 
the Far Eastern Division of the State Dej)artment concerning the 
exact significance of this shift in the cabinet. I believe the con- 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

census of opinion was that this shift did not tend to put in power 
a cabinet which was committed to closer relations with the United 
States but that it did not necessarily mean that a cabinet was coming 
into power which was committed to either getting in agreement with 
the United States or going to war, 

35. Q. Would you say, then, Admiral, that the State Department's 
views were different in that respect from those expressed by the 
Chief of Xaval Operations in his dispatch? 

A. I believe that the Navy Department's view of the meaning of 
the shift in cabinet was that it was an indication of a more serious 
situation than the State Department viewed. 

36. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions dispatch of November 24, 1941, and ask you to refresh youi 
memory. Do you know if the State Department had any informa 
tion that this dispatch had been sent? 

A. No, I do not know. 

37. Q. So far as you can remember, you had nothing to do, in 
your duties as liaison officer, with acquainting the State Department 
of the fact that this dispatch had been sent ? 

A. No. 

38. Q). Do you know, from your contacts with officials in the State 
Department, whether or not they did have information of this dis- 
patch having been sent? 

A. I cannot remember, but I believe at this date that this reflected 
the State Department's views. 

39. Q. Adverting to the first sentence of this dispatch, which I 
read: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan 
very doubtful." Do you know, from your discussions with officials 
in the State Department, whether or not they expressed this view 
or some other? 

A. They expressed that view. 

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941. Did you in the 
performance of your duties as liaison officer acquaint the State De- 
partment with the fact that this message had been sent by the Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

A. About the 1st of December I informed Mr. Hull that [201] 
a war warning had been sent. I did not clear the message with 
the State Department and did not, so far as I can remember, inform 
them on the 27th, the 28th, and the 29th of November that this mes- 
sage had been sent. The occasion when I informed the State Depart- 
ment, as I remember, was on the Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday 
preceding Pearl Harbor. Mr. Hull 'phoned me and stated some- 
thing to this effect : "I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of 
me, but I have done everything I can with these Japs, and they are 
liable to break loose and bite anyone." On this occasion I assured 
him that a war warning had been sent. I did not see the war warn- 
ing as worded, although 1 had knowledge that such message had been 
sent some time later. 

41. Q. In your contacts with officials in the State Department did 
you obtain any information as to the views of that department on 
this clause, which I quote : "Negotiations with Japan looking toward 
stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased" ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 157 

A. I can't remember any specific conversation, but I believe that 
was Mr. Hull's belief that, so far as any effective negotiations or hope 
of successful outcome of any other negotiations was concerned — that 
they had ceased. 

42. Q.^Did you in your duties as liaison officer communicate any 
such information as you have just stated to the Chief of Naval 
Operation ? 

A. I believe I did. 

43. Q. I again quote from Exhibit 17: "An aggressive move by 
Japan is expected within the next few days." Can you tell me, Ad- 
miral, whether or not that estimate of the situation was one held by 
the State Department? 

A. I cannot remember what the view was held by the State Depart- 
ment, but I believe they were informed of Japanese troop movements, 
etc., and that they held the view that an aggressive move by the 
Japanese was expected. "Whether they believed it was an aggressive 
move against the United States or not, I cannot say. 

44. Q. Do you recall having attended any conferences with rela- 
tion to the subject matter of this dispatch prior to its release by the 
Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. No. 

45. Q. Can you tell the court when you first became acquainted with 
the fact that this dispatch had been sent? 

A, I believe I knew that such a dispatch had been sent on the day 
of its dispatch, but I did not see the dispatch prior to its release. 

[£02] 46. Q. With reference to the estimate of the situation 
which I have just read: "An aggressive move by Japan is expected 
within the next few days," do you know whether or not that was the 
estimate of any division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. Undoubtedly, the estimates made by the War Plans Division. 

47. Q. Do you know, from your attendance at any conferences, 
whether or not this was the view of the Chief of Naval Operations 
at that time ? 

A. I believe it was, yes. 

48. Q. Upon what do you base that belief. Admiral ? 

A. There were numerous conferences, etc., at which the situation 
was discussed, and, undoubtedly, such a message would not be re- 
leased without the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations under date of December 3, 1941. Do you have 
any knowledge of the source of the information contained in this 
dispatch relative to the instructions that were sent Japanese diplo- 
matic and consular offices with reference to the destruction of their 
codes and ciphers and the burning of all confidential and secret 
documents ? 

A. No, I do not know the source of the information. 

50. Q. Do you know whether or not about December 3, 1941, the 
State Department had been informed of the subject matter of Exhibit 
20, which you have just read ? 

A. I cannot state positively, but I am pretty sure that they were 
informed of the contents of that message. 

51. Q. Can you remember whether or not you had any discussions 
yourself with the officials in the State Department on the subject 
matter set out in this dispatch ? 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I cannot remember specifically, but I do remember in the week 
or ten days preceding Pearl Harbor I was at the State Department, 
sometimes as often as three times a day, and such a matter would be 
given to them verbally, and we did make every attempt to keep them 
fully informed of any such development, so that I am sure they were 
informed. 

52. Q. Did you yourself attach any significance to the directive 
contained in this dispatch relative to Japanese diplomatic and consular 
posts, and if you did, what was it? 

A. That war was increasingly close. 

63. Q. About this time of December 3, 1941, and during these dis- 
cussions can you recall having heard any officials in the State Depart- 
ment in a responsible position with whom [£0S] you were 
dealing express any opinion as to the state of the negotiations between 
the United States and the Japanese Government, which had been 
going on for some time previous? 

A. Yes, Mr. Hull in the latter part of November and the first few 
days of December several times expressed himself as believing that the 
outcome of the negotiations was to be unsuccessful and that the nego- 
tiations were nearing an end and deadlock. 

54. Q. Can you remember, from any conversations you had with 
these officials of importance in the State Department at that time, 
whether they stated their views that negotiations had stopped or 
ceased entirely ? 

A. Not that I remember that they had completely ceased, although 
I believe their general feeling was that any hope of successful nego- 
tiations had ceased. 

55. Q. Are you trying to state to this court that while there may 
have been some discussions, it was the view of the State Department 
that the end must inevitably be that they would not be successful ? 

A. That is correct. 

56. Q. Can you recall if you did or did not keep the Chief of Naval 
Operations informed on these matters currently as they transpired? 

A. I kept him informed currently as the negotiations were going 
forth, and on return from various meetings from the State Depart- 
ment, I either sent in a memorandum to him as to what occurred or 
reported favorably to him what had transpired. 

57. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations, dated 4 December 1941. Can you recall whether 
or not officials in the State Department knew about the direction 
to the naval station at Guam to destroy all secret and confidential 
papers and certain other classified matter ? 

A. I am pretty sure that I would have informed the State Depart- 
ment of the contents of that message. I cannot specifically remember, 
because there were so many meetings and so many contacts, but I 
do remember that we tried to keep them informed as to what we 
were doing. 

58. Q. Did 3^ou have any knowledge of the subject matter in this 
dispatch prior to its having been released for transmission ? 

A. No. I did know that such a message was being sent. 

59. Q. Do you know of any special situation which existed on 
December 4, 1941, that might have caused such a directive to the 
naval station at Guam to destroy its secret and confidential publi- 
cations ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 159 

A. No, I don't know the exact estimate that was based on, but I 
presume that about this time Japanese planes were flying over Guam, 
against which we were protesting, and we had [204] various 
troop movements, and there may be other information which led the 
Director of Naval Intelligence to send this message. 

60. Q. As you can recall the situation existing between November 
27, 1941, and December 6 of the same year, can you state whether or 
not this information was that imminence of war was more critical on 
the 6th of December than it had been on the 27th of November? 

A. As I remember the situation, the Navy Department believed 
that a break with Japan — at least, a rupture of relations was drawing 
increasingly close with the passage of time. 

61. Q. Do I interpret your answer correctly, Admiral, by saying 
that relations between the Japanese and the United States had be- 
come worse between November 27 and December 6, 1941 ? 

A. Either that they had become worse, or, at least, the Navy De- 
partment and State Department believed that they had become worse. 

62. Q. There is evidence before this court that on the morning of 
December 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations received informa- 
tion concerning a directive to the Japanese Ambassador in Wash- 
ington that he was to present what amounted to an ultimatum at one 
o'clock Washington time. Did you have any knowledge of this 
subject matter on the morning of December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I knew that they were to present a note at one o'clock to the 
Secretary of State. 

63. Q. Did you have information before it was presented as to 
what might be contained in the note ? 

The witness stated that he hesitated to answer the question on the 
ground that it would involve the disclosure of information detrimental 
to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against re- 
vealing state secrets. 

The court directed the witness to answer the question. 

A. The general tenor, yes. 

64. Q. Can you recall whether or not the tenor of that information 
was to the effect that the Japanese diplomats would present the matter 
in the nature of an ultimatum at one o'clock Washington time on 
December 7, 1941 ? 

A. As subsequently proved by the public note, it was an ultimatum 
or in the nature of an ultimatum. 

65. Q. What I am trying to find out. Admiral, is just exactly what 
your information was which was contained in this note tliat the 
Japanese Ambassador was to deliver at one o'clock? 

[WS] The witness stated that he hesitated to answer the ques- 
tion on the ground that it would involve the disclosure of information 
detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege 
against revealing state secrets. 

The judge advocate replied. 

The court stated that the witness's claim for privilege was honored 
and that he need not answer the question. 

^ 66. Q. Can you recall any contact with the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, Admiral Stark, on the morning of December 7, 1941, with 
relation to any information which was m the Navy Department deal- 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing with negotiations between the Japanese Government and the 
United States? 

A. Yes, I was in Admiral Stark's office on the morning of Decem- 
ber 7. I had received information that the Japanese Ambassadors, 
Kiirusu and Nomura, had requested an appointment with the Secre- 
tary of State for one, o'clock, I believe, at which time they were to 
present a reply to our note of November 26 ; and while there General 
Marshall 'phoned Admiral Stark, and as I remember it, although I 
did not listen in, but to one end of the conversation, I believe Admiral 
Stark, after he laid down the 'phone, related the substance of General 
Marshall's conversation. As I remember it, in substance, it was, "I 
have a hunch that the Japanese have something timed with the de- 
livery of the note, and I propose to send a message to the forces in 
the field, stressing the necessity for an alert." The question of the 
Japanese asking for an appointment for Sunday afternoon was dis- 
cussed to some degree, as it was quite unusual and out of the known 
routine of the foreign service. 

67. Q. At about what time did this discussion take place which you 
have just related, Admiral? 

A. I cannot accurately place the time, but I would say it was 
probably about 10 : 30. 

68. Q. Was the Army Chief of Staff, Gei^eral Marshall, present 
with Admiral Stark at this conversation ? 

A. No, he was not present with Admiral Stark. It was a telephone 
conversation, of which I heard one end, and Admiral Stark, in effect, 
related the other end after laying down the 'phone. 

69. Q. Can you recall what Admiral Stark did about it? 

A. Admiral Stark concurred in the dispatch of the other message 
by General Marshall. 

70. Q. In your capacity as liaison officer with the State Depart- 
ment, did you, after overhearing this discussion between Admiral 
Stark and the Army Chief of Staff, have occasion to tell the State 
Department the subject thereof? 

A. No. 

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, 
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, withdrew. 

[$06] 71. Do you know whether or not anybody in the Navy 
Department told the State Department about this matter prior to 
1 : 00 o'clock on 7 December 1941? 

A. Well, I certainly did not. I was here in the Department till 
noon and left and was back around shortly after the messages began 
to come in that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, and I am sure that 
the State Department was informed of that conversation. 

72. Q. Between Admiral Stark and General Marshall? 

A. No, the State Department was not informed of the conversa- 
tion between General Marshall and Admiral Stark. 

73. Q. Now you have stated that there was a conversation between 
Admiral Stark and General Marshall on the morning of 7 December 
1941, during which General Marshall communicated certain informa- 
tion to the Chief of Naval Operations. You have stated that you 
knew in substance what General Marshall had some communicated, 
because Admiral Stark had repeated it to you in substance after he 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 161 

put down the telephone. Now do you know whether or not Admiral 
Stark had information of a similar nature to that presented by Gen- 
eral Marshall at the time of the telephone conversation that you have 
just related? 

A, Admiral Stark knew that the Japanese had requested an ap- 
pointment with the Secretary of State for 1 : 00 o'clock, for delivery 
of a note. Whether or not he had the same hunch that General 
Marshall had, I do not know. 

The court then, at 12 : 40 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

[mr] Present: 

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the 
inquiry and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

R. E. Schuirmann, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under 
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that 
the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

74. Q. Admiral, you testified this morning as to numerous confer- 
ences you had with State Department people and as to numerous trips 
that you made to the State Department, and conversations that took 
place at that time. Was the seeking out of these conferences and the 
leg work involved largely yours on behalf of the Navy Department ? 

A. Yes. 

75. Q. It was largely a Navy Department initiative, rather than an 
initiative of the Department of State ? 

A. Well, the leg work was done by the Navy Department ; I mean, 
as far as personal contact with Mr. Hull was concerned. Whether he 
asked me to come over to go over the results of these meetings after 
they were held — I am now^ referring to conversations with Kurusu 
and Nomura — or whether I asked him to come over, I don't know, but 
there was a general agreement on it. There was no appointment made ; 
it was more or less a custom that grew up. 

76. Q. But in order to get the information that you got, you went 
to the State Department, usually, to get it? 

A. Yes. At times, we used the telephone, but somebody had to go to 
get the information and we never made any issue as to whether I went 
over there. 

77. Q. Did I understand you to say this morning that in connection 
with the information that was secured from various sources by both 
the Navy and the State Department, that Secretary Hull commented 
at one point that the Navy seemed always to be ahead of us? 

A. Well, yes, I think that remark of Secretary Hull's was more or 
less to say, "Well, I apologize for making this suggestion" which he, in 
effect did. If it was time to send out some message, I took it, and that 
was just a polite w^ay of apologizing for making a suggestion which he 
thought primarily was of Navy Department concern! 

[£08] The "interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, stated that he had no further questions of this witness. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 12 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

78. Q. In your capacity as liaison officer with the State Department, 
I understood you to testify this morning. Admiral, that you felt during 
the fall of 1941 you had thorough and complete information as to the 
Far Eastern situation from Naval Intelligence ? 

A. Yes. 

79. Q. And by that did you mean that you felt that you had, and 
were told all the intelligence information they had concerning thai 
area ? 

A. I don't believe that I followed every detailed report that came 
in on that area because that was too large, but I felt that I was cognizant 
of their estimate of how they felt about the situation. 

80. Q. How did you get that information. Admiral ? 

A. Well, there was no form of memoranda that were exchanged, but 
I talked to the directors of Naval Intelligence, or heard them talk, and 
I talked to McCallum at various times, but there was no set routine 
whereby I would deliver certain information every time it came in, or 
the reports. 

81. Q. If their information was in written form, did you see the 
written form in which they had it? 

A. No, I don't believe I did see written estimates, although I may 
have. My memory is not clear on it. 

82. Q. I am referring more to the original written sources of their 
information, rather than estimates or conclusions that they formed 
from it. 

A. No, I didn't follow the original sources from which their informa- 
tion was derived, original reports. 

83. Q. Did you have access to those ? 

A. If I desired them ; there was no attempt to bar me from them. I 
made no particular attempt to look at them. 

84. Q. Do you recall learning from the Office of Naval Intelligence 
on or about the 15th of October of Japan's plans and intentions for the 
conquest of southeastern Asia ? 

A. I don't remember that report, no. 

[£09] 85. Q. Well, do you remember any information at or 
about that time of that character ? 

A. Not distinctly. There was lots of information. I think most 
of the information tended to show that Japan intended to expand to 
the southward through Indo-China, and perhaps Malaysia. 

86. Q. Sometime during the month of October, 1941, did you learn 
from Naval Intelligence that they had information that Japanese 
Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese na- 
tionalists from N. E. I., Malaya, the Philippines, Hawaii, America, 
and Europe ? 

A. I don't remember the date but I do remember we had informa- 
tion that the Japanese Nationals had been encouraged to get out of 
certain areas, and I believe that there were some — I am not exact on 
this point, but I believe that there was some question of whether an 
exchange or repatriation ship should go into Panama at the time. Of 
course, they would require permission from the United States govern- 
ment. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 163 

87. Q. Do you recall learning from the Office of Naval Intelligence 
early in November that the internal situation in Japan, both poltical 
and economic, primarily as a result of the American embargo and 
freezing orders, had become so desperate that the Japanese govern- 
ment had determined to distract popular attention, either by a foreign 
war or a definite diplomatic victory? 

A. I don't recollect it, no. 

88. Q. You have no memory of anything of that character? 
A. No. 

(NOTE: Question No. 89 and the answer thereto, numbered Page 
209-A, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record 
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken 
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of 
the war.) 

90. Were you getting information from any sources other than 
Naval Intelligence and the State Department concerning the Far East- 
ern situation? I am not going to ask you what the sources are. Or 
were there other sources? 

A. Yes, there were other sources. 

91. Q. Were those other sources within the Navy Department? 
A. Yes. 

92. Q. Can you tell us the Navy Department division whence that 
information emanated? 

A. From the Communications Division. 

[3J0] 93. Q. Would you get that information. Admiral, through 
Naval Intelligence, or from some other source directly? Would you 
get it via Naval Intelligence, or otherwise? 

A. I would get it via Naval Intelligence. 

94. Q. So that the immediate contacts, as far as you were concerned, 
were Naval Intelligence ? 

A. Yes. 

95. Q. Well, then, is it correct to say that so far as the Navy Depart- 
ment information is concerned, your source was Naval Intelligence? 

A. That is right. 

96. Q. Regardless of whence they may have gotten it? 
A. Yes. 

97. Q. You got it through Naval Intelligence? 
A. Yes. 

The following pages, Nos. 210-A, 211, 212 and 212-A have, by direc- 
tion of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with 
the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of 
national security and the successful prosecution of the war. 

\Sl-3] 108. Q. Coming down to Sunday, December 7th : "Wlien 
did you come to your office? 

A. Between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30, as I remember. 

109. Q. Wlien you reached the office, did you receive the informa- 
tion about which we have been talking with Admiral Stark? 

A. With Admiral Stark, yes. 

110. Q. It was available to you? 

A. I received information that the Japanese were going to present 
a note, and requested an appointment with the Secretary of State 
for 1 : 00 o'clock to deliver a note. 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

111. Q. And that was available to you immediately upon your ar- 
rival at your office, between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 ? 

A. Practically immediately. 

112. Q. Do you know when that information was received in the 
Navy Department? 

A. No. 

113. Q. Could you ascertain that fact from records now available 
to you ? 

A. I do not believe so. If I could, the records which would be 
available to me to substantiate the fact, I would object to discussing 
it on the grounds of national security. 

114. Q. I am only asking the time of the availability of that in the 
Department. 

A. In the Department? Well, that is correct, I received the mes- 
sage ; it was available to me at 9 : 30. The only records which I know 
of which would substantiate it would be objectionable on the grounds 
of national security, to establish the date or the time when that infor- 
mation was first available in the Department. 

115. Q. Bear in mind, I am not asking to see the records; I am 
merely asking if from your examination of the records now you could 
establish the time when that was available to the Navy Department? 

A. I don't know, but probably so. 

[214] 116. Q. And would the disclosure to this court of the time 
of availability in the Navy Department, in your opinion, violate the 
national security ? 

A. Yes. 

117. Q. Do you recall any conversation on Sunday morning, 7 De- 
cember, with those with whom you talked, as to when that informa- 
tion had been available in the Navy Department? 

The court announced that it would object to any further questions 
on that subject, on the groinids tliat the witness has stated that to 
answer them would be a violation of state secrets ; and that the war 
effort, not as of December 7, 1941 but as of today would be endan- 
gered. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), stated as follows: May I state what I understand to be 
the court's ruling, and I certainly intend to abide by it : That because 
of the statement of the witness as to the current national security 
I am forbidden from asking any more questions concerning the receipt 
of the message about which he has testified that he had on Sunday 
morning. 

The court announced that that was correct. 

118. Q. We will refer to your conversation with Admiral Stark. 
Please fix as precisely as you can — and I appreciate much allowance 
has got to be made for the passage of two years and a half — when you 
first saw Admiral Stark on Sunday morning? 

A. I believe it was about 10 : 00 o'clock, 

119. Q. Might it have been later? Might it have been an hour 
later? 

A. I think about 10 : 00 o'clock as near as I can remember. 

120. Q. Do you recall who was with Admiral Stark — strike that. 
Where did you confer with Admiral Stark ? 

A. In his office. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 165 

121. Q. In his personal office? 
A. That is right. 

122. Q. Who was with Admiral Stark when you first wenc into 
his room? 

A. As I remember, I and possibly Commander Wellborn were the 
only two there, but I'm not sure that there w^as anybody other than 
myself there when I first went in. 

123. Q. How 'long did 3^ou stay in Admiral Stark's office in con- 
ference with him ? 

A. I think I was there probably upward of an hour, or close to an 
hour. There were various people coming in and going out. 

[^iJ] 124. Q. Can you recall who those other people were com- 
ing in and going out ? 

A. I believe Captain Turner, Captain Wilkinson, Admiral Inger- 
soll, are the only three I can remember at this time. 

125. Q. While you were in there, was additional information 
brought in to Admiral Stark concerning this Japanese situation? 

A. None that I remember, no. 

[216] 12G. Q. You testified this morning that sometime during 
that conversation there was a telephone call to or from General 
Marshall? 

A. From General Marshall, yes. 

127. Q. That was from General Marshall ? 
A. Yes. 

128. Q, How long after you first went into Admiral Stark's office 
was the telephone call from General Marshall ? 

A. I should judge thirty to forty-five minutes. 

129. Q. It would be between 10 ^30 and 11 : 00 ? 
A. That is correct, 10 : 30. 

130. Q. Did you have any conversation, or did you overhear any 
conversation between Admiral Stark relative to tlie sending of the 
message by the Navy Department to Admiral Kinmiel? 

A. No. 

131. Q. There was no mention of that in your presence? 
A. None that I remember. 

132. Q. You told us this morning that you left the Navy Depart- 
ment; what time was that? 

A. 12 : 00 o'clock. 

133. Q. You went home to dinner? 
A. Yes. 

134. Q. Do you know Commander McCallum ? 
A. Yes. 

135. Q. What was his position at that time? 

A. I believe he was in charge of part of a section of Naval Intelli- 
gence. 

lo6. Q. During the week preceding 7 December, did you attend any 
conferences with Admiral Stark and Commander McCullum? 

A. None that I remember, no. I don't remember of any conference 
at which McCallum was present with Admiral Stark, that I was also 
present. 

137. Q. Do you recall if Admiral Brainard was present Sunday 
morning at the conference with Admiral Stark ? 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I am not positive, but I believe he was, tliat he did come in some 
time that morning. 

138. Q. Did you personally talk to Admiral Stark, or were you 
present when it was discussed with Admiral Stark, any time during 
the w^eek preceding 7 December, tlie question of sending any addi- 
tional messages to Admiral Kimmel — additional to what had been 
sent ? 

A. No. 

[pj7] 139. Q. That wouldn't come within the field of your 
activity ? 

A. No, it would not. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, did 
not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

The court was cleared. 

The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. 

Examined by the court: 

140. Q. Admiral, were negotiations continuing between the Jap- 
anese representatives and the State Department between 27 November 
and 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I think that depends on how you define negotiations. 

141. Q. Well, change that — were discussions continuing^ 

A. Discussions, I believe, were continuing to the extent that there 
were certain points being cleared up; for instance, what Tojo had said 
in a speech and various other points, but they were awaiting a reply 
to the note that was delivered on November 20, which reply was deliv- 
ered, I believe, on December 7. 

142. Q. During this time, 27 November to 7 December, did you 
make daily reports and keep Admiral Stark conversant with these 
discussions you speak of at the State Department. 

A. To the best of my knowledge I believe I did. 

143. Q. Were you familiar with the note of November 26, which 
this government delivered, as we understand, to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment ? 

A. I am perfectly familiar with the note to which you refer, and I 
liave done my best to recollect whether or not I was furnished a copy 
of that for delivery to the Navy Department prior to its dispatch, but 
I cannot state that I did ; and to the best of my recollection, I did not. 

144. Q. Did you consider at that time that this note of 26 November 
was an ultimatum to Japan ? 

A. To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note were 
such that there was no hope in anybody's mind — at least nobody with 
whom I discussed the question in the Navy Depai'tment — that the 
Japanese would or could under the circumstances agree to the terms 
of the note. 

145. Q. Did you inform Admiral Stark as to this note, or did you 
discuss it with him? 

A. I did not, specifically, no. 

146. Q. On Sunday morning, December 7, while you were [218] 
discussing matters which have been brought out in this testimony, with 
Admiral Stark, did any question arise as to the importance of phoning 
or any communication direct from the Navy Department to Admiral 
Kimmel? 



PROCEEDINGS OP^ NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 167 

A. I remember of none. I believe that Admiral Stark, after re- 
ceipt of the telephone call from General Marshall in which General 
Marshall said that he would send the dispatch, felt that it would take 
care of Admiral Kimmel on its arrival in Pearl Harbor. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make 
any f urtlier statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in 
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the 
previous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

The court then, at 2 : 45 p. m., adjourned until 10 : 15 a. m., Monday, 
August 14, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 169 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVYlCOURT OF INQUIRY 



MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944. 

[219] Ninth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. G. 

The court met at 10 : 15 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin U. S. Navy (Ret) , President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolplms Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kammel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the eighth day of the inquiry w^as 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, 
and was informed of ithe subject matter of the inquiry. 

The witness. Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S, Army (Ret) , 
informed the court that he had an interest in the subject matter of the 
inquiry, and requested that he be permitted to have counsel present. 

The court announced that the request of Lieutenant General Walter 
C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), was granted, and informed him of his 
rights as interested party. 

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), examined 
the precept, stated that he did not object to any member of the court, 
and with the permission of the court, introduced Brigadier General 
T. H. Green, U. S. Army, as his counsel. 

[220'] Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Will you please state your name, rank, and present status, 
General Short ? 

A. Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret) . 

2. Q. What was your station and duty on 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I was commanding the Hawaiian Department. I was stationed 
at Fort Shaf ter, Territory of Hawaii. 

3. Q. When did you assume that duty ? 

A. February 7, or it might be carried on the War Department's 
records as the 8th. The War Department records will show Febru- 
ary 7 or 8, 1941. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. Q. When were you relieved of this duty ? 
A. December 16, 1941. 

5. Q, I show you a document which is marked Exhibit 6 before 
this court for identification, and it is entitled Joint Army and Navy 
Action 1935. Generally, speaking, are you familiar with the pro- 
visions of this document ? 

A. I am generally familiar with it. 

6. Q. I. show you page five of this document, under paragraph nine, 
the general subject matter of determination of methods of coordina- 
tion, and ask you, had unity of command been placed in effect in the 
Hawaiian area prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. It had not. 

7. Q. So far as you were concerned, had any consideration been 
given to placing unity of command in effect under the provision that 
it might be done by the comanders of local forces ? 

A. As long as I had communication with the War Department, I 
would have not considered it without consulting them. 

8. Q. Under Chapter Two, Article 9, subsection b. (3), what officer 
did you deal with as Commander of Naval Forces in the Hawaiian 
area ? 

A. I dealt with two officers; primarily, on routine matters, with 
Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and on 
matters of immediate importance with Admiral Kimmel, with Admiral 
Block usually present — the three of us in the discussion. 

9. Q. In matters affecting the defenses of Pearl Harbor, what officer 
in the Navy, in the Hawaiian area, did you usually have dealings with ? 

A. The same reply pertains. When it was routine I dealt with 
Admiral Bloch. When it got beyond routine I usually dealt with 
both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel to- [221] gether. 

10. Q. Was it the practice in the Hawaiian area to hold confer- 
ences on military matters affecting the defenses of Pearl Harbor? 

A. We had no stated time set for holding conferences, but whenever 
Admiral Kimmel or I either got anything of prime importance from 
the Navy or War Department, we practically always had a personal 
conference. 

11. Q. How would you describe the relations between yourself and 
the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet — as cordial, strained, cooper- 
ative, or what language would you use ? 

A. I would say that they were extremely friendly, cordial, and 
cooperative. We were on a very friendly basis personally, as well as 
officially. We played golf together about every other Sunday, and 
the Sundays we didn't play golf, very frequently Admiral Kimmel 
dropped in to see me in the morning; because his family was away 
he came to my quarters more than I went to his. 

12. Q. I show you a document marked Exhibit 7 before this court 
of inquiry, which purports to be JCD-42. If you recognize this docu- 
ment, will you state what it is ? 

A. The full name of the document is "Joint Coastal Frontier De- 
fense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," and that is the way we 
usually designated it, rather than leaving out the word "frontier." 

13. Q. Again adverting to Exhibit 6, Joint Action of the Army 
and Navy, and referring to Article 19-D, thereof . 

A. "B''or"D"? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 171 

14. Q. D. I ask you if exliibit 7, that you have just identified, is 
the plan made in accordance with that article? 

A. It is. 

15. Q. By whom was this document, jCD-42, prepared? 

A. By the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District. 

16. Q. On what date was it promulgated ? 

A. 25th of April, 1941, is the date that it — probably the date of 
the amendment rather than the original document. I think it was 
probably a 1939 document and had been amended. 

17. Q. I ask you to read Article 21 of JCD-42. 
A. Reading: 

This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in 
writing by eitlier party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis- 
approved in part or in whole bv either the War or the Navy Department. This 
HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except [222] that the 
Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to 
VII, inclusive, of this plan. (Signed) WALTER C. SHOrwT, Lieutenant 
General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department ; C. C. BLOCH, Rear 
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

18. Q. According to Article 12 of this same Exhibit, what category 
of defense was in effect ? 

A. Mutual cooperation — category "D". 

19. Q. Now was the whole Exhibit, this JCD^2, in effect on 7 
December 1941 ? 

A. Yes, sir, before that date it had been amended, so that the 
amendment would be included in it. 

20. Q. Adverting to this same Exhibit, would you please read 
Article 14? 

A. Beading: 

TASKS, a. JOINT TASK To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, 
and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. 

b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, 
and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces. 

c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect 
shipping therein ; to support the Army forces. 

21. Q. Adverting to Article 17 of JCD-42, which states that the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department shall provide for 
the beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defenses of OAHU, 
with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, will you 
please state in general terms what provisions had been made to carry 
out the Army's undertaking in this respect prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. The Army had provided proper defenses — harbor defenses, anti- 
aircraft defense, aircraft defenses, commimications, and aircraft 
warning service. I say in general terms that would be the answer. 

22. Q. On 7 December 1941, would you state what your opinion 
Avas as to whether the dispositions that had been made were adequate 
to meet the Army's undertaking imder this section. 

A. I am not sure that I know just what you mean by that — whether 
the dispositions would be provided for in our plans or whether the 
dispositions we were actually occupying at the minute. 

23. Q. I shall rephrase my question. Will you state what 
your opinion was on about 7 December 1941 as to whether 
the [22S] Army had adequately provided the materiel and 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the personnel to carry out the requirements of Article 17, section a., 
that I read you in my question a moment ago ? 

A. The materiel of the harbor defense, on the average, yes, as 
pertaining to the harbor defenses proper. As pertaining to the anti- 
aircraft, there was a shortage of allotted guns, I think of twelve 3-inch 
anti-aircraft guns. There was a shortage of the 37-millimeter; we 
had 20 out of 140. In the 50-calibre guns, we had 180 out of, I think, 
345, so there was a shortage of equipment that had been allocated that 
we were trying to get ; and when it came to the personnel, there was 
a decided shortage of personnel in the Coast Artillery, which resulted 
in practically all our organizations having two assignments. They 
had to man harbor defense guns and anti-aircraft, and if you had 
gotten both kinds of attack at the same time, it would have been im- 
possible to man all the equipment. If you got one attack at a time, 
there was sufficient personnel to man the equipment. That covers, 
1 think, the harbor defenses. On the question of the air force, we 
had nothing like enough to carry out our mission properly. We had 
made a study, had it written ; we felt we should have 180 B-17s for 
long-distance reconnaissance and for bombers. We actually had 12, 
and only 6 of them in commission. We required approximately 200 
pursuit planes. We had, I think, something like 105 P-40s, and 80 
of them were in commission, but the others could have been put in 
commission fairly soon. On the anti-aircraft warning service, we had 
a program approved and funds allocated for the construction of six 
fixed stations and six mobile stations. Originally, the program had 
called for only three fixed stations and had been increased some time 
along in perhaps September or October, I don't remember the date, 
from three to six. None of the fixed stations on Oahu were to be placed 
at as great an altitude as 10,000 feet, and on the other islands at the 
highest suitable point we could get, which we hoped would give us 
200 miles effective radius. None of those were in action. The parts 
had not all been received ; certain articles, cable and material of that 
kind, were essential before we could construct the station, and it had 
not been received, so no fixed stations were operating. The six mobile 
stations were in condition to operate and were all stationed on the 
Island of Oahu. I believe that about covers the points. 

[^^4] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

24. Q. Adverting to your answer with reference to anti-aircraft 
guns in the Pearl Harbor area. Had you made any estimate of the 
number of anti-aircraft guns, together with their calibre, which yoji 
considered adequate for the defense of this base against an aircraft 
attack ? 

A. In addition to what had been allocated there, we were supposed 
to have twenty-four, 90-millimeter guns, fixed at the time the alloca- 
tion was made, and we had felt that with the exception of Kaneohe 
Bay — the Army had not assumed the responsibility for the defense 
of Kaneohe Bay then — that, the equipment, if we got it all, would 
be fairly satisfactory. Shortly after I got there, I strongly recom- 
mended to the War Department that the Hawaiian Department assume 
the responsibility for the defense of Kaneohe Bay because it was like 
shutting your front door and leaving your back door open if you 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 173 

didn't. We asked for a garrison for Kaneohe Bay which had never 
been aproved up to that- time because they said no approval would 
be given until after the limit of the strength of the Hawaiian garrison 
was lifted, which was placed then at 59,000, and we had asked them 
to raise it to 71,500 so that we could provide some additional personnel 
for Coast Artillery, Engineers, Air Corps, and a garrison for Kaneohe 
Bay. 

25. Q. Do you consider. General, that if you had gotten all the 90- 
millimeter guns that were allocated to you, that you would or would 
not have still been short of anti-aircraft fire to defend Oahu ? 

A. We could have done pretty well, cliregarding Kaneohe Bay, and 
the allocation, when it was made, did not include Kaneohe Bay. 

26. Q. Do you consider that 90-millimeter guns are effective against 
high-altitude bombers? 

A. Probably not as effective as your 5-inch, but they were the most 
effective thing the Army had. 

27. Q. Now, adverting to your aircraft warning service. You have 
told us what some of the technical equipment was that you had. What 
was the status of training of personnel in your aircraft warning 
service ? 

A. They were not expert by any means. We started our training, 
I think, about the last of October or the first of November, when we 
really got enough of our equipment to begin training our men. As 
the first step in our training, we had earlier sent 15 men to sea with 
the Navy to learn something of the operation of the naval radar 
before we got any of our equipment. Our operators had [£2S] 
gotten to the point where they were fairly satisfactory. As I say, 
the whole thing was new. The Army had just recently gone into it 
and they were by no means expert but had been working hard at it 
for at least a month, a little more than a month, and could be counted 
on to do fairly satisfactory work. 

28. Q. What communication facilities did you have between this 
aircraft warning service and the Commandant, 14th Naval District? 

A. We had several types of communication with the Commandant 
of the 14th Naval District. We had commercial telephones and we 
had a very fine cable system. Army cable system, that looped the 
island and went into, I think, your switchboard of the 14th Naval 
District. I don't think it went to a direct line to the Commandant. 
We also had messenger service by plane from the headquarters of the 
Department, these small messenger planes to Hickam Field, which 
was right alongside of Pearl Harbor, that we could use in case other 
signals went out. We had in operation, in addition to radar, about 
a hundred lookout stations throughout the island, and the Navy had 
some signal stations that they based on the island at various places 
and quartered with the Army troops, and they had communications 
with their own naval crew. 

29. Q. You have mentioned something to the effect that there were 
about 100 lookouts. What were those lookouts ? 

A. Those were regular Coast Artillery stations with communica- 
tions and everything of that kind. They served as a combination for 
spotting ships, or they would have spotted planes if they were visible. 

30. Q. As a general statement, where were these lookouts stationed? 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. They were pretty much on the high ground around the whole 
island. 

31. Q. Of Oahu? 
A. Of Oahu. 

32. Q. What sort of communication did they have ? 

A. They were tied in with the cable that circled the island so they 
had instant communication, practically. 

33. Q. Were these lookouts continuously on watch day and night? 
A. They were not. They would have been if we had considered the 

situation such as to go on that type of alert. 

[^^S] 34. Q. The point I would like to have you answer is 
whether these lookouts were or were not stationed on the morning of 
7 December 1941 ? 

A. They were not because they were not alerted for aircraft attack 
or for attack by a landing force, or an all-out attack. 

35. Q. But you did have provision for that in your plans ? 

A. Our plans were very complete for that and we had lots of train- 
ing in it, and if we had been on Alert No. 2 instead of Alert No. 1 

36. Q. Do you consider that your personnel were adequately trained 
to fulfill those duties? 

A. They were. 

37. Q,. Was your aircraft warning service in direct communication 
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? You have said 
that it was in communication with the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District. 

A. I think we were connected with the switchboard at Pearl Har- 
bor, and it would be the naval communication through the switch- 
board to the Commander of the Fleet. 

38. Q. Did the Navy have a liaison officer, or any other personnel, 
assigned to the aircraft warning service? 

A. I will have to answer that a little fully. On August 5, 1941, I 
wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel pointing out the desirability of a 
naval liaison officer, and I think it was the 24th day of November that 
Lieutenant Burr — who was the naval liaison officer in G-3 — was re- 
quested to set up liaison offices with the Navy because we were then 
working enough of these services iliat it was desirable to have it. I 
don't know whether they had actually reported on December 7th, or 
not. I thought they had. I thought they were actually working daily 
from November 24th to December Tth. I don't believe that I per- 
sonally visited the anti-aircraft warning information room between 
the hours of 4 : 00 and 7 : 00. I visited it two or three times during 
that period but not between the prescribed hours and I can't say 
whether there was a naval officer there on duty, or not, when I visited 
it, or whether there was a naval officer on duty daily between Novem- 
ber 24th and December 7th. 

39. Q. In your testimony as regards the aircraft warning service, 
I don't recall that you mentioned anything concerning sound detec- 
tors. Did you have any such materiel ? 

A. We had sound detectors. We felt that as soon as our radar was 
operating 100 per cent that the sound detectors would have little value 
and I don't think we were manning them when we look at the shortage 
of the [227] personnel because they were so much less valuable 
than the radar, as long as the radar was working. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 175 

40. Q. Then am I to understand that your position is this : That you 
had some sound detectors 

A. We had some sound detectors and we were using some of them 
because we didn't have the radars where we were sure of them at that 
time. We didn't have our fixed stations on December 7th. For that 
reason, the sound detectors were still valuable on account of the height 
of the mountains. We might have gotten them when they were close 
to the mountains, where we wouldn't have gotten them with the mobile 
stations. 

41. Q. Do I understand you to say that these sound detectors were 
not in use on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. They definitely were not because the command was not alerted 
that way. 

42. Q. Was there any organization in the Island of Oahu for civil- 
ian aircraft squadrons or lookouts? 

A. There was not. May I add there, that the limited terrain of the 
island was such that plotting by an individual was of very little value 
because the distance was so short, before the report could be made the 
aircraft would be upon us and considering that, we had not organized 
civilian lookouts. 

43. Q. Had you ever considered the practicability or the desirability 
of having an aircraft patrol organized? 

A. I didn't think that the aircraft patrol would be of any value 
for anything but submarines, considering the distance that we were 
supposed to go out. As far as air went, it would have been of no value. 

44. Q. Would you give the court an opinion of the efficacy of the 
aircraft warning service as you had it set up ; not as it was operated 
but as it was set up on the morning of 7 December 1941, to perform the 
functions for which an aircraft warning service would be provided? 

A. Those mobile sets were supposed to be effective about 75 to 100 
miles. Actually, under favorable conditions one morning, one set 
picked up enemy planes at 132 miles. There was one great handicap : 
They were not at sufficient height when the enemy planes came in and 
apparently turned to the east of the Koolau mountain range, and they 
lost them because of the intervening body of mountains. Now with 
the higher one, if we had had the one fixed station on Kaala in opera- 
tion it might not have lost them. 

45. Q. As I understand it, the Commanding General of the Hawai- 
ian Department was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor? Is 
that correct ? 

A. Supported by the naval forces. 

[228] 46. Q. Supported by the Naval forces. What support, in 
general, would be included in that statement? 

A. If the enemy tried to make a landing, we had even hoped that 
the Navy might stop that by themselves before he got near there. As 
to anti-aircraft, we had certain Marine organizations that functioned 
in our net. There were certain naval guns ashore that functioned with 
our anti-aircraft. Also any planes of the Marines or anti-aircraft 
planes that had been sent ashore because their carrier was in port or 
anything — all of those things would have been able to give us support. 
And then one of the most important things, of course, was the long- 
range reconnaissance. 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

47. Q. If units of the Pacific Fleet were present in Pearl Harbor, 
would they also be considered ? 

A. They would be a very valuable addition to the anti-aircraft fire, 
but we had not carried our coordination to the point where their fire, 
tliat is, the anti-aircraft fire from ships, was controlled by our anti- 
aircraft, before I gained command. We had not carried the coordina- 
tion to that extent. 

48. Q. You have mentioned certain anti-aircraft artillery that was 
available for the protection of Pearl Harbor. Do you consider that 
Army pursuit ships should be classed in one of the defenses of Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. Very decidedly. 

49. Q. Do you recall what the condition of readiness for combat of 
your pursuit ships was at 7 : 55 on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. We were in the state of routine training at that time, except 
for the alert against sabotage and the anti-aircraft warning signal. 

50. Q. It might be well at this point, General, since we are to speak 
of conditions of readiness, or alert, I believe, as the Army calls it, to 
set out for the record what the conditions of alert were according to 
your plans ? 

A. We had three types of alert. Alert No. 1 was an alert against 
sabotage and against internal disorders and uprisings with no threat 
from without. Alert No. 2 was an alert that included No. 1, all the 
threats of No. 1, and in addition, a threat of an aircraft attack and 
surface or submarine attack. Alert No. 3 was all-comprehensive. It 
included every element of No. 1 and No. 2, and in addition, the danger 
of hostile landings. I think, in general terms, that that makes it plain. 

51. Q. What was the condition of alert at 0755 on the morning of 7 
December 1941 as regards the Hawaiian Department? Was it all the 
same? 

A. We were on Alert No. 1 ; and in addition to Alert No. 1, our air- 
craft warning service was directed to operate between the hours of 
4: 00 and 7: 00. 

[2£9] 52. Q. Being in condition of Alert No. 1, what would that 
mean as regards the condition of readiness of 3'^our aircraft to commence 
combat ? 

A. It was routine training. They were not alerted for combat. They 
were alerted, I may add, definitely, for the protection of the ma- 
teriel. 

53. Q. Could you give the court an estimate of the time required 
to get into action from this condition of Alert No. 1 ? 

A. It actually took, that morning, 55 minutes. They were in action 
at 8 : 50. The attack struck at 7 : 55, so it is not theoretical there. 
That is wdiat it actually took. 

Questioned by the court : 

54. Q. 55 minutes? 
A. 55 minutes. 

55. Q. And the attack itself took place at 7: 55? 
A. At 7 : 55 ; and at 8 : 50 they took off. 
Questioned by the judge advocate : 

56. Q. Adverting to Article 17 /. of Exhibit No. 7, which is JCD- 
42, it states: "The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPART- 
MENT, shall provide for '/. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 177 

of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval 
Inshore Patrol, and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, 
and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.' '^ 
We have covered the matter of the aircraft warning service. What 
was the arrangement for the cooperation of the Naval Inshore Patrol ? 
A. We had one reconnaissance squadron of 6 planes stationed at Bel- 
lows Field, and all of this training was along reconnaissance lines and 
was carried out in such a way as to constitute a patrol during the train- 
ing period. A great deal of our pursuit training also was taking place 
at such a place that they did perform a certain amount of reconnais- 
sance. 

57. Q. Well, under your system of Alert No. 1, did you or did you 
not have this in operation ? 

A. We definitely did not. 

58. Q. Did you have these aircraft armed at the time, and supplied 
with ammunition? 

A. There was one squadron receiving machine gun training at 
Haleiwa that did have ammunition right adjacent to their planes. 
They were able to put it in in very short order. 

'[230] 59. Q. Adverting to Paragraph (g) of this same exhibit: 
"The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department will pro- 
vide for the sujjport of naval aircraft forces and major offensive 
operations at sea conducted in conjunction with Army bombers." 
You have previously testified as to the number and types of planes 
that you had available, and the number that were in operating 
status on the morning of 7 December 1941. Am I to assume that 
these planes that you had at this time were available for cooperation 
with the Navy had they been requested?- 

A. Yes, sir, the cooperation was automatic. If it was requested 
they were sent immediately, and if an emergency like an attack took 
place, they didn't wait for a request ; they reported for instructions. 

60. Q. In other words, am I to understand that you had plans that 
provided for just such a contingency? 

A. We did. I may add there, that when we sent them to the Navy 
they went under the direct orders of the Navy, they were assigned 
missions by the Navy, and operated just as much under the Navy as 
if they had been Navy planes. 

Questioned by the court : 

61. Q. These are the long-range bombers ; is that right ? 

A. Yes, sir. We had the same provision that if it became neces- 
sary to furnish pursuit planes at ranges where they could operate, 
to assist in any naval attack over the sea of any Navy vessels, they 
went under the Navy command in the same way. 

Questioned by the judge advocate : 

62. Q. Can you recall, General, the maximum radius of operation 
of the planes that you had available for support with the Navy? 

A. The B-17s, I think, fully equipped, were good for 24- or 2500 
miles; I think that's about right, round-trip. 

63. Q. Kound trip? 
A. Round trip. 

64. Q. Then that would be a radius of about what ? 

A. About 1,200 miles. 1 think that is correct, if they carried 
bomb loads. 

79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 13 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

65. Q. And just as a matter of having this in the record at this 
point, would you please repeat the number of such planes you had 
available, and then state how many were in operating condition on 
the morning of 7 December 1941? 

A. We had 12 B-l7s; 6 of them were in commission. The other 
6 had been stripped of parts in order to keep our ferrying of planes 
to the Philippines going. Now, we [SSI] had some other 
planes that were all right for short distances. We had 10 A-20s. 
They were modern planes, and 9 of those were in commission. We 
had, I think, approximately 50, B-18s, an obsolete plane. Twenty- 
four of those were in commission but they would have been death 
traps if they had been sent against a modern plane. 

66. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (h) of JCD-24, which provided 
that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department shall 
provide personnel and Army communication facilities to harbor 
control post provided for in Article 18 (c). Was such a harbor con- 
trol post established to your knowledge? 

A. It was. We had habitually, daily, one lieutenant colonel and 
one sergeant. When we carried on exercises we had a detail of 3 
officers so they could operate 24 hours a day. We had cable lines in 
there. We were required to furnish, when we carried on exercises 
or in case of an emergency or attack, certain telephone operators, 
certain teletype machines, and a clerical force for the use of these 
officers who were with the control post. The control post was oper- 
ated under naval command. 

67. Q. Do you know what its condition of readiness or alert was 
at 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941? 

A. I do not. It is my understanding that the Navy operated the 
post 24 hours a day. We had an officer there for the purpose of 
keeping the constant training going only eight hours a day. 
Whether he was there at that minute, I don't recall personally. 

68. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (i) of this same document, JCD-42, 
"The Commanding General shall provide for a system of land com- 
munications in conjunction with the Navy for the prompt trans- 
mittal and interchange of hostile intelligence." Will you please state 
what this system of land communications with the Navy was in 
Oahu on 7 December, 1941. Is it something which you have already 
described, or is it different? 

A. No, it is slightly different. They, of course, had the ordinary 
telephone communication for communication by commercial wire, or 
by the Army cable, but in addition to that, we had a teletype cir- 
cuit, a complete circuit that connected ONI, G-2, and FBI so that 
there was instant communication between the two. It worked both 
ways. 

69. Q. Wliat facilities did the Navy provide in this system? 

A. I frankly don't know whether the Army provided that teletype 
circuit, or the Navy. I think the Army provided them but I 
couldn't be sure, but they were there. 

70. Q. Was there a unity of command in carrying out the func- 
tions of this system? 

A. There was not. 

[252] 71. Q. Advertiiig to Article 17 (j) of JCD-42, which sets 
out that the Commanding General shall provide for an intelligence 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 179 

service which shall gather, evaluate, and distribute Army and Navy 
information of activity of enemy aliens in the Hawaiian Islands. 
Was such a service functioning during the period October 16, 1941 
to December 7, 1941? 

A. It was. We had, in addition to the ordinary G-3 personnel, we 
had personnel of the Civilian Intelligence Corps. They operated 
sometimes as undercover men. They had an office immediately ad- 
jacent to the FBI, and I believe that Naval Intelligence had an office 
at the same place, the Norfolk Building downtown ; not on the post. 
They were used constantly on activities of that kind. As to counter- 
espionage, however, the Army was responsible only in its own organ- 
izations. The Navy was supposed to be onl}^ a naval establishment, 
and the FBI would cover the civilians, the civilian aliens, and citizens 
who were suspects. However, I believe that the FBI had never fully 
taken over those duties from the Naval Intelligence; that the Naval 
intelligence had been requested to continue their work until FBI was 
able to take it over fully, and I don't recall that that had ever hap- 
pened. I think that the ONI still had the main responsibility on 
counter-espionage. 

72. Q. You have mentioned a Naval Intelligence service. Was 
there any liaison or connection between the Army Intelligence service 
and the Naval Intelligence service '^ 

A. There was constant touch; undoubtedly many communications 
each day. 

73. Q. Now, the information that the Army Intelligence system 
collected : Was that available to the Navy constantly ? 

A. That was available not only to the Navy but the FBI. Any- 
thing that anyone of the three services got was available to the other 
two, and they worked very close together. 

74. Q. What was the frequency of reports made by this intelligence 
service of the Army ? 

A. We didn't make any routine, daily report that came in at a cer- 
tain time. It was a question of getting in touch on a particular case 
at any time, and I think it would be safe to say that they made several 
reports a day on the average. 

75. Q. Adverting to the period 16 October 1941 and 7 December of 
the same year : Can you recall any items of importance that were re- 
ported by this intelligence service? 

