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Given By
y- S, SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK .. .
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES ...
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
,^6
S. Con. Res. 27 /"tjl^
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 32
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTAC
HEARINGS
DEFOKE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HAKBOR ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE INITED STATES^
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS "P ^
FIRST SESSION / A^
PURSUANT TO 4 ^V3l
So Con. Reso 27 vJLTr.
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 32
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT CF INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attacli
UNITED STATKS
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 194G
Ft, 32^
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOI'ER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Micbi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. ]\Iasten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate .General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistatit Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF. JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
Xo.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 9S2
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3
983-1 5S3
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2003
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946,
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exliibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 110.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-IIkistrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
rv
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^3
ai-;
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
3814-3826
3450-3519
"'5089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149 J
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"471-516"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
iiTfitiiiiiiriiiiiiiiiTficOi
iiCOiiitr)iii(iiiii)ii(j50i
1:1 :::;:::::;: 1 ; 1 ;;; r^ !
(? ; ; ; 1 1 : ; ; : ; ; ! ; i ; ; ; i 1 1 "^ ;
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
I 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 llN
^ ; 1 i 1 i ; ; i i i i i i 1 i i i 1 ; ; r
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
"660-688'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3105-3120'
2479-2491'
4022-4027'
148-186
2567-2580'
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643'
3720-3749'
1186-1220
1413-1442'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
"391-398'
"115-134'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138
1033-1038
1719-1721'
1219-1224'
"886-951"
1382-1399
"377-389'
1224-1229
"314-320'
%
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anstey, Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
Ballard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens ^__
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell. George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
lO o
I I
lO o
Oi CO
c^ CO
I I
OS CO
QO 00
(M CO
cr '^ 00
O "^ o
1 (M CO
-* I I
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CC (N (M
r- 02
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Ot-CJ3
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cc ooo
C^ 1
(NCO 1
1 00
1 1 00
ceo
oct--^
— 00
dec 00
(N
iCO
(M
(MCO
o^ -rt^ to CO CO
CO (M '^ CO CO o
O O --^ (M CO ^
<M ^ I COCO '^^
I I CO I I I
iC LQ •* 00 CO lO
-H ^ — I lO C3 Ci
OO (MCO O
(M -^ CO CO -^
■* CO lO
00O3 lO
^ CO Tt<
CC t^t^
CO CO' IN
oco
(NOi
I I
(N CO
00
T3
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w «
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S 2
Wj 2 -
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<v o
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p C _o o
CO S
o o p-Sca
OOOD>%'^*-'*-'*-'-^^
« pq fppq pqpq
fflPQffipqpQPCpqpQpqpqpq
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
194G
Pages
5080-5089
'""3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
""418-423"
"451-464"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
"8"7"-"b"
205
"B22S-224'
B 65-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
M 1 : ;
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3190-3201"
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
179-184
""105-114"
96-105
■ 74-85
""368-378"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
CommissioB,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178"
1178-1180'
1659-1663,
170-198
'"812-843,"
1538-1571
504-509
2-32"
365-368
1747-1753'
1
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
Dillon, James P
Dillon, John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Duseuburv, Carhsle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
c2
c--;:i
<M CO
1- o
pqo
«
CO
CC o
GO GO
'^ o
00 Tt^
i '^
<M I
00 GO
C-1 CO lO
IM ■* CC
lo CO 00
(N --H (N
I I I
O'* GO
iQ <M 00
(M --H (M
CO j/^lM
o lo CO
COCO (N
I I I
GOO t^
GO ■* C5
(MCO ^
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COO
CO CO
4i
o»o
CO o
coco
" CO<M
o -^ 00
coco to
I I ^
t^^ 1
CO^ o
(NCOl^
O I
oo
l> LO
cO(M
-* O
I -I
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■* t^
Oi
0
^4
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IS ^
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w
JP
. ^
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iii C !- *r ^
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rbb -'
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bJD _C C .5
g o p a o oj
_C _-*^ 53 O O O
pL, fe fSH pi, Ph Ph
o
P4
« fc< ~ ~
pi^P^P^P^
go
2 =:r:>
!> C-P a;
^ t-, <U Q
;-. — ^ (-1
S 03 c3 0)
P^OOO
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IP
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945.
to May 31,
1946
I I IrS 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ! ! ! ! I It-'o'ic^l ; |5ooco(n
E ! ! iti 1 1 ; 1 1 ! : 1 i ; ; ! iwi^g"? i i^^^^oo
111 1 1 ; 1 ; i 1 1 ; 1 1 1 ; "^ i i ^oJi
III 1 1 1 !! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '^'^'>
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
iiiiiiiCOi'-i(N ^1 iiii
lllllllr-^lOC0lllllOl IIII
S (Mii-(rtiiiiiT-Hi IIII
g. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII
o 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(M 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 IIII
Oi T-iiO iiliiOi IIII
IlllllllMlr-l ^I IIII
1 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 ! 1 1 1 I
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1914: July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
S i i i i i i i i ! i i i i i i i i i iiii
1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 IIII
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
;Oct. 19, 1944)-
Pages
1070-1076
461-469
""763-772"
816-851
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2636-2696"
3957-3971
""241-274"
""267-246"
2934-2942
2266-2214
1914-1917
""745-778"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1
1 1 1 ICO 1
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r)^ 1
^11111 1 1 1 1
(^ 1 1 1 1 ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 I 1 1^ I
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tt< 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 194'2)
Pages:
1571-1574"
1664-1676
"'469-473"
Witness
•
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen
Heard, William A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
HiU, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, .Jack W., Col
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
I I I I I I I I I 1 cc
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
o
O
o
P3
<
«
w
E-1
O
5
o
S
w
w
o
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1-5
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o
W
1^
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1915,
to Mav 31,
1946
0 C-. 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _r -0 1 1
coiiiiiiocoiii iiSlI^oii
lOiiiiiiOCOiiiiiiiiii i^S^c^ ' 1
10 Tfi 1 1 ^ "-^ lO 1 1
gl I1IIII|.-H1IIII vVl ''
0,10 1 1 1 1 1 1 C- -t< J., 1 10 1 I
t?io 1 1 1 1 1 icico 1 1 S£t>. 1 1
AhloiiiiiiOO iiiiiiiiiii2^£,-iii
10 ^ iiiiiiiiiiig^iOii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
IiIiIcoI(mIIIIIIIII!c?II 11
iiiiiiOiOSiii ii-t<ii II
« 1 1 1 1 iiO 1 CI r-H 1 1 II
0. 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' i 111 1 1 1 1 1 11
B 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 CI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , ci 1 1 II
"iiiiiirfiOOilliiiiiiiTjHil II
llllllOli-HIIIIIIIIII,-lll II
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1,1 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 v-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
^0 ' I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 II
1 1 1 1 1 1 ; 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904-918
628-643
""734-740"
""852-885"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2605-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374'
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1^13
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214^225
363-3(57
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 2:3, 1942)
iiCOi—iiC^iOiiiiOiiii-tiiiiLO iCJIOi
1 iiO il> ICOC3 1 1 IQO 1 1 1 iC 1 1 lO iiOOOiO
« 1 1 ,-( 1 1-1 1 1 0 1 1 1 C3 1 1 1 1 LO 1 1 1 GO 1 CO ^ 0
0, 1 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 ■* '-I 1 1 1 --( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .-1 1 ICOrH
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 --H
R, 1 iCO ICO 1 GO 1 1 1 Ca 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 CO 1 CQ
iiTtHiiOi COiiit^-iiiiiOiiiO ICQ
IIT-Hl-Hl OlllC<l Ilt^ 1
a
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN *__
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, .Ir
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Mai
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
ob'
i
■* CC (M
1 O I
(N 00
C0>0 (N CC &j
CR (M CO -* r-q
00 ci 00 cc x^
(N CO iM (N !;4
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XII
CONGRE.SSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
Pages
""387-388"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investicration,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
45-46
""179-181"
232
76^77"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1914; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
Q 1 1 1 III III 1 III 1 1 1 1
•^ 1 ' ' III III ' III 1 ' ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 liO 111 111 -^-„-C-ft^"(M 1 lo 1 loo 00
1 tOi III III Z^fZiZ'XiCOiCi 1 1^ 1 lOO
1 1 IT 111 III V^f^s^:: 1 It ; 1^=:
« 1 ItJ. Ill III <^i, 1 1 1 T 1 It^ 1 lob7
I ITt< 111 111 g^f^OOCOlO 1 ITJH 1 11005
II 111 111 i-Hi— li-HIl llr-H
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968-1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to .Tan. 23, 1942)
1 if_-t^^ 1 1 o i,--,--oo 1 1 ico^ 1 1 1 1
1 i^OOOi 1 1 lO iS2<^ 1 ' '<^=^ 1 1 1 1
« 1 i^iMiO 1 1 CO iSn^Tt< 1 1 il>GO 1 1 1 1
(S 1 \ii4< ! i i :s§ 1 ; icis 1 1 1 1
"Witness
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, WiUard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj
PoweU, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, WiUiam S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
xm
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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
i« 1 1 1 1 igss 1 1^ 1 ;?f^'i2§s 1 lo^ ! : :
« 17 1111 :""? 1 l'? ; :?^?5SS7 ; i;^^ i i ;
»3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 > 1 I 1 1 1 II tlj tX^ 1 I 1
0,ir-l lllllj^— lllOJll-IA-L-LCOllll III
-«'<N lllll^<MllOliS2^f2§'*i:«brHIII
(sici iiiii^ioiiOiigl^^S-oii^^iii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
4-9
"335-375'
411-413
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
69'
195-197
203-204
185'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
11 1 1 1(M 1 1 1 1 1(N 1 1 111 ill
[p 1 [ II' II III II III III
1^ ' ' ' I III II III III
1 1 111 II III ' ' 111 1 I I
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
lO liiiilN .-hIIII ^-_J-0 111 III
1 i^ i ; i i ;^ 1 i i i if s» i i i : ; i
<3iO iiiiioo iiiiii-!,-* Ill III
ft, i(N 1 1 1 1 iC^ 1-. 1 1 1 i<^St^ III 111
i(N lllliiOt^illi^J> 1
1 IIIII 0 1 1 1 1 "^ 111 111
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3644-3650
276-541,
4411-4445
3265-3236'
1539^1575'
4037-4094
C
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
32-65'
323-334
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
'"37-169,'
1617-1647
452-455
1738-1742
1186-1190'
1805-1808
1
Short, Arthur T
Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen
Shortt, Creed, Pvt
Sisson, George A
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN..
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen
Smith, William W., Rear Adm
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN
Smoot, Perry M., Col
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr
Spalding, Isnac, Brig. Gen
Staff, W. F, CH/CM
Stark, Harold R., Adm
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR
StOphen, Benjamin L
Stimsou, Henry L
Stone, John F
Street, George
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XV
I I I I „ ^ „ „ ^
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P-iOi
XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
O
O
H
O
M
w
ij
H
w
s
o
H
o
o
w
H
O
o
h3
o
s
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to Mav 31,
1940
I : : ; : ,o : : : 1 : : : : ; : ; :^^ :
1 ^ X^coi
2 1 ' 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 , iCO 1 ,
S, i i 1 1 i ico 1 1 1 1 CO 1
' N N li- i i i i N i i \\\^\
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""389^410"
376-386
541-553
597-602
442-450
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
187-189
105-10(3
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944: July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
" 1 '1 1 1 '1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1083-1096
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
1345-1381"
910-931
3063-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379-382
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Doc. 18. 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
CiCiiM 1 lO i iC3 II lOOiO 1
(MC»Tt<ii^iiO iiiCOO 1
?:CO-^00 1 iCO i l(M 1 1 i«Tt^ 1
^,,-H |^||,_||,| 1,,,,, ,,1,^^ ,
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'ii'-^OOii'*i"*iiiiii iiiLOCO 1
T-^'jicOiiCOiKMiiiiii'iiKMCC' 1
CO 00 1 1 CO 1 1 lO CD 1
S
a
s
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen
Av'fst, Melbourne II., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Ilea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 146
[secret]
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHING-
TON, D. C, BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
To Inquire Into the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces on
Peari. Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941
24 July 1944
[1] COURT OF INQUIRY
To inquire into the attack made by Japanese aimed forces on Pearl
Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, convened at Navy
Department, Washington, D. C, 24 July 1944, pursuant to precept
of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 13 July 1944.
INDEX
Page '
Organization of court 1
Introduction of counsel 1,4,5,13,185
Members, judge advocate, and reporters sworn 1, 2
Interested parties named 4
Adjournments 1,
12, 57, 77, 109, 143, 184, 218, 270, 309, 362, 411, 476, 510, 555, 573,
608. 659, 688, 732-A, 772-A, 815-A, 851, 885, 918-A, 948, 987-A, 1024,
1051-A, 1082, 1109, 1150, 1155
Judge advocate desires no further witnesses 1149
Interested parties desire no further witnesses 1152
Court desires no further witnesses 1155
Conclusion of testimony 1151
Termination of inquiry 1155
Findings of Fact 1156
Opinion 1201
Recommendation 1208
Testimony
Name of witness
Direct and Re-
direct
Cross and Recross
Court
Corrected
Harold R. Stark, Admiral, USN..
Robert D. Powers, Jr., Lt.
2, 14, 18-1, 319, 774..
9, 10, 271, 572, 691,
741, 903, 1081,
109], 1136, 1151.
194, 311,692, 732.. _
220,269
6, 7, 8, 78, 185, 192,
322,781,792,803.
11
187, 193, 320, 784,
793, 802, 809.
10 ..
323, 324.
Comdr., USNR.
R. E. Schuirmarui, Rear Ad-
miral, USN.
Walter 0. Short, Lt. General,
207,314, 717,732...
256, 266
217,316,728..
263,268,270
U. S. Army (Ret).
' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 2
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Testimont — Continued
Name of witness
Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Ad-
miral, USN (Ret).
Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, USN
(Ret).
William S. Pye, Vice Admiral,
USN (Ret).
Kermit A. Tyler, Lt. Col.,
USAAF.
William A. Heard, Captain,
USN.
Joseph John Rochefort, Com-
mander. USN.
Walter C. Phillips, Colonel,
USA.
Walter S. DeLany, Rear Ad-
miral, USN.
Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Ad-
miral, USN.
William W. Smith, Rear Ad-
miral, USN.
Logan C. Ramsey, Captain,
USN.
WUliam E. G. Taylor, Com-
mander, USNR.
Joseph L. Locard, 1st Lt., AUS...
George E. Elliott, Sergeant, AUS.
P. N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral,
USN.
[Ill]
George W. Lynn, Lt. Comdr.,
USNR.
L. F. Saflord, Captain, USN
Stanley K. Hombeck (Civilian)..
Alfred V. Pering, Lt. Comdr.,
USNR.
Ingersoll, Admiral,
Marshall, General,
Royal E.
USN.
George C,
USA.
C. H. McMorris, Rear Admiral,
USN.
Edwin T. Layton, Captain,
USN.
F. M. Brotherhood, Lt. Comdr.,
USNR.
W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral,
USN.
C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, USN...
A. D. Kramer, Comdr., USN....
R. K. Turner, Vice Admiral,
USN.
Leigh Noyes, Rear Admiral,
USN.
James O. Richardson, Admiral,
USN.
Joseph Clark Grew (Ambassa-
dor).
[IV]
Maxwell M. Hamilton, (Civil-
ian).
H. H. Smith-Hutton, Captain,
USN.
Thomas Withers, Rear Admiral,
USN.
Joseph R. Redman, Rear Ad-
miral, USN.
Direct and Re-
direct
273, 325, 382, 1110,
1117,1122,1135.
385-A, 403, 412,
1139.
417.
446,460
461...
470
477
495
511
528, 567, 569.
575,602
609,617
628, 642.
644, 658.
660
734.
744-
763.
812-
816.
852.
904,916
919-^, 926, 930-
931,943
947
950, 966, 967.
1026, 1050-
1052
1062
1070
1077
1083, 1089.
1091, 1108.
Cross and Recross
335,381,1116,1122,
1134, 1135.
402,416
431,445
453, 459, 460.
464
474
490
500,509.
517, 521, 526.
541,551.
589, 599, 603.
614
636, 643.
651
674, 687.
738-
754, 761.
771
813
831,843
874..
893,901
907, 911, 917.
923
937
971
999, 1000, 1005, 1006,
1007.
1039,1048, 1049....
1066.
1080.
1088.
1102.
Court
363,383, 1134-
405,415,417..
434
457,460
468
474
491....
504.-.
521
556,568,569-.
594,604
615
638, 643.
653
680, 687.
739.
757.
814
840, 847.
882
909, 912, 917.
927
947...
966,967,976
1002, 1005, 1006,
1018.
1043, 1048
1054.
1072.
1083, 1089.
1106, 1108.
Corrected
a]
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
Exhibits
Character of—
Admitted
In evi-
dence
General Order No. 142. _._
General Order No. 143
General Order No. 170
Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow Number 5 (WPL-46)
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five (WP
Pac-46)
Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935 Document No. FTP-155
14ND Plan 0-4 called Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater
(JCD-42)
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, dated 14 October 1941, subject, Secu-
rity of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas __
Copy of letter dated 24 January 1941 from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary
of War.
Memorandum dated 4 June 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral
Harold R. Stark
Letter dated 28 August 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel. ^
Letter dated 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Ilusband
E. Kimmel.
Dispatch dated 16 October 1941, date time group 162203, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Letter from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral Harold R. Stark, dated 22
October 1941
Dispatch dated 24 November 1941, date time group 242005, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
Letter dated 25 November 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel
Dispatch dated 27 November 1941, date time group 273337, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Dispatch dated 26 November 1941, date time group 270038, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Dispatch dated 28 November 1941, date time group 290110, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-m-Chief, Pacific
Dispatch dated 3 December 1941, date time group 031850, from Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, et al
Dispatch from Naval Operations to Naval Station, Quam, dated 4 December 1941 ,
date time group 042017.. _
Dispatch dated 6 December 1941, date time group 061743, from Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
Two enclosures of letter dated 1 May 1941 from Commandant, 14th Naval District,
to the Chief of Naval Operations
Letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 7 February
1941, subject. Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii ._
Fitness report on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 1 October 1941 to 17 December
1941
Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson, dated 27 May
1940
Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations,
dated 22 October 1940, subject. War Plans— Status and readiness of in view of the
current international situation
Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations,
dated 7 January 1941, subject. Situation concerning the Security of the Fleet, etc.
Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 10
February 1941..
Letter from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral Harold R. Stark, dated 18
February 1941
Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 25
February 1941 -
Letter dated 22 March 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel
Letter dated 26 May 1941 from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to the Chief of
Naval Operations, signed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel
Letter dated 26 July 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral Harold R.
Stark
Letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 22
August 1941
Letter dated 12 September 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral
Harold R. Stark ,
Letter dated 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel
Letter dated 17 October 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Husband E.
KimmeL
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibits — Continued
Exhib-
it
Character of-
39
39A
40
41
42
43
44
[d]
45
46
47
48
49
V 50
51
52
53
54
[/]
Letter dated-14 November 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark'to Admiral Husband
E. KimmeL__ , ," _.
Memorandum from the War and Navy Departments to the President, dated 5'No-
vember 1941, Serial Oi;-i0012, subject, Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation..
Dispatch from the Chief of- Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
date time group 270040, dated 26 November 1941
Letter dated 7 May 1941 from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief
of Naval Operations, subject. Local Defense Measures of Urgency
Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval
Operations,' dated 20 May 1941, subject, Fourteenth Naval District — Local De-
fense Forces
Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
dated 23 June 1941, subject. Fourteenth Naval District — Local Defense Forces
Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated 15 August
1941 from the Commander-in-Chief.'U. S.! Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy via
the Chief of Naval Operations
Commimication of August 1941 (date obscure) from the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, subject, Fourteenth Naval District — Local
Defense Forces _..
Basic letter dated 17 October 1941 from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to
the Chief of Naval Operations, subject. Reappraisal of Local Defense Forces,
Ila wa iian Coastal Frontier
Letter dated 25 November 1941 from the^Chief of Naval Operations to' the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Comm.andant, Fourteenth Naval District, subject,
Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
Memorandum of dispatch dated 7 Decemlier 1941, time 12:17, from War Department
to various ofiicers, including Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafter, Hawaii
Letter dated 15 February 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, subject. Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against tor-
pedo plane attacks. Pearl Harbor
lyetter dated 2 December 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark
Letter dated 2 December 1941 from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to Admiral
Harold R. Stark, subject, Defense of Outlying Bases .
Pacific Fleet confidential let ter 14CL-41 dated 31 October 1941 , subject, Task Forces—
Organisation and IVTissions
Operations Plan 1-41 dated 27 February 1941, with annexes (a) to (e) inclusive,
issued by Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Naval Base Defense Officer, Commandant
Fourteenth Naval District
Letter dated 17 February 194! from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandants
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth. Sixth, Seventh. Eigh h, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth,
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts & to Com-
mandant Naval Station Guantanamo, subject. Anti-torpedo baffles for Protection
against torpedo plane attacks Pearl Harbor -
Letter dated 13 June 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandants of
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth,
Thirteenth. Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, subject. Anti-
torpedo Baffles for Protection acainst Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor
Letter dated 11 February 1941, Serial No. 07830, from the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, subject. Experimental and Development
Work on Nets and Booms
Fortnightly summary of current National Situation prepared by ONI dated 1
December 1941, signed by T. S. Wilkinson
Pacific Fleet confidential letter 23CL-42 dated 6 May 1942, signed by Admiral
C. W. Nimitz, and enclosure A thereof signed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
subject. Battle Organization and Condition of Readiness Watches at Sea
Letter issued by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet, signed by Admiral C. W. Nimitz and enclosure ComPatWing Two, Secret
letter 0033, dated 30 December 1941. subject. Airplane situation, Hawaiian Area..
Work sheet showing dispositions of vessels in Pearl Harbor on morning of 7 Decem-
ber 1941
Extracts from official report of Com.mander-in-Chief, Pacific of the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, serial 0479, dated 15 February 1942
Memorandum nf minutes made by Commander. William E. G. Taylor of a meeting
called by him on 24 November 1941 at the information center, Oahu, T. H
File of copies of documents on file in office of the Chief of Naval Operations, pre-
pared at request of the Judge Advocate
File of copies of dispatches on file in office of the Chief of Naval Operations, prepared
at request of the Judge Advocate..
File of documents assembled by the Federal Communications Commission, on 18
August 1944, certified over signature of Secretary of Commission
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
Exhibits — Continued
Exhib-
it
Ctiaracter of-
Admitted
in evi-
dence
66
67
68
69A &
69B
70
77
Disptach dated 3 December 1941 from Naval Operations to tlit Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic and Commandant, 16ih Naval District for action; Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, and Commandant, 14th Naval District for information
Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, dated
1 February 1941. .•_
File of documents prepared for interested party Admiral Harold R. Stark, at re-
quest of the Judge Advocate, by the Director of Naval Communications
Memoranda of 30 November 1941 and 6 December 1941 submitted by War Plans
Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Letter from Admiral James O. Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated
25 January 1941, subject, Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG
Letter from the Chief.of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, dated 24
July 1941, together with enclosure of letter from Chief of Naval Operations to
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
dated 2 August 1941, with enclosure of letter from the Chiefiof Naval Operations to
Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., dated 31 July 1941
Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-m-Chief, Pacific,
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, dated 3 April
1941, subject. Observations on the Present International Situation
Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
dated 7 November 1941.,
Dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
date time group 2S2054
Dispatches 2i;0027, dated 28 November 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
to the Chief of Naval Operations; 300419, dated 30 November 1941, from the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific; 212155, dated 21 January 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet; and 070645, dated 7 December 1941,
from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to the Chief of Naval Operations..
Dispatch 292350, dated 30 November 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
to the Chief of Naval Operations; and 301709, dated 30 November 1941, from the
Chief of Naval Operations, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Page
903
1081
1091
nil
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1136
1137
1137
[A (i)] Department OF THE Navy,
Washington £5, D. C, 13 July 1944-
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, Retired.
Subj : Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7
December 1941.
Ends :
(A) Keport of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated
18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japa-
nese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 De-
cember 1941.
(B) Copy of examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary
of the Navy, 12 February 1944.
1. A court of inquiry, consisting of yourself as president and of
Admiral Edward C. Kalbf us, U. S. Navy, Retired, and Vice Admiral
Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy, Retired, as additional members, and
of Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, as judge advocate, is
hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington,
D. C, at 10 a. m., on 17 Jlily 1944, or as'soon thereafter as practicable,
for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the
attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of
Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.
•2. The attention of the court is particularly invited to sections 734
and 735, Naval Courts and Boards. The judge advocate is authorized
6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to summon such witnesses believed to have knowledge of facts per-
tinent to the subject matter and whose attendance can be had without
interruption to or interference with the war effort, and to obain all
document relating to the said attack that may be required for intro-
duction into evidence.
3. Orders for travel of witnesses must be approved by the conven-
ing authority prior to the issuance thereof.
4. The court will thoroughly inquire into the matter hereby sub-
mitted to it and will include m its findings a full statement of the
facts it may deem to be established. The court will further give its
opinion as to whetht^r any offenses have been committed or serious
blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval serv-
ice, and in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or
serious blame incurred, will specifically recommend what further pro-
ceedings should be had.
[A (2) ] 5. The court will be held with closed doors.
6. The Chief of Naval Personnel is hereby directed to furnish the
necessary clerical assistance for the purpose of assisting the judge
advocate in recording the proceedings of this court of inquiry.
FoRRESTAL.
[B] Department of the Navy,
Washington, D. 0., 24- '^uly 1944-
To : Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. N. R.
Sub : Orders as counsel to assist judge advocate.
Ref : (a) Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7
December 1941, convened by SecNav, 13 July 1944.
1. You are hereby directed to report to the president of the court of
inquiry, ordered to convene at the Navy Department, as counsel to
assist the judge advocate during the inquiry set forth in reference (a).
FoRRESTAL.
Navy Department,
Washingto7i, D. O., 24 July 1944-
First Endorseinent
From : President, Court of Inquiry.
To : Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, USNR.
1. Reported.
Orin G. Murfin,
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, USN {Ret).
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 7
[C] Department of the Navy,
Washington, D. C, July 15, 1944'
To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.
Subj : Orders as counsel to assist judge advocate.
Ref : (a) Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Jap-
anese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii,
on 7 December 1941, convened by SecNav, 13 July 1944.
1. You are hereby directed to report to the president of the court of
inquiry ordered to convene at the Navy Department, as counsel to
assist the judge advocate, during the inquiry set forth in reference (a).
Ralph A. Bard,
Acting Secretary/ of the Navy. -
First Endorsement
15 July 1944
To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., USNR.
1. Reported this date.
Orin G. Murfin,
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, USN {Ret), ^
President Court of Inquiry.
[Z>] The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, M Septeniber, 19Ji4'
From : Secretary of the Navy.
To: Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate of
Court of Inquiry to inquire into attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 December 1941.
Sub: Request for Attendance of Witnesses before Court of Inquiry
Convened by SecNav Precept 13 July 1944.
Ref: (a) Ltr. from Judge Advocate, Court of Inquiry, dtd. 21 Sep-
tember 1944.
1, The Secretary of the Navy has determined that the attendance of
the following officers as witnesses before the Court of Inquiry con-
vened by my precept of 13 July 1944, cannot now be made available
for attendance on the Court without interruption to or interference
with the war effort.
Rear Admiral T. S. WILKINSON, USN.
Captain A. H. McCOLLUM, USN.
FORRESTAL,
8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[iB'] Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. C.^ 30 August 19U.
Pers-3215-amf
Jacket No.
16977
To : Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy.
yia: Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN, Ketired, President, Court of
Inquiry.
Subject: Appointment for temporary service.
Reference :
(a) Act of Congress approved July 24, 1941 (U. S. Code (Supp.
1), Title 34, Sees. 350-350] ).
(b) Section 5, Act of Congress approved June 30, 1942 (Public
No. 639— 77tli Congress).
1. Pursuant to the provisions of reference (a), the President of
the United States hereby appoints you a
Captain
In the Navy for temporary service, to rank from the 10th day of
June, 1943. '
2. By reference (b), this appointment, unless expressly declined,
is regarded for all purposes as having been accepted on the date of
this letter, without formal acceptance or oath of office. The date of
rank stated in this appointment is for the purpose only of establishing
your order of precedence.
3. Acknowledgement of receipt is requested.
For the President :
S/ James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
Registered No. 13. The lowest number of same date takes rank
S/ F. J. SCHITYLER,
Registrar.
Navy Department,
Washington 25^ D. C, 2 Sei)temher lOItJf..
First Endorsement
From : Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN, Retired, President, Court of
Inquiry.
To : Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy.
1. Delivered, with congratulations.
S/ Orin G. Murfin.
A True Copy. Ateest :
Harold Biesemeier,
Captain^ V. S. Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
PROCEEDINGS OF NAYY COURT OF INQUIRY
MONDAY, JULY 24, 1944.
[1] First Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 10 : 10 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy, (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphiis Andrews, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate.
The judge advocate read orders from the convening authority, orig-
inals prefixed marked "B" and "C" detailing Lieutenant Commander
Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Lieutenant Wil-
liam M. Whittington, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, to act as counsel to
assist the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Powers and
Lieutenant Whittington took seat as such.
The judge advocate introduced Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve ; Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve; and Charles O. Manahan, yeoman third class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, as reporters.
The court was cleared and the judge advocate read the precept,
original prefixed hereto, marked "A".
All matters preliminary to the inquiry having been determined and
the court having declared that pursuant to the instructions contained
in the precept it would sit with closed doors, the court was opened.
Each member, the judge advocate, and the reporters were duly
sworn.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The court was cleared.
The court was opened.
The court then, at 11 : 45 a. m., adjourned subject to the call of the
president.
PROCEEDINfSS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY H
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUET OF INQUIRY
MONDAY, JULY 31, 1944.
[^] Second Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. C.
The court met at 10 : 00 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret) , Member.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, and
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porters.
The judge advocate introduced Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman
first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, was duly sworn as reporter. Frank
L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Frederick
T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporters, withdrew.
The record of proceedings of the first day of the inquiry was read
and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Harold JR. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval
Forces, European waters.
2. Q, What duties of major importance have been assigned to you
since attaining flag rank?
A. Chief of Bureau of Ordnance; Commander of Division of Cruis-
ers, Battle Force ; Commander Cruisers, Battle Force ; Chief of Naval
Operations; and present duty.
8. Q. During what period of time was your tenure of office as Chief
of Naval Operations?
_ A. 1 August 1939 to March 25, 1942. I will check that. That's
right.
\3'] 4. Q. On 7 December 1941, what was the echelon of the
strategical, tactical, and administrative command, between the Navy
Department and the 14th Naval District?
A. Strategically, I would say there was none. Administratively, it
^^as largely direct between the De])artment and the 14th Naval Dis-
trict. Tncticallv, any relations we had were through the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, who was also Commander-in-Chief, IJ. S, Pacific
Fleet, and through him to the District Commandant,
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. Q. Then am T to imderstancl that the chain of tactical command
was the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief of the
U. S. Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District; is that correct?
A, Yes, sir, theoretically. Practically, I would say it would be very
largely between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
Commandant of tlie District. I have not been able to check any bear-
ing of that with War Plans, but that, I believe, would be generally
accepted.
6. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were Chief of Naval Opera-
tions during the period from August 1, 1939, to March 25, 1942.
What is the name of the officer who was in command of the U. S. Fleet
on 7 December 1941?
A. Admiral Kimmel.
7. Q. What is the name of the officer who had command of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Admiral Kimmel.
8. Q. Could you tell us the full name of Admiral Kimmel?
A. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. I don't know what the "E" stands
for.
9. Q. That is sufficient. Can you tell the court the name of the
officer who was assigned the duties of commandant, 14th Naval District,
on 7 December 1941?
A. Admiral Claude Bloch.
10. Q. Did any event of national importance occur on 7 December
1941?
A. Yes, sir.
11. Q. Without elaborating your answer, please state what this event
was.
A. A surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.
12. Q. At the time of this event was the United States in a state of
war with any other nation ?
A. No.
13. Q. Wlien had the United States last been in a state of war ?
A. 1918.
[4-] The judge advocate stated that he did not desire further
to examine this witness at this time. The court not desiring further
to examine this witness at this time, the judge advocate requested
that the court be cleared.
The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to
the inquiry entered.
Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy : Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) ; and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), were called before the court.
The court stated as follows :
The judge advocate of tlie court has made a request that Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy
(Ret) ; and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
be named as interested parties in this inquiry for the reason that the
scope of the inquiry would appear to cover an extensive field ; there
would also appear to be many complicated details of evidence ; much
time at this critical period of the war effort could be saved if it does
not become necessary to read long extracts of testimony already before
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 13
the court and to recall witnesses for cross-examination who may have
returned to their duties in combat areas and other important war
work; that the evidence before the court is that Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), and
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), were in the
key positions of the echelon of naval command between the Navy De-
partment and the 14th Naval District at the time, the Japanese made
an armed attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December lOll and therefore
have a direct interest in the proceedings of this court.
The court informed Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral
Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ; and Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , that they had been named as interested
parties.
The court informed each of the interested parties of his rights.
Each of the interested parties examined the precept and stated that
he did not object to any member of the court.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), with the permission of the court, introduced Charles B.
Rugg, Esquire, civilian; Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy
(Ret) ; and Lieutenant (junior grade) Edward B. Hanify, U. S.
Naval Reserve, as his counsel, and stated that he would also have as
counsel Admiral Harry A. Yarnell, U. S. Navy (Ret), and Com-
mander W. C. Chambliss, U. S. Naval Reserve, neither of whom was in
attendance at this session.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, with the
permission of the court, introduced Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S.
Navy (Ret), and Admiral Royal E. Inger- [5] soil, U. S.
Navy, as his counsel.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
with the permission of the court, introduced Rear Admiral C. J. Row-
cliff, U. S. Navy, and Captain Fred A. Ironside, Junior, U. S. Naval
Reserve, as his counsel.
The interested' party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U, S. Navy (Ret),
with the permission of the court, made the following statement (read-
ing:)
The fact that I have been named an interested party comes as a surprise,
particularly in view of the published findings of an investigation made on the
spot, within a few weeks of December 7, 1941.
I am much concerned because of the baneful implications and presumptions
which may be attached to the term "interested party".
I have had no reason to suppose that it was incumbent upon me to preserve
evidence or to keep unimpaired my recollection of the details and circumstances
surrounding and prior to December 7th. Nor have I had reason over this inter-
vening time, even if I could, to keep those details and circumstances precisely
separated from what they subconsciously may api)ear to have been, in order to
be able to recapture and reconstruct them as they were.
I desire to be helpful to the court and to expedite its business, but I feel sure
that you appreciate the difficulties which now confront me as an "interested
party."
I have been informed only very recently that I would be an "interested party"
and I have had scant time to prepare myself, if indeed, reconstruction of the
facts, full and uncolored, is possible of human accomplishment at this time.
While I have no desire to burden the court with legal technicalities, I feel con-
fident that the court does not expect me to waive any rights that I have.
So that the record may be clear in this respect, I wish it understood and I
understand that I am not waiving any of my rights, whatever they are or may
be.
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The witness who was on the stand prior to the clearing and opening
of the court, resumed his seat as witness.
[6'] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C.
Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):
14. Q. Admiral Stark, you have testified as to the chain of the
administrative, tactical, and strategical command which is between the
Navy Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
Do I understand strategical and tactical are different from military
command ?
A. No, I would say not.
15. Q. Then in substance your answer was that the chain of mili-
tary command was from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-
Chief of Pacific Fleet and thence to the Commandant, 14th Naval
District?
A. Yes.
16. Q. And the chain of administrative command — may I inquire
exactly what you mean by that?
A. I was thinking largely of the civilian employees and the bearing
of furnishing the 14th Naval District its personnel, and so forth.
17. Q. Mr. President, I have here General Order 142, date January
10, 1941, which is a statement of the status of the 6'th, 10th, 13th, 14th,
and 15th Naval Districts. I merely want to state that in General
Order 142, January 10, 1941, which was in effect on 7 December 1941,
that the status of the Commandant of the 14t]i Naval District is
clearly defined; and I wonder if I might ask Admiral Stark to read
this order and ask him if this wasn't the chain of Command he is
endeavoring to establish by the questions propounded.
With the court's permission, the question was withdrawn.
The interested party, Admiral Claude Charles Bloch. U. S. Navy,
made the following motion : "Inasmuch as it appears that the chain
of command and responsibilities are fixed in documents, I move to
strike out that testimony on the ground that the documents themselves
are the best evidence of what that authority is. Number two, on the
further ground that the questions put by the judge advocate them-
selves presuppose an answer to the very question at issue here as to
what the command was. I mean, they were conclusions in themselves,
and I think it would make for time to strike out that testimony and
stick with the documents — and I make such a motion."
The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to
the inquiry entered. The court announced that the motion was not
sustained.
18. Q. Admiral Stark, there is in existence General Order Number
142, Navy Department, dated 10 January 1941, defining [7]
the status of the Commandants of the 5th, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th
Naval Districts. This order was in effect on December 7, 1941, and
prior thereto. Are you familiar with this order?
A. Generally, but I have had no time to go into the details. If it
is the same order that was in existence, generally, yes. I would
like to refreshen on the order if I may be cross-examined.
19. Q. According to this Order, and I read: "The Commandants
of the Tenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts, the Com-
mandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United
States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Ber-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 15
muda, and the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far
as pertains to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, are hereby assigned a
dual status as follows : (a) xVs Commandants of their repective Naval
Ditricts, operating under the orders of the Navy Department, (b)
As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those
of a Senior Officer Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such,
and (2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and
as directed by its Commander-in-Chief." Is this the command rela-
tion that you described in the previous questions propounded by the
judge advocate of the court of inquiry?
A. It is.
20. Q. Admiral Stark, I have in my hand U. S. Navy Kegulations
1920, corrected in so far as I am able to ascertain, to date. Articles
1480 and following, and including 1486 — these I interpret to be the
regulations governing the business of the naval districts as prescribed
in the first part of the General Order, just referred to in paragraph
(2), which says that the Commandants of their respective naval dis-
tricts operate under the orders of the Navy Department. Are these
regulations, governing the naval districts, given in the articles of the
Navy Regulations above quoted, the orders of the Navy Department in
regard to the duties of the Commandant ?
A. They are.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class. U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold E. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
21. Q. Admiral, referring to your answer to the jud^e advocate's
questions which have been read and which have been subject to cross-
examination by Admiral Bloch : Did you feel that you fully under-
stood the language of the judge advocate's questions in which he
brought in the words in the official orders and regulations such as
"strategic", "tactical", and so on ?
A. The question was no too clear and I gave the best general answer
to it that I could. The regulations and general orders are specific and
I think the best answer to *-\iq judge advocate's question.
[8] Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral
■Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
22. Q. In the provisions of General Order No. 142 and the Navy
Regulations that have been cited, the only instructions dealing with
the chain of command and the responsibilities of the command of the
14th Naval District, were there not certain directives in the war plans
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, and in the joint action of the
Army and the Navy ?
A. In answering the original question, I stated that they might be
affected by the war plans and that I have not had an opportunity to
look over them to answer your question. My recollection is that they
may have been somewhat modified by war plans or special letters and
which I would like an opportunity to check up on to answer your
question.
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
23. Q. As a matter of fact, might not the provisions of these publi-
cations have vitally changed the provisions of General Order 142 in
the Navy Regulations?
A. If you mean, would it have been possible to have issued such
instructions, it would. Wliether or not anything that was issued did,
I would like an opportunity to check up.
24. Q. Well, then, you cannot give a complete answer to this ques-
tion until you have further refreshed your memory ?
A. That is correct.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anj'^thing relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection
therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his previous
questioning.
The witness made the following statement : If I may state, I have
been pretty busy on the other side. I was not told why I was called
to Washington, did not know definitely until I arrived what I was
coming here for, obtained counsel only this morning, have had no
chance to refresh on testimony which has been given and other docu-
ments which have been made available to other interested parties, and
I should like time to check up and prepare myself to answer the ques-
tions which I feel will probably be asked me.
The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.
The judge advocate requested the court to take judicial notice of
General Order 142, 143, and 170, and stated that they would be
maintained in the custody of the judge advocate and would be avail-
able for ready reference by the interested parties or the court if and
when required, and the court stated that it would take judicial notice
thereof.
[9] General Orders Nos. 142, 143, and 170 were submitted to the
interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered
in evidence.
There being no objection, they were received in evidence and marked
"EXHIBITS 1, 2 and 3," respectively, copy appended.
One of counsel for the judge advocate was called as a witness by
the judge advocate, was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry,
and was duly sworn.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station ?
A. Robert D. Powers, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, United States
Naval Reserve, counsel for the judge advocate of this court.
2. Q. Are 3^ou the legal custodian of an official copy of Navy Basic
War Plan, Rainbow Number 5, also known as WPL--46 ? If so, pro-
duce it.
A. I am ; here it is.
The official copy of Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow Number 5, also
known as WPL-46, was submitted to the interested parties and to
the court, and hj the judge advocate offered in evidence for the pur-
pose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom
as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 17
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, re-
quested the judge advocate to state whether these documents were
being offered in evidence, or were being offered for identification only.
The judge advocate replied that they were being offered for identi-
fication only for the purpose of hereafter reading into the record such
extracts therefrom that might become pertinent to the inquiry before
the court.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
4," for reference.
3. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of U. S. Pacific
Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five, also
known as WP Pacific 4G ? If so, will you produce it ?
A. I am ; here it is.
The official copy of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5,
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five, also known as WP Pac-46 was submit-
ted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate
offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the
record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry
before the court.
[lO] There being no objection, it was so received and marked
"EXHIBIT 5", for reference.
4. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Joint Action
of the Army and Navy, 1935, document number FTP155? If so,
please produce it.
A. I am ; here it is.
The official copy of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, docu-
ment number FTP155, was submitted to the interested parties and to
the court, and by the judge advocate offiered in evidence for the
purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts,
therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 6", for reference.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, re-
quested information as to whether FTP155 was corrected up to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, or as of what date.
5. Q. Will you answer the question ?
A. The copy shows that all changes have been made up to and
including 26 July, 1944.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated
that that leaves the document in a condition that it can't be identified
as it was on the 7th of December, 1941, because there have been
numerous pages taken out and new pages put in.
The witness requested permission to correct his last answer. The
witness stated as follows : The answer which I gave to the last question
was incorrect. This document is corrected up to and including July
14, 1941 ; the date of July 26, 1944, which I gave, being the date upon
which it was corrected. In other words, that is the entry of the man
who made the correction, that he made it on July 26, 1944.
Examined by the court :
6. Q. Is the judge advocate prepared to submit a copy of that
publication in effect on December 7, 1941 ?
79716 — i6— Ex. 146. vol. 1 3
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I have been assured by the registrar of this document that it
stands corrected as in effect on December 7, 1941, as I have handed
it to the judge advocate.
Examined by the judge advocate :
7. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of the 14th
Naval District Plan 0-4, called the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, Hawaiian Theater, also sometimes known as JCD-42? If so,
please produce it.
A. I am ; here it is.
[11] 8. Q. Is this the plan that was in effect on 7 December,
1941?
A. It is.
The official copy of 14th Naval District Plan 0-4, called the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, also known as
JCD-42, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court,
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent
to the inquiry before the court.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 7", for reference.
9. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Pacific Fleet
Confidential Letter Number 2CL-41 (Revised), subject. Security of
Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas ?
A. I am ; here it is.
The official copy of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter Number
2CL-41 (Revised) , subject. Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating
Areas, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by
the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to
the inquiry before the court.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 8", for reference.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Block,
U.S. Navy:
10. Q. As assistant to the judge advocate, will you certify that all
the documents which have just been listed will lie as they were in
effect on 7 December, 1941 ?
A, I do, sir.
The interested parties, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire
to cross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.
The court then, at 11 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 19
[1£] Present:
All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties
to the inquiry, and their counsel.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he was not ready to proceed and requested a continuance in order
to familiarize himself with the subject matter of the inquiry.
The interested parties, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.) , and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) , joined
in the request for continuance.
The judge advocate stated that he was ready to proceed but that he
considered the request for continuance reasonable and did not object
thereto.
The court announced that the request of the interested parties for a
contiimance would be granted and that the next meeting of the court
would be held at 10 a. m., August 7, 1944.
With the permission of the court. Rear Admirad Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: I should like
to have what I am about to say put on the record, if it is pertinent
to put it on. I have been branded throughout this country as the one
responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. I feel that this investiga-
tion should go far enough to disclose all the facts in connection with
the matter and that witnesses from the Army, from the State Depart-
ment, or from any other federal department ought to be called before
this court in order to establish the facts that are necessary. It will
be a long time before I am afforded any other opportunity to refute
the statements made in the report of the Roberts Commission. Peo-
ple may die who can make statements before this court sufficient to
establish the facts and to refute the utterly false and misleading state-
ments made throughout the Roberts Commission.
The court stated : The court assures you that we will make every
effort to obtain any witness that you may care to call for the primary
purpose of establishing all the facts as demanded by the precept.
The court then, at 2:20 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. August 7,
1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 21
PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INOUIRY
MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944.
[13] Third Day
Navy Department.
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 10 : 00 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Eet) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S.Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, JJ. S. Navy, Judge Advocate,
and his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, IT. S. Navy (Ret), inter-
ested party, and his counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party,
and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the second day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
With the permission of the. court. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, introduced Liteutenant D. W. Richmond, U. S. Naval Reserve,
and Lieutenant R, L. Tedrow, U. S. Naval Reserve, as additional
counsel for himself as interested party.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.) , stated that it was his understanding that the judge advo-
cate had requested access to certain secret files in the Navy Depart-
ment, to which he also would like to have access, and that as yet the
matter had not been acted upon.
The judge advocate replied that he had written the Secretary of
the Navy, setting forth the request of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret) that he have access to said documents, but
that up to a half hour before the court convened it had not been acted
upon by the Secretary of the Navy. The judge advocate further
stated that he did not consider the said documents immediately neces-
sary to the proceedings of the court.
[i^] Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, a witness for the
judge advocate, was recalled and warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, with the
permission of the court, made the following statement prior to his
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
examination: Before my examination begins, before my further ex-
amination proceeds, I wish to state that although there has been a
week's adjournment, I have not been able to devote all of it to prepara-
tion. Considerable of my intervening time has been necessarily em-
ployed on the duties of my present station. It is difficult to throw back
over two and one-half years and testify about many things. I have
not been able to study over the full field which may be opened. I can
testify as to broad matters of policy and plans, though I may have
to ask for further time to refresh my memory. I suggest where evi-
dence as to matters of lesser degree is sought, it can be better obtained
from those of my subordinates who were in OpNav in 1941 and con-
sequently more familiar with detail, or from custodians of records
and documents in the department's files. I also wish to say that I am
appearing as the first witness before this court, having been declared
to be an interested party before any other testimony was taken. I
make no particular point of that unusual sequence and shall strive to
answer questions so far as my memory serves, fully and without re-
serve.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. During the period of two or three months preceding Decem-
ber 7, 1941, who were your principal advisers, assistants, or aides in
the Navy Department?
A, My assistants and advisers at that time were the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations; Head of War Plans; Head of Office of Naval
Intelligence; the Districts; Central Division: Ship Movements; Ship
Maintenance; Fleet Training; Commander Wellborn, my Flag Secre-
tary. Those are the principal ones that I i-ecall at the moment.
2. Q. What is the name of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll.
3. Q. Will you state in general the principal duties of this officer?
A. Admiral Ingersoll's principal duties a.ii Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations were to advise me in a general way, and for me to keep
him in touch with all matters of general importance. He took off
my shoulders many matters of detail which he settled himself. Mat-
ters of major importance, matters regarding policy, matters regarding
talks and so forth with other departments of the government were
considered by me, though he was largely acquainted with them, and
I accepted such letters. Many dispatches which we sent [161
over together he released after I had cleared them. In general, he was
a very close assistant.
4. Q. Did the major problems arising in the Pacific Fleet in the
14th Naval District come within his view ?
A. Thev did.
5. Q. Who wfis your Chief of War Plans?
A. Admiral Kelly Turner.
6. Q. Will you tell the court in general what the principal duties
of Admiral Turner were?
A. Admiral Turner, as head of the War Plans Division, was charged
with the drawing up of plans for the use of the Fleet in war. He
worked very closely with Army War Plans. Ke kept in very close
touch with the dispositions made in connection with War Plans. I
think that may cover the broad outline of it.
7. Q. Did you ordinarily call Admiral Turner in for conferences on
your principal military problems?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 23
A. I tliink there is no exaggeration to state that we were in what
might be called constant conference on important military problems.
I saw him not only daily — frequently a number of times daily.
8. Q. Did he have anything to do with making estimates of the
situations as matters progressed?
A. Yes, a great deal to do, because of his position.
9. Q. Would you say that he was familiar with the military prob-
lems and policies in the Pacific Area, so far as the Chief of Naval
Operations had anything to do with these plans and was concerned?
A. I would say he was thoroughly familiar with them. We dis-
cussed them together with all their aspects, and it was a matter of his
constant concern and that of his Division.
10. Q. What is the name of the officer who was in charge of the
General Division?
A. Captain Schuirmann.
11. Q. What were the principal duties that he performed in rela-
tion to your office as Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Captain Schuirmann was the officer particularly charged with
the liaison with the State Department. Central Division handled
matters of outlying possessions, but one of his principal duties, if
not the most important duty, was his connection with the State De-
partment.
12. Q. Did you consider him as an adviser or a liaison officer, or
an aide — or exactly in what capacity would you [16] state he
performed his duties ?
A. He was certainly a liaison officer with the State Department.
Many matters I asked him to take up with the State Department.
He obtained information on many matters from the State Department,
and naturally I asked his opinions to that extent, and to that extent
his advice on problems where it was required.
13. Q. What were the names of some of your principal aides?
A. Commander Wellborn was my Flag Secretary. My Flag Lieu-
tenant was Lieutenant Smedberg.
14. Q. Will you tell the court whether they acted in an advisory,
administrative, or in what capacity ?
A. Lieutenant Smedberg acted largely in the capacity of regular
Flag Lieutenant's duties; Commander Wellborn as Flag Secretary.
Most matters concerning the Department which come to the Chief of
Naval Operations Office or Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Office,
go over his desk. He was probably as familiar as anyone with corre-
spondence which I handled and which Admiral Ingersoll handled.
He brought me mail to sign, and he frequently was responsible for
diverting mail for Admiral Ingersoll's signature, which Admiral
Ingersoll of course would sign or send back to me, as he saw fit ; but
his liaison with me was very close.
15. Q. Do you know a Captain John L. McCrae ?
A. Yes, John L. McCrae to all intention and purposes also served
as an aide.
16. Q. Did you ever have him appointed in any special capacity?
A. Yes. I felt the need for a capable officer to follow up matters
for me which I did not have the time to follow up, but which I more
or less continuously checked. For example, a letter might come in
affecting several bureaus. I would have McCrae follow up the action
of the bureaus, and he was check-up and follow-up officer. Li addi-
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK .
tion, he sat in on a great many conferences which I had, to keep him
generally familiar with a good many matters.
17. Q. Adverting to problems that may have arisen in the Pacific
area, did he ever perform any special duties in connection therewith?
A. He did. I sent Captain McCrae — I do not recall just the date,
sometime in 1941 — with two sets of War Plans, which I was anxious
for more personal touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific
than I could get by simply mailing them. He first went to the
Hawaiian Islands, left a copy of these with the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific, with the request that while he was on his way to the
Asiatic and back, Commander-in-Chief would have opportunity to
study these plans, and [17] McCrae could pick up any sug-
gestions or comments and bring them back to me. In the Asiatic he
delivered the plans to Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic, remained
there in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic on
these plans, and brought back to me his reaction. Likewise, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific, when he stopped on his return. I
might add that Captain McCrae, of course, was made familiar with
these plans before he left, in order that he might perform his duty
more effectively.
18. Q. Who was your Director or Naval Intelligence?
A. I had three directors of Naval Intelligence.
19. Q. I would like the one for the period of three or four months
preceding December 7 ?
A. At that time Captain Wilkinson was Director of Naval
Intelligence.
20. Q. What were his principal duties as related to the function of
Chief of Naval Operations?
A. His principal duty was collecting and dessemination of infor-
mation, and of course keeping me informed of what was regarded as
important and pertinent.
21. Q. What was the general nature of information that he fur-
nished you ?
A. Well, it was broad in scope. For example, such matters as he
became cognizant of in connection with the war in Europe, not only
with regard to what he might obtain from his attaches in operational
matters, but a great deal also in technical matters.
22. Q. Were you kept currently informed?
A. Yes, I feel that I was.
23. Q. What method did he employ in transmitting this informa-
tion to you ?
A. Usually by w^ord of month. Sometimes by memorandum.
24. Q. What was your estimate of the efficiency of the Office of
Naval Intelligence in keeping you informed of international and mili-
tary developments in the Pacific area for the three months preceding
Pearl Harbor?
A. My estimate was that he gave me the best obtainable. I might
say in that regard, if you refer to what we knew as to what military
measures, particularly construction and so forth, were going on in
Japan, the data could not be considered accurate. It had to be sur-
mised. Someone once remarked, "The accurate information stopped
outside the three-mile limit." I may add also that the British had no
more information in regard to that than we did.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 25
25. Q. I refer principally, Admiral, to information on political de-
velopments in the. Orient, and military information [181 ^^
disposition of possible enemy ships and matters of that nature.
A. In regard to the political situation they made estimates from
time to time from what they had. I think they were reasonably good
at the time. As far as disposition of the enemy forces, I would have
to go back to the records to check their accuracy. The dispositions
were supplemented by information received from the Commander-in-
Chief in the Pacific, Commander-in-Chief in the Asiatic. The poli-
tical developments, I would also have to check back my memorandum
to really check their accuracy. I couldn't recall accurately at the mo-
ment how much they corroborated with other information that we
had.
26. Q. I only wanted a general statement. Admiral, and I am satis-
fied with what you have given. Did you have any direct dealings
with the State Department?
A. Yes, I did.
27. Q. Will you state to the court the details as to the manner in
which you may have conducted any business of the Navy Department
with the State Department ?
A. My direct dealings with the State Department were on meet-
ings which took place approximately weekly with the Under-Secretary
of State. I had many conferences with Mr. Hull, in addition. Mr.
Hull frequently called me by telephone, and in the latter part of '41,
while negotiations were going on, he was particularly anxious that
we were kept fully informed. It was not unusual for him to call me
up about C : 00 o'clock in the evening and report any matters of the
day's developments which he thought might be of interest to the Navy
Department.
28. Q. Did you have any dealings with the War Department?
A. Yes.
29. Q. With what officers did you ordinarily transact your business ?
A. Well, primarily with General Marshall, but I saw the War Plans
Division of the War Department occasionally. I saw the Secretary
of War occasionally, particularly where matters of priorities and so
forth were concerned.
30. Q. Did you consult with him as to military matters in the
Pacific area, also ?
A. With General Marshall ?
31. With General Marshall.
A. Yes.
32. Q. Could you give the court any idea of the frequency of these
conferences? In other words, were they a weekly affair, monthly,
or ?
A. The Joint Board met weekly, but in addition to that, [19]
I was in very frequent communication with General Marshall. We
worked very closely together, by telephone, or when the matter was
too secret for telephone, by running over to his office, and he to mine.
33. Q. Did your duties as Chief of Naval Operations require any
consultations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy?
A. They did.
34. Q. Were these consultations daily, weekly, monthly, or how
would you characterize them 2
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I would certainly characterize them as frequent, not only by per-
sonal visits, which were very frequent, but also by telephone, some-
times maybe two or three times in a day, frequently on matters of in-
formatory interest, of great length, at the end of the day.
35. Q. Was the subject of our military problems in the Pacific a
part of these discussions ?
A. Very decidedly so.
36. Q. I show you, sir, a document which has been marked for
identification "EXHIBIT 4." Do you recognize this document?
A. I do, as Navy Basic War Plan Eainbow Number 5, U. S. Navy,
WPL-46.
37. Q. Was the document in effect on December 7, 1941 ?
A. The document had been promulgated. I might say that it was
in effect, but had not been executed.
38. Q. On what date had it been promulgated ?
A. 26 May 1941.
Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Number 5, U. S. Navy, WPL-46,
was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the
judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into
the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received.
39. Q. Please refer to this document and read to the court such
portions as show how it was to be put in effect.
A. (Reading:)
Upon receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will
proceed with this plan in its entirety, including acts of war :
"EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5"
40. Q, Wlien might mobilization be directed ?
A. (Reading:)
The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise
designated.
[^6>] 41. Q. What provision was made for executing the plan in
part?
A. (Reading:)
Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or
any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. This
plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nation that is to be
considered the enemy, the tasks to be executed or accepted, and the preliminary
measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan, or
additional tasks thereof.
42. Q. Was the major task of the Pacific Fleet assigned in this War
Plan?
A. (Reading:)
The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II), will be organized into
task forces as follows :
a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET ;
b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;
c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.
The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC
AREA.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 27
a. TASK.
Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and cap-
ture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea com-
munications and positions :
b. TASK.
Prepare to capture and establish cantrol over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk :
c. TASK.
Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy:
d. TASK.
Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far
west as longitude 155° east :
[21] e. TASK.
Defend Samoa in category "D" ;
f. TASK.
Defend Guam in category "F" ;
g. TASK.
Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying
enemy raiding forces (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) ;
h. TASK.
Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the western hemi-
sphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air
forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere ;
i. TASK.
Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces ;
j. TASK.
Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as
circumstances require.
k. TASK.
Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.
43. Q. Had a copy of this War Plan been issued the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. It had.
44. Q. Had this War Plan, "EXHIBIT 4", been placed in effect,
either in full or in part prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. It had not been executed.
45. Q. When did Admiral Kinnnel assume command of the Pacific
Fleet?
A. In February, '41. I do not recall the exact date.
[22] 46. Q! What was the theater of operations of the Pacific
Fleet during the year 1941 ?
A. Central Pacific.
47. Q. Where did the fleet normally base?
A. The fleet normally bases in West Coast ports. Generally speak-
ing I would say, in answer to your question, Southern California.
48. Q. Do you recall if a directive had been issued basing the Pacific
Fleet in the Hawaiian area ?
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I do not recall a specific directive. In 1939, shortly after I be-
came Chief of Naval Operations, I established what might be termed
a Cruiser Force in the Hawaiian Islands. After the spring maneuvers
in 1940, the fleet was based in the Hawaiian Islands.
49. Q. Will you tell the court what were the broad underlying con-
siderations for basing the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands ?
A. If the court will permit me, I should like to read from a letter
which I wrote Admiral Richardson, a reply to a question of his which
in effect was, "Why am I here?" That reply, which is well-backed
and which I gave as a considered answer, I think, would be the best
thing I could give for the record.
There being no objection, with the court's permission, the witness
continued : This letter is dated 27 May 1941. The second paragraph
states: (Reading:)
Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?
The next paragraph starts :
Answer. You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your
presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I
have hoolied this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that
with Italy in, it is thought that the Japs might feel just that much freer to take
independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told
the Japs that so far as they are concerned, she (Japan) has a free hand in the
Dutch East Indies.
That paragraph is on page one. Now going over to page two, I
again quote :
I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or inci-
dental result, regardless, such as solving the logistics problems involved, including
not only supplies from the United States, but their [23] handling and
storage at Pearl Harbor.
Training, as you might do under war conditions.
c. Familiarity of task forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston,
Samoa, general area, in so far as practicable.
d. Closer liaison with the Army in the common defense of the Hawaiian Area
than has ever previously been exhibited between the Army and Navy.
e. Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army
and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
f. Security of the Fleet at anchor.
g. Accenting the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably
more than just Oahu.
You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating
base, but that will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up
against.
50. Q. Do you remember if there ever had been any official protest
made by anyone in the naval service to you regarding basing the Pacific
Fleet in that area ?
A. I recall no what might be called official protest. I do have let-
ters from Admiral Richardson in which he — personal letters — in which
he advised a return of the Fleet to the Pacific Coast ; and I am perfectly
willing, if the court so desires, to place these letters on the record.
51. Q. Could you tell the court. Admiral, in very general terms,
about how many units of each of the following types there were with
the Pacific Fleet when Admiral Kimmel took over command in Feb-
ruary, 1941 ? The categories are, first, battleships.
A. That is a matter of detail. It can be taken accurately from the
records.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 29
52. Q. I am asking generally.
A. And I would prefer it be from the record. I made out a mem-
orandum on it, the accuracy of which I would not vouch for, and it
should be checked with the record, but if the court would like to have
it, I will give it, I think the record for matters of that sort is the best
evidence.
53. Q. About how many patrol planes were assigned to the Hawai-
ian Area at that time, in February 1941 ?
A. I would have to check that from the record.
[^4] 54. Q. During the year 1941, were any naval units de-
tached from the Pacific Fleet?
A. There were. That also is a matter of record. There was a
detachment sent to the Atlantic.
55. Q. Do you remember the reasons for the detachment of this
unit?
A. The movement conformed in general to dispositions required
by WPL-46. Now there is a matter which I would like to give the
court off the record. I strongly question the advisability of putting
it in the record, but I have no objection to Admiral Kimmel and Ad-
miral Bloch and all hands having it. I would like to make it off the
record and then get your opinion.
The judge advocate requested that the statement be made by the
witness, and that the court direct that it not be included as a perma-
nent part of the record, but be made in the form of an exhibit which
could be placed in tlie secret files of the Navy Department for refer-
ence to by any person with authority to look at the record.
The interested party, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ket), stated that he objected to such procedure with regard to the
statement which might be made by the witness, and that he preferred
that the entire proceedings be made a matter of record.
The judge advocate replied.
The witness added these words to his answer: "I may add that 1
think making this matter public would be detrimental to the best
interests of the United States."
The interested party, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret), replied.
[26] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
The court was cleared.
The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The
court announced that it would hear the answer to the question and
then make its decision.
56. Q. Will you answer the question, please. Admiral ?
A. My first answer — my answer in part, to the question, was that
the movement was in general conformance with WPL-4:6. My second
part of the answer involves a matter of timing. The movement was
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations at that particular time
because I was given orders for an amphibious operation in the At-
lantic which, in my opinion, and in that of my advisers, required this
force to be in the Atlantic to insure its success.
The court announced that the answer would go in the record.
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
57. Q. What, in your opinion, was the adequacy of the Pacific
Fleet during the period October to December, 1941, to carry out
WPL-46?
A. In general, it was considered adequate for the tasks outlined.
Obviously — I will let the answer stand; that is, it was considered
generally adequate for the tasks outlined. The disposition was drawn
up to be realistic.
58. Q. Does that complete your answer, sir?
A. Yes.
59. Q. I show you, sir, a copy of a letter duly authenticated under
official seal of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War
dated January 24, 1941. Can you identify this?
A. Yes. I identify this as a letter signed by Col. Knox of January
24, 1941, then Secretary of the Navy, to Col. Stimson, then Secretary
of War.
The copy of a letter dated January 24, 1941, from the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War, was submitted to the interested
parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 9".
60. Q. Will you read the letter, please?
A. This is a letter dated January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of
the Navy to the Secretary of War.
The witness read Exhibit 9.
[£6] 61. Q. Admiral, do you know who prepared this letter for
the Secretary of the Navy's signature ?
A. The original draft was prepared in War Plans, We worked on
it several days. AVhen I say "we", I mean Admiral Turner (then
Captain Turner), Admiral Ingersoll, and myself. We finally
rounded it up in the form in which it has just been read.
62. Q. Did this letter represent the view of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations on the question of military defenses of the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base on the date of the letter, January 24, 1941 ?
A. It did. It didn't go into complete details but it covered, in our
opinion, the main points which were in our minds which we believed
were generally accepted main points and we decided to put them before
the Army.
63. Q. Admiral, in order to make this whole letter more clear to the
court, I will ask you to refer to Exhibit 9 and state what dangers were
envisaged, in the order of their importance, as set out in this letter.
A. The order of importance as set out is: (1) Air bombing attack;
(2) Air torpedo plane attack; (3) Sabotage; (4) Submarine attack ;
(5) Mining; (6) Bombardment by gun fire.
64. Q. What views did the Navy Department express as regards the
then existing defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against the
forms of attack set out in Paragraphs 1 and 2?
A. With regard to 1 and 2, the solution of which the letter stated
was considered to be of primary importance, the following paragraphs
particularly apply. Both types of air attack are possible. They may
be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any
of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy
effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and a minimum at
two. Attacks may be launched from a striking force of carriers and
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY 31
their supporting vessels. Tiie countermeasures to be considered are :
(A) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting ves-
sels before air attack can be launched; (B) Location and engagement
of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives; (C) Repulse of
enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire ; (D) Concealment of vital installa-
tions by artificial smoke; (E) Protection of vital installations by bal-
loon barrage. The operations set forth in (A), namely, location an'
engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack
can be launched, are largely functions of the Fleet but quite possibly
might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without
warning prior to a declaration of war. Is that part of your question '{
[^] 65. Q. Yes. On Page 3 of the letter contained in Exhibit
9, please read into the record the proposals of the Secretary of the
Navy to remedy the problems as set out in this letter.
A. The Secretary of the Navy offered the following proposals : ( 1 )
That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air
warning net in Hawaii ; that the Ai'my give consideration to the ques-
tions of balloon barrage, the employment of smoke, and other special
devices for improviiig the defense of Pearl Harbor; that local joint
plans be drawn for efltective cooperation of naval and military aircraft
operations and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire against surprise
aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree to the
appropriate degrees of joint readiness for in;imediate action in defense
against surprise aicraft raids against Pearl Harbor; that joint exer-
cises designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense
against surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as
the present uncertainty continues to exist. He requested that concur-
rence in these proposals and the rapid implementation of the measures
to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the
security of the Fleet, be met by the highest cooperation from the War
Department.
66. Q. Admiral, I show you an official document entitled "Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", which has been marked
"EXHIBIT 6" for identification. If you recognize this document,
state as what you identify it ?
A. I identify it as Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935,
sometimes referred to as FTP155. It is a confidential document.
The document entitled "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy,
1935", was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by
the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of here-
after reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be perti-
nent to the inquiry before the court.
There being no objection, it was so received.
67. Q. On Page 5, for the record will you read to the court Para-
graphs 8 and 9 ?
A. (Reading:)
8. Methods of coordination. —
Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by one of the following
methods :
a. Mutual cooperation.
b. The exercise of unity of command.
9. Determination of the method of coordination.
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual
cooperation.
b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of
unity of command in the following cases :
[28] (1) When ordered by the President ; or
(2) When provided for in joint agreements !)etwecn the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy ; or
(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation re-
quires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that
shall exercise such command.
68. Q. Wliat method of coordination was in effect in the 14th
Naval District on December 7, 1941 ?
A. The method of coordination in effect at that time was one of
mutual coordination, except that I would say the method for coordi-
nation of the air effort was one of, if not outright unity of com-
mand, that it very closely approached it, and one which I thought
was so splendid that I sent it to the commanders-in-chief of our prin-
cipal fleets and to all district commandants. It was the best thing
I had seen and I highly concurred in it. If the court would like to
have the two principal paragraphs of that document I would be
glad to insert them in the record at this time.
69. Q. Is that from this book?
A. No, I took them out of a paper. Shall I go ahead with them ?
70. Q. Yes.
A. (Reading:)
"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action
of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides" — I am reading from a
document which gives me two paragraphs sent to me by Admiral Kimmel, which
paragraphs are taken out of an agreement which was previously arrived at
in the Hawaiian Islands. The date of this memorandvim of Admiral Kimmel
to me is 4 June, 1941. The date of the document from which these extracts
are quoted, as I recall, is sometime in March, 1941. I quote :
(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps,
assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.
(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command
shall bo vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the base. Briefly,
when an alarm is sounded, the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy
ships, and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy
bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Re-
tired, requested that the document from which the witness was read-
ing be better identified.
The memorandum dated 4 June 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to
Admiral Stark, was submitted to each of the interested parties and
to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the
purpose only of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as
may be pertinent to the inquiry [29] before the court.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 10", for reference, description appended.
The judge advocate stated that the documents to which the mem-
orandum referred would be later offered in evidence.
71. Q. Will you read the rest of the memorandum. Admiral?
A. The thircl paragraph is: (Reading) "The liaison betwixt the
Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly
drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 33
held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the con-
ditions are steadily improving and it is felt that they are in much
better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions
will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been
supplied and the personnel drilled in its use. There are about 140
light Army planes (fighter and light bombers) and 21 heavy bomb-
ing airplanes now" — "now" being as of 4 June 1941 — "in the Is-
lands. These are in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fight-
ers. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands
should be at least four times the number that they have there now
and it is felt that these planes should be sent out as soon as it is
practicable to do so. There are not now a sufficient number of
Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands." Signed,
"H. E. Kimmel." Copies of this were sent to General Marshall,
Admiral King, and Admiral Towers — Admiral king then being in
the Atlantic and Admiral Towers being Chief of the Bureau of Aero-
nautics, Navy Department.
72. Q. Had this method of coordination of aircraft actually been
put in effect?
A. It was put in effect in March, 1941. As I noted, correspond-
ence or papers from which this extract was made were forwarded
to the commanders-in-chief of the three principal fleets — the At-
lantic, Pacific, and Asiatic — and to the commandants, as I recall, of
all districts.
73. Q. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, give any thought to
putting in effect the exercise of unity of command for the whole
Hawaiian area?
A. Much thought had been given to the proposition of unity of
command. We had not arrived at a satisfactory solution or de-
cision to put it into effect so far as the Navy Department was concerned
at that time.
74. Q. Am I to infer that you had discussions with the Army chief
of staff, or other higher authorities, in this study ?
A. You are to infer that. It had been the subject of many con-
versations with the chief of staff of the Army. I may state with ref-
erence to the amphibious operation which was referred to in the
testimony a little while back, that operations of that nature which we
were considering, we anticipated having unity of command for them.
[30] 75. Q. Will you read into the record. Article 25 on Page
27 of Exhibit 6?
A. Article 25, Page 27, FTP155, reads as follows (reading) :
25. Purpose of coastal frontier defense.
a. The purpose of a joint organization and measures for coastal frontier
defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense.
b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are
for the purpose of :
(1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;
(2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;
(3 Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas ;
(4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which
are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations.
76. Q. Will you read into the record Article 26 on Page 28, para-
graphs a. to e., both inclusive?
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 4
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I quote (reading) :
a. A coastal frontier is a geographical division of our coastal area established
for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective co-
ordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The
coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or
shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and
command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval
officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively,
assigned for the defen.se of tliese divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for
command purposes into sectors and subsectors.
b. Coastal irontier defense is the organizntiitn of the foi-ces and materiel of
the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of
continental United States and its overseas possessions.
c. The naval district is a military and administrative connnand ashore estab-
lished for the purijose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with
respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities
outside the Navy Department proi^er, and for the further purpose of centralizing
under one command within the district and the waters thereof:
(1) For militai'y coordination, all naval activities; and
(2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific ex-
ceptions. The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and
logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint
organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal
zones. The limits of the naval districts ai'e laid down in the Navy Regula-
tions. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes.
Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the
direct [SI] representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus
and offices, in all matters affecting district activity.
d. Naval local defense forces consist of naval forces, including Coast Guard
and Lighthouse Service, afloat and a.shore, attached to a naval district and
under the command of the commandant of the district. These forces are not
a part of the Fleet.
e. A naval base is a center from which men-of-war can operate and be main-
tained.
77. Q. On Page 31, will yon read into the record Paragraphs o.
to v., both inclusive?
A. I quote (reading) :
o. The outer harbor area is the war area which extends to seaward from
the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within
the range of the harbor defense batteries.
p. The harbor channel area is the water area which lies between the outer
harbor area and the inner harbor area, and which comprises all the entrance
channels to the harbor.
q. The inner harbor area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside
the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor.
r. An inshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating
generally within a defensive coastal area and controlling shipping within a
defensive sea area.
s. An offshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating
and patrolling the coastal zone outside of those areas assigned to the inshore
patrol.
t. An escort force is a part of the n"aval local defense forces charged with
the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.
u. A coastal force is a naval force which may be organized to operate within
the coastal zone to meet a specific situation in which naval local defense forces
are inadequate to carry out the Navy's functions in coastal frontier defense.
V. A harbor defense is an administrative and tactical Army command, com-
prising the armament and accessories, including anti-aircraft armament, con-
trolled mines and supporting aircraft, with the personnel for manning, pro-
vided for the defense of a harbor or other water area. Harbor defenses exist
to provide on the outbreak of war an effective seaward defense of important
strategic points, such as large centers of population, important commercial
centers, navy yards, coaling or fueling stations, locks and dams; to deny the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 35
enemy entrance to or occupation of a harbor or other waters which might serve
as a base for land or naval operations, or both ; and to keep the enemy at such
distance from the entrance to a waterway that our naval forces may debouch
therefrom and take up a battle formation with the least hostile interference.
[S2] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
78. Q. Will you read into the record paragraph "z" on page 32
of Exhibit 6?
A. [Reading:]
Tlie aircraft warning service is a communication and an intelligence service
which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier
defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public
utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile
aircraft and to alert Air Corps units and Antiaircraft artillery units. It con-
sists essentially of observers of information centers for plotting the courses and
distributing information of approaching hostile planes and of the necessary
communications.
79. Q. I ask you to turn to page 13 and read Article 19, paragraphs
a, b, and c.
A. [Reading:]
a. Attacks against our coastal frontiers may be classiiied as follows: (1)
Major oi>erations, i. e., those executed for the purpose of invasion; and (2)
Minor operations, i. e., raids against shipping or shore objectives.
b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct
military operations in direct defense of United States territory.
c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are: (1) To
provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the direct
defense of the coast. (2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor
defenses.
80. Q. What, in general, comprised the Hawaiian coastal frontier?
A. It is shown in chart WPL 46. Subject to the correction of my
testimony, in general, it comprises a zone around the Hawaiian Is-
lands, including Midway, Palmyra, Johnson, and Kingston reef, and,
to the best of my recollection. Wake. The boundary, as I recall, is
some 500 miles outside the Hawaiian Islands group.
81. Q. Will you turn to page 14 and read Article 19-d in its en-
tirety?
A. (Reading:)
In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or main-
tain—
(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and
tire-control installations.
[33] (2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general
coastal frontier defense ; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.
(3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning
service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt
exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.
(4) Controlled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels neces-
sary for their installation and maintenance.
(5) A system of underwater listening posts.
(6) Beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, main-
tenance, and patrol.
(7) Fixed underwater obstructions in connection with controlled mine bar-
rages.
(8) Additional mobile forces required in accordance with the situation.
82. Q. Adverting to paragraph 1, which you have just read, Ad-
miraL which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and
fire-control installations." Do you know whether the Army had lived
up, in general, to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to
December?, 1941?
A. The Army had the defenses mentioned installed. I would not
care to say that they were sufficient. In a general way, I knew and
had been told by the Chief of StaiOP of the Army that subject to a
complete breakdown in training, he was sending what he could to
the Hawaiian Islands. That does not mean that "what he could"
was sufficient, and without reference to the record, I could not state
what was there, and there are those whose testimony would be much
more direct than mine on that point; but I did know from frequent
conversation with Marshall that he stated he was doing the best he
could. He was up against it, to a considerable degree.
83. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (2), which you read a few mo-
ments ago and which states that the Army will provide and operate
or maintain "aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in
general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval
forces." Do you know, in a general way, whether the Army had lived
up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7,
1941?
A. I know, in a general way, that the Army had increased their
. air units out there to a considerable degree. This also was a matter
of frequent conversation between General Marshall and me, and as
I recall — and my recollection may be faulty — the Army had something
over 200 planes in Hawaii at that time. Just how many of them
were fighters and what were bombers and so forth I could not state.
[34-1 84. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (3), which you have just
read and which states that the Army will provide and operate or
maintain "a communication and intelligence system to include an air-
craft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with
provision for the prompt exchange of inforaiation or instructions
with the Navy." Do you know whether the Army had lived up to its
commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. I knew that the Army — again from conversations with General
Marshall, some of which I recollect with great clarity, because of an
amusing incident not necessary to put on the record — was making great
endeavor to get a warning system for the' island of Oahu, and thought
it was such that when installed and properly manned it should have
been a very effective system — at least, so far as we could make it with
the equipment developed up to that time. As regards getting the
information from that warning system properly distributed to those
to whom it was essential to make proper use of the information, that
will have to come from people out there. I could look up and read
what there was available, but I do not recollect clearly, after a lapse of
time, just what this was.
85. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (4) , which you have just read and
whicH'states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "con-
trolled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels necessary
for their installation and maintenance," do you know whether the
Army had lived up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior
to December 7, 1941 ?
A. I did not concern myself so much with the mining situation as I
did with the material in your immediately preceding questions, be-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 37
cause of the fact that, in general, the Hawaiian area hasn't good mine-
able waters, and the details of that I do not have.
86. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (5), which states that the Army
will provide and operate or maintain "a system of underwater listen-
ing posts," do you know whether, in a general way, the Army had lived
up to its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7,
1941?
A. Again my previous answer would largely apply. I considered it
more of a local affair and do not recall anything particular with
respect thereto.
87. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (6), which states that the Army
will provide and operate or maintain "beach defense, together with
vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol," do you
know whether, in a general way, the Army had lived up to its commit-
ments prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. Again my general answer applies. Beach defenses are some-
thing with which I am very familiar, so far as German installations
are concerned, which are largely local affairs, and there again I do not
have any recollection.
[S5] 88. Q. Paragraph d (7) states that the Army will pro-
vide and operate or maintain "fixed underwater obstructions in con-
nection with controlled mine barrages." Do you know whether, in
a general way, the Army lived up to its commitments prior to
December 7, 1941?
A. My previous answer applies.
89. Q. Paragraph d (8) states that the Army will provide and
operate or maintain "additional mobile forces required in accord-
ance with the situation." Do you know, in a general way, whether
the Army had lived up to this commitment prior to December 7,
1941?
A. Can you tell me just what was intended by that question?
90. Q. Other than that set out in "Joint Action of the Army and
the Navy", I don't know.
A. Well, I don't either.
91. Q. Adverting to paragraph g, which I shall read: "In carry-
ing our these functions the Navy will: (1) provide and operate —
(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warn-
ing of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy
forces in the vicinity of the coast. Do you know, in a general way,
whether the Navy had lived up to its commitment in a reasonable
manner prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. If by that question is meant that the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific, or, if you would like to put it, the District Commander,'
had the patrol planes which I would like to have had him have for
the business in question, he did not. I had made a distribution from
what w^as available to me and which I considered the best I could
do and, as I recall, based on the provisions of WPL 46. I would
like to reserve the right to correct that statement if my memory
is faulty. I might add I was moving Heaven and earth for in-
creasing our patrol planes, not only for the Pacific but for prob-
lems which I envisaged elsewhere, particularly also in the Atlantic.
92. Q. I quote from paragraph g (b) : "The Navy will provide
and operate a communication and intelligence system among the
elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt ex-
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
change of information or instructions with the Army." Can you
state whether or not, in your estimation, the Navy had lived up to
its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?
A. There again I feel I am not competent to give any detailed
information, I had absolute confidence in our people in the Hawaiian
Islands. I still have confidence in them. I knew they were drill-
ing and working on these subjects, and I left it to them. I con-
sider that the conditions existing with regard to your question could
be much better testified to by them.
[S6] 93. Q. In order to save time. Admiral, with respect to the
provisions of paragraph g (d), would your answer be the same as to
inshore patrols for the protection of mine fields and underwater ob-
structions other than beach defenses?
A. Generally, yes. In regard to mines and going back to when
I was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, I made mines one of my par-
ticular subjects of study with regard to outlying possessions, the
Hawaiian groups and the Philippines; and my recollection is that
they all had more mines than they could use. I cannot, however, state
that those mines were 100%, nor do I know just what their condition
was. That testimony can be obtained from more competent wit-
nesses or from the record of the department.
94. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (e), which states that the Nav^^
will provide and operate "underwater listening posts for naval use
where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts."
Have you any knowledge whether the Navy adequately lived up to
this commitment prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. That, too, I put in the local class, and I think better testimony
could be had from people who were charged with it on the spot. I
might add that we were doing all we could to develop this type of
listening in the way of buoys and so forth. Just what the situation
was in Hawaii I do not recollect.
95. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (f), which states that the Navy
will provide and operate "through the Lighthouse Service, when
turned over to the Navy, coastal lights, buoys, and aids to naviga-
tion, and to change them as necessary." Was this commitment lived
up to by the Navy prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. We took over the Coast Guard and, along with it, the Light-
house Service, and as regards to how they lived up to their commit-
ments, in that respect again it is a local affair. I do not know. I as-
sume they lived up to it, and if they had not been doing it, they would
have been required to.
96. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (g), which states that the Navy
will provide and operate "an information system through the Coast
Guard stations when turned over to the Navy, and through lighthouses
and light vessels." Do you know whether this commitment was lived
up to prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. I do not have a clear remembrance on that subject.
97. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (h) which states that the Navy
will provide and operate "necessary mine-sweeping vessels." Was
this commitment lived up to prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. I believe it was.
[S7] 98. Q. Paragraph g (2) states that the Navy will provide
and maintain "such fixed underwater obstructions as are component
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 39
parts of Navy barrages ; including the vessels necessary for their in-
stallation and maintenance." Was this commitment lived up to prior
to December 7, 1941?
A. Again mj^ previous reinark applies about Hawaiian waters gen-
erally not being subject to mining on a large scale. I do not recall
just what was done. I had no apprehension from that standpoint.
99. Q. Paragraph g (3) states that the Navy will "operate gates
through nets.'' Was this commitment lived up to by the Navy prior
to December 7, 194:1?
A. I believe it was.
100. Q. Paragraph g (4) states that the Navy will "conduct ship-
ping through channels in mine fields or obstructions." Was this com-
mitment lived up to 23rior to December 7, 1941?
A. To the best of my recollection, it was.
The court then, at 12 : 25 p. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at w^hicn
time it reconvened.
Present :
All tlie members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to
the inquiry and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
101. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 6 before this court, which
is "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", and ask you to read
from Section 3, Article 30, sub-])aragraph "d".
A. Before reading that, may I refer to my last question? I made
a pencil note when I had passed a previous question on the strength
of forces and their sufficiency. This question again refers to coastal
zones. I would like to state, in answer to a previous question, that
in my opinion there were not sufficient forces for the coastal work
in the Hawaiian Islands. To remedy this defect and as a compromise,
of course, it would be necessary to draw on the Pacific Fleet, and to
that extent the Pacific Fleet would be just so much under the original
qualification. I wanted to get that into the record. [S8] Sec-
tion 3 refers to the categories of defense and requirements and means
to be provided. (Reading) "Category D — Coastal frontiers that
may be subject to major attack, tinder this category, the coastal
defense areas sliould, in general, be provided with the means of de-
fense, both Arm}^ and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations
preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will
generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more ex-
tensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than Category C, will be re-
quired. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be estab-
lished. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense
of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized;
general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate
prompt reinforcement of the frontiers ; and plans should be developed
for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of opera-
tions. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made
for use of the GHQ air force."
102. Q. On December 7, 1941, do you know what category of defense
was in effect on the island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The article just read was the article prescribed for Oahu.
103. Q. Do you know when it had been put in effect?
A. Well, it was stated in WPL 46. As I recall that, a category
"D" was the category prescribed, which means a category toward
which one works. I would say it was in effect at that time.
104. Q, Do you know what plans were in effect on and before
December 7, 1941, for the use of the General Headquarters Air Force
for long-range reconnaissance in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?
A. Can you define to me just what you mean by the General Head-
quarters airplanes?
105. Q. I mean by General Headqualrters aircraft, the General
Headquarters aircraft that are referred to in Article 31, sub-para-
graph "d", which you have just read.
A. I will speak from recollection on that. My remembrance is
that the GHQ Air Force is the air force which is handled directly
from Washington and which may be sent from one location to an-
other to augment or strengthen a local area, but I'm not sure of this
and would have to refresh on it. That is my remembrance. There
have been some recent articles about the GHQ, and I am not certain
as to just what is meant, but I think it is a mobile force subject to
direct orders from the War Department.
106. Q. Admiral, I refer you again to Exhibit 6 and ask you to
read from Chapter 2, Article 9.
A. The heading of the article is
Deteemination of the Method of Coordination
a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual"
cooperation.
[39] b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the
exercise of unity of command in tlie following cases :
(1) When ordered by the President; or
(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy ; or
(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation
requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service
that shall exercise such command.
107. Q. Could you, as Chief of Naval Operations, with mutual
agreement with the Chief of Staff of the Army have placed unity of
command in effect in Hawaii ?
A. We could arrange for such, and subject to the approval of the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, put it into effect.
Paragraph 2 states, "When provided for in joint agreements be-
tween the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy."
108. Q. Adverting to paragraph 9b (3), which states, "When com-
manders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires
tlie exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service
that shall exercise such command." Could Admiral Kimmel, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with
the Commanding General of the 9th Corps Area, have placed unity
of command in effect in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?
A. They could had they agreed to do so.
109. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph, which I have just read,
could Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the 14th Naval District,
in mutual agreement with the Commander of the 9th Corps Area,
have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 41
A. I couldn't answer that question 100%.
110. Q. I will correct the last two questions to read, instead of
Commander of the 9th Corps Area, Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department?
A. I don't know whether he could have done it independent of
Admiral Kimmel's O. K, As I understand it, he was a task force
under the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. My guess would
be that he could, but I would hesitate to say so, not Knowing their
relationships with regard to such matters.
111. Q. Admiral, I again refer you to Exhibit 4, which is WPL-46
and has been introduced in evidence before this court for the purpose
of reading such extracts as may be pertinent to the record. I ask
you to read therefrom a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations,
dated July 1, 1941.
A. ( Reading:) "Navy Department, Office of the Chief of
[40] Naval Operations, Washington. Op-12B-McC/(SC)A16-
(R-5) Serial 071912, Secret, July 1, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Distribution List for WPL 46.
Subject : The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.
Reference: (a) GO No. 142.
(b) GO No. 143.
(c) WPL-46.
1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312
of WPL-46 are hereby established.
2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex
I, Appendix I, WPL-46.
3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and
Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in
accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of
General Order No. 142 are suspended.
4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General
Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and
Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders,
new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations,
rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval
Local Defense Forces.
5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional
duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated :
Commandant, 3rd Naval District — Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal
Frontier ;
Commandant, 6th Naval District — Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Fron-
tier;
Commandant, 10th Naval District — Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal
Frontier ;
Commandant, 15th Naval District — Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fron-
tier;
[^i] Commandant, 12th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Southern Naval
Frontier ;
Commandant, 13th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Fron-
tier;
Commandant, 14th Naval District — Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fron-
tier;
Commandant, 16th Naval District — Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal
Frontier.
6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the
commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of
the Naval Coastal Frontiers remains in a SECRET classification. Correspond-
ence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its
nature.
7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental
limits of the United States is authorized.
/s/ H. R. Stakk.
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
made the following statement: May there be read into the record
so much of the War Plan as was put in effect? It is this very direc-
tive, to wit : Chapter 2, Part 3, Section 4.
112. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 4, Part 3, Section 4, and
ask you to read into the record Articles 3241, 3242, and 3245, sub-
paragraphs "a" and "b".
A. (Reading)
Section 4. Command Relations.
3241. In order to provide for imity of command of task groups of the U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET and of tlie PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTH-
ERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in tlie execution of tasliS requiring
mutual support, the following provisions shall apply :
a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual
status as follows :
[42] 1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLI]ET, in conuuand of task groups of
that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.
b. The commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require
the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, tem-
porarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Fron-
tier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking
temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks
assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief
of Naval Operations.
1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task
groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their re-
spective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the
provisions of this paragraph are in effect.
3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command rela-
tions of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander,
HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances
under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution
of tasks requiring mutvial support, but appl.v in all circumstances.
3245a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily, to
the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.
b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by
the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
[4'3] 113. Q. Admiral, in addition to official or written or printed
instructions, regulations, war plans, joint agreements, and orders which
have been introduced as exhibits before this court, had you, as Chief
of Naval Operations, issued either orall}^ or by personal letters any
instructions to the Commander-in-Chief from time to time during the
period of six months preceding December 7, 1941 ?
A. I carried on with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
personal correspondence, which is a good deal of a Navy custom, but
to the best of my recollection, orders were given through official corre-
spondence or dispatch, and my personal correspondence was informa-
tory and for the purpose of background and explanation.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 43
114. Q. The judge advocate understands, then, from your answer
that none of these personal letters modified or changed the official writ-
ten or printed instructions, war plans, directives, orders, or joint agree-
ments ?
A. To the best of mj^ belief, they did not modify any official orders.
There mnj have been amplification of official orders — correspondence
of mutual interest to both of us — but I do not recall modifying any
official order by an unofficial letter.
115. Q. Do you have a record of such letters in case they are re-
quired before this court?
A. Yes, I do.
116. Q. Do 3'ou remember the approximate date of the executive
order freezing Japanese assets in the United States ?
A. It was in the early summer, as I recall. I think in July, 1941.
llT. Q. Can you recall if the Navy Department had been consulted
as to its ability to keep in step with this international move ?
A. My remembrance of that event is that while we knew of it, we
were not particularly consulted, it being a matter the ramifications of
which the department had no organization to study. It was more eco-
nomic than otherwise, and as I recall, it was put in effect without
asking us whether we objected or not. The outstanding thing in my
memor}' as regards my stand so far as the Navy Department is con-
cerned, with reference to pressure on Japan, was in reference to
petroleum — was in reference to oil, I made it known to the State
Department in no uncertain terms that in my opinion if Japan's oil
were shut off, she would go to war. I do not mean necessarily with
us, but I mean if her economic life had been choked and throttled by
inability to get to oil, she would go soinewhere and take it, and I stated
if I were a Jap, I would. I did state in that connection that unless
we were prepared for war — I do not mean prepared in the sense of
complete readiness for war, but unless we were ready to [M]
accept a war risk, we should not take measures which would cut oil
down to the Japanese below that needed for what might be called their
normal peace time needs for their industry and their ships. I never
waivered one inch on that stand.
118. Q. Do you recall any military or diplomatic action by Japan
between the date of the executive order, July 26, 1941, and October
16, 1941, which caused you to believe that war between the United
States and Japan was becoming more imminent than it had been as
of the time of the freezing of Japanese assets ?
A. I note that in your question you used the term "war between the
United States and Japan." I would like to invite attention to the
fact that in my previous answer I indicated that while Japan might
make an aggressive movement under certain circumstances, it need not
be confined to the United States or might not even include the United
States. The situation in the Far East during that particular period
I do not recall. Sometimes it was a little bit brighter, and sometimes
it dropped, but on the date you mentioned, October 16, I recall that
a cabinet change took place in Japan, which, in my opinion, indicated
that relations with the United States were no better and perhaps indi-
cated a more aggressive attitude by Japan. I include as possible
objects of this aggressive attitude, the N. E. I., Britain, China, and
the United States."
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
119. Q. Did you write any letters, notes, or memoranda to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, between July 26, 1941, and October 16,
1941, setting forth the views of the Navy Department on the proba-
bility of war between the United States and Japan ?
A. May I refer to my letters to Admiral Kimmel?
120. Q. I just want to know whether you did, as a general proposi-
tion?
A. I am not sure between those dates. I corresponded with Admiral
Kimmel whenever I thought it would be helpful to him or helpful to
us, but I have to check between those dates. That was when ?
121. Q. July 26, 1941, and October 16, 1941?
A. I wrote Admiral Kimmel on August 2, I think. I will be per-
fectly glad to have Admiral Kimmel check that letter, if he has a copy
of it, so as to agree with me that the letter has no particular bearing
on the subject under discussion. On August 21 1 again wrote Admiral
Kimmel, which again, I would say, does not bear on the particular
question of our relations with Japan. It is more personnel and mate-
rial. I wrote again on August 23. This is a long leter — 21 pages —
the bulk of it being devoted to specific answers to material questions
which Admiral Kimmel had asked me. There is some discussion
of Russian war matters, but I think of no particular enlightenment on
the question. I have [^5] no objection to placing this letter
in the file if desired. I again wrote on the 29th of August. There
are matters of material and ships. There is also a paragraph in that
letter regarding a visit to me from Admiral Nomura, the Japanese
Ambassador.
[46] Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U.
S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
A letter dated August 28, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was sub-
mitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge
advocate offered in evidence, for the purpose of reading such extracts
into the record as might be pertinent to the inquiry.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E, Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), suggested that the entire letter should be entered as an
exhibit, rather than reading extracts therefrom.
The judge advocate replied that the entire letter had been offered
in evidence, but that only such extracts as he considered pertinent to
the inquiry would be read by the witness in response to the questions
of the judge advocate.
The letter dated August 28, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was
received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 11," for reference, de-
scription appended.
122. Q. Please read from Exhibit 11, the matter relating to the
visit of Admiral Nomura.
A. I will read from the letter extracts, not confining myself to that
one paragraph. (Reading:)
With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is the
Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only
intimate to you that spme very strong messages have Jbeen sent to them, but just
what they are going to do, I don't know.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 45
Another paragraph. (Keading:)
I told one of their statesmen this morning I felt another move such as the
one in- Thailand would go a long way toward destroying for the American public
what good will still remains. As you know, I have had some extremely frank
talks with them. I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific,
but I wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. There
is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia.
123. Q. Do you have something in the letter of August 23, 1941 ?
A. Yes.
[i?] A letter dated August 23, 1941, from Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), was submitted to the interested parties and to the court,
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of read-
ing therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the inquiry, to be
marked "EXHIBIT 12."
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret) , stated that he suggested that the entire letter be entered
in the record as an exhibit, rather than that extracts therefrom be read.
The judge advocate replied that the entire letter had been offered
in evidence, but that he was asking the witness to read only such ex-
tracts as were considered by the judge advocate to be pertinent to the
inquiry.
The witness stated that he withdrew his answer regarding the letter
of August 23, 1941.
The judge advocate, with the permission of the court, withdrew the
proposed Exhibit 12, and a letter dated September 23, 1941, from Ad-
miral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted' to the interested parties
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence, for
the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as
might be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
12", for reference, description appended.
124. Q. Will you read from the exhibit extracts which are respon-
sive to the question ?
A. (Reading:)
Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked about an hour.
He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope. There is
not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before, but whether I can this
time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever.
If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow
more tense. I have talked with Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try.
He keeps me pretty well informed, and if there is anything of moment I will, of
course, hasten to let you know.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), stated that he suggested again that the entire letter be
read, rather than extracts therefrom.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not consider it necessary to read the entire letter.
[4^] The court announced that only the pertinent extracts of the
letters just read by the witness would be read into the record at this
time.
The witness continued his answer, as follows : I have covered up
until 16 October, I think. I will check these letters more carefully to
see if there is anything more in there which throws useful light.
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
125. Q. Sir, I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated
under official seal, of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to
the Commander-in-Chief, of the Pacific Fleet, and other addressees,
dated 16 October 1911, date time group 16220;^ If you recognize this
document, please state as what you identify it.
A. I identify it as the dispatch from the Navy Department, from
the Chief of Naval Operations, to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
The photostatic copy of the dispatch, duly authenticated under
official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941,
date time group 162203, was submitted to the interested parties and to
the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked
"EXHIBIT 13."
126. Q. Please read this document to the court.
The witness read "EXHIBIT 13" to the court.
127. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that the dispatch was re-
leased by Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
Did you authorize the release ?
A. I did. That w^as not an unusual procedure, because we went over
these dispatches. J'inal form might have a number of interlineations
in my own handwriting, the note, "HRS O. K." Thereafter they
would be turned over, probably to Admiral Ingersoll, by my Flag
Secretary, and he would release it, knowing that he had my full
approval.
128. Q. In this dispatch there is noted what appear to be inter-
lineations or changes in the original wording of the dispatch. In
whose handwriting are those changes made ?
A. It looks like — I can't identify it. It is too illegible.
129. Q. What special circumstances prompted your sending this
dispatch on 16 October 1941 to your Commanders-in-Chief?
A. The special event prompting it was the event which the dispatch
related; namely, the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, which the
dispatch states, which did in our opinion create a grave situation.
[4^] 130. Q. Was the resignation of the Japanese cabinet then
the principal information upon which you sent this dispatch ?
A. I would say it precipitated the dispatch. There may have been
other things in the back of our heads at that time that made the dis-
patch advisable. I do not recall just what else we had in mind. The
event was the primary reason for the dispatch.
131. Q. Will you read the next to the last sentence of this dispatch?
A. (Reading:)
In view of these possibilities you will take clue precautions including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute
provocative action against .Japan.
132. Q. State what deployments were contemplated by the Chief of
Naval Operations in this directive?
A. We had general thought on the security, of course, of tlie ships
in port and at sea, and of the Islands ; and I may say that Admiral
Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, reported what he
had done, and I placed an O. K. on it. It seemed to us that it was
very satisfactory. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel reported what he
had done in official correspondence I do not recall. I know that he
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 47
did in personal correspondence, and in personal correspondence I
O. K.'d it. I have an extract here from that letter — from Admiral
Kimmel's letter — which I O. K.'d.
A letter from Kear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ket) ,
to Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, dated October 22, 1941, was
submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge
advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom
such extracts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
14" for reference, description appended.
The witness read the following extracts from "EXHIBIT 14" :
Am in receipt of your dispatches tlie cliange in tlie Japanese cabinet. We made
the following dispositions :
Continued to maintain the patrol of the two submarines at Midway.
Dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway.
Dispatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.
Dispatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to John.ston and Wake with addi-
tional marhies, ammunition, and stores.
[50] The CURTIS arrives at WAKE on 21 October with gas, lube oil, and
bombs.
Prepared to send G patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the 6 at
Midway from Pearl Harbor.
Dispatched additional marines to Palmyra.
Placed Admiral Pye with the ships making a health cruise on 12 hours' notice
after 20 Octobei*.
Had submarine prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.
Put additional security measures in effect in the areas outside Pearl Harbor.
Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when
she is going for an overhaul to Puget Sound, and deferred final decision until
that time.
133. Q. I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under
official seal, of a secret dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations
to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific and other addressees, dated 24
November 1941, date time group 242005. If you recognize this, please
state as what you identify it.
A. Yes, I recognize this dispatch as dispatch from Chief of Naval
Operations to CinCPac, CinCAsiatic, Comll, Coml2, Coml3, Coml5,
under date of November 24, 1941.
The copy of the dispatch, secret, duly authenticated under official
seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, and other addressees, dated 24 November 1941, date time group
242005, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and
by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 15".
134. Q. Please read the document to the court.
The witness read the document, Exhibit 15, to the court.
135. Q. Admiral, did you authorize the release of this dispatch?
A. I did.
136. Q. What special circumstances prompted you sending it ?
A. The special circumstances are embodied in the dispatch — pri-
marily, that it looked less and less as though favorable outcome of the
negotiations with Japan would be forthcoming. It had been over a
month since I had sent war [51] information to the fleet, and
in my opinion the situation was deteriorating. In addition, the Japs
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were moving forces into Formosa, and to the southard. You will note
if you leave out the words in that dispatch "in any direction", that it
would read, "a surprise, aggressive movement, including an attack on
the Phillippines or Guam is a possibility". I remarked that while
that phrase "including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a pos-
sibility" did not exclude an attack in another direction, but I thought
it ought to be included, and I personally wrote into the dispatch the
words "in any direction", which I intended would convey to the re-
cipient that it might come in any direction, and particularly did I have
the Hawaiian Islands in thought, and so remarked when I wrote it.
[52] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Examined by the court :
137. Q. Why did you specifically mention the Phillippines and
Guam, and specifically leave out the Hawaiian Islands?
A. Because the weight of evidence, by movements of which we were
cognizant at that time, showed a southern movement into Formosa
and on to the southern. We knew that; is was definite, and the
■( dispatch)- information came in that way. -(Now that, m itaolfj di4
ftot include the Hawaiian lolanda ; *fe didn't include them bccauao it
was ftet mentioned, ft»d: feeling tha* we should fee eft guard e^ tihe
poaoibility ol ftft attack coming from ft«y direction^ i wrote these
wordg iftte that dispatch myself. I remember it very distinctly.)
[Notation in margin] "See correction page 323."
Examined by the judge advocate :
138. Q. Do you consider that this dispatch, Exhibit 15, conveyed
the full import of the international developments as you knew them
on November 24, 1941 ?
A. It was a very condensed picture. I didn't pass, for example,
•(eft mentioning) or mention the details of the movements other than
to indicate them because, as I recall, they were known to both the
commander-in-chief, Atlantic^ Asiatic and the commander-in-chief,
Pacific. I thought it was a reasonably accurate picture as I saw it.
You will note that I used the word "possibility". I didn't use a strong-
er term.
139. Q. In order to make clear for the record I shall ask you, what
movements of Japanese naval and military forces did you refer to in
this dispatch ?
A. I would have to refresh from the records on that. They were,
as I recall, expeditionary forces, the details of which are a matter of
record.
140. Q. You speak of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direc-
tion. What did you mean by this term "surprise, aggressive move-
ment"?
A. The Japanese had announced no intention as to where this
movement would strike. Obviously, from her past history, what she
did was likely to be a surprise. It could hardly be assumed to be
other than for aggressive purposes and we assumed that it was to be
a surprise, aggressive movement. As I recall, my own thoughts were
that its most probable objective was the Kra Peninsula, which subse-
quently turned out to be one of the objectives.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 49
141. Q. What action did you expect the commander-in-chief of the
Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, now
before the court ?
A. It was largely informatory. He had previously taken measures
regarding which testimony has been given, which I considered appro-
priate. I considered that if in his judgment, with what he had been
doing in the course of the month, he thought any additional tightening
up as necessary [53] he would do it. I was trying to acquaint
him with the picture as I saw it and that there was a possibility of a
surprise attack. I left that to his good judgment. And the same
way in the Far East; I sent no specific instructions. It was not
my general habit to do so.
142. Q. The language of the dispatch is, and I quote : "A surprise,
aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility". "Was your
information at the time sucli as would have warranted your using
language indicating that the aggressive movement was stronger than
a possibility ?
A. I didn't feel — I wasn't ready to go to an all-out at that time.
Admiral Kimmel was confronted with problems, and very difficult
problems, of training. He was making a so-called health cruise which
I had initiated. As I recall, they were originated with Admiral Rich-
ardson and Admiral Kimmel, which I was not yet ready to interrupt.
I didn't feel at that time that he was ready needed to start using
everything he had on a war basis, and the word "possibility" was
used advisedly, though I knew the situation was certainly no better,
and if anything, deteriorating.
143. Q. Did you have any other information from any source re-
garding Japan which prompted the sending of this dispatch.
Exhibit 15?
A. That is a broad question.
144. Q. Tliat prompted your sending the dispatch, that is.
A. Not that I recall. Certainly the main-spring was the thought
that the negotiations were deteriorating. I might state that Mr. Hull
sometimes thought they might go through; sometimes he was pessi-
mistic. He didn't give up hope until the last. He was striving as
hard as he could. He knew how I felt about it ; he knew how General
Marshall felt about it ; and even though the chances were slender, he
held on to whatever chance there was in the hope of arriving at a
solution with the Japs which would prevent, or at least delay, war
with Japan.
145. Admiral, in both your dispatches of October 16, 1941, and
November 24, 1941, you speak of a possible attack on the United States,
or territory belonging thereto.
A. Yes.
146. Q. Do you recall whether you felt at the time an attack on Pearl
Harbor was a possibility on this later date, November 24, 1941?
A. Yes, I thought it was a possibility. That was the reason that I
wrote the words "in any direction". I don't Imow that they were
necessary as regards a possibility. But having used the words "Philip-
pines or Guam", I thought it very desirable to convey, so far as I could,
the fact that the possibility was that the Jap would strike anywhere,
if he struck.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 5
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[54.] 147. Q. I note that Exhibit 15 was released by Admiral
Ingersoll. Does this bear your authorization?
A. Yes.
148. Q. After directing the release of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, did
you amplify it by any letters or notes or memorandum to the com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. Which one is that ? November 24th ?
149. Q. That is November 24th, yes.
A. Yes, I did. Yes, I have the letter of the 25th.
A letter dated November 25, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral
Kimmel, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and
by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 16".
150. Q. Will you please read the letter, Exhibit 16?
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 16.
151. Q. Were there any other communications from you to Admiral
Kimmel ?
A. The letter of the 25th of November is the last copy of a letter to
Admiral Kimmel of which I have record and think there was no
other letter.
152. Q. Admiral, I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated
under ofHcial seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated No-
vember 27, 1941, date time group 273337. Do you identify this docu-
ment as such ?
A. I recognize it as such.
153. Q. Do you identify it as a dispatch released from your office?
A. Yes.
The certified, photostatic copy of secret dispatch dated November 27,
1941, date time group 273337, was ubmitted to the interested parties
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 17".
154. Q. Please read the dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 17.
[SS] 155. Q. It is noted that this dispatch. Exhibit 17, bears a
date three days later than Exhibit 15, which is your dispatch of
November 24, 1941. What additional information had you received
between November 24 and November 27, 1941, that prompted your
sending Exhibit 17?
A. Negotiations with Japan had come to an impasse; they were
stopped. The long months of endeavor to arrive at a solution had
brought us nowhere except a complete inability to agree. The situa-
tion looked very critical. It looked like a certain break was to occur.
If you want me to amplify that, I can.
156. Q. The answer is yours, sir.
A. I have answered it, with the additional information which
l)rompted it. I may say with regard to that disi^atch that, as you
can readily imagine, I pondered a great deal over the expression "this
is a war warning", with my principal advisers, and with Col. Knox.
We went into the picture as we saw it, and we thought there was
grave danger of Japan striking somewhere and we wanted the outlying
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 51
stations to know and we used language which we thought was strong
eiiougli to indicate to them that Japan was going to strike.
157. Q. It is noted that in two previous dispatches, namely, the
one of October 16, 1941, and the one of November 21, 1941, the dis-
patch expresses Japanese aggressive actions being a possibility. In
this dispatch of November 27, 1941, you characterize the Japanese
aggressive action as being expected. Was this a deliberate choice of
words ?
A. It was. As I have previously testified, we had not gone stronger
than '"possibility" in previous dispatches. This is the first dispatch
where I definitely inclicated war as likely to take place at any time,
and as I stated, we pondered almost an entire forenoon on that phrase,
whether it was strong enough, whether it would convey what w^e felt,
whether it was too strong. We felt that we must be prepared.
158. Q. Did you consider war between the Japanese and the United
States more imminent on tlie 27th of November than vou did on the
24th of November, 1941? "
A. Yes.
159. Q. I note that the dispatch of November 27, 1941, fails to
mention Guam as a possible objective of the Japanese attack, as did
the dispatch of November 24, 1941. Did you intentionally omit Guam
from this dispatch of November 27, 1941, as a possible objective?
A. Not as I recall. We expected Guam to be attacked and fall
almost immediately, I do not recall just why it wasn't included.
I attach no serious importance to the omission.
[S6] 160. Q. Your dispatch of November 24, 1941, indicated
the possibility of a Japanese aggressive movement in any direction.
It is noted in the dispatch of November 27, 1941, that certain Japanese
possible actions are indicated but you omitted the words ''in any direc-
tion" from your dispatch of November 27, 1941. Was this done
advisedly ?
A. I do not recall. We had previously stated "in any direction",
and there was nothing to indicate that that still did not hold. I re-
iterated what seemed to us as the most probable objectives in this
dispatch from the definite information we had, where the blow might
come. We couldn't forecast. Previouslv having put in "in any direc-
tion", I think it still held.
161. Q. What was your information of a favorable outcome of
negotiatio'.s with Japan on November 27, 1941, as contrasted with your
information on November 24, 1941?
A. They were still under way on November 24th. As long as we
coidd keep them going, there w^as some hope. I might add, we were
struggling to keep them going. On November 27th, they ceased.
162. Q. In your dispatch of October 16, 1941, you directed the
commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet to take due precautions, in-
cluding such preparatory deployments that will not constitute provoc-
ative action. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you directed
addressees to execute an appropriate defense de]:)]oyment pre])aratory
to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Now, what additional
dispositions of the forces assigned the commander-in-chief of the
Pacific Fleet were intended by this last directive that were different
from the deployments that you had ordered in your dispatch of
October 16, 1941, which was more than a month previous?
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Keeping in mind the words "war warning", you asked me what
I anticipated as a result of the dispatch, I would assume full security
measures, not only for ships in port but for ships at sea; measures
regarding the safety of Pearl Harbor ; anti-submarine measures ; dis-
tant reconnaissance ; and that the Army would do its utmost to carry
out its obligations to protect Pearl Harbor, certainly including a con-
dition of readiness of its aircraft and the full manning of such devices
as it had for locating trouble coming in from the sea, with watches to
insure any information they got would be sent to those who needed to
have it; and that they should be fully alive to the possibility of war,
and that watches would be placed on such a basis.
163. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you set out as a
possible objective of the Japanese, the Philippines. I do not see any
other reference to United States territory or objectives. Did you
intentionally omit any reference to any other United States territorial
objectives ?
A. I mentioned the Philippines because of the primary objectives,
other than Guam perhaps, I considered the Philippines one of their
most likely objectives for the [57] reason that if Japan were
going to make an attack to the southern — and to which the evidence
all pointed — the Philippines lay squarely on her flank and called for
a major attack on her part to take them, in my opinion. Whether
she would or not, I could not tell, but with our continually increasing
our strength on the Philippines, with our continuing our support of
China, with our employing continued increasing economic pressure
against her, our relations were not good and we stood, in a measure,
so far as her work to the southern, as a thorn in her side continually
getting stronger. Roughly and briefly, those are some of the reasons,
plus the material evidence at hand which was available to both the
commander-in-chief. Pacific, and the commander-in-chief, Asiatic,
which indicated that the Philippines was a probable and logical point
of attack and surprise.
164. Q. The point I am trying to make. Admiral, is that in previous
dispatches, namely those of October 16, 1941, and November 24, 1941,
other objectives of United States territory were mentioned, and in
the one of November 27, 1941, you have omitted them all with the
exception of the Philippines. Had you considered that this might
confuse an addressee of other messages as to possible Japanese objec-
tives ?
A. Did you go back to 24 November ?
With the court's permission, the judge advocate withdrew the
question.
The court then, at 4 : 05 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., August
8, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 53
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAYY COUET OF INaUIKY
TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944.
[68] FouETH Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U- S. Navy (Eet.), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolplius Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U, S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yoeman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his
counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) , interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the third day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The procedings following directly hereafter. Page 58-A, have,
by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited
with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[59] The court was cleared.
The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The
court announced that it would hear the statement of the interested
party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret).
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), continued his statement as follows: On 28 July re-
presentation was made to the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry
that the dispatches which were the basis of this testimony should
be introduced before the court. On August 1, my counsel, with a
copy of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy dated December 7,
1943, called on the Director of Naval Communications with the judge
advocate of the Court of Inquiry and requested permission to see the
confidential files. This permission was refused on the ground that the
Director of Naval Communications would not release them without a
statement as to individual numbers and contents, which was impossible
to supply; whereupon my counsel called on the Director of Naval
Intelligence and went with the Director of Naval Intelligence to the
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Home, who stated that a
letter should be addressed to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the
release of these dispatches. A letter was written by the judge advocate
of the Court of Inquiry on 1 August, and delivered to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy, w^ho was designated by Admiral Home
as the proper officer to process the request. On Friday, 4 August,
upon inquiry of the Judge Advocate General, informal information
was given that the letter had been misplaced in the office of the Sec-
retary of the Navy. On 8 August, yesterday, the judge advocate of
the Court of Inquiry informed me that the letter had been returned
to him with the request that the classification be changed from
SECKET to TOP SECKET. Both the judge advocate and my
counsel have done all within their power to have this information
available to the court. My counsel feel it imperative that this infor-
mation be available before the conclusion of the cross-examination
of Admiral Stark.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret) , requested permission of the court to add other data which
he had obtained from the testimony given before Admiral Hart.
The court announced that such permission was not granted.
The judge advocate made the following reply: The factual situa-
tion with regard to requests for permission to examine the records of
the Navy Department are correct — that in compliance with Admiral
Kimmel's request, the judge advocate did submit on 1 August an official
letter to the Secretary of the Navy in which he requested that the in-
formation desired by Admiral Kimmel be made available to the judge
[60'] advocate. This was done for the reason that the Acting
Director of Naval Communications declined to permit access to the
files of the Director of Naval Communications without first being
informed specifically of the dispatches or correspondence that was
desired. The judge advocate has checked up daily since that time with
the office of the Judge Advocate General, who was designated by the
Chief of Naval Operations to process his request for this information,
and it was not until this morning at about 0900 that the letter came
back from the Secretary of the Nav3^ The judge advocate immediat-
ely sat down and wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in
which he requested, in conformance with the Secretary's directive,
that the files of the Director of Naval Communications be made avail-
able to Captain R. A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, for the purpose of obtain-
ing the information which the interested i^arty, Admiral Kimmel,
requested. I sent Lieutenant (junior grade) Spavor, of my office,
to the Chief of Naval Operations office with that letter just before
entering the court this morning.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the adjournment was taken* on Monday, August 7, 1941,
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
With the permission of the court, the witness made the following
statement prior to his further examination :
I request to lay before the court some considerations concerning my personal
letters.
I corresponded with several officers in high places and the general purpose was
informatory — keeping in touch. I myself wrote frankly and since the letters
were confidentially personal! paid little attention to discretion.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 55
I don't desire to liold buck from those personal letters anything whatever
which is really pertinent to this In(|nir.\. There is contained in them, however,
some passages which certainly should not be disclosed. There are passages con-
cerning foreign nations, other than Japan, and perhaps foreign officials, which
are not pertinent to this Inquiry. On the other hand, certain disclosures could
easily become very inimical to the country's future interest.
It is of course for the court to .iudge how those letters are to be used. If they
are to become a part of the court's records. I can't too strongly urge that those
passages be deleted. In fact, I must go farther and ask that I myself be absolved
from all responsibility if those deletions are not made. I am responsible for
having written them, representing what I thought at the time, but I can't share
the responsibility for their disclousure
One thing more: The letters contain a few criticisms [Gl] of individuals
and of non-naval organizations which, also, are not pertinent to this Inquiry.
I request, as a matter of personal privilege, that those passages also be deleted
from any letters which may be made a pail of the court's records.
I request a ruling at the court's earliest convenience.
(The foregoing statement was read by the witness.)
The judge advocate st;Ued that the method suggested in the state-
ment of the witness was in accordance with the policy of the judge
advocate to introduce only such parts of letters as might pertain to
the subject matter of the Inquiry.
The court made the following statement: If the letters re-
ferred to are introduced in accordance with the statement -of
the judge advocate, that is, only pertinent parts are read into the
record — pertinent to this investigation — then if any other parts
are desired by anybody, then the court will at that time decide
whether or not they will be allowed in the record.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, inquired
of the court as to whether or not the complete letters would in any way
be attached to the record.
The court announced that this question would be decided as it came
before the court in the instances involved.
Examined by the judge advocate:
165. Q. At the time of releasing the dispatch of 27 November 1941,
which is "EXHIBIT 17" before this court, had you considered any
further action, such as mobilization?
A. I considered the Navy at that time practically mobilized. As I
recall, we had not a ship left on the Navy's list which could be useful
which had not been placed in commission. To all intents and purposes,
I believe we were fully mobilized.
166. Q. Did you consider any further action such as affecting unity
of command in the Hawaiian area?
A. I don't recall whether or not at that particular time we went
over the question of unity of command in the Hawaiian area. I have
already testified to that subject in general terms.
167. Q. Were you familiar with the information that was being
made public, in the newspapers and radio broadcasts about 27 Novem-
ber 1941, relative to the progress of negotiations with the Japanese
diplomatic officers then in Washington?
A. Generally
168. Q. What was this information?
A. Generally, I did not listen to all the broadcasts [62] nor
read all the papers — and on your next question, "What was the infor-
mation?"— I don't recall and would have to refreshen on reading the
56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
papers at that time, of those dates. I would say the best evidence
would be to introduce the papers. I was relying primarily on informa-
tion which I had from sources available to me, and which I considered
responsible information.
169. Q. Do I understand that it is your desire to state to the court
now that you have no present recollection of what information was
being given to the public by newspapers and broadcasts on the subject
of the progress of negotiations with the Japanese diplomatic repre-
sentatives in Washington ?
A. After going on three years, I certainly would hesitate to state
categorically what was then being written and said in the newspapers.
170. Q. In your dispatch of 27 November 1941, you employed the
words, "Negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have stopped." Did these words express the factual situation
as you knew it at that time ?
A. They did.
171. Q. Can you state what action you expected the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of your dispatch of
27 November 1941?
A. Very briefly, I expected fully readiness measures ashore and
afloat, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures. I as-
sumed that all measures with the Army, particularly those which had
been previously agreed upon for emergency, would be implemented,
and which are a matter of record. I think those could be recited
without reference to hindsight.
172. Q. Did you require the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet to make any report to you of the action that he had taken in
response to your dispatch of 27 November 1941 ?
A. I did not. He was on the spot and had detail beyond what was
available to me. I had every confidence in him, and I left the matter
entirely to him, after giving him a war warning, and informing him
that an aggressive move by Japan was expected in the next few days.
173. Q. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated
under official seal, of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, dated 26 November 1941, date
time group 270038. If you recognize this dispatch, please state as
Avhat you identify it.
A. Yes, I identify it as a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
The photostatic copy of the dispatch, duly authenticated under
official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 26, [6S] 1941, date
time group 270038, was submitted to the interested parties and to the
court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked
"EXHIBIT 18."
174. Q. Please read the dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch, "EXHIBIT 18."
175. Q. Adverting to "EXHIBIT 18" which has just been read,
in executing the directive to station twenty-five pursuit planes at
Wake, what means of transporting these planes to that area was
indicated in the dispatch ?
A. The dispatch was not a directive of execution. It distinctly
puts up a proposition and states, "Provided you consider it feasible
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 57
and desirable." And furthermore, it requests that after conference
with the Commanding General, the Department be advised.
176. Q. What surface units would you estimate would be required
to escort the carrier on such a mission, if she were sent under the con-
ditions as you knew them at that time ?
A. I should say cruisers and destroyers.
177. Q. What prompted the directive to transfer these pursuit
plants to Wake at this time ?
A. This was one of many subjects under constant study with a view
to strengthening our position in the Central Pacific, covering forces
in those areas, strengthening Hawaii. It had been in the mill, as I
recall, some days, and it was more or less of a routine procedure which
was going on.
178. Q. In your dispatch of 24 November 1941, you stated in sub-
stance, "The situation indicates a Japanese surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction." Did you at the time of releasing this dispatch
of 26 November 1941, consider that the carrier and escorting force were
running any hazards to themselves in carrying out a movement to
deliver planes to Wake ?
A. Again I would point out that the movement was not directed.
We were asking CinCPac's advice. Were it to be made, the usual
hazards of war would be accepted, if war were suddenly to arrive. As
regards the dispatch of the 24th, I again invite attention to the fact
that we said such a movement was a possibility.
179. Q. Does that complete your answer ?
A. Yes.
[64] 180. Q. At the time of releasing this dispatch of 26 Novem-
ber, 1941, had it occurred to you that this action of the Commander-
in-Chief in sending a carrier to Wake might or might not influence
his views of the imminence of an outbreak of war?
A. May I ask if you mean by that, the mere fact that I brought it
up might indicate that it would influence previous messages in which
I had indicated an outbreak of war? I don't just understand the
question. I repeat, he was not directed to do it. The arrangement
which could be made was made known to him, in an area which, of
cours'e, was vital to him. We told him what could be done. We
asked his advice as to whether or not it should be done, after con-
ference with his Army opposite.
181. Q. I shall rephrase the question. At the time of releasing this
dispatch of 26 November 1941, had it occurred to you that the sug-
gestion in your dispatch of 26 November 1941, relative to sending a
carrier to Wake, might or might not influence the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific's estimate of the imminence of an outbreak of war?
A. To the best of my recollection that did not cross my mind.
182. Q. In your dispatch of 24 November 1941, you stated in sub-
stance, "The situation indicates, in our opinion, a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction." I ask you with relation to your dispatch
of 26 November 1941, in which you suggested sending a carrier to Wake
with her escort, would this carrier and her escort, under the circum-
stances as you knew them, be running any extraordinary hazard ?
A. I wouldn't say so. The task force would have been a fast one,
ostensibly on guard against surprise, and then and ever since then
there are matters besides safety to be considered. We figured that if
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
anything these movements were more or less in conformance with
strengthening against the danger threatening in that ui'ea.
183. Q. In your directive of 26 — in your suggestion of 26 November
1941, relative to sending these planes to Wake, it is noted that no
limitation of time is prescribed for delivering the planes. What were
your intentions with regard to the urgency of the delivery at this time?
A. I again — I woukl invite attention to the fact that there was not
a directive to send these planes to Wake.
At the direction of the judge advocate, the question was repeated
by the reporter.
A. We were endeavoring to strengthen covering forces in the area.
I do not recall just what time element we had in mind, if any was,
except that we were ready to go ahead if the Commander-in-Chief
in the Pacific advised us to that effect, which advice we requested
of him.
[6S] 184. Q. Had you formed any estimate of the time that
would be required for the carrier to execute the task of delivering
planes to Wake and the task force returning within supporting dis-
tance of the United States Pacific Fleet, if and when your suggestions
were executed ?
A. I do not recall the estimate. One may have been made. I simply
do not recall that feature of it.
185. Q. Did you ever cancel or modify the suggestion to send planes
to Wake?
A. I do not recall that we did. A search of the files might disclose
something, but the cancellation of this particular message I do not
recall. I also do not recall receiving a reply regarding the message.
186. Q. Can you remember whether the suggested task was ever
carried out?
A. To the best of my recollection the task was not carried out, so
far as Wake is concerned.
187. Q. I will ask you again, Admiral, remembering your sugges-
tion in the dispatch of 26 November, 1941, to send a carrier wnth planes
to Wake as still being something to be done, and that on the next day,
27 November 1941, you dispatched the message which contained the
phrase, "This is a war warning" — did you consider this situation as
you set out in your dispatch of 27 November as having any weight on
the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet's evaluation of the information
of the imminence of a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet?
A. I do not recall feeling that the message asking for his advice
about sending this increase to Wake would influence any interpretation
of my message of the 27th.
188. Q. I show you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under
official seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Com-
mander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, 1941, date time
group 290110. If you recognize this, please state as what you iden-
tify it.
A. Yes, I recognize the dispatch as one from the Chief of Naval
Operations to Pacific Naval Northern Coastal Frontier, to the Pacific
Southern Naval Coastal Frontier, and info to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific, and ComPanama Naval Coastal Area.
[66~\ Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Keserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 59
The photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a
dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of
Pacific Fleet, dated 28 November, 1941, date time group 290110, was
submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge
advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit
19," copy appended.
189. Q. Please read the dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 19.
190. Q. Did this dispatch relate entirely to matters coming under
the cognizance of the War Department?
A. Well, it is a directive from the War Department to their people,
but in directing them to take reconnaissance and other measures, it
obviously affects our operations and this message was repeated to
our people in order that they might know what the Army had sent,
and what they directed.
191. Q. This dispatch. Exhibit 19, contains the following words:
"To all practical purposes negotiations with Japan appear to be ter-
minated with only barest possibilities that Japanese government might
come back and offer to continue." Did you intend these words to
convey to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet any informa-
tion about the progress of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese
at that time?
A. I was merely repeating a dispatch to him for information which
had been sent by the Army. I did not intend to convey that. I gave
them the Army's thought and I think the statement in the dispatch
that hostile action was possible at any moment would convey, cer-
tainly, imminence of such. However, I repeat, I sent it as a matter
of information to C-in-C, Pacific, telling him what the Army had
sent out.
192. Q. What is the time group on this dispatch. Exhibit 19?
A. 290110.
193. Q. What is the time group on the dispatch of 27 November,
1941, Exhibit 17?
A. 272337.
194. Q. Approximately how much difference in time is there between
sending the dispatch of 29 November, and the one of 27 Novem-
ber, 1941 ?
A. About 26 hours.
[67] 195. Q. In your message of November 24, 1941. you used
the words "chance of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan
very doubtful." In your dispatcli of November 27, 1941, you stated,
"Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of' conditions
in the Pacific have stopped." In this message of November 28, 1941,
which you have characterized as being of an informatory nature, you
quote the War Department's dispatch, "To all practical purposes,
negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only barest pos-
sibilities that Japanese government might come back and offer to
continue." Do you consider this last information, which appears to be
the War Department's estimate as to the possibility of continuing
negotiations with Japan, to be more, or less optimistic than your own
where you used the words in your message of November 27, 1941,
"Negotiations have stopped"?
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I would consider the terms "barest possibilities" as being barest
optimistic portent over the message that I had sent that "negotiations
have stopped". But that message did not modify my message, nor did
I modify my message. I sent it for information of CinCPac, and I also
sent to the addressees the information which you have quoted, along
with the direction which it contains to undertake such reconnaissance
and other measures as they deemed necessary, et cetera. I didn't con-
sider it modified my message. To the best of my recollection, that did
not enter my head.
196. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under
official seal, of a message dated December 3, 1941, from OpNav to
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific;
and other addressees, date time group 031850. If you recognize this
document, please state as what you identify it.
A. I identify it as a message from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic, Pacific, Coml4 and Coml6.
The photostatic copy, duly autlienticated under official seal, of a
message dated December 3, 1941, from OpNav to Cominch, Asiatic,
Pacific, and other addressees, date time group 031850, was submitted
to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate
offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
20", copy appended.
197. Q. Please read this dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 20.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.), suggested that the dispatch be read as it appears and
not as it was sent ; that a portion of the message was crossed out which
appears on the formal exhibit.
[681 The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, stated that this was a matter for cross-examination.
The judge advocate replied that the exhibit as introduced in evi-
dence is a certified copy of a dispatch that was transmitted from the
Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees ; it has been certified
as such by the acting director of Naval Communications, and that the
dispatch was being offered as it stands.
The court announced that it would accept the dispatch. Exhibit
20, in evidence as it was read, for the time being.
198. Q. It is noted that the officer releasing this dispatch is T. S.
Wilkinson. Did he do so by your authority ?
A. I do not recall.
199. Q. It is noted that the last sentence as it appears in the photo-
static copy has a line run through it. Can you state of your own
knowledge whether or not this line was omitted from the dispatch as
it was released?
A. No, I cannot from my own personal knowledge.
200. Q. Did you have any information as to whether the directive
in this dispatch applied to all codes and ciphers, or only to certain
ones?
A. No, I do not recall that. The message is broad, but I do not
recall.
201. Q. What was the usual disposition of outdated or compro-
mised codes and ciphers?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 61
A. Destruction; and usually by burning,
202. Q. From the information you had were there any circum-
stances that led you to believe that this particular directive for code
and cipher destruiction might not be a routine matter ?
A. Coupling the incident with other information at hand, I con-
sidered that their destruction of codes and secret documents at that
time was one of the most telling and confirmatory things that had
happened; supporting our previous dispatches. It made a very deep
impression on me when I learned of it.
203. Q. Did the information which you sent to the Commander-in-
Qiief between October 16, 1941 and December 6, 1941, express your
estimate of the progress of United States-Japanese negotiations as
you interpreted them based on all the information you had at the
time?
A. Yes.
204. Q. Did the information which you sent to the Commander-in-
Chief between October 16, 1941 and December 6, 1941, express your
estimate of the probable objectives of a Japanese attack as you evalu-
ated the information you had at the time ?
A. Yes, very briefly.
[69] 205. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy of a dispatch
from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam, with information copies to
CinCAF, CinCPac, Coml4, Coml6, date time group 042017. If you
recognize this document, please state as what you identify it.
A. I recognize it as a dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam,
info, C-in-C, Pacific ; C-in-C, Asiatic, Coml4 and Coml6, released by
Admiral Ingersoll.
The photosatic copy of dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station,
Guam, with information copies to CinCAF, CinCPac, Coml4 and
Coml6, date time group 042017, was submitted to the interested parties
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 21", copy appended.
206. Q. Please read this dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 21.
207. Q. It is noted that this dispatch is released by Admiral Inger-
soll. Was that done with your authority ?
A. Yes.
208. Q. Adverting to your dispatch of December 3, 1941, which is
Exhibit 20 before this court, had you received any new information
that warranted your sending this dispatch of December, 1941, to Guam,
with a directive for the disposal of secret and confidential matter ?
A. Not that I recall.
209. Q. Can you recall whether or not your estimate of the situation
at this time included an attack on Guam as a possibility ?
A. Yes, we always considered a nattack on Guam a possibility.
Also, in Guam there was danger of sabotage. The position was out-
lying and exposed.
210. Q. It is noted that the commandant of the 14th Naval District
is not made an action addressee on this dispatch of 4 December 1941,
to the Naval Station Guam. Was there any reason for omitting the
Commandant, 14th Naval District, as an action addressee ?
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. We thought it unnecessai-y to send such a message to Coml4.
We thought it would be left to his discretion. We felt that he was
in no such dangerous situation as was Guam.
211. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy, duly authenticated
under official seal, of a dispatch dated December 6, 1941, from OpNav
to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, date time group 061743. If
you recognize this, please state as what you identify it.
A. It is a message from OpNav to C-in-C, Pacific; info C-in-C,
Asiatic.
[70] The photostatis copy of dispatch from OpNav to Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated December 6, 1941, date time
group 061743, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court,
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 22", copy appended.
212. Q. Please read the dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 22.
213. Q. It is noted that Exhibit 22 has been released by Admiral
IngersoU. Was this done with your authority ?
A. To the best of my recollection, it was.
214. Q, At the time you released this dispatch. Exhibit 22, did you
have any additional information on the imminence of an attack by
the Japanese that you did not have on December 4, 1941, at the time
of sending the dispatch to Guam ?
A. Not that I recall.
215. Q. By "the outlying Pacific Islands" in Exhibit 22, what places
did the you mean to be included ?
A. Generally those under CinCPac's cognizance outside the innne-
diate Hawaiian group.
216. Q. Was the Philippine area intended in the words "Outlying
Pacific Islands"?
A. No.
217. Q. Why did you not issue a directive for the destruction of the
codes and ciphers in the outlying islands at the same time you sent
your dispatch to Guam to do this on December 4, 1941 ?
A. I do not recall just the reason. I could make a supposition in
my answer. So far as my direct memory as to just why we didn't
do it at exactly the same time, I don't recall.
The court then, at 11:20 a. m., took a recess until 11:30 a. m.,
at which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the in-
terested parties and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
[71] Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) :
218. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 20, which is the dispatch from the
Chief of Naval Operations dated December 3, 1941, from which you
have testified that the message was released by T. S. Wilkinson. Do
you desire to correct that statement?
A. The message bears Admiral Ingersoll's initials showing his
release.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 63
219. Q. Is that then to be considered a release by you ?
A. It is a release by Admiral Ingersoll.
220. Q. On either the 6th or 7th of December, 1941, did you receive
any further information than you have testified to on diplomatic
developments with the Japanese government?
A. On Sunday forenoon, the 7th, there was information to the
effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to call on the Secretary of
State at exactly loOO. I was talking over this information with Cap-
tain Schuirman when General Marshall called me asking me if I had
it. I told him "yes," and he asked me what I thought about sending
it on to the Hawaiian Islands. To the best of my memory, my first
answer to him was that we had sent them so much already and of such
a character that I rather questioned sending this information. I
hung up the 'phone and I think w^ithin a minute, if not within 30
seconds, I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar
significance to the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at exactly
1300, and that I would go along with his hunch that it might be a
good thing to send that information to the Pacific. I asked him if
his communications were such that he could get it out in the very
minimum of time because I knew our communications were efficient
and rapid when we wanted to push them very quickly. He replied
that he felt tiiat he could get it out just as quickly as I could. I told
him to go ahead and be sure and embody in his dispatch to inform our
people, that is, the Army's naval opposite.
221. Q. 1300 Washington time is what time in Honolulu?
A. 0730.
222. Q. At the time of receiving this information from both Gen-
eral Marshall and the sources in the Navy Department, did you form
any personal estimate of the significance of the hour 1300?
A. We didn't know. We thought that there might be something,
and in view of this "might," that we ought not to take the chance and
that it would be better to send the message than not to send it. That
was the reason it was sent.
[72] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
223. Q. Do you recall if there was any other information that you
received other than the fact that the Japanese were presenting certain
information at 1 : 00 p. m. ?
A. I recall no other information.
224. Q. During the period from October 16, 1941, to December 7,
1941, what was your estimate at that time of the reliability of the
information being furnished you concerning Japanese diplomatic and
military matters?
A. The information was quite reliable.
225. Q. Do you know who was the Commander-in-Chief of the
Japanese Fleet on December 7, 1941 ?
A. Admiral Yamamoto, as I recall.
226. Q. Did you have any knowledge of his military character-
istics ?
A. I would be guessing if I were to testify on that at this time. I
do not recall any particular thoughts that influenced me in anything
I did by the characteristics of Yamamoto.
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
227. Q. I refer to Exhibit 15, which is the dispatch from OpNav
dated 24 November 1941, and which states in substance that "in our
opinion a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an
attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility." Did you esti-
mate at this time that an attack on Pearl Harbor was one of these
possibilities ?
A. Yes.
228. Q. Did you form any estimate of the manner in which this
attack might be made ?
A. We wrote down our estimate of that form in the letter which
Secretary Knox signed in January, and we had had no reason to alter
the form expressed therein by the intervening time.
229. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 9, which is the letter from the Secre-
tary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, will
you read therefrom the dangers envisaged in the order of their
importance ?
A. (Reading)
"(1) air bombing attack: (2) air torpedo plane attack; (3) sabotage; (4)
submarine attack; (5) mining; (6) bombardment by gun fire."
[7«?] 230. Q. When and by what means did you first learn of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. To the best of my remembrance, by a dispatch received from
Pearl Harbor on the 7th.
231. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 9, which is the letter of the
Secretary of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, did the Secretary of
War reply to this letter ?
A. He did.
232. Q. In this letter of January 24, 1941, an air torpedo plane
attack was placed No. 2 in the list of dangers envisaged. Assuming
that an air torpedo attack was imminent, what do you consider the
relative merits of the safety of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor as
contrasted with a similar attack on the Fleet at sea ?
A. I would consider that the danger to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
would be greater than it would be against the Fleet at sea.
233. Q. Can you remember if there was any information during the
period from November 27, 1941, to December 7, 1941, on the geographi-
cal location of the major units of the Japanese Fleet? I mean by
major units, battleships and carriers.
A. I recall that there was conflicting information regarding the
presence of the units which you mention. Our naval people in Pearl
Harbor had made one dignosis. Our people at Manila had made an-
other. They didn't agree. .Each knew the conclusions the other had
reached. As I recall, the information from one indicated strength in
the Mandates and the information from the other did not. As I fur-
ther recall, the information which indicated strength in the Mandates
came from the Pearl Harbor estimate. I may ask to correct my testi-
mony on that later, but that is the best of my remembrance.
234. Q. Do you remember what the estimate of the Chief of Naval
Operations was on these same matters ?
A. We had both estimates, and I do not recall to which one, if either,
we gave the greater weight. CNO, CincPac, and CincAsiatic all had
the same information, as I recall.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 65
235. Q. During the year 1041 did you know whether or not the
Bureau of Ordnance had expressed any opinion on the practicability
of launching torpedoes from aircraft on water of the depth to })e found
in Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, the Bureau did express an opinion on that subject and later
modified the opinion, which opinions can be obtained from the
Bureau's letters if desired.
236. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was
supplied this information ?
A. Yes, as I recall, we sent those letters to CincPac.
[74] 237. Q. Can you recall. Admiral, whether on December 7,
1941, there was a protected Fleet anchorage outside of Pearl Harbor?
A. To the best of my remembrance, there was not, if you are refer-
ring to the immediate Hawaiian area.
238. Q. Assuming that schedule operations provided for ships to be
at the island of Oahu, in your opinion, would these ships be safer inside
Pearl Harbor or safer anchored outside Pearl Harbor?
A. I would say if they were anchored or, in other words, immobile,
they would be safer inside than outside.
239. Q. Since you were Chief of Naval Operations, I am assuming
that during the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941, you
had some information on the attitude of the people of the United
States toward a war with Japan, had you not?
A. Yes, very conflicting views, I would say.
240. Q. Would you like to state briefly and in general what your
information was on this subject?
A. No, I would not.
241. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, had you, as Chief of Naval
Operations, made any estimate of what might be the reactions of the
people of the United States to a Japanese attack on the Nether>nds
East Indies or on Thailand ?
A. That, too, would have been very difficult. It would have cer-
tainly created some reactions in certain quarters very different from
those in others. I would not forecase what, if any, wave of opinion
such an attack might have caused.
242. Q. Independently of the information upon which you based
your dispatches to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to
matters concerning impending Japanese action between October 16,
1941, and December 7 of the same year, what was your own estimate
in regard to Japanese intentions to attack the United States?
A. My own estimate in the later period was that we had irreconcil-
able differences which sooner or later were bound to lead to war. I
might add that opinion had been smouldering over a considerable
period of time.
243. Q. What was your own estimate of Japanese intentions to
attack the United States at the time you sent your last message con-
cerning the destruction of codes on or about December 6, 1941 ?
A. I thought the probability was very strong that she would strike.
[75] 244. Q. Did you make an estimate of the locality in which
she would most probably strike?
A. Yes, I thought she was more likely to strike in the Philippines
than elsewhere, so far as United States territory is concerned. I also
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 6
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
felt that Guam would probably fall shortly after hostilities com-
menced.
245. Q. As contrasted with mere intention, what was your estimate
of Japan's capacity to make a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base at the time she did?
A. We always recognized a surprise attack as a possibility. Do you
mean by that, actually make a surprise atack or to attempt it?
246. Q. Her capacity to make the attack.
A. We knew, of course, .that they had the force to attempt such an
attack. We had often envisaged such an attempt and means to repel
it. I also assumed that there was certainly some chance, if not a good
chance, of getting some advance warning of such an attack by alerting
measures available to minimize the surprise or to intercept such an
attack or to reduce its effectiveness or even to break it up. I am refer-
ring particularly to air attack.
247. Q. Admiral, we have asked you the duties of all your principal
aides as Chief of Naval Operations, but I have neglected to ask you
what your assigned duties were at the time you held that office.
A. Chief of Naval Operations?
248. Q. Yes, office of Chief of Naval Operations. Will you enu-
merate, to the best of your ability, what those duties are?
A. They are in the regulations, and the principal part of them is
summed up in the very first sentences on that. If you have a copy of
the regulations, they could be introduced into the record.
249. Q. The court may take judicial notice of Navy Regulations.
Anything else besides Navy Regulations ?
A. I think that covers it.
250. Q. Is there anything in statute law which you remember, de-
scribing the duties of Chief of Naval Operations other than those in-
corporated in Navy Regulations?
A. There may be. I will have to check that.
251. Q. Between November 25, 1941, which is also the date of Ex-
hibit 16, a letter addressed by you to Admiral Kimmel, and December
7, 1941, did you send any further letters, dispatches, or memoranda
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, giving him any infor-
mation on diplomatic or [76] military developments with the
Japanese Government ?
A. What is the date of my last letter ?
252. Q. November 25.
A. I don't recall any? I have none on file. Admiral Kimmel
might supplement jfty memory upon that4.
[Notation in margin :] See correction page 324.
253. Q. Admiral, I will ask you to look back to the attack on Pearl
Harbor (and consider therewith the attitude of the people of the
United States resulting from this attack. How would you charac-
terize the decision of the Japanese Government in this action?
A. I thought the Japanese Government made the greatest mistake
they possibly could have made when they attacked Pearl Harbor, ftftd;
i may add that i teid Admiral Nomura, t4^ Japanese Ambagoador,
4- l-k f\ -J- -1 4- J- l-> r\~tT /-] 1 /-I ii-'j^ ITT i^T -I I ^I l-\i»j^r> I ^ 4- N i^-*-fc-\ |-\y-k4-i^>»^-\ t^r r\ r\*r^4' 4-l^-t'*^~^t-i rvl-^ »/-\ ^^ii*c\ -r^z-J
TTTTTTTC TT VIIL" V vTTTT« TTT^ TTTTTTTTT IJL t^'ttl^ "IlL/llx TTtTTTTrT? TTT? STxtT Llll Utllill* 1 tJl' Itl \X
T^TTTkj vTT TTTTt* 1 ^ ^ 1 1 gT^ TC TTTTTxvT
[Notation in margin:] See correction page 324.
At the request of the judge advocate, the court was cleared.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 67
The court was opened, and all parties to the mquiry entered.
254. Q. Admiral, in response to a previous question of the judge
advocate in ^Yhich he asked you to enumerate your duties as Chief of
Naval Operations, your reply, in substance, was that they were set
forth generally in Navy Regulations. The court has taken judicial
notice of Navy Regulations. I therefore shall ask you to read the
duties of the Chief of Naval Operations, as set out in Article 392.
A. (Reading) :
(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointerl by the President by and with
the advice and consent of tlie Senate from among oificers of tlie Line of the Navy,
not below the grade of eaptaiii, for a period of four years. He is charged, under
the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, with
the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordina-
tion of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the deter-
mination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or
about to be commissioned.
(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title
of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and
allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 .June 1922. All orders issued
by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are
performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are
considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such.
[77] To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in iierforming the duties of his
office there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifieen
officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of
the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations,
be retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be
retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest
grade or rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.
(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary when
serving, and the A.ssistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations
is next in succession to act as Seci'etary of the Navy.
The court announced that it would take a recess until 2 : 00 p. m.
The interested party. Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., requested that
the court adjourn until 2 : 00 p. m., August 9, 1944, in order that he
might have additional time to review his files dealing with the subject
matter of the inquiry, so that he might be prepared to answer ques-
tions propounded in cross-examination. This interested party fur-
ther stated that he had been recalled from foreign duty recently and
that as the events which are the subject of the inquiry occurred almost
three years ago, he desired an opportunity to fully refresh his mem-
ory. The court announced that it would adjourn until 10 a. m.
August 9, 1944.
The court then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. August
9. 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 69
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVYICOUET OFillNaUIRY
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944.
[76'] Fifth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. C.
The court met at 10 : 00 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfiis, U. S. Navy (Ret), INIember.
Vice Admiral Aclolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his
counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested p)arty, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the fourth day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-.
tion when the adjournment was taken on Tuesday, August 8, 1944, re-
sumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
255. Q. Admiral Stark, I hand you Exhibit 4, which is Navy Basic
War Plan Rainbow Number 5, for the purpose of reading certain ar-
ticles into the record. Will you please read articles 0101, 0102, and
0104?
(A. (Reading:)
This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction
of the Cliief of Naval Operations.
It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations
(Short Title ABC-1), the [T^J Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan
(Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan^Rainbow
No. 5.
This plan provides for the initial organization, a composition of forces, and
tasks for the Naval Establishments in a Rainbow No. 5 War.
256. Q. Article 0102, which you have just read, states that this plan
was based upon the report of the U. S. -British Staff conversations
and gives the short title ABC-1. What is ABC-1 ?
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. ABC— 1 was American, British, Canadian conversations and
the resuks thereof.
257. Q. Who approved tlie Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan
Kainbow 5 ?
A. It was approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the
iSavy, and the President.
258. Q. Will you please read the concept of war as laid down in the
Joint Basic War Plan Rainbow 5, which you will find in appendix 1,
section 4, and it is necessary to read only articles 10 and 13, subpara-
graphs a, cl, and e, on page 5, appendix 1 ?
A. (Reading:)
12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of
ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraphs 13(h) is quoted as modified by
the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staffs secret letter Serial
039412 of April 5, 1941.
10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the de-
feat of Germany and her Allies.
11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense
policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take ac-
count are :
(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the At-
lantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The prin-
cipal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and opera-
tions of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a man-
ner as to facilitate that effort.
(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their
forces in a mannei- to guard against Japanese [SO] intervention. If
Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East v»ill be defensive.
The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the
Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet Offensively in the
manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the
defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia.
The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean areas that the British Conmionwealth will be in a position to release the
necessary forces for the Far East.
(e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers
at any or.e time will be decided with regard to the Military sitiiation in all
theaters.
259. Q. From what you read then. Admiral Stark, the decisive
theater was considered to be in the Atlantic and the European area,
and the principal United States military effort w^as to be exerted in
that area, and the operation of other forces would be cut in such
manner as to facilitate that effort ; is that correct?
A. It is.
260. Q. Will you read that part of Joint Plan, Rainbow 5, per-
taining to the Navy tasks in the Far East and in the Pacific area?
That is section VII of the Appendix, Articles 35 and 36 only.
A. (Reading:) _ •
35. Navy tasks.
a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far E-ast l)y diverting
enemy strength awa.v from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions.
b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy.
c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the
Pacific Area.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 71
d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west
as Longitude 155° East.
e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere,
by destroying hostile expeditions and [81] by supporting land and air
forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.
f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area.
g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Guam.
h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified
localities in categories of defen.se presci-ibed in paragraph 47.
i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.
261. Q. 36?
A. (Keading:)
36. Navy Forces.
a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
262. Q. Admiral Stark, since the Joint Army and Navy Basic
Rainbow 5 was, as you have stated, approved by the Secretaries of
War and Navy and by the President, was that plan then the binding
directive on you in the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rain-
bow 5?
A. It w^as.
263. Q. You have previously testified regarding the tasks assigned
to the Pacific Fleet in that Navy Basic Plan. Were the tasks which
you assigned in that Plan, and those in the Joint Army and Navy Plan,
consistent ?
A. They were. They were practically identical.
264. Q. I show you a letter. Can you identify it ?
A. Yes.
265. Q. Will you state what it is, please ?
A. I identify it as a letter from the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 1 May 1941, Subject,
Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.
The letter, file_ number S-Al6-3/A7-3(3) ND14 (0410), dated
May 1, 1941, Subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, from the Com-
mandant, 14th Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations, was sub-
mitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to
the court, and by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the
record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
23," for reference, description appended.
[82] 266. Q. Will you identify Enclosure (C) of this letter?
A. Enclosure (C) of this letter is an enclo.sure dated 31 March
1941, is an addendum to Naval Base Defense Air Force, Operation
Plan Number A-1-41, on a joint estimate covering joint Army and
Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu
or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area, and is signed by Rear Admiral
P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander Naval Air Base, Defense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Tw^o, and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S.
Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Defense Force.
267. Q. Admiral, w^ill you read from that. Appendix C, Article 3,
sub-paragraphs a. and b?
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. (Reading:)
Article 3. Possible enemy action.
a. A declaration of war might be proceeded by;
(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
(2) A surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
(3) A combination of these two.
b. It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely
be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside
of 300 miles.
268. Q, Do you recall having read what yon have just quoted, or, in
fact, the entire estimate at any time during the spring or early summer
of 1941?
A. I could not say definitely that I read this particular letter. I
am under the impression that I did, or that I knew about it. It is
contamed in that file, which was forwarded by the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District. It contains the paragraph to which I have
previously testified, and which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet showed me in his memorandum of June 4, and after which I
sent a considerable portion of this file out to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, Commander-in-
Chief of the Asiatic, and to all Naval Districts. It is approximately
three years since then, and to state whether I read the particular
enclosure I could not definitely state.
269. Q. In conection with the difficulty in remembering, do you
recall it from the standpoint of having had any reaction as regards
it in measures which you had previously taken?
A. The reaction I got on this file was one of considerable satisfac-
tion, because it is along the line of the letter signed by the Secretary
of the Navy of January 24.
[SS] Examined by the court :
270. Q. What year?
A. '41.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy (continued) :
271. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter. Can you identify it?
A. Yes, this is a letter dated 7 February 1941, on the subject of Air
Defense of Pearl Harbor, Haw^aii, by the Secretary of War, Henry L.
Stimson, in reply to the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January
1941.
The letter from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to the
Secretary of the Navy, dated February 7, 1941, was submitted to the
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the
interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in
evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copv appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 24".
272. Q. Please read the letter.
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 24.
273. Q. Admiral, do you recall any other urging of the War De-
partment, formal or otherwise, between the date of that letter and
7 December 1941, on that point?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 73
A. The matter of anti-aircraft defense and of planes to Hawaii
for defense was a subject of frequent conversations between myself
and General Marshall, and my offers were to transport them when-
ever and as quickly as thej^ could be made ready. There might have
been some particular time when we couldn't have transported, but in
general we stood ready to get out to the Hawaiian Islands anything
which the Army could make available in that connection.
274. Q. When you sent your war warning dispatch of 27 Novem-
ber, 1941, which is Exhibit 17, did you know that the Chief of Staff,
Army, had sent a similar dis^Datch to Commanding General Hawaiian
Department ?
A, I did, and the dispatch so states.
275. Q. What steps did you expect the Hawaiian Department to
take upon their receipt of this dispatch from the Chief of Staff?
A. I expected the Army to utilize its warning system to the utmost,
with all accessories thereto, in the way of communications. I ex-
pected them to make ready a maximum [S4\ number of planes
possible. I expected them to man their anti-aircraft defense, both
fixed — I expected them to man tb.eir batteries, both fixed and mobile.
I expected them to imx^lement arrangements which they had with the
Navy in joint agreements. I expected them to take some sabotage
measures. In other words, I ex])ected them to assume a maximum
state of readiness in defense of Pearl Harbor. The defense of the
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor was an Army responsibility. That base
was vital to the prosecution of a war in the Pacific. That was com-
mon knowledge, also that we were rushing as fast as possible every-
thing we could to make that base more useful. It made no dilference,
so far as the Army's responsibility for the defense of that base was
concerned, whether the Fleet was all at sea, or all in harbor, or any
part thereof. It made no difference whether the Commander-in-Chief
of that Fleet was in Pearl Harbor or whether he was at sea. In par-
ticular, I would have expected the Army to have ready their pursuit
planes, some of them certainly in instant readiness, and full alert-
edness with regard to others, to man these pursuit planes in the ear-
liest possible time in emergency. These were the principal or certainly
the primary weapon of defense against an air attack coming in from
tlie sea.
276. Q. Admiral, were the measures by which the Battle ot Britain
was won and the repeated German attempts to win the war by m«ans
of bombing defeated — matters of technical and general knowledge —
known to the Navy Department, and, in so far as you know, to tne War
Department, in early 1941?
A. I'o a very considerable extent they were to the Navy Department,
and I am not familiar with how many observers, operational, tecn-
iiical, and otherwise, the Army employed in this connection.
277. Q. Admiral, in your testimony of yesterday you stated that,
in answer to a question, that you considered that there was greater
danger to the ships in the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area while in
port than at sea. When you said that, did you envisage the conditions
that were found to actually obtain on 7 December, or those which you
have stated you expected to obtain?
A. I was thinking of the conditions which did obtain.
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
278. Q. Admiral, your dispatch of 28 November, which is Exhibit
19, and was sent to the Commanders of the Pacific Coastal Frontiers —
what was your purpose in fully quoting an Army disjiatch?
A. I quoted the Army's dispatch to our people that they might
know the information and the instructions their Army opposites
in their area had.
[S5] 279. Q. What else did your dispatch contain?
A. It also contained a directive to our peo])le to be prepared to carry
out the tasks assigned in WPL— 46 so far as they applied to Japan and
in case of hostilities. The entire dispatch, therefore,, was mostly
informator}' and contained a directive.
280. Q. On what basis was CinCPac an informatory addressee?
A. He was made an informatory addressee that he might know that
this information and this directive had been given to the Pacific
Coastal Frontiers, which automatically came under him in case of
hostilities with Japan.
281. Q. Admiral, the extract from WPL— 46 which you have read
this morning mentioned tasks or commitments in connection with th.e
defense of Guam. What, in late November 1941, was the actual situa-
tion as regard to the possibility of holding Guam, and what was really
expected in case Japan went to war with us?
A. We had little or no hope of holding Guam in case of war with
Japan, at that time.
282. Q. In your testimony of yesterday you stated you thought the
information which had been placed before you concerning Japan, in
the period 16 October to 7 December Avas quite reliable. What
variety of information were you referring to ?
A. I was referring to political information.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : "
283. Q. When Admiral Kimmel Avas appointed Commander-in-
Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet about 1 February, 1941, did
you have and express any o])inion about his selection?
A. I strongly recommended his appointment. He was my choice,
my recommendation. I do not mean by that, that he was not recom-
mended by others. He was.
284. Q. After 7 December '41, did you cause a note to be inserted
in Admiral KimmeFs fitness report ?
A. Yes.
[86] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
285. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it?
A. I identify this as a report of fitness on Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, from the
period 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941.
The fitness report on Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from
the period 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941, was submitted to
each of the other interested parties, to the judge advocate, and to
the court, and by the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence for the jiurpose only
of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may
be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 75
There beino; no objection, the document wap so received and marked
"EXHIBIT 25", for reference, description appended.
286. Q. Please read the answer to Question No. 9, Admiral Stark?
A. (Reading:)
No. 9: Has the work of this officer been reported on either in a commenda-
tory way or adversely dnring the period of this report? The answer: (Read-
ing) Has been reported on adversely by the Commission appointed by the
President to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the
Territory of Hawaii, December 7, 1941. (Copy of report attached.)
287. Q. Please read the answer to Question No. 14?
288. A. (Reading:)
No. 14. Is this officer professionally qualified to perform ALL the duties
of his grade? The answer: (reading) I have always considered Admiral
Kimmel an outstanding officer in ability, integrity, and character. I still do.
288. Q. Admiral J. O. Richardson was Commander-in-Chief of
th6 United States Fleet from approximately one year prior to Ad-
miral Kimmel's appointment, was he not?
A. He was.
289. Q. And during Admiral Richardson's command, the Fleet
sailed from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor for maneuvers in
March or April of 1940, did it not ?
A. That is right.
290. When the Fleet went to Pearl Harbor from the West Coast
on that occasion, did you have any thought or plan that the Fleet
would stay at Pearl Harbor longer than was necessary to carry out
the maneuvers that were immediately planned for it ?
A. Just when that thought developed, I would hesitate to say.
I couldn't answer specifically "j^es".
[87] The witness requested permission to refresh his memory
from documents he had in his possession.
The court granted the permission.
291. Q. When the Fleet sailed from the West Coast to Hawaiian
waters in the spring of 1940, Admiral Stark, did you have any
thought or plan that it would continue in Hawaiian waters longer
than for the execution of the maneuvers currently planned?
A. The question is very broad as to whether or not I had any
thought on the subject. To the best of my recollection no decision
had been reached at that time but I do not recall; and I do not
recall of any particular discussion at that time.
292. Q. Do I understand that it is your present recollection that
when the Fleet sailed from the West Coast, probably in March of
1940, for Hawaiian waters, that the Navy Department as personified
by the Chief of Naval Operations, had concluded the intention of
keeping the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor for an indefinite time?
A. To the best of my recollection, we had not come to such a con-
clusion when the Fleet sailed.
293. Q. Had Admiral Richardson been advised of the possibility
of his remaining indefinitely at Pearl Harbor when he sailed ?
A. Not that I recall, and I would have to search any correspond-
ence I may have to see if that answer should be changed.
294. Q. When was the decision made to keep the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor after the conclusion of the spring maneuvers of 1940?
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The decision was made in early May to retain it there for the
time being.
295. Q. What do yon mean by "the time being", Admiral?
A. Well, to continue it there. To the best of my remembrance,
there was no decision made at that time, for example, to keep it there
for the period which it was kept there.
296. Q. Well, is it fair to say that the immediate return was post-
poned with no definite conclusion reached as to when, if ever, it
should return?
A. The decision was reached at that time to keep it there for a
short period.
297. Q. And what do you mean by "a short ]3eriod" ?
A. I mean a couple of weeks.
298. Q. And at the conclusion of that couple of weeks, what de-
cision was reached?
[88] The witness requested permission to refresh his memory
from documents he had in his possession.
The court granted the permission.
A. The decision was reached to continue the Fleet in Hawaii again
for the time being. To the best of my recollection we didn't then, and
for some time afterwards, decide that the Fleet was going to remain
there continuously. The question came up from time to time with the
result that the Fleet was kept there
299. Q. At some time was there a definitive decision reached that
the Pacific Fleet should be kept more or less permanently based at
Pearl Harbor?
A. Well, in effect, it was kept there. When we state "permanently",
which would mean regardless of all else, I could not say "yes" to that.
Under the conditions which then existed we did keep it there. Had
they been considerably altered, we might have changed our decision.
300. Q. At some time during tlie late summer or fall of 1940, did
Admiral Richardson make either one or two official visits to Washing-
ton?
A. He did.
301. Q. And during one or both of those visits, did you have con-
versations with him relative to continuing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl
Harbor?
A. That question was undoubtedly one which we talked about.
302. Q. And do you recall that Admiral Richardson protested with
strength and vigor the continued maintenance of the Pacific Fleet
at Pearl Harbor under the then existing conditions ?
A. I recall his desire to bring the Fleet back to the Coast.
303. Q. Did he advance any reasons to you for that desire?
A. Yes, he supported them with reasons.
304. Q. Do you recall what the reasons were, as stated to you ?
The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from docu-
ments he had in his possession.
The court granted the permission.
A. I can give you some of the reasons.
305. Q. Can you state generally your present recollection?
A. I recall one reason which Admiral Richardson gave which was
in connection with morale, namely, that the fleet [SO] on the
Pacific Coast would have better opportunity for recreation, visits with
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 77
their families. I am not sure, but as I recall the question of re-enlist-
ments was brought up in that same connection, but as to any material
reason which he might have given, I do not recall specifically at the
moment.
The interested party, Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, sug-
gested that this line of questioning is based upon events that are a
long distance back and i-equested that the documents be introduced in
evidence.
306. Q. You understood. Admiral Stark, that in these questions I
have been referring to basing the wliole Pacific Fleet, rather than any
particular section of it, at Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, I understand that.
307. Q. Do you recall whether Admiral Eichardson based his pro-
test on the fact that he considered the Fleet was not secure at Pearl
Harbor ?
A. I do not recall that, no, nor any official communication to that
effect.
308. Q. Do you recall whether one of the factors behind Admiral
Richardson's protest was that strategically and logistically, war op-
erations could not be conducted, either actually or in training, from
Pearl Harbor because of inadequate train then attached to the Fleet?
A. I remember a discussion of inadequate train came up and we
were endeavoring to meet the needs of the Fleet to make Pearl Harbor
suitable for some of these purposes, if not all of them.
309. Q. Yesterday you read from a letter dated, I think, in May of
1940, to Admiral Richardson, in which you discussed some of the
factors for maintaining the entire Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.
A, Right.
310. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it ?
A. I identify it as a copy of a letter from me to Admiral Richard-
son dated 27 May, 1940.
The letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark, to Admiral J. O. Rich-
ardson, U. S. Navy, dated May 27, 1940, was submitted to the judge
advocate, each of the other interested parties, and to the court, and
by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret) , offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter read-
ing into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to
the inquiry before the court.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
26", for reference, description appended.
[90] Q. I should like to read two of the paragraphs, Admiral
Stark (reading) :
Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask,
"Suppose the Japs do go into tlie East Indies'? What are we going to do about
it?" My answer to that is, "I don't know"', and I think there is no one on
God's green earth that can tell. I do know my own arguments with regard to
this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the
thoughts contained in your recent later. I would point out one thing, and that is
that even if the decision here were for the United States to take no decisive
action, if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not
breathe it to a soul as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for
your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know
what we are going to do and so long as they don't know, they may hesitate or
be deterred. The above, I think, will answer the question "why you are there".
It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest
78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you.
Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have been asked the question, and
also like you, I have been imable to get the answer.
There is stated in that letter, in substance, that one of the reasons for
maintaining the entire Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was because of
the deterrent effect on the Japanese, or the anticipated deterrent effect
on the Japanese from going into the Netherlands East Indies ; is that
correct ?
A. Yes.
312. Q. At that time, as Chief of Naval Overations, was it your
opinion that the Pacific Fleet was strong enough and adequately
equipped with train and repair facilities to'be a genuine and realistic
threat to the Japanese on that basis ?
A. Well, they certainly were a threat.
313. Q. A genuine and realistic threat, I said, Admiral.
A. Asking that from the standpoint of the Japanese, I certainly
would say that it w^ould have been taken into consideration very
seriously. It was a considerable fleet and if the question means
whether it would have stopped them going down as a surprise, if they
intended to do so, I would say the chances are it wouldn't. But it
did have the chance of serving as a deterrent by its presence.
314. Q. Was it your decision to keep the Fleet based at Pearl
Harbor ?
A. Major movements and major dispositions of the Fleet were
taken up with the Commander-in-Chief, who made the final decision.
[91] 315. Q. Was it your decision to keep the Fleet based at
Pearl Harbor?
A. I have answered the question that the decision to keep it there,
which was effected, was that of the Commander-in-Chief.
Examined by the court:
316. Q. Commander-in-Chief of what?
A. Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (continued) :
317. Q. To a non-military man, that means the President of the
United States?
A. Yes; I mean by that the President of the United States:
318. Q. Do you recall any other factors in addition to those stated
in Exhibit 20, the letter of 27 May, 1941, that influenced the decision
to keep the entire Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor ?
The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from docu-
ments he had in his possession.
The court granted the permission.
The court then, at 11 : 40 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 50 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
reporter, the interested parties and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel (Ret.) (continued) :
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 79
319. Q. Admiral Eichardson did not agree with your estimate of
the readiness of the Pacific Fleet as stated in your letter of 27 May
1941, Exhibit 20, did he, Admiral Stark?
A. Did not agree with what ?
320. Q. Your estimate and evalution of the readiness of the Fleet
to accomplish some of the purposes which were among the factors for
basing the P'leet at Pearl Harbor.
A. I would say that Admiral Richardson could testify to that better
than I could.
[9^2] 321. Q. I ask you if you can identify the document which I
now hand you, Admiral Stark?
A. This letter is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22 October 1940, Subject, War
Plans, status and readiness of in view of current international situa-
tion.
322. Q. You received that letter as Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. I haven't read it. I certainly assume that I did.
The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of
Naval Operations, dated 22 October 1940, was submitted to the judge
advocate, each of the interested parties, and to the court, and by the
interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
(Ret) , offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
'^EXHIBIT 27".
Frederick T. La chat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
323. Q. Willyoureadtheletter, Admiral Stark?
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 27.
The court then, at 12 : 15 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 15 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
[93] Present:
All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to
the inquiry and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Harold R. Stark, Admiral, IT. S. Navy, the witness under cross-
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (Continued) :
324. Q. Admiral Stark, would you like to make any comments on
Exhibit 27, which was read just before adjournment?
A. Yes, I would be glad to say that I think it a very good letter. I
was delighted to receive it. I was in accord with most of what it had to
say, particularly with regard to war plans, and the very reasons which
he gave in his criticism of the situation at that time were some of the
causes of the development of Rainbow 5. For example, I would like to
read Admiral Richardson's paragraph 10, in which he says :
The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows :
(a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present develop-
ment of Naval Establishment ;
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II) ;
(c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. Ill) based on
present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known
or can be predicted at the present time ; (2) coordination of plans developed with
National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;
(d) In tlie light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief
is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody :
(1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;
(2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;
[OJf] (3) Threats and raids against the enemy;
(4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establish-
ment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up
to support them.
I should also like to read from page 19, Appendix 1, of Exhibit
4, the Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5. Recalling the four
provisions which Admiral Richardson recommended, the following
are what Rainbow 5 prescribes :
(Reading:)
a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a
sustained air offensive;
b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and
air offensive;
c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers ;
d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or
Asiatic military power; and by
e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance
against land, air, or sea-borne attack.
In anotlier part of Admiral Richardson's letter appears this para-
graph : "It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective
(BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some
six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment."
Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, to which I have just re-
ferred, among its tasks requires the Commander-in-Chief of the Pa-
cific Fleet to prepare the following plans : "A plan for the execution
of Task B of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approxi-
mately 30.000 armed troops, in addition to forces of the U. S. Pacific
Fleet, and assuming that the task will be executed under 180 M, which
is six months. ,
325. Q. Was one of the other factors supporting the retention of the
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the fall of 1040 a proposed plan to
stop all trade between Japan and the Americas by means of the main-
tenance of a patrol line west from Honolulu to the Philippines and
south from Samoa to Singapore?
A. Not that I recall at that time.
[95] 320. Q. Was there under discussion a program to maintain
a life force line in those directions for the purpose of controlling
commercial traffic to Japan?
A. Not at that time that I recall,
326a. Q. Was there at any time?
A. The war plan which has been put in evidence speaks about in-
terrupting Japan's commerce.
327. Q. Do you recall a discussion with Admiral Richardson when
he was in Washington in the fall of 1940 relative to such a patrol
line?
A. No, I don't recall it.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 81
328. Q. You recall no discussions with Admiral Richardson about
that subject matter?
A. Not about establishing a line at that time to stop Japan's —
320. Q. To stop or control ?
A. To stop or control Japan's traffic. We may have discussed mat-
ters of the future in connection with war plans as to what we would
do and how we would do it, but I don't recall the conversations at this
time.
330. Q. I will ask j^ou to read a letter from Admiral Richardson,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet and see if jour memory is refreshed.
A. I had forgotten this particular paper and don't particularly
recall it at this time.
331. Q. Do I understand you have no recollection of a discussion
with Admiral Richardson over the proposition I outlined in my
earlier question ?
A. I would say that I have forgotten that completely.
332. Q. After reading the letter, you say that your memory is not
adequately refreshed to testify concerning that?
A. That's correct.
333. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it,
Admiral Stark?
A. Yes, I can identify this document as a letter from the Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated
7 January 194:1, on the subject of the situation concerning the security
of the Fleet and the present ability of the local defense forces to meet
a surprise attack.
[96] The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the
interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence
for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom
as ma}- be considered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked
"EXHIBIT 28", copy appended.
334. Q. Was this letter, Exhibit 28, the basis and initiating thought
in the preparation of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the
Secretary of War, previously introduced in evidence, dated January
24,1941?
A. I couldn't say whether it w^as the basis, but it is in some respects
along the sam.e line. It may have been. I don't recall. "Wliere I
said, "It may have been," it may have influenced ; I don't remember.
335. Q. I ask you if you can identify this as a photostatic copy of
a letter which you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 10 Februarv
1941? ^ ' . . .
A. Yes, I can identify this as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel,
dated 10 February 1941.
The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the
purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may
be considered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked
"EXHIBIT 29", copy appended.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 7
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
336. Q. I ask you if you cau identify this as a photostatic copy of
a letter written by Admiral Kinimel to you dated 18 February 1941 ?
A. I recognize this letter as one from Admiral Kimmel to me, dated
18 February 1941.
The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for
the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as
may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked
•'EXHIBIT 30", copy appended.
[1)7] 337. Q. After the receipt of this letter from Admiral Kim-
mel did you make an effort to ascertain who was responsible for the
transmission of secret information ? It was between O. N. I. and
Operations.
A. I unquestionably did. I don't recall just the action taken.
338. Q. Did you understand from this postscript which I have just
read that the Commander-in-Chief requested to be currently and
promptly advised as to information of a secret character?
A. Which would be of use to him, yes.
339. Q. What did you understand was included in information of
a secret character, as used in the letter?
A. Well, I would understand that technical matters, which would
be of assistance to the Pacific Fleet, should be sent; also operational
matters or other matters which would be of use and of interest to him.
When I say "technicaF', if we received word of some particular method
of mine-sweeping or of some particular mines that ought to be used,
that information certainly might be of some future use to him. When
I say "operational", we had many observers in England sending in
data as to how they operated, and if I found something that might be
of use to him, I would consider that it ought to go to him. There are
many subjects of which these two are just samples.
340. Q. Did you understand it to include all information relative
to diplomatic and international developments affecting the Pacific
Area ?
A. I would not say all matters. We aimed to keep the Commander-
in-Chief in the Pacific acquainted with these subjects, so far as we
thought he would have a vital interest, but to have sent him a mass
of everything that came in without evaluation, which we were more
or less ]3i'epared to do, it might have been more of a hindrance than
help to him.
341. Q. The only reason you would not send him information in that
category was that you felt it too trivial to be worthy of his attention?
A. Well, I wouldn't send him that which I thought to be trivial of
his attention.
342. Q. Did you send him anything which you did not consider
trivial affecting international and political developments in the Pa-
cific area?
A. It was my aim to keep Admiral Kimmel abreast of wortlnvhile
developments.
[9S] 343. Q. I ask you if you can identify what I now hand you
as a photostatic copy of a letter which you wrote Admiral Kimmel
under date of 25 February 1941, enclosing copies of two memoranda
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 83
to the President, one dated 11 February 1941 and the other February
5, 1941. I shall call attention only to the first memorandum to the
President.
A. I identify this as a letter to Admiral Kimmel from me dated 25
February 1941.
The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the
purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be
considered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked
"EXHIBIT 31", copy appended.
3444. Q. When you said. Admiral, in that memorandum to the Pres-
ident that the Pacific Fleet is now weaker in tonnage and aircraft, did
you mean the entire U. S. Fleet in the Pacific, minus the Asiatic, or
only that portion of it which was based at Pearl Harbor?
A. My recollection is that I was referring to that which was under
command of .Admiral Kimmel, but I may have taken the other into
consideration. I don't recall.
345. Q. At that time how much weaker was the U. S. Pacific Fleet
under Admiral Kimmel than the Japanese Fleet?
A. That can be obtained from the record.
346. Q. Have you any general knowledge on it?
A. I had general knowledge of it, but numbers, tonnages, etc., are a
matter of record.
347. Q. At that time had any portion of the Pacific Fleet which
was based at Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Richardson took it to
Pearl Harbor in March, 1940, been diverted to the Atlantic?
A. I would have to check the record on that. The record can be
checked on that.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, withdrew.
[9,9] 348. Q. Would that be tedious for you to do before to-
morrow or would it be practicable?
A. The answer to the question is that the CINCINNATI and MIL-
WAUKEE were transferred between the dates you mentioned.
349. Q. And those were the only diversions from the Pacific Fleet
from March of 1940 until 11 February '41?
A. Those are the only diversions of which I have access to the rec-
ord here at this time, and I think they are accurate.
350. Q. Isn't it a matter of fact that up to 11 February 1941, there
had been no substantial change in the strength of the Pacific Fleet
from the time that it went to Pearl Harbor under Admiral Richard-
son in the spring of 1940?
A. I think that is correct.
351. Q. And yet, with no substantial change, you considered in
February 1940 that the Pacific Fleet was weaker than the Japanese
Fleet?
A. That's right.
352. Q. In February '41 ?
A. Yes.
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
353. Q. You say that it remains a constant, serious, and real threat
to the Japanese Fleet in the memorandum?
A. That's right.
354. Q. Did you mean by that that the strength of the U. S. Pacific
Fleet was such that it was only a threat and that it did not possess
the power to initiate a frontal offensive against the Japanese Fleet
in February of 1941?
A. Yes.
355. Q. In May of 1941, there was diverted under your orders, from
the Pacific Fleet, a substantial quota of vessels, was there not?
A. In May, 1941 ?
356. Q. Yes. That would have been in connection with the am-
phibious operation to which you made reference yesterday, in the
Atlantic.
A. I would have to refer to the record as to just when it was made.
The information that I have shows transit through the Canal in June.
I think your statement is probably correct.
357. Q. What was the strength of that diversion in June of 1941?
A. To the best of my recollection, three battleships, four cruisers,
the YORKTOWN, at approximatelv that date.
[100] 358. Q. That is a carrier?
A. Carrier. And a squadron of destroyers.
359. Q. Now how many destroyers would be in a squadron?
A. I think there were nine in that squadron. I would have to
check the record.
360. Q. How much did that diversion to the Atlantic reduce the
striking force or the fighting value of the Pacific Fleet as compared
with what it was before that diversion ?
A. It reduced it by just so much as was detached.
361. Q. Were there any transports diverted at about that time?
A. My answer is that it is not sufficiently clear in my memory to
give an answer.
362. Q. Now you say the diversion of this force of three battle-
ships, four cruisers, and a carrier and squadron of destroyers re-
ducecl the striking force or the fighting value by — what was the phrase
you used?
A. By just so much as was detached or transferred.
363. Q. Wliat is the square rule about fighting forces or striking
power of a fleet ?
A. Wliat is that, may I ask you ?
The question was repeated.
A. Well, the greater the strength, the greater its striking power,
but: it should be borne in mind in connection with these transfers
that they were laid down in accordance with plans which had been
approved and which had been promulgated, and that it left the
Fleet with forces which were in these plans to accomplish certain
tasks. The forces transferred were in accordance with the previous
directive, Rainbow. V.
364. Q. Was the comparative number of vessels diverted in June
of 1941, consisting of three battleships, four cruisers, and accom-
panying escorts, approximately a quarter of the forces of the Pacific
Fleet originally there at Pearl Harbor ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 85
A. Well, we had twelve battleships. A quarter of twelve would
be three; we had nine left. So far as the battleships were con-
cerned, that would be true. As I recall, we had four carriers. We
took one. That would be a quarter. As far as the destroyers,
speaking from recollection, we had approximately fifty, according
to my recollection. If we took nine, it would be approximately 20%.
365. Q. And four cruisers?
A. As I recall, we had about fourteen cruisers out [^01^
there. That is recollection, and if we took four, it would be ap-
proximately 25%, maybe a little over.
36'6. Q. This is it fair to say that this diversion of three battle-
ships, four cruisers, nine destroyers, and one carrier, constituted
apj)roximately 25% of the Pacific Fleet as it originally moved to
Hawaii under Admiral Richardson?
A. Xo, I wouldn't say that. That statement, according to my recol-
lection, is true except as regards destroyers and submarines.
367. Q. It was 20% of the destroyers instead of 25?
A. Approximately.
368. Q. Slightly more than 25%, of the cruisers?
A. Yes.
369. Q. I kind of balanced those differences.
A. Yes.
370. Q. No submarines were diverted to the Atlantic?
A. Not that I recollect.
371. Q. At any time?
A. I don't want to guess on that question and I don't recall clearly,
372. Q. Admiral Kimmel advises that no submarines were trans-
ferred to the Atlantic.
A. Yes.
373. Q. Now how would you evaluate by fractions the force which
you have described as passing through the Canal in June in relation
to the force moving out to Pearl Harbor under Admiral Eichard-
son? I suggested a quarter. You felt that I was a little extravagant
in my estimate.
A. You mean would I evaluate it as a 20% reduction?
374. Q. Yes, or a 25% reduction.
A. I think the figures in the record speak for themselves.
375. Q. They speak for themselves except for the submarine fac-
tor. No submarines were moved. How do you evaluate the sub-
marine force in the Pacific as part of the whole?
A. You mean as part of the whole Pacific Fleet ?
376. Q. That's right.
A. I never evaluate in that way.
377. Q. 'Wliat I am getting at is, what fraction of the [102]
Pacific Fleet was diverted in June of 1941 to the Atlantic ?
A. The composition of the Fleet, I believe, is in the record in pre-
vious testimony. The detachments are, approximately, in the record.
The figures as to what remained are in the record. If one started to
evaluate, you can't evaluate by numbers alone. You have got to
evaluate by types.
378. Q. With exception of the submarmes, it was practically 25%?
A. With reference to number alone ?
379. Q. Yes.
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. To the best of my recollection that would be a fair estimate,
380. Q. Now would you explain what is the application of the
square rule to the diversion of a fraction of a fleet, in its fighting
force ?
A, I don't know what you mean,
381. Q. That means nothing — that phrase?
A, No, it doesn't to me, sorry,
382. Q. Is there any section or paragraph of WPL-46, Admiral
Stark, where the term ''War Warning" is used?
A. Not that I recall.
383. Q. Has the term any more significance in naval parlance than
in ordinary speech?
A. Well, to me it was a very glaring phrase — to me and to those
of us who went over that dispatch,
384. Q. Has it any more significance than it has in ordinary
speech ?
A. I would say used as it was, that it did. ^
385. Q. The phrase "mobilize" does have a very definite meaning
under WPL-46, does it not ?
A, Yes,
386. Q. Is it not accurate to say that there is a regularly established
procedure for putting the Navy on a war basis under Rainbow 5, and
tliat that procedure is to issue orders to mobilize or to execute WPL-46
in whole or in part?
A. It is so far as directing execution in total or in part. I don't
recall for the moment with regard to the mobilization, but I may state,
and- 1 think it is repetition, that we were practically mobilized at that
time. I had nothing else left to mobilize, as I recall.
387. Q. You never at any time prior to December 7 sent out any
orders to mobilize under WPL-46 ?
A. No.
388. Q, Did you ever keep any record of your conversations
[103] with the President, during the year 1941 ?
A, No, I did not.
389. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you omitted the
phrase, "in any direction", which you used to characterize a surprise
aggressive move by Japan in the dispatch of Novembar 24, did you
not?
A. Yes, Let me check that. I will make sure. Yes, I did omit
it. I did not put it in.
390. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, you particularized the
description of objectives of a Japanese amphibious ex]3edition as the
Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo, did you not?
A, I stated in that dispatch that the number and the equipment
of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces
indicated — repeat "indicated" — an amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo,
391. Q. In this respect, then, your dispatch of November 27 re-
stricted the geographical area from "any direction" to specific areas,
did it not?
A, I do not consider that it restricted it to the areas mentioned.
I stated that the organization of the Naval task forces indicated cer-
tain objectives, but the fact that I didn't mention others does not
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 87
necessarily exclude them, particularly in view of the preceding dis-
patch to which you have referred. I make mention in that connec-
tion, if I may, with reference to the previous dispatch to which you
referred, in which the phrase, "in any direction", was used, that that
message, in addition to being sent to CinCAF and CinCPac was also
sent to Comll, Coml2, ComlS, and ComlS. I meant to invite atten-
tion to it at the time we were talking about it, but it slipped my
mind. In other words, I not only w^anted, as I then mentioned, to
put forth the thought that Hawaii might be an objective, but that
the attack might come anywhere, on the Canal, or the whole coast.
392. Q. Well, will you agree, Admiral Stark, that the addressee of
such dispatches as those of November 24 and November 27 could
reasonably conclude that your last-stated expectation of the direc-
tion of the Japanese movement, in your dispatch of November 27, was
designed to be more precise that the directions indicated in your
dispatch of November 24?
A. The dispatch of the 24th mentioned the Philippines or Guam
as a possibility, and stated that it might be in any direction. The
dispatch of the 27th stated that the information we had indicated
an amphibious expedition to the southward, including the Philip-
pines, and it was confirmatory. It was not intended to limit the
previous notice of the addressees in the November 24 dispatch — that
they were immune. It simply showed the information that we had.
Frank L. Middleston, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[10 Jf] 393. Q. The question was, whether you did not agree
that the addressee of these two dispatches could, and probably did,
reasonably conclude that the last dispatch was much more precise in
the direction indicated than the earlier message.
A. I am perfectly willing, and have tried to answer the question
as to what the dispatch meant to me, namely, as to what information
we had indicating where it might fall, but it was far from my mind
as to making that exclusive. We had data indicating these points;
lack of data regarding other points didn't necessarily mean that they
could not be attacked. And in the previous dispatch, the words "iii
any direction" were put in there to show that while we were giving
what we had, that w^e did consider that it might come anywhere, even
so far to the eastward as the United States.
394. Q. And in your mind the message of the 27th did not limit
or change the breadth or the scope indicated in the message of the
24th?
A. No, it did not.
395. Q. At the time of your dispatch of November 24th, you testi-
fied in your direct testimony, Admiral Stark, that the words "in any
direction" expressed your thought that an attack on Pearl Harbor
was a possibility.
A. That is right. And to broaden that, I have just brought up
the question showing where that dispatch was addressed.
39r). Q. Now, if you thought that Pearl Harbor was a possibility
as a point of attack, th.ere was no reason why, in your dispatch to
Admiral Kimmel, you couldn't have said so explicitly, was there?
A. No, there was no reason why I could not have.
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
397. Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you consider an attack on Pearl
Harbor as no more than a possibility, even on November 27tli ?
A. I considered it as a possibility.
398. Q. But a rather remote possibility?
A. Well, I went between "remote possibility" and "probability".
It is a little difficult to differentiate. I considered it a possibility.
399. Q. You did not consider it a probability ?
A. No, I didn't consider it a probability ? If I had thought it was
a probability I might have mentioneTl it. I thought it a possibility.
400. Q. If you had thought that Pearl Harbor was a probability
on November 27th, you would have doubtless included that in the
specific mention of the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly
Borneo ?
A. No, I don't know that I would have. We were giving a war
warning that Japan might strike. We gave the best UOS] in-
formation we had indicating points which might be struck. We
didn't exclude anything else, and the fact that other places were
possibilities was intended to stand.
401. Q. My question was, If you had conceived Pearl Harbor to
be a probable point of attack, you would have included it specifically
in your message of November 27 ?
A. If I had had information that indicated that Pearl Harbor was
a point of attack, I certainly should have included it.
402. Q. I think you testified in your direct examination. Admiral
Stark, that after the dispatch of November 24th, you did not intend
Admiral Kimmel to interrupt his training or discontinue his health
cruises for all-out security measures?
A. I think it was with reference to the dispatch of October 16th
that I mentioned that.
The court then, at 4 : 05 p. m., took a recess until 4 : 10 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interested parties and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, (Ret) (Continued) :
403. Q. I refer you to Page 52 of the record of Monday, August 7,
1944, question No. 141, which reads :
141. Q. What action did you expect the commander-in-chief of the Pacific
Fleet to take on the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, now before the court?
A. It was largely informatory. He had previously taken measures regarding
whicli testimony lias been given, which I considered appropriate. I considered
that if in his judgment, with what he had been doing in the course of the month,
he thought any additional tigtening up was necessary he would do it. I was
trying to acquaint him with the picture as I saw it and that there was a possi-
bility of a surprise attack. I left that to his good judgment. And the same
way in the Far East ; I sent no specific instructions. It was not my general
habit to do so.
[106] 142. Q. The language of the dispatch is, and I quote: "A surprise,
aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility." Was your information
at the time such as would have warranted your using language indicating that
the aggressive movement was stronger than a possibility?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 89
A. I didn't feel — I wasn't ready to go to an all-out at that time. Admiral
Kimmel was confronted with problems, and very difficiUt problems, of training.
He was making a so-called health cruise which I had initiated. As I recall,
they were originated with Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, which I
was not yet ready to interrupt. I didn't feel at that time that he was ready
needed to start using everything we had on a war basis, and the word "possi-
bility" was used advisedly, though I knew the situation was certainly no better,
and if anything, deteriorating.
A. You are referring to the dispatch of November 24th, now?
404. Q. I will repeat my question. After November 24th, you
have already testified, have you not, that you did not intend Admiral
Kimmel to interrupt his training or discontinue health cruises for
all-out security measures?
A. I wrote Admiral Kimmel after the dispatch of October 14th
405. Q. No, no ; November 24th.
A. I was thinking of the dispatch of October 17 with reference
to your question, but I am willing to let it stand for the 24th.
406. Q. And yet, after the dispatch of November 27th, you have
testified you expected Admiral Kimmel to institute full security
measures ?
A. That is right.
407. Q. At the time you sent both dispatches, however, in your
own mind an attack on the Hawaiian area was a possibility and not
a probability ; is that correct ?
A. Yes, except that the war warning message certainly gave a
picture of very much more gravity than anything else, anything
previous which had been sent.
408. Q. But you considered an attack on Pearl Harbor a possi-
bility at the time you sent the message on November 24 ?
A. Yes, that is right^
409. Q. And you considered it only a possibility when you sent
your message of November 27th ?
A. I considered war far more probable on the sending of the mes-
sage of the 27th, and to that extent was more likely to happen.
[107] 410. Q. But you have been very definite. Admiral, that
on the 27th you considered an attack on Pearl Harbor only a possi-
bility as distinguished from a probability.
A. Yes.
411. Q. You so testified before the Roberts Commission.
A. Yes. I don't recall about the Roberts Commission but I say
"yes" to that.
412. Q. And you so testify now?
A. Yes.
413. Q. After the dispatch of November 24th, did you have a con-
ference with the President and Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State?
A. After November 24th? I did.
414. Q. That is referred to in the postscript of your letter of No-
vember 25th, which was introduced as an exhibit yesterday, or the
day before.
A. Yes; that is right.
415. Q. Do you recall when that conference was?
A. No, I don't. I think it was shortly after — it was probably the
25th, or very close to it, as I recall. The postscript is not "dated.
416. Q. In Exhibit 16, this letter of November 25th, you state in
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the postscript, "I held this up pending a meeting with the President
and Mr. Hull today." Now, the letter is dated the 25th. Do you
recall whether you held it more than one day ?
A. No, I do not recall. I think it was just about the time the letter
was written, but I don't recall. It may have been the next morning;
it may have been that afternoon. I don't remember. I have no means
of remembering,
417. Q. That postscript represented your very recent and prob-
ably extremely accurate impression of the conference, did it not?
A. Yes.
418. Q. Did your estimate of the situation, namely, that an attack
on Pearl Harbor was a possibility and not a probability, remain the
same after the conference as it had been when you sent (Tie dispatch
of November 24th ?
A. I don't recall that I changed my opinion any, I stated in the —
that is in the record, isn't it, that postscript?
419. Q, Yes, that was read in the vec/)rd before.
A. I gave the thouglit of the President and Mr. Hull in it, and
I gave the thought with regard to Russia in it.
[JOS] 420. Q. But your own mental reaction with respect to the
over-all situation did undergo some change prior to the 27th of
November ?
A. Yes. On the 27th of November when negotiations ceased, that
made, in my opinion, quite a difference in the whole set-up. It brought
it to a head.
421. Q. As I understand it, the basic factor of your personally hav-
ing a more alarming view in the interval between November 24 and
November 27, was the fact that negotiations between our Secretary
of State and Admiral Nomura had ceased ?
A. That is right.
422. Q. You knew, did you not, that on November 26th the United
States had given Japan a note which stated certain basic proposals for
Japanese-American relations? That note is now printed on Page 768
of Volume 2 of Foreign Relations, 1931-1041 ?
A. I don't know whether I did or not, but if you will read the note
it may refresh my memory.
Tlie witness requested jjermission to refresh his memory from
Volume 2 of Foreign Relations, 1931-1941.
The court granted the permission.
423. Q. My inquiry was, Did you know if such was a fact ?
A. I don't recall ever having seen that note.
424. Q. The question is whether or not you knew, on November 26th,
that the United States had given Japan a note which stated certain
basic proposals for Japanese-American relations. I am not asking
whether you knew the precise contents of it.
A. No, I don't remember that note. I do recollect a conference in
the White House at which were present, Mr. Hull, the Japanese Am-
bassador, and myself, when certain items were discussed looking
toward peace. I do not recall the date of that meeting.
425. Q. I think that was quite a bit earlier.
A. But I remember rather distinctly some of the President's pro-
posals. But tliis document which you have given me, I do not recall
ever having seen that.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 91
426. Q. That wasn't the question. Did you know that a document,
a message, a note, was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese
Ambassador on the 2Gth of November?
A. 1 do not recall such, no.
427. Q. Where did you get your information that diplomatic rela-
tions had broken off? Bear in mind that a note looking forward to
peaceful relations had been handed by the Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador on the day before you sent your message of
November 27th.
A. Yes. Wliere did I get the information that negotiations had
been broken off?
[100] 428. Q. Yes.
A. To the best of my recollection and belief, I got it from Mr. Hull.
429. Q. At that time did Mr. Hull tell you that he had handed a note
the day before, on the 2()th, to the Japanese Ambassador?
A. Not that I recollect.
430. Q. You learned nothing from the State Department to indi-
cate that any proposal that might have been made on November 27 was
not intended in good faith by the Secretary of State and that it at least
was not possible of acceptance?
A. On the 26th?
431. Q. Yes.
A. I don't recall the note which you asked me to read, of having
seen it or having heard anything about it. As to whether or not it
Avas made in good faith, you would have to ask the State Department.
Sometimes things are made for the record in the hopes that they will
get through as a last hope.
432. Q. As I understand it, you leave it that although on November
27 you were advised by the Secretary of State that negotiations had
broken off, you never were advised that on the 2Gth a note had been
1 landed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador?
A. I do not recall it, and I have so stated. I haven't the slightest
recollection of that note.
The court then, at 4: 32 p. m., adjounvd until 10 a. m., August 10,
1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 93
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIKY
THURSDAY, AUGUST 10, 1944.
[110] Sixth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 10 :00 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews. U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman, first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his
counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of tlie proceedings of the fifth day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The judge advocate stated that during the proceedings of the fourth
day of the inquiry he had requested the court to take judicial notice
of Navy Regulations and particularly called attention to Article 392,
regarding the Chief of Naval Operations. The judge advocate fur-
ther stated that at this time he desired to call the court's attention
further to Article 433 of Navy Regulations, which more particularly
sets forth the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the adjournment was taken on Wednesday, August 9, 1944,
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) (continued:)
433. Q. I show you a document. Admiral Stark, apparently a
[iii] photostatic copy of a letter that you wrote Admiral Kimmel
under date of 22 March 1941, and ask you if you may identify it?
A. I do, as a letter to Admiral Kimmel, from me, dated 22 March.
A letter dated March 22, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was
submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to
the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
me], U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading
into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the
inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
32," for reference, description appended.
434. Q. Will you read the last paragraph on page five?
A. (Reading:)
With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal ele-
ments within the ITnited States. He further says that information concerning
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to
you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent
to despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade
routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of
shipping which moves over each route.
435. Q. I show you a letter from Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May 1941, and ask
you if you can identify it. I propose to offer it for the purpose of
reading portions thereof.
A. I recognize it as a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, dated 26 May, to the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by
Admiral Kimmel.
A letter dated May 26, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by Rear Ad-
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted to the
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the
interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record
such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
33," for reference, description appended.
[113] 436. Q. Will you read. Admiral Stark, paragraphs seven
and eight of Exhibit 33 ?
A. (Reading:)
7. Information.
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is
far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy,
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is nnable to
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of
what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is
disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition whicla directly contra-
venes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so
necessary to the conduct of military operations.
It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the internationlal
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objec-
tives, even though necessarily late at times," would enable the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of
action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a par-
tially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of inter-
ruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impend-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 95
injr eventualities. ^Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the
Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particul'arly
with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it
even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacihc Fleet be guided by
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instnictions.
It is suggested that it be m'ade a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as
they occur and by the quickest secure means available.
S. Public Opinion.
As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our
people, as reflected in the \ll-i] newsp'apers and magazines, is utterly
wrong. To back into a war, unsupivorted, or only half-heartedly supported by
public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a
very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and tirmness of
national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands
that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and
available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must
go wi'th ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources.
To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only
be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.
Tlie interested party, Kear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, IT. S.
Navy (Ret), stated tliat he reserved the right to read further from
Exhibit 83 at such time as lie. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), might be a witness before the court of inquiry.
437. Q. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he
visited Washington officially in June of 1941, did he not, Admiral
Stark (
A. Yes, that's right. Whether he sent it on before that I don't
recall, but I do recall our having gone over it during his visit.
438. Q. And the subject matter of the important paragraphs were
discussed between you and him i
A. Yes.
439. Q. June of 1941, here in Washington?
A. That's right.
440. Q. And those were official discussions?
A. Yes, discussions on that letter between him and me.
441. Q. Now, do you recall what the discussion was relative to par-
agraph 7, which was the first of the two paragraphs that you read?
A. Which was about — do you wish me to comment on that para-
o;raph ?
442. Q. Yes, will you state to the court what that discussion was ?
A. The discussion covered many things as regard policy. There
are some definite questions which Admiral Kimmel would like to have
answered, which I would like to have answered — which were never
answered until war was declared. For example, [114] and I
think these specific things were asked : What would we do if Japan
attacked Russia ? What would we do if Japan attacked the N. E. I. ?
What would we do if Japan attacked Britain? What would we do
if she attacked any combination of these? He asked those questions,
and as I recall, in one letter I stated to Admiral Kimmel that so far
as I knew, nobody on God's green earth could answer them. It was
impossible to get an answer. In fact, I don't think anybody knew.
Those were definite guides which he simply would like to have had.
They simply were not available. Now as regards current events, I
kept Admiral Kimmel acquainted with them as I knew them, gen-
erally speaking by personal letter. It may have been official letters
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
at times, but it certainly was my aim to give him the picture pretty
much as I had it. This paragraph states that he was "not even sure
of what force woukl be available to him and has little voice in matters
radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks." My
recollection is that I wrote Admiral Kimmel at one period that I did
not intend to detach any further forces from his command and that
his command would stand practically as outlined in Rainbow 5, which
was definite, and which was based on a world estimate. Admiral Kim-
mel did not have all the forces he would like to have had for an open
Pacific campaign, but for what was assigned we gave him what we
thought he needed. I might call attention to the fact that there just
were not enough forces available to the Associated Powers to wage
war all-out in all oceans. We simply didn't have it. Bearing this in
mind, and of the tasks possibly ahead, we gave to him what we thought
would meet his task he was assigned to do. He said, "This lack of
information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty." It was
disturbing to us. Nobody knew what was going to happen. He states
that it created ^'a condition which directly contravenes that singleness
of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary
to the conduct of military operations." I only reply to that, that
we gave him a directive, we gave him forces which we thought, with
all the other problems we were confronted with, were the best suited
to the situation.
443. Q. What do you mean by "gave him a directive"?
A. In.WPL-46.
444. Q. On the part that you have commented on. Admiral Stark,
did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel in June of 1941 rela-
tive to the withdrawal from the Pacific Fleet of another battleship
division ?
A. (Yes), we discussed every question which was facing them.
445. Q. There was then imminent the question of a withdrawal of
an additional battleship division from the Pacific Fleet, [i^^]
was there not ?
A. I don't recall anything but one division.
446. Q. Do you recall any discussion concerning the withdrawal of
an additional division at that time?
A. There may have been. I don't recall it. I do recall, whether
it was then or later, telling him that I didn't expect to withdraw
anything further.
447. Q. Do you recall telling Admiral Kimmel in June of 1941 that
at that time, approximatel}', within a day or two previous to the con-
versation, that you had been told by the Secretary of the Navy that
the President had directed the withdrawal of another battleship
division wih accompanying support, from the Pacific Fleet to the
Atlantic Fleet?
A. No, I do not.
448. Q. Do you recall telling Admiral Kimmel, in connection with
the possible discussion of that character, that you had protested to
Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, to such a movement, and
the matter hacl been held over for a day or two; and that during that
interval you met Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, on the street,
and he had asked you in peremptory tones whether you had already
started the movement of that division of battleships from the Pacific
to the Atlantic ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 97
A. I recall talking about Colonel Stimson, either then or later, in
relation to some movement. I think it was with reference to the
movement which we talked about yesterday, the movement to the
Philippines. At the moment I do not recall specifically another bat-
tleship division under discussion. There ma}^ have been talk of
further withdrawals. They were not made; and I remember telling
him in my opinion they wouldn't be made.
449. Q. Would it reJfresh your recollection to have recalled to you
the fact that Admiral Kinunel later told you that he had taken the
matter up with the President and tliat he had been able to persuade
the President that it was an unwise move ?
A. No, I just don't remember the incident. I know that we didn't
send anything. There were many tilings that came up in the course
of conversation — the whole world over — but I do not recall the par-
ticular incident to which you refer.
450. Q. Now will you continue your comment on paragraph num-
bered 7 ?
A. Admiral Kimmel states, in the first sentence of the following
paragraph, that "tlie rapid developments in the international picture,
both diplomatic and military, and perhaps, even the lack of knowl-
edge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the
furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation
is susceptible to marked improvement." As regards that, I would say
that I did the best I could.
[116] 451. Q. Did you inaugurate any different or better method
after and as a result of that letter from Admiral Kimmel, and con-
'sersation al)out it?
A. Only to keep him informed as well as I could. As with regard
to the O. N. I. information, I might say the O, N. I. papers have,
usually in the margin, notations as to whom the information has been
sent. I believe it was Admiral Ingersoll's custom to look at that.
Commander Wellborn's papers were brouglit to me. I invariably
checked it. I still do, to see whether those wlio should have the in-
formation received it, and if not, to see that they got it ; and as regards
what I knew myself, I kept him. as 1 say, acquainted the best I could.
I wrote him frequently. He goes on to state that, "This is particu-
larly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities
for an intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be care-
fully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training
by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventuali-
ties. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the
Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation,
particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island
development, thus making it even more necessary that the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and ob-
jectives rather than by categorical instructions." If there is one thing
which I have l)een immune from, it has been the issuance of categorical
instructions — and leaving to those, particularly at a distance, what to
do after I give them such information as I have.
452. Q. Have you any comments on the last sentence of the last
paragraph of 7 ?
A. About being guided bj^ broad policy and objectives rather than
by categorical instructions ? I just covered that. You mean the next
paragraph ?
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 8
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The interested party, Eear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), entered.
453. Q. Yes.
A. (Reading:)
It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as
they occur and by the quiclvest secure means available.
I was in complete concurrence with him on that, and that was one
of my objectives.
454. Q. You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that Commander-
in-Chief of Pacific Fleet should be, in so far as you were able, im-
mediately informed of all important developments as they occurred,
and by the quickest secure means available?
A. Yes. The other paragTaph which has been referred to is, "The
current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in
the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. [^iT'] To back
into a war, unsupported, or only half-heartedly supported by public
opinion, is to court losing it. A lefthanded, vacillating approach to a
very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and
firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The
situation demands that our people be fully infoirned of the issues in-
volved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of
success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns,
men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our peo-
ple anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be
reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution." I was told
that I was the first person in the United States to 'take this tack in
talking with responsible bodies and over the radio. I could elaborate
a good deal on that as to what I said and when I said it, but world
preparedness was a thing that stressed completely — not just getting
appropriations and money and slapping our hands and say, "Well, let
somebody else do it." As for telling our people what the conditions
were we were in, I became Chief of Naval Operations in the Fall of
1939, late summer. Congress met in 1940, in January. I went up, I
think, almost the day they met. I was on the stand with the House
Naval Committee, as I recall, nine consecutive days. I was told by
many people in Congress that no man ever took such a grilling. Those
were morning and afternoon sessions. I laid out our whole picture
with regard to the Pacific. It got much publicity and hit headlines.
That was not what I was seeking. I was asking for a 25% increase
in the strength of the Navy, pointing out our weaknesses in every re-
spect. It was a searching analysis of our condition. I thought the re-
quest would carry through because of its modesty, although it involved
a considerable sum of money. It was based, not only on our needs,
but on the capacity of our yards, as they then existed, to take up this
construction. I got 111/2%, which started the program. I may say
that I went back in June and asked for what is generally known as a
70% increase. It was about a 73% increase, involving a great deal of
mone^. I may say that Congress was then scared. France had fallen.
What I had striven hours and hours for in the earlier meetings, I got
almost in a matter of minutes, by telling them that it was impossible
to confront the situation which we miglit face with what we had. Now,
as regard to personnel, which has been mentioned here frequently, I
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 99
went before the Congressional Committees, and I was told, particularly
by the House Naval Appropriations Committee, that no man had ever
talked to them as I did. I portrayed what I considered a very critical
situation. The Fleet was 85% manned. I said it should be a minimum
of 115%, particularly with the increases that were coming. They cut
what I asked for. Struggling for personnel was one of the toughest
things I had. Admiral Kimmel, I think, may recall some of those mat-
ters, as he was a budget officer at that time. When they said that they
had never had \JJS^ the personnel situation jammed down
their throats as I jammed it down, I invited their attention to the
remarks of some previous chiefs of the Bureau of Navigation, showing
how much of it was on the record, if I recall, Andrews being one of
them.
455. Q. Did you agree with Admiral Kimmel's statement of policy
set forth in paragraph 8, Exhibit 33?
A._Yes, I did.
456. Q. One other question about the last paragraph, preceding
paragraph 8: after you had agreed with Admiral Kimmel that you
would immediately inform him of all important developments as they
occurred and by the quickest secure means available, did you do so
between tlien. and 7 December '41 ?
A. To the best of my conscience I did, perhaps not always by the
quickest means but what I considered sufficiently, quick means, some-
times by personal letter, sometimes when I thought it was critical, by
dispatch.
457. Q,. You are now conscious of no important development of
which Admiral Kimmel was not advised as it occurred by the quickest
secure means then available?
A. I have searched my brain, my conscience, my heart, and every-
thing I have got, since Pearl Harbor started, to see wherein I was
derelict or wherein I might have omitted something. There is only
one thought — that doesn't mean that I am right — in my mind there is
only one thought that I regretted. What the effect would have been, I
don't know — and that was the dispatch which was sent by the Army
on the morning of December 7, that I had not paralleled it with my own
system, or that I had not telephoned it. I may be reminded, before
this investigation is over, of other things where I may realize that
t^iere was something more I could have done, but that is the one con-
scious realization I remember and regret, that I have had.
458. Q. You considered the letter, Exhibit 33, so good, did you not.
Admiral Stark, that you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in
a restricted area upon its receipt, among important officers in the
Navy Department ?
A. Yes, it was our general custom to do that, and I mimeographed
this, sent it to all hands who were concern^'cl, followed it up, and as I
recall, assembled all concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself
in my office.
459. Q. There was no written and specific, categorical reply to that
Jetter, Exhibit 33 ?
A. No, when Admiral Kimmel left I asked him, as I recall, in view
of all our conversations and what I had made Ijid] available
to him, the picture as I saw it and the disposition of ships and person-
nel, if he had been sitting where I was, w^ould he give us a fairly clean
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bill of health. As I recall, he smiled and said he would, which was a
matter of ^reat satisfaction to me.
4G0. Q. I ask you whether you can identify this document, which I
now hand you, as a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to you under
date of 26 July 1941, for the purpose of reading portions therefrom
into the record.
A. Yes, I do identify it as a letter from Admiral Kimmel to me,
dated 2(> July 1941?
A letter dated July 20, 1941, from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was sub-
mitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court,
and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the
record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the
inquiry.
There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
34" for reference, description appended.
[1£0] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
461. Q. I will read. Admiral Stark, certain portions of this letter,
Exhibit 34: (Reading:)
(1) The importance of keeping the Comir.ander-in-Chief advised of Depart-
ment policies and decisions and tlie clianges in policies and decisions to meet
changes in the international situation.
(a) We have as yet received no official information as to tlie U. S. attitude
towards Russian participation in the war. particularly as to the degree of coop-
eration, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become
active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for
coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like.
The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and
full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions
are :—
(1) Will England declare war on Japan if .Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?
(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively
provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?
(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint
action, mutual support, etc.?
(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will
ours be?
(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard
Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc?
(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to
offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particu-
larly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes,
.Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Soiithern adven-
tures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for
providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German
success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with
consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion
we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the
Philippines. The Russo-Axis [J 21] war may give us more time.
That portion of the letter that I have just read, Admiral Stark, indi-
cated to you, did it not, that Admiral Kimmel was keenly alert as to
not only the military, but also the international developments, and was*
implei^Tenting the over-all general request in his letter of 26 May,
Exhibit 33, to keep himself fully advised as to developments in that
field?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 101
A. Yes.
462. Q. I ask you if you can identify what I now liand you as a
letter from yourself to Admiral Kimmel dated 22 August, 1941,
enclosing a long draft of a letter dated 19 August 1941?
A. Yes. I recognize this as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel,
22 August 1941. I recognize the enclosure.
The letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, dated 22 August, 1941, was submitted to the
judge advocate, each of the other interested parties, and to the court,
and by the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent
to the inquiry before the court.
There being no objection it was so received and marked "Exhibit
35" for reference, description appended.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, suggested that the
entire letter be used in the interest of saving time in the future.
The interested party, Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) requested
information as to whethei- all the exhibits introduced before the court
would be appended to the record in their entirety.
The judge advocate requested a recess.
The court then, at 11 : 05 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 35 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interested parties and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
[122] The judge advocate made the following statement:
There appears to be some confusion in the minds of the interested
parties, and also in the minds of the court, as to the exact procedure
the judge advocate proposes to follow in writing up this record of
proceedings in its final form. This question arises out of certain
letters which are considered by interested parties to be their own pri-
vate property. Initially, I would like to point out that when these
documents are offered in evidence they are required to be offered in
evidence as a whole. At such time, having been offered in evidence
as a whole, these documents become the property of the convening
authority. The next point that I would like to make is the system
that the judge advocate proposes to follow in appending these exhibits
to the actual record of proceedings itself. For example, we will take
Exhibit 34, which has been offered in evidence before the court. Only
certain extracts have been read to the court. The judge advocate
pro)5oses in such cases to append to the record the extracts as read, or
set tliem out in the record as they were read, which ever seems to be
the more appropriate. But in the event that the matter is appended
to the record and not copied into the record the extracts as read will be
the appended matter and will bear the exhibit number, and a full
description of the document from which the extracts were made will
be attached as a description, and the place where the complete docu-
ment is filed for future reference will also be set out. In the event
that the extracts are copied directly into the record in response to a
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
question put, abviously it is not necessary to again attach the same
matter as an exhibit, but a description of the exhibit will be appended
marked with the same number as a description, and its disposition put
on this page in a manner similar to that which I have just described.
The court made the following statement : The court, in brief,
would like to ask if its understanding, which is as follows, is correct :.
Tlie procedure in Courts and Boards shows in places the introduction
of such things as a ship's log. Extracts from the log are read and then
the record will show that that extract is appended to the record with
an exhibit number. Your method is practically the same thing with
the exception that where counsel has it read directly into the record
it will, of course, not be necessary to again copy it and attach it as an
exhibit, but that the letter from which the reading was made will be
described so that it can be perfectly identified so that we w^ill know
where it is filed, and that will then become the exhibit number which
you have previously given.
The judge advocate replied that that was correct.
[123] The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S.
Navy (Ret) requested information as to whether or not at the time
a document is marked as an exhibit, at that ]Doint of time the entire
document becomes beholden to the court for all purposes and whether
the court becomes the final repository for each such document in toto.
The judge advocate replied that he would follow in all cases the
procedure as he had just outlined it.
The interested partj^. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, re-
cjuested information as to how that affected the proposition that certain
passages in his personal letters not be made a matter of record.
The court replied that a letter which Admiral Stark may have
written to Admiral Kimmel was also the property of Admiral Kimmel
and could be introduced by Admiral Kimmel as a part of the record.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
as follows : It was not our intention to advance such a proposition, but
■what we asked was that by agreement, those parts which we con-
sidered to be inimical to the public interests, if they were disclosed,
would be left out of the record. We are not asking the court to
rule, as a matter of law, in opposition to Admiral Kimmel's position
if he wishes to introduce them. What we wished to make plain was
that we consider some small parts of those letters inimical to the pub-
lic interests and it was not our intention to take the responsibility
for their disclosure. If someone else wishes to take that respon-
sibility that is up to them. But if we could agree at this time that
those letters simply be copied again, leaving out these rather important
sentences, which are small in number, and use those exhibits as re-
copied, tliat would be the proposition to be put.
The court replied that it could not agree to have a letter rewritten
with ])a]'ts left out, and attached to the record; that the only thing
that could be clone would be to describe the letter in the exhibit and
state that they are secret papers and should not be available to any-
body but the convening authority.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, re-
quested clarification as to whether the record was clear that he
(Admiral Stark) refused to take the responsibility for having any of
these passages made public.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 103
The court replied that it was entirely vip to the convening authority ;
that if it is so described in the record and specified to that effect, the
convening authority was then the one responsible.
[124'] The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S.
Navy, requested that vvdien any of these letters are considered inimical
to the public interest, he simply make a statement to that effect to
he noted in the record and noted on the description of the exhibit.
The court made the folloAving statement: I shall direct the judge
advocate now, that when that point is raised, when any of those letters
comes up where secrecy is involved, that he will specify on the exhibit
so that the convening authority tlioroughly understands that it is a
secret document and involves state secrets that should not be made
public.
The judge advocate replied that he would do it not only on the record
but on the exhibit itself when it is placed in the file.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-'
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, witlidrew.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel. U. S. Navy (Ret.) (continued) :
463. Q. Admiral will j^ou please read pages 1 to 11 of Exhibit 35?
The witness read pages 1 to 11, both inclusive, of Exhibit 35, copy
appended, marked "EXHIBIT 35-A".
The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[7^5] Present :
All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to
the inquiry and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross-
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (continued) :
With the permission of the court, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), made the following statement: I have today
been informed that certain vital, pertinent data physically available
now in the ofHce of the Chief of Naval Operations are to be denied
this court. These data are among that which the judge advocate of
this court has endeavored to obtain at my request. Their availability
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy. They are now being
denied this court by order of the Acting Secretary of the Navy. With-
out these data it is impossible for this court to develop the full story of
the disaster at Pearl Harbor. What the motives are prompting the
denial of these data to the court, guarded as it is by the security of
its secret proceedings, I can only surmise, but I can state unequivocally
that the result of this denial is to render impotent this court in its
effort to find the truth of the matter, which constitutes he burden of
its precept. Without a full and fair disclosure of all known and avail-
able evidence, this inquiry is futile. Against such evasion of the clear
mandate of Congress and the demands of simple justice, I most sol-
emnly protest.
The judge advocate stated: The judge advocate has proceeded dili-
gently through the proper channels of the Navy Department to secure
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tlie documents requested by the interested party, Rear Admiral Kim-
mel. His request for that information is still in the hands of the
Secretary of the Navy (1 believe the Director of Naval Comnmnica-
tions). To date, he has had no answer to that letter. He therefore
cannot tell the court whether or not the request has been acceded to or
denied until he receives a reply to that letter.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, IT. S.
Navy, (Ret.) stated: The information I have given the court was
supplied to me by Admiral King this forenoon.
[126] The court stated : The court has nothing to do with the
collection of evidence. That is in the judge advocate's hands.
The interested party. Real Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.) stated: I suggest most respectfully that it might be ap-
propriate for the court to take up this matter with the convening au-
thority to determine whether this development permits it to comply
with its precept. The situation I have described affects very materially
the adequate cross-examination of the witness now testifying, Admiral
Stark.
The court then, at 2 : 35 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 40 p. m., at which
ime it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
interested parties and their counsel. Frederick T. Lachat, j^eoman
first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The court stated (addressing the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) ) : On what do jou base your
assumption that the request has been refused ?
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.) stated : I base my assumption that it has been refused on
a conversation I had with Admiral King, who stated that he would
recommend that it be not made available, and he was sure that the
Acting Secretary would approve it. May I make a further statement ?
These data are vital to me and my counsel for the examination of the
witness now on the stand. We have been waiting since the 1st of
August, when this request was submitted by the judge advocate of
this court at my request, attempting to get this data. One of my
counsel. Captain Lavender, inspected this data by permission of the
Secretary of the Navy and designated the parts that he wished to have
produced before this court. My information is that it will now be
denied. If the court deems it necessary to have further evidence than
that which I have given, I suggest that Admiral King be called before
this court to testify on this point. It is a point which can be readily
established ; it should be established now.
The court stated : The court will aAvait the action of the Secretary
of the Navy on the official request for those papers. If it is denied,
then, we will be better able to act. In the meantime, the judge advocate
should make every effort to obtain a reply to that letter.
[127] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated: I fear that there will be further delays.
The witness has stated to the court as an apparently approved state-
ment that he expects to leave for London the latter part of this week
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 105
or early next week. That is the primary reason for nn^ insistence on
an answer in regard to these data at this time.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated:
If I may say so, I do not recall having stated that I was going to leave
at the end of this week. I hope to finish, if posible, with what Admiral
Kimmel wants of me, but I do not think I can stay much beyond
this week.
The court stated (addressing Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy) : The interested party, it is assumed, understands that he will
remain an interested party whether or not he is liere and that his
interest will continue if he leaves.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated:
I do understand that. That is why it was rather a surprise to me when
I w^as brought over here, in the first place. I had no knowledge of it,
I was told to come here for a short time and get back. My interest
will be left in the hands of counsel.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.), stated: May I give the basis of my statement that I
understand Admiral Stark is returning to London ? In a letter signed
by Admiral King, dated 20 July 1944, there is a memorandum for the
Chief of Naval Personnel, which was supplied to me by the Chief of
Naval Personnel: (Reading) "Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll
are being made available immediately for witnesses. It is assumed
that their presence will be required only for a limited period. Neither
of tliese two admirals, or any other officer on active service on im-
portant duty, can be brought to Washington for an indefinite period
without interfering with the war effort.
The court stated : We Avill proceed with the testimony of this witness.
464. Q. When you wrote Exhibit 35, Admiral Stark, on the date of
22 August 1941, you had just returned to Washington from a so-called
Atlantic Charter conference in the North Atlantic, had you not ?
A. That is right.
465. Q. There were present at that conference, among others, the
President 'and Mr. Churchill?
A. Yes.
[l£8l 466. Q. You stated in your letter : "Thaidc God we should
have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete.
It has clianged so many times, but now I think we at last have some-
thing fairly definite — maybe." Did you tell Admiral Kimmel what
"something fairly definite" was ?
A. In the rest of my letter I gave him such information of that con-
ference. I did not state what was in full swing in the Atlantic, as I
recall. The letter covers some of the points of that conference.
467. Q. Did some of the fairly definite thinjzs have reference to
(lie Pacific?
A. Tlie discussion was broad. It may have included the Pacific,
but as I recall, not a great deal. Russia was mentioned, I believe,
wit]i regard to some aid, but so far as any commitment of what we
'iiight do in case Japan attacked Russia or"the British or the N. E. I.,
I do not recall.
468. Q. By that do you mean that no such commitments were made
or that currently you have no memory of them ?
A. To the best of my belief, and so far as I know, no commitments
were made.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
469. Q. Did you think that you did know of any commitments
which were made at that Athxntic conference ?
A. Up to the moment of your question, I thought I did, but there
were conversations at which I was not present, where I have no idea
of what might have been said. I was given no understanding of any
commitments made regarding what I have just testified to.
470. Q. On the 27th of January, 1942, Mr. Churchill made a speech
in the House of Commons, which I quote: "On the other hand, the
probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these
matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself
attacked, would come into a war in the Far East and tlius make final
victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expecta-
tion has not been fulfilled by the events. It fortified our British deci-
sion to use our limited resources on the actual fighting front."
The court stated : From what are you reading?
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.) stated: The speech of Mr. Churchill to the House of
Commons.
This question was objected to by the judge advocate and by the
interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, on the ground
that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.
[129] The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), replied.
The court announced that the objection was sustained.
471. Q. At any time between the date of the Atlantic Conference
and December 7 were you advised of any commitments made by the
United States to Britain in the eventuality of war breaking out in the
Pacific between Japan and Britain ?
A. Absolutely none.
472. Q. Do you recall receiving a dispatch, probably on 7 December
1941, from Admiral Hart bearing a Greenwich time date of December
7, which I am advised by those more familiar with astronomical time
than I, means December 6' in Manila, the substance of which was, "Cine-
Asiatic reports to OpNav that he has learned from Singapore that the
United States had assured Britain armed support under several eventu-
alities. I have received no corresponding instructions from you,"
copy of that dispatch having been sent to Admiral Kimmel for
information ?
A. Yes, I have some remembrance of that dispatch.
473. Q. At that that time did you know of any assurances that
Britain would receive armed support from the United States under
any eventuality ?
A. No.
474. Q. Did you understand at any time prior to the receipt of that
message that the United States had given Britain assurance that it
would come to its armed support if Japan attacked Britain in the
Pacific?
A. I did not, nor did I understand it after receipt of the dispatch,
475. Q. If any such commitment had been made b}' a higher author-
ity than you, you had no information concerning it?
A. None whatsoever.
476. Q. I ask if you can identify this, Admiral, as a letter written by
Admiral Kimmel to you under date of 12 September 1941, which 1
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 107
would like to offer in evidence for the purpose of reading portions into
the record.
A. Yes. I note it is unsigned, but I recall it.
The letter of 12 September 1941 from Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was
submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the
court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading'
into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent
to the inquiry.
[130] There being no objection, it was so received and marked
"EXHIBIT 36" or reference, description appended.
477. Q. Will you read from it?
A. (Reading:)
Dear "Betty",
We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and
King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic
is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?
I noticed that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for
surface raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as
raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting
offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility
of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improb-
able, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat
of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-
Japanese rapprochement and tlie absence of any specific reference to tlie Pacific
in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation
out here is. Specific questions that arise are:
(a) What orders' to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic
and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present
escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them
have been to protect their convoy from interference ; to avoid use of force if
possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication,
preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive
measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature
of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I
feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.
(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese
situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the
vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to
bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb con-
tacts, without waiting to be attacked?
478. Q. That will be enough of that letter. Did you write Ad-
miral Kimmel under date of 23 September 1941 in response to the
letter which you just read, Exhibit 36?
A. Yes.
\_131] 479. Q. The document I show you is the letter which you
wrote to him under that date ?
A. Yes, it is a letter to Kimmel from me, dated 23 September 1941.
The letter of 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R, Stark,
U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was
submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to
the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copv appended marked
"EXHIBIT 37".
480. Q. Will you please read this exhibit ?
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 37.
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
481. Q. You intended by the second postscript, which you have
just read, Admiral, to indicate to Admiral Kimmel that you would
keep him fully and promptly informed as to all diplomatic develop-
ments which you learned, at least from the Secretary of State? -
A. That's right.
482. Q. Can you identify the document I now hand j^ou as a letter
you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 17 October 1941?
A. Yes, I recognize it as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, dated
17 October 1941.
The letter of 17 October 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy^, was sub-
mitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court,
and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into
the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to
the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
38" for reference, description appended.
483. Q. Will you read the first three paragraphs of that letter?
A. (Reading:)
Dear Kimmel : Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours
but from our despatches you know about all that we do.
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you merely stated the "possil)ility" ; in fact I tempered the message
handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case
after long pow-wov.'s in tlie White House it was felt we should be on guard, at
least until something indicates the trend.
If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of
the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura
and gave the dope as I saw it.
484. Q. Enclosed with that letter was a copy of a memorandum
under the date of 17 October 1941, signed by R. E. Schuirmann, and
addressed to C.N.O. Will you read the last paragraph in the enclosed
paragraph ?
A. (Reading:)
Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and
no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or
may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the
military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by
what cabinet is in power.
485. Q. In your dispatch of 16 October you stated :
* In either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility.
Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her
present desperate situation, there is a possibility that Japan may attack these
two powers.
In Exhibit 15, your dispatch of November 24, you state:
The situation, coupled with statements of the Japanese Government and
movements of their naval and military forces, indicates, in our opinion, a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam as a possibility.
A. That is November 24?
486. Q. Yes. Did you use the word "possibility" in your message
of November 24 in the same sense in which you used it in your message
of October 16, as interpreted in your letter of October 17?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 109
A. What you are asking me, as I understand it, is if the letter which
I wrote following the dispatch of October IG qualified the dispatch
of November 24^ I would say the correspondence and the dispatch
of October IG and the letter of October 17 stand as an entity.
487. Q. When j^ou used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of
October IG, you wrote Admiral Kimmel that you personally did not
believe that the Japs were going to sail into us ?
A. I did.
488. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of
November 24, did j^ou use it in the same connotation ?
A. I still was not convinced that it was more than a possibility, and,
as I have already testified, after reading [■i'^o] the dispatch of
October IG, I wanted to make sure that Admiral Kimmel, so far as I
was concerned, was not to read into that dispatch that he was to stop
his training or his cruises to the coast.
489. Q. When you used "possibility" in your dispatch of October
16, you told him in your letter that you personally did not mean by
that any individual thought that the Japanese were going to sail into
us?
A. I stated at that time that I did not believe the Japs were going
to sail into us ; that is right.
490. Q. Although the word in the dispatch referring to that thought
was "possibility"?
A. Yes.
491. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of
November 24, did you use it in the same sense in which you used it in
the dispatch of October 16, namely, that you did not personally ex-
pect a surprise aggressive move or attack on the Philippines or
Guam ?
A. Well, I stated it as a possibility. I still considered it only a
possibility.
492. Q. When you used "possibility" on October 16, you said that
although it was a possibility in the sense that anything might be a
possibility, you personally did not believe anything would happen ?
A. Yes.
493. Q. Did you use the word "possibility" in your dispatch of
November 24 with the same connotation?
A. In the message of November 24 I still maintained it was a possi-
bility, and I was not convinced at that time that the Japs were going
to sail into us from the evidence I had.
494. Q. That was when?
A. The message of the 24th which you are questioning me about,
but there was that possibility. I had thought they might, and in any
case, I sent the message, to be on guard. I made it a possibility be-
cause I felt that was what it was. If I had felt that it had been a
strong probability, I would have stated so.
[134] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered, Frederick T. Lachat, j^eoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdreM'.
495. Q. Do I understand that you used the word "possibility" in the
same sense on November 24th as you did on October 16th ?
A. Generally speaking. I qualified it in the message of the 16th,
and I also wrote regarding the message of the 24th, but it was a possi-
'110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bility. The word "possibility", as far as I am concerned, stands in
these. dispatches.
496. Q. But when you used "possibility" in October, you frankly
stated to Admiral Kinimel that you didn't expect the possibility to
eventuate ?
A. I said I didn't expect Japan to sail into us at that time. I didn't
say that it wouldn't eventuate.
497. Q. The wording of the message was: "Since the U. S. and
Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situa-
tion there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers",
and you wrote and said as you used the word in that message you
personally did not believe the Japanese were going to sail into us.
A. At that time ; that is right.
498. Q. Now, when you used "possibility" in your clispatch of No-
vember 24, did you personally believe that the Japanese were not going
to sail into the Philippines and Guam?
A. I thought there was a possibility of it. I don't know how differ-
ently to express it.
499. Q. Did you think there was any more possibility of the Japa-
nese sailing into the Philippines and Guam on November 24th than
you thought on October 16th there was a possibility of Japan attacking
Britain and the United States?
A. Well, we had further evidence about the movements of forces,
again indicating that possibility ; and the negotiations certainly were
getting no better, and in fact, looked less likely of favorable outcome,
and the two circumstances combined caused me to reiterate that possi-
bility and keep it in front of Admiral Kimmel.
500. Q. Then do I gather that on November 24th you did feel there
was more of a possibility of an attack by Japan on the Philippines and
Guam than you felt on October 16th there was a possibility of an attack
on the United States and Britain?
A. Well, I thought it sufficient to again warn Admiral Kimmel.
[135]- 501. Q. Yes. I understand that, but did you think there
was more possibility on November 24th than you did on October 16th ?
A. Generally speaking, I would say '"yes", that we had more evidence.
502. Q. Then why didn't 3'ou use words that would clearly indicate
that change of thought on your part, Admiral Stark ?
A. I gave him the evidence I had, and I gave him my interpretation
of it.
503. Q. In your letter of November 25th, you mean ?
A. In the dispatch of 24 November.
504. Q. But you used the same words relative to the possibility of an
attack that 7/ou used in October when you said that you personally
didn't believe that it would happen?
A. Yes, and I added in the dispatcli of November 24th, "in any direc-
tion", as well as including an attack on the Philippines or Guam.
The judge advocate objected to the line of questioning on the ground
that it was haznig the witness.
The court announced that the objection was not sustained.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret.) stated that he v^'ould not pursue this line of questioning further.
505. Q. I show you that which appeals to be a letter from yourself
to Admiral Kimmel dated November 14, 1941, enclosing a memorandum
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 111
from yourself and General Marshall to the President. Do you identify
that as a letter that you wrote, with the enclosure ?
A. I do.
The letter of November 14, 1941 from Admiral Harold K Stark,
U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Eet.)
enclosing a memorandum to the President, was submitted to the judge
advocate^, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the inter-
ested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such ex-
tracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection it was so received and marked '"EXHIBIT
39" for reference, description appended.
[J36] 506. Q. Will you read, Adiniral Stark, the fourth para-
graph of the letter, the letter beginning "Dear Mustapha"?
A. (Reading) : "Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be
seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently
submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see
from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be
followed remains to be seen.
507. Q. T shoAv you a document which is attached to the letter en-
titled "]\lemorandum for the President"'. Can you identify this docu-
ment ?
A. Yes. This is a Memorandum for the President from the War and
Navy Departments, Washington, dated November 5. 1941.
The memorandum from the War and Navy Departments, Washing-
ton, dated November 5, 1941, Serial 0130012, was submitted to the judge
advocate, to the interested pai'ties, and to the court, and by the inter-^
ested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. U. S. Navy, (Ret.) ,
offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 39 (A)!" •
508. Q. Will vou read the memorandum. Admiral Stark?
The witness read the memorandum. Exhibit 39(A).
509. Q. In the memorandum of November 5th. you and General
Marshal! jointly stated to the President that military action agaiiist
Japan should be undertaken — this is under (b) on Page 4 — only in one
or more of the following eventualities. No. 1 of which is, "A direct act
of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated
territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the
Netherlands East Indies'-. At the time you made that recommendation
to the President in conjunction with General Marshall, were you aware
of any agreement or understanding between the United States and
Britain by which this country had agreed to do that?
A. No.
510. Q. Was this recommendation in the niemorandum of Novem-
ber 5th the original initiation of that thought so far as you know ?
A. Tliat ])oint had been discussed, as I recall, as to just what its effect
would be if concluded at this time. I don't recall it having been set
down before. .
511. Q. What do you mean by "set down"?
A. I mean that it was formulated into a definite proposition.
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1S7] 512. Q. How long had that problem been under discus-
sion ? You said it had been discussed before November 5th.
A. Well, I couldn't recall that. We discussed that entire Far East-
ern situation for a matter of months.
513. Q. Had it been discussed as far back as August of 1941?
A. I couldn't recall.
514. Q. With whom were these discussions to which you have made
reference ?
A. The War Plans discussed them. I don't remember ever having
discussed them with the British.
515. Q. There had been conversations with the British, not only in
the North Atlantic in August, but earlier in 1941 in Washington.
Was that called the Chief s-of-Staff conference, of Staff conferences?
A. Yes.
516. Q. On either of those occasions, do you recall any discussion of
what the United States would do if Japan attacked eitlier the Neth-
erlands or Bi^itain in the Pacific?
A. Not so far as giving the slightest commitment, and as regards
this particular point I do not recall any definite proposition on this
until we formulated it here.
517. Q. Do you recall how long the matter had been under discus-
sion between you and General Marshall?
A. No. Mr. Hull's request brought this thing to its present form.
I couldn't recall the time of that.
518. Q. What was Mr. Hull's request?
A. Whether we volunteered this to Mr. Hull, or
, 519. Q. This memorandum is to the President.
A. I will take that back regarding Mr. Hull.
520. Q. Had there been any discussion with the President about
this point prior to the memorandum?
A. Yes. I don't know about this memorandum as it stands but
theer were many discussions with the President about the Far Eastern
situation.
521. Q. I know, but the possibility of your firm recommendation
contained in (b) (1) on Page 4
A. You mean, had there been any discussion on that particular line
before this was formed?
522. Q. Yes.
A. I do not recall.
523. Q. This was sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 14th of November,
some nine days after it was dated, and at that time you stated that
you were not informed whether your advice v/ould be followed or not?
A. Right.
[138] 524. Q. Did you ever get any advice as to that?
A. Not to my recollection.
525. Q. You stated yesterday afternoon that the new information
which you got which prompted the dispatch of November 27th, advised
that the Japanese-United States negotiations were about to be stopped?
A. I said they had ceased.
526. Q. Had ceased. Do you recall when — and by "when" I mean
in the morning or afternoon of November 27th — you got that infor-
mation?
A. It would be during the working day. I would hesitate to say
whether it was morning or afternoon.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 113
527. Q. Well, now, does the symbol on this Exhibit 17 assist you
in locating that at all, 272337 ?
A. Yes. From that it would appear that it might have been in the
late afternoon, but I couldn't say that it was. I don't remember just
what time of day that message was cleared. It is a priority dispatch.
528. Q. Do these symbols, 272337, refer to Greenwich Mean Time,
or Eastern War Time?
A. I think tliat was GMT. I'm not sure.
529. Q. That fact will be ascertained?
A. Yes, I shall be glad to find that out. May I add that when you
asked me what time of day, the question was whether you had intended
asking me what time we first considered it, or wdien we cleared it.
530. Q. What time of day, Admiral, did you learn about the cessa-
tion of negotiations?
A. What time of day we decided on it ?
531. Q. No, the question was, What time of day you learned about
the cessation of negotiations, when the Secretary informed you?
A. Of course, it was prior to the sending of this dispatch, but I don't
recall just what time of day it was.
532. Q. Now, do you recall how you learned that ; from whom you
got the information?
A. No. Whether it came direct from Mr. Hull, or whether it came
through Captain Schuirmann, or just how it came, I do not recall.
533. Q. If it came direct from Mr. Hull, would it have come by
telephone, or would you have gone up to the State Department?
A. It might have come either way He frequently telephoned me.
[13d] 534. Q. Since j^esterday, did you go over the note that
was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on
the 26th of November. We had some conversation about that yes-
terday afternoon.
A. No, except that I went over it when you handed it to me.
535. Q. I didn't hand it to you.
A. You gave it to me, pointed it out, aild asked me if I had seen it.
636. Q. And you still have no memory of either having seen or
heard of that note or the fact that a note had been handed to the
Japanese Ambassador the day before your message was dispatched
on November 27th ?
A. No, I have no recollection of that long note.
537. Q. Until I mentioned it yesterday, you had no recollection
of it?
A. Correct.
538. Q. Did you attend a conference with the President at the
White House with Admiral Nomura between the 27th of November
and December 7th ?
A. Between what ?
539. Q. Between November 27th and December 7th?
A. I don't recall but I might be able to find out if I can find the
record of my visits to the White House. If I did it should be in
the record which was kept in the CNO office. I recall being in the
White House with the President and Mr. Hull and Admiral Nomura,
the Japanese Ambassador.
540. Q. Well, you followed the international situation very closely,
as indicated by this joint memorandum that you and General Marshall
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 9
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
submitted on the 5th of November, particularly with reference to the
Far Eastern situation ?
A. Particularly with reference to the Japanese situation, yes.
541. Q. Again, doesn't it appear to you that you must have hej^rd
of the substance of this message on November 26th at or about the
time it was sent?
A. No, I didn't. The message that I started to tell you about
yesterday, and which you interrupted and said that was an earlier
message, from which I assumed you had a record of my visits and
knew something of what had been discussed.
542. Q. I have no such record.
A. I am sorry. We had a conference in the White House — and I
give you this only from recollection ; it should not be taken as strictly
accurate but I am perfectly [-?-4<^] willing to give you my
recollection of what transpired. And I might mention, the State
Department officials could probably give you exact information.
There was a proposition made, in effect, to the Japanese Ambassador
by which the President, so far as he was possibly able, would see that
the Japanese were guaranteed rice from the south — I have forgotten
whether it was Indo-China, or not — but that he would undertake to
see that she got rice. Whether other raw materials were included,
I do not recall at the moment — provided she would stop where she
was and, as I recall, send no more troops into Indo-China, and hold the
status quo at least for the time being. I rather hesitate to testify
to that because it is not clear. The matter was later made a record
of to be sent. It was a fair offer showing the President's desire to
maintain peace and get Japan to stop further building up in the south,
and if she did, he was willing — ^lie couldn't guarantee it, but so far
as he was able as President of the United States — to guarantee her
certain things. I recall Admiral Nomura stating that one of the
things they were going south for was to insure their food supply.
That was about this time, I would say.
543. Q. Might it have been the preparation of this very message
of November 26 about which I am speaking ?
A. Well, the message you showed me goes way, way beyond the
subject of the conversation that afternoon; it covered a very large
field which was not discussed at that time. It sort of opened up
and hashed over the whole subject.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew,
[i^-?] 544. Q. Was the information you received relative to the
cessation of negotiations, that there would be no more talks between
Admiral Nomura or the Japanaese?
A. At that time?
545. Q. Yes.
A. Oh, no, we were endeavoring to continue.
546. Q. I am talking about November 27 now.
A. My information as of November, 27 was to the effect that the
conversations had ceased.
547. Q. There was no more talk?
A. That is what it meant to me.
548. Q. There were no more formal conferences ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 115
A. Yes.
549. Q. Well now you know that there were more conferences ; you
knew that at the time, didn't you ?
A. Well, the official discussions which had been taking place were—
at least I was so "nformed — terminated. They had not been able tQ
agree on a solution.
' 550. Q. What I am getting at is, just what, in the way of talks,
if any, may have occurred after that ?
A. Except the one at 1300 on 7 December, I do not recall. I was
told that the negotiations had failed, that they were over.
551. Q. Was it the negotiations had failed, or the negotiations had
ceased ?
A. They had ceased.
552. Q. Well, you knew then that there were further conversations
after November 27, and you knew that fact from reading the public
press, in addition to what official information you may have had,
didn't you?
A. I just don't recall after that what was said and what wasn't
said.
553. Q. In Volume II of "Foreign Relations of the United States,
1931-1941," on page 772, there appears a memorandum of conversa-
tion on December 1 between the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Kurusu
and the Secretary of the State. State whether or not that refreshes
your recollection as to your knowledge at that time, either officially or
from the newspapers, that the negotiations between the State Dej)art-
ment and the Japanese representatives in this country were continuing
after November 27?