A. There were two things in particular. There may have been a 
good many more but two that made enough impression that I re- 
member. One was a conversation between a man named Mori in 
Honolulu and some party in Japan that I think took place on the 6th 
and was reported to me about 7 : 00 o'clock on the 6th. 

76. Q. Of what month, sir? 

A. Of December. The other was a report of burning of papers in 
the Japanese Consulate. I think that took [233] place either 
on the 6th or the 5th. The report was made on the 6th. 

77. Q. Do you know whether or not the Navy received this in- 
formation ? 

A. When I received this information about the message from Mori, 
it was given to me by our contact officer, Colonel Bicknell, given to 
G-2 and me at the same time, and I asked specifically whether the 
Navy had information that had come from FBI, and I was informed 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that it was turned over to Naval Intelligence at the same time it was 
turned over to our G-2, to our contact officer, 

78. Q. What was that conversation? 

A. I couldn't describe it exactly. There were several pages of con- 
versation that went on back and forth for sometime. They talked 
about the weather. They talked about whether there was much ac- 
tivity around Honolulu in the way of ships. The man said, "Well, 
there wasn't as many as there was a year ago." They talked about the 
air activity, asked what the feeling of the Americans were toward the 
Japanese-American pojDulation, and they were told that as far as the 
old-timers went, there was apparently no prejudice; that the new- 
comers, when they first got out there, they were likely to be decidedly 
prejudiced but in a short time they accepted the situation the same as 
the old-timers. It was a good deal in detail. That, in a general way, 
covers the scope of the thing. 

79. Q. Do you have any present knowledge of where copies of this 
might be obtained ? 

A. I believe there is a copy of that in the Koberts Report. I think 
there is a copy in the Roberts Report. 

80. Q. Adverting to Article 18 (a) of JCD-42, which states, "The 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for an inshore 
l^atrol." What is your recollection as to what the Navy was doing 
in this respect between 16 October and 7 December, 1941 ? 

A. I don't know in detail. I am sure that they had one because it 
happened that there were some submarine scares, and I think they 
trailed what they thought was submarines and sometimes they were 
not sure wliether it was a submarine or a whale. I believe Admiral 
Kimmel will bear me out in that. They did have both there during 
the keeping of the lookout. 

81. Q. Adverting to Article 18 (b) of JCD-42, "The Commandant 
14th Naval District shall provide for offshore patrol." During the 
period 6 October to 7 December, 1941, do you have any knowledge of 
what the Navy was doing as regards providing and conducting an off- 
shore patrol ? 

A. I don't know the exact details of any coast offshore patrol like 
150 or 200 miles, which they provided for, but I did have pretty con- 
stant information of the task forces that were sent out all the time 
and did the patroling, which I considered was very much more im- 
portant than closer in. 

[£34] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

82. Q. In Article 18 (e) of JCD-42 the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District was to provide for harbor patrol posts for Pearl Har- 
bor and Honolulu HarTDor. Do you have any knowledge of whether 
this was done ? 

A. Yes, sir, that was provided, and we had personnel operating 
then. 

83. Q. Adverting to paragraph 18 (h) of JCD-42, do you have 
any knowledge of what the Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
was doing with respect to sweeping channels immediately prior to 
December 7, 1941 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 181 

A. I know that there was a certain amount of channel sweeping, 
because I happen to remember that the standing order was such that 
whenever any important elements of the Fleet went in and out of 
the harbor, they were preceded by mine sweepers. That is just recol- 
lection from talking over their plans with them, and I couldn't give 
any details. 

84. Q. General, I invite your attention to Article 18 (i) of JCD-42, 
which provides that the Navy shall furnish distance reconnaissance. 
Do you know whether or not before December 7, 1941, there was any 
plan for effecting this reconnaissance ? 

A. There was, and exercises had been carried out. It had been 
functioning. 

85. Q. Was the Army a cooperating body in this plan? 
A. It was. 

86. Q,. Wliat is your recollection as to what officer was primarily 
responsible under the plan for distance reconnaissance? 

A. In the actual carrying out of the details. Admiral l^ellinger 
and General Martin worked together. 

87. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 23, which is in evidence for 
identification before this court of inquiry, and advert to Annex 7. 
I ask you if you recognize what that is ? 

A. I do. Tliat is a plan for the joint air operations of the 14th 
Naval District and of the Hawaiian Department. 

88. Q. Is this the plan which was in effect on the morning of De- 
cember 7, 1941 ? 

A, It went into effect on March 21, 1941, and continued in effect 
as long as I was commander of the department. 

89. Q. You mentioned some time ago drills which were held in the 
matter of distance reconnaissance with the Navy. Can you give the 
court some idea of the frequency of those drills and the extent thereof, 
say, between October 16, 1941, and December 7 of the same year? 

A. We had air exercises not less than once a week. Now, whether 
during that period we had the long-range bombers [2S5] work- 
ing with them I'm not sure, because there was a time when we had 
to suspend the exercises as far as B-17's were concerned in order 
to get ferry teams ready to take the ships to the Philippines. I don't 
know the elate that happened, but we were having constant air exer- 
cises with the Navy. 

90. Q. In your opinion, the drills which were held were sufficient 
in time and character to indoctrinate personnel properly ? 

A. They were. 

91. Q. I believe you have testified — and I ask you to correct me 
if I am wrong — that on the morning of December 7, 1941, the condi- 
tion of alert for the whole command, which included aircraft, was 
alert No. 1 ? 

A. That is correct. 

92. Q. Do you know what the corresponding condition of readi- 
ness or alert was in the naval establishment at the same time? 

A. I think that they were definitely alerted for antisabotage, and 
I know, from talking with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, 
that they had increased their reconnaissance where the task forces 
were operating. I don't know definitely just what reconnaissance was 
sent out independent of the task forces. 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

93. Q. Can you tell us, General, whether or not Army and Navy 
aircraft under this plan were, on the morning of December 7, 1941, 
operating under the provision of mutual coordination or the other 
provision, unity of command? 

A. Mutual cooperation. 

94. Q. Then, did the condition of alert in the Army necessarily 
have any corresponding relationship to a condition of readiness or 
alert with naval craft? In other words, were they independent in 
this respect? 

A. They were independent, but we used exactly the same letters 
and numbers to describe their condition of readiness in regard to 
materiel and personnel, so they were speaking the same language. 

95. Q. In other words, when speaking of the condition of readmess 
or alert, so far as aircraft were concerned, if the condition were pre- 
scribed as condition 1 or alert No. 1, it meant the same thing, so far 
as naval aircraft were concerned, as it did for the Army ? 

A. The letters meant the same percentage of craft to be ready, 
and the numbers meant the same number of minutes required to 
get them in the air. You will find that in the plans signed by Bellinger 
and Martin. 

[2S6] 96. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 23, which I showed you a 
moment ago and which is this joint agreement for the employment of 
Army and Navy aircraft, I ask you to read the next to the last sentence 
of Article 1. 

A. (Reading :) "These agreements are to take effect at once and will 
remain effective until notice in writing by either party of the re- 
nouncement in whole or in part." 

97. Q. Adverting to this same exhibit, I will ask you to read Section 
2, paragraph 2 for the record. 

A. (Reading:) 

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 
Base Defense Officer (Commandant of the 14th Naval District) agree that the 
threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, 
each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make 
available without delay to the other such proportion of the air forces at its 
disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be 
conducted in accordance with the following plan. 

98. Q. Article 18, sub-paragraph "I", which is JCD-42, states that 
the Commandant, 14th Naval District shall provide for distance recon- 
naissance. Was there a plan in effect or do you know of any plan 
that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had provided for 
distance reconnaissance ? 

A. I don't know the details of his plan. I know that it was his 
responsibility, and he had full authority to call on me for planes 
when he did not consider that he had a sufficient number ready. I 
think, in any case, his reconnaissance would change so constantly that 
if I had known one day what he was doing, I would not necessarily 
have known the next. 

99. Q. For the purposes of the record. General, I am going to ask 
you to read from Exhibit 23, Section II (c) and (d) . 

A. (Reading:) 

(c) When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search 
operations and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under 
the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 183 

(d) In the special instances in wliich Army pursuit protection is requested 
for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission 
will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission. 

100. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 9, which is a copy of a letter 
from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated Janu- 
ary 24, 1941. I am going to ask you to take your time and to look 
over this letter. Then, I shall ask you a few questions about it. 

[237] The court then, at 11 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 50 
a. m., at which time it reconvened. 

Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the 
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S, Navy, whose counsel were present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeo- 
man first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), the witness 
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a 
witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still 
binding. 

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued :) 

101. Q. Since you have inspected this exhibit, I ask you to state 
whether the views expressed on the question of the military defenses 
of Pearl Harbor had ever, in general, been made to you ? 

A. They had. A copy of this letter was furnished to me along in 
February, 1942. 

102. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not you concurred in 
the views expressed therein as to the defenses of Pearl Harbor? 

A. There are some elements of the letter in which I did not concur. 
He envisaged the danger, in order of importance, as it were, as a 
constant, continuing thing. He based air bombing attack first, air 
torpedo second, sabotage third, submarines fourth, mines fifth, and 
bombardment by gun fire. I think that would be an ever-changing 
thing. What was the most important would appear to be what was 
the most probable, in view of the information you had of the enemy 
and the information you had from the Navy and War departments, 
but you could not always say that you would have air bombing as the 
most important. If your situation was such that it looked like air 
attack was completely ruled out, sabotage moved up to first priority. 

103. Q. Adverting to the proposals of the Navy Department m 
this exhibit which I have just shown you, wherein the Navy Depart- 
ment suggested certain corrective action, what were your views on 
the Navy Department's suggestions ? 

A. I agreed with all the suggestions except as regards smoke and 
balloon barrages. We convened joint committees on the use of smoke 
and balloon barrages, and I believe there was a unanimous recom- 
mendation that under the conditions prevailing there, they were not 
practical, that the wind conditions were such to eliminate the use of 
smoke, that the restricted area was such to make balloon barrages 
more dangerous to us in the end. The air people in both services 
were opposed to those two things. 

[238] 104. Q. I show you Exhibit 24, which is in evidence be- 
fore this court and which is the reply of the Secretary of War to 
the Secretary of the Navy on his letter, which you have just in- 
spected. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, have the general infor- 
mation that the Secretary of War sets out in his reply here ? 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I did. 

105. Q. Bet'ween November 27, 1941, and December 7 of the same 
year did you have anything in your department corresponding to an 
interceptor command? 

A. We had an actual operating interceptor command, which was 
put in operation by verbal instructions and was not put in as a defi- 
nite organization with written orders until December 17. I wish to 
explain that rather fully. It was entirely a service in the Army. 
We had prescribed conditions when standing operating procedures, 
and we had sent four officers to school in the States, including Gen- 
eral Davidson, the Commander of the Pursuit Wing, and Colonel 
Powell, who was the Signal Officer of the Department. We wanted 
to get the latest thought from the War Department before we put 
out a definite organization on paper. This had been operating from 
4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily from November 27 to December 7, although 
the actual written order organizing it was not put out until Decem- 
ber 17. We were trying to avoid a lot of changes. We wanted to 
give them a few days to try out what they were doing and get their 
ideas in a positive statement before we put it in printed form. 

106. Q. Do you have any recollection, General, whether there was 
any liaison between this pursuit organization and the Navy? 

A. I think I stated previously that I had requested, in a letter of 
August 5, liaison officers from the Navy to operate the war-craft 
warning service, and on November 24, 1941, Lieutenant Burr, who 
was the liaison officer from the Navy with our G-3 section, had been 
requested to ask liaison officers. I was under the impression they 
were present from November 27 to December 7 from four to seven. 
That is an impression. I did not verify that at any time. 

107. Q. How do you spell Lieutenant Burr's name ? 
A. B-u-r-r. 

108. Q. Do you know his initials? 
A. I do not. 

109. Q. Are you sure he is a naval officer ? 

A. I'm sure he is a naval officer. Admiral Bloch can probably 
give you his initials. 

[239] 110. Q. We have gone into the question previously of 
antiaircraft fire in connection with the defenses of Pearl Harbor, in 
which there was some reference made as to naval units acting or 
cooperating with the Army in that regard. Can you tell us whether 
or not there was any system of ainti-aircraft fire coordination for 
these different units. 

A. The marines anti-aircraft organization, and I believe — I may 
be wrong — there were four naval guns in the vicinity of Pearl Har- 
bor that reported to the Army anti-aircraft commander and took 
positions from him. 

111. Q. Assuming that units of the Pacific Fleet were present in 
Pearl Harbor, is it my understanding that they were to be used as 
anti-aircraft guns, supplementing the fixed defenses ? 

A. They were but not to be under the command of our anti-air- 
craft commander. 

112. Q. I understand that coordination of gun fire between naval 
units and other miits had not been effected. 

A. That is, naval units on board ship. That is correct. They 
selected their own targets. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 185 

113. Q. You have previously stated, General, that the condition of 
alert No. 1 was in effect on the morning of December 7, 1941. Would 
you please state to the court more fully your reasons for ordering 
this condition of alert? 

- A. Alert No. 1, leaving out the question of whether it covered the 
proposition from the point of view of enemy activity, permitted the 
units to go ahead with their routine training. We had, especially 
in the air corps, a very serious training proposition. We had been 
assigned the mission of ferrying B-l7's to the Philippines. We had 
to furnish all the crews. We had only six B-l7's available for train- 
ing crews. If we went into alert No. 2 or 3, all training of air would 
stop, and we would not have had the crews ready to carry out the 
ferrying operations, which the War Department considered very im- 
portant. I had been in conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral 
Bloch from the morning of November 27 for possibly three hours. 
I had been given the information of the movements of the Japanese 
Fleet, and, as I remember, the main movements of the Fleet, outside 
of the home waters, was to the south or to the Philippines and possibly 
the Malay Peninsula. Admiral Kimmel during this conference — the 
conference was primarily for the question of the reenforcement of 
Wake and Midway by Army air squadrons. Naturally, if we reen- 
forced those, we temporarily reduced our own defenses at Honolulu. 
We lost that much air, and we did not have much to spare. We talked 
over the thing from many angles as to the effect of reducing our 
planes and the danger and so forth, and Admiral Kimmel asked Cap- 
tain McMorris, who was his operations officer [^40] or war 
plans, what he considered was the probability of enemy aircraft, and 
he said "none" and there was no disagreement. Nobody in the naval 
staff or no naval officer present raised the point. iVpparently they 
were following the view, with the information we had and the task 
forces that they had out, that the Navy did not definitely believe in 
the probability of an air attack. Also, as I remember the discussion, 
we knew that battleships were going to be brought into Pearl Harbor, 
and from discussions with Admiral Kimmel, I knew he felt if there 
was an air attack, he would get everything in the way of naval ships 
out of Pearl Harbor. In addition to that, the language of the message 
that I had received indicated to me that they were more concerned 
about not alarming the civilian population and not disclosing intent 
and any number of things, which lead me to believe we were not going 
to be attacked at Honolulu. Hostilities may have been considered 
imminent, but there was nothing in the message to indicate that would 
be the form that hostilities would take. As a matter of fact, I have 
read General Martin's testimony before the Roberts' Committee. He 
stated that the attack at Honolulu was a surprise to him, and he con- 
sidered the main threat was at the Philippines. He looked for dis- 
order and sabotage at Honolulu. Apparently, I got the same idea, 
from the messages and the actions of the War Department, that he 
had in mind. There were two other things that would confirm this 
belief of the War Department very fully. On the 5th of December 
a B-24 came in to Honolulu, being sent over the Mandate Islands 
to Manila. It had the mission of photographing Truk and Jaluit. 
It had one 30-caliber machine gun and two 50-caliber machine guns. 
That was all the armament it had. We had machine guns which we 
could have taken and put on it, but we didn't have any adapted to it. 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That ship liad the strictest kind of orders : It must be ready to fight 
when it left Honolulu. You could draw the inference that they 
thought it was perfectly safe up until it reached Honolulu, and the 
hazard of carrying the additional weight of the guns was greater than 
meeting the Japanese attack. General Martin prepared a wire to the 
Chief of the Air Corps, which went over his signature and mine, tell- 
ing them we were holding up that plane until another B-24 came 
along with additional equipment and that we would not let this plane 
go over the Mandate Islands until it was properly equipped and ready 
to fight. On the night of the 6th and 7th of December there were 
twelve B-17's sent from Hamilton Field, California. Six of them left 
at 9 : 30 Pacific Coast Time, which would be 12 : 30 a. m. on the 7th in 
Washington. The other flight of six left at 10 : 30 p. m., which would 
have been 1 : 30 a. m, in Washington. Those planes came into Pearl 
Harbor. They had no ammunition. The guns were all cosmolined. 
They had not [^4^] been boresighted. They had skeleton crews 
consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer, and radioman ; so if 
they had guns in firing condition and ammunition, they could not have 
been manned. As late as 1 : 30 a. m. in the War Department on De- 
cember 7 they did not believe there was any danger of air attack at 
Honolulu, or they never would have been so rash as to send planes 
out in those conditions. Those planes actually came into Honolulu 
just five minutes behind the first wave of Japanese, and the direction 
of approach was just three degrees different. The Japanese came in 
three degrees east and our planes from straight north. The first 
one hit Hickam Field, and the first pilot was killed. Twelve of those 
planes were destroyed without being able to fire a shot. They were not 
equipped. You can only draw one conclusion. Whoever sent them 
out felt that the hazard of carrying the ammunition was greater than 
the hazard of a Japanese attack. In other words, he considered that 
there was no probability of an air attack at Pearl Harbor on the 
morning of December 7 or the planes would not have been started 
from Hamilton Field in that condition, as late as they were. 

114. Q. Can you recall when you put alert No. 1 into effect in the 
Hawaiian Department? 

A. Within thirty minutes after I got the message on November 27. 

115. Q. 1941? 
A. 1941. 

116. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before 
this court and which purports to be a message from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to certain addressees, in which he sets out a message that 
was sent from the Army to the Commander Western Defense Com- 
mand. I am going to ask you to inspect this message and see whether 
or not if it contains, in substance 

A. That was not the message I was speaking of. I got this message 
from Admiral Kimmel — probably personally, but the message I men- 
tioned came from the Chief of Staff to me. 

117. Q. That is not the message ? 

A. That- is not the message. That is the message that came to me 
from Admiral Kimmel. The one I was discussing came from the 
Chief of Staff. 

118. Q. I ask you to refresh your recollection from any notes which 
you have and to identify to this court the message you speak of on 
November 27, 1941 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 187 

A. (Reading.) "Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, 427-2T. 
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated, to all practical pnr^ 
poses, with only the barest possibilities that the [24^\ Japa- 
nese Government might come back and oHer to continne. Japanese 
future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. 
If hostilities cannot be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the 
first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you 
to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to 
hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon- 
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these meas- 
ures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose 
intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will 
carry out the tasks assigned to Rainbow 5, so far as they pertain to 
Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to 
minimum essential officers." 

119. Q. General, will you state the originator of the dispatch which 
was read ^ 

A. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. 

120. Q. To wdiom is it addressed ? 

A. To the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shafter, T. H. 

12 1. Q. Does the dispatch have a number ? 
A. It is radiogram 472. 

122. Q. General, I now show you Exhibit 19, wdiich purports to be 
a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated the 28th of 
November. Have you seen the substance of that dispatch ? 

A. I have seen this. 

123. Do you recall, General, whether or not you communicated the 
fact that you had put into effect alert No. 1 at or about the time you 
stated you did ? 

A. When I sent the message, as delivered to Admiral Kimmel, I'm 
not sure which I did. He was informed, I'm sure, that alert No. 1 
had gone into effect. 

121. Q. Had 3'ou ever had occasion, subsequent to this information 
being given to Admiral Kimmel, to advise him that alert No. 1 was 
still in effect? 

A. We had conferences on December 1 and December 2, and I'm 
sure that we talked over pretty much every phase of what we were 
doing. 

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserves, reporter, 
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, withdrew. 

125. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding then that at those 
conferences you did advise Admiral Kimmel of the condition of alert 
which you had in effect? 

A. I think he knew^ exactly wdiat we were doing at the time. 

[!24'3] 126. Q. Between the time you put the condition of Alert 
No. 1 into effect and the attack on Pearl Harbor at 0755 December 7, 
1941, did you have any reason for changing this condition of Alert 
No. 1 to some other condition of alert? 

A. I did not. I received no further information from the War 
Department — I will change that. I received additional information 
from the War Department that it was off, cautioning me about the 
carrying out of measures in regard to sabotage, and if the War Depart- 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

meiit's message of November 28 and my reply of November 28 are not 
in the record, I would like to put them in. 

The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all 
the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of Admiral 
Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, intertested party, whose counsel were 
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, IT. S. Naval Keserve, 
reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), the witness un- 
der examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a wit- 
ness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued :) 

[^^4] 127. Q. General, I believe you read into the record this 
morning a dispatch which you described as 472, from an officer in the 
War Department. Did you ever make any reply to this dispatch, 
and if you did, will you tell the court what it was ? 

A. That dispatch called for a report of action taken, and in reply 
to it I sent the following dispatch : 

RTJRD 472 report department alerted to prevent sabotage liaison with Navy 
(Signed) Short. 

I want to call attention that the very first thing in this radiogram 
positively identifies it as in answer to 472, because I say, "Re your 
radiogram 472." The reason I am calling your attenion to that is 
that General Gerow, who was in charge of the War Plans Division of 
General Staff, testifying for the Roberts Commission, said he did not 
connect this with the answer to 472. They had called on me for a 
reply, and ten days had gone by and they hadn't called on me, and 
still he didn't identify this as the report of the action taken. They 
knew exactly for ten days what my action vv^as. I told them as 
plainly as I could. I was alerted against sabotage, and during that 
ten days they did not come back and say, "You are doing too much," 
or "You are doing too little;" and naturally I assumed that they 
approved of what I was doing. No reason in the world for them 
not to know what I was doing, because I identified it clearly with the 
other wire ; and I stated before tlie board that it was the business of 
his division to identify it, but that some way they just failed to iden- 
tify it. Now the day after I sent that, on the 27th, I got another 
radiogram from the War Department that I assume was sent more or 
less as an answer to this one of mine, because it was sent the follow- 
ing day, the 28th, and on the same subject. Naturally, I thought 
they were coming back and indicating additional things to me they 
wanted to do. I received a telegram from Adams, the Adjutant 
General, which I will read, as follows (reading) : 

Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter Territory of Hawaii, 482 28 critical 
situation demands that all precautions be taken innnediately against subversive 
activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See 
Paragraph 3 MID, SC, 30-45) Stop Also desire that you initiate forthwith all 
additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments, 
property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against 
subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage Stop. 
This does not repeat not mean any illegal measures are authorized Stop. Pro- 
tective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding un- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 189 

necessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure speed of transmission identical 
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not effect 
your responsibility under existing instructions." (Signed) "Adams." 

You can see when I got that radiogram everything in it was exactly 
what my alert called for. It never occurred to me that they hadn't con- 
sidered my reply when I was alerted for sabotage at the time 
[^45] they were writing this, because everything that they em- 
phasized there I had ordered in my alert and it looked like they were 
thoroughly satisfied with it, but wanted to make out certain other 
points. They wanted to be sure I didn't violate Territory laws and 
get in bad with the Government finally, because they wanted me to 
be sure and commit no illegal acts. In other words, taking this 
message on top of my reply, it didn't indicate that anybody in the 
War Department was excited over an air attack or an attack to make 
a landing, but that they were very much exercised over the sabotage 
and civil disorders, possible uprisings, and didn't want me to alarm 
the public. They didn't want me to do any illegal acts, and they 
wanted me to be sure and carry out everything that was laid down in 
regard to subversive measures. In other words, it w^as just emhasiz- 
ing everything that I had ordered done. Now I sent a reply to that 
on the same day, I think addressed to the Adjutant General. I sent 
a dispatch, which I will read, as follows : 

The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. Re your secret radio 482 28 full 
precautions have been taken against subversive activities within the field of 
investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph 3, MID, SC, 30-45) 
and military establishment including personnel and equipment Stop As regards 
protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power 
plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges this headquarters by confiden- 
tial letter dated June 19, 1941, requested the Governor of the Territory to use 
the broad powers vested in him by section 67 of the Organic Act which pro- 
vides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of Military and 
Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii, to prevent or sui)- 
press lawlessness, invasion, insurrection, etc Stop Pursuant to the authority 
stated the Governor on June 20 made a formal written demand of this head- 
quarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be 
necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawlessness, violence, in connection therewith, 
being committeed against vital installations and structures in the Territory 
Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is 
now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection, at the 
instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June 80, 
1941, enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian 
Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within 
the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such 
action necessary in the interests of national defense Stop. The authority thus 
given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with the FBI and all Federal 
and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and with mutual coopera- 
tion has been given on all pertinent matters. (Signed) Shoet. 

Now I explain the reasons that I made this request on the Governor 
and on the Mayor to take these steps. For two years, off and on, they 
had had sentinels over bridges and electric light plants, water plants, 
everything of that kind. There was always the danger that a senti- 
solutely unprotected, because we had no legal right to have him there. 
For that reason I taken the matter up with the Governor months be- 
fore and got him to make the formal request that we take over this 
guarding, and then the Military would be fully protected if we did 
have to kill somebody. We had roads, especially one, rumiing prac- 
tically over our 16-inch guns, and if the situation got worse we felt 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

like we would have to close some of those roads and streets, and I 
wanted to have the legal authority to do that. I had gotten the 
Mayor of Plonoliilu to pass this ordnance so that I would have the 
authority if I needed it. So I was able immediately to report to the 
War Department that all of the acts I haxl taken were thoroughly 
legal because they had been done at the request of the Governor and 
with the authority of the mayor. Now may I say one more thing? 
You can see how this message from the Adjutant General, following 
the other, just convinced me beyond any question that I had the ap- 
proval of the War Department on my message telling them what I 
was doing, because there wasn't a word in what came to me the next 
day indicating that they had not gotten my message or that there 
was anything that I had directed to be done that they didn't approve 
of, and I had no further instructions or information from the War 
Department from this message on the 28th until seven hours after the 
attack. 

128. Q. General, to emphasize one or two little points, I am going 
to ask you some questions that are very obvious from your answer. 
One of them is, you did not make any report concerning aircraft 
reconnaissance that you were conducting at that time, did you ? 

A. I did not. The long-range reconnaissance, the Chief of Staff 
had approved that in Annex Number 7, where the Navy assumed the 
responsibility for it, and I felt sure that this wasn't intended to abro- 
gate that, and I felt that they should know that it was the Navy's 
responsibility and not mine, and I didn't cover that. 

129. Q. And 3"ou state that the War Department didn't take any 
exception to the action that you had taken in making your report 
to them; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

130. Q. And I understand you to say that in the absence of a reply 
either of approval or disapproving the action that you had taken, 
that you assumed that everything you had done met with their ap- 
proval ? 

A. Especially in view of that message of the 28th, that pertained 
fully to everything that I had ordered. 

131. Q. When, during the year 1941, did political matters between 
the United States and the Japanese Government appear to be ap- 
proaching a critical stage? 

A. -About Jul3% when they put into effect that Act freezing the 
Japanese credits. 

[2i7] 132. Q. Had you been supplied with any estimate of the 
situation as to the effect this order might have on the imminence of 
war between the United States and Japan, and if you did, what was 
it? 

A. I had a wire from the War Department. I don't remember 
the exact phraseology of it, but they were afraid that it might have 
an unfavorable reaction on business interests in Japan and on the 
Japanaese population in Hawaii. 

133. Q. Did you, as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department, have any personal estimate of the imminence of war as a 
result of this Executive Order? 

A. There was a very noticeable uneasiness on the part of the Japa- 
nese population of Hawaii, and I realized that some event might 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 191 

happen to make the thing very serious; but the whole people for a 
few days there were pretty restless. 

134. Q. After the issuance of this Executive Order, when next did 
you receive any information that gave you an opportunity to re- 
estimate the imminence of war between the United States and Japan? 

A. I think the next thing I got of any importance was on October 
16; a message came to me through the Commander of the Fleet. 

135. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 13 which is in evidence before 
this court, and ask you whether or not the information contained in 
this Exhibit, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations 
to certain addressees, dated 16 October 1941, and ask you if this is in 
substance the information you received ^ 

A. That is correct. I received that. 

136. Q. Did you make any estimate of the situation relative to the 
imminence of war between the United States and Japan as a result 
of having received this information, and if you did, what was it? 

A. If you noticed, that message said there was a very strong pos- 
sibility of war between Hussia and Japan, and there was a possibility 
of war between the British and the United States, and Japan. In 
other words, their main emphasis there was war between Russia and 
Japan. That weakened, as far as I was concerned, the probability 
of immediate war between the United States and Japan, because ap- 
[)arently they had considered the strongest possibility was between 
Russia and Japan. 

137. Q. Having this information in your possession, and having 
estimated the situation as you did, did you take any action other 
than that in effect at the time, looking towards alerting or making 
ready the defenses under your command ? 

A. We had tightened up ail our guards against [^-^] sab- 
otage, and measures against subversive measures, things of that kind, 
at the time of the freezing of the Japanese assets, and we had never 
taken oif a great part of those ; and I figured when I got that message 
that we were all right, as far as that message was concerned — and I 
was probably just a little more watchful. 

138. Q. Asking you some specific questions regarding thereto : had 
the condition of alert for the aircraft warning system been changed? 

A. We did not have any stations in operation at that time. 

139. Q. Did you change the location of any guns ? 
A. No, we did not. 

140. Q. Now what was the condition of readiness of guns that you 
had in place at that time, on 16 October 1941 ? 

A. We had guards. We didn't have quite as strong guards, so 
they didn't amount to a skeleton crew, that we had later. 

141. Q. Were there any special orders given as to changing the 
condition of alert, so far as aircraft went? 

A. There was none. 

142. Q. There is a point we Avould like to have cleared up with 
reference to some testimony that is before the court. I draw your 
attention to page 39 of Exhibit 6, which is the Joint Action of Army 
and Navy 1935 — and refer you to page 39, Article d. The sentence 
that I am inquiring about is, "Long-range air reconnaissance will be 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

provided and plans made for the use of the General Headquarters Air 
Force." Would you explain to this court what General Headquarters 
Air Force is? 

A. Well, the General Headquarters Air Force is an air force that, 
in the theater of operations, operates directly under the Headquar- 
ters — like you would say there are certain bombing commands un- 
doubtedly at the present time operating directly under General Eisen- 
hower's orders that are not attached to the armies in France or Italy; 
probably operating out of England and directly on his order. That 
is what we consider G. H. Q. Air Force. 

143. Q. May I ask you, General, what were the plans for the use 
of G. H. Q. Air Force in your Department ? 

A. We had nothing that we called a G. H. Q. Air Force. The area 
there was so limited that every plane operated directly under the 
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. None of it was parceled out 
to anybody, so if you considered anything as G. H. Q. Air Force, it 
would be every plane in the Department. 

144. Q. Was there any provision made for getting planes [^W] 
of the G. H. Q. from the continent to the Hawaiian Department? 

A. We had asked for planes, for increases, and we had not asked 
for them to go into G. H. Q. Air Force. We had asked for a very 
considerable increase and been told that the decision on it wouldn't 
be made until the limit of 59,000 for the Hawaiian Garrison was lifted. 

145. Q. Am I to understand that there may have been some planes 
in the General Headquarters Air Force ? 

A. In this book they may intend, here, to refer to G. H. Q. Air 
Force in the United States. It is really hard to say how they mean 
that. 

146. Q. In other words, from having read that article, you wouldn't 
be able to tell the court whether the G. H. Q. Air Force to which this 
article refers means planes that miglit be available in the Hawaiian 
area or whether they were planes that might be available on the 
continent for being sent to Hawaii ? 

A. I would say this, that with the distance from Hawaii to the 
United States, it would have been impracticable to operate the planes 
in Hawaii that were controlled by G. H. Q. in the United States. The 
distance is so great they couldn't have operated. If they had been 
going to give us reinforcements, they undoubtedly would have been 
given to us outright and not sent to carry out missions and return. 

147. Q. Between 16 October 1941 and 24 November the same year, 
did your estimate of the intentions of the Japanese military toward 
the United States change because of any information you received? 

A. I received nothing to cause me to make a re-estimate from the 
16th of October until the 27th of November. 

148. Q. You said you received nothing? 
A. Nothing. 

149. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is in evidence before this 
court. It is Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November 
1941 — and I will ask you to read it and state whether or not you had 
received from any source information of a similar nature as is con- 
tained in this dispatch. 

A. I do not remember receiving this message at that time. I do 
not think it was received at my headquarters. 



Proceedings of navy court of inquiry 193 

150. Q. Do you recall if, between 24 and 27 November of 1941 you 
had had any request made on you by Naval authorities for the use 
of Army planes, and long-range reconnaissance? 

A. I had not. 

151. Q. And as you say, you had no information upon which to 
make any advice to the Navy during the same period of time? 

A. That's right. 

[£S0] 152. Q. Adverting to dispatch 472, which you read into 
the record this morning, did you make any re-estimate of the situation 
based on the information contained in that dispatch? 

A. I looked over that very carefully and talked the matter over with 
my Chief of Staff, and considered all the things they put in there, be- 
fore I decided to order Alert Number 1. I considered it all fully, and 
considered it in the light of conversations that I had had with Admiral 
Kimmel's Headquarters that morning. 

153. Q. Was the decision that you made based upon this estimate ? 
A. My estimate was that there wasn't a danger of any immediate 

air attack, and that our real dangers were from sabotage, disorders, or 
possible uprising. 

154. Q. I believe you said this morning that you put Alert Number 1 
into effect at that time? 

A. That's correct. 

155. Q. This was one of the decisions you made? 
A. That was the decision I made, 

156. Q. And the only one? 

A. That covered it — and I turned out the aircraft warning service 
from 4 : 00 a. m. to 7 : 00 a. m. 

157. Q. Other than this changing the alert and the putting into 
effect of your aircraft warning system between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 in the 
morning, did you make any changes in your antiaircraft defense of 
Pearl Harbor? 

A. I don't think that they found it necessary to move a single gun. 
We did this : There was a skeleton crew based at all these guns, and 
there were small arms ammunition in the immediate vicinity of the 
guns, the small arms guns — and except for four batteries there of 3- 
inch guns, in all other cases there was ammunition not more than 75 
or at most 100 yards away, and in most cases considerably less than 
that. We didn't bring it out of the casemate, but we had it where it 
was available, I say, in three to five minutes. 

158. Q. And there had been no change in the condition of alert for 
aircraft, either reconnaissance or pursuit? 

A. Except tightening up on the guarding of the aircraft — more 
vigilant than we had been at any time. 

159. Q. Have you any recollection that the Naval authorities re- 
quested you for any assistance in the way of long-range reconnaissance 
after 27"November 1941 ? 

A. They did not. 

160. Q. Can you recall whether or not there had been a discussion 
between you and the appropriate Naval Commanders as to [^Sl] 
the advisabilit}' of establishing a long-range reconnaissance after 27 
November 1941? 

A. We had conferences on the 1st and 2nd and 3rd of December. 
While it was primarily in reference to the relief of the Marine garri- 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1^ 14 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sons at Wake and Midway and Canton, by the Army, it just naturally 
drifted into every phase of it, you might say — of the defense of Hono- 
lulu, These were long conferences, two or three hours on the 1st and 
3rd, and a shorter time on the 2nd, 

161. Q. Did I understand from your previous testimony, General, 
that you testified that the primary responsibility for the defense of 
Oahu lay in the Army ? 

A, Supported by the Navy. 

162. Q, Can you recall from plans, orders, or agreements what the 
responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, was in the 
matter of defense of Pearl Harbor? 

A. I'd say in the beginning, the distant reconnaissance, to get the 
information. The question of meeting the enemy at sea, if they at- 
tempted to land, would come under the Fleet Commander rather than 
the 14th District. I think that, as I remember, the 14th District would 
have had the function of employing anything that was strictly ashore, 
like their anti-aircraft guns that they probably operated, and instru- 
ments of that kind ; but Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel could tell 
you much more definitely than I could about that. Of course, we had 
harbor control posts, things of that kind, working with the 14th Dis- 
trict. 

(NOTE: Question No. 163 and the answer thereto, numbered Page 
251-A, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record 
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken 
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the 
war, ) 

164. Q. I will ask you. General Short, if you can read into the record 
the dispatch you received on 7 December ? 

A. (Reading:) 

To Hawaiian Department Foi't Shafter Territory of Hawaii 529 7 Japanese are 
presenting at one pm Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum 
also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just 
what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accord- 
ingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication Marshall. 

That message was filed at 12 : 18 p, m., the 7th, in Washington, signed 
by General Marshall, 6 : 48 Honolulu time. It was sent by the RCA. 
It was not sent by the War Department Radio. Apparently the War 
Department Radio was fading out that morning, I know it was true, 
Wc were having difficulty getting in connection with Washington 
from Hawaii that morn \j25'3] ing; and it was sent by RCA. 
It arrived in the RCA, Honolulu, at 7 : 33. It w^as delivered to the Sig- 
nal Officer at 11 : 45 a. m. Now I don't know the reason for the delay, 
but in all probability the messenger may have got caught in the attack 
and gone back and waited until the attack was over, which was about 
11 : 45 it was delivered. It was decoded by the Signal Officer and de- 
livered to the Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department at 2 : 58 
p. m. That was the first information we had of it. No, it wasn't the 
first information we had, because sometime between 8 : 30 and 9 : 00, 1 
told my Chief of Staff to call General Marshall and inform him that 
we were being attacked. When General Marshall was informed that 
we were being attacked, the first thing he said was, "Did you get my 
message?" Colonel Phillips called him over the scrambler telephone. 
The Chief of Staff replied, "We have had no message from Washington 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 195 

this morning." Then this came in later in the afternoon ; and then, on 
the 9th, we got a message — I don't know whether it was signed by Mar- 
shall or by the Adjutant General, requesting us to state the exact time 
this message was received in Honolulu, when it was delivered to the Sig- 
ual Officer, when they finished decoding, and when it was delivered, and 
to what Staff officer at Department Headquarters. That is the history 
of the message. Now if that message had been put through by scram- 
bler phone, like my Chief of Staff called the Chief of Staff to report the 
attack, nine chances out of ten it would have been received by me ten or 
fifteen minutes after he wrote it, without any loss of time for in-coding, 
transmission, and decoding. Now in all probability we would have had 
two hours, which would have been plenty of time to warm up planes, 
disperse the pursuit planes, send the bombing planes to the other is- 
land, and have every man at his post. We could have been ready for 
practically anything. If they had, it would have come through in 
plenty of time; and I felt like that Washington considered that there 
was a direct probability of an air attack, and we had a right to expect 
the shortest possible time in notification. General Marshall was asked 
before the Roberts Board why he did not use the scrambler phone, and 
he replied that he wasn't sure of the secrecy, that there was some doubt 
as to just how secret the phone is, that it had to cross the Pacific and 
might have been intercepted ; and if he had been going to phone it, he 
would have phoned it to Manila first, because that was where he con- 
sidered the greatest threat. That is in the General's testimony before 
the Roberts Commission. You will have it in Volume I of the Roberts 
Report. 

165. Q. The point I would like to have you make clear to the board 
is this, General, at exactly what time did this message that you speak 
of as coming from General Marshall first arrive in the hands of any- 
body connected with your Command ? 

A. 11 : 45 a. m., it got to the Signal Officer, but had not been decoded. 

[253] Examined by the court : 

Ififi. Q. Honolulu time? 

A. Honolulu time. 

Examination b}^ the jiidge advocate (Continued) : 

167. Q. Now there is evidence before this court in considerable quan- 
tity, and you have given some yourself, that there was actually an 
attack made by tlie Japanese on Pearl Harbor at about 0755 on Decem- 
ber 7, 1941. When were you first informed of this attack? 

A. When the first bomb exploded, I heard it. My first thought was 
that the Navy was having some exercises that I had forgotten about. 
Then another one exploded in a minute or two, and I ran out my back 
door, which gave me a view of Pearl Harbor, and I could see the smoke, 
and things didn't look right. Just at that time, I think, my Chief of 
Staff, who lived next to me, ran over and called and said, "It's the real 
thing. I have just had word from Wheeler Field and Hickam Field 
that we are being attacked." 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class. U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, reporter, with- 
(b^ew. 

[^S4-] Q. At the time of this attack, I believe you have previ- 
ously testified that the condition of alert was No. 1. Is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

169. Q. You have recited in a few words some of the things that 
happened when the Japanese attacked. Will you state in general also 
what the Hawaiian Department did to repel the attack immediately 
after 0755? 

A. As soon as this report was made to me I immediately said, "Go 
into Alert No. 3", which is an all-out defense. In other words, since 
we had been surprised by an air attack, I felt that we might even be 
surprised by an attempted landing and I ordered Alert No, 3 rather 
than No. 2. The minute the attack struck, all of the anti-aircraft, 
on their own, replied to the enemy fire and we brought down planes 
as early as 8 : 05 and there was one lirought down at Fort Kamehameha 
that might have been brought down a little sooner than that. And 
at 8 : 15 a plane had been brought down at Schofield. As soon as the 
alert struck, most of the pursuit pilots — they were sleeping in their 
quarters at Wheeler Field and their planes were 7 miles north at 
Haleiwa, that is, one squadron — jumped in their car and raced to 
Haleiwa as soon as they could, and when they got there the officer who 
was in charge there, and the men, were arming the planes with ammu- 
nition, and that squadron, I think practically all from that squadron — 
there may have been a few planes able to take off from Wheeler Field, 
Fm not positive, but most of those were involved in burning and ex- 
plosions on the runways and I am inclined to believe that the first 
group of planes all were from Haleiwa, and they brought down 10 
enemy planes. The anti-aircraft continued to fire as targets offered 
themselves, and they brought down somewhere between 19 and 28. 
G-2 figured that there were not less than 29 verified planes, and possi- 
bly 38, with some duplications that we couldn't be sure about. Shall 
I go ahead with what happened to the enemy ? 

170. Q. I think that w^ll give us a general idea. 

A. I might show the wdiole picture. The infantry divisions im- 
mediately fell in by 8 : 10. In the 21:th Division they had engaged 
enemy planes by small arms fire. At 8 : 30 they were moving into bat- 
tle positions. The same way with the 25th Division. All the anti- 
aircraft got their 3-inch ammunition immediately. There were 4 bat- 
teries that didn't have ammunition at hand. The first one started 
throwing its ammunition at 8 : 15 and they had all finished by 10 : 00 
a. m. In the infantry divisions, one of them was in battle position 
complete at 4 : 00 o'clock and the other at 5 : 00 o'clock with one day 
of fire. The second day of fire was gone that night. The department 
headquarters, we had an advanced command post in the crater and we 
started moving there and I think [-^od] w^e opened that com- 
mand post perhaps along about 8 : 35, and I left the Chief of Staff 
and the Supply at headquarters and I went there with the G-2 and 
G-3 sections. 

171. Q. You mentioned your first intimation of an attack around 
0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941 as being an explosion that 
you heard. 

A. That is right. 

172. Q. Had you had any information of any other enemy activity 
in the Hawaiian area shortl}^ before this time? 

A. I had not. 

173. Q. You had no information on a submarine being present in 
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 197 

A. I heard about that hiter, but I think it was the next day. It 
could possibly have been that afternoon but I did not know at the 
time. Also, later that afternoon, as I said before, we got a submarme 
off of Bellows Field. We got a rope around it and towed it m. 

1T4. Q. General, I am going to show you Exhibit No. 20, which is m 
evidence before this court. It is a naval dispatch from the Chief of 
Naval Operations to certain addressees, among them being the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and has to do with information 
that had been received concerning the destruction of Japanese diplo- 
matic and consular codes in certain areas. Will you read the dispatch 
to yourself and then state to the court whether or not you had that in- 
formation prior to 7 December, 1941 ? 
- A. I am quite sure that I did not. 

17.5. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a naval dispatch from the 
Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Station, Guam, with infor- 
mation copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and others. 
The subject matter of the dispatch directs the Naval Station, Guam, 
to destroy secret and confidential publications. I show^ you this dis- 
patch and ask you to read it and then tell the court whether or not 
you had been informed of the general subject matter contained therein 
prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I don't think I had. 

17G. Q. I show^ you Exhibit 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet as the action addressee, dated 6 December 1941. This 
dispatch directs certain outlying Pacific Islands to destroy seci^t and 
confidential matters in their possession. I ask you to read this dispatch 
and to state to the court whether or not the general subject matter con- 
tained in this dispatch had been communicated to you prior to 7 De- 
cember 1941 ? 

A. I make the same reply ; I'm (juite sure that I had not seen it. 

['256] 177. Q. I will ask you, do you recall any conversations 
with naval authorities in Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, as to any 
matters relating to the destruction of codes and ciphers by the Japanese 
anywhere? 

A. I knew on December 6th that the Japanese Consul had been 
burning papers. I don't know whether I had them identified as codes, 
or just papers, but I remember that a contact officer made some report. 
That, I think came from the FBI, probably. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy : 

178. Q. General, with two hours advance notice on Sunday morn- 
ing, couldn't the Department have been fully ready by the time of the 
attack if you had immediately ordered the full alert ? 

A. We could have been completely ready for an air attack. The 
infantry divisions would not have been on their battle positions com- 
plete if we had ordered them to their battle positions for an all-out 
attack. 

179. Q. General, would you have made a very quick reestimate of 
the situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scram- 
bled telephone conversation with General Marshall? 

A. I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in 
there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

wouldn't have made an impression on me. But when you destroy your 
codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I 
would have had this advantage also : I could have asked him the sig- 
nificance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have 
been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have 
been very significant to me. I would have been very much more 
alarmed about that than the other matter. 

180. Q. Had you received in the two or three days prior to 7 De- 
cember any information from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
to the effect that the Japanese had been detected in destroying codes, 
ciphers, and so forth? 

A. I had not. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Real Admiral Husband E'. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : 

181. Q. Over all, how many troops did you have. General Short, on 
T December 1941 ? 

A. About 57,000. 

[^67] 182. Q. What was your estimate of minimum require- 
ments at that time ? 

A. I had asked for the Hawaiian Garrison to be raised to 71,500, 
and told them at the same time that I would put in a later estimate 
for troops for the outlying islands which would have been in addition 
to the 71,500. 

183. Q. Between November 27 and December 7, the opposite mem- 
bers of the Army and Navy in charge of the aircraft, exchanged daily 
information as to the number of planes that each service had available 
for service that day, did they not ? 

A. I'm quite sure they did. They were supposed to do that con- 
stantly, and I think they did. 

184. Q. Did you show Admiral Kimmel the message that you re- 
ceived from the Adjutant General, on the 28th of November? 

A. I did on the 27th, and I am inclined to think that I gave him 
copies on the 28th. It is possible I didn't but I think I did. 

185. Q. You told Admiral Hart what you would have done if you 
had received the scrambled telephone message at the time that the 
dispatch was filed in Washington. That was 12 : 18 Washington time. 

A. I figured that in place of filing it then — you see that allowed 
time for decoding, which would have been an hour, and I would have 
probably had it an hour ahead of that. 

186. Q. What you have told Admiral Hart as to what you would 
have done if you had had the message at 11 : 18 Washington time, 
would have been made more certain and more sure had you received 
the information at 9 : 30 Washington time ? 

A. Very much surer. 

187. Q. Could you have done any more had you received that in- 
formation at 9 : 30 Washington time? 

A. The preparations would probably have been a little more com- 
plete, although I think in two hours, our planes would not have reached 
the outlying islands but they would have been on their way and the 
additional time would have been valuable, I mean our bombers, be- 
cause our plan was to send them to the outlying islands. 

188. Q. You told the judge advocate that you did not recall seeing 
the message received by Admiral Kimmel from the Chief of Naval 
Operations dated the 24th of November ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 199 

A. 1 (lid not. I iiiiolit have received it but I don't recall it. 

1S<). Q. Well, what you mean is that you have no positive memory 
one way or the other about it ? 

A. AVell, I think I would have remembered it if I had received it, 
because I remember other messages there without any ({uestion. 

I'J'hS] VM). Q. ])o you recall your testimony l)cfore the I\oberts 
Commission, about seein<;' this messaire of 24: November? 

A. I don't remember exactly what I said. I probal)ly said the same 
thing, that I didn't know positively, because 1 don't remember. Of 
course, my memory might have been better then than now. That was 
much closer to the time. 

191. Q. Would it refresh your memory as to the possible receipt of 
learning al)0ut the message of November 24th, General Short, to know 
that Lieutenant C'onnnander Layton, intelligence ollicei- to Admiral 
Kinunel, reported to him that a copy of this had been delivered to you 
at 1-2 : 20 on November 24:th? 

A. Did he state that it had been delivered to me personally ? 

\U'2. Q. Delivered to General Short. 

A. Personally? 

lt);j. Q. I will show you the report. 

A. If he said he gave it to me personally, he probably did, but I 
do not remember the message. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ket) : " 

104. Q.' General, this morning you spoke of a procedure that you 
had develo]:)ed in connection with the interceptor conunand Init which 
had not been officially promulgated. 

A. That is correct. 

105. Q. That document was in draft form and in the hands of your 
people ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

190. Q. It bore the date of api)roximately 5 Noveml)er, and do you 
recall it stating that the interceptor command will coordiiuite and con- 
trol the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft aitillery, includ- 
ing available naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, the air- 
craft warning service and attached units, and will ]irovide for the 
cordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military con- 
trol ? I am just asking you about the document. 

A. Yes, that's about right. 

lOT. Q. Now, if you will remember, in that same document under 
Section 15 (i) of this same standard operating pi'ocedure, did that 
{)rovide that the Department signal officer will (1) insure occupation 
of all battle stations by the aircraft warning service and then release 
it to the interceptor comnuuid, and then (2) insure that joint Army- 
Navy communications are in immediate readiness for such employ- 
ment ? Do you recall such a ])assage of the document ? 

A. I think I do, yes. 

\'S59] 108. Q. Now, even thougli (hat procedure in the document 

was not ollicially ])i'omulgated, is it not the fact that the procedure 
was in elfect fi'om perhaps Noveml)er 27 on, as indicated therein? 

A. I am sure it was. 

100. Q. That is how it was operating at the time, even though tlio 
paper w^asn't released ? 

A. That's right; I'm siu-e that it was. 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

200. Q. Very good. Now, I have something I want to get 
straightened out and perhaps you can help me with it. This Exhibit 
6, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 : Am I not correct in 
saying that this document represents Army-wide and Na'vy-wide 
general policy ? 

A. That is correct. 

201. Q. It does not relate to a specific place? 
A. That is correct. 

202. Q. It represents general policy and agreement? 
A. That's right. 

203. Q. Now, in connection with JCD, General, being Exhibit 7: 
Is it not the fact that all pertinent provisions of policy that were in 
the joint action, this document, were picked up and incorporated in 
this document? 

A. They should be. 

204. Q. You have no doubt tliat the pertinent ones were; I mean, 
there is no question on that? 

A. No. 

205. Q. So that JCD, this document, really is, to all the extent that 
we need concern ourselves with, the document that bears upon the 
Hawaiian Islands? 

A. That is right. 

206. Q. And we need not concern ourselves with this because Ex- 
hibit 7 is the one that contains what goes on in the Hawaiian Islands? 

A. That is right. 

207. Q. Now, attached to this JCD were certain appendices that 
you have referred to, joint air defense, appendices 1 up to 7, that were 
made a very part of JCD-42? 

A. Yes. 

208. Q. And those documents and this document represent a plan; 
is that right? 

A. Yes. 

209. Q. That plan, while the language used here has been that it 
was not effective, by that we would understand that it was not in 
execution, nor was it in operation. Am \'3(J0] I correct in 
that? 

A. The plan? 

210. Q. The plan. 

A. It was in effect but not in operation. 

211. Q. That is right. Tliis JCD, in turn, was predicated upon the 
Rainbow War Plans; is that not correct? 

A. That is right. 

212. Q. In JCD on Page 8, Paragraph (C) (2), it provides that 
JCD will go into execution upon the execution of the War Plans, 
being the Rainbow Plans; is that riffht? 

A. Yes. 

213. Q. Or the establishment of M-day? 
A. Yes. 

214. Q. So the things you were describing, sir, this morning, that 
you did, were, so to speak^ in anticipation in training, in getting ready 
for the actual execution of this plan? 

A. That is correct. 

215. Q. And so it was with the Navy? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 201 

A. Tliat is correct. 

21G. Q. They, too, were taking anticipatory drill and training 
methods so that all of you might put this into effect when it came 
into elt'ect as provided by Paragraph (2) ; is that correct? 

A. That's right. 

217. Q. Now, that plan and the appendices, which include the air 
measures, actually was in execution during the drill periods; is that 
right? 

A. When we were having exercises, maneuvers, yes. 

218. Q. AVIien you were having exercises and drill plans, that plan 
and all appendices were in effect during that drill period? 

A. That is correct. 

219. Q. At the closing of the drill period, then the plan went back 
to its unexecuted status again ? 

A. That is correct. 

220. Q. I would just like to clear up one other thing. General. 1 
recall that you mentioned about a liaison officer in connection with tl^e 
air raid warning service. 

A. That is correct. 

221. Q. And you mentioned something about the 5th of August? 
A. Yes. 

[261] 222. Q. Now, am I correct in this : That on August 5th 
you wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel which had a heading on it, 
"Aircraft Warning Service", or some such as this, and in it — and I 
quote what portions of it that I have — that the aircraft warning fa- 
cilities, in connection with those, ''Small scale operations are expected 
in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original set-up the AWS 
has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, how- 
ever, are not expected to materialize for some months". And then you 
went on to a further paragraph, "It seems greatly to the interests of 
both services to have a naval officer as a contact or liaison officer be- 
tween Army and Navy AWS activities. Accordingly, your assistance 
would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer 
from your headquarters be detailed to serve as a liaison between your 
headquarters and mine."' Do you remember that? 

A. Yes. 

223. Q. That is the letter you were speaking of this morning? 
A. Yes. 

224. Q. Then in answer to that, do you recall receiving from Ad- 
miral Kimmel on August 16th, a reply to that in which he says that, 
"In re])Iy to your suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison 
with your headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander 
Morris D. Curtis, I". S. Navy, connnunications officer on my staff, 
has been assigned to that duty." Do you recall that reply? 

A. Yes. I am doubtful whether he understood, whether he intended 
from that letter that Curts was to act as liaison in the play of the game 
with the aircraft warning service. 

225. Q. General, the liaison officer that you were talking about in 
respect of August 5th. in fact, was appointed by Admiral Kimmel 
August 16th, from that point on. Right ? 

A. A liaison officer was appointed. 

226. Q. No, but I mean, the very one that you are speaking of, sir. 
A. I do not know personally whether Commander Curts functioned 

in that capacity, or not. 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

227. Q. Then we will let tlie letters speak for tliemselves, as far as 
you know ? 

A. I have had the feeling that he intended for a general liaison, 
rather than for a liaison officer with the aircraft warning service, 

228. Q. General, sir, in connection with that liaison: In addition 
to whatever may have been the matter of Lieutenant Commander 
Curts, there did come a time subsequent to the 15 men going out with 
the Fleet, that you [362] wished assistance in connection with 
radar, and there was made available to you by Admiral Kimmel, an 
expert in those matters ? 

A. Commander Taylor. 

229. Q. Even previous to him, there was a Commander Hitchcock, 
was there not? 

A. I don't remember him. I remember Taylor. 

230. Q. And those, at least so far as you recall — Commander Tay- 
lar was made available to your people, worked with them in conenc- 
tion with giving them all the experience that the Navy had with 
these matters? 

A. That is right. 

231. Q. And worked with you, for example, clear through this 
period that w^e are talking about ? 

A. That is correct. May I make a statement here ? When I wrote 
the letter, what I had in mind was a liaison officer as provided in 
Paragraph 6 of Section 3, Communications, Appendix No. 7. Now, 
I would like to read what it says. This is in regard to the coastal 
frontier defense plan. "Upon establishment of the aircraft warn- 
ing service, provision will be made for transmission of information 
on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire 
or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison 
officers so that they may make their own evaluation of available in- 
formation and transmit them to their respective organizations. In- 
formation relating to the presence or movement of hostile aircraft 
offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be 
transmitted without delay to the aircraft warning service informa- 
tion center." What I had in mind in writing that letter was a naval 
officer that would sit right there in the interceptor command and 
comply with that paragraph, tell the Navy where targets were, and 
if they had information, tell the interceptor command of the infor- 
mation they had. 

232. Q. On that, sir, during the drills conducted under these docu- 
ments, theer was such a liaison officer there during the drills; is that 
not right? 

A. I frankly don't know because unfortunately I didn't get over to 
the station between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 in the morning. I was there sev- 
eral times in that period other times of the day when they were 
going ahead with their training but the liaison officer, the period 
they were formally workinir was 4 : 00 to 7 : 00, and I thought that 
there was a liaison officer from the Navy working with them all the 
time and I can't say definitely there was because I didn't go through 
at that time. 

233. Q. Now, the time that Ave were speaking about, sir, in connec- 
tion with this paragraph, this that you have [£SS] referred 
to calls for there being a liaison officer, or at least it can be inter- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 203 

preted that way, upon establishment of the aircraft warning service. 
A. That is right. 

234. Q. I take it you issued no orders that the aircraft warning 
service had been established? 

A. There were only verbal instructions, but no formal, written 
orders the 7th day of December, but it was operating. 

235. Q. It was somewhat of a training device? 

A. Well, yes. It was really both. It was training and getting 
information, and as I remember, about the 24th of November we 
asked Lieutenant Burr to take up informally again about getting 
liaison officers to work with the aircraft warning service. Now as 
I say, I don't know whether that request was complied with, or not. 

236. Q. As you recall that, that would be something over and 
above Lieutenant Commander Curts, and Taylor ? 

A. Oh, Yes, that would be definitely under the provisions of this 
Paragraph 6, Section 3, Comnuniications, Appendix No. 7. 

237. Q. On this same thing in connection with this communication 
facility. General, was your aircraft warning service fully equipped 
on December 7th with all parts ? 

A. There were 6 mobile stations which were equipped. 

238. Q. And your switchboards were all fully manned ? 

A. Yes, everything as far as the mobile stations were concerned, 
and we had our control room operating from November 27th, just 
like it operated later ; only it wasn't being done by a written order. 

239. Q. Only just for those few hours? 

A. From 4 : 00 to 7 : 00. Well, I think it was actually operated but 
they went ahead and trained, did more or less as they wanted to — I 
mean the different commanders — from 7 : 00 to 11 : 00, and from 1 : 00 
to 4:00. 

Examined by the court : - 

240. Q. General, were you familiar with the State Department 
note of November 26th to Japan ? 

A. I may have read it in that State Department paper that came 
out a year or so after the attack. I am sure I never saw it before. 

241. Q. Up to December 7th you had no intimation of its existence ? 
A. No. That was true of most of the stuff that was in that State 

Department paper. I read it all carefully but most of it was new to 
me. 

[264-^ 242. Q. General, were you influenced in any way, or per- 
haps deterred in assuming Alert No. 3, by the War Department's in- 
junction not to alarm the populace by unusual activity? 

A. Alert No. 2, or No. 3 either one would have had us carrying 
live ammunition out; I mean, large 3-inch ammunition right in the 
middle of the city, and would undoubtedly have caused some alarm 
with the strained relations we had. That entered into the thing 
because I had been cautioned not to alarm the public. 

243. Q. You mean, then, the War Department's warning to you 
did affect your decision ? 

A. It did, unquestionably. 

244. Q. Then General, if you had received the dispatch which you 
did not receive until 2 : 58 — had you received it earlier that morning, 
would you then have been influenced by this War Department in- 
junction ? 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, I would not have been because I would have taken the 
destruction of the code machines very seriously. 

245. Q. You would have thought that over very seriously ? 
A. I would have taken it very seriously. 

246. Q. General, do we understand that at frequent intervals dur- 
ing this period from 27 November to 7 December, you had telephonic 
communication with officials in the War Department? 

A. I did not. 

247. Q. You did not ? 
A. No. 

248. Q. You had no 'phone communication with them? 

A. I don't think I talked to them by 'phone a single time. The 
communication system was there but we weren't using it. 

249. Q. Nor was your Chief of Staff using it? 

A. No. We just used that scrambler 'phoije on very important 
things where we wanted to talk to the Chief of Staff himself and be 
sure we got his slant. I hardly ever used it any other way. 

250. Q. General, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, did 
you have information, intimation, or even a suspicion from any source, 
officially or otherwise, that Japan's known preparations in the Western 
Pacific might indicate a hostile movement elsewhere than toward the 
Malay Peninsula ? 

A. As to the information of movement of enemy vessels, all I got 
from Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, as I remember, the only thing 
was that they were in home ports, or a considerable number had moved 
to the south, and mentioned several places to the south and southwest. 

[265] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke- 
serve, reported, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

251. Q. Nothing indicated there were vessels east of Guam, for 
instance ? 

A. Nothing. 

252. Q. General, what is your estimate of the time interval between 
the first bomb that was hurled by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and 
the total manning of the anti-aircraft guns at Oahu? 

A. I think, except for four batteries which had 3-inch guns and had 
to draw their ammunition from the munition depot, that they were all 
ready to open fire at 8 : 15. That does not mean they opened fire. I 
think they were all ready except four batteries which did not have 
ammunition. 

253. Q. What were the considerations governing your order to limit 
radar operations from four to seven on the morning of December 7? 

A. Our study indicated that any enemy that was going to make an 
attack had the best chance of making the attack and getting away if 
he made it either at dawn or at dusk. It finally got around to the 
point that the most advantageous time would be dawn. We felt that 
by working two hours before dawn and one hour after dawn we would 
cover the most dangerous part of the day and also give our men prac- 
tice in the part of the day where they would have to be most careful 
if we had hostilities. 

254. Q. In that connection if the range of your radar was not much 
more than a hundred miles — You stated it was about seventy-five? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 205 

A. That's what yon count on. We actually got 132. 

255. Q. Wasn't 7 : 30 a. m. a little early to secure the radar? 

A. 7 : (JO a. m. was an hour after daylight. Daylight was just about 
C o'clock. 

250. Q. You have testified, General, that your radar actually picked 
up planes at a distance of about 132 miles. 

A. That is correct. 

257. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, had you known that 
there were enemy planes about to attack Oahu, immediately when this 
contact was made and with the means available to you, could you have 
repelled the attack which actually took place and prevented the re- 
sulting damage done to Army and Navy personnel ? 

A. We would not have had time to get our planes in [266] 
the air. We would have had time to disperse their planes. You 
could have gotten the planes dispersed, and we would have suffered 
less loss of planes. I don't think we could possibly have prevented 
that attack by torpedo planes on the battleships. 

258. Q. If you had had that information from the War Depart- 
ment, say, two hours sooner, would it have enable you to repel the 
attack which actually took place with the means available to you 
and prevented the resulting damage? 

A. It is awfully difficult to say about that. We could undoubtedly 
have gotten part of them, but I doubt very much whether we could . 
have prevented their making the attack against the battleships, and 
even if the anti-aircraft had been ready to fire, they came in so low, 
the 3-inch guns couldn't have fired on them, and the anchor chains 
were fast. 

259. Q. Is it not a historical fact that practically every aircraft 
attack launched in this war has been partially driven in? 

A. I think it can always be driven in. We would have knocked 
down more of their planes if we had everything we had in the air. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy (Continued) : 

260. Q. General, I shall read to you from a dispatch which is 
Exhibit 20 before this court: (Reading) "Highly reliable information 
has been received, and categoric and urgent instructions were sent 
yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at, among other 
places, Manila and Washington.'' That is a dispatch dated Decem- 
ber 3, sent from the Navy Department to various addressees. Re- 
ferring to your testimony in response to my previous questions, if you 
had been informed of that dispatch soon after it was sent, in what 
way would that have changed your dispositions and actions? 

A. I'm not sure, because if you look at that dispatch again, it points 
down toward the Malays and that section of the world where all this 
action was taking place, and taken in conjunction with the informa- 
tion I had from the Navy as to the Japanese Fleet, it might have con- 
curred with my idea that that was where the action would be. 

201. Q. General, insofar as Washington is concerned, that dispatch 
gave the same information which you might have received from Gen- 
eral Marshall by telephone on the morning of December 7 ? 

A. Oh, no. He said there had been an ultimatum delivered and 
ordered codes destroyed. 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[267] Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret.), (Continued) : 

262. Q. General, you had a special communication by telephone with 
the War Department? 

A. I had one in my office and they had one. 

263. Q. It was not commercial ? 

A. It was partially scrambled. It was partially scrambled in Hon- 
olulu and partially scrambled in San Francisco, but it was a me- 
chanical device. You got all your connections, and they said, "Pull 
up your plug." It was a commercial phone. 

264. Q. It was on an Army circuit? 

A. Yes, but whether the commercial telephone people could have 
done anything to it, if they wanted to, I don't know. 

265. Q. All six of the mobile radar were operating on December 7 ? 
A. I think they were. 

266. Q. Now, do you know in what direction the planes which were 
ultimately determined to be Japanese were detected on this radar at 
7 : 15 or thereabouts ? 

A. Three degrees east of north, about 132 miles out. 

267. Q. Do you know whether that radar detected the approach 
of the Army bombers ? 

A. I don't know, because the Army bombers came in five minutes 
later. 

268. Q. You knew the course in which the Army bombers were due 
to come? 

A. They were to come in from the north. There were only three 
degrees difference. 

269. Q. The people who were operating the radar knew about the 
approach of the Army bombers ? 

A. No, they didn't. The officer in the Control Office in the In- 
terceptor Command did, but the sergeant who was working the station 
did not know that any planes were coming in. 

270. Q. But the officer did? 

A. The officer in the Control Station did. 

Cross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. 
Bloch,U. S. Navy (Ret^) (Continued) : 

[268'] 271. Q. Admiral, you stated that in your opinion it was 
the responsibility of Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel to go to 
sea and to do distance reconnaissance. You, of course, are expressing 
only an opinion. You do not know what the fact was? 

A. I do not know exactly the division of labor between them. 
What led me to say that, there had been talk about assignment of 
planes, so if the Fleet went out, we would still have something for 
distance reconnaissance. If the Fleet went out, the 14th Naval 
District Commander would have full responsibility. 

272. Q. During all this period you are talking about, the Fleet 
Commander was there? 

A. Yes. I frankly don't know the division between the two of 
them, only I have the feeling, through my liaison with Admiral 
Bloch 

273. Q. Sometimes with Admiral Kimmel alone? 

A. Sometimes and sometimes he came to my headquarters and dis- 
cussed things. A great many times Admiral Bloch was in on it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 207 

Examined by the court : 

274. Q. General, in making your estimates and studies and in your 
several discussions with your staff and others regarding the probable 
war with Japan, as we understood it, you finally decided that sabo- 
tage would be given priority ? 

A. With the information we had then. 

275. Q. And you and your staff were in agreement on that? 

A. We were. I know my G-2 and my Chief of Staff agreed. I 
didn't talk over the details with anybody but them. 

276. Q. You did discuss this on the 27th with the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific? 

A. We had discussed the probability of air attacks that morning, 
and we got that wire in the afternoon, and I sent him a copy of it, 
and I am c^uite sure — I don't believe I took that copy to him, but 
I am sure he was informed. 

276. Q. Following December 7 there was in the papers — and I 
understood there was some reference to it in the Roberts Report — a 
reference to over-indulgence in alcoholic liquors on the part of the 
naval and armed forces in the Hawaiian Islands. Can you en- 
lighten us on that in any way from your knowledge of conditions? 

A. You mean on that particular night? 

[269] 277. Q. Yes, the night of December 6 and 7th? 

A. I couldn't say anything about the Navy on that night, because 
I went to Schofield Barracks about 7 o'clock and came back about 10 
and wasn't down in that part of the city. I can say definitely that 
at Schofield Barracks, where our two infantry divisions were sta- 
tioned and a big majority of the officers were present at a party given 
for Army relief purposes, where they had a cabaret, there was no 
drinking in excess. I imagine that various people had dinner par- 
ties, and probably most of them had a cocktail or two before dinner, 
but I saw no one who had too much to drink. I didn't see any Navy, 
except a few naval officers who happened to be at the Army post 
that night. 

278. Q. Were the effects of possible over-indulgence evident on 
the morning of December 7 ? 

A. They were not. I don't believe I saw more than two officers 
under the influence of drink during the whole time I was in Hawaii. 
Re-examined by the judge advocate: 

279. Q. You have testified that the aircraft warning by means of 
its radar picked up some planes at a distance of 132 miles from the 
station at Pearl Harbor in a northerly direction. Is that substan- 
tially correct? 

A. Three degrees east of north. 

280. Q. Was there any way that this radar station had of identi- 
fying those planes as friendly or enemy ? 

A. There isn't any possibility. 

281. Q. Unless there had lieon some means of knowing what friendly 
planes were around, it would then be, I understand, impossible to 
tell whether planes picked up at this time by radar method could be 
identified as friendly or enemy ? 

A. And when you are expecting friendly planes on a direction just 
three degrees difference, I don't believe anyone would dare say 
definitely they were enemy planes. 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

282. Q. Do you know whether any track was made of these incom- 
ing' planes by the operator who detected them? 

A. They were followed until they were a few miles north of 
Oaliu, and apparently they turned east, so that they were out of 
the range between the station and the planes. 

283. Q. Technically, in making this track you speak of, is the 
actual path of the planes indicated in any manner graphically for the 
record ? 

A. I have forgotten. I have watched them operate, but I think 
they should record. 

[^70] 284. Q. Do you remember whether any track was made • 
of these enemy planes when they departed from the attack on the 
morning of December 7, 1941? 

A. It would simply indicate that a bunch of them, some little dis- 
tance down in the southwest, seemed to disappear. It indicated they 
had been aboard a carrier. 

285. Q. To save the time of the court, do you or do you not feel that 
you can give us any testimony with regard to this track of planes as 
they retired? 

A. My information is not definite on that. 
Examined by the court : 

286. Q. In that connection, did you receive prior information re- 
garding the sending of planes from Hamilton Field to Oahu? 

A. Oh, yes, we knew they were coming in. 

Neither the judge advocate, the interested parties, nor the court 
desired further to examine this witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ- 
ous questioning. 

The witness said that he had nothing further to state. 

The court inquired of the interested party, Major General Walter C. 
Short, U. S. Army (Ret), whether he desired to remain an interested 
party. 

The interested party. Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army 
(Ret) , stated that he did not so desire. 

The court announced that Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. 
Army (Ret), was, at his own request, released as an interested party 
and was no longer accorded status as such before the court. 

The witness was duly warned, and with his counsel, withdrew. 

The court then, at 3-45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 
15, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 209 



PEOCEEDmCTS OF NAYY COURT OF INOUIRY 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1944. 
[271] Tenth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. G. 

The court met at 10 : 15 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiiiral Grin G. Murfin, U. S. Navv (Ret), President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphns Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kinnnel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the ninth day of the inquiry was 
read and apjDroved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry w^ere present. 

Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, one of counsel for the judge advocate, was recalled as a wit- 
ness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously 
taken was still binding. 

1. Q. You are the same Robert D. Powers, Junior, Lieutenant Com- 
mander, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel to the judge advocate, wdio tes- 
tified earlier in these proceedings % 

A. I am. 

2. Q. I hand you a document ; can you identify it? 

A. I can, sir. I am the authorized custodian of this document, 
which was received under ofiicial seal from the War Department. It 
is a memorandum of a dispatch to be released, in which it is certified 
that it was released to various officers, including the Commanding 
(jeneral, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at 12: 17 De- 
cember 7, 1941, by Western Union Telegraph and Radio Corporation 
of America. 

[i27i?] The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy (Ret), requested that the time, 12:17, be clarified as to 
time zone; that is, whether it be Eastern Standard time or some other 
time. 

The court directed that such clarification be made. 

79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 15 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Q. Do you have any means of knowing to what time the various 
time zones in this message refer; whether it is Eastern Standard 
Time, Greenwich Civil Time, or what ? 

A. Of my own knowledge, I do not. 

With the permission of the court, the judge advocate directed the 
witness to confer with the War Department in order to ascertain as 
to the time zones in which the times indicated in the message refer, 
and to report thereupon. 

It was stipulated by the judge advocate and the interested parties, 
with the permission of the court, that the determination by the wit- 
ness would be admissible before the court. 

The memorandum of dispatch released by the War Department, cer- 
tifying as to the dispatch of a message by the War Department to 
various officers, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at 12:17, December 7, 1941, was 
submitteci to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge 
advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX- 
HIBIT 48." 

4. Q. Will you please read the memorandum ? 
The witness read the memorandum, "Exhibit 48." 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his pre- 
vious questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, was called as a witness by the judge advocate, [£73] _ was 
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and j)resent station. 

A. Husband Edward Kimmel, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy retired. 

2. Q. Please state what your duty was on 7 December 1941.? 
A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and U. S. Fleet. 

3. Q. When did you assume this duty ? 
A. 1 February 1941. 

4. Q. When were you relieved of this duty? 
A. 17 December 1941. 

5. Q. I show you a document, marked Exhibit 5 before this court, 
which is called WP Pac 46. Please state its nature and whether it 
was in effect on 7 December 1941. 

A. WP Pac 46 was made effective on 7 December 1941, by my order, 
immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Complete 
readiness to place WP Pac 46 was required of all elements of the 
Pacific Fleet. 

6. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 6 before this court. Can you identify 
it? 

A. I recognize Exhibit 6' as a publication called, "Joint Action of 
Army and Navy 1935." I presume and request the assurance of the 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 211 

judge advocate that this copy of the Joint Action of the Army and 
Navy is corrected as of 7 December 1941. 

The judge advocate stated that the witness might be assured. 

7. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 7, which has been presented in 
evidence before this court, and ask you if you recognize it and what 
it is. 

A. I recognize Exhibit 7 as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, 
prepared in Hawaii, and approved by the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

8. Q. In a general way, Admiral, can you state to the court what 
the major task groups of the Pacific Fleet were on 7 December 1941, 
and who were the respective commanders of task forces ? 

A. The major task groups of the Pacific Fleet on [^7^] 7 
December 1941, are shown in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14C]^-41, 
of 31 October 1941. With minor changes, this task force organization 
was in effect during all the time I commanded the Pacific Fleet. The 
changes which were made as a result of experience may be obtained 
from a comparison of Pacific Fleet Letter No. 4 CL-41 of 30 April 
1941. It will be noted that the publication of October 31, 1941, is 
much more complete. Task Force One under the command of the 
Commander Battle Force, Vice Admiral "W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy, was 
composed of six battleships, one carrier, five light cruisers, one old 
light cruiser, two destroyer leaders, sixteen destroyers, one mine layer, 
and one minesweeper. His primary mission was to organize, train, and 
continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and 
in the vicinity of, the Main Body ; to keep up-to-date normal arrange- 
ments and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and 
maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the 
task force, in order to provide an efficient covering force available for 
supporting operations of other areas; or for engagement, with or 
without support, in Fleet action. 

Task Force Two under the command of the Commander Air Craft 
Battle Force, Vice Admiral William Halsey — ^William F. Halsey — 
U. S. Navy, was comprised of three battleships, one aircraft carrier, 
four heavy cruisers, one old light cruiser, two destroyer leaders, sixteen 
destroj^ers, and four mine layers. Its primary mission was to organize, 
train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, 
with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; 
to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such opera- 
tions; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential 
material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient 
Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy 
communication lines and positions and for making forays against the 
enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces. 

Task Force Three under the command of the Commander Scouting 
Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, was comprised of 
eight heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, one destroyer leader, eight 
destroyers, thirteen minesweepers, and six transports. I might state 
that the troop transports were non-existent. Its primary mission was 
to organize, train and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy 
land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date nor- 
m.al arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate 
and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tlie task force in order to provide an efficient amphibious force for 
attack, witli or without support of other forces, on outlying positions 
of the enemy. 

Task Force Four, under command of the commandant 14th Naval 
District, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that 
part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island 
•bases. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and develop the 
island bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient 
services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations. By the pro- 
visions of 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941, the [275'] Commandant 
14th Naval District was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer, and 
liis duties were laid down in detail in that publication, which is in 
evidence before this court. Task Force Seven, under the Command 
of the Commander Submarine Scouting Force, Rear Admiral Thomas 
Withers, U. S. Navy, Avas composed of all the submarines in the Pacific 
and their tenders. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and 
concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue 
development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient 
Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations 
or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols 
in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United 
States Fleet, in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases. 
Task Force Nine was under the Command of the Commander Patrol 
Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy. It included 
all of the patrol planes and sea plane tenders in the Pacific. Its 
primary mission was to organize, train, and concurrently with execu- 
tion of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine 
in tactics in order to provide an efficient long-range Air Scouting and 
Air Striking Force for independent operation or operations coordi- 
nated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times 
]3rescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet 
in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases. Task Force 
Fifteen, Commander Base Force, Rear Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. 
Navy, was com])osed of four CA and CLs, whose primary mission was 
to escort trans-Pacific shipping in order to protect trans-Pacific ship- 
ping against possible attack. Cruisers were rotated in duty under 
Task Force Fifteen and supplied from the other forces, according to 
the Command. Force and Type Commander continued to exercise the 
other functions as required by the administrative organizations as set 
forth in Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 13CN-41 of 1 October 1941, 
and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions. 

9. Q. Who was vour next senior in command in the Pacific Fleet? 
A. Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy. 

10. Q. I call your attention to General Order No. 143. Will you state 
what your duties were under this order for the period in which you 
were in command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

A. For the period 1 February to 17 December 1941, I was Com- 
mander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief U. S. 
Fleet. My duties were set forth in General Order No. 143, the Navy 
Regulations, General Orders and War Plans; General Order No. 143 
provided for the organization of tlie United States Fleet into three 
Fleets, viz., U. S. Atlantic Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet, U. S. Asiatic 
Fleet. In addition it provided for : National Coastal Frontier Forces ; 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 213 

Special Task Forces; Special Duty Ships; Naval Transportation 
Service ; Naval District Craft. As Conimander-in- [276] Chief 
Pacific Fleet, I exercised command over the Pacific Fleet, and 
as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, I exercised command 
over either one or both of the other two fleets when concen- 
trated with the Pacific Fleet to form a task force. Also, under the 
Chief of Naval Operations the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet, 
through the Type Commanders, was required to prescribe standards 
and methods of training; for all of the seagoino- forces and aircraft 
of the Navy. 

11. Q. As Connnander-in-Cliief of the Pacific Fleet, what duties 
had you assigned the Commandant of the 14th Naval District? 

A. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, I had assigned the 
Commandant 14th Naval District to perform the duties of Naval Base 
Defense Officer for Pearl Harbor and set forth his duties in 2CL-41 
of 14 October 1941. I had also assigned the Commandant 14th Naval 
District to Command Task Force Four, U. S. Pacific Fleet, which 
included that part of the 14ili Naval District Activities which involved 
the Island Bases. He was charged with the duty of organizing, train- 
ing, and developing the island bases. 

12. Q. As Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, had any other duties, other than those set 
forth in 143, been assigned to you? 

A. As Commander-in-Chief, IT. S. Fleet, and Connnander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, the duties as set forth in Navy Regulations. General 
Orders, and War Plans, were assigned to me when I was detailed to 
these duties. The duties required are reasonably well summarized 
in General Order 143, the essential points of which have been covered 
in this discussion. 

13. Q. What were the aircraft forces under A^iur command, as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in the period from October 
16, 1941, to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet was divided into two general 
categories: the aircraft which was based on carriers, and included 
land-plane types only; the aircraft which were based on shore, which 
included both seaplanes and land planes. Seaplanes could be, and 
frequently were, based upon a seaplane tender in a sheltered harbor. 
While based on an aircraft carrier or on a seaplane tender, the planes 
were under the command of the forces afloat exclusively. While the 
planes were based at Pearl Harbor, there were certain planes which 
were under the Command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District 
and assigned to him to perform more or less routine tasks. Under 
the Commandant on Ford Island there was an officer ordered to com- 
mand an air base. He was responsible to the Commandant for oper- 
ating the planes assigned exclusively to the Commandant, and was 
also responsible to the Commandant for supplying to the carriers the 
facilities for their operation while the carriers were in port. The 
commander of the air base was also responsible for supplying the 
Patrol Wing Two facilities and services necessary to operate those 
patrol planes based on Ford Island, and under the Command of 
[277] Patrol Wing Two — Commander Patrol Wing Two was in 
command of the Patrol Wing, which was a part of the Fleet. He 
was also Commander of the aircraft assigned for the defense of bases 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

as set forth in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Phm of 11 April 
1941, in addendum 1, the Naval Base Defense Force, Air Force Oper- 
ating Plan No. A4-41, of March 31, 1941. Briefly, Patrol Wing Two 
was responsible to Commander-in-Chief for the training and operation 
of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Fleet, and was respon- 
sible to the Commandant, 14th Naval District for the training and 
operation of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Naval Base 
Defense Forces, at which time, of course, the Commandant, 14th 
Naval District, was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. 

14. Under the organization you had in effect, how were aircraft 
made available to the Commandant 14th Naval District? 

A. Aircraft were made available to the Commandant 14th Naval 
District upon his request, either to ComPatWing Two, or to the 
Commander-in-Chief. Normally, ComPatWing Two would make 
such aircraft available upon request unless there were conflict with 
other connnitments, in which case he would refer to the Commander- 
in-Chief. All Navy shore-based planes were automatically made 
available to the Commandant, 14th Naval District or the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, upon sounding of the air-raid alarm, 
either for drills or for the real thing. All such planes had frequently 
been made available in this matter for practice prior to the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, and to the best of my knowledge, were so made 
available when the attack took place. 

15. Q. Did you, on 7 December 1941, have in effect any written 
orders for security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor ? 

A. Yes, 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941. I might add that this letter 
of 14 October was a revision of a letter written in February of 1941, 
arid promulgated to the Fleet at that time. This revision was the 
result of tying up certain loose ends, which we found as a result of 
experience to be desirable. 

16. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 8 and ask you if this is the document 
to which you refer — it being marked Exhibit No. 8 for identification. 

A. That is the document to which I refer. 

2CL-41, of October 14, 1941, was submitted to the interested parties 
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 8." 

17. Q. I will ask you to read it to the court. 

The witness read 2CL-41 of October 14, 1941, Exhibit 8. 

[278] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

18. Q. Did this Order 2CL-41 comprise all the security measures 
issued by you for the security of the Fleet and naval establishments 
in the Pearl Harbor area and which were in effect on 7 December 
1941? 

A. Certain measures which are prescribed in Fleet Tactical Orders 
and Instructions were applicable to the Fleet or individual ships 
thereof while in Pearl Harbor. In this category were the conditions 
of material readiness which could be and were prescribed on occasions. 
I cannot now recall any specific instructions for the safety of the 
Fleet in Pearl Harbor except those contained in 2CL-41 of October 
14, 1941. Certain standing orders pursuant to 2CL-41 were issued 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 215 

by the task force and type commanders. Such a one was an order 
of Commander, Battleships, Battle Force, issued in April, 1941, which 
required a continuous manning of a part of the anti-aircraft batteries. 
This was a twenty-four hour watch on the anti-aircraft batteries. In 
other orders, I provided for all types to have ready ammunition on 
deck in ammunition boxes readily accessible to the anti-aircraft guns 
at all times, both day and night. 

19. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack, 
can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was 
in ett'ect on ships of the Pacific Fleet then in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL-41 had 
been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was 
in effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander 
of Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two, 
5-inch guns and two, 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned 
at all times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
manned on the date in question. 

20. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, where did 
you have your flag flying on G-7 December 1941, up until the hour 
of the Japanese attack? 

A. My headquarters were at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. 
My personal quarters were in a house on a hill in a new devolopment 
behind and to the rear of the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. All 
provision was made to control the Fleet from my headquarters at 
the Submarine Base. We had communication direct from the Sub- 
marine Base to the Fleet by way of the high-powered stations on 
shore, and I felt, and my communication officer advised me, that we 
had facilities equal to, if not superior to, those that we had on the 
PENNSYLVANIA for communication with the Fleet. 

[279] 21. Q. Under these conditions and your own 2CL-41, 
which has just been read into the record, do you consider that you 
were embarked in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I trans- 
ferred my flag to shore solely because I felt that I could exercise com- 
mand of the Pacific Fleet more expeditiously from that point than 
I could from on board the ship. When I went ashore and estab- 
lished my headquarters on shore, I did not intend to supplant- the 
Commandant, 14th Naval District in the exercise of the duties as- 
signed to him by the Navy Department and by my orders. 

22. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is 2CLr-41, I ask you to look 
at Paragraph 3 (g), which has a sub-title, "Defense against air at- 
tack", and under that paragraph, refer to sub-paragraph (d) (1), 
in which are outlined some of the duties of the Commandant, 14th 
Naval District, one of which is advising the senior oflicer embarked 
in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, what con- 
dition of readiness to maintain. What I am trying to find out is 
this. Admiral : Under the conditions of having your flag flying on 
shore, did you consider yourself the senior officer embarked in Pearl 
Harbor within the meaning of this sub-paragraph ? 

A. I did not. 

23. Q. Will you tell the court who, on the morning of 7 December 
1941, immediately prior to the Japanese attack, the senior officer was? 

A. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, USN, Commander Battle Force 
U. S. Fleet and Commander Task Force 1, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"24:. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph 3 (g), "Defense against 
air attack"', under sub-paragraph 6 thereof, certain duties are kiid 
down for the Commandant, Ittth Naval District in regard to matters 
affecting the defense of Pearl Harbor and the ships of the Pacific 
Fleet therein. Did you, as Commander-in-Chief, except the Com- 
mandant to carry out these various functions directly with the Fleet 
or ofkcers concerned, and without reference to you ? 

A. Yes. If there was any doubt in his mind about what he was to 
do, he had access to me at all times. 

25. Q. Now, one of the duties prescribed here and to which I have 
before adverted, was the duty of advising the senior officer embarked 
in Pearl Harbor, exchisive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. Can you remember 
the condition of readiness that had been prescribed by the Com- 
mandant, 14th Naval District, in compliance with this directive on 
the night of 6-7 December, 1941 ? 

A. 1 do not know that he prescribed, or advised Admiral Pye to 
prescribe, any condition of readiness on tliat day. 

[i2S0] 20. Q. Can you state to the court what the condition of 
readiness was on G-7 December 1941 up until the time of the initiation 
of the Japanese attack? 

A. I have already stated to the court, Condition 3. That condition 
3 was prescribed with certain modifications wdiicli, incidentally, were 
additional safety measures prescribed by the Commander, Battleships 
and Battle Force. 

27. Q. And this condition of readiness to which you have just 
referred in your last answer met with your full approval? 

A. Yes, I thought it was sufficient. 

28. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, and 
with your headquarters located as you have described them, did you 
l^.ave any unit for furnishing you with combat intelligence? 

A. I depended largely uj^on the units under the direction of the 
Commandant, 14th Naval District, who had a reasonably complete 
set-up for obtaining this information. 

29. Q. Am I to infer, then, that your own intelligence unit, that 
which belonged to the Fleet, was rather a minor part of this organiza- 
tion, or what am I to understand ? 

A. Well, it w^as an essential but not a major part. 

30. Q. Did this intelligence unit that belonged to the Fleet work 
with and function wnth the intelligence unit that you have described 
as belonging to the Commandant, 14th Naval District? 

A. Yes. 

31. Q. What do you consider the efficiency of this combined in- 
telligence unit to have been prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. From my observation of their operation, I thought the efficiency 
of this intelligence unit was quite satisfactory prior to 7 December 
1941. 

32. Q, Did you, prior to 7 December 1941, receive combat intelli- 
gence from other sources than your own unit ? 

A. Yes. We received reports from Connnandant, 16th Naval Dis- 
trict, from the Navy Department, and our own forces, wherever they 
may be. 

33. Q. From your experience wath combat intelligence as you re- 
ceived it, did you feel that it was — 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 217 

A. Well, I am talking about all kinds of intelligence. 

34. Q. That is what I am talking about too, generally, 

A. I think combat intelligence is a little more restrictive than what 
we are talking about. 

[281] 35. Q. The meaning I am trying to convey to you when I 
ask you questions about combat intelligence is essentially the informa- 
tion 3^ou had upon which you made military decisicms? 

A. That is right. Well, by that definition, I received combat in- 
telligence from all naval sources, from many naval sources, and the 
decisions I made were based upon my evaluation of this information. 

3G. Q. Speaking of evaluation. Admiral, did this intelligence serv- 
ice that you had organized ordinarily evaluate the information prior 
to giving it to you, or just exactly how did the evaluation fimiction 
operate, if you can remember? 

A. They presented to me summaries of the information. It was 
physically impossible for one man to go over all the information. I 
received summaries and, to a certain extent, conclusions that the in- 
telligence units had drawn, and the basic facts generally presented, 
what they considered important basic matter. 

37. Q. I presume you had a War Plans officer or division set up in 
your own staff, did you not? 

A. I had a War Plans division set up within my own staff com- 
posed of Captain C. H. McMorris, Captain McCormick, Commander 
V. R. Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer of the United States Marine Corps, 
and one lieutenant whose names escapes me for the moment. In- 
cidentally, the War Plans division of my staff was greatly expanded 
immediately after I took command. I thought that the number of 
people engaged in producing War Plans should be considerably aug- 
mented. I therefore added two captains and a colonel in the Marine 
Corps to the ones that I got at the time that I took command. And 
in that connection it may be well to point out to the court that that was 
one of the prime considerations wliich decided me to move my head- 
quarters from the PENNSYLVANIA to the Submarine Base. I 
had a choice of dividing my staff' or of going ashore. I could have 
divided it by putting part of the staff on other ships. I could not 
have my staff available to me with their advice in their entirety in any 
other way than by taking up my quarters on shore. The number of 
the staff in War Plans and in intelligence and public relations was 
such that it was a physical impossibility to have them on board the 
PENNSYLVANIA aind at the same time have them operate in an 
efficient manner. 

38. Q. Would you tell the court how this War Plans division func- 
tioned with you in evaluating enemy intelligence? 

A. All enemy intelligence went to the War Plans division and was 
discussed and estimates drawn from day to day as to what this in- 
formation meant and what action we should take as a result of this 
information. I had [^<5.3] the Fleet intelligence officer bring 
to me daily the summaries made of the information received in the 
last 24 hours and go over it with me in detail. My chief of staff was 
generally present, and also the War Plans officer was present at this 
conference. In any event, they always received this information, and 
this information included all messages that I received from the Navy 
Department. In addition to the senior member of the War Plans 
division — who was Captain McCormick — Captain DeLany, my opera- 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tions officer, was also kept fully informed in order that the War Plans 
and Operations should not get in any degree at cross purposes. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.) , suggested that the question referred to enemy intelligence, 
and asked if it were to be assumed that the question referred to 
countries who are now enemies. 

The judge advocate replied in the affirmative; that the judge ad- 
vocate meant, in asking his question in which he used the term "enemy", 
"possible enemies". 

With the court's permission, the witness made the following state- 
ment : Up until the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on 7 De- 
cember we were at peace and I was the first one to recognize the changed 
situation. 

39. Q. Did your organization exchange intelligence with the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department? 

A. We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Ha- 
waiian Department had his interests restricted to the defense of 
Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and 
the ones to which he expected to send his forces. He was primarily 
interested in the probability of attack where his forces were stationed, 
and in general, the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, 
or was confined to his interests. My own interests covered a much 
greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to keep 
the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought 
would be useful to him. I did not inform the Commanding Gen- 
eral of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Mar- 
shalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for 
taking the additional chance of having such information divulged by 
giving it to an agency who would have no part in the execution of the 
plan. 

[283] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Micldleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

40. Q. Did you likewise receive any information from the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department? 

A. I believe the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department 
gave me every bit of information that he had. We exchanged infor- 
mation fully and freely. 

41. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 8, which is Fleet Letter 2CLf-41, 
and calling your attention to paragraph 2 (b) , which has been read into 
the record but which I shall now read for your information : "That a 
declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships 
in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating 
area, (3) a combination of these two." Did this estimate continue 
from the time this letter was promulgated up to the time of the attack 
by the Japanese on the morning of December 7, 1941 ? 

A. This specific confidential letter and the assumptions upon which 
it is based are not so much an estimate as they were a basis for the 
training of the Fleet to meet all contingencies that might arise. Esti- 
mates and the chances of any particular action might change from day 
to day, but this was a letter to ]:)rovide for the security of the Fleet 
under all the contingencies which we could foresee. 

42. Q. I again refer to Exhibit 8 and refer you to paragraph 3 (G) 
entitled "Defense Against Air Attack." After you have read each 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 219 

directive thereunder to yourself, will you state to the court categori- 
cally what action had been taken prior to December 7, 1941, or at the 
time of the attack on that morning, whichever way may be applicable? 

A. In my opinion, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment disposed his available troops and material to the best advan- 
tage. I felt then and still feel that there were many deficiencies, 
particularly in anti-aircraft defense. General Short testified here 
yesterday about the steps he took as to the adequacy of the material 
and as to the material he had available and as to the number and types 
and weapons and personnel that he had available. I feel that his state- 
ment is better than any I could make on this subject. So far as the 
other paragraphs in this letter, there were practically no naval guns 
based on shore except those which belonged to the marine defense 
battalions temporarily stationed in Pearl Harbor. My recollection is 
that there were very few marine guns available on that day. Do 
you wish me now to cover the question of long distance reconnaissance? 

43. Q. Just in a general manner. I shall cover it specifically later 
on. 

A. The number of planes available to the Fleet, to the Commandant, 
14th Naval District, and to the Commanding General in Hawaii had 
all been lumped into one coordinated force bj'- the agreements arrived 
at. Of those planes, there was not a sufficient number of the type 
required to perform distance reconnaissance effectively. There was 
not a sufficient number of planes of the long range available to make a 
complete reconnaissance for one day, utilizing all of them. A con- 
tinuous patrol over long periods of time was out of the question. 
In this connection, I can state there was a total of eighty-one patrol 
planes in the whole Hawaiian area. There was a total of twelve 
B-17 Army planes in the Hawaiian area. Of these, a maximum of 
sixty-one patrol planes and six B-17's were available on the island of 
Oahu during the period immediately preceding the attack. We had 
some patrol planes operating from Midway. I base my statement 
that there was not a sufficient number of planes to perform a 360 degree 
search for one day on a requirement of eighty-four planes to make the 
360 degree search, based on a fifteen-mile visibility. I think that can 
be demonstrated. I might state that when I took command of the 
Fleet I thoroughly appreciated the deficiencies in anti-aircraft defense 
that existed in Oahu and in the Hawaiian area. I read the letter 
written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War. I read 
the answer written by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the 
Navy. I also read the letter written by the Commandant, 14th Naval 
District and forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander- 
in-Chief on or about January 7, 1941. All these letters set forth clearly 
the inadequacy of the force available in Pearl Harbor for aircraft 
defense. There was a deficiency in reconnaissance planes and in 
various other elements. Recognizing this and recognizing that it was 
a physical impossibility for General Short to perform distance recon- 
naissance, there was nothing that we could do. We had no choice 
except to attempt to utilize the forces that we had to the best advan- 
age, and I think we did organize and use these forces to the best 
advantage. It was unfortunate that the warnings, messages, and 
information from the Navy Department did not convey to us the 
imminence of war and the imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor 
that some witnesses now want to read into those warnings. We did 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not get it. We had in the Fleet a constantly changing personnel — 
officers and enlisted men. In November I mentioned in a letter to 
the Chief of Naval Operations that we needed 20,000 more men in the 
Pacific Fleet to fill our complements and to fill the schools and other 
training institutions that we had. I had also attempted to get he 
enlisted men of the Navy frozen in their positions. In other words, 
I wanted to cancel the [38S] expiration of enlistments. I made 
a trip to Washington, advanced that in letters both before and after 
that trip in June, 1941, and I took it up with the chairman of the 
Senate and House Naval Affairs Committee. We never did get that 
revision put into effect, and we continued to lose our men, who were 
attracted outside by the high wages prevailing about that time and 
doubted whether or not we would get into the war. It was absolutely 
essential that we maintain training in the Pacific Fleet up until the 
last minute. If we had stopped training the first time we received 
these alarming messages, I feel certain that by the time war was 
declared our ships would have been in a dangerously ineffective condi- 
tion. As an example, we were supplying men for the expansion pro- 
gram both on shore and at sea, and as I recall at the present time, 
we were transferring twelve patrol plane crews a month from Pearl 
Harbor to the mainland, training those patrol crews in the Fleet, 
and we had a great urge to continue our work of training the Fleet. 
These were the conditions that confronted me when I made the deci- 
sion on the 27th of November not to stop training in the Fleet but 
to continue until further developments. 

44. Q. The judge advocate is primarily concerned at the present 
moment with your views as to whether or not the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer, did or did 
not carry out the duties under sub-paragraph 6 of Article 3 (G) , which 
you have just read, and he would like to have you, as the Commander- 
in-Chief and as his immediate superior, state categorically whether 
or not the duties outlined thereunder were performed to your satis- 
faction ? 

A. I can state, in general, that the perforance of duty of the Com- 
mandant of the 14th Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer 
and as prescribed in paragraph 3 (G) and sub-paragraph G (a), (b), 
(c), (d), was, in general, satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief. 
If it had not been so performed, I would not have hesitated at any 
time to call his attention to the fact. 

45. Q. Was there any different condition of readiness for action in 
regard to naval base defense activities than those prescribed for units 
of the U. S. Pacific Fleet ? 

A. As Naval Base Defense Officer was charged with fixing the state 
of readiness for all the shore activities, and he was charged with ad- 
vising the senior officer afloat, in this case Admiral Pye, what he con- 
sidered to be tlie state of readiness of the ships. That was put in to 
insure that all the information in the hands of the commandant of 
the district was placed in the hands of the senior officer afloat [286] 
and not to have any condition arise where the Commandant of the 
district might have information which was not in the hands of the 
senior officer afloat. The responsibility for fixing the state of readiness 
of the ship was not taken away from the senior officer afloat. 

46. Q. It is not quite clear to me. Adnui-al, exactly what connection 
the advice of the Naval Base Defense Officer had to do with a con- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY . 221 

ditioii of refidiiiess in the Fleet, but if 1 iinderstaiid your answer cor- 
rectly, it is that the senior officer afloat in the Fleet prescribed his own 
condition of readiness? . . 

A. That is correct. 

47. Q. And he might take into consideration, if he wanted to, the 
condition of readiness which was being maintained by the Naval Base 
Defense Officer if he so desired? 

A. And the advice he i-eceived from the Xaval Base Defense Officer. 

48. Q. The senior officer present afloat was responsible for the con- 
dition of readiness of vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet ? 

A. That is correct. 

40. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 0, which is a letter from the 
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941 
and which has been introduced in its entirety into the record. Do 
you recognize this letter as any that you have been acquainted with? 

A. Yes, I saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary 
of War, dated ^lanuary 24. 1011, early in February", 1941. 

50. Q. Referring to this letter as of the time you received it, did the 
views expressed therein differ from your own views materially on 
matters of military defense at Pearl Harbor? 

A. I was in substantial agreement with this letter, although I dif- 
fered somewhat from the probabilities as established therein. This 
letter was, I believe, initiated in the Navy Department after the re- 
ceipt of a letter prepared by the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict and forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, who at that time was 
Admiral Richardson. In these two letters, submitted in early Janu- 
ary. 1041, practically all the points covered in the Secretary's letter 
of January 24 were included. I felt the most probable form of attack 
in the Hawaiian area was by submarine. I thought a bombing attack 
by airplanes was second in order of probability. I also felt the danger 
of torpedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor was nil, because I believed 
[287] torpedoes would not run in the shallow water of that 
harbor. The maximum depth at any point was only forty-five feet. 
I felt that the probability of a surface gunnery attack by bombardment 
was a low order of priority. The probability of mining was considered 
a high order of priority. The unlimited areas which required sweep- 
ing made mining no particular menace, and this was due to the extreme 
depth of the water in the innnediate vicinity of the island of Oahu 
and limited areas. 

51. Q. I know that in the answer you have just given you envisaged 
a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as the most probable form 
of attack? 

A. That is right. 

52. Q. And that an air attack was second in order of ])robability ? 
A. I would like to amend the second in order of probability. I did 

not think it was second in order of probability, because the airplane 
attack I thought was a remote possibility. I did not think it was a 
probability at any time. I want to make that clear now. My previous 
statement was in error. I did not mean that, but what I was thinking 
of was that a submarine attack would hurt us and the thing which 
would hurt us next the most was the airplane attack. 

53. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is your letter 2CL-41, and 
to paragraph 2 (b) (1), you say that a declaration of war may be 
preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. What form 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor did you contemplate by 
this statement? 

A. An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base 
our training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was 
sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose. I felt, as the 
situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor, 
and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the installa- 
tions at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much 
more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if 
the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I 
consider it more than a possibility, and one which ordinary prudence 
would make us guard against. 

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, reporter, 
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, 
reporter, withdrew. 

54. Q. Then, the order in which you set out what might happen on a 
declaration of war, in paragraph 2 (b), does not necessarily mean 
the order of importance as you envisaged the probability of forms of 
attack? 

A. No. 

The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at which 
time it reconvened. 