A. You give it from the record. I can onlj^ assume that it took
place. What I am stating is that the thing, so far as we were con-
cerned, spelled failure on the 27th, or at least that we had no hope of
a favorable solution.
[142] 554. Q. But the message you sent to Admiral Kimmel
said nothing about failure of negotiations. It merely said that nego-
tiations with Japan, looking to a stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific, have ceased. Now I am directing your attention, Admiral
Stark, to whether you knew that negotiations in fact were continuing,
however phantom they may have been.
A. I assume by ceasing, that they had failed. I will stand on the
message as it was sent, that the negotiations with Japan, "looking
toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific, have ceased."
555. Q. Well, did you mean when you used that word "ceased" to
convey the impression to Admiral I^mmel that there would be no
tnore negotiations in fact, or that in spirit and in theory they had
become spent, and nothing more in reality could be accomplished,
November 27 had been dissipated somewhat ?
A. The message meant to me that all the efforts which had been
spent looking toward stabilization had ceased, and the conversations
were over, and I stated that an aggressive move was expected. It
mean't to me, failure.
556. Q. And if Admiral Kimmel saw in the public press on the
days following the receipt of this message that there were continued
negotiations, continued conversations, continued meetings between
Admiral Nomura and Secretary of State, did you think that he would
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have the reasonable impression that the basis of your message of
November 27 had been dissipated somewhat ?
A. I would have thought that if he was in doubt, after receiving
both a war warning — and saying, "an aggressive move by Japan is
expected" — that if he was worried by the message as to what it meant,
he might have asked me for a clarification.
557. Q. Well, do you agree that there is some doubt in view of
possible continuation of negotiations, as to how the message might
have been reasonably interpreted by Admiral Kimmel ?
A. The message of the 27th ?
558. Q. Yes.
A. Well, you are asking me how Admiral Kimmel interpreted it.
559. Q. I am asking you how you might assume that Admiral
Kimmel reasonably could have interpreted it ?
A. I can tell you what I had in mind when I sent it.
560. Q. Please do.
A. I think I have already testified to it, but anyway, (Reading) :
"This is a w^ar warning." To me that was about as strong as I could
make it. It was followed by the [^4^] statement that "an
aggressive move by Japan is expected." The words, "war warning,"
coupled with the expectation within the next few days of a (war
warning) looked to me definite that Japan was going to make an
aggressive move and strike somewhere. I further stated, giving him
what information we had as to where we thought her set-up, as we
knew it, indicated.
561. Q. Well, you now" know the true facts to be that on November
26, the United States had made a proposition to Japan which Japan
had not rejected on November 27? You know now, do you not, that
so far as negotiations were concerned, the status was that on Novem-
ber 26, the United States had made a proposition to Japan which
Japan had not rejected, and which had been transmitted to Tokio
for deliberation ?
A. Yes, from what you have shown me in the book.
562. Q. Did that situation constitute an end of negotiations ?
A. You mean the sending of that dispatch ?
563. Q. The handing of this message to the Japanese Government;
did that situation as I have stated, indicate to you negotiations with
Japan had ceased?
A. I am confused.
564. Q. So far as the negotiations with Japan were concerned their
status on November 26 and on November 27 was that the United
States had made a proposition to Japan, embodied in the note of
November 26, which Japan had not rejected and which ostensibly
had been submitted to Tokio for deliberations. I now ask you
whether that situation constituted a cessation of negotiations as
stated in your message of November 27?
A. Well, until the answer was received or rejected — I suppose it
might be questioned whether or not it was to be a sign-off or "here
is the last thing" — knowing that it couldn't be accepted. As to that,
I don't know.
565. Q. From your reading of the note yesterday. Admiral, would
you term this note of November 26 an ultimatum ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 117
A. Reading that, I would not say that it would be considered an
ultimatum.
666. Q. In the sense of which you used "ultimatum" in your memo-
randum to the President of November 5 ?
A. No.
The court then, at 4 : 27 p. m., adjourned until 10 a.m., Auirust 11
1944. ^ '
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 119
PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INaUIKY
FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944.
[144] Seventh Dat
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 10 a.m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Eet), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Adovcate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his
counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the sixth day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the Inquiry were
present.
The judge advocate asked the court to take judicial knowledge of
"Communication Instructions 1939", as in effect on December 7, 1941,
calling particular attention to paragraph 935 a., and c.
At the direction of the court, paragraph 935 a., and c, of "Com-
munication Instructions 1939", were read by the judge advocate.
With the permission of the court, the interested party. Rear Ad-
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following
statement: I have been informed that the judge advocate of this court
has received a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, denying
to this court, and to tlie judge advocate, and to me, certain data which
is on file in the Navy Depaitment. If it be true that he has received
this letter, denying to this court this data, I wish to [^4^] state
that this data is essential to the establishment of the facts in connection
with this case, and I am respectfully suggesting to the court that if
the data is of such a highly secret nature that it cannot be presented
to this court, that full consideration be given by the court to taking
steps whereby they, the members of the court, can inspect this data.
I also respectfully request the letter received by the judge advocate
of the court be made a part of the record of proceedings of this court,
the letter on this subject, I mean.
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The judge advocate replied : Admiral Kimmel, under date of 1
August 1944, made a request upon the judge advocate that he be sup-
plied with certain documents on file in the Navy Department, relating
to a subject matter which the judge advocate does not consider it
necessary for him to set out in his reply. The judge advocate on the
same day wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, setting out the
general subject matter of the dispatches that he had been requested
to obtain for the interested party, Admiral Kimmel. The judge ad-
vocate was informed by the Secretary of the Navy, under date of 2
August 1944, that "it appears that Admiral Kinnnel had not been
made available to have copies of certain dispatches which could be
construed as warnings of hostilites. The Secretary of the Navy's
orders in this matter are set out in enclosure (A), which you will
please show to those concerned." Enclosure (A) was a letter from
Admiral Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of 27 De-
cember 1943, in which Admiral Kimmel had requested that the Navy
Department make available to him certain documents and letters in
its possession. Accordingl}', in response to the Secretary of the Navy's
directive, the judge advocate prepared two letters under date of 9
August 1944, in which he made a request on the Secretary of the Navy
that he be supplied with certain documents, the file numbers of which
he set out in these two letters. The Secretary of the Navy replied
under date of 10 August 1944, that the material requested "cannot be
furnished as it is not in the public interest to introduce this type of
material in evidence before the court of inquiry of which you are judge
advocate." The file number of this letter is. Secret, serial number
01662416, dated 10 August 1944.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), stated: I respectfully request that all of the corespond-
ence on this subject which the judge advocate has just read be made
a part of the record of this court.
The court stated: With reference to that last request, it will be
pertinent, at such time as you call your own witnesses, to introduce
those documents as a part of the record if you wish. It is at present
the province of the judge advocate as to whether he wishes to make it
a part of the [^4^] record or not.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), stated: I don't wish to be too insistent in this matter,
and I don't want to be in any sense disrespectful, but I think I must
emphasize the fact that this data which I have requested is essential
for proper examination of the witness now on the stand, Admiral
Stark, that what I have requested is to show affirmatively in the record
that I have exhausted every means at my command to accomplish the
introduction of this data at this time.
The court stated : The court might state for all practical purposes
the letter is now in the record because the judge advocate just read it.
As to whether or not it will be appended is entirely a question as to
whether the judge advocate wishes to do it now, or you do it later.
The court has taken notice of the statement of the interested party,
Admiral Kimmel, and that is now a matter of record. The court will
now proceed with such testimony as is available.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), stated : Just a suggestion — that the decision made by the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 121
Secretary is now an accomplish fact. It has been decided that this
data is denied this conrt.
The judge advocate stated: Denied you, sir. There wasn't any
request for it by the court.
Tlie court stated : It isn't the option of the court to make requests
for any documents, except that if the court is not satisfied at the end
of the introduction of evidence by the judge advocate and the inter-
ested parties — if the court at that time "wants any further informa-
tion— it is up to it to decide at that time.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), stated: I most respectfully insist on my wording, "it is
denied this court", because it is denied to me, and because it is denied
to the judge advocate of the court. Denial to me and to the judge
advocate is not nearly as important in my mind as denial to this court,
in order to arrive at a proper verdict; and that is the burden of every
statement I have made on this subject. I would respectfully like to be
informed of the decision of the court as to how they will proceed in
this matter. The counsel has called my attention to the paraphrase
of the data. The Secretary of the Navy, under August 10, 1944, states
that "the material requested, as it is not in the public interest to intro-
duce such material before the court of which you are judge advocate."
Before the court.
The judge advocate stated: The judge advocate would like to ad-
vise the court, in his capacity as legal adviser [-^-^T"] to them,
that, in response to Admiral Kimmel's request that they view this
evidence themselves in the files of the Navy Department, it would be
highly irregular and illegal for the reason that it does not permit of
usual cross-exantination by other interested parties or the judge
advocate, and the court would be receiving the information from a
source not set forth in the record.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband' E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), stated: I admit that extraordinary conditions require
extraordinary procedures.
The court announced that it would proceed with the Inquiry.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the adjournment was taken on Thursday, August 10, 1944,
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
The interesting party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), asked the court to take judicial notice of the note, so-
called, about which there was testimony on the sixth day of the in-
quiry, dated November 2(), 1941, that was handed b}'^ the Secretary
of State to the accredited representatives of the Japanese Govern-
ment, which appears in an official printed document, "Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States", 1931-1941, Volume 2.
The court announced that it would accede to the request.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), (Continued),
567. Q. One consequence "of your testimony yesterday. Admiral
Stark, relative to your lack of knowledge of the note of November 26,
would be, of course, that so far as you know. Admiral Kimmel was not
advised of the delivering of that note, at least prior to December 7.
1941 ?
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. So far as I know, he was not.
5G8. Q. In your dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of November 27, '41,
you state tliat an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the
next few days. What did you mean by the phrase, "next few days"?
A. Well, I meant the next few days. I meant that it might be ex-
pected at any time.
569. Q. Well, would twenty days be a few days, the next few days ?
A, No, my thought was that it was imminent, and that it might
happen in the next few days.
[14^] 570. Q. That would be something less than ten days ?
A. I would like to stand on the phrase "the next few days." I think
to attempt to define it as three days, a week, or ten days, would be very
futile.
571. Q. Did you intend to connote imminence of the possibility of
action ?
A. I did.
572. Q. Have you any recollection. Admiral Stark, whether publicly
in the press and on the radio there was carried news, between November
27 and December 7, of the ostensible resumption of negotiations or the
continuation of negotiations between the Secretary of State and the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington?
A. I do not recall such at this time.
673. Q. Have you no recollection of it one way or the other.
A. No, I simply don't recall that. It is nearly three years ago, and
for me to testify as to what the press carried at that time would be
difficult. I have testified as to what I knew from official conversations.
574. Q. The primary basis of the message of November 27, as dis-
closed in the message, was that negotiations, I quote, "negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the
Pacific have ceased" — was it not ?
A. That's right.
575. Q. And you have no recollection whether the public, available
information subsequent to the sending of that dispatch indicated that
the assumption of the dispatch had ceased to be effective?
A. I have stated that I do not recollect what the press carried at
that time. I can't go back on that statement. I think it stands for
itself.
576. Q. You have read "Peace and War" ?
A. I have read about two paragraphs in "Peace and War". I have
not read the document.
577. Q. Are you familiar with that portion of "Peace and War"
which indicates that negotiations, genuine or apparent, between the
Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador, were continued
between November 27, 1941, and December 7, 1941 ?
A. I am familiar with one paragraph in "Peace and War", which I
would like to read if it is permissible, and which I think would be
very clarifying to the line of questioning.
It was pointed out by the judge advocate that the \JW]
book, "Peace and War", was a public document issued by the State
Department, of which the court had taken judicial notice.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated,
with the permission of the court, and for clarification, that "Peace and
War" was a condensation of "Foreign Relations of the United States,
■ 1931-1941", of which the court had taken judicial notice.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 123
The witness continued his answer (reading) :
On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this
Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of
this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility
of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese
were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquests by force ; and
that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the liands of the
Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for
our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make
the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack
at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense
and of coordination for purposes thereof.
578. Q. In the paragraph beyond the paragraph that you read,
Admiral Stark, there appears the sentence, "Secretary Htill conferred
with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on December 1"?
A. That's right.
579. Q. That now at least indicates to you that negotiations were
in progress on December 1, 1941 ?
A. That indicates that he was conferring with them; it does not
indicate to me that the extract which I read, and which states, "there
was practicallj^ no possibility of an agreement being achieved with
Japan ; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any
time with new acts of conquest by force" had been affected.
580. Q. Of course you did not advise Admiral Kimmel that Secre-
tary Hull bad advised you that there was practically no possibility
of agreement being achieved with Japan, and I quote from the state-
ment that you read ?
A. 1 gave Admiral Kimmel my message of 27 November, and I
stated in it that a similar warning is being sent by the War Depart-
ment. I repeated that warning of the War Department in which the
War Department stated — when I say "repeated" it to Admiral Kim-
mel, I mean I made him an info addressee — of the message of the 29th
which has been before this court: "negotiations with Japan appear to
be terminated, to all practical purposes, with only the barest possi-
bility [JSO] that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue. Japanese future action is unpredictable, but
hostile action possible at any moment." That was the War Depart-
ment's independent estimate, so far as their size-up of the negotiations
situation.
581. Q. But you did not advise Admiral Kimmel that, "there was
practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan"?
A. I stated that, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabil-
ization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive
move by Japan is expected." I think the message is plain, and the
forecast made therein was borne out.
• 582. Q. But you now know that negotiations with Japan in fact
continued, either genuinely or in phantom fashion, on December 1?
A. From what you have shown me in official documents from the
State Department, I know that conversations took place, but I do not
think, after reading these, that it changed the reasons from which
my dispatch of November 27 was drawn, namely : "That negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific
have ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within
the next few days", which, I repeat, is very much in line with the
extract I read from "Peace and War", previously referred to.
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[JSJ] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
583. Q. On November 27th, had yon been furnished with a copy
of the message that- General Marshall sent General Short?
A. I stated in my message of November 27th that a similar warn-
ing is being sent by the War Department. I knew it was being sent.
I felt that General ^Marshall, who had the same facts that I had, was
in accord. Whether or not I had seen it at that time I do not recall.
I saw it subsequently.
584. Q. You certainly saw it not later than November 29th when the
copy was dispatched to
A, I repeated it for action to certain addressees, and info to Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific.
585. Q,. Did you inquire of General Marshall subsequent to Novem-
bei: 27th whether he had heard from General Short in response to
the request in his message, of the action taken by the Army in Hawaii ?
A. Not that I recall.
586. Q. General Marshall did not tell you that the alert assumed
by the Army was an anti-sabotage alert?
A. I do not recollect that. I have no recollection of it until it
was brought to my attention considerably later.
587. Q. Do you identify a document I hand you, Admiral, as a
dispatch sent by you to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A, I identify it as a document from the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, released by Admiral
Ingersoll, bearing time group 2700-10, November 26, 1941.
The dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, released by Admiral Ingersoll,
date time group 270040, dated November 26, 1941, was submitted to
the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and
by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret) , offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 40".
588. Q. Will you read the dispatch, Admiral?
The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 40.
[1S2] 589. Q. Now, Admiral, this proposed relief in whole or
in part of garrisons at Midway and Wake, did it not?
A. The message reads, "Army has offered to make available some
units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station
if you consider this desirable.'" It goes on to state, "Army also pro-
poses to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advanced bases which
you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft
units. Take this into considei'ation in your plans and advise when
practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament."
It is offering to make available infantry battalions now on station
and looking forAvard to helping in case of advanced bases which he
might occupy.
590. Q. You testified a day or so earlier that among the defensive
measures that you anticipated. Admiral Kimmel would inaugurate as
a result of your dispatch of November 27, were anti-submarine meas-
ures, did you not ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 125
A. I believe I did, yes.
591. Q. Did you ever modify, cancel, or recall the instructions that
you gave Admiral Kimmel in your letter of 23 September which was
introduced in evidence yesterday, Exhibit 37, which was the answer
to Admiral Kimmel's request for authority to bomb submarines?
A. Not that I recall.
592. Q. Then the statement in the letter of September 25rd, and
I quote, "The existing orders, that is, not to bomb suspected sub-
marines in defensive sea areas, are appropriate," still stood, unqualified,
until December 7th?
A. Considerable has gone over the dam since 23 September when
I invited attention to the Navy Regulations regarding instances in
the Pacific, and I mentioned what was being done elsewhere. In view
of the warning he had just received, I think he could have exercised
his own judgment as to what latitude to take.
593. Q. Which communication from you to Kimmel subsequent
(o September 23rd qualified the injunction relative to not bombing
submarines?
A. Well, the war warning, I would say, certainly would give the
picture of things, if not the previous warning. And as I recall, Ad-
miral Kimmel had written me, or had notified me that he would bomb
under certain circum.stances, and I took no exception to it.
594. Q. That was after the first of December?
A. I have forgotten just what the date of that information was.
595. Q. Referring to Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War of 21 January, 194:1?
A. Yes.
[ISS] 596. Q. The counter-measures to possible Japanese attack
enumerated are (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and
supporting vessels before air attack can be launched. At any time
prior to December 7th, Admiral Stark, did you authorize Admiral
Kimmel to engage enemy carriers before an attack could be launched ?
A. No.
597. Q. In fact, in the Army message which you incorporated as
your own on the 29th of November and sent to Admiral Kimmel
for information, it is said, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." When you sent
the Army message to Admiral Kimmel you intended him to be gov-
erned by that injunction therein, did you not?
A. He was ail info addressee on that dispatch. If your question
implies that had carriers appeared in the proximity of Hawaii after
his war warning and that he was not to do anything about it, I
wouldn't be prepared to go that far; I would have left it to his judg-
ment. I had told him in the dispatch, in my own dispatch, that an
attack was expected. The appearance of carriers in position to at-
tack Oahu would, in my opinion, have justified his attacking them and
I would have stood back of him if he had. I would have considered
such appearance practically an overt act.
598. Q. By the Army message, the action was further restricted
by the caution, and I quote, "But these measures" — referring to recon-
naissance— "should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil popula-
tion or disclose intent". You intended Admiral Kimmel to be re-
stricted by that caution and injunction, did you not?
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, I wouldn't say that I did. He was not an action addressee.
I can sum up the whole thing by saying that with the warning, I left
it up to Admiral Kimmel with regard to such matters. There is judg-
ment required there which can't be specifically set out.
599. Q. Well, what effect did you intend this clause in the Army
message which you sent Admiral Kimmel to have on him ?
A. I repeated it for information, particularly for information, and
I particularly sent it as a directive showing that we had given the
coastal frontiers this information and directed the commanding of-
ficers thereof that in case of hostilities they should be prepared to
carry out their tasks, as they came under Admiral Kimmel in case
of hostilities.
[1S4-] 600. Q. Well, there can't be any doubt but what the two
phrases in the Army message which I have just read had the effect
of minimizing an all-out effort on Admiral Kimmel's part, can there ?
A. Knowing Admiral Kimmel as I do I would not have expected
him to minimize his own judgment in accordance with the directive
that the dispatch sent him for action, which I sent him on November
27th. The message you are now referring to, namely, the repeated one
from Marshall, was addressed for action to the Pacific Naval Northern
Coastal Frontier and the Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier
showing them the tenseness of the situation, showing them what their
Army opposites had, and directing them to carry out WPL-46 in case
of hostilities, and I wanted Admiral Kimmel to know that they had
received such direction as they came under him. It was not in any
way intended to modify anything I had said on the 27th. I should
like to add to that answer, or to invite attention to what has already
been brought forth, that when Admiral Kimmel issued orders to
bomb submarines and made me an info addressee, I took no exception
to it and that wasn't qualified by whether the submarines struck
first, or not.
601. Q. I will read to you. Admiral Stark, Paragraph IV of Exhibit
23, sub-paragraph (a) : '^Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward
through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air sur-
prise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained
with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a
practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other in-
telligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow
time limits." Did you send Admiral Kimmel any intelligence which
indicated that a surface raid on Pearl Harbor was probable within
rather narrow time limits ?
A. No intelligence to that effect.
[1S5] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
602. Q. Both the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Commu-
nications were under you as Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Yes.
603. Q. The Office of Naval Intelligence collected all the intelli-
gence which the 'Navy Department had concerning everything, par-
ticularly the Japanese and Pacific Ocean situation ?
A. Generally speaking, but there were occasional outside sources
available to us. I collected some myself, for example, from the State
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 127
Department and our so-called Central Division. Generally speaking,
they were the central agency for such work.
604. Q. During the fall of 1941 was all important Japanese intelli-
gence brought to your attention ?
A. I assume that what was important was brought to my attention.
I could not say definitely, but the question of importance might even
be decided by subordinates who were responsible for dissemination.
Intelligence was responsible for collection and dissemination. It was
their job, but certainly if they had something which they deemed of
real importance for me to know, it was up to them to bring it to my
attention.
605. Q. Had you issued any informal instructions to the Office of
Naval Intelligence about advising you personally on Japanese Intelli-
gence during the fall of 1941 ?
A, I recall no special instructions. That was their job.
606. Q. To whom, other than you, as a routine matter, was intelli-
gence distributed concerning the Japanese situation in the fall of
1941?
A. I would say, generally, to War Plans and to the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations. They worked, of course, closely with Com-
munications. Are you referring to just within the Navy Department ?
607. Q. No, to the entire list of agencies.
A. Of course, they disseminated it to people outside the Navy De-
partment like Hawaii, the Far East, and the Commanders-in-Chief
not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic. They sent a great deal
to London.
608. Q. Were there any other routine distributees in Washington
other thail those you enumerated in the Navy Department ?
A. It was up to the Officer in Charge of the Central [i66]
Division to keep the State Department informed of information which
would be of use to them. There was an exchange going on there all
the time. There was an exchange of information between F. B. I.
and Naval Intelligence on certain matters. There would be an ex-
change between the Treasury if it was pertinent, but on routine
matters, I would say, the State Department was the distributee.
609. Q. Were there routine 'distributions of important intelligence
concerning the Japanese situation to the White House?
A. I would not say routine, but we certainly gave the White House
any information which we thought was of worthwhile interest. The
White House's primary collection of that would be from the State
Department, but if either War or Navy or anybody else got vital infor-
mation, I assume it would go to the Wliite House.
610. Q. That distribution would take effect on important matters
without your personal direction in a particular instance ?
A. No, I would not say so. If your question means that the White
House is marked on information copies as a distributing point, to the
best of my recollection it was not. I might say that the White House
aide at times attended conferences, but the White House was not a
regular distributee.
611. Q. Do I understand that the White House would not receive
any particular item of intelligence without your specific direction ?
A. No, I would not say that. The Naval Aide to the President
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
might have picked up something, but, generally, if there was some-
thing of interest to the White House, I would note it or Intelligence
would note it. We aimed to give them everything of importance, of
course.
612. Q. Either the Director of Naval Intelligence or the head of
C. N. O. had authority to send to the White House anything they felt
was of importance?
A. Yes. There was no denial of any such thing. If they thought
anything should go to the White House, th'ey would tell me, and it
would probably go.
613. Q. Who was the head of Naval Intelligence during the Fall
of 1941 ?
A. I think at the time you refer to Captain Wilkinson was director
of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
614. Q. Was there a section known as the Far Eastern Section?
A. Yes.
[157] 615. Q. Was that the Central Division to which you refer ?
A. No, the Central Division is a separate division.
616. Q. Who was the head of the Far Eastern Section of Naval
Intelligence in the fall of 1941 ?
A. I would have to refresh my memory on that. I think it was
McCallum, but I'm not certain. If that answer is incorrect, I will
change it in. the record.
617. Q. You testified, in substance, that the basis of the dispatch
to Admiral Kimmel on October 16, 1941, was the fall of the Japanese
Cabinet but that there might have been other background factors
prompting the sending of that dispatch. Do you recall what those
other background factors were?
A. Not specifically. Wliat might be termed deterioration of rela-
tions. They were certainly getting no better. My letters show that,
some of which have been i-eferred to.
618. Q. Do you recall whether on or about 15 October 1941 you
received an unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions
of the conquest of Southeastern Asia ?
A. At the moment, I don't recall that.
619. Q. That would have been of important enough character to
have been called to your attention, if such intelligence report had been
received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, would it not ?
A. If Intelligence has a document of sufficient importance, it would
have.
620. Q. I am asking you if information of that character was of
sufficient importance ?
A. It would depend on the value they put on it. They might have
regarded it as poor or good information. From the source from
which they got it, they might have considered it not worthwhile. I
could not say whether they would have sent it.
621. Q. You have no recollection of hearing about that about the
16th of October?
A. I do not recall.
622. Q. Do you recall in the month of October, 1941, receiving in-
telligence reports that Japanese consuls were directing and advising
the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines,
Hawaii, America, and Europe?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 129
A. I do have some recollection of that.
623. Q. When did that information come, before or, after the 15th
of October?
A. I could not say.
[1S8] 624. Q. That was brought to your attention?
A. As I recall, that was. I have some remembrance of that.
625. Q. Was that information forwarded to Admiral Kimmel?
A. I don't recall.
626. Q. You have no recollection?
A. No, it may have been sent out automatically. ii €-fe pkkia
4ey©«7 i-fe sheeid ber I was not the forwarding agency for Admiral
Kimmel. It was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
I could not possibly go over everything that was sent out, and many
things they undoubteclly sent out which I did not see.
[Notation in margin :] See correction page 324.
627. Q. There were some things that were of such grave importance
that you personally saw to their transmission to Admiral Kimmel?
A. Well, I would check anything of grave importance — that I
considered of grave importance, and certainly if it were of interest to
him, it would have been my first thought to get it to him.
628. Q. Do you recall wiiether on or about 4 November 1941, you
received intelligence information that the internal situation in Japan,
both politically and economically, since the American embargo had
become so desperate that the Japanese Government had concluded
that it was necessary to distract popular attention, either by foreign
war or by a diplomatic victory ?
A. Yes, I recall that.
629. Q. That was called to your attention ?
A. I recall that incident.
630. Q. Do you recall whether that information was forwarded
to the White House?
A. I couldn't say definitely that it was. That is all material three
years old. I assume the White House had it.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, ob-
jected to the line of questioning on the ground that it was immaterial
and that the information could be obtained directly from other
people.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.), replied.
The court announced that the objection was overruled.
[iS9] 631. Q. Do you recall any discussions at the White House
concerning that information?
A. The discussions in the White House were broad and wide and
continuous on the entire Japanese situation.
632. Q. Do you recall whether you yourself forwarded that infor-
mation to Admiral Kimmel ?
A. No, not at the moment.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 159-A through
162, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of
the war.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 10
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[163] The court then, at 12 : 40 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 00
p. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
parties to the inquiry and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross-
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, (Ret), (Continued) :
With the permission of the court, the interested party. Rear Ad-
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) made the following
statement: May it please the court: Admiral Kimmel has stated to
the court the necessity of obtaining certain documents now in the pos-
session of the Navy Department which are absolutely essential as
evidence if a thorough and impartial investigation of all the facts
in the Pearl Harbor affair is to be made. In Paragraph Two of the
Precept of the Secretary of the Navy, appointing this court, there is
the statement that the judge advocate is authorized "to obtain all
documents relating to the said attack that maay be required for intro-
duction into evidence. This morning, a letter was read from the
Secretary of the Navy to the judge advocate of this court denying
the availability of certain evidence on the ground that it was contrary
to the public-interest. Obviously, as Admiral Kimmel pointed out,
the court will be unable to arrive at any correct conclusions unless
these documents are admitted. They are absolutely essential if Ad-
miral Kimmel is to make a full presentation of the evidence in the
matter regarding which he is an interested party. For two and one-
half years, due to the report of the Roberts Commission, he has been
pilloried by the press and the Congress and before the people of this
country. It is now time that the true facts in this matter be brought
out, and that Admiral Kimmel have a full opportunity to exonerate
himself of the unsupported charges that wer^ made against him in the
report of the Roberts Commission. May I take the liberty of pointing
out to the court the importance, not only to the interested parties but
to the Navy and to the people of this nation, that this court make its
hearings and findings as full and complete a report of all the circum-
stances which are within its power to develop. I can imagine the
widespread unfavorable repercussions on the Navy if it subsequently
develops that this has not been done. It is obvious that in due time
the proceedings [J64] of this court, and all of the evidence it
might have secured will be a matter of open record, available to the
public. May I recommend to the court the following procedure:
First, that the court itself endeavor to secure from the Secretary of
the Navy the documents which have now been denied; second, that
the proceedings of this court be considered as of a secrecy that now
governs in the case of the documents to which Admiral Kimmel has
been denied access. This would enable the Secretary of the Navy to
hold the proceedings of this court in the same degree of secrecy as that
of the documents. It is inevitable that as soon as the public interests
permit the documents which are now being withheld will become
public property. When that time comes, I feel that the whole Naval
Service will feel the effects of the public disapprobation which will
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 131
undoubtedly arise if this court is not furnished all evidence that is now
available to arrive at just and proper findings.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, page 164-A, have, by
direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited
with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[166] 673. Q. Do you recall any discussion with anyone con-
cerning the sending of additional messages or dispatches to Admiral
Kimmel ?
A. No, I do not.
674. Q. During the week preceding 7 December, 1941 ?
A. No, I do not.
675. Q. Do you recall ever having declined to approve the sending
of a dispatch concerning intelligence information during that week
to Admiral Kimmel ?
A. No.
676. And I assume that you have no recollection of any conversa-
tion with Admiral Wilkinson to that effect?
A. With whom?
677. Q. Captain Wilkinson.
A. Captain Wilkinson ? No, I do not.
678. Q. What was the incident that prompted the sending of the
message of December 4th by you to Admiral Kimmel relative to Guam,
something to do with the disposition of United States codes on
Guam?
A. We considered war to be imminent, as noted in our previous dis-
patches. We knew that Guam was practically defenseless and we
wanted to make certain that confidential publications which might
be useful to the enemy did not fall into the enemy's hands in case
Guam were captured. Guam was sort of a step-child of the Navy
Department. It was under, as I recall, the 14th Naval District for
matters of construction that were going on.
679. Q. When the message was sent on 4 December to Guam, or rela-
tive to Guam, did you consider war imminent?
A. Yes. We were looking for Japan to strike any day. We didn't
know where.
680. Q. Did you consider war imminent. Admiral ?
A. Yes.
681. Q. You never advised Admiral Kimmel in so many words
that war was imminent?
A. Well, I thought I had ; I had intended to.
682. Q. The words "imminence of war" were not included in any of
Admiral Kimmel 's dispatches, were they ?
A. Well, I think the equivalent was. The dispatch stated that this
was a war warning and that an aggressive move by Japan was ex-
pected within the next few days, and from the best indications we had
it would be the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo —
that being after a message which indicated she might strike in any
direction.
[J66] 683. Q. Between 27 November and 4 December, do you
recall any intelligence information that you had received changing
your conception of the situation as it was on the 27th of November?
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. To me, one of the most telling pieces of information that we had
that confirmed our suspicions and that gave me the distinct impression
that war was possible, that war was probable, was the information
that the Japs here and in London had orders to destroy most of their
codes and ciphers at once, and also to burn all other important con-
fidential and secret documents. That message was a beacon light to
me at that time and it still is. I considered it extremely important.
684. Q. That message was sent with no priority. Admiral Stark.
I refer to Exhibit 21, which is a photostatic copy of the original.
A. There is no priority indicated on this dispatch.
685. Q. That means that it went deferred, or routine ?
A. Yes, unless some other personal direction was concerned. By
the record it would mean that it was sent routine. I should like to
correct my testimony because I was given the wrong dispatch. The
dispatch to which I referred is marked "priority".
686. Q. What is the date of that dispatch. Admiral Stark?
A. The date of that dispatch is 031850, and it has a priority rating.
687. Except for the intelligence that you received relative to the
destruction of Japanese codes as you have stated, did you receive any
other intelligence indicating more probability of war between Japan
and the United States between November 27th and December 6th ?
A. To the best of my remembrance, I received nothing indicating
more probability than the messages to which I have referred.
688. Q. Do you recall two accasions on either the 4th or 5th of
December when Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCallum came
to your office to confer about intelligence relative to the Pacific and
Japanese situation that you considered of such import that you called
a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral
Noyes ?
A. No, I don't recall.
689. Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941 ?
A. No.
690. Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine
day, the time in the afternoon or evening?
A. No, I do not.
[167 \ 691. Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday eve-
ning, 6 December ?
A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remem-
brance is — I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall
clearly.
692. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever you were,
between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence infor-
mation brought by an officer messenger?
A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort
on that evening.
693. Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Com-
mander Kramer stationed in Naval Communications or ONI?
A. Yes, there "vvas.
694. Q. You knew him?
A. Yes ; he used to deliver messages in the office.
695. Q. Do you recall whether he. delivered a message at your home?
A. I haven't tlie slightest recollection of any message bearing on
this, or any other subject, being given to me between the time I left
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 133
the office and the distinct recollection next morning of my talking over
with Cajjtain Schuirmann the dispatch to which reference has already
been made, namely, the dispatch which the Army sent.
(^^Kk Q. Do you recall receiving by telephone any information of
intelligence that had been received by the Navy Department on Satur-
day night ?
A. No, I say I don't recall. I don't w^ant to make it stronger than
that. Mv remembrance is that I did not ; that I had nothino- until that
message next morning.
697. Q. Do you recall wdiat time you came to the office on Sunday,
7 December 'i
A. It was in the forenoon. I don't recall what time. Probably
rather late in the forenoon but I do not recall the hour.
698. Q. AVere you in your office by 0800 Sunday morning, 7
Decembei' ^
A. No, I was not, and I don't recall what hour I did get there. I
say I was not; I don't recall. I would be very much surprised if I
had been there.
699. Q. Do you recall receiving by telephone or officer messenger
any intelligence information at your home Sunday morning?
A. No.
[168] 700. Q, Before you came to the Navy Department?
A. No, I do not.
701. Q. Is your recollection rather clear that you did not receive
any message at home that Sunday morning ?
A. My recollection is that I did not but I couldn't say 100 per cent.
I just don't recall having received anything from the time I left Sat-
urday night until the message Sunday mornin,g.
702. Q. Do you recall any telephone conversations on Saturday
night with either Secretary Knox or Captain Wilkinson?
A. No. My remembrance is rather distinct that I didn't have, but
it is going on three years and I haven't the slightest recollection of any
such conversations.
703. Q. But the events of Saturday and Sunday, or at least Sunday,
were tremendously important ?
A. Yes ; the events of Sunday were.
704. Q. What is your best recollection as to the time that you
arrived at the Navy Department Sunday morning ?
A. I don't know. It may have been around — I don't recollect but it
may have been around half past ten, or 11 : 00. It may have been
earlier. I don't recollect the hour but my Sunday moniing arrivals
were rather late, generally.
705. Q. Will you tell the court in as detailed manner as you can
recall all that you did when you arrived at your office on Sunday
morning ?
A. The one point that I remember about that Sunday morning, and
which I have already testified to, is the message which the Army sent.
706. Q. Didn't you have any intelligence information yourself of
the Navy Department brought to your attention before you talked to
General Marshall?
A. i^e* tfea* i f eeaUr ^
[Notation in margin :] See correction p. 324.
707. Q. Did General Marshall call you, or did you call him?
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. He called me.
708. Q. Do you recall what he told you ?
A. Yes. He asked me if I had seen the message. I said, "I have it
in front of me."
709. Q. What message ?
A. He brought up the subject of information which required the
Japanese Ambassador to see Mr. Hull at exactly 1300. It stressed
the exact time ; told him, as I recall, not to be late. The thing that
stands out was the [^^^] exact time. And General Marshall,
as I have testified, said there might be something in that and asked
me if I didn't think it would ge a good thing to send it on. Shall I
go on and repeate the testimony ?
710. Q. No. Before General Marshall called you, did you have
information concerning the events that were to happen at 1300, De-
cember 7th?
A. As I recall, I had similar information about that same time. I
have forgotten for the moment whether it was in the form of a dis-
patch, or what it was.
711. Q. Wliat was the substance of the information that you had
before General Marshall called?
A. It was the 1300 appointment of the Japanese Ambassador with
the Secretary of State.
712. Q. At that time did you have any information as to the na-
ture of the appointment between the Japanese Ambassador and the
Secretary of State at 1:00 o'clock?
A. I do not recall that I knew what it was about except that he
was to see him exactly at that time.
713. Q. You have no memory as to whether the subject of the dis-
cussion between the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Hull was the
subject of the information which you had ?
A. No; I don't recall. Of course, this is in the light of hind-
sight— I may be in error — but I thought it was a reply to Mr, Hull on
something. I just don't know. I know that he had this appointmisnt
with Mr. Hull at that time. Obviously, it was on something with
reference to relations between the two countries.
714. Q. Well, we now all know, and we knew Monday morning, that
the Japanese Ambassador delivered a note closing relations between
Japan and the United States ?
A. That is right.
715. Q. Did you have any information that a note of that char-
acter was to be delivered at 1 : 00 o'clock.
A. No, r did not.
716. Q. Do you j-ecall v» ho gave you the information that you did
receive about the 1 : 00 o'clock appointment ; who in your department?
A. No ; I don't recall just how that came in.
717. Q. Have you any recollection that anyone in the Navy De-
partment suggested to you that 1 : 00 o'clock Washington time was ap-
proximately sunrise in Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila?
A. I don't recall about the sunrise in Pearl Harbor. I knew about
what time it would be in Pearl Harbor.
[170] 718. Q. Well, do you recall anyone suggesting it to you,
either by note or orally?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 135
A. No. Captain Schiiirmann and I talked that over and we dis-
cussed the time element, and of course it was apparent that we
needed speed to get that message tlirough if it could possibly be
gotten through in time.
719. Q. Do you recall anyone other than Captain Schuirmann with
whom vou were talking about that at that time ?
A. No ; I recall only Captain Schuirmann.
720. Q. Do you have any recollection of the suggestion having
been made to you that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl
Harbor?
A. No, I don't recall that.
721. Q. How long after you had the information in the Navy De-
partment was it before General Marshall telephoned you ?
A. There again, I don't recall just what time I got down. I simply
recall that when he called I was talking that message over with Cap-
tain Schuirmann. It was on my desk at that time. I cannot recall
the time.
722. Q. Do you have any recollection when the information about
which you were talking with Captain Schuirmann was received in
the Navy Department?
A. No. -
723. Q. You have no recollection of making any inquiries as to
when that was received in the Navy Department ?
A. No, I haven't.
724. Q. After you talked with General Marshall, did you tele-
phone anyone else concerning that subject matter?
A. I do not recall telephoning anyone else.
725. Q. Do you recall talking about it with Colonel Knox?
A. I don't recall it.
726. Q. Do you know whether Colonel Knox was in conference
with the Secretary of State and Secretary of War at 10 : 00 o'clock
on that morning?
A. No, I do not remember that. Of course, I remember the events
very clearly later on, talking with Colonel Knox late that evening.
It was my wont to keep him informed of anything of this sort which
was important, but whether or not I telephoned, I can't recall. I'
am rather under the impression that I did, but I couldn't say so.
727. Q. Do you recall talking with Captain Wilkinson and Com-
mander McCallum on that Sunday morning?
A. No, I do not.
[171] 728. Q. Do you recall telephoning the ^Yliite House after
you had had your talk with Captain Schuirmann, or while you were
talking with him?
A. No. I have no clear recollection of telephoning anyone.
729. Q. What did you do after vou had talked with General
Marshall?
A. I went on about my routine work, knowing that the dispatch
was on its way.
730. Q. You stayed at the Department, then, through the day?
A. Yes; and most of the night.
731. Q. But you didn't go home after 11:00 or 11:30, whenever
3^ou talked to General Marshall, until you had word of the attack?
A. No, I didn't go home.
136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
732. Q. And except for the message that was sent via the Army,
you did not communicate with Admiral Kimmel on Saturday or
Sunday ?
A. You mean prior to 1300 ?
733. Q. Prior to 1300?
A. No, I did not.
734. Q. Do I understand that General Marshall read the dispatch
that he proposed and did send, over the telephone to you ?
A. Well, my recollection is that he did. I am not sure. I knew
what he was going to send.
735. Q. But you didn't have any copy of it when you were talking
to him?
A. No. He wrote it out, as I recall, in his own hand and read it
to me. What we were wondering was, if by any chance that particular
hour and the clearness with which it was set forth, the preciseness,
might possibly mean a strike and, as I have testified, after having said
"We have sent so much ; I don't know that we could send much more,"
I thought, well, there might be something to it; let's not take the
chance. I called him back, I think within 30 seconds, almost as soon
as I hung up the 'phone, and asked him to go ahead and send it, and
that I would be glad to put it over our system if he didn't feel that
his was just as rapid as could be made.
736. Q. Have you a copy of the dispatch that General Marshall sent ?
A. Yes, I have it in front of me.
[172] 737. Q. Would you read that in the record, please ?
A. I say I have the dispatch; I have a dispatch which is marked
"paraphrased". I would be glad to read it if you would like to have it.
The judge advocate stated that he had made a written request to
the Secretary of War for a duly certified copy of this dispatch, but
that it had not yet arrived.
738. Q. I should like" to have you read it.
A. I would like to add to my previous testimony, if I didn't put
it in in the first place, that I asked Marshall to make sure that our
people were informed ; that had gotten to be more or less a habit of ours.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he liad no assurance as to the exactness of the paraphrased dis-
patch but that there was no objection to reading it into the record.
739. Q. Would you read the paraphrased dispatch, please?
A. This message is a paraphrase of a message sent from the War
Department to the C. G., Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.
It starts out with :
5297. Japanese are presenting at one p. m., Eastern Standard Time today what
amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code
machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not
know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communi-
cation.
740. Q. Well, that would indicate that at least General Marshall
had intelligence of something more than the requested appointment
at 1:00 o'clock?
A. Yes.
741. Q. Did you have anything additional?
A. I don't recall just what that information we had was. What
stands out in my memory clearly is the 1 : 00 o'clock time.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 137
742. Q. And you have no recollection that the 1 : 00 o'clock appoint-
ment was for the delivery of an ultimatum ?
A. Not other than is contained in this dispatch.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.) stated that he had no further questions of this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
743. Q. Admiral Stark, from January, say, of 1941, down to Decem-
ber 7th, the Chief of Naval Operations did receive certain communi-
cations and letters from Pearl Harbor about conditions there; isn't
that the fact?
A. Yes.
[173 j 744. Q. Now, Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 24 have been introduced
and read in full, this being the exchange of correspondence in January
between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Prior to
that time. Exhibit 28 was received in the Navy Department; is that
not correct ?
A. Yes.
745. Q. Now, Admiral, may I ask you to read this document, Ex-
hibit 28?
The witness read the document, Exhibit 28, copy appended.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[174] 746. Q. By the way, if you know, was consideration given
to that letter at the time the letter was written from the Secretary
of Navy to the Secretary of War in January ?
A. Well, there is a similarity there that would certainly suggest
that it was.
747. Q. But you can't recall?
A. No, the subject was one of conversations. This sets forth many
needs.
748. Q. So you may have that before you, I desire to ask just a
couple of questions about it, sir. Admiral Bloch was a Rear Admiral
at the time this letter was written, do you recall?
A. He was.
749. Q. Now Admiral, in paragraph 2 there is the statement that —
paragraph 2 of Admiral Bloch's letter — there is a statement about the
necessity for large planes. Specifically, the statement: "It is my
opinion that neither numbers or types are satisfactory for the purposes
indicated." Admiral, were any such plans sent to the Fourteenth
Naval District, or caused to be sent to them, prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. Yes, plans were sent out there, as I recall. I don't remember
as to numbers and types.
750. Q. To the Fourteenth Naval District?
A. No, I am glad you brought that question up because when I read
the letter I got the impression that this does not take into account the
air forces which we had there, which was under an air officer, not
directly under Admiral Bloch.
751. Q. Are you referring to Rear Admiral Bellinger ?
A. Yes.
752. Q. My question was only, if you knew, were any planes of this
character, to wit: the large planes — sent or caused to be sent to the
Fourteenth Naval District prior to December 7 ?
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. As distinct from the Air Command ?
753. Q. Yes.
A. I do not recollect that any were sent directly to be under the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. That was a local arrange-
ment out there.
754. Q. Yes, Admiral. At the foot of that same page there is a
discussion of new fighters, and there were 185 projected for Hawaii
at that time. Now do you recall whether or not any such planes were
sent or caused to be sent to the Fourteenth Naval District prior to
December 7 ?
A. Not to the Fourteenth Naval District.
[175] 755. Q. Yes, sir. On the following page .
A. Those are Army planes.
756. Q. Yes, in connection with the statement that "I am of the
opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range wiH be re-
quired for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian Area," I ask you,
Admiral, if you know — were these guns sent or caused to be sent prior
to December 7, to Hawaii ?
A. There were some guns sent to the Hawaiian Area. It being an
Army obligation, I have forgotten the number.
757. Q. Would it be anything like 500?
A. I don't recall. My reaction is that it was considerably short of
that, but I couldn't say positively.
758. Q. In paragraph 3, Admiral, the statement there is in con-
nection with patrol vessels and aircraft in connection with patrol
vessels. Were there sent or caused to be sent to the 14th Naval Dis-
trict any further patrol vessels prior to December 7, if you recall ?
A. I'd have to check the record.
759. Q. You have no recollection of it now, sir ?
A. My recollection is that some vessels were sent or offered. I know
they were short.
760. Q. Well, that would also cover the vessels needed for mine-
sweeping. Admiral, too. I take it that they would be short, too, to
your recollection, as you recall ?
A. To my recollection, all districts were short of what we thought
was necessary.
761. Q. Admiral, I'd like to show you this paper and ask you if you
recognize it as a communication of 7 May 1941, from the Comman-
dant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Yes, I recognize it as a letter of 7 May from Commandant, 14th
Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations.
The letter from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief
of Naval Operations, dated May 7, 1941, was submitted to the judge
advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the inter-
ested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ket), offered in
evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 41."
762. Q. Will you please read it.
The witness read the letter. Exhibit 41.
763. Q. Admiral, I hand you a paper and ask you if you [J76]
recognize it as a letter dated May 20, 1941, from the Commander-in-
Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 139
A. I do.
The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the
Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 20, 1941, was submitted to the
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the
interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered
in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 42."
764. Q. Will you be good enough. Admiral, to read it.
The witness read the letter. Exhibit 42.
765. Q. I hand you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize
it as a letter of June 23, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet?
A. I do.
The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, dated June 23, 1941, was submitted to the judge
advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the inter-
ested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in
evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 43."
766. Q. Please read it. Admiral.
The witness read the letter. Exhibit 43.
767. Q. I will show you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recog-
nize it as a report dated August 15, 1941, from the Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Chief of Naval
Operations?
A. I do, 15 August.
The report, dated August 15, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Chief of Naval
Operations, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested
parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. Admiral Claude
C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered
pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
44" for reference, description appended.
[177] 768. Q. Please read, Admiral, from page 20 of the report,
starting with "remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is
not being made," through to the end of subparagraph (2) .
A. (Reading:)
Remaining deficiencies, on wliich satisfactory progress is not being made, are:
(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a
large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general
stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh
water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to
contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.
(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in
harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other require-
ments of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard
to such forces is as follows :
(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.
(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the air-
craft expansion program.
(3) Insufficient Army anti-aircraft gxins actually available.
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
769. Q. I hand you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize
it as a communication in August, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet?
A. I do.
The communication of August, 1941 (date obscure), from the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to
the court, and by the interested party. Admiral C. Bloch, U. S. Navy
(Ret), offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 45."
770. Q. Will you please read it.
The witness read the communication. Exhibit 45.
771. Q. I show you a paper. Admiral, and ask you if you recognize
it as an endorsement, together with the basic from the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, the basic
being of 17 October 1941 ?
A. I do.
[178] Basic letter dated October 17, 1941, from the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, with
endorsement thereon, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the
interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 46".
771. (a) Q. Will you read the letter, please?
A. The witness read the letter. Exhibit 46.
[179'} Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdraw.
772. Q. I show you a paper dated November 25, 1941, and ask you
if you recognize it as being from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District?
A. I do.
The letter of November 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and the Com-
m^dant, Fourteenth Naval District, was submitted to the judge ad-
vocate, to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Admiral
Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the pur-
pose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be con-
sidered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 47" for reference, description appended.
773. Q. Will you read paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of that letter?
A. (Reading:)
1. The request of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in reference
(e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of
VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full con-
sideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. A previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference
(a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d)-
3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, in his war plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 141
responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and
Local Defense Forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces,
will, of course, indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be
assigned to local defense tasks.
5. The augmentation of the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval
District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, ma-
terial and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be
summarized as follows :
[180] (a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert
four small and ten larger types of privately owned vessels for the Naval
Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District. These are generally
of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of under-
water detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority
for such gear assigned these vessels,
(b) The completion of the 173-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is progessing slowly,
and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May, 1942. Eight
of these, due for completion in May, 1942, are tentatively assigned to the
Fourteenth Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. sub-chasers
(PC) is indefinite due to the engine situation.
(c) The Commandant now has under his command the Coast Guard of
the Fourteenth Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his com-
mand, the following are equipped with depth charges and underwater detec-
tion gear : TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER.
(d) Ten YMS, expected to have depth charges and sound gear when avail-
able, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. Two of these
are due for completion in the third quarter.
(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assign-
ment to the Fourteenth Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squad-
rons which become available in the near future will be determined by the
requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.
774. Q. In connection with WPL-46, the judge advocate and your
own counsel have had you read certain portions of it. In some of that
reading there was mention made of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fron-
tier Forces. Now, is it correct to say that so far as Hawaii was con-
cerned there never did exist any naval coastal forces other than those
four old destroyers and four old mine-sweepers up until December 7,
1941?
A. I guess that is right.
775. Q. Of course, they did not have the aircraft?
A. That is right.
776. Q. They did not have any PC vessels or PT boats?
A. No, the PC's were not yet available.
[181] 777. Q. Admiral, in connection with your testimony,
about the November 27 message, am I accurate in saying that you
considered the Navy to be mobilized at that time ?
A. No order had been given for mobilization. I stated that the
Navy was practically mobilized. We had put in everything from
the oldest submarines and destroyers and tankers — practically every-
thing we had, including even old boats built by Ford in the preceding
war — Eagle boats. I had to accept the responsibility for their turn-
ing over. We were in a desperate situation for craft in all districts.
778. Q. When you use mobilization that way, you did not mean us
to understand mobilization in the very technical and precise military
sense, such as "M" day?
A. That is correct ; I did not mean that.
779. Q. "M" day carries with it a particular and definitive mean-
ing throughout the naval establishment, isn't that so ?
A. Yes.
142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
780. Q. A mobilization or partial mobilization definitely establishes
an "M" day, isn't that true ?
A. Well, you can establish "M" day or mobilization day any time
you would like to.
781. Q. Isn't "M" day the time for execution of certain supporting
plans, for instance, frontier defense plans and coast defense plans?
They go into effect on "M" day, isn't that correct ?
A. There are certain measures to be taken on "M" day.
782. Q. Which you would say go automatically into effect on "M"
day?
A. Yes.
783. Q. In WPL-46, which is exhibit 4, I shall direct your atten-
tion to these provisions on page 7 : (Reading :)
0221. The preliminary jieriod of strained relations of a certain duration is
anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this
plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 0222. Mobilization may
be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof.
The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. 0223. This plan may be
executed in part by a dispatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy.
The tasks to be executed are accepted, and the preliminary measures to be
taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or the additional tasks
thereof.
Now, those provisions, Admiral, were established for a certain pur-
pose, that is, to establish an "M" day and to prevent surprise under
this plan?
A. If it were thought expedient to do so.
{JS2] 784. Q. Those provisions, of course, came to the eye of
every holder of WPL-46 and were to know to all commands that had
that document?
A. Yes, sir.
785. Q. Am I correct in this? There isn't any definition in
WPL— 46, or any of its predecessor plans, going back to Rainbow 1,
as to war warning or what was to be done?
A. Not that I recall that it was specifically laid down. I would
say it would be regarded as unnecessary.
786. Q, At any rate, it is not in the document ?
A. No.
787. Q. That would be true for the phrase "defensive deployment" ?
That is not used in the document either ?
A. No, I do not think it is defined. I think it has a rather definite
meaning to an officer who would receive it.
788. Q. As far as the plan is concerned, that is not there, as you
recall ?
A. No, I think not.
789. Q. Would you say, during the period from October 16 to De-
cember 7, that this country had strained relations with Japan?
A. Well, it all depends upon your definition. The relations cer-
tainly w^ere not what could be desired.
790. Q. What I am trying to ascertain is whether the conditions
which existed between October 16 and November 30 were strained in
the sense mentioned in WPLf-46 ^
A. In the sense of ordering mobilization ?
791. Q. In the sense that the words were used in WPL-46?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 143
A. Well, it is a matter of degree. I would hesitate to say. We
did not mobilize, but conditions certainly were strained toward the
finish.
792, Q. Now, Admiral, am I correct that the establishment of
mobilization or partial mobilization by the Navy Department under
such circumstances as provided in WPL-46 would have been clearly
understood by the entire service?
A. I don't know that it would have meant much more than what
we were doing, depending on how you would look at it. It would have
been rather difficult to order and explain such a set-up. Politically,
for us to have mobilized might have precipitated what we were trying
to avoid. European nations mobilize frequently, as we know. Some-
times it is a drill; sometimes it is a cover to war. For us to have
ordered mobilization at that time would have been a very difficult
thing to do, I think.
[18S] 793. Q. But, Admiral, would you make the same answer
in connection with a partial mobilization, as contemplated by
WPL-46?
A. I think it would have been very difficult to have explained it
and put into effect. Everything we had was in commission. We had
sent messages as to the seriousness of the situation, but to have sent
word out to mobilize probably would have meant to the country and
to Japan a preliminary declaration of intention to go to war. I think
it would have been a very difficult thing to have done.
794. Q. That would also have applied if it were a partial mobiliza-
tion, contemplated by WPL-46, in your opinion ?
A. More or less, yes.
795. Q. Well, in any event that procedure which was provided in
WPL-46 for the establishment of the doing of certain things prior to
hostile acts was not used in the dispatches of October 16 or November
24 or November 27 ?
A. No, it was not. Again I repeat, we were practically mobilized.
We had a full convoy system going in the Atlantic, so that there would
be no rupture. What we had was manned in the Pacific, extremely
short as it was and of which I was very consciously cognizant. I do
not see where it would have availed us much, and I would say it
would have been inadvisable from many standpoints.
796. Q. I believe your counsel identified Exhibit 7, but it has not
been offered in evidence, and I should like to ask you whether you
recognize this document. Exhibit 7, as being the Joint Coastal Fron-
tier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Area, effective 11 April 1941?
A. Yes, I recognize it.
797. Q. I want you to read from page 8, paragraph C-2, this being
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,
Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District.
A. (Reading:)
M-day is the first day of mobilization, and it is the time origin for the execution
of this plan. M-day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary
measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain
features of their respective plans prior to M-day. Such parts of this plan as
are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-day, as ordered by the
War and Navy departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
798. Q. The procedure there indicated, Admiral, in JCD-42 was
not used in the messages up to November 30 ?
A. I would say there was nothing whatever to prevent the authori-
ties on the spot from taking any readiness measures [184]
which they thought their directives may have given them, but for us
to have declared it would very likely have been construed as an overt
act — to publicly declare mobilization.
799. Q. I take it that on or before December 7, 1941, the Navy De-
partment did not use any of the established procedures to place in
full or partial effect WPL-46 or JCD-42, or any other war plan, nor
did they direct full or partial mobilization under either of those
plans, isn't that a fact ?
A. In the message of November 27 appropriate defensive deploy-
ment was ordered to be executed. It stated that it was preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, but the answer to your
question is that we did not specifically order any mobilization, but we
did indicate. I would like to add one thing with reference to the lack
of air. The record should show that while the 14th Naval District
of itself had no aircraft, the Fleet did have patrol craft under its com-
mand stationed in Oaliu.
Reexamined by the judge advocate:
800. Q. Do you remember who was the Naval Aide to the President
on or about December 1, 1941?
A. Captain John McCrea.
801. Q. In Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Operations dis-
patch of 28 November 1941, there appears the sentence, "If hostilities
cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the
first overt act." This is the message which repeated General Mar-
shall's message for information of CincPac. To clear up a situation,
do you feel tliat you are in a position to state what an overt act on
the part of the Japanese might be ?
A. An attack on us or on any of our craft anywhere.
802. Q. Are you prepared to say that the presence of a Japanese
force, consisting of carriers and escorts, within, say, a thousand miles
of the Hawaiian Islands would be an overt act ?
A. That certainly is one hypothetical question. I think if I were
out there and saw them, I would keep them under surveillance and
probably tell them to stand off when I thought the time had come.
^ 803. Q. Do you know if the intelligence bulletins which you men-
tioned in your testimony this morning and which I understand were
prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence were forwarded to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as a matter of routine ?
A. Yes.
The court then, at 4 : 20 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m. August
12, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 145
PROCEEDINGS OF NAYY COURT OF INaUIRY
SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944.
[185] Eighth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphns Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his
counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral "Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the seventh day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
With the permission of the court, the interested party. Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, introduced Commander W. R. Smedberg,
U. S. Navy, as additional counsel.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the adjournment was taken on Friday, August 11, 1944,
resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
804. Q. I hand you Exhibit 7, which is known as JCD-42, and is
the Joint Local Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the
14th Naval District. On page 8, paragraph C, (2), what do you find
as regards putting that plan in effect oy action of local authorities?
A. It may be put in as mutually agreed upon by the local com-
manders.
805. Q. Admiral, you have given some testimonv about the relative
strengths of the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese IS'avy, Other than
num.erical comparisons, what other factors must enter in order to make
any such comparison of forces really useful ?
A. Geography was a primary factor — bases. It has been [^5^]
estimated, for example, that to carry the war to the Far East and to
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol.1 11
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Japanese homeland, that we should be two to three times as strong
as she is, in Navy. I repeat, bases and geography are important
factors.
806. Q. I hand you Exhibit 35, which is your personal note to the
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet of 22 August 1941. A portion
of that has been read in court. About what percentage of it was read
by your own counsel ?
" A. Approximately half.
807. Q. What was the subject of the rest of the letter?
A. Largely technical, and training.
808. Q. Did the rest of the letter have much to do with materiel
deficiencies?
A. It did.
809. Q. Wliat was your purpose, Admiral, in going into such long
detail on such subjects in your informal letter to the Commander-in-
Chief?
A. The letter was in reply to a letter from the Commander-in-Chief,
and I was anxious that he have from me a detailed reply so far as
information was available.
810. Q. Admiral, during 1941, did you receive from the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, or from any other authoritive sources,
any expressions of opinion that the effect of the long-continued stay of
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was adverse in any respect ?
A. On the contrary, I received word from the Commander-in-Chief
that morale was good, that gunnery was better than it had any right
to be, and in fact was very good by any standards. Also, I might
add that the facilities for supporting the Fleet were becoming in-
creasingly good.
811. Q. Were your official dispatches of 16 October and 24 Novem-
ber— Exhibits 13 and 15, respectively — your own personal drafting,
and if they were not, what did they represent as they were actually
drafted?
A. They represented a concensus of opinion of myself and my most
trusted advisers. As finally drafted they had my O. K., and of course
I stood completely responsible for them.
812. Q. Referring to your considerable testimony concerning the
phraseology of the several dispatches, those two and also [1871
the one of 27 November, which is Exhibit 17, most of all of which
testimony that you have given concerning them being properly con-
fined to the Hawaiian area alone — those dispatches had several ad-
dressees, did they not?
A. They did.
813. Q. Look at your dispatch of 16 October. To whom was it
addressed ?
A. CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCASIATIC.
814. Q. Look at the one of 24 November, Exhibit 15. To whom was
it addressed ?
A. CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMll, C0M12, C0M13, SPENAVO,
London, and CINCLANT.
815. Q. Look at your dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 17. To
whom was it addressed ?
A. To CINCASIATIC, CINCPAC, info to CINCLANT, and
SPENAVO, London.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 147
816. Q. Admiral, at any time, and particularly during the ten days
which elapsed between 27 November and 7 December, did you receive
from any of those addressees any request whatever for clarification
of any of those three dispatches ?
A. No.
The judge advocate stated that he did not wish to examine the
witness further.
Examined by the court :
817. Q. Admiral, referring to your testimony concerning unity of
command in the Hawaiian area, you stated that this was under discus-
sion between the Navy Department and the War Department, and
that no decision had been arrived at up to December 7, 1941 ; is that
correct ?
A. That is correct.
818. Q. Wliat prevented a decision on this appointment being
reached ?
A. We were never able to come to a satisfactory agreement. May I
make that answer — we had not arrived at a solution.
819. Q. Will you state in general the position of the two depart-
ments on this subject during the discussions?
A. The discussions, as I recall, were general in character about unity
of command in general. We had not gotten very far with it and had
reached no conclusions.
820. Q. Wliat was the stumbling block preventing such conclusion,
if any?
A. Well, I think it might be said they may not have been pushed
as hard -as they might have been. We simply U88] hadn't
followed through with it.
821. Q. What was your personal attitude and your recommendation
with reference to unity of command in the Hawaiian area ?
A. As I stated, the discussion of unity of command, I think, prior
to Pearl Harbor, was more of a general nature on unity of command
in general. We discussed it specifically on projects which might be
take place, such as amphibious operations for example, and arrived at
definite conclusions, but with regard to Pearl Harbor, canal, and other
places, we had not pushed those discussions. I do not recall anything
specific with regard to Pearl Harbor — with regard to the Hawaiian
Islands. The discussion was general.
At the direction of the court, the question was repeated.
A. (Continued.) I won't add anything to it. I do not recall
specific recommendations with regard to the Hawaiian Islands.
822. Q. Does the court understand that you do not at this time
remember your attitude or recommendations that you may have made
on this question ?
A. My remembrance is that, except for definite operations which we
discussed, such as amphibious operations where we had come to definite
unity of command, the discussions as regards outlying bases was gen-
eral in nature and we didn't really get down to buiness on it.
823. Q. Admiral, your answer is still the same. I am talking about
you.
A. I grant the answer is not definite, but as I recall, the conversa-
tions were general, and as to my specific recommendation regarding
Pearl Harbor, I don't recall making any specific recommendations
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
regarding the Hawaiian Islands. We were operating, as has been
testified, under mutual cooperation.
824. Q. Then the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor
Naval Station lay with the Army or with the Navy ?
A. It lay with the Army.
825. Q. Was there ever any opinion on the part of either Army or
Navy that part or all of this responsibility rested with the Navy ?
A. No, not that I ever heard of.
826. Q. Referring to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy to base the fleet in the Hawaiian area, did you
recommend such action ?
A. Originally, and — yes.
827. Q. Referring to your testimony with reference to you [iS9^
and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, not having thoroughly
information or directives as to action to be taken in case Japan attacked
England or Russia, or Dutch East Indies, or a combination of these,
who had the responsibility for formulating policies in this respect?
A. Well, in the last analysis it would rest with the White House.
828. A. It has been testified that the assigned mobilization stations
of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet were in the several ports of the
Pacific Coast — the mobilization stations.
A. Yes.
829. Q. It has also been testified to that one of the reasons for
moving these battleships to the Hawaiian area in May, 1940, was that
their presence there — of the vessels of the Fleet — would act as a deter-
rent on Japan. As matters progressed during the autumn of 1941,
and particularly at the time of your war warning message, -was any
consideration given to the return of these battleships to their assigned
mobilization stations?
A. Not at that time.
830. Q. When on November 27, 1941, you issued a war warning and
stated that the negotiations had ceased, did you still consider that the
presence of United States battleships in Hawaiian waters would have
a deterrent effect upon Japan ?
A. I would consider that witlidrawing them might have had the
opposite effect.
831. Q. On December 7 and just previous thereto, were the ships
of the fleet allocated or based in accordance with your views and
recommendations ?
A. Yes.
832. Q. With your knowledge of what the Commander-in-Chief
Pacific was doing regarding training of the Fleet, and in view of the
critical situation existing in November 1941, did you ever give any
orders to assume a condition of readiness, even though it meant that
this would have curtailed the training?
A. I gave no specific orders, but the dispatches contained all that
I gave in that connection.
833. Q. Referring to your testimony that no designation of M Day
was made because of the effect it might have on Japan, who was
responsible for not designating an M Day ?
A. I assumed that responsibility in that I didn't recommend it.
834. Q. On November 27, 1941, was not the situation sufficiently
critical to have justified you in conferring with the Commander-in-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 149
Chief of the Pacific by phone, giving him U^O] a full picture
of the situation and checking up as to what he had done, even at the
risk of jeopardizing the security of communications?
A. I didn't consider it. I thought my dispatch gave him the warn-
ing which I felt he should have, and briefly, such information as it
was based on.
835. Q. Did you make use, during this critical period, of the tele-
phone for communicating to the Hawaiian area ?
A. I did not prior to December 7, and then only after Japan had
struck.
836. Q. Had any conflict of opinion, or lack of cooperation between
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and the Army Commander of
Hawaii come to your notice ])rior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. Not that I recall.
837. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you consider that your con-
tact with the State Department was full and complete, and that you
received from them all essential information regarding conditions in
the Pacific?
A. I felt that I was receiving, certainly, sufficient to acquaint me
with the picture. I could not say I received all.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
entered, as reporter. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[191] 838. Q. From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, did
you continue to receive this information ?
A. I recall receiving no information which in any way altered what
I had sent on November 27th, at which time I stated that negotiations
had ceased. I recall nothing which would change the dispatch.
839. Q. Admiral, in comparing the strength of the Pacific Fleet
as of the autumn of 1941 with that of the Japanese Navy at the same
time, did not the fact that Japan had been engaged in hostilities for
some time previously and was therefore presumably war minded and
geared for war enter as a factor favorable to Japan ?-
A. Yes.
840. Q. Wlien, in your opinion, or from your knowledge, was it
first conceived that the United States might have to engage in hos-
tilities in both the Atlantic and the Pacific contrary to the existing
policy, which policy had existed for some years prior to the outbreak
of war in Germany?
A. In 1939, I definitely thought so. On the Hill in 1940, on the
record, I stated that in my opinion there was in the making another
world conflagration. I told the Senate Committee that there cer-
tainly was the possibility of our coming in ; that if we c^me in there
certainly was no doubt as to which side we would come in with, and
that in my opinion we should be prepared to depend only on ourselves
and we should build accordingly. My first letter to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific, which I think he has introduced — perhaps not
but that is immaterial — gave the thought that we might some day have
a surprise attack by Japan. I didn't see how we could avoid it and
I endeavored to carry that tone consistently through every action I
took. It certainly animated everything that I was doing here in the
Department. Much has been said about the small boat program, dis-
trict craft. It was one of the worst headaches I had. It was difficult
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to get through. We were terribly delayed in construction, particu-
larly due to engines after it was started. But I felt certain we were
headed for collision and I think I made that certainty of thought
known. The Department was animated by it.
841. Q. In the period subsequent to 1939, did you notice from your
contacts with the Congress of the United States any change in the
attitude which had become fixed to the effect that there was no need
for an increase in the Naval strength?
A. Wellj I could only judge them by their acts. The real change
in the sentmient of Congress came when France fell.
842. Q. That was in 1940, was it not?
A. That was in June^ as I recall, 1940.
[1931 843. Q. You stated, Admiral Stark, that originally you
recommended that the Pacific Fleet be based on Hawaii. Did you,
during the latter part of 1941, or any time prior thereto, recommend
a continuance of basing this fleet on Hawaii?
A. Not during the latter part. I originally recommended, when
they went out there, not having in mind originally retaining them
right through. Once they were there, there was frequent discussion
regarding keeping them there. It was a close question and the deci-
sion was always the same, to keep them there. Later on we had just
settled into it.
844. Q. "Was it in accordance with War Plans that in event of a
critical situation in. the Pacific, vis-a-vis Japan or any other nation,
that the battleships of the Pacific Fleet would be based in Hawaii?
A. I do not recall any such provision.
The court announced that it had no further questions of this
witness.
Recross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy (continued) :
845. Q. Admiral, your war warning dispatch. Exhibit 17: What
are the three most essential, vital phrases of that dispatch ?
A. I would say, first, that this dispatch is to be considered a war
warning; second, that an aggressive move by Japan was expected
within the next few days; third, execute an appropriate defensive
deployment preparatory of carrying out the tasks in WPL-46.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R, Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he had no further questions of this witness.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
846. Q. On Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, did you consider
using the telephone for conference with Admiral Kimmel ?
A. No. J have already testified that I did not.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret.), stated that he had no further questions of this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should [IdS] be a matter of record
in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by
the previous questioning.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 151
The witness stated as follows : In the question which I believe was
asked as to whether the Army was responsible in part or in whole for
the defense of Pearl Harbor, I stated the Army was responsible, and
the Army was. There were certain responsibilities which I assume
the Navy had of a minor nature in cooperation with the Army, but
in my opinion it was the Army's responsibility. I don't want to
weaken my answer at all but I assume that certain arrangements were
made which it was up to us to carry out when the Army took that
responsibility, which was hers.
Questioned by the court :
847. Q. Admiral, the court has a few more questions to ask in order
that one of your answers may be cleared up. You have stated that
the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor rested with the
Army ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct.
848. Q. Was Pearl Harbor considered a first-class Naval base ?
A. Yes, I would say it was.
849. Q. What was the responsibility of the Fleet with reference to
the defense of Pearl Harbor ?
A. The Fleet primarily was in no way responsible for the defense of
Pearl Harbor. It was supposed to be completely foot-free and their
presence or absence, in my opinion, neither lessened nor changed in
any way the Army's responsibility.
850. Q. In line with that answer, what was the responsibility of the
14th Naval District for the defense of Pearl Harbor, generally ?
A. Generally, it was a task force of the Fleet. The responsibilities,
I would say, were subsidiary.
851. Q. To what?
A. To the Army's primary responsibility regarding such local
arrangements as might be made. This, in my opinion, in no way less-
ened the Army's responsibility.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
[19 ^i] The court stated as follows : I think it would be proper
if I would restate what I have said before; that the court is finished
with you as a witness for the time being ; that you will take your seat
as an interested party, subject to further call as a witness for such
exarnination or re-examination as may be desired by the court or any
parties to the inquiry.
The witness was ektiy warned and resumed his seat as an interested
party.
[Initialed in margin :] H. B.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made
the following statement : May it please the court : I am under orders
to return to my command post without delay, and must do so as soon
as I can verify my testimony. I am therefore unable to resume my
status as an interested party before this court at this time. My counsel
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
will remain to represent me as best they may and I assume that they
will have all the same rights as though I were actually present. My
absence from the court's proceeding is beyond my control. I am
obliged to state that I waive no rights whatsoever in consequence
thereof.
The court then, at 10: 50 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the in-
terested parties and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station ?
A. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirman, Assistant Chief, Combat In-
telligence ; and additional duties of Director of Naval Intelligence.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year
1941?
A. Director of Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
3. Q. Will you explain in detail what these duties were?
A. Thev are a variety of duties, some of which were specified which
included Liaison with the State Department, and other duties not
under the cognizance of any other division of Naval Operations.
[195] 4. Q. Can you state what duties you performed directly
with the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Directly with the Chief of Naval Operations, the principal duty
was liaison with the State Department.
5. Q. In performing those duties that brought you in contact with
the State Department, what was the routine for carrying them out ?
A. The liaison duties with the State Department were conducted
by personal visits with those handling matters of mutual concern in
both departments, by telephone and through a so-called liaison com-
mittee which was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval
Operations, which consisted of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Chief
of Naval Operations ; and Under Secretary of State. I accompanied
the Chief of Naval Operations to these meetings in order to make notes
so that on my return I could implement any action decided upon.
6. Q. What was the division of the State Department that conducted
matters pertaining to Asiatic countries?
A. The Far Eastern Division.
7. Q. What officers in the State Department did you usually contact
in the performance of your duties in connection with Far Eastern
affairs ?
A. Generally Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Joseph
Ballantine, and a number of others ; and Secretary Hull, and on occa-
sion. Under Secretary Welles direct.
8. Q. Did you keep any file of conferences with officials of the State
Department, either official or private?
A. In regard to the liaison meetings, prior to about the middle of
May, 1941, 1 kept a resume of the meetings which was, I believe, kept
by the Liaison Division of the State Department, and after the middle
of May a stenographer was present to record these meetings. In addi-
tion to the matters on the record, there were certain matters discussed
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 153
off the record, and on occasions I did make a memorandum of the pro-
ceedings after returning from the State Department. However, I do
not believe that there was a complete record of these meetings and I
do not know of any complete record of the meetings which were held
from time to time with Secretary Hull or a record of the conversations
with Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and others. All records that I
know of are in the Central Division of the Navy Department. I have
none in my own possession.
9. Q. Adverting to this liaison committee that you speak of: Did
I understand you to say that there were probably minutes kept by this
committee ?
A. Yes. This committee, however, was mainly occupied with mat-
ters other than those pertaining to the Far East, although on occa-
sions, especially when Mr. Hull was [196] absent from the
city, or incapacitated, matters concerning the Far East were discussed.
10. Q. Could you tell the court where it could probably find the
minutes of these meetings ?
A. I believe those that are in the Navy Department are in the files
of the Central Division.
11. Q. Would you think that there are probably minutes also filed
in the State Department?
A. Yes.
12. Q. Do you consider that you were present at most of the con-
ferences in the State Department of major importance when matters
dealing with the Navy Department were being discussed?
A. Generally so, yes, but they were high-level conferences which
occurred, I believe, between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Secre-
tary Hull, and probably Admiral Stark and Gener^al Marshall, at
which I was not present. Undoubtedly there were meetings at the
White House on matters concerning the Far East, none of which I
attended.
13. Q. Did you have access to intelligence information of the Navy
Department ?
A. Yes.
14. Q. "Wliat was the system of keeping your currently informed
on matters of Naval Intelligence?
A. I do not believe there was any set system ; none that I can remem-
ber. I generally got the information from various people in Naval
Intelligence, or picked it up from
15. Q. What I am trying to find out, Admiral, is whether or not
you had to go around and search for this information yourself, or
was there some system whereby at stated intervals, or when anything
important occurred, persons responsible in the Naval Intelligence
Division sought you out and delivered the information to you ?
A. I believe that they either telephoned it or somebody dropped in
and told me things which were of particular importance. In addition,
the Secretary of the Navy had, for some time preceding Pearl Harbor,
had a practically daily round up in his office at 9 : 00 o'clock where tha
general war situation was presented much the same as it is now pre-
sented in Room 3621, where the military situation was discussed and
the Japanese troops movements were discussed, et cetera.
16. Q. Do you feel that you attended most of these conferences, or
not?
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The morning conferences?
17. Q. Yes.
A. Yes
[197] 18. Q. Wliat contact did you have with the Navy War
Flans Division ?
A. My contact with the Navy War Plans Division was generally
to keep them informed of what was going on in the State Depart-
ment, and on occasions when proposals were under discussion or
various courses of action were being considered in the State Depart-
ment, to inform the War Plans Division and obtain their reactions.
[198] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke-
serve; reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
19. Q. Admiral, that tells what information you gave the War
Plans Division. What I would like to know is, did the War Plaiis
Division keep you currently informed on its estimates of the situa-
tion, especially with regard to the Japanese situation?
A. There was no regular system. What I learned as to the War
Plans estimate situation, I believe I learned at meetings, such as the
one described this morning and such meetings as I attended in Ad-
miral Stark's office, which were occasional, at which members of the
War Plans Division were present and listening to them express their
views.
20. Q. Who was the officer in War Plans Division who generally
attended these conferences that you speak of ?
A. Generally, Captain Turner was present, and if he were too busy
to attend, some alternate was present.
21. Q. Can you recall who his principal alternates were ?
A. No.
22. Q. Do you know, from your attending these conferences and
hearing the discussions, whether or not the War Plans Division kept
a current estimate of the situation, so far as the Japanese situation was
concerned ?
A. I believe they did.
23. Q. Commencing with the Executive Order which was issued in
the latter part of July, 1941, the subject matter of which dealt with
freezing Japanese assets in the United States, do you know, from your
many contacts, what the rejoercussions were in Japan as a result of the
issuance of this order?
A. None other than there was a bitter press campaign in the Jap-
anese press against the United States.
24. Q. In your capacity as the Director of the Central Division
and because of your many contacts with the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in these morning conferences which you have discussed, do you
feel that the Chief of Naval Operations was supplied currently with
information on developments in Japan about this time?
A. I believe he was.
25. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what the current Navy De-
partment estimate was of the effect of this order on United States-
Japanese relations ?
A. I know of no specific estimate having been made. There may
have been one. Naturally, the Navy Department knew the freezing
order was not helpful to United States-Japanese relations.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 155
[IPP] 26. Q. I show you Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24,
1941, which deals with matters of security and defenses in the Pearl
Harbor area. I will ask you to glance at this letter and state
whether or not you have any recollection that the general subject
matter of this letter was brought to the knowledge of the State
Department ?
A. Insofar as I know, it w as never brought to the attention of the
State Department, and I did not see the letter until after December
7, 1941.
27. Q. From your liaison duties with the State Department, do
you or do you not feel that the State Department was kept reason-
ably well informed on the Navy Department's estimate of the situa-
tion, so far as developments with the Japanese Government were
concerned ?
A. I think that they were reasonably well informed, yes.
28. Q. And do you have any idea of whether the State Depart-
ment was informed currently on matters relating to the capacity of
the U. S. Navy to cope with the situations as they were developing?
A. It is difficult to answer that question, because when you state
the Navy Department, I do not know who was speaking on behalf
of the Navy Department. I imagine Secretary Knox would be the
one to express the point of view of the Navy Department.
29. Q. As liaison officer, did you transmit any such information to
the State Department that you can remember ?
A. I cannot remember specifically, but I attempted to keep them
informed, naturallj^, on how we viewed the various steps that were
being taken, and on occasions we were asked specificall}^ to obtain
the views of other people, including the War Plans Division.
30. Q. I show you Exhibit 13, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions dispatch of October IG, 1941. I ask you to look at the dispatch
and tell the court if you remember having seen the draft of the dis-
patch prior to its transmission or prior to its being released by the
Chief of Naval Operations?
A. I don't remember having seen it prior to transmission to the
Chief of Naval Operations. I may have.
31. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the source of information
on which this dispatch was based?
A. No. I imagine it is an estimate of taking into consideration
what was known as to the character of the members of the new
Japanese cabinet.
32. Q. Do you know in what office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions this dispatch was prepared?
A. No. I presume it was prepared in the War Plans Division.
[200] 33. Q. Were you present at any discussion of this dis-
patch before it was released?
A. Not that I remember.
34. Q. From your liaison duties in the State Department, can you
recall any expression of opinion by the officials with whom you dealt
over there as to what their views on this cabinet shift were?
A. As I remember, there were varying views of the members of
the Far Eastern Division of the State Dej)artment concerning the
exact significance of this shift in the cabinet. I believe the con-
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
census of opinion was that this shift did not tend to put in power
a cabinet which was committed to closer relations with the United
States but that it did not necessarily mean that a cabinet was coming
into power which was committed to either getting in agreement with
the United States or going to war,
35. Q. Would you say, then, Admiral, that the State Department's
views were different in that respect from those expressed by the
Chief of Xaval Operations in his dispatch?
A. I believe that the Navy Department's view of the meaning of
the shift in cabinet was that it was an indication of a more serious
situation than the State Department viewed.
36. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions dispatch of November 24, 1941, and ask you to refresh youi
memory. Do you know if the State Department had any informa
tion that this dispatch had been sent?
A. No, I do not know.
37. Q. So far as you can remember, you had nothing to do, in
your duties as liaison officer, with acquainting the State Department
of the fact that this dispatch had been sent ?
A. No.
38. Q). Do you know, from your contacts with officials in the State
Department, whether or not they did have information of this dis-
patch having been sent?
A. I cannot remember, but I believe at this date that this reflected
the State Department's views.
39. Q. Adverting to the first sentence of this dispatch, which I
read: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan
very doubtful." Do you know, from your discussions with officials
in the State Department, whether or not they expressed this view
or some other?
A. They expressed that view.
40. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941. Did you in the
performance of your duties as liaison officer acquaint the State De-
partment with the fact that this message had been sent by the Chief
of Naval Operations?
A. About the 1st of December I informed Mr. Hull that [201]
a war warning had been sent. I did not clear the message with
the State Department and did not, so far as I can remember, inform
them on the 27th, the 28th, and the 29th of November that this mes-
sage had been sent. The occasion when I informed the State Depart-
ment, as I remember, was on the Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday
preceding Pearl Harbor. Mr. Hull 'phoned me and stated some-
thing to this effect : "I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of
me, but I have done everything I can with these Japs, and they are
liable to break loose and bite anyone." On this occasion I assured
him that a war warning had been sent. I did not see the war warn-
ing as worded, although 1 had knowledge that such message had been
sent some time later.
41. Q. In your contacts with officials in the State Department did
you obtain any information as to the views of that department on
this clause, which I quote : "Negotiations with Japan looking toward
stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased" ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 157
A. I can't remember any specific conversation, but I believe that
was Mr. Hull's belief that, so far as any effective negotiations or hope
of successful outcome of any other negotiations was concerned — that
they had ceased.
42. Q.^Did you in your duties as liaison officer communicate any
such information as you have just stated to the Chief of Naval
Operation ?
A. I believe I did.
43. Q. I again quote from Exhibit 17: "An aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next few days." Can you tell me, Ad-
miral, whether or not that estimate of the situation was one held by
the State Department?
A. I cannot remember what the view was held by the State Depart-
ment, but I believe they were informed of Japanese troop movements,
etc., and that they held the view that an aggressive move by the
Japanese was expected. "Whether they believed it was an aggressive
move against the United States or not, I cannot say.
44. Q. Do you recall having attended any conferences with rela-
tion to the subject matter of this dispatch prior to its release by the
Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. No.
45. Q. Can you tell the court when you first became acquainted with
the fact that this dispatch had been sent?
A, I believe I knew that such a dispatch had been sent on the day
of its dispatch, but I did not see the dispatch prior to its release.
[£02] 46. Q. With reference to the estimate of the situation
which I have just read: "An aggressive move by Japan is expected
within the next few days," do you know whether or not that was the
estimate of any division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Undoubtedly, the estimates made by the War Plans Division.
47. Q. Do you know, from your attendance at any conferences,
whether or not this was the view of the Chief of Naval Operations
at that time ?
A. I believe it was, yes.
48. Q. Upon what do you base that belief. Admiral ?
A. There were numerous conferences, etc., at which the situation
was discussed, and, undoubtedly, such a message would not be re-
leased without the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations.
49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations under date of December 3, 1941. Do you have
any knowledge of the source of the information contained in this
dispatch relative to the instructions that were sent Japanese diplo-
matic and consular offices with reference to the destruction of their
codes and ciphers and the burning of all confidential and secret
documents ?
A. No, I do not know the source of the information.
50. Q. Do you know whether or not about December 3, 1941, the
State Department had been informed of the subject matter of Exhibit
20, which you have just read ?
A. I cannot state positively, but I am pretty sure that they were
informed of the contents of that message.
51. Q. Can you remember whether or not you had any discussions
yourself with the officials in the State Department on the subject
matter set out in this dispatch ?
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I cannot remember specifically, but I do remember in the week
or ten days preceding Pearl Harbor I was at the State Department,
sometimes as often as three times a day, and such a matter would be
given to them verbally, and we did make every attempt to keep them
fully informed of any such development, so that I am sure they were
informed.
52. Q. Did you yourself attach any significance to the directive
contained in this dispatch relative to Japanese diplomatic and consular
posts, and if you did, what was it?
A. That war was increasingly close.
63. Q. About this time of December 3, 1941, and during these dis-
cussions can you recall having heard any officials in the State Depart-
ment in a responsible position with whom [£0S] you were
dealing express any opinion as to the state of the negotiations between
the United States and the Japanese Government, which had been
going on for some time previous?
A. Yes, Mr. Hull in the latter part of November and the first few
days of December several times expressed himself as believing that the
outcome of the negotiations was to be unsuccessful and that the nego-
tiations were nearing an end and deadlock.
54. Q. Can you remember, from any conversations you had with
these officials of importance in the State Department at that time,
whether they stated their views that negotiations had stopped or
ceased entirely ?
A. Not that I remember that they had completely ceased, although
I believe their general feeling was that any hope of successful nego-
tiations had ceased.
55. Q. Are you trying to state to this court that while there may
have been some discussions, it was the view of the State Department
that the end must inevitably be that they would not be successful ?
A. That is correct.
56. Q. Can you recall if you did or did not keep the Chief of Naval
Operations informed on these matters currently as they transpired?
A. I kept him informed currently as the negotiations were going
forth, and on return from various meetings from the State Depart-
ment, I either sent in a memorandum to him as to what occurred or
reported favorably to him what had transpired.
57. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations, dated 4 December 1941. Can you recall whether
or not officials in the State Department knew about the direction
to the naval station at Guam to destroy all secret and confidential
papers and certain other classified matter ?
A. I am pretty sure that I would have informed the State Depart-
ment of the contents of that message. I cannot specifically remember,
because there were so many meetings and so many contacts, but I
do remember that we tried to keep them informed as to what we
were doing.
58. Q. Did 3^ou have any knowledge of the subject matter in this
dispatch prior to its having been released for transmission ?
A. No. I did know that such a message was being sent.
59. Q. Do you know of any special situation which existed on
December 4, 1941, that might have caused such a directive to the
naval station at Guam to destroy its secret and confidential publi-
cations ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 159
A. No, I don't know the exact estimate that was based on, but I
presume that about this time Japanese planes were flying over Guam,
against which we were protesting, and we had [204] various
troop movements, and there may be other information which led the
Director of Naval Intelligence to send this message.
60. Q. As you can recall the situation existing between November
27, 1941, and December 6 of the same year, can you state whether or
not this information was that imminence of war was more critical on
the 6th of December than it had been on the 27th of November?
A. As I remember the situation, the Navy Department believed
that a break with Japan — at least, a rupture of relations was drawing
increasingly close with the passage of time.
61. Q. Do I interpret your answer correctly, Admiral, by saying
that relations between the Japanese and the United States had be-
come worse between November 27 and December 6, 1941 ?
A. Either that they had become worse, or, at least, the Navy De-
partment and State Department believed that they had become worse.
62. Q. There is evidence before this court that on the morning of
December 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations received informa-
tion concerning a directive to the Japanese Ambassador in Wash-
ington that he was to present what amounted to an ultimatum at one
o'clock Washington time. Did you have any knowledge of this
subject matter on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
A. I knew that they were to present a note at one o'clock to the
Secretary of State.
63. Q. Did you have information before it was presented as to
what might be contained in the note ?
The witness stated that he hesitated to answer the question on the
ground that it would involve the disclosure of information detrimental
to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against re-
vealing state secrets.
The court directed the witness to answer the question.
A. The general tenor, yes.
64. Q. Can you recall whether or not the tenor of that information
was to the effect that the Japanese diplomats would present the matter
in the nature of an ultimatum at one o'clock Washington time on
December 7, 1941 ?
A. As subsequently proved by the public note, it was an ultimatum
or in the nature of an ultimatum.
65. Q. What I am trying to find out. Admiral, is just exactly what
your information was which was contained in this note tliat the
Japanese Ambassador was to deliver at one o'clock?
[WS] The witness stated that he hesitated to answer the ques-
tion on the ground that it would involve the disclosure of information
detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege
against revealing state secrets.
The judge advocate replied.
The court stated that the witness's claim for privilege was honored
and that he need not answer the question.
^ 66. Q. Can you recall any contact with the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Admiral Stark, on the morning of December 7, 1941, with
relation to any information which was m the Navy Department deal-
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing with negotiations between the Japanese Government and the
United States?
A. Yes, I was in Admiral Stark's office on the morning of Decem-
ber 7. I had received information that the Japanese Ambassadors,
Kiirusu and Nomura, had requested an appointment with the Secre-
tary of State for one, o'clock, I believe, at which time they were to
present a reply to our note of November 26 ; and while there General
Marshall 'phoned Admiral Stark, and as I remember it, although I
did not listen in, but to one end of the conversation, I believe Admiral
Stark, after he laid down the 'phone, related the substance of General
Marshall's conversation. As I remember it, in substance, it was, "I
have a hunch that the Japanese have something timed with the de-
livery of the note, and I propose to send a message to the forces in
the field, stressing the necessity for an alert." The question of the
Japanese asking for an appointment for Sunday afternoon was dis-
cussed to some degree, as it was quite unusual and out of the known
routine of the foreign service.
67. Q. At about what time did this discussion take place which you
have just related, Admiral?
A. I cannot accurately place the time, but I would say it was
probably about 10 : 30.
68. Q. Was the Army Chief of Staff, Gei^eral Marshall, present
with Admiral Stark at this conversation ?
A. No, he was not present with Admiral Stark. It was a telephone
conversation, of which I heard one end, and Admiral Stark, in effect,
related the other end after laying down the 'phone.
69. Q. Can you recall what Admiral Stark did about it?
A. Admiral Stark concurred in the dispatch of the other message
by General Marshall.
70. Q. In your capacity as liaison officer with the State Depart-
ment, did you, after overhearing this discussion between Admiral
Stark and the Army Chief of Staff, have occasion to tell the State
Department the subject thereof?
A. No.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, withdrew.
[$06] 71. Do you know whether or not anybody in the Navy
Department told the State Department about this matter prior to
1 : 00 o'clock on 7 December 1941?
A. Well, I certainly did not. I was here in the Department till
noon and left and was back around shortly after the messages began
to come in that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, and I am sure that
the State Department was informed of that conversation.
72. Q. Between Admiral Stark and General Marshall?
A. No, the State Department was not informed of the conversa-
tion between General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
73. Q. Now you have stated that there was a conversation between
Admiral Stark and General Marshall on the morning of 7 December
1941, during which General Marshall communicated certain informa-
tion to the Chief of Naval Operations. You have stated that you
knew in substance what General Marshall had some communicated,
because Admiral Stark had repeated it to you in substance after he
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 161
put down the telephone. Now do you know whether or not Admiral
Stark had information of a similar nature to that presented by Gen-
eral Marshall at the time of the telephone conversation that you have
just related?
A, Admiral Stark knew that the Japanese had requested an ap-
pointment with the Secretary of State for 1 : 00 o'clock, for delivery
of a note. Whether or not he had the same hunch that General
Marshall had, I do not know.
The court then, at 12 : 40 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[mr] Present:
All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the
inquiry and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
R. E. Schuirmann, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
74. Q. Admiral, you testified this morning as to numerous confer-
ences you had with State Department people and as to numerous trips
that you made to the State Department, and conversations that took
place at that time. Was the seeking out of these conferences and the
leg work involved largely yours on behalf of the Navy Department ?
A. Yes.
75. Q. It was largely a Navy Department initiative, rather than an
initiative of the Department of State ?
A. Well, the leg work was done by the Navy Department ; I mean,
as far as personal contact with Mr. Hull was concerned. Whether he
asked me to come over to go over the results of these meetings after
they were held — I am now^ referring to conversations with Kurusu
and Nomura — or whether I asked him to come over, I don't know, but
there was a general agreement on it. There was no appointment made ;
it was more or less a custom that grew up.
76. Q. But in order to get the information that you got, you went
to the State Department, usually, to get it?
A. Yes. At times, we used the telephone, but somebody had to go to
get the information and we never made any issue as to whether I went
over there.
77. Q. Did I understand you to say this morning that in connection
with the information that was secured from various sources by both
the Navy and the State Department, that Secretary Hull commented
at one point that the Navy seemed always to be ahead of us?
A. Well, yes, I think that remark of Secretary Hull's was more or
less to say, "Well, I apologize for making this suggestion" which he, in
effect did. If it was time to send out some message, I took it, and that
was just a polite w^ay of apologizing for making a suggestion which he
thought primarily was of Navy Department concern!
[£08] The "interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, stated that he had no further questions of this witness.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 12
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
78. Q. In your capacity as liaison officer with the State Department,
I understood you to testify this morning. Admiral, that you felt during
the fall of 1941 you had thorough and complete information as to the
Far Eastern situation from Naval Intelligence ?
A. Yes.
79. Q. And by that did you mean that you felt that you had, and
were told all the intelligence information they had concerning thai
area ?
A. I don't believe that I followed every detailed report that came
in on that area because that was too large, but I felt that I was cognizant
of their estimate of how they felt about the situation.
80. Q. How did you get that information. Admiral ?
A. Well, there was no form of memoranda that were exchanged, but
I talked to the directors of Naval Intelligence, or heard them talk, and
I talked to McCallum at various times, but there was no set routine
whereby I would deliver certain information every time it came in, or
the reports.
81. Q. If their information was in written form, did you see the
written form in which they had it?
A. No, I don't believe I did see written estimates, although I may
have. My memory is not clear on it.
82. Q. I am referring more to the original written sources of their
information, rather than estimates or conclusions that they formed
from it.
A. No, I didn't follow the original sources from which their informa-
tion was derived, original reports.
83. Q. Did you have access to those ?
A. If I desired them ; there was no attempt to bar me from them. I
made no particular attempt to look at them.
84. Q. Do you recall learning from the Office of Naval Intelligence
on or about the 15th of October of Japan's plans and intentions for the
conquest of southeastern Asia ?
A. I don't remember that report, no.
[£09] 85. Q. Well, do you remember any information at or
about that time of that character ?
A. Not distinctly. There was lots of information. I think most
of the information tended to show that Japan intended to expand to
the southward through Indo-China, and perhaps Malaysia.
86. Q. Sometime during the month of October, 1941, did you learn
from Naval Intelligence that they had information that Japanese
Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese na-
tionalists from N. E. I., Malaya, the Philippines, Hawaii, America,
and Europe ?
A. I don't remember the date but I do remember we had informa-
tion that the Japanese Nationals had been encouraged to get out of
certain areas, and I believe that there were some — I am not exact on
this point, but I believe that there was some question of whether an
exchange or repatriation ship should go into Panama at the time. Of
course, they would require permission from the United States govern-
ment.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 163
87. Q. Do you recall learning from the Office of Naval Intelligence
early in November that the internal situation in Japan, both poltical
and economic, primarily as a result of the American embargo and
freezing orders, had become so desperate that the Japanese govern-
ment had determined to distract popular attention, either by a foreign
war or a definite diplomatic victory?
A. I don't recollect it, no.
88. Q. You have no memory of anything of that character?
A. No.
(NOTE: Question No. 89 and the answer thereto, numbered Page
209-A, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of
the war.)
90. Were you getting information from any sources other than
Naval Intelligence and the State Department concerning the Far East-
ern situation? I am not going to ask you what the sources are. Or
were there other sources?
A. Yes, there were other sources.
91. Q. Were those other sources within the Navy Department?
A. Yes.
92. Q. Can you tell us the Navy Department division whence that
information emanated?
A. From the Communications Division.
[3J0] 93. Q. Would you get that information. Admiral, through
Naval Intelligence, or from some other source directly? Would you
get it via Naval Intelligence, or otherwise?
A. I would get it via Naval Intelligence.
94. Q. So that the immediate contacts, as far as you were concerned,
were Naval Intelligence ?
A. Yes.
95. Q. Well, then, is it correct to say that so far as the Navy Depart-
ment information is concerned, your source was Naval Intelligence?
A. That is right.
96. Q. Regardless of whence they may have gotten it?
A. Yes.
97. Q. You got it through Naval Intelligence?
A. Yes.
The following pages, Nos. 210-A, 211, 212 and 212-A have, by direc-
tion of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with
the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of
national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
\Sl-3] 108. Q. Coming down to Sunday, December 7th : "Wlien
did you come to your office?
A. Between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30, as I remember.
109. Q. Wlien you reached the office, did you receive the informa-
tion about which we have been talking with Admiral Stark?
A. With Admiral Stark, yes.
110. Q. It was available to you?
A. I received information that the Japanese were going to present
a note, and requested an appointment with the Secretary of State
for 1 : 00 o'clock to deliver a note.
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
111. Q. And that was available to you immediately upon your ar-
rival at your office, between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 ?
A. Practically immediately.
112. Q. Do you know when that information was received in the
Navy Department?
A. No.
113. Q. Could you ascertain that fact from records now available
to you ?
A. I do not believe so. If I could, the records which would be
available to me to substantiate the fact, I would object to discussing
it on the grounds of national security.
114. Q. I am only asking the time of the availability of that in the
Department.
A. In the Department? Well, that is correct, I received the mes-
sage ; it was available to me at 9 : 30. The only records which I know
of which would substantiate it would be objectionable on the grounds
of national security, to establish the date or the time when that infor-
mation was first available in the Department.
115. Q. Bear in mind, I am not asking to see the records; I am
merely asking if from your examination of the records now you could
establish the time when that was available to the Navy Department?
A. I don't know, but probably so.
[214] 116. Q. And would the disclosure to this court of the time
of availability in the Navy Department, in your opinion, violate the
national security ?
A. Yes.
117. Q. Do you recall any conversation on Sunday morning, 7 De-
cember, with those with whom you talked, as to when that informa-
tion had been available in the Navy Department?
The court announced that it would object to any further questions
on that subject, on the groinids tliat the witness has stated that to
answer them would be a violation of state secrets ; and that the war
effort, not as of December 7, 1941 but as of today would be endan-
gered.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), stated as follows: May I state what I understand to be
the court's ruling, and I certainly intend to abide by it : That because
of the statement of the witness as to the current national security
I am forbidden from asking any more questions concerning the receipt
of the message about which he has testified that he had on Sunday
morning.
The court announced that that was correct.
118. Q. We will refer to your conversation with Admiral Stark.
Please fix as precisely as you can — and I appreciate much allowance
has got to be made for the passage of two years and a half — when you
first saw Admiral Stark on Sunday morning?
A. I believe it was about 10 : 00 o'clock,
119. Q. Might it have been later? Might it have been an hour
later?
A. I think about 10 : 00 o'clock as near as I can remember.
120. Q. Do you recall who was with Admiral Stark — strike that.
Where did you confer with Admiral Stark ?
A. In his office.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 165
121. Q. In his personal office?
A. That is right.
122. Q. Who was with Admiral Stark when you first wenc into
his room?
A. As I remember, I and possibly Commander Wellborn were the
only two there, but I'm not sure that there w^as anybody other than
myself there when I first went in.
123. Q. How 'long did 3^ou stay in Admiral Stark's office in con-
ference with him ?
A. I think I was there probably upward of an hour, or close to an
hour. There were various people coming in and going out.
[^iJ] 124. Q. Can you recall who those other people were com-
ing in and going out ?
A. I believe Captain Turner, Captain Wilkinson, Admiral Inger-
soll, are the only three I can remember at this time.
125. Q. While you were in there, was additional information
brought in to Admiral Stark concerning this Japanese situation?
A. None that I remember, no.
[216] 12G. Q. You testified this morning that sometime during
that conversation there was a telephone call to or from General
Marshall?
A. From General Marshall, yes.
127. Q. That was from General Marshall ?
A. Yes.
128. Q, How long after you first went into Admiral Stark's office
was the telephone call from General Marshall ?
A. I should judge thirty to forty-five minutes.
129. Q. It would be between 10 ^30 and 11 : 00 ?
A. That is correct, 10 : 30.
130. Q. Did you have any conversation, or did you overhear any
conversation between Admiral Stark relative to tlie sending of the
message by the Navy Department to Admiral Kinmiel?
A. No.
131. Q. There was no mention of that in your presence?
A. None that I remember.
132. Q. You told us this morning that you left the Navy Depart-
ment; what time was that?
A. 12 : 00 o'clock.
133. Q. You went home to dinner?
A. Yes.
134. Q. Do you know Commander McCallum ?
A. Yes.
135. Q. What was his position at that time?
A. I believe he was in charge of part of a section of Naval Intelli-
gence.
lo6. Q. During the week preceding 7 December, did you attend any
conferences with Admiral Stark and Commander McCullum?
A. None that I remember, no. I don't remember of any conference
at which McCallum was present with Admiral Stark, that I was also
present.
137. Q. Do you recall if Admiral Brainard was present Sunday
morning at the conference with Admiral Stark ?
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I am not positive, but I believe he was, tliat he did come in some
time that morning.
138. Q. Did you personally talk to Admiral Stark, or were you
present when it was discussed with Admiral Stark, any time during
the w^eek preceding 7 December, tlie question of sending any addi-
tional messages to Admiral Kimmel — additional to what had been
sent ?
A. No.
[pj7] 139. Q. That wouldn't come within the field of your
activity ?
A. No, it would not.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The court was cleared.
The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered.
Examined by the court:
140. Q. Admiral, were negotiations continuing between the Jap-
anese representatives and the State Department between 27 November
and 7 December 1941 ?
A. I think that depends on how you define negotiations.
141. Q. Well, change that — were discussions continuing^
A. Discussions, I believe, were continuing to the extent that there
were certain points being cleared up; for instance, what Tojo had said
in a speech and various other points, but they were awaiting a reply
to the note that was delivered on November 20, which reply was deliv-
ered, I believe, on December 7.
142. Q. During this time, 27 November to 7 December, did you
make daily reports and keep Admiral Stark conversant with these
discussions you speak of at the State Department.
A. To the best of my knowledge I believe I did.
143. Q. Were you familiar with the note of November 26, which
this government delivered, as we understand, to the Japanese Gov-
ernment ?
A. I am perfectly familiar with the note to which you refer, and I
liave done my best to recollect whether or not I was furnished a copy
of that for delivery to the Navy Department prior to its dispatch, but
I cannot state that I did ; and to the best of my recollection, I did not.
144. Q. Did you consider at that time that this note of 26 November
was an ultimatum to Japan ?
A. To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note were
such that there was no hope in anybody's mind — at least nobody with
whom I discussed the question in the Navy Depai'tment — that the
Japanese would or could under the circumstances agree to the terms
of the note.
145. Q. Did you inform Admiral Stark as to this note, or did you
discuss it with him?
A. I did not, specifically, no.
146. Q. On Sunday morning, December 7, while you were [218]
discussing matters which have been brought out in this testimony, with
Admiral Stark, did any question arise as to the importance of phoning
or any communication direct from the Navy Department to Admiral
Kimmel?
PROCEEDINGS OP^ NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 167
A. I remember of none. I believe that Admiral Stark, after re-
ceipt of the telephone call from General Marshall in which General
Marshall said that he would send the dispatch, felt that it would take
care of Admiral Kimmel on its arrival in Pearl Harbor.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any f urtlier statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 2 : 45 p. m., adjourned until 10 : 15 a. m., Monday,
August 14, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 169
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVYlCOURT OF INQUIRY
MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944.
[219] Ninth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 10 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Vice Admiral Adolplms Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kammel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the eighth day of the inquiry w^as
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of ithe subject matter of the inquiry.
The witness. Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S, Army (Ret) ,
informed the court that he had an interest in the subject matter of the
inquiry, and requested that he be permitted to have counsel present.
The court announced that the request of Lieutenant General Walter
C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), was granted, and informed him of his
rights as interested party.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), examined
the precept, stated that he did not object to any member of the court,
and with the permission of the court, introduced Brigadier General
T. H. Green, U. S. Army, as his counsel.
[220'] Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you please state your name, rank, and present status,
General Short ?
A. Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret) .
2. Q. What was your station and duty on 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was commanding the Hawaiian Department. I was stationed
at Fort Shaf ter, Territory of Hawaii.
3. Q. When did you assume that duty ?
A. February 7, or it might be carried on the War Department's
records as the 8th. The War Department records will show Febru-
ary 7 or 8, 1941.
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Q. When were you relieved of this duty ?
A. December 16, 1941.
5. Q, I show you a document which is marked Exhibit 6 before
this court for identification, and it is entitled Joint Army and Navy
Action 1935. Generally, speaking, are you familiar with the pro-
visions of this document ?
A. I am generally familiar with it.
6. Q. I. show you page five of this document, under paragraph nine,
the general subject matter of determination of methods of coordina-
tion, and ask you, had unity of command been placed in effect in the
Hawaiian area prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. It had not.
7. Q. So far as you were concerned, had any consideration been
given to placing unity of command in effect under the provision that
it might be done by the comanders of local forces ?
A. As long as I had communication with the War Department, I
would have not considered it without consulting them.
8. Q. Under Chapter Two, Article 9, subsection b. (3), what officer
did you deal with as Commander of Naval Forces in the Hawaiian
area ?
A. I dealt with two officers; primarily, on routine matters, with
Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and on
matters of immediate importance with Admiral Kimmel, with Admiral
Block usually present — the three of us in the discussion.
9. Q. In matters affecting the defenses of Pearl Harbor, what officer
in the Navy, in the Hawaiian area, did you usually have dealings with ?
A. The same reply pertains. When it was routine I dealt with
Admiral Bloch. When it got beyond routine I usually dealt with
both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel to- [221] gether.
10. Q. Was it the practice in the Hawaiian area to hold confer-
ences on military matters affecting the defenses of Pearl Harbor?
A. We had no stated time set for holding conferences, but whenever
Admiral Kimmel or I either got anything of prime importance from
the Navy or War Department, we practically always had a personal
conference.
11. Q. How would you describe the relations between yourself and
the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet — as cordial, strained, cooper-
ative, or what language would you use ?
A. I would say that they were extremely friendly, cordial, and
cooperative. We were on a very friendly basis personally, as well as
officially. We played golf together about every other Sunday, and
the Sundays we didn't play golf, very frequently Admiral Kimmel
dropped in to see me in the morning; because his family was away
he came to my quarters more than I went to his.
12. Q. I show you a document marked Exhibit 7 before this court
of inquiry, which purports to be JCD-42. If you recognize this docu-
ment, will you state what it is ?
A. The full name of the document is "Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," and that is the way we
usually designated it, rather than leaving out the word "frontier."
13. Q. Again adverting to Exhibit 6, Joint Action of the Army
and Navy, and referring to Article 19-D, thereof .
A. "B''or"D"?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 171
14. Q. D. I ask you if exliibit 7, that you have just identified, is
the plan made in accordance with that article?
A. It is.
15. Q. By whom was this document, jCD-42, prepared?
A. By the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
16. Q. On what date was it promulgated ?
A. 25th of April, 1941, is the date that it — probably the date of
the amendment rather than the original document. I think it was
probably a 1939 document and had been amended.
17. Q. I ask you to read Article 21 of JCD-42.
A. Reading:
This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in
writing by eitlier party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis-
approved in part or in whole bv either the War or the Navy Department. This
HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except [222] that the
Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to
VII, inclusive, of this plan. (Signed) WALTER C. SHOrwT, Lieutenant
General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department ; C. C. BLOCH, Rear
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
18. Q. According to Article 12 of this same Exhibit, what category
of defense was in effect ?
A. Mutual cooperation — category "D".
19. Q. Now was the whole Exhibit, this JCD^2, in effect on 7
December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, before that date it had been amended, so that the
amendment would be included in it.
20. Q. Adverting to this same Exhibit, would you please read
Article 14?
A. Beading:
TASKS, a. JOINT TASK To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base,
and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces,
and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces.
c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect
shipping therein ; to support the Army forces.
21. Q. Adverting to Article 17 of JCD-42, which states that the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department shall provide for
the beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defenses of OAHU,
with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, will you
please state in general terms what provisions had been made to carry
out the Army's undertaking in this respect prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. The Army had provided proper defenses — harbor defenses, anti-
aircraft defense, aircraft defenses, commimications, and aircraft
warning service. I say in general terms that would be the answer.
22. Q. On 7 December 1941, would you state what your opinion
Avas as to whether the dispositions that had been made were adequate
to meet the Army's undertaking imder this section.
A. I am not sure that I know just what you mean by that — whether
the dispositions would be provided for in our plans or whether the
dispositions we were actually occupying at the minute.
23. Q. I shall rephrase my question. Will you state what
your opinion was on about 7 December 1941 as to whether
the [22S] Army had adequately provided the materiel and
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the personnel to carry out the requirements of Article 17, section a.,
that I read you in my question a moment ago ?
A. The materiel of the harbor defense, on the average, yes, as
pertaining to the harbor defenses proper. As pertaining to the anti-
aircraft, there was a shortage of allotted guns, I think of twelve 3-inch
anti-aircraft guns. There was a shortage of the 37-millimeter; we
had 20 out of 140. In the 50-calibre guns, we had 180 out of, I think,
345, so there was a shortage of equipment that had been allocated that
we were trying to get ; and when it came to the personnel, there was
a decided shortage of personnel in the Coast Artillery, which resulted
in practically all our organizations having two assignments. They
had to man harbor defense guns and anti-aircraft, and if you had
gotten both kinds of attack at the same time, it would have been im-
possible to man all the equipment. If you got one attack at a time,
there was sufficient personnel to man the equipment. That covers,
1 think, the harbor defenses. On the question of the air force, we
had nothing like enough to carry out our mission properly. We had
made a study, had it written ; we felt we should have 180 B-17s for
long-distance reconnaissance and for bombers. We actually had 12,
and only 6 of them in commission. We required approximately 200
pursuit planes. We had, I think, something like 105 P-40s, and 80
of them were in commission, but the others could have been put in
commission fairly soon. On the anti-aircraft warning service, we had
a program approved and funds allocated for the construction of six
fixed stations and six mobile stations. Originally, the program had
called for only three fixed stations and had been increased some time
along in perhaps September or October, I don't remember the date,
from three to six. None of the fixed stations on Oahu were to be placed
at as great an altitude as 10,000 feet, and on the other islands at the
highest suitable point we could get, which we hoped would give us
200 miles effective radius. None of those were in action. The parts
had not all been received ; certain articles, cable and material of that
kind, were essential before we could construct the station, and it had
not been received, so no fixed stations were operating. The six mobile
stations were in condition to operate and were all stationed on the
Island of Oahu. I believe that about covers the points.
[^^4] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
24. Q. Adverting to your answer with reference to anti-aircraft
guns in the Pearl Harbor area. Had you made any estimate of the
number of anti-aircraft guns, together with their calibre, which yoji
considered adequate for the defense of this base against an aircraft
attack ?
A. In addition to what had been allocated there, we were supposed
to have twenty-four, 90-millimeter guns, fixed at the time the alloca-
tion was made, and we had felt that with the exception of Kaneohe
Bay — the Army had not assumed the responsibility for the defense
of Kaneohe Bay then — that, the equipment, if we got it all, would
be fairly satisfactory. Shortly after I got there, I strongly recom-
mended to the War Department that the Hawaiian Department assume
the responsibility for the defense of Kaneohe Bay because it was like
shutting your front door and leaving your back door open if you
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 173
didn't. We asked for a garrison for Kaneohe Bay which had never
been aproved up to that- time because they said no approval would
be given until after the limit of the strength of the Hawaiian garrison
was lifted, which was placed then at 59,000, and we had asked them
to raise it to 71,500 so that we could provide some additional personnel
for Coast Artillery, Engineers, Air Corps, and a garrison for Kaneohe
Bay.
25. Q. Do you consider. General, that if you had gotten all the 90-
millimeter guns that were allocated to you, that you would or would
not have still been short of anti-aircraft fire to defend Oahu ?
A. We could have done pretty well, cliregarding Kaneohe Bay, and
the allocation, when it was made, did not include Kaneohe Bay.
26. Q. Do you consider that 90-millimeter guns are effective against
high-altitude bombers?
A. Probably not as effective as your 5-inch, but they were the most
effective thing the Army had.
27. Q. Now, adverting to your aircraft warning service. You have
told us what some of the technical equipment was that you had. What
was the status of training of personnel in your aircraft warning
service ?
A. They were not expert by any means. We started our training,
I think, about the last of October or the first of November, when we
really got enough of our equipment to begin training our men. As
the first step in our training, we had earlier sent 15 men to sea with
the Navy to learn something of the operation of the naval radar
before we got any of our equipment. Our operators had [£2S]
gotten to the point where they were fairly satisfactory. As I say,
the whole thing was new. The Army had just recently gone into it
and they were by no means expert but had been working hard at it
for at least a month, a little more than a month, and could be counted
on to do fairly satisfactory work.
28. Q. What communication facilities did you have between this
aircraft warning service and the Commandant, 14th Naval District?
A. We had several types of communication with the Commandant
of the 14th Naval District. We had commercial telephones and we
had a very fine cable system. Army cable system, that looped the
island and went into, I think, your switchboard of the 14th Naval
District. I don't think it went to a direct line to the Commandant.
We also had messenger service by plane from the headquarters of the
Department, these small messenger planes to Hickam Field, which
was right alongside of Pearl Harbor, that we could use in case other
signals went out. We had in operation, in addition to radar, about
a hundred lookout stations throughout the island, and the Navy had
some signal stations that they based on the island at various places
and quartered with the Army troops, and they had communications
with their own naval crew.
29. Q. You have mentioned something to the effect that there were
about 100 lookouts. What were those lookouts ?
A. Those were regular Coast Artillery stations with communica-
tions and everything of that kind. They served as a combination for
spotting ships, or they would have spotted planes if they were visible.
30. Q. As a general statement, where were these lookouts stationed?
174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. They were pretty much on the high ground around the whole
island.
31. Q. Of Oahu?
A. Of Oahu.
32. Q. What sort of communication did they have ?
A. They were tied in with the cable that circled the island so they
had instant communication, practically.
33. Q. Were these lookouts continuously on watch day and night?
A. They were not. They would have been if we had considered the
situation such as to go on that type of alert.
[^^S] 34. Q. The point I would like to have you answer is
whether these lookouts were or were not stationed on the morning of
7 December 1941 ?
A. They were not because they were not alerted for aircraft attack
or for attack by a landing force, or an all-out attack.
35. Q. But you did have provision for that in your plans ?
A. Our plans were very complete for that and we had lots of train-
ing in it, and if we had been on Alert No. 2 instead of Alert No. 1
36. Q. Do you consider that your personnel were adequately trained
to fulfill those duties?
A. They were.
37. Q,. Was your aircraft warning service in direct communication
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? You have said
that it was in communication with the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District.
A. I think we were connected with the switchboard at Pearl Har-
bor, and it would be the naval communication through the switch-
board to the Commander of the Fleet.
38. Q. Did the Navy have a liaison officer, or any other personnel,
assigned to the aircraft warning service?
A. I will have to answer that a little fully. On August 5, 1941, I
wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel pointing out the desirability of a
naval liaison officer, and I think it was the 24th day of November that
Lieutenant Burr — who was the naval liaison officer in G-3 — was re-
quested to set up liaison offices with the Navy because we were then
working enough of these services iliat it was desirable to have it. I
don't know whether they had actually reported on December 7th, or
not. I thought they had. I thought they were actually working daily
from November 24th to December Tth. I don't believe that I per-
sonally visited the anti-aircraft warning information room between
the hours of 4 : 00 and 7 : 00. I visited it two or three times during
that period but not between the prescribed hours and I can't say
whether there was a naval officer there on duty, or not, when I visited
it, or whether there was a naval officer on duty daily between Novem-
ber 24th and December 7th.
39. Q. In your testimony as regards the aircraft warning service,
I don't recall that you mentioned anything concerning sound detec-
tors. Did you have any such materiel ?
A. We had sound detectors. We felt that as soon as our radar was
operating 100 per cent that the sound detectors would have little value
and I don't think we were manning them when we look at the shortage
of the [227] personnel because they were so much less valuable
than the radar, as long as the radar was working.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 175
40. Q. Then am I to understand that your position is this : That you
had some sound detectors
A. We had some sound detectors and we were using some of them
because we didn't have the radars where we were sure of them at that
time. We didn't have our fixed stations on December 7th. For that
reason, the sound detectors were still valuable on account of the height
of the mountains. We might have gotten them when they were close
to the mountains, where we wouldn't have gotten them with the mobile
stations.
41. Q. Do I understand you to say that these sound detectors were
not in use on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. They definitely were not because the command was not alerted
that way.
42. Q. Was there any organization in the Island of Oahu for civil-
ian aircraft squadrons or lookouts?
A. There was not. May I add there, that the limited terrain of the
island was such that plotting by an individual was of very little value
because the distance was so short, before the report could be made the
aircraft would be upon us and considering that, we had not organized
civilian lookouts.
43. Q. Had you ever considered the practicability or the desirability
of having an aircraft patrol organized?
A. I didn't think that the aircraft patrol would be of any value
for anything but submarines, considering the distance that we were
supposed to go out. As far as air went, it would have been of no value.
44. Q. Would you give the court an opinion of the efficacy of the
aircraft warning service as you had it set up ; not as it was operated
but as it was set up on the morning of 7 December 1941, to perform the
functions for which an aircraft warning service would be provided?