[28^1 Present: 

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the inter- 
ested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. 
Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

The judge advocate stated: Adverting to Exhibit 48, which was 
introduced in evidence before this court this morning, there was a 
stipulation made by the interested parties and by the judge advocate 
that Lieutenant Commander Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, the wit- 
ness before the court who introduced the exhibit, would communicate 
with the War Department, and that the information he obtained from 
them as to the time, or the character of the time, that was being used 
on Exhibit 48, would be accepted in evidence before this court as of 
the times which are thereon indicated. I will now ask Lieutenant 
Commander Powers to make to the court a statement as to the infor- 
mation he received from the War Department. 

With the permission of the court. Lieutenant Commander Powers, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, stated : Traffic Operations Branch, Army Com- 
munications Service, has advised me that the times indicated upon 
Exhibit 48, as used by the War Department on 7 December 1941, were 
Washington time; that is. Eastern Standard Time. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness 
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as 
witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still 
binding, and continued his testimony. 

Examination by the judge advocate (continued) : 

55. Q. Admiral, in the questions I am about to ask you, I would 
request that you note the distinction between air bombing attack 
and air torpedo plane attack. This is just for the purpose of clarify- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 223 

ing the questions in your own mind. With reference to an air bomb- 
ing attack, what was the status of the defenses of Pearl Harbor in 
this regard when you took command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet? 

A. The status of defenses of Pearl Harbor in reference to air 
bombing attack when I took command of the Pacific Fleet were the 
same as those stated in the letter forwarded by the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District through the Commander-in-Chief, to the Navy 
Department, early in January of 1941. The Commander-in-Chief at 
that time was Admiral J. O. Kichardson, U. S. Navy, who signed the 
letter addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the Navy 
Department. 

[2Sd] 56. Q. I show you Exhibit 28, which is now in evidence 
before this court, and has been read in full, and ask you if that is the 
letter to which you refer ? 

A. That is the letter, together with the enclosure of a letter from 
the Commandant, 14th Naval District. 

57. Q. Will you sketch as best you can any changes that were made 
in these defenses during your tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific Fleet? 

A. During my tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, 
a number of pursuit planes were brought to Pearl Harbor. The net 
increase of operating pursuit planes during this period was approxi- 
mately 100 pursuit Army planes. This was an increase from no effec- 
tive Army pursuit planes to approximately 100. I do not know the 
exact number of Army anti-aircraft artillery, but my recollection is 
that at no time did it exceed approximately one-third of the number 
recommended by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and 
approved by the Commander-in-Chief in his letter of early January, 
1941. Regarding bombing planes, the Army supplied a maximum 
number of 27, B-17 Flying Fortresses. The Army planned, as I 
recalled it, to supply about 180 of these B-17s. However, prior to 
December 7, 1941, order were received to send a number of B-l7s to 
the Philippines. This resulted in stripping Oahu of all but 12 B-17 
Flying Fortresses, of which 6 had been further stripped of essential 
gear to outfit the ones going to the Philippines, and this left 6 B-17 
planes in operating condition on December 7, 1941. Therefore, dur- 
ing my tour as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, Army had a net 
increase of 6 bombing planes, no balloon barrage, no smoke-making 
apparatus, and none of the other facilities that I can now recall and 
which were mentioned in the Secretary of the Navy's letter had been 
supplied prior to 7 December 1941. In this connection, it is my recol- 
lection that a number of Navy Patrol planes was increased by one or 
two squadrons during this period. In any event, there were stationed 
on Hawaii on 7 December 1941, exactly 81 patrol planes, of which 61 
were in operating condition on Oahu on 7 December 1941. There were 
12 operating from Midway, and the remainder were under overhaul or 
out of commission for various reasons. An agreement as to the opera- 
tion of Army and Navy airplanes stationed on shore was put into 
effect. The agreement was arrived at by the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment, which provided in general that the Army would command 
all fighter planes, both Army and Navy, and the Navy would com- 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mand all distance reconnaissance and bombing planes. My order 
2CL-41, issued in February, 1941, and revised on October 14, 1941, 
provided that all naval forces in Pearl Harbor would assist the Army 
in the defense of Pearl Harbor. The Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District was designated in this letter as the Naval Base Defense Officer, 
and vested with the necessary authority to direct [^W] the 
naval forces in the event of attack, and he was also given authority to 
conduct the necessary drills to insure the most effective use of the 
naval forces in port. There was a very considerable increase in the 
number of troops supplied by the Army to the Commander of the 
Hawaiian Department. I believe there were some 50,000 troops in 
Hawaii on 7 December 1941, but I might say that General Short felt 
that the minimum required for the defense of Hawaii was in the 
neighborhood of 75,000 troops. It would be noted in the letter of 24 
January that the establishment by the Army of a radar station and 
aircraft warning net is given a very high priority. The answer to this 
letter, written by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 
promises a high priority for this w^ork. It stated that it would be 
completed in the summer of 1941. I know that members of my staff 
who appreciated the importance of the Army radar in the defense of 
Pearl Harbor and of the aircraft warning net, did everything within 
their power to assist the Army, and incidentally the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District, in the training of personnel and in rendering 
them whatever other assistance they considered within our power. 
We took Army personnel to sea in our ships prior to the time they 
received their radar, and w^e sent several officers at different times to 
work with the Army in establishing their service, all the time urging 
them to get something. The aircraft warning net was far from com- 
plete on 7 December 1941. Specifically, the permanent Radar stations 
were not anywhere near completed but there were several mobile units 
which had been placed in advantageous positions on the island and had 
been operating w^ith some degree of success prior to 7 December 1941. 
You have lieard General Short testify as to the operation of this radar, 
that it was being operated from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 every morning, and that 
training continued throughout the day until about 4: 30 in the after- 
noon ; also that it was decided on December G by the personnel on the 
job that they would not operate the radar after 7 : 00 a. m. This was 
unknown to me at the time, and I knew only in general that the radar 
had been in operation. I knew, of course, that it was far from perfect. 
Durin,o; 1941, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and Com- 
manding General, Ilaw^aiian Department, completed their Joint Fron- 
tier Coastal Defense Plan. Four destroyers were detailed to the 
Commandant of the 14t]i Naval District for use in anti-submarine 
j)atrol and other patrol duties. He also had some tugs which he used 
for mine-sweeping, as I recall it. However, there were available to 
him sufficient forces to do the limited mine-sweeping which was 
required at the District. 

58. Q. That goes into a little more detail than I intended, but I 
thank you, Admiral. Who gave the order to transfer the B-17 
bombers from tlie Hawaiian area'^ Do you recall 'i 

A. The War Department. 

[291] 59. Q. And at about what time of the year did this order 
take effect? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 225 

A. Oh, that transfer, the most of it was effected in November of 
1941. 

GO. Q. Do you feel that you had kept the Navy Department in 
"Washington reasonably well informed as to the status of the defenses 
of Pearl Harbor in the matter of protecting that area against air- 
craft attack during your tour of dutv as Comamnder-in-Chief ^ 

A. I do. 

Gl. Q. With special reference to aircraft torpedo plane attack, 
what would you say w^ould be the requirements for such a defense 
that are different from the defenses against air bombing attack in 
general ( 

A. Well, the defense against an air torpedo plane attack in addition 
to the elements required for an air bombing attack, requires nets so 
placed that they will deflect or explode the torpedoes before they 
reach their objectives; in lieu of a net, baffles, target rafts, or any 
objects properly placed that will explode or deflect the torpedo, are 
required. 

G2. Q. Were any of these means of defense available in Oahu or in 
the Hawaiian area when vou assumed command of the Pacific Fleet 
in February 1941 ? 

A. None of the defenses against an air torpedo plane attack, as 
such, were available to me when I assumed command of the Pacific 
Fleet. 

G3. Q. What was done, to your knowledge, to improve these de- 
fenses against airplane torpedo attack during your tour of duty as 
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleets 

A. No effective steps were taken that I recall. In addition to the 
defenses that I have mentioned against an air torpedo plane attack, 
the use of barrage balloons would have been a help, because they 
w^ould have tended to keep the planes so high that they^ could not 
have dropped the torpedoes. 

64. Q. What w^ould have been the effect of these barrage balloons 
on our own air activities in the Pearl Harbor area? 

A. They would have stopped the air activity to a very large extent, 
and they were not recommended. 

65. Q. When you assumed command of the Pacific Fleet, what was 
the technical view you held on the performance of torpedoes dropped 
from aircraft in depths of water that prevailed at Pearl Harbor? In 
order words, was it your view that this could, or could not, be done? 

A. I felt that there was no chance of aircraft torpedo attack on 
ships in Pearl Harbor. I based this opinion on letters which I had 
received from the Chief of Naval Operations. 

[293] The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy (Ret.), requested that the letter of February 17, 1941, 
from the Chief of Naval 0})erations to the Commander-in-Chief of 
Pacific Fleet, to which he referred in his testimony, be admitted in 
evidence at this time. 

The judge advocate stated that he had no objection. 

The said document was submitted to the jud^e advocate, to the 
other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. 
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), ofi'ered in 
evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked 
"EXHIBIT 49." 

7971<)— 40 — Ex. 14(5, vol. 1 10 



226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

66. Q. Please read the letter. 

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 49. 

66-A. Q. I would ask you if there were any changes in the views 
of technical bureaus or others in authority as regards the possibility 
of using aircraft torpedoes in waters of depths prevailing at Pearl 
Harbor during 1941 ? 

A. On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations addressed a 
letter to the Commandants of all naval districts, with copies to 
CinCPac, CinClant, and so forth. The subject was, "Anti-torpedo 
baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks." Reference (a) 
is a CNO confidential letter of February 17, 1941. (Reading:) 

In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employ- 
ment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially 
for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective 
harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized 
certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following 
was stated : 

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to success- 
fully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is 
necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered." 

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes 
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in 
some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent 
runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship 
or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if 
surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed 
and a sufiicient run to arm the torpedo. 3. While no minimum depth of water 
in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing 
safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of [293] 
water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack 
launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely. 
4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto 
were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes 
may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms. 

(Signed) R. E. Ingersoll. 

Now when the letter of 17 February, which was a letter to the Com- 
mandant of the District, was received, Admiral Bloch submitted a 
letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, and his letter dated 20 March 
1941, stated (reading) : 

The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does 
not exceed 45 feet. b. There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for 
vessels approaching and leaving berths, which prevents the departure of a 
large group of vessels .on short notice, c. Most of the available berths are located 
close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipelines 
as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the Fleet moorings would 
have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted. 
Other harbors in the 14th Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to 
Pearl Harbor. In view of the foregoing, the Commandant does not recommend 
the installation of baffles for mooring in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the 
14th Naval District. 

(Signed) C. C. Bloch. 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, under date of March 
12, 1941, wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and stated, "In view 
of the contents of reference (a) , that is, the CNO's confidential letter of 
15 February 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Pacific Fleet 
recommends that until a light, efficient net that can be laid temporarily 
and quickly, is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area." When 
the letter of June 13 was received at my headquarters, we went over 
this letter thoroughly and my staff considered that, in view of the 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 227 

statements in this letter, that there was still no danger from torpedoes 
in Pearl Harbor. While the statement was made that no ship could be 
considered safe, yet, there was strong presumption that the torpedoes 
would not run in the depths of water which obtained in Pearl Harbor, 
and those depths are 40 feet or less. In any event, I recall of no effort 
on the part of the Navy Department to put these nets in Pearl Harbor. 
I feel that the Navy Department was no more concerned about the use 
of aerial torpedoes in Pearl Harbor than were the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District. To the best of my recollection, no further correspondence 
on thiss ubject was had. 

67. Q. Wliat did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor prove as 
regards the use of air torpedoes in depths of water of those prevailing 
in Pearl Harbor? 

A, They performed very well indeed from the Japanese standpoint. 
[^^4] 68. Q. Admiral, in a number of instances, especially in 
the testimony of General Short, there was reference made to a General 
Headquarters Air Force. What is your conception of such a com- 
mand ? What does that mean to you ? 

A. My conception of the Army G. H. Q. Air Force has always been 
a little bit hazy. I have never been able to grasp all of the details of 
what the General Headquarters Air Force does nor how it is admin- 
istered. So far as our activities in Pearl Harbor were concerned, we 
had to work with what we had. We were forced to work with what 
we had, and the General Headquarters Air Force was a theory. I 
would add this : I would like to add this point : In all that I have said 
about the inadequacy of the forces in Pearl Harbor, and of the efforts 
of the Navy to supplement the Army deficiencies, it is my belief that 
what we did does not alter in any way the basic responsibility of the 
Army for the defense of Pearl Harbor, as provided for in the "Joint 
Action of the Army and Navy." 

69. Q. What were your views immediately before 7 December 1941 
on measures to be employed for locating and engaging enemy aircraft 
before they reached their objective? I am assuming now that an 
attack has been launched and that the planes are en route to their 
objective. 

A. After aircraft are launched and are en route to their objective, 
the only practicable means of locating them in time are by radar and 
to a very much less efficient extent by visual observation, either from 
shore, from ships, or from scouting planes. This was true before 
December 7, as it is now. Prior to December 7, however, radar was 
in its infancy, so far as our services are concerned, and it was to that 
extent in effective due to the limitations of material and the greenness 
of the personnel. We had carried on an intensive training program on 
radar operations on the ships of the Fleet in which this was installed. 
I have told you about taking the selected personnel from the Army to 
sea and about giving them the benefit of what we had learned about 
radar. Now the supplement to the shore radar was the aircraft warn- 
ing net, which was an Army responsibility; and you have heard Gen- 
eral Short describe the conditions of this net on December 7, 1941. I 
think that the Army personnel in Hawaii did everything they could, 
or I should say, perhaps, Gejieral Short, I felt, did everything that he 
could within the limitations of material supplied them to establish this 



228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

warnin<T net and to put together tlie radar. Of course, T was not 
familiar with the details of .their construction,, but I know our people 
did put pressure on them constantly to get something done. 

70. Q. What service was charged under existing orders and agree- 
ments on December 7, 1941, with locating and engaging enemy air- 
craft before they reached their objectives? 

A. Army. 

[295] 71. Q. Was the other service to lend am^ assistance? 

A. In Hawaii each service was prepared to render any practicable 
assistance to the other; and if the Navy in any of their planes which 
were under naval command at the time, had sighted attacking aircraft, 
they would have rendered such assistance to the Army as was practica- 
ble and possible. When planes are once launched and coining in to 
make an attack on Oahu, the Army is responsible for locating the 
jilanes. The methods of locating the planes are radar, observation 
posts on shore, in ships, and in scouting or observation planes. Now 
while it is the Army's basic responsibility to locate these planes, the 
Navy by agreement was obligated to give them all the information they 
obtained in the performance of whatever mission was assigned to them. 

72. Q. What ^service in Hawaii was charged with repulsing enemy 
aircraft by anti-aircraft fire, on 7 December 1941? 

A. The Army, I should say, had the prime responsibility. The 
plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible 
assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all the guns, in- 
cluding -50 calibres and even shoulder rifles by the marines in the Navy 
Yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition, it provided 
that the batteries of all ships should take part in shooting down the 
planes. 

73. Q. What was the agreement for joint readiness for immediate 
action in defense against surprise raids on Pearl Harbor? 

A. It is set forth in several publications which the court has already 
examined, and I will re-state that the principal agreement effectuating 
the coordination of effort was the status of aircraft. Army and Navy 
aircraft. In general, this ])rovided for all fighter planes from the 
Navy that were based on shore to report at once to the Army. It pro- 
vided for all bomber planes from the Army and all patrol and bombing 
planes from the Navy, that were based on shore, to re])ort to the Navy. 
The naval planes were under the command of the naval base defense 
officer, who in turn had the commander of the naval base defense air 
force to actually operate the planes. The Army operated the fighter 
and pursuit planes. We had arrangements made whereby daily re- 
ports were made of the availability of planes, and Admiral Bellinger 
made his report to the Army of the planes that he would have available 
on any one day. The Army made its report to Admiral Bellinger so 
that each knew wliat planes were available and, very closely, w^hat all 
the planes were doing on any one day. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[390] 74. Q. Were there any drills held in furthering these 
joint exercises? 

A. Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each 
week. For about two to three months prior to December 7, 1941, we 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 229 

conducted the drills once every two weeks. This was in order to 
insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when 
the drills were held weekly there were too many people excused due 
to overhaulino; a plane or some work that they considered essential 
and more important than taking part in the drills. It was particularly 
difficult at times and it required considerable insistence to get these 
])eople all ready to take part in the drills. We had better results and 
accomplished more after we went to tlie bi-weekly drills than we had 
had when we had the weekly drills because when we made that con- 
cession we also tightened up on the people who we requird to take 
part in them. 

75. Q,. With regard to the activities of the Army and Navy in the 
Hawaiian area — I speak of their activities in a military sense — did you 
ever have any discussions with the Commanding General of the Ha- 
waiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command 
in effect in the Hawaiian area ? 

A. No. 

76. Q. Do you feel that any problems that you had would have 
been more easily resolved, or not, if you had had unity of command 
in effect? 

A. I feel that where command is vested in one agency, other things 
being equal, you will get very much better results than where there is 
a divided responsibility. 

77. Q. Do you consider that the Commandant, 14th Naval District, 
had authority, so far as you were concerned, to put unity of command 
in effect ? 

A. 1 do not, not without reference to me, and I would not have put 
unity of command in effect, or accepted responsibility for the Army 
actions, without reference to the Navy Department, 

78. Q. There is evidence before this court that in July, 1941, an 
executive order had been issued freezing Japanese assets in the United 
States. Did this order give you any views as to the imminence of war 
Avitli Japan ? 

A. This executive order tended to worsen the relations betwixt 
the United States and Japan. I judged that it was one more step along 
the road to war. However, there was room for the opposite view, 
and that is that a firm stand against Japan would deter them from 
taking any action. I believe a good many people had advocated and 
argued that that would be the case. 

79. Q. Subsequent to this executive order, can you remember the 
next development in United States- Japanese relations that bore on 
the imminence of war with Japan ? 

A. Well, I knew of the Atlantic conference, but I knew of no com- 
mitments that were made there. I got my [2.97] informa- 
tion from the newspapers. I also had a message from the Chief of 
Naval Operations dated October IGth which indicated that an attack 
by Japan on Russia was considered a strong possibility, but that 
Japan blamed the United States and Great Britain for her present 
situation and it was possible that Japan might attack either one or 
both. There were other developments which were unknown to me 
until after the war started. One of these is the alleged commitment 
by the United States that even if not herself attacked she would come 
to Britain's aid in the Far East. Also, on 16 August, 1941, Mr. Hull 



230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

delivered to Japan a note protesting strongly against further move- 
ments to the south. This was not known to me until after the war was 
started. 

80. Q. You mentioned having received the dispatch of 16 October, 
1941. What was your estimate at the time of the receipt of this dis- 
patch on the imminence of a United States-Japanese war, on 16 Octo- 
ber 1941, after you received the dispatch which is Exhibit 13 before 
this court? 

A, I did not consider at this time that war betwixt the United States 
and Japan was imimnent. I had attempted to find out what the action 
of the United States would be in case Japan attacked the Maritime 
Provinces, but I got no definite answer. I did not consider that war 
was imminent. 

81. Q. In this dispatch. Exhibit 13, there is this directive: "In 
view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including 
such preparatory deployments as will not disclose the stragetic in- 
tention, nor constitute provocative attacks against Japan." What did 
you do, as Commander-in-Chief, in complying with this directive to 
take due precautions? 

A. This dispatch states, in part, "In view of these possibilities, you 
will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as 
will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative attacks 
against Japan." I took the action at this time which I described to 
the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October, Exhibit 14, 
and which action was approved specifically in the letter of 7 Novem- 
ber from the Chief of Naval Operations. In that letter of 22 October 
I stated that I had placed and would continue to maintain the 
patrol of two submarines at Midway. I dispatched 12 patrol planes 
to Midway. I dispatched two submarines to Wake, and they would 
arrive there on 23 October. I dispatched the CASTOR and two de- 
stroyers to Johnson and Wake with additional marines, ammunition 
and stores. The CURTISS arrived at Wake on 21 October with gas, 
lube oil, and bombs. I prepared to send 6 patrol planes from Midway 
to Wake; to replace the 6 at Midway from Pearl Harbor. I dis- 
patched additional marines to Palmyra. I placed Admiral Pye, with 
the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 Octo- 
ber. I had 6 submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. 
I put some [298] additional security measures in effect in the 
operating areas outside of Pearl Harbor. I delayed the sailing of 
the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November, when she was due 
to go for an overliaul at Puget Sound, and I deferred final decision until 
that time. With minor changes I proposed to continue the health 
cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. 

The court then, at 3 : 00 p. m., took a recess until 3 : 10 p. m., at which 
time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the in- 
terested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the wit- 
ness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat 
as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still 
binding. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 231 

Exaniination by the judge advocate, (Continued) : 

82. Q. Admiral, I show you a Chief of Xaval Operations dispatch 
of 24 November 1041 which is now in evidence before this court marked 
Exhibit 15, and ask you if you received that dispatch ? 

A. Yes, I received it. 

83. Q. Did the receipt of this dispatch cause you to make any 
changes in your estimate of the situation as regards the intentions of 
the Japanese government as of this date? 

A. There Avas, in my opinion, a possibility of an aggressive move- 
ment, and the dispatch itself indicated an attack on the Philippines or 
Guam was a possibility. I felt that this required no action by me fur- 
ther than that which I had already taken and I did not stop the train- 
ing program. The Chief of Naval Operations felt that no change in 
the training program was desirable or required by the dispatch of 24 
November. 

84. Q. Did your estimate of the situation at this time of what the 
Japanese intentions might be, include a surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A, At this time I considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was 
a remote possibility. However, if Japan attacked the Philippines, a 
submarine attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected. 

85. Q. At the time of the receipt of this dispatch, did you take any 
additional security measures within vour command ? 

A. No. ■ 

[209] 8G. Q. Specifically, what did the words contained in this 
dispatch, and I quote, "a surprise, aggressive movement in any direc- 
tion" convey to you ? 

A. "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including 
an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility," is the wording 
of the dispatch. I thought when I received it that the surprise, 
aggresive movement in any other direction than the Philippines or 
Guam referred to a foreign territory. 

87. Q. The words "in any direction," then, did or did not include, 
so far as your estimate was concerned, the Hawaiian Islands? 

A. That is correct; only as regards submarine attack and not as 
regards an air attack. 

88. Q. Can you recall the next information that you received from 
any source which gave you any information on the change in United 
States-Japanese relations looking toward war? 

A. On 27 November 1941, I received the dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

89. Q. I I'efer you to Exhibit 17, which is now in evidence before 
the court, and ask you if that is the message that you refer to? 

A. Yes. ■ 

90. Q. Did you, as Commander-in-Chief, take any additional se- 
curity measures other than those that you have already stated were 
in effect in your command ? 

A. We ordered to Wake, one patrol squadron then at Midway, and 
it proceeded on 1 December, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en 
route. The patrol squadron at ISIidway was replaced by a patrol 
squadron from Pearl, which left Pearl the 3rd of November via 
Johnston Island, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route to John- 
ston, and also from Johnston to Midway. This patrol squadron made 



232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a daily search from Midway on 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 December. They 
were to make daily searches until further orders. We sent the 
ENTERPRISE to Wake with one Marine fighting squadron, which 
departed from Pearl on 28 November and landed the planes at Wake 
on 3 December. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance 
flights with its own planes. The patrol squadron at Wake was then 
withdrawn. It conducted a reconnaissance sweep en route Wake to 
Midway, and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl. The LEXING- 
TON proceeded to Midway with a VMF squadron, departing Pearl 
5 December. It conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own 
planes en route and was 400 miles southeast of Midwav when the war 
broke. The BURROUGHS was dispatched to Wake with additional 
forces and supplies, including radar, but was short of Wake when 
the war broke. She departed Pearl 29 November. We conducted 
daily reconnaissance flights with PB planes based on Pearl Harbor 
[300] to cover the Fleet operating areas and approaches thereto. 
On 27 November I issued an order that any submarine contacts in 
the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be depth 
bombed, and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations, as I have 
j)reviously noted. These dispositions of mine were well known to 
the- Navy Department, and Admii-al Stark testified before the Roberts 
Commission that he considered them sound; that he knew of them 
and considered them O. K. We had two sulimarines operating at 
Wake and two at Midway doing patrol duty. I issued orders for 
full security measures to be taken by ships in operating areas and 
at sea. In Pearl Harbor proper, the Commandant warned all of 
his anti-submarine patrol forces to take additional security measures 
against submarines. I have previously testified about the condition 
of the anti-aircraft batteries at this time. I would like at this time 
to tell the reasons that actuated me in issuing the order to bomb 
submarines in the operating area. In February of 1941, shortly after 
I took command of the Fleet, we had what the destroyer personnel 
who trailed this contact always insisted was a Japanese submarine. 
They had it under observation for, I think, about 48 hours, something 
over 48 hours. They got propeller noises, and I was much coiicernecl. 
I wrote out a dispatch telling them to bomb the submarine and my 
staff pointed out to me that that was not in accordance with orders 
and that we were forbidden to bomb submarines except in the de- 
fensive sea area which was about 3 miles from land. I made a com- 
plete, full report to the Chief of Naval Operations after this incident. 
Incidentally, I had 4 destroyers trailing the submarine contact. I 
was most unha])py while the destroyers were exposed in this way 
and I suggested that I would be delighted to give orders to bomb 
the submarines, any submarines contacted in the operating areas. 
That was in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. His answer 
came back by dispatch telling me not to bomb any submarine contacts 
in the operating area but to keep in effect the orders that had been 
issued by my j^redecessor. On four or five other occasions we had 
submarine contacts in the operating area. In September, after an- 
other one of these contacts which lasted for some time. I wrote an- 
other letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in which I said I would 
like to bomb the submarines, and was again informed that in case 
we got positive evidence that there was a submarine in the operating 
area it would be in order to make a protest to Japan, During all 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 233 

this time, and at various other times which I am not detailing- now, 
I felt that I was exposing these destroyers' crews to considerable 
danger, and when I got the dispatch of 27 Xovember I decided that 
I would go ahead and tell them to bomb all the submarine contacts. 
I got no answer to the information copy which I sent to the Chief 
of Naval Operations. The Pearl Harbor operating area was some 
2,000 miles from the nearest Japanese possession. I knew that if 
we sent any submarines into a Japanese operating area they wouldn't 
hesitate a moment to bomb them. I felt that any submarine op- 
erating submerged in the Pearl Harbor operating ^area should be 
bombed. I had felt it a long time, and I decided on 27 November 
to bomb them anyhow. 

[301] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, moved 
that that part of the ans^ver with reference to what he testified before 
the Roberts Connnission be stricken out. 

Neither the judge advocate nor any of the interested parties replied. 

The court directed that that part of the answer dealing with the 
testimony of the inerested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. 
Navy, before the Roberts Commission be stricken out. 

91. Q. Did the receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of 
November 27, 1941, in any way change your estimation of the situation 
in regard to Japanese intentions? 

A. My estimate of Japanese intentions after the receipt of this 
dispatch of November 27 was as stated in the dispatch, that a move 
would take place within the next few days in the form of an amphibi- 
ous expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or 
possibly Borneo. I estimated from this and all other information 
available to me that if the aggressive move eventuated against a U. S. 
possession, it would be made against the Philippines, and if it were 
made against the Philippines, I felt there was a very good chance 
that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area. 
I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility, and I did not 
expect an air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at" this time due to 
the tenor of the dispatches, the other information available to me, the 
clifficulties of making such an attack, and the latest information I had 
from the Navy Department and other sources was that the greater 
portion of the carrier forces were located in home waters. I con- 
sidered, of course, that one of the primary causes for the dispatch 
was, as stated, that negotiations had ceased.' Consequently, when the 
press indicated further conversations were continuing between the 
Japanese ambassadors and the State Department, the w^arning lost 
much of its force. I further assumed that no ultimatum had been 
given by the United States Government to Japan, because I had been 
niformed that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations 
had submitted a recommendation to the President that no such ulti- 
matum be delivered. I had no knowledge of the contents and tenor 
of the note handed by the Secretarv of State to the Japanese ambassa- 
dors on November IG until long after I returned to the United States. 
_ [302] 92. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 17, I quote: "This dispatch 
IS to be considered a w^ar warning." Did those words which I have 
aust quoted have any special significance to you ? 



234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I regarded that phrase as a characterization of specific intelli- 
gence which the message contained. 

93. Q. Did these words change in any manner your estimate of the 
imminence of a war with Japan ? 

A. The text which accompanied this phrase indicated that an 
aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days. 
This made the war with Japan closer than it had been before I re- 
ceived the message of November 27. Other statements in the dis- 
patch, however, directed my attention to specific localities in which 
the Navy Department apparently expected the attack to eventuate. 
The more cautious phrasing and the emphasis of measures contained 
in the War Department's messages and the precaution against taking 
measures which might alarm the civilian population, all lead me to 
the conclusion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor or anything other 
than a surprise submarine attack was most improbable. Of course, 
the surprise submarine attack could be in conjunction with an attack 
made on the Philippines. 

Examined by the court : 

94. Q. What do you mean by a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor ? 
A. I mean by that a mass submarine attack on the ships in the 

operating area. In this connection, I was using Pearl Harbor in the 
sense not only of the harbor itself but in the operating areas sur- 
rounding Oahu. 

Reexamined by the judge advocate : 

95. Q. Did you take any additional security measures as a result 
of the receipt of this dispatch of November 27, 1941 ? 

A. I already stated the additional security measures which I placed 
m effect upon the receipt of this dispatch, and they are much more 
convincing. 

96. Q. What naval officer was, under your existing plans as of 
November 27, 1941, responsible for the defense of the Pearl Harbor 
Naval Base ? 

A. The joint agreement with the Army — and it is prescribed in the 
Naval Coastal Defense Plan— makes the Army primarily responsible 
for the defense of Pearl Harbor. However, the forces supplied by 
the War Department to the Army were never adequate to perform 
this task properly. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District en- 
tered into certain agreements with the Army, looking to the best 
utilization of [303] both the Army and Navy forces available 
in Oahu. The War Department, in effect, admitted that they were 
unable to defend Pearl Harbor by not supplying sufficient long-range 
bombing planes and sufficient fighting planes and artillery of all de- 
scription to accomplish the task unaided. Admiral Block, with my 
approval, made these agreements with the Army, and with the security 
orders which I issued and which included 2CL-41 of October 14, 
looked to the utilization of every force, both Army and Navy, which 
was stationed in Hawaii or which, at the time, was in Pearl Harbor. 
I compiled and issued this order, 2CL-41, and specifically designated 
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense 
Officer of Pearl Harbor, who was charged in this order, as well as in 
the war plans, with coordinating the naval effort, which was to sup- 
plement the Army effort in defense of Pearl Harbor. He agreed to 
undertake distance reconnaissance, insofar as the planes available per- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 235 

mitted. Our agreement ^Tith the Army pooled the patrol planes under 
Navy commancl and the fighters under Army command. 

The question was repeated. 

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was the Naval Base 
Defense Officer and was responsible for coordinating the naval effort 
to supplement the Army effort in defense of the base. 

97. Q. Did you on receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of 
November 27, consult with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
on any measures of security to be adopted in the 14th Naval District 
that were different from any then in effect? 

A. Yes, I discussed this message with the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District. 

98. Q, Were any additional measures of securit}' deemed advisable 
as a result of this conversation? 

A. No. 

99. Q. Specifically, did you consider such a measure as having an 
air cover during morning twilight? 

A. By air cover, I presume you mean having fighter planes in the 
air during this period? 

100. Q. That is correct. 

A. That was considered, but inasmuch as the Army pursuit planes 
would remain in the air for only one hour without refueling and were 
restricted to flying within fifteen miles of land, this measure was not 
considered practical. 

101. Q. Was the condition of readiness of the Fleet in the Ha- 
waiian area changed in any manner as a result of the receipt of this 
message. Exhibit 17 ? 

A. The full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect. 
[304.] 102. Q. Did you consider a higher condition of readiness 
advisable at this time? 
A. For ships at sea ? 

103. Q. No, ships at Pearl Harbor? 

A. Yes, I considered it, but we didn't put any additional steps into 
effect. 

104. Q. Do you feel that the Fleet would have been more secure if, 
after November 27, you had adopted some such security measure as 
having all ships go to general quarters at an hour before sunrise? 

A. It might have been. In the light of what has happened, it was, 
of course, a precaution that perha]is should have been taken, but if 
I had considered an air raid on Pearl Harbor at this time imminent, 
there are many other steps which we would have taken. 

105. Q. From your naval experience, what is the most probable 
time of day to expect an air attack from carrier -based planes? 

A. If you are referring to Pearl Harbor, as I presume you are, 
I should say the most probable time is shortly after daylight, because 
that would give the aircraft a chance to complete their attack, return 
to the carriers during the daylight, and they would have a full dark 
period to get out of the range of the shore-based aircraft. That, how- 
ever, can be argued. That is merely my opinion. 

106. Q. You gave us some testimony this morning. Admiral, on 
the organization of the Army's aircraft warning system. I should 
like to have you summarize briefly at this point what the ge^ieral equip- 
ment was and the proficiency of the personnel in its operation ? 



236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I liave been informed thcat the personnel of the Army's aircraft 
warning system were green and untrained. The aircraft warning 
system and the radars were new. The equipment was not entirely 
adequate. The radar was limited in operation to a limited range, and 
the permanent station was incomplete. The warning net needed much 
polishing and adjustment to make it a real, efficient service. 

107. Q. What would be the range in miles from Oahu that a long- 
range reconnaissance flight would have to be flown to be effective 
against known Japanese carriers as of November 27, 1941? 

A. 800 miles. 

[305] 108. Q. In order to cover thoroughly a 360-degree arc, 
liow many patrol-type aircraft would have been necessary to cover 
this area ejfficiently at this range of 800 miles, the patrol to be flown 
once daily for, say, as long as ten days? 

A. Well, assuming 15 miles visibility, it Avould require 84 planes 
to make one flight and cover -S60 degrees, and to maintain a continu- 
out patrol would take anywhere from two-and-a-half to thi'ee times 
that number for search only. 

109. Q. What would you consider the most probable areas of ap- 
]u-oach for a surprise air attack launched from carriers against Pearl 
Harbor? 

A. I testified before the so-called Roberts Conunission that I 
thought the noi'thern sector was the most probable. I thought at the 
time that the aircraft had come from the north — the time I tesified 
I mean — and I didn't Avish to make alibis. However, I feel that 
there is no sector around Oahu which is much more dangerous than 
any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from 
any direction. Theie is no outlying land which prevents this, and 
you have got a 360-degree arc, minus the very small line which runs 
up along the Hawaiian cliain. From the southern, we have observa- 
tion stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the closest Japanese pos- 
session is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese 
carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. 1 would say tliat while 
all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would probably 
search the western 180-degree sector first. 

110. Q. In the dispatch of November 27 there is a directive: 
''Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry- 
ing out the tasks assigned in WPLf-46. On receipt of this dispatch 
what did those words mean to you? 

A. This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me. 
I decided that what was meant was something similar to the dispo- 
sition I had made on October 16, wdiich had been approved by the 
originator of both these dispatches, and I therefore made the dis- 
positions which I have outlined. 

111. Q. This dispatch of November 27 also contains the state- 
ment, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of con- 
ditions in the Pacific have ceased." Was this information in con- 
formance with any other information that you had, or was it con- 
trary to other information that you had? 

A. I had received several statements saying, as I recall, that con- 
versations had about reached an impasse, and on two or three occa- 
sions — all of which are in the record here — a statement w^as made 
that conversations were just about finished — just finishing, and this 
was news that conversations had actually ceased. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 237 

[S06] 112. Q. Did you see any notices in the i)ul)lie press or 
hear any radio hroadcasts wliich were contrary to this statement? 

A. Oh, subsequently, yes, that the conversations, at least, were 
continuino;. That w^as in the public press, and it came over the 
radio, and it was discussed among me and my staff and my principal 
advisors. I was in consultation during this period with Admiral 
Pye, Admiral Bloch, General Short, Admiral Brown, and Admiral 
Halsey. To be sure, Halsey went to sea on the 28th of November 
and made a trip to Wake and got back on the morning of the attack. 
BroAvn went out several days later, and I discussed the measures with 
him as well as with my staff — those and other things. I had adopted 
a policy whereby I showed my correspondence with the Navy Depart- 
ment, and, particularly, the letters which I received from the Chief 
of Naval Operations and all the dispatches, to the. officers that I 
have named, and insofar as they were available at my headc[uarters 
during this period, I showed them these dispatches and these letters 
and discussed the matters with them, and we certainly discussed the 
question of the apparent resumption of conversations between iSIr. 
Kurusu and Admiral Nomura and Secretary Hull. 

113. Q. Did this information which you had thus gleaned from 
public sources affect, in any way, your estimate of the situation in 
regard to the imminence of war between the United States and 
Japan ? 

A. Oh, yes, everything affected — All the information a man gets 
affects him in arriving at a decision. 

114. Q. Can you tell the court in what way this information 
affected the estimate which you had previously made regarding the 
iimninence of war with Japan? 

A. The attempt here to Hnd a distinction between negotiations 
and conversations was not apparent to me, and I thought that nego- 
tiations were continuing. They were having conversations. That, 
T think, is borne out by various evidence which we have. If negotia- 
tions had ceased, that means to me that they didn't have anything 
more to do with each other. 

115. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch of November 27, 
19-41, and up until the attack on Pearl Harbor at 0755 on the 7th of 
December, 1941, had you received any further official information 
from the Navy Department as to the progress or the status (;f nego- 
tiations with the Japanese? 

A. No. 

116. Q. In other words, the Navy Department had failed to say 
that negotiations were either continuing or had stopped? 

A. That is correct. I got a major part of by diplomatic informa- 
tion from the newspapers. 

\307] 117. Q. Do you mean to tell the court that you acted on 
newspaper infoi-mation in preference to official information supplied 
you by the Navy Department ? 

A. No, I make no such statement. 

118. Q. I show you Exhibit 18, which is a dispatch of November 
2G, 1041, and ask you if you will identify it for the court and state 
whether vou received it or not ? 

A. I did. 

119. Q. Will you say what it is? 



238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. This is a proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to trans- 
fer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve 
the marine planes for expeditionary duty. It goes into considerable 
details as to how we shall land the planes and says that planes will 
be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats, etc. 

120. Q. Do you consider the matter of stationing these twenty-five 
pursuit planes at Midway and a considerable number at Wake to be a 
directive or a suggestion? How do you consider that? 

A, I considered it as a suggestion, and in my letter of December 2, 
1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, which I request to be read to 
the court and placed in evidence, you will see the steps that we took 
and that we recommended. I replied to this dispatch by a dispatch 
of November 28, I think it w^as. Incidentally, at the same time, or 
during the same period in which I received this dispatch from the 
Navy Department, General Short received a dispatch from the War 
Department. In his dispatch the proposal was made to relieve the 
marine infantry units on the outlying islands with Army personnel. 
It also touched on the question of taking Army pursuit planes to put 
on the outlying islands instead of the Navy planes. This proposal, 
if carried out, would have meant that the Army transfer something 
similiar to a Marine defense battalion. They had nothing of the 
kind organized. It would have involved a great deal of transport and 
boat work, and at Wake, for instance, it took on an average of five 
or six days to unload a ship, due to the fact that the unloading had 
to be done in the open sea. On one occasion that I recall it took 
thirty days to unload a ship lying off Wake. We were making every 
effort to open a channel into the lagoon and permit the ships to go 
inside. That woi-k was proceeding at top speed when the attack 
came, but this proposal was made by the Navy Department, who were 
fully cognizant of these conditions which existed on the outlying 
islands, and the proposals in themselves were evidence — at least, some 
evidence to me — that the Navy Department did not expect any serious 
uj^sets in the outlying area. 

\308\ 121. Q. The time group of this dispatch of 26 November 
indicates that it was released to the Navy Department at what time, 
sir? 

A. 270038. 

122. Q. The dispatch of 27 November, Avhich is Exhibit 17 before 
this court, bears what date time group ? 

A. 2T2337. 

123. Q. Approximately how many hours later is this dispatch of 
27 November than the dispatch of 26 November? 

A. About 22 hours ; 23 hours. 

124. Q. About 23 hours? 
A. Yes. 

125. Q. In other words, the Navy Department, when it wrote the 
dispatch of 27 November, had cognizance of the suggestion to you in 
its dispatch of the day before regarding the transfer of planes to 
Midway and Wake. Is that not a fact ? 

A. I have every reason to think that is correct. 

126. Q. What means had you at the time of delivering pursuit or 
fighter planes to Midway or Wake from Oahu ? 

A. Pursuit planes had to be hoisted aboard the carriers at the flying 
field. Ford Island. They could be taken to within flying distance of 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY . 239 

the islands and the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force informed 
me at a conference that his planes could only fly 15 miles from shore, 
his pursuit planes could only fly 15 miles from shore. 

127. Q. Did that mean then, Admiral, that you had to send your 
carriers to an area approximately 15 miles from their destination be- 
fore 3"ou could deliver these planes ? 

A. If you followed what he said literally, yes. However, the pur- 
suit planes could be flown oif the carriers and could have landed on 
the flying fields at Midway and at Wake. Once on the flying fields 
at Midway and Wake, these planes could not again be flown off and 
landed on a carrier. They could not land one of the pursuit planes 
they had then on one of our carriers. They didn't have enough run 
for it. And that was another reason given in my letter of 2 December 
to the Navy Department why I thought it better to send Marine planes 
to the islands because I felt them, and so indicated, that the planes 
AYould probably have to be removed from the islands before war came. 
We had very limited facilities on these islands to maintain the planes 
at this time. And that was the reason we had delayed sending the 
planes out there until the last minute. In this letter I also stated the 
arrangements I had made for handling material for planes and 
ground crews at Wake and at Midwav and of the fact that I was 
sending the ENTERPRISE to Wake, and the LEXINGTON tc 
Midway, 

[o09] 128. Q. Would the dispatch of a carrier subsequent to 
November 26, 1941, to these areas for the purpose of delivering planes, 
involve the absence from Pearl Harbor for a period of some days of 
this carrier and her escort? 

A. Yes. 

129. Q. About how manv days would you estimate for the trip to 
Wake? 

A. My recollection is that Wake is some 2.000 miles from F'earl 
Harbor. Midway is about 1,100 Miles. Halsey, with the ENTER- 
PRISE, left on the 28th of November and would have arriv(3d back in 
Pearl Harbor on 7 December. 

130. Q. The Navy Department, after sending you this dispatch of 
27 November in which it mentioned the war warning and the fact that 
an aggressive action is expected within the next few days, didji't then 
give you any further instructions as regards dispatching this carrier 
toward Wake and Midway, did it? 

A. I sent a dispatch on 28 November telling what I was doing in 
regard to the transfer of these planes and as I recall it, recommending 
that no marines be relieved and no army be sent to the islands. 

131. Q. Did you report to the Navy Department that you were 
dispatching or had dispatched a carrier to Wake or Midway for the 
purpose of delivering planes in response to its suggestions of 26 
November ? 

A. I told the Nav yDepartment that I was dispatching a carrier to 
Wake on 28 November and that I expected to send another carrier 
with Marine planes to Midway later. 

132. Q. You say the Navy Department gave you no instructions 
as regards sending the carrier on its mission, as j^ou have stated you 
reported to them in your dispatch of 28 November? 

A. You mean did it stop me ? 



240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

133. Q. Yes. 
A. No. 

134. Q. Did tills situation that you haA^e described of having sug- 
gested to you sending carriers a long distance from their base have 
any influence on your estimate of the situation at the time, that is, 28 
November 1941, of the imminence of an attack by the Japanese on 
the United States i 

A. Every communication that I received from the Navy Depart- 
ment, and every bit of information that I had that })ore even remotely 
on this subject atfected me in some degree. This action by the Navy 
Department, which we have just been discussing, indicated that they 
did not expect much immediate activity in the Hawaiian area. 

The court then, at 4:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., August 
16, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 241 



PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INaUIEY 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944 
[SIO] IClea-enth Dat 

Xavy Department, 

Washhigton, D. C. 

The court met at 9 : 45 a. in. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navj^ (Ret). President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy ( Ret) , Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Jndge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the tenth day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

The judge advocate made the following statement : The judge ad- 
vocate at tliis time would request that the witness under examination 
at the end of yesterday's session be asked to resume his status as in- 
terested party, for the reason that the judge advocate desires to recall 
Admiral Schuirmann for the purpose of conducting further examina- 
tion into matters connected with the inquiry, which should be in- 
quired into at this time, for the reason that his testimony may have 
some bearing on witnesses whose return to duties in connection with 
the war effort are imperative and we can no longer afford to keep them 
in Washington. 

The court directed that the witness who was testifying at the close 
of yesterday's session resume his seat as interested party. 

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness \S11^ 
for the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate and was 
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

The court made the following announcement : During your cross- 
examination, when you were last on the stand, the court made a ruling 
w^hich pi-ohibited the counsel for Admiral Kinunel from continuing 
along a certain line of examination. The court now rescinds that 
ruling, and your cross-examination will be continued along those lines 
if the counsel so desires. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1. Q. Admiral, I refer you to a document entitled "Peace and War", 
which is an official State Department publication, and which the court 
was requested to take judicial knowledge of, and the court announced 
that it would. I refer you to a document printed on page 823 of this 
publication, and ask you if you can identify it. 

A. I can identify it to the extent that I have seen it before, yes, 
and more or less recall that such a note was sent, and the contents, 

2. Q. "Wliat is the title of this document as set forth in the publica- 
tion? 

A. Memorandum regarding the conversation between Under-Secre- 
tary of State Welles and the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and 
Mr. Kurusu, on the 2nd day of December 1941. 

3. Q. Adverting to this document, I will request you to read to the 
court for the purpose of inserting into the record the statement of 
the Under Secretary of State Welles, and the reply of the Japanese 
Ambassador. 

A. (Reading) : 

I have received reports during tlie past days of continuing; Japanese troop 
movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and 
material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by .Japan in Indochina. 
It was my clear understanding that Ijy the terms of the" agreement — and there 
is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement — between Japan 
and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces 
permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very 
considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing 
of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the 
utilization of these forces by Japan for purpose of further aggression, since 
no such number of forces could possii)ly be required for the policing of that 
region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands ; 
against the jnany islands of the East Indies ; against Biu-ma ; against IMalaya 
or eitlier through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose 
of undertaking the occupation of [312] Thailand. Such new aggression 
would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken 
against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and" has been repeatedly 
stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the 
Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inqure at once of the Japanese 
Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and 
what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demon- 
strated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This 
Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of 
the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroach- 
ment upon the teri'itory and rights of free and independent peoples through 
the utilization of military steps of the same charactei*. It is for that reason 
and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to 
know tlie intention of the Japanese Government. 

The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese 
Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter 
but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his 
Government. 

4. Q. Admiral, in your duties as liaison officer with the State De- 
partment, had the subject matter of this note been brought to your 
attention ? 

A, I cannot recall definitely, but I presume, in view of the close 
liaison maintained, I was aware of the fact that such a note had 
been handed to the Japanese. 

5. Q. Then you would not have any present recollection as to 
whether or not the information contained in this note had been com- 
municated to the Chief of Naval Operations by you? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 243 

A. No. 

6. Q. Adverting to your testimony when you were before the court 
at a previous session, you named certain individuals that were present 
when you and Admiral Stark were in his office about 9:o0 on the 
morning of 7 December 1941. I would ask j'ou to re-state, to the 
best of your ability and recollection, the officers wdio w^ere there present 
at that time, in addition to yourself and Admiral Stark? 

A. To the best of my recollection, Captain Turner and Admiral 
Wilkinson. I cannot place definitely whether they were there at 9 : 30 
or later. Admiral Ingersoll was in and out of the office during that 
morning. 

7. Q. Would you please re-state your best estimate of the [313^ 
time that Admiral Stai'k came into his office. 

A. My best estimate is 9 : 30. 

8. Q. At the time he came into his office, had there been any infor- 
mation received from the War Department with reference to the 
Japanese-American situation; from the War Department, I ask? 

A. None that I remember of, no. 

9. Q. While you were present at the office did any such informa- 
tion arrive ? 

A. From the War Department? 

10. Q. From the War Department. 
A. None that I remember. 

11. Q. Did any such information arrive from any officer of the 
War Department? 

A. None that I recall. ^ 

12. Q. As I remember your testimony of the other day, this informa- 
tion was in your possession at 0930, or arrived in your possession 
shortly after 0930, as to certain information which was in the posses- 
sion of the War Department relative to the status of the Japa- 
nese-American diplomatic situation. Do I remember correctly ? 

A. As I recall my testimony, the only thing that I stated which 
might be of that nature was the telephone conversation betw^een Gen- 
eral Marshall and Admiral Stark. I presume that this was available 
in the War Department, the same information that I mentioned and 
which formed the basis of General Marshall's telephone conversation. 

13. Q. Did you not, at your last appearance before this court, tell 
us in substance that which you gleaned, or what you deemed to be the 
subject matter of this conversation between General Marshall and 
Admiral Stark? 

A. That is correct. 

14. Q. I show you Exhibit 48, which is now in evidence before this 
court and ask you to read to yourself the substance thereof. Can 
you recall whether or not the substance of the subject matter set out 
in Exhibit 48 was or was not the subject matter of the conversation 
between General Marshall and Admiral Stark, as you then under- 
stood it? 

A. I presume that that message was sent following the conversa- 
tion with Admiral Stark, and that, as I recollect, the information on 
which the message was based was in possession of the Navy Depart- 
ment and Admiral Stark. 

15. Q. Did you yourself know about this general subject matter 
at that time? 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. As I recollect, I did not. 

Note: Question ]8, and the answer thereto, have, by direction of 
the court, been extracted from the following page, page 814, and 
placed on page 314-A, which has been deposited with the Secretary 
of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national secu- 
I'ity and the successful prosecution of the w'ar. 

[3W] 16. Q. Prior to Admiral Stark's arrival in the Navy 
Department at or about 0930, did you mnke any attempt to conuuuni- 
mate the information you had on this subject matter? 

A. Prior to his arrival, no. I reached the Department, as I recol- 
lect, about 0900 o'clock, and Admiral Stark came in about 9 : 30. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did 
not desire to cross-examine this w-itness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

17. Q. Referring to "Peace and AVar'*, the same volume from which 
you read, I read a paragraph on page 847, which is a paragraph of a 
radio address delivered by Presiclent Roosevelt from Washington on 
December 9, 1941 (reading) : 

Your (ioverninent knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if 
•Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in the dividing 
of spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that 
if she came in she would get complete and perpetual control of tlie whole Pacific 
area, and that means not only the Far East, not only all of the islands in the 
Pacific, but also a strangle hold on the west coast of North, Central, and South 
America. 

In your capacity as liaison officer betw^een the Navy Department and 
State Department, did you know, prior to 7 December 1941, the infor- 
mation stated by the President on December 9, 1941, in his public 
address, wdiich I have just read to you? 

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no. 

18. Q. (SEE NOTE AT BOTTOM OF PAGE 313.) 

19. Q. Did you tell the Chief of Naval Operations of the informa- 
tion concerning that subject matter which you acquired? 

A. No, but it would have been conveyed to him in the normal course 
of events, by Commander Kramer. 

20. Q. Did you have any conversations with Admiral Stark on that 
subject matter? 

A. No conversation that I can recall. I feel sure that Admiral Stark 
did receive this information. 

21. Q. Did you interpret this information as indicating a time 
when Japan would initiate a military offensive? 

A. It is difficult for me to determine just how I evaluated the infor- 
uiation at that time, because of events which have transpired since 
and w4iich may lead me to believe that I placed a certain interpreta- 
tion on it when at the time I did not. To the best of my recollection 
I believed that wdien the negotiations ended there would be a rupture 
of diplomatic relations, possibly a military move by Japan, but that 
such a move would not necessarily be directecl against the United 
States. 

[.i'7-5] 22. Q. On or prior to December 6, was there information 
in the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States? 

A. None that I know; no positive information of that character, 
that Ja])an would attack the United States. 



PR0CEP]U1NGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 245 

2^1 Q. Was there any information from which you estimated Japan 
would attack the United States? 

A. None that came to my attention of such a definite character, that 
Japan would attack the United States. 

24. Q. Or any United States' possession? 

A. Or any United States' possession. There was infornuition, I 
})elieve, but I cannot be positive, that Japan would sever diplomatic 
relations with the United States. 

25. Q. If a foreign nation — and this is a hypothetical question — 
if a foreign nation, during a period of strained diplomatic relations, 
manifested marked interest in the movement and location of units of 
the United States Fleet at a specific Fleet base, would not those cir- 
cumstances lead to the opinion that the base in question was a likely 
place for such foreign nation to attack in the event of war? 

A. It would depend in my opinion as to the detailed information. 
If the period of strained relations existed, and that nation was to 
embark on a military expedition, say into Indochina, which might in 
her opinion be opposed by the United States, she would be interested 
in knowing the location and movements of all the armed forces of the 
United States, particularly the Fleet, in order that she could evaluate 
whether or not any move by the United States to oppose by force her 
movement against a third power was under way. If the detailed loca- 
tions of the ships within the harbor was a question of which the 
hypothetical power was concerned, it might indicate that an attack 
on that particular place was under consideration. 

26. Q. Was there information in the Navy Department, Admiral, 
prior to 6 December 1941, that Japan was manifesting interest in the 
movements and location, not only generally, but in Pearl Harbor, of 
the units of the United States Fleet? 

A. In answering this question I wish to make plain that whether 
or not I knew in December that such information was available in 
the Department, I do not now recollect. I have ascertained that cer- 
tain information on that subject was in the Navy Department about 
the 5th or 6th of December. 

1^16'] 27. Q. Will you look at Exhibit 48, which you read a 
moment ago. Was any of the information set forth in Exhibit 48, 
which is the dispatch from General Marshall to Hawaii on Sunday — 
was any of the information contained in Exhibit 48 available in the 
Navy Department ? 

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, all of it was. 

28. Q. AVas any of it available in the Navy Department prior to 
7 December ? 

A. I do not know whether any of it — I do not recollect whether 
any of it was available prior to 7 December, or not. I believe that 
part of the information, the first item, was available on the 7th of 
December, and the second item of information was available prior to 
that date, perhaps on the 6th of December. 

29. Q. Do you know whether any portion of the information in that 
dispatch that was available in the Navy Department prior to 7 De- 
cember was distributed to responsible officials in the Navy Department 
or in the Government when received ? 

A. I don't know. 

30. Q. I understood you to testify on the occasion of your previous 
appearance that you had no recollection of anyone in the Navy De- 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

partment telling the State Department on Sunday morning, 7 De- 
cember, of the subject matter of the discussions between you and Ad- 
miral Stark and whoever else may have been present? 

A. The subject matter of discussion, you mean, about the note? 

31. Q. Yes. 

A. I did not tell the State Department, but I am sure that the State 
Department was informed. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Examined by the court : 

32. Q. Admiral, for a number of years prior to December 1941, was 
it not a matter of common knowledge that Japan made a point of ob- 
serving the movement of the United States Fleet units whenever 
possible ? 

A. That was the general belief throughout the Navy. 

33. Q. Have you not personally observed Japanese merchant vessels 
in the vicinity of the United States Fleet when the said Fleet was ma- 
neuvering ? 

A. I do not know whether I personally observed, but during Fleet 
maneuvers there were reports generally received that merchant ships 
or Japanese tankers were in the vicinity for the purpose of observing. 

[317] 34. Q. Admiral, do we understand that you were the 
liaison officer between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State 
Department ? 

A. Yes; may I add, I did not transmit information — I mean per- 
sonally transmit all the information. There was a system set up 
whereby a courier went to the State Department with items of naval 
intelligence, which were matters of general information. Then if 
there was to be a discussion of that information, then I did the dis- 
cussing of it with the State Department, unless it was done on a higher 
level. 

35. Q. As the court remembers, you stated that you made a daily 
memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations as to wliat had transpired 
in the State Department that day ? 

A. No, sir. I did not make a daily memorandum. Sometimes I 
would go in and just relate, after a visit to the State Department, to 
the Chief of Naval Operations what had occurred. 

36. Q. But that was the daily custom; is that correct? 

A. I couldn't say it was a daily custom. Admiral, There were no 
regularity about the visits. If I thought it was necessary to go over 
there, I might go three times a day. Then maybe there' would be a 
day or so elapse when there was no occasion to go, 

37. Well, during this interval between 27 November and 7 Decem- 
ber, you had daily contacts and made daily reports ; is that correct ? 

A. Practically daily, sometimes oftener ; some days it would be two 
or three times, 

_ 38, Q, And these reports and conversations were discussing ques- 
tions regarding Japan ? 

A, Most of them, yes, 

39. Q. In this note or letter you just read, of December 2, regarding 
conversations of Mr, Welles with the Japanese representatives, did 
you discuss that with the Chief of Operations ? 

A. I cannot state definitely whether I did or not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 247 

40. Q. Will 3'ou please state to the court the system by which Chief 
of Operations received reports from the State Department relative to 
our relations with Japan ? 

A. The Chief of Naval Operations — I presume you mean this par- 
ticular period, 27 of November to 7 December? 

41. Q. That's right. 

A. I think the Chief of Naval Operations received it sometimes 
direct from Secretary Hull via telephone. I think he received certain 
information from the Secretary of the Navy, after conferences that 
he held with Secretary Hull. If [31S] matters of this nature 
were discussed in cabinet meetings, which I presume they were, he was 
undoubtedly informed by the Secretary of the Navy, although I was 
never present when the Secretary did inform him. I informed him 
during this period, verbally, of the meeting I attended on this subject 
with the State Department. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, w^ithdrew. 

42. Q. Do we understand that during that period, November 27 to 
December 7, you informed him and conversed with him regarding 
negotiations being carried on with Japan by the State Department? 

A. That is correct, sir. 

The proceedings following. Page 318-A; questions 43, 44, 45 and 
the answers thereto, have, by direction of the court, been extracted 
from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This 
action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful 
prosecution of the war. 

[oW] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to 
examine this witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ- 
ous questioning. 

The witness stated he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

The court then, at 10 : 30 a. m., took a recess until 10 : 45 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the 
interested parties, and their counsel. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, a wit- 
ness for the judge advocate, was recalled and warned that the oath 
perviously taken by him was still binding. 

The proceedings following. Page 320, Question Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive, 
have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and 
deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the 
interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war. 

[32r\ 6. Q. The court understands, of course, that through your 
liaison officer you were in daily touch with the State Department, 
and that you had other means of having knowledge of any conver- 
sations that went on ? 

A. That is right; we were in daily liaison with the State De- 
partment. 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. Q. In your answers to these questions regarding negotiations, 
will you please explain to the court your ditferentiation between 
conversations and negotiations? 

A. Well, I would say that negotiations might flow from con- 
versations. Two parties might get together and talk things over 
without coming to any agreement as to what, for example, they 
might send their respective governments. The line, I would say, 
Avould be a rather fine one, but negotiations would mean to me, tak- 
ing some action on conversations. 

8. Q. But did you understand that from November 27th to De- 
cember 7th there were conversations going on between these respective 
representatives? 

A. I do not recall learning of continued conversations, or at least 
nothing definite which, to my mind, changed the information which 
I had sent to the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific on 27 Novem- 
ber, except, as I have previously testified, tliat I had been informed 
of in this court. 

9. Q. It has been testified before this court that the note which 
was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese representative 
on 26 November was an incident which was a matter of general 
knowledge in the Navy Department. Are we correct in understand- 
ing that you had no knowledge whatsoever of this note? 

A. I do not recall having seen the note, or the extent of it. I may 
have been told by mj^ liaison officer, but the distinct impression that 
I had when I sent my dispatch was that we had come to an impasse. 

10. Q. Do we understand that you had no knowledge of the con- 
tents of this note of 26 November up to and even inunediately sub- 
sequent to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. May I ask if that is the note which was given me here to read? 

11. Q. That is the note of the 26th of November wdiich told Japan 
our condition's for her maintaining relations with this country, 
specifying that she would give up Indo-China, withdraw her troops 
from China, and really revert to her status quo prior to the capture of 
Manchukuo ? 

A. I wouldn't say that I had no infornnition. I have stated that 
I do not recall this note definitely. I have also testified to the fact — 
though I couldn't remember the date — that I understood a further 
dispatch might be sent to Japan. 

[322] 12. Q. The reason that these questions are being asked 
is that if we remember correctly you stated when you were before 
this court that the first knowledge that you had ever had of this 
note was when it was shown to you at this court. 

A. That is right. In enswer to the ])revious question, I was re- 
ferring to testimony which I gave and in which I said my remem- 
brance of it w^as hazy ; that the President was putting, or might put, 
before Japan some sort of a proposition looking to letting her have 
certain raw materials if, in turn, she would do certain things. The 
note, I do not recall having seen. 

13. Q. Or the contents^ thereof ? 

A. Or its contents. 

Cross-examined bv the interested ])artv. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy : 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 249 

14. Q. Admiral Stark, concerning the shreds of information which 
may have been bronght to yonr attention and which you do not recall 
now: Do you recall at any time during the period w^hich followed 
27 NovemlDer having any thought that in consequence of that infor- 
mation you should amend your dispatch of 27 November? 

A. I do not. 

The interested parties, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.) and Admiral Chiude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) did 
not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the 
previous questioning. 

The witness made the following statement : I can think of nothing 
further to give the court. I do have a statement which I would 
like to make and then I should like to verify my testimony before 
the court. There are one or two more or less unimportant changes 
but in the interest of clarification I should like to put them before 
the court. They are short and will only take a few- minutes. 

The court granted permission to make the statement. 

The witness made the following statement : In reading over my 
testimony I noted a considerable space devoted to questions on mes- 
sages which, because of their secrecy, have been made exhibits before 
this court. I feel that I ought to make a further statement to the 
court on this matter. The line of questioning on certain messages 
which [3£S] I did not recall and still have no recollection of 
having seen furnishes certain indications to an elert enemy which 
might be of vital interest to him were he to obtain such information. 
Should tJie secret chissification of the proceedings of this court be 
removed, or should a copy of those proceedings or information gained 
therefrom come into the possession of persons unfriendly to this coun- 
try while the present war with Japan is still in progress, these certain 
questions which were asked me might suggest enough to the enemy to 
be definitely injurious to our present and continuing war effort. From 
past experience I find myself in complete agreement with the opinion 
that Admiral Kimmel has already expressed on the record before this 
court that it is obvious that in due time proceedings of this court and 
all of the evidence it might have secured Avill be a matter of open 
record available to the public. I therefore feel it my duty as a re- 
sponsible naval officer and as a former Chief of Naval Operations with 
knowledge of many of the intelligence activities of my subordinates to 
suggest for the court's consideration that that part of the record which 
would in any way identify material now held so secret that it has been 
denied this court be taken out of the record and placed in a top secret 
status which will absolutely preclude any leak and reference thereto. 

The judge advocate stated as follows: The judge advocate is in 
concurrence with the statement of the interested party. Admiral Stark, 
and he feels that if counsel for the other interested ]:)arties are willing 
to stipulate that these matters be deleted from the record and filed 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in a secure place with due reference to them so that they may be seen 
by proper authorities on demand, that the record might be, with the 
consent of the court, so written up. 

The court announced that the questions were not objected to and 
would not be taken out of the record. 

The witness stated that he had read over the testimony given by 
him on the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth days 
of the trial and that he desired to make the following corrections in 
his testimony : 

In the fourth line I desire to change "dispatch" to "information". 
I would like to amend the last two sentences to read, "Now that, in 
itself, did not exclude an attack on the Hawaiian Islands; the dispatch 
referred to didn't include them specifically because they were not men- 
tioned in the information we had of Japanese naval and military move- 
ments. Feeling, however, that we should be on guard against the 
jDossibility of an attack coming from any direction, I wrote the words 
'in any direction' into that dispatch myself. I remember it very 
distinctly." 

[324] On the same page, Question 138, change "on mentioning" 
to "or mention" ; and change the word "Atlantic" to "Asiatic". 

On the next page. Question 142, the answer to the question, change 
"he was ready" to '^he needed". 

On Page 76, Question 252, insert after the word "any" in the first 
line, the words "other than official dispatches". Change the second 
sentence to read, "I have no further personal letters on file". 

On the same page. Page 76, Question 253, insert period after the 
words "Pearl Harbor" and change the second sentence to read, ' 'I may 
add that I told Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, that if 
Japan attacked the United States, we would break them before we got 
through, regardless of how long it took". 

On Page 85, Question 279, in next to the last line, change the word 
"most" to "mostly". 

On Page 106, Question 403, in the fifth line from the bottom, change 
the words "was ready" to "needed". 

On Page 114, Question 444, strike out "yes" and substitute "as I 
recall". 

On Page 143, Question 660, in the third line, change the words "war 
warning" in the third line, to "aggressive movement". 

On Page 158, Question 626, delete the second sentence. 

On Page 168, Question 706, change the answer to read, "I was in- 
formed that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to present 
a note to the State Department at exactly 1300". 

None of the parties objected to the corrections as made. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court infoi-med the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec- 
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous 
questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness resumed his seat as an interested party. 

[S^S] The court then, at 11 : 30 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 35 
a. m., at which time it reconvened. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 251 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested 
parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, 
whose counsel was present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness 
under examination when the adjournment was taken on Tuesday, 
August 15, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the 
oath previously taken was still binding. 

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

135. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the dispatch of November 
28, 1941. Will you examine this dispatch and state briefly what it is 
and whether or not you received it ? 

A. Yes, I received that dispatch. 

136. Q. Will you state briefly the subject matter of it? 

A. This informs the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific of certain 
instructions sent by the Army to the Commander, Western Defense 
Command, and it adds certain admonitions on the part of the Navy 
Department. 

137. Q. Did this dispatch convey to you any information which 
differed materially from the dispatch of 27 November 1941 from the 
Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. Not materially, no. It stressed that no hostile action should be 
taken against Japan, that Japan should be permitted to commit the 
first overt act and not to alarm the civil population. It also directed a 
report of measures taken, and I knew such a report had been sub- 
mitted. 

138. Q. Did these so-called admonitions, as I believe you expressed 
them, influence your estimate of the situation on the imminence of war 
between the United States and Japan ? 

A. As I have stated before, every bit of information I received, 
which I considered in any way reliable, affected my estimate. 

139. Q. Specifically, did this information change any estimate that 
you had made on the innninence of war between the United States and 
Japan ? 

A. No, I can't say it materially affected my estimate. 

[326] 140. Q" After November 27, 1941, did you know the con- 
dition of alert that had been set by the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department, so far as his command was concerned? 

A. I knew on the 27th of November that the Army had gone on an 
alert. It was re]3orted to me by members of my staff that an alert status 
had been taken by the Army. 

141. Q. Do you know what this alert was? 
A. I did not at that time. 

142. Q. Well, do you know the condition of readiness which had 
been j^rescribed for vessels of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor between 
November 27 and December 7, 1941, and if you do, state what it was? 

A. I have previously testified that the vessels in Pearl Harbor were 
in condition three, as specified in 2CLf-41. I have also testified that, 
in addition to this condition, all the battleships manned about one- 
fourth of their anti-aircraft battery continuously. 

143. Q. Did the condition of readiness, as prescribed, meet with your 
approval ? 

A. Yes. 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

144. Q. I show you Exhibit 2U, which is the dispatch of the Chief of 
Naval Operations of December 3, 1041. I ask you to examine it and 
state whether or not you received it. 

A. Yes, I received that. 

145. Q. Will you state, in general, what the subject matter of this 
dispatch is? 

A. The subject matter of this dispatch is that instructions were sent 
to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hono- Kong, Singapore, 
Batavia, and Manila to destroy their important and secret documents. 

146. Q. How did the information contained in this dispatch influ- 
ence any estimate of the situation you had prior to its receipt as to the 
imminence of war between the United States and Japan? 

A. This was another indication that some move was contemplated 
by Japan. It did not change my estimate made as a result of the re- 
ceipt of the dispatch on the 27th of November. I felt that this was a 
step which Japan might well take, no matter in which direction she 
was going, to prevent the seizure of these documents upon the breaking 
of diplomatic relations. 

147. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations under date of December 4, 1941, and ask you to 
read this dispatch and state the substance of it to the court. 

A. This is a dispatch to the naval station at Guam, [3i27] di- 
lecting them to destroy their secret and confidential publications, ex- 
cept those that were essential for current purposes, and this meant to 
me that at probably the most exposed outpost we were anticipating 
anything that might happen as a general precautionary measure. 

148. Q. I show you Exhibit 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations dated December 6, 1941. I ask you to read it and 
state the substance. 

A. This is a dispatch sent by OpNav to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet. This is a deferred dispatch, incidentally. It says that, 
in view of the international situation and the exposed position of the 
outlying Pacific islands, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
was authorized to have them destroy their secret and confidential docu- 
ments, now or under later conditions, of greater emergency. Also to 
retain the means of communication of current operations and special 
intelligence. I have been informed that the view of the Registered 
Publication Section of the Navy Department was that we had sent too 
many secret codes to these outlying islands, and they were concerned 
about their destruction, because they felt that they had many more 
codes on the outlying islands than there was any real need for, and I 
am inclined to think that the Registered Publication Section was 
correct. 

149. Q. Can you recall whether you received this dispatch. Exhibit 
22, prior to the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I cannot state positively. I presume I did receive it prior to the 
attack. 

150. Q. Can you recall. Admiral, whether or not you communicated 
the substance of these dispatches, Exhibits 21 and 22, relative to the 
destruction of codes, to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment prior to the Japanese attack on December 7? 

A. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of all dis- 
patches in which I though he would have the slightest interest. I did 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 253 

not myself direct tliat tliese dispatches be delivered to him. If he 
states that he did not see them, I presume he is correct. 

151. Q. Between November 27 and December 7, 11)41, were yon re- 
ceivinff any information of a diplomatic or military nature from your 
own intellio^ence unit in the Hawaiian area concerning matters v.-hich 
might have a bearing on the imminence of war? 

A. Yes. I have testified that I ?-eceived these dispatches, and once 
each day the Fleet Intelligence Oliicei" presented a summary of in- 
formation received during the past twenty-four hours and his estimate 
of how this affected decisions made at this conference. When the 
Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division did not actu- 
ally attend, this information \--'^^] ^^"^s always made available 
to them, and it was added to whatever we had formerly received, to 
complete the picture and make such changes as we considered necessary. 

152. Q. Can you recall whether or not this information which you 
received from your own intelligence unit added to or modified in any 
material manner the information you had received from the Navy 
Department between November 27 and December 7, 1941 ? 

A. My recollection is that the tenor of the newspaper articles, radio 
and other news items indicated that conversations were going on in 
Washington between the -Tapanese and the United States. I should 
say the priucii)al thing that we got from my own intelligence imit 
had to do with the movements of Japanese ships, and there was nothing 
in these reports which indicated an expedition aimed at Honolulu 
ov Pearl Harbor. We watched this very closely and went over the 
probabilities from time to time — I mean, daily, not from time to time — 
and that was my conclusion. 

] 53. Q. I show you Exhibit 48. which is in evidence before this court. 
It is a dispatch from General Marshall to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Depai'tment, among others, and ask you to state to the court, 
in general, the subject matter of this dispatch. 

A. This was a dispatch sent on the 7th of December, and it states 
that Japan is presenting what amounts to an ultimatum at one o'clock, 
that they are imder orders to destroy their code machines immediately, 
and just what significance the hour set may have, they do not know. 

154. Q. Can you state when vou received this dispatch if you ever 
did? 

A. It was brought to me some time in the afternoon of December 7. 
It was presented to me by a courier — a captain, I think, in the Army. 
I told him it wasn't of the slightest interest to me at that time, and 
I threw the thing in the waste basket. 

155. Q. Adverting to the information contained in Exhibit 48 and 
recalling the informiiti(m that you had up to the time of the Japanase 
attack, v.hat additional information do you feel that this dispatch, 
Exhibit 48, would have given you which you did not have at the time? 

A. In view of the fact that Japan w^as presenting an ultimatum to 
the United States at exactly one o'clock Washington time, which is 
approximately sunrise or early daylight in Honolulu, and midnight 
in Manila, I feel that had I had this information., we would have im- 
mediately assumed the [329] highest conditions of readiness, 
at least, until this time appointed was well in the past. That was 
most definite information. I must at this time say that it is easy to 
fall into an error of saying what I would have done after the fact, and 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

when you ask me and when the members of the Roberts Commission 
asked me what I woukl have done, I must add I cannot answer that. 
I can only answer what I now think I woukl have done, which might 
be different from what I would have done. 

156. Q. I refer again to Exhibit 19, which is the dispatch from the 
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet as one of the information addressees, and which is the dispatch 
in which the Chief of Naval Operations states that there is an injunc- 
tion contained in it to the effect that the United States desires that 
Japan commit the first overt act. Could this injunction have any 
influence on your decision to have conducted long-range reconnais- 
sance ? 

A. No, I don't think that had any particular influence on my de- 
cision as to the conduct of long-range reconnaissance. It was my firm 
conviction that any long-range reconnaissance we conducted over an 
extended period of time would destroy the means that I had, due to the 
destruction of planes and putting them out of commission. It has 
been estimated by competent aviators that, in view of the practical 
absence of spare parts for the patrol planes in Hawaii at that time 
and the limited repair facilities, thirty days' operation of these planes 
would have reduced them by not less than twenty-five per cent. That 
is. twenty-five per cent of them would have been out of commission. 

157. Q. If you are sending out long-distance reconnaissance planes 
under circumstances in which you might expect to encounter a hos- 
tile force, would you arm those patrol planes? 

A. Oh, under my orders to permit Japan to commit the first overt 
act, technically, I could not fire a shot at a Japanese Fleet until after 
they had first shot at us, and also, technically, had I sent out patrol 
planes armed, I would have had to wait until the enemy fired at these 
patrol planes or committed some other overt act before I could do 
anything more than protest. It has been testified, I believe, that a 
Japanese carrier force approaching within 1,000 miles of Oahu would 
have been properly considered as an overt act. I had no such in- 
formation prior to December 7, 1941. 

158. Q. But, Admiral, if your planes were out there on reconnais- 
sance and were attacked, would it not be your desire that they be in a 
jjosition to defend themselves? 

A. Oh, if I had sent them out, and when I did send them out, they 
were armed. 

[SSO] 159. Q. Would the arming of these planes on the recon- 
naissance flights before an act of war had been committed been any 
source of alarm to the civil populace? 

A. No, because we had been arming them constantly. 

Counsel for the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim- 
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that the judge advocate should clarify 
what he meant by armed planes. 

The judge advocate replied that the interested party would have 
a right to clarify any questions he desired on cross-examination. 

160. Q. What percentage of the officers and men were permitted 
to be away from their ships in a liberty or leave status on the night of 
the 6th and 7th of December, 1941 ? 

A. Those ships which were in Pearl Harbor 

161. Q. I had reference to those in Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 255 

A. We granted the regular liberty, and the Fleet orders in effect 
at that time required one-fourth of the officers and one-half the men 
to be aboard at all times. My orders provided that each quarter of 
the crew should be trained and capable of manning the anti-aircraft 
guns on cruisers and battleships, so that there was a complete and 
trained crew for all anti-aircraft guns and air control on board at 
all times. On the destroyers, this was provided for on the basis of 
a watch in three. At the time of the attack there was some ninety 
per cent, by count, of the enlisted men actually on board on all ships 
and around seventy per cent of the officers. 

162. Q. Had you heard any rumors, or do you know of any state- 
ments in the public press as to the number of officers and men who 
were unfit for duty on the morning of December 7, 1941, because of 
previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor? 

A. I caused an investigation to be made of this matter, in order 
to present the data to the Roberts Commission. The number of men 
under the influence of alcohol on the night of December 6 was incon- 
sequential. There were no officers in this condition, and there was 
no evidence of the after effects of liquor on any individual man at 
the time of the attack — nothing that affected his performance of duty. 
As a result of the investigation I ordered, these facts were determined. 

163. Q. What was your estimate prior to the Japanese attack on 
December T, 1941, of the capacity of the Army to defend the Naval 
Base at Pearl Harbor with regard to an air attack by torpedo planes? 

A. I didn't think that the torpedo plane attack would be made, 
because I didn't believe that aerial torpedoes would [331] run 
in Pearl Harbor. We did not give this a great deal of consideration, 
for that reason. However, we had this problem in the Fleet at sea, 
and the best defense against them is, I believe, the fighter planes to 
knock them down before they can get in to a point where they drop 
the torpedoes. The anti-aircraft guns at that time were not anywhere 
near as numerous as they should have been, and they weren't nearly 
as efficient then as they are now, either on shore or afloat. The best 
defense that the Army had against aerial torpedo attack in Pearl 
Harbor were their pursuit planes, and I don't think they were suffi- 
cient. They didn't have a sufficient number of planes nor crews for 
them, according to my information, and the crews were not well 
trained. 

164. Q. As against the number of pursuit ships the Army had avail- 
able, what was your estimate of the additional number that would 
have been required to have prevented a successful torpedo plane 
attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, in Pearl Harbor? 

A. About three times that number. 

165. Q. Did you know the condition of alert that had been set 
by the Army for its aircraft and aircraft defense during the period 
from November 27 to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. No, I didn't know in detail. 

166. Q. Am I to understand from that statement that no Army 
authorities notified you of that fact ? 

A. I knew the Army was on an alert, which corresponded, in gen- 
eral, to the alert status assumed by the Navy. I did not inquire into 
the particular details, as I did not consider that important under 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the conditions of readiness which we were maintaining in November 
and the general situation. 

107. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on the morning of 
December 7, 1941, know what condition of alert w^as being maintained 
in the Army's aircraft warning system ? 

A. My answer is covered in the previous question. I had been 
informed that the aircraft warning system w^as being manned but did 
not inquire into the details of the watch standing. I have testified 
that I knew this was a new system and needed training. 

168. Q. Were any of the ships which were present in Pearl Harbor 
at the time of the Japanese attack on the morning of December 7, 
1941, equipped with radar? 

A. Yes. 

169. Q. Do you know whether or not these instruments were being 
manned prior to the attack ? 

A. We did not require the ships in Pearl Harbor to man their 
radar, because due to the surrounding hills in that port, the radar of 
those ships so located was virtually useless. 

[M2] 170. Q. Were any battle lookouts stationed on the ships 
of the Fleet in the condition of readiness you have described that they 
were maintaining on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941? 

A. To the best of my knowledge, they had battle lookouts, yes. 
The crews of the guns themselves were on watch. 

171. Q. Did you have any complaints prior to December 7, 1941, 
as to the communication system which existed between your own 
command and that of the Army in the Hawaiian area? 

A. No, I had no complaints. I knew that the commercial telephone 
system in Honolulu was entirely inadequate, but I believe the com- 
munication between responsible Army and Navy commanders was 
fairly good and that steps were being prosecuted vigorously to make 
this communication. 

172. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, just prior to the 
attack by the Japanese, do you have any recollection as to whether 
or not there were any deficiencies in the communications between the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and your own 
Flag Office? 

A. I have no knowledge of any difficulties at that time. 

173. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an attack 
being made on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941? 

A. The first information that I had which conveyed to me that an 
attack was being made on the United States at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, was a telephone message from my staif duty officer, 
telling me that a raid was in progress. I ran out of my quarters, 
which were on the hill immediately behind the submarine base, and 
saw the first torpedo plane attack which was launched on the battle- 
ships. I stood there for perhaps five minutes estimating the situation 
and got into my car. which had appeared, and drove down to the 
headquarters. I was in my headquarters by five minutes after eight — 
probably before and proceeded to take such steps as appeared to be 
practicable. Prior to this time, between 7 : 30 and 7 : 40, 1 had a report 
from my staff duty officer that a destroyer reported that they had 
attacked a submarine off Pearl Harbor. In the ten days between 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ' 257 

November 27 and December 7, and after I had issued orders for ships 
to bomb all submarine contacts, I had at least a half dozen reports 
of such bombing, and when I received this information that the 
destroyer had attacked the submarine, I presumed it was another 
bombing of a submarine contact of some kind, and while I was waiting 
for an amplification of this report the bombing attack started. You 
will note that in my order 2CL— il we specifically provide that when 
a ship is attacked by a submarine and, by implication, when they 
definitely knew a Japanese submarine was in the area, [3S3] 
they were to broadcast that information in plain language in order 
to alarm all the proper people and put them in a state of readiness. 
This provision was not carried out by the commanding officer making 
the attack, and I think that changed considerably the course of events 
that followed. 

174. Q. At about what time did you get this report of the attack 
by a destroyer on a submarine in the Pearl Harbor area ? 

A. Between 7 : 30 and 7 : 40 a. m. 

The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

[834] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his 
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were 
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness 
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as wit- 
ness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, 
and continued his testimony. 

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

175. Q. Did you yourself, as Commander-in-Chief, ever make an 
official report of the personnel casualties and damage sustained by ships 
of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor after the Japanese attack on 
December 7, 1941? 

A. I did. About the 12th of December I submitted reports as to per- 
sonnel and materiel casualties. These reports were necessarily incom- 
plete, and I believe that better data was eventually submitted by my 
successor. 

176. Q. Do you have any recollection of receiving a radar report 
from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department which 
showed a radar track of Japanese planes after the attack? 

A. I never saw any written document on the subject, that I now 
recall, but about three days after the attack my Fleet Gunnery Officer, 
My Fleet Marine Officer, was shown such a track by General Davidson, 
who was in command of the Interceptor Command. They reported this 
to me upon their return to Headquarters. That was the first news I 
had of any radar information. 

177. Q. Do you laiow what this radar information disclosed? 

A. It was reported to me at the time that the planes were picked up 
at a little after 7 : 00 o'clock, I think. The planes were picked up 
about 132 miles, bearing north of Oahu. 

178. Q. The question I meant to ask you. Admiral, was with ref- 
erence to planes that were returning after the attack had been com- 
pleted. Did you have any radar information as to the track these re- 
treating planes were pursuing? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 18 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, neither before nor after the attack did I have any such in- 
formation until very recently, since this court has been in session, as 
testified to by General Short. That is all I know about it. I would 
like to make it clear to the court that I had absolutely no reports from 
the Army as to the location of enemy planes or enemy carriers, which 
were of any use to me. Any information that I got came so late 
that it was of no use. 

[3ii5] Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold 
E.Stark, U.S. Navy: 

179. Q. Admiral, with respect to the war warning message, dispatch 
of 27 November, you testified that the warning was weakened by. sub- 
sequent press and radio reports that conversations with Japanese rep- 
resentatives were continuing after the message from Chief of Naval 
Operations stated that negotiations has ceased ; is that correct ? 

A. I stated it, yes. 

180. Q. Did you receive, subsequent to November 27, any dispatch 
from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department 
which cancelled or modified in any way the war message ? 

A. No. 

181. Q. Then I gather the conflict between the ofScial dispatches 
from the Chief of Naval Operations in the period between 24 Novem- 
ber and 7 December and the press and radio reports which you got 
during that same period left you uncertain as to the exact meaning 
of the dispatches, or, as you put it, that weakened their effect ; is that 
correct ? 

A. That is true, and that same cycle I had gone through with on 
previous occasions. 

182. Q. Well, in view of this conflict and confusion in your own 
mind as to the meaning of this dispatch, did you ask for any clarifica- 
tion during this ten-day period ? 

A. I did not testify that I had any confusion in my own mind as to 
the meaning of the dispatch. 

183. Q. Well, I understood that you testified that there was a con- 
flict between the information you received from the Chief of Naval 
Operations and information you received from other sources, such 
as press and radio, which caused you to have some doubt as to the 
efficacy of the first dispatch. 

A. I did not seek any clarification from the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations. 

184. Q. You stated yesterday that — this was in answer to a question 
concerning the relations between you and the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District — you stated that if there was any doubt at any time in 
the mind of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District or his staff 
about the instructions that you had given him with respect to your 
orders for the defense of the naval base, that you were available to him 
for discussion of those orders and clarification at any time. 

A. That is correct. 

185. Q. Did you have that same feeling about approaching the 
Chief of Naval Operation about clarification of his dispatches? 

A. Yes. 

186. Q. Then am I to gather from this discussion that you [336] 
were relying to some extent at least on the press and radio reports 
of what was going on in Washington for the m-itical military decisions 
that you were making at Pearl Harbor ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 259 

A. I used all means of information at my command, and evaluated 
the information which I received, and considered the source. 

187. Q. Now you have testified in effect that the dispatches from 
the Chief of Naval Operations, in view of these conflicting press and 
radio reports, didn't cause you to think that war was particularly 
imminent or that an attack by Japan on United States territory was 
particularly imminent — in spite of the fact, however, that you had 
not received approval from the Chief of Naval Operations of your 
request to bomb submarine contacts, you decided on November 27, 
after receiving the war warning dispatch, to bomb submarine con- 
tacts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor; is that correct? 

A. In answer to your question, yes. I decided to bomb submarine 
contacts as previously I have stated. 

188. Q. Was that decision made after the receipt of the war warn- 
ing message on that day ? 

A. Yes. 

189. Q. Then I undei'stand that the situation regarding the pos- 
sibility of submarine attack on Pearl Harbor, and the measures which 
you decided to take to meet it, were considered by you to be different 
after you received the war warning dispatch than existed before? 

A. I would say that the war warning dispatch gave me an excuse 
to do something that I had wanted to do for several months. 

190. Q. Did you consider the situation to be any more serious after 
receiving the war warning dispatch than before, with respect to sub- 
marine attack on Pearl Harbor? 

A. I considered that if an attack were made by Japan on the Philip- 
pines, it would probably be accompanied by an attack by submarines 
in the Pearl Harbor area. 

191. Q. With respect to the reasons and your consideration of 
the reasons why the Navy Department withheld the permission that 
you had sought to bomb submarine contacts, or suspect contact sub- 
marines, did you give any thought to the possible situation in the 
western Pacific where our own submarines were operating in waters 
adjacent to those waters used by the Japanese Navy? 

A. Yes, and I was convinced that if one of our submarines operated 
in the vicinity of a Japanese operating area, it would be bombed with- 
out question, no matter what my action was in Hawaii. 

[337] 192. I believe you stated the war warning message was 
followed within twenty-three hours after the message of 27 Novem- 
ber, on the 28th, asking your advice concerning the Army proposal 
to send planes to Midway; it came within twenty-three hours, as 
I recall. 

A. The evidence and the message themselves indicate that. 

193. Q. There was also another message, 2740, at the same time, 
concerning an Army proposal to reenforce certain defense battalions, 
wasn't there? 

A. Yes. 

194. Q. Now did the proximity in point of time of these two dis- 
patches to which I have referred cause doubt as to the real meaning 
of the war message? Perhaps I should clarify by saying. I mean 
by that, did the proximity of these two messages in point of time 
to the war warning message — that is, within twenty-three hours of the 
war warning message — cause any doubt in your mind as to the reii] 
meaning of the war messnije? 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Well, I think they lessened the force of the war warning mes- 
sage to the extent that the Chief of Naval Operations was appar- 
ently willing to temporarily upset, to a considerable degree, the de- 
fenses of Pearl Harbor as well as of the outlying bases. 

195. Q. Didn't it occur to you that these might be steps in further- 
ance of the war warning message ; that is, providing for reeforcement 
of positions which were not considered in an appropriate state of 
readiness ? 

A. There was that consideration, of course, but the difficulties of 
reenforcing the outlying stations were undoubtedly well-known to 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and the War Department message, 
which I have mentioned, but which has not been put in evidence 
before this court, proposed a replacement of marine defense battalions 
on Midway and Wake in toto by Army troops. I have my letter of 
2 December, written to the Chief of Naval Operations, reviewing 
this matter completely; and in that letter, War Department message 
number 48, of 29 November — that was to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department — was likewise a proposal from the War De- 
partment that indicated a conflict betwixt the ideas of the War Depart- 
ment and the Navy Department at that time, which I attempted to 
iron out in my letter of 2 December 1941, and also in my dispatch 
of 28 November 1941, a part of which I quoted to the court here 
the other day. 

196. Q. Did you ask the Chief of Naval Operations to clarify these 
apparent inconsistencies between these dispatches and the war mes- 
sage, by this dispatch of 28 November ? 

A. No. I reported the action I was taking. 

197. Q. Admiral, you testified yesterday, I believe, that [SSS] 
you considered an air bombing attack on Pearl Harbor to be a remote 
possibilty; is that correct? 

A. At that time, yes. 

198. Q. Did you consider it at that time to be a remote possibility? 
A. Yes. 

199. Q. Now, referring to Exhibit 30, which was the letter of 18 
February from you to Admiral Stark, will you read to the court, please, 
the second paragraph on page three. 

A. (Reading:) 

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor 
is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage 
inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine 
forces, DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when 
they arrive. 

200. Q. Between the date of your letter, 18 February 1941, and 
December 7, 1941, did you change that estimate of the situation as you 
recited it there ? 

A. When I wrote the letter of 18 February 1941, I was trying to 
urge that steps be taken to place Pearl Harbor in a proper defensive 
posture, and that we have there all the forces necessary to meet the 
contingencies which might arise. I continued that policy as long as 
I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. I wanted the base to be self- 
sustaining in the defensive way in every respect. 

201. Q. Excuse me, Admiral, but I have an obligation not to burden 
the record with more than the answers to the questions, and I just want 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 261 

to loiow whether that letter of February 18 represented your estimate 
of the situation at that time, and whether you changed that estimate 
between then and December 7. 

A. I maintained the same estimate of the situation in regard to the 
possibility of an air and submarine attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
Pearl Harbor area as long as I was Commander-in-Chief. The prob- 
ability of the attack I think I have completely covered here for the 
period of 27 November to 7 December, in the previous testimony. 

202. Q. I show you Annex 7 to Exhibit 23, to which is attached an 
addendum one to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. 
A-1-41, dated March 31, lOttl, and showing the signature of Rear 
Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base De- 
fense Air Force, and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Com- 
manding Hawaiian Air Force. As I understand it, Admiral, that 
represents an estimate of the [339] situation made by the air 
officer attached to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, in conjunction with the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force. 

A. That represents an estimate made by Admiral Bellinger in his 
capacity' as Naval Base Defense Air Officer, and Commander, Naval 
Base Defense Air Force. This estimate was approved by Admiral 
Bloch and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. I 
also ajjproved the estimate. 

203. Q. Now will you refer to Paragraph 3, b., I believe it is, and 
read that paragraph? 

A. (Reading:) 

II appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would 
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely 
be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 
three hundred miles. 

204. Q. Now, having in mind that you had said a surprise attack 
by air is a remote possibility, and having in mind also that a surprise 
ordinarily occurs once, didn't you consider it important, upon receipt 
of the war warning, to put all possible security measures into effect 
to guard against an air attack, even though it was only a remote 
possibility? 

A. I took action to which I have testijQed, after mature considera- 
tion and balancing all the factors. I did not make a decision lightly, 
and I had had many difficult decisions to make before. My actions, I 
think, speak for themselves. 

205. Q. What were the other factors that you took into account, 
other than the war warning, in making that decision ? 

A. I took into account the necessity for continued training, and 
the chances of attack against Pearl Harbor at that time — in fact the 
chances of an attack against the United States at all at that time— 
although I gave, I think, full consideration to the warning from the 
Navy Department. 

206. Q. You have testified that you had in your own command an 
Intelligence Unit. Did you, during the last half of November, have, 
from any of these units or organizations within your own command, 
any estimate that a force of Japanese carriers had recently gone 
to the Marshall Islands ? 

A. We had some information that, I think, there was one or two 
carriers which had gone to the Marshall Islands, and no more. 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

207. Q. Had you heard of Japanese carriers being previously re- 
ported so far from home waters ? 

A. What do you mean ? When? 

[340] 208. Q. Well, during say the previous year. 

A. To the best of my recollection, the Jap carriers had been in 
the Marshalls during the previous year. 

209. Q. Would you consider that the information you got from 
your intelligence unit was significant in connection with the war 
warning message that had been received about this time? 

A. I weighed the information and gave it the weight that I 
thought it was entitled to. I did not consider it especially significant, 
no; all those things had a significance. 

210. Q. I understood you testified this morning that about this 
time you were receiving from your own intelligence unit mostly 
military information concerning the movements of the Japanese 
Fleet, and there was nothing received during this period from that 
unit which gave any indication to you of an expeditionary force 
that might be directed to Pearl Harbor? 

A. That's right. 

211. Q, You didn't consider the information concerning the Japa- 
nese carrier task force going into the Marshalls was that type of 
information ? 

A. That's right. 

212. Q. In your letter of July 26, 1941, to Admiral Stark, you 
ask a series of questions concerning the United States attitude toward 
Russian participation in the war, and you ask him a number of 
questions. You were asking information as to what the United 
States attitude would be in case certain contingencies, which you 
outlined in the letter, might occur. As I understand from your 
testimony, you don't feel that you ever got any satisfactory answers 
to the questions that you put in that letter ? 

A. I did not have any clear and definite answers to certain phases 
of that. 

213. Q. Well, you knew, of course, did you not, and Admiral 
Stark had informed you on numerous occasions, that he, too, would 
like to have answers to some of the questions that you were propos- 
ing in these letters; and that he himself asked these questions in 
other places and had been unable to secure an answer? 

A. That is contained in his answers to my letters, and what is 
not contained in his answers to my letters doesn't exist, because I 
I didn't see him, 

214. Q. Now in connection with the letter of January 24, from 
the Secretary of the Navy to the War Department, rela [S^-l] 
tive to the weaknesses in the Army defense of Pearl Harbor. You 
testified, I believe, that you felt that you kept the Navy Department 
informed concerning the lack of progress in making up these defici- 
encies; is that correct? 

A. In general, yes. 

215. Q. Would you tell the court in what way you kept the Navy 
Department informed of the failure of the Army to make good the 
deficiencies which existed in the defenses at Pearl Harbor? 

A. If you will read my letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, 
that is where I kept him informed, and I think that is in the letters. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 263 

If you will give me a little time I can bring it out specifically, where 
it was. 

216. Q. Did you do it by personal letters? 

A. All kinds of letters, personal and official, and dispatches. 

217. Q. You stated yesterday specifically, with respect to the fail- 
ure of the Army to make good the deficiencies that existed in the 
defense there — not your deficiency of materiel and men that you had, 
but it is the Army deficiencies that I am speaking of — you informed 
the Chief of Naval Operations or the Navy Department of the Army's 
failure to make up their deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor? 

A. If you mean that I informed him specifically about the failure 
of the Army to make up their deficiencies, I did not inform him 
specifically of that. I did inform him in general of such things. 
I felt that that was a responsibility of the War Department. I had 
seen the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secreary 
of War. I saw the Secretary of War's answer to the Secretary of 
the Navy, in which he placed the remedying of this unsatisfactory 
situation at Pearl Harbor in the highest priority; and the Navy 
Department's attention had been very forcibly called to this — and 
I didn't think that the detailed report was called upon by me. Now 
the Commandant of the District, in addition to the Commander-in- 
Chief, did seufl in certain information to the Navy Department, and 
I felt then and now feel that the Navy Department was reasonably 
well informed of the progress of the Army installations at Pearl 
Harbor. I did not accept responsibility for everything that the 
Armv failed to do. 

218. Q. You stated yesterday that you worked closely with the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department and that you pressed 
him to improve the defenses of Pearl Harbor ; is that correct 1 

A. Yes, we discussed those affairs on many [34^] occasions, 
and the Commanding General of Pearl Harbor was very anxious to 
improve them, and he was doing all he could. 

219. Q. During the last half of 1941, did you make any representa- 
tion to the Chief of Naval Operations to take up with the War De- 
partment the matter of the failure of the Army to provide what you 
and General Short considered to be the adequate defenses of Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. I had no doubt that the Chief of Naval Operations was ade- 
quately informed. 

220. Q. But you made no specific request on him to follow this 
matter through ? 

A. No, I did not. 

[34s] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frann Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

221. Q. You stated this morning that the Army did not notify you 
specifically of the state of readiness which they were observing alter 
the war warning messages, and that you did not ascertain the state of 
readiness which the Army was exercising at that time, I believe you 
stated that the reason you didn't was because you understood that the 
Army was on an alert status corresponding to the Navy's alert status, 
and knowing what that was you didn't consider it important to follow 
it further. You further testified that the Navy's condition of alert 
was Condition 3. Is that right? 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Yes. 

222. Q. Are we to understand by that that in view of the fact that 
you received from the Navy Department an official war warning on 
November 27, tliat you did not consider it important to deterinino 
from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether 
or not he was in the best state of readiness he could possibly be for 
the protection of F'earl Harbor in any eventuality which might be faced 
in the event war should develop ? 

A. The Commanding General in the Hawaiian Department was 
faced with a considerable number of difficulties which were parallel 
to those that I had and that the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict had. He had untrained troops and he had to continue his train- 
ing, and I think that he did make his decision to do what he considered 
was the proper thing after full consideration of all the factors. 

223. Q. Did you make any inquiries of the Commanding General 
to make sure in your own mind that he was doing the utmost with 
everything he had to provide for any eventuality should war develop; 
that is my question. 

A. I felt sure that he was doing that. 

224. Q. But you didn't make any inquiries of the Commanding Gen- 
eral at that time? 

A. In the specific terms that you have stated, perhaps not. 

225. Q, Now, you stated this morning with respect to the dispatch 
of 7 December which was received after the attack, that had you had 
it prior to the attack it would have had a great influence on your ac- 
tions and on j^our estimate of the situation. Now, I take that to mean 
that the destruction of the code machines which was called to [<?-j4] 
your attention, or would have been called to your attention in that 
dispatch had you received it before the attack, had considerable sig- 
nificance to you, did it? 

A. No, that wasn't the thing that was most significant to me. There 
were two other factors in there which were much more significant than 
that. One was that an ultimatum was being delivered. The other 
was that it was being delivered at a specific time and that the Japanese 
Ambassador had instructions from his government to deliver it at a 
specific time. The question of the destruction of the code machines 
was just one more thing which I did not consider of any vital im- 
portance. 

226. Q. Did you consider the message that you got on December 
3, saying that the Japanese had given urgent and categoric instruc- 
tions to destroy the code machines, and even to burn secret and con- 
fidential documents, as having any peculiar significance in view of the 
fact that you had received the war warning? 

A. I have testified as to my views on that subject. 

227. Q. Would you mind stating whether or not you did, that is, 
whether or not you considered that as having any particular import- 
ance in view of the war warning that you had received ? 

A. Those were all factors that had to be considered. 

228. Q. That wasn't a factor of major importance? 
A. No, I didn't so consider it. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : _ 

229. Q. In general terms, during your discussions with General 
Short beginning on 27 November and covering several days there- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 265 

after to and including 7 December, did you canvass with him the 
whole situation and wliat both he and you were doing in view of the 
warnings that you both received? 
A. I would say yes. 

230. A. After 27 November did 5'ou issue from time to time instruc- 
tions, in the event of war with Japan, for the Fleet ? 

A, I caused my War Plans officer to maintain a memorandum 
which was in the hands of the duty officer at all times, and this memo- 
randum was revised whenever necessary and contained the action 
that I would take in the event that we had a war with Japan. I did 
that as a general precautionary measure and that was kept on file. The 
date of the last one was December 6, 1941. It [34^] was sub- 
mitted to me by then Captain McMorris, and I approved it. That 
was a summary of the orders that we issued, indicating what we were 
going to do with each one of the task forces that we had out there in 
the Pacific. 

231. Q. That was a measure which was taken after and as a result 
of the warning of 27 November, and in addition to those measures 
which you enumerated yesterday ? 

A. Yes. 

232. Q. That you adopted as a result of it? 
A. Yes. 

233. Q. There has been talk about correspondence that you had 
with Admiral Stark on 2 December relative to this situation in the 
outlying islands. I ask you if you can identify the document I now 
hand you ? 

A. I do. I identify this as a personal letter which I wrote to the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, on 2 December 1941, and 
which covers all of the current action I was taking. 

The personal letter dated December 2, 1941, from Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. 8. 
Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, 
and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose 
of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be con- 
sidered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
50" for reference, description appended. 

234. Q. I show you another document and ask you if you can 
identify it? 

A. This is an official letter which I wrote to Admiral Stark on the 
same day, December 2, 1941. 

The official letter dated December 2, 1941, from Real Admiral Hus- 
band E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, 
was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and 
to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose of 
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered 
pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 
51" for reference, description appended. 

The court then, at 2 : 45 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 55 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S46] Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the re- 
porter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the witness 
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a 
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still 
binding. 