A. Those mobile sets were supposed to be effective about 75 to 100
miles. Actually, under favorable conditions one morning, one set
picked up enemy planes at 132 miles. There was one great handicap :
They were not at sufficient height when the enemy planes came in and
apparently turned to the east of the Koolau mountain range, and they
lost them because of the intervening body of mountains. Now with
the higher one, if we had had the one fixed station on Kaala in opera-
tion it might not have lost them.
45. Q. As I understand it, the Commanding General of the Hawai-
ian Department was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor? Is
that correct ?
A. Supported by the naval forces.
[228] 46. Q. Supported by the Naval forces. What support, in
general, would be included in that statement?
A. If the enemy tried to make a landing, we had even hoped that
the Navy might stop that by themselves before he got near there. As
to anti-aircraft, we had certain Marine organizations that functioned
in our net. There were certain naval guns ashore that functioned with
our anti-aircraft. Also any planes of the Marines or anti-aircraft
planes that had been sent ashore because their carrier was in port or
anything — all of those things would have been able to give us support.
And then one of the most important things, of course, was the long-
range reconnaissance.
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
47. Q. If units of the Pacific Fleet were present in Pearl Harbor,
would they also be considered ?
A. They would be a very valuable addition to the anti-aircraft fire,
but we had not carried our coordination to the point where their fire,
tliat is, the anti-aircraft fire from ships, was controlled by our anti-
aircraft, before I gained command. We had not carried the coordina-
tion to that extent.
48. Q. You have mentioned certain anti-aircraft artillery that was
available for the protection of Pearl Harbor. Do you consider that
Army pursuit ships should be classed in one of the defenses of Pearl
Harbor ?
A. Very decidedly.
49. Q. Do you recall what the condition of readiness for combat of
your pursuit ships was at 7 : 55 on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. We were in the state of routine training at that time, except
for the alert against sabotage and the anti-aircraft warning signal.
50. Q. It might be well at this point, General, since we are to speak
of conditions of readiness, or alert, I believe, as the Army calls it, to
set out for the record what the conditions of alert were according to
your plans ?
A. We had three types of alert. Alert No. 1 was an alert against
sabotage and against internal disorders and uprisings with no threat
from without. Alert No. 2 was an alert that included No. 1, all the
threats of No. 1, and in addition, a threat of an aircraft attack and
surface or submarine attack. Alert No. 3 was all-comprehensive. It
included every element of No. 1 and No. 2, and in addition, the danger
of hostile landings. I think, in general terms, that that makes it plain.
51. Q. What was the condition of alert at 0755 on the morning of 7
December 1941 as regards the Hawaiian Department? Was it all the
same?
A. We were on Alert No. 1 ; and in addition to Alert No. 1, our air-
craft warning service was directed to operate between the hours of
4: 00 and 7: 00.
[2£9] 52. Q. Being in condition of Alert No. 1, what would that
mean as regards the condition of readiness of 3'^our aircraft to commence
combat ?
A. It was routine training. They were not alerted for combat. They
were alerted, I may add, definitely, for the protection of the ma-
teriel.
53. Q. Could you give the court an estimate of the time required
to get into action from this condition of Alert No. 1 ?
A. It actually took, that morning, 55 minutes. They were in action
at 8 : 50. The attack struck at 7 : 55, so it is not theoretical there.
That is wdiat it actually took.
Questioned by the court :
54. Q. 55 minutes?
A. 55 minutes.
55. Q. And the attack itself took place at 7: 55?
A. At 7 : 55 ; and at 8 : 50 they took off.
Questioned by the judge advocate :
56. Q. Adverting to Article 17 /. of Exhibit No. 7, which is JCD-
42, it states: "The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPART-
MENT, shall provide for '/. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 177
of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval
Inshore Patrol, and an aerial observation system on outlying islands,
and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.' '^
We have covered the matter of the aircraft warning service. What
was the arrangement for the cooperation of the Naval Inshore Patrol ?
A. We had one reconnaissance squadron of 6 planes stationed at Bel-
lows Field, and all of this training was along reconnaissance lines and
was carried out in such a way as to constitute a patrol during the train-
ing period. A great deal of our pursuit training also was taking place
at such a place that they did perform a certain amount of reconnais-
sance.
57. Q. Well, under your system of Alert No. 1, did you or did you
not have this in operation ?
A. We definitely did not.
58. Q. Did you have these aircraft armed at the time, and supplied
with ammunition?
A. There was one squadron receiving machine gun training at
Haleiwa that did have ammunition right adjacent to their planes.
They were able to put it in in very short order.
'[230] 59. Q. Adverting to Paragraph (g) of this same exhibit:
"The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department will pro-
vide for the sujjport of naval aircraft forces and major offensive
operations at sea conducted in conjunction with Army bombers."
You have previously testified as to the number and types of planes
that you had available, and the number that were in operating
status on the morning of 7 December 1941. Am I to assume that
these planes that you had at this time were available for cooperation
with the Navy had they been requested?-
A. Yes, sir, the cooperation was automatic. If it was requested
they were sent immediately, and if an emergency like an attack took
place, they didn't wait for a request ; they reported for instructions.
60. Q. In other words, am I to understand that you had plans that
provided for just such a contingency?
A. We did. I may add there, that when we sent them to the Navy
they went under the direct orders of the Navy, they were assigned
missions by the Navy, and operated just as much under the Navy as
if they had been Navy planes.
Questioned by the court :
61. Q. These are the long-range bombers ; is that right ?
A. Yes, sir. We had the same provision that if it became neces-
sary to furnish pursuit planes at ranges where they could operate,
to assist in any naval attack over the sea of any Navy vessels, they
went under the Navy command in the same way.
Questioned by the judge advocate :
62. Q. Can you recall, General, the maximum radius of operation
of the planes that you had available for support with the Navy?
A. The B-17s, I think, fully equipped, were good for 24- or 2500
miles; I think that's about right, round-trip.
63. Q. Kound trip?
A. Round trip.
64. Q. Then that would be a radius of about what ?
A. About 1,200 miles. 1 think that is correct, if they carried
bomb loads.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 13
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
65. Q. And just as a matter of having this in the record at this
point, would you please repeat the number of such planes you had
available, and then state how many were in operating condition on
the morning of 7 December 1941?
A. We had 12 B-l7s; 6 of them were in commission. The other
6 had been stripped of parts in order to keep our ferrying of planes
to the Philippines going. Now, we [SSI] had some other
planes that were all right for short distances. We had 10 A-20s.
They were modern planes, and 9 of those were in commission. We
had, I think, approximately 50, B-18s, an obsolete plane. Twenty-
four of those were in commission but they would have been death
traps if they had been sent against a modern plane.
66. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (h) of JCD-24, which provided
that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department shall
provide personnel and Army communication facilities to harbor
control post provided for in Article 18 (c). Was such a harbor con-
trol post established to your knowledge?
A. It was. We had habitually, daily, one lieutenant colonel and
one sergeant. When we carried on exercises we had a detail of 3
officers so they could operate 24 hours a day. We had cable lines in
there. We were required to furnish, when we carried on exercises
or in case of an emergency or attack, certain telephone operators,
certain teletype machines, and a clerical force for the use of these
officers who were with the control post. The control post was oper-
ated under naval command.
67. Q. Do you know what its condition of readiness or alert was
at 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941?
A. I do not. It is my understanding that the Navy operated the
post 24 hours a day. We had an officer there for the purpose of
keeping the constant training going only eight hours a day.
Whether he was there at that minute, I don't recall personally.
68. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (i) of this same document, JCD-42,
"The Commanding General shall provide for a system of land com-
munications in conjunction with the Navy for the prompt trans-
mittal and interchange of hostile intelligence." Will you please state
what this system of land communications with the Navy was in
Oahu on 7 December, 1941. Is it something which you have already
described, or is it different?
A. No, it is slightly different. They, of course, had the ordinary
telephone communication for communication by commercial wire, or
by the Army cable, but in addition to that, we had a teletype cir-
cuit, a complete circuit that connected ONI, G-2, and FBI so that
there was instant communication between the two. It worked both
ways.
69. Q. Wliat facilities did the Navy provide in this system?
A. I frankly don't know whether the Army provided that teletype
circuit, or the Navy. I think the Army provided them but I
couldn't be sure, but they were there.
70. Q. Was there a unity of command in carrying out the func-
tions of this system?
A. There was not.
[252] 71. Q. Advertiiig to Article 17 (j) of JCD-42, which sets
out that the Commanding General shall provide for an intelligence
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 179
service which shall gather, evaluate, and distribute Army and Navy
information of activity of enemy aliens in the Hawaiian Islands.
Was such a service functioning during the period October 16, 1941
to December 7, 1941?
A. It was. We had, in addition to the ordinary G-3 personnel, we
had personnel of the Civilian Intelligence Corps. They operated
sometimes as undercover men. They had an office immediately ad-
jacent to the FBI, and I believe that Naval Intelligence had an office
at the same place, the Norfolk Building downtown ; not on the post.
They were used constantly on activities of that kind. As to counter-
espionage, however, the Army was responsible only in its own organ-
izations. The Navy was supposed to be onl}^ a naval establishment,
and the FBI would cover the civilians, the civilian aliens, and citizens
who were suspects. However, I believe that the FBI had never fully
taken over those duties from the Naval Intelligence; that the Naval
intelligence had been requested to continue their work until FBI was
able to take it over fully, and I don't recall that that had ever hap-
pened. I think that the ONI still had the main responsibility on
counter-espionage.
72. Q. You have mentioned a Naval Intelligence service. Was
there any liaison or connection between the Army Intelligence service
and the Naval Intelligence service '^
A. There was constant touch; undoubtedly many communications
each day.
73. Q. Now, the information that the Army Intelligence system
collected : Was that available to the Navy constantly ?
A. That was available not only to the Navy but the FBI. Any-
thing that anyone of the three services got was available to the other
two, and they worked very close together.
74. Q. What was the frequency of reports made by this intelligence
service of the Army ?
A. We didn't make any routine, daily report that came in at a cer-
tain time. It was a question of getting in touch on a particular case
at any time, and I think it would be safe to say that they made several
reports a day on the average.
75. Q. Adverting to the period 16 October 1941 and 7 December of
the same year : Can you recall any items of importance that were re-
ported by this intelligence service?
A. There were two things in particular. There may have been a
good many more but two that made enough impression that I re-
member. One was a conversation between a man named Mori in
Honolulu and some party in Japan that I think took place on the 6th
and was reported to me about 7 : 00 o'clock on the 6th.
76. Q. Of what month, sir?
A. Of December. The other was a report of burning of papers in
the Japanese Consulate. I think that took [233] place either
on the 6th or the 5th. The report was made on the 6th.
77. Q. Do you know whether or not the Navy received this in-
formation ?
A. When I received this information about the message from Mori,
it was given to me by our contact officer, Colonel Bicknell, given to
G-2 and me at the same time, and I asked specifically whether the
Navy had information that had come from FBI, and I was informed
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that it was turned over to Naval Intelligence at the same time it was
turned over to our G-2, to our contact officer,
78. Q. What was that conversation?
A. I couldn't describe it exactly. There were several pages of con-
versation that went on back and forth for sometime. They talked
about the weather. They talked about whether there was much ac-
tivity around Honolulu in the way of ships. The man said, "Well,
there wasn't as many as there was a year ago." They talked about the
air activity, asked what the feeling of the Americans were toward the
Japanese-American pojDulation, and they were told that as far as the
old-timers went, there was apparently no prejudice; that the new-
comers, when they first got out there, they were likely to be decidedly
prejudiced but in a short time they accepted the situation the same as
the old-timers. It was a good deal in detail. That, in a general way,
covers the scope of the thing.
79. Q. Do you have any present knowledge of where copies of this
might be obtained ?
A. I believe there is a copy of that in the Koberts Report. I think
there is a copy in the Roberts Report.
80. Q. Adverting to Article 18 (a) of JCD-42, which states, "The
Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for an inshore
l^atrol." What is your recollection as to what the Navy was doing
in this respect between 16 October and 7 December, 1941 ?
A. I don't know in detail. I am sure that they had one because it
happened that there were some submarine scares, and I think they
trailed what they thought was submarines and sometimes they were
not sure wliether it was a submarine or a whale. I believe Admiral
Kimmel will bear me out in that. They did have both there during
the keeping of the lookout.
81. Q. Adverting to Article 18 (b) of JCD-42, "The Commandant
14th Naval District shall provide for offshore patrol." During the
period 6 October to 7 December, 1941, do you have any knowledge of
what the Navy was doing as regards providing and conducting an off-
shore patrol ?
A. I don't know the exact details of any coast offshore patrol like
150 or 200 miles, which they provided for, but I did have pretty con-
stant information of the task forces that were sent out all the time
and did the patroling, which I considered was very much more im-
portant than closer in.
[£34] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
82. Q. In Article 18 (e) of JCD-42 the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District was to provide for harbor patrol posts for Pearl Har-
bor and Honolulu HarTDor. Do you have any knowledge of whether
this was done ?
A. Yes, sir, that was provided, and we had personnel operating
then.
83. Q. Adverting to paragraph 18 (h) of JCD-42, do you have
any knowledge of what the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
was doing with respect to sweeping channels immediately prior to
December 7, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 181
A. I know that there was a certain amount of channel sweeping,
because I happen to remember that the standing order was such that
whenever any important elements of the Fleet went in and out of
the harbor, they were preceded by mine sweepers. That is just recol-
lection from talking over their plans with them, and I couldn't give
any details.
84. Q. General, I invite your attention to Article 18 (i) of JCD-42,
which provides that the Navy shall furnish distance reconnaissance.
Do you know whether or not before December 7, 1941, there was any
plan for effecting this reconnaissance ?
A. There was, and exercises had been carried out. It had been
functioning.
85. Q. Was the Army a cooperating body in this plan?
A. It was.
86. Q,. Wliat is your recollection as to what officer was primarily
responsible under the plan for distance reconnaissance?
A. In the actual carrying out of the details. Admiral l^ellinger
and General Martin worked together.
87. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 23, which is in evidence for
identification before this court of inquiry, and advert to Annex 7.
I ask you if you recognize what that is ?
A. I do. Tliat is a plan for the joint air operations of the 14th
Naval District and of the Hawaiian Department.
88. Q. Is this the plan which was in effect on the morning of De-
cember 7, 1941 ?
A, It went into effect on March 21, 1941, and continued in effect
as long as I was commander of the department.
89. Q. You mentioned some time ago drills which were held in the
matter of distance reconnaissance with the Navy. Can you give the
court some idea of the frequency of those drills and the extent thereof,
say, between October 16, 1941, and December 7 of the same year?
A. We had air exercises not less than once a week. Now, whether
during that period we had the long-range bombers [2S5] work-
ing with them I'm not sure, because there was a time when we had
to suspend the exercises as far as B-17's were concerned in order
to get ferry teams ready to take the ships to the Philippines. I don't
know the elate that happened, but we were having constant air exer-
cises with the Navy.
90. Q. In your opinion, the drills which were held were sufficient
in time and character to indoctrinate personnel properly ?
A. They were.
91. Q. I believe you have testified — and I ask you to correct me
if I am wrong — that on the morning of December 7, 1941, the condi-
tion of alert for the whole command, which included aircraft, was
alert No. 1 ?
A. That is correct.
92. Q. Do you know what the corresponding condition of readi-
ness or alert was in the naval establishment at the same time?
A. I think that they were definitely alerted for antisabotage, and
I know, from talking with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch,
that they had increased their reconnaissance where the task forces
were operating. I don't know definitely just what reconnaissance was
sent out independent of the task forces.
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
93. Q. Can you tell us, General, whether or not Army and Navy
aircraft under this plan were, on the morning of December 7, 1941,
operating under the provision of mutual coordination or the other
provision, unity of command?
A. Mutual cooperation.
94. Q. Then, did the condition of alert in the Army necessarily
have any corresponding relationship to a condition of readiness or
alert with naval craft? In other words, were they independent in
this respect?
A. They were independent, but we used exactly the same letters
and numbers to describe their condition of readiness in regard to
materiel and personnel, so they were speaking the same language.
95. Q. In other words, when speaking of the condition of readmess
or alert, so far as aircraft were concerned, if the condition were pre-
scribed as condition 1 or alert No. 1, it meant the same thing, so far
as naval aircraft were concerned, as it did for the Army ?
A. The letters meant the same percentage of craft to be ready,
and the numbers meant the same number of minutes required to
get them in the air. You will find that in the plans signed by Bellinger
and Martin.
[2S6] 96. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 23, which I showed you a
moment ago and which is this joint agreement for the employment of
Army and Navy aircraft, I ask you to read the next to the last sentence
of Article 1.
A. (Reading :) "These agreements are to take effect at once and will
remain effective until notice in writing by either party of the re-
nouncement in whole or in part."
97. Q. Adverting to this same exhibit, I will ask you to read Section
2, paragraph 2 for the record.
A. (Reading:)
"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer (Commandant of the 14th Naval District) agree that the
threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action,
each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make
available without delay to the other such proportion of the air forces at its
disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
conducted in accordance with the following plan.
98. Q. Article 18, sub-paragraph "I", which is JCD-42, states that
the Commandant, 14th Naval District shall provide for distance recon-
naissance. Was there a plan in effect or do you know of any plan
that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had provided for
distance reconnaissance ?
A. I don't know the details of his plan. I know that it was his
responsibility, and he had full authority to call on me for planes
when he did not consider that he had a sufficient number ready. I
think, in any case, his reconnaissance would change so constantly that
if I had known one day what he was doing, I would not necessarily
have known the next.
99. Q. For the purposes of the record. General, I am going to ask
you to read from Exhibit 23, Section II (c) and (d) .
A. (Reading:)
(c) When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under
the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 183
(d) In the special instances in wliich Army pursuit protection is requested
for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission
will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.
100. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 9, which is a copy of a letter
from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated Janu-
ary 24, 1941. I am going to ask you to take your time and to look
over this letter. Then, I shall ask you a few questions about it.
[237] The court then, at 11 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 50
a. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S, Navy, whose counsel were present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeo-
man first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), the witness
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a
witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
Examination by the judge advocate (Continued :)
101. Q. Since you have inspected this exhibit, I ask you to state
whether the views expressed on the question of the military defenses
of Pearl Harbor had ever, in general, been made to you ?
A. They had. A copy of this letter was furnished to me along in
February, 1942.
102. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not you concurred in
the views expressed therein as to the defenses of Pearl Harbor?
A. There are some elements of the letter in which I did not concur.
He envisaged the danger, in order of importance, as it were, as a
constant, continuing thing. He based air bombing attack first, air
torpedo second, sabotage third, submarines fourth, mines fifth, and
bombardment by gun fire. I think that would be an ever-changing
thing. What was the most important would appear to be what was
the most probable, in view of the information you had of the enemy
and the information you had from the Navy and War departments,
but you could not always say that you would have air bombing as the
most important. If your situation was such that it looked like air
attack was completely ruled out, sabotage moved up to first priority.
103. Q. Adverting to the proposals of the Navy Department m
this exhibit which I have just shown you, wherein the Navy Depart-
ment suggested certain corrective action, what were your views on
the Navy Department's suggestions ?
A. I agreed with all the suggestions except as regards smoke and
balloon barrages. We convened joint committees on the use of smoke
and balloon barrages, and I believe there was a unanimous recom-
mendation that under the conditions prevailing there, they were not
practical, that the wind conditions were such to eliminate the use of
smoke, that the restricted area was such to make balloon barrages
more dangerous to us in the end. The air people in both services
were opposed to those two things.
[238] 104. Q. I show you Exhibit 24, which is in evidence be-
fore this court and which is the reply of the Secretary of War to
the Secretary of the Navy on his letter, which you have just in-
spected. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, have the general infor-
mation that the Secretary of War sets out in his reply here ?
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I did.
105. Q. Bet'ween November 27, 1941, and December 7 of the same
year did you have anything in your department corresponding to an
interceptor command?
A. We had an actual operating interceptor command, which was
put in operation by verbal instructions and was not put in as a defi-
nite organization with written orders until December 17. I wish to
explain that rather fully. It was entirely a service in the Army.
We had prescribed conditions when standing operating procedures,
and we had sent four officers to school in the States, including Gen-
eral Davidson, the Commander of the Pursuit Wing, and Colonel
Powell, who was the Signal Officer of the Department. We wanted
to get the latest thought from the War Department before we put
out a definite organization on paper. This had been operating from
4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily from November 27 to December 7, although
the actual written order organizing it was not put out until Decem-
ber 17. We were trying to avoid a lot of changes. We wanted to
give them a few days to try out what they were doing and get their
ideas in a positive statement before we put it in printed form.
106. Q. Do you have any recollection, General, whether there was
any liaison between this pursuit organization and the Navy?
A. I think I stated previously that I had requested, in a letter of
August 5, liaison officers from the Navy to operate the war-craft
warning service, and on November 24, 1941, Lieutenant Burr, who
was the liaison officer from the Navy with our G-3 section, had been
requested to ask liaison officers. I was under the impression they
were present from November 27 to December 7 from four to seven.
That is an impression. I did not verify that at any time.
107. Q. How do you spell Lieutenant Burr's name ?
A. B-u-r-r.
108. Q. Do you know his initials?
A. I do not.
109. Q. Are you sure he is a naval officer ?
A. I'm sure he is a naval officer. Admiral Bloch can probably
give you his initials.
[239] 110. Q. We have gone into the question previously of
antiaircraft fire in connection with the defenses of Pearl Harbor, in
which there was some reference made as to naval units acting or
cooperating with the Army in that regard. Can you tell us whether
or not there was any system of ainti-aircraft fire coordination for
these different units.
A. The marines anti-aircraft organization, and I believe — I may
be wrong — there were four naval guns in the vicinity of Pearl Har-
bor that reported to the Army anti-aircraft commander and took
positions from him.
111. Q. Assuming that units of the Pacific Fleet were present in
Pearl Harbor, is it my understanding that they were to be used as
anti-aircraft guns, supplementing the fixed defenses ?
A. They were but not to be under the command of our anti-air-
craft commander.
112. Q. I understand that coordination of gun fire between naval
units and other miits had not been effected.
A. That is, naval units on board ship. That is correct. They
selected their own targets.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 185
113. Q. You have previously stated, General, that the condition of
alert No. 1 was in effect on the morning of December 7, 1941. Would
you please state to the court more fully your reasons for ordering
this condition of alert?
- A. Alert No. 1, leaving out the question of whether it covered the
proposition from the point of view of enemy activity, permitted the
units to go ahead with their routine training. We had, especially
in the air corps, a very serious training proposition. We had been
assigned the mission of ferrying B-l7's to the Philippines. We had
to furnish all the crews. We had only six B-l7's available for train-
ing crews. If we went into alert No. 2 or 3, all training of air would
stop, and we would not have had the crews ready to carry out the
ferrying operations, which the War Department considered very im-
portant. I had been in conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral
Bloch from the morning of November 27 for possibly three hours.
I had been given the information of the movements of the Japanese
Fleet, and, as I remember, the main movements of the Fleet, outside
of the home waters, was to the south or to the Philippines and possibly
the Malay Peninsula. Admiral Kimmel during this conference — the
conference was primarily for the question of the reenforcement of
Wake and Midway by Army air squadrons. Naturally, if we reen-
forced those, we temporarily reduced our own defenses at Honolulu.
We lost that much air, and we did not have much to spare. We talked
over the thing from many angles as to the effect of reducing our
planes and the danger and so forth, and Admiral Kimmel asked Cap-
tain McMorris, who was his operations officer [^40] or war
plans, what he considered was the probability of enemy aircraft, and
he said "none" and there was no disagreement. Nobody in the naval
staff or no naval officer present raised the point. iVpparently they
were following the view, with the information we had and the task
forces that they had out, that the Navy did not definitely believe in
the probability of an air attack. Also, as I remember the discussion,
we knew that battleships were going to be brought into Pearl Harbor,
and from discussions with Admiral Kimmel, I knew he felt if there
was an air attack, he would get everything in the way of naval ships
out of Pearl Harbor. In addition to that, the language of the message
that I had received indicated to me that they were more concerned
about not alarming the civilian population and not disclosing intent
and any number of things, which lead me to believe we were not going
to be attacked at Honolulu. Hostilities may have been considered
imminent, but there was nothing in the message to indicate that would
be the form that hostilities would take. As a matter of fact, I have
read General Martin's testimony before the Roberts' Committee. He
stated that the attack at Honolulu was a surprise to him, and he con-
sidered the main threat was at the Philippines. He looked for dis-
order and sabotage at Honolulu. Apparently, I got the same idea,
from the messages and the actions of the War Department, that he
had in mind. There were two other things that would confirm this
belief of the War Department very fully. On the 5th of December
a B-24 came in to Honolulu, being sent over the Mandate Islands
to Manila. It had the mission of photographing Truk and Jaluit.
It had one 30-caliber machine gun and two 50-caliber machine guns.
That was all the armament it had. We had machine guns which we
could have taken and put on it, but we didn't have any adapted to it.
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That ship liad the strictest kind of orders : It must be ready to fight
when it left Honolulu. You could draw the inference that they
thought it was perfectly safe up until it reached Honolulu, and the
hazard of carrying the additional weight of the guns was greater than
meeting the Japanese attack. General Martin prepared a wire to the
Chief of the Air Corps, which went over his signature and mine, tell-
ing them we were holding up that plane until another B-24 came
along with additional equipment and that we would not let this plane
go over the Mandate Islands until it was properly equipped and ready
to fight. On the night of the 6th and 7th of December there were
twelve B-17's sent from Hamilton Field, California. Six of them left
at 9 : 30 Pacific Coast Time, which would be 12 : 30 a. m. on the 7th in
Washington. The other flight of six left at 10 : 30 p. m., which would
have been 1 : 30 a. m, in Washington. Those planes came into Pearl
Harbor. They had no ammunition. The guns were all cosmolined.
They had not [^4^] been boresighted. They had skeleton crews
consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer, and radioman ; so if
they had guns in firing condition and ammunition, they could not have
been manned. As late as 1 : 30 a. m. in the War Department on De-
cember 7 they did not believe there was any danger of air attack at
Honolulu, or they never would have been so rash as to send planes
out in those conditions. Those planes actually came into Honolulu
just five minutes behind the first wave of Japanese, and the direction
of approach was just three degrees different. The Japanese came in
three degrees east and our planes from straight north. The first
one hit Hickam Field, and the first pilot was killed. Twelve of those
planes were destroyed without being able to fire a shot. They were not
equipped. You can only draw one conclusion. Whoever sent them
out felt that the hazard of carrying the ammunition was greater than
the hazard of a Japanese attack. In other words, he considered that
there was no probability of an air attack at Pearl Harbor on the
morning of December 7 or the planes would not have been started
from Hamilton Field in that condition, as late as they were.
114. Q. Can you recall when you put alert No. 1 into effect in the
Hawaiian Department?
A. Within thirty minutes after I got the message on November 27.
115. Q. 1941?
A. 1941.
116. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before
this court and which purports to be a message from the Chief of Naval
Operations to certain addressees, in which he sets out a message that
was sent from the Army to the Commander Western Defense Com-
mand. I am going to ask you to inspect this message and see whether
or not if it contains, in substance
A. That was not the message I was speaking of. I got this message
from Admiral Kimmel — probably personally, but the message I men-
tioned came from the Chief of Staff to me.
117. Q. That is not the message ?
A. That- is not the message. That is the message that came to me
from Admiral Kimmel. The one I was discussing came from the
Chief of Staff.
118. Q. I ask you to refresh your recollection from any notes which
you have and to identify to this court the message you speak of on
November 27, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 187
A. (Reading.) "Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, 427-2T.
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated, to all practical pnr^
poses, with only the barest possibilities that the [24^\ Japa-
nese Government might come back and oHer to continne. Japanese
future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment.
If hostilities cannot be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the
first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you
to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to
hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these meas-
ures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose
intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will
carry out the tasks assigned to Rainbow 5, so far as they pertain to
Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to
minimum essential officers."
119. Q. General, will you state the originator of the dispatch which
was read ^
A. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
120. Q. To wdiom is it addressed ?
A. To the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H.
12 1. Q. Does the dispatch have a number ?
A. It is radiogram 472.
122. Q. General, I now show you Exhibit 19, wdiich purports to be
a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated the 28th of
November. Have you seen the substance of that dispatch ?
A. I have seen this.
123. Do you recall, General, whether or not you communicated the
fact that you had put into effect alert No. 1 at or about the time you
stated you did ?
A. When I sent the message, as delivered to Admiral Kimmel, I'm
not sure which I did. He was informed, I'm sure, that alert No. 1
had gone into effect.
121. Q. Had 3'ou ever had occasion, subsequent to this information
being given to Admiral Kimmel, to advise him that alert No. 1 was
still in effect?
A. We had conferences on December 1 and December 2, and I'm
sure that we talked over pretty much every phase of what we were
doing.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserves, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, withdrew.
125. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding then that at those
conferences you did advise Admiral Kimmel of the condition of alert
which you had in effect?
A. I think he knew^ exactly wdiat we were doing at the time.
[!24'3] 126. Q. Between the time you put the condition of Alert
No. 1 into effect and the attack on Pearl Harbor at 0755 December 7,
1941, did you have any reason for changing this condition of Alert
No. 1 to some other condition of alert?
A. I did not. I received no further information from the War
Department — I will change that. I received additional information
from the War Department that it was off, cautioning me about the
carrying out of measures in regard to sabotage, and if the War Depart-
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
meiit's message of November 28 and my reply of November 28 are not
in the record, I would like to put them in.
The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all
the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of Admiral
Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, intertested party, whose counsel were
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, IT. S. Naval Keserve,
reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), the witness un-
der examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a wit-
ness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examination by the judge advocate (Continued :)
[^^4] 127. Q. General, I believe you read into the record this
morning a dispatch which you described as 472, from an officer in the
War Department. Did you ever make any reply to this dispatch,
and if you did, will you tell the court what it was ?
A. That dispatch called for a report of action taken, and in reply
to it I sent the following dispatch :
RTJRD 472 report department alerted to prevent sabotage liaison with Navy
(Signed) Short.
I want to call attention that the very first thing in this radiogram
positively identifies it as in answer to 472, because I say, "Re your
radiogram 472." The reason I am calling your attenion to that is
that General Gerow, who was in charge of the War Plans Division of
General Staff, testifying for the Roberts Commission, said he did not
connect this with the answer to 472. They had called on me for a
reply, and ten days had gone by and they hadn't called on me, and
still he didn't identify this as the report of the action taken. They
knew exactly for ten days what my action vv^as. I told them as
plainly as I could. I was alerted against sabotage, and during that
ten days they did not come back and say, "You are doing too much,"
or "You are doing too little;" and naturally I assumed that they
approved of what I was doing. No reason in the world for them
not to know what I was doing, because I identified it clearly with the
other wire ; and I stated before tlie board that it was the business of
his division to identify it, but that some way they just failed to iden-
tify it. Now the day after I sent that, on the 27th, I got another
radiogram from the War Department that I assume was sent more or
less as an answer to this one of mine, because it was sent the follow-
ing day, the 28th, and on the same subject. Naturally, I thought
they were coming back and indicating additional things to me they
wanted to do. I received a telegram from Adams, the Adjutant
General, which I will read, as follows (reading) :
Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter Territory of Hawaii, 482 28 critical
situation demands that all precautions be taken innnediately against subversive
activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See
Paragraph 3 MID, SC, 30-45) Stop Also desire that you initiate forthwith all
additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments,
property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against
subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage Stop.
This does not repeat not mean any illegal measures are authorized Stop. Pro-
tective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding un-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 189
necessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure speed of transmission identical
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not effect
your responsibility under existing instructions." (Signed) "Adams."
You can see when I got that radiogram everything in it was exactly
what my alert called for. It never occurred to me that they hadn't con-
sidered my reply when I was alerted for sabotage at the time
[^45] they were writing this, because everything that they em-
phasized there I had ordered in my alert and it looked like they were
thoroughly satisfied with it, but wanted to make out certain other
points. They wanted to be sure I didn't violate Territory laws and
get in bad with the Government finally, because they wanted me to
be sure and commit no illegal acts. In other words, taking this
message on top of my reply, it didn't indicate that anybody in the
War Department was excited over an air attack or an attack to make
a landing, but that they were very much exercised over the sabotage
and civil disorders, possible uprisings, and didn't want me to alarm
the public. They didn't want me to do any illegal acts, and they
wanted me to be sure and carry out everything that was laid down in
regard to subversive measures. In other words, it w^as just emhasiz-
ing everything that I had ordered done. Now I sent a reply to that
on the same day, I think addressed to the Adjutant General. I sent
a dispatch, which I will read, as follows :
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. Re your secret radio 482 28 full
precautions have been taken against subversive activities within the field of
investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph 3, MID, SC, 30-45)
and military establishment including personnel and equipment Stop As regards
protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power
plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges this headquarters by confiden-
tial letter dated June 19, 1941, requested the Governor of the Territory to use
the broad powers vested in him by section 67 of the Organic Act which pro-
vides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of Military and
Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii, to prevent or sui)-
press lawlessness, invasion, insurrection, etc Stop Pursuant to the authority
stated the Governor on June 20 made a formal written demand of this head-
quarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be
necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawlessness, violence, in connection therewith,
being committeed against vital installations and structures in the Territory
Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is
now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection, at the
instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June 80,
1941, enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian
Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within
the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such
action necessary in the interests of national defense Stop. The authority thus
given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with the FBI and all Federal
and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and with mutual coopera-
tion has been given on all pertinent matters. (Signed) Shoet.
Now I explain the reasons that I made this request on the Governor
and on the Mayor to take these steps. For two years, off and on, they
had had sentinels over bridges and electric light plants, water plants,
everything of that kind. There was always the danger that a senti-
solutely unprotected, because we had no legal right to have him there.
For that reason I taken the matter up with the Governor months be-
fore and got him to make the formal request that we take over this
guarding, and then the Military would be fully protected if we did
have to kill somebody. We had roads, especially one, rumiing prac-
tically over our 16-inch guns, and if the situation got worse we felt
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
like we would have to close some of those roads and streets, and I
wanted to have the legal authority to do that. I had gotten the
Mayor of Plonoliilu to pass this ordnance so that I would have the
authority if I needed it. So I was able immediately to report to the
War Department that all of the acts I haxl taken were thoroughly
legal because they had been done at the request of the Governor and
with the authority of the mayor. Now may I say one more thing?
You can see how this message from the Adjutant General, following
the other, just convinced me beyond any question that I had the ap-
proval of the War Department on my message telling them what I
was doing, because there wasn't a word in what came to me the next
day indicating that they had not gotten my message or that there
was anything that I had directed to be done that they didn't approve
of, and I had no further instructions or information from the War
Department from this message on the 28th until seven hours after the
attack.
128. Q. General, to emphasize one or two little points, I am going
to ask you some questions that are very obvious from your answer.
One of them is, you did not make any report concerning aircraft
reconnaissance that you were conducting at that time, did you ?
A. I did not. The long-range reconnaissance, the Chief of Staff
had approved that in Annex Number 7, where the Navy assumed the
responsibility for it, and I felt sure that this wasn't intended to abro-
gate that, and I felt that they should know that it was the Navy's
responsibility and not mine, and I didn't cover that.
129. Q. And 3"ou state that the War Department didn't take any
exception to the action that you had taken in making your report
to them; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
130. Q. And I understand you to say that in the absence of a reply
either of approval or disapproving the action that you had taken,
that you assumed that everything you had done met with their ap-
proval ?
A. Especially in view of that message of the 28th, that pertained
fully to everything that I had ordered.
131. Q. When, during the year 1941, did political matters between
the United States and the Japanese Government appear to be ap-
proaching a critical stage?
A. -About Jul3% when they put into effect that Act freezing the
Japanese credits.
[2i7] 132. Q. Had you been supplied with any estimate of the
situation as to the effect this order might have on the imminence of
war between the United States and Japan, and if you did, what was
it?
A. I had a wire from the War Department. I don't remember
the exact phraseology of it, but they were afraid that it might have
an unfavorable reaction on business interests in Japan and on the
Japanaese population in Hawaii.
133. Q. Did you, as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department, have any personal estimate of the imminence of war as a
result of this Executive Order?
A. There was a very noticeable uneasiness on the part of the Japa-
nese population of Hawaii, and I realized that some event might
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 191
happen to make the thing very serious; but the whole people for a
few days there were pretty restless.
134. Q. After the issuance of this Executive Order, when next did
you receive any information that gave you an opportunity to re-
estimate the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?
A. I think the next thing I got of any importance was on October
16; a message came to me through the Commander of the Fleet.
135. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 13 which is in evidence before
this court, and ask you whether or not the information contained in
this Exhibit, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations
to certain addressees, dated 16 October 1941, and ask you if this is in
substance the information you received ^
A. That is correct. I received that.
136. Q. Did you make any estimate of the situation relative to the
imminence of war between the United States and Japan as a result
of having received this information, and if you did, what was it?
A. If you noticed, that message said there was a very strong pos-
sibility of war between Hussia and Japan, and there was a possibility
of war between the British and the United States, and Japan. In
other words, their main emphasis there was war between Russia and
Japan. That weakened, as far as I was concerned, the probability
of immediate war between the United States and Japan, because ap-
[)arently they had considered the strongest possibility was between
Russia and Japan.
137. Q. Having this information in your possession, and having
estimated the situation as you did, did you take any action other
than that in effect at the time, looking towards alerting or making
ready the defenses under your command ?
A. We had tightened up ail our guards against [^-^] sab-
otage, and measures against subversive measures, things of that kind,
at the time of the freezing of the Japanese assets, and we had never
taken oif a great part of those ; and I figured when I got that message
that we were all right, as far as that message was concerned — and I
was probably just a little more watchful.
138. Q. Asking you some specific questions regarding thereto : had
the condition of alert for the aircraft warning system been changed?
A. We did not have any stations in operation at that time.
139. Q. Did you change the location of any guns ?
A. No, we did not.
140. Q. Now what was the condition of readiness of guns that you
had in place at that time, on 16 October 1941 ?
A. We had guards. We didn't have quite as strong guards, so
they didn't amount to a skeleton crew, that we had later.
141. Q. Were there any special orders given as to changing the
condition of alert, so far as aircraft went?
A. There was none.
142. Q. There is a point we Avould like to have cleared up with
reference to some testimony that is before the court. I draw your
attention to page 39 of Exhibit 6, which is the Joint Action of Army
and Navy 1935 — and refer you to page 39, Article d. The sentence
that I am inquiring about is, "Long-range air reconnaissance will be
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
provided and plans made for the use of the General Headquarters Air
Force." Would you explain to this court what General Headquarters
Air Force is?
A. Well, the General Headquarters Air Force is an air force that,
in the theater of operations, operates directly under the Headquar-
ters— like you would say there are certain bombing commands un-
doubtedly at the present time operating directly under General Eisen-
hower's orders that are not attached to the armies in France or Italy;
probably operating out of England and directly on his order. That
is what we consider G. H. Q. Air Force.
143. Q. May I ask you, General, what were the plans for the use
of G. H. Q. Air Force in your Department ?
A. We had nothing that we called a G. H. Q. Air Force. The area
there was so limited that every plane operated directly under the
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. None of it was parceled out
to anybody, so if you considered anything as G. H. Q. Air Force, it
would be every plane in the Department.
144. Q. Was there any provision made for getting planes [^W]
of the G. H. Q. from the continent to the Hawaiian Department?
A. We had asked for planes, for increases, and we had not asked
for them to go into G. H. Q. Air Force. We had asked for a very
considerable increase and been told that the decision on it wouldn't
be made until the limit of 59,000 for the Hawaiian Garrison was lifted.
145. Q. Am I to understand that there may have been some planes
in the General Headquarters Air Force ?
A. In this book they may intend, here, to refer to G. H. Q. Air
Force in the United States. It is really hard to say how they mean
that.
146. Q. In other words, from having read that article, you wouldn't
be able to tell the court whether the G. H. Q. Air Force to which this
article refers means planes that miglit be available in the Hawaiian
area or whether they were planes that might be available on the
continent for being sent to Hawaii ?
A. I would say this, that with the distance from Hawaii to the
United States, it would have been impracticable to operate the planes
in Hawaii that were controlled by G. H. Q. in the United States. The
distance is so great they couldn't have operated. If they had been
going to give us reinforcements, they undoubtedly would have been
given to us outright and not sent to carry out missions and return.
147. Q. Between 16 October 1941 and 24 November the same year,
did your estimate of the intentions of the Japanese military toward
the United States change because of any information you received?
A. I received nothing to cause me to make a re-estimate from the
16th of October until the 27th of November.
148. Q. You said you received nothing?
A. Nothing.
149. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is in evidence before this
court. It is Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November
1941 — and I will ask you to read it and state whether or not you had
received from any source information of a similar nature as is con-
tained in this dispatch.
A. I do not remember receiving this message at that time. I do
not think it was received at my headquarters.
Proceedings of navy court of inquiry 193
150. Q. Do you recall if, between 24 and 27 November of 1941 you
had had any request made on you by Naval authorities for the use
of Army planes, and long-range reconnaissance?
A. I had not.
151. Q. And as you say, you had no information upon which to
make any advice to the Navy during the same period of time?
A. That's right.
[£S0] 152. Q. Adverting to dispatch 472, which you read into
the record this morning, did you make any re-estimate of the situation
based on the information contained in that dispatch?
A. I looked over that very carefully and talked the matter over with
my Chief of Staff, and considered all the things they put in there, be-
fore I decided to order Alert Number 1. I considered it all fully, and
considered it in the light of conversations that I had had with Admiral
Kimmel's Headquarters that morning.
153. Q. Was the decision that you made based upon this estimate ?
A. My estimate was that there wasn't a danger of any immediate
air attack, and that our real dangers were from sabotage, disorders, or
possible uprising.
154. Q. I believe you said this morning that you put Alert Number 1
into effect at that time?
A. That's correct.
155. Q. This was one of the decisions you made?
A. That was the decision I made,
156. Q. And the only one?
A. That covered it — and I turned out the aircraft warning service
from 4 : 00 a. m. to 7 : 00 a. m.
157. Q. Other than this changing the alert and the putting into
effect of your aircraft warning system between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 in the
morning, did you make any changes in your antiaircraft defense of
Pearl Harbor?
A. I don't think that they found it necessary to move a single gun.
We did this : There was a skeleton crew based at all these guns, and
there were small arms ammunition in the immediate vicinity of the
guns, the small arms guns — and except for four batteries there of 3-
inch guns, in all other cases there was ammunition not more than 75
or at most 100 yards away, and in most cases considerably less than
that. We didn't bring it out of the casemate, but we had it where it
was available, I say, in three to five minutes.
158. Q. And there had been no change in the condition of alert for
aircraft, either reconnaissance or pursuit?
A. Except tightening up on the guarding of the aircraft — more
vigilant than we had been at any time.
159. Q. Have you any recollection that the Naval authorities re-
quested you for any assistance in the way of long-range reconnaissance
after 27"November 1941 ?
A. They did not.
160. Q. Can you recall whether or not there had been a discussion
between you and the appropriate Naval Commanders as to [^Sl]
the advisabilit}' of establishing a long-range reconnaissance after 27
November 1941?
A. We had conferences on the 1st and 2nd and 3rd of December.
While it was primarily in reference to the relief of the Marine garri-
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1^ 14
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sons at Wake and Midway and Canton, by the Army, it just naturally
drifted into every phase of it, you might say — of the defense of Hono-
lulu, These were long conferences, two or three hours on the 1st and
3rd, and a shorter time on the 2nd,
161. Q. Did I understand from your previous testimony, General,
that you testified that the primary responsibility for the defense of
Oahu lay in the Army ?
A, Supported by the Navy.
162. Q, Can you recall from plans, orders, or agreements what the
responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, was in the
matter of defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. I'd say in the beginning, the distant reconnaissance, to get the
information. The question of meeting the enemy at sea, if they at-
tempted to land, would come under the Fleet Commander rather than
the 14th District. I think that, as I remember, the 14th District would
have had the function of employing anything that was strictly ashore,
like their anti-aircraft guns that they probably operated, and instru-
ments of that kind ; but Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel could tell
you much more definitely than I could about that. Of course, we had
harbor control posts, things of that kind, working with the 14th Dis-
trict.
(NOTE: Question No. 163 and the answer thereto, numbered Page
251-A, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the
war, )
164. Q. I will ask you. General Short, if you can read into the record
the dispatch you received on 7 December ?
A. (Reading:)
To Hawaiian Department Foi't Shafter Territory of Hawaii 529 7 Japanese are
presenting at one pm Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum
also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just
what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accord-
ingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication Marshall.
That message was filed at 12 : 18 p, m., the 7th, in Washington, signed
by General Marshall, 6 : 48 Honolulu time. It was sent by the RCA.
It was not sent by the War Department Radio. Apparently the War
Department Radio was fading out that morning, I know it was true,
Wc were having difficulty getting in connection with Washington
from Hawaii that morn \j25'3] ing; and it was sent by RCA.
It arrived in the RCA, Honolulu, at 7 : 33. It w^as delivered to the Sig-
nal Officer at 11 : 45 a. m. Now I don't know the reason for the delay,
but in all probability the messenger may have got caught in the attack
and gone back and waited until the attack was over, which was about
11 : 45 it was delivered. It was decoded by the Signal Officer and de-
livered to the Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department at 2 : 58
p. m. That was the first information we had of it. No, it wasn't the
first information we had, because sometime between 8 : 30 and 9 : 00, 1
told my Chief of Staff to call General Marshall and inform him that
we were being attacked. When General Marshall was informed that
we were being attacked, the first thing he said was, "Did you get my
message?" Colonel Phillips called him over the scrambler telephone.
The Chief of Staff replied, "We have had no message from Washington
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 195
this morning." Then this came in later in the afternoon ; and then, on
the 9th, we got a message — I don't know whether it was signed by Mar-
shall or by the Adjutant General, requesting us to state the exact time
this message was received in Honolulu, when it was delivered to the Sig-
ual Officer, when they finished decoding, and when it was delivered, and
to what Staff officer at Department Headquarters. That is the history
of the message. Now if that message had been put through by scram-
bler phone, like my Chief of Staff called the Chief of Staff to report the
attack, nine chances out of ten it would have been received by me ten or
fifteen minutes after he wrote it, without any loss of time for in-coding,
transmission, and decoding. Now in all probability we would have had
two hours, which would have been plenty of time to warm up planes,
disperse the pursuit planes, send the bombing planes to the other is-
land, and have every man at his post. We could have been ready for
practically anything. If they had, it would have come through in
plenty of time; and I felt like that Washington considered that there
was a direct probability of an air attack, and we had a right to expect
the shortest possible time in notification. General Marshall was asked
before the Roberts Board why he did not use the scrambler phone, and
he replied that he wasn't sure of the secrecy, that there was some doubt
as to just how secret the phone is, that it had to cross the Pacific and
might have been intercepted ; and if he had been going to phone it, he
would have phoned it to Manila first, because that was where he con-
sidered the greatest threat. That is in the General's testimony before
the Roberts Commission. You will have it in Volume I of the Roberts
Report.
165. Q. The point I would like to have you make clear to the board
is this, General, at exactly what time did this message that you speak
of as coming from General Marshall first arrive in the hands of any-
body connected with your Command ?
A. 11 : 45 a. m., it got to the Signal Officer, but had not been decoded.
[253] Examined by the court :
Ififi. Q. Honolulu time?
A. Honolulu time.
Examination b}^ the jiidge advocate (Continued) :
167. Q. Now there is evidence before this court in considerable quan-
tity, and you have given some yourself, that there was actually an
attack made by tlie Japanese on Pearl Harbor at about 0755 on Decem-
ber 7, 1941. When were you first informed of this attack?
A. When the first bomb exploded, I heard it. My first thought was
that the Navy was having some exercises that I had forgotten about.
Then another one exploded in a minute or two, and I ran out my back
door, which gave me a view of Pearl Harbor, and I could see the smoke,
and things didn't look right. Just at that time, I think, my Chief of
Staff, who lived next to me, ran over and called and said, "It's the real
thing. I have just had word from Wheeler Field and Hickam Field
that we are being attacked."
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class. U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, reporter, with-
(b^ew.
[^S4-] Q. At the time of this attack, I believe you have previ-
ously testified that the condition of alert was No. 1. Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
169. Q. You have recited in a few words some of the things that
happened when the Japanese attacked. Will you state in general also
what the Hawaiian Department did to repel the attack immediately
after 0755?
A. As soon as this report was made to me I immediately said, "Go
into Alert No. 3", which is an all-out defense. In other words, since
we had been surprised by an air attack, I felt that we might even be
surprised by an attempted landing and I ordered Alert No, 3 rather
than No. 2. The minute the attack struck, all of the anti-aircraft,
on their own, replied to the enemy fire and we brought down planes
as early as 8 : 05 and there was one lirought down at Fort Kamehameha
that might have been brought down a little sooner than that. And
at 8 : 15 a plane had been brought down at Schofield. As soon as the
alert struck, most of the pursuit pilots — they were sleeping in their
quarters at Wheeler Field and their planes were 7 miles north at
Haleiwa, that is, one squadron — jumped in their car and raced to
Haleiwa as soon as they could, and when they got there the officer who
was in charge there, and the men, were arming the planes with ammu-
nition, and that squadron, I think practically all from that squadron —
there may have been a few planes able to take off from Wheeler Field,
Fm not positive, but most of those were involved in burning and ex-
plosions on the runways and I am inclined to believe that the first
group of planes all were from Haleiwa, and they brought down 10
enemy planes. The anti-aircraft continued to fire as targets offered
themselves, and they brought down somewhere between 19 and 28.
G-2 figured that there were not less than 29 verified planes, and possi-
bly 38, with some duplications that we couldn't be sure about. Shall
I go ahead with what happened to the enemy ?
170. Q. I think that w^ll give us a general idea.
A. I might show the wdiole picture. The infantry divisions im-
mediately fell in by 8 : 10. In the 21:th Division they had engaged
enemy planes by small arms fire. At 8 : 30 they were moving into bat-
tle positions. The same way with the 25th Division. All the anti-
aircraft got their 3-inch ammunition immediately. There were 4 bat-
teries that didn't have ammunition at hand. The first one started
throwing its ammunition at 8 : 15 and they had all finished by 10 : 00
a. m. In the infantry divisions, one of them was in battle position
complete at 4 : 00 o'clock and the other at 5 : 00 o'clock with one day
of fire. The second day of fire was gone that night. The department
headquarters, we had an advanced command post in the crater and we
started moving there and I think [-^od] w^e opened that com-
mand post perhaps along about 8 : 35, and I left the Chief of Staff
and the Supply at headquarters and I went there with the G-2 and
G-3 sections.
171. Q. You mentioned your first intimation of an attack around
0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941 as being an explosion that
you heard.
A. That is right.
172. Q. Had you had any information of any other enemy activity
in the Hawaiian area shortl}^ before this time?
A. I had not.
173. Q. You had no information on a submarine being present in
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 197
A. I heard about that hiter, but I think it was the next day. It
could possibly have been that afternoon but I did not know at the
time. Also, later that afternoon, as I said before, we got a submarme
off of Bellows Field. We got a rope around it and towed it m.
1T4. Q. General, I am going to show you Exhibit No. 20, which is m
evidence before this court. It is a naval dispatch from the Chief of
Naval Operations to certain addressees, among them being the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and has to do with information
that had been received concerning the destruction of Japanese diplo-
matic and consular codes in certain areas. Will you read the dispatch
to yourself and then state to the court whether or not you had that in-
formation prior to 7 December, 1941 ?
- A. I am quite sure that I did not.
17.5. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a naval dispatch from the
Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Station, Guam, with infor-
mation copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and others.
The subject matter of the dispatch directs the Naval Station, Guam,
to destroy secret and confidential publications. I show^ you this dis-
patch and ask you to read it and then tell the court whether or not
you had been informed of the general subject matter contained therein
prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I don't think I had.
17G. Q. I show^ you Exhibit 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet as the action addressee, dated 6 December 1941. This
dispatch directs certain outlying Pacific Islands to destroy seci^t and
confidential matters in their possession. I ask you to read this dispatch
and to state to the court whether or not the general subject matter con-
tained in this dispatch had been communicated to you prior to 7 De-
cember 1941 ?
A. I make the same reply ; I'm (juite sure that I had not seen it.
['256] 177. Q. I will ask you, do you recall any conversations
with naval authorities in Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, as to any
matters relating to the destruction of codes and ciphers by the Japanese
anywhere?
A. I knew on December 6th that the Japanese Consul had been
burning papers. I don't know whether I had them identified as codes,
or just papers, but I remember that a contact officer made some report.
That, I think came from the FBI, probably.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy :
178. Q. General, with two hours advance notice on Sunday morn-
ing, couldn't the Department have been fully ready by the time of the
attack if you had immediately ordered the full alert ?
A. We could have been completely ready for an air attack. The
infantry divisions would not have been on their battle positions com-
plete if we had ordered them to their battle positions for an all-out
attack.
179. Q. General, would you have made a very quick reestimate of
the situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scram-
bled telephone conversation with General Marshall?
A. I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in
there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter
198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
wouldn't have made an impression on me. But when you destroy your
codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I
would have had this advantage also : I could have asked him the sig-
nificance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have
been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have
been very significant to me. I would have been very much more
alarmed about that than the other matter.
180. Q. Had you received in the two or three days prior to 7 De-
cember any information from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
to the effect that the Japanese had been detected in destroying codes,
ciphers, and so forth?
A. I had not.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Real Admiral Husband E'.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
181. Q. Over all, how many troops did you have. General Short, on
T December 1941 ?
A. About 57,000.
[^67] 182. Q. What was your estimate of minimum require-
ments at that time ?
A. I had asked for the Hawaiian Garrison to be raised to 71,500,
and told them at the same time that I would put in a later estimate
for troops for the outlying islands which would have been in addition
to the 71,500.
183. Q. Between November 27 and December 7, the opposite mem-
bers of the Army and Navy in charge of the aircraft, exchanged daily
information as to the number of planes that each service had available
for service that day, did they not ?
A. I'm quite sure they did. They were supposed to do that con-
stantly, and I think they did.
184. Q. Did you show Admiral Kimmel the message that you re-
ceived from the Adjutant General, on the 28th of November?
A. I did on the 27th, and I am inclined to think that I gave him
copies on the 28th. It is possible I didn't but I think I did.
185. Q. You told Admiral Hart what you would have done if you
had received the scrambled telephone message at the time that the
dispatch was filed in Washington. That was 12 : 18 Washington time.
A. I figured that in place of filing it then — you see that allowed
time for decoding, which would have been an hour, and I would have
probably had it an hour ahead of that.
186. Q. What you have told Admiral Hart as to what you would
have done if you had had the message at 11 : 18 Washington time,
would have been made more certain and more sure had you received
the information at 9 : 30 Washington time ?
A. Very much surer.
187. Q. Could you have done any more had you received that in-
formation at 9 : 30 Washington time?
A. The preparations would probably have been a little more com-
plete, although I think in two hours, our planes would not have reached
the outlying islands but they would have been on their way and the
additional time would have been valuable, I mean our bombers, be-
cause our plan was to send them to the outlying islands.
188. Q. You told the judge advocate that you did not recall seeing
the message received by Admiral Kimmel from the Chief of Naval
Operations dated the 24th of November ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 199
A. 1 (lid not. I iiiiolit have received it but I don't recall it.
1S<). Q. Well, what you mean is that you have no positive memory
one way or the other about it ?
A. AVell, I think I would have remembered it if I had received it,
because I remember other messages there without any ({uestion.
I'J'hS] VM). Q. ])o you recall your testimony l)cfore the I\oberts
Commission, about seein<;' this messaire of 24: November?
A. I don't remember exactly what I said. I probal)ly said the same
thing, that I didn't know positively, because 1 don't remember. Of
course, my memory might have been better then than now. That was
much closer to the time.
191. Q. Would it refresh your memory as to the possible receipt of
learning al)0ut the message of November 24th, General Short, to know
that Lieutenant C'onnnander Layton, intelligence ollicei- to Admiral
Kinunel, reported to him that a copy of this had been delivered to you
at 1-2 : 20 on November 24:th?
A. Did he state that it had been delivered to me personally ?
\U'2. Q. Delivered to General Short.
A. Personally?
lt);j. Q. I will show you the report.
A. If he said he gave it to me personally, he probably did, but I
do not remember the message.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ket) : "
104. Q.' General, this morning you spoke of a procedure that you
had develo]:)ed in connection with the interceptor conunand Init which
had not been officially promulgated.
A. That is correct.
105. Q. That document was in draft form and in the hands of your
people ?
A. Yes, sir.
190. Q. It bore the date of api)roximately 5 Noveml)er, and do you
recall it stating that the interceptor command will coordiiuite and con-
trol the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft aitillery, includ-
ing available naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, the air-
craft warning service and attached units, and will ]irovide for the
cordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military con-
trol ? I am just asking you about the document.
A. Yes, that's about right.
lOT. Q. Now, if you will remember, in that same document under
Section 15 (i) of this same standard operating pi'ocedure, did that
{)rovide that the Department signal officer will (1) insure occupation
of all battle stations by the aircraft warning service and then release
it to the interceptor comnuuid, and then (2) insure that joint Army-
Navy communications are in immediate readiness for such employ-
ment ? Do you recall such a ])assage of the document ?
A. I think I do, yes.
\'S59] 108. Q. Now, even thougli (hat procedure in the document
was not ollicially ])i'omulgated, is it not the fact that the procedure
was in elfect fi'om perhaps Noveml)er 27 on, as indicated therein?
A. I am sure it was.
100. Q. That is how it was operating at the time, even though tlio
paper w^asn't released ?
A. That's right; I'm siu-e that it was.
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
200. Q. Very good. Now, I have something I want to get
straightened out and perhaps you can help me with it. This Exhibit
6, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 : Am I not correct in
saying that this document represents Army-wide and Na'vy-wide
general policy ?
A. That is correct.
201. Q. It does not relate to a specific place?
A. That is correct.
202. Q. It represents general policy and agreement?
A. That's right.
203. Q. Now, in connection with JCD, General, being Exhibit 7:
Is it not the fact that all pertinent provisions of policy that were in
the joint action, this document, were picked up and incorporated in
this document?
A. They should be.
204. Q. You have no doubt tliat the pertinent ones were; I mean,
there is no question on that?
A. No.
205. Q. So that JCD, this document, really is, to all the extent that
we need concern ourselves with, the document that bears upon the
Hawaiian Islands?
A. That is right.
206. Q. And we need not concern ourselves with this because Ex-
hibit 7 is the one that contains what goes on in the Hawaiian Islands?
A. That is right.
207. Q. Now, attached to this JCD were certain appendices that
you have referred to, joint air defense, appendices 1 up to 7, that were
made a very part of JCD-42?
A. Yes.
208. Q. And those documents and this document represent a plan;
is that right?
A. Yes.
209. Q. That plan, while the language used here has been that it
was not effective, by that we would understand that it was not in
execution, nor was it in operation. Am \'3(J0] I correct in
that?
A. The plan?
210. Q. The plan.
A. It was in effect but not in operation.
211. Q. That is right. Tliis JCD, in turn, was predicated upon the
Rainbow War Plans; is that not correct?
A. That is right.
212. Q. In JCD on Page 8, Paragraph (C) (2), it provides that
JCD will go into execution upon the execution of the War Plans,
being the Rainbow Plans; is that riffht?
A. Yes.
213. Q. Or the establishment of M-day?
A. Yes.
214. Q. So the things you were describing, sir, this morning, that
you did, were, so to speak^ in anticipation in training, in getting ready
for the actual execution of this plan?
A. That is correct.
215. Q. And so it was with the Navy?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 201
A. Tliat is correct.
21G. Q. They, too, were taking anticipatory drill and training
methods so that all of you might put this into effect when it came
into elt'ect as provided by Paragraph (2) ; is that correct?
A. That's right.
217. Q. Now, that plan and the appendices, which include the air
measures, actually was in execution during the drill periods; is that
right?
A. When we were having exercises, maneuvers, yes.
218. Q. AVIien you were having exercises and drill plans, that plan
and all appendices were in effect during that drill period?
A. That is correct.
219. Q. At the closing of the drill period, then the plan went back
to its unexecuted status again ?
A. That is correct.
220. Q. I would just like to clear up one other thing. General. 1
recall that you mentioned about a liaison officer in connection with tl^e
air raid warning service.
A. That is correct.
221. Q. And you mentioned something about the 5th of August?
A. Yes.
[261] 222. Q. Now, am I correct in this : That on August 5th
you wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel which had a heading on it,
"Aircraft Warning Service", or some such as this, and in it — and I
quote what portions of it that I have — that the aircraft warning fa-
cilities, in connection with those, ''Small scale operations are expected
in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original set-up the AWS
has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, how-
ever, are not expected to materialize for some months". And then you
went on to a further paragraph, "It seems greatly to the interests of
both services to have a naval officer as a contact or liaison officer be-
tween Army and Navy AWS activities. Accordingly, your assistance
would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer
from your headquarters be detailed to serve as a liaison between your
headquarters and mine."' Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
223. Q. That is the letter you were speaking of this morning?
A. Yes.
224. Q. Then in answer to that, do you recall receiving from Ad-
miral Kimmel on August 16th, a reply to that in which he says that,
"In re])Iy to your suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison
with your headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander
Morris D. Curtis, I". S. Navy, connnunications officer on my staff,
has been assigned to that duty." Do you recall that reply?
A. Yes. I am doubtful whether he understood, whether he intended
from that letter that Curts was to act as liaison in the play of the game
with the aircraft warning service.
225. Q. General, the liaison officer that you were talking about in
respect of August 5th. in fact, was appointed by Admiral Kimmel
August 16th, from that point on. Right ?
A. A liaison officer was appointed.
226. Q. No, but I mean, the very one that you are speaking of, sir.
A. I do not know personally whether Commander Curts functioned
in that capacity, or not.
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
227. Q. Then we will let tlie letters speak for tliemselves, as far as
you know ?
A. I have had the feeling that he intended for a general liaison,
rather than for a liaison officer with the aircraft warning service,
228. Q. General, sir, in connection with that liaison: In addition
to whatever may have been the matter of Lieutenant Commander
Curts, there did come a time subsequent to the 15 men going out with
the Fleet, that you [362] wished assistance in connection with
radar, and there was made available to you by Admiral Kimmel, an
expert in those matters ?
A. Commander Taylor.
229. Q. Even previous to him, there was a Commander Hitchcock,
was there not?
A. I don't remember him. I remember Taylor.
230. Q. And those, at least so far as you recall — Commander Tay-
lar was made available to your people, worked with them in conenc-
tion with giving them all the experience that the Navy had with
these matters?
A. That is right.
231. Q. And worked with you, for example, clear through this
period that w^e are talking about ?
A. That is correct. May I make a statement here ? When I wrote
the letter, what I had in mind was a liaison officer as provided in
Paragraph 6 of Section 3, Communications, Appendix No. 7. Now,
I would like to read what it says. This is in regard to the coastal
frontier defense plan. "Upon establishment of the aircraft warn-
ing service, provision will be made for transmission of information
on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire
or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison
officers so that they may make their own evaluation of available in-
formation and transmit them to their respective organizations. In-
formation relating to the presence or movement of hostile aircraft
offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be
transmitted without delay to the aircraft warning service informa-
tion center." What I had in mind in writing that letter was a naval
officer that would sit right there in the interceptor command and
comply with that paragraph, tell the Navy where targets were, and
if they had information, tell the interceptor command of the infor-
mation they had.
232. Q. On that, sir, during the drills conducted under these docu-
ments, theer was such a liaison officer there during the drills; is that
not right?
A. I frankly don't know because unfortunately I didn't get over to
the station between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 in the morning. I was there sev-
eral times in that period other times of the day when they were
going ahead with their training but the liaison officer, the period
they were formally workinir was 4 : 00 to 7 : 00, and I thought that
there was a liaison officer from the Navy working with them all the
time and I can't say definitely there was because I didn't go through
at that time.
233. Q. Now, the time that Ave were speaking about, sir, in connec-
tion with this paragraph, this that you have [£SS] referred
to calls for there being a liaison officer, or at least it can be inter-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 203
preted that way, upon establishment of the aircraft warning service.
A. That is right.
234. Q. I take it you issued no orders that the aircraft warning
service had been established?
A. There were only verbal instructions, but no formal, written
orders the 7th day of December, but it was operating.
235. Q. It was somewhat of a training device?
A. Well, yes. It was really both. It was training and getting
information, and as I remember, about the 24th of November we
asked Lieutenant Burr to take up informally again about getting
liaison officers to work with the aircraft warning service. Now as
I say, I don't know whether that request was complied with, or not.
236. Q. As you recall that, that would be something over and
above Lieutenant Commander Curts, and Taylor ?
A. Oh, Yes, that would be definitely under the provisions of this
Paragraph 6, Section 3, Comnuniications, Appendix No. 7.
237. Q. On this same thing in connection with this communication
facility. General, was your aircraft warning service fully equipped
on December 7th with all parts ?
A. There were 6 mobile stations which were equipped.
238. Q. And your switchboards were all fully manned ?
A. Yes, everything as far as the mobile stations were concerned,
and we had our control room operating from November 27th, just
like it operated later ; only it wasn't being done by a written order.
239. Q. Only just for those few hours?
A. From 4 : 00 to 7 : 00. Well, I think it was actually operated but
they went ahead and trained, did more or less as they wanted to — I
mean the different commanders — from 7 : 00 to 11 : 00, and from 1 : 00
to 4:00.
Examined by the court : -
240. Q. General, were you familiar with the State Department
note of November 26th to Japan ?
A. I may have read it in that State Department paper that came
out a year or so after the attack. I am sure I never saw it before.
241. Q. Up to December 7th you had no intimation of its existence ?
A. No. That was true of most of the stuff that was in that State
Department paper. I read it all carefully but most of it was new to
me.
[264-^ 242. Q. General, were you influenced in any way, or per-
haps deterred in assuming Alert No. 3, by the War Department's in-
junction not to alarm the populace by unusual activity?
A. Alert No. 2, or No. 3 either one would have had us carrying
live ammunition out; I mean, large 3-inch ammunition right in the
middle of the city, and would undoubtedly have caused some alarm
with the strained relations we had. That entered into the thing
because I had been cautioned not to alarm the public.
243. Q. You mean, then, the War Department's warning to you
did affect your decision ?
A. It did, unquestionably.
244. Q. Then General, if you had received the dispatch which you
did not receive until 2 : 58 — had you received it earlier that morning,
would you then have been influenced by this War Department in-
junction ?
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, I would not have been because I would have taken the
destruction of the code machines very seriously.
245. Q. You would have thought that over very seriously ?
A. I would have taken it very seriously.
246. Q. General, do we understand that at frequent intervals dur-
ing this period from 27 November to 7 December, you had telephonic
communication with officials in the War Department?
A. I did not.
247. Q. You did not ?
A. No.
248. Q. You had no 'phone communication with them?
A. I don't think I talked to them by 'phone a single time. The
communication system was there but we weren't using it.
249. Q. Nor was your Chief of Staff using it?
A. No. We just used that scrambler 'phoije on very important
things where we wanted to talk to the Chief of Staff himself and be
sure we got his slant. I hardly ever used it any other way.
250. Q. General, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, did
you have information, intimation, or even a suspicion from any source,
officially or otherwise, that Japan's known preparations in the Western
Pacific might indicate a hostile movement elsewhere than toward the
Malay Peninsula ?
A. As to the information of movement of enemy vessels, all I got
from Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, as I remember, the only thing
was that they were in home ports, or a considerable number had moved
to the south, and mentioned several places to the south and southwest.
[265] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke-
serve, reported, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
251. Q. Nothing indicated there were vessels east of Guam, for
instance ?
A. Nothing.
252. Q. General, what is your estimate of the time interval between
the first bomb that was hurled by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and
the total manning of the anti-aircraft guns at Oahu?
A. I think, except for four batteries which had 3-inch guns and had
to draw their ammunition from the munition depot, that they were all
ready to open fire at 8 : 15. That does not mean they opened fire. I
think they were all ready except four batteries which did not have
ammunition.
253. Q. What were the considerations governing your order to limit
radar operations from four to seven on the morning of December 7?
A. Our study indicated that any enemy that was going to make an
attack had the best chance of making the attack and getting away if
he made it either at dawn or at dusk. It finally got around to the
point that the most advantageous time would be dawn. We felt that
by working two hours before dawn and one hour after dawn we would
cover the most dangerous part of the day and also give our men prac-
tice in the part of the day where they would have to be most careful
if we had hostilities.
254. Q. In that connection if the range of your radar was not much
more than a hundred miles — You stated it was about seventy-five?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 205
A. That's what yon count on. We actually got 132.
255. Q. Wasn't 7 : 30 a. m. a little early to secure the radar?
A. 7 : (JO a. m. was an hour after daylight. Daylight was just about
C o'clock.
250. Q. You have testified, General, that your radar actually picked
up planes at a distance of about 132 miles.
A. That is correct.
257. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, had you known that
there were enemy planes about to attack Oahu, immediately when this
contact was made and with the means available to you, could you have
repelled the attack which actually took place and prevented the re-
sulting damage done to Army and Navy personnel ?
A. We would not have had time to get our planes in [266]
the air. We would have had time to disperse their planes. You
could have gotten the planes dispersed, and we would have suffered
less loss of planes. I don't think we could possibly have prevented
that attack by torpedo planes on the battleships.
258. Q. If you had had that information from the War Depart-
ment, say, two hours sooner, would it have enable you to repel the
attack which actually took place with the means available to you
and prevented the resulting damage?
A. It is awfully difficult to say about that. We could undoubtedly
have gotten part of them, but I doubt very much whether we could .
have prevented their making the attack against the battleships, and
even if the anti-aircraft had been ready to fire, they came in so low,
the 3-inch guns couldn't have fired on them, and the anchor chains
were fast.
259. Q. Is it not a historical fact that practically every aircraft
attack launched in this war has been partially driven in?
A. I think it can always be driven in. We would have knocked
down more of their planes if we had everything we had in the air.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy (Continued) :
260. Q. General, I shall read to you from a dispatch which is
Exhibit 20 before this court: (Reading) "Highly reliable information
has been received, and categoric and urgent instructions were sent
yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at, among other
places, Manila and Washington.'' That is a dispatch dated Decem-
ber 3, sent from the Navy Department to various addressees. Re-
ferring to your testimony in response to my previous questions, if you
had been informed of that dispatch soon after it was sent, in what
way would that have changed your dispositions and actions?
A. I'm not sure, because if you look at that dispatch again, it points
down toward the Malays and that section of the world where all this
action was taking place, and taken in conjunction with the informa-
tion I had from the Navy as to the Japanese Fleet, it might have con-
curred with my idea that that was where the action would be.
201. Q. General, insofar as Washington is concerned, that dispatch
gave the same information which you might have received from Gen-
eral Marshall by telephone on the morning of December 7 ?
A. Oh, no. He said there had been an ultimatum delivered and
ordered codes destroyed.
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[267] Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret.), (Continued) :
262. Q. General, you had a special communication by telephone with
the War Department?
A. I had one in my office and they had one.
263. Q. It was not commercial ?
A. It was partially scrambled. It was partially scrambled in Hon-
olulu and partially scrambled in San Francisco, but it was a me-
chanical device. You got all your connections, and they said, "Pull
up your plug." It was a commercial phone.
264. Q. It was on an Army circuit?
A. Yes, but whether the commercial telephone people could have
done anything to it, if they wanted to, I don't know.
265. Q. All six of the mobile radar were operating on December 7 ?
A. I think they were.
266. Q. Now, do you know in what direction the planes which were
ultimately determined to be Japanese were detected on this radar at
7 : 15 or thereabouts ?
A. Three degrees east of north, about 132 miles out.
267. Q. Do you know whether that radar detected the approach
of the Army bombers ?
A. I don't know, because the Army bombers came in five minutes
later.
268. Q. You knew the course in which the Army bombers were due
to come?
A. They were to come in from the north. There were only three
degrees difference.
269. Q. The people who were operating the radar knew about the
approach of the Army bombers ?
A. No, they didn't. The officer in the Control Office in the In-
terceptor Command did, but the sergeant who was working the station
did not know that any planes were coming in.
270. Q. But the officer did?
A. The officer in the Control Station did.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Admiral Claude C.
Bloch,U. S. Navy (Ret^) (Continued) :
[268'] 271. Q. Admiral, you stated that in your opinion it was
the responsibility of Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel to go to
sea and to do distance reconnaissance. You, of course, are expressing
only an opinion. You do not know what the fact was?
A. I do not know exactly the division of labor between them.
What led me to say that, there had been talk about assignment of
planes, so if the Fleet went out, we would still have something for
distance reconnaissance. If the Fleet went out, the 14th Naval
District Commander would have full responsibility.
272. Q. During all this period you are talking about, the Fleet
Commander was there?
A. Yes. I frankly don't know the division between the two of
them, only I have the feeling, through my liaison with Admiral
Bloch
273. Q. Sometimes with Admiral Kimmel alone?
A. Sometimes and sometimes he came to my headquarters and dis-
cussed things. A great many times Admiral Bloch was in on it.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 207
Examined by the court :
274. Q. General, in making your estimates and studies and in your
several discussions with your staff and others regarding the probable
war with Japan, as we understood it, you finally decided that sabo-
tage would be given priority ?
A. With the information we had then.
275. Q. And you and your staff were in agreement on that?
A. We were. I know my G-2 and my Chief of Staff agreed. I
didn't talk over the details with anybody but them.
276. Q. You did discuss this on the 27th with the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific?
A. We had discussed the probability of air attacks that morning,
and we got that wire in the afternoon, and I sent him a copy of it,
and I am c^uite sure — I don't believe I took that copy to him, but
I am sure he was informed.
276. Q. Following December 7 there was in the papers — and I
understood there was some reference to it in the Roberts Report — a
reference to over-indulgence in alcoholic liquors on the part of the
naval and armed forces in the Hawaiian Islands. Can you en-
lighten us on that in any way from your knowledge of conditions?
A. You mean on that particular night?
[269] 277. Q. Yes, the night of December 6 and 7th?
A. I couldn't say anything about the Navy on that night, because
I went to Schofield Barracks about 7 o'clock and came back about 10
and wasn't down in that part of the city. I can say definitely that
at Schofield Barracks, where our two infantry divisions were sta-
tioned and a big majority of the officers were present at a party given
for Army relief purposes, where they had a cabaret, there was no
drinking in excess. I imagine that various people had dinner par-
ties, and probably most of them had a cocktail or two before dinner,
but I saw no one who had too much to drink. I didn't see any Navy,
except a few naval officers who happened to be at the Army post
that night.
278. Q. Were the effects of possible over-indulgence evident on
the morning of December 7 ?
A. They were not. I don't believe I saw more than two officers
under the influence of drink during the whole time I was in Hawaii.
Re-examined by the judge advocate:
279. Q. You have testified that the aircraft warning by means of
its radar picked up some planes at a distance of 132 miles from the
station at Pearl Harbor in a northerly direction. Is that substan-
tially correct?
A. Three degrees east of north.
280. Q. Was there any way that this radar station had of identi-
fying those planes as friendly or enemy ?
A. There isn't any possibility.
281. Q. Unless there had lieon some means of knowing what friendly
planes were around, it would then be, I understand, impossible to
tell whether planes picked up at this time by radar method could be
identified as friendly or enemy ?
A. And when you are expecting friendly planes on a direction just
three degrees difference, I don't believe anyone would dare say
definitely they were enemy planes.
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
282. Q. Do you know whether any track was made of these incom-
ing' planes by the operator who detected them?
A. They were followed until they were a few miles north of
Oaliu, and apparently they turned east, so that they were out of
the range between the station and the planes.
283. Q. Technically, in making this track you speak of, is the
actual path of the planes indicated in any manner graphically for the
record ?
A. I have forgotten. I have watched them operate, but I think
they should record.
[^70] 284. Q. Do you remember whether any track was made •
of these enemy planes when they departed from the attack on the
morning of December 7, 1941?
A. It would simply indicate that a bunch of them, some little dis-
tance down in the southwest, seemed to disappear. It indicated they
had been aboard a carrier.
285. Q. To save the time of the court, do you or do you not feel that
you can give us any testimony with regard to this track of planes as
they retired?
A. My information is not definite on that.
Examined by the court :
286. Q. In that connection, did you receive prior information re-
garding the sending of planes from Hamilton Field to Oahu?
A. Oh, yes, we knew they were coming in.
Neither the judge advocate, the interested parties, nor the court
desired further to examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ-
ous questioning.
The witness said that he had nothing further to state.
The court inquired of the interested party, Major General Walter C.
Short, U. S. Army (Ret), whether he desired to remain an interested
party.
The interested party. Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army
(Ret) , stated that he did not so desire.
The court announced that Major General Walter C. Short, U. S.
Army (Ret), was, at his own request, released as an interested party
and was no longer accorded status as such before the court.
The witness was duly warned, and with his counsel, withdrew.
The court then, at 3-45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August
15, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 209
PEOCEEDmCTS OF NAYY COURT OF INOUIRY
TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1944.
[271] Tenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 10 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiiiral Grin G. Murfin, U. S. Navv (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphns Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kinnnel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the ninth day of the inquiry was
read and apjDroved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry w^ere present.
Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval
Reserve, one of counsel for the judge advocate, was recalled as a wit-
ness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
1. Q. You are the same Robert D. Powers, Junior, Lieutenant Com-
mander, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel to the judge advocate, wdio tes-
tified earlier in these proceedings %
A. I am.
2. Q. I hand you a document ; can you identify it?
A. I can, sir. I am the authorized custodian of this document,
which was received under ofiicial seal from the War Department. It
is a memorandum of a dispatch to be released, in which it is certified
that it was released to various officers, including the Commanding
(jeneral, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at 12: 17 De-
cember 7, 1941, by Western Union Telegraph and Radio Corporation
of America.
[i27i?] The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), requested that the time, 12:17, be clarified as to
time zone; that is, whether it be Eastern Standard time or some other
time.
The court directed that such clarification be made.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 15
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Q. Do you have any means of knowing to what time the various
time zones in this message refer; whether it is Eastern Standard
Time, Greenwich Civil Time, or what ?
A. Of my own knowledge, I do not.
With the permission of the court, the judge advocate directed the
witness to confer with the War Department in order to ascertain as
to the time zones in which the times indicated in the message refer,
and to report thereupon.
It was stipulated by the judge advocate and the interested parties,
with the permission of the court, that the determination by the wit-
ness would be admissible before the court.
The memorandum of dispatch released by the War Department, cer-
tifying as to the dispatch of a message by the War Department to
various officers, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at 12:17, December 7, 1941, was
submitteci to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge
advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EX-
HIBIT 48."
4. Q. Will you please read the memorandum ?
The witness read the memorandum, "Exhibit 48."
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, was called as a witness by the judge advocate, [£73] _ was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and j)resent station.
A. Husband Edward Kimmel, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy retired.
2. Q. Please state what your duty was on 7 December 1941.?
A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and U. S. Fleet.
3. Q. When did you assume this duty ?
A. 1 February 1941.
4. Q. When were you relieved of this duty?
A. 17 December 1941.
5. Q. I show you a document, marked Exhibit 5 before this court,
which is called WP Pac 46. Please state its nature and whether it
was in effect on 7 December 1941.
A. WP Pac 46 was made effective on 7 December 1941, by my order,
immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Complete
readiness to place WP Pac 46 was required of all elements of the
Pacific Fleet.
6. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 6 before this court. Can you identify
it?
A. I recognize Exhibit 6' as a publication called, "Joint Action of
Army and Navy 1935." I presume and request the assurance of the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 211
judge advocate that this copy of the Joint Action of the Army and
Navy is corrected as of 7 December 1941.
The judge advocate stated that the witness might be assured.
7. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 7, which has been presented in
evidence before this court, and ask you if you recognize it and what
it is.
A. I recognize Exhibit 7 as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
prepared in Hawaii, and approved by the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
8. Q. In a general way, Admiral, can you state to the court what
the major task groups of the Pacific Fleet were on 7 December 1941,
and who were the respective commanders of task forces ?
A. The major task groups of the Pacific Fleet on [^7^] 7
December 1941, are shown in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14C]^-41,
of 31 October 1941. With minor changes, this task force organization
was in effect during all the time I commanded the Pacific Fleet. The
changes which were made as a result of experience may be obtained
from a comparison of Pacific Fleet Letter No. 4 CL-41 of 30 April
1941. It will be noted that the publication of October 31, 1941, is
much more complete. Task Force One under the command of the
Commander Battle Force, Vice Admiral "W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy, was
composed of six battleships, one carrier, five light cruisers, one old
light cruiser, two destroyer leaders, sixteen destroyers, one mine layer,
and one minesweeper. His primary mission was to organize, train, and
continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and
in the vicinity of, the Main Body ; to keep up-to-date normal arrange-
ments and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and
maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the
task force, in order to provide an efficient covering force available for
supporting operations of other areas; or for engagement, with or
without support, in Fleet action.
Task Force Two under the command of the Commander Air Craft
Battle Force, Vice Admiral William Halsey — ^William F. Halsey —
U. S. Navy, was comprised of three battleships, one aircraft carrier,
four heavy cruisers, one old light cruiser, two destroyer leaders, sixteen
destroj^ers, and four mine layers. Its primary mission was to organize,
train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding,
with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land;
to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such opera-
tions; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential
material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient
Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy
communication lines and positions and for making forays against the
enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.
Task Force Three under the command of the Commander Scouting
Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, was comprised of
eight heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, one destroyer leader, eight
destroyers, thirteen minesweepers, and six transports. I might state
that the troop transports were non-existent. Its primary mission was
to organize, train and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy
land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date nor-
m.al arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate
and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tlie task force in order to provide an efficient amphibious force for
attack, witli or without support of other forces, on outlying positions
of the enemy.
Task Force Four, under command of the commandant 14th Naval
District, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that
part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island
•bases. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and develop the
island bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient
services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations. By the pro-
visions of 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941, the [275'] Commandant
14th Naval District was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer, and
liis duties were laid down in detail in that publication, which is in
evidence before this court. Task Force Seven, under the Command
of the Commander Submarine Scouting Force, Rear Admiral Thomas
Withers, U. S. Navy, Avas composed of all the submarines in the Pacific
and their tenders. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and
concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue
development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient
Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations
or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols
in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United
States Fleet, in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases.
Task Force Nine was under the Command of the Commander Patrol
Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy. It included
all of the patrol planes and sea plane tenders in the Pacific. Its
primary mission was to organize, train, and concurrently with execu-
tion of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine
in tactics in order to provide an efficient long-range Air Scouting and
Air Striking Force for independent operation or operations coordi-
nated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times
]3rescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases. Task Force
Fifteen, Commander Base Force, Rear Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S.
Navy, was com])osed of four CA and CLs, whose primary mission was
to escort trans-Pacific shipping in order to protect trans-Pacific ship-
ping against possible attack. Cruisers were rotated in duty under
Task Force Fifteen and supplied from the other forces, according to
the Command. Force and Type Commander continued to exercise the
other functions as required by the administrative organizations as set
forth in Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 13CN-41 of 1 October 1941,
and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.
9. Q. Who was vour next senior in command in the Pacific Fleet?
A. Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy.
10. Q. I call your attention to General Order No. 143. Will you state
what your duties were under this order for the period in which you
were in command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
A. For the period 1 February to 17 December 1941, I was Com-
mander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief U. S.
Fleet. My duties were set forth in General Order No. 143, the Navy
Regulations, General Orders and War Plans; General Order No. 143
provided for the organization of tlie United States Fleet into three
Fleets, viz., U. S. Atlantic Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet, U. S. Asiatic
Fleet. In addition it provided for : National Coastal Frontier Forces ;
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 213
Special Task Forces; Special Duty Ships; Naval Transportation
Service ; Naval District Craft. As Conimander-in- [276] Chief
Pacific Fleet, I exercised command over the Pacific Fleet, and
as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, I exercised command
over either one or both of the other two fleets when concen-
trated with the Pacific Fleet to form a task force. Also, under the
Chief of Naval Operations the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet,
through the Type Commanders, was required to prescribe standards
and methods of training; for all of the seagoino- forces and aircraft
of the Navy.
11. Q. As Connnander-in-Cliief of the Pacific Fleet, what duties
had you assigned the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?
A. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, I had assigned the
Commandant 14th Naval District to perform the duties of Naval Base
Defense Officer for Pearl Harbor and set forth his duties in 2CL-41
of 14 October 1941. I had also assigned the Commandant 14th Naval
District to Command Task Force Four, U. S. Pacific Fleet, which
included that part of the 14ili Naval District Activities which involved
the Island Bases. He was charged with the duty of organizing, train-
ing, and developing the island bases.
12. Q. As Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, had any other duties, other than those set
forth in 143, been assigned to you?
A. As Commander-in-Chief, IT. S. Fleet, and Connnander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, the duties as set forth in Navy Regulations. General
Orders, and War Plans, were assigned to me when I was detailed to
these duties. The duties required are reasonably well summarized
in General Order 143, the essential points of which have been covered
in this discussion.
13. Q. What were the aircraft forces under A^iur command, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in the period from October
16, 1941, to December 7, 1941 ?
A. The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet was divided into two general
categories: the aircraft which was based on carriers, and included
land-plane types only; the aircraft which were based on shore, which
included both seaplanes and land planes. Seaplanes could be, and
frequently were, based upon a seaplane tender in a sheltered harbor.
While based on an aircraft carrier or on a seaplane tender, the planes
were under the command of the forces afloat exclusively. While the
planes were based at Pearl Harbor, there were certain planes which
were under the Command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District
and assigned to him to perform more or less routine tasks. Under
the Commandant on Ford Island there was an officer ordered to com-
mand an air base. He was responsible to the Commandant for oper-
ating the planes assigned exclusively to the Commandant, and was
also responsible to the Commandant for supplying to the carriers the
facilities for their operation while the carriers were in port. The
commander of the air base was also responsible for supplying the
Patrol Wing Two facilities and services necessary to operate those
patrol planes based on Ford Island, and under the Command of
[277] Patrol Wing Two — Commander Patrol Wing Two was in
command of the Patrol Wing, which was a part of the Fleet. He
was also Commander of the aircraft assigned for the defense of bases
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as set forth in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Phm of 11 April
1941, in addendum 1, the Naval Base Defense Force, Air Force Oper-
ating Plan No. A4-41, of March 31, 1941. Briefly, Patrol Wing Two
was responsible to Commander-in-Chief for the training and operation
of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Fleet, and was respon-
sible to the Commandant, 14th Naval District for the training and
operation of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Naval Base
Defense Forces, at which time, of course, the Commandant, 14th
Naval District, was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief.
14. Under the organization you had in effect, how were aircraft
made available to the Commandant 14th Naval District?
A. Aircraft were made available to the Commandant 14th Naval
District upon his request, either to ComPatWing Two, or to the
Commander-in-Chief. Normally, ComPatWing Two would make
such aircraft available upon request unless there were conflict with
other connnitments, in which case he would refer to the Commander-
in-Chief. All Navy shore-based planes were automatically made
available to the Commandant, 14th Naval District or the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, upon sounding of the air-raid alarm,
either for drills or for the real thing. All such planes had frequently
been made available in this matter for practice prior to the attack
on Pearl Harbor, and to the best of my knowledge, were so made
available when the attack took place.
15. Q. Did you, on 7 December 1941, have in effect any written
orders for security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941. I might add that this letter
of 14 October was a revision of a letter written in February of 1941,
arid promulgated to the Fleet at that time. This revision was the
result of tying up certain loose ends, which we found as a result of
experience to be desirable.
16. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 8 and ask you if this is the document
to which you refer — it being marked Exhibit No. 8 for identification.
A. That is the document to which I refer.
2CL-41, of October 14, 1941, was submitted to the interested parties
and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 8."
17. Q. I will ask you to read it to the court.
The witness read 2CL-41 of October 14, 1941, Exhibit 8.
[278] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
18. Q. Did this Order 2CL-41 comprise all the security measures
issued by you for the security of the Fleet and naval establishments
in the Pearl Harbor area and which were in effect on 7 December
1941?
A. Certain measures which are prescribed in Fleet Tactical Orders
and Instructions were applicable to the Fleet or individual ships
thereof while in Pearl Harbor. In this category were the conditions
of material readiness which could be and were prescribed on occasions.
I cannot now recall any specific instructions for the safety of the
Fleet in Pearl Harbor except those contained in 2CL-41 of October
14, 1941. Certain standing orders pursuant to 2CL-41 were issued
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 215
by the task force and type commanders. Such a one was an order
of Commander, Battleships, Battle Force, issued in April, 1941, which
required a continuous manning of a part of the anti-aircraft batteries.
This was a twenty-four hour watch on the anti-aircraft batteries. In
other orders, I provided for all types to have ready ammunition on
deck in ammunition boxes readily accessible to the anti-aircraft guns
at all times, both day and night.
19. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack,
can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was
in ett'ect on ships of the Pacific Fleet then in Pearl Harbor ?
A. The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL-41 had
been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was
in effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander
of Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two,
5-inch guns and two, 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned
at all times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
manned on the date in question.
20. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, where did
you have your flag flying on G-7 December 1941, up until the hour
of the Japanese attack?
A. My headquarters were at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor.
My personal quarters were in a house on a hill in a new devolopment
behind and to the rear of the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. All
provision was made to control the Fleet from my headquarters at
the Submarine Base. We had communication direct from the Sub-
marine Base to the Fleet by way of the high-powered stations on
shore, and I felt, and my communication officer advised me, that we
had facilities equal to, if not superior to, those that we had on the
PENNSYLVANIA for communication with the Fleet.
[279] 21. Q. Under these conditions and your own 2CL-41,
which has just been read into the record, do you consider that you
were embarked in Pearl Harbor ?
A. I was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I trans-
ferred my flag to shore solely because I felt that I could exercise com-
mand of the Pacific Fleet more expeditiously from that point than
I could from on board the ship. When I went ashore and estab-
lished my headquarters on shore, I did not intend to supplant- the
Commandant, 14th Naval District in the exercise of the duties as-
signed to him by the Navy Department and by my orders.
22. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is 2CLr-41, I ask you to look
at Paragraph 3 (g), which has a sub-title, "Defense against air at-
tack", and under that paragraph, refer to sub-paragraph (d) (1),
in which are outlined some of the duties of the Commandant, 14th
Naval District, one of which is advising the senior oflicer embarked
in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, what con-
dition of readiness to maintain. What I am trying to find out is
this. Admiral : Under the conditions of having your flag flying on
shore, did you consider yourself the senior officer embarked in Pearl
Harbor within the meaning of this sub-paragraph ?
A. I did not.
23. Q. Will you tell the court who, on the morning of 7 December
1941, immediately prior to the Japanese attack, the senior officer was?
A. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, USN, Commander Battle Force
U. S. Fleet and Commander Task Force 1, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"24:. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph 3 (g), "Defense against
air attack"', under sub-paragraph 6 thereof, certain duties are kiid
down for the Commandant, Ittth Naval District in regard to matters
affecting the defense of Pearl Harbor and the ships of the Pacific
Fleet therein. Did you, as Commander-in-Chief, except the Com-
mandant to carry out these various functions directly with the Fleet
or ofkcers concerned, and without reference to you ?
A. Yes. If there was any doubt in his mind about what he was to
do, he had access to me at all times.
25. Q. Now, one of the duties prescribed here and to which I have
before adverted, was the duty of advising the senior officer embarked
in Pearl Harbor, exchisive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific
Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. Can you remember
the condition of readiness that had been prescribed by the Com-
mandant, 14th Naval District, in compliance with this directive on
the night of 6-7 December, 1941 ?
A. 1 do not know that he prescribed, or advised Admiral Pye to
prescribe, any condition of readiness on tliat day.
[i2S0] 20. Q. Can you state to the court what the condition of
readiness was on G-7 December 1941 up until the time of the initiation
of the Japanese attack?
A. I have already stated to the court, Condition 3. That condition
3 was prescribed with certain modifications wdiicli, incidentally, were
additional safety measures prescribed by the Commander, Battleships
and Battle Force.
27. Q. And this condition of readiness to which you have just
referred in your last answer met with your full approval?
A. Yes, I thought it was sufficient.
28. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, and
with your headquarters located as you have described them, did you
l^.ave any unit for furnishing you with combat intelligence?
A. I depended largely uj^on the units under the direction of the
Commandant, 14th Naval District, who had a reasonably complete
set-up for obtaining this information.
29. Q. Am I to infer, then, that your own intelligence unit, that
which belonged to the Fleet, was rather a minor part of this organiza-
tion, or what am I to understand ?
A. Well, it w^as an essential but not a major part.
30. Q. Did this intelligence unit that belonged to the Fleet work
with and function wnth the intelligence unit that you have described
as belonging to the Commandant, 14th Naval District?
A. Yes.
31. Q. What do you consider the efficiency of this combined in-
telligence unit to have been prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. From my observation of their operation, I thought the efficiency
of this intelligence unit was quite satisfactory prior to 7 December
1941.
32. Q, Did you, prior to 7 December 1941, receive combat intelli-
gence from other sources than your own unit ?
A. Yes. We received reports from Connnandant, 16th Naval Dis-
trict, from the Navy Department, and our own forces, wherever they
may be.
33. Q. From your experience wath combat intelligence as you re-
ceived it, did you feel that it was —
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 217
A. Well, I am talking about all kinds of intelligence.
34. Q. That is what I am talking about too, generally,
A. I think combat intelligence is a little more restrictive than what
we are talking about.
[281] 35. Q. The meaning I am trying to convey to you when I
ask you questions about combat intelligence is essentially the informa-
tion 3^ou had upon which you made military decisicms?
A. That is right. Well, by that definition, I received combat in-
telligence from all naval sources, from many naval sources, and the
decisions I made were based upon my evaluation of this information.
3G. Q. Speaking of evaluation. Admiral, did this intelligence serv-
ice that you had organized ordinarily evaluate the information prior
to giving it to you, or just exactly how did the evaluation fimiction
operate, if you can remember?
A. They presented to me summaries of the information. It was
physically impossible for one man to go over all the information. I
received summaries and, to a certain extent, conclusions that the in-
telligence units had drawn, and the basic facts generally presented,
what they considered important basic matter.
37. Q. I presume you had a War Plans officer or division set up in
your own staff, did you not?
A. I had a War Plans division set up within my own staff com-
posed of Captain C. H. McMorris, Captain McCormick, Commander
V. R. Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer of the United States Marine Corps,
and one lieutenant whose names escapes me for the moment. In-
cidentally, the War Plans division of my staff was greatly expanded
immediately after I took command. I thought that the number of
people engaged in producing War Plans should be considerably aug-
mented. I therefore added two captains and a colonel in the Marine
Corps to the ones that I got at the time that I took command. And
in that connection it may be well to point out to the court that that was
one of the prime considerations wliich decided me to move my head-
quarters from the PENNSYLVANIA to the Submarine Base. I
had a choice of dividing my staff' or of going ashore. I could have
divided it by putting part of the staff on other ships. I could not
have my staff available to me with their advice in their entirety in any
other way than by taking up my quarters on shore. The number of
the staff in War Plans and in intelligence and public relations was
such that it was a physical impossibility to have them on board the
PENNSYLVANIA aind at the same time have them operate in an
efficient manner.
38. Q. Would you tell the court how this War Plans division func-
tioned with you in evaluating enemy intelligence?
A. All enemy intelligence went to the War Plans division and was
discussed and estimates drawn from day to day as to what this in-
formation meant and what action we should take as a result of this
information. I had [^<5.3] the Fleet intelligence officer bring
to me daily the summaries made of the information received in the
last 24 hours and go over it with me in detail. My chief of staff was
generally present, and also the War Plans officer was present at this
conference. In any event, they always received this information, and
this information included all messages that I received from the Navy
Department. In addition to the senior member of the War Plans
division — who was Captain McCormick — Captain DeLany, my opera-
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions officer, was also kept fully informed in order that the War Plans
and Operations should not get in any degree at cross purposes.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.) , suggested that the question referred to enemy intelligence,
and asked if it were to be assumed that the question referred to
countries who are now enemies.
The judge advocate replied in the affirmative; that the judge ad-
vocate meant, in asking his question in which he used the term "enemy",
"possible enemies".
With the court's permission, the witness made the following state-
ment : Up until the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on 7 De-
cember we were at peace and I was the first one to recognize the changed
situation.
39. Q. Did your organization exchange intelligence with the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department?
A. We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Ha-
waiian Department had his interests restricted to the defense of
Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and
the ones to which he expected to send his forces. He was primarily
interested in the probability of attack where his forces were stationed,
and in general, the information I gave to him bore upon his interests,
or was confined to his interests. My own interests covered a much
greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to keep
the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought
would be useful to him. I did not inform the Commanding Gen-
eral of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Mar-
shalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for
taking the additional chance of having such information divulged by
giving it to an agency who would have no part in the execution of the
plan.
[283] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Micldleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
40. Q. Did you likewise receive any information from the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department?
A. I believe the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
gave me every bit of information that he had. We exchanged infor-
mation fully and freely.
41. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 8, which is Fleet Letter 2CLf-41,
and calling your attention to paragraph 2 (b) , which has been read into
the record but which I shall now read for your information : "That a
declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships
in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating
area, (3) a combination of these two." Did this estimate continue
from the time this letter was promulgated up to the time of the attack
by the Japanese on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
A. This specific confidential letter and the assumptions upon which
it is based are not so much an estimate as they were a basis for the
training of the Fleet to meet all contingencies that might arise. Esti-
mates and the chances of any particular action might change from day
to day, but this was a letter to ]:)rovide for the security of the Fleet
under all the contingencies which we could foresee.
42. Q. I again refer to Exhibit 8 and refer you to paragraph 3 (G)
entitled "Defense Against Air Attack." After you have read each
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 219
directive thereunder to yourself, will you state to the court categori-
cally what action had been taken prior to December 7, 1941, or at the
time of the attack on that morning, whichever way may be applicable?
A. In my opinion, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment disposed his available troops and material to the best advan-
tage. I felt then and still feel that there were many deficiencies,
particularly in anti-aircraft defense. General Short testified here
yesterday about the steps he took as to the adequacy of the material
and as to the material he had available and as to the number and types
and weapons and personnel that he had available. I feel that his state-
ment is better than any I could make on this subject. So far as the
other paragraphs in this letter, there were practically no naval guns
based on shore except those which belonged to the marine defense
battalions temporarily stationed in Pearl Harbor. My recollection is
that there were very few marine guns available on that day. Do
you wish me now to cover the question of long distance reconnaissance?
43. Q. Just in a general manner. I shall cover it specifically later
on.
A. The number of planes available to the Fleet, to the Commandant,
14th Naval District, and to the Commanding General in Hawaii had
all been lumped into one coordinated force bj'- the agreements arrived
at. Of those planes, there was not a sufficient number of the type
required to perform distance reconnaissance effectively. There was
not a sufficient number of planes of the long range available to make a
complete reconnaissance for one day, utilizing all of them. A con-
tinuous patrol over long periods of time was out of the question.
In this connection, I can state there was a total of eighty-one patrol
planes in the whole Hawaiian area. There was a total of twelve
B-17 Army planes in the Hawaiian area. Of these, a maximum of
sixty-one patrol planes and six B-17's were available on the island of
Oahu during the period immediately preceding the attack. We had
some patrol planes operating from Midway. I base my statement
that there was not a sufficient number of planes to perform a 360 degree
search for one day on a requirement of eighty-four planes to make the
360 degree search, based on a fifteen-mile visibility. I think that can
be demonstrated. I might state that when I took command of the
Fleet I thoroughly appreciated the deficiencies in anti-aircraft defense
that existed in Oahu and in the Hawaiian area. I read the letter
written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War. I read
the answer written by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the
Navy. I also read the letter written by the Commandant, 14th Naval
District and forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-
in-Chief on or about January 7, 1941. All these letters set forth clearly
the inadequacy of the force available in Pearl Harbor for aircraft
defense. There was a deficiency in reconnaissance planes and in
various other elements. Recognizing this and recognizing that it was
a physical impossibility for General Short to perform distance recon-
naissance, there was nothing that we could do. We had no choice
except to attempt to utilize the forces that we had to the best advan-
age, and I think we did organize and use these forces to the best
advantage. It was unfortunate that the warnings, messages, and
information from the Navy Department did not convey to us the
imminence of war and the imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor
that some witnesses now want to read into those warnings. We did
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not get it. We had in the Fleet a constantly changing personnel —
officers and enlisted men. In November I mentioned in a letter to
the Chief of Naval Operations that we needed 20,000 more men in the
Pacific Fleet to fill our complements and to fill the schools and other
training institutions that we had. I had also attempted to get he
enlisted men of the Navy frozen in their positions. In other words,
I wanted to cancel the [38S] expiration of enlistments. I made
a trip to Washington, advanced that in letters both before and after
that trip in June, 1941, and I took it up with the chairman of the
Senate and House Naval Affairs Committee. We never did get that
revision put into effect, and we continued to lose our men, who were
attracted outside by the high wages prevailing about that time and
doubted whether or not we would get into the war. It was absolutely
essential that we maintain training in the Pacific Fleet up until the
last minute. If we had stopped training the first time we received
these alarming messages, I feel certain that by the time war was
declared our ships would have been in a dangerously ineffective condi-
tion. As an example, we were supplying men for the expansion pro-
gram both on shore and at sea, and as I recall at the present time,
we were transferring twelve patrol plane crews a month from Pearl
Harbor to the mainland, training those patrol crews in the Fleet,
and we had a great urge to continue our work of training the Fleet.
These were the conditions that confronted me when I made the deci-
sion on the 27th of November not to stop training in the Fleet but
to continue until further developments.
44. Q. The judge advocate is primarily concerned at the present
moment with your views as to whether or not the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer, did or did
not carry out the duties under sub-paragraph 6 of Article 3 (G) , which
you have just read, and he would like to have you, as the Commander-
in-Chief and as his immediate superior, state categorically whether
or not the duties outlined thereunder were performed to your satis-
faction ?
A. I can state, in general, that the perforance of duty of the Com-
mandant of the 14th Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer
and as prescribed in paragraph 3 (G) and sub-paragraph G (a), (b),
(c), (d), was, in general, satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief.
If it had not been so performed, I would not have hesitated at any
time to call his attention to the fact.
45. Q. Was there any different condition of readiness for action in
regard to naval base defense activities than those prescribed for units
of the U. S. Pacific Fleet ?
A. As Naval Base Defense Officer was charged with fixing the state
of readiness for all the shore activities, and he was charged with ad-
vising the senior officer afloat, in this case Admiral Pye, what he con-
sidered to be tlie state of readiness of the ships. That was put in to
insure that all the information in the hands of the commandant of
the district was placed in the hands of the senior officer afloat [286]
and not to have any condition arise where the Commandant of the
district might have information which was not in the hands of the
senior officer afloat. The responsibility for fixing the state of readiness
of the ship was not taken away from the senior officer afloat.
46. Q. It is not quite clear to me. Adnui-al, exactly what connection
the advice of the Naval Base Defense Officer had to do with a con-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY . 221
ditioii of refidiiiess in the Fleet, but if 1 iinderstaiid your answer cor-
rectly, it is that the senior officer afloat in the Fleet prescribed his own
condition of readiness? . .
A. That is correct.
47. Q. And he might take into consideration, if he wanted to, the
condition of readiness which was being maintained by the Naval Base
Defense Officer if he so desired?
A. And the advice he i-eceived from the Xaval Base Defense Officer.
48. Q. The senior officer present afloat was responsible for the con-
dition of readiness of vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet ?
A. That is correct.
40. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 0, which is a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941
and which has been introduced in its entirety into the record. Do
you recognize this letter as any that you have been acquainted with?
A. Yes, I saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary
of War, dated ^lanuary 24. 1011, early in February", 1941.
50. Q. Referring to this letter as of the time you received it, did the
views expressed therein differ from your own views materially on
matters of military defense at Pearl Harbor?
A. I was in substantial agreement with this letter, although I dif-
fered somewhat from the probabilities as established therein. This
letter was, I believe, initiated in the Navy Department after the re-
ceipt of a letter prepared by the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict and forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, who at that time was
Admiral Richardson. In these two letters, submitted in early Janu-
ary. 1041, practically all the points covered in the Secretary's letter
of January 24 were included. I felt the most probable form of attack
in the Hawaiian area was by submarine. I thought a bombing attack
by airplanes was second in order of probability. I also felt the danger
of torpedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor was nil, because I believed
[287] torpedoes would not run in the shallow water of that
harbor. The maximum depth at any point was only forty-five feet.
I felt that the probability of a surface gunnery attack by bombardment
was a low order of priority. The probability of mining was considered
a high order of priority. The unlimited areas which required sweep-
ing made mining no particular menace, and this was due to the extreme
depth of the water in the innnediate vicinity of the island of Oahu
and limited areas.
51. Q. I know that in the answer you have just given you envisaged
a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as the most probable form
of attack?
A. That is right.
52. Q. And that an air attack was second in order of ])robability ?
A. I would like to amend the second in order of probability. I did
not think it was second in order of probability, because the airplane
attack I thought was a remote possibility. I did not think it was a
probability at any time. I want to make that clear now. My previous
statement was in error. I did not mean that, but what I was thinking
of was that a submarine attack would hurt us and the thing which
would hurt us next the most was the airplane attack.
53. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is your letter 2CL-41, and
to paragraph 2 (b) (1), you say that a declaration of war may be
preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. What form
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor did you contemplate by
this statement?
A. An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base
our training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose. I felt, as the
situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor,
and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the installa-
tions at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much
more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if
the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I
consider it more than a possibility, and one which ordinary prudence
would make us guard against.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve,
reporter, withdrew.
54. Q. Then, the order in which you set out what might happen on a
declaration of war, in paragraph 2 (b), does not necessarily mean
the order of importance as you envisaged the probability of forms of
attack?
A. No.
The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
[28^1 Present:
All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the inter-
ested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M.
Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The judge advocate stated: Adverting to Exhibit 48, which was
introduced in evidence before this court this morning, there was a
stipulation made by the interested parties and by the judge advocate
that Lieutenant Commander Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, the wit-
ness before the court who introduced the exhibit, would communicate
with the War Department, and that the information he obtained from
them as to the time, or the character of the time, that was being used
on Exhibit 48, would be accepted in evidence before this court as of
the times which are thereon indicated. I will now ask Lieutenant
Commander Powers to make to the court a statement as to the infor-
mation he received from the War Department.
With the permission of the court. Lieutenant Commander Powers,
U. S. Naval Reserve, stated : Traffic Operations Branch, Army Com-
munications Service, has advised me that the times indicated upon
Exhibit 48, as used by the War Department on 7 December 1941, were
Washington time; that is. Eastern Standard Time.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as
witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding, and continued his testimony.
Examination by the judge advocate (continued) :
55. Q. Admiral, in the questions I am about to ask you, I would
request that you note the distinction between air bombing attack
and air torpedo plane attack. This is just for the purpose of clarify-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 223
ing the questions in your own mind. With reference to an air bomb-
ing attack, what was the status of the defenses of Pearl Harbor in
this regard when you took command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?
A. The status of defenses of Pearl Harbor in reference to air
bombing attack when I took command of the Pacific Fleet were the
same as those stated in the letter forwarded by the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District through the Commander-in-Chief, to the Navy
Department, early in January of 1941. The Commander-in-Chief at
that time was Admiral J. O. Kichardson, U. S. Navy, who signed the
letter addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the Navy
Department.
[2Sd] 56. Q. I show you Exhibit 28, which is now in evidence
before this court, and has been read in full, and ask you if that is the
letter to which you refer ?
A. That is the letter, together with the enclosure of a letter from
the Commandant, 14th Naval District.
57. Q. Will you sketch as best you can any changes that were made
in these defenses during your tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet?
A. During my tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet,
a number of pursuit planes were brought to Pearl Harbor. The net
increase of operating pursuit planes during this period was approxi-
mately 100 pursuit Army planes. This was an increase from no effec-
tive Army pursuit planes to approximately 100. I do not know the
exact number of Army anti-aircraft artillery, but my recollection is
that at no time did it exceed approximately one-third of the number
recommended by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and
approved by the Commander-in-Chief in his letter of early January,
1941. Regarding bombing planes, the Army supplied a maximum
number of 27, B-17 Flying Fortresses. The Army planned, as I
recalled it, to supply about 180 of these B-17s. However, prior to
December 7, 1941, order were received to send a number of B-l7s to
the Philippines. This resulted in stripping Oahu of all but 12 B-17
Flying Fortresses, of which 6 had been further stripped of essential
gear to outfit the ones going to the Philippines, and this left 6 B-17
planes in operating condition on December 7, 1941. Therefore, dur-
ing my tour as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, Army had a net
increase of 6 bombing planes, no balloon barrage, no smoke-making
apparatus, and none of the other facilities that I can now recall and
which were mentioned in the Secretary of the Navy's letter had been
supplied prior to 7 December 1941. In this connection, it is my recol-
lection that a number of Navy Patrol planes was increased by one or
two squadrons during this period. In any event, there were stationed
on Hawaii on 7 December 1941, exactly 81 patrol planes, of which 61
were in operating condition on Oahu on 7 December 1941. There were
12 operating from Midway, and the remainder were under overhaul or
out of commission for various reasons. An agreement as to the opera-
tion of Army and Navy airplanes stationed on shore was put into
effect. The agreement was arrived at by the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment, which provided in general that the Army would command
all fighter planes, both Army and Navy, and the Navy would com-
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mand all distance reconnaissance and bombing planes. My order
2CL-41, issued in February, 1941, and revised on October 14, 1941,
provided that all naval forces in Pearl Harbor would assist the Army
in the defense of Pearl Harbor. The Commandant of the 14th Naval
District was designated in this letter as the Naval Base Defense Officer,
and vested with the necessary authority to direct [^W] the
naval forces in the event of attack, and he was also given authority to
conduct the necessary drills to insure the most effective use of the
naval forces in port. There was a very considerable increase in the
number of troops supplied by the Army to the Commander of the
Hawaiian Department. I believe there were some 50,000 troops in
Hawaii on 7 December 1941, but I might say that General Short felt
that the minimum required for the defense of Hawaii was in the
neighborhood of 75,000 troops. It would be noted in the letter of 24
January that the establishment by the Army of a radar station and
aircraft warning net is given a very high priority. The answer to this
letter, written by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy,
promises a high priority for this w^ork. It stated that it would be
completed in the summer of 1941. I know that members of my staff
who appreciated the importance of the Army radar in the defense of
Pearl Harbor and of the aircraft warning net, did everything within
their power to assist the Army, and incidentally the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District, in the training of personnel and in rendering
them whatever other assistance they considered within our power.
We took Army personnel to sea in our ships prior to the time they
received their radar, and w^e sent several officers at different times to
work with the Army in establishing their service, all the time urging
them to get something. The aircraft warning net was far from com-
plete on 7 December 1941. Specifically, the permanent Radar stations
were not anywhere near completed but there were several mobile units
which had been placed in advantageous positions on the island and had
been operating w^ith some degree of success prior to 7 December 1941.
You have lieard General Short testify as to the operation of this radar,
that it was being operated from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 every morning, and that
training continued throughout the day until about 4: 30 in the after-
noon ; also that it was decided on December G by the personnel on the
job that they would not operate the radar after 7 : 00 a. m. This was
unknown to me at the time, and I knew only in general that the radar
had been in operation. I knew, of course, that it was far from perfect.
Durin,o; 1941, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and Com-
manding General, Ilaw^aiian Department, completed their Joint Fron-
tier Coastal Defense Plan. Four destroyers were detailed to the
Commandant of the 14t]i Naval District for use in anti-submarine
j)atrol and other patrol duties. He also had some tugs which he used
for mine-sweeping, as I recall it. However, there were available to
him sufficient forces to do the limited mine-sweeping which was
required at the District.
58. Q. That goes into a little more detail than I intended, but I
thank you, Admiral. Who gave the order to transfer the B-17
bombers from tlie Hawaiian area'^ Do you recall 'i
A. The War Department.
[291] 59. Q. And at about what time of the year did this order
take effect?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 225
A. Oh, that transfer, the most of it was effected in November of
1941.
GO. Q. Do you feel that you had kept the Navy Department in
"Washington reasonably well informed as to the status of the defenses
of Pearl Harbor in the matter of protecting that area against air-
craft attack during your tour of dutv as Comamnder-in-Chief ^
A. I do.
Gl. Q. With special reference to aircraft torpedo plane attack,
what would you say w^ould be the requirements for such a defense
that are different from the defenses against air bombing attack in
general (
A. Well, the defense against an air torpedo plane attack in addition
to the elements required for an air bombing attack, requires nets so
placed that they will deflect or explode the torpedoes before they
reach their objectives; in lieu of a net, baffles, target rafts, or any
objects properly placed that will explode or deflect the torpedo, are
required.
G2. Q. Were any of these means of defense available in Oahu or in
the Hawaiian area when vou assumed command of the Pacific Fleet
in February 1941 ?
A. None of the defenses against an air torpedo plane attack, as
such, were available to me when I assumed command of the Pacific
Fleet.
G3. Q. What was done, to your knowledge, to improve these de-
fenses against airplane torpedo attack during your tour of duty as
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleets
A. No effective steps were taken that I recall. In addition to the
defenses that I have mentioned against an air torpedo plane attack,
the use of barrage balloons would have been a help, because they
w^ould have tended to keep the planes so high that they^ could not
have dropped the torpedoes.
64. Q. What w^ould have been the effect of these barrage balloons
on our own air activities in the Pearl Harbor area?
A. They would have stopped the air activity to a very large extent,
and they were not recommended.
65. Q. When you assumed command of the Pacific Fleet, what was
the technical view you held on the performance of torpedoes dropped
from aircraft in depths of water that prevailed at Pearl Harbor? In
order words, was it your view that this could, or could not, be done?
A. I felt that there was no chance of aircraft torpedo attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor. I based this opinion on letters which I had
received from the Chief of Naval Operations.
[293] The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret.), requested that the letter of February 17, 1941,
from the Chief of Naval 0})erations to the Commander-in-Chief of
Pacific Fleet, to which he referred in his testimony, be admitted in
evidence at this time.
The judge advocate stated that he had no objection.
The said document was submitted to the jud^e advocate, to the
other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), ofi'ered in
evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked
"EXHIBIT 49."
7971<)— 40 — Ex. 14(5, vol. 1 10
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
66. Q. Please read the letter.
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 49.
66-A. Q. I would ask you if there were any changes in the views
of technical bureaus or others in authority as regards the possibility
of using aircraft torpedoes in waters of depths prevailing at Pearl
Harbor during 1941 ?
A. On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations addressed a
letter to the Commandants of all naval districts, with copies to
CinCPac, CinClant, and so forth. The subject was, "Anti-torpedo
baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks." Reference (a)
is a CNO confidential letter of February 17, 1941. (Reading:)
In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employ-
ment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially
for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective
harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized
certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following
was stated :
"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to success-
fully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is
necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."
2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in
some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent
runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship
or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if
surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed
and a sufiicient run to arm the torpedo. 3. While no minimum depth of water
in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing
safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of [293]
water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack
launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.
4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto
were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes
may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.
(Signed) R. E. Ingersoll.
Now when the letter of 17 February, which was a letter to the Com-
mandant of the District, was received, Admiral Bloch submitted a
letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, and his letter dated 20 March
1941, stated (reading) :
The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does
not exceed 45 feet. b. There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for
vessels approaching and leaving berths, which prevents the departure of a
large group of vessels .on short notice, c. Most of the available berths are located
close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipelines
as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the Fleet moorings would
have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.
Other harbors in the 14th Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to
Pearl Harbor. In view of the foregoing, the Commandant does not recommend
the installation of baffles for mooring in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the
14th Naval District.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, under date of March
12, 1941, wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and stated, "In view
of the contents of reference (a) , that is, the CNO's confidential letter of
15 February 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Pacific Fleet
recommends that until a light, efficient net that can be laid temporarily
and quickly, is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area." When
the letter of June 13 was received at my headquarters, we went over
this letter thoroughly and my staff considered that, in view of the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 227
statements in this letter, that there was still no danger from torpedoes
in Pearl Harbor. While the statement was made that no ship could be
considered safe, yet, there was strong presumption that the torpedoes
would not run in the depths of water which obtained in Pearl Harbor,
and those depths are 40 feet or less. In any event, I recall of no effort
on the part of the Navy Department to put these nets in Pearl Harbor.
I feel that the Navy Department was no more concerned about the use
of aerial torpedoes in Pearl Harbor than were the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District. To the best of my recollection, no further correspondence
on thiss ubject was had.
67. Q. Wliat did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor prove as
regards the use of air torpedoes in depths of water of those prevailing
in Pearl Harbor?
A, They performed very well indeed from the Japanese standpoint.
[^^4] 68. Q. Admiral, in a number of instances, especially in
the testimony of General Short, there was reference made to a General
Headquarters Air Force. What is your conception of such a com-
mand ? What does that mean to you ?
A. My conception of the Army G. H. Q. Air Force has always been
a little bit hazy. I have never been able to grasp all of the details of
what the General Headquarters Air Force does nor how it is admin-
istered. So far as our activities in Pearl Harbor were concerned, we
had to work with what we had. We were forced to work with what
we had, and the General Headquarters Air Force was a theory. I
would add this : I would like to add this point : In all that I have said
about the inadequacy of the forces in Pearl Harbor, and of the efforts
of the Navy to supplement the Army deficiencies, it is my belief that
what we did does not alter in any way the basic responsibility of the
Army for the defense of Pearl Harbor, as provided for in the "Joint
Action of the Army and Navy."
69. Q. What were your views immediately before 7 December 1941
on measures to be employed for locating and engaging enemy aircraft
before they reached their objective? I am assuming now that an
attack has been launched and that the planes are en route to their
objective.
A. After aircraft are launched and are en route to their objective,
the only practicable means of locating them in time are by radar and
to a very much less efficient extent by visual observation, either from
shore, from ships, or from scouting planes. This was true before
December 7, as it is now. Prior to December 7, however, radar was
in its infancy, so far as our services are concerned, and it was to that
extent in effective due to the limitations of material and the greenness
of the personnel. We had carried on an intensive training program on
radar operations on the ships of the Fleet in which this was installed.
I have told you about taking the selected personnel from the Army to
sea and about giving them the benefit of what we had learned about
radar. Now the supplement to the shore radar was the aircraft warn-
ing net, which was an Army responsibility; and you have heard Gen-
eral Short describe the conditions of this net on December 7, 1941. I
think that the Army personnel in Hawaii did everything they could,
or I should say, perhaps, Gejieral Short, I felt, did everything that he
could within the limitations of material supplied them to establish this
228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
warnin<T net and to put together tlie radar. Of course, T was not
familiar with the details of .their construction,, but I know our people
did put pressure on them constantly to get something done.
70. Q. What service was charged under existing orders and agree-
ments on December 7, 1941, with locating and engaging enemy air-
craft before they reached their objectives?
A. Army.
[295] 71. Q. Was the other service to lend am^ assistance?
A. In Hawaii each service was prepared to render any practicable
assistance to the other; and if the Navy in any of their planes which
were under naval command at the time, had sighted attacking aircraft,
they would have rendered such assistance to the Army as was practica-
ble and possible. When planes are once launched and coining in to
make an attack on Oahu, the Army is responsible for locating the
jilanes. The methods of locating the planes are radar, observation
posts on shore, in ships, and in scouting or observation planes. Now
while it is the Army's basic responsibility to locate these planes, the
Navy by agreement was obligated to give them all the information they
obtained in the performance of whatever mission was assigned to them.
72. Q. What ^service in Hawaii was charged with repulsing enemy
aircraft by anti-aircraft fire, on 7 December 1941?
A. The Army, I should say, had the prime responsibility. The
plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible
assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all the guns, in-
cluding -50 calibres and even shoulder rifles by the marines in the Navy
Yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition, it provided
that the batteries of all ships should take part in shooting down the
planes.
73. Q. What was the agreement for joint readiness for immediate
action in defense against surprise raids on Pearl Harbor?
A. It is set forth in several publications which the court has already
examined, and I will re-state that the principal agreement effectuating
the coordination of effort was the status of aircraft. Army and Navy
aircraft. In general, this ])rovided for all fighter planes from the
Navy that were based on shore to report at once to the Army. It pro-
vided for all bomber planes from the Army and all patrol and bombing
planes from the Navy, that were based on shore, to re])ort to the Navy.
The naval planes were under the command of the naval base defense
officer, who in turn had the commander of the naval base defense air
force to actually operate the planes. The Army operated the fighter
and pursuit planes. We had arrangements made whereby daily re-
ports were made of the availability of planes, and Admiral Bellinger
made his report to the Army of the planes that he would have available
on any one day. The Army made its report to Admiral Bellinger so
that each knew wliat planes were available and, very closely, w^hat all
the planes were doing on any one day.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[390] 74. Q. Were there any drills held in furthering these
joint exercises?
A. Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each
week. For about two to three months prior to December 7, 1941, we
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 229
conducted the drills once every two weeks. This was in order to
insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when
the drills were held weekly there were too many people excused due
to overhaulino; a plane or some work that they considered essential
and more important than taking part in the drills. It was particularly
difficult at times and it required considerable insistence to get these
])eople all ready to take part in the drills. We had better results and
accomplished more after we went to tlie bi-weekly drills than we had
had when we had the weekly drills because when we made that con-
cession we also tightened up on the people who we requird to take
part in them.
75. Q,. With regard to the activities of the Army and Navy in the
Hawaiian area — I speak of their activities in a military sense — did you
ever have any discussions with the Commanding General of the Ha-
waiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command
in effect in the Hawaiian area ?
A. No.
76. Q. Do you feel that any problems that you had would have
been more easily resolved, or not, if you had had unity of command
in effect?
A. I feel that where command is vested in one agency, other things
being equal, you will get very much better results than where there is
a divided responsibility.
77. Q. Do you consider that the Commandant, 14th Naval District,
had authority, so far as you were concerned, to put unity of command
in effect ?
A. 1 do not, not without reference to me, and I would not have put
unity of command in effect, or accepted responsibility for the Army
actions, without reference to the Navy Department,
78. Q. There is evidence before this court that in July, 1941, an
executive order had been issued freezing Japanese assets in the United
States. Did this order give you any views as to the imminence of war
Avitli Japan ?
A. This executive order tended to worsen the relations betwixt
the United States and Japan. I judged that it was one more step along
the road to war. However, there was room for the opposite view,
and that is that a firm stand against Japan would deter them from
taking any action. I believe a good many people had advocated and
argued that that would be the case.
79. Q. Subsequent to this executive order, can you remember the
next development in United States- Japanese relations that bore on
the imminence of war with Japan ?
A. Well, I knew of the Atlantic conference, but I knew of no com-
mitments that were made there. I got my [2.97] informa-
tion from the newspapers. I also had a message from the Chief of
Naval Operations dated October IGth which indicated that an attack
by Japan on Russia was considered a strong possibility, but that
Japan blamed the United States and Great Britain for her present
situation and it was possible that Japan might attack either one or
both. There were other developments which were unknown to me
until after the war started. One of these is the alleged commitment
by the United States that even if not herself attacked she would come
to Britain's aid in the Far East. Also, on 16 August, 1941, Mr. Hull
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
delivered to Japan a note protesting strongly against further move-
ments to the south. This was not known to me until after the war was
started.
80. Q. You mentioned having received the dispatch of 16 October,
1941. What was your estimate at the time of the receipt of this dis-
patch on the imminence of a United States-Japanese war, on 16 Octo-
ber 1941, after you received the dispatch which is Exhibit 13 before
this court?
A, I did not consider at this time that war betwixt the United States
and Japan was imimnent. I had attempted to find out what the action
of the United States would be in case Japan attacked the Maritime
Provinces, but I got no definite answer. I did not consider that war
was imminent.
81. Q. In this dispatch. Exhibit 13, there is this directive: "In
view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including
such preparatory deployments as will not disclose the stragetic in-
tention, nor constitute provocative attacks against Japan." What did
you do, as Commander-in-Chief, in complying with this directive to
take due precautions?
A. This dispatch states, in part, "In view of these possibilities, you
will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as
will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative attacks
against Japan." I took the action at this time which I described to
the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October, Exhibit 14,
and which action was approved specifically in the letter of 7 Novem-
ber from the Chief of Naval Operations. In that letter of 22 October
I stated that I had placed and would continue to maintain the
patrol of two submarines at Midway. I dispatched 12 patrol planes
to Midway. I dispatched two submarines to Wake, and they would
arrive there on 23 October. I dispatched the CASTOR and two de-
stroyers to Johnson and Wake with additional marines, ammunition
and stores. The CURTISS arrived at Wake on 21 October with gas,
lube oil, and bombs. I prepared to send 6 patrol planes from Midway
to Wake; to replace the 6 at Midway from Pearl Harbor. I dis-
patched additional marines to Palmyra. I placed Admiral Pye, with
the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 Octo-
ber. I had 6 submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.
I put some [298] additional security measures in effect in the
operating areas outside of Pearl Harbor. I delayed the sailing of
the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November, when she was due
to go for an overliaul at Puget Sound, and I deferred final decision until
that time. With minor changes I proposed to continue the health
cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops.
The court then, at 3 : 00 p. m., took a recess until 3 : 10 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the in-
terested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the wit-
ness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat
as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 231
Exaniination by the judge advocate, (Continued) :
82. Q. Admiral, I show you a Chief of Xaval Operations dispatch
of 24 November 1041 which is now in evidence before this court marked
Exhibit 15, and ask you if you received that dispatch ?
A. Yes, I received it.
83. Q. Did the receipt of this dispatch cause you to make any
changes in your estimate of the situation as regards the intentions of
the Japanese government as of this date?
A. There Avas, in my opinion, a possibility of an aggressive move-
ment, and the dispatch itself indicated an attack on the Philippines or
Guam was a possibility. I felt that this required no action by me fur-
ther than that which I had already taken and I did not stop the train-
ing program. The Chief of Naval Operations felt that no change in
the training program was desirable or required by the dispatch of 24
November.
84. Q. Did your estimate of the situation at this time of what the
Japanese intentions might be, include a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor ?
A, At this time I considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
a remote possibility. However, if Japan attacked the Philippines, a
submarine attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected.
85. Q. At the time of the receipt of this dispatch, did you take any
additional security measures within vour command ?
A. No. ■
[209] 8G. Q. Specifically, what did the words contained in this
dispatch, and I quote, "a surprise, aggressive movement in any direc-
tion" convey to you ?
A. "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including
an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility," is the wording
of the dispatch. I thought when I received it that the surprise,
aggresive movement in any other direction than the Philippines or
Guam referred to a foreign territory.
87. Q. The words "in any direction," then, did or did not include,
so far as your estimate was concerned, the Hawaiian Islands?
A. That is correct; only as regards submarine attack and not as
regards an air attack.
88. Q. Can you recall the next information that you received from
any source which gave you any information on the change in United
States-Japanese relations looking toward war?
A. On 27 November 1941, I received the dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations.
89. Q. I I'efer you to Exhibit 17, which is now in evidence before
the court, and ask you if that is the message that you refer to?
A. Yes. ■
90. Q. Did you, as Commander-in-Chief, take any additional se-
curity measures other than those that you have already stated were
in effect in your command ?
A. We ordered to Wake, one patrol squadron then at Midway, and
it proceeded on 1 December, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en
route. The patrol squadron at ISIidway was replaced by a patrol
squadron from Pearl, which left Pearl the 3rd of November via
Johnston Island, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route to John-
ston, and also from Johnston to Midway. This patrol squadron made
232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a daily search from Midway on 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 December. They
were to make daily searches until further orders. We sent the
ENTERPRISE to Wake with one Marine fighting squadron, which
departed from Pearl on 28 November and landed the planes at Wake
on 3 December. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance
flights with its own planes. The patrol squadron at Wake was then
withdrawn. It conducted a reconnaissance sweep en route Wake to
Midway, and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl. The LEXING-
TON proceeded to Midway with a VMF squadron, departing Pearl
5 December. It conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own
planes en route and was 400 miles southeast of Midwav when the war
broke. The BURROUGHS was dispatched to Wake with additional
forces and supplies, including radar, but was short of Wake when
the war broke. She departed Pearl 29 November. We conducted
daily reconnaissance flights with PB planes based on Pearl Harbor
[300] to cover the Fleet operating areas and approaches thereto.
On 27 November I issued an order that any submarine contacts in
the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be depth
bombed, and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations, as I have
j)reviously noted. These dispositions of mine were well known to
the- Navy Department, and Admii-al Stark testified before the Roberts
Commission that he considered them sound; that he knew of them
and considered them O. K. We had two sulimarines operating at
Wake and two at Midway doing patrol duty. I issued orders for
full security measures to be taken by ships in operating areas and
at sea. In Pearl Harbor proper, the Commandant warned all of
his anti-submarine patrol forces to take additional security measures
against submarines. I have previously testified about the condition
of the anti-aircraft batteries at this time. I would like at this time
to tell the reasons that actuated me in issuing the order to bomb
submarines in the operating area. In February of 1941, shortly after
I took command of the Fleet, we had what the destroyer personnel
who trailed this contact always insisted was a Japanese submarine.
They had it under observation for, I think, about 48 hours, something
over 48 hours. They got propeller noises, and I was much coiicernecl.
I wrote out a dispatch telling them to bomb the submarine and my
staff pointed out to me that that was not in accordance with orders
and that we were forbidden to bomb submarines except in the de-
fensive sea area which was about 3 miles from land. I made a com-
plete, full report to the Chief of Naval Operations after this incident.
Incidentally, I had 4 destroyers trailing the submarine contact. I
was most unha])py while the destroyers were exposed in this way
and I suggested that I would be delighted to give orders to bomb
the submarines, any submarines contacted in the operating areas.
That was in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. His answer
came back by dispatch telling me not to bomb any submarine contacts
in the operating area but to keep in effect the orders that had been
issued by my j^redecessor. On four or five other occasions we had
submarine contacts in the operating area. In September, after an-
other one of these contacts which lasted for some time. I wrote an-
other letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in which I said I would
like to bomb the submarines, and was again informed that in case
we got positive evidence that there was a submarine in the operating
area it would be in order to make a protest to Japan, During all
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 233
this time, and at various other times which I am not detailing- now,
I felt that I was exposing these destroyers' crews to considerable
danger, and when I got the dispatch of 27 Xovember I decided that
I would go ahead and tell them to bomb all the submarine contacts.
I got no answer to the information copy which I sent to the Chief
of Naval Operations. The Pearl Harbor operating area was some
2,000 miles from the nearest Japanese possession. I knew that if
we sent any submarines into a Japanese operating area they wouldn't
hesitate a moment to bomb them. I felt that any submarine op-
erating submerged in the Pearl Harbor operating ^area should be
bombed. I had felt it a long time, and I decided on 27 November
to bomb them anyhow.
[301] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, moved
that that part of the ans^ver with reference to what he testified before
the Roberts Connnission be stricken out.
Neither the judge advocate nor any of the interested parties replied.
The court directed that that part of the answer dealing with the
testimony of the inerested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, before the Roberts Commission be stricken out.
91. Q. Did the receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of
November 27, 1941, in any way change your estimation of the situation
in regard to Japanese intentions?
A. My estimate of Japanese intentions after the receipt of this
dispatch of November 27 was as stated in the dispatch, that a move
would take place within the next few days in the form of an amphibi-
ous expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or
possibly Borneo. I estimated from this and all other information
available to me that if the aggressive move eventuated against a U. S.
possession, it would be made against the Philippines, and if it were
made against the Philippines, I felt there was a very good chance
that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area.
I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility, and I did not
expect an air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at" this time due to
the tenor of the dispatches, the other information available to me, the
clifficulties of making such an attack, and the latest information I had
from the Navy Department and other sources was that the greater
portion of the carrier forces were located in home waters. I con-
sidered, of course, that one of the primary causes for the dispatch
was, as stated, that negotiations had ceased.' Consequently, when the
press indicated further conversations were continuing between the
Japanese ambassadors and the State Department, the w^arning lost
much of its force. I further assumed that no ultimatum had been
given by the United States Government to Japan, because I had been
niformed that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
had submitted a recommendation to the President that no such ulti-
matum be delivered. I had no knowledge of the contents and tenor
of the note handed by the Secretarv of State to the Japanese ambassa-
dors on November IG until long after I returned to the United States.
_ [302] 92. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 17, I quote: "This dispatch
IS to be considered a w^ar warning." Did those words which I have
aust quoted have any special significance to you ?
234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I regarded that phrase as a characterization of specific intelli-
gence which the message contained.
93. Q. Did these words change in any manner your estimate of the
imminence of a war with Japan ?
A. The text which accompanied this phrase indicated that an
aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days.
This made the war with Japan closer than it had been before I re-
ceived the message of November 27. Other statements in the dis-
patch, however, directed my attention to specific localities in which
the Navy Department apparently expected the attack to eventuate.
The more cautious phrasing and the emphasis of measures contained
in the War Department's messages and the precaution against taking
measures which might alarm the civilian population, all lead me to
the conclusion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor or anything other
than a surprise submarine attack was most improbable. Of course,
the surprise submarine attack could be in conjunction with an attack
made on the Philippines.
Examined by the court :
94. Q. What do you mean by a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. I mean by that a mass submarine attack on the ships in the
operating area. In this connection, I was using Pearl Harbor in the
sense not only of the harbor itself but in the operating areas sur-
rounding Oahu.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
95. Q. Did you take any additional security measures as a result
of the receipt of this dispatch of November 27, 1941 ?
A. I already stated the additional security measures which I placed
m effect upon the receipt of this dispatch, and they are much more
convincing.
96. Q. What naval officer was, under your existing plans as of
November 27, 1941, responsible for the defense of the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base ?
A. The joint agreement with the Army — and it is prescribed in the
Naval Coastal Defense Plan— makes the Army primarily responsible
for the defense of Pearl Harbor. However, the forces supplied by
the War Department to the Army were never adequate to perform
this task properly. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District en-
tered into certain agreements with the Army, looking to the best
utilization of [303] both the Army and Navy forces available
in Oahu. The War Department, in effect, admitted that they were
unable to defend Pearl Harbor by not supplying sufficient long-range
bombing planes and sufficient fighting planes and artillery of all de-
scription to accomplish the task unaided. Admiral Block, with my
approval, made these agreements with the Army, and with the security
orders which I issued and which included 2CL-41 of October 14,
looked to the utilization of every force, both Army and Navy, which
was stationed in Hawaii or which, at the time, was in Pearl Harbor.
I compiled and issued this order, 2CL-41, and specifically designated
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense
Officer of Pearl Harbor, who was charged in this order, as well as in
the war plans, with coordinating the naval effort, which was to sup-
plement the Army effort in defense of Pearl Harbor. He agreed to
undertake distance reconnaissance, insofar as the planes available per-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 235
mitted. Our agreement ^Tith the Army pooled the patrol planes under
Navy commancl and the fighters under Army command.
The question was repeated.
A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was the Naval Base
Defense Officer and was responsible for coordinating the naval effort
to supplement the Army effort in defense of the base.
97. Q. Did you on receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of
November 27, consult with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
on any measures of security to be adopted in the 14th Naval District
that were different from any then in effect?
A. Yes, I discussed this message with the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District.
98. Q, Were any additional measures of securit}' deemed advisable
as a result of this conversation?
A. No.
99. Q. Specifically, did you consider such a measure as having an
air cover during morning twilight?
A. By air cover, I presume you mean having fighter planes in the
air during this period?
100. Q. That is correct.
A. That was considered, but inasmuch as the Army pursuit planes
would remain in the air for only one hour without refueling and were
restricted to flying within fifteen miles of land, this measure was not
considered practical.
101. Q. Was the condition of readiness of the Fleet in the Ha-
waiian area changed in any manner as a result of the receipt of this
message. Exhibit 17 ?
A. The full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect.
[304.] 102. Q. Did you consider a higher condition of readiness
advisable at this time?
A. For ships at sea ?
103. Q. No, ships at Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, I considered it, but we didn't put any additional steps into
effect.
104. Q. Do you feel that the Fleet would have been more secure if,
after November 27, you had adopted some such security measure as
having all ships go to general quarters at an hour before sunrise?
A. It might have been. In the light of what has happened, it was,
of course, a precaution that perha]is should have been taken, but if
I had considered an air raid on Pearl Harbor at this time imminent,
there are many other steps which we would have taken.
105. Q. From your naval experience, what is the most probable
time of day to expect an air attack from carrier -based planes?
A. If you are referring to Pearl Harbor, as I presume you are,
I should say the most probable time is shortly after daylight, because
that would give the aircraft a chance to complete their attack, return
to the carriers during the daylight, and they would have a full dark
period to get out of the range of the shore-based aircraft. That, how-
ever, can be argued. That is merely my opinion.
106. Q. You gave us some testimony this morning. Admiral, on
the organization of the Army's aircraft warning system. I should
like to have you summarize briefly at this point what the ge^ieral equip-
ment was and the proficiency of the personnel in its operation ?
236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I liave been informed thcat the personnel of the Army's aircraft
warning system were green and untrained. The aircraft warning
system and the radars were new. The equipment was not entirely
adequate. The radar was limited in operation to a limited range, and
the permanent station was incomplete. The warning net needed much
polishing and adjustment to make it a real, efficient service.
107. Q. What would be the range in miles from Oahu that a long-
range reconnaissance flight would have to be flown to be effective
against known Japanese carriers as of November 27, 1941?
A. 800 miles.
[305] 108. Q. In order to cover thoroughly a 360-degree arc,
liow many patrol-type aircraft would have been necessary to cover
this area ejfficiently at this range of 800 miles, the patrol to be flown
once daily for, say, as long as ten days?
A. Well, assuming 15 miles visibility, it Avould require 84 planes
to make one flight and cover -S60 degrees, and to maintain a continu-
out patrol would take anywhere from two-and-a-half to thi'ee times
that number for search only.
109. Q. What would you consider the most probable areas of ap-
]u-oach for a surprise air attack launched from carriers against Pearl
Harbor?
A. I testified before the so-called Roberts Conunission that I
thought the noi'thern sector was the most probable. I thought at the
time that the aircraft had come from the north — the time I tesified
I mean — and I didn't Avish to make alibis. However, I feel that
there is no sector around Oahu which is much more dangerous than
any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from
any direction. Theie is no outlying land which prevents this, and
you have got a 360-degree arc, minus the very small line which runs
up along the Hawaiian cliain. From the southern, we have observa-
tion stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the closest Japanese pos-
session is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese
carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. 1 would say tliat while
all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would probably
search the western 180-degree sector first.
110. Q. In the dispatch of November 27 there is a directive:
''Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry-
ing out the tasks assigned in WPLf-46. On receipt of this dispatch
what did those words mean to you?
A. This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me.
I decided that what was meant was something similar to the dispo-
sition I had made on October 16, wdiich had been approved by the
originator of both these dispatches, and I therefore made the dis-
positions which I have outlined.
111. Q. This dispatch of November 27 also contains the state-
ment, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of con-
ditions in the Pacific have ceased." Was this information in con-
formance with any other information that you had, or was it con-
trary to other information that you had?
A. I had received several statements saying, as I recall, that con-
versations had about reached an impasse, and on two or three occa-
sions— all of which are in the record here — a statement w^as made
that conversations were just about finished — just finishing, and this
was news that conversations had actually ceased.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 237
[S06] 112. Q. Did you see any notices in the i)ul)lie press or
hear any radio hroadcasts wliich were contrary to this statement?
A. Oh, subsequently, yes, that the conversations, at least, were
continuino;. That w^as in the public press, and it came over the
radio, and it was discussed among me and my staff and my principal
advisors. I was in consultation during this period with Admiral
Pye, Admiral Bloch, General Short, Admiral Brown, and Admiral
Halsey. To be sure, Halsey went to sea on the 28th of November
and made a trip to Wake and got back on the morning of the attack.
BroAvn went out several days later, and I discussed the measures with
him as well as with my staff — those and other things. I had adopted
a policy whereby I showed my correspondence with the Navy Depart-
ment, and, particularly, the letters which I received from the Chief
of Naval Operations and all the dispatches, to the. officers that I
have named, and insofar as they were available at my headc[uarters
during this period, I showed them these dispatches and these letters
and discussed the matters with them, and we certainly discussed the
question of the apparent resumption of conversations between iSIr.
Kurusu and Admiral Nomura and Secretary Hull.
113. Q. Did this information which you had thus gleaned from
public sources affect, in any way, your estimate of the situation in
regard to the imminence of war between the United States and
Japan ?
A. Oh, yes, everything affected — All the information a man gets
affects him in arriving at a decision.
114. Q. Can you tell the court in what way this information
affected the estimate which you had previously made regarding the
iimninence of war with Japan?
A. The attempt here to Hnd a distinction between negotiations
and conversations was not apparent to me, and I thought that nego-
tiations were continuing. They were having conversations. That,
T think, is borne out by various evidence which we have. If negotia-
tions had ceased, that means to me that they didn't have anything
more to do with each other.
115. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch of November 27,
19-41, and up until the attack on Pearl Harbor at 0755 on the 7th of
December, 1941, had you received any further official information
from the Navy Department as to the progress or the status (;f nego-
tiations with the Japanese?
A. No.
116. Q. In other words, the Navy Department had failed to say
that negotiations were either continuing or had stopped?
A. That is correct. I got a major part of by diplomatic informa-
tion from the newspapers.
\307] 117. Q. Do you mean to tell the court that you acted on
newspaper infoi-mation in preference to official information supplied
you by the Navy Department ?
A. No, I make no such statement.
118. Q. I show you Exhibit 18, which is a dispatch of November
2G, 1041, and ask you if you will identify it for the court and state
whether vou received it or not ?
A. I did.
119. Q. Will you say what it is?
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. This is a proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to trans-
fer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve
the marine planes for expeditionary duty. It goes into considerable
details as to how we shall land the planes and says that planes will
be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats, etc.
120. Q. Do you consider the matter of stationing these twenty-five
pursuit planes at Midway and a considerable number at Wake to be a
directive or a suggestion? How do you consider that?
A, I considered it as a suggestion, and in my letter of December 2,
1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, which I request to be read to
the court and placed in evidence, you will see the steps that we took
and that we recommended. I replied to this dispatch by a dispatch
of November 28, I think it w^as. Incidentally, at the same time, or
during the same period in which I received this dispatch from the
Navy Department, General Short received a dispatch from the War
Department. In his dispatch the proposal was made to relieve the
marine infantry units on the outlying islands with Army personnel.
It also touched on the question of taking Army pursuit planes to put
on the outlying islands instead of the Navy planes. This proposal,
if carried out, would have meant that the Army transfer something
similiar to a Marine defense battalion. They had nothing of the
kind organized. It would have involved a great deal of transport and
boat work, and at Wake, for instance, it took on an average of five
or six days to unload a ship, due to the fact that the unloading had
to be done in the open sea. On one occasion that I recall it took
thirty days to unload a ship lying off Wake. We were making every
effort to open a channel into the lagoon and permit the ships to go
inside. That woi-k was proceeding at top speed when the attack
came, but this proposal was made by the Navy Department, who were
fully cognizant of these conditions which existed on the outlying
islands, and the proposals in themselves were evidence — at least, some
evidence to me — that the Navy Department did not expect any serious
uj^sets in the outlying area.
\308\ 121. Q. The time group of this dispatch of 26 November
indicates that it was released to the Navy Department at what time,
sir?
A. 270038.
122. Q. The dispatch of 27 November, Avhich is Exhibit 17 before
this court, bears what date time group ?
A. 2T2337.
123. Q. Approximately how many hours later is this dispatch of
27 November than the dispatch of 26 November?
A. About 22 hours ; 23 hours.
124. Q. About 23 hours?
A. Yes.
125. Q. In other words, the Navy Department, when it wrote the
dispatch of 27 November, had cognizance of the suggestion to you in
its dispatch of the day before regarding the transfer of planes to
Midway and Wake. Is that not a fact ?
A. I have every reason to think that is correct.
126. Q. What means had you at the time of delivering pursuit or
fighter planes to Midway or Wake from Oahu ?
A. Pursuit planes had to be hoisted aboard the carriers at the flying
field. Ford Island. They could be taken to within flying distance of
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY . 239
the islands and the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force informed
me at a conference that his planes could only fly 15 miles from shore,
his pursuit planes could only fly 15 miles from shore.
127. Q. Did that mean then, Admiral, that you had to send your
carriers to an area approximately 15 miles from their destination be-
fore 3"ou could deliver these planes ?
A. If you followed what he said literally, yes. However, the pur-
suit planes could be flown oif the carriers and could have landed on
the flying fields at Midway and at Wake. Once on the flying fields
at Midway and Wake, these planes could not again be flown off and
landed on a carrier. They could not land one of the pursuit planes
they had then on one of our carriers. They didn't have enough run
for it. And that was another reason given in my letter of 2 December
to the Navy Department why I thought it better to send Marine planes
to the islands because I felt them, and so indicated, that the planes
AYould probably have to be removed from the islands before war came.
We had very limited facilities on these islands to maintain the planes
at this time. And that was the reason we had delayed sending the
planes out there until the last minute. In this letter I also stated the
arrangements I had made for handling material for planes and
ground crews at Wake and at Midwav and of the fact that I was
sending the ENTERPRISE to Wake, and the LEXINGTON tc
Midway,
[o09] 128. Q. Would the dispatch of a carrier subsequent to
November 26, 1941, to these areas for the purpose of delivering planes,
involve the absence from Pearl Harbor for a period of some days of
this carrier and her escort?
A. Yes.
129. Q. About how manv days would you estimate for the trip to
Wake?
A. My recollection is that Wake is some 2.000 miles from F'earl
Harbor. Midway is about 1,100 Miles. Halsey, with the ENTER-
PRISE, left on the 28th of November and would have arriv(3d back in
Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
130. Q. The Navy Department, after sending you this dispatch of
27 November in which it mentioned the war warning and the fact that
an aggressive action is expected within the next few days, didji't then
give you any further instructions as regards dispatching this carrier
toward Wake and Midway, did it?
A. I sent a dispatch on 28 November telling what I was doing in
regard to the transfer of these planes and as I recall it, recommending
that no marines be relieved and no army be sent to the islands.
131. Q. Did you report to the Navy Department that you were
dispatching or had dispatched a carrier to Wake or Midway for the
purpose of delivering planes in response to its suggestions of 26
November ?
A. I told the Nav yDepartment that I was dispatching a carrier to
Wake on 28 November and that I expected to send another carrier
with Marine planes to Midway later.
132. Q. You say the Navy Department gave you no instructions
as regards sending the carrier on its mission, as j^ou have stated you
reported to them in your dispatch of 28 November?
A. You mean did it stop me ?
240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
133. Q. Yes.
A. No.
134. Q. Did tills situation that you haA^e described of having sug-
gested to you sending carriers a long distance from their base have
any influence on your estimate of the situation at the time, that is, 28
November 1941, of the imminence of an attack by the Japanese on
the United States i
A. Every communication that I received from the Navy Depart-
ment, and every bit of information that I had that })ore even remotely
on this subject atfected me in some degree. This action by the Navy
Department, which we have just been discussing, indicated that they
did not expect much immediate activity in the Hawaiian area.
The court then, at 4:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., August
16, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 241
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INaUIEY
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944
[SIO] IClea-enth Dat
Xavy Department,
Washhigton, D. C.
The court met at 9 : 45 a. in.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navj^ (Ret). President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy ( Ret) , Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Jndge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the tenth day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The judge advocate made the following statement : The judge ad-
vocate at tliis time would request that the witness under examination
at the end of yesterday's session be asked to resume his status as in-
terested party, for the reason that the judge advocate desires to recall
Admiral Schuirmann for the purpose of conducting further examina-
tion into matters connected with the inquiry, which should be in-
quired into at this time, for the reason that his testimony may have
some bearing on witnesses whose return to duties in connection with
the war effort are imperative and we can no longer afford to keep them
in Washington.
The court directed that the witness who was testifying at the close
of yesterday's session resume his seat as interested party.
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness \S11^
for the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate and was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The court made the following announcement : During your cross-
examination, when you were last on the stand, the court made a ruling
w^hich pi-ohibited the counsel for Admiral Kinunel from continuing
along a certain line of examination. The court now rescinds that
ruling, and your cross-examination will be continued along those lines
if the counsel so desires.
Examined by the judge advocate:
242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. Q. Admiral, I refer you to a document entitled "Peace and War",
which is an official State Department publication, and which the court
was requested to take judicial knowledge of, and the court announced
that it would. I refer you to a document printed on page 823 of this
publication, and ask you if you can identify it.
A. I can identify it to the extent that I have seen it before, yes,
and more or less recall that such a note was sent, and the contents,
2. Q. "Wliat is the title of this document as set forth in the publica-
tion?
A. Memorandum regarding the conversation between Under-Secre-
tary of State Welles and the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and
Mr. Kurusu, on the 2nd day of December 1941.
3. Q. Adverting to this document, I will request you to read to the
court for the purpose of inserting into the record the statement of
the Under Secretary of State Welles, and the reply of the Japanese
Ambassador.
A. (Reading) :
I have received reports during tlie past days of continuing; Japanese troop
movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and
material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by .Japan in Indochina.
It was my clear understanding that Ijy the terms of the" agreement — and there
is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement — between Japan
and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces
permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very
considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing
of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the
utilization of these forces by Japan for purpose of further aggression, since
no such number of forces could possii)ly be required for the policing of that
region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands ;
against the jnany islands of the East Indies ; against Biu-ma ; against IMalaya
or eitlier through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose
of undertaking the occupation of [312] Thailand. Such new aggression
would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken
against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and" has been repeatedly
stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the
Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inqure at once of the Japanese
Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and
what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demon-
strated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This
Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of
the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroach-
ment upon the teri'itory and rights of free and independent peoples through
the utilization of military steps of the same charactei*. It is for that reason
and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to
know tlie intention of the Japanese Government.
The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese
Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter
but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his
Government.
4. Q. Admiral, in your duties as liaison officer with the State De-
partment, had the subject matter of this note been brought to your
attention ?
A, I cannot recall definitely, but I presume, in view of the close
liaison maintained, I was aware of the fact that such a note had
been handed to the Japanese.
5. Q. Then you would not have any present recollection as to
whether or not the information contained in this note had been com-
municated to the Chief of Naval Operations by you?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 243
A. No.
6. Q. Adverting to your testimony when you were before the court
at a previous session, you named certain individuals that were present
when you and Admiral Stark were in his office about 9:o0 on the
morning of 7 December 1941. I would ask j'ou to re-state, to the
best of your ability and recollection, the officers wdio w^ere there present
at that time, in addition to yourself and Admiral Stark?
A. To the best of my recollection, Captain Turner and Admiral
Wilkinson. I cannot place definitely whether they were there at 9 : 30
or later. Admiral Ingersoll was in and out of the office during that
morning.
7. Q. Would you please re-state your best estimate of the [313^
time that Admiral Stai'k came into his office.
A. My best estimate is 9 : 30.
8. Q. At the time he came into his office, had there been any infor-
mation received from the War Department with reference to the
Japanese-American situation; from the War Department, I ask?
A. None that I remember of, no.
9. Q. While you were present at the office did any such informa-
tion arrive ?
A. From the War Department?
10. Q. From the War Department.
A. None that I remember.
11. Q. Did any such information arrive from any officer of the
War Department?
A. None that I recall. ^
12. Q. As I remember your testimony of the other day, this informa-
tion was in your possession at 0930, or arrived in your possession
shortly after 0930, as to certain information which was in the posses-
sion of the War Department relative to the status of the Japa-
nese-American diplomatic situation. Do I remember correctly ?
A. As I recall my testimony, the only thing that I stated which
might be of that nature was the telephone conversation betw^een Gen-
eral Marshall and Admiral Stark. I presume that this was available
in the War Department, the same information that I mentioned and
which formed the basis of General Marshall's telephone conversation.
13. Q. Did you not, at your last appearance before this court, tell
us in substance that which you gleaned, or what you deemed to be the
subject matter of this conversation between General Marshall and
Admiral Stark?
A. That is correct.
14. Q. I show you Exhibit 48, which is now in evidence before this
court and ask you to read to yourself the substance thereof. Can
you recall whether or not the substance of the subject matter set out
in Exhibit 48 was or was not the subject matter of the conversation
between General Marshall and Admiral Stark, as you then under-
stood it?
A. I presume that that message was sent following the conversa-
tion with Admiral Stark, and that, as I recollect, the information on
which the message was based was in possession of the Navy Depart-
ment and Admiral Stark.
15. Q. Did you yourself know about this general subject matter
at that time?
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. As I recollect, I did not.
Note: Question ]8, and the answer thereto, have, by direction of
the court, been extracted from the following page, page 814, and
placed on page 314-A, which has been deposited with the Secretary
of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national secu-
I'ity and the successful prosecution of the w'ar.
[3W] 16. Q. Prior to Admiral Stark's arrival in the Navy
Department at or about 0930, did you mnke any attempt to conuuuni-
mate the information you had on this subject matter?
A. Prior to his arrival, no. I reached the Department, as I recol-
lect, about 0900 o'clock, and Admiral Stark came in about 9 : 30.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this w-itness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
17. Q. Referring to "Peace and AVar'*, the same volume from which
you read, I read a paragraph on page 847, which is a paragraph of a
radio address delivered by Presiclent Roosevelt from Washington on
December 9, 1941 (reading) :
Your (ioverninent knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if
•Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in the dividing
of spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that
if she came in she would get complete and perpetual control of tlie whole Pacific
area, and that means not only the Far East, not only all of the islands in the
Pacific, but also a strangle hold on the west coast of North, Central, and South
America.
In your capacity as liaison officer betw^een the Navy Department and
State Department, did you know, prior to 7 December 1941, the infor-
mation stated by the President on December 9, 1941, in his public
address, wdiich I have just read to you?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no.
18. Q. (SEE NOTE AT BOTTOM OF PAGE 313.)
19. Q. Did you tell the Chief of Naval Operations of the informa-
tion concerning that subject matter which you acquired?
A. No, but it would have been conveyed to him in the normal course
of events, by Commander Kramer.
20. Q. Did you have any conversations with Admiral Stark on that
subject matter?
A. No conversation that I can recall. I feel sure that Admiral Stark
did receive this information.
21. Q. Did you interpret this information as indicating a time
when Japan would initiate a military offensive?
A. It is difficult for me to determine just how I evaluated the infor-
uiation at that time, because of events which have transpired since
and w4iich may lead me to believe that I placed a certain interpreta-
tion on it when at the time I did not. To the best of my recollection
I believed that wdien the negotiations ended there would be a rupture
of diplomatic relations, possibly a military move by Japan, but that
such a move would not necessarily be directecl against the United
States.
[.i'7-5] 22. Q. On or prior to December 6, was there information
in the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States?
A. None that I know; no positive information of that character,
that Ja])an would attack the United States.
PR0CEP]U1NGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 245
2^1 Q. Was there any information from which you estimated Japan
would attack the United States?
A. None that came to my attention of such a definite character, that
Japan would attack the United States.
24. Q. Or any United States' possession?
A. Or any United States' possession. There was infornuition, I
})elieve, but I cannot be positive, that Japan would sever diplomatic
relations with the United States.
25. Q. If a foreign nation — and this is a hypothetical question —
if a foreign nation, during a period of strained diplomatic relations,
manifested marked interest in the movement and location of units of
the United States Fleet at a specific Fleet base, would not those cir-
cumstances lead to the opinion that the base in question was a likely
place for such foreign nation to attack in the event of war?
A. It would depend in my opinion as to the detailed information.
If the period of strained relations existed, and that nation was to
embark on a military expedition, say into Indochina, which might in
her opinion be opposed by the United States, she would be interested
in knowing the location and movements of all the armed forces of the
United States, particularly the Fleet, in order that she could evaluate
whether or not any move by the United States to oppose by force her
movement against a third power was under way. If the detailed loca-
tions of the ships within the harbor was a question of which the
hypothetical power was concerned, it might indicate that an attack
on that particular place was under consideration.
26. Q. Was there information in the Navy Department, Admiral,
prior to 6 December 1941, that Japan was manifesting interest in the
movements and location, not only generally, but in Pearl Harbor, of
the units of the United States Fleet?
A. In answering this question I wish to make plain that whether
or not I knew in December that such information was available in
the Department, I do not now recollect. I have ascertained that cer-
tain information on that subject was in the Navy Department about
the 5th or 6th of December.
1^16'] 27. Q. Will you look at Exhibit 48, which you read a
moment ago. Was any of the information set forth in Exhibit 48,
which is the dispatch from General Marshall to Hawaii on Sunday —
was any of the information contained in Exhibit 48 available in the
Navy Department ?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, all of it was.
28. Q. AVas any of it available in the Navy Department prior to
7 December ?
A. I do not know whether any of it — I do not recollect whether
any of it was available prior to 7 December, or not. I believe that
part of the information, the first item, was available on the 7th of
December, and the second item of information was available prior to
that date, perhaps on the 6th of December.
29. Q. Do you know whether any portion of the information in that
dispatch that was available in the Navy Department prior to 7 De-
cember was distributed to responsible officials in the Navy Department
or in the Government when received ?
A. I don't know.
30. Q. I understood you to testify on the occasion of your previous
appearance that you had no recollection of anyone in the Navy De-
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
partment telling the State Department on Sunday morning, 7 De-
cember, of the subject matter of the discussions between you and Ad-
miral Stark and whoever else may have been present?
A. The subject matter of discussion, you mean, about the note?
31. Q. Yes.
A. I did not tell the State Department, but I am sure that the State
Department was informed.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.)
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
32. Q. Admiral, for a number of years prior to December 1941, was
it not a matter of common knowledge that Japan made a point of ob-
serving the movement of the United States Fleet units whenever
possible ?
A. That was the general belief throughout the Navy.
33. Q. Have you not personally observed Japanese merchant vessels
in the vicinity of the United States Fleet when the said Fleet was ma-
neuvering ?
A. I do not know whether I personally observed, but during Fleet
maneuvers there were reports generally received that merchant ships
or Japanese tankers were in the vicinity for the purpose of observing.
[317] 34. Q. Admiral, do we understand that you were the
liaison officer between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State
Department ?
A. Yes; may I add, I did not transmit information — I mean per-
sonally transmit all the information. There was a system set up
whereby a courier went to the State Department with items of naval
intelligence, which were matters of general information. Then if
there was to be a discussion of that information, then I did the dis-
cussing of it with the State Department, unless it was done on a higher
level.
35. Q. As the court remembers, you stated that you made a daily
memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations as to wliat had transpired
in the State Department that day ?
A. No, sir. I did not make a daily memorandum. Sometimes I
would go in and just relate, after a visit to the State Department, to
the Chief of Naval Operations what had occurred.
36. Q. But that was the daily custom; is that correct?
A. I couldn't say it was a daily custom. Admiral, There were no
regularity about the visits. If I thought it was necessary to go over
there, I might go three times a day. Then maybe there' would be a
day or so elapse when there was no occasion to go,
37. Well, during this interval between 27 November and 7 Decem-
ber, you had daily contacts and made daily reports ; is that correct ?
A. Practically daily, sometimes oftener ; some days it would be two
or three times,
_ 38, Q, And these reports and conversations were discussing ques-
tions regarding Japan ?
A, Most of them, yes,
39. Q. In this note or letter you just read, of December 2, regarding
conversations of Mr, Welles with the Japanese representatives, did
you discuss that with the Chief of Operations ?
A. I cannot state definitely whether I did or not.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 247
40. Q. Will 3'ou please state to the court the system by which Chief
of Operations received reports from the State Department relative to
our relations with Japan ?
A. The Chief of Naval Operations — I presume you mean this par-
ticular period, 27 of November to 7 December?
41. Q. That's right.
A. I think the Chief of Naval Operations received it sometimes
direct from Secretary Hull via telephone. I think he received certain
information from the Secretary of the Navy, after conferences that
he held with Secretary Hull. If [31S] matters of this nature
were discussed in cabinet meetings, which I presume they were, he was
undoubtedly informed by the Secretary of the Navy, although I was
never present when the Secretary did inform him. I informed him
during this period, verbally, of the meeting I attended on this subject
with the State Department.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, w^ithdrew.
42. Q. Do we understand that during that period, November 27 to
December 7, you informed him and conversed with him regarding
negotiations being carried on with Japan by the State Department?
A. That is correct, sir.
The proceedings following. Page 318-A; questions 43, 44, 45 and
the answers thereto, have, by direction of the court, been extracted
from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This
action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful
prosecution of the war.
[oW] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to
examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ-
ous questioning.
The witness stated he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 10 : 30 a. m., took a recess until 10 : 45 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interested parties, and their counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, a wit-
ness for the judge advocate, was recalled and warned that the oath
perviously taken by him was still binding.
The proceedings following. Page 320, Question Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive,
have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and
deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the
interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[32r\ 6. Q. The court understands, of course, that through your
liaison officer you were in daily touch with the State Department,
and that you had other means of having knowledge of any conver-
sations that went on ?
A. That is right; we were in daily liaison with the State De-
partment.
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. Q. In your answers to these questions regarding negotiations,
will you please explain to the court your ditferentiation between
conversations and negotiations?
A. Well, I would say that negotiations might flow from con-
versations. Two parties might get together and talk things over
without coming to any agreement as to what, for example, they
might send their respective governments. The line, I would say,
Avould be a rather fine one, but negotiations would mean to me, tak-
ing some action on conversations.
8. Q. But did you understand that from November 27th to De-
cember 7th there were conversations going on between these respective
representatives?
A. I do not recall learning of continued conversations, or at least
nothing definite which, to my mind, changed the information which
I had sent to the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific on 27 Novem-
ber, except, as I have previously testified, tliat I had been informed
of in this court.
9. Q. It has been testified before this court that the note which
was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese representative
on 26 November was an incident which was a matter of general
knowledge in the Navy Department. Are we correct in understand-
ing that you had no knowledge whatsoever of this note?
A. I do not recall having seen the note, or the extent of it. I may
have been told by mj^ liaison officer, but the distinct impression that
I had when I sent my dispatch was that we had come to an impasse.
10. Q. Do we understand that you had no knowledge of the con-
tents of this note of 26 November up to and even inunediately sub-
sequent to 7 December 1941 ?
A. May I ask if that is the note which was given me here to read?
11. Q. That is the note of the 26th of November wdiich told Japan
our condition's for her maintaining relations with this country,
specifying that she would give up Indo-China, withdraw her troops
from China, and really revert to her status quo prior to the capture of
Manchukuo ?
A. I wouldn't say that I had no infornnition. I have stated that
I do not recall this note definitely. I have also testified to the fact —
though I couldn't remember the date — that I understood a further
dispatch might be sent to Japan.
[322] 12. Q. The reason that these questions are being asked
is that if we remember correctly you stated when you were before
this court that the first knowledge that you had ever had of this
note was when it was shown to you at this court.
A. That is right. In enswer to the ])revious question, I was re-
ferring to testimony which I gave and in which I said my remem-
brance of it w^as hazy ; that the President was putting, or might put,
before Japan some sort of a proposition looking to letting her have
certain raw materials if, in turn, she would do certain things. The
note, I do not recall having seen.
13. Q. Or the contents^ thereof ?
A. Or its contents.
Cross-examined bv the interested ])artv. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy :
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 249
14. Q. Admiral Stark, concerning the shreds of information which
may have been bronght to yonr attention and which you do not recall
now: Do you recall at any time during the period w^hich followed
27 NovemlDer having any thought that in consequence of that infor-
mation you should amend your dispatch of 27 November?
A. I do not.
The interested parties, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.) and Admiral Chiude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I can think of nothing
further to give the court. I do have a statement which I would
like to make and then I should like to verify my testimony before
the court. There are one or two more or less unimportant changes
but in the interest of clarification I should like to put them before
the court. They are short and will only take a few- minutes.
The court granted permission to make the statement.
The witness made the following statement : In reading over my
testimony I noted a considerable space devoted to questions on mes-
sages which, because of their secrecy, have been made exhibits before
this court. I feel that I ought to make a further statement to the
court on this matter. The line of questioning on certain messages
which [3£S] I did not recall and still have no recollection of
having seen furnishes certain indications to an elert enemy which
might be of vital interest to him were he to obtain such information.
Should tJie secret chissification of the proceedings of this court be
removed, or should a copy of those proceedings or information gained
therefrom come into the possession of persons unfriendly to this coun-
try while the present war with Japan is still in progress, these certain
questions which were asked me might suggest enough to the enemy to
be definitely injurious to our present and continuing war effort. From
past experience I find myself in complete agreement with the opinion
that Admiral Kimmel has already expressed on the record before this
court that it is obvious that in due time proceedings of this court and
all of the evidence it might have secured Avill be a matter of open
record available to the public. I therefore feel it my duty as a re-
sponsible naval officer and as a former Chief of Naval Operations with
knowledge of many of the intelligence activities of my subordinates to
suggest for the court's consideration that that part of the record which
would in any way identify material now held so secret that it has been
denied this court be taken out of the record and placed in a top secret
status which will absolutely preclude any leak and reference thereto.
The judge advocate stated as follows: The judge advocate is in
concurrence with the statement of the interested party. Admiral Stark,
and he feels that if counsel for the other interested ]:)arties are willing
to stipulate that these matters be deleted from the record and filed
250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in a secure place with due reference to them so that they may be seen
by proper authorities on demand, that the record might be, with the
consent of the court, so written up.
The court announced that the questions were not objected to and
would not be taken out of the record.
The witness stated that he had read over the testimony given by
him on the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth days
of the trial and that he desired to make the following corrections in
his testimony :
In the fourth line I desire to change "dispatch" to "information".
I would like to amend the last two sentences to read, "Now that, in
itself, did not exclude an attack on the Hawaiian Islands; the dispatch
referred to didn't include them specifically because they were not men-
tioned in the information we had of Japanese naval and military move-
ments. Feeling, however, that we should be on guard against the
jDossibility of an attack coming from any direction, I wrote the words
'in any direction' into that dispatch myself. I remember it very
distinctly."
[324] On the same page, Question 138, change "on mentioning"
to "or mention" ; and change the word "Atlantic" to "Asiatic".
On the next page. Question 142, the answer to the question, change
"he was ready" to '^he needed".
On Page 76, Question 252, insert after the word "any" in the first
line, the words "other than official dispatches". Change the second
sentence to read, "I have no further personal letters on file".
On the same page. Page 76, Question 253, insert period after the
words "Pearl Harbor" and change the second sentence to read, ' 'I may
add that I told Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, that if
Japan attacked the United States, we would break them before we got
through, regardless of how long it took".
On Page 85, Question 279, in next to the last line, change the word
"most" to "mostly".
On Page 106, Question 403, in the fifth line from the bottom, change
the words "was ready" to "needed".
On Page 114, Question 444, strike out "yes" and substitute "as I
recall".
On Page 143, Question 660, in the third line, change the words "war
warning" in the third line, to "aggressive movement".
On Page 158, Question 626, delete the second sentence.
On Page 168, Question 706, change the answer to read, "I was in-
formed that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to present
a note to the State Department at exactly 1300".
None of the parties objected to the corrections as made.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court infoi-med the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.
[S^S] The court then, at 11 : 30 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 35
a. m., at which time it reconvened.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 251
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested
parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
whose counsel was present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness
under examination when the adjournment was taken on Tuesday,
August 15, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) :
135. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the dispatch of November
28, 1941. Will you examine this dispatch and state briefly what it is
and whether or not you received it ?
A. Yes, I received that dispatch.
136. Q. Will you state briefly the subject matter of it?
A. This informs the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific of certain
instructions sent by the Army to the Commander, Western Defense
Command, and it adds certain admonitions on the part of the Navy
Department.
137. Q. Did this dispatch convey to you any information which
differed materially from the dispatch of 27 November 1941 from the
Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. Not materially, no. It stressed that no hostile action should be
taken against Japan, that Japan should be permitted to commit the
first overt act and not to alarm the civil population. It also directed a
report of measures taken, and I knew such a report had been sub-
mitted.
138. Q. Did these so-called admonitions, as I believe you expressed
them, influence your estimate of the situation on the imminence of war
between the United States and Japan ?
A. As I have stated before, every bit of information I received,
which I considered in any way reliable, affected my estimate.
139. Q. Specifically, did this information change any estimate that
you had made on the innninence of war between the United States and
Japan ?
A. No, I can't say it materially affected my estimate.
[326] 140. Q" After November 27, 1941, did you know the con-
dition of alert that had been set by the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department, so far as his command was concerned?
A. I knew on the 27th of November that the Army had gone on an
alert. It was re]3orted to me by members of my staff that an alert status
had been taken by the Army.
141. Q. Do you know what this alert was?
A. I did not at that time.
142. Q. Well, do you know the condition of readiness which had
been j^rescribed for vessels of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor between
November 27 and December 7, 1941, and if you do, state what it was?
A. I have previously testified that the vessels in Pearl Harbor were
in condition three, as specified in 2CLf-41. I have also testified that,
in addition to this condition, all the battleships manned about one-
fourth of their anti-aircraft battery continuously.
143. Q. Did the condition of readiness, as prescribed, meet with your
approval ?
A. Yes.
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
144. Q. I show you Exhibit 2U, which is the dispatch of the Chief of
Naval Operations of December 3, 1041. I ask you to examine it and
state whether or not you received it.
A. Yes, I received that.
145. Q. Will you state, in general, what the subject matter of this
dispatch is?
A. The subject matter of this dispatch is that instructions were sent
to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hono- Kong, Singapore,
Batavia, and Manila to destroy their important and secret documents.
146. Q. How did the information contained in this dispatch influ-
ence any estimate of the situation you had prior to its receipt as to the
imminence of war between the United States and Japan?
A. This was another indication that some move was contemplated
by Japan. It did not change my estimate made as a result of the re-
ceipt of the dispatch on the 27th of November. I felt that this was a
step which Japan might well take, no matter in which direction she
was going, to prevent the seizure of these documents upon the breaking
of diplomatic relations.
147. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations under date of December 4, 1941, and ask you to
read this dispatch and state the substance of it to the court.
A. This is a dispatch to the naval station at Guam, [3i27] di-
lecting them to destroy their secret and confidential publications, ex-
cept those that were essential for current purposes, and this meant to
me that at probably the most exposed outpost we were anticipating
anything that might happen as a general precautionary measure.
148. Q. I show you Exhibit 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations dated December 6, 1941. I ask you to read it and
state the substance.
A. This is a dispatch sent by OpNav to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet. This is a deferred dispatch, incidentally. It says that,
in view of the international situation and the exposed position of the
outlying Pacific islands, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
was authorized to have them destroy their secret and confidential docu-
ments, now or under later conditions, of greater emergency. Also to
retain the means of communication of current operations and special
intelligence. I have been informed that the view of the Registered
Publication Section of the Navy Department was that we had sent too
many secret codes to these outlying islands, and they were concerned
about their destruction, because they felt that they had many more
codes on the outlying islands than there was any real need for, and I
am inclined to think that the Registered Publication Section was
correct.
149. Q. Can you recall whether you received this dispatch. Exhibit
22, prior to the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941 ?
A. I cannot state positively. I presume I did receive it prior to the
attack.
150. Q. Can you recall. Admiral, whether or not you communicated
the substance of these dispatches, Exhibits 21 and 22, relative to the
destruction of codes, to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment prior to the Japanese attack on December 7?
A. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of all dis-
patches in which I though he would have the slightest interest. I did
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 253
not myself direct tliat tliese dispatches be delivered to him. If he
states that he did not see them, I presume he is correct.
151. Q. Between November 27 and December 7, 11)41, were yon re-
ceivinff any information of a diplomatic or military nature from your
own intellio^ence unit in the Hawaiian area concerning matters v.-hich
might have a bearing on the imminence of war?
A. Yes. I have testified that I ?-eceived these dispatches, and once
each day the Fleet Intelligence Oliicei" presented a summary of in-
formation received during the past twenty-four hours and his estimate
of how this affected decisions made at this conference. When the
Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division did not actu-
ally attend, this information \--'^^] ^^"^s always made available
to them, and it was added to whatever we had formerly received, to
complete the picture and make such changes as we considered necessary.
152. Q. Can you recall whether or not this information which you
received from your own intelligence unit added to or modified in any
material manner the information you had received from the Navy
Department between November 27 and December 7, 1941 ?
A. My recollection is that the tenor of the newspaper articles, radio
and other news items indicated that conversations were going on in
Washington between the -Tapanese and the United States. I should
say the priucii)al thing that we got from my own intelligence imit
had to do with the movements of Japanese ships, and there was nothing
in these reports which indicated an expedition aimed at Honolulu
ov Pearl Harbor. We watched this very closely and went over the
probabilities from time to time — I mean, daily, not from time to time —
and that was my conclusion.
] 53. Q. I show you Exhibit 48. which is in evidence before this court.
It is a dispatch from General Marshall to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Depai'tment, among others, and ask you to state to the court,
in general, the subject matter of this dispatch.
A. This was a dispatch sent on the 7th of December, and it states
that Japan is presenting what amounts to an ultimatum at one o'clock,
that they are imder orders to destroy their code machines immediately,
and just what significance the hour set may have, they do not know.
154. Q. Can you state when vou received this dispatch if you ever
did?
A. It was brought to me some time in the afternoon of December 7.
It was presented to me by a courier — a captain, I think, in the Army.
I told him it wasn't of the slightest interest to me at that time, and
I threw the thing in the waste basket.
155. Q. Adverting to the information contained in Exhibit 48 and
recalling the informiiti(m that you had up to the time of the Japanase
attack, v.hat additional information do you feel that this dispatch,
Exhibit 48, would have given you which you did not have at the time?
A. In view of the fact that Japan w^as presenting an ultimatum to
the United States at exactly one o'clock Washington time, which is
approximately sunrise or early daylight in Honolulu, and midnight
in Manila, I feel that had I had this information., we would have im-
mediately assumed the [329] highest conditions of readiness,
at least, until this time appointed was well in the past. That was
most definite information. I must at this time say that it is easy to
fall into an error of saying what I would have done after the fact, and
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
when you ask me and when the members of the Roberts Commission
asked me what I woukl have done, I must add I cannot answer that.
I can only answer what I now think I woukl have done, which might
be different from what I would have done.
156. Q. I refer again to Exhibit 19, which is the dispatch from the
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet as one of the information addressees, and which is the dispatch
in which the Chief of Naval Operations states that there is an injunc-
tion contained in it to the effect that the United States desires that
Japan commit the first overt act. Could this injunction have any
influence on your decision to have conducted long-range reconnais-
sance ?
A. No, I don't think that had any particular influence on my de-
cision as to the conduct of long-range reconnaissance. It was my firm
conviction that any long-range reconnaissance we conducted over an
extended period of time would destroy the means that I had, due to the
destruction of planes and putting them out of commission. It has
been estimated by competent aviators that, in view of the practical
absence of spare parts for the patrol planes in Hawaii at that time
and the limited repair facilities, thirty days' operation of these planes
would have reduced them by not less than twenty-five per cent. That
is. twenty-five per cent of them would have been out of commission.
157. Q. If you are sending out long-distance reconnaissance planes
under circumstances in which you might expect to encounter a hos-
tile force, would you arm those patrol planes?
A. Oh, under my orders to permit Japan to commit the first overt
act, technically, I could not fire a shot at a Japanese Fleet until after
they had first shot at us, and also, technically, had I sent out patrol
planes armed, I would have had to wait until the enemy fired at these
patrol planes or committed some other overt act before I could do
anything more than protest. It has been testified, I believe, that a
Japanese carrier force approaching within 1,000 miles of Oahu would
have been properly considered as an overt act. I had no such in-
formation prior to December 7, 1941.
158. Q. But, Admiral, if your planes were out there on reconnais-
sance and were attacked, would it not be your desire that they be in a
jjosition to defend themselves?
A. Oh, if I had sent them out, and when I did send them out, they
were armed.
[SSO] 159. Q. Would the arming of these planes on the recon-
naissance flights before an act of war had been committed been any
source of alarm to the civil populace?
A. No, because we had been arming them constantly.
Counsel for the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that the judge advocate should clarify
what he meant by armed planes.
The judge advocate replied that the interested party would have
a right to clarify any questions he desired on cross-examination.
160. Q. What percentage of the officers and men were permitted
to be away from their ships in a liberty or leave status on the night of
the 6th and 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. Those ships which were in Pearl Harbor
161. Q. I had reference to those in Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 255
A. We granted the regular liberty, and the Fleet orders in effect
at that time required one-fourth of the officers and one-half the men
to be aboard at all times. My orders provided that each quarter of
the crew should be trained and capable of manning the anti-aircraft
guns on cruisers and battleships, so that there was a complete and
trained crew for all anti-aircraft guns and air control on board at
all times. On the destroyers, this was provided for on the basis of
a watch in three. At the time of the attack there was some ninety
per cent, by count, of the enlisted men actually on board on all ships
and around seventy per cent of the officers.
162. Q. Had you heard any rumors, or do you know of any state-
ments in the public press as to the number of officers and men who
were unfit for duty on the morning of December 7, 1941, because of
previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor?
A. I caused an investigation to be made of this matter, in order
to present the data to the Roberts Commission. The number of men
under the influence of alcohol on the night of December 6 was incon-
sequential. There were no officers in this condition, and there was
no evidence of the after effects of liquor on any individual man at
the time of the attack — nothing that affected his performance of duty.
As a result of the investigation I ordered, these facts were determined.
163. Q. What was your estimate prior to the Japanese attack on
December T, 1941, of the capacity of the Army to defend the Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor with regard to an air attack by torpedo planes?
A. I didn't think that the torpedo plane attack would be made,
because I didn't believe that aerial torpedoes would [331] run
in Pearl Harbor. We did not give this a great deal of consideration,
for that reason. However, we had this problem in the Fleet at sea,
and the best defense against them is, I believe, the fighter planes to
knock them down before they can get in to a point where they drop
the torpedoes. The anti-aircraft guns at that time were not anywhere
near as numerous as they should have been, and they weren't nearly
as efficient then as they are now, either on shore or afloat. The best
defense that the Army had against aerial torpedo attack in Pearl
Harbor were their pursuit planes, and I don't think they were suffi-
cient. They didn't have a sufficient number of planes nor crews for
them, according to my information, and the crews were not well
trained.
164. Q. As against the number of pursuit ships the Army had avail-
able, what was your estimate of the additional number that would
have been required to have prevented a successful torpedo plane
attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, in Pearl Harbor?
A. About three times that number.
165. Q. Did you know the condition of alert that had been set
by the Army for its aircraft and aircraft defense during the period
from November 27 to December 7, 1941 ?
A. No, I didn't know in detail.
166. Q. Am I to understand from that statement that no Army
authorities notified you of that fact ?
A. I knew the Army was on an alert, which corresponded, in gen-
eral, to the alert status assumed by the Navy. I did not inquire into
the particular details, as I did not consider that important under
256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the conditions of readiness which we were maintaining in November
and the general situation.
107. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on the morning of
December 7, 1941, know what condition of alert w^as being maintained
in the Army's aircraft warning system ?
A. My answer is covered in the previous question. I had been
informed that the aircraft warning system w^as being manned but did
not inquire into the details of the watch standing. I have testified
that I knew this was a new system and needed training.
168. Q. Were any of the ships which were present in Pearl Harbor
at the time of the Japanese attack on the morning of December 7,
1941, equipped with radar?
A. Yes.
169. Q. Do you know whether or not these instruments were being
manned prior to the attack ?
A. We did not require the ships in Pearl Harbor to man their
radar, because due to the surrounding hills in that port, the radar of
those ships so located was virtually useless.
[M2] 170. Q. Were any battle lookouts stationed on the ships
of the Fleet in the condition of readiness you have described that they
were maintaining on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?
A. To the best of my knowledge, they had battle lookouts, yes.
The crews of the guns themselves were on watch.
171. Q. Did you have any complaints prior to December 7, 1941,
as to the communication system which existed between your own
command and that of the Army in the Hawaiian area?
A. No, I had no complaints. I knew that the commercial telephone
system in Honolulu was entirely inadequate, but I believe the com-
munication between responsible Army and Navy commanders was
fairly good and that steps were being prosecuted vigorously to make
this communication.
172. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, just prior to the
attack by the Japanese, do you have any recollection as to whether
or not there were any deficiencies in the communications between the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and your own
Flag Office?
A. I have no knowledge of any difficulties at that time.
173. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an attack
being made on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941?
A. The first information that I had which conveyed to me that an
attack was being made on the United States at Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, was a telephone message from my staif duty officer,
telling me that a raid was in progress. I ran out of my quarters,
which were on the hill immediately behind the submarine base, and
saw the first torpedo plane attack which was launched on the battle-
ships. I stood there for perhaps five minutes estimating the situation
and got into my car. which had appeared, and drove down to the
headquarters. I was in my headquarters by five minutes after eight —
probably before and proceeded to take such steps as appeared to be
practicable. Prior to this time, between 7 : 30 and 7 : 40, 1 had a report
from my staff duty officer that a destroyer reported that they had
attacked a submarine off Pearl Harbor. In the ten days between
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ' 257
November 27 and December 7, and after I had issued orders for ships
to bomb all submarine contacts, I had at least a half dozen reports
of such bombing, and when I received this information that the
destroyer had attacked the submarine, I presumed it was another
bombing of a submarine contact of some kind, and while I was waiting
for an amplification of this report the bombing attack started. You
will note that in my order 2CL— il we specifically provide that when
a ship is attacked by a submarine and, by implication, when they
definitely knew a Japanese submarine was in the area, [3S3]
they were to broadcast that information in plain language in order
to alarm all the proper people and put them in a state of readiness.
This provision was not carried out by the commanding officer making
the attack, and I think that changed considerably the course of events
that followed.
174. Q. At about what time did you get this report of the attack
by a destroyer on a submarine in the Pearl Harbor area ?
A. Between 7 : 30 and 7 : 40 a. m.
The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[834] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as wit-
ness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding,
and continued his testimony.
Examination by the judge advocate (Continued) :
175. Q. Did you yourself, as Commander-in-Chief, ever make an
official report of the personnel casualties and damage sustained by ships
of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor after the Japanese attack on
December 7, 1941?
A. I did. About the 12th of December I submitted reports as to per-
sonnel and materiel casualties. These reports were necessarily incom-
plete, and I believe that better data was eventually submitted by my
successor.
176. Q. Do you have any recollection of receiving a radar report
from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department which
showed a radar track of Japanese planes after the attack?
A. I never saw any written document on the subject, that I now
recall, but about three days after the attack my Fleet Gunnery Officer,
My Fleet Marine Officer, was shown such a track by General Davidson,
who was in command of the Interceptor Command. They reported this
to me upon their return to Headquarters. That was the first news I
had of any radar information.
177. Q. Do you laiow what this radar information disclosed?
A. It was reported to me at the time that the planes were picked up
at a little after 7 : 00 o'clock, I think. The planes were picked up
about 132 miles, bearing north of Oahu.
178. Q. The question I meant to ask you. Admiral, was with ref-
erence to planes that were returning after the attack had been com-
pleted. Did you have any radar information as to the track these re-
treating planes were pursuing?
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 18
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, neither before nor after the attack did I have any such in-
formation until very recently, since this court has been in session, as
testified to by General Short. That is all I know about it. I would
like to make it clear to the court that I had absolutely no reports from
the Army as to the location of enemy planes or enemy carriers, which
were of any use to me. Any information that I got came so late
that it was of no use.
[3ii5] Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold
E.Stark, U.S. Navy:
179. Q. Admiral, with respect to the war warning message, dispatch
of 27 November, you testified that the warning was weakened by. sub-
sequent press and radio reports that conversations with Japanese rep-
resentatives were continuing after the message from Chief of Naval
Operations stated that negotiations has ceased ; is that correct ?
A. I stated it, yes.
180. Q. Did you receive, subsequent to November 27, any dispatch
from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department
which cancelled or modified in any way the war message ?
A. No.
181. Q. Then I gather the conflict between the ofScial dispatches
from the Chief of Naval Operations in the period between 24 Novem-
ber and 7 December and the press and radio reports which you got
during that same period left you uncertain as to the exact meaning
of the dispatches, or, as you put it, that weakened their effect ; is that
correct ?
A. That is true, and that same cycle I had gone through with on
previous occasions.
182. Q. Well, in view of this conflict and confusion in your own
mind as to the meaning of this dispatch, did you ask for any clarifica-
tion during this ten-day period ?
A. I did not testify that I had any confusion in my own mind as to
the meaning of the dispatch.
183. Q. Well, I understood that you testified that there was a con-
flict between the information you received from the Chief of Naval
Operations and information you received from other sources, such
as press and radio, which caused you to have some doubt as to the
efficacy of the first dispatch.
A. I did not seek any clarification from the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations.
184. Q. You stated yesterday that — this was in answer to a question
concerning the relations between you and the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District — you stated that if there was any doubt at any time in
the mind of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District or his staff
about the instructions that you had given him with respect to your
orders for the defense of the naval base, that you were available to him
for discussion of those orders and clarification at any time.
A. That is correct.
185. Q. Did you have that same feeling about approaching the
Chief of Naval Operation about clarification of his dispatches?
A. Yes.
186. Q. Then am I to gather from this discussion that you [336]
were relying to some extent at least on the press and radio reports
of what was going on in Washington for the m-itical military decisions
that you were making at Pearl Harbor ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 259
A. I used all means of information at my command, and evaluated
the information which I received, and considered the source.
187. Q. Now you have testified in effect that the dispatches from
the Chief of Naval Operations, in view of these conflicting press and
radio reports, didn't cause you to think that war was particularly
imminent or that an attack by Japan on United States territory was
particularly imminent — in spite of the fact, however, that you had
not received approval from the Chief of Naval Operations of your
request to bomb submarine contacts, you decided on November 27,
after receiving the war warning dispatch, to bomb submarine con-
tacts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor; is that correct?
A. In answer to your question, yes. I decided to bomb submarine
contacts as previously I have stated.
188. Q. Was that decision made after the receipt of the war warn-
ing message on that day ?
A. Yes.
189. Q. Then I undei'stand that the situation regarding the pos-
sibility of submarine attack on Pearl Harbor, and the measures which
you decided to take to meet it, were considered by you to be different
after you received the war warning dispatch than existed before?
A. I would say that the war warning dispatch gave me an excuse
to do something that I had wanted to do for several months.
190. Q. Did you consider the situation to be any more serious after
receiving the war warning dispatch than before, with respect to sub-
marine attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I considered that if an attack were made by Japan on the Philip-
pines, it would probably be accompanied by an attack by submarines
in the Pearl Harbor area.
191. Q. With respect to the reasons and your consideration of
the reasons why the Navy Department withheld the permission that
you had sought to bomb submarine contacts, or suspect contact sub-
marines, did you give any thought to the possible situation in the
western Pacific where our own submarines were operating in waters
adjacent to those waters used by the Japanese Navy?
A. Yes, and I was convinced that if one of our submarines operated
in the vicinity of a Japanese operating area, it would be bombed with-
out question, no matter what my action was in Hawaii.
[337] 192. I believe you stated the war warning message was
followed within twenty-three hours after the message of 27 Novem-
ber, on the 28th, asking your advice concerning the Army proposal
to send planes to Midway; it came within twenty-three hours, as
I recall.
A. The evidence and the message themselves indicate that.
193. Q. There was also another message, 2740, at the same time,
concerning an Army proposal to reenforce certain defense battalions,
wasn't there?
A. Yes.
194. Q. Now did the proximity in point of time of these two dis-
patches to which I have referred cause doubt as to the real meaning
of the war message? Perhaps I should clarify by saying. I mean
by that, did the proximity of these two messages in point of time
to the war warning message — that is, within twenty-three hours of the
war warning message — cause any doubt in your mind as to the reii]
meaning of the war messnije?
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Well, I think they lessened the force of the war warning mes-
sage to the extent that the Chief of Naval Operations was appar-
ently willing to temporarily upset, to a considerable degree, the de-
fenses of Pearl Harbor as well as of the outlying bases.
195. Q. Didn't it occur to you that these might be steps in further-
ance of the war warning message ; that is, providing for reeforcement
of positions which were not considered in an appropriate state of
readiness ?
A. There was that consideration, of course, but the difficulties of
reenforcing the outlying stations were undoubtedly well-known to
the Chief of Naval Operations, and the War Department message,
which I have mentioned, but which has not been put in evidence
before this court, proposed a replacement of marine defense battalions
on Midway and Wake in toto by Army troops. I have my letter of
2 December, written to the Chief of Naval Operations, reviewing
this matter completely; and in that letter, War Department message
number 48, of 29 November — that was to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department — was likewise a proposal from the War De-
partment that indicated a conflict betwixt the ideas of the War Depart-
ment and the Navy Department at that time, which I attempted to
iron out in my letter of 2 December 1941, and also in my dispatch
of 28 November 1941, a part of which I quoted to the court here
the other day.
196. Q. Did you ask the Chief of Naval Operations to clarify these
apparent inconsistencies between these dispatches and the war mes-
sage, by this dispatch of 28 November ?
A. No. I reported the action I was taking.
197. Q. Admiral, you testified yesterday, I believe, that [SSS]
you considered an air bombing attack on Pearl Harbor to be a remote
possibilty; is that correct?
A. At that time, yes.
198. Q. Did you consider it at that time to be a remote possibility?
A. Yes.
199. Q. Now, referring to Exhibit 30, which was the letter of 18
February from you to Admiral Stark, will you read to the court, please,
the second paragraph on page three.
A. (Reading:)
I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor
is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage
inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine
forces, DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when
they arrive.
200. Q. Between the date of your letter, 18 February 1941, and
December 7, 1941, did you change that estimate of the situation as you
recited it there ?
A. When I wrote the letter of 18 February 1941, I was trying to
urge that steps be taken to place Pearl Harbor in a proper defensive
posture, and that we have there all the forces necessary to meet the
contingencies which might arise. I continued that policy as long as
I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. I wanted the base to be self-
sustaining in the defensive way in every respect.
201. Q. Excuse me, Admiral, but I have an obligation not to burden
the record with more than the answers to the questions, and I just want
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 261
to loiow whether that letter of February 18 represented your estimate
of the situation at that time, and whether you changed that estimate
between then and December 7.
A. I maintained the same estimate of the situation in regard to the
possibility of an air and submarine attack on Pearl Harbor and the
Pearl Harbor area as long as I was Commander-in-Chief. The prob-
ability of the attack I think I have completely covered here for the
period of 27 November to 7 December, in the previous testimony.
202. Q. I show you Annex 7 to Exhibit 23, to which is attached an
addendum one to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No.
A-1-41, dated March 31, lOttl, and showing the signature of Rear
Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base De-
fense Air Force, and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Com-
manding Hawaiian Air Force. As I understand it, Admiral, that
represents an estimate of the [339] situation made by the air
officer attached to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, in conjunction with the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force.
A. That represents an estimate made by Admiral Bellinger in his
capacity' as Naval Base Defense Air Officer, and Commander, Naval
Base Defense Air Force. This estimate was approved by Admiral
Bloch and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. I
also ajjproved the estimate.
203. Q. Now will you refer to Paragraph 3, b., I believe it is, and
read that paragraph?
A. (Reading:)
II appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely
be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of
three hundred miles.
204. Q. Now, having in mind that you had said a surprise attack
by air is a remote possibility, and having in mind also that a surprise
ordinarily occurs once, didn't you consider it important, upon receipt
of the war warning, to put all possible security measures into effect
to guard against an air attack, even though it was only a remote
possibility?
A. I took action to which I have testijQed, after mature considera-
tion and balancing all the factors. I did not make a decision lightly,
and I had had many difficult decisions to make before. My actions, I
think, speak for themselves.
205. Q. What were the other factors that you took into account,
other than the war warning, in making that decision ?
A. I took into account the necessity for continued training, and
the chances of attack against Pearl Harbor at that time — in fact the
chances of an attack against the United States at all at that time—
although I gave, I think, full consideration to the warning from the
Navy Department.
206. Q. You have testified that you had in your own command an
Intelligence Unit. Did you, during the last half of November, have,
from any of these units or organizations within your own command,
any estimate that a force of Japanese carriers had recently gone
to the Marshall Islands ?
A. We had some information that, I think, there was one or two
carriers which had gone to the Marshall Islands, and no more.
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
207. Q. Had you heard of Japanese carriers being previously re-
ported so far from home waters ?
A. What do you mean ? When?
[340] 208. Q. Well, during say the previous year.
A. To the best of my recollection, the Jap carriers had been in
the Marshalls during the previous year.
209. Q. Would you consider that the information you got from
your intelligence unit was significant in connection with the war
warning message that had been received about this time?
A. I weighed the information and gave it the weight that I
thought it was entitled to. I did not consider it especially significant,
no; all those things had a significance.
210. Q. I understood you testified this morning that about this
time you were receiving from your own intelligence unit mostly
military information concerning the movements of the Japanese
Fleet, and there was nothing received during this period from that
unit which gave any indication to you of an expeditionary force
that might be directed to Pearl Harbor?
A. That's right.
211. Q, You didn't consider the information concerning the Japa-
nese carrier task force going into the Marshalls was that type of
information ?
A. That's right.
212. Q. In your letter of July 26, 1941, to Admiral Stark, you
ask a series of questions concerning the United States attitude toward
Russian participation in the war, and you ask him a number of
questions. You were asking information as to what the United
States attitude would be in case certain contingencies, which you
outlined in the letter, might occur. As I understand from your
testimony, you don't feel that you ever got any satisfactory answers
to the questions that you put in that letter ?
A. I did not have any clear and definite answers to certain phases
of that.
213. Q. Well, you knew, of course, did you not, and Admiral
Stark had informed you on numerous occasions, that he, too, would
like to have answers to some of the questions that you were propos-
ing in these letters; and that he himself asked these questions in
other places and had been unable to secure an answer?
A. That is contained in his answers to my letters, and what is
not contained in his answers to my letters doesn't exist, because I
I didn't see him,
214. Q. Now in connection with the letter of January 24, from
the Secretary of the Navy to the War Department, rela [S^-l]
tive to the weaknesses in the Army defense of Pearl Harbor. You
testified, I believe, that you felt that you kept the Navy Department
informed concerning the lack of progress in making up these defici-
encies; is that correct?
A. In general, yes.
215. Q. Would you tell the court in what way you kept the Navy
Department informed of the failure of the Army to make good the
deficiencies which existed in the defenses at Pearl Harbor?
A. If you will read my letters to the Chief of Naval Operations,
that is where I kept him informed, and I think that is in the letters.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 263
If you will give me a little time I can bring it out specifically, where
it was.
216. Q. Did you do it by personal letters?
A. All kinds of letters, personal and official, and dispatches.
217. Q. You stated yesterday specifically, with respect to the fail-
ure of the Army to make good the deficiencies that existed in the
defense there — not your deficiency of materiel and men that you had,
but it is the Army deficiencies that I am speaking of — you informed
the Chief of Naval Operations or the Navy Department of the Army's
failure to make up their deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. If you mean that I informed him specifically about the failure
of the Army to make up their deficiencies, I did not inform him
specifically of that. I did inform him in general of such things.
I felt that that was a responsibility of the War Department. I had
seen the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secreary
of War. I saw the Secretary of War's answer to the Secretary of
the Navy, in which he placed the remedying of this unsatisfactory
situation at Pearl Harbor in the highest priority; and the Navy
Department's attention had been very forcibly called to this — and
I didn't think that the detailed report was called upon by me. Now
the Commandant of the District, in addition to the Commander-in-
Chief, did seufl in certain information to the Navy Department, and
I felt then and now feel that the Navy Department was reasonably
well informed of the progress of the Army installations at Pearl
Harbor. I did not accept responsibility for everything that the
Armv failed to do.
218. Q. You stated yesterday that you worked closely with the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department and that you pressed
him to improve the defenses of Pearl Harbor ; is that correct 1
A. Yes, we discussed those affairs on many [34^] occasions,
and the Commanding General of Pearl Harbor was very anxious to
improve them, and he was doing all he could.
219. Q. During the last half of 1941, did you make any representa-
tion to the Chief of Naval Operations to take up with the War De-
partment the matter of the failure of the Army to provide what you
and General Short considered to be the adequate defenses of Pearl
Harbor ?
A. I had no doubt that the Chief of Naval Operations was ade-
quately informed.
220. Q. But you made no specific request on him to follow this
matter through ?
A. No, I did not.
[34s] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frann Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
221. Q. You stated this morning that the Army did not notify you
specifically of the state of readiness which they were observing alter
the war warning messages, and that you did not ascertain the state of
readiness which the Army was exercising at that time, I believe you
stated that the reason you didn't was because you understood that the
Army was on an alert status corresponding to the Navy's alert status,
and knowing what that was you didn't consider it important to follow
it further. You further testified that the Navy's condition of alert
was Condition 3. Is that right?
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes.
222. Q. Are we to understand by that that in view of the fact that
you received from the Navy Department an official war warning on
November 27, tliat you did not consider it important to deterinino
from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether
or not he was in the best state of readiness he could possibly be for
the protection of F'earl Harbor in any eventuality which might be faced
in the event war should develop ?
A. The Commanding General in the Hawaiian Department was
faced with a considerable number of difficulties which were parallel
to those that I had and that the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict had. He had untrained troops and he had to continue his train-
ing, and I think that he did make his decision to do what he considered
was the proper thing after full consideration of all the factors.
223. Q. Did you make any inquiries of the Commanding General
to make sure in your own mind that he was doing the utmost with
everything he had to provide for any eventuality should war develop;
that is my question.
A. I felt sure that he was doing that.
224. Q. But you didn't make any inquiries of the Commanding Gen-
eral at that time?
A. In the specific terms that you have stated, perhaps not.
225. Q, Now, you stated this morning with respect to the dispatch
of 7 December which was received after the attack, that had you had
it prior to the attack it would have had a great influence on your ac-
tions and on j^our estimate of the situation. Now, I take that to mean
that the destruction of the code machines which was called to [<?-j4]
your attention, or would have been called to your attention in that
dispatch had you received it before the attack, had considerable sig-
nificance to you, did it?
A. No, that wasn't the thing that was most significant to me. There
were two other factors in there which were much more significant than
that. One was that an ultimatum was being delivered. The other
was that it was being delivered at a specific time and that the Japanese
Ambassador had instructions from his government to deliver it at a
specific time. The question of the destruction of the code machines
was just one more thing which I did not consider of any vital im-
portance.
226. Q. Did you consider the message that you got on December
3, saying that the Japanese had given urgent and categoric instruc-
tions to destroy the code machines, and even to burn secret and con-
fidential documents, as having any peculiar significance in view of the
fact that you had received the war warning?
A. I have testified as to my views on that subject.
227. Q. Would you mind stating whether or not you did, that is,
whether or not you considered that as having any particular import-
ance in view of the war warning that you had received ?
A. Those were all factors that had to be considered.
228. Q. That wasn't a factor of major importance?
A. No, I didn't so consider it.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : _
229. Q. In general terms, during your discussions with General
Short beginning on 27 November and covering several days there-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 265
after to and including 7 December, did you canvass with him the
whole situation and wliat both he and you were doing in view of the
warnings that you both received?
A. I would say yes.
230. A. After 27 November did 5'ou issue from time to time instruc-
tions, in the event of war with Japan, for the Fleet ?
A, I caused my War Plans officer to maintain a memorandum
which was in the hands of the duty officer at all times, and this memo-
randum was revised whenever necessary and contained the action
that I would take in the event that we had a war with Japan. I did
that as a general precautionary measure and that was kept on file. The
date of the last one was December 6, 1941. It [34^] was sub-
mitted to me by then Captain McMorris, and I approved it. That
was a summary of the orders that we issued, indicating what we were
going to do with each one of the task forces that we had out there in
the Pacific.
231. Q. That was a measure which was taken after and as a result
of the warning of 27 November, and in addition to those measures
which you enumerated yesterday ?
A. Yes.
232. Q. That you adopted as a result of it?
A. Yes.
233. Q. There has been talk about correspondence that you had
with Admiral Stark on 2 December relative to this situation in the
outlying islands. I ask you if you can identify the document I now
hand you ?
A. I do. I identify this as a personal letter which I wrote to the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, on 2 December 1941, and
which covers all of the current action I was taking.
The personal letter dated December 2, 1941, from Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. 8.
Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties,
and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose
of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be con-
sidered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
50" for reference, description appended.
234. Q. I show you another document and ask you if you can
identify it?
A. This is an official letter which I wrote to Admiral Stark on the
same day, December 2, 1941.
The official letter dated December 2, 1941, from Real Admiral Hus-
band E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and
to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose of
reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered
pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT
51" for reference, description appended.
The court then, at 2 : 45 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 55 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
[S46] Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the re-
porter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold
R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the witness
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Hus-
band E. Kimmel, (Ret) (Continued) :
235. Q. Since the letters are rather lengthy. Admiral, can you sum-
marize them briefly, for the benefit of the court ?
A. These two letters, one an official letter and one a personal letter,
written by me to Admiral Stark, are Exhibit Nos. 50 and 51. In
general, the two letters cover the same information. They discuss
the dispatches from the Navy Department in regard to the reenforce-
ment of marine crews on the islands, and the replacement of the
Marine aircraft by Army aircraft. They also invite attention to the
War Department's dispatch which apparently contemplated the re-
placement of all Marine units on the islands. We pointed out the
fact that the Army had no defense battalions organized ; that it would
take some time for them to organize a defense battalion ; and we also
pointed out the inadvisability of mixing Marines and Army on a
small island, and I informed the Chief of Naval Operations that in
my opinion we should let the Marines alone where they were and let
the Army go down to Canton and Christmas Island and develop them.
In case the Army took over the defense of the islands, they could not
furnish the anti-aircraft gims and they wanted us to turn the anti-
aircraft guns that the Marines had over to them. They could furnish
men and some surface guns. They wanted us to furnish them with
5-inch guns also. Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying
bases but has a serious shortage on (Jahu. It has insufficient suitable
guns for replacing Marine 7-inch and 5-inch guns without weakening
the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-millimeter guns from Hawaii,
the Marine 5-inch guns might be replaced, but the 155-millimeter guns
would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.
Army can spare no 50-calibre [^47] machine guns but can
supply rifles and 30-calibre machine guns. Army has a limited num-
ber of 37-millimeter guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but
some few might be made available by weakening defenses here, par-
ticularly as a considerable increase in the nun;iber of such guns is
expected in the near future. At present, there is a marked shortage of
ammunition for 37-millimeter guns. Incidentally, I received a dis-
patch just about this time in which they told me they were going to
send me either four or six 37-millimeter guns for the Marines, i in-
formed him that Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE and three
heavy cruisers, and so forth, were going to Wake. I think that any
further information that the court wants they could obtain by reading
this.
236. Q. Would not the sending of a carrier over 2,000 miles to the
westward, within 600 miles of a Japanese base as proposed in these
dispatches from both CNO and the War Department, have been a
rather dangerous operation if war was expected imminently ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 267
A. Yes. And when we sent the ENTERPKISE to the westward—
this aflPected my estimate — that is, to Wake, we covered our advance by
a couple of squadrons of patrol planes operating between Pearl, John-
ston, Midway and Wake.
237. Q. Although the dispatch of the 27th concerning the relief of
these outlying bases was sent some 22 hours prior to the war warning
dispatch of 27 November, did you ever receive any modification of
the suggestion about relieving tnese outlying bases?
A. I recommended certain action which was different from that
suggested by the War and Navy Departments, and the Navy Depart-
ment approved the action which I recommended, which was to send
Marine planes to Wake and Midway.
238. Q. Wliat I meant was, on the receipt of the war warning dis-
patch of 27 November, did you receive any cancellation or modification
of the suggestion about relieving the outlying bases specifically ?
A. No.
239. Q. As a matter of fact, did not this proposal about relieving
the outlying bases, coming so close to the war warning message of
27 November, modify the war warning as connoting no prospect of
an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. It tended to and did reduce, in my mind, the chances of an attack
on Pearl Harbor insofar as the Navy Department had any idea that
there was imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
[348] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude
C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
240. Q. Admiral, you have testified yesterday and again today that
when you received important dispatches and letters, important letters,
you would apprise your senior officers of the contents of them and
discuss them with them?
A. That is right. ^ _ ■
241. Q. And that was a customary and rather an invariable prac-
tice of yours, was it not ?
A. That is right.
242. Q. I take it that this practice obtained in connection with the
messages that we have here discussed of 16 October, 24 November,
27 November, and 3 December — that series of messages?
A. Yes.
243. Q. At these conferences I think you have indicated that there
would be present your War Plans officer ?
A. That is right.
244. Q. Your chief of staff?
A. Generally.
245. Q. Your operations officer?
A. Generally.
246. Q. At the time, there were under your command three vice
admirals ; am I correct in that?
A. Correct.
247. Q. And they would attend these conferences if they were im-
portant?
A. That is correct.
248. Q. From November 27 on, I take it that at least two of them
were there at all times ; or am I incorrect in that ?
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No; both Halsey and Wilson Brown were out. Halsey left on
the 28th and didn't come back until after the attack; and Brown left,
I thhik it was the 4th or 5th.
249. Q. The 5th of December?
A. The 4th or 5th of December, and didn't come back until after the
attack.
250. Q. Now, at these discussions you would have Rear Admiral
Bloch at such discussions?
A. Yes.
251. Q. Those are different discussions than the ones you mentioned
about discussing intelligence information that you had every day?
A. That is correct.
[SW] 252. Q. Those discussions you had were with your own
people at your own headquarters?
A. That is correct, but at the general conferences I made it a prac-
tice to have my intelligence officer come in and summarize to the con-
ference everything up to that moment.
253. Q. Now, in connection with that intelligence, your headquar-
ters, and indeed you personally, received through your people the in-
telligence information gleaned by the unit of Coml4; am I right?
A. That is correct.
254. Q. There was close liaison between your headquarters and
theirs on that subject?
A. That is correct.
255. Q. Mention was made of an estimate that some Jap carriers
were in the Marshalls?
A. Tliat is right, and I have given here what my recollection was.
256. Q. But that information, as you recall, came to you imme-
diately from the unit of Coml4?
A. It was presented to me by my intelligence officer. Lieutenant
Commander Layton, who worked in close contact with Commander
Rochefort, who was in charge of the Commandant, 14th Naval Dis-
trict unit. And in addition to Layton, there w^ere three or four other
officers who were really under Admiral Bloch, worked under Roche-
fort and were attached to the Commander-in-Chief's unit.
257. Q. Now, the information that this intelligence unit of Coml4
supplied, largely had to do with the estimates of the disposition of
the Japanese Fleet?
A. That is correct.
258. Q. That would not be political intelligence?
A. No; that is right. I think they called themselves the combat'
information unit.
259. Q. After these conferences that you would have with your
senior officers after you had received important dispatches, on the
basis of those discussions and the intelligence that you had previously
received, you would make your decision as to what steps should be
taken ?
A. That is correct, and the decisions were mine.
2G0. Q. The decisions were yours and you made them at the time?
A. That is correct.
2G1. Q. Now, at that time, and in making those decisions, you were
then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet
and your rank at that point of time was admiral?
A.' That is rijrht.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 269
[350] 2G2. Q. And from all of 1941 clown to and including De-
cember 7, the Pacific Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor ?
A. That is correct.
2()3. Q. During all of that period, except for your trip to Wash-
ington, I think 1 June, and perhaps a couple of sea voyages, you
were personally present at Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, sir .
2G4. Q. And I think you testified yesterday that your headquar-
ters were at the Submarine Base; your residence was on the military
reservation just behind it?
A. That is right. There were more than a couple of trips to sea,
but not many.
205. Q. In any event, you were there at all times from October 16
and through December 7 ?
A. Yes. Wait a minute. We had a maneuver to the islands, which
I think took place after October 16, when I went out, for about four
or five days.
2G(5. Q. Four or five days only?
A. Yes. That is my memory at the present time.
267. Q. Now, after the October 16 message, which is Exhibit 13,
you sent, as I recall it, twelve patrol planes from Oahu to Midway?
A. Twelve patrol planes, yes.
268. Q. And then these same planes were sent to Wake and they
replaced some planes at Midway; is that how it worked ?
A. My recollection now is that we sent a patrol squadron to Midway
and then when we sent Halsey out there we sent another patrol squad-
ron up from Pearl to Midway, and the patrol squadron which had
been at Midway we sent to Wake. And in reverse order, we brought
them back.
2()9. Q. Then there was mention of some Marine planes that were
sent from the Hawaiian area. You sent some Marine planes about
October 27 or 28th to Wake?
A. No. I sent the Marine planes on the ENTERPRISE to Wake,
leaving Pearl on the 28th of November.
270. Q. The 28th of November ?
A. Yes.
271. Q. Then you sent other planes on December 5 to Midway?
A. That is correct : on the LEXINGTON.
[351] 272. Q. You have previously mentioned. Admiral, that
in all Hawaii — and correct me if I am wrong — there were only 81 patrol
planes during the period November 27 to December 7 ?
A. That is according to my records and my best information.
273. Q. And not all of those were available for full operation?
A. That is correct.
274. Q. From November 15th to December 7th, Patrol Wing One
and Patrol Wing Two in the Hawaiian area were commanded by a
Rear Admiral liellinger; is that not so?
A. That is right.
275. Q. Rear Admiral Bellinger was an officer of the Fleet?
A. Yes.
276. Q. And he was also the Senior Fleet Air Detachment officer
at the air station during that period?
A. That is right.
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
277. Q. He was also, under your orders, the Commander of Task
Force Nine ; is that not so ?
A. Yes.
278. Q. And that had been set up by you in an order that became
effective on November 15th ?
A. Well, I don't recall now.
279. Q. You don't recall at this time?
A. I don't recall just exactly the date. The first paragraph of this
letter says "Reference (A) is cancelled and superseded by this letter
effective 15 November 1941" and I presume that this letter is a revi-
sion of a previous letter which had been in effect for some time previous
and I am quite sure that that is true.
280. Q. Now, the 81 patrol planes which you have testified about are
the identical patrol planes which are in this task force ; is that not so ?
A. That is right. May I revert a moment? You omitted to state
one of the duties of Admiral Bellinger. I hope you will remedy that
later.
281. Q. I show you now a paper and ask you if you recognize it ?
A. Yes, this is a letter effective November 15, 1941 which supersedes
and cancels a previous letter on this same subject. It is merely a
modification of the previous letter which had been in effect for some
time. It is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41.
[S5^] The Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL^1, dated
October 31, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested
parties, and by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S.
Navy (Ret.) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the
record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the
inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit
52" for reference, description appended.
282. Q. Admiral, the other day you read certain parts of this
exhibit 52, even though Jt wasn't evidence; you read some extracts
from it. Isn't that correct ?
A. Yes, in my answer to a question as to what task force the Pacific
Fleet was incorporated into, I copied certain parts of that into my
answer.
283. Q. In Exhibit 52, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Pacific Fleet, you prescribed certain missions and tasks for your various
task forces, including Task Force Nine, did you not?
A. Yes.
284. Q. And you indicated in that order and prescribed the compo-
sition of the task force ?
A. Right.
285. Q. Will you please read the paragraph under the caption "Task
Force Four, Commandant 14th Naval District"?
A. (Reading:)
That part of the 14th Naval District activities which involve the Island Bases.
Primary Mission : To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to
insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in
advanced operations.
Tasli Force Nine: Commander Patrol Wing Two. PatWingOne 3G VPB (A),
1 AV, 2AVL, lAVP, PatWingTwo 42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, lAVP. Primary
missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expan-
sion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 271
an efl5cient long range Air Scouting and Air Striliing force for independent oper-
ations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in
areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and Bases. Paragraph 5.
Commanders of Task Force 7 and 9 established by this order will perform the
duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operations of their
respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct
of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within
their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type train-
ing) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining mate-
rial conditions of readiness for war service.
[S53] 286/ Q. Now, at that time, specifically, from November
15 to December 7, I believe you testified, Admiral, there were not
enough patrol planes to do distance reconnaissance for even so much
as a day with all these planes ?
A. That is right, as a complete reconnaissance.
287. Q. And did that condition obtain during the period from No-
vember 15, in any event, to December 7?
A. Yes.
288. Q. In this order you required, did you not, that Task Force
Nine submit to you for your approval their schedules of employment ?
A. That is right.
289. Q. And those schedules came to you and you approved them ?
A. That is right.
290. Q. There were also during this same period some ship-borne
aircraft temporarily based at the Naval Air Station at Ford Island,
were there not ?
A. Yes.
291. Q. And in addition, there were some Marine planes tempo-
rarily based at Ewa field, were there not ?
A. That is correct.
292. Q. Now, these types of planes, I take it, are not capable of
doing distance reconnaissance ?
A. That is right.
293. Q. It is the fact, isn't it, that these planes have their own
commanding officers and their own missions and duties and training
schedules prescribed by those commanding officers; is that not so?
A. That is right.
294. Q. And their employment and training schedules were ap-
proved by you ?
A. Yes. They were approved by me, or some of my subordinates.
I didn't approve the training schedule for every plane squadron.
295. Q. Now, during this period. Admiral, you testified it was your
decision that you did not wish to interrupt training ?
A. That is correct.
296. Q. And you continued the training ?
A. That is correct.
[S54-] 297. Q. Admiral, isn't it a fact from what you have said
that these planes were not available for the exclusive use of the Naval
Base Defense officer, or Coml4 as you remarked yesterday, but could
only be considered as available for drill or in the case of an immediate
emergency or positive information of the imminence of an attack ; is
that not so ?
A. That is correct. The planes that I spoke of that I considered as
immediately, exclusively available for the Commandant of the 14th
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Naval District were what I thought to be a few of these utility planes
which I believe he had over there, which were of no use for patroling
or for distance reconnaissance. Now, he did hope to get some day
some observation planes to attack submarines. He did hope to get
some planes which could be permanently assigned to him, and we had
had promises that they were coming. Those had not arrived, and
when I spoke of tliose planes which were exclusively available to the
Commandant of the District, I was speaking, perhaps, of theoretical
planes. I tliought he did have a few of the utility planes. I think he
did have a few.
298. Q. Let me refresh your recollection. Even on the utility
planes, Admiral, is it not the fact that there was some discussion
initiated by him to try to get some utility planes to be used, but that
you were not able, under conditions as they then stood, to furnish them
to him. Does that refresh your recollection ?
A. That is quite possible. I know they had tried particularly to
get observation planes for use in antisubmarine work.
299. Q. Now, in your testimony yesterday, I think I heard the
remark that you made that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
had agreed to clo distance reconnaissance. I take it, what you had
in mind was JCD-^2; is that right?
A. That is correct.
300. Q. That would be the item, Admiral, in Exhibit 7 on Page 10
under Paragraph 18 (i), the words "Distance reconnaissance"?
A. Yes.
301. Q. That appears under the caption of "Navy, 18"?
A. Yes. And when the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
was charged with this duty by the Naval Frontier Coast Defense plan,
it was his duty to keep himself informed, and in my opinion when he
considered it necessary to request planes for the purpose of performing
the duties that he had responsibility for under this Naval Coastal
Frontier Defense plan.
[355] 302. Q. Now, Admiral, you say the responsibility that
he was charged with under this JCD-42 was distance reconnaissance ;
is that right?
A. That is right.
303. Q. There are several ways of doing distance reconnaissance,
are there not ?
A. Oh, I would say, yes, but every one of them involves the use
of long-rance planes. They have that in common.
304. Q. Well, let's see; radar is one of the means of doing a dis-
tance reconnaissance, am I right, to obtain intelligence and infor-
mation ?
A. I hadn't thought of radar being termed as an instrument to
perform distance reconnaissance, no. I don't consider that a proper
term.
305. Q. I take it that submarines may be used for distance recon-
naissance ?
A. That is correct.
300. Q. They may be sent out and placed on picket, or to take
tours ?
A. Yes.
307. Q. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District didn't have
any submarines, didlie?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 273
A, No, but when he assumed the responsibility, or wlien he was
given the responsibility, and the responsibility was placed upon him,
he had that obligation to do what he could, and one of the things
he could do was to apply and I did not consider it practicable at this
time to perform distance reconnaissance. I stated that.
[356] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ee-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
308. Q. Well, the long and short of it is that the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District did not have any submarines at this time?
A. No, he did not.
309. Q. Another method of making a distance reconnaissance is
with destroyers and cruisers ; is that so ?
A. Yes.
310. Q. The Commnndant of the lith Naval District did not have
any cruisers at the time, did he?
A. No, he had four destroyers and a few mine sweepers. He had
no means under his direct command which were adequate to perform
distance reconnaissance. Is that the answer you are driving at?
311. Q. Yes. Admiral, I want to be sure about this responsibility
with which Admiral Block is charged. I understood you to say that
under JCD-42 Admiral Bloch was charged with the responsibility
of distance reconnaissance.
A. I should say so, from the papers.
312. Q. I refer to paragraph 2, page 8 of Exhibit 7 of JCD-42.
Isn't it a fact that at no time, up to and including December 7, that
that instrument was ever in operation or execution ?
A. It is a fact — Wait a minute. These war plans did not become
effective — were not executed until after the attack. However, it was
well known that the reconnaissance had been made on occasions, and
I considered those measures provided in War Plans, which required
attention prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, to be, in fact, in
effect, and the oflicers charged with the execution were responsible.
By that token. I considered myself responsible for the pj'eparations
and the preliminary steps necessary in carrying out this WPL-46 in
toto in the Pacific Fleet.
313. Q. That is a different document from the one to which I was
referring.
A. Yes, but the document you quoted flows directly from WPL-46
and from the basic war plan gotten out by the Navy Department.
314. Q. The Rainbow Plans?
A. Yes.
315. Q. Admiral, it is also true that the Rainbow Plans were never
placed in execution, nor, indeed, was WPL-46 in execution prior to
December 7 ?
A. No, they were not placed in execution prior to December 7, 1941.
[3S7] 316. Q. Now, the term Naval Base D3fense Officer has
been used, and reference has been made to it. That is not standard
nomenclature?
A. That is not standard nomenclature, but the duties of the Naval
Base r)3fense Officer were prescribed by me. I coined that title. It
was coined on my staff, and he was assigned certain specific duties.
317. Q. The document you speak of wherein you defined his duties
is2CL^l?
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 19
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. As a matter of fact, the term Naval Base Defense Officer has
been used in the Navy and had been used for some time. I did not
coin the term ; it had been used for some time.
318. Q. As a series of words?
A. Yes.
319. Q. No precision of meaning to it?
A. The precision of meaning would vary with the conditions and
the orders given to the Naval Base Defense Officer and the respon-
sibilities assigned to him.
320. Q. So that insofar as the Naval Base Defense Officer is con-
cerned, we find all there is to know about it in Exhibit 8, being 2CL-41 ;
isn't that right?
A. I would say the major part of it appears there. There may have
been other specific orders. I wouldn't want to commit myself entirely
to this. However, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had
certain other responsibilities as the Commander of the Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier.
321. Q. Admiral, since you brought up the Commander of the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, under General Order 143 there was dis-
cussion in that agreement that they would have certain forces ; is that
not so ? The Coastal Frontiers would have certain forces ?
A. Yes.
322. Q. But by the directive of July 1, 1941, it was determined by
competent authority in the Navy Department that they should not
have forces and they would not be formed ; is that right ?
A. I don't recall. That may be true.
323. Q. I refer you to Exhibit 4, the directive of July 1, 1941. Just
read the first sentence of paragraph 4. It may refresh your recollec-
tion.
A. (Reading) "The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in para-
graphs 3122, 3232, and 3312 of WPl^-46 are hereby established."
[368'] 324. Q. Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4.
A. (Reading) "For the present. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,
as prescribed in General Order No. 143, will not be formed."
325. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-41, revised
October 14, 1941. I ask you if it is not a fact that the term Naval
Base Defense Officer does not appear in the following paragraphs
of that document: The first paragraph, being 3 (a), Continuous
Patrols; 3 (b) Intermittent Patrols; 3 (c) Sorties and Entry; 3 (d)
Operating Areas; 3 (e) Ships at Sea; 3 (f ) Ships in Port.
A. I presume what you say is true. I did not follow you. You
went too fast for me, but that can be verified by reading the docu-
ment.
326. Q. It is not there down to that point, paragraph 3 (f).
A. I presume that what you say is correct, sir.
327. Q. In the same document. Admiral, may I refer you to para-
graph 3 (h), and the caption of that reads: "Action to be taken if
submarine attacks in operating area." That is the caption of it?
A. That is right.
. 328. Q. I want to call your attention to the next page. I believe
the only place in that referring to the Naval Base Defenne Officer
A. This document refers to the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict, who, in fact, was the same individual.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 275
329. Q. Paragraph "J" mentions the Naval Base Defense Officer,
does it not?
A. Now, what are you talking about ?
330. Q. In the exhibit you are holding there is mentioned in para-
graph "J", page 6, the Naval Base Defense Officer; is that not so?
A. Yes.
331. Q. There the document recites that the only connection that
the Naval Base Defense Officer has at that point is that if Pearl Har-
bor is also attacked — when a submarine attacks an operting area —
such instructions as the Naval Base Defense Officer may issue as to
shore-based aircraft will have priority; isn't that what it provides?
A. Yes.
332. Q. Do you find in paragraphs "I" and "J" of the same docu-
ment that there is a distinction made between shore-based Fleet air-
craft on the one hand and patrol wings on the other ; is that not the
fact?
A. There seems to be some distinction there.
[S59] 333. Q. But it does describe two different forces, does it
not? One paragraph deals with the patrol wings and the other with
shore-based Fleet aircraft.
A. Yes, that is what it says.
334. Q. Now, if you will please turn to paragraph 3 (G) under the
heading "Defense Air Attack," which happens to be the only para-
graph that we have not dealt with in the whole order, the Naval Base
Defense Officer is mentioned there in sub-division 6 of "G" ; is that not
•right?
A. Yes.
335. Q. Can you show me in that document any place where it is
stated, as you testified yesterday, that the Naval Base Defense officer is
responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor ? Can you show me those
words in that document ?
A. I would have to search the document, and if you haven't been
able to find those words in the document, I presume they are not there,
but there are other items there which speak for themselves.
336. Q. That is a matter for the court to determine on the whole
evidence.
A. That is correct.
337. Q. At any place in that document is there used the expression
"distance reconnaissance" ?
A. In this document?
338. Q. That document, Exhibit 8 ? If it helps you, I have never
found it.
A. I will answer that question by saying I don't know. By reading
that document, it can be readily determined.
339. Q. I take it, Admiral, that in this document there is no place
where it is stated, as you testified yesterdfiy, that the Naval Base
Defense Officer is vested with authority to use all naval forces in the
event of an attack ? Do you make the same answer ?
A. No, this and my other statement were my own conclusions from
the text of this order.
340. Q. Admiral, in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor,
is it not the fact that the Army was responsible for the command and
employment o f pursuit planes, whether they were Army or Navy ?
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. In exactly the same way that the Navy was responsible for the
bombing planes under the command of the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District.
[SGO] 311. Q. The bombing planes
A. I mean patrol planes.
342. Q. Under the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?
A. That is right.
343. Q. The Army was also- responsible, I take it, from what you
said before, for the command and employment of antiaircraft weapons
which were mounted ashore, and the Army was also responsible for the
command and employment of the seacoast batteries in connection with
the defense of Pearl Harbor ?
A. That is right.
344. Q. And also for the command and employment of the air-
craft warning service in the defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. That is right.
345. Q. I take it, from what you said, the only duty the Navy had
in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor was in support of the
Army ?
A. That is right.
346. Q. In connection with that support, available guns on the ships
of the Navy would be used, and you have prescribed certain orders,
giving sectors and the firing positions of naval vessels and naval anti-
aircraft in the harbor?
A. Yes.
347. Q. In connection with the general defense of Pearl Harbor,
you came to know of conditions of defense there very intimately while
you were there ?
A. I had a good working knowledge of what was there for defense.
I took a great deal from the reports of my subordinates.
348. Q. One of the reports, I take it, would be such a document as
has been previously read about the condition of local defense at Pearl
Harbor, some instituted by Admiral Bloch while others went through
your office with endorsement ?
A. Yes, I had a large staff, and I was kept reasonably well informed
of what went on.
349. Q. I will recall to you. Admiral, Exhibit 46, which is Admiral
Bloch's letter of October 17, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations via
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
A. I remember that letter very well. I put an endorsement on it
and forwarded it approved to the Navy Department and urged them to
furnish the forces which the Commandant of the district requested
and which he stated he didn't have.
[361'] 350. Q. In the letter of the I7th, which has been read in
evidence, the Commandant explained about the four old destroyers,
the old SACRAMENTO, the fact that he hadn't any planes, and that
he was afraid that it would be, as in the case of the British, "Too little
and too late."
A. Yes. I think the Commandant kept the Navy Department fully
informed of the condition of defense forces at Pearl Harbor.
351. Q. And yourself, too?
A. Yes.
352. Q. In the endorsement on Exhibit 46 you stated : "There is a
possibility that the reluctance or the inability of the Department to
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 277
furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District with forces adequate
to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that in an emer-
f>ency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for
these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly
warrant refutation." Down to December 7 is it not a fact that the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District had only four old destroyers,
all of which were occupied on inshore patrol, four small mine sweepers,
which were constantly engaged in sweeping the channels, three Coast
Guard cutters which were in patrolling off Honolulu, in addition to
their regular Coast Guard duties, and, then, of course, he had the old
SACRAMENTO. That is the status of the forces in the 14th Naval
District at the time we are talking about; isn't that so?
A. He also had some sanpans, which the Department had promised
him in the future.
Cross-examined by tbe interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) :
353. Q. In your last cross-examination were all the duties of Ad-
miral Bellinger included in the questions propounded to you?
A. I think one duty was omitted. He was the Commander of the
Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing 2).
354. Q. Now, referring to WPL-46, which is Exhibit 4, are there
any other paragraphs in that to which you wish to call the court's
attention in connection with the establishment of the Hawaiian Naval
Base Frontier?
A. In paragraph 1 of the letter of July 1, 1941, 1 read : "The Naval
Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232, and 3312 of
WPL-46 are hereby established." Now, paragraph 3232: (Reading)
'"The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the Pacific area are (a) Pacific
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier; (b) Pacific Southern Naval Coastal
Frontier; (c) Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier." In paragraph 4
I wish to call ['362] attention to the fact that the statement is:
"For the present. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, as prescribed in
General Order 143, will not be formed." That is different from the
establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.
355. Q. In 2CL^1, paragraph "G", sub-paragraph 6, were the duties
there defined the basis on which you made the statement yesterday
that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in general, w^as
charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor with the Army?
A. Yes, and other paragraphs, such as 9-C and the paragraphs
under "A" and other points where the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District is charged with other duties in that connection.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navv (Ret.) :
356. Q. With reference to the order of July 1, 1941, in Exhibit 4,
the directive from which you just read portions, the question that I was
concerned about was whether there were forces, not whether there was
a frontier. This order states that the frontier forces would not be
formed.
A. That is correct.
357. Q. So that there might have been a frontier formed, but there
were no forces?
A. There was a frontier formed.
The court then, at 4 : 10 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., August
17, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 279
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INQUIRY
THUBSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944.
136S] Twelfth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeir, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) , interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of tlie proceedings of the eleventh day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , the witness
under examination when the adjournment was taken yesterday, Wed-
nesday, August 16, 1944, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned
that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his
testimony.
Examined by the court :
358. Q. Admiral, was there anything irregular in establishing your
headquarters on shore ?
A. No.
359. Q. To your knowledge, has it ever been done before you did it,
or since ?
A. I presume it had been done before I did it. I do not have any
examples readily available, but subsequent to the time that I estab-
lished my headquarters on shore. Admiral King, in the Atlantic, es-
tablished his headquarters in a [-5^-^] station ship tied up at
Naval Training Station, in Newport. Admiral Hart, I have been in-
formed, established his headquarters on shore at Manila. During the
war I am informed that Admiral Nimitz maintained them in the sub-
marine base until the new headquarters had been constructed, money
for which I had obtained from the Navy Department prior to my
detachment.
360. Q. Did this move relieve you in any way of the responsibilities
which you held while operating from a Flagship ?
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. It did not. It changed in no way any responsibilities which
were assigned to me. nor did it add anything to my responsibilities.
301. Q. You have testified that you gave to the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department all information that came to you
which you considered to be of any value to him.
A. That's correct.
362. Q. Would not all information which was available to you, how-
ever remote from Pearl Harbor, have been of assistance to him in
forming his geneial estimate of what he might then or eventually
expect at Pearl Harbor ?
A. I attempted to give him all such information, and I intended to
do so. If at any time I failed, it was not for lack of intention.
363. Q. The question was based on the exact wording of your reply,
that is, you gave him all that 3^ou considered of value to him, not
that you gave all, and my question was based on that — that wouldn't
all the information that you had relating to the war conditions in
the Pacific, or anticipated war conditions in the Pacific, have been of
value to him in forming his estimate of what he might expect ?
A. Yes. I gave him that.
364. Q. In your answer to a question relating to the condition of
readiness of forces afloat in Pearl Harbor, you made an answer that
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District advised the Senior Officer
Present as to the condition of readiness. Your exhibit, 2CL-41 says
that the Commandant shall place the condition of readiness. There
may be no conflict in these two statements, but I would like to clear
it up a little.
A. I was attempting to state what is contained in order 2CL-41.
That was the order under which the Commandant was operating at
the time. In paragraph 6, d., it reads: (Reading) "Coordinate fleet
anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by (1) Advising the Senior
Officer Present embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain.
(2) Holding necessary drills."
365. Q. Well, specifically, the Commandant set the condition
[366] of readiness?
A. I did not so consider it. I considered that he advised the Senior
Officer Present; and you cannot, in a naval organization, take away
from the Senior Officer Present the prerogative of setting the con-
dition of readiness that he himself considered necessary and essential.
366. Q. Well, Admiral, as I read this exhibit, reference is had only
to the state of the condition of readiness of anti-aircraft batteries of
ships,
A. Yes, I so read that.
367. Q. Is this the only condition of readiness that anyone prescribed
for the naval forcess, for ships afloat, in Pearl Harbor?
A. No. The Senior Officer Present afloat in Pearl Harbor, exclu-
sively of the Commander-in-Chief, was charged with setting the con-
dition of readiness for the ships in Pearl Harbor.
368. Q. What condition of readiness was in effect on the morning
of 7 December?
A. Admiral Pye has stated that the condition 3 was in effect, and
to the best of my knowledge and belief that is true.
369. Q. As the court understands it, the Commandant of the ■14th
Naval District was charged with the coordination, the coordination
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 281
of fire of the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, with the shore bat-
teries ; is that correct ?
A. I will put it this way: that was my intention when this order
was written.
370. Q. To your knowledge, did the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District take any steps or give any orders in the way of coordinating
the fire of ships of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and shore batteries,
prior to 7 December ?
A. Yes, he took many steps in conducting drills and giving the
alarm; and he was charged with conducting the drills and directing
all the naval effort against antiaircraft attack, and he did so during
drill periods. Now I think that you will find the duties of the Com-
mandant of the District, as Commandant of the 14th Naval District,
as Commander of the Hawaiian Frontier, and as Naval Base Defense
Officer, set forth in 2CD-41, revised, paragraphs a. (1) and (2), which
charges him with the maintenance of the inshore patrol and the boom
patrol ; and other articles in 2CL-41. He was a party to the agreement
.contained in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March
1941, in which he assumed certain responsibilities. In the Operation
Plan No. 1-41, of 27 February 1941, he sets up a task organization
for the inshore patrol, the boom patrol, the harbor patrol, the mine-
sweepers, the base defense air force, antiaircraft defense, the harbor
control posts — some of these in conjunction with the Army.
[36^] 371. Q. I might say that that is all a matter of record,
and that the court is cognizant of that; and the questions we have
asked are simply for the purpose of clearing up what in our minds
appeared to be a little conflict. I don't think, unless you wish, it is
necessary to go any further with that.
A. Wliat I'd like to make clear to the court is that for all of the
duties of the Commandant — don't depend on my recollection now what
it was. It is laid down in the documents.
372. Q. In answer to a question during the course of your testimony,
you made reference occasionally to opinions of your staff. Specifically
in one answer to one question you stated that your staff' considered
there was no clanger from air attack in Pearl Harbor.
A. That's right.
373. Q. Did you concur in this opinion?
A. I did, indeed. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not
asking my staff to. assume any responsibility. I did receive advice
from my staff, which I considered in making my decisions.
374. Q. What was the consensus of your staff and senior subordi-
nates as to the probability of an air attack by the Japanese ?
A. Members of my staff — a considerable number of them are avail-
able here in Washington at the present time — I can say without any
fear of contradiction, that none of them considered an air attack on
Pearl Harbor any more than a possibility, myself included. I con-
sidered it a remote possibility.
375. Q. Does that also apply to your Senior Subordinates in the
chain of command?
A. In so far as I know their opinions, yes.
376. Q. Did you at any time, as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
and as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability
of maintaining the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor ?