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Hus- 
band E. Kimmel, (Ret) (Continued) : 

235. Q. Since the letters are rather lengthy. Admiral, can you sum- 
marize them briefly, for the benefit of the court ? 

A. These two letters, one an official letter and one a personal letter, 
written by me to Admiral Stark, are Exhibit Nos. 50 and 51. In 
general, the two letters cover the same information. They discuss 
the dispatches from the Navy Department in regard to the reenforce- 
ment of marine crews on the islands, and the replacement of the 
Marine aircraft by Army aircraft. They also invite attention to the 
War Department's dispatch which apparently contemplated the re- 
placement of all Marine units on the islands. We pointed out the 
fact that the Army had no defense battalions organized ; that it would 
take some time for them to organize a defense battalion ; and we also 
pointed out the inadvisability of mixing Marines and Army on a 
small island, and I informed the Chief of Naval Operations that in 
my opinion we should let the Marines alone where they were and let 
the Army go down to Canton and Christmas Island and develop them. 
In case the Army took over the defense of the islands, they could not 
furnish the anti-aircraft gims and they wanted us to turn the anti- 
aircraft guns that the Marines had over to them. They could furnish 
men and some surface guns. They wanted us to furnish them with 
5-inch guns also. Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying 
bases but has a serious shortage on (Jahu. It has insufficient suitable 
guns for replacing Marine 7-inch and 5-inch guns without weakening 
the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-millimeter guns from Hawaii, 
the Marine 5-inch guns might be replaced, but the 155-millimeter guns 
would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost. 
Army can spare no 50-calibre [^47] machine guns but can 
supply rifles and 30-calibre machine guns. Army has a limited num- 
ber of 37-millimeter guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but 
some few might be made available by weakening defenses here, par- 
ticularly as a considerable increase in the nun;iber of such guns is 
expected in the near future. At present, there is a marked shortage of 
ammunition for 37-millimeter guns. Incidentally, I received a dis- 
patch just about this time in which they told me they were going to 
send me either four or six 37-millimeter guns for the Marines, i in- 
formed him that Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE and three 
heavy cruisers, and so forth, were going to Wake. I think that any 
further information that the court wants they could obtain by reading 
this. 

236. Q. Would not the sending of a carrier over 2,000 miles to the 
westward, within 600 miles of a Japanese base as proposed in these 
dispatches from both CNO and the War Department, have been a 
rather dangerous operation if war was expected imminently ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 267 

A. Yes. And when we sent the ENTERPKISE to the westward— 
this aflPected my estimate — that is, to Wake, we covered our advance by 
a couple of squadrons of patrol planes operating between Pearl, John- 
ston, Midway and Wake. 

237. Q. Although the dispatch of the 27th concerning the relief of 
these outlying bases was sent some 22 hours prior to the war warning 
dispatch of 27 November, did you ever receive any modification of 
the suggestion about relieving tnese outlying bases? 

A. I recommended certain action which was different from that 
suggested by the War and Navy Departments, and the Navy Depart- 
ment approved the action which I recommended, which was to send 
Marine planes to Wake and Midway. 

238. Q. Wliat I meant was, on the receipt of the war warning dis- 
patch of 27 November, did you receive any cancellation or modification 
of the suggestion about relieving the outlying bases specifically ? 

A. No. 

239. Q. As a matter of fact, did not this proposal about relieving 
the outlying bases, coming so close to the war warning message of 
27 November, modify the war warning as connoting no prospect of 
an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor? 

A. It tended to and did reduce, in my mind, the chances of an attack 
on Pearl Harbor insofar as the Navy Department had any idea that 
there was imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

[348] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude 
C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : 

240. Q. Admiral, you have testified yesterday and again today that 
when you received important dispatches and letters, important letters, 
you would apprise your senior officers of the contents of them and 
discuss them with them? 

A. That is right. ^ _ ■ 

241. Q. And that was a customary and rather an invariable prac- 
tice of yours, was it not ? 

A. That is right. 

242. Q. I take it that this practice obtained in connection with the 
messages that we have here discussed of 16 October, 24 November, 
27 November, and 3 December — that series of messages? 

A. Yes. 

243. Q. At these conferences I think you have indicated that there 
would be present your War Plans officer ? 

A. That is right. 

244. Q. Your chief of staff? 
A. Generally. 

245. Q. Your operations officer? 
A. Generally. 

246. Q. At the time, there were under your command three vice 
admirals ; am I correct in that? 

A. Correct. 

247. Q. And they would attend these conferences if they were im- 
portant? 

A. That is correct. 

248. Q. From November 27 on, I take it that at least two of them 
were there at all times ; or am I incorrect in that ? 



268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No; both Halsey and Wilson Brown were out. Halsey left on 
the 28th and didn't come back until after the attack; and Brown left, 
I thhik it was the 4th or 5th. 

249. Q. The 5th of December? 

A. The 4th or 5th of December, and didn't come back until after the 
attack. 

250. Q. Now, at these discussions you would have Rear Admiral 
Bloch at such discussions? 

A. Yes. 

251. Q. Those are different discussions than the ones you mentioned 
about discussing intelligence information that you had every day? 

A. That is correct. 

[SW] 252. Q. Those discussions you had were with your own 
people at your own headquarters? 

A. That is correct, but at the general conferences I made it a prac- 
tice to have my intelligence officer come in and summarize to the con- 
ference everything up to that moment. 

253. Q. Now, in connection with that intelligence, your headquar- 
ters, and indeed you personally, received through your people the in- 
telligence information gleaned by the unit of Coml4; am I right? 

A. That is correct. 

254. Q. There was close liaison between your headquarters and 
theirs on that subject? 

A. That is correct. 

255. Q. Mention was made of an estimate that some Jap carriers 
were in the Marshalls? 

A. Tliat is right, and I have given here what my recollection was. 

256. Q. But that information, as you recall, came to you imme- 
diately from the unit of Coml4? 

A. It was presented to me by my intelligence officer. Lieutenant 
Commander Layton, who worked in close contact with Commander 
Rochefort, who was in charge of the Commandant, 14th Naval Dis- 
trict unit. And in addition to Layton, there w^ere three or four other 
officers who were really under Admiral Bloch, worked under Roche- 
fort and were attached to the Commander-in-Chief's unit. 

257. Q. Now, the information that this intelligence unit of Coml4 
supplied, largely had to do with the estimates of the disposition of 
the Japanese Fleet? 

A. That is correct. 

258. Q. That would not be political intelligence? 

A. No; that is right. I think they called themselves the combat' 
information unit. 

259. Q. After these conferences that you would have with your 
senior officers after you had received important dispatches, on the 
basis of those discussions and the intelligence that you had previously 
received, you would make your decision as to what steps should be 
taken ? 

A. That is correct, and the decisions were mine. 

2G0. Q. The decisions were yours and you made them at the time? 

A. That is correct. 

2G1. Q. Now, at that time, and in making those decisions, you were 
then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet 
and your rank at that point of time was admiral? 

A.' That is rijrht. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 269 

[350] 2G2. Q. And from all of 1941 clown to and including De- 
cember 7, the Pacific Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor ? 

A. That is correct. 

2()3. Q. During all of that period, except for your trip to Wash- 
ington, I think 1 June, and perhaps a couple of sea voyages, you 
were personally present at Pearl Harbor? 

A. Yes, sir . 

2G4. Q. And I think you testified yesterday that your headquar- 
ters were at the Submarine Base; your residence was on the military 
reservation just behind it? 

A. That is right. There were more than a couple of trips to sea, 
but not many. 

205. Q. In any event, you were there at all times from October 16 
and through December 7 ? 

A. Yes. Wait a minute. We had a maneuver to the islands, which 
I think took place after October 16, when I went out, for about four 
or five days. 

2G(5. Q. Four or five days only? 

A. Yes. That is my memory at the present time. 

267. Q. Now, after the October 16 message, which is Exhibit 13, 
you sent, as I recall it, twelve patrol planes from Oahu to Midway? 

A. Twelve patrol planes, yes. 

268. Q. And then these same planes were sent to Wake and they 
replaced some planes at Midway; is that how it worked ? 

A. My recollection now is that we sent a patrol squadron to Midway 
and then when we sent Halsey out there we sent another patrol squad- 
ron up from Pearl to Midway, and the patrol squadron which had 
been at Midway we sent to Wake. And in reverse order, we brought 
them back. 

2()9. Q. Then there was mention of some Marine planes that were 
sent from the Hawaiian area. You sent some Marine planes about 
October 27 or 28th to Wake? 

A. No. I sent the Marine planes on the ENTERPRISE to Wake, 
leaving Pearl on the 28th of November. 

270. Q. The 28th of November ? 
A. Yes. 

271. Q. Then you sent other planes on December 5 to Midway? 
A. That is correct : on the LEXINGTON. 

[351] 272. Q. You have previously mentioned. Admiral, that 
in all Hawaii — and correct me if I am wrong — there were only 81 patrol 
planes during the period November 27 to December 7 ? 

A. That is according to my records and my best information. 

273. Q. And not all of those were available for full operation? 
A. That is correct. 

274. Q. From November 15th to December 7th, Patrol Wing One 
and Patrol Wing Two in the Hawaiian area were commanded by a 
Rear Admiral liellinger; is that not so? 

A. That is right. 

275. Q. Rear Admiral Bellinger was an officer of the Fleet? 
A. Yes. 

276. Q. And he was also the Senior Fleet Air Detachment officer 
at the air station during that period? 

A. That is right. 



270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

277. Q. He was also, under your orders, the Commander of Task 
Force Nine ; is that not so ? 

A. Yes. 

278. Q. And that had been set up by you in an order that became 
effective on November 15th ? 

A. Well, I don't recall now. 

279. Q. You don't recall at this time? 

A. I don't recall just exactly the date. The first paragraph of this 
letter says "Reference (A) is cancelled and superseded by this letter 
effective 15 November 1941" and I presume that this letter is a revi- 
sion of a previous letter which had been in effect for some time previous 
and I am quite sure that that is true. 

280. Q. Now, the 81 patrol planes which you have testified about are 
the identical patrol planes which are in this task force ; is that not so ? 

A. That is right. May I revert a moment? You omitted to state 
one of the duties of Admiral Bellinger. I hope you will remedy that 
later. 

281. Q. I show you now a paper and ask you if you recognize it ? 
A. Yes, this is a letter effective November 15, 1941 which supersedes 

and cancels a previous letter on this same subject. It is merely a 
modification of the previous letter which had been in effect for some 
time. It is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41. 

[S5^] The Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL^1, dated 
October 31, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested 
parties, and by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the 
record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the 
inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 
52" for reference, description appended. 

282. Q. Admiral, the other day you read certain parts of this 
exhibit 52, even though Jt wasn't evidence; you read some extracts 
from it. Isn't that correct ? 

A. Yes, in my answer to a question as to what task force the Pacific 
Fleet was incorporated into, I copied certain parts of that into my 
answer. 

283. Q. In Exhibit 52, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Pacific Fleet, you prescribed certain missions and tasks for your various 
task forces, including Task Force Nine, did you not? 

A. Yes. 

284. Q. And you indicated in that order and prescribed the compo- 
sition of the task force ? 

A. Right. 

285. Q. Will you please read the paragraph under the caption "Task 
Force Four, Commandant 14th Naval District"? 

A. (Reading:) 

That part of the 14th Naval District activities which involve the Island Bases. 
Primary Mission : To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to 
insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in 
advanced operations. 

Tasli Force Nine: Commander Patrol Wing Two. PatWingOne 3G VPB (A), 
1 AV, 2AVL, lAVP, PatWingTwo 42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, lAVP. Primary 
missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expan- 
sion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 271 

an efl5cient long range Air Scouting and Air Striliing force for independent oper- 
ations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in 
areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific 
Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and Bases. Paragraph 5. 
Commanders of Task Force 7 and 9 established by this order will perform the 
duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operations of their 
respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct 
of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within 
their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type train- 
ing) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining mate- 
rial conditions of readiness for war service. 

[S53] 286/ Q. Now, at that time, specifically, from November 
15 to December 7, I believe you testified, Admiral, there were not 
enough patrol planes to do distance reconnaissance for even so much 
as a day with all these planes ? 

A. That is right, as a complete reconnaissance. 

287. Q. And did that condition obtain during the period from No- 
vember 15, in any event, to December 7? 

A. Yes. 

288. Q. In this order you required, did you not, that Task Force 
Nine submit to you for your approval their schedules of employment ? 

A. That is right. 

289. Q. And those schedules came to you and you approved them ? 
A. That is right. 

290. Q. There were also during this same period some ship-borne 
aircraft temporarily based at the Naval Air Station at Ford Island, 
were there not ? 

A. Yes. 

291. Q. And in addition, there were some Marine planes tempo- 
rarily based at Ewa field, were there not ? 

A. That is correct. 

292. Q. Now, these types of planes, I take it, are not capable of 
doing distance reconnaissance ? 

A. That is right. 

293. Q. It is the fact, isn't it, that these planes have their own 
commanding officers and their own missions and duties and training 
schedules prescribed by those commanding officers; is that not so? 

A. That is right. 

294. Q. And their employment and training schedules were ap- 
proved by you ? 

A. Yes. They were approved by me, or some of my subordinates. 
I didn't approve the training schedule for every plane squadron. 

295. Q. Now, during this period. Admiral, you testified it was your 
decision that you did not wish to interrupt training ? 

A. That is correct. 

296. Q. And you continued the training ? 
A. That is correct. 

[S54-] 297. Q. Admiral, isn't it a fact from what you have said 
that these planes were not available for the exclusive use of the Naval 
Base Defense officer, or Coml4 as you remarked yesterday, but could 
only be considered as available for drill or in the case of an immediate 
emergency or positive information of the imminence of an attack ; is 
that not so ? 

A. That is correct. The planes that I spoke of that I considered as 
immediately, exclusively available for the Commandant of the 14th 



272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Naval District were what I thought to be a few of these utility planes 
which I believe he had over there, which were of no use for patroling 
or for distance reconnaissance. Now, he did hope to get some day 
some observation planes to attack submarines. He did hope to get 
some planes which could be permanently assigned to him, and we had 
had promises that they were coming. Those had not arrived, and 
when I spoke of tliose planes which were exclusively available to the 
Commandant of the District, I was speaking, perhaps, of theoretical 
planes. I tliought he did have a few of the utility planes. I think he 
did have a few. 

298. Q. Let me refresh your recollection. Even on the utility 
planes, Admiral, is it not the fact that there was some discussion 
initiated by him to try to get some utility planes to be used, but that 
you were not able, under conditions as they then stood, to furnish them 
to him. Does that refresh your recollection ? 

A. That is quite possible. I know they had tried particularly to 
get observation planes for use in antisubmarine work. 

299. Q. Now, in your testimony yesterday, I think I heard the 
remark that you made that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
had agreed to clo distance reconnaissance. I take it, what you had 
in mind was JCD-^2; is that right? 

A. That is correct. 

300. Q. That would be the item, Admiral, in Exhibit 7 on Page 10 
under Paragraph 18 (i), the words "Distance reconnaissance"? 

A. Yes. 

301. Q. That appears under the caption of "Navy, 18"? 

A. Yes. And when the Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
was charged with this duty by the Naval Frontier Coast Defense plan, 
it was his duty to keep himself informed, and in my opinion when he 
considered it necessary to request planes for the purpose of performing 
the duties that he had responsibility for under this Naval Coastal 
Frontier Defense plan. 

[355] 302. Q. Now, Admiral, you say the responsibility that 
he was charged with under this JCD-42 was distance reconnaissance ; 
is that right? 

A. That is right. 

303. Q. There are several ways of doing distance reconnaissance, 
are there not ? 

A. Oh, I would say, yes, but every one of them involves the use 
of long-rance planes. They have that in common. 

304. Q. Well, let's see; radar is one of the means of doing a dis- 
tance reconnaissance, am I right, to obtain intelligence and infor- 
mation ? 

A. I hadn't thought of radar being termed as an instrument to 
perform distance reconnaissance, no. I don't consider that a proper 
term. 

305. Q. I take it that submarines may be used for distance recon- 
naissance ? 

A. That is correct. 

300. Q. They may be sent out and placed on picket, or to take 
tours ? 

A. Yes. 

307. Q. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District didn't have 
any submarines, didlie? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 273 

A, No, but when he assumed the responsibility, or wlien he was 
given the responsibility, and the responsibility was placed upon him, 
he had that obligation to do what he could, and one of the things 
he could do was to apply and I did not consider it practicable at this 
time to perform distance reconnaissance. I stated that. 

[356] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ee- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

308. Q. Well, the long and short of it is that the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District did not have any submarines at this time? 

A. No, he did not. 

309. Q. Another method of making a distance reconnaissance is 
with destroyers and cruisers ; is that so ? 

A. Yes. 

310. Q. The Commnndant of the lith Naval District did not have 
any cruisers at the time, did he? 

A. No, he had four destroyers and a few mine sweepers. He had 
no means under his direct command which were adequate to perform 
distance reconnaissance. Is that the answer you are driving at? 

311. Q. Yes. Admiral, I want to be sure about this responsibility 
with which Admiral Block is charged. I understood you to say that 
under JCD-42 Admiral Bloch was charged with the responsibility 
of distance reconnaissance. 

A. I should say so, from the papers. 

312. Q. I refer to paragraph 2, page 8 of Exhibit 7 of JCD-42. 
Isn't it a fact that at no time, up to and including December 7, that 
that instrument was ever in operation or execution ? 

A. It is a fact — Wait a minute. These war plans did not become 
effective — were not executed until after the attack. However, it was 
well known that the reconnaissance had been made on occasions, and 
I considered those measures provided in War Plans, which required 
attention prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, to be, in fact, in 
effect, and the oflicers charged with the execution were responsible. 
By that token. I considered myself responsible for the pj'eparations 
and the preliminary steps necessary in carrying out this WPL-46 in 
toto in the Pacific Fleet. 

313. Q. That is a different document from the one to which I was 
referring. 

A. Yes, but the document you quoted flows directly from WPL-46 
and from the basic war plan gotten out by the Navy Department. 

314. Q. The Rainbow Plans? 
A. Yes. 

315. Q. Admiral, it is also true that the Rainbow Plans were never 
placed in execution, nor, indeed, was WPL-46 in execution prior to 
December 7 ? 

A. No, they were not placed in execution prior to December 7, 1941. 

[3S7] 316. Q. Now, the term Naval Base D3fense Officer has 
been used, and reference has been made to it. That is not standard 
nomenclature? 

A. That is not standard nomenclature, but the duties of the Naval 
Base r)3fense Officer were prescribed by me. I coined that title. It 
was coined on my staff, and he was assigned certain specific duties. 

317. Q. The document you speak of wherein you defined his duties 
is2CL^l? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 19 



274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. As a matter of fact, the term Naval Base Defense Officer has 
been used in the Navy and had been used for some time. I did not 
coin the term ; it had been used for some time. 

318. Q. As a series of words? 
A. Yes. 

319. Q. No precision of meaning to it? 

A. The precision of meaning would vary with the conditions and 
the orders given to the Naval Base Defense Officer and the respon- 
sibilities assigned to him. 

320. Q. So that insofar as the Naval Base Defense Officer is con- 
cerned, we find all there is to know about it in Exhibit 8, being 2CL-41 ; 
isn't that right? 

A. I would say the major part of it appears there. There may have 
been other specific orders. I wouldn't want to commit myself entirely 
to this. However, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had 
certain other responsibilities as the Commander of the Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontier. 

321. Q. Admiral, since you brought up the Commander of the 
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, under General Order 143 there was dis- 
cussion in that agreement that they would have certain forces ; is that 
not so ? The Coastal Frontiers would have certain forces ? 

A. Yes. 

322. Q. But by the directive of July 1, 1941, it was determined by 
competent authority in the Navy Department that they should not 
have forces and they would not be formed ; is that right ? 

A. I don't recall. That may be true. 

323. Q. I refer you to Exhibit 4, the directive of July 1, 1941. Just 
read the first sentence of paragraph 4. It may refresh your recollec- 
tion. 

A. (Reading) "The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in para- 
graphs 3122, 3232, and 3312 of WPl^-46 are hereby established." 

[368'] 324. Q. Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4. 

A. (Reading) "For the present. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, 
as prescribed in General Order No. 143, will not be formed." 

325. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-41, revised 
October 14, 1941. I ask you if it is not a fact that the term Naval 
Base Defense Officer does not appear in the following paragraphs 
of that document: The first paragraph, being 3 (a), Continuous 
Patrols; 3 (b) Intermittent Patrols; 3 (c) Sorties and Entry; 3 (d) 
Operating Areas; 3 (e) Ships at Sea; 3 (f ) Ships in Port. 

A. I presume what you say is true. I did not follow you. You 
went too fast for me, but that can be verified by reading the docu- 
ment. 

326. Q. It is not there down to that point, paragraph 3 (f). 
A. I presume that what you say is correct, sir. 

327. Q. In the same document. Admiral, may I refer you to para- 
graph 3 (h), and the caption of that reads: "Action to be taken if 
submarine attacks in operating area." That is the caption of it? 

A. That is right. 
. 328. Q. I want to call your attention to the next page. I believe 
the only place in that referring to the Naval Base Defenne Officer 

A. This document refers to the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict, who, in fact, was the same individual. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 275 

329. Q. Paragraph "J" mentions the Naval Base Defense Officer, 
does it not? 

A. Now, what are you talking about ? 

330. Q. In the exhibit you are holding there is mentioned in para- 
graph "J", page 6, the Naval Base Defense Officer; is that not so? 

A. Yes. 

331. Q. There the document recites that the only connection that 
the Naval Base Defense Officer has at that point is that if Pearl Har- 
bor is also attacked — when a submarine attacks an operting area — 
such instructions as the Naval Base Defense Officer may issue as to 
shore-based aircraft will have priority; isn't that what it provides? 

A. Yes. 

332. Q. Do you find in paragraphs "I" and "J" of the same docu- 
ment that there is a distinction made between shore-based Fleet air- 
craft on the one hand and patrol wings on the other ; is that not the 
fact? 

A. There seems to be some distinction there. 

[S59] 333. Q. But it does describe two different forces, does it 
not? One paragraph deals with the patrol wings and the other with 
shore-based Fleet aircraft. 

A. Yes, that is what it says. 

334. Q. Now, if you will please turn to paragraph 3 (G) under the 
heading "Defense Air Attack," which happens to be the only para- 
graph that we have not dealt with in the whole order, the Naval Base 
Defense Officer is mentioned there in sub-division 6 of "G" ; is that not 
•right? 

A. Yes. 

335. Q. Can you show me in that document any place where it is 
stated, as you testified yesterday, that the Naval Base Defense officer is 
responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor ? Can you show me those 
words in that document ? 

A. I would have to search the document, and if you haven't been 
able to find those words in the document, I presume they are not there, 
but there are other items there which speak for themselves. 

336. Q. That is a matter for the court to determine on the whole 
evidence. 

A. That is correct. 

337. Q. At any place in that document is there used the expression 
"distance reconnaissance" ? 

A. In this document? 

338. Q. That document, Exhibit 8 ? If it helps you, I have never 
found it. 

A. I will answer that question by saying I don't know. By reading 
that document, it can be readily determined. 

339. Q. I take it, Admiral, that in this document there is no place 
where it is stated, as you testified yesterdfiy, that the Naval Base 
Defense Officer is vested with authority to use all naval forces in the 
event of an attack ? Do you make the same answer ? 

A. No, this and my other statement were my own conclusions from 
the text of this order. 

340. Q. Admiral, in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, 
is it not the fact that the Army was responsible for the command and 
employment o f pursuit planes, whether they were Army or Navy ? 



276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. In exactly the same way that the Navy was responsible for the 
bombing planes under the command of the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District. 

[SGO] 311. Q. The bombing planes 

A. I mean patrol planes. 

342. Q. Under the Commandant of the 14th Naval District? 
A. That is right. 

343. Q. The Army was also- responsible, I take it, from what you 
said before, for the command and employment of antiaircraft weapons 
which were mounted ashore, and the Army was also responsible for the 
command and employment of the seacoast batteries in connection with 
the defense of Pearl Harbor ? 

A. That is right. 

344. Q. And also for the command and employment of the air- 
craft warning service in the defense of Pearl Harbor? 

A. That is right. 

345. Q. I take it, from what you said, the only duty the Navy had 
in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor was in support of the 
Army ? 

A. That is right. 

346. Q. In connection with that support, available guns on the ships 
of the Navy would be used, and you have prescribed certain orders, 
giving sectors and the firing positions of naval vessels and naval anti- 
aircraft in the harbor? 

A. Yes. 

347. Q. In connection with the general defense of Pearl Harbor, 
you came to know of conditions of defense there very intimately while 
you were there ? 

A. I had a good working knowledge of what was there for defense. 
I took a great deal from the reports of my subordinates. 

348. Q. One of the reports, I take it, would be such a document as 
has been previously read about the condition of local defense at Pearl 
Harbor, some instituted by Admiral Bloch while others went through 
your office with endorsement ? 

A. Yes, I had a large staff, and I was kept reasonably well informed 
of what went on. 

349. Q. I will recall to you. Admiral, Exhibit 46, which is Admiral 
Bloch's letter of October 17, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations via 
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

A. I remember that letter very well. I put an endorsement on it 
and forwarded it approved to the Navy Department and urged them to 
furnish the forces which the Commandant of the district requested 
and which he stated he didn't have. 

[361'] 350. Q. In the letter of the I7th, which has been read in 
evidence, the Commandant explained about the four old destroyers, 
the old SACRAMENTO, the fact that he hadn't any planes, and that 
he was afraid that it would be, as in the case of the British, "Too little 
and too late." 

A. Yes. I think the Commandant kept the Navy Department fully 
informed of the condition of defense forces at Pearl Harbor. 

351. Q. And yourself, too? 
A. Yes. 

352. Q. In the endorsement on Exhibit 46 you stated : "There is a 
possibility that the reluctance or the inability of the Department to 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 277 

furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District with forces adequate 
to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that in an emer- 
f>ency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for 
these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly 
warrant refutation." Down to December 7 is it not a fact that the 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District had only four old destroyers, 
all of which were occupied on inshore patrol, four small mine sweepers, 
which were constantly engaged in sweeping the channels, three Coast 
Guard cutters which were in patrolling off Honolulu, in addition to 
their regular Coast Guard duties, and, then, of course, he had the old 
SACRAMENTO. That is the status of the forces in the 14th Naval 
District at the time we are talking about; isn't that so? 

A. He also had some sanpans, which the Department had promised 
him in the future. 

Cross-examined by tbe interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) : 

353. Q. In your last cross-examination were all the duties of Ad- 
miral Bellinger included in the questions propounded to you? 

A. I think one duty was omitted. He was the Commander of the 
Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing 2). 

354. Q. Now, referring to WPL-46, which is Exhibit 4, are there 
any other paragraphs in that to which you wish to call the court's 
attention in connection with the establishment of the Hawaiian Naval 
Base Frontier? 

A. In paragraph 1 of the letter of July 1, 1941, 1 read : "The Naval 
Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232, and 3312 of 
WPL-46 are hereby established." Now, paragraph 3232: (Reading) 
'"The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the Pacific area are (a) Pacific 
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier; (b) Pacific Southern Naval Coastal 
Frontier; (c) Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier." In paragraph 4 
I wish to call ['362] attention to the fact that the statement is: 
"For the present. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, as prescribed in 
General Order 143, will not be formed." That is different from the 
establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

355. Q. In 2CL^1, paragraph "G", sub-paragraph 6, were the duties 
there defined the basis on which you made the statement yesterday 
that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in general, w^as 
charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor with the Army? 

A. Yes, and other paragraphs, such as 9-C and the paragraphs 
under "A" and other points where the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District is charged with other duties in that connection. 

Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navv (Ret.) : 

356. Q. With reference to the order of July 1, 1941, in Exhibit 4, 
the directive from which you just read portions, the question that I was 
concerned about was whether there were forces, not whether there was 
a frontier. This order states that the frontier forces would not be 
formed. 

A. That is correct. 

357. Q. So that there might have been a frontier formed, but there 
were no forces? 

A. There was a frontier formed. 

The court then, at 4 : 10 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., August 
17, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 279 



PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INQUIRY 



THUBSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944. 

136S] Twelfth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. G. 

The court met at 9 : 30 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeir, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) , interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of tlie proceedings of the eleventh day of the inquiry was 
read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , the witness 
under examination when the adjournment was taken yesterday, Wed- 
nesday, August 16, 1944, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned 
that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his 
testimony. 

Examined by the court : 

358. Q. Admiral, was there anything irregular in establishing your 
headquarters on shore ? 

A. No. 

359. Q. To your knowledge, has it ever been done before you did it, 
or since ? 

A. I presume it had been done before I did it. I do not have any 
examples readily available, but subsequent to the time that I estab- 
lished my headquarters on shore. Admiral King, in the Atlantic, es- 
tablished his headquarters in a [-5^-^] station ship tied up at 
Naval Training Station, in Newport. Admiral Hart, I have been in- 
formed, established his headquarters on shore at Manila. During the 
war I am informed that Admiral Nimitz maintained them in the sub- 
marine base until the new headquarters had been constructed, money 
for which I had obtained from the Navy Department prior to my 
detachment. 

360. Q. Did this move relieve you in any way of the responsibilities 
which you held while operating from a Flagship ? 



280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. It did not. It changed in no way any responsibilities which 
were assigned to me. nor did it add anything to my responsibilities. 

301. Q. You have testified that you gave to the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department all information that came to you 
which you considered to be of any value to him. 

A. That's correct. 

362. Q. Would not all information which was available to you, how- 
ever remote from Pearl Harbor, have been of assistance to him in 
forming his geneial estimate of what he might then or eventually 
expect at Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I attempted to give him all such information, and I intended to 
do so. If at any time I failed, it was not for lack of intention. 

363. Q. The question was based on the exact wording of your reply, 
that is, you gave him all that 3^ou considered of value to him, not 
that you gave all, and my question was based on that — that wouldn't 
all the information that you had relating to the war conditions in 
the Pacific, or anticipated war conditions in the Pacific, have been of 
value to him in forming his estimate of what he might expect ? 

A. Yes. I gave him that. 

364. Q. In your answer to a question relating to the condition of 
readiness of forces afloat in Pearl Harbor, you made an answer that 
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District advised the Senior Officer 
Present as to the condition of readiness. Your exhibit, 2CL-41 says 
that the Commandant shall place the condition of readiness. There 
may be no conflict in these two statements, but I would like to clear 
it up a little. 

A. I was attempting to state what is contained in order 2CL-41. 
That was the order under which the Commandant was operating at 
the time. In paragraph 6, d., it reads: (Reading) "Coordinate fleet 
anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by (1) Advising the Senior 
Officer Present embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. 
(2) Holding necessary drills." 

365. Q. Well, specifically, the Commandant set the condition 
[366] of readiness? 

A. I did not so consider it. I considered that he advised the Senior 
Officer Present; and you cannot, in a naval organization, take away 
from the Senior Officer Present the prerogative of setting the con- 
dition of readiness that he himself considered necessary and essential. 

366. Q. Well, Admiral, as I read this exhibit, reference is had only 
to the state of the condition of readiness of anti-aircraft batteries of 
ships, 

A. Yes, I so read that. 

367. Q. Is this the only condition of readiness that anyone prescribed 
for the naval forcess, for ships afloat, in Pearl Harbor? 

A. No. The Senior Officer Present afloat in Pearl Harbor, exclu- 
sively of the Commander-in-Chief, was charged with setting the con- 
dition of readiness for the ships in Pearl Harbor. 

368. Q. What condition of readiness was in effect on the morning 
of 7 December? 

A. Admiral Pye has stated that the condition 3 was in effect, and 
to the best of my knowledge and belief that is true. 

369. Q. As the court understands it, the Commandant of the ■14th 
Naval District was charged with the coordination, the coordination 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 281 

of fire of the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, with the shore bat- 
teries ; is that correct ? 

A. I will put it this way: that was my intention when this order 
was written. 

370. Q. To your knowledge, did the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District take any steps or give any orders in the way of coordinating 
the fire of ships of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and shore batteries, 
prior to 7 December ? 

A. Yes, he took many steps in conducting drills and giving the 
alarm; and he was charged with conducting the drills and directing 
all the naval effort against antiaircraft attack, and he did so during 
drill periods. Now I think that you will find the duties of the Com- 
mandant of the District, as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, 
as Commander of the Hawaiian Frontier, and as Naval Base Defense 
Officer, set forth in 2CD-41, revised, paragraphs a. (1) and (2), which 
charges him with the maintenance of the inshore patrol and the boom 
patrol ; and other articles in 2CL-41. He was a party to the agreement 
.contained in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 
1941, in which he assumed certain responsibilities. In the Operation 
Plan No. 1-41, of 27 February 1941, he sets up a task organization 
for the inshore patrol, the boom patrol, the harbor patrol, the mine- 
sweepers, the base defense air force, antiaircraft defense, the harbor 
control posts — some of these in conjunction with the Army. 

[36^] 371. Q. I might say that that is all a matter of record, 
and that the court is cognizant of that; and the questions we have 
asked are simply for the purpose of clearing up what in our minds 
appeared to be a little conflict. I don't think, unless you wish, it is 
necessary to go any further with that. 

A. Wliat I'd like to make clear to the court is that for all of the 
duties of the Commandant — don't depend on my recollection now what 
it was. It is laid down in the documents. 

372. Q. In answer to a question during the course of your testimony, 
you made reference occasionally to opinions of your staff. Specifically 
in one answer to one question you stated that your staff' considered 
there was no clanger from air attack in Pearl Harbor. 

A. That's right. 

373. Q. Did you concur in this opinion? 

A. I did, indeed. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not 
asking my staff to. assume any responsibility. I did receive advice 
from my staff, which I considered in making my decisions. 

374. Q. What was the consensus of your staff and senior subordi- 
nates as to the probability of an air attack by the Japanese ? 

A. Members of my staff — a considerable number of them are avail- 
able here in Washington at the present time — I can say without any 
fear of contradiction, that none of them considered an air attack on 
Pearl Harbor any more than a possibility, myself included. I con- 
sidered it a remote possibility. 

375. Q. Does that also apply to your Senior Subordinates in the 
chain of command? 

A. In so far as I know their opinions, yes. 

376. Q. Did you at any time, as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, 
and as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability 
of maintaining the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor ? 



282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. When I took command of the fleet, I knew of the disagreement 
between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in 
Washington, on the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
He told me himself. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general, 
but when I took command of the fleet we had been for some time 
without much gunnery, due to the fact that no adequate training 
target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, and when I took 
command we had just about succeeded in completing the transfer of 
that material from the coast. I did not make any protest, any formal 
protest, against maintaining the fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I 
did, in conversation with the Chief of [S67] Naval Opera- 
tions, in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl 
Harbor as a fleet base. The various elements that entered into that 
are well known. I repeated substantially the same thing to the 
President when I had an interview with him, and the substantial 
point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl 
Harbor is concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to 
have the fleet in port if and when the air attack came; that it took 
from two to four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started, the 
attack would be completed before we could change in any degree the 
disposition of the fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the 
entrance, the single entrance, that we had, and the danger from the 
oil storage as it was at that time ; and I don't recall anything other 
than that at the present time, although there probably was. These 
were factors which were well known both to the President and the 
Chief of Naval Operations, prior to any statement by me. I accepted 
the condition at Pearl Harbor, and that was one of the reasons why, 
repeatedly, in correspondence, I requested to be kept informed of 
developments. 

377. Q. In other words, does the court understand you concurred 
with your predecessor in that the fleet should not be kept at Pearl 
Harbor? 

A. In general, yes. 

378. Q. And you so expressed your opinion in conversations with 
the President and the Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. I did not definitely recommend that the fleet be withdrawn at 
the time of my conversation, because I wanted to get some training in. 
I accepted the situation, but pointed out the dangers that existed so 
long as the fleet was in Pearl Harbor. 

379. Q. Did you at any time make any recommendations as to with- 
drawal of the battleships and carriers, or battleships alone, from 
Pearl Harbor? 

A. Not that I recall. 

380. Q. Wliat were your relations with General Short, both per- 
sonal and officially, during the entire time you were Commander-in- 
Chief of Pacific Fleet ? Did you have conferences with him — and the 
court would like to have you explain more or less in detail the con- 
ditions existing. 

A. I will be very pleased to. Wlien I became Commander-in-Chief 
of the fleet, I remembered the situations which had arisen in the 
Hawaiian area on various occasions. They had been the subject of 
newspaper comments throughout the nation. For many years I had 
felt that the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy not only in 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 283 

Hawaii, but on our own coast, had been entirely inadequate. When 1 
was Chief of Staff of [3681 Commander Battleships, Admiral 
Craven, he made several attempts to get some joint exercises, in which 
he was not entirely successful. I give this background to show I 
became determined that no such occasion as that should arise while 
I was Commander-in-Chief. General Short arrived in Honolulu a 
few days before he took over command of the Hawaiian Department. 
He was quartered in Admiral Richardson's house on Honolulu. I 
made a trip in civilian clothes and paid my respect to General Short, 
attempting to establish friendly relations. He responded whole- 
heartedly, and I had a real regard for him before I had known him 
for a very long time. The thought that was uppermost in my mind 
at that particular time was to obtain some degree of cooperation 
betwixt the Army and Navy air forces stationed on shore in Hawaii. 
I think I broached the subject during our first interview. If not, I 
did on an early subsequent interview. I found General Short in com- 
plete agreement with me on the steps that should be taken — the broad 
steps that should be taken — and Admiral Bloch and General Short 
at once put into process the question of attaining the cooperation and 
agreements betwixt the air forces. I saw General Short frequently 
because I made it a point to see him. I think he also made it a point 
to see me. We conferred officially on many occasions, and at practi- 
cally every official conference, Admiral Bloch was present, because 
Admiral Bloch w^as the officer in Hawaii who was charged with deal- 
ing with the Army, and at no time did I wish to by-pass him. I think 
I kept Admiral Bloch thoroughly informed of every dealing I had 
with General Short. I played golf with General Short at a little 
9-hole golf course which he had established near his headquarters at 
Fort Shafter. That was particularly convenient for me, because it 
was only about fifteen minutes by car from my headquarters. Since 
this affair has happened, a Colonel Throckmorton, who was on Gen- 
eral Short's staff, informed my brother, in Kentucky, that he remem- 
bers distinctly that General Short and I had an engagement to play 
golf about 9 : 30 on Sunday, the day the attack came ; and of course 
we did not play golf that day. My relations with General Short were 
highly satisfactory, both my personal relations and my official rela- 
tions. I found him a very pleasant gentleman. I consider him my 
friend, and officially he was very cooperative, and we had no differ- 
ences of opinion which were not resolved in a most amicable way. 

381. Q. Admiral, have you heard rumors and reports that your re- 
lationship with General Short, during the time of your command, were 
not cordial, that you did not cooperate, that you had few conferences, 
and so forth. The court presumes that this is not correct, by your 
previous answer. Is that in line with your thought? 

A. I believe every man, woman, and child in the United [369'] 
States who can read, has read such statements. I wish to state that all 
such statements are malicious lies. 

382. Q. Did you have any idea at that time, or do you now, how 
these rumors originated, or how they were brought about, or any in- 
stances which would tend to prompt such rumors ? 

A. There was absolutely no basis for the rumojs, and I am forced to 
the conclusion that this was part of a deliberate campaign to smear 
me and General Short. 



284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

383. Q. Why were certain ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor 
on 7 December, and why were not all ships at sea ? 

A, A fleet must have time in port for repairs, upkeep, and recrea- 
tion of the crews, also to obtain fuel and supplies. I had established 
a rotation of task forces. When I took over the fleet, Admiral Richard- 
son had put in process a scheme which required one-half of the fleet 
to be at sea while the other half was in port. I operated under this 
scheme about two months. I found that there was not sufficient time 
for upkeep of the fleet, and I also found that the fuel oil supply at 
Pearl Harbor was being depleted. We did not have a sufficient number 
of tankers to maintain the level of fuel oil, and at the same time 
operate half the fleet at sea all the time. I then changed my plan and 
had one-third — approximately one-third — of the fleet operating at sea 
all the time, and part of the time two-thirds were operating at sea. 
During the periods of maneuvers, and we had a maneuver — five-day 
maneuver — about once a quarter, all the ships went to sea. I felt that 
1 was operating the ships at sea as great a proportion of the time as it 
was possible to do so and still maintain them in top efficiency, ready 
for any eventuality. I felt that when war came, I wanted the ma- 
chinery and material, and personnel, in the highest possible state of 
efficiency, and balanced the time at sea against the time in port in 
order to accomplish this most effectively. 

384. Q. On December 7, 1941, what was the proportion of the Pacific 
Fleet in Pearl Harbor? 

A. I'd say about two-thirds. 

385. Q. Was this an unusual number of ships to have in Pearl 
Harbor? 

A. It was a condition which occurred for a few days when Task 
P orce One and Two overlapped for a few days in port. 

386. Q. Who, in your opinion, was responsible for the defense of 
Pearl Harbor, in event of any form of attack by the enemy — by an 
enemy ? 

A. The actual responsibility was undertaken by the Army, in the 
Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935. The Navy, however, was re- 
sponsible for assisting the Army in any way [370] they could. 
It is just common sense that they should. General Short was the Com- 
manding General, and therefore responsible for whatever Army efforts 
could be made. Admiral Bloch had been designated as Naval Base 
Defense Officer, and was responsible for coordinating the naval effort 
with that of the Army. I was responsible for the safety of the ships, 
and at no time did I want or expect to evade such responsibility. 

387. Q. Admiral, you have testified that the Fleet, or the ships of the 
Fleet, would render certain assistance to the Army in case of attack? 

A. That is correct. 

388. Q. Could the Army depend at all times on the assistance of • 
the Fleet? 

A. They could not, and during the period betwixt November 7 and 
December 7, we had a meneuver and we were out for about five days, 
up to the north of the Islands, and during that period, the only ships 
in Pearl Harbor were of no consequence ; that is, were undergoing over- 
haul, and there was very little assistance from the batteries of ships 
during that period. "That condition was liable to occur at any time, 
and my object in all the orders and efforts that I made was to, first, 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 285 

get adequate defense from the Army there, and second, to utilize what- 
ever might be aboard ships of tlie Navy that were still in port ; and 
Admiral Bloch was put in charge of the coordination of the naval effort, 
primarily because he was the only responsible officer attached to the 
Fleet who was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor. The Com- 
mander Base .Force was there most of the time, but I didn't know, in 
the course of the campaign, when the Commander Base Force might 
move out, and I did not wish to put him in charge as Naval Base De- 
fense Officer. 

389. Q. In other words, Admiral, we understand you are stating 
that the Fleet should be mobile and footloose at all times regardless 
of any consideration of defending the base as a Fleet ? 

A. I do, and a base which depends upon the Fleet for its defense is 
a very poor base. 

390. Q. Then, as the court understands, in your opinion the Army, 
in accordance with the plan referred to by you, the Joint Action Army 
and Navy 1935, was primarily responsible for the defense of Pearl 
Harbor? 

A. Correct. 

391. Q. Would you leave out that word, "primarily"? 
A. Yes. 

392. Q. Admiral, please state in brief what in your opinion 
[.871] was the direct responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval 
JDistrict, for the defense of Pearl Harbor? 

A. I considered the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in gen- 
eral responsible for coordinating with the Army all the naval forces 
that were in Pearl Harbor, and for their use in the defense of Pearl 
Harbor. 

393. Q. Do you mean "ail naval forces", or naval defense forces? 
A. Well, every element of the naval forces that could 15(3 used in the 

defense of Pearl Harbor. I think you are asking me to draw conclu- 
sions from records which are available to the court. 

[S72] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

394. Q. It isn't that. Admiral. It is trying to get your statement 
there that he had responsibility for using all naval forces. Now, if 
we follow that line of thought, then does this court understand that 
with that responsibility he had the right to give orders to a battleship 
to use her defense forces ? That is the question that we are trying to 
straighten out. 

A. I see what j^ou mean now. The Commandant's duties were con- 
fined to coordinating the efforts. The senior officer present afloat and 
the sector commanders which were appointed by my 2CL-41 were, 
of course, responsible for the actual fire and control of fire of the 
ships in Pearl Harbor. Now, the Commandant was responsible for 
suggesting changes, and matters of that kind. Again, gentlemen, I 
must state that I was responsible for everything that went on in that 
Fleet. I tried to exercise my responsibilities by delegating certain 
authority and certain tasks, and some of these questions that you ask 
are very difficult to answer categorically. It comes down to a question 
of opinion. 



286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

395. Q. You have stated in your testimony and explained very 
minutely the responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District 
in coordinating his efforts with the Army. 

A. Yes. 

396. Q. But did not the Commandant, 14th Naval District, have 
a direct responsibility in other matters? 

A. Oh, yes. 

397. Q. For instance, you have stated that at some time there might 
be a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor? 

A. That is right. 

398. Q. Was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District responsible 
for the defense against submarines? 

A. There was a net across the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The Com- 
mandant operated that net. No ship moved in or out of Pearl Harbor, 
and no ship moved in Pearl Harbor, without the knowledge and 
approval of the Commandant. 

399. Q. Did the Commandant, 14th Naval District, have certain 
forces directly under his command? 

A. It has been testified here that he had 4 destroyers which were 
utilized primarily for the inshore patrol, as I would call it. He had 
some minesweepers and he had some tugs. He had from time to time 
forces detailed from the Fleet to report to him and to perform duties 
under his direction and control. 

[37S] 400. Q. Was there any attempted attack on ships of the 
Fleet in Pearl Harbor by submarines ? 

A. Yes ; one submarine got into the harbor. I think they got her 
before she did anything, before she accomplished anything. That, 
incidentally, was a midget submarine, a surprise type. 

401. Q. Admiral, you have testified that the Navy had a certain 
number of planes, patrol planes, under your command at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. That is correct. 

402. Q. As the court understands, these patrol planes were under 
the direct command of Rear Admiral Bellinger ; is that correct ? 

A. Yes. 

403. Q. You have further testified that these patrol planes were 
used for searching; is that correct? 

A. Yes. 

404. Q. Wlien you took command of the Pacific Fleet, were these 
patrol planes being used daily for search ? 

A. Yes, they were being used daily for search, and I used them 
myself, some of them, daily, to search the operating areas, and my 
understanding and belief is that prior to my taking command they 
used these planes to search restricted arcs on occasions. At no time 
do I know of any 360 degree search being continuously conducted, 

405. Q, Are you aware of the fact that prior to your taking com- 
mand these patrol planes were used in daily search over a certain 
arc emanated from Honolulu ? 

A. No, not as a permanent fixture. I did know that certain 
searches were being conducted. Personally, I considered tliem in- 
effective and at the time immediately preceding the attack on Pearl 
Harbor we had gotten the number of planes we had — I think some 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAViT COURT OF INQUIRY 287 

54 of them — which were brand new planes from the States. They 
were having a great many material troubles and the nose casting was 
going bad; and we were conserving the planes much more then, 
I think, than had been the case for some time. We were in a more 
critical state for planes then than we had been for maybe some time 
before. 

406. Q. Had you considered the use of all or part of the number 
of patrol planes in searching a probable area of advance, by enemy 
carriers, on Pearl Harbor? 

A, I had considered such, yes. Some time prior to the attack we 
ran a search for a few days at Admiral Bloch's suggestion on the 
line from Jaluit to Pearl. We had in mind that we might catch a_ 
submarine on the surface out there, as well as perhaps find anj^ other 
thing that was moving around. We found nothing, and this was 
discontinued after a few days. 

[S74] 407. Q. Were any of these patrol planes searching or in 
the air for search on the morning of 7 December ? 

A. Yes, there were a number that were searching the operating 
areas, and there were some more that were engaged in maneuvers with 
our own submarines. I think I was told about a dozen planes were 
in the air. 

408. Q. Were there any searching activities going on by planes sta- 
tioned at Midway ? 

A. Yes, they were running such a reconnaissance as they could with 
twelve planes, which was not much. I had them there primarily 
getting ready to start out with the Fleet in case of war, part of the 
deployment, and we were utilizing them to run a search from there. 

The court then, at 10 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 10 : 55 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present : 

All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties 
and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, 
whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yoeman second 
class, U, S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness 
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a 
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still 
binding. _ 

Examination by the court (Continued) : 

409. Q. What was the number of patrol planes capable of operating 
in the air on the morning of 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I cannot answer that question categorically because I do not 
know the number of patrol planes which were laid up temporarily for 
periodical checks. My best estimate, however, is that not more than 
50 patrol planes on the Island of Oahu were in flying condition on 
the morning of 7 December, 1941. 

410. Q. What proportion of these planes were operating in the air ? 
A, About 12 of them were in the air. 

411. Q. Whose direct responsibility was it to have tliese planes 
operating in the area at this time ? 

A. They were operating in the area in accordance with the approved 
operating plans which my headquarters had approved. If you mean, 



288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

who was responsible for deciding whether or not a distance recon- 
naissance should have been undertaken, I was. 

[375] 412. Q. In other words, we understand that you were di- 
rectly responsible for not having more operating planes in the air, 
more available operating planes in the air on 7 December? 

A. Yes, I was responsible. I can add, however, that I had received 
no recommendations from my subordinates to conduct a distance re- 
connaissance on this date. 

413. Q. To which subordinates do you refer ? 

A. All of them ; my staff and the Commandant, 14th Naval District. 

414. Q. On the morning of 7 December did you have any inner 
patrol established around Pearl Harbor ? 

A. You mean an inner air patrol ? 

415. Q. Inner air patrol. 

A. My recollection is that there was no inner air patrol on that 
date. 

416. Q. Had this been considered ? 

A. Yes, and not only considered but was provided for to be under- 
taken when ordered. 

417. Q. Did you have any information regarding the arrival of the 
Army air squadron coming from Hamilton Field on the morning of 
7 December ? 

A. I do not now recall whether I had any such information. I 
think it is highly probable that the appropriate subordinates did have 
such information. They would not necessarily have reported such a 
movement to me. 

418. Q. Admiral, you stated that the Chief of Staff of Army and 
the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy had presented to the JPresi- 
dent a communication not recommending that an ultimatum be sent 
to Japan. Is that correct ? 

A. I was so informed in an enclosure to a letter sent to me by the 
Chief of Naval Operations. 

419. Q. Upon receipt of the message from OpNav on November 27, 
referred to as the war warning message, did you have a conference 
with officers regarding this message ? 

A. Yes. 

420. Q. Who were the officers present; not by name but probably 
better by reason of their positions ? 

A. The message was received about 4:00 o'clock p. m., Honolulu 
time. I asked the Commandant of the District to come over, and his 
chief of staff came. He informed me that the Commandant was 
visiting his wife in the hospital. I delivered this message to the chief 
of staff with directions to give it at once to the Commandant, and 
dispatched my intelligence officer with the dispatch to be delivered to 
General Short. I also received this afternoon a copy of the dispatch 
which General Short had received from [376] General Mar- 
shall, which was delivered to me by the Navy liaison officer, Lieutenant 
Burr, in my headquarters. On 28 November, as nearly as I can re- 
member the date, we had a conference in my headquarters at which 
Admiral Bloch, General Short, members of my staff. Captain Smith, 
Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, all took part. And at that con- 
ference we discussed these measures to be taken and a good part of 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 289 

the time was taken iii) with coiisi deration of tlie proposed relief of 
Marine personnel on the Islands by Arni}^ personnel. However, in 
considering this movement and these reenforcements, all phases of the 
situation were discussed and these messages were taken into considera- 
tion in the pre])aration. or in deciding upon the action which we Avould 
take. 

421. Q. That was on 20 November? 

A. 28 November; in the forenoon, as I remember. 

422. Q. Was this dispatch of November 27th the principal matter 
of discussion in the conference which you speak of as taking place on 
28 November? 

A. The implications growing from that dispatch were the principal 
subjects. 

423. Q. In that conference, what was the general concensus of 
opinion as to the probability or possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor? 

A. I think we considered it a remote possibility. General Short has 
testified to a statement made by Captain McMorris in answer to my 
question. Although I cannot recall that exact circumstance, I have 
no doubt but that General Short's testimony is correct. 

424. Q. As pertains to Captain McMorris? 

A. No, General Short's testimony was that, as I recall it, that he 
asked me the question and I turned to McMorris and asked him to 
answer it, and McMorris answered that there was no chance of a 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and^ that none of the members of 
the conference dissented in any way from that view. I think that 
is his testimony. 

425. Q. At that conference, was it the general opinion that in lieu 
of an outside attack on Pearl Harbor, that their real concern was 
internal sabotage? 

A. I do not recall that the question of internal sabotage was dis- 
cussed at any length. Sabotage was mentioned in these various mes- 
sages. I knew that the Navy had long since taken all measures which 
could be taken in the prevention of sabotage, and I felt that that was 
purely an Army concern to put into effect such antisabotage measures 
as might be necessary to protect the Islands. Our action was an 
accomplished fact, and we dwelt very little on that subiect. 

[37?"] 426. Q. At this conference, was there any discussion as to 
the proper state of readiness into which the Army and Navy should 
be placed in view of the message of 27 November ? 

A. The decision, whether stated or not, specifically was that no 
change in the conditions that we had been maintaining was indicated 
at that time for the Island of Oahu. 

427. Q. And you had been maintaining what condition of readiness? 

A. We had been for some time maintaining the condition of readi- 
ness of Condition 3 in the Navy. I knew that General Short had 
ordered an alert on 27 November. That was reported to me by mem- 
bers of my staff. 

428. Q. But that alert was changed to Alert 1 later? 
A. No, that was the alert that he ordered. 

429. Q. That was Alert No. 1? • 
A. Yes, the anti-sabotage alert. 

430. Q. Admiral, if you had received notice immediately that Jap- 
anese planes or foreign planes were 132 miles fi'om Oahu and head- 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 20 



290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing in for Oahu on the morning of 7 December, what would you have 
done and what effect would this have had on the attack ? 

A. I would have ordered general quarters on all ships. I would 
have started the destroyers, the light forces out of the main channel 
on sortie and put all the planes in the air ; mustered every available 
plane starting to search in the particular area indicated, and launched 
an attack on their carriers. At the same time I would have expected 
the Army to get all of their pursuit planes in the air to meet the attack. 
The ENTERPRISE was about 200 miles to the westward of Oahu 
and headed for Oahu and she had an escort of 3 heavy cruisers and 
9 destroyers. The LEXINGTON was 400 miles southeast of Midway 
with an escort of 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. I would have put 
both those carriers on an intercepting course and kept them informed 
of the movements of the Japanese force. I would have had all avail- 
able light forces join Halsey in the ENTERPRISE and I think we 
would have had quite a party. 

431. Q. With the foreign planes 132 miles off, assuming they would 
be over Pearl Harbor in an hour or less, in general and roughly, how 
much of all of this preparation which you say you would have taken, 
could have been taken ? 

A. Well, the location of the Japanese carriers was the principal 
benefit, the greatest benefit from this information. 

[S78] 432. Q. Then you were not thinking solely of what the 
planes might do ? 

A. I think I can develop that. The ships in Pearl Harbor would 
have greeted the planes with full anti-aircraft fire. The ships would 
have been at general quarters and closed up for general quarters. 
That, I think, is beyond question. I believe that most of the planes, the 
patrol planes, would have been in the air by that time. A certain 
number, possibly two squadrons, were kept constantly on one-half 
hour's notice while they were on the ground. The others were on 
four hours notice but it took nothing like that long to get the people 
there and ready to put the planes in the air. I think it is fair to state 
that more than 50 percent, perhaps 75 percent of the planes on the 
ground in flying condition would have been in the air; well, 50 per- 
cent, we will say, would have been in the air by the time those planes 
arrived for the attack. Now, so far as the ENTERPRISE and the 
LEXINGTON were concerned, we could have directed them to the 
area in which they would have made a contact with the enemy and we 
could have supported them with such of the cruisers and destroyers 
as we were able to get out of Pearl Harbor. The battleships would 
probably not have been of much use because they are too slow and 
couldn't get up there. Does that answer the question? 

433. Q. Were all anti-aircraft guns manned on all ships in Pearl 
Harbor at the time of attack, about 7:55 a. m., on the morning of 
December 7 ? 

A. They were not. 

434. Q. What proportion of anti-aircraft guns were manned? 
A. It is as prescribed in here, but roughly one-fourth. 

435. Q. In your estimation, how long was it before all anti-aircraft 
guns were manned after this attack ? 

A. Oh, I should say within 5 to 10 minutes all the anti-aircraft 
guns were manned and firing. I had stressed the importance of keep- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 291 

ing trained crews on board, or requiring trained crews be kept on 
board at all times and of having ammunition readily available at the 
guns. On one ship I heard that the ammunition was in the ammuni- 
tion boxes but they couldn't find the keys and they knocked off the locks 
and everything else and opened it up and went ahead. 

436. Q. You stated, Admiral, that on the morning of 7 December 
you received word from your dutj^ officer a raid was coming in? 

A. That is right. 

[379] 437. Q. What time did you receive this, and how did he 
receive this information ? 

A. I received that between 7 : 55 and 8 : 00 o'clock. He had ob- 
tained it, I believe, from the signal tower which we maintained in 
Pearl. 

438. Q. In other words, do we understand that j^ou received this 
information just immediately prior to the attack, or after the attack? 

A. They attacked the fields first, and I should say I received it 
after they had dropped bombs on Hickam Field and Ford Island. 
That, you understand, is an estimate. I didn't stop to figure those 
things out. 

439. Q. When did you receive information that certain planes had 
been picked up 132 miles from Honolulu ? 

A. I think it was on Tuesday, December 9, 1941, in the afternoon. 

440. Q. Did you have any information as to the probable break- 
ing of diplomatic relations with Jaj^an as of November 25 or Novem- 
ber 29, 1941 ? 

A. No. 

441. Q. Admiral, did you feel that during the period October 16 
to December 7, 1941, you were kept fully informed regarding con- 
versations, negotiations, et cetera, by our government with Japanese 
representatives as to the Japanese situation, and their import and 
significance ? 

A. It is hard at this time to state accurately what I felt prior to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor. I had requested many times that I be 
kept informed. I had been assured that I would be kept informed. 
I believed that there must be details about which I was not informed 
and I could only guess. You are asking me to recapture something 
which is a long way in the past about what I would feel. 

[380] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second 
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

442. Q. In the light of events preceding December 7, 1941, of which 
you now have knowledge would that knowledge have altered your 
dispositions and actions independently without reference to the 
Department ? 

A. It would have altered my actions and dispositions, but I would 
have promptly informed the Department. 

443. Q. At any time from October 16 to December 7 did you receive 
by official communication or personal communication from OpNav 
the suggestion of an air attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I did not. 

444. Q. You have stated that there was a unanimous opinion among 
your princij^al advisors, in coDCurrence with your own state of opin- 



292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ion, to the effect that an air attack was merely a remote possibility. 
In the discussions which took place was a distinction drawn between 
the possibility of attack during the existence of a state of peace and 
the existence of a state of war ? 

A. I think we were primarily concerned with what would happen 
to us immediately, and our conclusion related specifically to the con- 
dition that confronted us there while we were in a state of peace. 

445. Q. But had a state of war existed on December 7, 1941, would 
not your condition of readiness been radically different? 

A. Yes, it would have been different. I would have then placed 
considerations of security ahead of any consideration of training. 

446. Q. In earlier testimony you accepted the responsibility for not 
having ordered a distance reconnaissance on December 7, 1941. 

A. That is correct. 

■ 447. Q. Does the court understand that your reason was that the use 
of patrol planes for distance i-econnaissance was not warranted, in 
that the presence of carriers of a foreign power within the range of 
such a reconnaissance was neither known nor suspected? 

A. Yes. 

448. Q. How long before the attack on December 7 did you have 
information concerning the movement of Japanese carriers to the 
Marshall Islands ? 

A. I cannot now recall. 

449. Q. Is it your recollection that it was not within, let us say, 
a week previous ? 

A. It was something on that order, yes. 

[381] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (Continued) : 

450. Q. Questions have been asked you relative to the transfer of 
your headquarters from the PENNSYLVANIA to shore. Was that 
move taken up by you with the Department in Washington before it 
was effectuated ? 

A. I informed the Chief of Naval Operations of the place I pro- 
posed to take. Eventually, and after I had transferred my head- 
quarters on shore, I took up with the Department the question of 
getting permanent headquarters there, and the money was allocated 
and the plans drawn to provide these permanent quarters prior to 
the time I was relieved. 

451. Q. Did you receive specific approval for the removal of the 
temporary quarters before it was done ? 

A. Yes, in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations. Further- 
more, I received his approval for the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District to allocate my quarters on shore, which the Commandant did. 

452. Q. You have related, in answer to questions, the officers of 
your staff who were present at the conference on November 28 in 
reference to the dispatches received both by you and the Army on No- 
vember 27. In addition to your staff, and Admiral Bloch and Gen- 
eral Short, were any of the flag officers of your command present? 

A. I think Admiral Wilson Brown was also present. 

453. Q. Had Admiral Halsey gone? 

A. Halsey left on the 28th. He may or may not have been present. 
I don't recall. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 293 

454. Q. Did you confer with Admiral Halsey, after the receipt of 
the dispatch of November 27 and before he left on his misison, relative 
to the dispatch? 

A. 1 'm not sure that there was an opportunity for him to come to 
the otlice before he sailed. I believe, however, he did see the dispatch 
before he sailed. 

455. Q. Did any of your flag officers or staff officers recommend to 
you any other disposition of the Fleet or extra precautions as a result 
of the message of November 27? 

A. None except the ones I took. 

456. Q. Did these officers have all the information regarding the 
situation which was in your possesison? 

A. The members of my staff to whom you refer did have all the 
information that was in my possession. The three Fleet task force 
connnanders, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Calhoun had all the in- 
formation which was available [382] when they visited my 
headquarters. 

457. Q. The question was asked you whether between October 16 
and December 7 you felt that you were kept fully informed by the 
Navy Department as to the progress of relations between the United 
States and Japan. Can you answer that question categorically, yes 
or no ? 

A. As to how I felt prior to December 7 ? 

458. Q. Yes. 

A. No, I cannot ansAver that question categorically, yes or no. 

Tlie interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Eet.), made the following statement: I should like to intro- 
duce in evidence Operations Plan 1-41, dated 27 February 1941, with 
annexes: (a) Inshore Patrol Plan; (b) Base Defense Air Force Plan; 
(c) Anti-aircraft Defense Plan; (d) Harbor Control Post Plan: 
(e) Communications Plan. It was issued by C. C. Bloch, Naval Base 
Defense Officer, Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I do not 
care to read it, but I should like to have it as an exhibit. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 53". 

Reexamined by the judge advocate : 

459. Q, Do you recall, from any data which you have, how long 
it took those Japanese planes to fly 132 miles? 

A. My best answer is only an estimate, and I will say it took them 
something over an hour to fly 132 miles. 

460. Q. That is the best answer you can give from any informa- 
tion you have? 

A, Yes, and that is not accurate. I don't know. 

461. Q. I ask you if you are acquainted with charges that have 
been made as to lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy 
in the Hawaiian area, specifically that neither service knew what 
security measures were in effect in the other and that the services 
did not cooperate in matters of defense. Can you state. Admiral, what 
the facts are in this regard ? 

A. These charges, as I recall them, were made in the report of 
the Roberts Commission substantially as you state them. They w^ere 
widely made in the press. In my opinion, such charges were en- 
tirely unsubstantiated by the recorded testimony of the Roberts Com- 



294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mission. Regardless of the testimony and conclusions of the Roberts 
Commission, [3S3] the charges were entirely without any 
solid foundation in fact. We did cooperate, and we did know — quite 
accurately — what was going on in the other service. 

462. Q. You knew what condition of alert was set in the Army 
on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941, did you not? 

A. I knew the condition of alert was set there and, in general, 
what it was. 

463. Q. Do you consider, from all the plans, orders, and agree- 
ments we have introduced in evidence before this court and which 
are now a matter of record before it, that the charge that there was 
lack of cooperation in the defense of Pearl Harbor is now refuted? 

A. I do. I consider that the evidence submitted to this court most 
conclusively disposes of any such charge. 
Reexamined by the court: 

464. Q. Admiral, did you have available to you telephonic com- 
nmnication with the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington? 

A. By commercial line, yes. During the attack, the Chief of 
Naval Operations was in communication with the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District. 

465. Q. Was this telephonic communication available to you in 
what is known as the scrambler telephone? 

A. No special arrangements had been made, and I am not familiar 
with the commercial telephone, but I believe it was the scrambler 
system. In addition to the commercial telephone, there was a direct 
communication provided between the Chief of Staff of the Army 
and the Commanding General in the Hawaiian Department, which 
1 presume the Chief of Naval Operations might have used, if he so 
desired. That I do not know. 

466. Q. That, Admiral, has been brought out in the testimony re- 
garding the scrambler system which the Army had in Honolulu 
with Washington. The court was trying to find out whether a simi- 
lar telephone system was available to you. 

A. It was not. 

467. Q. Only the commercial line was available to you ? 
A. Only the commercial line was available to me. 

468. Q. The scrambler telephone had not been installed in your 
headquarters ? 

A. That is correct. 

[384-li 469. Q. Did you at any time during this period use the 
commercial telephone in discussing matters with the Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

A. I did not. 

470. Q. Did he at any time call you over his telephone ? 
A. He did not. 

471. Q. Admiral, were you completely satisfied with the per- 
formance, of duty of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
previous to and on December 7, 1941 ? 

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District has had a dis- 
tinguished career in the Navy. I had the greatest confidence in his 
ability and acted accordingly in all my dealings with him. He had 
a very difficult job. The personnel supplied to him in a rapidly 
expanding agency required a lot of training. He was faced with 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 295 

the same difficulties that the Fleet was faced with. He repeatedly 
requested personnel to be detailed. I agreed that he required the 
personnel. Under the handicaps which he was laboring, I con- 
sidered his performance of duty highly satisfactory. 

472. Q. You included the whole period? 
A. Yes. 

473. Q. Admiral, were you satisfied with the performance of duty 
of all your senior subordinates, insofar as that performance of duty 
had any bearing on the Japanese attack? 

A. I was. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine 
this witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make 
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject 
matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record 
m connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by 
the previous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness wfts duly warned ftftd resumed his seat as an interested 
partly. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: It has been brought out 
before this court that some of the findings of the Roberts Conmiission 
dealt with relations existing between the Commandant, the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department, and the Commander-in- 
Chief of the U. S. Fleet to their disadvantage in describing these 
[3SS] relations as unsatisfactory. It is this report which'^as been 
published to the world and which has given rise to the campaign in 
the press for the last two years as to the lack of relations between the 
Army and Navy in that area. It is noted that the report of the Roberts 
Commission has been submitted to this court, and I wish to ask the 
court if it intends to use the report in question as evidence in reaching 
its findings? There are contained in the public version of the report 
of the Roberts Commission misstatements which can be readily dis- 
proved. 

The judge advocate replied as follows : The reports of the Roberts 
Commission were furnished to him, as well as all other documents he 
desired in the Navy Department for use in conducting this inquiry. 
The reports of the Roberts Commission are not now in evidence before 
the court, and the judge advocate has no knowledge of what intention 
the court has with regard to them, but they will be subject to proper 
objection and to a ruling if and when the occasion arises that any parts 
thereof are to be put in the record. 

The court then, at 12 : 10 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 



[So8A] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his 
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel was 
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U, S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, was 



296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

called as a witness by the judge advocate, was duly sworn, and was 
informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 
Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station. 

A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, retired, on active duty 
as a member of the General Board. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the year 1941? 

A. Connnandant 14th Naval District, and appertaining thereto, 
Commander Local Defense Forces; Commander Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Sea Fi-ontier; Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor; and 
as an officer of the United States Pacific Fleet and appertaining 
thereto. Commander Task Force 4, and as a Task Group Commander 
under 2CL-41, under the title of Naval Base Defense Officer. 

3. Q. Were you performing any duties in conjunction with or in 
cooperation with the Army? 

A. Yes. 

4. Q. What Avere they, in brief ? 

A. I was performing duties prescribed by the Navy Emulations, 
Joint Action 1935, Rainbow War Plans, Fleet Letter 2CL-41, and 
directives from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

5. Q. What was the method in effect for the coordination of these 
duties with the Army? 

A. I assume you mean the method of coordination with the Army. 

6. Q. Thati is correct. 

A. That was done by the principal of mutual cooperation. 

7. Q. Will you refer to section 3 of JCD-42, and state what the 
Army ta'tk was. 

A. The Army task was to hold Oahu against attack by sea, land, 
and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval 
forces. 

[3Se] 8. Q. What is the Navy task? 

A. The Navy task — to patrol the coastal zone and to control and 
protect shipping therein ; to support the Army forces. 

9. Q. Will you state what forces were assigned you as naval local 
defense forces ; what ships or equipment was in this category ? 

A. During 1941, the following forces were assigned as naval local 
defense forces : 4 old destroyers, destroyer division 80 — that is the 4 
old destroyers ; 4 small minesweepers, 3 Coast Guard cutters of differ- 
ent sizes and capabilities which also performed the duties of the Coast 
(xuard; the SACREMENTO; 1 net vessel, 1 gate vessel, 2 self- 
l)ropelled oil lighters, YO's; a few tugs and a few small craft, which 
were unsuitable for any real military use. 

10. Q. Did you consider this force as adequate to perform the Navy 
Task assigned under JCD-42, that you have just referred to? 

A. No. 

11. Q. Would you like to amplify that answer by stating w^herein 
you considered they were deficient ? 

A. I did not have enough patrol craft to properly organize inshore 
patrol. I had neither surface craft nor aircraft for offshore patrol, 
no escorts except that the Commander-in-Chief had made arrange- 
ments to supply, under the Commander Base Force, one when Rainbow 
5 was executed. I had no attack force except such Army bombers as 
could be used under the Joint Agreement. They were not adequate 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 297 

in numbers and types. I had no aircraft assigned to the Naval District 
to be used to meet the requirements of the Joint Agreement. 

12. Q. We have had considerable reference befoi-e this court to 
Exhibit 7, which is the Joint Defense Plan. JCD-42. Had any part 
of this been put in effect in 1941 ? 

A. No part of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense l*lan as such was 
put into operation by the orders of the War and Navy Departments. 
or by mutual agreement of the local connnanders of the Army and 
Navy prior to December 7. However, some parts of appendix 7 were 
in operation. 

13. Q. Will you describe in general terms what these parts of ap- 
pendix 7 were and what they pertained to ? 

A. Appendix 7 was a joint agreement between the Commanding- 
General and the Commandant 14th Naval District in regard to air 
defense. The pertinent parts which were in operation were: The 
Arm}' agreed to turn over to Navy tactical control all bombers in the 
case of air attack, or when required. The Navy agreed to turn over 
to the tactical control of the Army all fighters or aircraft suitable as 
lighters in case of emergency, or when required. 

14. Q. As Navy Base Defense Officer, did you consider you had 
[SS7] a fairly accurate picture of what military forces and equip- 
ment the Army had for the execution of its task; that is, to hold Oahu 
against attack by sea, land, and air forces, particularly as this task 
applied to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base ? 

A. Yes, and my knowledge has been reflected in correspondence 
which has been read before this court. 

15. Q, Adverting to article 17 of JCD-42, where the Army is 
charged with providing certain service and key defenses, I shall ask 
you to state opposite each category that is applicable to the Pearl 
Harbor Naval Base, not on others, what the Army had provided in 
accordance with the Joint Agreement, prior to 7 December 1941. 

A. Under subparagraph a., which was beach and land, seacoast, and 
anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl 
Harbor Naval Base, I knew that there were insufficient military per- 
sonnel according to the estimate of the need by the Commanding 
General. It was my belief that the seacoast batteries had had insuffi- 
cient target practice. I knew there were insufficient numbers of anti- 
aircraft guns, both in the long-range type and in the close-in weapons. 
I knew there were insufficient modern Army bombing planes. I knew 
that there was a deficiency in the numbers and types of Army pursuit 
planes. I knew that the permanent anti-aircraft warning service was 
nowhere near complete. I had general knowledge that a number of 
mobile stations had been set up, but that the personnel was not trained, 
that the entitre system was in a formative condition, notwithstanding 
the assistance which had been provided to the Army by the Navy. 
With reference to subparagraph c, I knew that no protection had been 
provided to landing fields in outlying islands by the Army. In ref- 
erence to paragraph d., I believed that this had been taken care of. 
Subparagraph e., I knew this had been provided for. Subparagraph 
f., I knew that the Army could not ])erform inshore aerial patrol, and 
I had endeavored to get aircraft so that the Navy could take over these 
duties until such time as the Army was properly equipped. Results — 
negative. I have also referred previously to the aircraft warning 



298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

service; that is also under f. Subparagraph g., arrangements had 
been made for this by Joint Agreement, appendix 7, but Army did not 
have adequate numbers or types of bombers, and specifically during the 
period from November 27 to December 7, the Army had only 6 modern 
bombers in serviceable condition. Paragraph h,, this had been one 
of the subjects of the Joint Air Defense Agreement. My recollection 
is that the Army furnished personnel during the day time, but that up 
to December 7, we had been unable to get them at night. Paragraph i., 
this had been diligently prosecuted. Paragraph j., this service was 
operational. Paragraph k., this service was operational. Paragraph 
1. (love), the Army, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of In- 
vestigation, had a plan for taking care of this detail. Paragraph m., 
I knew that the Army were working on this. Paragraph n., many 
conferences and studies had been held on the subject. Paragraph o., 
A 1^88] plan had been made. Paragraph p., a plan had been 
made. 

16. Q. Referring to Article 18 of JCD-4:2, which sets out what the 
Navy shall provide, will you state categorically what the Navy did 
provide, as they relate to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base prior to 7 
December 1941 ? 

A. According to paragraph 18, the Navy was first required to sup- 
ply an inshore patrol. The vessels for the inshore patrol were in- 
adequate, as I stated before. Paragraph b., the Navy was required to 
provide for an offshore patrol. There were not vessels or aircraft 
available for this patrol. None had been supplied, c. : Navy was re- 
quired to supply an escort. No vessels were available, but the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in his war plan had arranged to have an escort force 
under Commander Base Force. Paragraph d. : An attack force. I 
had no surface vessels ; none were supplied, for an attack force. Com- 
plete reliance had to be made on Army bombers. They were inade- 
quate in numbers and types. The Navy might possibly have temporar- 
ily based on shore Navy dive bombers and other shore-based aircraft, 
but they might or might not be present, e. : This had been provided 
for and was adequate except for trained personnel, f . : Torpedo nets 
had been installed in both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, magnetic loops 
and sono-buoys had been installed, but I am not sure whether they 
were installed before or after 7 December, g. : Army forces are to 
be supported by Marine anti-aircraft. This varied from time to time. 
Arrangements had been made to support Army forces as fully as could 
be done by the Commander-in-Chief in his Fleet Confidential Letter 
2CL-41 of October 14, 1st of February, 1941. h. : Number of mine- 
sweepers were inadequate, i. : There were no means for the 14th 
Naval District to conduct distant reconnaissance, either by surface 
vessels or long-range aircraft. No long-range aircraft had been fur- 
nished, j. : Only means of attacking enemy's naval forces were by air- 
craft. This meant Army bombers and whatever Navy planes happened 
to be present. Army bombers were inadequate in numbers and types. 
k. : Adequate. 1. : Fairly adequate but improving all the time. m. : 
Completely effective and ready to take over. n. : In operation, o. : 
Inadequate but being remedied very rapidly by the construction of new 
hospitals, p. : Plans made but not put into operation until after 
December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 299 

17. Q. Advertiiifr to Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-4:1, what was the rela- 
tion of the Naval Base Defense Officer to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific Fleet in the chain of military command ? 

A. The Commander-in-Chief was my immediate superior in com- 
mand. 

18. Q. Adverting to paragraph 3, g., subparagraph (6) , of this same 
exhibit, will you state what the Naval Base Defense Officer was re- 
sponsible for under each of the subparagraphs, and opposite each state 
the action taken by you as Naval Base Defense Officer prior to the 
Japanese attack [3S9] on 7 December 1941 ? 

A. g. (6) A. This was done by effecting agreement in regard to the 
use of Army planes by the Navy, and naval planes by the Army in case 
of attack. Frequently drills were held, difficulties were determined, 
remedies applied, and Marine anti-aircraft was made available to as- 
sist the Army, in arranging to have Army personnel sent in ships of the 
Fleet for training. All of this done prior to December 7. (6) B. 
About February 20, 1 had a conference with General Short, and urged 
the necessity of emplacing his mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field. 
On February 23 I was informed by his Chief of Staff, in writing, that 
General Short had given orders that mobile anti-aircraft artillery 
would be emplaced as close to the sites of our emplacements as pos- 
sible, having due regard for the ownership of land. It is my belief that 
his rej)resentations were not lived up to. In the intervening period 
until October, the Naval Base Defense Officer personally examined 
the nlans for location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were 
to be emplaced, particularly those that were to be located on the naval 
reservations. Subordinates of the N. B. D. O. were in constant touch 
with Army representatives; endeavoring to have the guns in place, and 
on December 7, the Navy was actually making arrangements to mess 
and quarter Army gun crews on naval reservations, so that objections 
would be removed. At a date somewhere between 15 October and 
November 1 or 15th, Naval Base Defense Officer personally talked to 
LieutenanfGeneral Short about this matter. General Short explained 
his position, that he could not emplace these guns for several reasons — 
sites were not on government land, fire-control communications would 
have to be out in the weather, usually in cane fields and irrigation 
ditches and be subject to deterioration; furthermore, that it would be 
extremely difficult for personnel comprising the gun crews to be quar- 
tered and subsisted. There were approximately 26, 3-inch anti-air- 
craft guns in fixed emplacements, about 20 of them being in the vicinity 
of Pearl Harbor. All of these measures were taken prior to 7 De- 
cember. C.-: Commander Patrol Wing Two was a flying officer and as 
such understood all the technicalities of air operation and was quali- 
fied to command air forces. Control was exercised through him, and 
it is believed that thorough coordination with the Army was effected. 
Detailed operating plans were prepared, drills were held, difficulties 
determined, and improvements made. All done before December 7. D. 
(1) : N. B. D. O. was responsible for advising the S. O. E. of what 
condition of readiness to maintain This was done by means taken 
by him in drill. Communication plans were provided wherebv it could 
be effected quickly. All before December 7. (6) D. (2) Drills held 
weekly until the autumn, when they were changed to be held every two 
weeks, and in these bi-weekly drills, the arrangements were made to 



300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to bi-weekly 
drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army participation 
and, also due to their frequency, there [390] had been ab- 
sentees. The bi-weekly drills were arranged well in advance and in- 
sured the Army participation and all hands being at each drill. All 
prior to December 7. (6) D. (3) : This was done ; all signals that were 
contained in the Communication Annex to the Operations Plan 1-41. 
(6) D. (4) : This was practiced at actual drills, and communications 
provided for the purpose. All done prior to December 7. D. (5) : A 
communications plan was promulgated prior to December 7, was used 
at drills. D. (G) : Air raid alarm signal was contained in the connnu- 
nication plan. 

1!). Q. Do you recall what condition of readiness was in effect in the 
14th Naval District on the night of G December 1941 ? 

A. Admiral Kimmel testified that there was a Fleet order to main- 
tain condition of readiness No. 3, and General Short has testified that 
Alert No. 1 was in effect in the Army in the harbor control posts. Con- 
dition No. 3 was in effect, full anti-sabotage measures. It had been in 
constant effect for several months. The various posts comprising my 
connnand, such as the air station at Ford Island, the one at Kaneohe 
Bay, the ammunition depot at Lualualei. and the communication station 
at Wahiawa, and other places — the conditions of readiness were deter- 
mined by the Commanding Officer, but there were no conditions of 
readiness in effect. 

20. Q. Had the condition of readiness existing in the 14th Naval 
District been notified to the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor 
on the night of 6 December 1941, to your knowledge? 

A. The condition of readiness — no. 

21. Q. No condition of readiness was advised to the S. O. E. ? 

A. It should be borne in mind that the normal condition on board 
ships in Pearl Harbor, w^ith their guns ready and ammunition at the 
guns, a lai'ge percentage of the officers and men on board, was equal to 
and probably higher than the Army Alert No. 2. 

22. Q. What condition of readiness for aircraft was being main- 
tained in the 14th Naval District, if you had any? 

A. The condition of readiness for aircraft, that is, shore-based air- 
craft, was the normal day-to-day condition of readiness prescribed 
according to the requirements of the various squadrons or units, in 
accordance with their most probable use and their days' tasks and mis- 
sions, which at that point were largely training, personnel-type train- 
ing exercises and materiel lessons. 

23. Q. Adverting to page 5 of the Exhibit, Avliich is 2CL-41, there 
are laid down certain duties of the Naval Base Defense Officer. In each 
case, state what was done by you when the Japanese attacked Pearl 
Harbor Naval Base at 0755 December 7, 1941. 

A. Paragraph 3, big G, subpai-agraph 9, subparagraph c, ( 1 ) . That 
is to give alarm indicating attack in progress or [S91] immi- 
nent. If not already blacked out, black out when the alarm is given. 
This was done both by visual signal and by air-raid alarm. Next is 
(2). That was done. Paragraph 3 and 4, one of which is, launch air 
search for enemy ships, and the other is to arm and prepare all bombing 
units available. Many drills had been held with a view to making all 
these . actions automatic and not requiring orders consuming time. 
They were done "irisof ar as" aircraft 'were available after the attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 301 

24. Q. Adverting to the aircraft warning system which you have 
testified was the responsibility of the Army, were you required to have 
any personnel attached to this system ? If so, what? 

A. The Joint Agreement with the Army required the Navy to have 
a liaison officer in the interceptor connnand to evaluate and relay the 
messages, when the aircraft warning systgm was established. This 
system was not established until December 7, when officers were sent. 

25. Q. Am I to understand, then, that the aircraft warning system 
had not yet been organized by the Army ? 

A. The entire system, the permanent system, was nowheres near 
completed. Some five or six mobile stations had been placed at points 
around the island by the Army. The entire system, including the train- 
ing of the personnel and the organization of the system, was in a very 
formative state, and no order had been issued for Ihe establishment of 
a station, nor was it issued until December 7. The entire anti-aircraft 
warning system was the responsibility of the Army, and General Short 
testified before this court the other day that the establishment order 
was not issued until December 7. 

26. Q. Achniral Kimmel has testified he considered the intelligence 
unit under your command to have been adequate and, I believe, efficient. 
How did you classify this unit at the time of the Japanese attack? 

A. I considered the Combat Intelligence Unit efficient, but that per- 
sonnel numbers were inadequate. 

27. Q. As you look back upon the events which preceded the Jap- 
anese attack on Pearl Harbor, are you still of the same opinion? 

A. Yes, I believe it was efficient, except now I know that the space, 
numbers of personnel, and equipment, was grossly inadequate. 

28. Q. Do you feel that this unit kept you and the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet currently informed ? 

A. Yes, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and [392] 
the Commandant 14th Naval District were kept informed from such 
information as this unit was able to obtain. 

29. Q. Do you remember if you received intelligence information 
from sources other than this unit ? 

A. Yes, from the Commander-in-Chief, from the District Intelli- 
gence Officer, who had an organization under the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence and who had contact with Military Intelligence, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. 

30. Q. Did you get any intelligence information from the Navy De- 
])artment in the form of bulletins or dispatches, that you remember? 

A. I got none in the form of dispatches that I remember. It is possi- 
ble that the Intelligence Office got bulletins. I don't recall seeing them. 

31. Q. Do you feel that you and the Comander-in-Chief of Pacific 
Fleet worked in harmony in military matters affecting your command? 

A. Yes, unequivocally so. 

32. Q. Do you recall whether your conferences were frequent, or 
otherwise, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, from 
the period, say October 16, 1941, to 7 December 1941? 

A. I believe it to be a fair estimate to say that I saw and talked to 
the Commander-in-Chief four of five times weekly. 

33. Q. In the light of what you now know, do you feel that the 
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet kept you currently informed 
in militarv matters? 



302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I felt, and still feel, that the Commander-in-Chief made an hon- 
est effort to keep me fully and currently informed on all matters, and 
I did my best to reciprocate. 

34. Q. And can you say now that you feel that you were informed ? 
A, So far as I know he gave me all the information he had. 

35. Q. What Avas the nature of your relations in military matters 
with the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I had little contact with the S. O. E. at Pearl Harbor in military 
matters, in view of the physical presence of the Commander-in-Chief. 

36. Q. Did you have any responsibility for the condition of readi- 
ness of the vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, or was that a matter 
under the Comander-in-Chief or the Senior Officer Embarked? 

A. Yes, I had some resj)onsibility by paragraph 3 G (6) d. (1) of 
Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41. 1 was required [393] to 
advise the S. O. E. in Pearl Harbor what condition of readiness be 
maintained. 

37. Q. Can you now remember when you first felt that United 
States-Japanese relationships were becoming acutely strained 

A. I was conscious that United States-Japanese relations were 
strained, in varying degrees, throughout the entire year of 1941. 

38. Q. Do you recall making any decisions based on any estimate 
as to what the Japanese intentions might be towards an attack in the 
Hawaiian area ? 

A. Of course I was not called on to make any independent decisions. 
I did not have any information separate and distinct from the High 
Command of the Fleet, nor did any information w^hich was furnished 
me cause me to disagree with the decisions made. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, withdrew. 

[394] 39. Q. I am asking you, did you make any decisions of 
3^our own ? 

A. My answer to that is that I was not called upon to make any in- 
dependent decisions. I didn't have any information separate and 
distinct from the high command of the Fleet, nor any information 
which would cause me to disagree with the decisions that he made. 

40. Q. Did you have any views on the possibility of a surprise air 
attack on Pearl Harbor before 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the 
declaration of war as a remote possibility. 

41. Q. You have heard the testimony which Rear Admiral Kimmel 
gave before this court as to the views of the Navy Department on the 
physical possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack as being influenced 
by the prevailing depths of water in Pearl Harbor. Did these tech- 
nical views influence any estimate that you may have made of the 
possibility of such an attack ? 

A. Yes, inasmuch as it appeared impossible to successfully launch 
torpedoes from aircraft in Pearl Harbor, I was of the opinion that a 
bombing raid by aircraft would not be sufficiently profitable to cause 
an enmy to undertake it. 

42. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions dispatch of 27 November, 1941. Had you been shown this dis- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 303 

patch by anyone before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 
7 December ? 

A. Yes. I saw this dispatch, or a paraphrase of it, on the evening 
of November 27. 

43. Q. Do you recall if you had any conference with the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet before December 7, 1941, with 
reference to the information contained in this dispatch? 

A. Yes, I think so. 

44. Q. What was your own estimate of the situation as to the JajDa- 
nese intentions based on the information current with this dispatch ? 

A. At the conference above referred to, the subject matter was fully 
discussed, after which the Comander-in-Chief made his decision as to 
what steps should be taken. I had no information to cause me to 
disagree with his conclusions. 

45. Q. As a result of the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 17, at 
which you are now looking, was the condition of readiness under your 
command changed in any way that you remember? 

A. The various commonds in the 14th Naval District did not as- 
sume condition of readiness. Full anti-sabotage measures had been 
in effect for several months. The various commanding officers were 
responsible as such [395] for their commands. There were 

adequate armed marines at all stations. There were elaborate identi- 
fication pass systems in effect. All measures outside the naval reser- 
vations, even up to their gates and fences, were Army responsibilities. 

46. A. But so far as your command itself was concerned, what I am 
trying to find out is, did you take any additional security measures 
bv virtue of the information that was contained in this dispatch, 
Exhibit 17? 

A. Yes. We placed a patrol off of Honolulu Harbor, conducted by 
the Coast Guard. We began sweeping Honolulu Harbor channel 
and approaches by Navy sweepers. Some time subsequent to the 
dispatch, Commander Inshore Patrol, who was one of my subordi- 
nates, had the captains of the four destroyers, of Destroyer Division 
80, in his office, and gave them a pep talk, and particularly^ he in- 
vited their attention to the Commander-in-Chief's directive con- 
cerning the depth-charging of submarines in the defensive sea area. 

47. Q. Can you remember whether the question of unity of com- 
mand in the Hawaiian area had been under consideration by you and 
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the 
Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941 ? 

A. I recall no discussions concerning unity of command as apply- 
ing to the Army and Navy. The existing system was mutual co- 
operation. I had no reason to take any independent steps looking 
toward a change in the established system. 

48. Q. I show you Exhibit 18, which is the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations' dispatch of 26 November, 1941. Did you have any knowledge 
of its contents shortly after this date ? 

A. Yes, I believe so. 

49. Q. Did the action contemplated therein, namely, dispatching 
a carrier to Midway and Wake, a task the accomplishment of which 
would have to be executed in the future, have any influence on your 
estimate of the imminence of war with JaDan? 

A. No. 



304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

50. Q. On the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? 
A. No. 

51. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions' dispatch of 28 November, 1941 and refers to a message sent 
by the Army to Commander Western Defense Command. Please 
inspect the subject matter contained in this dispatch and inform the 
court whether you were familiar with its contents around the time 
of its probable receipt in Hawaii ? 

A. I saw the dispatch. The only items in the dispatch which made 
a real impression on me were those parts [396] concerning the 
desire of the United States to have Japan make the first hostile act, 
and the other one was concerning not to alarm the public. By im- 
plication it was my belief that it was obligatory upon the Navy to 
consider these same restrictions. 

52. Q. In other words, I understand your view was this: That 
even though the dispatch was purely informatory, its having been 
sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to activities in the Hawaiian 
area, it did have some influence on your actions ? 

A. The message was an Army dispatch but it contained certain 
wording concerning hostile attack and alarming the public that was 
in the Navy dispatch of the same date. I believe that these restric- 
tions applied to the Navy. 

53. Q. Did these matters which you say you feel applied to the 
Navy limit your initiative in any way relative to measures for in- 
creased security that you might have taken in the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict? 

A. No. 

54. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibit 20, which is the Chief of Naval 
Operations' dispatch of 3 December, 1941, the subject matter of which 
is informatory of the action of Japanese diplomatic and consular 
posts at certain places destroying most of their codes and ciphers 
and burning all other secret and confidential documents. Do you 
recall whether you were informed of the subject matter of this dis- 
patch at any time after its probable time of receipt by the Commander- 
in-Chief? 

A. I saw the dispatch. 

55. Q. Did the receipt of this information revise your estimate in 
any way of the imminence of a United States- Japanese war ? 

A. The dispatch itself did not cause any change, in my opinion, 
regarding the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior 
to the declaration of war. It did not cause me to take any increased 
security measures in the 14th Naval District except to direct the Dis- 
trict Intelligence Officer to arrange with the Army and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for a close surveillance of the Japanese Con- 
sulate General. Adequate security measures were already effective. 

56. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibits 21 and 22, which are the 
Chief of Naval Operations' dispatches of 4 and 6 December, 1941, 
respectively, and which contain directives to destroy secret and con- 
fidential publications on Guam and outlying Pacific bases. Do you 
remember whether you had been informed of the subject matter of 
these dispatches prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 
7 December 1941 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 305 

A. I believe Admii-al Kimmel showed me these dispatches, or para- 
ph i-nses of them. 

[397] oT. Q- Did these dispatches influence you to revise in any 
manner your estimate of the imminence of war between the United 
States and Japan as of that time? 

A. No. 

58. Q. The possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? 
A. No. 

59. Q. Did the information influence you to take any increased 
security measures in the activities under your command? 

A. 1 believe that Admiral Kimmel caused me to send dispatches to 
Wake and, possibly Midway concerning the destruction of such con- 
fidential and secret codes as they might have. I am not certain on 
that point but that is my belief. 

60. Q. Were you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
in contact frequently between 27 November and 7 December lOil, on 
matters of a military nature ? 

A. Yes. 

61. Q. Do you feel you were reasonably well informed in matters 
affecting your command? 

A. Yes, I think the Commander-in-Chief tried to tell me everything. 

62. Q. Will you answer the questions? Do you feel that you were 
reasonably well informed on matters that affected your own command ? 

A. Yes. 

63. Q. You and the Commander-in-Chief of the' Pacific Fleet were 
in accord in these matters ? 

A. Yes. The Commander-in-Chief never indicated any disap- 
proval of my actions. 

64. Q. Do you, yourself, remember having informed him of the 
condition of readiness w^hich you were taking in your command up 
to the time of 0755 on 7 December 1941 ? 

A. No, I do not remember ever having categorically advised him, 
but on October 16 and on November 27, and possibly on November 24, 
conferences were held with the Commander-in-Chief and it was de- 
cided to make no changes. I had every reason to think the Com- 
mander-in-Chief knew the conditions. 

65. Q. On the question of long-range reconnaissance, I would like a 
summary at this time of the command relationship that existed be- 
tween yourself as a Naval Base Defense officer and the Commander of 
Patrol Wing Two. For what matters did he come under your com- 
mand ? 

A. My sole connection with long-range reconnaissance [S98] 
was that as Commandant of the 14th Naval District I had made a joint 
agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 
which would be placed in execution on M-day, or by order of the War 
and Navy Departments, or upon the mutual agreement of the two 
local commanders of the Army and Navy, after which time it would 
then become a responsibility of the Navy to provide distant reconnais- 
sance aircraft for this purpose which had been allocated to the 14th 
Naval District by the Navy Department, but I had been informed that 
their delivery was indefinite. In connection wath Fleet Confidential 
Letter 2CL-41 (Revised), Commander Patrol AVing Two was Com- 
mander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and as such he was under 

79716—46 — J:x. 146. vol. 1 21 



306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

my control insofar as I exercised supervisory control over naval shore- 
based aircraft, arranging through him, Commander Patrol Wing Two, 
for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy. 

66. Q. I am still a little bit puzzled as to this command relationship. 
ComPat Wing Two was whom ? 

A. Admiral Bellinger. 

67. Q. Did he have any other duties than ComPat Wing Two ? 

A. Yes. He was Commander of Task Force Nine. I believe he w^as 
Commander Air Scouting Force. He was also Commander Naval Base 
Defense Air Force. 

68. Q. That is what I am trying to straighten out, exactly this situ- 
ation : For example, if Admiral Bellinger had under his command, 
say 5 squadrons of patrol planes. How w^ould you, as a Naval Base 
Defense officer, know whether these 5 squadrons of planes belonged 
to him as Commander Scouting Force, or as Naval Base Defense 
officer ? 

A. I don't believe I am the best qualified person to tell you that. 
Admiral Bellinger, was not under my command. He was a Fleet 
officer. 

69. Q. But he was a Naval Base Defense Air Officer, was he not ? 

A. Yes, but the Naval Base Defense Air Force was like a volun- 
teer fire department. When you sounded the air raid alarm they 
came, and when the air raid alarm wasn't in effect, they were doing 
something else. 

10. Q. That is exactly what I am trying to get at. Suppose, for 
example, you, in your capacity as Naval Base Defense officer, wanted 
to use two or three squadrons of these 5 squadrons of planes that 
I have assumed Admiral Bellinger had under his command, and you 
ordered him to turn these planes over to you. Could he say, "Well, 
they belong to the Scouting Force and I can't let you [399] 
have them"? 

A. Well, he was a very good friend of mine but I don't believe 
he would have done it without asking the Commander-in-Chief. 

71. Q. In other words, for you to get any planes that Admiral 
Bellinger had under his command it would probably mean that you 
would have to go to the Commander-in-Chief, or that he would, 
before you would get them in your capacity as Naval Base Defense 
officer ? 

A. Not exactly. There were a lot of aircraft. First, the Marine 
aircraft at Ewa Field. That had a commanding officer, a Marine 
officer, a flyer. They had certain duties to do all the time. On 
Ford Island there were a lot of carrier based planes that had been 
left there temporarily, and m.aybe some other types of planes. They 
had commanding officers. They had their duties and so forth to 
carry out. Task Force Nine, the patrol planes, the same thing. They 
had their duties to perform under Admiral Bellinger. Now, normally 
they were all carrying on their duties. When the air-raid alarm went, 
then they all became the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and only at 
that time. 

72. Q. In other words, in your capacity as Naval Base Defense 
officer, you had no planes at all unless you rang the alarm ? 

A. Of course I might, under some circumstances, receive positive 
information from the Commander-in-Chief that there was an enemy 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 307 

approaching, to sound an air raid alarm, and I would sound an air 
raid alarm, and then this thing would function. 

73. Q. Let me put it another way: Suppose, for example, upon 
the receipt of the information contained in the dispatch of November 
27, you felt it your duty, as the Naval Base Defense officer, to send 
out a long-range reconnaissance. Could you have told Admiral 
Bellinger then, "I want all the planes you've got to conduct this 
reconnaissance" ? 

A. My duties as Naval Base Defense officer are clearly described in 
the Order. Nowhere in the order does it say that I shall make long- 
distance reconnaissance. 

74. Qi. Well, I am puzzled and I don't know whether the court 
has it clear, or not, but that is exactly the point I would like to get 
cleared up. 

A. I have told you all there is about it. If I know something you 
want to know, I would be very glad to tell you. 

75. Q. Who did have the authority to make long distance recon- 
naissance ? 

A. The Commander Task Force Nine, or Commander Patrol Wing 
One and Two, the same individual. Admiral Bellinger, had as his 
mission to make scouting patrols and [400] distance recon- 
naissance. But they were subject to the order of the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

76. Q. To clarify that point, Admiral Bellinger couldn't do this 
on his own initiative; he would have to have orders from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief ? 

A. I believe so, but I would rather you ask Admiral Bellinger. 

77. Q. At any rate during the period 27 November to 7 December, 
1941, did you consult with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet looking toward the establishment of a long-range aircraft 
reconnaissance ? 

A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, made his decision on 
November 27, that the intensive training, material upkeep and opera- 
tional schedules would continue and that no changes would be made. 
This, by itself, would include the long-range aircraft reconnaissance. 
I made no suggestions to him. 

78. Q. Whose responsibility was it for berthing ships in Pearl 
Harbor so that they could develop the maximum anti-aircraft fire? 

A. The senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. 

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of your own whether on the 
night of 6-7 December, ships were so berthed ? 

A. I believe so, except possibly in the case of double-berthed 
battleships. 

80. Q. But this was not a matter of your responsibility ? 

A. That was not a matter of my responsibility and was an un- 
avoidable situation. 

81. Q. Wlien did you first know there was an enemy attack on 
Pearl Harbor, and how did you ascertain it ? 

A. At about 0755, 7 December 1941. I heard the explosion of 
bombs. 

82. Q. This convinced you of an attack, or did you need somebody 
to inform you further? 

A. I went out on my lanai and saw a Japanese plane coming by. 



308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

83, Q. Will you tell the court what action you took at this time? 

A. I went to my headquarters as fast as I could. I immediately 
initiated dispatches to Washington, the Philippines, Guam, ships at 
sea, and possibly others, to the effect that Oahu had been attacked. 
I directed local broadcasting stations to call all Navy Yard workers 
and naval personnel to the yard; directed drydocks to be flooded; 
also many other local directives. 

[401] 84. Q. Wliat percentage of officers and men under your 
command who had military duties were ready and available for duty 
at the time of the attack at 0755, if you can remember, in a general 
way i 

A. The Navy Yard, under my command, and the District Head- 
quarters, I do not know the exact percentage, but ample personnel 
was present and all institutions and vessels in the command were im- 
mediately ready. 

The court then, at 3 : 00 p. m., took a recess until 3 : 15 p. m., at which 
time it reconvened. 

Present : 

All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties and 
their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose 
counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness under 
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness 
and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Examination by the judge advocate (continued) : 

85. Q. Prior to the air attack at 0755 on the morning of 7 December, 
1941, had there been any enemy activity in the Hawaiian area other 
than that of aircraft that you knew about ? 

A. Yes. 

86. Q. What was it? 

A. At about 0715 I received a telephone message from my chief of 
staff to the effect that the USS WARD, the old destroyer which was 
acting as inshore patrol off the harbor entrance, had reported that she 
had attacked a submarine, and about the same time, either in this mes- 
sage or a subsequent message, the WARD reported that she was then 
escorting a sampan to Honolulu. The staff duty officer at Commander- 
in-Chief's headquarters was given the same information at the same 
time by the Harbor Control Post. I discussed this with the chief of 
staff over the telephone and we were uncertain as to whether this was 
another false contact, or not. Captain Momsen, the War Plans officer, 
went to headquarters to verify the situation and immediately ordered 
the ready-duty destroyer out to sea to support the WARD. This was 
doctrine. Before the matter could be clarified the air attack had 
begun. 

[4-02] 87. Q. Did you have any information as to where the 
attack on the submarine took place that you have stated you had a 
report of ? 

A. I knew it was somewhere south of the entrance buoys in the 
harbor entrance approaches. 

88. Q. But do you or do you not know whether it was inside or out- 
side of the submarine net? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 309 

A. That would be outside the submarine net. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

89. Q. In your testimony. Admiral, you related the Army deficien- 
cies and the Navy deficiencies insofar as the 14th Naval District was 
concerned. However, when the Fleet was in, the deficiencies in regard 
to patrol craft and, to a reasonable degree, in regard to patrol planes, 
could be remedied, couldn't it, sir ? 

A. No. The Fleet's vessels which could be used as patrol craft, 
and the Fleet's patrol planes, were all occupied in their own routine 
employment, which was intensive training, material upkeep, and oper- 
ation. I could not use those instrumentalities without the consent of 
the Commander-in-Chief. 

90. Q. I think you misunderstood me, Admiral. I will rephrase my 
question this way : In the event such contingency as occured on De- 
cember 7, 1941, there were other craft when the Fleet was in port that 
could be made available to you, sir. Is that not correct ? 

A. There were ships and aircraft there but I do not know as to their 
availability, as to giving them to me. 

91. Q. That is, insofar as you were Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District? 

A. As Commandant of the 14th Naval District. 

92. Q. And as far as the Army was concerned, whether the ships 
came from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, or whether 
they came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, wouldn't 
make any difference to them, would it? 

A. I don't think the Army had any interest in the ships. 

93. Q. My point is this. Admiral: Then as of December 6 and 
December 7, 1941, in regard to the actual vessels and planes then avail- 
able at Pearl Harbor, do you think that the Army had any particular 
criticism to make of the Navy in regard to the readiness of the Navy to 
meet necessary commitments ? 