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. When I took command of the fleet, I knew of the disagreement
between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in
Washington, on the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
He told me himself. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general,
but when I took command of the fleet we had been for some time
without much gunnery, due to the fact that no adequate training
target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, and when I took
command we had just about succeeded in completing the transfer of
that material from the coast. I did not make any protest, any formal
protest, against maintaining the fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I
did, in conversation with the Chief of [S67] Naval Opera-
tions, in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl
Harbor as a fleet base. The various elements that entered into that
are well known. I repeated substantially the same thing to the
President when I had an interview with him, and the substantial
point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl
Harbor is concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to
have the fleet in port if and when the air attack came; that it took
from two to four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started, the
attack would be completed before we could change in any degree the
disposition of the fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the
entrance, the single entrance, that we had, and the danger from the
oil storage as it was at that time ; and I don't recall anything other
than that at the present time, although there probably was. These
were factors which were well known both to the President and the
Chief of Naval Operations, prior to any statement by me. I accepted
the condition at Pearl Harbor, and that was one of the reasons why,
repeatedly, in correspondence, I requested to be kept informed of
developments.
377. Q. In other words, does the court understand you concurred
with your predecessor in that the fleet should not be kept at Pearl
Harbor?
A. In general, yes.
378. Q. And you so expressed your opinion in conversations with
the President and the Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. I did not definitely recommend that the fleet be withdrawn at
the time of my conversation, because I wanted to get some training in.
I accepted the situation, but pointed out the dangers that existed so
long as the fleet was in Pearl Harbor.
379. Q. Did you at any time make any recommendations as to with-
drawal of the battleships and carriers, or battleships alone, from
Pearl Harbor?
A. Not that I recall.
380. Q. Wliat were your relations with General Short, both per-
sonal and officially, during the entire time you were Commander-in-
Chief of Pacific Fleet ? Did you have conferences with him — and the
court would like to have you explain more or less in detail the con-
ditions existing.
A. I will be very pleased to. Wlien I became Commander-in-Chief
of the fleet, I remembered the situations which had arisen in the
Hawaiian area on various occasions. They had been the subject of
newspaper comments throughout the nation. For many years I had
felt that the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy not only in
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 283
Hawaii, but on our own coast, had been entirely inadequate. When 1
was Chief of Staff of [3681 Commander Battleships, Admiral
Craven, he made several attempts to get some joint exercises, in which
he was not entirely successful. I give this background to show I
became determined that no such occasion as that should arise while
I was Commander-in-Chief. General Short arrived in Honolulu a
few days before he took over command of the Hawaiian Department.
He was quartered in Admiral Richardson's house on Honolulu. I
made a trip in civilian clothes and paid my respect to General Short,
attempting to establish friendly relations. He responded whole-
heartedly, and I had a real regard for him before I had known him
for a very long time. The thought that was uppermost in my mind
at that particular time was to obtain some degree of cooperation
betwixt the Army and Navy air forces stationed on shore in Hawaii.
I think I broached the subject during our first interview. If not, I
did on an early subsequent interview. I found General Short in com-
plete agreement with me on the steps that should be taken — the broad
steps that should be taken — and Admiral Bloch and General Short
at once put into process the question of attaining the cooperation and
agreements betwixt the air forces. I saw General Short frequently
because I made it a point to see him. I think he also made it a point
to see me. We conferred officially on many occasions, and at practi-
cally every official conference, Admiral Bloch was present, because
Admiral Bloch w^as the officer in Hawaii who was charged with deal-
ing with the Army, and at no time did I wish to by-pass him. I think
I kept Admiral Bloch thoroughly informed of every dealing I had
with General Short. I played golf with General Short at a little
9-hole golf course which he had established near his headquarters at
Fort Shafter. That was particularly convenient for me, because it
was only about fifteen minutes by car from my headquarters. Since
this affair has happened, a Colonel Throckmorton, who was on Gen-
eral Short's staff, informed my brother, in Kentucky, that he remem-
bers distinctly that General Short and I had an engagement to play
golf about 9 : 30 on Sunday, the day the attack came ; and of course
we did not play golf that day. My relations with General Short were
highly satisfactory, both my personal relations and my official rela-
tions. I found him a very pleasant gentleman. I consider him my
friend, and officially he was very cooperative, and we had no differ-
ences of opinion which were not resolved in a most amicable way.
381. Q. Admiral, have you heard rumors and reports that your re-
lationship with General Short, during the time of your command, were
not cordial, that you did not cooperate, that you had few conferences,
and so forth. The court presumes that this is not correct, by your
previous answer. Is that in line with your thought?
A. I believe every man, woman, and child in the United [369']
States who can read, has read such statements. I wish to state that all
such statements are malicious lies.
382. Q. Did you have any idea at that time, or do you now, how
these rumors originated, or how they were brought about, or any in-
stances which would tend to prompt such rumors ?
A. There was absolutely no basis for the rumojs, and I am forced to
the conclusion that this was part of a deliberate campaign to smear
me and General Short.
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
383. Q. Why were certain ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor
on 7 December, and why were not all ships at sea ?
A, A fleet must have time in port for repairs, upkeep, and recrea-
tion of the crews, also to obtain fuel and supplies. I had established
a rotation of task forces. When I took over the fleet, Admiral Richard-
son had put in process a scheme which required one-half of the fleet
to be at sea while the other half was in port. I operated under this
scheme about two months. I found that there was not sufficient time
for upkeep of the fleet, and I also found that the fuel oil supply at
Pearl Harbor was being depleted. We did not have a sufficient number
of tankers to maintain the level of fuel oil, and at the same time
operate half the fleet at sea all the time. I then changed my plan and
had one-third — approximately one-third — of the fleet operating at sea
all the time, and part of the time two-thirds were operating at sea.
During the periods of maneuvers, and we had a maneuver — five-day
maneuver — about once a quarter, all the ships went to sea. I felt that
1 was operating the ships at sea as great a proportion of the time as it
was possible to do so and still maintain them in top efficiency, ready
for any eventuality. I felt that when war came, I wanted the ma-
chinery and material, and personnel, in the highest possible state of
efficiency, and balanced the time at sea against the time in port in
order to accomplish this most effectively.
384. Q. On December 7, 1941, what was the proportion of the Pacific
Fleet in Pearl Harbor?
A. I'd say about two-thirds.
385. Q. Was this an unusual number of ships to have in Pearl
Harbor?
A. It was a condition which occurred for a few days when Task
P orce One and Two overlapped for a few days in port.
386. Q. Who, in your opinion, was responsible for the defense of
Pearl Harbor, in event of any form of attack by the enemy — by an
enemy ?
A. The actual responsibility was undertaken by the Army, in the
Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935. The Navy, however, was re-
sponsible for assisting the Army in any way [370] they could.
It is just common sense that they should. General Short was the Com-
manding General, and therefore responsible for whatever Army efforts
could be made. Admiral Bloch had been designated as Naval Base
Defense Officer, and was responsible for coordinating the naval effort
with that of the Army. I was responsible for the safety of the ships,
and at no time did I want or expect to evade such responsibility.
387. Q. Admiral, you have testified that the Fleet, or the ships of the
Fleet, would render certain assistance to the Army in case of attack?
A. That is correct.
388. Q. Could the Army depend at all times on the assistance of •
the Fleet?
A. They could not, and during the period betwixt November 7 and
December 7, we had a meneuver and we were out for about five days,
up to the north of the Islands, and during that period, the only ships
in Pearl Harbor were of no consequence ; that is, were undergoing over-
haul, and there was very little assistance from the batteries of ships
during that period. "That condition was liable to occur at any time,
and my object in all the orders and efforts that I made was to, first,
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 285
get adequate defense from the Army there, and second, to utilize what-
ever might be aboard ships of tlie Navy that were still in port ; and
Admiral Bloch was put in charge of the coordination of the naval effort,
primarily because he was the only responsible officer attached to the
Fleet who was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor. The Com-
mander Base .Force was there most of the time, but I didn't know, in
the course of the campaign, when the Commander Base Force might
move out, and I did not wish to put him in charge as Naval Base De-
fense Officer.
389. Q. In other words, Admiral, we understand you are stating
that the Fleet should be mobile and footloose at all times regardless
of any consideration of defending the base as a Fleet ?
A. I do, and a base which depends upon the Fleet for its defense is
a very poor base.
390. Q. Then, as the court understands, in your opinion the Army,
in accordance with the plan referred to by you, the Joint Action Army
and Navy 1935, was primarily responsible for the defense of Pearl
Harbor?
A. Correct.
391. Q. Would you leave out that word, "primarily"?
A. Yes.
392. Q. Admiral, please state in brief what in your opinion
[.871] was the direct responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval
JDistrict, for the defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. I considered the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in gen-
eral responsible for coordinating with the Army all the naval forces
that were in Pearl Harbor, and for their use in the defense of Pearl
Harbor.
393. Q. Do you mean "ail naval forces", or naval defense forces?
A. Well, every element of the naval forces that could 15(3 used in the
defense of Pearl Harbor. I think you are asking me to draw conclu-
sions from records which are available to the court.
[S72] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
394. Q. It isn't that. Admiral. It is trying to get your statement
there that he had responsibility for using all naval forces. Now, if
we follow that line of thought, then does this court understand that
with that responsibility he had the right to give orders to a battleship
to use her defense forces ? That is the question that we are trying to
straighten out.
A. I see what j^ou mean now. The Commandant's duties were con-
fined to coordinating the efforts. The senior officer present afloat and
the sector commanders which were appointed by my 2CL-41 were,
of course, responsible for the actual fire and control of fire of the
ships in Pearl Harbor. Now, the Commandant was responsible for
suggesting changes, and matters of that kind. Again, gentlemen, I
must state that I was responsible for everything that went on in that
Fleet. I tried to exercise my responsibilities by delegating certain
authority and certain tasks, and some of these questions that you ask
are very difficult to answer categorically. It comes down to a question
of opinion.
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
395. Q. You have stated in your testimony and explained very
minutely the responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District
in coordinating his efforts with the Army.
A. Yes.
396. Q. But did not the Commandant, 14th Naval District, have
a direct responsibility in other matters?
A. Oh, yes.
397. Q. For instance, you have stated that at some time there might
be a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. That is right.
398. Q. Was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District responsible
for the defense against submarines?
A. There was a net across the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The Com-
mandant operated that net. No ship moved in or out of Pearl Harbor,
and no ship moved in Pearl Harbor, without the knowledge and
approval of the Commandant.
399. Q. Did the Commandant, 14th Naval District, have certain
forces directly under his command?
A. It has been testified here that he had 4 destroyers which were
utilized primarily for the inshore patrol, as I would call it. He had
some minesweepers and he had some tugs. He had from time to time
forces detailed from the Fleet to report to him and to perform duties
under his direction and control.
[37S] 400. Q. Was there any attempted attack on ships of the
Fleet in Pearl Harbor by submarines ?
A. Yes ; one submarine got into the harbor. I think they got her
before she did anything, before she accomplished anything. That,
incidentally, was a midget submarine, a surprise type.
401. Q. Admiral, you have testified that the Navy had a certain
number of planes, patrol planes, under your command at Pearl
Harbor ?
A. That is correct.
402. Q. As the court understands, these patrol planes were under
the direct command of Rear Admiral Bellinger ; is that correct ?
A. Yes.
403. Q. You have further testified that these patrol planes were
used for searching; is that correct?
A. Yes.
404. Q. Wlien you took command of the Pacific Fleet, were these
patrol planes being used daily for search ?
A. Yes, they were being used daily for search, and I used them
myself, some of them, daily, to search the operating areas, and my
understanding and belief is that prior to my taking command they
used these planes to search restricted arcs on occasions. At no time
do I know of any 360 degree search being continuously conducted,
405. Q, Are you aware of the fact that prior to your taking com-
mand these patrol planes were used in daily search over a certain
arc emanated from Honolulu ?
A. No, not as a permanent fixture. I did know that certain
searches were being conducted. Personally, I considered tliem in-
effective and at the time immediately preceding the attack on Pearl
Harbor we had gotten the number of planes we had — I think some
PROCEEDINGS OF NAViT COURT OF INQUIRY 287
54 of them — which were brand new planes from the States. They
were having a great many material troubles and the nose casting was
going bad; and we were conserving the planes much more then,
I think, than had been the case for some time. We were in a more
critical state for planes then than we had been for maybe some time
before.
406. Q. Had you considered the use of all or part of the number
of patrol planes in searching a probable area of advance, by enemy
carriers, on Pearl Harbor?
A, I had considered such, yes. Some time prior to the attack we
ran a search for a few days at Admiral Bloch's suggestion on the
line from Jaluit to Pearl. We had in mind that we might catch a_
submarine on the surface out there, as well as perhaps find anj^ other
thing that was moving around. We found nothing, and this was
discontinued after a few days.
[S74] 407. Q. Were any of these patrol planes searching or in
the air for search on the morning of 7 December ?
A. Yes, there were a number that were searching the operating
areas, and there were some more that were engaged in maneuvers with
our own submarines. I think I was told about a dozen planes were
in the air.
408. Q. Were there any searching activities going on by planes sta-
tioned at Midway ?
A. Yes, they were running such a reconnaissance as they could with
twelve planes, which was not much. I had them there primarily
getting ready to start out with the Fleet in case of war, part of the
deployment, and we were utilizing them to run a search from there.
The court then, at 10 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 10 : 55 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present :
All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties
and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yoeman second
class, U, S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness
under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding. _
Examination by the court (Continued) :
409. Q. What was the number of patrol planes capable of operating
in the air on the morning of 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor ?
A. I cannot answer that question categorically because I do not
know the number of patrol planes which were laid up temporarily for
periodical checks. My best estimate, however, is that not more than
50 patrol planes on the Island of Oahu were in flying condition on
the morning of 7 December, 1941.
410. Q. What proportion of these planes were operating in the air ?
A, About 12 of them were in the air.
411. Q. Whose direct responsibility was it to have tliese planes
operating in the area at this time ?
A. They were operating in the area in accordance with the approved
operating plans which my headquarters had approved. If you mean,
288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
who was responsible for deciding whether or not a distance recon-
naissance should have been undertaken, I was.
[375] 412. Q. In other words, we understand that you were di-
rectly responsible for not having more operating planes in the air,
more available operating planes in the air on 7 December?
A. Yes, I was responsible. I can add, however, that I had received
no recommendations from my subordinates to conduct a distance re-
connaissance on this date.
413. Q. To which subordinates do you refer ?
A. All of them ; my staff and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.
414. Q. On the morning of 7 December did you have any inner
patrol established around Pearl Harbor ?
A. You mean an inner air patrol ?
415. Q. Inner air patrol.
A. My recollection is that there was no inner air patrol on that
date.
416. Q. Had this been considered ?
A. Yes, and not only considered but was provided for to be under-
taken when ordered.
417. Q. Did you have any information regarding the arrival of the
Army air squadron coming from Hamilton Field on the morning of
7 December ?
A. I do not now recall whether I had any such information. I
think it is highly probable that the appropriate subordinates did have
such information. They would not necessarily have reported such a
movement to me.
418. Q. Admiral, you stated that the Chief of Staff of Army and
the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy had presented to the JPresi-
dent a communication not recommending that an ultimatum be sent
to Japan. Is that correct ?
A. I was so informed in an enclosure to a letter sent to me by the
Chief of Naval Operations.
419. Q. Upon receipt of the message from OpNav on November 27,
referred to as the war warning message, did you have a conference
with officers regarding this message ?
A. Yes.
420. Q. Who were the officers present; not by name but probably
better by reason of their positions ?
A. The message was received about 4:00 o'clock p. m., Honolulu
time. I asked the Commandant of the District to come over, and his
chief of staff came. He informed me that the Commandant was
visiting his wife in the hospital. I delivered this message to the chief
of staff with directions to give it at once to the Commandant, and
dispatched my intelligence officer with the dispatch to be delivered to
General Short. I also received this afternoon a copy of the dispatch
which General Short had received from [376] General Mar-
shall, which was delivered to me by the Navy liaison officer, Lieutenant
Burr, in my headquarters. On 28 November, as nearly as I can re-
member the date, we had a conference in my headquarters at which
Admiral Bloch, General Short, members of my staff. Captain Smith,
Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, all took part. And at that con-
ference we discussed these measures to be taken and a good part of
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 289
the time was taken iii) with coiisi deration of tlie proposed relief of
Marine personnel on the Islands by Arni}^ personnel. However, in
considering this movement and these reenforcements, all phases of the
situation were discussed and these messages were taken into considera-
tion in the pre])aration. or in deciding upon the action which we Avould
take.
421. Q. That was on 20 November?
A. 28 November; in the forenoon, as I remember.
422. Q. Was this dispatch of November 27th the principal matter
of discussion in the conference which you speak of as taking place on
28 November?
A. The implications growing from that dispatch were the principal
subjects.
423. Q. In that conference, what was the general concensus of
opinion as to the probability or possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I think we considered it a remote possibility. General Short has
testified to a statement made by Captain McMorris in answer to my
question. Although I cannot recall that exact circumstance, I have
no doubt but that General Short's testimony is correct.
424. Q. As pertains to Captain McMorris?
A. No, General Short's testimony was that, as I recall it, that he
asked me the question and I turned to McMorris and asked him to
answer it, and McMorris answered that there was no chance of a
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and^ that none of the members of
the conference dissented in any way from that view. I think that
is his testimony.
425. Q. At that conference, was it the general opinion that in lieu
of an outside attack on Pearl Harbor, that their real concern was
internal sabotage?
A. I do not recall that the question of internal sabotage was dis-
cussed at any length. Sabotage was mentioned in these various mes-
sages. I knew that the Navy had long since taken all measures which
could be taken in the prevention of sabotage, and I felt that that was
purely an Army concern to put into effect such antisabotage measures
as might be necessary to protect the Islands. Our action was an
accomplished fact, and we dwelt very little on that subiect.
[37?"] 426. Q. At this conference, was there any discussion as to
the proper state of readiness into which the Army and Navy should
be placed in view of the message of 27 November ?
A. The decision, whether stated or not, specifically was that no
change in the conditions that we had been maintaining was indicated
at that time for the Island of Oahu.
427. Q. And you had been maintaining what condition of readiness?
A. We had been for some time maintaining the condition of readi-
ness of Condition 3 in the Navy. I knew that General Short had
ordered an alert on 27 November. That was reported to me by mem-
bers of my staff.
428. Q. But that alert was changed to Alert 1 later?
A. No, that was the alert that he ordered.
429. Q. That was Alert No. 1? •
A. Yes, the anti-sabotage alert.
430. Q. Admiral, if you had received notice immediately that Jap-
anese planes or foreign planes were 132 miles fi'om Oahu and head-
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 20
290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing in for Oahu on the morning of 7 December, what would you have
done and what effect would this have had on the attack ?
A. I would have ordered general quarters on all ships. I would
have started the destroyers, the light forces out of the main channel
on sortie and put all the planes in the air ; mustered every available
plane starting to search in the particular area indicated, and launched
an attack on their carriers. At the same time I would have expected
the Army to get all of their pursuit planes in the air to meet the attack.
The ENTERPRISE was about 200 miles to the westward of Oahu
and headed for Oahu and she had an escort of 3 heavy cruisers and
9 destroyers. The LEXINGTON was 400 miles southeast of Midway
with an escort of 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. I would have put
both those carriers on an intercepting course and kept them informed
of the movements of the Japanese force. I would have had all avail-
able light forces join Halsey in the ENTERPRISE and I think we
would have had quite a party.
431. Q. With the foreign planes 132 miles off, assuming they would
be over Pearl Harbor in an hour or less, in general and roughly, how
much of all of this preparation which you say you would have taken,
could have been taken ?
A. Well, the location of the Japanese carriers was the principal
benefit, the greatest benefit from this information.
[S78] 432. Q. Then you were not thinking solely of what the
planes might do ?
A. I think I can develop that. The ships in Pearl Harbor would
have greeted the planes with full anti-aircraft fire. The ships would
have been at general quarters and closed up for general quarters.
That, I think, is beyond question. I believe that most of the planes, the
patrol planes, would have been in the air by that time. A certain
number, possibly two squadrons, were kept constantly on one-half
hour's notice while they were on the ground. The others were on
four hours notice but it took nothing like that long to get the people
there and ready to put the planes in the air. I think it is fair to state
that more than 50 percent, perhaps 75 percent of the planes on the
ground in flying condition would have been in the air; well, 50 per-
cent, we will say, would have been in the air by the time those planes
arrived for the attack. Now, so far as the ENTERPRISE and the
LEXINGTON were concerned, we could have directed them to the
area in which they would have made a contact with the enemy and we
could have supported them with such of the cruisers and destroyers
as we were able to get out of Pearl Harbor. The battleships would
probably not have been of much use because they are too slow and
couldn't get up there. Does that answer the question?
433. Q. Were all anti-aircraft guns manned on all ships in Pearl
Harbor at the time of attack, about 7:55 a. m., on the morning of
December 7 ?
A. They were not.
434. Q. What proportion of anti-aircraft guns were manned?
A. It is as prescribed in here, but roughly one-fourth.
435. Q. In your estimation, how long was it before all anti-aircraft
guns were manned after this attack ?
A. Oh, I should say within 5 to 10 minutes all the anti-aircraft
guns were manned and firing. I had stressed the importance of keep-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 291
ing trained crews on board, or requiring trained crews be kept on
board at all times and of having ammunition readily available at the
guns. On one ship I heard that the ammunition was in the ammuni-
tion boxes but they couldn't find the keys and they knocked off the locks
and everything else and opened it up and went ahead.
436. Q. You stated, Admiral, that on the morning of 7 December
you received word from your dutj^ officer a raid was coming in?
A. That is right.
[379] 437. Q. What time did you receive this, and how did he
receive this information ?
A. I received that between 7 : 55 and 8 : 00 o'clock. He had ob-
tained it, I believe, from the signal tower which we maintained in
Pearl.
438. Q. In other words, do we understand that j^ou received this
information just immediately prior to the attack, or after the attack?
A. They attacked the fields first, and I should say I received it
after they had dropped bombs on Hickam Field and Ford Island.
That, you understand, is an estimate. I didn't stop to figure those
things out.
439. Q. When did you receive information that certain planes had
been picked up 132 miles from Honolulu ?
A. I think it was on Tuesday, December 9, 1941, in the afternoon.
440. Q. Did you have any information as to the probable break-
ing of diplomatic relations with Jaj^an as of November 25 or Novem-
ber 29, 1941 ?
A. No.
441. Q. Admiral, did you feel that during the period October 16
to December 7, 1941, you were kept fully informed regarding con-
versations, negotiations, et cetera, by our government with Japanese
representatives as to the Japanese situation, and their import and
significance ?
A. It is hard at this time to state accurately what I felt prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbor. I had requested many times that I be
kept informed. I had been assured that I would be kept informed.
I believed that there must be details about which I was not informed
and I could only guess. You are asking me to recapture something
which is a long way in the past about what I would feel.
[380] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
442. Q. In the light of events preceding December 7, 1941, of which
you now have knowledge would that knowledge have altered your
dispositions and actions independently without reference to the
Department ?
A. It would have altered my actions and dispositions, but I would
have promptly informed the Department.
443. Q. At any time from October 16 to December 7 did you receive
by official communication or personal communication from OpNav
the suggestion of an air attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. I did not.
444. Q. You have stated that there was a unanimous opinion among
your princij^al advisors, in coDCurrence with your own state of opin-
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ion, to the effect that an air attack was merely a remote possibility.
In the discussions which took place was a distinction drawn between
the possibility of attack during the existence of a state of peace and
the existence of a state of war ?
A. I think we were primarily concerned with what would happen
to us immediately, and our conclusion related specifically to the con-
dition that confronted us there while we were in a state of peace.
445. Q. But had a state of war existed on December 7, 1941, would
not your condition of readiness been radically different?
A. Yes, it would have been different. I would have then placed
considerations of security ahead of any consideration of training.
446. Q. In earlier testimony you accepted the responsibility for not
having ordered a distance reconnaissance on December 7, 1941.
A. That is correct.
■ 447. Q. Does the court understand that your reason was that the use
of patrol planes for distance i-econnaissance was not warranted, in
that the presence of carriers of a foreign power within the range of
such a reconnaissance was neither known nor suspected?
A. Yes.
448. Q. How long before the attack on December 7 did you have
information concerning the movement of Japanese carriers to the
Marshall Islands ?
A. I cannot now recall.
449. Q. Is it your recollection that it was not within, let us say,
a week previous ?
A. It was something on that order, yes.
[381] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (Continued) :
450. Q. Questions have been asked you relative to the transfer of
your headquarters from the PENNSYLVANIA to shore. Was that
move taken up by you with the Department in Washington before it
was effectuated ?
A. I informed the Chief of Naval Operations of the place I pro-
posed to take. Eventually, and after I had transferred my head-
quarters on shore, I took up with the Department the question of
getting permanent headquarters there, and the money was allocated
and the plans drawn to provide these permanent quarters prior to
the time I was relieved.
451. Q. Did you receive specific approval for the removal of the
temporary quarters before it was done ?
A. Yes, in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations. Further-
more, I received his approval for the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District to allocate my quarters on shore, which the Commandant did.
452. Q. You have related, in answer to questions, the officers of
your staff who were present at the conference on November 28 in
reference to the dispatches received both by you and the Army on No-
vember 27. In addition to your staff, and Admiral Bloch and Gen-
eral Short, were any of the flag officers of your command present?
A. I think Admiral Wilson Brown was also present.
453. Q. Had Admiral Halsey gone?
A. Halsey left on the 28th. He may or may not have been present.
I don't recall.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 293
454. Q. Did you confer with Admiral Halsey, after the receipt of
the dispatch of November 27 and before he left on his misison, relative
to the dispatch?
A. 1 'm not sure that there was an opportunity for him to come to
the otlice before he sailed. I believe, however, he did see the dispatch
before he sailed.
455. Q. Did any of your flag officers or staff officers recommend to
you any other disposition of the Fleet or extra precautions as a result
of the message of November 27?
A. None except the ones I took.
456. Q. Did these officers have all the information regarding the
situation which was in your possesison?
A. The members of my staff to whom you refer did have all the
information that was in my possession. The three Fleet task force
connnanders, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Calhoun had all the in-
formation which was available [382] when they visited my
headquarters.
457. Q. The question was asked you whether between October 16
and December 7 you felt that you were kept fully informed by the
Navy Department as to the progress of relations between the United
States and Japan. Can you answer that question categorically, yes
or no ?
A. As to how I felt prior to December 7 ?
458. Q. Yes.
A. No, I cannot ansAver that question categorically, yes or no.
Tlie interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Eet.), made the following statement: I should like to intro-
duce in evidence Operations Plan 1-41, dated 27 February 1941, with
annexes: (a) Inshore Patrol Plan; (b) Base Defense Air Force Plan;
(c) Anti-aircraft Defense Plan; (d) Harbor Control Post Plan:
(e) Communications Plan. It was issued by C. C. Bloch, Naval Base
Defense Officer, Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I do not
care to read it, but I should like to have it as an exhibit.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 53".
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
459. Q, Do you recall, from any data which you have, how long
it took those Japanese planes to fly 132 miles?
A. My best answer is only an estimate, and I will say it took them
something over an hour to fly 132 miles.
460. Q. That is the best answer you can give from any informa-
tion you have?
A, Yes, and that is not accurate. I don't know.
461. Q. I ask you if you are acquainted with charges that have
been made as to lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy
in the Hawaiian area, specifically that neither service knew what
security measures were in effect in the other and that the services
did not cooperate in matters of defense. Can you state. Admiral, what
the facts are in this regard ?
A. These charges, as I recall them, were made in the report of
the Roberts Commission substantially as you state them. They w^ere
widely made in the press. In my opinion, such charges were en-
tirely unsubstantiated by the recorded testimony of the Roberts Com-
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mission. Regardless of the testimony and conclusions of the Roberts
Commission, [3S3] the charges were entirely without any
solid foundation in fact. We did cooperate, and we did know — quite
accurately — what was going on in the other service.
462. Q. You knew what condition of alert was set in the Army
on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941, did you not?
A. I knew the condition of alert was set there and, in general,
what it was.
463. Q. Do you consider, from all the plans, orders, and agree-
ments we have introduced in evidence before this court and which
are now a matter of record before it, that the charge that there was
lack of cooperation in the defense of Pearl Harbor is now refuted?
A. I do. I consider that the evidence submitted to this court most
conclusively disposes of any such charge.
Reexamined by the court:
464. Q. Admiral, did you have available to you telephonic com-
nmnication with the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?
A. By commercial line, yes. During the attack, the Chief of
Naval Operations was in communication with the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District.
465. Q. Was this telephonic communication available to you in
what is known as the scrambler telephone?
A. No special arrangements had been made, and I am not familiar
with the commercial telephone, but I believe it was the scrambler
system. In addition to the commercial telephone, there was a direct
communication provided between the Chief of Staff of the Army
and the Commanding General in the Hawaiian Department, which
1 presume the Chief of Naval Operations might have used, if he so
desired. That I do not know.
466. Q. That, Admiral, has been brought out in the testimony re-
garding the scrambler system which the Army had in Honolulu
with Washington. The court was trying to find out whether a simi-
lar telephone system was available to you.
A. It was not.
467. Q. Only the commercial line was available to you ?
A. Only the commercial line was available to me.
468. Q. The scrambler telephone had not been installed in your
headquarters ?
A. That is correct.
[384-li 469. Q. Did you at any time during this period use the
commercial telephone in discussing matters with the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
A. I did not.
470. Q. Did he at any time call you over his telephone ?
A. He did not.
471. Q. Admiral, were you completely satisfied with the per-
formance, of duty of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
previous to and on December 7, 1941 ?
A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District has had a dis-
tinguished career in the Navy. I had the greatest confidence in his
ability and acted accordingly in all my dealings with him. He had
a very difficult job. The personnel supplied to him in a rapidly
expanding agency required a lot of training. He was faced with
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 295
the same difficulties that the Fleet was faced with. He repeatedly
requested personnel to be detailed. I agreed that he required the
personnel. Under the handicaps which he was laboring, I con-
sidered his performance of duty highly satisfactory.
472. Q. You included the whole period?
A. Yes.
473. Q. Admiral, were you satisfied with the performance of duty
of all your senior subordinates, insofar as that performance of duty
had any bearing on the Japanese attack?
A. I was.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine
this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record
m connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by
the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness wfts duly warned ftftd resumed his seat as an interested
partly.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: It has been brought out
before this court that some of the findings of the Roberts Conmiission
dealt with relations existing between the Commandant, the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department, and the Commander-in-
Chief of the U. S. Fleet to their disadvantage in describing these
[3SS] relations as unsatisfactory. It is this report which'^as been
published to the world and which has given rise to the campaign in
the press for the last two years as to the lack of relations between the
Army and Navy in that area. It is noted that the report of the Roberts
Commission has been submitted to this court, and I wish to ask the
court if it intends to use the report in question as evidence in reaching
its findings? There are contained in the public version of the report
of the Roberts Commission misstatements which can be readily dis-
proved.
The judge advocate replied as follows : The reports of the Roberts
Commission were furnished to him, as well as all other documents he
desired in the Navy Department for use in conducting this inquiry.
The reports of the Roberts Commission are not now in evidence before
the court, and the judge advocate has no knowledge of what intention
the court has with regard to them, but they will be subject to proper
objection and to a ruling if and when the occasion arises that any parts
thereof are to be put in the record.
The court then, at 12 : 10 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[So8A] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel was
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U, S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, was
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
called as a witness by the judge advocate, was duly sworn, and was
informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, retired, on active duty
as a member of the General Board.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the year 1941?
A. Connnandant 14th Naval District, and appertaining thereto,
Commander Local Defense Forces; Commander Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Sea Fi-ontier; Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor; and
as an officer of the United States Pacific Fleet and appertaining
thereto. Commander Task Force 4, and as a Task Group Commander
under 2CL-41, under the title of Naval Base Defense Officer.
3. Q. Were you performing any duties in conjunction with or in
cooperation with the Army?
A. Yes.
4. Q. What Avere they, in brief ?
A. I was performing duties prescribed by the Navy Emulations,
Joint Action 1935, Rainbow War Plans, Fleet Letter 2CL-41, and
directives from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
5. Q. What was the method in effect for the coordination of these
duties with the Army?
A. I assume you mean the method of coordination with the Army.
6. Q. Thati is correct.
A. That was done by the principal of mutual cooperation.
7. Q. Will you refer to section 3 of JCD-42, and state what the
Army ta'tk was.
A. The Army task was to hold Oahu against attack by sea, land,
and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval
forces.
[3Se] 8. Q. What is the Navy task?
A. The Navy task — to patrol the coastal zone and to control and
protect shipping therein ; to support the Army forces.
9. Q. Will you state what forces were assigned you as naval local
defense forces ; what ships or equipment was in this category ?
A. During 1941, the following forces were assigned as naval local
defense forces : 4 old destroyers, destroyer division 80 — that is the 4
old destroyers ; 4 small minesweepers, 3 Coast Guard cutters of differ-
ent sizes and capabilities which also performed the duties of the Coast
(xuard; the SACREMENTO; 1 net vessel, 1 gate vessel, 2 self-
l)ropelled oil lighters, YO's; a few tugs and a few small craft, which
were unsuitable for any real military use.
10. Q. Did you consider this force as adequate to perform the Navy
Task assigned under JCD-42, that you have just referred to?
A. No.
11. Q. Would you like to amplify that answer by stating w^herein
you considered they were deficient ?
A. I did not have enough patrol craft to properly organize inshore
patrol. I had neither surface craft nor aircraft for offshore patrol,
no escorts except that the Commander-in-Chief had made arrange-
ments to supply, under the Commander Base Force, one when Rainbow
5 was executed. I had no attack force except such Army bombers as
could be used under the Joint Agreement. They were not adequate
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 297
in numbers and types. I had no aircraft assigned to the Naval District
to be used to meet the requirements of the Joint Agreement.
12. Q. We have had considerable reference befoi-e this court to
Exhibit 7, which is the Joint Defense Plan. JCD-42. Had any part
of this been put in effect in 1941 ?
A. No part of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense l*lan as such was
put into operation by the orders of the War and Navy Departments.
or by mutual agreement of the local connnanders of the Army and
Navy prior to December 7. However, some parts of appendix 7 were
in operation.
13. Q. Will you describe in general terms what these parts of ap-
pendix 7 were and what they pertained to ?
A. Appendix 7 was a joint agreement between the Commanding-
General and the Commandant 14th Naval District in regard to air
defense. The pertinent parts which were in operation were: The
Arm}' agreed to turn over to Navy tactical control all bombers in the
case of air attack, or when required. The Navy agreed to turn over
to the tactical control of the Army all fighters or aircraft suitable as
lighters in case of emergency, or when required.
14. Q. As Navy Base Defense Officer, did you consider you had
[SS7] a fairly accurate picture of what military forces and equip-
ment the Army had for the execution of its task; that is, to hold Oahu
against attack by sea, land, and air forces, particularly as this task
applied to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base ?
A. Yes, and my knowledge has been reflected in correspondence
which has been read before this court.
15. Q, Adverting to article 17 of JCD-42, where the Army is
charged with providing certain service and key defenses, I shall ask
you to state opposite each category that is applicable to the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base, not on others, what the Army had provided in
accordance with the Joint Agreement, prior to 7 December 1941.
A. Under subparagraph a., which was beach and land, seacoast, and
anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base, I knew that there were insufficient military per-
sonnel according to the estimate of the need by the Commanding
General. It was my belief that the seacoast batteries had had insuffi-
cient target practice. I knew there were insufficient numbers of anti-
aircraft guns, both in the long-range type and in the close-in weapons.
I knew there were insufficient modern Army bombing planes. I knew
that there was a deficiency in the numbers and types of Army pursuit
planes. I knew that the permanent anti-aircraft warning service was
nowhere near complete. I had general knowledge that a number of
mobile stations had been set up, but that the personnel was not trained,
that the entitre system was in a formative condition, notwithstanding
the assistance which had been provided to the Army by the Navy.
With reference to subparagraph c, I knew that no protection had been
provided to landing fields in outlying islands by the Army. In ref-
erence to paragraph d., I believed that this had been taken care of.
Subparagraph e., I knew this had been provided for. Subparagraph
f., I knew that the Army could not ])erform inshore aerial patrol, and
I had endeavored to get aircraft so that the Navy could take over these
duties until such time as the Army was properly equipped. Results —
negative. I have also referred previously to the aircraft warning
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
service; that is also under f. Subparagraph g., arrangements had
been made for this by Joint Agreement, appendix 7, but Army did not
have adequate numbers or types of bombers, and specifically during the
period from November 27 to December 7, the Army had only 6 modern
bombers in serviceable condition. Paragraph h,, this had been one
of the subjects of the Joint Air Defense Agreement. My recollection
is that the Army furnished personnel during the day time, but that up
to December 7, we had been unable to get them at night. Paragraph i.,
this had been diligently prosecuted. Paragraph j., this service was
operational. Paragraph k., this service was operational. Paragraph
1. (love), the Army, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, had a plan for taking care of this detail. Paragraph m.,
I knew that the Army were working on this. Paragraph n., many
conferences and studies had been held on the subject. Paragraph o.,
A 1^88] plan had been made. Paragraph p., a plan had been
made.
16. Q. Referring to Article 18 of JCD-4:2, which sets out what the
Navy shall provide, will you state categorically what the Navy did
provide, as they relate to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base prior to 7
December 1941 ?
A. According to paragraph 18, the Navy was first required to sup-
ply an inshore patrol. The vessels for the inshore patrol were in-
adequate, as I stated before. Paragraph b., the Navy was required to
provide for an offshore patrol. There were not vessels or aircraft
available for this patrol. None had been supplied, c. : Navy was re-
quired to supply an escort. No vessels were available, but the Com-
mander-in-Chief in his war plan had arranged to have an escort force
under Commander Base Force. Paragraph d. : An attack force. I
had no surface vessels ; none were supplied, for an attack force. Com-
plete reliance had to be made on Army bombers. They were inade-
quate in numbers and types. The Navy might possibly have temporar-
ily based on shore Navy dive bombers and other shore-based aircraft,
but they might or might not be present, e. : This had been provided
for and was adequate except for trained personnel, f . : Torpedo nets
had been installed in both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, magnetic loops
and sono-buoys had been installed, but I am not sure whether they
were installed before or after 7 December, g. : Army forces are to
be supported by Marine anti-aircraft. This varied from time to time.
Arrangements had been made to support Army forces as fully as could
be done by the Commander-in-Chief in his Fleet Confidential Letter
2CL-41 of October 14, 1st of February, 1941. h. : Number of mine-
sweepers were inadequate, i. : There were no means for the 14th
Naval District to conduct distant reconnaissance, either by surface
vessels or long-range aircraft. No long-range aircraft had been fur-
nished, j. : Only means of attacking enemy's naval forces were by air-
craft. This meant Army bombers and whatever Navy planes happened
to be present. Army bombers were inadequate in numbers and types.
k. : Adequate. 1. : Fairly adequate but improving all the time. m. :
Completely effective and ready to take over. n. : In operation, o. :
Inadequate but being remedied very rapidly by the construction of new
hospitals, p. : Plans made but not put into operation until after
December 7.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 299
17. Q. Advertiiifr to Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-4:1, what was the rela-
tion of the Naval Base Defense Officer to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet in the chain of military command ?
A. The Commander-in-Chief was my immediate superior in com-
mand.
18. Q. Adverting to paragraph 3, g., subparagraph (6) , of this same
exhibit, will you state what the Naval Base Defense Officer was re-
sponsible for under each of the subparagraphs, and opposite each state
the action taken by you as Naval Base Defense Officer prior to the
Japanese attack [3S9] on 7 December 1941 ?
A. g. (6) A. This was done by effecting agreement in regard to the
use of Army planes by the Navy, and naval planes by the Army in case
of attack. Frequently drills were held, difficulties were determined,
remedies applied, and Marine anti-aircraft was made available to as-
sist the Army, in arranging to have Army personnel sent in ships of the
Fleet for training. All of this done prior to December 7. (6) B.
About February 20, 1 had a conference with General Short, and urged
the necessity of emplacing his mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field.
On February 23 I was informed by his Chief of Staff, in writing, that
General Short had given orders that mobile anti-aircraft artillery
would be emplaced as close to the sites of our emplacements as pos-
sible, having due regard for the ownership of land. It is my belief that
his rej)resentations were not lived up to. In the intervening period
until October, the Naval Base Defense Officer personally examined
the nlans for location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were
to be emplaced, particularly those that were to be located on the naval
reservations. Subordinates of the N. B. D. O. were in constant touch
with Army representatives; endeavoring to have the guns in place, and
on December 7, the Navy was actually making arrangements to mess
and quarter Army gun crews on naval reservations, so that objections
would be removed. At a date somewhere between 15 October and
November 1 or 15th, Naval Base Defense Officer personally talked to
LieutenanfGeneral Short about this matter. General Short explained
his position, that he could not emplace these guns for several reasons —
sites were not on government land, fire-control communications would
have to be out in the weather, usually in cane fields and irrigation
ditches and be subject to deterioration; furthermore, that it would be
extremely difficult for personnel comprising the gun crews to be quar-
tered and subsisted. There were approximately 26, 3-inch anti-air-
craft guns in fixed emplacements, about 20 of them being in the vicinity
of Pearl Harbor. All of these measures were taken prior to 7 De-
cember. C.-: Commander Patrol Wing Two was a flying officer and as
such understood all the technicalities of air operation and was quali-
fied to command air forces. Control was exercised through him, and
it is believed that thorough coordination with the Army was effected.
Detailed operating plans were prepared, drills were held, difficulties
determined, and improvements made. All done before December 7. D.
(1) : N. B. D. O. was responsible for advising the S. O. E. of what
condition of readiness to maintain This was done by means taken
by him in drill. Communication plans were provided wherebv it could
be effected quickly. All before December 7. (6) D. (2) Drills held
weekly until the autumn, when they were changed to be held every two
weeks, and in these bi-weekly drills, the arrangements were made to
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to bi-weekly
drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army participation
and, also due to their frequency, there [390] had been ab-
sentees. The bi-weekly drills were arranged well in advance and in-
sured the Army participation and all hands being at each drill. All
prior to December 7. (6) D. (3) : This was done ; all signals that were
contained in the Communication Annex to the Operations Plan 1-41.
(6) D. (4) : This was practiced at actual drills, and communications
provided for the purpose. All done prior to December 7. D. (5) : A
communications plan was promulgated prior to December 7, was used
at drills. D. (G) : Air raid alarm signal was contained in the connnu-
nication plan.
1!). Q. Do you recall what condition of readiness was in effect in the
14th Naval District on the night of G December 1941 ?
A. Admiral Kimmel testified that there was a Fleet order to main-
tain condition of readiness No. 3, and General Short has testified that
Alert No. 1 was in effect in the Army in the harbor control posts. Con-
dition No. 3 was in effect, full anti-sabotage measures. It had been in
constant effect for several months. The various posts comprising my
connnand, such as the air station at Ford Island, the one at Kaneohe
Bay, the ammunition depot at Lualualei. and the communication station
at Wahiawa, and other places — the conditions of readiness were deter-
mined by the Commanding Officer, but there were no conditions of
readiness in effect.
20. Q. Had the condition of readiness existing in the 14th Naval
District been notified to the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor
on the night of 6 December 1941, to your knowledge?
A. The condition of readiness — no.
21. Q. No condition of readiness was advised to the S. O. E. ?
A. It should be borne in mind that the normal condition on board
ships in Pearl Harbor, w^ith their guns ready and ammunition at the
guns, a lai'ge percentage of the officers and men on board, was equal to
and probably higher than the Army Alert No. 2.
22. Q. What condition of readiness for aircraft was being main-
tained in the 14th Naval District, if you had any?
A. The condition of readiness for aircraft, that is, shore-based air-
craft, was the normal day-to-day condition of readiness prescribed
according to the requirements of the various squadrons or units, in
accordance with their most probable use and their days' tasks and mis-
sions, which at that point were largely training, personnel-type train-
ing exercises and materiel lessons.
23. Q. Adverting to page 5 of the Exhibit, Avliich is 2CL-41, there
are laid down certain duties of the Naval Base Defense Officer. In each
case, state what was done by you when the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor Naval Base at 0755 December 7, 1941.
A. Paragraph 3, big G, subpai-agraph 9, subparagraph c, ( 1 ) . That
is to give alarm indicating attack in progress or [S91] immi-
nent. If not already blacked out, black out when the alarm is given.
This was done both by visual signal and by air-raid alarm. Next is
(2). That was done. Paragraph 3 and 4, one of which is, launch air
search for enemy ships, and the other is to arm and prepare all bombing
units available. Many drills had been held with a view to making all
these . actions automatic and not requiring orders consuming time.
They were done "irisof ar as" aircraft 'were available after the attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 301
24. Q. Adverting to the aircraft warning system which you have
testified was the responsibility of the Army, were you required to have
any personnel attached to this system ? If so, what?
A. The Joint Agreement with the Army required the Navy to have
a liaison officer in the interceptor connnand to evaluate and relay the
messages, when the aircraft warning systgm was established. This
system was not established until December 7, when officers were sent.
25. Q. Am I to understand, then, that the aircraft warning system
had not yet been organized by the Army ?
A. The entire system, the permanent system, was nowheres near
completed. Some five or six mobile stations had been placed at points
around the island by the Army. The entire system, including the train-
ing of the personnel and the organization of the system, was in a very
formative state, and no order had been issued for Ihe establishment of
a station, nor was it issued until December 7. The entire anti-aircraft
warning system was the responsibility of the Army, and General Short
testified before this court the other day that the establishment order
was not issued until December 7.
26. Q. Achniral Kimmel has testified he considered the intelligence
unit under your command to have been adequate and, I believe, efficient.
How did you classify this unit at the time of the Japanese attack?
A. I considered the Combat Intelligence Unit efficient, but that per-
sonnel numbers were inadequate.
27. Q. As you look back upon the events which preceded the Jap-
anese attack on Pearl Harbor, are you still of the same opinion?
A. Yes, I believe it was efficient, except now I know that the space,
numbers of personnel, and equipment, was grossly inadequate.
28. Q. Do you feel that this unit kept you and the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet currently informed ?
A. Yes, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and [392]
the Commandant 14th Naval District were kept informed from such
information as this unit was able to obtain.
29. Q. Do you remember if you received intelligence information
from sources other than this unit ?
A. Yes, from the Commander-in-Chief, from the District Intelli-
gence Officer, who had an organization under the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence and who had contact with Military Intelligence, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
30. Q. Did you get any intelligence information from the Navy De-
])artment in the form of bulletins or dispatches, that you remember?
A. I got none in the form of dispatches that I remember. It is possi-
ble that the Intelligence Office got bulletins. I don't recall seeing them.
31. Q. Do you feel that you and the Comander-in-Chief of Pacific
Fleet worked in harmony in military matters affecting your command?
A. Yes, unequivocally so.
32. Q. Do you recall whether your conferences were frequent, or
otherwise, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, from
the period, say October 16, 1941, to 7 December 1941?
A. I believe it to be a fair estimate to say that I saw and talked to
the Commander-in-Chief four of five times weekly.
33. Q. In the light of what you now know, do you feel that the
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet kept you currently informed
in militarv matters?
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I felt, and still feel, that the Commander-in-Chief made an hon-
est effort to keep me fully and currently informed on all matters, and
I did my best to reciprocate.
34. Q. And can you say now that you feel that you were informed ?
A, So far as I know he gave me all the information he had.
35. Q. What Avas the nature of your relations in military matters
with the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor ?
A. I had little contact with the S. O. E. at Pearl Harbor in military
matters, in view of the physical presence of the Commander-in-Chief.
36. Q. Did you have any responsibility for the condition of readi-
ness of the vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, or was that a matter
under the Comander-in-Chief or the Senior Officer Embarked?
A. Yes, I had some resj)onsibility by paragraph 3 G (6) d. (1) of
Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41. 1 was required [393] to
advise the S. O. E. in Pearl Harbor what condition of readiness be
maintained.
37. Q. Can you now remember when you first felt that United
States-Japanese relationships were becoming acutely strained
A. I was conscious that United States-Japanese relations were
strained, in varying degrees, throughout the entire year of 1941.
38. Q. Do you recall making any decisions based on any estimate
as to what the Japanese intentions might be towards an attack in the
Hawaiian area ?
A. Of course I was not called on to make any independent decisions.
I did not have any information separate and distinct from the High
Command of the Fleet, nor did any information w^hich was furnished
me cause me to disagree with the decisions made.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, withdrew.
[394] 39. Q. I am asking you, did you make any decisions of
3^our own ?
A. My answer to that is that I was not called upon to make any in-
dependent decisions. I didn't have any information separate and
distinct from the high command of the Fleet, nor any information
which would cause me to disagree with the decisions that he made.
40. Q. Did you have any views on the possibility of a surprise air
attack on Pearl Harbor before 7 December 1941 ?
A. I considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the
declaration of war as a remote possibility.
41. Q. You have heard the testimony which Rear Admiral Kimmel
gave before this court as to the views of the Navy Department on the
physical possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack as being influenced
by the prevailing depths of water in Pearl Harbor. Did these tech-
nical views influence any estimate that you may have made of the
possibility of such an attack ?
A. Yes, inasmuch as it appeared impossible to successfully launch
torpedoes from aircraft in Pearl Harbor, I was of the opinion that a
bombing raid by aircraft would not be sufficiently profitable to cause
an enmy to undertake it.
42. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions dispatch of 27 November, 1941. Had you been shown this dis-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 303
patch by anyone before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
7 December ?
A. Yes. I saw this dispatch, or a paraphrase of it, on the evening
of November 27.
43. Q. Do you recall if you had any conference with the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet before December 7, 1941, with
reference to the information contained in this dispatch?
A. Yes, I think so.
44. Q. What was your own estimate of the situation as to the JajDa-
nese intentions based on the information current with this dispatch ?
A. At the conference above referred to, the subject matter was fully
discussed, after which the Comander-in-Chief made his decision as to
what steps should be taken. I had no information to cause me to
disagree with his conclusions.
45. Q. As a result of the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 17, at
which you are now looking, was the condition of readiness under your
command changed in any way that you remember?
A. The various commonds in the 14th Naval District did not as-
sume condition of readiness. Full anti-sabotage measures had been
in effect for several months. The various commanding officers were
responsible as such [395] for their commands. There were
adequate armed marines at all stations. There were elaborate identi-
fication pass systems in effect. All measures outside the naval reser-
vations, even up to their gates and fences, were Army responsibilities.
46. A. But so far as your command itself was concerned, what I am
trying to find out is, did you take any additional security measures
bv virtue of the information that was contained in this dispatch,
Exhibit 17?
A. Yes. We placed a patrol off of Honolulu Harbor, conducted by
the Coast Guard. We began sweeping Honolulu Harbor channel
and approaches by Navy sweepers. Some time subsequent to the
dispatch, Commander Inshore Patrol, who was one of my subordi-
nates, had the captains of the four destroyers, of Destroyer Division
80, in his office, and gave them a pep talk, and particularly^ he in-
vited their attention to the Commander-in-Chief's directive con-
cerning the depth-charging of submarines in the defensive sea area.
47. Q. Can you remember whether the question of unity of com-
mand in the Hawaiian area had been under consideration by you and
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the
Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941 ?
A. I recall no discussions concerning unity of command as apply-
ing to the Army and Navy. The existing system was mutual co-
operation. I had no reason to take any independent steps looking
toward a change in the established system.
48. Q. I show you Exhibit 18, which is the Chief of Naval Op-
erations' dispatch of 26 November, 1941. Did you have any knowledge
of its contents shortly after this date ?
A. Yes, I believe so.
49. Q. Did the action contemplated therein, namely, dispatching
a carrier to Midway and Wake, a task the accomplishment of which
would have to be executed in the future, have any influence on your
estimate of the imminence of war with JaDan?
A. No.
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
50. Q. On the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. No.
51. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' dispatch of 28 November, 1941 and refers to a message sent
by the Army to Commander Western Defense Command. Please
inspect the subject matter contained in this dispatch and inform the
court whether you were familiar with its contents around the time
of its probable receipt in Hawaii ?
A. I saw the dispatch. The only items in the dispatch which made
a real impression on me were those parts [396] concerning the
desire of the United States to have Japan make the first hostile act,
and the other one was concerning not to alarm the public. By im-
plication it was my belief that it was obligatory upon the Navy to
consider these same restrictions.
52. Q. In other words, I understand your view was this: That
even though the dispatch was purely informatory, its having been
sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to activities in the Hawaiian
area, it did have some influence on your actions ?
A. The message was an Army dispatch but it contained certain
wording concerning hostile attack and alarming the public that was
in the Navy dispatch of the same date. I believe that these restric-
tions applied to the Navy.
53. Q. Did these matters which you say you feel applied to the
Navy limit your initiative in any way relative to measures for in-
creased security that you might have taken in the 14th Naval Dis-
trict?
A. No.
54. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibit 20, which is the Chief of Naval
Operations' dispatch of 3 December, 1941, the subject matter of which
is informatory of the action of Japanese diplomatic and consular
posts at certain places destroying most of their codes and ciphers
and burning all other secret and confidential documents. Do you
recall whether you were informed of the subject matter of this dis-
patch at any time after its probable time of receipt by the Commander-
in-Chief?
A. I saw the dispatch.
55. Q. Did the receipt of this information revise your estimate in
any way of the imminence of a United States- Japanese war ?
A. The dispatch itself did not cause any change, in my opinion,
regarding the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior
to the declaration of war. It did not cause me to take any increased
security measures in the 14th Naval District except to direct the Dis-
trict Intelligence Officer to arrange with the Army and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for a close surveillance of the Japanese Con-
sulate General. Adequate security measures were already effective.
56. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibits 21 and 22, which are the
Chief of Naval Operations' dispatches of 4 and 6 December, 1941,
respectively, and which contain directives to destroy secret and con-
fidential publications on Guam and outlying Pacific bases. Do you
remember whether you had been informed of the subject matter of
these dispatches prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
7 December 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 305
A. I believe Admii-al Kimmel showed me these dispatches, or para-
ph i-nses of them.
[397] oT. Q- Did these dispatches influence you to revise in any
manner your estimate of the imminence of war between the United
States and Japan as of that time?
A. No.
58. Q. The possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. No.
59. Q. Did the information influence you to take any increased
security measures in the activities under your command?
A. 1 believe that Admiral Kimmel caused me to send dispatches to
Wake and, possibly Midway concerning the destruction of such con-
fidential and secret codes as they might have. I am not certain on
that point but that is my belief.
60. Q. Were you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
in contact frequently between 27 November and 7 December lOil, on
matters of a military nature ?
A. Yes.
61. Q. Do you feel you were reasonably well informed in matters
affecting your command?
A. Yes, I think the Commander-in-Chief tried to tell me everything.
62. Q. Will you answer the questions? Do you feel that you were
reasonably well informed on matters that affected your own command ?
A. Yes.
63. Q. You and the Commander-in-Chief of the' Pacific Fleet were
in accord in these matters ?
A. Yes. The Commander-in-Chief never indicated any disap-
proval of my actions.
64. Q. Do you, yourself, remember having informed him of the
condition of readiness w^hich you were taking in your command up
to the time of 0755 on 7 December 1941 ?
A. No, I do not remember ever having categorically advised him,
but on October 16 and on November 27, and possibly on November 24,
conferences were held with the Commander-in-Chief and it was de-
cided to make no changes. I had every reason to think the Com-
mander-in-Chief knew the conditions.
65. Q. On the question of long-range reconnaissance, I would like a
summary at this time of the command relationship that existed be-
tween yourself as a Naval Base Defense officer and the Commander of
Patrol Wing Two. For what matters did he come under your com-
mand ?
A. My sole connection with long-range reconnaissance [S98]
was that as Commandant of the 14th Naval District I had made a joint
agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
which would be placed in execution on M-day, or by order of the War
and Navy Departments, or upon the mutual agreement of the two
local commanders of the Army and Navy, after which time it would
then become a responsibility of the Navy to provide distant reconnais-
sance aircraft for this purpose which had been allocated to the 14th
Naval District by the Navy Department, but I had been informed that
their delivery was indefinite. In connection wath Fleet Confidential
Letter 2CL-41 (Revised), Commander Patrol AVing Two was Com-
mander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and as such he was under
79716—46 — J:x. 146. vol. 1 21
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
my control insofar as I exercised supervisory control over naval shore-
based aircraft, arranging through him, Commander Patrol Wing Two,
for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.
66. Q. I am still a little bit puzzled as to this command relationship.
ComPat Wing Two was whom ?
A. Admiral Bellinger.
67. Q. Did he have any other duties than ComPat Wing Two ?
A. Yes. He was Commander of Task Force Nine. I believe he w^as
Commander Air Scouting Force. He was also Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force.
68. Q. That is what I am trying to straighten out, exactly this situ-
ation : For example, if Admiral Bellinger had under his command,
say 5 squadrons of patrol planes. How w^ould you, as a Naval Base
Defense officer, know whether these 5 squadrons of planes belonged
to him as Commander Scouting Force, or as Naval Base Defense
officer ?
A. I don't believe I am the best qualified person to tell you that.
Admiral Bellinger, was not under my command. He was a Fleet
officer.
69. Q. But he was a Naval Base Defense Air Officer, was he not ?
A. Yes, but the Naval Base Defense Air Force was like a volun-
teer fire department. When you sounded the air raid alarm they
came, and when the air raid alarm wasn't in effect, they were doing
something else.
10. Q. That is exactly what I am trying to get at. Suppose, for
example, you, in your capacity as Naval Base Defense officer, wanted
to use two or three squadrons of these 5 squadrons of planes that
I have assumed Admiral Bellinger had under his command, and you
ordered him to turn these planes over to you. Could he say, "Well,
they belong to the Scouting Force and I can't let you [399]
have them"?
A. Well, he was a very good friend of mine but I don't believe
he would have done it without asking the Commander-in-Chief.
71. Q. In other words, for you to get any planes that Admiral
Bellinger had under his command it would probably mean that you
would have to go to the Commander-in-Chief, or that he would,
before you would get them in your capacity as Naval Base Defense
officer ?
A. Not exactly. There were a lot of aircraft. First, the Marine
aircraft at Ewa Field. That had a commanding officer, a Marine
officer, a flyer. They had certain duties to do all the time. On
Ford Island there were a lot of carrier based planes that had been
left there temporarily, and m.aybe some other types of planes. They
had commanding officers. They had their duties and so forth to
carry out. Task Force Nine, the patrol planes, the same thing. They
had their duties to perform under Admiral Bellinger. Now, normally
they were all carrying on their duties. When the air-raid alarm went,
then they all became the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and only at
that time.
72. Q. In other words, in your capacity as Naval Base Defense
officer, you had no planes at all unless you rang the alarm ?
A. Of course I might, under some circumstances, receive positive
information from the Commander-in-Chief that there was an enemy
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 307
approaching, to sound an air raid alarm, and I would sound an air
raid alarm, and then this thing would function.
73. Q. Let me put it another way: Suppose, for example, upon
the receipt of the information contained in the dispatch of November
27, you felt it your duty, as the Naval Base Defense officer, to send
out a long-range reconnaissance. Could you have told Admiral
Bellinger then, "I want all the planes you've got to conduct this
reconnaissance" ?
A. My duties as Naval Base Defense officer are clearly described in
the Order. Nowhere in the order does it say that I shall make long-
distance reconnaissance.
74. Qi. Well, I am puzzled and I don't know whether the court
has it clear, or not, but that is exactly the point I would like to get
cleared up.
A. I have told you all there is about it. If I know something you
want to know, I would be very glad to tell you.
75. Q. Who did have the authority to make long distance recon-
naissance ?
A. The Commander Task Force Nine, or Commander Patrol Wing
One and Two, the same individual. Admiral Bellinger, had as his
mission to make scouting patrols and [400] distance recon-
naissance. But they were subject to the order of the Commander-
in-Chief.
76. Q. To clarify that point, Admiral Bellinger couldn't do this
on his own initiative; he would have to have orders from the Com-
mander-in-Chief ?
A. I believe so, but I would rather you ask Admiral Bellinger.
77. Q. At any rate during the period 27 November to 7 December,
1941, did you consult with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet looking toward the establishment of a long-range aircraft
reconnaissance ?
A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, made his decision on
November 27, that the intensive training, material upkeep and opera-
tional schedules would continue and that no changes would be made.
This, by itself, would include the long-range aircraft reconnaissance.
I made no suggestions to him.
78. Q. Whose responsibility was it for berthing ships in Pearl
Harbor so that they could develop the maximum anti-aircraft fire?
A. The senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.
79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of your own whether on the
night of 6-7 December, ships were so berthed ?
A. I believe so, except possibly in the case of double-berthed
battleships.
80. Q. But this was not a matter of your responsibility ?
A. That was not a matter of my responsibility and was an un-
avoidable situation.
81. Q. Wlien did you first know there was an enemy attack on
Pearl Harbor, and how did you ascertain it ?
A. At about 0755, 7 December 1941. I heard the explosion of
bombs.
82. Q. This convinced you of an attack, or did you need somebody
to inform you further?
A. I went out on my lanai and saw a Japanese plane coming by.
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
83, Q. Will you tell the court what action you took at this time?
A. I went to my headquarters as fast as I could. I immediately
initiated dispatches to Washington, the Philippines, Guam, ships at
sea, and possibly others, to the effect that Oahu had been attacked.
I directed local broadcasting stations to call all Navy Yard workers
and naval personnel to the yard; directed drydocks to be flooded;
also many other local directives.
[401] 84. Q. Wliat percentage of officers and men under your
command who had military duties were ready and available for duty
at the time of the attack at 0755, if you can remember, in a general
way i
A. The Navy Yard, under my command, and the District Head-
quarters, I do not know the exact percentage, but ample personnel
was present and all institutions and vessels in the command were im-
mediately ready.
The court then, at 3 : 00 p. m., took a recess until 3 : 15 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
Present :
All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties and
their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose
counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness
and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examination by the judge advocate (continued) :
85. Q. Prior to the air attack at 0755 on the morning of 7 December,
1941, had there been any enemy activity in the Hawaiian area other
than that of aircraft that you knew about ?
A. Yes.
86. Q. What was it?
A. At about 0715 I received a telephone message from my chief of
staff to the effect that the USS WARD, the old destroyer which was
acting as inshore patrol off the harbor entrance, had reported that she
had attacked a submarine, and about the same time, either in this mes-
sage or a subsequent message, the WARD reported that she was then
escorting a sampan to Honolulu. The staff duty officer at Commander-
in-Chief's headquarters was given the same information at the same
time by the Harbor Control Post. I discussed this with the chief of
staff over the telephone and we were uncertain as to whether this was
another false contact, or not. Captain Momsen, the War Plans officer,
went to headquarters to verify the situation and immediately ordered
the ready-duty destroyer out to sea to support the WARD. This was
doctrine. Before the matter could be clarified the air attack had
begun.
[4-02] 87. Q. Did you have any information as to where the
attack on the submarine took place that you have stated you had a
report of ?
A. I knew it was somewhere south of the entrance buoys in the
harbor entrance approaches.
88. Q. But do you or do you not know whether it was inside or out-
side of the submarine net?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 309
A. That would be outside the submarine net.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
89. Q. In your testimony. Admiral, you related the Army deficien-
cies and the Navy deficiencies insofar as the 14th Naval District was
concerned. However, when the Fleet was in, the deficiencies in regard
to patrol craft and, to a reasonable degree, in regard to patrol planes,
could be remedied, couldn't it, sir ?
A. No. The Fleet's vessels which could be used as patrol craft,
and the Fleet's patrol planes, were all occupied in their own routine
employment, which was intensive training, material upkeep, and oper-
ation. I could not use those instrumentalities without the consent of
the Commander-in-Chief.
90. Q. I think you misunderstood me, Admiral. I will rephrase my
question this way : In the event such contingency as occured on De-
cember 7, 1941, there were other craft when the Fleet was in port that
could be made available to you, sir. Is that not correct ?
A. There were ships and aircraft there but I do not know as to their
availability, as to giving them to me.
91. Q. That is, insofar as you were Commandant of the 14th Naval
District?
A. As Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
92. Q. And as far as the Army was concerned, whether the ships
came from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, or whether
they came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, wouldn't
make any difference to them, would it?
A. I don't think the Army had any interest in the ships.
93. Q. My point is this. Admiral: Then as of December 6 and
December 7, 1941, in regard to the actual vessels and planes then avail-
able at Pearl Harbor, do you think that the Army had any particular
criticism to make of the Navy in regard to the readiness of the Navy to
meet necessary commitments ?
A. I have heard of none.
[403] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross examine this
witness.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret),
stated that he did not desire to cross examine this witness.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
94. Q. Did you have any information on a submarine being sunk
inside the harbor?
A. Yes. In my previous testimony I have stated that Captain
Momsen ordered the ready-duty destroyer to sea to support the USS
WARD. This destroyer got under way about 8 : 00 o'clock, and_ in
standing out of the harbor she sighted a Japanese submarine which
she rammed and depth-charged and sunk. Subsequent thereto this
same submarine was depth-charged several additional times. The
submarine, after it was raised, was found to have one, 5-inch shell
hole through the conning tower, which killed the captain. He was
blown into a mass of crumpled steel, and both torpedoes were missing.
The submarine carried two torpedoes. The submarine was known as
a midgret submarine.
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
95. Q. You spoke a moment ago about an attack that the WARD
had made on a submarine. Do you know whether or not this sub-
marine was sunk, or whether it was just a report of an attack that
the WARD made?
A. Subsequent to December Tth, I learned for the first time that
a patrol plane had also seen this submarine, or another submarine,
and attacked it with depth bombs, and that the submarine was sunk.
96. Q. What type of submarine was this ?
A. A midget.
, 97. Q. What sort of net protection against submarines was in-
stalled in the Pearl Harbor channel ?
A. No anti-submarine nets were installed in Pearl Harbor or Hono-
lulu, but anti-torpedo nets were installed to prevent submarines from
firing torpedoes from outside into the harbor. The only nets in opera-
tion then, and now I believe, was an anti-torpedo net.
98. Q. If this net had been closed, do you think it was adequate to
exclude a midget submarine from the harbor ?
A. That is a question of opinion. I think it highly probable that
the submarine would have been fouled by the net and the patrols would
have seen it and made its detection much easier.
99. Q. Do you have any information as t^^ the condition of this
anti-torpedo net in the Pearl Harbor channel; whether it was open
or closed on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. The practice and orders required the net gate to [4^4] be
open all day but to be closed all night, except when ships were arriving
or departing. At about 4:45 a. m., some vessels which had been at
sea, I believe minesweepers, approached the net and the gate was
open.
100. Q. What day?
A. December 7th. And I subsequently found that this gate had not
been closed until sometime after 8 : 00 o'clock, when it was ordered
closed by Headquarters.
[4-OS] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Examined by the court :
101. Q. Will you give a brief description of that net?
A. The net was backed up in the shallow water areas by under-
water obstacles. Where the water became deep enough to permit a
torpedo to run, the net began. It was anchored on the shore side with
heavy buoys. The net was made in interlocking rings, so that every
ring interlocked with three or four. It was held afloat by large buoys
on the surface known as baulks. They were merely small wooden
rafts. On the top of these rafts were powerful steel prongs projected
to seaward. At the gate end, on the shore side, there was a gate vessel,
which was a steel vessel probably three or four hundred feet long and
twelve to fourteen feet draught, which had some generators and power-
ful winches to handle lines. The other shore end was anchored in
exactly the same way I have described the first one, except there was
no gate vessels, but there was a hinge on the gate which held in place
the large buoys. There were lines which ran from the gate vessel to
the opposite side of the net through blocks and came back to the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 311
entrance of the gate, so that when the gate was to be opened, the gate
vessel hauled on a wire line, which went through a block on the other
side and pulled open the gate. When you wanted to close it, you
hauled on the opposite line.
102. Q. What was the depth of the water in the channel?
A. I think the deepest place was about seventy-two feet, but that
was in the exact center of the channel.
103. Q. What was the depth of the net?
A. As I recall it, it was forty -five feet.
104. Q. Can you tell us what the overall measurements of the sub-
marine were, from the top of the conning tower to the bottom?
A. I think the submarine was sixteen feet from the keel to the top
of the conning tower, and the periscope stuck up three or four feet
more — say, twenty feet.
105. Q. The first submarine on which you got a contact was about
liow^ far south of the entrance buoy? Do you remember?
A. I have subsequently determined it was somewhat over a mile.
[406] 106. Q. You don't know whether it was a midget or big-
ger submarine?
A. I believe it was a midget, I think the WARD sunk one, and
whether or not the plane sunk another or contributed to the WAilD's
effort, I haven't been able to learn. However, a Japanese radio broad-
cast admitted on or about December 12 that the Japanese had lost five
submarines on this attack.
107. Q. Now, will you tell the court a little about the submarine
which got into the harbor?
A. It is my recollection that the submarine which entered the har-
bor was first sighted by a barge, which we call YP something. I don't
remember the number. It was somewhere south of Hospital Point.
This barge endeavored to ram it and made a report by signal to the
signal tower. The submarine proceeded up channel and went on the
north side of Ford Island — All of this was reconstructed afterwards —
and fired torpedoes at the USS CURTIS, which was moored some-
where west of Pearl City. The CURTIS saw the torpedoes. They
missed and hit the Pearl City peninsula, and one of them exploded.
The CURTIS opened fire immediately, and I believe the five-inch
shell found in the conning tower of this submarine was one of the five-
inch shell of the CURTIS. The MONAGHAN, which had gotten
away from her berth at the east end of the harbor and was standing
out, saw this submarine about the same time and rammed depth
charges, and the other destroyers coming along later dropped a few
depth charges for good luck.
108. Q. Were there any other submarines which got into the har-
bor, to your knowledge ?
A. None, although we had no less than fifty alarms that day, the
next day, and the following days.
109. Q. I believe you said that if the gate of that net had been
closed, it is probable that the submarine would have been entangled
in it?
A. Yes. I might say another submarine was captured.
110. Q. Where?
A. The third submarine ran ashore on the reef off Bellows Field
on the northeast coast of Oahu. The Army went out, and the captain
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
jumped overboard and was captured by the Army. The Army went
out and got lines on her and informed us, and we went over and took
her apart and brought her to Pearl Harbor, and she is now used for
making bond drives around this country.
111. Q. As we understand it, the submarine which you speak of
as entering the harbor was not sighted until after it reached Ford
Island or was off Ford Island ?
A. Sighted by a YP south of Hospital Point first.
[407] 112. Q. How far is that inside the gate and the net?
A. Oh, probably a mile and a half.
113. Q. Were there any lookouts at the gate as a matter of doctrine
or as a result of your orders to keep watch 'i
A. Yes, there was a gate vessel which had a full crew on board in
command of a chief petty officer, and there were motor launch patrols.
lU. Q. At all times?
A. At all times.
115. Q. They did not sight this submarine?
A. If they did, they did not report it.
lie. Q. Did you give orders to close the gate?
A. I believe the captain of the yard gave orders to close it.
117. Q. But it was closed immediately?
A. It was closed.
118. Q. In view of the critical conditions existing with Japan, al-
though w^e were on a peace footing at that time, was there any con-
sideration given by you or anyone else to keeping this gate closed at
all times, opening it only for the passage of vessels?
A. Yes, we considered it, but owning to the heavy traffic in the day
time and the fact that visibility was good and that there were men and
boats there all the time, it w^as decided in the day time to keep it
open.
119. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, was there any inner
air patrol maintained around the entrance to seaward of Pearl
Harbor ?
A. None that I have knowledge of.
120. Q. Did you ever consider asking for it, looking to the main-
tenance of such a patrol ?
A. Yes, I had asked the Nav}^, through the Commander-in-Chief,
for four observation sea planes for the purpose of anti-submarine
patrol and work in the coastal area.
121. Q. But in view of the ships in Pearl Harbor at that time and
the fact that these ships had on them 0S2U planes and other smaller
planes which could have been used for an enemy patrol, were any
steps taken toward this end ?
A. No, not by me.
122. Q. Was it considered?
A. I think it was considered. I have some difficulty separating
pre-December 7 and post-December 7. I think it was [V^S]
considered, but I think that owing to the fact that the ships at sea
were employed for long periods — ten days — in which they used their
planes, when they came into the Base, the opinion was that these
planes and the men were entitled to rehabilitation, the same as the
rest of the crew on a ship.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 313
128. Q. Does the court understand that you liad no aircraft what-
soever under your direct command?
A. That is correct, sir.
124. Q. Did you. Admiral, considei- that the Army was responsible
for the defense of Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, absolutely so.
125. Q. How many anti-aircraft guns did you request the Army to
place on naval reservations in and arounci Pearl Harbor?
A. In a letter which I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations, via the
Commander-in-Chief, dated December 30, 1040, which is an exhibit
before this court, I stated, based on my knowled^re of the density of
anti-aircraft fire, that I thouojht at least 500 guns were required.
126. Q. On the reservation?
A. Not all on the reservation. The Army Commanding General,
through his supporting generals in charge of this particular thing,
controlled the distribution of weapons which he had available.
127. Q. Admiral, will you please state your relations with General
Short, both official and personal, during your tenure of command?
A. My personal relations with General Short were friendly and
cordial. My official relations with him were good. Of course, we
had disagreements from time to time — differences of opinion but none
of them of any serious consequence.
128. Q. Did you feel that there was close cooperation existing be-
tween you and General Short ?
A. Yes.
129. Q. You have no doubt heard rumors of the existence of non-
cooperation and lack of cooperation between high officials of the
Navy in Hawaii and General Short? Are you aware of such rumors?
A. I have read them in the papers.
130. Q. Do you know where such rumors emanated?
A. I do not, but every time I heard them I took occasion to deny
their truthfulness.
[409] 131. Q. In other words, you are of the opinion that there
was close cooperation between the Army and Navy in Hawaii?
A. That is my opinion.
132. Q. On or prior to the night of 6th-7th of December, 1941,
did you advise the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor as to what
condition of readiness to maintain?
A. No.
133- Q. During the conference which you speak of as taking place
on November 28 with the Commander-in-Chief and at which there
were numerous officers present, did you express your ideas to the
Commander-in-Chief and to officers present as to the kind of attack,
if any, which could be expected?
A. Expected where, sir?
134. Q. Expected at Pearl Harbor?
A. The only information which I had was contained in this dis-
patch of November 27, in which there is nothing said indicating an
attack on Pearl Harbor.
135. Q. But, Admiral, in discussing this dispatch was there any
discussion as to the kind of attack which might come from Japan?
A. I believe that there was full and free discussion by all members
who were present and that, without exception, everyone believed that
the dispatch indicated an attack in Southeast Asia.
314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
136. Q. Did you at that time express your views as to the improb-
ability of an attack on Hawaii ?
A. I don't recall.
137. Q. But you have stated that your views were that an air attack
was a remote possibility?
A. I have — a surprise air attack prior to declaration of war.
138. Q. In view of the history of the Japanese war with Russia,
in which they attacked Russia prior to a declaration of war, was any
consideration given in these conferences to the possibility of such an
attack by Japan against Pearl Harbor?
A. I don't know that the Chemulpo incident was mentioned, but I
think every person present at the conferences knew the circumstances.
My own opinion was that if Japan ever made a surprise attack on the
Hawaiian area prior to a declaration of war, the probabilities were,
first, a submarine attack on ships in the operating areas; second,
blocking the entrance channel by running in a ship and sinking it;
third, by laying mines to to the approaches of Pearl Harbor ; fourth,
by sabotage throughout the establishment.
[^4J0] 139. Q. And you eliminated, as we understand, the possi-
bility of aerial torpedo attack by reason of information received from
the Navy Department and elsewhere?
A. I believed an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor could not
be successful, from information which had been supplied by the Navy
Department.
140. Q. And if there was any air attack, it would be a bombing
attack?
A. Yes.
141. Q. Did you feel, Admiral, at that time that you, by reason
of information you had received from all sources, had a complete
picture of conditions existing between the United States and Japan
with reference to this critical situation ?
A. My horizon and my perspective were extremely restricted. I
had a great many pressing local duties to do. I felt confident that
the Navy Department could evaluate any of these matters and keep
the responsible officers advised.
142. Q. Did you have telephonic communication with the Chief of
Naval Operations or the Navy Department in Washington ?
A. I had a commercial telephone in my office which could be
connected.
143. Q. Did you have a scrambler system? ^
A. Not an individual scrambler system.
144. Q. Any scrambler system which you could use and which was
available to you ?
A. No, unless it was on a commercial line.
145. Q. As a matter of fact, the scrambler system is attached to a
personal line telephone?
A. I believe that is correct.
146. Q. Did you have any telephonic communication with Wash-
ington during your tenure of office ?
A. Yes, on December 7 at approximately nine o'clock in the morning
the Chief of Naval Operations called me by telephone and asked me
for details of the attack.
147. Q. He called you and you did not call him?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 315
A. That is correct, sir.
148. Q. Admiral, referring to the gate again, how long did it take
to open and shut it?
A. I haven't an exact knowledge. I suppose eight or ten minutes.
[4^1] 149. Q. In normal traffic, wouldn't that have meant, had
you kept the gate closed in the day time, as a matter of practice, it
would have been open most of the time ?
A. It would have been working all the time. That's correct.
150. Q. Before or since December 7, 1941, did there come to your
notice, official or otherwise, any instances of naval personnel being
unfit for duty immediately before or during the attack because of
previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor?
A. None whatever.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.
The court then, at 4:00 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August
18, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 317
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1944
[4^-^] Tjiirteexth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Xavy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfns, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews. U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
leporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested
party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the twelfth day .of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), an interested party
and a witness for the judge advocate, w^as recalled as a witness by
the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1, Q. In previous testimony before this court, not only yours but
others, there Jias been certain evidence introduced as to the number
of guns available for anti-aircraft guns in the protection of Pearl
Harbor. It is not clear to the judge advocate the actual number of
guns that were in position and ready to fire at 0755, on the morning
of 7 December 1941. Will you state as best you can the number and
the calibre of each anti-aircraft gun that was in position and ready
to fire at that time?
A. You mean on shore?
2. Q. Exclusive of units of the Pacific Fleet or of the l-lth Naval
District on board ship ?
A. To my best belief and kowledge, the Army had about [-^-?<?]
80 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about
100 50-calibre machine guns — all of these for antiaircraft use. Of
the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed em-
placements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of this
30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
other 3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37-
millimeter guns and 50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with
any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in
place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them
were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the
Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in
conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the
neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not
mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their
orders from the Army.
3. Q. What calibre were these marine guns?
A. They were 3-inch guns, Army type, mobile.
4. Q. These guns, Admiral, that you have described as being located
in permanent mounts at forts in the vicinity, were they sufficiently
close to Pearl Harbor Naval Base to be effective as anti-aircraft guns
for the protection of that base and units of the fleet at the base^
A, In my opinion they were not sufficient in number or calibre or
type.
5. Q. My question related to the closeness of these guns to Pearl
Harbor, for the purpose of furnishing protection.
A. They covered the approaches from the sea in the vicinity of the
channel, and four or five thousand yards inside.
6. Q. Now can you tell the court or give the court any estimate of
the number of these guns that you have described that were actually
manned and in the engagement after the alarm was sounded at 0755
on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. No, I can't give you any data on that.
7. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter dated February 17, 1941, from
the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addresses. I ask you if
you can identify it.
A. Yes, I identify this letter.
8. Q. What do you identify it as ?
A. I identify it as a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations,
dated February 17, 1941, addressed to the Commandants, First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, TAvelfth,
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth Naval Districts, and the
Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo; subject: Anti-torpedo
baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks ; simed by R. E.
Ingersoll, Acting.
[^i.j] The letter dated February 17, 1941, from the Chief of
Naval operations to the Commandants of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and to the Com-
mandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo, was submitted to the inter-
ested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in
evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 54."
9. Q. Will you please read the letter to the court ?
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 54.
10. Q. Admiral, I show you a document; can you identify it?
A. Yes, I identify this as a letter from the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, dated June 13, 1941, addressed to the Commandants, First,
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 319
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh,
Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval
Districts, on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against
torpedo plane attacks. It is confidential letter, serial number
055730, signed by R. E. Ingersoll.
The letter dated June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations,
addressed to the Commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, was submitted to
the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate
offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 55."
11. Q. Will you please read it to the court?
The witness read the letter, Exhibit 55.
12. Q. Admiral, I show you a document and ask you if you can
identify it?
A. I don't recall ever having seen it before.
13. Q. Can you identify it?
A. The letter is a copy, apparently, of a confidential letter, serial
number 07830, dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, on the subject
of Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms, signed
by H. R. Stark.
The letter, serial number 07830, confidential, dated February 11, 1941,
from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance, was submitted to the inter- 14^-5] ested parties and
to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
The interested p)arties. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ;
and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , stated that
they had never before seen the letter, but stated that they had no objec-
tion to its being received as an exhibit.
Accordingly, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT
56."
14. Q. Will you please read the letter?
The witness read the letter. Exhibit 56.
None of the interested parties desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
15. Q. Were there any guns mounted or in use or available for use by
the Navy, other than guns on board ship at the Pearl Harbor station ?
A. The Marine Defense Battalion guns were there, but they were al-
located to the Army, in connection with the Army.
16. Q. Does this apply on Kanoehe and other activities under your
command ?
A. The Marine detachment in the Yard had shoulder rifles and 30-
calibre machine guns. They were not designed for anti-aircraft work,
but there is no doubt in my mind that they were used to the fullest ex-
tent by the Marines there. I know of no other machine guns. I know
there were no larger guns, and I know of no 50-calibre machine guns in
the Navy Yard that were mounted for anti-aircraft defense and so
used, unless they were improvised after the attack. At Kanoehe, the
Army had agreed to defend it, and I believe that they had a 3-inch
battery, of 4 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, mobile, located in the near vicin-
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ity of Kanoehe. Whether they were eniphiced and whether they fired,
I don't know. The Navy had no guns for that purpose. They had guns,
of course, but they were macliine guns for the Marines, and I suppose
the aircraft had machine guns at Kanoehe. The aircraft at Pearl Har-
bor had machine guns, but they were either mounted in the planes or
outside, so the answer, with those excej^tions, is there were no guns.
17. Q. Due to the critical situation and the possibility of war, and a
possibility — even though as stated, remote — of attack on Pearl Harbor,
did you give any consideration to the obtaining of and mounting in
prominent places on buildings, and otherwise, of anti-aircraft guns?
A. The Army's plan for the utilization of their 50-cal- liiG]
ibre guns and 37-millimeter guns was to take certain numbers of them,
which I don't know, and mount them on the top of Marine Barracks,
storehouse, submarine base, and the receiving barracks in Pearl Har-
bor; and I made no independent plans.
18. Q. But the question was, did you give any consideration to the
defense by anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, on buildings or other
prominent structures in Pearl Harbor ?
A. I don't recollect that I did.
19. Q. Did you consider that it was your responsibility to consider
this in view of conditions existing ?
A. Well, that is a rather broad question. The Army was charged
with the responsibility, as I have stated before. I knew that their
weapons were not adequate. Naturally, I wanted to do everything pos-
sible in my power, but I know that I considered it was my responsi-
bility— I would have done it if I thought it was possible and I could
have done it and if I could have manned them, and had trained per-
sonnel, and so forth.
20. Q. But you did consider. Admiral, that one of the means of anti-
aircraft defense of shore establishments is the mounting of these
smaller guns on prominent positions, did you ?
A. No, I think when the responsibility of the defense of a place rests
with a certain agency, that that agency should do it to the fullest extent,
and if it is not sufficient, that anybody who is there should do what he
could to supplement, but in no way should the responsibility of the first
agency be weakened.
21. Q. The fact remains that you were cooperating with the Army
for this defense ; is that correct ?
A. Yes, I was cooperating to my fullest extent in every regard.
22. Q. The only reason for these questions was to try to find out
what had been done in the way of suggestions, cooperation, and other-
wise, to install and obtain as many guns as possible, and install these
guns in the Navy Yard, in addition to outside.
A. I did not ask for any guns.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) :
23. Q. Admiral, do you recall in connection with guns, of conversa-
tions with the Army representatives in connection with providing
quarters and so forth on naval grounds, for this material?
A. Yes.
[4J'/\ 24. Q. Would you indicate that?
A. In my testimony yesterday, I mentioned that I had been trying
to arrange with the Commanding General, the emplacement of his
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 321
mobile guns. I wanted the guns in the Navy Yard, on the buildings
and so forth and so on, to be supplied by the Army, to be emplaced
with their crews. One of the objections, as I remember it, was that the
Army didn't see how they could c[uarter and mess the men in those
localities, and we had sent a letter, I believe, to the submarine barracks
and the receiving station, and the Marine Barracks, asking them if
they could quarter certain numbers, and mess them; and I believe that
at the time of December 7, some of these letters had been answered,
but the arrangements had not been perfected.
Neither the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
nor the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), desired to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
25. Q. Are you referring to guns to be mounted on buildings, or
3-inch guns, or guns to be mounted on the ground ?
A. I am referring to machine guns and 37-millimeter guns to be
mounted on buildings.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything lelating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as interested party.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret.), at present on
active duty in the Naval War College, Newport.
2. Q. Will you state what duties you were performing in tlie year
1941?
A. In January 1941, I became Commander Battle Force, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, and later in that same year, under [4^^] special
directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Commander of Task Force
One.
3. Q. Where were you at 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941?
A. I was at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu.
4. Q. The Task Force which you commanded was in port at that
time, Admiral ?
A. It was.
5. Q. How long previous to the morning of 7 December 1941, had
this task force which you commanded, and you yourself, along with
it, been in Pearl Harbor — how many days ?
A. We had to report on Thursday, approximately the 27th of No-
vember, 1941.
6. Q. Who was the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor dur-
ing the period of time that you and your Task Force were in Pearl
Harbor ?
A. I was.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 22
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 8, which is Fleet letter 2CL-41, in
evidence before this court, and ask you if you identify it as such.
A. I do.
8. Q. What is the subject of this letter ?
A. Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
9. Q. Paragraph 3 of this letter stated that "The following security
measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accoidance with
enclosure (B)." I shall ask you to read to the court the following
subparagraphs and state whether the directive was being complied
with as of 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941.
A. (Reading) "Items one, two, and three under continuous patrols :
Inshore Patrol (Administered and furnished by Commandant Four-
teenth Naval District). (2) Boom Patrols. (3) Harbor Patrols."
Although these patrols were not under my direct supervision, to the
best of my knowledge and belief they were in effect. (Reading)
"Intermittent Patrols: (1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol. (a) The
limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a
circle 10 miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number 1
which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol." To the best of my
knowledge and belief, that was being complied with. Item (2) (a)
(Reading) "Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft,
Scouting Force." Also, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
within the capacities of available aircraft.
10. Q. Adverting to paragraph (3) (G), which is "Defense Against
Air Attack," subparagraph (4), please read this directive to the court
for the record and state whether or [4^9^ not it had been com-
plied with at the time of the Japanese attack at 7 : 55, December 7,
1941?
A. (Reading:)
The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that
they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensu-
rate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to
depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers,
and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.
In my opinion, it was being complied with.
11. Q. Will you please read subparagraph (5), the next one, and
state whether or not at the same time each gunfire sector had a known
sector gun commander 'i
A. (Reading:)
The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in subparagraph (G) (3)
above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.
The passing of responsibility to the sector commander was auto-
matic with the ships in that sector. It was the practice upon any
change of ships in port for each sector commander to inform the ships
of his sector that he had so taken command, and that was the common
practice.
12. Q. What was the system employed in these sectors for control-
ling the fire in the sector ?
A. There was no system other than to be responsible for the look-
out being maintained within the sector, and the necessary action taken
to indicate possible targets.
13. Q. Was there any method or system of coordination of lire be-
tween ships of the Fleet and Shore batteries?
A. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 323
14. Q. Did yon, as Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, set
llie condition of readiness for ships in the United States Pacific Fleet
in Pearl Harbor when you were in ])ort ?
A. There was no condition of readiness set, and in this respect I
would like to say that my testimony before Admiral Hart's board, in
Avhich I stated that conclition 3 was in effect, was in error; also the
statement that I had informed Admiral Kinnnel that condition 3 was
in effect, which statement was also in error. In that testimony I had
principally in mind the differentiation between condition 3, 1, and 2;
in other words, I meant to imply that neither one nor two were in
effect. What was in effect was the result of an order previously is-
sued by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, directing that anti-
aircraft guns of all ships be available for immediate action. In ac-
cordance with this directive, each battleship had two 5-inch anti-air-
craft guns in readiness, and two machine guns manned ; in addition to
the anti-aircraft control, with the provision under this directive in
effect, I 4^0] the condition of readiness of the anti-aircraft bat-
teries actually was in excess of that required by condition 3, Base De-
fense Condition 3, of the order referred to.
[4^0] 15. Q. Rear Admiral Kimmel, who was Commander-in-
Chief of Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor, testified, as the judge advocate recalls it, that it was the duty of
the Naval Base Defense Officer to advise the Senior Officer Embarked
in Pearl Harbor in what condition he, the Naval Base Defense Of-
ficer, was maintaining of readiness on shore. Exhibit 8, which you
have before you, states it was the Naval Base Defense Officer's duty
to advise the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, other than the
Commander-in-Chief, what condition of readiness to maintain. This
appears to be slightly confusing. What was the normal way of pre-
scribing the condition of readiness for ships at Pearl Harbor^
A. It seems to me that the order is perfectly clear. No condition
of readiness other than the condition one, had been prescribed at any
time, even during the drills. My interpretation of advise, was written
in the order is, ''inform as to the necessity for," which was a perfectly
sound directive in view of the fact that the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District was in direct contact with the Army and had his own
intelligence service or operations within the immediate vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands. I, being senior to him, it is my opinion that the
Commander-in-Chief used the term "advise" because he did not want
to use the term "order." The senior commander afloat had no direct
communication with the Army and had no intelligence service except
his own staff, which was operative only at sea.
16. Q. During the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, had
the Naval Base Defense Officer advised you of any condition of read-
iness to maintain ?
A. Not to my know- ledge. It is possible that during that period
we did have an anti-air raid drill, in which case we may have received
word to take condition one, which was indicated by the sounding of
the air-raid siren and word over the communication network.
17. Q. Adverting to subparagraph 8, under this same general sec-
tion that you have been reading from, that is, "Defense Against Air
Attack," certain things are directed to be done by the Senior Officer
Embarked in Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack. Will you read to
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the court for the purpose of putting into the record each item sepa-
rately, and state after this item, what you did with regard thereto.
A. (Reading:)
(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and
(4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.)
(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating
task force commander.
(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable
sortie.
[421] (4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force
Commander operating at sea, advised.
As I have stated, I was not on board at 7 : 55 on the morning of De-
cember 7, 1941. I can state what my chief of staff has informed me of
the action he took, but he himself is available in case the board desires
to question him. My Chief of Staff was then Captain, now Rear Ad-
miral, Harold Train.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, IT. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[4^2] 18. Q. Youhavestated, Admiral, that certain guns aboard
ship in Pearl Harbor were required to be manned under the security
conditions that you were then maintaining. Was it necessary for
these crews to be awake and alert while they were on watch ?
A. They were required to be on deck in the vicinity of the guns,
communications manned with the anti-aircraft control. I should like
to add to that that the condition in which the Fleet was based at that
time, being inside of the defended port, it was assumed that we would
have at least from tliree to five minutes notice of any possible air raid
attack. To have maintained people immediately at the guns during
all this long period would have resulted in tiring them out and without
beneficial results in case of an attack. We had every reason to suppose
that the crews on deck would be able to man their guns after informa-
tion was received of a possible approach of an enemy.
19. Q. Among the personnel stationed under this condition of se-
curity, were there any men detailed specifically as battle lookouts?
A. Only the anti-aircraft control.
20. Q. You mean by the "anti-aircraft control" the director room?
A. Yes.
21. Q. If a ship, under the condition of security that you were main-
taining at Pearl Harbor between 27 November and 7 December, 1941,
had gone to general quarters at any time day or night, would the
officers and men that were required to remain on board be sufficient
in number and adequately trained to man all your anti-aircraft guns?
A. Yes, they would have been. The organization of each section
was such that all anti-aircraft guns and directors could be manned
and the personnel had been so trained, using the engineers group when
necessary to complete the crews.
22. Q. Were any of the ships present in Pearl Harbor at the time
of the Japanese attack on the morning of 7 December equipped with
radar ?
A. Yes; in my Battle Force Two, the PENNSYLVANIA and the
CALIFORNIA.
23. Q. Do you know what the general efficiency of these sets was
from a material point of view ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 325
A. The efficiency was ^ood. The PENNSYLVANIA'S radar was
better than the CALIFORNIA'S, but on the passage to the States for
liberty and recreation in October, 1941, the CALIFORNIA'S radar
had picked up a Pan-American plane at 85 miles and continued to
detect it until it went out of range ahead at approximately the same-
distance.
14£3] 24. Q. On these two ships that were equipped with radar,
what was, in general, the state of training of the operators?
A. The training of the operators was considered good.
25. Q. Preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is. preceding
0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941, were any of the ships' radars
being manned ?
A. No. Ship radars in port could not be used effectively because
of the interference of hills and the buildings at the Navy Yard.
2(). Q. At what time did you first learn there was an enemy attack
on Pearl Harbor?
A. My first suspicion of it was^about 7: 55 on the morning of De-
cember 7, 1941. I heard gun-fire from my room in the Halekulani
Hotel, and having one window in the direction of Pearl Harbor,
stepped to the window and could see bursts of anti-airci'aft shells in
the sky. At first, I considered it was a possibility that some Army
aircraft units were holding exercises but the appearance of the bursts
over a rather large area made nje question this. Before I had actually
reached a decision that there was an attack on, my telephone bell rang
and my assistant operations officer informed me that he would be by for
me in a minute. I was partially dressed and I completed my dressing
and went to the entrance of the Halekulani Hotel wliere I met Admiral
Leary, who had also received a telephone message, and we two pro-
ceeded to Pearl Harbor with Mr. Kimball in Mr. Kimball's automo-
bile without waiting for my staff officers to arrive.
27. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 13, which is a dispatch from
the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees under date of 16
October, 1941, relative to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and
possible future military actions by the Japanese. Had you seen this
dispatch prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief I had never seen this
dispatch. At the time it was received I was on the Pacific Coast of
the United States in command of a task force which had, been sent
there for leave and recreation. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, sent me a dispatch of which I have no copy but in substance,
"Be prepared to return to the Hawaiian Islands on short notice". I
immediately recalled all officers and men from leave and put the force
on twelve hours sailing notice.
28. Q. Do you recall ever having discussed the contents of tliis dis-
patch with the Commander-in-Chief or any of his staff?
A. Not this dispatch, to the best of my knowledge.
[424] 29. Q. Do you know whether or not any decisions based
on the information contained therein were made other than the ones
that you have already recited, to-wit, being placed on short notice or
twelve hours notice to return to Pearl Harbor?
A. That was the only one, to the best of my knowledge.
30. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 15, which is the Chief of Naval
Operations' dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which sets out briefly that
the chances of favorable negotiations with Japan are very doubtful;
326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated, includ-
ing possible attack on the Philippines or Guam. Had you seen this
dispatch prior to 7 December, 1941?
A. Yes.
• 31. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the in-
formation current with this dispatch?
A. I saw this dispatch on the morning of Saturday, the 29th of
November, two days after my task force had returned to port. The
instructions in effect to the Pacific Fleet were that task force com-
manders would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their re-
turn from duties unless they were so directed. I therefore did not see
the Commander-in-Chief tmtil Saturday, when I went to talk to him
concerning the tactical exercises which had been carried out during
the last period at sea. He then showed me this dispatch.
32. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the
information current with this dispatch ; and if you do, what were they ?
A. I know of no decisions that were a result of this dispatch. I
should like to state, however, that in my opinion this dispatch is sub-
ject to several interpretations. In the first place, it mentions an ag-
gressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam as a possibility. It therefore did not indicate that the
aggressive action was to be necessarily against the United States. It
was well known from the general situation that such an aggressive
movement was contemplated. It was assumed that the aggressive
movement was to be directed against Thailand. The only significant
part of this message, in my opinion, is including the possibility that
the enemy might take the initiative by attacking the Philippines or
Guam. The fact that the Philippines and Guam are mentioned indi-
cates that that is the estimate of the author of tlie dispatch and prob-
ably places a limitation, in his mind, as to the extent of the aggressive
movement against the United States.
\_4-25] 33. Q. Can you recall if at about the time, or at the time
you saw this dispatch or were informed of its contents, if there was
any estimate of the possibility of a surprise, aggressive movement on
Pearl Harbor ?
A. I should like to state that there is another dispatch in the record
which I saw at the same time. Exhibit 17. As a consequence, I cannot
differentiate between the two dispatches in relation to the conversation
which I had with the Commander-in-Chief.
34. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' dispatch of 27 November 1941. It contains the information
that the dispatch is a war warning, that an aggressive move by Japan
is expected within the next few days, and directs the execution of an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46. That is some of the important informa-
tion this dispatch contains which I cite to you foT identification. Do
you recall when you first saw or were informed of the contents of this
dispatch ?
A. I saw this dispatch at the same time as the one previously re-
ferred to on Saturday, the 29th of November.
35. Q. Is the judge advocate correct in understanding that you dis-
cussed this dispatch. Exhibit 17, and the previous one of November 24,
which is Exhibit 15, at the same time with the Commander-in-Chief?
A. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 327
36. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the
information that you had current with these two dispatches?
A. Yes. This clispatch was discussed at some length with the Com-
mander-in-Chief. The significance of the first clause, "This dispatch
is to be considered a war warning" was, in my mind, nothing more
than we had been receiving at various times during the past year.
From the time of the Secretary of the Navy's first visit to the Fleet
in September, 1940, we had known that there was a possibility of war
and that every endeavor was being made by those in the Fleet to pre-
pare the Fleet to carry out its plans. It is significant, I think, to note
that this dispatch is a multiple address dispatch. It is addressed to
both the C-in-C Asiatic and the C-in-C Pacific. It was well known
that there were certain strategical deployments that the Commander-
in-Chief Pacific anticipated carrying out. As far as any strategic de-
ployment of the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the execution of WPL— 40
■required the Fleet to depart from Pearl Harbor. There were no other
elements of the strategic deployment that were available at this par-
ticular time other than to leave the base and proceed toward the West
Coast. There were at this time no carriers in port. A Fleet at sea
without carriers, sighted [-^6'] by a force of such character
as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands,
would be more subject to defeat than a force in port guarded by pre-
sumably several hundred fighting planes of the Army at the base. We
therefore did not believe that under the circumstances it was necessary
to take any further action. To have taken the Fleet to sea would like-
wise have subjected it to possible enemv submarine attack, from which
it was guarded in port.
37. Q. How about air attack, along the same line ?
A. I have stated that I considered with that Fleet at sea it would
have been under greater danger from air attack than they would in
port guarded by the Army and presumably, at least, several hundred
fighting planes. I should like to add one more thing to that, that
during this conference the Commander-in-Chief sent for his intelli-
gence officer and the intelligence officer presented to us the latest
intelligence so far as it was available to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, indicating that all major units of the Japanese Fleet
were in home waters.
38. Q. Do you recall if there was any estimate made at this time
of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
as a result of this additional information jou received ?
A. I am not conversant with whether or not the Commander-in-
Chief made a direct estimate of the situation.
39. Q. Were additional security measures ordered in the Fleet as a
result of having received the information and directives that w^ere
contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 16, the one of November 27th?
A. None insofar as concerned my command.
40. Q. What did the directive, "Execute appropriate defensive
deployment prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46"
mean to you ?
A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it meant nothing.
41. Q. Was there anything done in compliance with this directive
that you know of ?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief.
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The court then, at 10 : 55 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 07 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present :
All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, and the inter-
ested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman
second class, U. S. Naval Eeserve, reporter.
[4£7] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry
were present.
Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness
and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examination by the judge advocate (continued) :
42. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' dispatch of 28 November 1941. It relays to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information, a dispatch which it
states the Army has sent to certain of its commanders. Can you
recall having seen or discussed the contents of this dispatch with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not see this dis-
patch until after December 7th.
43. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is a Chief of Naval Operations'
dispatch of 3 December 1941. It gives information to the effect that
the JajDanese consular posts in certain areas were to destroy codes and
ciphers along with secret and confidential documents. When and
under what conditions did you see this dispatch or were informed of
its contents, if you Avere?
A. I saw the dispatch, I believe, on Thursday, December 4. I was
not particularly impressed by it as the same account appeared in the
Honolulu papers that morning. There is one other comment I would
like to make on a dispatch of this nature. If a senior desires a junior
to make an inference, he should give him complete information, or
else make the inference himself. If the inference from this dispatch
which the author apparently desired the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific to make Avas that war with Japan was imminent, in my opinion
the proper procedure would be for the Chief of Naval Operations to
make the inference and send to the Commander-in-Chief that war with
Japan appears imminent.
44. Q. Did you discuss this dispatch with the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet at that time, if you recall ?
A. I mentioned to him when he showed it to me that I had seen
the same thing in the paper that morning.
45. Q. May I ask whether or not tlie information contained in
Exhibit 20 changed in any way your estimate of the situation on the
imminence of war between the United States and Jai)an ?
A. It did not.
[4^8] 46. Q. Did it give you any information of a possible
United States objective of an attack by the Japanese ?
A. Well, there are lots of places mentioned there. They couldn't
attack them all, and the latest information we had looked very much
more like Thailand than any other place. It, in my opinion, added
nothing to what had been previously received. It might have added
something had the source of the information been divulged, but it
was not.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 329
47. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibits 21 and 22, which are Chief
of Naval Operations dispatches of 4 and G December 1941, and direct
the destruction of confidential publications on Guam and the outlying
Pacific islands respectively. Did you ever see or had you been in-
formed of the contents of either or both of these dispatches before 7
December 1941?
A. No. To the best of my knowledge and belief I never saw them
until yesterday.
The judge advocate stated: All members of this court of inquiry
have had distinguished careers in the Navy and are themselves grad-
uates of the U. S. Naval War College at Newport. However, since
this witness is especially qualified in these matters by virtue of his
present duties, the judge advocate requests the court at this time to
accept this witness as an expert on matters pertaining to the estimate
of the situation. Does the court so accept him?
The court stated: The court will accept him as an expert witness as
they would any officer of his experience, irrespective of his present
status.
The judge advocate further stated : I have asked the court to accept
this witness as an expert for the reason that there are matters in the
record now, and there may be more, which pertain to such statements
as a commander's estimate of an enemy's intentions, the possibility
and probability of certain enemy action and decisions based thereon.
I hope by this witness to clarify these matters in order that the esti-
mates and the decisions of the responsible officers in the command
echelon at the time of the events which led up to the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 may be cleared
up, in a way.
The court stated : To add to our ruling, we consider the court them-
selves expert enough to analyze all of these matters which you have
referred to.
48. Q. Admiral, I shall ask you hypothetically to set out in as
brief a manner as possible for the record the various steps that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet might have taken in making
an estimate of the situation [4'^.^'] oi the Japanese-United
States relationships as they existed on or about December 1, 1941.
The court stated that it did not desire this line of questioning
as it did not consider this to be necessary for it in arriving at the facts
in the case.
49. Q. Can you recall during the period 27 November to 7 December
1941, what your estimate of the enemy's courses of action were at that
time?
A. During this particular period I was completely absorbed in
making out a history and a critique of a Fleet exercise which had
occurred during the last period at sea. After the Commander-in-
Chief had moved his headquarters ashore I was placed in the responsi-
bility for training the Fleet to a large extent due to the fact that he
did not frequently go to sea. As commander of Task Force One I
had the particular responsibility of training the task force for the
conduct of major action. At other times. Task Force Two and Task
Force Three, together or singly, would be scheduled at sea for periods
with me or with my task force in order to coordinate their activities
with those of the battle line in Fleet action. During the last period
at sea, which ended on Thursday, the 27th, a tactical exercise had
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
been conducted in which the objective was to determine the best
means of defense of a convoy against air attack. This exercise was
terminated on Sunday, November 23, and the critique of this exercise
was to be held on Wednesday, December 3. From the time that my
task force returned to port, with the exception of the visit I made
to the Commander-in-Chief on Saturday, the 29th, I was engaged in
making the history and critique of this exercise. I therefore did not
make any estimate of the situation from the point of view of the higher
command.
50. Q. How couki any prospective enemy have information of the
presence of ships in Pearl Harbor ?
A. There were many points in the Hawaiian Islands not under
control of Naval authorities from which the entire harbor could be
observed. Up to the morning of December 7 there were no restrictions
upon commercial or diplomatic communications. It was therefore
very simple for them to be informed of the forces in the port at any
time. On the 9th or 10th of December, when the one-man submarine
was recovered on the eastern end of the Island of Aahu, there was
found in this ship a confidential chart of Pearl Harbor with the ships
as berthed approximately three weeks before. It is quite evidenc
that this chart was used as a basis of the plan of attack on December
7th as many berths were attacked in which the ships actually present
at that time were not the ones indicated [4^0] in the diagram
which we recovered, but much smaller ships. It therefore appeared
that in making their plan for an attack they had decided to attack
certain berths in the hopes that the allocation of ships at those berths
would be the same as it had been three weeks before.
51. Q. Did task force units, according to normal operating sched-
ules, more or less follow a certain well-defined procedure of being at
sea so many days and in Pearl Harbor so many days ?
A. There was a normal sequence of operations of the three task
forces in which the period at sea was about one-half of that in port.
The actual dates varied somewhat, depending upon whether or not
there were to be any combined operations of more than one task force.
As I ha.ve pointed out before, at times each task force operated during
the full period at sea completely by itself. At other times, two task
forces were operating for a period of one or two days together at the
end of the period of the one task force which had been at sea the
longest. Approximately every six weeks or two months, a period in
the schedule provided for the operation of all three task forces for
one or two-day periods. Therefore, although it was a schematic
sequence, there was not an actual, fixed number of days for the time
at sea or the time at Pearl.
52. Q. If, for example, a task force came into Pearl Harbor, was
there a reasonable expectation, even to one not knowing the Fleet's
schedule, that this force coming in might be in port for a fairly Avell
defined period of time?
A. I should say within the limits of 9 to 14 days.
53. Q. Considering the Japanese psychological make-up as you no
doubt knew it, would you not expect them to evidence active curiosity
about all matters pertaining to the Pasific Fleet, especially movements
of ships?
A. Unquestionably.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 331
54. Q. I am going to ask you a hypothetical question, Admiral:
Suppose that on the 0th of December, 1941 you had had information
that the Japanese diplomats in Washington were to call on the Secre-
tary of State at exactly 1 : 00 p. m., Washington time, December 7th,
and that they had been directed to destroy their code machines.
Would this information have given you any special indication of
Japanese intentions as to the probability or the imminence of an
attack on the United States ?
A. It is pretty hard to answer that after the event, but I do feel
that it would have been a definite indication that diplomatic relations
w^ere to be [4-3^] discontinued, after which time it certainly
would have been more obvious that an attack might take place.
Cross-examined bv the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy : ^
55. Q. Admiral, were you in general familiar with the logistic sit-
uation of the Pacific Fleet insofar as its ability to fight into the
Marshall Islands was concerned in late 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir. In my opinion, tlie Fleet could have operated as far
as the Marshall Islands, but it could not have gone very much farther.
5f). Q. Did you think that even that might be difficult on account
of logistic limitations?
A. It would have been difficult to maintain operations there for any
perceptible length of time Ijecause of the scarcity of tankers.
[4-32] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
57. Q. The fuel situation would have been determined somewhat
from the Fleet's activity ?
A. The fuel in Pearl Harbor had been reduced to what was consid-
ered to be the least safe reserve, and the number of tankers which were
supplying it were very limited.
58. Q. Admiral, you, of course, remember that the so called Atlantic
detachment was transferred from the Pacific Fleet in the spring
of 1941?
A. Yes.
59. Q. Had that detachment remained, would the Fleet have been
any more powerful in the ISIarshall Islands, in view of what you have
just said about the logistic difficulties?
A. Yes, it would have been more powerful, because the operations,
so far as I have indicated their practicability, depended upon the
ships not refueling during operations.
60. Q. The logistic difficulties would not have been any greater if
you had twice the number of ships ?
A. Not in my opinion.
(51. Q. You had plenty of fuel ?
A. Fuel within a reasonable degree of safety. The Fleet was using
it faster than it was coming in, but up to December 7 there was a
reasonable reserve.
62. Q. Admiral, was your testimony, in interpretation of the OpNav
dispatch of November 24, representative of what you thought at that
time and so expressed?
A. So far as I recall, yes.
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
68. Q. Referring to that dispatcli of December 3, why do you think
the Japanese were going to the extent of destroying codes and ciphers
in Washington and in Manihi ?
A. It unquestionably indicated a severance of diplomatic relations.
It did not necessarily indicate the imminence of war. We did not
know — I do not suppose we know today — which ones they destroyed
or how many were destroyed.
64. Q. Did you think that the information which you gained from
the dispatch of December 3 was altogether different from what you
had just testified you gained from the dispatch which came very late
on December 7 concerning the action in Washington at 1300 ? I simply
refer to your answer to the judge advocate's hypothetical question.
A. Only in degree. The statement that the codes were [4^3'\
being destroyed was merely a dispatch quoting a confidential authority.
If the dispatch concerning the definite breaking off of relations at one
o'clock had been received, it would have been a definite determination
of that condition. Consequently, it was only one of degree, but I
think possibly the lack of importance attached to that dispatch about
burning codes and ciphers was due to the fact that it was reported in
the paper that same morning.
65. Q. Admiral, I am sure you do not wish to be understood as being
influenced by what you saw in the local papers in Honolulu?
A. Not at all, but we often get good information that way.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
66. Q. Between the time you returned, on or about November 28,
and December 7 was the condition of readiness actually in effect a
greater degree of readiness than that prescribed by Condition 3?
A. Due to the size of the task force, it was, because the order only
directed that the anti-aircraft battery of one ship be available, con-
sisting of four guns. Under the orders which were in effect the battle-
ships had 25% of their anti-aircraft batteries manned and two machine
guns apiece. There being six battleships there, it made twelve guns,
when actually only four were needed.
67. Q. How long had that condition of readiness been in effect
while the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor ?
A. It had been in effect for several months — came into effect shortly
after Admiral Kimmel had taken command of the Fleet.
68. Q. You were at sea on the 24th of November, Admiral?
A. Yes, sir.
69. Q. On the 24th of November did you receive a dispatch from the
Commander-in-Chief relative to any action or precautions to be taken
by you ?
A. I did receive a dispatch. I don't recall the exact wording of it,
but it was to take precaution against attack. I'm not sure M'hetlier it
said submarine attack or not. From that period until after the Task
Force had entered Pearl Harbor all possible means were taken to
safeguard this task force against both submarines and aircraft,
[434.] 70. Q. From the time when you returned on November
28 until December 7, did you recommend to the Commander-in-Chief
any movement of the battle force ?
A. I did not.
_ 71. Q. It has been testified at this hearing that the Fleet was prac-
tically mobili2;ed prior to December 7, 1941. Have you any opmion
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 333
as to whether the Fleet was practically mobilized prior to December
7, 1941 ? . . .
A. In my opinion, it was far from mobilized. It was concentrated
but not properly prepared for the conduct of war in all respects, which
mobilization implies. We were short of men, short of machine guns,
and short of even a complete allowance of carrier-based planes.
72. Q. In the dispatch received by the Commander-in-Chief from
the Chief of Naval Operations under date of November 28, which in
substance contained a dispatch that had been sent by the Ai-my Com.-
manding General, there appear the words: "If hostilities cannot be
avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt
act." Do you think that this injunction influenced the steps that
might have been taken in preparation for war ?
A. It did not influence mine, and to the best of my knowledge and
belief, I never saw the dispatch until after December 7.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Eet.),
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
73. Q. Admiral, an estimate of a situation does not necessarily mean
a long written document based upon conditions, does it?
A. Not at all. An estimate of a situation is a process in matters
of great concern in great areas with large forces. It is normal to
make it a written estimate.
74. Q. An estimate of a situation can be made mentally, can't it ?
A. Unquestionably.
75. Q. These maneuvers you mentioned, in which you say you were
so occupied, did not necessarily prevent j'ou from thinking about the
possibilities of war, in view of the critical situation ?
A. Tliat is true, but I made no written estimate.
[4^S] 76. Q. Did you not keep what is known as a mental run-
ning estimate?
A. Of course, I think every person who is in a position of responsi-
bility attempts to retain a running mental estimate, but it is, unques-
tionably, more usual that it be in writing, and even the running estimate
can be put in writing after the actual operations are in progress.
77. Q. Well, then, during the few days previous to December 7
what was your estimate of the possibilities or probabilities of an at-
tack in any form on Pearl Harbor?
A. My estimate of the possibility or probability of an attack on
Pearl Harbor was that it was a possibility but not within the prob-
ability. The basis for this estimate may be found, I think, during
the months preceding the dispatches of the 24th and 27th of November.
There had been a constant interchange of letters and dispatches be-
tween the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations,
m.any of which I read, although not all, which gave the indication to
me — and I believe to him — that war in the Pacific, if it occurred, would
be upon the initiative of the United States. The main reason for such
a supposition, in my opinion, lay in the psychological aspect and po-
litical aspect of the situation within the United States. There was, as
we all know, much diversity of opinion in the Congress of the United
States as to whether or not the United States should enter into the war.
The fact that the Japanese made an unexpected attack, in my opinion,
created the situation which united the people of the United States
and therefore increased our strength to a remarkable degree. Al-
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
though the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was a tactical success, it
was, in my opinion, a strategical and psychological blunder, because
it reduced the possibility of their winning the war. Any tactical idea,
to be sound, must have as its objective a large field of strategy and
ultimately the winning of the war. It was this feeling that if no
attack was made upon the United States, months might pass before the
United States actually entered the war and thus give Japan a much
greater time in which to make her desired occupations in the southern
part of Asia and in Australia. That leads me to believe that they
would not take action which would force the United States to enter
the war.
78. Q. Did you hold this opinion which you have just expressed be-
fore December 7, or was it formed afterwards ?
A. It was not formed afterwards, although I cannot state that I
can specifically point to Pearl Harbor. As I said in my last statement,
I considered any action which they might take to force the United.
States into the war would be a blunder.
79. Q. And therefore unlikely?
A. And therefore comparatively unlikely.
[4^6] 80. Q. In view of your opinion, which was the result of
your mental estimate of the situation, to the effect that an attack on
Pearl Harbor by the Japanese was a possibility, what would be the
priority of the form of attack which you thought might be made ?
A. We had considered that the probability of attack in those waters
would be by submarine.
81. Q. Not in Pearl Harbor but within the area ?
A. Within the area, as an act in advance of the declaration of war.
The basis for that argument was that destruction by torpedo from a
submarine, if the submarine is not sighted or captured, can be mistaken
for an internal explosion and no one can prove to the contrary. There-
fore, there was always the possibility that the ships of the Fleet could
be attacked by submarines without its being definitely apparent who
did the attacking or any visible proof that it was by submarine. There
is also the possibility that the Germans might man Japanese subma-
rines and might even move their submarines into the Pacific and attack
the Fleet to cause us to go into the war with Japan, believing at that
time that war with Germany was even closer than war with Japan.
We had contemplated our attack, and in all the plans for defense it had
been considered as one of the possibilities. It, however, had been con-
sidered primarily as a possibility after the condition became more
serious, either by the breaking off of diplomatic relations or the dec-
laration of war.
82. Q. Well, while considering the possibility of any form of attack
on Pearl Harbor, do you feel that everything possible had been done
in the Fleet to meet an attack, so far as your vessels, personnel, planes,
and all other control conditions available were concerned ?
A. I though there might have been other things done,
83. Q. I am talking now about your opinion as of the date before
the event.
A. Before the event, it Avas my opinion that the defense measures
taken were consistent with the situation. There is one point which may
have been established by other testimony, Avhich is quite important in
connection with this, and that is the fact that in our service and in the
opinion of our Bureau of Ordnance, torpedo planes could not be effee-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 335
lively used in less than seventy-five feet of water. That point made it
particularly difficult for us to conceive the actual conduct of torpedo
attack from the direction they made it under the condition of shallow
waters and with the degree of effectiveness wliich they actuall}^ accom-
plished.
[4'37] 84. Q. With this in mind, then, did you not consider that
tlie likelihood of a pi-actice bombino- attack was rendered less prob-
able than otherwise?
A. I think the probability of bombing over torpedoes was much
greater.
85. Q. Do you consider that it would be profitable?
A. The attack w^ould be possible, but the damage would be rela-
tively less.
S(i. Q. I say, profitable ?
A. Probably not.
87. Q. To come all the way across the Pacific Ocean to attack solely
by bombs?
A, I don't believe it would have been profitable.
88. Q. When vou testified that you gave some consideration to the
fact that the Honolulu papers carried information concerning the
burning of confidential papers, was it not a fact that the information
was contained in the papers rather than tJie character of the informa-
tion?
A. I didn't say I gave any 'consideration to it. I just said it de-
creased the weight of the other official information.
89. Q. Admiral, you testified as to the anti-aircraft guns manned
on battleships. Did this same condition exist as to the manning of
guns on other ships in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7?
A. I haven't the official order of the commander of cruisers or
conmiander of destroyers, but, in general, it was somewhat similar.
The cruisers, I believe, were required to have two anti-aircraft guns
and two machine guns ready for action with ammunition in the
ready boxes. Because of the fact that most types of destroyers have
batteries with double purpose guns which may be considered anti-
aircraft batteries, tliey were not required to keep the anti-aircraft
guns in readiness but only the machine guns. The availability of the
crews to man these guns, however, up to one-half, as I recall, of the
guns on board was maintained.
90. Q. When you dej^arted from the hotel at Pearl Harbor on the
morning of December 7, at what time did you arrive on the CALI-
FORNIA?
A. I arrived on the CALIFORNIA between 8 : 40 and 8 : 45.
[4-3S'] 91. Q. With reference to sub-paragraph 9 of Exhibit 8,
you testified that since you were not on board, the orders were carried
out as to action taken at the time of attack. Weren't there certain
pre-orders required to be arranged prior to any attack?
A. They were all got up. In fact, the sortie order had been issued.
All it had to do was to be put in effect.
92. Q. In your opinion. Admiral, and in view of your knowledge of
existing orders, who was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. In the Joint Army and Navy Action I considered the Army was
responsible for the defense of the Naval Base, to be assisted in such
manner as possible by the Navy.
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
93. Q. You have testified about a conference with the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific on November 29. Was this a general con-
ference, and were there other officers present ?
A. There were no otlier officers present, except during the period
in which the Intelligence officer was present to give us the in-
formation he had.
94. Q. Having been in an important position in the Fleet for some
years and especially liaving been in the Pacific and Ha«vaiian area
during that time, did you feel, under conditions existing prior to
December, 1941, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was probable,
possible, or remotely possible ?
A. Eemotely possible, and I did not consider that any such attack
would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off.
95. Q. Admiral, did you have, from any source, any information
that a note had been send by our Government on November 26 to the
Japanese Government, giving the conditions which we suggested to
Japan were necessary to maintain peaceful relations throughout the
Pacific?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. I don't recall any.
The only official messages I saw
96. Q. I asked for information from any source.
A. Nothing, unless it Avas something 1 read in the paper. I don't
recall anytliing definite.
97. Q. In other words, you had no information from papers or
otherwise that what has been testified to as an ultimatum had been
sent to Japan on November 26 ?
A. I may have read something along that general line in the paper.
I never considered it as an ultimatum. I couldn't swear that I saw
any.
[4^9'] 98. Q. Did you at any time make any recommendation to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific that the battleships of your
force should be based on the Pacific Coast rather than at Pearl Harbor?
A. No, I did not. That subject had been discussed by a previous
Commander-in-Chief, and it was my understanding that it had been
decided that the Fleet was to remain in Pearl Harbor.
99. Q. Did you express your opinion as to this at any time?
A. I expressed my opinion several times that I considered it unwise.
100. Q, Considered it unwise to have the battleships —
A. To maintain the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. I should like to ex-
pand on that just a bit. There was one real advantage in keeping the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and that was the fact that the money which
became available for the repair of ships could be expended on that
navy yard to assist in its development. I believe that the Fleet's
being there did advance the capacity of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard,
so that when the war actually broke, the Navy Yard was in better
condition than it would have been had the Fleet not been there.
101. Q. Is that statement which you have just made a conclusion
which you have arrived at after the attack rather than before?
A. No, it is not a conclusion. It was an expressed opinion at the
time. The one reason for staying there was to get the money to try
to build a Navy yard.
102. Q. Did you at any time discuss with the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific the advisability of using patrol planes of the Fleet — as
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 337
many as were available — to make daily searches in scouting expe-
ditions ?
A. I did not. They weren't under my command. We had a Base
Defense Officer and an Air Officer who were responsible for those
activities, and I didn't discuss it with them.
103. Q. Admiral, if the court understood you correctly, you stated
that the Fleet was not mobilized by reason of the fact that it did not
have the complete number of antiaircraft guns, that the crews were
deficient in number, etc. To your mind, could not a Fleet be mobilized
without these deficiencies ?
A. Mobilization, as I understand it, means the preparation of the
units for the conduct of war. Your state of mobilization, therefore, is
a relative condition. [MO] There are two conditions: One is
the concentration of your forces, and the other is the personnel and
preparation of your forces. In this case we had endeavored for
months to obtain more men, more machine guns, and more planes
without success. No order to mobilize had ever been issued. There-
fore, in my opinion, those are only a few of the deficiencies indicative
of the attempt which had been made to prepare the Fleet for a state
closer to mobilization.
104. Q. There was no M-day set or designated, was there ?
A. There was not.
105. Q. But if M-day had been set and designated and if there was
a deficiency in the number of men and of certain guns, you would not
say that the ship was not mobilized because of that condition, would
you?
A. You might say that mobilization had been ordered, but I don't
think you would say they were mobilized until the mobilization had
been completed. The old war plans used to provide, if possible,
mobilization would be ordered at least thirty days in advance of the
probably outbreak of war.
106. Q. Is that ideal condition, in which everything needed is avail-
able, always possible ?
A. Your state of mobilization depends on when you start. In our
mobilization plan we had orders for certain ships to go to certain
Navy yards to get certain work done. Mobilization means the prep-
aration for the conduct of war. You are never completely mobilized.
107. Q. If you had received a message from the NaA'y Department
to mobilize, wouldn't you have considered yourself mobilized?
A. I would have considered that there were many activities which
were not in progress and which were essential to mobilize completely
the forces and which should have been undertaken immediately.
108. Q. There seems to be a difference of opinion, and some of us in
the Navy think that mobilization of a fleet consists of having the
ship stripped, fully supplied with provisions, oil or coal, ammunition,
and ready for war. That is one opinion, I think, of mobilization.
Now, the fact that a ship or ships did not have a complete complement
and did not have the full number of guns which had been required, to
my mind, is a situation which would not be a condition of non-mobil-
ization but one, rather, of hopeful mobilization in the future.
A. I agree with you except to extent. If all the fleets are below
complement, that is different than possibly [H^] several.
The same thing applies in general. It is one of degree. When the
degree is such that all the ships are below complement, you are not
79716 — 40— Ex. 146, vol. 1 23
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
actually mobilized. You may be mobilized up to the point where
you are going to war, but you aren't mobilized until you are prepared
for war.
101). Q. If a higher authority says the Fleet is mobilized for war
and establishes a day for that, isn't that Fleet mobilized, irrespective
of the fact that it might not be in as an efficient condition as you, a
subordinate in the Fleet, might want or expect ?
A. M-day is the date established for mobilization by order, and it
meant that certain things would be done. It was tlie initiation of a
movement toward mobilization, which is never completed. You are
not, in a sense, mobilized simply because they give the order. If the
ships had been separated and out of condition, and they said,
"Mobilize," they wouldn't have been mobilized until they were in
condition. The order to' mobilize simply initiates a certain chain of
events.
110. Q. Admiral, in the time you spent in and around the Hawaiian
area did you meet General Short, the Commanding General of the
Army ?
A. I did.
111. Q. Will you please express to the court your opinion as to the
cooperation between him and, as far as you know, the Oommander-
in-Chief of the Pacific and other high ranking officials of the Pacific
Fleet?
A. In all respects which I observed, or which came to my attention,
the relationship between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Islands, General Short, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific,
Admiral Kimmel, and other officers of the Fleet was excellent. So far
as I am aware, there were no differences of opinion as to the respective
responsibilities of the Army and Navy in defense of the Naval Base. I
believe the conditions existing on December 7 indicated a much closer
cooperation than had existed at the period when Admiral Kimmel took
command of the Fleet. The Base Defense Order establishing the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District as Base Defense Officer pro-
vided a definite means of coordination with the Army for the defense
of the Base. There had also been much improvement made in the
coordination of Army and Navy aircraft.
112. Q. Admiral, have you heard rumors, or have you seen pub-
lished reports, subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and perhaps
before the attack, that there was not friendly and cordial cooperation
between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific and General Short.
A. I believe I have, but, in my opinion, they were [44^]
without foundation. In all my relationships, I observed no indica-
tion of any disagreement between these two officers.
llo. Q. Do you have any idea as to where these rumors started and
from whence they came ?
A. No.
The court then, at 12:20 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at
Avhich time it reconvened.
[44^] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, Avhose counsel was
present, Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 339
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were
present.
Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness un-
der examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned
that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his
testimony.
Examination by the court (Continued) :
114. Q. Admiral, in your opinion and by your observation, what
was the condition of officers and men of the Fleet as to sobriety, on
the night of G-7 December, 1941, and at the time of the attack?
A. The only officers whom I contacted on the night of the 6-7
December, were those attending a dinner at Halekulani Hotel, among
whom were Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Leary, and various other offi-
cers of the Fleet. There was no signs of drinking or intoxication,
or revelry of any kind. After dinner, Admiral Kimmel left, as I
recall, at 9 : 80 or 10 : 30 o'clock to go back to the ship, and I myself
engaged in a game of bridge. I saw no evidence at any time of any
intoxication or any condition that would prevent most effective action
of officers and men.
115. Q. And at the time of the attack?
A. Nor the morning following — 6-7 December.
116. Q. You have undoubtedly heard rumors that there was quite
a little drinking and so on among the members of the Navy during
this night. Do you. have any knowledge of those rumors or do you
know how they started ?
A. I have no knowledge, and in my opinion they were unfounded,
from all observation or knowledge that I possess.
117. Q. In your opinion what was the condition of the state of
training of personnel of your force and of the Fleet, that is, the
Pacific Fleet, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. After over four years continuously in the Fleet up to then, I
considered the state of training the highest I had seen since I had
been in the Fleet.
118. Q. And was this trainnig being continued?
A. It was being continued most diligently.
119. Q. What is your opinion as to adequacy of material equip-
ment for the Fleet ?
A. There were many ways in which the material of the [4441
Fleet might have been improved with time and availability of the
required materiel. One of those ways which we have followed in
the war was the large increase in anti-aircraft and light machine gun
weapons, smaller than the 5-inch.
120. Q. But that great increase in anti-aircraft by our ships was
probably brought about to a large extent by experience gained in the
war ; is that correct ?
A. That is true to an extent, although it was in the mind of the)
Commander-in-Chief and all of the senior officers in the Fleet nt
that time, that it should be augmented. I would like to state that
at tactical exercise the last Meek at sea before my force came in,
when using the rules for bombing which had been developed at the
War College, and we found that the defense of a convoy against air-
craft was very difficult; in fact, practically all of the convoys were
destroyed, although they were protected by five battleships and sev-
340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eral squadrons of destroyers. The reason that I desire to bring this
up is that I feel that the attitude expressed in the rules invoked at
the War College, and I think in the minds of the officers of the Fleet,
was that even during the war, the actual efficiency of individual air-
planes is no higher than we anticipated that it would be. We, I be-
lieve, underestimated the high percentage of the industrial capacity
of nations that would be placed into the manufacture of aircraft.
In other words, while the individual planes in my opinion have not
demonstrated much more than we anticipated, the number of planes
greatly exceeded the anticipated number with which we might have
to deal.
121. Q. Admiral, did you feel at this time, prior to 7 December,
1941, you were kept adequately informed as to all matters relating
to the Fleet in that area at that time ?
A. I felt that our information as to the policy of the United States
was entirely inadequate. On several occasions, when information
was received — a letter from Admiral Stark, which Admiral Kimmel
showed me, we remarked to each other, "Well, what are we going to
do now?" In other words, the policy of the United States, as ex-
tended to us by the information which we possessed, was not definite.
122. Q. And from whom would this policy be received?
A. I should think it would have been received from the Chief of
Naval Operations, but not initiated by him ; it must have come from
a higher source than he.
123. Q. In other words, you believe that if you had had more in-
formation from this source or other sources, authentic information,
that it would have helped you, as an officer of the Fleet, in making
a better estimate of the entire strategical set-up?
A. I cannot say that any information would have helped me, with-
out knowing what that information would have been.
124. Q. Admiral, when was the 40-millimeter first made [44^]
available to the Fleet?
A. The first 40-millimeter gun that I recall was in the NORTH
CAROLINA.
125. Q. When?
A. When she joined up out there in the Pacific; she was made a
part of my Task Force and joined up about April of 1942, and that was
the time that I first saw the 40-millimeter gun installed in a ship.
126. Q. What was, in your opinion, the behavior of personnel on the
morning of December 7 ?
A. I think it was superb.
127. Q. Were you entirely satisfied with the performance of duty
of your immediate subordinates on December 7, and prior thereto ?
A. Yes, sir.
128. Q. And you have no complaint whatever to make?
A. None whatever.
129. Q. Are you familiar. Admiral, with communications, letters
or otherwise, which stated that there may have been a possibility of
Japan attacking Russia?
A. I don't recall.
130. Q. Did this question come up at all before you, or were you
cognizant of such a possibility ?
A. At this time I think certainly my opinion was that the move-
ment was directed to the southard, that the question of Japan attack-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 341
ing Russia was probably out of the pictui*e, that all the indications that
we possessed had a move tow^ard Thailand rather than toward the
north.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
131. Q. Admiral, with regard to your testimony concerning the
depth of water for torpedoes in Pearl Harbor, I hand you Exhibit 55
before this court, which is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commandants of the various naval districts, under date of 13
June 1941. Will you please read to the court the second paragraph
of t He letter?
A. (Reading:)
2. Recent clevelopmeiits have shown that United States and Bi-itish torpedoe-s
may be dropped from phiiies at heit-hts of as much as three hundred feet, and
in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make
excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any
capital sliip or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of
attacl^ If surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to
be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
Neither the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. [44^]
Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), nor the interested party. Admiral Harold
R. Bloch, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquir}?^ which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness made the following statement :
I liave no information other than that I have given in my testimony, but I
should like to state for the record that when Admiral Kimmel was appointed
as Commander-in-Chief, I considered it an excellent appointment and I wrote
him a letter to that effect, not expecting at the time to serve under his com-
mand. At that time I possessed orders ashore, and my orders were later changed
and I became Commander Battle Force. I considered that he performed his
duties in an excellent manner in all respects, and I know of no Commander-
in-Chief who devoted moi i time and effort to the performance of his duties.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Kermit A. Tyler.
2. Q. Rank?
A. Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps, Army Air Force Board, Orlando,
Florida.
3. Q. What was your rank and duty on 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was assigned as Executive Officer in the 8th Pursuit Squadron.
I was a first lieutenant in the air corps at that time.
4. Q. What particular duties were you performing at about 0755
on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was assigned as pursuit officer with a duty as Assistant to the
Controller, at the information center at Fort Shaf ter.
5. Q. Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii ?
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes.
6. Q. Will you tell the court in a brief way what these [4-1^]
duties consisted of that you were performing on this particular morn-
ing?
A. The duties of a pursuit officer was to assist the Controller in
ordering planes to intercept enemy planes or supposed enemy planes,
after the planes got in the air,
7. Q. Your duty, then, was in connection with a pursuit squadron,
and not in some capacity such as the aircraft warning center?
A. That is correct. I was sent down there for training. Inasmuch
as this w^as just being started, it was necessary to detail certain officers
who had some background in order to get the thing going. •
8. Q. This duty w^as actually performed in the, shall we say in the
Command Post of your pursuit squadron? I am not familiar with
your terminology, and I would ask you to explain just exactly the
nature of the post of duty at which you were stationed.
A. The information center was a post from which fighter squadrons
on the alert would be ordered to take to the air ; in fact, my task at this
information center had involved a small switchboard which would
I'each fighter squadrons.
9. Q. What I am trying to get at now, were you in a branch of an
information center, or at an information center, or what?
A. I was at the one information center for all of the islands.
10. Q. At the one infoi-ntation center of all the islands. Now you
were in contact at such station with all radar stations?
A. Yes, sir, they had direct lines.
11. Q. Now how long had you been assigned these duties that you
were performing that morning ?
A. I had one previous tour on the preceding Wednesday, at which
time there was only myself and the telephone operator at the informa-
tion center. This was my second assignment of that nature.
12. Q. Now this particular station or post at which you were then
stationed was in what locality in the island of Oahu ?
A. It was at Fort Shaffer.'
13. Q. Fort Shaffer is where with I'eference to Pearl Harbor?
A. I would say it is about eight miles east of Pearl Harbor.
14. Q. How^ many officers and men were on duty with you in this
particular post or station on this morning of 7 December, 1941 ?
A. Approximately seven or eight enlisted men, and I [44^]
was the only officer present.
15. Q. Now what duties in general did they perform? Were they
assistants to you, or what were they doing?
A. There were five or six spotters whose duty was to display arrows
on the information center board, to indicate radar plots of aircraft.
There was one man on the telephone exchange, and one man on the
historical record — which keep a historical record of all plots that are
made by the radar.
16. Q. Now these plots that you were making — the information
upon when they were based, where did you get that?
A. They came by direct lines to each plotter from one radar station
which jjave him the information.
17. Q. Could you give an example as to about what sort of data
would come in from a telephone from one radar station when a plane
or group of planes were sighted ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 343
A. Simply be a bearing of so many degrees and range, certain number
of miles.
18. Q. And then as I understand it, somebody plotting in the center
where you were located put tliat down in the form of a record, a
graphic record ?
A. It was plotted with a replaceable arrow on the table, and also
there was a system of recording it on this sheet of paper which was an
overlay of the Plawaiian Islands and surrounding waters. I might say
probably they included in the report of the radar station the number
of planes expected in the plot, but that wasn't at the time conveyed
in each plot.
19. Q. In other words, that was not always done?
A. No.
20. Q. Now, were you the Senior Officer Present in this central
station where you were on post ?
A. I was the only officer present.
21. Q. And it is my understanding that you wei'e the officer in charge
of this ]3articular station or post?
A. Yes, sir.
22. Q. Was there a Naval oflicer present at this post on the morning
of 7 December 1941 ?
A. There was after the attack started, sir.
23. Q. Was there an officer present before the attack?
A. 'No, sir.
24. Q. Did you receive, while you were on duty on the morning of
the 7th December 1941, any report of interest?
A, How do you mean by that, sir?
25. Q. Did you receive any information or any report that
[449] you considered of any import !i nee ^
A. Well, I received a call from one of the radar stations, I believe
it is called Opana, which indicated that they had a larger number
of planes than he had seen before on his scope; that is, the original"
report.
26. Q. Can you recall at about what time this report was received
in the station ?
A. I would estimate it was around 7 : 15.
27. Q. Now where is Opana station located from where you say
you got this report?
A. It was the north side of the island.
28. Q. And it was about how many miles from Fort Shaffer,
where you were ?
A. I would say thirty-five miles in a direct line, perhaps,
29. Q. Now is this station on top of a mountain, on seashore, or
can you tell how it was located ?
A. I had never been there, and I don't know.
30. Q, Can you remember the language of the report ?
A. I can't remember the exact language. As I said before, the
radar operator reported that he had a larger plot than he had pre-
viously seen ; that is about all there was to it.
31. Q. Did you have any abnormal reaction to this report at that
time ?
A, No, sir, I thought about it for a minute, and then told him,
"Thanks for calling in the report."
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
32. Qj. Had you any information during your tour of duty on this
morning of 7 December 1941, as to the movements of any friendly
planes in the Hawaiian area?
A. I had no official information. However, I had very good reason
to believe that there was. a flight of B-l7's en route to the Islands
from the mainland. I had a friend who was in the bomber com-
mand who told me that any time the radio stations were playing this
Hawaiian music all night, I could be certain that a flight of our
bombers was coming over, and when I had gotten up at 4:00 a. m.,
to report for duty, I listened to this music all the way to the station,
so I was looking for a flight of B-17's.
83. Q. Now when you went on watch, or duty shall I say, that
morning, were you given any information by the officer stationing
you or the officer whom you relieved, if you did relieve anybody —
were you given any special instructions as to what to be on the
lookout for?
A. No, sir.
34. Q. Did you actually relieve anybody that morning?
A. No, sir.
[4-50] 35. Q. How did you happen to come to go on duty?
Was that in response to a detail that went on duty at that time every
morning?
A. Yes, sir. There was a roster of various fighter pilots. My tour
of duty was from 4 : 00 to 8 : 00 a. m. on that morning, sir.
36. Q. Did you have any instructions for your post ?
A. No, sir.
37. Q. And you say the only previous experience you had had
with that post of duty was the time, several days before, when you
did a tour of duty there ?
A. Yes, sir.
38. Q. Did you have any familiarity with the mechanics of radar
interceptors? That is, how they functioned mechanically or elec-
trically ?
A. I understood the principle of radar, yes, sir.
39. Q. What information did the radar show to the operator?
For example, when he sighted a flight of planes ?
A. Well, I understood that it showed a way tliey call a "blip" or
"pip", or something like that on the scope. Beyond that, I don't
know.
40. Q, You don't have any idea how this so-called scope indicated
the number of planes in a flight?
A. No, I hadn't ever seen one in operation, so I didn't know.
41. Q. And you wouldn't know how they determined the bearing
of the flight, or the distance?
A. I understand that, yes, sir.
42. Q. Now exactly, again. Colonel, what information did this
radar operator give you when he made the report ?
A. He said that at a distance of around 130 miles, he had a larger
plot than he had seen on his scope.
43. Q. Did he give you any subsequent reports, after this initial
report, as to what these planes were doing, or did he amplify this
original report in any way?
A. No, he didn't give any subsequent report.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 345
44. Q. Did you call up and ask him for any subsequent informa-
tion— amplifying information ?
A. No, sir.
45. Q. Did you know whether or not the particular type of radar
that was then in use, had any means of distinguishing a friendly
plane from an unfriendly one?
A. Oh, I kneAV that there was no way of distinguishing by radar.
46. Q. And the only information of friendly planes tliat you
[4^1] had on this morning was the deduction you made when you
heard a Honolulu radio station playing Hawaiian music at a viery early
hour; is that correct?
A. That is the only definite indication I had. I think I was equally
divided between the thought that it could be the B-l7's, or a carrier
force.
47. Q. You mean, by "carrier force", U. S. Naval carrier force, or
enemy ?
A. Friendly force, U. S. Naval airplanes.
48. Q. Had it occurred to you to identify with the Navy whether
or not they had any planes in flight at this time ?
A. No, sir.
49. Q. I don't suppose, from the information you had, that you had
any idea at that time of the course on which these B-17's would ap-
proach Oahu ?
A. Only the rough idea, sir.
50. Q. What was this rough idea?
A. Well, somewhere from the northeast.
51. Q. And why do you say somewhere from the northeast?
A. W^ell, that would be the course from San Francisco.
52. Q. Did you have any special information on the morning of
7 December 1941, as to international developments, especially those
between the Japanese and the United States, which would indicate any
imminence of war?
A. The only special information was what I read in the papers, and
that was that a friendly relations — or that some agreement — had been
reached approximately a week before, or thereabouts.
53. Q. Well, had you or had you not been put in some sort of a frame
of mind of being on the alert against any possible enemy action when
you went on duty that morning ?
A. No, sir; in fact, just the opposite, because we had been on alert
about a week before, and the alert had been called off.
54. Q. Now do you know whether or not there was actually an air-
plane attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base that morning by Japa-
nese planes?
A. Yes, sir.
55. Q. When did you first become aware of this attack ?
A. It was about five minutes after 8 : 00 when the telephone operator
received a call from some source, which I don't know right now, that
there was an attack on.
[4^5<i] 56. Q. You don't recall the language of the report that
you heard?
A. No, sir, the operator was very excited; and so I told him to call
in all information center personnel who had gone off duty at 7:00
o'clock. There was just the operator and myself there at the time.
346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
57. Q. Did he tell you the kind of attack, whether it was a naval
surface ship attack, aircraft attack, or what?
A. He didn't say, but, -however, I knew that it was an air attack,
because at 8 : 00 o'clock I had just stepped outside for a breath of air
and I saw the attack in progress, but at that time I thought it was the
Navy practicing dive bombing.
58. Q. Do you recall what action you took when you received this
leport ?
A. I called in the information center personnel, who had all gone off
duty at 7 : 00 o'clock, except the operator and myself, and in a very
few minutes. Major Tindall, who was one of the controllers, arrived
from Hickam Field, and took charge of operations.
59. Q. Did you go off duty then, or what was your status afte?
Major Tindall arrived?
A. I remained on duty as assistant to him and to Major Berquist,
who also arrived soon thereafter, for approximately thirty-six hours.
60. Q. Now can you remember whether or not you received any
further reports from any of your radar stations, after the attack was
reported, or after it became known ?
A. The plotting board was very much confused, due to the number
of airplanes flying around, and I don't think there was; I doubt if any
definite information could be obtained from it.
61. Q. Do you recall whether or not any attempt was made by the
officers in the information center to ascertain from your radar stations
whether there were any more planes coming in or not?
A. I don't know that that was done, sir.
62. Q. Do you know whether or not there was any directives given
as to plotting planes in any area other than the Pearl Harbor area?
What I am trying to get at. Colonel — was any attempt made to plot
planes when they retired from the attack?
A. I don't know whether that attempt was made or not; I was busy
with the squadrons then.
63. Q. Wliose duty would it have been to have directed such a plot,
in your opinion?
A. The controller's duty.
64. Q. And that was Major Tindall?
A. Or Maior Berquist, who were both there at that time.
65. Q. But so far as you know, of your own knowledge, that
[4^53] direction may or may not have been given?
A. That's right. I don't know, sir.
66. Q. Now you say a naval officer reported shortly after the attack
became known to you ; is that correct ?
A. Well, how shortly I couldn't say.
67. Q. But so far as your recollection serves you now, you are not
able to say whether he reported before or after the attack was an-
nounced ?
A. He definitely reported after the attack was announced.
68. Q. Now do you know this officer, what his name was ?
A. No, sir, I don't.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not
desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 347
G9. Q. What were your duties, Colonel, when you reported at 4 : 00
o'clock on that Sunday morning.
A. My duties, I believe, were chiefly for training, inasmuch as it
was the first morning I had ever been there on such duty when the
information center was even manned in any degi'ee at all. I had no
specified duties, either written or oral — just to report there for duty.
70. Q. Well, did you have any instructions to report information
that came from different radars to any superior officer ?
A. No, sir.
71. Q. Would you have reported it to a superior officer, if you had
information that alarmed you ?
A. Certainly, if I had been warned that there was any possibility
of attack I would have. However, at that time, there being no means
of identifying plots, there was not much that one man could do, with-
out having a liaison officer from both the Navy, bombers, and civilian
airways, to give you identification between friendly and enemy plots.
72. Q. Did you get any reports between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 a. m. that
morning ?
A. There were a number of plots in and around the Islands. I
believe they started sometime before 7 : 00 o'clock ; the actual time I
am not certain of.
73. Q. At 7 : 00 o'clock, did you get a report of a plot northerly ? I
mean as distinguished from 7:15.
A. At around very close on 7 : 00 o'clock, it might have been a little
after — I don't know — I walked over to where [4^4] the boy
was working on his historical record, and didn't know what he was
doing, so I asked him w^hat his duties were, and so forth. Incidentally,
he noted this plot, which was 130 miles somewhere north of the island,
I don't know what bearing.
74. Q. Did the plot indicate the number of planes in the air?
A. No, sir.
75. Q. Might have been one, or might have been fifty?
A. Yes, sir.
7G. Q. When did that plot come into the center where you were?
A. It was right about 7 : 00 o'clock, sir.
77. Q. Which station did that come from ?
A. I don't remember, sir; probably it was the same one, but I
wouldn't say for sure.
78. Q. Did you do anything about that?
A. No, sir.
79. Q. That report came to the man and not to you or to your
subordinates ?
A. That's right.
SO. Q. Well, now what happened at 7:15?
A. That was when I received a call from this radar operator. You
see, at 7:00 o'clock, all the plotters folded up their equipment and
left the information center.
81. Q. What did you do after 7 : 00 o'clock, then ?
A. There was nothing. I didn't do anything. I was just waiting
for my tour to be finished.
82. Q. What did your tour consist of between 7:00 and 8:00?
What were you supposed to do after 7 : 00 until your tour was com-
pleted?
348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I had no particular duties to perform, except to learn all I could
at the information center.
83. Q. Now what happened at 7 : 15?
A. This radar operator called the telephone operator and said he
wanted to report that he had seen this large indication on his scope,
and wanted to report to whoever was in charge. The call was relayed
to me, and he made his report.
84. Q. At that time the operator at Opana thought the object re-
flected in the diagram was a large object?
A. Yes, sir, that's right.
[4^5] 85. Q. The object reported at 7 : 00 wasn't a large object?
A. There was no indication of that at 7 : 00 o'clock, sir.
86. Q. Did you talk with the man yourself?
A. Yes, sir.
87. Q. On the telephone?
A. Yes, sir.
Frank L, Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, withdrew,
[4^6] 88. Q. Before the 7:15 call came in, had the activity that
you had seen reported as of 7 : 00, increased ?
A. I think it was on a slight increase all the time.
89. Q. How did you get the indications of reports of the increase
between 7 : 00 and 7 : 15 ?
A. I had no indication then. It increased from the time it started
up to 7 : 00 o'clock, and then all the keys were removed from the board
and I had no means of receiving further information.
90. Q. Oh, there had been an increase up to 7: 00 o'clock?
A. Yes, sir.
91. Q. When were the first indications of the reflections which were
culminated in the report at 7 : 00 ?
A. You mean the large report ?
92. Q. The one at 7:00?
A. The one at 7 : 00 o'clock would be the first indication.
93. Q. I understood you to say the activity had increased.
A. Up until 7 : 00 these local plots were on the increase.
94. Q. This wasn't the northern plot that increased, up to 7 : 00?
A. You mean the number of plots ?
95. Q. I understood you to say that you had a report at 7 : 00 o'clock
of something around 130 miles to the north ?
A. Yes.
96. Q. Had that reflection been shown at all before 7 : 00 ?
A. Yes, sir. It was shown on the historical record right at 7:00
o'clock.
97. Q. Had it been shown before 7 :00 on the historical record ?
A. If it was, it would have been .a minute or two.
98. Q. Very shortly?
A. Yes, sir.
99. Q. Now, will you relate to the court precisely what you were
told on the telephone at 7 :15 when you got the call ? I am now talking
about the second one at 7 :15 ?
A. Whether the operator said "a large number of planes" or "a larger
indication" or "a large blip" on his radar, I couldn't say, but he gave
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 349
me information of that nature, that the distance was around 130 miles
in a northerly direction.
[4S7] 100. Q. Who was the individual with whom you talked
at that time ?
A. I believe he was a private, Lockhart.
101. Q. And what did you say to him?
A. I deliberated for a minute and told him not to worry about it,
or something to that effect. I don't know exactly.
102. Q. And then nothing more happened until the attack?
A. That's right, sir.
103. Q. Do I understand that you stayed there in that center the
rest of the day ?
A. Yes, sir.
104. Q. Were you familiar with what was reported into the center
after 8: 00 o'clock?
A. Well, things were so confused and there were so many plots on
the board that I couldn't give any detailed information on that, sir.
The historical record, however, should show the information.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ket)
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
105. Q. Colonel, when you went on duty at this post at 4 : 00 a. m.,
on 7 December, had you ever had any instructions whatsoever as to
what you were to do or why you were there?
A. On the previous Wednesday when I went on duty, there was
just myself and the telephone operator there, and not having any
instructions, I called the operations officer, then Major Berquist.
106. Q. You heard my question, didn't you ?
A. Yes, sir. And I asked him why I was there and what my duties
were. He: told me that they were trying to get the information center
set up and that we were leading off' by furnishing personnel to man it.
I got the idea that I was there for training, and he said if any ships
went down, if any of our planes went down we might, by radar reports,
be able to tell where they went down and I would be al)le to assist in
that.
107. Q. But prior to 4: 00 o'clock when you went on duty, you had
no instructions as to what you were to do in reporting in any large
number of planes or anything else in the air?
A. That is right, sir.
[4S8] 108. Q. You had no instructions?
A. I had no instructions.
109. Q. And was this the first time you were on duty there, or the
second ?
A. That was the second time.
110. Q. And there were no further instructions given you as to
what you were to do while you were on duty from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 a. m.,
of that morning?
A. That is right, sir.
111. Q. Do you know how many radar stations were in operation
on that morning ?
A. Because I had about 5 plotters, I gathered there were about 5
in operation,
112. Q. Did you know their locations?
A. I knew the exact location of just one radar, sir.
350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1V>. Q. Yon had no information from anyone to look out for a
large plot of planes, did yon, or did you have?
A. I had no warning, sir.
114. Q. You spoke of Hawaiian music playing all night. Will you
please explain that?
A. Well, the conventional Hawaiian music, guitars and so forth.
115. Q. But you mentioned that as an indication of planes coming
in.
A. Because they would play this music without interruption and
even Avithout announcement, and it had been standard practice to do
so for homing for the planes coming in.
116. Q. Did anyone tell them to play this music for homing for
planes to come in, to your knowledge?
A. From the information I had from this bomber pilot friend of
mind, it was that someone, probably in the Air Force or the Bomber
Command, apparently had arranged for such homing, you see, because
it didn't play on other nights.
117. Q. But you don't know what arrangement they had?
A. No, I don't know, definitely.
118. Q. The instant you saw or became aware of enemy planes over
Oahu, what did you do?
A. I instructed the operator to call the information center plotters
back in. They arrived very shortly and Major Tindal also arrived
almost simultaneously.
[4^59] 119. Q. Did it ever occur to you at that time to report,
immediately to your senior, or the ofhcer who would like to have that
information?
A. Yes, sir. I'm not certain whether I called Major Berquist, or
whether I told the operator to call Wheeler Field and tell them of the
events, or just what happened then. It was really quite confusing for
a while, sir.
120. Q. About what time was this?
A. About 8:10, I would say, sir. As a matter of fact. Major
Tindal arrived so soon and took over that there was hardly time to do
anything there. He apparently started on the way as soon as the
first bombs hit Hickam Field.
121. Q. No effort was made to pass this information along that you
first got about 7 : 00 o'clock ? "
A. No, sir; that is right.
122. Q. Or at 7: 15?
A. That is right, sir.
123. Q. Well, did it occur to you at all tliat it might be an attack
and that it should be passed along?
A. No, sir ; it did not.
124. Q. Well, did you make any effort from any source to find out
whether this flight was foreign, or local?
A. No, sir.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Kear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
125. Q. The report that came in at 7 : 15 wasn't plotted historically,
was it ?
A. That was the same report that was plotted, I'm quite sure, sir, at
7 : GO o'clock.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 351
126. Q. Well, the one that you got at 7 : 15 wasn't recorded other
than by telephone call to you ?
A. Well, only if it could have been plotted at T : 00 o'clock. I
gathered that it was the same plot, sir.
127 Q. Well, if it were a different one at 7 : 15, it was not recorded?
A. That is right, sir.
128. Q. Did you report to your superior or to anyone else about the
7 : 15 incident ?
A. No, sir.
[460] Examined by the court :
129.. Q. Did the Opana station have any place they could have
reported to except through your station ?
A. No, sir.
Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel. U. S. Navy, (Ret.) (continued) :
130. Q. Do you now believe that the planes indicated at 7 : 15 were
the Japanese planes, or were the B-17s ?
A, I believe now that they were Japanese planes, sir.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
131. Q. Was the post at which you were stationed on the morning
of 7 December in the Air Command, or was it in some other part of
the Hawaiian Command, the infantry or something like that? In
other words, did you come directly under the Commanding Officer
of the Army Air Forces in your station, or did you come under some
other department, or do you know?
A. I'm not certain of that. I was working under orders of the
operations officer of the 14th Wing, which was the Air Force Com-
mand. However, the information center was manned mostly by
Signal Corps troops.
Re-cross examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
132. Q. What makes you now think the flight you had reported at
7: 15 was Japanese planes?
A. Because, sir, I have learned about radar since then and it would
take a large plot, a large number of planes to make a plot at that dis-
tance, and I don't think that B-17s coming over as they did, that it
would have been possible to pick them up at that range.
133. Q. When did you first reach that conclusion ?
A. That would be hard to say. It was in the weeks following,
somewhere in the weeks following Pearl Harbor. I learned quite a
bit about radar very soon after that, sir.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not [-^67] been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station, please.
A. William A. Heard, Captain, USN, Deputy Director, Naval
Intelligence.
2. Q. What duties were you performing in late 1941 ?
A. Prior to October 1), I was in charge of the British Empire desk
in the Office of Naval Intelligece. On that date I relieved Captain
Bode as the officer in charge of the Foreign Branch, Office of Naval
Intelligence, Washington, D. C.
3. Q. How long did you remain on this detail?
A. Until 30 June 1942.
4. Q. I would like to have you state for tlie information of the
court in as brief a manner as possible what the organization of the
Office of Naval Intelligence was between the dates of 16 October 1941
and 7 December of the same year.
A. The organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence was last
revised on August 11, 1941. At that time it consisted of a director,
an assistant director, and 3 principal branches. Do you want to
include the field organizations?
5. Q. Yes, you might add that.
A. There were three principal branches: Domestic, Foreign, and
Administrative ; and a field organization of the Naval District Intelli-
gence offices and the foreign posts.
6. Q. That is the broad outline ?
A. Yes.
7. Q. Now, you say you headed the Foreign Branch ?
A. Yes.
8. Q. Without stating the sources of your information, please tell
the court the form in which intelligence information left your divi-
sion ; that is, was it simply a list of facts, or was it facts from which
a general [4^^] summary or evaluation was made, or just ex-
actly how did you pass information along from your division ?
A. Intelligence was passed from the Office of Naval Intelligence in
the following specific forms : First, when we received items of urgent
interest, by oral report. Daily, Japanese summary to the Director
of Naval Intelligence by the head of the Far East Section, relayed
by Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operators.
(Not invariably a daily report.) Daily, summary of State Depart-
ment dispatches. Whenever appropriate, printed serials presenting
related items of information. Weekly, known or estimated disposi-
tions of all foreign fleets. When required by the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, comparative strength tables by types of all fleets. A daily
bulletin for the President's naval aide. Fortnightly, summaries of
current national situation. When occurring, special summaries. Dis-
patches to foreign posts and the naval attaches. I have undertaken
to answer specifically as to whether the information was evaluated.
There were varying degrees of evaluation, naturally, in that scope of
forms of leporting. Generally, all information was evaluated as to
its credibility, as to its implications, and to a greater or less degree as
to the conclusions which might be drawn from it. It had been estab-
lished that the final evaluation in the form of enemy intentions was
more properly the responsibility of the War Plans Division.
9. Q. Did the Chief of Naval Operations get all classifications of
information which you have enumerated?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 353
A. I believe, without exception copies of all of the reports and also
the oral re[)orts were directed to the Chief of Naval Operations.
10. Q. I believe you spoke of a classification of information which
you called "Political." Would that type of classification of informa-
tion, for example, include such matters as the diplomatic negotiations
that were going on between the Japanese and the United States gov-
ernments the latter part of 1941 ?
A. Political information was included, such information as was
available to the Office of Naval Intelligence was further reported to
the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. Q. Let me ask you another question : What were the sources of
this political information, if you are at liberty to so relate. In other
words, generally speaking, what were the sources of your political
information ?
A. Foreign Post Fleet Comamnclers, State Department, and other
sources.
12. Q. How often was this particular classification of information
passed to the Chief of Naval Operations ? Do you know ?
A. As a rule — certainly I am sure it was the case in the period under
consideration — there was a daily report.
[463] 13. Q. In relation to the events of late November and
early December, 1941 — that is, before the outbreak of war with Ja-
pan— was there or was there not considerable information of a mili-
tary nature passing through your office?
A. There was.
14. Q. Do you feel, from your recollection of those events, that
this information was promptly passed to the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it was passed quite
promptly to the Chief of Naval Operations.
15. Q. Did information arising in the office of the Director of
Naval Intelligence have to be cleared" by anyone between that office
and the Chief of Naval Operations before this latter officer could
receive it? In other words, my question is this: Was information
passed directly from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Chief
of Naval Operations, that is, those matters which concerned him,
without the interference or the permission of any intermediary?
A. The Director of Naval Intelligence enjoyed ready access, both
to Admiral Ingersoll and to Admiral Stark.
16. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it?
A. I can, I have had previous knowleclge of the dispatch.
17. Q. Will you state what the general subject matter of this dis-
patch is, for the record?
A. This is a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the
Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East, Caribbean
Defense Command, and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department and of the Fourth Army.
18. Q. What is the subject matter of the dispatch?
A. Alerting the addressees as to the impending action of Jap^anese
diplomatic representatives with regard to our relations.
19. Q. Can you recall whether or not similar information was in
the Office of Naval Intelligence on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. It was.
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 24
354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
20. Q. Can you state from recollection or records of the office, that
you have examined to refresh your memory, whether or not this
information was in the Office of Naval Intelligence as early as 0900,
AVashington Time, on [W] 7 December, 1941 ?
A. From the best record available in the Office of Naval Intelligence,
the information upon which I believe this document was based was
not available in the Navy Department until about 0900 of 7 December
1941.
21. Q. That being your estimate of the time the information was
available in your office, from 3^our experience could you give the court
an estimate of the time that its evaluation or the facts which the
exhibit show were sent to Hawaii, what time this might have been
reasonably in the hands of the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Captain McCallum, Chief of the Far East Section, who had
relieved his chief Japanese assistant at 0800, brought this informa-
tion which he received about 9 : 00 o'clock immediately to the Director
of Naval Intelligence who arrived in his office at 0900. Some time
later — and I believe prior to 10 : 00 o'clock — the Director of Naval
Intelligence took Commander McCallum to the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations for the purpose of presenting the information
to him. I cannot state the exact hour.
The court then, at 3 : 13 p. m., took a recess until 3 : 21 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present :
All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties
and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose
counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Captain William A. Heard, U. S. Navy, the witness under exami-
nation when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not care to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
22. Q. Is the information which you have given. Captain, from your
personal knowledge as of 7 December, or from records now available
to O. N. I. ? That is, were you down [•^6'^] at the Navy Depart-
ment Sunday morning, December 7th ?
A. I \vas not here until a little after noon, sir. I did receive, through
the official conduct of business, a report from Commander McCallum
as to what had taken place in the forenoon. I have also the official
statement of the Director of Naval Intelligence which was made very
shortly after the event.
23. Q. And you are the custodian of that official report now ?
A. I don't know that I would say I am the official custodian, sir. I
have a copy of the Director of Naval Intelligence's statement. I have
not the original of his statement in my custody and I believe it is not
in the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, I was aware of it at the
time and at present, I can say that I was aware of the underlying in-
formation up until the preceding evening, of my own, first-hand knowl-
edge.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 355
24. Q. Referring to the dispatch from General Marshall to Hawaii,
which I believe tlie j'udge advocate showed you, Exhibit 48 : There ap-
pear to be three factual statements in it. "Japanese are presenting at
1 : 00 p. m., Eastern Standard Time today" — that I would consider to
be one factual statement — "what amounts to an ultimatum" — that
might be the second — "Also they are under orders to destroy their code
machine immediately" — that would be the third. Then there are con-
clusions drawn from it. Do you kno^^' whether any of those three
factual statements or information tending to establish those was avail-
able to the Navy Department prior to 7 December?
A. As to the destruction of the codes and confidential papers, there
was information in the Navy Department on the 3rd of December.
That information was made available to the outling possessions and
to the High Command ; and based on that information, the Director of
Naval Intelligence directed our representatives, our attaches in other
words, in Japanese and satellite or ex])osed stations, to destroy forth-
with their communication systems and gave them a plain language code
word to report when it had been done. Those reports were duly re-
ceived prior to the 7th of December, As to the time of the meeting and
the precise character of the ultimatum or that there would be an ulti-
matum, there was not a clear appreciation of either fact until, as I have
previously testified, based on the Director of Naval Intelligence's offi-
cial statement, that became available at just abo'ut 0900 on 7 December.
There were pi-evious implications and it was a matter of common
knowledge, I think, that the negotiations were stalemated and that
there would not be, to us, a satisfactory conclusion. But there is that
difference, sir, that as of the information available up until about 9 : 00
o'clock there was not clear-cut evidence which, I believe, led to the for-
mulation of this subject document,
[4-66] 25, Q, Did the written report of the Director of Naval
Intelligence to which you made reference contain top secret informa-
tion?
A, It did, sir, I might say, incidental to the report.
26. Q. But it isjncluded in the report?
A, It is, sir. There is much material in it which is not in that clas-
sification, sir,
27. Q. Who was the assistant to Commander McCallum when he
was relieved about 8 : 00 o'clock Sunday morning?
A. Then Lieutenant Commander — now Commander, I believe —
Watts, wdio was also a Japanese language officer and had been ordered
here to the Department as the tentative relief for Comuiander McCal-
lum.
28. Q. Is Commander Watts on cMty in Washington now?
A. He is not, sir. He is, I believe, in the Pacific.
29. Q. Did you then, or do you now, know of a conference on Sun-
day, 7 December, at or about 10 : 00 o'clock at the State Department?
A. No. sir.
30. Q. Do you know whether any of this information was communi-
cated to the Secretary of the Navy Sunday morning?
A. I do not, sir. of mv own knowledge.
[467] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U, S, Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U, S, Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew,
31. Q. And the records do not
356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I have no records of that, sir. In conformance with general
practice, I should be much surprised if it were not, but I have no
first-hand knowledge.
32. Q. Do you know whether any intelligence information was com-
municated to the Chief of Naval Operations Saturday evening, De-
cember 6, 1941 ?
A. I can't be sure of that, sir. It was the practice — certainly in
those last few days — for the Director of Naval Intelligence to report,
not less than once daily, to the Chief of Naval Operations more or less
of a summary of new developments and new information..
33. Q. I am asking about Saturday evening.
A. On Saturday evening I don't know. I was here and the Director
was here, and the Chief of Naval Operations was here some time, too,
along in the evening of the 6th of December, but I don't know whether
or not the Director saw him at that time and whether or not any
further information was passed to him.
34. Q. At approximately what time did you go home on Saturday
evening, December 6 ?
A. It was 7 o'clock or after.
35. Q. After you got home did you receive a report of further
information ?
A. I did not, sir. I would not normally have received it unless
I was called to come back to the office, because on Friday, the 4th of
December, the Director of Naval Intelligence had established a 24-hour
continuous watch in the Far East Section, the watch to be stood by the
three or four senior officers in that section who were involved in the
processing, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence.
36. Q. Do you know whether or not on Saturday night there was
any information available in the Navy Department that was reported
to the Director of Naval Intelligence at his home ?
A. I do not, but I do know, sir, that there had been since May 27,
1941, a special, continuous watch in the Office of Naval Intelligence,
headed by one of the more senior officers in the division, and that watch
included junior officers of all the major branches. There was an
elaborate arrangement for prompt notification to the Director of Naval
Intelligence of any matter of interest to him. That also included my
telephone communication with [ 46S] both Military Intelligence
and with the State Department. I would like to add I had occasion
personally to arrange for a special week-end teleplione line between the
Office of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, to go directly
to Mr. Hull's office, where continuous watch was stood in his absence.
All of that telephone was active and was available. As to wliat specific
reports passed over it, I'm not sure.
37. Q. Did Naval Intelligence advise the Army Sunday morning of
the information about which we have been talking?
A. To my own knowledge, I can't answer. I would say that Colonel
Bracken and Commander McCallum were on a cloge basis of communi-
cation and exchange. Whether any specific delivery was made of
information that morning, I don't know.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 357
38. Q. Captain, referring to your testimony about the information
concerning the destruction of codes and ciphei*s, in which you stated
it was known about December 3 : I hand you Exhibit 20 before this
court, a dispatch of December 3 to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic, Pacific, and two naval districts. Is that the dispatch to which
you refer?
A. That is the dispatch.
Examined by the court :
39. Q. Captain, during this time and especially in November and
up to December 7, 1941, did you consider that you were kept thoroughly
informed regarding all information as to the Japanese situation in
your capacity as an officer in Naval Intelligence?
A. You mean within Naval Intelligence, sir ?
40. Q. Yes.
A. Yes, sir, I do.
41. Q. Were you also kept informed at this time, or did you have
information regarding what was going on at the State Department as
to these relations ?
A. I had it second-hand only, sir, through the Director of Naval
Intelligence. You mean, so far as the conduct of the negotiations
were concerned ?
42. Q. Yes. Was it your understanding between November 27 and
December 7, 1941, that conversations and negotiations were continuing
by the State Department with the Japanese representatives?
A. I can't recall as to daily meetings.
[4^9] 43. Q. It is not a question of daily meetings. You are
familiar with the dispatch sent on November 27?
A. Yes.
44. Q. From that time until December 7 were there conversations
and negotiations going on with the State Department and the Japa-
nese representatives ?
A. It is my impression that they were, sir.
45. Q. Do you have any knowledge of a note of November 26, 1941,
being sent by the U. S. Government to Japan and being delivered t<i
the representatives here by the State Department?
A. I have no knowledge of that.
4G. Q. Have you ever seen that note ?
A. I have not, sir. I don't recall ever having seen it. I have had
knowledge of it subsequently.
47. Q. With your information, did you and the officers of Naval
Intelligence form any opinion as to the likelihood of a Japanese
attack?
A. I think that we were solidly of the opinion that war was near at
hand.
48. Q. Did you have any opinion as to how that w^ar would take
place or how it would begin?
A. We were quite convmced that war would begin, or, at least, the
strongest indication we had was of a war in Southeast Asia.
49. Q. Was it generally known or was it your opinion that an at-
tack would be made on Hawaii ?
A. No, sir, we had no information which indicated or would lead
to an obvious conclusion that there was an impending attack on
Hawaii.
358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
50. Q. In other words, you considered that if an attack were made,
it would be made to the southern rather than to the eastern of the
chain of islands from Japan to the Dutch East Indies ?
A. Including the Philippines.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
[470] The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, U. S. Navy, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Q. What duties were you performing after the month of June,
1941?
A. Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, 14th Naval
District, at Pearl Harbor.
3. Q. Will you state briefly the organization of the Intelligence
Unit of the dommandant of the 14tli Naval District, showing par-
ticularly how it was linked to other U. S. naval units of the same
character, the F. B. I., the Army, and the Navy Department? In
other words, how was your unit linked with other units throughout
the service ?
A. Prior to my reporting as officer in charge, the unit was desig-
nated as a field unit, the main unit being in Washington, the other
unit being in Cavite under the Commandant of the 16th Naval Dis-
trict. Personnel, for security reasons, were ordered either as assist-
ants to the District Intelligence Officer or District Communications
Officer. All orders read: ""To the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District for duty." It was decided that perhaps it would be a little
more in keeping if it were called a Combat Intelligence unit, still
retaining the two letters for communication intelligence and placing
it more on a military footing. Accordingly, it was organized under
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, to whom I had been
ordered for duty. It generally consisted of an interceptor unit, of a
direction finder unit, and of a cryptographic or research group. At
the direction of the Coimiiandant, this was increased to provide for
plotting, the preparation of charts, situation maps, etc.
4. Q. What was the connection with other U. S. naval units of a
similar character?
A. The main unit, being in Washington, controlled, to a certain
extent, the duties of the two field units by designating their general
mission and by allocating the [4'^^] various tasks. For ex-
ample, if there were certain work to be done which could not be
accomplished all in one month and if it were uneconomical to have
all three offices working on it, the Washington office designated which
unit was to do the particular piece of work.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 359
5. Q. Did you have any link with the F. B. I, or the Army in
Hawaii?
A, Tlie coUaboration with other than U. S. naval units was more or
less on a personal basis, by reason of the extreme security tliat was in
effect regarding the functions and results of tlie Combat Intelligence
unit. Contact was established and maintained, particularly with
the F. B. I., the Army, and the F. C. C. in the Honolulu area. That
Avas entirely of a personal nature by reason of the fact that we were
not allowed to indicate any results or any details of the work in-
Aolved.
6. Q. So far as your unit was concerned, did you receive weekly or
bi-weekly Intelligence bulletins from the Office of Naval Intelligence
in tJie Navy Department or any summary of information of that
cliaracter?
A. We received two different types of reports or intelligence evalua-
tions, one being the normal reports which were disseminated by the
Office of Naval Intelligence and Avhich were available to everybody in
the Fleet, the other being personal letters, official letters, or dispatches
in our own system, which were more of a technical nature than
anything else.
7. Q. Let us suppose, for example, that during the critical period
preceding December T, 1941, the Navy Department was possessed of
military information concerning Japanese warlike intentions or move-
ments of their ships, etc. Would information of this character be
sent out to your connnand?
A. Not necessarily, sir. We might or might not get all the in-
formation, or any of the information, which was available.
8. Q. Do you mean to state that there wasn't any determined policy
in regare to the information which you got from the Navy Depart-
ment relating to these matters ?
A. No, sir, I wouldn't say that. I would say that I could expect
all information of a technical nature, particularly that bearing on
the tasks which had been assigned our office, but I would not say
that all information available in Washington would be forwarded
to me or forwarded to the Combat Intelligence unit as a matter of
course.
9. Q. Would you say that all information on the Japanese mili-
tary situation which might be of interest to naval forces in the
Hawaiian area would be sent you in the fonn of a bulletin or a
dispatch?
A. Again not necessarily. Perhaps my description [4^^] of
tJie Combat Intelligence Unit has not been clear. We were more of
a technical nature. We were not a Fleet Intelligence Unit in any
sense of the word. We provided intelligence only of a particular and
rather narrow type, and I did not expect — nor would I expect now —
that all information bearing on any foreign country would be sent
to my office. It would probably be sent to the Fleet Intelligence
Officer.
10. Q. Would information regarding political developments and
diplomatic negotiations be given you?
A. No. It is my recollection that one or two bits of that informa-
tion were sent to me, but I would say that not all of it had been.
11. Q. Did you have any information on the location of units of the
Japanese Fleet from November 27 to December 7, 1941? Was that
the type of information you were handling ?
360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes.
12. Q,. Did you have any information on the location of Japanese
carriers during the latter part of November and up to the time of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?
A. We had what we thought was fairly good information of the
presence of various types of Japanese Fleet units, included in which
were one or more carriers.
13. Q. Were there any of these units in which carriers were a part
in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands ?
A. No, sir, the nearest that we had estimated their location to be
was in the Marshalls.
14. Q. Did you, by means of your intelligence liaison with other
units, know whether any other intelligence unit in the naval service
had any information of a carrier group being in closer than the
Marshall group?
A. No, sir. As a result of an exchange of messages in the latter
part of November between the Far Eastern unit and ourselves, I am
of the opinion that neither of us considered that any carriers were
closer than the Marshalls. We heard nothing from the Washington
unit, so I am not in the position to say what they felt.
15. Q. How did you disseminate the information which you re-
ceived in your unit ? To whom did you pass the information that you
received ?
A. We passed the information that we had received, or any de-
ductions which we had made ourselves, by radio and in our own
cryptographic system, which automatically included the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and the two field units. That was
automatic. If one message was originated by one of those two field
units, it automatically went to all addresses.
U73] 16. Q. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes.
17. Q. What about the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?
A. The other method of dissemination was either verbally with the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Fleet Intelligence
Officer or in the form of written, daily sumniaries, which were sent to
the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
18. Q. From October 1 to December 7, 1941, do you recall receiving
information wliich you evaluated as being of a warlike nature concern-
ing the Japanese Govermnent?
A. Yes, sir.
19. Q. Can you recall whether or not this information you had re-
vealed any probable Japanese objectives?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, all of the communica-
tions indicated a southern and westward movement from Japan.
20. Q. Do you recall any information which you had that might
indicate an attack on the United States or its possessions?
A. Definitely not, aside from Guam.
21. Q. How about the Philippines?
A. I will amend that. The Philippines were mentioned on one or
two occasions.
22. Q. Then, is the understanding of the Judge Advocate correct
that you had no information which indicated any Japanese objective
east of Guam ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 361
A. Yes, sir, that is my understanding from reading the various
communications.
23. Q. Will you state to the court, if you know, what method of
communication a Japanese spy, for example, would have of com-
municating between the Hawaiian area and the homeland?
A. Prior to December 7, cable, radio, and such methods as delivery
to a foreign vessel in port and possibly some form of unauthorized
radio transmitter.
2-i. Q. Do you know whether or not there was available to the au-
thorities in the Hawaiian area any means by which they could censor
radio messages going from the Hawaiian area to Japan ?
A. No, sir, that was not permitted by law.
25. Q. How about cable?
A. Cable the same, sir.
[474] 20. Q. How about ordinary mail?
A, Ordinary mail the same.
27. Q. Then, am I to understand your answer that there was un-
restricted mail, radio, and cable communication between Japan and
the Hawaiian Islands which the United States could not stop or censor
prior to December 7, 1941?
A. Yes, sir.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined bv the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
28. Q. On Saturday, December 6, did Admiral Kimmel come to your
office at Pearl Harbor?
A. I wouldn't say whether it was Saturday, but it was in that im-
mediate time.
29. Q. At that time did he gather from you all the intelligence and
information that you had?
A. It is my recollection that any time an important message was
received either by us or was originated by us the Commander-inChief ,
with the Connnandant of the 14th Naval District, came down and dis-
cussed the matter at great length.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
30. Q. Commander, in your capacity as an intelligence officer and as
the head of Combat Intelligence in Honolulu, were you familiar with
local conditions among the civilians of Honolulu?
A. I believe I was, yes, sir.
31. Q. On or about November 27, 1941, and subsequent thereto, did
you notice any marked change in public opinion or in the general
feeling of the Japanese populace as to any impending war or danger?
xV. No, sir, there was no change noticeable.
32. Q. You did not notice any special activities by the Japanese
Consul General or his associates?
A. Yes, sir, there had been some activity there, with particular ref-
ei-ence to apparent burning or destruction of various articles.
[47s] 33. Q. Was there any noticeable propaganda being sent
out by the Japanese or circulated in Honolulu relative to conditions
existing at that time?
A. Insofar as I could find out, none, sir.
362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
34. Q. I presume that you have heard that there have been rumors
to the effect that cordial relations and close cooperation did not
exist between the high commands of the Army and Navy at that
time. What is your idea about such rumors ?
A. My opinion, sir, is that they are entirely unfounded,
35. Q. Did you, as an Intelligence officer, have any idea as to the
source of these rumors or how they started?
A. No, sir, I did not hear any such rumors until after the 7th of
December.
36. Q. In other words, as far as you kijow, the relationship be-
tween the Army and Navy officials was cordial and friendly?
.A. Yes, sir, I gathered that impression from my official relations
W'ith the various Intelligence officers in the Army and Navy, plus
personal relations with various Army officers at Schofield.
37. Q. Did Army and Navy subordinate officers work closely
together ?
A, I think as closely as they do now^, sir,
38. Q. Did you know of any degree of intoxication among officers
and men of the Navy on the night of 6th-7th of December ?
A. No, sir; I heard such rumors after the 7th. From what I
can gather, after discussing the matter with numerous friends at
the alleged places in Honolulu, I do not believe there is any truth
in the rumor, insofar as I could find out.
39. Q. In other words, insofar as you know, there was no special
intoxication ?
A. No, sir; none other than normal — no change from the normal.
40. Q. As Intelligence officer of that community, I suppose you
were conversant with the general bearing and deportment of the
officers and men of the Navy?
A, Yes, sir.
41. Q. Was that good, bad, or excellent insofar as any indulgence
went ?
A. I would say, sir, it was infinitely better than during a normal
Fleet cruise and perhaps about the same or a little less than in the
San Pedro-Long Beach area.
[476] 42. Q. This court understands that you, as the Combat
Intelligence officer, not only kept conversant with all information
obtainable regarding the Japanese situation but immediately upon
obtaining it, you communicated it to the Commander-in-Chief and
to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?
A. Yes, sir.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine
this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat -
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record
in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by
the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 4: 10 p. m., adjourned until 9: 30 a. m., August
19, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 363
PEOCEEDINGS OF MYY COUET OF maUIRY
SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1944.
[477] Fourteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washingto7i, D. €.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Oriii G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfiis, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolplnis Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the thirteenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and your present duty station,
Colonel ?
A. Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, General Staff Corps, G-3, of Gen-
eral Stilwell, Myitkyina, North Burma.
2. Q. To what duties were you assigned in the year 1941 ?
A. I Avas Chief of Staff' to General Short.
3. What was General Short's position at that time ?
A. He was commanding the Hawaiian Department.
[478] 4. Q. And were j'ou Chief of Staff during the entire year
1941?
A. No, sir.
5. Q. Wlien were you assigned the duties as Chief of Staff to the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and when were you re-
lieved of these duties ?
A. On November 5, 1941, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the
Hawaiian Department, and relieved on December 18, 1941.
6. Q. Previous to your assignment as Chief of Staff, were you per-
forming duties under the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment ?
A. I was.
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. Q. What were these duties during the year 1941, that you were
then performing ?
A. I arrived in the Hawaiian Department the early part of March,
1941. I don't remember the exact date. From that time until the
time of my 'appointment as Chief of Staff, I rotated through the various
General Staff Sections, G-1, 2, 3, and 4, in order to become thoroughly
acquainted with the situation in the Hawaiian Department. Most of
that time I was in G-3, Operations Section of General Staff.
8. Q. Since being relieved in December — 17 December, from your
duties in the Hawaiian Department, would you state in general what
duties you have since been performing?
A. I was relieved as Chief of Staff on December 18, 1941, and at
General Emmons' request I was retained as Deputy Chief of Staff to
him. I remained with that duty until about November of the next
year.
9. Q. That was in the Hawaiian Department ?
A. That was in the Hawaiian Department, as Deputy Chief of
Staff to General Delos Emmons.
10. Q. Can you remember during your tour of duty with the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department, and during the year
1941 only — can you recall in general what had been the principal
problems which the Army and Navy were mutually interested in, in"
the Hawaiian area ?
A. I can, generally. I wish to state that the details of the attack
on Pearl Harbor — many of the details — are rather dim, rather hazy.
I have been in active operations since that period. I have kept no
notes, no file.
11. Q. My question, Colonel, related to the problems that confronted
the Army and Navy, mutually, during the year 1941, in the Hawaiian
Department, not the details of the attack.
A. My reply is, I know them.
[4'/5] 12. Q. Can you state what they were?
A. Of course, the chief problem was the defense of the islands
against any attack. That was our mission.
13. Q. Were there any problems related to the defense of Pearl
Harbor, that you recall ?
A. No, I don't recall any.
14. Q. Whose responsibility was it, under existing orders or agree-
ments, for the defense of Pearl Harbor ?
A. That was covered in the plans that we had in existence at that
time, and I cannot state exactly where the responsibility for that was.
15. Q. Do you recall whether it was a joint responsibility, an Army
respqjisibility, or a Navy responsibility ?
A. Generally, as I recall, a joint responsibility.
16. Q. Do you remember if there were any problems as to the ade-
quacy of anti-aircraft defense?
A.' We generally considered that there wns a shortage of anti-
aircraft defense, and had made recommendations to rectify that.
17. Q. Do you recall anything concerning problems in the aircraft
warning system?
A. We were exerting every effort to get that installed at the earliest
possible time.
18. Q. Can you remember any problems concerning aviation?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 365
A. Yes, there was a definite shortage of planes for reconnaissance,
heavy bombers, and small reconnaissance ships.
19. Q. Do you have any recollection of the number of anti-aircraft
guns that were available under the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department for the defense of the naval base at Pearl
Harbor '^
A. I do not.
20. Q. And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where
these guns were placed ?
A. I do not.
21. Q. Can you recall, after 7 November 1941, up to and including
December 7, 1941, if there ^as any condition of alert ordered in the
Haw^aiian Department ?
A. There was, sabotage alert. It went into effect on November 27,
22. Q. Do you remember that the official Army name for this type
of alert was, by number or anything else ?
A. It was Alert No. 1, I believe, or No. 3; I am not [4^0]
sure. It was one or the other. The alerts were divided into three;
one for sabotage, the second requiring more troops with the idea of
increasing the defense for anti-aircraft, and the third was an all-out
defense against a landing,
23. Q. Under the condition of Alert No. 1, can you recall wdiether
that alert required any of your anti-aircraft guns to be manned?
A. I cannot recall right now the details that were in the plan.
24. Q, Do you know whether or not under the condition. Alert
No, 1, that gun crews were required to be at their stations continu-
ously ?
A. J do not recall.
25. Q. Can you recall wdiether or not under the condition of Alert
No. 1, ammunition had to be at the guns ?
A. I do not.
26. Q. Since you have testified that you do not know the positions
of the guns that were designated for the defense of the naval base at
Pearl Harbor, and further you do not know where the men were
quartered, you probably Avould not be able to give us any idea of how
long it would take to man these guns in the event that a general alarm
was given ?
A. I could not.
27. Q. Do you have any idea as to the number of mobile guns that
were available for anti-aircraft fire in the Hawaiian Department just
prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I knew at the time, but I have no idea now.
28. Q. Do you know if there was any plan in effect between 27
November 1941 and 7 December 1941, for coordinating the anti-
aircraft fire of Army units and Navy units in the defense of Pearl
Harbor?
A. I cannot say definitely as to that.
29. Q. Did you have any sort of a committee in the Hawaiian area,
represented by both Army and Navy, which committee studied the
problems that were mutually affecting both services, that you can
remember ?
A. We had a committee, of which I became the chairman by virtue
of my office as Chief of Staff, which had to do with the plans, and
366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was only called — this is purely from memory — into being when any
change in the plans was demanded by either party.
30. Q. Am I to understand from your answer, then, that this joint
committee dealt with plans solely, and not with other problems?
A. That is my recollection, sir.
[4-81] 31. Q. Can you recall when the last meeting was held
prior to 7 December 1041 ?
A. I cannot.
32. Q. Do you know if there were any other steps, other than this
joint committee that you have just told us about, taken with the aim
of coordinating any measures or problems between the Army and
Navy?
A. Yes, there were. We had an officer in G-3, of the Army, wdiose
duty it was to take back to the Navy any information, all actions,
everything of any importance, particularly operation; and we had
likewise an Army officer in the Navy Headquarters, whose duty it
was to do the same thing. There were many meetings between Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Short in regard to official matters.
33. Q. That is what I am trying to get at, Colonel. I w^ould assume
that in an area as important as the Hawaiian Department and the
Navy Base at Pearl Hrbor, that there might be many military prob-
lems arise ?
A. Many.
34. Q. Can you tell this court these mutual problems were solved in
tliat area ?
A. Directly ; the air directly with your air — and those conferences
were frequent. If we had any construction, my G-4 was directed
to see his opposite, and the problems were threshed out. All of these
meetings were reported on through me to the Commanding General,
or directly to him by the Staff Officer concerned, usually in my
presence.
35. Q. Did you yourself have any opposite in the naval command
with whom you dealt or negotiated regarding mutual problems aris-
ing in the area ?
A. During my time I was present at a number of conferences which
Admiral Kimmel had with the General, but I do not recall that I went
to my opposite in the Navy during my tour as Chief of Staff.
36. Q. Can you tell the court whether or not it was the Command-
ing General's custom to confer with the commandant of the 14th Naval
District and the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet when these
problems arose ?
A. It was.
37. Q. Now, do you know whether or not these consultations took
place frequently or not ?
A. I do. They took place quite frequently, officially and socially.
38. Q. Well now, adverting to the answer that you have just made,
from your own observation as Chief of Staff, and the other official
offices that you held in the Haw-aiian Department, what is your frank
opinion of the relationship [482] between the Army and Navy,
in official matters especially ?
A. In my opinion it was extremely cordial and cooperative.
39. Q. Are you acquainted with criticism that has been made public
through several sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 367
and Navy before the outbreak of the present war — that is, prior to
7 December 1941 ?
A. I am, generally speaking.
40. Q. Do you have any idea of the source of these rumors or
statements ?
A. I have not.
41. Q. But in your opinion i hey are what ?
A. Absurd.
42. Q. Adverting to the critical period from 16 October 1941, to
the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December of
the same year, had any effort been made in the Hawaiian Department
and in the Navy, so far as you know, towards improving communi-
cations and the exchange of information ?
A. I cannot answer that, I do not know, between those specific
dates.
43. Q. Now you have stated that the Army was in Alert No. 1 from
about November 27, 1941 ?
A. It was the sabotage alert, from November 27.
44. Q. Do you know what the sabotage alert directed in the way
of security measures or readiness measures ?
A. I know generally. It is definitely specified in our standing
operating procedure, which was furnished to the Navy at that time.
The general provisions of the sabotage alert were to defend water
works, telephone exchanges, radio stations, bridges, trestles, and so
forth, against attack from any enemy.
45. Q. Can you recall whether the alert that you described as having
been in effect provided any additional precautions to be taken in your
aircraft warning system ?
A. I cannot recall that.
46. Q. Colonel, I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before
this court, and which I will tell you is a dispatch from our own
Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees in the Navy, and
this message purports to quote a message which the Army had sent
to the Commander of the Western Defense Command. I ask you to
inspect this message and tell the court [-^5^] whether or not
a message of similar tenor had been received by the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department?
A. I believe that is correct. The Commanding General, Ha-
waiian Department, received a message similar to that.
47. Q. The dispatch bares date of release in Washington by the
Chief of Naval Operations, November 28, 1941. Can you state at
about what time you, as Chief of Staff, became familiar with the
subject matter of this dispatch?
A. About that date — November 27 or 2.S; I don't remember.
48. Q. Can you recall that the representatives of the Army and
Navy had an conferences as regards this dispatch, in the Hawaiian
area?
A. General Short conferred once with Admiral Kimmel in regard
to this, I am positive.
49. Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, what the result of
this conference was?
A. I did at the time. I cannot recall at present.
368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
50. Q. You can't recall any of the details?
A. I do not.
51. Q. I note that the dispatch contemplates certain action on the
part of the Army. One directive reads "You are directed to under-
take, prior to Japanese hostile action, such reconnaissance and other
measures as you consider necessary." Now at that time no Japanese
attack had yet been launched ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct.
52. Q. Was any reconnaissance undertaken prior to Japanese
action ?
A. Reconnaissance was discussed. We had few heavy bombers.
We were sending them, as rapidly as possible, to the southwest, and
utilizing the few we had chiefly to train crews for other operations
or taking additional planes to the southwest.
53. Q. Can you recall if there were in effect any plans, between
27 November 1941 and the Japanese attack on 7 December, which
provided for reconnaissance?
A. As I recall, that was in our joint plan.
54. Q. Can you give us some idea of what this provision was?
A. I think, generally, the Navy was responsible for distance re-
connaissance, and the Army for inshore, I believe. I am not
positive.
55. Q. Now do you know whether or not there was any confer-
ence regarding the matter of reconnaissance after the receipt of the
dispatch about 27 or 28 November, that you have [4^4] been
talking about?
A. I am sure there was. I can't state the date, or with whom.
56. Q. Now inasmuch as this message purports to direct the Com-
manding General to undertake reconnaissance, can you state what
was done about it? .
A. I cannot.
57. Q. And you can't tell us what the results of this conference
was with the Navy on this subject?
A. I don't remember.
58. Q. Can you recall what planes you had in the Hawaiian De-
partment, on or about 6 or 7 December 1941, that were suitable for
reconnaissance work?
A. Distant reconnaissance?
59. Q. Yes, distance reconnaissance.
A. As I recall, about a dozen ; maybe a few more.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[485] 60." Q. Can you recall whether there were planes suitable
for any other sort of reconnaissance than long-range reconnaissance?
A. We had a squadron of small ships, a reconnaissance squadron — I
do not recall how many, a small number — at Bellows Field.
61. Q. How far were they suitable for operating at sea ?
A. I cannot tell you the range. I do not know.
62. Q. Did you yourself, on and after the time you were informed
of the contents of this message which you have examined. Exhibit 19,
form any estimate of your own as to the imminence of an attack by
the Japanese on the Island of Oahu ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 369
A. At the time of the receipt of this message, we estimated the situa-
tion, considering every angle, and arrived at the decision that a sabo-
tage alert was the alert to execute. I concurred in that decision.
63. Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this : Did you form
any estimate of your own based on the information you had on, say,
28 November, 1941, as to whether the Japanese would attack any objec-
tive in the Hawaiian area?
A. My personal estimate was that it was possible but not very
probable.
64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack that might be
made by the Japanese ?
A. An air attack more probably than any.
65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack was bombing
or torpedo, or both?
A. Generally, an air attack, including everything concerned therein.
66. Q. Did you receive any further information officially or in your
conversations with your Commanding General after the information
set out in Exhibit 19 that led you to believe that an attack on the
Hawaiian area was more imminent than it had been ?
A. We did not.
67. Q. Can you recall if you received any information whatsoever
after having been informed of the contents of Exhibit 19, on the immi-
nence of war between the Japanese and the United States ?
A. I do not recall having received any additional information until
about 3 : 30 the afternoon of December Ttli,
68. Q. And of course the attack at that time had already been
initiated?
A. It had been concluded.
[4S6~\ 69. Q. Do you feel that the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department between 27 November 1941 and the attack on
7 December, kept you fully informed of the developments in the United
States- Japanese situation?
A. I do.
70. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is in evidence before this court,
which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain
naval addressees under date of November 27, 1941. I ask you to in-
spect this dispatch and to inform the court whether you had seen this
dispatch or had been informed of its contents before December 7, 1941 ?
A. I do not recall having seen that dispatch.
71. Q. Do you feel that you may have seen it and do not remember?
A. That is possible.
72. Q. Colonel, I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from
the Chief of Naval Operations to certain naval addressees under date
of 4 December 1941, having as its general subject matter a directive
to the Naval Station, Guam, to destroy all secret and confidential
publications. I ask you to inspect that message and state to the court
whether or not you had either seen the message or had been informed
of its contents before the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. I do not recall having seen that message.
73. Q. Or having been informed of the contents thereof?
A. That is possible that I was informed. I haven't seen the message.
74. Q. Do you have any present recollection whether you had been
informed of the contents?
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 25
370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I do not.
75. Q. Colonel, I show you Exhibit No. 22, which is a dispatch from
the Chief of Naval Operations to certain naval addressees, under date
of 6 December 4941, and which contains a directive which has to do
with the destruction of certain codes and publications in outlying
Pacific islands. I ask you to inspect this dispatch and state to the court
whether or not you had seen the dispatch or been informed of its
contents before 7 December 1941 ?
A. I do not recall having seen that message.
76. Q. Do you recall whether or not you had been informed of the
contents thereof?
A. I do not.
77. Q. Colonel, will you give the court to the best of your recollec-
tion, what was the organization of the Interceptor Command in the
Hawaiian Department immediately [4<5"/] preceding 7 Decem-
ber 1941 ?
A. We were barely in the first stage of organization, I should say.
just installing the equipment or attempting to install it. We had no
permanent stations installed at the time. We did have a mobile sta-
tion, as I recall, operating.
78. Q. What I am trying to get at. Colonel, is what the set-up in
this Interceptor Command was, what units comprised it, and I mean
by "units" such items as planes, aircraft warning communications,
and the like, if any of these did comprise the Interceptor Command?
A. The organization was, as I recall, under the Signal Corps and
the Air Corps. We had sent a general officer with our department
signal officer to the Mainland to go to school and become better ac-
quainted with what we meant as an interceptor command. They had
just returned shortly before December 7th — I can't give you the date —
and the organization was just in the making.
79. Q. Did this Interceptor Command include an information
center ?
A. Ultimately it did. I'm not sure that it was functioning at that
time.
80. Q. Then if it were functioning at that time, your answer is
that you do not remember?
A. I do not remember.
81. Q. Then you probably could not state what the set-up was in
this Interceptor Command prior to 7 December, 1941 ?
A. I cannot.
82. Q. Can you recall if there was any system in effect in the Ha-
waiian Department immediately prior to 7 December 1941 for keep-
ing the proper officials informed on the movement of friendly planes
in the area so as to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy
if enemy planes approached?
A. I do not.
83. Q. You do not remember?
A. I do not remember.
84. Q. Can you recall what the system was for the daily operation
of your aircraft warning system between 27 November 1941 and 7
December, 1941?
A. As I recall, it was operated on more or less a training schedule,
with the idea of training operators chiefly.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 371
85. Q, Do you know what the scheduled hours for this operation
were?
A. I cannot say. I do not remember,
[4^8] 86. Q. Can you recall whether it was in the morning,
in the afternoon, or in the evening?
A. It was in the morning, but what hours or why that particular
time, I cannot remember.
87. Q. You say you feel it was in the morning ?
A. That is right.
88. Q. Can you remember whether it was before daybreak, or after
daybreak ?
A. I do not recall.
89. Q. Do you know whether or not during these periods during
which the aircraft warning systems were manned, there was an officer
in charge of the aircraft warning system in the pursuit command?
A. I do not remember, but I'm sure there must have been.
90. Q. Can you recall whether or not on the morning of 7 Decem-
ber 1941 there w'as scheduled to arrive in the Hawaiian area a flight
of friendly planes ?
A. There was. As I recall, 13, B-l7s came in during the attack,
or about 13.
91. Q. What I am trying to ascertain. Colonel, is this: Was the
flight scheduled, and if it was, do you know the hour that the flight
was due to arrive on the Island of Oahu ?
A. I do not.
92. Q. Can you remember whether, between October 1, 1941 and
December 7, 1941, any joint Army ancl Navy drills were held involv-
ing long-range air reconnaissance?
A. I do not remember.
93. Q. Can you recall whether or not there were any drills held
between the same period involving Navy fighters and Army pursuit
ships ?
A. I do not remember.
94. Q. Adverting to the morning of 7 December 1941, do you have
any knowledge of a radar track having been kept of incoming planes
which afterward turned out to be Japanese, or of these same planes
when they made a return ?
A. There was such a radar track.
95. Q. Was it for both incoming and outgoing, or for just one?
A. I cannot say. I do not know.
[489] 96. Q- What is your information on this radar track?
A. I saw the track several days subsequent to December 7th but
I'm not a radar man.
97. Q. Did this track show whether or not it was for retiring planes,
or for incoming planes ? Can you remember that ?
A. I do not remember that.
98. Q. Specifically Avhen, after 0755 on 7 December 1941, did you
become acquainted with the existence of this radar track, to the best
of your knowledge?
A. I do not remember.
99. Q. Can you recall when you first became aware that an enemy
Avas attacking in the Hawaiian area ?
A. According to my watch, it Avas 7 : 58 a. m., December 7th.
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
100. Q. What was the information that j'ou had that led you to
believe that this was an enemy attack?
A. I was out in my quarters. I received a telephone message.
I received a number of telephone messages immediately thereafter
from Hickam Field. The first message, the adjutant general at
Hickam Field relayed to me at once, I informed the Commanding
General immediately, who lived in the adjoining quarters, ran to my
office, issued the order for the all-out alert which the General had
directed. That all occurred within a very few minutes.
101. Q. What was the message you got from Hickam Field?
A. That we were being attacked by Japanese planes. The explo-
sions were going on at the time. It was very evident.
102. Q. Can you remember how long after you gave the directive
for the general alert that it took to man the anti-aircraft guns for
the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor?
A. I do not remember.
103. Q. Can you recall whether or not this general alert included
the matter of pursuit planes getting aloft?
A. I believe it did.
104. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not any
Army pursuit ships did get off the ground after the initiation of the
Japanese attack at 0755 7 December 1941?
A. I do. They did.
105. Q. About how long did it take them to get into the air?
A. I do not know.
[490] 106. Q. Can you state approximately how many pursuit
ships did get in the air at that time ?
A. I cannot.
107. Q. Do you know whether or not any bombers were able to
take the air after the gfjneral alert you have described ?
A. I do not.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
108. Q. Sometime on Sunday morning, 7 December, did you tele-
phone Chief of Staff, General Marshall ?
A. I did.
109. Q. About what time was that, Colonel Phillips?
A. As I recall, that was about 8 : 22.
110. Q. That would be Hawaiian Time?
A. That is right.
111. Q. How long did it take to get the call through ?
A. Not very long. I should say maybe five, maybe ten minutes;
not over that.
112. Q. Was the connection good?
A. Excellent.
113. Q. Now, will you relate as accurately as you can recall just
what you said and what General Marshall said ?
A. I told the Chief of Staff — I. think I first got the secretary of
the General Staff, Colonel Smith. I asked for the Chief of Staff
and was connected with him. I told him that we were under an at-
tack by the Japanese. I gave him what information I had as to the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 373
casualties and tlie destruction by that time. He replied, "Did you
get my message?" My reply, "What message?" His reply, "The
message I sent yesterday", I believe, or "last night".
114. Q. "The message I sent yesterday or last night?"
A. Well, I'm not sure exactly.
115. Q. But it was either one of the two ?
A. Yes, sir. My reply, "We did not".
116. Q. And that was about all?
A. That was about all that I recall. This is all that I recall.
[491] 117. Q. Was the call shifted on the Washington end to
someone else?
A. I do not know.
118. Q. And repeated by you at the request of General Marshall
to somebody else in the office ?
A. It was not.
119. Q. It was not?
A. It was not repeated by me.
120. Q. It was not repeated ?
A. It was not repeated by me to somebody else in the office.
121. Q. What time did j^ou get the dispatch that General Marshall
did send ?
A. About 3 : 30 the afternoon of December 7th.
122. Q. I show you Exhibit 48 in these proceedings and ask if that
is a copy of the message that was received ?
A. I do not know.
123. Q. You saw it when it came?
A. I saw it and immediately dispatched it by officer messenger
in my office to General Short.
124. Q. He was then at some
A. He was at the forward echelon, as we called it, up in the crater
at his forward command post. I was at Fort Shafter.
125. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when that message was
received in Hawaii, as distinguished from being received by you,
I mean ?
A. Not of my own knowledge. I have been told that it came in
sometime that morning. It was sent, as I recall, over the Radio
Corporation of America lines.
126. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when it was dispatched
in Washington?
A. I have not.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret)
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
127. Q. Colonel, are you familiar with the publication, "Joint Ac-
tion of the Army and the Navy"?
A. Yes, sir.
[4'92'\ 128. Q. I think you answered a question with reference
to the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor, in which you
said it was a joint responsibility?
A. I was familiar with those, w^ith the provisions. I haven't seen
them for two years and a half.
129. Q. Did you answer that it was a joint responsibility? Am
I correct in my recollection ?
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I thinks my reply, sir, was to the effect that, as I recalled, it
was generally a joint responsibility. That is what I meant to say.
130. Q. This publication, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy",
is still in effect, isn't it ?
A. I do not know.
131. Q. It was effective on December 7, 1941 ?
A. I believe it was, sir.
132. Q. Do you know what the responsibility of the Army and
Navy was, respectively, under this Joint Action, and also under any
agreements that may have been entered into between the Commandant
of the 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawai-
ian Department, as to the responsibility for the defense of Pearl
Harbor ?
A. I undoubtedly knew at the time. I do not recall specifically
at this time.
133. Q. Don't you consider that it is a matter of such great im-
portance that it couldn't possibly leave jour mind as Chief of Staff
to the Commanding General?
A. I have been away entirely from that office for many months.
Admiral, been on an active combat front, and haven't throught of
Pearl Harbor for some time.
The question was repeated.
A. I consider it is of great importance, sir, but I cannot answer
the question. I do not remember.
134. Q. You testified to the effect that you didn't remember whether
you had Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 3 ; is that correct?
A. I remember definitely, sir, that it was the sabotage alert. We
called them the sabotage alert, the half-out, and the all-out, rather than
1, 2 and 3. I do not at present recall. It is a matter of record in the
standard operating procedure.
135. Q. Aren't the Army designations of alert still in effect as 1,
2 and 3?
A. Those were numbers that were adopted in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment merely for convenience.
[493] 136. Q. But not in general throughout the Army?
A. No, sir.
137. Q. And you don't recall a distinction now between 1 and 3 ?
A. I recall the distinction, sir, but I'm not sure whether the sabo-
tage alert was No. 1 or No. 3.
138. Q. I'm not talking about the sabotage alert. I am talking
about your knowledge of conditions 1 and 3 of the alert. You mean
that you are just confused as to the numbering?
A. That is right ; that is right exactly.
139. Q. When important dispatches such as the judge advocate
has shown you here during your testimony were received by the Com-
manding General, did he discuss them with you at all ?
A. Yes, sir, generally.
140. Q. Then if General Short had seen those dispatches, would he
assume that you saw them, or would that be a correct assumption?
A. I may have seen them, but the correct assumption would be that
if I did not see them, he discussed them with me.
141. Q. Colonel, you stated that in your opinion an air attack was
more probable than any other ; an air attack on Hawaii ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 375
A. That was my personal opinion, yes, sir,
142. Q. Upon what was that opinion based?
A. The enemy's capabilities.
143. Q. Did you know anything about the enemy'§ capabilities or
dispositions ?
A. Nothing definite, no, sir.
144. Q. In other words, your personal opinion was not based on
any definite information ?
A. That is right.
145. Q. Simply a question of opinion?
A. Personal opinion.
146. Q. Did you receive any message that certain planes were 132
miles from Honolulu, in a northeasterly direction, on the morning
of 7 December 1941 ?
A. I did not.
147. Q. In general, did you accompany General Short when he
made official visits and otherwise to Admiral Kimmel?
A, In general, I did.
[4^4] 148. Q. Were they on speaking terms?
A. Certainly.
149. Q. Officially and personally?
A. Yes, sir ; and socially.
150. Q. What do you consider their relationship, both personally
and officially?
A. Very friendly.
151. Q. Cordial?
A. Very cordial,
152. Q. Have you any knowledge of any disputes among them?
A. None.
153. Q. Or controversies?
A. No, sir.
154. Q. In other words, your opinion was that there was very
close cooperation, not only between the General and the Admiral, but
between their subordinates?
A. Exactly.
155. Q. What is that?
A. Yes, sir.
156. Q. From your knowledge as Chief of Staff of the General, did
you consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate
to defend Hawaii ?
A. I did not.
157. Q. To your knowledge, was there a free exchange of informa-
tion between the Commanding General of the Army and the Comman-
der-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. There was.
158. Q. Have you any knowledge of the conditions relative to
drinking or intoxication of Army personnel on the night of 6-7
December, 1941 ?
A. I have.
159. Q. What was that condition so far as you know it?
A. Purely normal; no excess wdiatsoever; no drunkenness. There
had been no officer in the Army tried for drunkenness or charges pre-
ferred during my tour in the Hawaiian Department.
376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
160. Q. This apj)lied also to officers, as well as men, did it?
A. In the Hawaiian Department. I cannot say as to the charges
preferred against men but I can say that there was nothing excessive
or anything of that kind on December 6th, 5th, or any other time in
that immediate period.
[4^5] 161. Q. What was the condition of Army personnel and
Naval, so far as you were able to see them, at the time of the attack on
the morning of 7 December, 1941, with reference to their fitness for
duty?
A. There were no cases or any indication of anything except top
condition at that time.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
162. Q. In other words, they were all fit for duty and were on the
job?
A. All that I came in contact with.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 11 : 05 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 25 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold E. Stark,
interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state j^our name, rank, and present station?
A. Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief
of Staff on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.
[496] 2. Q. What duties were assigned you in 1941 ?
A. In the beginning of the year I was Chief of Staff of Group 4
and on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.
3. Q. When did you assume the duties of Chief of Staff for Opera-
tions on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet ?
A. When Admiral Kimmel assumed command, which, as I recall it,
was about the 1st of February, 1941.
4. Q. There is evidence before this court that the U. S. Pacific Fleet
was based in the Hawaiian Islands during the year 1941. I will ask
you to discuss the problems attendant to basing the U. S. Pacific Fleet
in that area under the heading, first, of materiel.
A. Well, materiel for getting the Fleet ready for war requirements
was hard to get. The normal flow seemed to be toward the Atlantic,
and this applies particularly to items such as radar, anti-aircraft guns,
bombs, and planes.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 377
5. Q. The second is with regard to supplies.
A. Generally speaking, except for the items mentioned above, the
Pacific Fleet was well supplied.
6. Q. AVhat about the morale of personnel ?
A. I think the morale was higli — as high as could be expected under
the circumstances. There were continued rumors of the Fleet's re-
turning to the West Coast, which upset the people to a certain extent.
There were few recreational facilities on the Island for the number
of personnel in the Fleet, and transportation between Pearl Harbor
and Honolulu was difficult. A combination of all these things, I
think, made it difficult to maintain the high standard of morale that I
think we did maintain.
7. Q. "Wliat about training?
A. The Pacific Fleet was divided into three task forces. That per-
mitted an operating schedule, which, in my opinion, gave plenty of
time for training and overhaul. The training was realistic, in that
ships were required to steam darkened in war time dispositions. The
training was emphasized so as to be of an inter-type nature, which
included aircraft, submarines, and all types of service forces. I had
never seen' the Fleet organized and trained under more warlike condi-
tions, and I believe the training conducted during this period, within
the personnel and materiel available, prepared them and readied them
for war. I think the basic organization of the Fleet was greater, and
that is substantiated by the fact that the Fleet has operated in generally
that organization during the war. In port, the training was not con-
fined merely to readying the ships for possible war at sea, but also
in defense of the base at Pearl Harbor, and the training which was
conducted in port was all joint, in that the Army Air [W^]
Forces always participated. Generally speaking, at sea the exercises
were practically of a joint nature, too, in that the Army conducted
joint exercises as pertains to range-finder checking and based on
artillery defense training. Their aircraft usually partcipated w^ith
the Fleet in training exercises. The training was not confined to any
particular area, because we operated both to the northern and to the
southern of the Island.
8. Q. From your experience as Fleet Operations Officer, what was
your view in 1941 of the correctness of the continuing decision to base
the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. From my own personal point of view, I could see no reason
for maintaining the Pacific Fleet in the Pearl Harbor area as a
threat to Japan. If it had to be maintained out there to get funds
for the materiel and logistic development of Pearl Harbor, then, the
retention has paid dividends.
9. Q. From your official position on the staff of the Commander-
in-Chief, will you state what views you held between November 27,
1941, and December 7, 1941, on the question of the imminence of war
between the United States and Japan?
A. Well, I knew Japan was on the move, but I believe that the
direction of the movement was toward the Malays or toward Thai-
land. If, in doing that, they had committed an overt act against
the United States, what attitude the United States would assume
in that case was questionable to me. As a matter of fact, that
whole subject was very much, confused in my mind, because as I
378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
saw it, the Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear-cut view of
the attitude which the Government was assuming toward Japan.
10. Q. During the same period of time, what were your views, if
you had any, with reference to a suriDrise attack on the U. S. Pacific
Fleet?
A. I never thought there would be an air or surface ship attack
on the Pacific Fleet at that time.
11. Q. You mean the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, I never thought that Japan would initiate a war by an
attack on the Pacific Fleet, because even though that would gain
some temporary tactical supremacy, I thought it would be an act
which would hasten the defeat of Japan, that an attack on the Pacific
Fleet would wake up America with a bang more than anything else
except an attack on the mainland. In addition to that, and referring
to the dates of November 27 and December 7, I think we had infor-
mation indicating that the Japanese Fleet was primarily based in
the Empire, and then, too, we were in the throes of long discus-
sions between the Army and Washington on the changing of de-
fense battalions on the outlying islands, the withdrawal of certain
aircraft from the bases in the Pacific and substituting Army for
Marine planes. A combination of all these [4'9<§] things just
strengthened my belief that a surprise air surface ship attack would
not be made.
12. Q. Had you ever considered the possibility of an air attack on
units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, and if you had,
will you tell the court what form of attack you estimated they would
most probably make?
A. In my opinion, an attack on Pearl Harbor or an attack in the
area of Pearl Harbor would have been made by submarine. I think
there was evidence of submarines around there before on these dates
that you mentioned.
13. Q. In answer to my last question, Admiral, you discussed sub-
marine attack. M}^ question referred specifically to an air attack
on units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
A. Well, my answer to your former question applies. I did not
think there would be an air or surface ship attack on ships at Pearl
Harbor.
14. Q. Did you form any estimate, if the attack were made, of
the manner in which it would develop, that is, by bombing or by
torpedo plane?
A. No, I didn't, but it would be natural to presume it would be
made by both.
15. Q. What were your views in late November, 1941, as to the
possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack on units of the Pacific Fleet
moored or anchored in Pearl Harbor?
A. From information which I had, I felt the depth of water in
Pearl Harbor was such that torpedoes could not be successfully
launched from aircraft against ships moored in Pearl Harbor.
16. Q. Had this view been influenced by any opinions from the
Navy Department?
A. Yes, because I believe there is information available in letters
of the Chief of Naval Operations to the effect that — at least, as I
recall it — ten to eleven fathoms were required for torpedo launching.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 379
17. Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether the view of the
Chief of Naval Operations was modified in respect to the depth
of water in which torpedoes might be launched?
A. No, I do not.
18. Q. Do you know what condition of readiness was being main-
tained in units of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor between Novem-
ber 27, 1941, and December 7 of the same year?
A. Generally speaking, no, except I know what conditions of
readiness were defined in the security letter of the Commander-in-
Chief, and I know it had been prescribed what guns were to be
manned and what the condition of readiness for ammunition was
to be.
[ 4-^5] 19. Q. Did you, during this period of time, have any per-
sonal views as to the adequacy of this state of readiness which was
being maintained?
A. I felt it was satisfactory.
20. Q. Did 3'ou know during this same period of time what condi-
tion of readiness for aircraft was being maintained in subordinate
commands of the Fleet?
A. Generally speaking, no, but I knew what the plane requirements
were for training activities and generally what was being done to
maintain and prepare planes for their operations.
21. Q. Immediately prior to December 7. 1941, do you know whether
there was any aircraft reconnaissance being conducted from Pearl
Harbor or its environments ?
A. Generally speaking, all reconnaissance was conducted in connec-
tion with training flights.
22. Q. Specifically, do j'ou know whether there was any reconnais-
sance of Fleet operating areas during this period of time ?
A. Yes, the operating areas were under constant patrol.
23. Q. Do you recall a so-called war warning message dated ap-
proximately I^ovember 27, 1941 ?
A. Yes.
. 24. Q. Do you recall whether or not any additional aircraft recon-
naissance was undertaken after the receipt of this message?
A. I think not.
25. Q. Do you know of any reasons for not making additional
reconnaissance?
A. The primary reason was that there were not enough planes and
pilots and the requirement for getting planes in operation condition,
so far as guns and bullet-proof tanks were concerned.
26. Q. What facilities did a prospective enemy have for appraising
itself of the ships which were in Pearl Harbor ?
A. Well, Pearl Harbor is sitting in plain view of everybody, and I
presume if anybody wanted to pass out information or get it out of
Honolulu, he could send it any place he wanted.
27. Q. Did task force units operate according to a certain well-
defined procedure, being at sea so many days and being in Pearl Har-
bor so many days?
A. The operating schedule provided a varying length of time when
ships would be at port and at sea, and there was no regular pattern
of sorties, entrances, and operating periods.
380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[600] 28. Q. Suppose, for example, that an enemy spy saw a
task force coming into Pearl Harbor on November 28, 1941. Would
that be any basis for a presumption on the part of the spy that those
ships might remain in port for a certain hxecl period of time, such as
a week, ten days, or two weeks ?
A. I think it would be logical for him to presume that when the
ships came into port, they did so for logistic requirements and over-
haul.
29. Q. Can you recall whether there were any restrictions on out-
going communications from the Hawaiian area to foreign countries
for the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941^
A. Not that I know of.
30. Q. Would it have been possible for any person in the Hawaiian
area to have sent any sort of mail communication he wished without
censorship ?
A. I presume so.
31. Q. Does that apply to radio messages?
A. I don't know, but I would presume so.
32. Q. From your own naval experience in matters relating to a
current estimate of the situation, do you consider it an important
factor to keep well informed on the location and probable movements
of a prospective enemy ?
A. Yes, it is highly important that you do that, but to do it you
must be able to get the information either through your own organi-
zation or you must depend on someone outside your organization to
give you all the information that is available to them and not available
to you.
33. Q. Do you have any information on whether or not any Japa-
nese interests were endeavoring to keep currently informed on the
location and movements of the units of the Pacific Fleet immediately
preceding December 7, 1941 ?
A. Not from any information that I recall that was available to us
in Pearl Harbor or had been furnished to us from any other source.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
34. Q. Admiral, referring to your testimony concerning torpedoes
running in the waters at Pearl Harbor, I show you a document, which
is before this court as Exhibit 55, dated June 13. Will you read this
to yourself, particularly the second pamgraph, and state to the court
whether you had that in mind when you gave the testimony ?
A. No, I did not. I was not referring to this letter.
[-501] 35. Q. You, of course, were familiar with the naval war
plans which were current in the latter half of 1941, were you not?
A. I think generally, yes.
36. Q. Did you know that that plan was based upon a joint Army
and Navy plan ? I show you Exhibit 4 in that connection.
A. I think so, yes.
37. Q. Referrring to your testimony concerning your own personal
doubts as to the policy of the United States in its relations with Japan,
did you think during those days that under the circumstances which
did exist there were any deficiencies in WPL-46 or that there were
any parts of it which were wrong ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 381
A. The plan could not have been executed, in my opinion, with the
forces which Avere available in the Pacific Fleet.
38. Q. Couldn't the official task have been carried out?
A. Some of them, yes, sir.
39. Q. What was the official task?
A. To take the offensive on mobilization and raid certain islands.
40. Q. Now, in any relationship between that plan and what you
said about your doubts or lack of knowledge concerning national policy
between the two nations, did you see any amendment which could
have been made to those plans that yould have been helpful?
A. Well, I do not think that the plans as laid out here, or that
you are discussing here, are entirely applicable to the question of
whether or not the Commander-in-Chief wass informed of national
policy.
[SO^I Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Cross-examined bv the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : "
41. Q. Will you please read the'entire letter of 13 June which Ad-
miral Hart showed you relative to the torpedo baffles, to yourself;
were you familiar with that letter when it was received by the Com-
mander-in-Chief ?
A. Yes, sir, and I think that my statement in my testimony was
based on Paragraph 3 of this letter.
42. Q. Specifically, do you care to change the opinion that you ex-
pressed in your direct testimony in view of your memory being re-
freshed by having presently read the letter of 13 June?
A. If I recall correctly, I said there was a Vice-Chief of Naval
Operations' letter which stated that 10 or more fathoms were required
for launching torpedoes, and as T read here, I believe that the state-
ment I made refers to Paragraph 3 of this letter.
43. Q. I show you a document. Admiral DeLany. Can you identify
it?
A. I don't know whether I have seen it before, or not.
44. Q. Well, can you identify it now?
A. Well, it is a fortnightly summary of the current national situ-
ation as prepared by ONI dated 1 December 1941 and signed by T. S.
Wilkinson, Captain, U. S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence.
The fortnightly summary of the current national situation ffs pre-
pared by Office of Naval Intelligence, dated 1 December 1941, signed
by T. S, Wilkinson, was submitted to the judge advocate and to the
interested parties, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose of
reading therefrom such extracts as may be deemed pertinent to the
inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 57"
for reference, description appended.
45. Q. Will you read Paragraphs (a) and (c), please. Admiral?
A. (Reading:)
(a) The Diplomatic Situation. 1. Japan. Unless the Japanese
request continuance of the conversations the Japanese- American nego-
tiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese government and
382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely
the work of buildinc]^ the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
The press also is criticizing Thailand severely. Strong indications
point to an early Japanese advance against \:50S~\ Thailand,
(c) The Japanese Naval Situation. Deployment of naval forces to the south-
ern has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostili-
ties. At the same time, troop transports and freighters are pouring continually
down from Japan and Northern China Coast ports headed south, apparently for
French Indo-China and Formosa ports. Present movements to the south appear
to be carried out by small, individual iinits, but the organization of an extensive
task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next
few days. To date, this task force, under the command of the commander-in-
chief, second fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task forces ; one
gradually concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the otlier in the Mandates.
Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of tlie
combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Altliough one division
of battleships also may be assigned, the ma.ior capital ship strengtli remains in
home waters, as well as the greater proportion of carriers.
46. Q. Did you have any information in Pearl Harbor prior to
7 December contrary to the information in this report from ONI which
you have just read?
A. Not to my knowledge.
47. Q. I ask you if you can identify this document, Admiral
DeLany ?
A. Yes, sir. This was issued while I was still operations officer
in the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean areas. It
is a Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 23CL-42 issued by the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet to the Pacific
Fleet which prescribes battle organization and condition of readiness,
watches at sea. It lists the batteries, including main AA and auto-
matic weapons, and it is signed by Admiral C. W. Nimitz. It has as
Enclosure A, a copy of Reference (a), which was issued by the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 21st of February, 1941,
which has as its subject, "Battle organization and condition watches",
signed by H. E. Kimmel.
_ The Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 23CL-42 dated 6 May 1942,
signed by Admiral C. W. Nimitz, and Enclosure A thereof, was sub-
mitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and by the
interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret.) offered in evidence, for the purpose of reading therefrom such
extracts as may be deemed pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
58" for reference, description appended.
[504] 48. Q. Is it fair to state that the effect of the letter,
Exhibit 58, is a re-issue by Admiral Nimitz under date of 6 May 1942
of the letter of Admiral Kimmel under date of 21 February 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, because the letter of 6 May 1942, signed by C. W.
Nimitz, states, "Enclosure (A) is a copy of Reference (a)," and
Reference (a) is CinCPac Confidential Serial 0300 of 21 February
1941, and CinCPac Serial 0300 of 21 February 1941 is the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's letter of battle organization and condition
watches signed by H. E. Kimmel.
49. Q. Will you read Enclosure (A) to Exhibit 58, omitting Para-
graphs 10, 11, and 12, which I do not consider sufficiently important
or pertinent to warrant taking the time of the court in reading ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 383
The witness read Enclosure (A) to Exhibit 58, except Paragraphs
10, 11 and 12, copy appended.
50. Q. I show you anotlier document, Admiral DeLany, and ask
you if 3'ou can identify it?
A. Yes, sir. This is a letter that was issued by the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Fleet, outlining the airplane situation in the Hawaiian area,
dated 7 January 1912, and signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific 1' leet, C. W. Nimitz. It has as an enclosure, ComPatWing
Two, Secret Letter 0033, December 30, 1941.
The letter issued by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Com-
mander-in-Chief of United States Fleet, signed "C. W. Nimitz", and
enclosure, ComPatWing Two, Secrete Letter 0033 dated Dec. 30, 1941,
were submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties,
and to the court, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose
of sucli future use <is may be desired to be made of it.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
59" for reference, descrii)tion appended.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
51. Q. Admiral, to your knowledge, was anv M-Day set prior to
7 December 1941?
A. No, sir.
'1505] 52. Q. Was there any order to mobilize the Fleet?
A. No, sir.
53. Q. Do you consider that the Fleet was mobilized ?
A. No, sir.
54. Q. In what way was it not mobilized ?
A. Deficiencies in personnel, material, logistics in support.
55. Q. Are you familiar with Joint Army and Navy Plan and
Agreement as to defense of the Hawaiian Islands?
A. Prior to 7 December?
50. Q. Prior to 7 December,
A. Yes.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[50G] 57. Q. Under this plan wdiom do you consider as respon-
sible for the defense of the Hawaiian area and Pearl Harbor?
A. The Army is responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor.
58. Q. In your position on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of
Pacific, were you conversant with official messages received by him
from the Navy Department and Chief of Operations regarding the
Japanese situation ?
A. Yes, I think I saw all mesages.
59. Q. Did you at that time feel that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, was receiving full information, so as to give him complete
knowledge of existing conditions between this country and Japan?
A. No, sir, I did not.
60. Q. Will you please state why, and in what respect?
384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I believe that the negotiations and discussions in Washington
were not fully reported to the Commander-in-Chief.
61. Q. Do you have reference, Admiral, to the period 27 November
to 7 December, especially, or in the whole period ?
A, The whole period.
62. Q. Will you please state to the court how you interpreted the
message of 27 November? We refer to the message sent by the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and
referred to as the "war warning" message ?
A. Well, sir, I think I have expressed my opinion on that question
before, when I said I believed that Japan was on the move. I thought
that they were moving to the southard, and that what the position
of the United States would be as to what it would regard as an overt
act was questionable.
63. Q. What was your interpretation, specifically, as to the phrase,
"war warning", and what did it mean to you ?
A. Just what I have said, sir, that Japan was on the move.
64. Q. Did you interpret this as immediate attack by the Japanese
on the United States ?
A. No, sir.
65. Q. When was the O. N. I. bulletin of December 1, 1941, which
was presented to you a few minutes ago, received in the office of the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific ?
A. I cannot answer. I don't remember.
66. Q. Do you know whether or not it was received prior to 7 Decem-
ber 1941 ?
A, No, sir, I cannot say, but the information that appears [507]
in that bulletin, in my opinion, as I recall it, had been probably re-
ceived from the estimate of the situation or the information that was
put out by the 16th Naval District, prior to that time — as I recall the
thing.
67. Q. In your position as one of the officers of the staff of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did you come in contact with and
discuss matters of mutual interest with Army officials ?
A. Yes, sir.
68. Q. Will you please state to the court what kind of cooperation
existed and what the relationship existing was between Army and
Naval officers at that time ?
A. I think there was a complete understanding, not only between
the officers in the high echelon — I refer to Admiral Kimmel and
(leneral Short — but also a complete understanding between the officers
of Admiral Kimmel's staff .and their opposite numbers in the Army
organization. There was complete cooperation, I will say, instead of
"complete understanding."
69. Q. In other words, so far as you know, a cordial relationship
and a friendly relationship existed between the Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet and General Short?
A. Definitely so, sir.
70. Q. Have you heard rumors to the effect that such relationship
did not exist, that these officers were not on speaking terms, and that
there was no coordinated effort between the Army and the Navy?
A. Yes, sir, I have read it in the press, and I think there is an article
in this week's "Collier's" which refers to the unfortunate relationship
that existed between those two individuals.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 385
71. Q. Have you any knowledge of from what sources these rumors
emanated ?
A. No, sir, I haven't any idea from what sources they emanated, and
I believe that the individuals that would start them are attempting
to malign the individuals that are concerned.
72. Q. What was the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet at this
time ? We refer to the latter part of 1941.
A. I think it was training,
78. Q. Had there been any order received from higher authority in
Washington to discontinue this training, or to lessen the training?
A. No, sir, not that I remember.
74. Q. As an operations officer of the Fleet, were you con- [^08']
versant with the conditions of material readiness and the deficiencies
of material in the Fleet?
A. Yes, sir.
75. Q. And we understand that you have stated that there were
certain deficiencies ?
A. Yes, sir.
76. Q. In your opinion, was there an inadequacy of material equip-
ment for ships of the Fleet ?
A. Definitely so in particular items, as I mentioned — radar, anti-
aircraft equipment, airplane bombs, airplanes themselves.
77. Q. ^^'dl you please state to the court the reasons why certain
ships were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December?
A. They were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December, as I
recall it, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Pacific Fleet.
78. Q. Was it necessary that these ships there present return to
Pearl Harbor for any reason ?
A. Well, there weren't enough oilers to refuel them at sea. They
had to come back for incidental repairs and recreation of the crew.
79. Q. On the night of 6-7 December, what, in your opinion, was
the condition of officers and men as to sobriety?
A. I have no way of answering that question, Admiral. I was in
my own home on that night, and I don't know what the condition was.
If you can take the general set-up there in the Hawaiian area, I think
that you could say that they were sober, because I don't believe that
there was any excessive drinking in the area.
80. Q. In your opinion was there any truth in this gossip, that was
afterwards spread, that there were numerous officers intoxicated and
men intoxicated at that time?
A. I think that the rumor is a very definite untruth.
81. Q. What, in your opinion, w^as the condition of officers and men
at the titme of the attack on 7 December, the morning of 7 December?
We refer to fitness for duty.
A. I think they were fit for duty, and the evidence of that fact is that
they did perform their duty well.
82. Q. Throughout your tour of duty as Assistant Chief for Opera-
tions, was there any evidence on the part of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, of any attitude other than [S09] a persistent
desire to arrive at a high state of readiness for war, and any action
other than a single-minded, intelligent effort toward the attainment
of this objective?
A. Most definitely not. I think that any bit of information that is
available in the files of the Navy Department will show that his one
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 26
386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
single thought m as intensive training and preparation, and in readi-
ness of the fleet for war, not only to the extent of requiring that per-
sonnel that was necessary to man the ships should be provided, but
also in his insistent efforts to get material into the ships.
83. Q. Do you know of any case of disaffection, inattention to duty,
carelessness, or irresponsibility, on the part of any individual or
individuals which w^ould tend to defeat the success of this effort?
A. No, sir, I do not.
Kecross-examined by the interested partv, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy :
8-1. Q. Admiral, referring to your statement to the effect that the
Pacific Fleet had not been given any very clear-cut view as to the
attitude the United States was assuming towards Japan, you know,
of course, that questions of that sort were decided on very high political
levels, did you not ?
A. I had no idea who was formulating the policy back here, other
than it was natural to presume that that would be the status.
85. Q. Did you ever hear from xVdmiral Kimmel or anyone else
that the Chief of Naval Operations repeatedly said that he himself
could not get answers to many questions of that nature?
A. I think that statement has appeared in personal correspondence
which I saw.
86. Q. Your testimony which you gave concerning the 1 December
O. N. I. bulletin which you had not received, do you recall having
heard from intelligence units in Hawaii an estimate that two or more
Japanese carriers were in the Marshall Islands?
A, I have heard that statement made since the 7th of December,
but as I recall it, my knowledge prior to the 7tli of December, was that
there was a small carrier force to the southard of the Philippines,
but that the main strength of the Japanese Navy, as pertains to capital
ships and carriers, was based in the Empire, and I do not recall having
heard, prior to 7 December, that there were two carriers in the
Marshalls.
87. Q. Did you think, during those last ten or fifteen [SIO]
days of peace, that you were fully in touch with all information con-
cerning the Japanese, that was available to the Commander-in-Chief?
A. All the information that was available to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I felt sure I had seen.
Neither the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), nor the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) , desired to recross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 12 : 45 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., August
21, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 387
PKOCEEDINGS OF NAYY COUET OF INOUIRY
MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1944.
[511] Fifteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washingto7i, D. G .
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ket), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus. U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolplius Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party,
and his counsel.
Admiral Claude C. Block, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the f)roceedings of the fourteenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
Avas informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate : ^ — -.
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, Assistant Chief, Bureau
of Ordnance, Navy Department.
2. Q. State what duties you were assisgned between February and
December?, 1941?
A. I was Fleet Gunnery Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. Sir, I show you a drawing showing certain dispositions, ap-
parently in Pearl Harbor. I ask you if you recognize this drawing.
A. I do.
\51'!i\ 4. Q. Will you state to the court what that drawing is and
what it shows ?
A. This white sheet is a copy of the Avork sheet whicli was used by
the group of officers, including myself, who made up the official report
of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1041. It Avas the duty
of my division of the staff to ])repare an action report. Immediately
after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye and his staff came over and joined
the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. Admiral Pye, in the interim, Avas
acting as Commander-in-Chief. He brought some of his staff officers
388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with liim. Among them were Captain, now Rear Admiral, Allen
Smith, and Captain Hall Adlon, who actively prepared this report
because my section of the staff was very busy. 1 worked with them on
this and I recognize this as the work sheet we used in drawing the
path of the various Japanese attacks on that morning. This white
sheet show^s a layout of Pearl Harbor Base, the docks, anchorages, and
moorings, and indicates thereon the position of the various ships which
were in Pearl Harbor on that morning, the morning of the Tth of
December, 1941.
The work sheet showing the disposition of vessels in Pearl Harbor
on the morning of 7 December 1941, was submitted to the interested
parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked
"EXHIBIT CO."
5. Q. You have stated that you were the Fleet Gunnery Officer dur-
ing your tour of duty between February and December, 1941. Did
you perform any additional duties in this capacity?
A. Well, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, I Avas part of the operational di-
vision of the staff, performing duty under Captain, now Real Admiral,
Walter DeLany.
6. Q. Did your duties include anything in the nature of fleet
training?
A. That was my primary duty as Fleet Gunnery Officer.
7. Q. I suppose that the statement that you were in charge of fleet
training also included gunnery?
A. That's right, sir.
8. Q. Can you state what the general efficiency of ships and gunnery
was on the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. In my opinion, sir, it w^s the highest state that it had ever
reached in times of peace in the history of the Fleet as I have known it.
9. Q. And may I assume that also included anti-aircraft guns?
A. Yes. sir.
10. Q. Now can you state what consideration had been given to
Fleet security while in Pearl Harbor, in general terms?
A. Consideration had been given to Fleet security in Pearl Har-
bor to the extent that in February or March 1941, a ['^13] fleet
circular letter was issued. If I recollect, it was 2CL-41, which laid
down the general security measures which were to be taken for the
security of the fleet, both at sea and in Pearl Harbor.
11. Q. Was this letter, 2CL-41, which you mentioned, the only
written orders concerning the security of the fleet that you recall ?
A. There were various operational orders setting forth the mis-
sion of various subordinate commanders in the fleet. They were
issued from time to time, implementing these security plans. There
was also a letter issued in February or March, 1941, and later re-
issued, in toto without any change, in the summer of 1942, setting
forth the organization of the crews of all the ships in the fleet and
the methods of standing conditions-of -readiness watches, the require-
ment that in general all anti-aircraft guns should have four crews,
so that a practically complete anti-aircraft could be manned on the
basis of a watch in four. This letter also required the actual firing
of target practices by these various crews, four per gun, and pro-
visions or ammunition and a change in the gunnerv rules for the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 389
whole Navy were instituted which permitted and insured this train-
ing. I do not recollect the file number of that letter, or whether it
was a circular or a letter addressed to force and type commanders.
It was reissued in the summer of 1942 by Admiral Nimitz, as a cir-
cular letter to the fleet, I believe.
12. Q). I show you Exhibit 58, which is now in evidence before
the court. Can you state whether or not this is the letter to which
you have just referred?
A. Yes, sir. This letter is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet to the Pacific Fleet, and has as its enclosure the letter
to which I referred. I see the date is the 21st of February, 1941, and
it was addressed to the force and type commanders of the Pacific
Fleet.
13. Q. Will you state the condition of readiness being maintained
in the Pacific Fleet on 7 December, 1941 ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, nothing less than condition 3
had been maintained at sea for nearly a year prior to the 7th of
December, 1941, and to the best of my knowledge port condition 3,
or its equivalent, was in effect in port on those two dates. Those con-
ditions of readiness, I might say, are not identical, condition 3, be-
tween sea and port.
14. Q. Did the Commandant of the 14th Naval District have any
anti-aircraft guns under his control?
A. Only the guns of the fleet, with the possible exception of a
battery of 3-inch AA Army type guns which may have been available
to a battalion or part of a defense battalion of Marines, which were
assembled in Pearl Harbor prior to being dispatched to an outlying
base. There were no what might be called Naval shore batteries.
[S14] 15. Q. Had any provision been made for the coordi-
nation of anti-aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor area?
A. Yes, sir. _
16. Q. Will you state in brief what this was?
A. Well, the harbor defense, or base defense officer in Pearl Har-
bor, as far as anti-aircraft fire was concerned, was in effect an officer
in charge of a command post of the anti-aircraft battery set-up
of the whole island area, in that under the provisions of circular
letter 2CL, the guns of the fleet were made available in sectors to
the base defense officer, for his use in coordination with the Army
batteries. The set-up was that the whole anti-aircraft defense of
that area was under the command of a Brigadier General in the
Army Air Forces, Brigadier General Davidson; he had command
of the filter station, the Army fighter command, which used what
Navy fighters were available on the island strips. He also had com-
mand of the anti-aircraft batteries, heavy and light, the search-light
batteries, and under that category came the ships of the fleet in the
harbor. The anti-aircraft gun batteries were under the command of
a Brigadier General of the coastal artillery corps, AA.
17. Q. What was the detailed method of coordinating these bat-
teries on shore with the guns of the fleet ?
A. The anti-aircraft master command post at Fort Shaffer com-
municated with the harbor control post. As I recollect, the actual
officer in actual charge was Connnander Momsen, in Pearl Harbor.
390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
18. Q. And how in turn did this harbor post get in communica-
tion or have control of fire with the fleet ?
A, It had control to this extent, that it set the conditions, gave
the alerts, warned of the approach of enemy planes, chiefly by signals
from the signal tower, but obviously could not actually control the
fire of the individual battery or ship. That was the function of
the commanding officer.