A. I have heard of none. 

[403] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross examine this 
witness. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), 
stated that he did not desire to cross examine this witness. 

Reexamined by the judge advocate : 

94. Q. Did you have any information on a submarine being sunk 
inside the harbor? 

A. Yes. In my previous testimony I have stated that Captain 
Momsen ordered the ready-duty destroyer to sea to support the USS 
WARD. This destroyer got under way about 8 : 00 o'clock, and_ in 
standing out of the harbor she sighted a Japanese submarine which 
she rammed and depth-charged and sunk. Subsequent thereto this 
same submarine was depth-charged several additional times. The 
submarine, after it was raised, was found to have one, 5-inch shell 
hole through the conning tower, which killed the captain. He was 
blown into a mass of crumpled steel, and both torpedoes were missing. 
The submarine carried two torpedoes. The submarine was known as 
a midgret submarine. 



310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

95. Q. You spoke a moment ago about an attack that the WARD 
had made on a submarine. Do you know whether or not this sub- 
marine was sunk, or whether it was just a report of an attack that 
the WARD made? 

A. Subsequent to December Tth, I learned for the first time that 
a patrol plane had also seen this submarine, or another submarine, 
and attacked it with depth bombs, and that the submarine was sunk. 

96. Q. What type of submarine was this ? 
A. A midget. 

, 97. Q. What sort of net protection against submarines was in- 
stalled in the Pearl Harbor channel ? 

A. No anti-submarine nets were installed in Pearl Harbor or Hono- 
lulu, but anti-torpedo nets were installed to prevent submarines from 
firing torpedoes from outside into the harbor. The only nets in opera- 
tion then, and now I believe, was an anti-torpedo net. 

98. Q. If this net had been closed, do you think it was adequate to 
exclude a midget submarine from the harbor ? 

A. That is a question of opinion. I think it highly probable that 
the submarine would have been fouled by the net and the patrols would 
have seen it and made its detection much easier. 

99. Q. Do you have any information as t^^ the condition of this 
anti-torpedo net in the Pearl Harbor channel; whether it was open 
or closed on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. The practice and orders required the net gate to [4^4] be 
open all day but to be closed all night, except when ships were arriving 
or departing. At about 4:45 a. m., some vessels which had been at 
sea, I believe minesweepers, approached the net and the gate was 
open. 

100. Q. What day? 

A. December 7th. And I subsequently found that this gate had not 
been closed until sometime after 8 : 00 o'clock, when it was ordered 
closed by Headquarters. 

[4-OS] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

Examined by the court : 

101. Q. Will you give a brief description of that net? 

A. The net was backed up in the shallow water areas by under- 
water obstacles. Where the water became deep enough to permit a 
torpedo to run, the net began. It was anchored on the shore side with 
heavy buoys. The net was made in interlocking rings, so that every 
ring interlocked with three or four. It was held afloat by large buoys 
on the surface known as baulks. They were merely small wooden 
rafts. On the top of these rafts were powerful steel prongs projected 
to seaward. At the gate end, on the shore side, there was a gate vessel, 
which was a steel vessel probably three or four hundred feet long and 
twelve to fourteen feet draught, which had some generators and power- 
ful winches to handle lines. The other shore end was anchored in 
exactly the same way I have described the first one, except there was 
no gate vessels, but there was a hinge on the gate which held in place 
the large buoys. There were lines which ran from the gate vessel to 
the opposite side of the net through blocks and came back to the 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 311 

entrance of the gate, so that when the gate was to be opened, the gate 
vessel hauled on a wire line, which went through a block on the other 
side and pulled open the gate. When you wanted to close it, you 
hauled on the opposite line. 

102. Q. What was the depth of the water in the channel? 

A. I think the deepest place was about seventy-two feet, but that 
was in the exact center of the channel. 

103. Q. What was the depth of the net? 
A. As I recall it, it was forty -five feet. 

104. Q. Can you tell us what the overall measurements of the sub- 
marine were, from the top of the conning tower to the bottom? 

A. I think the submarine was sixteen feet from the keel to the top 
of the conning tower, and the periscope stuck up three or four feet 
more — say, twenty feet. 

105. Q. The first submarine on which you got a contact was about 
liow^ far south of the entrance buoy? Do you remember? 

A. I have subsequently determined it was somewhat over a mile. 

[406] 106. Q. You don't know whether it was a midget or big- 
ger submarine? 

A. I believe it was a midget, I think the WARD sunk one, and 
whether or not the plane sunk another or contributed to the WAilD's 
effort, I haven't been able to learn. However, a Japanese radio broad- 
cast admitted on or about December 12 that the Japanese had lost five 
submarines on this attack. 

107. Q. Now, will you tell the court a little about the submarine 
which got into the harbor? 

A. It is my recollection that the submarine which entered the har- 
bor was first sighted by a barge, which we call YP something. I don't 
remember the number. It was somewhere south of Hospital Point. 
This barge endeavored to ram it and made a report by signal to the 
signal tower. The submarine proceeded up channel and went on the 
north side of Ford Island — All of this was reconstructed afterwards — 
and fired torpedoes at the USS CURTIS, which was moored some- 
where west of Pearl City. The CURTIS saw the torpedoes. They 
missed and hit the Pearl City peninsula, and one of them exploded. 
The CURTIS opened fire immediately, and I believe the five-inch 
shell found in the conning tower of this submarine was one of the five- 
inch shell of the CURTIS. The MONAGHAN, which had gotten 
away from her berth at the east end of the harbor and was standing 
out, saw this submarine about the same time and rammed depth 
charges, and the other destroyers coming along later dropped a few 
depth charges for good luck. 

108. Q. Were there any other submarines which got into the har- 
bor, to your knowledge ? 

A. None, although we had no less than fifty alarms that day, the 
next day, and the following days. 

109. Q. I believe you said that if the gate of that net had been 
closed, it is probable that the submarine would have been entangled 
in it? 

A. Yes. I might say another submarine was captured. 

110. Q. Where? 

A. The third submarine ran ashore on the reef off Bellows Field 
on the northeast coast of Oahu. The Army went out, and the captain 



312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

jumped overboard and was captured by the Army. The Army went 
out and got lines on her and informed us, and we went over and took 
her apart and brought her to Pearl Harbor, and she is now used for 
making bond drives around this country. 

111. Q. As we understand it, the submarine which you speak of 
as entering the harbor was not sighted until after it reached Ford 
Island or was off Ford Island ? 

A. Sighted by a YP south of Hospital Point first. 

[407] 112. Q. How far is that inside the gate and the net? 

A. Oh, probably a mile and a half. 

113. Q. Were there any lookouts at the gate as a matter of doctrine 
or as a result of your orders to keep watch 'i 

A. Yes, there was a gate vessel which had a full crew on board in 
command of a chief petty officer, and there were motor launch patrols. 

lU. Q. At all times? 

A. At all times. 

115. Q. They did not sight this submarine? 

A. If they did, they did not report it. 

lie. Q. Did you give orders to close the gate? 

A. I believe the captain of the yard gave orders to close it. 

117. Q. But it was closed immediately? 
A. It was closed. 

118. Q. In view of the critical conditions existing with Japan, al- 
though w^e were on a peace footing at that time, was there any con- 
sideration given by you or anyone else to keeping this gate closed at 
all times, opening it only for the passage of vessels? 

A. Yes, we considered it, but owning to the heavy traffic in the day 
time and the fact that visibility was good and that there were men and 
boats there all the time, it w^as decided in the day time to keep it 
open. 

119. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, was there any inner 
air patrol maintained around the entrance to seaward of Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. None that I have knowledge of. 

120. Q. Did you ever consider asking for it, looking to the main- 
tenance of such a patrol ? 

A. Yes, I had asked the Nav}^, through the Commander-in-Chief, 
for four observation sea planes for the purpose of anti-submarine 
patrol and work in the coastal area. 

121. Q. But in view of the ships in Pearl Harbor at that time and 
the fact that these ships had on them 0S2U planes and other smaller 
planes which could have been used for an enemy patrol, were any 
steps taken toward this end ? 

A. No, not by me. 

122. Q. Was it considered? 

A. I think it was considered. I have some difficulty separating 
pre-December 7 and post-December 7. I think it was [V^S] 
considered, but I think that owing to the fact that the ships at sea 
were employed for long periods — ten days — in which they used their 
planes, when they came into the Base, the opinion was that these 
planes and the men were entitled to rehabilitation, the same as the 
rest of the crew on a ship. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 313 

128. Q. Does the court understand that you liad no aircraft what- 
soever under your direct command? 
A. That is correct, sir. 

124. Q. Did you. Admiral, considei- that the Army was responsible 
for the defense of Pearl Harbor ? 

A. Yes, absolutely so. 

125. Q. How many anti-aircraft guns did you request the Army to 
place on naval reservations in and arounci Pearl Harbor? 

A. In a letter which I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations, via the 
Commander-in-Chief, dated December 30, 1040, which is an exhibit 
before this court, I stated, based on my knowled^re of the density of 
anti-aircraft fire, that I thouojht at least 500 guns were required. 

126. Q. On the reservation? 

A. Not all on the reservation. The Army Commanding General, 
through his supporting generals in charge of this particular thing, 
controlled the distribution of weapons which he had available. 

127. Q. Admiral, will you please state your relations with General 
Short, both official and personal, during your tenure of command? 

A. My personal relations with General Short were friendly and 
cordial. My official relations with him were good. Of course, we 
had disagreements from time to time — differences of opinion but none 
of them of any serious consequence. 

128. Q. Did you feel that there was close cooperation existing be- 
tween you and General Short ? 

A. Yes. 

129. Q. You have no doubt heard rumors of the existence of non- 
cooperation and lack of cooperation between high officials of the 
Navy in Hawaii and General Short? Are you aware of such rumors? 

A. I have read them in the papers. 

130. Q. Do you know where such rumors emanated? 

A. I do not, but every time I heard them I took occasion to deny 
their truthfulness. 

[409] 131. Q. In other words, you are of the opinion that there 
was close cooperation between the Army and Navy in Hawaii? 

A. That is my opinion. 

132. Q. On or prior to the night of 6th-7th of December, 1941, 
did you advise the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor as to what 
condition of readiness to maintain? 

A. No. 

133- Q. During the conference which you speak of as taking place 
on November 28 with the Commander-in-Chief and at which there 
were numerous officers present, did you express your ideas to the 
Commander-in-Chief and to officers present as to the kind of attack, 
if any, which could be expected? 

A. Expected where, sir? 

134. Q. Expected at Pearl Harbor? 

A. The only information which I had was contained in this dis- 
patch of November 27, in which there is nothing said indicating an 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

135. Q. But, Admiral, in discussing this dispatch was there any 
discussion as to the kind of attack which might come from Japan? 

A. I believe that there was full and free discussion by all members 
who were present and that, without exception, everyone believed that 
the dispatch indicated an attack in Southeast Asia. 



314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

136. Q. Did you at that time express your views as to the improb- 
ability of an attack on Hawaii ? 

A. I don't recall. 

137. Q. But you have stated that your views were that an air attack 
was a remote possibility? 

A. I have — a surprise air attack prior to declaration of war. 

138. Q. In view of the history of the Japanese war with Russia, 
in which they attacked Russia prior to a declaration of war, was any 
consideration given in these conferences to the possibility of such an 
attack by Japan against Pearl Harbor? 

A. I don't know that the Chemulpo incident was mentioned, but I 
think every person present at the conferences knew the circumstances. 
My own opinion was that if Japan ever made a surprise attack on the 
Hawaiian area prior to a declaration of war, the probabilities were, 
first, a submarine attack on ships in the operating areas; second, 
blocking the entrance channel by running in a ship and sinking it; 
third, by laying mines to to the approaches of Pearl Harbor ; fourth, 
by sabotage throughout the establishment. 

[^4J0] 139. Q. And you eliminated, as we understand, the possi- 
bility of aerial torpedo attack by reason of information received from 
the Navy Department and elsewhere? 

A. I believed an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor could not 
be successful, from information which had been supplied by the Navy 
Department. 

140. Q. And if there was any air attack, it would be a bombing 
attack? 

A. Yes. 

141. Q. Did you feel, Admiral, at that time that you, by reason 
of information you had received from all sources, had a complete 
picture of conditions existing between the United States and Japan 
with reference to this critical situation ? 

A. My horizon and my perspective were extremely restricted. I 
had a great many pressing local duties to do. I felt confident that 
the Navy Department could evaluate any of these matters and keep 
the responsible officers advised. 

142. Q. Did you have telephonic communication with the Chief of 
Naval Operations or the Navy Department in Washington ? 

A. I had a commercial telephone in my office which could be 
connected. 

143. Q. Did you have a scrambler system? ^ 
A. Not an individual scrambler system. 

144. Q. Any scrambler system which you could use and which was 
available to you ? 

A. No, unless it was on a commercial line. 

145. Q. As a matter of fact, the scrambler system is attached to a 
personal line telephone? 

A. I believe that is correct. 

146. Q. Did you have any telephonic communication with Wash- 
ington during your tenure of office ? 

A. Yes, on December 7 at approximately nine o'clock in the morning 
the Chief of Naval Operations called me by telephone and asked me 
for details of the attack. 

147. Q. He called you and you did not call him? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 315 

A. That is correct, sir. 

148. Q. Admiral, referring to the gate again, how long did it take 
to open and shut it? 

A. I haven't an exact knowledge. I suppose eight or ten minutes. 

[4^1] 149. Q. In normal traffic, wouldn't that have meant, had 
you kept the gate closed in the day time, as a matter of practice, it 
would have been open most of the time ? 

A. It would have been working all the time. That's correct. 

150. Q. Before or since December 7, 1941, did there come to your 
notice, official or otherwise, any instances of naval personnel being 
unfit for duty immediately before or during the attack because of 
previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor? 

A. None whatever. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make 
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat- 
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in 
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the 
previous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness resumed his seat as an interested party. 

The court then, at 4:00 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 
18, 1944. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 317 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1944 
[4^-^] Tjiirteexth Day 

Navy Department, 

Washington, D. G. 

The court met at 9 : 30 a. m. 

Present : 

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Xavy (Ret), President. 

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfns, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews. U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. 

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and 
his counsel. 

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
leporter. 

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested 
party. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and 
his counsel. 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, and his counsel. 

The record of the proceedings of the twelfth day .of the inquiry 
was read and approved. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), an interested party 
and a witness for the judge advocate, w^as recalled as a witness by 
the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken 
was still binding. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1, Q. In previous testimony before this court, not only yours but 
others, there Jias been certain evidence introduced as to the number 
of guns available for anti-aircraft guns in the protection of Pearl 
Harbor. It is not clear to the judge advocate the actual number of 
guns that were in position and ready to fire at 0755, on the morning 
of 7 December 1941. Will you state as best you can the number and 
the calibre of each anti-aircraft gun that was in position and ready 
to fire at that time? 

A. You mean on shore? 

2. Q. Exclusive of units of the Pacific Fleet or of the l-lth Naval 
District on board ship ? 

A. To my best belief and kowledge, the Army had about [-^-?<?] 
80 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about 
100 50-calibre machine guns — all of these for antiaircraft use. Of 
the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed em- 
placements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of this 
30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the 



318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

other 3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37- 
millimeter guns and 50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with 
any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in 
place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them 
were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the 
Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in 
conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the 
neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not 
mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their 
orders from the Army. 

3. Q. What calibre were these marine guns? 
A. They were 3-inch guns, Army type, mobile. 

4. Q. These guns, Admiral, that you have described as being located 
in permanent mounts at forts in the vicinity, were they sufficiently 
close to Pearl Harbor Naval Base to be effective as anti-aircraft guns 
for the protection of that base and units of the fleet at the base^ 

A, In my opinion they were not sufficient in number or calibre or 
type. 

5. Q. My question related to the closeness of these guns to Pearl 
Harbor, for the purpose of furnishing protection. 

A. They covered the approaches from the sea in the vicinity of the 
channel, and four or five thousand yards inside. 

6. Q. Now can you tell the court or give the court any estimate of 
the number of these guns that you have described that were actually 
manned and in the engagement after the alarm was sounded at 0755 
on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. No, I can't give you any data on that. 

7. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter dated February 17, 1941, from 
the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addresses. I ask you if 
you can identify it. 

A. Yes, I identify this letter. 

8. Q. What do you identify it as ? 

A. I identify it as a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, 
dated February 17, 1941, addressed to the Commandants, First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, TAvelfth, 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth Naval Districts, and the 
Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo; subject: Anti-torpedo 
baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks ; simed by R. E. 
Ingersoll, Acting. 

[^i.j] The letter dated February 17, 1941, from the Chief of 
Naval operations to the Commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and to the Com- 
mandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo, was submitted to the inter- 
ested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in 
evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked 
"EXHIBIT 54." 

9. Q. Will you please read the letter to the court ? 
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 54. 

10. Q. Admiral, I show you a document; can you identify it? 

A. Yes, I identify this as a letter from the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations, dated June 13, 1941, addressed to the Commandants, First, 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 319 

Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, 
Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval 
Districts, on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against 
torpedo plane attacks. It is confidential letter, serial number 
055730, signed by R. E. Ingersoll. 

The letter dated June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations, 
addressed to the Commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Four- 
teenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, was submitted to 
the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate 
offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, 
marked "EXHIBIT 55." 

11. Q. Will you please read it to the court? 
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 55. 

12. Q. Admiral, I show you a document and ask you if you can 
identify it? 

A. I don't recall ever having seen it before. 

13. Q. Can you identify it? 

A. The letter is a copy, apparently, of a confidential letter, serial 
number 07830, dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, on the subject 
of Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms, signed 
by H. R. Stark. 

The letter, serial number 07830, confidential, dated February 11, 1941, 
from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of 
Ordnance, was submitted to the inter- 14^-5] ested parties and 
to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

The interested p)arties. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ; 
and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , stated that 
they had never before seen the letter, but stated that they had no objec- 
tion to its being received as an exhibit. 

Accordingly, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 
56." 

14. Q. Will you please read the letter? 
The witness read the letter. Exhibit 56. 

None of the interested parties desire to cross-examine this witness. 
Examined by the court : 

15. Q. Were there any guns mounted or in use or available for use by 
the Navy, other than guns on board ship at the Pearl Harbor station ? 

A. The Marine Defense Battalion guns were there, but they were al- 
located to the Army, in connection with the Army. 

16. Q. Does this apply on Kanoehe and other activities under your 
command ? 

A. The Marine detachment in the Yard had shoulder rifles and 30- 
calibre machine guns. They were not designed for anti-aircraft work, 
but there is no doubt in my mind that they were used to the fullest ex- 
tent by the Marines there. I know of no other machine guns. I know 
there were no larger guns, and I know of no 50-calibre machine guns in 
the Navy Yard that were mounted for anti-aircraft defense and so 
used, unless they were improvised after the attack. At Kanoehe, the 
Army had agreed to defend it, and I believe that they had a 3-inch 
battery, of 4 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, mobile, located in the near vicin- 



320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ity of Kanoehe. Whether they were eniphiced and whether they fired, 
I don't know. The Navy had no guns for that purpose. They had guns, 
of course, but they were macliine guns for the Marines, and I suppose 
the aircraft had machine guns at Kanoehe. The aircraft at Pearl Har- 
bor had machine guns, but they were either mounted in the planes or 
outside, so the answer, with those excej^tions, is there were no guns. 

17. Q. Due to the critical situation and the possibility of war, and a 
possibility — even though as stated, remote — of attack on Pearl Harbor, 
did you give any consideration to the obtaining of and mounting in 
prominent places on buildings, and otherwise, of anti-aircraft guns? 

A. The Army's plan for the utilization of their 50-cal- liiG] 
ibre guns and 37-millimeter guns was to take certain numbers of them, 
which I don't know, and mount them on the top of Marine Barracks, 
storehouse, submarine base, and the receiving barracks in Pearl Har- 
bor; and I made no independent plans. 

18. Q. But the question was, did you give any consideration to the 
defense by anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, on buildings or other 
prominent structures in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I don't recollect that I did. 

19. Q. Did you consider that it was your responsibility to consider 
this in view of conditions existing ? 

A. Well, that is a rather broad question. The Army was charged 
with the responsibility, as I have stated before. I knew that their 
weapons were not adequate. Naturally, I wanted to do everything pos- 
sible in my power, but I know that I considered it was my responsi- 
bility — I would have done it if I thought it was possible and I could 
have done it and if I could have manned them, and had trained per- 
sonnel, and so forth. 

20. Q. But you did consider. Admiral, that one of the means of anti- 
aircraft defense of shore establishments is the mounting of these 
smaller guns on prominent positions, did you ? 

A. No, I think when the responsibility of the defense of a place rests 
with a certain agency, that that agency should do it to the fullest extent, 
and if it is not sufficient, that anybody who is there should do what he 
could to supplement, but in no way should the responsibility of the first 
agency be weakened. 

21. Q. The fact remains that you were cooperating with the Army 
for this defense ; is that correct ? 

A. Yes, I was cooperating to my fullest extent in every regard. 

22. Q. The only reason for these questions was to try to find out 
what had been done in the way of suggestions, cooperation, and other- 
wise, to install and obtain as many guns as possible, and install these 
guns in the Navy Yard, in addition to outside. 

A. I did not ask for any guns. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

23. Q. Admiral, do you recall in connection with guns, of conversa- 
tions with the Army representatives in connection with providing 
quarters and so forth on naval grounds, for this material? 

A. Yes. 

[4J'/\ 24. Q. Would you indicate that? 

A. In my testimony yesterday, I mentioned that I had been trying 
to arrange with the Commanding General, the emplacement of his 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 321 

mobile guns. I wanted the guns in the Navy Yard, on the buildings 
and so forth and so on, to be supplied by the Army, to be emplaced 
with their crews. One of the objections, as I remember it, was that the 
Army didn't see how they could c[uarter and mess the men in those 
localities, and we had sent a letter, I believe, to the submarine barracks 
and the receiving station, and the Marine Barracks, asking them if 
they could quarter certain numbers, and mess them; and I believe that 
at the time of December 7, some of these letters had been answered, 
but the arrangements had not been perfected. 

Neither the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, 
nor the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), desired to cross-examine this witness. 

Examined by the court : 

25. Q. Are you referring to guns to be mounted on buildings, or 
3-inch guns, or guns to be mounted on the ground ? 

A. I am referring to machine guns and 37-millimeter guns to be 
mounted on buildings. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything lelating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec- 
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous 
questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness resumed his seat as interested party. 

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and 
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station. 

A. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret.), at present on 
active duty in the Naval War College, Newport. 

2. Q. Will you state what duties you were performing in tlie year 
1941? 

A. In January 1941, I became Commander Battle Force, U. S. 
Pacific Fleet, and later in that same year, under [4^^] special 
directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Commander of Task Force 
One. 

3. Q. Where were you at 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941? 
A. I was at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu. 

4. Q. The Task Force which you commanded was in port at that 
time, Admiral ? 

A. It was. 

5. Q. How long previous to the morning of 7 December 1941, had 
this task force which you commanded, and you yourself, along with 
it, been in Pearl Harbor — how many days ? 

A. We had to report on Thursday, approximately the 27th of No- 
vember, 1941. 

6. Q. Who was the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor dur- 
ing the period of time that you and your Task Force were in Pearl 
Harbor ? 

A. I was. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 22 



322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 8, which is Fleet letter 2CL-41, in 
evidence before this court, and ask you if you identify it as such. 

A. I do. 

8. Q. What is the subject of this letter ? 

A. Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas. 

9. Q. Paragraph 3 of this letter stated that "The following security 
measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accoidance with 
enclosure (B)." I shall ask you to read to the court the following 
subparagraphs and state whether the directive was being complied 
with as of 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941. 

A. (Reading) "Items one, two, and three under continuous patrols : 
Inshore Patrol (Administered and furnished by Commandant Four- 
teenth Naval District). (2) Boom Patrols. (3) Harbor Patrols." 
Although these patrols were not under my direct supervision, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief they were in effect. (Reading) 
"Intermittent Patrols: (1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol. (a) The 
limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a 
circle 10 miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number 1 
which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol." To the best of my 
knowledge and belief, that was being complied with. Item (2) (a) 
(Reading) "Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, 
Scouting Force." Also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
within the capacities of available aircraft. 

10. Q. Adverting to paragraph (3) (G), which is "Defense Against 
Air Attack," subparagraph (4), please read this directive to the court 
for the record and state whether or [4^9^ not it had been com- 
plied with at the time of the Japanese attack at 7 : 55, December 7, 
1941? 

A. (Reading:) 

The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that 
they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensu- 
rate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to 
depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, 
and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit. 

In my opinion, it was being complied with. 

11. Q. Will you please read subparagraph (5), the next one, and 
state whether or not at the same time each gunfire sector had a known 
sector gun commander 'i 

A. (Reading:) 

The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in subparagraph (G) (3) 
above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector. 

The passing of responsibility to the sector commander was auto- 
matic with the ships in that sector. It was the practice upon any 
change of ships in port for each sector commander to inform the ships 
of his sector that he had so taken command, and that was the common 
practice. 

12. Q. What was the system employed in these sectors for control- 
ling the fire in the sector ? 

A. There was no system other than to be responsible for the look- 
out being maintained within the sector, and the necessary action taken 
to indicate possible targets. 

13. Q. Was there any method or system of coordination of lire be- 
tween ships of the Fleet and Shore batteries? 

A. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 323 

14. Q. Did yon, as Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, set 
llie condition of readiness for ships in the United States Pacific Fleet 
in Pearl Harbor when you were in ])ort ? 

A. There was no condition of readiness set, and in this respect I 
would like to say that my testimony before Admiral Hart's board, in 
Avhich I stated that conclition 3 was in effect, was in error; also the 
statement that I had informed Admiral Kinnnel that condition 3 was 
in effect, which statement was also in error. In that testimony I had 
principally in mind the differentiation between condition 3, 1, and 2; 
in other words, I meant to imply that neither one nor two were in 
effect. What was in effect was the result of an order previously is- 
sued by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, directing that anti- 
aircraft guns of all ships be available for immediate action. In ac- 
cordance with this directive, each battleship had two 5-inch anti-air- 
craft guns in readiness, and two machine guns manned ; in addition to 
the anti-aircraft control, with the provision under this directive in 
effect, I 4^0] the condition of readiness of the anti-aircraft bat- 
teries actually was in excess of that required by condition 3, Base De- 
fense Condition 3, of the order referred to. 

[4^0] 15. Q. Rear Admiral Kimmel, who was Commander-in- 
Chief of Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har- 
bor, testified, as the judge advocate recalls it, that it was the duty of 
the Naval Base Defense Officer to advise the Senior Officer Embarked 
in Pearl Harbor in what condition he, the Naval Base Defense Of- 
ficer, was maintaining of readiness on shore. Exhibit 8, which you 
have before you, states it was the Naval Base Defense Officer's duty 
to advise the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, other than the 
Commander-in-Chief, what condition of readiness to maintain. This 
appears to be slightly confusing. What was the normal way of pre- 
scribing the condition of readiness for ships at Pearl Harbor^ 

A. It seems to me that the order is perfectly clear. No condition 
of readiness other than the condition one, had been prescribed at any 
time, even during the drills. My interpretation of advise, was written 
in the order is, ''inform as to the necessity for," which was a perfectly 
sound directive in view of the fact that the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District was in direct contact with the Army and had his own 
intelligence service or operations within the immediate vicinity of the 
Hawaiian Islands. I, being senior to him, it is my opinion that the 
Commander-in-Chief used the term "advise" because he did not want 
to use the term "order." The senior commander afloat had no direct 
communication with the Army and had no intelligence service except 
his own staff, which was operative only at sea. 

16. Q. During the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, had 
the Naval Base Defense Officer advised you of any condition of read- 
iness to maintain ? 

A. Not to my know- ledge. It is possible that during that period 
we did have an anti-air raid drill, in which case we may have received 
word to take condition one, which was indicated by the sounding of 
the air-raid siren and word over the communication network. 

17. Q. Adverting to subparagraph 8, under this same general sec- 
tion that you have been reading from, that is, "Defense Against Air 
Attack," certain things are directed to be done by the Senior Officer 
Embarked in Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack. Will you read to 



324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the court for the purpose of putting into the record each item sepa- 
rately, and state after this item, what you did with regard thereto. 
A. (Reading:) 

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and 
(4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.) 

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating 
task force commander. 

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable 
sortie. 

[421] (4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie. 
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force 
Commander operating at sea, advised. 

As I have stated, I was not on board at 7 : 55 on the morning of De- 
cember 7, 1941. I can state what my chief of staff has informed me of 
the action he took, but he himself is available in case the board desires 
to question him. My Chief of Staff was then Captain, now Rear Ad- 
miral, Harold Train. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, IT. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[4^2] 18. Q. Youhavestated, Admiral, that certain guns aboard 
ship in Pearl Harbor were required to be manned under the security 
conditions that you were then maintaining. Was it necessary for 
these crews to be awake and alert while they were on watch ? 

A. They were required to be on deck in the vicinity of the guns, 
communications manned with the anti-aircraft control. I should like 
to add to that that the condition in which the Fleet was based at that 
time, being inside of the defended port, it was assumed that we would 
have at least from tliree to five minutes notice of any possible air raid 
attack. To have maintained people immediately at the guns during 
all this long period would have resulted in tiring them out and without 
beneficial results in case of an attack. We had every reason to suppose 
that the crews on deck would be able to man their guns after informa- 
tion was received of a possible approach of an enemy. 

19. Q. Among the personnel stationed under this condition of se- 
curity, were there any men detailed specifically as battle lookouts? 

A. Only the anti-aircraft control. 

20. Q. You mean by the "anti-aircraft control" the director room? 
A. Yes. 

21. Q. If a ship, under the condition of security that you were main- 
taining at Pearl Harbor between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, 
had gone to general quarters at any time day or night, would the 
officers and men that were required to remain on board be sufficient 
in number and adequately trained to man all your anti-aircraft guns? 

A. Yes, they would have been. The organization of each section 
was such that all anti-aircraft guns and directors could be manned 
and the personnel had been so trained, using the engineers group when 
necessary to complete the crews. 

22. Q. Were any of the ships present in Pearl Harbor at the time 
of the Japanese attack on the morning of 7 December equipped with 
radar ? 

A. Yes; in my Battle Force Two, the PENNSYLVANIA and the 
CALIFORNIA. 

23. Q. Do you know what the general efficiency of these sets was 
from a material point of view ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 325 

A. The efficiency was ^ood. The PENNSYLVANIA'S radar was 
better than the CALIFORNIA'S, but on the passage to the States for 
liberty and recreation in October, 1941, the CALIFORNIA'S radar 
had picked up a Pan-American plane at 85 miles and continued to 
detect it until it went out of range ahead at approximately the same- 
distance. 

14£3] 24. Q. On these two ships that were equipped with radar, 
what was, in general, the state of training of the operators? 

A. The training of the operators was considered good. 

25. Q. Preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is. preceding 
0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941, were any of the ships' radars 
being manned ? 

A. No. Ship radars in port could not be used effectively because 
of the interference of hills and the buildings at the Navy Yard. 

2(). Q. At what time did you first learn there was an enemy attack 
on Pearl Harbor? 

A. My first suspicion of it was^about 7: 55 on the morning of De- 
cember 7, 1941. I heard gun-fire from my room in the Halekulani 
Hotel, and having one window in the direction of Pearl Harbor, 
stepped to the window and could see bursts of anti-airci'aft shells in 
the sky. At first, I considered it was a possibility that some Army 
aircraft units were holding exercises but the appearance of the bursts 
over a rather large area made nje question this. Before I had actually 
reached a decision that there was an attack on, my telephone bell rang 
and my assistant operations officer informed me that he would be by for 
me in a minute. I was partially dressed and I completed my dressing 
and went to the entrance of the Halekulani Hotel wliere I met Admiral 
Leary, who had also received a telephone message, and we two pro- 
ceeded to Pearl Harbor with Mr. Kimball in Mr. Kimball's automo- 
bile without waiting for my staff officers to arrive. 

27. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 13, which is a dispatch from 
the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees under date of 16 
October, 1941, relative to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and 
possible future military actions by the Japanese. Had you seen this 
dispatch prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief I had never seen this 
dispatch. At the time it was received I was on the Pacific Coast of 
the United States in command of a task force which had, been sent 
there for leave and recreation. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, sent me a dispatch of which I have no copy but in substance, 
"Be prepared to return to the Hawaiian Islands on short notice". I 
immediately recalled all officers and men from leave and put the force 
on twelve hours sailing notice. 

28. Q. Do you recall ever having discussed the contents of tliis dis- 
patch with the Commander-in-Chief or any of his staff? 

A. Not this dispatch, to the best of my knowledge. 

[424] 29. Q. Do you know whether or not any decisions based 
on the information contained therein were made other than the ones 
that you have already recited, to-wit, being placed on short notice or 
twelve hours notice to return to Pearl Harbor? 

A. That was the only one, to the best of my knowledge. 

30. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 15, which is the Chief of Naval 
Operations' dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which sets out briefly that 
the chances of favorable negotiations with Japan are very doubtful; 



326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated, includ- 
ing possible attack on the Philippines or Guam. Had you seen this 
dispatch prior to 7 December, 1941? 

A. Yes. 
• 31. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the in- 
formation current with this dispatch? 

A. I saw this dispatch on the morning of Saturday, the 29th of 
November, two days after my task force had returned to port. The 
instructions in effect to the Pacific Fleet were that task force com- 
manders would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their re- 
turn from duties unless they were so directed. I therefore did not see 
the Commander-in-Chief tmtil Saturday, when I went to talk to him 
concerning the tactical exercises which had been carried out during 
the last period at sea. He then showed me this dispatch. 

32. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the 
information current with this dispatch ; and if you do, what were they ? 

A. I know of no decisions that were a result of this dispatch. I 
should like to state, however, that in my opinion this dispatch is sub- 
ject to several interpretations. In the first place, it mentions an ag- 
gressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip- 
pines or Guam as a possibility. It therefore did not indicate that the 
aggressive action was to be necessarily against the United States. It 
was well known from the general situation that such an aggressive 
movement was contemplated. It was assumed that the aggressive 
movement was to be directed against Thailand. The only significant 
part of this message, in my opinion, is including the possibility that 
the enemy might take the initiative by attacking the Philippines or 
Guam. The fact that the Philippines and Guam are mentioned indi- 
cates that that is the estimate of the author of tlie dispatch and prob- 
ably places a limitation, in his mind, as to the extent of the aggressive 
movement against the United States. 

\_4-25] 33. Q. Can you recall if at about the time, or at the time 
you saw this dispatch or were informed of its contents, if there was 
any estimate of the possibility of a surprise, aggressive movement on 
Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I should like to state that there is another dispatch in the record 
which I saw at the same time. Exhibit 17. As a consequence, I cannot 
differentiate between the two dispatches in relation to the conversation 
which I had with the Commander-in-Chief. 

34. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions' dispatch of 27 November 1941. It contains the information 
that the dispatch is a war warning, that an aggressive move by Japan 
is expected within the next few days, and directs the execution of an 
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46. That is some of the important informa- 
tion this dispatch contains which I cite to you foT identification. Do 
you recall when you first saw or were informed of the contents of this 
dispatch ? 

A. I saw this dispatch at the same time as the one previously re- 
ferred to on Saturday, the 29th of November. 

35. Q. Is the judge advocate correct in understanding that you dis- 
cussed this dispatch. Exhibit 17, and the previous one of November 24, 
which is Exhibit 15, at the same time with the Commander-in-Chief? 

A. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 327 

36. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the 
information that you had current with these two dispatches? 

A. Yes. This clispatch was discussed at some length with the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. The significance of the first clause, "This dispatch 
is to be considered a war warning" was, in my mind, nothing more 
than we had been receiving at various times during the past year. 
From the time of the Secretary of the Navy's first visit to the Fleet 
in September, 1940, we had known that there was a possibility of war 
and that every endeavor was being made by those in the Fleet to pre- 
pare the Fleet to carry out its plans. It is significant, I think, to note 
that this dispatch is a multiple address dispatch. It is addressed to 
both the C-in-C Asiatic and the C-in-C Pacific. It was well known 
that there were certain strategical deployments that the Commander- 
in-Chief Pacific anticipated carrying out. As far as any strategic de- 
ployment of the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the execution of WPL— 40 
■required the Fleet to depart from Pearl Harbor. There were no other 
elements of the strategic deployment that were available at this par- 
ticular time other than to leave the base and proceed toward the West 
Coast. There were at this time no carriers in port. A Fleet at sea 
without carriers, sighted [-^6'] by a force of such character 
as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, 
would be more subject to defeat than a force in port guarded by pre- 
sumably several hundred fighting planes of the Army at the base. We 
therefore did not believe that under the circumstances it was necessary 
to take any further action. To have taken the Fleet to sea would like- 
wise have subjected it to possible enemv submarine attack, from which 
it was guarded in port. 

37. Q. How about air attack, along the same line ? 

A. I have stated that I considered with that Fleet at sea it would 
have been under greater danger from air attack than they would in 
port guarded by the Army and presumably, at least, several hundred 
fighting planes. I should like to add one more thing to that, that 
during this conference the Commander-in-Chief sent for his intelli- 
gence officer and the intelligence officer presented to us the latest 
intelligence so far as it was available to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, indicating that all major units of the Japanese Fleet 
were in home waters. 

38. Q. Do you recall if there was any estimate made at this time 
of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 
as a result of this additional information jou received ? 

A. I am not conversant with whether or not the Commander-in- 
Chief made a direct estimate of the situation. 

39. Q. Were additional security measures ordered in the Fleet as a 
result of having received the information and directives that w^ere 
contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 16, the one of November 27th? 

A. None insofar as concerned my command. 

40. Q. What did the directive, "Execute appropriate defensive 
deployment prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" 
mean to you ? 

A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it meant nothing. 

41. Q. Was there anything done in compliance with this directive 
that you know of ? 

A. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. 



328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The court then, at 10 : 55 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 07 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present : 

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, and the inter- 
ested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman 
second class, U. S. Naval Eeserve, reporter. 

[4£7] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry 
were present. 

Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness under 
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness 
and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Examination by the judge advocate (continued) : 

42. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions' dispatch of 28 November 1941. It relays to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information, a dispatch which it 
states the Army has sent to certain of its commanders. Can you 
recall having seen or discussed the contents of this dispatch with the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not see this dis- 
patch until after December 7th. 

43. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is a Chief of Naval Operations' 
dispatch of 3 December 1941. It gives information to the effect that 
the JajDanese consular posts in certain areas were to destroy codes and 
ciphers along with secret and confidential documents. When and 
under what conditions did you see this dispatch or were informed of 
its contents, if you Avere? 

A. I saw the dispatch, I believe, on Thursday, December 4. I was 
not particularly impressed by it as the same account appeared in the 
Honolulu papers that morning. There is one other comment I would 
like to make on a dispatch of this nature. If a senior desires a junior 
to make an inference, he should give him complete information, or 
else make the inference himself. If the inference from this dispatch 
which the author apparently desired the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific to make Avas that war with Japan was imminent, in my opinion 
the proper procedure would be for the Chief of Naval Operations to 
make the inference and send to the Commander-in-Chief that war with 
Japan appears imminent. 

44. Q. Did you discuss this dispatch with the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific Fleet at that time, if you recall ? 

A. I mentioned to him when he showed it to me that I had seen 
the same thing in the paper that morning. 

45. Q. May I ask whether or not tlie information contained in 
Exhibit 20 changed in any way your estimate of the situation on the 
imminence of war between the United States and Jai)an ? 

A. It did not. 

[4^8] 46. Q. Did it give you any information of a possible 
United States objective of an attack by the Japanese ? 

A. Well, there are lots of places mentioned there. They couldn't 
attack them all, and the latest information we had looked very much 
more like Thailand than any other place. It, in my opinion, added 
nothing to what had been previously received. It might have added 
something had the source of the information been divulged, but it 
was not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 329 

47. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibits 21 and 22, which are Chief 
of Naval Operations dispatches of 4 and G December 1941, and direct 
the destruction of confidential publications on Guam and the outlying 
Pacific islands respectively. Did you ever see or had you been in- 
formed of the contents of either or both of these dispatches before 7 
December 1941? 

A. No. To the best of my knowledge and belief I never saw them 
until yesterday. 

The judge advocate stated: All members of this court of inquiry 
have had distinguished careers in the Navy and are themselves grad- 
uates of the U. S. Naval War College at Newport. However, since 
this witness is especially qualified in these matters by virtue of his 
present duties, the judge advocate requests the court at this time to 
accept this witness as an expert on matters pertaining to the estimate 
of the situation. Does the court so accept him? 

The court stated: The court will accept him as an expert witness as 
they would any officer of his experience, irrespective of his present 
status. 

The judge advocate further stated : I have asked the court to accept 
this witness as an expert for the reason that there are matters in the 
record now, and there may be more, which pertain to such statements 
as a commander's estimate of an enemy's intentions, the possibility 
and probability of certain enemy action and decisions based thereon. 
I hope by this witness to clarify these matters in order that the esti- 
mates and the decisions of the responsible officers in the command 
echelon at the time of the events which led up to the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 may be cleared 
up, in a way. 

The court stated : To add to our ruling, we consider the court them- 
selves expert enough to analyze all of these matters which you have 
referred to. 

48. Q. Admiral, I shall ask you hypothetically to set out in as 
brief a manner as possible for the record the various steps that the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet might have taken in making 
an estimate of the situation [4'^.^'] oi the Japanese-United 
States relationships as they existed on or about December 1, 1941. 

The court stated that it did not desire this line of questioning 
as it did not consider this to be necessary for it in arriving at the facts 
in the case. 

49. Q. Can you recall during the period 27 November to 7 December 
1941, what your estimate of the enemy's courses of action were at that 
time? 

A. During this particular period I was completely absorbed in 
making out a history and a critique of a Fleet exercise which had 
occurred during the last period at sea. After the Commander-in- 
Chief had moved his headquarters ashore I was placed in the responsi- 
bility for training the Fleet to a large extent due to the fact that he 
did not frequently go to sea. As commander of Task Force One I 
had the particular responsibility of training the task force for the 
conduct of major action. At other times. Task Force Two and Task 
Force Three, together or singly, would be scheduled at sea for periods 
with me or with my task force in order to coordinate their activities 
with those of the battle line in Fleet action. During the last period 
at sea, which ended on Thursday, the 27th, a tactical exercise had 



330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

been conducted in which the objective was to determine the best 
means of defense of a convoy against air attack. This exercise was 
terminated on Sunday, November 23, and the critique of this exercise 
was to be held on Wednesday, December 3. From the time that my 
task force returned to port, with the exception of the visit I made 
to the Commander-in-Chief on Saturday, the 29th, I was engaged in 
making the history and critique of this exercise. I therefore did not 
make any estimate of the situation from the point of view of the higher 
command. 

50. Q. How couki any prospective enemy have information of the 
presence of ships in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. There were many points in the Hawaiian Islands not under 
control of Naval authorities from which the entire harbor could be 
observed. Up to the morning of December 7 there were no restrictions 
upon commercial or diplomatic communications. It was therefore 
very simple for them to be informed of the forces in the port at any 
time. On the 9th or 10th of December, when the one-man submarine 
was recovered on the eastern end of the Island of Aahu, there was 
found in this ship a confidential chart of Pearl Harbor with the ships 
as berthed approximately three weeks before. It is quite evidenc 
that this chart was used as a basis of the plan of attack on December 
7th as many berths were attacked in which the ships actually present 
at that time were not the ones indicated [4^0] in the diagram 
which we recovered, but much smaller ships. It therefore appeared 
that in making their plan for an attack they had decided to attack 
certain berths in the hopes that the allocation of ships at those berths 
would be the same as it had been three weeks before. 

51. Q. Did task force units, according to normal operating sched- 
ules, more or less follow a certain well-defined procedure of being at 
sea so many days and in Pearl Harbor so many days ? 

A. There was a normal sequence of operations of the three task 
forces in which the period at sea was about one-half of that in port. 
The actual dates varied somewhat, depending upon whether or not 
there were to be any combined operations of more than one task force. 
As I ha.ve pointed out before, at times each task force operated during 
the full period at sea completely by itself. At other times, two task 
forces were operating for a period of one or two days together at the 
end of the period of the one task force which had been at sea the 
longest. Approximately every six weeks or two months, a period in 
the schedule provided for the operation of all three task forces for 
one or two-day periods. Therefore, although it was a schematic 
sequence, there was not an actual, fixed number of days for the time 
at sea or the time at Pearl. 

52. Q. If, for example, a task force came into Pearl Harbor, was 
there a reasonable expectation, even to one not knowing the Fleet's 
schedule, that this force coming in might be in port for a fairly Avell 
defined period of time? 

A. I should say within the limits of 9 to 14 days. 

53. Q. Considering the Japanese psychological make-up as you no 
doubt knew it, would you not expect them to evidence active curiosity 
about all matters pertaining to the Pasific Fleet, especially movements 
of ships? 

A. Unquestionably. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 331 

54. Q. I am going to ask you a hypothetical question, Admiral: 
Suppose that on the 0th of December, 1941 you had had information 
that the Japanese diplomats in Washington were to call on the Secre- 
tary of State at exactly 1 : 00 p. m., Washington time, December 7th, 
and that they had been directed to destroy their code machines. 
Would this information have given you any special indication of 
Japanese intentions as to the probability or the imminence of an 
attack on the United States ? 

A. It is pretty hard to answer that after the event, but I do feel 
that it would have been a definite indication that diplomatic relations 
w^ere to be [4-3^] discontinued, after which time it certainly 
would have been more obvious that an attack might take place. 

Cross-examined bv the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy : ^ 

55. Q. Admiral, were you in general familiar with the logistic sit- 
uation of the Pacific Fleet insofar as its ability to fight into the 
Marshall Islands was concerned in late 1941 ? 

A. Yes, sir. In my opinion, tlie Fleet could have operated as far 
as the Marshall Islands, but it could not have gone very much farther. 

5f). Q. Did you think that even that might be difficult on account 
of logistic limitations? 

A. It would have been difficult to maintain operations there for any 
perceptible length of time Ijecause of the scarcity of tankers. 

[4-32] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

57. Q. The fuel situation would have been determined somewhat 
from the Fleet's activity ? 

A. The fuel in Pearl Harbor had been reduced to what was consid- 
ered to be the least safe reserve, and the number of tankers which were 
supplying it were very limited. 

58. Q. Admiral, you, of course, remember that the so called Atlantic 
detachment was transferred from the Pacific Fleet in the spring 
of 1941? 

A. Yes. 

59. Q. Had that detachment remained, would the Fleet have been 
any more powerful in the ISIarshall Islands, in view of what you have 
just said about the logistic difficulties? 

A. Yes, it would have been more powerful, because the operations, 
so far as I have indicated their practicability, depended upon the 
ships not refueling during operations. 

60. Q. The logistic difficulties would not have been any greater if 
you had twice the number of ships ? 

A. Not in my opinion. 

(51. Q. You had plenty of fuel ? 

A. Fuel within a reasonable degree of safety. The Fleet was using 
it faster than it was coming in, but up to December 7 there was a 
reasonable reserve. 

62. Q. Admiral, was your testimony, in interpretation of the OpNav 
dispatch of November 24, representative of what you thought at that 
time and so expressed? 

A. So far as I recall, yes. 



332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

68. Q. Referring to that dispatcli of December 3, why do you think 
the Japanese were going to the extent of destroying codes and ciphers 
in Washington and in Manihi ? 

A. It unquestionably indicated a severance of diplomatic relations. 
It did not necessarily indicate the imminence of war. We did not 
know — I do not suppose we know today — which ones they destroyed 
or how many were destroyed. 

64. Q. Did you think that the information which you gained from 
the dispatch of December 3 was altogether different from what you 
had just testified you gained from the dispatch which came very late 
on December 7 concerning the action in Washington at 1300 ? I simply 
refer to your answer to the judge advocate's hypothetical question. 

A. Only in degree. The statement that the codes were [4^3'\ 
being destroyed was merely a dispatch quoting a confidential authority. 
If the dispatch concerning the definite breaking off of relations at one 
o'clock had been received, it would have been a definite determination 
of that condition. Consequently, it was only one of degree, but I 
think possibly the lack of importance attached to that dispatch about 
burning codes and ciphers was due to the fact that it was reported in 
the paper that same morning. 

65. Q. Admiral, I am sure you do not wish to be understood as being 
influenced by what you saw in the local papers in Honolulu? 

A. Not at all, but we often get good information that way. 
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

66. Q. Between the time you returned, on or about November 28, 
and December 7 was the condition of readiness actually in effect a 
greater degree of readiness than that prescribed by Condition 3? 

A. Due to the size of the task force, it was, because the order only 
directed that the anti-aircraft battery of one ship be available, con- 
sisting of four guns. Under the orders which were in effect the battle- 
ships had 25% of their anti-aircraft batteries manned and two machine 
guns apiece. There being six battleships there, it made twelve guns, 
when actually only four were needed. 

67. Q. How long had that condition of readiness been in effect 
while the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor ? 

A. It had been in effect for several months — came into effect shortly 
after Admiral Kimmel had taken command of the Fleet. 

68. Q. You were at sea on the 24th of November, Admiral? 
A. Yes, sir. 

69. Q. On the 24th of November did you receive a dispatch from the 
Commander-in-Chief relative to any action or precautions to be taken 
by you ? 

A. I did receive a dispatch. I don't recall the exact wording of it, 
but it was to take precaution against attack. I'm not sure M'hetlier it 
said submarine attack or not. From that period until after the Task 
Force had entered Pearl Harbor all possible means were taken to 
safeguard this task force against both submarines and aircraft, 

[434.] 70. Q. From the time when you returned on November 
28 until December 7, did you recommend to the Commander-in-Chief 
any movement of the battle force ? 

A. I did not. 
_ 71. Q. It has been testified at this hearing that the Fleet was prac- 
tically mobili2;ed prior to December 7, 1941. Have you any opmion 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 333 

as to whether the Fleet was practically mobilized prior to December 
7, 1941 ? . . . 

A. In my opinion, it was far from mobilized. It was concentrated 
but not properly prepared for the conduct of war in all respects, which 
mobilization implies. We were short of men, short of machine guns, 
and short of even a complete allowance of carrier-based planes. 

72. Q. In the dispatch received by the Commander-in-Chief from 
the Chief of Naval Operations under date of November 28, which in 
substance contained a dispatch that had been sent by the Ai-my Com.- 
manding General, there appear the words: "If hostilities cannot be 
avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt 
act." Do you think that this injunction influenced the steps that 
might have been taken in preparation for war ? 

A. It did not influence mine, and to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, I never saw the dispatch until after December 7. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Na