19. Q. Then, as I understand your answer, this officer in the har-
bor control post warned the ships of the fleet the condition of readi-
ness, the direction of approach of an enemy, and then the officer
in command of that sector in the fleet or the conunanding officer
of ships in the fleet, undertook the fire control from there on?
A. That is correct, sir.
20. Q. Can you recall whether or not anti-aircraft fire was co-
ordinated in any manner on the morning of 7 December, 1941, at the
time of the Japanese attack?
A. Certainly was not coordinated through the normal chain of com-
mand as expected to be done, because to the best of my knowledge there
was no anti-aircraft fire delivered during the Japanese attack except
from vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and from the fleet machine
gun school at Palua, plus, may I add, machine gunfire and rifle fire
from marines and sailors in the Navy Yard. I speak of the area
immediately [^J^\ around Pearl Harbor, and for the period
of the actual attack by the Japanese on that area.
21. Q. Now do you mean by the actual Japanese attack, the period
between 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941, and the remainder
of the day of the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. I mean up to the period of approximately the middle of the after-
noon. I was informed by Army anti-aircraft officers on the 8th of
December, that certain fixed Army anti-aircraft batteries which were
already emplacecl at De Eussy, Sand Island, and I forget the name of
the fort just beyond Hickam Field — Kamehameha — ^liad actually fired
at Japanese planes during this attack. I have no knowledge of that
myself. I do have knowledge that the greatest strength of Army anti-
aircraft defense was in mobile batteries of 3-inch caliber, AA guns,
which were not emplaced on the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.
22. Q. And did the mobile batteries which you have just testified
about get into action during the period of the Japanese attack on 7
December, 1941, that you have knowledge of ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, no. I was informed in the course
of a trip around the whole area on the 8th of December, that the first
Army anti-aircraft battery got in position shortly afternoon on that
day, the 7th.
23. Q. When did you consider that the last Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor had ended on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Sometime between 10 : 30 and 11 : 00 a. m.
24. Q. As I understand your answer, the mobile batteries did not
get into position until after this last attack was over ?
A. That is my firm belief.
25. Q. Can you state the number and calibre of Army anti-aircraft
guns available on the island of Oahu for the defense of the naval base
at Pearl Harbor and other naval installations?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 391
A. I cannot state that exactly, because batteries were rushed in there
over a period of several weeks after the attack, and my memory is con-
fused by that factor. I would estimate that somewhere between eight
and twelve 4-gun batteries were available.
26. Q. What calibre?
A. 3-inch. 90-millimeter AA guns were available very shortly
after the attack, and it may be that one battery of 90-millimeter guns
was available in the island at the time of the attack.
27. Q. How many 3-incli guns in a battery ?
A. Four, sir.
[516] 28. Q. And that makes a total of how many 3-inch
guns ?
A. Somewhere between 32 and 48. That is an estimate on my part,
however.
29. Q. How many guns in a 90-millimeter gun battery?
A. Four.
30. Q. And how many 90-millimeter guns would you say were
available ?
A. Perhaps one battery.
31. Q. Do you know where the Army quartered the gun crews that
manned the guns that were in fixed emplacements?
A. I can't testify to all of this to my exact knowledge. This is
information I picked up before and afterwards. I didn't actually see
all this, but to the best of my knowledge and belief, they were quar-
tered in their barracks.
32. Q. Where?
A. Some at Fort Shafter and Fort De Russy, the various forts
around that area, and the ,guns themselves were in the gun parks.
33. Q. During your tour of duty as fleet gunnery officer, had you
given consideration to an aircraft torpedo attack on vessels of the
Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, sir.
34. Q. What were your views on the possibility of such attack
taking place ?
A. My views were that the particular kind of aircraft attack,
namely, by torpedoes, was possible in Pearl Harbor. In that, we had
considered counter measures, such as nets and balloon barrages. The
feeling in general in my own mind was that the feasibility of a success-
ful torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor — to my mind, that was minimized
b}^ the receipt of information copies of one or two letters addressed by
the Chief of Naval Operations to the District Commandant, indicating
to me that the water at Pearl Harbor was so shallow that the success
of a torpedo attack on ships in Pearl Harbor was dubious. Nets were
considered. The difficulty of procuring these nets, on which there was
a low priority, and the need of moving the fleet on short notice from
berths for a sortie, the difficulties of cluttering up the harbor with these
nets — it was my understanding that all these factors placed the nets
not only in a loAv-priority, but gave us a feeling that the risk of a suc-
cessful torpedo attack was slight. Balloon barrages were considered
in discussions amon,g members of the staff. The chief objection to
them was that they would interfere with the normal operations of our
own aircraft in that area.
392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S17] 35. Q. Was there or was there not considerable United
States Naval seaplane activity in the Pearl Harbor area ?
A. There was a great deal of it, because it was the only place where
it could be carried on, on that side of the island.
36. Q. What effect would torpedo baffles laid in the Pearl Plarbor
cliannels have on the operation of our naval aircraft?
A. Might probably very seriously interfere. The aircraft people
were objectors from the standpoint of both nets and balloons.
37. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what had been done in the
matter of anti-submarine nets in the entrances of Pearl Harbor?
A. No more than to know that there were nets at the entrance. I
passed back and forth through them aboard the flagship.
38. Q. Did you know the exact type of quality of these nets?
A. No, sir.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not
desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Kear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
39. Q. You referred. Admiral Kitts, to a letter by the Commander-
in-Chief to the various force and type commanders, of February, 1941,
describing conditions for readiness. What degree of training was
achieved in the Fleet under that letter on December 7?
A. A very high degree of training, sir. I can't say that every ship
had actual training by firing every one of its crews that this letter
called for, but I would say the goal had been very closely approached.
40. Q. Do you recall whether there was a shortage in 50-calibre
ammunition for the Fleet prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir.
41. Q. Did this shortage affect the target practice of the 50-calibre
anti-aircraft guns?
A. Definitely, sir,
42. Q. How did it affect it?
A. We didn't have enough to carry on as much training as we would
have if the ammunition had been plentiful. Practices were carried out
by all ships, but the actual length of the strings and the number of
rounds permitted to an individual gunner were reduced. This also
liad its effect on [«?-?<5'] the machine gun school at Palua, where
we had to reduce to a mininnnn the number of rounds that the gunners
could fire.
43. Q. I understood you to state that there were no naval anti-
aircraft shore batteries in and around Pearl Harbor?
A. That is correct, sir.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), asked the court to take judicial notice of a document, 159
of the 77th Congress, 2nd Session, entitled : "The attack upon Pearl
Harbor by Japanese armed forces. Report of the commission ap-
pointed by the President of the United States to investigate and
report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed
forces upon Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941,"
which was published on January 23, 1942.
44. Q. In connection with your statement that there were no anti-
aircraft shore batteries of the Navy in and around Pearl Harbor, I
call your attention to a statement in paragraph 12 on page 20 of that
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 393
document, "The anti-aircraft batteries of the Ami}', and simihir shore
batteries of the Navy, as well as additional anti-aircraft artillery
located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been
manned and supplied with ammunition, a high-state of readiness of
aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in
fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible
commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to the necessary action,
based upon the warnings, and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders
given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy Commands in Wash-
ington." Did you testify before the Roberts commission?
A. No, sir.
45. Q. You were not called ?
A. No, sir.
46. Q. Were you present in person at Pearl Harbor at the time of
the sessions of the Roberts Commission there held?
A. Yes, sir.
47. Q. The statement which I have read from the Congressional
Report — does that change your statement, which I understood to be a
categorical statement that there were no shore batteries belonging to
the Navy — anti-aircraft shore batteries?
A. That does not change my statement at all except to this extent,
and it is not a change : that it is possible that there may have been a
Marine anti-aircraft battery, mobile, attached to the Marine defense
battalion, under Admiral Bloch, under the Navy Yard. I am not sure
whether such a battery was actually there on that morning. If that
w ere so, that is the only battery which could be considered as a Navy
shore battery. There was no such thing as a Navy shore battery.
[-519] 48. Q. The judge advocate asked you some questions
about the probability of an airplane torpedo attack on vessels located
in Pearl Harbor. Having refreshed your recollection by reading the
letter. Exhibit 65, of June 13, 1941, did I understand you to say that
you had read that letter?
A. Yes, sir, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, yes, sir.
49. Q. And after reading that letter, did you make any recom-
mendation or estimate to the Commander-in-Chief on that subject?
A. Not that I can recollect, sir. I know this matter was discussed
among members of the staff, and probably with people in the District,
since the letter was addressed to the District, but only a copy to the
Commander-in-Chief.
50. Q. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel on the
subject matter of a torpedo plane or torpedo air attack after that
letter?
A. Not exactly, no, sir, I do not.
51. Q. After having read that letter, what was your opinion as to
the probability of a successful air torpedo attack on ships in Pearl
Harbor?
A. My opinion, as I recollect, of this letter, is that the probability
of attack in water of certain depths was increased — and that they had
reduced it, in their opinion, to about ten fathoms. The question of
the availability of nets had not been changed by this at all, and my
recollection of my feeling on this was that 10 fathoms was the limit-
ing depth at which a successful attack could be expected.
52. Q. Was there 10 fathoms of water in Pearl Harbor at any
place ?
394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I believe one or two spots there was a deep place.
53. Q. Generally speaking, was the anchorage 10 fathoms in depth?
A. The greatest depth was 42 feet, about 7 fathoms, the deepest
channel.
54. Q. As Fleet Gunnery Officer on either Tuesday or Wednesday
the 10th or the 11th of December, did you go to the Army and inves-
tigate the workings of the radar situation on 7 December?
A. Yes, sir.
55. Q. Will you tell the court what you did and what you found
out as to operation of Army radar during the attack and prior thereto?
A. Well, on the morning of the 8th of December, Monday morning,
I received a telephone call from General Davidson.
56. Q. This was the morning after the attack ?
A. Yes, sir, he had a complaint to make that the night [520]
before the ships of the fleet had, during a false alarm, fired at friendly
planes, and that he wanted a conference with me to determine how
we could prevent a recurrence.
57. Q. May I direct your attention in particular to conversation
about the radar ?
A. Yes, sir. I told him that I couldn't get up to meet him that day
because I just couldn't get away, that I could come the next morning,
and that the subject on which he requested this conference was some-
thing in which I was interested, but which properly was a matter for
the harbor control post officer to attend to. That was Commander
Momsen. I got in touch with Commander Momsen, informed him of
the subject on which we were going up there, and Colonel Pfeiffer,
now General Pfeiffer — he was a Colonel in the Marines — Captain
Hanley, and I went to the filter station close to Fort Shaffer and held
this conference with General Davidson on the subject of the control
of the fire of the guns of the fleet. When it was over, he said, "There
is something over here on the drawing board in which you would be
interested." And I said, "What is it?" And he said it was the radar
plot of the attack on Pearl Harbor, whereupon he took us over to
a drafting board and showed us the layout of the area, with radar
lines plotted in from a point about 150 miles northwest of the island
down to a lot of circles around Pearl Harbor and then out again.
58. Q. This was a plot goin^ out, not coming in ?
A. Yes. I was very shocked at seeing such a thing, and told Gen-
eral Davidson at that time that the plot coming in might have been
mistaken for friendly planes, but after a two-hour attack on Pearl
Harbor, it was quite evident that the plot out were enemy planes —
and we never knew the existence of this plot.
59. Q. That was never reported to the Navy?
A. It was never reported to the Commander-in-Chief's staff in the
exactly forty-eight hours it took from the time they took it off the
radar until we discovered it.
60. Q. That was on Tuesday morning?
A. That was on Tuesday morning about 11 : 00 o'clock.
61. Q. Did General Davidson say anything about the reasons for
the 48-hour delay in reporting?
A. No, sir. Everybody was speechless there and after we left.
There was nothing, no explanation.
62. Q. Speechless over the fact that you hadn't received the infor-
mation ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 395
A. I would say very frankly I was very disturbed, and got out.
[S21] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
63. Q. Referring again to the Roberts' Report: Is the statement
which I read you earlier relative to the shore anti-aircraft batteries
of the Navy at Pearl Harbor accurate, or not?
A. My statement, sir?
64. Q. The statement in the Roberts Report ?
A. It is inaccurate.
Cross examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
65. Q. Admiral, sir, just a couple of questions : In connection with
the defense of Pearl Harbor, it wns the Army's continual and full-time
responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor; is that not correct?
A. That was my understanding, certainly.
06. Q. And the Navy's function in connection with it was but that
of support ; is that not right ?
A. Yes, sir, to the extent that when ships of the Fleet were in Pearl
Harbor, the guns of the Fleet were made available to the Army through
the Harbor Defense Officer, Base Defense Officer.
67. Q. And by that you mean that when such nn event happened,
the guns at that point of time were then under the command of these
generals that jou speak of, in connection with their employment and
use?
A. Ultimately under the supreme command of Brigadier General
Davidson.
68. Q. The vehicle through the Harbor Command post that you
speak of is only the facility for activating that command relation-
ship ; is that not so ?
A. The general command and warning. There is a red, yellow, and
green alert; the enemy's approaching from a certain direction and at
a certain altitude, warning that those planes coming in from another
direction are friendly, and that sort of thing. Not the actual control
of the guns, which was always under the command of the commanding
officer of the vessel. I might say that long after the attack on Pearl
Harbor there wasn't any fundamental change in that set-up, nor to my
knowledge is there one now.
Examined by the court :
69. Q. Admiral, were you personally so stationed on the morning
of 7 December 1941 as to be able to observe the Army anti-aircraft
fire as such firing took place ?
A. Yes, sir, to a considerable extent, in that I [5^£'] reached
Pearl Harbor from Honolulu at, I should say, about 8 : 20 or 8 : 25 in
the morning. I stayed in Staff Headquarters until, I imagine, about
10 : 45 — that was approximately, I think, the end of the attack,
although I didn't know it at the time — at which time I went in the
station wagon all around Pearl Harbor to West Loch, where we were
already sending ammunition, replenishment anununition out to the
ships. ' On my way from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor, I was in a good
position to observe Japanese planes dive bombing at altitudes of 5-
or 6,000 feet, and observed that all the fire came from Pearl Harbor.
I spent a good part of the afternoon out around the harbor in the
vicinity of West Loch and back to the Submarine Base. Army troops
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were taking position and anti-aircraft mobile guns were being moved
at that time. I went all around the area again on the 8th and the
9th of December, on one occasion accompanied by Army officers of the
anti-aircraft command, and was at that time informed that some time
after noon the first Army mobile anti-aircraft was in place.
70. Q. There is testimony before this court to the general effect
that Army anti-aircraft guns were in action within 25 minutes of
the beginning of the attack. Does that conflict with what you have
already testified to ?
A. I can well believe, sir, and it is quite possible and probable,
that the Army fixed anti-aircraft guns, of which there were several
batteries, actually went into action. I think the nearest one to Pearl
Harbor was at Kamehameha. They were, I know, at De Russy and
at Sand Island.
71. Q. So that amends your answer to the previous questions, do
we understand ?
A. I think in my previous testimony. Admiral, I was talking about
the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor and I said that there were
Army fixed anti-aircraft batteries, a few of which were actually
manned and fired.
72. Q. Well, wouldn't you consider anti-aircraft batteries at Kame-
hameha the immediate defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, sir.
73. Q. Were there any anti-aircraft batteries at Hickam Field in
operation in the early part of this attack?
A. Not to my knowledge, sir.
74. Q. Any anti-aircraft batteries within a reasonable distance sur-
rounding Pearl Harbor would be considered aircraft defense of the
harbor, would they not?
A. Yes, sir, that is true. I don't believe that I stated in my testi-
mony that these guns were not used. I say it is quite probable they
were but two groups of the batteries were quite a distance from Pearl
Harbor. They were at Sand Island and at Fort De Russy, on the
other side of Honolulu. I don't know whether they fired or not. They
were World War I guns, I feel quite sure, [523'] with quite
rudimentary fire control. The main strength of the Army anti-air-
craft defense in the Island was the Army mobile 3-inch AA gun with
computer, height finder, and everything complete. None of those, to
my knowledge, were in place on the morning of the 7th of December
except possibly a battery training over on the west coast of the Island
at the regular target practice area.
75. Q. Then the testimony that I have referred to about the guns
being in action within 25 minutes, you would say that that is not true
with reference to the mobile guns ?
A. That is correct, sir, except possibly, there was a battery of mobile
guns mounted in a camp whose name I can't remember now over on
the west side of the Island, beyond Barbers Point, where they had
an anti-aircraft training range. There may have been a battery of
4 guns mounted there for target practice and they could have fired.
76. Q. Admiral, you state that a certain condition of readiness
existed in the Fleet on the morning of 7 December 1941?
A. That is right.
PROCEEDINGS OF NA\^ COURT OF INQUIRY 397
77. Q. What was that condition of readiness and under that condi-
tion what part, if any, of the anti-aircraft guns were manned and ready
for action ?
A. I can't state directly and exactl}^ from my own knowledge.
Admiral. However, I think that information is available exactly in
the report of the action at Pearl Harbor and the individual report
from every ship. My understanding at the time and since has
been that Base Condition of Readiness 3, or its equal, was in effect.
And I say it is equal because certain of the Force and Type com-
manders, for example Admiral Pye, had made modifications which
were equal or better than the general rec{uirement laid down in the
Circular Letter, in the interests of watch standing and better cover-
age of the sectors. We had 4 sectors laid out to be covered by the
anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. As a matter of fact.
Admiral Pye had submitted a study of this thing to the Commander-
in-Chief a day or two before the attack indicating what changes to-
ward betterment he suggested. I know that the ships of the battle
force present in Pearl Harbor following his order on security and the
manning of guns was equal to or better than the condition of readiness
3 laid down in Port Security, 2CL-41.
78. Q. Have you any knowledge as to the manner or kind of coop-
eration, if any, which existed between Admiral Kimmel and General
Short?
A. To this extent, sir: I know that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short met frequently. I saw General Short many times around Fleet
Headquarters. I was certainly under the impression that relation-
ships between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were most cordial
and cooperative in every way.
[524-\ 79. Q. And in your opinion, or to your knowledge, did
they discuss matters tending toward cooperation of their separate
forces ?
A. I cannot state to my knowledge. Admiral, because I was not in
that echelon of the staff that would have knowledge of that.
80. Q. Have you any knowledge of measures enjoined by the orders
given by the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington as to the specific
defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. No, sir.
81. Q. Do you know the number of Japanese planes which made
this attack on the morning of 7 December ? If so, please give it.
A. No, sir, I do not know the number. It was estimated some-
where between 175 and 250.
82. Q. Do you know the direction from which they came? If so,
please give it.
A. I'm quite sure that they came from the west, nor'west, a distance
of something beyond 200 miles.
83. Q. And from what type of ship did they come? Do you Imow?
A. Carriers.
84. Q. Haye you any knowledge as to the time from the first attack
on the morning of the 7th that all anti-aircraft guns were in com-
mission and firing?
A. Since I didn't arrive there until somewhere between 8:20 and
8 : 25, 1 cannot testify to that, Admiral.
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
85. Q. In the reply to your question regarding torpedo aircraft,
you stated that it was possible for these planes carrying torpedoes
to make an attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, Are you still of that
opinion after reading these letters and refreshing your memory on
these letters from the Navy Department regarding this matter ?
A. As I say, Admiral, all types of aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor
were considered as a possibility, including a torpedo attack. I can
only testify as to what my impression was at the time, that a torpedo
attack was the least possible of all air attacks, and I was led to that
belief by my interpretation, right or wrong, of letters received from the
Chief of Naval Operations.
86. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with dispatches, et cetera, rela-
tive to the probable action of Japan at that time ?
A. Not with dispatches, sir; only personal messages. I was not
in the echelon that would be consulted on those matters or I was not,
in other words, chief of operations, or war plans, or of intelligence.
[S^S] 87. Q. Would you please state to the court the condition
and efficiency of the personnel of the Fleet on the morning of De-
cember 7th ?
A. It is my very strong belief, sir, that subject to certain handicaps
that the Fleet had, that the state of training and efficiency of the per-
sonnel of the Fleet was the highest I have ever known it. The diffi-
culties were chiefly those of shortage of personnel. Many ships were
going in commission. There was a very large turnover in personnel,
crews of the ships, and large drafts had to be sent back to the Main-
land to put new ships in commission. Replacements were not forth-
coming. We needed excess hands aboard the ships in order to train
them and to fill drafts. We didn't get them. The Theobold Board
was called early in the year 1941 to go into this whole question to see
how many men could be crowded aboard ships in order to have excess
numbers for training. That was the chief handicap so far as training
and efficiency of the Fleet was concerned. Shortage of small arms
ammunition, machine gun ammunition, contributed to that. Other
ammunition was plentiful, and day and night surface and anti-air-
craft practices w^ere fired. Gunnery practices were "debunked" to the
extent that high-speed targets were used and the use of battle rafts
was dispensed with. Umpire parties were not transferred at sea.
The results were obtained by photography. It was my opinion that
the efficiency and training of the Fleet was at its highest level in history.
88. Q. On the night of 6-7 December, had you any occasion to ob-
serve personally, or did you have any knowledge of the conduct of the
officers and men on shore, as to sobriety and indulgence in intoxicating
liquors ?
A. Well, I was ashore, sir, myself, until about 1 : 00 a. m., in the
Navy Yard at the Officer's Club. I observed nothing out of line as to
behaviour or sobrfety or fitness of the officers — all I saw there — for
any eventualities.
89. Q. In your opinion, were the officers and crews of the ships fit
for duty in all respects on ships of the Fleet on the morning of 7
December ?
A. Yes, sir.
90. Q. From your knowledge of the performance of the Navy sub-
sequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, do you consider that that per-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 399
formance has reflected the hiah state of efficiency of the personnel to
which you have testified as existing on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir.
[53{)] 91. Q. Was not this hij^h state of efficiency of personnel
the result of vigorous and intellio-ent training throughout a period of
years, intensified during 1941 and continuing in accordance with care-
fully planned schedules of operations up to the date of the Japanese
attack?
A. Yes, sir, but particularly from the first of February until the
Tth of December, it was more realistic, it was intensified, and it reached
its peak.
92. Q. Was there any operation at sea going on between 27 Novem-
])ev and 7 December in the way of training?
A. It is a matter of recollection now, sir. All ships of the Fleet
were engaged in intensive training when they were out and during
that
93. Q. Perhaps I should say that Vice xVdmiral Pye returned with a
task force about that time.
A. He returned on Saturday.
94. Q. And remained in until the 7th of December. Does that
indicate a cessation of training during that period?
A. No, sir; it only means that the schedule provided for necessary
overhaul of ships, upkeep of the Fleet, rest and recreation for the
personnel.
Recross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Hus-
band E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (continued) :
95. Q. When Admiral Pye came in on Saturday, as you have tes-
tified, prior to 7 December, did one or more of the other task forces
go to sea?
A. My recollection of the situation is, sir, that Admiral Pye, or
the other task force — one still being at sea — had come in on Saturday,
the 6th of December. I'm not sure whether it was Admiral Pye's
task force or the other task force came in. Well, one-third, approxi-
mately, of the Fleet was in port on the 6th of December. Another
third, approximately, another task force, came in on that date. The
other task force was in that was supposed to go out on Monday, the
8th.
96. Q. Isn't it a fact that the normal operating schedule provided
for at least one task force to be at sea at all times undergoing training;
sometimes two, but never less than one?
A. That is correct, sir; mostly two, and many times three.
None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine
this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
[527] The witness made the following statement: I would like
to make a statement, Admiral. I remained in my position as Fleet
Gunnery Officer on the staff until September, 1942. I would like to
state, sir, that the plan for the security of the Fleet, so far as the
400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had anything to do with it while
it was in Pearl Harbor, the plan for the use of the anti-aircraft guns
of the Fleet by the Commanding General ashore through the instru-
ment of the base defense commanders, the plan for a multiple number
of anti-aircraft gun crews for the anti-aircraft guns of the ships of
the Fleet, the organization of the Fleet and the method of standing
condition watches — all of those things which contributed to our part,
the Fleet's part in fighting off the Japs at Pearl Harbor were continued
in force with no essential change for at least 9 months after Pearl
Harbor. 2CL-41 was written, I believe, first in February or March,
1941. It was revised in October, 1941. In September, 1942, its essen-
tial provisions were still in effect. In September, 1942, the method of
defending Pearl Harbor by the guns of the Fleet and the anti-aircraft
guns of the Army, and the Army Fighter Command under General
Davidson, was still in effect. The organization of the Fleet and the
method of standing watches, the requirement that watch crews should
be competent by actually firing in target practice, was re-issued in the
summer of 1942 by Admiral Nimitz, reiterating the provisions which
must be carried out, and carrying as an enclosure to that letter the old
letter signed by Admiral Kimmel. If there was anything wrong in
the plans and how they should be carried out prior to Pearl Harbor,
there wasn't any change in the set-up afterwards. What Pearl Harbor
brought out by the record indicates that the plan was sound. I may
say that there were changes in material and we got anti-aircraft guns
of a superior type that we didn't have before, but the basic plan for
defense and the basic organization of the Fleet were not changed one
iota. Nets were installed later, and balloons, after a long controversy,
were installed in August, 1942, and it is my understanding have since
been removed because they interfere.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 11 : 05 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 25 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interested parties and their counsel, except Harold R. Stark, interested
party, whose counsel^ were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
[S£8] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. William W. Smith, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Naval
Transportation inider the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Q. During the year 1941, what duties were you performing after
the month of February ?
A. Chief of Staff, United States Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. Did you hold that position up to and including the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 ?
A. I did.
4. Q. Are you acquainted with the policies surrounding the basing
of the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands ?
A. I don't know what was behind their policy because it started
before I took over the job of Chief of Staff, but I was commander of
a ship of the Fleet at the time. It began in April, 1940, when we went
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 401
to the Pearl Harbor area for a Fleet problem, and while enroute the
German Army invaded France, and after we had been at Pearl Harbor
for a few weeks we were ordered to remain there. I assumed — and I
think everyone did — that it meant the probability of war in the Pacific.
5. Q. Do you know of any military reasons why the Fleet should
have been kept in Pearl Harbor?
A. No.
G. Q. Did tlie keeping of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor have anything
to do with the development of the Naval Base there ?
A. In my opinion, no. The Hawaiian detachments had gone out
approximately a year before and there were enough ships in the Hawai-
ian detachment to keep the Pearl Harbor base busy. I will add to that
that we felt that we were getting better training in the Hawaiian area
than we ever got in the San Pedro area because we were at sea more.
7.- Q. Was there any relation between keeping the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor and the development of, say, Fleet logistics for operating from
an advanced base ?
A. No, that was not the purpose, in my opinion.
[529] 8. Q. Can vou state anv militarv objections for basing the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. Well, the principal objection at the start was that we had no
proper Fleet anchorage. The Fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads.
We were not protected by mines. We were not protected by air cover-
age. I am speaking of 1040 now. At that time our two big carriers,
the SARATOGA and the LEXINGTON were anchored off Honolulu,
and were very vulnerable. That was the principal objection to keeping
the Fleet there. But later on and before Admiral Kimmel became
Commander-in-Chief, Pearl Harbor was fitted so that it could take the
entire Fleet, but even at that time we had no nets, no boom to protect
anything from getting into the harbor, and of course the channel into
the harbor had only one entrance, which was bad. Those were the
military objections to keeping the Fleet there.
9. Q. During the year 1941 while you were Cliief of Staff to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, what was the paramount mission of the
Pacific Fleet at that time?
A. Preparation for war, training for war and, I might add, for war
against Japan. Whether that was in writing from the Navy Depart-
ment, or not, I do not recall, but it was in the minds of the Commander-
in-Chief and his staff, and I believe of all the officers of the Pacific Fleet.
10. Q. Was this more or less of an intense training schedule, or not?
A. Yes, very much so.
11. Q. Did this paraniount mission of training of the U. S. Pacific
Fleet ever change before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 7 Decem-
ber 1941?
A. No, I think not. It built up a force. The way we started to steam
entirely without lights and take all precautions, t don't recall, except
it was a security order, and 2CL-41 was issued 15 days after the Com-
mander-in-Chief took over on the 15th of February. It was revised
later on.
12. Q. When, during the year 1941, did you first realize that the
international situation as it affected the relationship between the United
States and Japan was becoming critical?
A. I realized it before 1941.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 27
402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
13. Q. Did it become more critical during the year 1941, and if so,
can yon state the approximate date when you. reached this decision?
A. I believe that what brought it home to us more than anything
else was when we closed the Panama Canal [■530'\ to Japan-
ese merchant shipping. When that occurred, I do not know, but it
was long before Pearl Harbor.
14. Q. You have stated that during 1941 up until the time of the
Japanese attack on 7 December of that year, that the paramount
mission of the Pacific Fleet was training and preparation for war.
Were there any compelling reasons during that year why that mis-
sion should have been changed?
A. No. I might add that there was a secondary mission, because
of our great construction program, to train additional men so that
we could send experienced men home, but that did not interfere with
the efficiency of the Fleet, although most commanding officers thought
it did, naturally.
15. Q. Can you state the source or the authority for this para-
mount mission? Did it come from higher authority such as the
Navy Department, or was it one deduced by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet himself?
A. That is a difficult question. It was certainly deduced by the
Commander-in-Chief himself, but he received almost weekly letters
from the Chief of Naval Operations which certainly indicated that
war was probably inevitable.
16. Q. In these letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, do
you have any knowledge of whether or not the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions was acquainted with the fact that the paramount mission of the
Fleet was as you stated it?
A. I would deduce from his letters that he was not. We were con-
tinually being advised that the war was in the Atlantic. The fact
that in, I think it was May, 1941, they were taking from the Pacific
Fleet very secretly the best commissioned battleships we had, the
most modern aircraft carriers, a division of four modern cruisers,
and some two squadrons of destroj^ers, would indicate that the
authorities in Washington believed the war was to be in the Atlantic,
but that was never our idea in the Pacific.
17. Q. From the information you had during your tour of duty
as Chief of Staff, and from any information that you since have re-
ceived, do you consider that you were kept informed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief of all the information he had received on the ques-
tion of United States military and diplomatic relations?
A. I feel confident that the Commander-in-Chief kept me informed
on everything.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[531] 18. Q. I ask you to examine this document, which is a
dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941,
and which has been referred to by some witnesses before this court
as the "war warning message." Does Exhibit 17 state that negotia-
tions with Japan had ceased ?
A. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 403
19. Q. What information came into the possession of the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet after receipt of this message
which in any way weakened or confirmed this statement ?
A. I cannot state tlie source of the information, but I am certain
that we knew in the Pacific Fleet that negotiations had been resumed,
and I believe we got it through the press or the radio but not through
an official dispatch.
20. Q. Then, so far as you recall, did the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions ever change the statement that negotiations with Japan had
ceased ?
A. No.
21. Q. Did you, as the Chief of Staff, keep a current estimate of
the situation, either in writing or mentally, as to the imminence of
war between Japan and the United States?
A. In writing, no; mentally, yes. We discussed it every day. I
will add that the War Plans Officer presented to the Commander-in-
Chief each day his estimate of what was happening, as did also the
Fleet Intelligence Officer.
22. Q. Admiral, I ask you to refer to Exhibit 19, which is in evi-
dence before this court and which is a dispatch of the Chief of Naval
Operations of 28 November 1941, purporting to quote a dispatch
which the Army had sent to the Commander, Western Defense Com-
mand. I ask you to examine this exhibit and state whether or not
you were acquainted with the general information that this dispatch
contains.
A. I remember the dispatch because of the emphasis placed on the
direction that you should not alarm the civil population or disclose
intent. I do remember that.
23. Q. Do you recall whether or not the wording which you have
just cited had any effect on your estimate of the imminence of war?
A. No, it did not.
24. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General of
the Hawaiian Department ever replied to that dispatch? In other
words, did he report the action he had taken to the War Department?
A. Yes, he did. I can't recall the wording of the [53.^^ dis-
patch or what action it was, but in every matter of that kind, when the
Commanding General received a direction such as this, he invariably
informed the Commander-in-Chief of the action he had taken. I
dare say you will find a copy of the action he had taken in the files
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
25. Q. Do you now feel that you probably did know wliat the reply
of the Comanding General was at that time?
A. I don't remember. There were very many things happening
about that time. There was a problem on to relieve the marines in
the outlying islands with armed troops, but there were so many things
which happened at tliat time, I can't remember what was stated in any
dispatch.
26. Q. Can you remember the date of this dispatch which gave you
a. directive or suggestion relative to relieving these troops which you
have just mentioned?
A. It was not received on the date of the war warning of Novem-
ber 27. It may have been received a few days before or a day or so
afterwards, but it wasn't on the same day.
404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. Q. In order to refresh your memory, I am going to ask you to
examine Exhibit 18, which is the dispatch from the Cliief of Naval
Operations, dated November 26, 1941, and ask you if tliis is tlie dis-
patcli which suggested certain dispositions on outlying islands ?
A. Yes, I remember it very well. General Short received a similar
dispatch from the War Department about the same time.
28. Q. Do you recall the suggested method of the Chief of Naval
Operations for effecting the transfer of planes to those outlying
islands ?
A, Yes, because the message tells us we cannot fly the equipment,
and we have to lower it into boats. This particular message caused
a little amusement among the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet. At that time we had naval fighting planes at both Wake
and Midway, and it seemed rather odd to pull them out and put Army
planes in. However, we were directed to do it, and the plans were
made.
29. Q. What was the method of transporting those planes to Wake
and Midway?
A. Only by carrier ; that is the only way possible.
30. Q. That dispatch is dated November 26, is it not ?
A. Yes.
[5S3] 31. Q. Assuming that a delivery of these planes by carrier
was to be made at as early a date as practicable, just how many days
after November 26 could this delivery have been effected?
A. I would prefer that that question be answered by an airman, but
my estimate is that the Army could not possibly have prepared the
planes for us in less than a week, and adding another week to that for
delivery would make two weeks as the best we could have done.
32. Q. Then this suggestion involves the absence of carriers in the
direction of the Japanese homeland ?
33. Q. And at a time subsequent to November 27 ?
A. Yes.
34. Q. November 27 is the date of the dispatch to which we have
referred as the "war warning message", is it not ?
A. Yes. It also involves sending carriers in that direction not fully
prepared for war, because when you put planes on board a carrier for
passage, she cannot possibly have all her own planes ready for fighting.
35. Q. Did this suggestion on the part of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions have any effect on your estimate at that time of the imminence
of war between the Japanese Empire and the United States?
A. Not at all, no.
36. Q. I am going to refer to Exhibits 21 and 22 and ask you to
examine them and state whether or not you were familiar with these
dispatches at or about the time they were probably received by the
Commander-in-Chief. These dispatches refer to the destruction of
codes and ciphers on Guam and outlying islands.
A. The first message about the destruction of our own codes
37. Q. Under what date ?
A. 6th of December. I have some recollection of it, but it meant
very little to me, because the War Plans handled that situation.
Guam, for example, under the War Plans was category "F", which
means that it would not be defended but that they would burn the
codes, and, of course, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 405
prepared to destroy any codes and did not require orders from the
Navy Department to do it.
[S34] 38. Q. Did this particular suggestion to burn our own
codes and ciphers in Guam and the outlying islands have any effect
on your estimate of the situation as to the imminence of war between
the United States and Japan as of the date of the receiving of these
dispatches in your headquarters?
A. The situation as of the 6th of December, when that message
was received, was that war was inevitable. The Japanese units had
been reported by the planes of the Asiatic Fleet as heading southward.
The Navy Department had given us a warning on the 27th of No-
vember as a war warning. The unfortunate thing is that they should
have put a period after the word "warning", but they told us where
it would happen: in the Kra Peninsula, Malay, and possibly the
Philippines and Guam. We assumed they would take over Guam,
and we had no way of defending it.
39. Q. I ask you to refer to Exhibit 15, which is the dispatch of
the Chief of Naval Operations of November 24, 1941, and inspect it.
A. Yes, I remember the dispatch.
40. Q. This dispatch states : "Chances of favorable outcome of ne-
gotiations with Japan very doubtful. A surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines and
Guam, is a possibility." Can you recall what the estimate was at
that time of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the possi-
bility of an aggressive movement on the United States in the Pearl
Harbor area ?
A. I don't recall what his estimate was at the time, but I can recall
my own. By stating that a surprise attack may occur in any direc-
tion, including the Philippines and Guam, the inference is that cer-
tainly they are not going any farther to the eastward.
41. Q. Did you have any information during this period preceding
December 7 of the performance of airplane torpedoes in water of the
depth prevailing at Pearl Harbor? . ^--^
A. Yes. _ ^ ^■
42. Q. What, in general, w\as this information?
A. We received a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations either
quoting or enclosing a copy of a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance,
stating that aerial torpedoes could not be effective in depth of less
than seventy-five feet. I remember that particularly, because Ad-
miral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch had a meeting about it and dis-
cussed it, and Admiral Bloch pointed out that the maximum depth in
Pearl Harbor was something like forty-six feet. It was a question
of whether or not we wanted torpedo nets. The letter from the
Chief of Naval Operations asked us whether we wanted them and
stated that they were not effective in depths of less than seventy-five
feet, and as a result of the discussion between [S3S] Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, it was decided why clutter up the harbor
with nets if the torpedoes are not effective? ^We don't need them.
That was several months before Pearl Harbor.
43. Q. I refer you to Exhibit 55, Admiral, and I shall read you para-
graph 2: "Recent developments have shown that United States and
British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much
3,8 300 feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less
406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
than 75 feet and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that
it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel
is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water
at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a
sufficient run to arm the torpedo." I ask you if you were familiar with
that statement ?
A. I never heard of that. It is a surprise to me now. I am quite
certain that that letter was never received in the Pacific Fleet.
44. Q. I ask you to refer to this exhibit and state whether or not
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet is designated by the
originator to receive a copy ?
A. He is.
45. Q. So far as your own personal knowledge serves you now, you
don't remember having seen it ?
A. No.
46. Q. I will ask you to examine Exhibit 55 fully and then state
whether you have any recollection of having seen it or whether you
had been informed of it during your tour of duty as Chief of Staffs
A. I have no recollection of the letter at all, and I never heard it
discussed.
47. Q. I show you Exhibit 54, w^hich is in evidence before this court
and which is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated Feb-
ruary 17, 1941, and addressed to certain commandants. A copy of it
is purported to have been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pa-
cific Fleet. The subject of this letter is "Anti-torpedo baffles for pro-
tection against torpedo plane attacks." I ask you to examine this
exhibit and state whether or not you had seen it or had the informa-
tion contained therein during your tour of duty as Chief of Staff under
the Comander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
A. I don't remember this letter in the detail in which it is w^ritten,
but we did receive a letter which included paragraph 3 (a) about the
minimum depth. That was freely discussed on the staff, and the
Commander-in-Chief answered it, but whether it was this definite
letter or not, I cannot answer.
[S36] 48. Q. Did you have any estimate of the probability or
possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack on ships anchored or moored
in Pearl Harbor up to and including December 7, 1941 ?
A. Nothing except a staff discussion when torpedo baffles were con-
sidered. We did not believe the Japanese would attack us with tor-
pedo planes, if that is what you mean.
49. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibit 17, which is a dispatch of the
Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 27, 1941, and which you
have previously been informed was called the "war warning dis-
patch." This dispatch states that an aggressive move by Japan is
expected within the next few days and further that certain move-
ments indicate an amphibious expedition against the Philippines,
the Ki-a Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Did the information con-
tained in this dispatch in any way change your estimate of the situa-
tion with regard to the possibility of an attack on the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base?
A. No. You Avill note that this dispatch is addressed to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
It directs: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment," There
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 407
was a defensive deployment planned for the Asiatic Fleet but not for
the Pacific Floet that I recall.
50. Q. Well, did this information have any influence on your esti-
mate of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. No, it did not.
51. Q. What was your estimate of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
at that time ?
A. My estimate and, I believe, the estimate of the Commander-in-
Chief and his staif were that the surprise attack would be in the
form of a submarine attack, and we were alerted against that and
had been for some time. Our operating areas were searched every
day by jDlanes. AYe had plans to meet a submarine attack. We be-
lieved that would be the form of attack that we would receive.
52. Q. What were the relations of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
during the period from about October IG, 1941, up until the Japanese
attack on December 7 with reference to conferences on matters of
political and military developments in the United States- Japanese
situations?
A. Relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Command-
ing General were very close. They had been from the start. It is my
recollection that when General Short arrived in the Haw^iiian area
Admiral Kinnnel called on him before he shifted into uniform. They
were together very frequently, and in all cases in connection with
any w^arning or any [S37~\ dispatch or any letter received that
indicated war, they invariably got together. It wasn't always the
case that General Short came over to see Admiral Kimmel. Admiral
Kimmel frequently went over to see him. They met frequently so-
ciall}^ and were in conference, I should say, at least twice a week.
53. Q. Do 3^ou feel, then, that there was a free and full exchange of
military information ? -
A. Yes, I do.
54. Q. What can you state as to the attitude of cooperation betw^een
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding
General of the HaAvaiian Department in matters of defense of Oahu?
A. I believe they discussed everything that was on the mind of
either. I should like to mention one very little thing that indicates
the cooperation between Admiral Kinnnel and General Short. In
the summer of 1941 the then Cajitain Mountbatten came to the Pacific
Fleet and delivered a series of lectures. I drove him up to Fort
Shafter when he addressed the Army. Mountbatten stated, "I have
dictated a letter during a high level bombing attack. I hold high
level bombing in contempt, but I am frankly afraid of the dive
bomber." When that speech was over. General Short shook hands
with Mountbatten and said, "Thank you for those remarks. I have
been trying to make my Army Air Force go over to dive bombing. I
talked to Kimmel about it, and he recommends it, but they won't
do it." I brought that out to show there was a close cooperation
between the two. I believe also, as far as the defense of Pearl Harbor
is concerned, your records will show that General Short made fre-
quent requests for better planes and better anti-aircraft guns. A
great deal of this was prompted by Admiral Kimmel, and I believe
the Admiral wrote to the Navy Department to get a little support for
General Short.
408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
55. Q. After the receipt of the so-called "war warning message"
on November 27, 1941, did you know at that time what was being done
by the Army with reference to taking measures of security in the
Hawaiian Department ?
A. Yes. I know that the Army was alerted that night, because on
my way to Honolulu
56. What night?
A. November 27. On that night, in driving home, I passed long
columns of troops and groups of equipment blocking the road leading
into Honolulu, but they were going on the alert to prevent sabotage.
Remember that we had something like 160,000 Japanese in the
islands, and I dare say that was the Army's primary method of de-
fense— to defend their public utilities, their reservoirs, and defend
against sabotage. They were on the alert that night, because I saw it.
[53S~\ 57. Q. Do you have any information, or do you know
whether or not the Cammanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment knew what measures of security the Navy had adopted in its
defense of Pearl Harbor or the Fleet therein at about that time ?
A. Yes, he knew, because every directive issued by the Commander-
in-Chief was circulated to the Army. Our operating plans, issued a
month in advance, were sent to the Army, because they had to co-
operate with them. They knew everything that we were doing.
58. Q. A month in advance of what?
A. Of the actual operations. They were always invited to par-
ticipate.
59. Q I am not going to ask you for details. Admiral, because I am
calling Admiral Bellinger and his then Chief -of-Staff, Captain Ram-
sey, to give the court the details of the number of patrol planes, their
material condition, and the effectiveness, etc., of a distant patrol. I
shall ask you, however, if you know whether the question of long-
range reconnaissance was considered by the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet at any time between November 27, 1941, and the
Japanese attack on December 7 ?
A. Yes, it was. In fact, it was considered before Admiral Kimmel
became Commander-in-Chief. The Fleet was there in 1940, and I
discussed the matter with Admiral Richardson's staff, and the answer
was that they didn't have enough planes to do everything, such as
training and meeting the requirements of a long 360-degree search.
It is my recollection that Admiral Bellinger in 1941 was trying to get
more crews and that he made the statement that they needed two crews
for each plane. They were also installing gas proof tanks. I believe
they put in their own armor. There w^ere never enough planes to have
an all around search. Consequently, the available planes were given
the job to search the operating areas. The operating areas were
usually to the south of Oahu but not always. When the Fleet operated
to the north of Oahu, as they did, the planes searched in that direction,
but they did not have an all around search, because we were not only
shy of planes, but it is also my recollection that we had to detach some
of them and send them elsewhere. Even the War Plan itself called for
sending squadrons of planes to Samoa and Alaska and directed that we
keep two squadrons in Oahu. Obviously, two squadrons of airplanes
cannot make any kind of search, such as would be required.
60. Q. How many planes in a squadron of patrol ships ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 409
A. Twelve, I believe.
CI. Q. Then, it is your estimate that the AVar Plans considered
retaining two squadrons, or about twenty-four patrol planes, for the
Hawaiian area?
A. Directed that we not reduce it below that level.
[530] 02. Q. I believe you stated in the first part of your testi-
mony that tlie paramount mission of tlie Pacific Fleet was training and
that you further stated that until December 7, 1041, this mission had
not been changed. In view of the information that the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific liad of the United States-Japanese situation on
and after November 27, 1041, had consideration been given to changing
this mission?
A. The mission, of course, was laid down in the War Plans. Some-
where about the middle of October, on the receipt of a message, we
discontinued the cruises to the coast. We had been sending a small
task force to the coast just for recreation, and we discontinued that
about the middle of October and never resumed it. In Pearl Harbor
they had black-outs for training purposes. The Fleet was alerted all
the time at sea. At least once during each operational period of the
task forces at sea there would be a drill, assuming an attack by sub-
marine. When the striking force would be organized, the battle-
ships would assemble, and the destroyers would assemble to protect
the battleshi])s. Those things had l)een going on for some time. I
cannot say that the mission of the Pacific Fleet was ever changed,
because where you state that the mission was training, I would say
training and preparation for war.
G3. Q. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, state the ap])roximate geographical location of the
three major task forces of the Pacific Fleet?
A. Task Force One was in port. That included most of the battle-
ships under Admiral Pye. Each of the three task forces had a car-
rier, but that task force was without its carrier on the 7th of December.
The SARATOGA was on the coast. I don't recall whether she was
needing overhaul, but one of her missions was to ferry planes out to
Pearl Harbor, because we had no means to get them out there, so she
wasn't in Pearl Harbor at the time. She was on the coast. Task
Force Two under Admiral Halsey had gone to sea about the same time
Admiral Pye got in.
04. Q. This was approximately wliat date?
A. About the 27th of November. His task force returned on the
afternoon of Friday, the 5th of December, except that his carrier, the
ENTERPRISE, was at Wake delivering marine planes. He had
cruisers and destroyers with him. How much of his task force was
in Pearl Harbor I don't recall, except that battleship division 1, which
was under Halsey, was in Pearl Harbor. Task Force Three under
Admiral Brown had gone to sea about the 5th of December. Admiral
Brown was conducting am])hibious training in the vicinity of John-
ston Island, and his carrier, with some cruisers and destroyers imder
Admiral Newton, had gone to Midwav to land some planes there.
[S40] 05. Q. You have stated that the SARATOGA was absent
from the Hawaiian area. Do you recall whether or not any other cap-
ital ships than the ones you have described were absent from the
Hawaiian area?
410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The COLORADO ^Yas undergoing overhaul at Puget Sound.
The PENNSYLVANIA was at drydock in Pearl Harbor. I can
recall only the COLORADO as a capital ship which was away at that
time.
The court then, at 12 : 20 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
[541] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel with the exception
of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose
counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral William W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness.
He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and
continued his testimony.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy :
66. Q. Admiral, as Chief of Staff to CinCPac, were you familiar
with WPL-46, and the initial task assigned bv that plan?
A. Yes.
67. Q. Would you state to the court what the initial tasks were
that were assigned in WPL-46 to the Pacific Fleet?
A. The tasks defined by the Navy Department were to remove the
pressure from the Mala}^ barrier by raiding commerce, by attacking
the Marshall Islands in a raid, and also assisting our British allies
below the equator from zero longitude, starting in Samoa, to the
westward as far as longitude 155 degrees, and we were ordered to send,
I think it was, two cruisers and two submarines to that area. That
was from Samoa, south of the equator westward as far as 155 degrees
longitude, east.
68. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the fact that this plan,
that is, WPL-46. implemented certain high-level decisions v*'hich
contemplated the British bringing some of their capital ships into the
Indian ocean as a restraining influence against the Japanese Fleet, and
at the same time the United States bringing a unit from the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic as a method of furthering the war against
Germany?
A. I know that was in the Pacific Fleet war plan. Wliether it was
in the Navy Department plan originally I don't know, except that
during the summer of 1941, a British Admiral — Rear Admiral Dank-
werts — who was the British representative in the United States at that
time, and he had conferred with our war planners — he, in company
with a Captain Clark, who was the British military naval attache in
Washington, came to Pearl Harbor and told the Commander-in-Chief
that they had attempted to make this agreement with the Navy De-
partment, mentioned particularly Admiral Kelly Turner and said,
"We think that the British Empire wil fall apart [5^?] if we
lose Singapore." He went further to say that Admiral Turner didn't
believe in Singapore, and he said, "We have finally come to an arrange-
ment where if you will send a batleship division to Gibraltar to defend
our interest in the Mediterranean, we shall send six battleships to
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COTJRT OF INQUIRY 411
Singapore. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, gave him no
encouragement at all, but told Admiral Dankwerts, in effect, "Well, if
you can't get information from the Navy Department, why do you
come to me ?
Gy. Q. Do I understand that was in the summer of '-11?
A, The summer of '-11.
7. Q. We may be talking about two different things. What I want
to establish is whetlier or not you knew that there was to be detached
from the Pacific Fleet a unit which would be transferred to the At-
lantic Fleet, and as a part of that plan it was contemplated that the
British would transfer some capital ships to the Indian Ocean?
A. I did, but I knew it only through the statement of Admiral
Dankwerts, because there was no official paper on the subject that I
remember.
71. Q. You testified this morning that the Navy Department
secretly, as you told it, sent a force of three battleships, four cruisers,
and two squadrons of destroyers in 191:1, from the Pacific Fleet, and
transferred them to the Atlantic i
A. That's right.
72. Q. And this indicated to your mind the people in Washington
considered the war to be in the Atlantic, which was not the view enter-
tained by the staff of CinCPac ; is that correct ?
A. That is absolutely correct.
73. Q. Well, now, in connection with WPL-4(), I'd like to refresh
your memory as to whether or not that transfer is in WPL— tG.
A. In WPL— IG, it states that at the outbreak of war, they will move
one division of cruisers from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, in addi-
tion to what we had already moved.
74. Q, That's right, but there was also to be transferred, as a part
of this agreement — a high-level agreement — a division of battleships, a
division of cruisers, and a carrier, and the two squadrons of destroyers,
was there not, under WPL-46 ?
A. At the time that I received WPL-4G, which I tliink was about the
first of July, that had already been done. It was made in ]\lav.
75. Q. Tlien there was no movement that you know of in 1941
[S4S] that was not in accordance with WPI.^G (
A. No.
76. Q. Admiral, you testified this morning with respect to Exhibit
18, which is the dispatch concerning the transfer of Army planes to
Midway and Wake, that when you received that dispatch at Pearl
Harbor, or were so advised, that since you were directed to send these
planes out, you carried out these instructions; is that correct?
A. No, we did not carry out the instructions. We made the plans
and the Commander-in-Chief sent a dispatch telling how it was to be
done, but war broke before we could do it. The marines were still
at Wake when war broke.
77. Q. Did I understand j-ou to say that you were not directed to
do this i
A. We were directed to do it. and we were prepared to do it, but
war broke before we could execute it.
78. Q. I hand you Exhibit IS and ask you if that was the dispatch
you had before you this morning when you were testifying?
A. Yes, it is.
412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
79. Q. I will ask you to read to the court the first sentence and the
last sentence on the second page, if you please.
A. (Reading) : "In order to keep the planes of the second marine
aircraft available for expeditionary use, OpNav has requested and the
Army has agreed to station twenty-five Army pursuit planes at Mid-
way and a similar number at Wake, provided you consider this feasible
and desirable." (Reading) : "Confer to Commanding General and
advise as soon as practicable."
80. Q. Which, in effect, is not a directive to CinCPac to carry out
this transfer, but rather a request for advice from CinCPac as to
whether he considered it as practicable?
A. Yes, however it was construed at the time in my mind, at least,
as a directive, just as when your commanding officer says to you, "Don't
you think that it would be a good thing for you to do so and so," and
you say, "Yes, sir, I do."
81. Q. What action did you take with respect to this dispatch ? Did
the Commander-in-Chief reply and give the Navy Department the
benefit of his suggestion in that respect ?
A. The first thing the Commander-in-Chief did was to get General
Short and his entire staff, and Admiral Kimmel and his staff together,
and we conferred, to my recollection, for at least three days on how
to do this thing. We dicln't know why, but the Army was in very great
doubt as to whether ['544] it would put P-39's or P-40's on
Wake, and they finally decided on P-39's. The Commander-in-Chief
said we could put the planes on the island, but we could not get them
off. I tell you that just to let you know that we did consider it; our
combined staffs discussed it for at least two days, and I think three
clavs, before the answer was sent in.
82. Q. But you didn't consider that you had to do it ; the Navy De-
partment hadn't directed you to carry out this operation ? They simply
asked for an answer.
A. No, I considered that we had been directed to do it.
83. Q. You stated this morning that you had seen, around the 27th
of November, Exhibit 17. That is the so-called war warning dis-
patch, in which the Chief of Naval Operations informed CinCPac
that negotiations with Japan looking toward a stabilization of condi-
tions in the Pacific have ceased. You also testified that you had seen,
a day or two later, Exhibit 19. That is the dispatch from C. N. O.,
which presented, for the information of CinCPac, the Army's dispatch
which stated that, "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated
to all practicable purposes, with only the barest possibility the Japan-
ese Government will come back and offer to continue." Do you recall
those two dispatches?
A. Yes, I recall both of these.
84. Q. I understood you to say this morning that subsequent to the
receipt of these dispatches you also had press and radio reports to the
effect that conversations with Japanese representatives in Washington
might be continuing ; is that correct ?
A. That is my recollection, yes.
85. Q. But you never received any modification from the Chief of
Naval Operations of the two dispatches?
A. No, I remember both of these dispatches, but it does not say here
that negotiations had been resumed.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 413
86. Q. But you didn't receive anything officially from the Chief of
Naval Operations which modified either of the dispatches, copies of
which were sent you, before the Japanese attack?
A. No. ^
87. Q. Then I understood you to say that you and the staff con-
sidered that these press and radio reports which you had heard sub-
sequent to the receipt of these dispatches modified, in your opinion,
the effect of these dispatches ?
A. No, I wouldn't say that. I would say that the press and radio
were very frequently ahead of the information we got from the Navy
Department.
88. Q. Well, was there any doubt in your mind as to the [^45]
meaning of the dispatch of November 27, which begins, "This is a war
warning?"
A. Not at all. If they had put a period after, "This is a war warn-
ing," I think we might have been better off, but they went on to tell
us after that where the attack was coming from.
80. Q. Leaving aside for the moment tlie fact that there is a period
after, "This is a war warning", in that dispatch, I think you said this
morning that the unfortunate part of it was that the Cliief of Naval
Operations should have included in the message, he didn't put a
period after "war warning", but instead went on to tell you where the
attack might come from. Now, I'd like you to look at the sentence in
that dispatch which reads, "The number and the equipment of Japa-
nese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an
amphibious expedition against the Philippines or the Kra Peninslua,
or possibly Borneo.'' Now at the time you received this dispatch you
also had information, you were also considering the dispatch which
was sent to you by the Chief of Naval Operations on the 24th of
November, which is Exhibit 15, did you not?
A. The one about burning the codes ?
90. Q. No. It begins, "Chances are — " You received that prior to
the receipt of the war warning message?
A. Yes, sir.
91. Q. That dispatch begins, "The chances of favorable outcome
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled
with the statements ot Japanese Government and movements theii
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise ag-
gressive movement in any direction including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam is a possibility." You will also note from the dispatch
before you that it is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic,
Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th,
and 15th Naval Districts, all for action. In the face of those two
dispatches, Admiral, did I understand you to saj^ this morning that
you considered the mention of the Philippines and Guam to indicate
that the Chief of Naval Operations intended not to include an attack
on any other possession of the United States, including Hawaii?
A. Yes, I do. The inference is plain, I think. AVhen you say that
they may attack in any direction, including the Philippines and Cruam.
They didn't say New York or San Francisco. They didn't say Pearl
Harbor. I think the inference is plain that whoever wrote the dis-
patch had an idea that so far as the attack on the Philippines or Guam,
that is what we expected them to do.
414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\5Jt6^ 92. Q. What effect did you give to the dispatch of No-
vember 24, which says an attack in any direction may be expected, the
dispatch having been addressed to lK)th the Commander-in-Chief Asi-
atic and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and the naval districts
which might be concerned?
A. I can't tell you exactly what was done about that. It may have
intensified the action we were taking, but it did not change our general
estimate at all.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
93. Q. Admiral Smith, did you testify before the Roberts Com-
mission ?
A, No, sir.
94. Q. Were you in Pearl Harbor during the ten days or more that
they were holding liearings there?
A. I was there all during the hearings. I left Pearl Harbor to go
to sea about 15 January 1942. I was available at all times. I was not
called.
95. Q. I call your attention to a paragraph on page 19 of the Rob-
erts Report, of which the court has taken judicial notice, paragraph 9,
conclusions, "These commanders," referring to General Short and
Admiral Kimmel, — "These commanders failed to confer with respect
to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to
adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency."" I ask you
whether General Sliort and Admiral Kimmel failed to confer with
respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27.
A. It would be my estimate that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short, between 27 November and 7 December, conferred every day.
I will give you an example of that. One night Admiral Kimmel, at
6 : 00 o'clock at night, called up General Short and said, "What are
you doing?" He said, "I am going to the north shore;" and he said,
"Hang on for a few minutes ; I am coming over to see you." And
that was in the week of Pearl Harbor. General Short and his staff
were over nearly every day. I never heard any expression of ill-
feeling between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. They were
trying to get along with each other, if I make myself plain.
96. Q. Were these conferences about which you have testified in
connection with the warnings and orders issued on and after 27
November?
A. The conferences were always called after receipt of a warning,
but they had been going on all the time, because General Sliort and
Admiral Kimmel were veiy much of the opinion that war was coming.
I think in most cases the ['^i'/'] (piestions raised by the Navy
Department had already been discussed between these two command-
ing officers.
97. Q. Were the conferences in respect to the orders and warnings,
Admiral ?
A. Not all, no — oh. no.
98. Q. But these between 27 November and 7 December?
A. Not in response to a dispatch, because they had conferred so
frequently on the general situation. You see. General Short had a
great manyM)rob]ems, of Canton Island, for example — they had no
glnis on the thing. He was trying to prepare the thing. They were
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 415
continually discussing the problems, but it already connected witli
war — every word of it.
99. Q. Some of the conferences were in respect to the orders and
warnings?
A. Oh, certainly. There was a conference, as I recollect it, after
every one of these warning messages was received — there was alwa3's
a conference.
100. Q. And you observed and Avere present at some or most of
these conferences ?
A. I was present at all conferences where General Short brought
his staff with him. There were times when General Short came over
to see Admiral Kimmel accompanied by no one but an aide. In those
cases, having a great deal of administrative duty to do, I stayed out
until sent for, but on every conference that involved anything per-
taining to the war, I was called in.
101. Q. Were there conferences between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel on and after 27 November with respect to adapting and using
the existing plans to meet the emergency?
A. My recollection is that there was a conference approximately
the first of December. Just what was discussed in detail, I do not
remember, but I do know that General Short stated to Admiral Kimmel
that he had reported to the War Department all of his reactions to
these warning disj^atches and what he intended to do, and I also know
that Admiral Kimmel had done the same with the Navy Department.
102. Q. I now read paragraph 11, on the same page of the same
document : "The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning
of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency
envisaged in the warning messages." In your opinion as Chief of
Staff to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific, was the state of readiness of
the naval forces on the morning of December 7 such as was required to
meet any [-^iS] emergency envisaged in the warning messages
received from the Navy Department ?
A. It was. You must remember that what we were thinking about
in the Pacific Fleet was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. We were
thinking about the fleet and the readiness of the fleet. I believe that
the state of readiness is indicated by the fact that how quickly the
gun crews responded to the fire which was absolutely unexpected.
We exercised as much security as we could in port. We realized that
the Army defenses were not adequate, that ships were stationed in
sectors and every sector was always occupied for antiaircraft fire, but
we also had to get that fleet in readiness to go back to sea. It happened
at a time when two task forces were in ]iort. Usually only one was
in port. Sometimes three were at sea, depending upon the exercises
that were projected by the Commander-in-Chief. The readiness of
the ships — they were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly
of how soon they could get out, and how to get out and go into battle.
They were not thinking about the defense of Pearl Harbor.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, IT. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[S-^] 103. Q. I call your attention to Paragraph 11 on Page 9
of the same document: (Reading) "At about noon, eastern standard
416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time (6:30 a. m. Honolulu time), December 7, an additional warning
message, indicating an almost immediate break in relations between
the United States and Japan, was dispatched by the Chief of Staff
after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, for the informa-
tion of responsible Army and Navy connnand:'rs. Every effort was
made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time,
but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the de-
livery of this urgent message w^as delayed until after the attack." In
your opinion, is the sending of a dispatch from Washington to Pearl
Harbor by means of R. C. A., the achievement of every effort to have
the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time?
A. I am not a communicator, but my recollection is that at that time
communication between Washington and Pearl Harbor could be estab-
lislied within 30 minutes. We did not have a telephone but we had
priority radio.
104. Q. That would be the Navy radio ?
A. Yes, of course. Thirty minutes ; not more than forty.
105. Q. The Navy radio was more expeditious than the commercial
lines ?
A. Oh, yes; from Washington, directly controlled from the Navy
Department to Pearl Harbor.
106. Q. Now, will you look at Exhibit 48, Admiral? That is, I
believe, the dispatch from General Marshall to the Hawaiian De-
partment. I now call your attention to a statement in the Roberts
Report on Page 20, Conclusion No. 14: (Reading) "If the message" —
referring to the message which is Exhibit 48 — "had reached its destina-
tion at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of sub-
stantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to
take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated
receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to
meet it." If the message. Exhibit 48, had been received in Hawaii at
the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet between
5:00 and 6:00 o'clock a. m., Haw^aii time, in your opinion could the
Commander-in-Chief have taken measures that would have been of
substantial use in repelling the attack?
A. Yes. The measures he could have taken, lemembering it was
Sunday morning, by sounding the alarm, by getting all the pilots — not
of the Navy so much as the Army — back to their planes, getting them
(jut of their homes and getting them back, the Ja})anese would have
suffered much greater punishment. The Japanese attack, however,
would have damaged us nevertheless, perhaps not so much as it did.
As you probably know^, it is difficult to get a battleship under way.
[t takes time. There is a [SoO] certain amount of enertia.
riie destroyers could have gotten out of Peai'l Harbor, and the crusiers,
probably. The aircraft of both the Army and Navy could have been
iderted, and although they could not have prevented the attack and
certain damage, they probably would have reduced the damage and
pvmished the enemy much more than he was punished. There is some-
thing more that you have to remember : We had two carriers at sea,
our only two carriers, and it was very important, if war were coming,
to get oil tankers out there to refuel them, and they might have been
started out. So far as the battleships getting out, I doubt very much
if they could have gotten out, and if they had left the harbor they
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 417
would have been sunk in many thousands of feet of water just outside
of Pearl Harbor, which would do us no good today. But that informa-
tion would have been of great value to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet if he had had it.
107. Q. I call your attention, to a sentence in Paragraph 17 appear-
*ing on Page 20 of the same report: (Reading) "The attitude of each",
— that is. General Short and Admiral Kimmel — "that he was not re-
quired to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures
undertaken by the other to carry out the responsil)ility assigned to
such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demon-
strated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities
vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander-in-chief.
Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department." To
your personal knowledge, did Admiral Kimmel inform himself of
measures undertaken by General Short to carry out the responsibilities
assigned the Army under the })rovisions of the plans then in effect?
A. I may tell you that in the first place I have never read the Roberts
Report. I can't get it. Admiral Kinnnel, long before he became
Commander-in-Chief — you see, I served with him as a cruiser captain
when he had the cruisers, Pacific Fleet. And wdien he asked me to be
his chief of staff, he said, "There are several things I want you to re-
mind me to do. One is to keep my Type Commandei-s, my high ad-
mirals, informed of everything that is going on; and the other one is
to cooperate with the Army because it has not been d(jne before". And
he followed that up.
108. Q. Specifically and to your knowdedge, did Admiral Kimmel
inform himself of the measures undertaken by General Short to carry
out the responsibilities assigned to General Short under the provisions
of the plans then in effect ?
A. My opinion is "yes".
109. Q. You were present at many of the conferences ?
A. Yes ; most of them. —
[561] 110. Q. Do you Icnow wliether General Short informed
himself of the measures undertaken by Admiral Kimmel ?
A. I'm quite certain he did. When General Short took over, his
chief of staff — I can't remember his name ; Phillip Hayes, I think it is,
the man who is in charge at Philadelphia — said that he had been out
there on the staff of the Commanding General vears Ijefore, W'hich was
the commanding general w ho was opposite to Admiral McDonald, and
he told me that he had never seen cooperation between the Army and
Navy such as he sees now. He was then a colonel and he was detached,
I should say, wnthin three months after General Short took over. But
that was the imj^ression he gave me.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy, (Ret) :"
111. Q. Admiral, then I take it, in connection with the defense of
Pearl Harbor, it was understood by the Army that it was their prime
and particular responsibility to defend Pearl Harbor; there was no
question in their mind of that?
A. No, that is written down in the 1:)ook called. "Joint Army aiid
Navy Action".
112. Q. Yes. And in respect of such responsibility that the Navy
might have, that was only in support of the Army and was under-
stood by all concerned to be such ?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 28
418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. It was understood by all concerned because all hands knew that
the Army was not prepared to defend Pearl Harbor as a naval base.
They did not have the anti-aircraft guns or anythin<2:, and it was
understood that the Navy would help as much as it could and that is
why the ships were anchored in four sections because we knew that the
only guns that could be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor would prob-
ably be fired from the Navy guns.
Recross-examined bv the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy : ^
113. Q. Admiral, you testified a few moments ago that General
Short had reported to the War Department the measures that he had
taken after the war warning dispatches had been received and that
Admiral Kimmel had also reported to the Chief of Naval Operations
the measures which he took, as I understood. Is that correct?
A. Yes. I think you will probably find that in the form of personal
correspondence.
114. Q. Isn't it true that the reference that you had to a report by
Admiral Kinnnel is the personal letter which Admiral Kimmel wrote
to Admiral Stark after the message of October 16th with respect to the
change in the Jai)anese cabinet? Do you recall any further reports
[S52] by Admiral Kimmel to Chief of Naval Operations concern-
ing the steps which he had taken ?
A. I could not possibly recall every detail of everything that hap-
pened. All that I know is that I read every report that Admiral
Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel. It was usually in the form of a
weekly letter written on Sunday, and Admiral Kimmel always replied.
He showed me the letters from Stark and he showed me his replies.
Now, whether you have those or not, I don't know, but I think you
will find that in there. Every measure he took he informed the Chief
of Naval Operations.
115. Q. With reference to the war warning message: Do you
recall specifically that a reply was made to the war warning message
regarding what steps were taken by Admiral Kinnnel pursuant to it?
A. No, I do not.
Recross-examined by the interested partv, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Nav"y (Ret) :
IIG. Q. With respect to the last question : I call your attention to
Exhibit 50, which is a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark
under date of December 2nd. and ask you to read to yourself Para-
graph 2. Does that refresh your memory as to whether Admiral
Kinnnel made a report to Admiral Stark as of December 2 as to what
he was doing?
A. Very much. I didn't know the date of it but I do know that at
that time when these planes Avere sent to Wake it was Admiral Kim-
mel's idea, and his whole staff talked about it. He did it and we did
not. It was his own idea to send those additional planes to Wake.
117. Q. The point is. Was the report to Admiral Stark as of De-
cember 2nd, a report as to what he was doing?
A. Yes. Well, I can't swear to that, no, but I am certain it was
because he always kept him informed, but as you say, it is there, down
in black and white.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U.S. Navy:
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 419
118. Q. With further reference to this letter of December 2ikI,
Admiral, would you care to look a little more closely at that letter, the
complete letter, and tell the court whether or not that whole letter
doesn't concern the movement of ]:)lanes to Wake and Midway, and also
whether you consider that to be a report to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions of what the Connnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet did with
respect to the war warnino- dispatch of Xovember 2Tth, not the dis-
patch of the 27th [o63] concerninc: the movement of planes to
Wake and Midway?
A. This letter is in the form of all the correspondence that was held,
practically all, between the Navy Department and the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet. You will notice that it is a personal letter
and it starts out "Dear Betty." I believe there the Commander-in-
Chief has told what he is doiuf^, and I believe I have previously said
that so much correspondence was carried on between the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, personal
letters, that we had to file it and consider it official correspondence.
119. Q. There were two messa<2;es concerning the movement of planes
to Wake and Midway which were dated the 26th of November but dis-
patched on the 27th, with time date references of the 27th, which you
have before you as Exhibits LS and -10. There was another dispatch
which bore a time date reference of the 27th which is the war warning
message. My question is this, specifically : Do you consider the letter
of December 2nd, which has been called "to your attention by counsel
for Admiral Kimmel, as being a report to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions on the steps taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet in response to the war warning message?
A. Now I believe my mind is clear on what you were driving at. In
my opinion, this letter by the Commander-in-Chief dated December
2nd, was what he considered a weekly report on what he had done.
The dispatch of planes to Midway and Wake was the idea of the Com-
mander-in-Chief and it was in no way related to the war warning-
message from the Navy Department about putting Army planes out
there. They are not connected at all.
120. Q. To further clarify the matter, the letter of December 2nd
is concerned solely with the transfer of the planes to Wake and Mid-
way, is it not, and the discussion of the problems involved in that
connection ?
A. No, I wouldn't say that. You have asked me to read the letter
but I haven't had a chance to read it, but my impression of that let-
ter is that it is sort of a weekly report. Every Sunday Admiral Stark
wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel. and he always replied. I think that
is a summary of what he had done.
[55^] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second
class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
The court then, at 2 : 45 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 55 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all
the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the
interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose coun-
sel were present.
420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rear Admiral William W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness.
He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and
continued his testimony.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, (Continued) :
121. Q. Admiral, now that you have read the letter, is the ques-
tion clear to you now.
A. Yes, but this letter is obviously one of the weekly letters by
the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations. It
does not confine itself to that one movement. As I say, the Com-
mander-in-Chief had already made plans to reenforce those islands.
122. Q. Admiral, let me further clarify the matter. After the
war warning message was received by the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department — that is, his war warning message —
he sent a report by dispatch to the Chief of Staff of the Army of
the steps he took pursuant to the dispatch that he received from
them. A few minutes ago in your testimony you stated that Gen-
eral Short had reported the steps he took, and you also stated that
Admiral Kimmel also reported to the Chief of Naval Operations
the steps he took upon the receipt of the w^ar warning dispatch. I
want to clear up in the minds of the court the fact that you do not
mean that this letter is to be taken as a parallel to the dispatch which
the Commanding General sent to the Chief of Staff but that it is
just a routine, w^eekly letter which Admiral Kimmel wrote?
A. That is right.
123. Q. In other words, do you know of any dispatch wdiich you
or Admiral Kimmel sent, reporting to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions the actions you had taken upon receipt of the war warning
message of November 27?
A. I couldn't possibly remember that, no.
[SS5] 124. Q. As far as you know, there was none?
A. We are going back two and a half years, and it is very difficult
to remember everything that happened. There may or may not be
a dispatch, but I would not go on record and say there was. I'm
not sure.
125. Q. So far as you know, there was not ?
A. That is not the way I put it. That is the legal way of putting
it. I do not remember it. I think probably there was, but I do not
remember it.
The court then, at 3: 00 p. m., adjourned until 10: 00 a. m., August
22, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 421
proceedinctS of navy court of INaUIRY
TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1944.
[556] Sixteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 10 : 00 a, m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Xavv (Ret.), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Xavv (Ret.), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolplms Andrews, U. S. Aavy (Ret.), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
iiis counsel.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second-class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for xVdmiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested
party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the fifteenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiiT were
present.
Rear Admiral William W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was
warned that the oath pi-eviously taken was still binding, and con-
tinued his testimony.
Examined by the court :
126. Q. Admiral, in the Roberts Report, of which this court has
taken judicial notice, there is a statement made that the responsible
commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware of previous Japanese
actions and demonstrated Axis methods which indicated that hostile
action might be expected prior to a declaration of war. Were you
aware of this?
A. I think we all were, yes, sir, but that did not necessarily indicate
an attack on Pearl Harbor. We knew that they had attacked the
Chinese and the Russians before the outbreak of war and we expected
they would do it again. We did expect they might hit the Philippines
or i^Iidway or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.
127. Q. What effect did this have on the Commander-in-Chief's
estimate with reference to tlie Hawaiian area?
A. We expected nothing in the Hawaiian area except [557]
a submarine attack. We expected that as almost a sure thing.
422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
128. Q. Was telephonic communication available to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the Chief of Naval Operations?
This question is asked in connection with your statement that the
quickest form of communication which could have been used by
OpXav on the morning of the 7th of December between the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations was by priority,
Navy radio.
A. I would say, Admiral, that priority, Navy radio, was the most
reliable, quick inethod of communicating. We had no telephonic
communication with Washington. We did have it with the West
Coast and it could have been relayed through the West Coast. It
has only been recently that we have established telephone communi-
cation with Pearl Harbor and it is very unreliable now.
129. Q. But you actually had it; it was available to you if you
wanted to use it ?
A. To California, yes, sir; but through a commercial station; not
through the naval communications.
130. Q. But you actually had it even though you had to go through
California for it?
A. Yes, sir.
131. Q. In other words, you could speak directly to Washington
over commercial telephone?
A. That is my understanding ; yes, sir.
132. Q. What courses of action could the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, have taken subsequent to the receipt of a war warning
message on November 27th had he interpreted the words "war warn-
ing" to mean that an attack on Pearl Harbor was about to ensue?
A. He could have put out a search with the available aircraft
and with the Army bombers available. There were not very many.
If necessary, he could have used his carrier-based planes for search.
He could have had his Fleet out of Pearl Harbor to the westward
with the heavy ships in a supporting position and his carriers ad-
vanced to intercept the Japanese.
133. Q. Well, without a definite movement on the part of the
Fleet toward the westward to meet such a ])ossible attack, what means
were available to prepare for it in the Hawaiian area?
A. The only source of searching other than airplanes is the de-
stroyer, but the destroyers were being intensively trained in night
attack. The}^ were always required to guard our heavy ships in case
of submarine [S5'8] attack which we expected so that we could
not use destroyers for scouting. We could have searched a radius
of perhaps 600 miles, but not through 360 degrees with the planes
available.
134. Q. Were you familiar witli the state of readiness of the Army's
aircraft warning system ?
A. No, sir, I was not. I knew that the Army had installed the
radar ; that we had sent officers up there. I did not realize that it was in
anything but an experimental stage; they were feeling around. Now,
it is quite possible that that is not the picture. The radar was a very
secret thing and General Short sometimes held conferences with Ad-
miral Kimmel, and when he came over unaccompanied by his staff I did
not go in the Admiral's oflice unless sent for because I had other work
to do. It is possible that General Shoi't told Admiral Kimmel of the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 423
state of readiness of that radar but I had no knowledge that it coiikl
be depended upon, and in fact, it wasn't dependal^le. The mueli pub-
lished report that a non-commissioned officer picked up the Japanese
planes comino- in, we learned two or three days after Pearl Harlior.
We liad no knowled^-e on that date that ]:)lanes were comino- in. When
I spoke to Colonel Davidson about it, I asked why that report had
not been given to the Xavy sooner, and he said, ''We reconstructed that
from all of the bearings the man got that morning but we didn't
know on Sunday; we were not convinced that that was the direction
from which the planes came.'' And that is obviously correct because
we searclied to the south rather than to the north. We got no informa-
tion that day whatever from that radar, even after the attack. Had
the radar been dependable, they should have certainly traced the planes
out, but they didn't. They didn't report to us.
185. Q. Whether they were de])endali]e or not, whether they were
efficient or not, wasn't it worthwhile to keep them constantly manned
on the chance that they might pick something up ?
A. Yes, sir.
136. Q. In other words, that is one thing that could \\a\e been done
after that warning message ?
A. Yes. sir.
137. Q. How many ships of the Fleet had radars installed, ap
proximately i
A. We had 4 heavy cruisers, possibly 5, that were equip]:)ed with
radar. The light cruisers and destroyers were not. The carriers were
equipi^ed with radar.
138. Q. What was the state of their efficiency and dependability?
A. It was very good. We had had a number of night exercises prior
to Pearl Harbor locating and attacking the enemy by the use of radar.
It was considered very efficient l)ut of course inside Pearl Harbor the
[S59] radar on a ship is no good because it fails to penetrate the
mountains. I will add to that, there were other ships equipped with a
form of radar, but it was very unreliable. My own flagship, the
ASTORIA, a month or so after Pearl Harbor, had a radar but it could
not pick up a plane that was visible to the naked eye. It was a very
poor type. They have all since been taken off. Now, how many other
ships were equipped with that form of radar, I do not know.
139. Q. No battleship were equipped with radar?
A. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.
140. Q. And the ships' radars were not available or effective while
anchoi'ed in Pearl Harbor?
A. No, sir.
141. Q. Then among the steps that might possibly have l)een taken,
what would have been the objection to having a shi]) outside, after the
warning message of November 27th. in orderto use all methods
available?
A. None, except that we did have ships outside. We had two car-
riers outside. Both ships had radar.
142. Q. And these carriers did not pick up the Japanese ships from
which the planes came to Pearl Harbor?
A. No, sir. Not only that, but Admiral Halsey, on his trip to
Midway and return, had a search in the air, I believe, to a radius of
300 miles, and he picked up nothing.
424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
143. Q. Then in your opinion to station a ship clear of Pearl Harbor
for the purpose of using the radar would not have been effective?
A. No, sir. The radar at that time, I doubt if a ship's radar could
pick up anything in the air more than 65 miles, so unless you had a
cordon of sliips around Oahu, it is very unlikely that you would have
found anything.
145. Q. And to have had such a cordon, would it have been very
dangerous to tlie ships?
A. Yes, sir.
145. Q. For what reason?
A. Well, if you are going to use your ships for a scouting line, you
have nothing to concentrate to fight the enemy if you meet it.
146. Q. How about the dangers of submarine attack on ships so
stationed?
A. That is always dangerous.
147. Q. Admiral, were these matters considered at that time and
rejected for the reasons you give?
A. Not to my knowledge. I would like to add to my [560\
answer that we did have patrol planes searching from Midway and
we also had submarines stationed at both Midway and Wake.
118. Q. Was it considered that because of an attack on Pearl Har-
bor was held to be only a remote possibility that additional precau-
tions against such a possibility were unnecessary and unjustified?
A. Yes, sir.
149. Q. iVdmiral, so much has been said in previous testimony from
officers of the Fleet with regard to training of the Fleet, and that
training might have to be sto])ped under such conditions. The word
"training" in the record might be misleading. Isn't "preparation" a
preparation for war ?
A. The Fleet was training for war, and in my opinion was in very
efficient condition for war. I believe where that training discussion
iirose was that because of the ncAv ships under construction we were
required to send so many trained men back for months and we were
constantly getting new men, and some officers felt that we were handi-
capped but I never did because the new men learned very quickly.
The Fleet was not filled up, however ; we were about 10,000 men shy,
as I recollect; below complement.
150. Q. Do I understand your testimony to be that it is your belief
that withdrawing men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling com-
plements and new construction did not decrease the efficiency of the
Fleet to any extent?
A. Not materially, no, sir.
151. Q. Well, if trained men were withdrawn from a ship and no
men were available to take their places, leaving vacancies in the com-
plement, would you please elaborate a little more why the efficiency
wasn't necessarily decreased ?
A. Some months before Pearl Harbor there was a board convened
under Admiral Theobald to look into the complements of all types
of ships and to recommend new complements, including lookouts and
anti-aircraft guns. These complements materially increased the
crews oA'er what we had had before. When I say that we were approx-
imately 10,000 men short of complement, I mean for that new comple-
ment. We had never met it, but the ships did have the crews that
they had normally held, say a year before Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 425
152. Q. Was that Oil the 85 per cent basis?
A. Yes, sir.
[56'1] 153. Q. Upon receipt of the war warning message of 27
November, or within a reasonable time thereafter, did the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific, hold a conference with his staff or with the Army
relative to the contents of this message?
A. He called a conference of his staff immediately. He sent the
Fleet Intelligence ofticer, with a copy of the war warning, to be deliv-
ered to General Short. He sent for Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bloch
was at the hospital and Captain Earle came over to represent Admiral
Bloch. To the best of my recollection, a conference was held the
following morning with General Short and, as usual, with all Task
Force commanders and Type commanders in port.
154. Q. Then to your knowledge. General Short did know of this
message and did confer with Admiral Kimmel concerning it?
A. Yes, sir.
155. Q. Within a da}^ of two after its receipt ?
A. Yes, sir, within a day or two. When he received that message,
I do not know, but I know that Lieutenant Commander Layton was
sent over with a copy to be delivered to General Short that night.
156. Q, You don't know how soon after the message was received
that the conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in
reference to the message was held ?
A. I believe within 24 hours ; the next morning.
157. Q. Will you state to the best of your knowledge what took
I)lace at this conference between General Short and Admiral Kimmel?
A. I do not recall the details.
158. Q. Do you recall the concensus of opinion as to what this mes-
sage meant and as to the probable place of attack in case war came?
A. I believe I stated yesterday that the unfortunate thing about
that war warning is, they told us where the attack was likely to hap-
pen. It would have been better had it merely said "this is a w-ar
warning" and stopped right there. But they told us that the attack
would very likely be on the Kra Peninsula, jSIalay, and Thailand, and
we figured that their information was better than ours.
151). Q. Well, what did you consider the intent of this message by
heading it "A war warning"?
A. Why, I thought that the intent was to put us on our toes and get
ready to carry out the mission required by the War Plan. The War
Plan w^as not executed by the Navy Department.
I 'jO.J I 160. Q. Was it ever executed (
A. I believe it was on the afternoon of December 7th. I'm not
certain. But it w\as not before the attack.
161. Q. What were the controlling conditions that required the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to send ships into Pearl Harbor
at any time during the critical period?
A. Well, it had been proved that ships cannot remain at sea forever
and it wuis part of our program. The Fleet had been in Pearl Harbor
a very long time, I mean, had been in the area a very long time, and
it was part of our program to bring ships in, refuel and provision
them, and give the men some recreation.
162. Q. Well, in addition to being a part of the program, wasn't
it an absolute necessity?
A. Yes, sir.
426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
163. Q. Always a necessity ?
A. Always a necessity. You see, you can fuel ships at sea but there
was no anciiorao-e outside of Pearl Harbor that was at all safe, such
as Lahaina Roads. It was not considered safe. There was no pro-
tection against submarines.
164. Q. Will you elaborate a little in that connection on the physical
and morale condition of the crews of the ships by keeping ships con-
stantly outside?
A. Wliile at sea, we were always in Condition 3, or in a higher con-
dition. We invariably operated without lights. After a week or ten
days of these intensive operations^and they were intensive; in one
operation alone we had 4 ships damaged hy collision — it was necessary
to give the officers and men some recreation and relaxation.
[6631 Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew,
165. Q. And relavation ?
A. And relaxation, yes, sir.
166. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief or his staff have information
that certain Army planes were leaving Hamilton Field on the west
coast of the United States on the night of 6th-7th December, to arrive
at Oahu early in the morning on December 7 ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, the Navy had no such knowledge.
I did not. It is possible the Fleet aviator did have it. It is quite
possible that Admiral Bellinger knew it.
167. Q. Did you on the morning of December 7, or subsequent there-
to, have any information as to the most probable location of the Japa-
nese carriers from which the attack against Pearl Harbor was made?
A. Not for some two days. You see, there had been a great deal
of confusion. There were radio bearings reported indicating the
enemy was to the south of Oahu. We suspected at the time that these
might have been sampans or other Japanese ships opening the radio
to confuse us, but we found out later that the confusion originated
in Oahu itself by false reports being made by excited people report-
ing things which did not occur and which they imagined.
168. Q. Where would these excited people get their information?
A. Well, for example, one report was that parachute troops were
landing on the north coast of Oahu. Some citizen had telephoned
that in, and it was put on the warning net immediately. It was stated
that they were dressed in blue clothes with red arm bands, and after
we had time to trace that down, we found that a training plane —
a little seaplane — under the authority of the Commander of the Serv-
ice Force had been shot down by one of these Japs, and the mechanic
was dressed in dungarees and he dropped to safety. Another report
was that troops landed at Barbers Point. Ships were sent to look
into it, but there was nothing there. That came from excited civilians
out in that direction. Then we had a report that an enemy carrier
had been sighted south. That came from one of our own planes. It
turned out to be the MINNEAPOLIS, I believe. On the afternoon
of Pearl Harbor a squadron of seaplanes returned from Midway to
Pearl Harbor, and they had been ordered to scout on the way. The
squadron commander reported well south of Pearl Harbor a Japanese
carrier accompanied by a Japanese destroyer. He stated that he
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 427
had dropped two bombs on this carrier, which was zigzagging at
high speed, and then had been chased some eighty miles [564-]
down wind until he found bad weather. We immediately sent a
dispatch to Admiral Bi'own, who was within ninety-two miles of
there, telling him to get the carrier. He still had several hours of
daylight. Admiral Brown re})lied that he believed the sliip bombed
was the POR'lTiAXD and not a Japanese carrier. The ])ilot arrived
about *.) p. m. and was examined by almost the entire stall* of Admiral
Kimmel. He had a very fine reputation, and he said he knew it was
a Japanese carrier because he saw the Rising Sun painted on her
deck. He said that this carrier had the plan of a heavy cruiser
painted on her deck as camouflage. We then sent a radio message
to the PORTLAND: "Were you bombed this afternoon?" and he
replied, "Yes, a plane dropped two bombs narrowly missing me
astern.'' That was war hysteria, and there was considerable of it,
and that is the cause, in my opinion, of the more or less wild goose
chase we had looking for the enemy. It was a case of receiving bad
reports from excited people.
169. Q. No reports of this nature were received prior to the attack?
A. No, sir, none at all.
170. Q. You stated that subsecjuent to the attack on Pearl Harbor
you had information as to the location of the carriers from which the
plan attack was launched.
A. I would like to correct my answer to that. On the late after-
noon of Pearl Harbor we received a chai't that had been taken by
the Army from a Japanese plane that had been shot down but had
not burned. The Army evidently thought this was of no value
until the Fleet Intelligence Officer learned of it and brought it over
immediately, and in pencil on that chart it indicated that he had
come down from about 200 miles north of Oahu. That was the first
information we had of actually where it came from.
171. Q. What was the best information available to Admiral Kim-
mel or his staff subsequent to the attack as to the location of the ships
at the time the attack was launched?
A. He had absolutely no information.
172. Q. I mean at the time Admiral Kimmel left the Fleet.
A. He had that after receiving the radar report from the Army
some two clays after Pearl Harbor, and that report agreed with the
map fom the shot-down Jap aviator, indicating that the planes were
launched from a position some 200 miles to the northward and that
the carriers had then turned around. They were never sighted by
any of our planes.
173. Q. Turned around to which direction?
A. To the north, probably seeking bad visibility.
[■566] 174. Q. Speaking of visibility in the trade wind area,
what would you call the extremes of visibility?
A. Well, by bad visibility, I mean fog. For example, the day
after the battle of Midway we headed north with some carriers, and
we very soon came into zero visibility and could not transfer planes
from one carrier to another.
175. Q. Was a similar condition obtained in the general area sur-
rounding Oahu at a range, say, from 200 to 300 miles?
A. Yes, to the north.
428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
176. Q. What was the state of visibility on the morning of De-
cember 7?
A. At Pearl Harbor?
177. Q. In the Hawaiian area?
A. Very good.
178. Q. Admiral, did tlie messages directing the destruction of
codes, etc., at Guam influence your decision or idea of the most prob-
able place of Japanese attack in case of war?
A. No, sir, it did not, because we had known that it was not our
intention to defend Guam, and that would be one of the first places
where they would be told to destroy codes.
179. Q. We believe that you have answered the question that had
you received word from the Navy Department on the morning of
December 7 one or two hours prior to the attack, it would have influ-
enced the disposition of planes, etc.
A. Yes, sir. There would have been the opportunity to get the
])ilots to the airfields and to get the planes in the air and get the light
forces out of Pearl Harbor.
180. Q. From your information prior to December 7 and from in-
formation received subsequent thereto, is it your opinion that the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific was kept sufficiently informed by the
Navy Department to give him a clear picture of the Japanese sit-
uation ?
A. In my opinion, he was not. I will cite an incident. At the time
before Pearl Harbor — probably in May 1941 — the Commander-in-
Chief received orders to send a division of heavy cruisers and a di-
vision of light cruisers toward Samoa, prepared for distant service,
and to equip themselves with the Mark 6 exploder for torpedoes,
which exploder was entirely unknown to destroyers at the time. The
Commander-in-Chief Avas given no information as to where those
ships were to go. It was not until they reached Samoa that orders
were received from the Chief of Naval Operations, telling them to
make a cruise to New Zealand and Australia. I have many a time
heard the Commander-in-Chief say, ''These people in AVashington
must have more information than we have. I wish I knew what
they are thinking about." Our Fleet Intelligence Officer had
[566] placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters mostly. If the
Navy Department had better information than that, we should have
received it.
181. Q. Was tl^-is concern on the part of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific regarding his lack of information fi'oni AVashington
especially apparent from the period of November 27 to December 7?
A. No, sir, at the time he l^elieved that he was getting everything
that the Navy Department had.
182. Q. Specifically, did the deficiency in information which the
Navy Department was fin-uishing him have any effect on what actions
he took or might have taken with respect to possible action by the
Ja))anese in the Hawaiian area?
A. Yes. I would like to state, for exam]de, that a few days after
Pearl Harbor the late Secretary of the Navy Knox arrived in Pearl
Harbor to conduct an investigation. He was with Admiral Kimmel,
General Short, and I believe Admiral Bloch all morning. I wasn't
there, but I was invited to join them at 12 o'clock for lunch. After
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 429
I arrived I believe I remember the exact words of Secretary Knox.
Present at this conference were Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Pye, Ad-
miral Bloch, General Short, Captain Beatty, who was aide to the Secre-
tary, and I. Secretary Knox said, "Did you not get a warning on the
6th of December?" We all answered in the negative. He stated, "We
learned surreptitiously on the Gth of December that Nomura and
Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull
at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the Tth."' 1 p. m. in Washington was about 7 : 30
in Pearl Harbor, shortly before the attack. He said, "I know that that
information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was
sent to you." Now, had we had that information on Saturday, the
6tli of December, it would have been very valuable. The Army re-
ceived that message on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor. The Navy
never did receive it. The Commander-in-Chief had no message on
the order of that mentioned l3y Secretary Knox.
183. Q. Did Secretary Knox say when this information first be-
came available?
A. My recollection is on Saturday, the (ith of December.
184. Q. Do you now know of any information that the Navy De-
partment had prior to the attack whicli would have been valuable to
the Commander-in-Chief in taking action in the Hawaiian area?
A. Since my return to W^ashington. I have been informed that the
Navy Department did have information that would have been very im-
portant to the Commander-in-Chief, but since this information is
of a nature that might possibly be damaging to the war eifort, I be-
lieve that I should not quote it in the interest of national security.
\oG7] 185. Q. During the course of this luncheon with Secre-
tary Knox on the date you have indicated at Pearl Harbor, did he
express any opinion as to what was the prevailing thought regarding
the place of attack by the Japanese ?
A. He did. His words, as I remember them, are, "Frankly, I know
of no one in tlie War Department or in the Navy Department, not
even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor."
18(). Q. Do you remember now any other pertinent expressions by
the Secretary of the Navy on that date regarding this matter?
A. No, sir, I do not. Most of the conversation was as to the dam-
age done, but what had gone on before I joined the conference, I do
not know. ' They had been together several hours before I joined them.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
187. Q. There has been some testimony by other witnesses before
this court, other than yourself, as to actions which might have been,
and possibly would have been, taken had the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet received the message from the Chief of Staff set-
ting out the information that the Japanese diplomats were presenting
their credentials at one o'clock and the possible further information
that the Japanese were destroying their ciphering machines in cer-
tain areas. Admiral, you have testified that you saw the message
of November 27, 1941. from the Chief of Naval Operations, which
started out by saying, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warn-
ing." It stated further that negotiations with the Japanese looking
toward stabilization have ceased and that an aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next few days. This message also indi-
cated possible Japanese objectives, and it directed an appropriate
430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
in WPL— 1(). I should like to ask you to state for the court what this
message from General Marshall to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department of 7 December 1941, which was not received
until after the attack, would have added in the way of a warning so
that you could have taken additional measures prior to the Japanese
attack?
A. The message received by General Short was delivered by an
officer messenger to us at Pearl Harbor on the afternoon of December
7. I glanced at it quickly and said, "It's no good to us now." I don't
remember the wording of that dispatch, but if it stated that the final
conference was not to be held until 1 p. m. on Sunday, it is a very simple
deduction that Pearl Harbor might be the objective, because one o'clock
[S6S] in Washington is about midnight on the Asiatic station and
shortly after daylight at Pearl Harbor. For that reason, that in-
formation would have been very valuable.
188. Q. What steps would you have taken?
A. We would have given the Condition One, sent the Fleet to sea,
and alerted all aircraft. They had two carriers at sea with their task
forces. We would have held them up to the northward to try to locate
the enemy in an attempt to divert the attack.
Reexamined by the court:
189. Q. How would air coverage for the Fleet been provided in such
a case?
A. As it was at that time and still is — by carrier-based planes.
190. Q. I understand 3'OU were going to work the carriers to the
northward to chase the enemy.
A. Yes, sir, but each one was accompanied by cruisers and destroyers.
The battleships would be in support of them.
191. Q. It has been testified that had the Fleet been at sea and
attacked without air coverage, the ships would have been irretrievably
sunk.
A. That is true if they had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before
and were within enemy range, but had they been two or three hundred
miles to the westward, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would
have been attacked.
192. Q. Is it not a fact, however, that the speed of the battleships
in Pearl Harbor at that time was not such as to enable them to ac-
company a task force which had carriers as its basis?
A. The battleship tieet speed was about fifteen knots at that time.
As I indicated, they could be used only as a support force. Of course,
they and the cruisers have their own airplanes for scouting purposes.
Reexamined by the jndge advocate:
193. Q. You have mentioned a number of measures which the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet might have taken had he received
the dispatch from General Marshall, which arrived late on December
7. In view^ of.the fact that the Army had a number of pursuit squad-
rons available, do you think that if they hatl put them aloft before
sunrise they would have been an effective measure for diverting the
Japanese attack?
A. It would not, in my opinion, have diverted the attack. [569]
It would have decreased the damage done and increased the number
of planes shot down, but all of the Air Force that we had in Pearl
Harbor at that time would not have stopped a determined attack by
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 431
three or four carriers, such as we liave today. The way the Japanese
do it, if they lose all their planes, they continue to oo throu<i;h. There
is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been
damaged even if we had been alert.
Reexamined by the court :
194. Q. Is it not a fact that the only method by which that attack
could have been completely diverted would have been an anticipation
of the launching of planes from a Japanese carrier?
A. Yes, by locating the carriers before they got within launching
range.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
1 eporter entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
The W'itness made the following statement : I should like to cite a
few incidents to attempt to prove that the Navy in the Pacific was
not asleep in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and that Admiral
Kimmel did everything he could to keep them awake. I should like
to start in 1989, when Admiral Kinunel had the cruisers battle force.
I had one of those cruisers. We were intensively trained. We towed
each other, fueled at sea, and did about everything that ships can do.
In September of that year I was proud of the fact that my ship could
launch four planes quicker than any other, which was fifteen minutes.
Bear in mind that these planes are in hangars and have to be brought
up on deck and their w-ings spread before they can be catapulted. I
came out of the Navy Yard overhaul three months later and found
that if I took more than five minutes in launching them, I got a signal,
so we started launching them in that time. In 1940 when we got to
Pearl Harbor we were required by Admiral Kimmel, if we went out
for one or two days' target practice, the first thing on returning to
Lahaina Roads was to go alongside a tanker and fuel to ninety-five
per cent. After he became Commander-in-Chief he required that of
the entire Fleet. In the year 1940 he sent a secret letter to [S70]
each commanding officer, saying, "Without telling anybody, sound
general quarters and send up 100 rounds of live ammunition per gun.
The result of this was rather astounding in some cases. The warrant
officer down below would answer the gunnery officer, "Are you kid-
ding?" or, "It is against the Bureau of Ordnance regulations." The
turrets had no difficulty, but the 5-inch anti-aircraft guns, their am-
munition was in galvanized iron boxes. In some cases the gunner's
mate couldn't find his wrench. They arrived on deck and there was
a great deal of confusion. I think it took me twenty -five minutes to
get 100 rounds per gun. It took some ships an hour and forty-five.
To do it we had to strip the fuse of its water-proofed and air-tight
container, and I believe that we were called by the Bureau of Ordnance
on that and told that we had disregarded Navy Regulations. At any
rate, when the report of that incident was made to the Commander-
432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in-Chief, Aclmiral Richardson, he had a special board appointed and
they looked into the animnnition snpply of all ships. They found
that on some of our battleships — I believe one was the MISSIS-
SIPPI— the ventilation was so poor in the handlino; rooms that after
the crew had furnished some fourteen or fifteen charges, they were
absolutely all in and could not furnish anything more. I believe that
the effect of that investigation on providing ammunition was very
good for us on the 7th of December, because the ships had no trouble
in getting their ammunition to the guns. As soon as Admiral Kim-
mel took over, he moved his War Plans. The fleet at that time had one
War Plans officer, and an assistant who was merely a secretary. He
moved the War Plans section off of the flagship into good, spacious
rooms on shore. He increased the number from one to four, putting
in some of the Navy's and Marine Corps' most intelligent officers,
and told them to bring the War Plans up to date, wdiich they did.
Fifteen days after he took over the Fleet, he issued Security Order —
I believe it is called 2CL-41 — dated 15 February '41. It was revised
on October 14, 1941, only because conditions had changed. That Se-
curity Order of 15 February was, so far as I know, the only security
order that had been issued in the Pacific Fleet, the first one. He then,
in conference with the Army, required Army planes to land on Navy
fields, Navy planes to land on Army fields. It was soon discovered
that the Navy bombs would not fit the Army planes, so the fittings of
all planes w^ere changed so either service could use the bombs of the
other. When Admiral Halsey started for Wake, he took with him
two Army planes and launched them from the carrier's deck, which
I believe was the first time that an Army ]^lane had ever seen launched
from a Navy carrier. I'd say another thing about Admiral Kimmel :
He went from the lunch room to his office. He was never knowni to
take a siesta. The Fleet's problem was not to protect Pearl Harbor,
but to guard the entire Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief felt that
he had reasonable assurance that he would receive enough informa-
tion from Washington to avert attack. He was building up [57^]
the islands as rapidly as he could. We didn't have enough ships to
supply those islands properly. The submarines were stationed at
Wake and Midway. He had put planes on both Wake and Midway
about the 15th of November, 1941. He wrote a letter to Admiral
Stark — I do not recall the exact wording — but he stated that the
Pacific Fleet should not be used as a training squadron to fill up the
Atlantic. Within approximately two months after Pearl Harbor,
practically all the shi]xs that had been sent to the Atlantic in 1941
returned to the Pacific Fleet. I believe all except two light cruisers
returned. The destroyers from that outfit came alongside my flagship
to fuel, and I remarked, "They now have everything that Kimmel
tried to get for them while they were in the Pacific." They had radar,
the latest methods of depth-charge throwing, a great many improve-
ments that he had repeatedly demanded and had been unable to get.
As soon as they got to the Atlantic, the things were installed. Now
as for the Washington ])oint of view, I have told you what Secretary
Knox stated. The fact that on the morning of Pearl Harbor a squad-
ron of B-l7's arrived from San Francisco with their machine guns
mounted but with no ammunition, indicates that the west coast of
the United States had not been warned from Washington that war
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 433
was imminent. Several days after Pearl Harbor we received a letter
from the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, written shortly before
Pearl Harbor, and as I recall the wording in that letter, he stated:
'•AVe know that you would like to have 20,000 men— 10,000 to fill up
the fleet and 10,000 more for training, and we would like to give them
to you, but they are not available; but remember, the war is in the
Atlantic, and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty
m the Pacific." That was actually received after Pearl Harbor. I
would like to mention the arrival of the Roberts Board. On the morn-
ing of their arrival I called up a Colonel Lee Brown and asked him
when the board would be over to Pearl Harbor — told him that all ar-
rangements had been made. His reply was: "We are going out to
Fort Shafter, and we may not be in Pearl Harbor for several days."
And I said, "If you are going to question General Short, shouldnot
Admiral Kimmel have the privilege of being present?" His reply
was, "No, this is merely a fact-finding board. We don't want any-
thing like that." I then said, "Admiral Kimmel is not accused of
anything. May he have counsel when he apj^ears as a witness?" And
the answer was, "No, we are merely a fact-finding board."
The court, for clarification, asked to whom reference was 'being
made, to which the witness answered: Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown.
1 believe he was secretary to the board ; Marine Corps.
The witness then continued his statement as follows : When the
board finally did arrive at Pearl Harbor, and Admiral [572]
Kimmel went before it, he had no information whatever as to what
any witness preceding him had stated, and I have been told by him
that it was two years before he could get a copy of the Roberts Board
and did read the testimony of all witnesses.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 11: 35 a. m., took a recess until 11: 50 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present, and Rear
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, LT. S. Navy (Ret), interested party,
whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, counsel to the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate
and warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Are you the legal custodian of the official report by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, which he made of the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which is
serial number 0479, dated 15 February 1942 ? If j'-ou are, will you pro-
duce it ?
A. I am. I identify the document, which I hold in my hand, as the
original report, with enclosures, authenticated by the signature of
Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at
the time of the making of the re]iort.
The document, official report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 29
434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of T December 1941, serial number 0479, dated February 15, 1942, was
submitted to the interested parties and to the court and by the judge
advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into the
record such extracts therefrom as show the damages done to naval ships
and aircraft by the Japanese raid of December 7, 1941,
There being no objection, it was so received.
2. Q. Refer to this document and read such portions thereof as per-
tain to the facts for which it had been offered in evidence.
The witness read from said document extracts, copies [573]
appended, marked "EXHIBIT 61."
3. Q. Have you examined the official report submitted by the Com-
mander-in-Chief giving the personnel casualties resulting from the
Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?
A. I have. These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bu-
reau of Personnel, give in detail the names by ships and stations of the
killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor.
These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I ob-
tained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This cal-
culation shows that the total killed, including those who died of
wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those
wounded, 896.
The judge advocate asked if any party to the inquiry or the court
had any objection to the summary of the information as given in the
answer of the witness. None of the interested parties nor the court
made any objection.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out.by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel to the judge advocate.
The court then, at 12 : 05 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., August
23, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 435
PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INOUIRY
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944
[S74] Seventeenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin. U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S.Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeir, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the sixteenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The court then, at 9 : 40 a. m., took a recess until 9 : 55 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel;
counsel for the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party,
and his counsel ; counsel for the interested party, Rear Admiral Hus-
band E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). Frank M. Sickles, yeoman
first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected wnth the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject nuitter of the inquiry.
[57S] Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Logan C. Ramsey, Captain, U. S. Navy, acting as Chief of Staff
to Commander Fleet Air, Norfolk.
2. Q. What duties were you assigned between November 1 and
December 7, 1941 ?
A. During the period specified, I was Operations Officer on the
staff of Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger.
3. Q. Will you state what duties were assigned that officer — what
duties was Admiral Bellinger performing?
A. Admiral Bellinger's immediate command was Patrol Wing Two.
In addition, he was designated as Commander Patrol Wings, Ha-
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
waiian area, assisting the Patrol Wings One and Two and attached
tenders. In addition, he was Commander Task Force Nine, tac-
tical organization. He was also designated as aviation liaison officer
to cooperate with the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in the devel-
opment of aviation facilities, particularly on the outlying islands,
Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston. The final duty was Com-
mander— or rather, it was termed — Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force.
4. Q. What were the aviation organizations available to Admiral
Bellinger under the designation as Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force ?
A. I have to answer that question indirectly. The procedure was
slightly different from that outlined in the question. Units of Army
bombardment aviation, of Marine Corps bombardment aviation, re-
ported daily planes that were available to the Naval Base Defense Air
Force when that organization was in a functioning status. Of course,
in addition, the aircraft of Patrol Wings One and Two were under his
command.
5. Q. The force then which was known as the Naval Base Defense
Air Force only came into being under certain conditions; is that
correct ?
A. That is correct.
6. Q. What w^ere those conditions ?
A. Primarily, an emergency. Second, the vitalization of that or-
ganization for drill purposes or for impending possible emergencies,
upon advice from higher authority. For drill purposes, the proce-
dure was for the Commandment of the 14th Naval District, in his
capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, to send a message,
"Drill, danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, drill" — at which
time the Naval Base Defense Force was considered vitalized, or
[576] placed in functioning status for drill purposes. Similarly,
if under conditions where it had been considered necessary to place
the organization on an actual war basis, I presume the same message
would have been sent, but the word, "drill," be omitted.
7. Q. You mean to tell the court to vitalize the Naval Base Defense
Air Force, some specific order from a higher commander was neces-
sary ? I mean by "higher commander" some officer senior to Admiral
Bellinger.
A. That is correct.
8. Q. Who were these officers who had such authority to vitalize
and bring into being the Naval Base Defense Air Force?
A. Naval Base Defense Air Force was simply a part of the Naval
Base Defense Force. As such, the normal procedure would be to
receive orders from that commander who was the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District. I presume that, in many cases, it might
have been possible for us to receive word from higher authority.
9. Q. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet have
vitalized or brought into being this air force on orders of his own?
A. I presume so. Ordinarily, it would have been normal pro-
cedure for him to have expressed his wishes or his orders to the Com-
mander Naval Base Defense Force. On that point I am not certain,
because it never arose.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 437
10. Q. I show you Exliibit 53, which is a document in evidence
before this court, and ask you if you recognize it and if so, state what
it is.
A. Yes, sir. I recognize it as the basic operations plan of the Naval
Base Defense Force,
11. Q. Was the operating plan in effect on 7 December, 1941?
A. To the best of my belief and recollection, after more than two
years of not looking at it, this is the one that was in effect,
12. Q. It is noted that on this plan, one of the Task Forces is the
Base Defense Air Force, and that paragraph o (b) of the Operations
Plan, directs ComPat Wing Two, in consultation with the Army,
to prepare detailed naval participation air defense plans in annex
Baker ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct,
13. Q. I show you what purports to be Annex B to Operations
Plan No. 1-41, and ask you if you recognize it as such.
A. That is correct; this plan was in effect.
[S77] 14. Q. Now, does Annex B, at which you are now looking,
and which is Naval Base Defense Air Force Operating Plan 1-44,
Annex B, bear the title "Naval Base Defense Air Force Operating
PlanNo. A-1-41"?
A. That's correct.
15. Q. Now referring to Addendum I to this operating plan, No.
l-A-41, what is the general substance or subject matter of this
addendum?
A. It is an estimate of the situation, prepared by Admiral Bellinger
and General Martin, covering the air situation at the time, which was
the end of March, 1941.
16. Q. I will ask you to read paragraph 1, wdiich is entitled, "Sum-
mary of the Situation."
A. (Reading:)
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration
of war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific
for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine
force which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raid-
ing force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warnings from our
intelligence service.
17. Q. I will ask you also to read paragraph 3 (a), under the title,
"Possible Enemy Action."
A, (Reading:)
A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise sulmiarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor. ,
.'{. A coml)ination of these two.
18. Q. I will ask you who signed this joint estimate?
A. Rear Admiral P. N. Bellinger, and Major General Frederick
L. Martin, U. S. Army.
438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. Q. And what is the date of this document?
A. March 31, 1941.
20. Q. I will ask you to advert to the extract which you [57'<§]
have just read, "Possible Enemy Action." Did this estimate repre-
sent your own views?
A. Yes, sir.
21. Q. I will ask you to read paragraph 3 (b) of addendum I.
A. (Keading:)
It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely
be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside
of three hundred miles.
22. Q. Will you state whether this estimate also represented your
own views ?
A. This estimate — I may say parenthetically that I did not report
until after the estimate was prepared. However, in general, I con-
sidered and still consider the estimate sound.
23. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph 3 (b), "Possible Enemy
Action," wnll you state the consideration upon which you based your
estimate that the most likely form of attack on OAHU would be an
air attack launched from one or two carriers?
A. I will have to go slowly, because it is difficult at this late dat€
to distinguish between what I believed prior to Pearl Harbor and
what changes in my opinions occurred subsequent to the attack. I
served in the same capacity for six months subsequent to Pearl Har-
bor, and under actual war conditions. My ideas, naturally, were
modified. As nearly as I can remember, before Pearl Harbor, I be-
lieved that the miDst likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack, because I did not believe that it would be
possible for the enemy, or any potential enemy, to reach a position
from which he could seriously menace our naval position in the Pacific
by any other means.
24. Q. Arriving at this estimate, did you consider any particular
nation, or was this just a generality for any country — any enemy
which might attack without a declaration of war?
A. It w^as obviously and solely Japan. I use the pre-war phrase-
ology intentionally in trying to get myself into a pre-war frame of
mind.
25. Q. Tlien your conclusion was that if any attack at all were
made on OAHU, it would be by air and not by some other means?
A. That is correct.
26. Q. At the time you made this estimate of the situation, did
you conclude from the international situation as it [S79]
existed on that date, that Japan would attack the United States?
A. It is impossible for me to say at this late date, but I do recall
having mentioned to Admiral Bellinger, half in earnest and half in
pure speculation, that it was my belief that if the Japanese did attack
us by an air raid, that the attack would probably come on Christmas
Eve or New Year's Day.
27. Q. What I am trying to develop is, would not your estimate
have been the same — that an attack by air w^ould have been the only
effective means of attack on OAHU, whether it was delivered by the
Japanese, the Germans, or the Italians, or any country?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 439
A. That is correct.
28. Q. Do you know whether or not this estimate of the situation
that you have been testifying concerning, was ever sliown to Admiral
Bloch, the Naval Base Defense Officer ?
A. I cannot say. The first time I saw the estimate, it was appended
to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan, and the Naval Base Air De-
fense Force Plan I was handed, had three, bound together with
binders — and I assumed that they were all one document; that they
were parts of one document.
29. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of
Pacific Fleet had seen or been informed of this estimate ?
A. Not to my positive knowledge.
30. Q. I would ask you to advert to addendum I of this Naval Base
Air Force Operating Plan No. A-1-41, and read paragraph (d) , down
to "Material Readiness."
A. (Reading:)
(d) Define conditions of readinef^s for use with tliis plan as follows: Condi-
tions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number
from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition
of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree
of readiness prescribed for that part.
31. Q. Between 27 November and 0755, 7 December 19^:1, in what
degree of material readiness were planes which were available for
operation under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?
A. The general condition of readiness was Baker 5, 50% aircraft
available ready on four hours notice. Many units — I would have to
refer to papers and statements to give you the exact numbers — but
many units were on a mucli higher degree of readiness. Some air-
craft were actually in the air.
32. Q. Do you have any data from which you could refresh [SSO]
your memory as to this material condition of readiness for the planes,
which I have asked you ? / \
A. No, I have not.
33. Q. I will again advert to paragraph 3 (cl) of this same operat-
ing plan, and ask you to read paragraph 3 (d).
A. (Reading:)
Degree of readiness.
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters —
fifteen minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — one hour.
4. All types — two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
The armament and fuel load for each tj^pe under the above conditions of
readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and
orders and will be prescribed therein.
34. Q. Between 27 November and 0755 on 7 December 1941, in what
degree of readiness were tlie planes wliich were available to the Com-
mander Naval Base Defense Air Force?
A. My answer is substantially the same as to the last question:
generally. Baker 5, but many units — the exact numbers and designa-
tions are beyond my personal recollection at the moment — were in a
higher degree of readiness.
35. Q. And do you have any data from which 3'ou could refresh
your memory as to this degree of readiness ?
440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No. I have no records. I can give isolated examples, as for
example the planes of Patrol Wing 14 were in the air, conducting a
search of the operating area, on the morning of December 7. I do
not remember how man}^ — I forget now whether there w^ere three or
four. There were approximately six planes, I believe, of Patrol Wing
Two in the air, at the time conducting tactics with the submarines iji
the submarine sanctuary over that island. There was a ready squad-
ron, I forget its number, at Pearl Harbor — planes lined up and pre-
sumably ready to take to the air in thirty minutes. That squadron
was due to be relieved at 8 : 00 o'clock in the morning by another
squadron over at Kaneohe, at which time that squadron was required
to be in that same degree of readiness. We modified that from time .
to time by permitting these planes on thirty minutes' notice to take
the air for training purposes and not to proceed more than 30 minutes'
flying time from their base.
36. Q. Whose responsibility was it to prescribe the degree of readi-
ness for aircraft aivailable to the Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force?
A. The readiness question was one which was in fact [<^5i]
decided by higher authority. Whether it stemmed directly from the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or from Commander Naval Base
Defense Force, I cannot say. In ordinary practice for drills, and
this is the only way I can recollect the details of that problem, we
would receive the drill message placing the entire organization in an
activated status, from the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, and
tliat '•Drill, danger of an air raid exists, drill," — and then we would
send a dispatch to all the units making aircraft available to the Naval
Base Defense Air Force, "Assume condition of readiness 1", and im-
mediately start in issuing the various orders for the drill. Planes in
the air already were to be sent out immediately to search sectors. At
the conclusion of drill, we would send a message — "Resume normal
condition of readiness." At least once during my being on this par-
ticular job, the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree
of readiness. I am sorry I can't recollect just who sent the message,
but it was sent by some higher authority, and at that time was changed,
I believe, from Cast to Baker.
37. Q. As I recall the various sources of aircraft wdiich you stated
would make up the Naval Base Defense Air Force, when it was vital-
ized, it seems to me that these planes, under normal operating condi-
tions, were under different commanders; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
38. Q. And then if, for example, you desired to place all planes,
while still under these various commanders, in a condition of readiness,
how could it be done ?
A. We had in our command center several means of communication ;
where planes were actually in the air, we used radio. For planes of
the Marine Corps, based on Ewa, we had to communicate by tele-
phone— field telephone set with specially strung wires. For Army
bombardment aviation, we had a field telephone set which had been
installed by the Army units and which was our own direct means of
communicating to the Ai'my bombardment aviation. We had no
means of direct connnunication, except through the Pearl Harbor,
Ford Island, Hickam Field telephone exchanges, to the search and
attack groups of the Naval Base Air Defense. It was very diflficult
PROCEEDIJ^GS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 441
to communicate with General Davidson, who had command of all
fighter aircraft on Kanoehe. Our only means of direct communica-
tion was the telephone through the Pearl Harbor exchange. In addi-
tion to that, we had two or three — I forget which now — teletype page
printer circuits, which ran to various localities, but which not on ail
outlying stations were continuously manned.
[582] 39. Q. If the commander of the Naval Base Defense Air
Force desired to put into effect a condition of readiness before his air
force was assembled under his command, could he do it?
A. I will have to answer indirectly again because the air force was
never assembled under his connnand. The conditions of readiness were
set by high authority and based upon logistic considerations. The
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, had no power, except
under an actual emergency, to take action toward initiating operation
of these aircraft or of increasing or decreasing their degree of
readiness.
40. Q. Adverting to this same addendum No. 1 about which you
have been testifying. I will ask you to read Paragraph IV (a) ?
A. (Reading :) "IV. Action open to us : (a) Run daily patrols as far
as possible to seaward through oC.O degrees to reduce the probabilities
of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be
effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very
short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be under-
taken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable
within rather narrow time limits."
41. Q. Between 27 November and 7 December 1911, will you state
the number of naval aircraft that were available in the Hawaiian
area for conducting a distant reconnaissance?
A. A portion of my answer will depend upon the definition of distant
reconnaissance. It was my personal opinion that reconnaissance to a
distance of less than approximately 800 miles — which would give
visibility, we assumed, to approximately 825 miles — would not pro-
tect against surprise air raid in that sector, and I therefore believed
that the 800 mile figure was the proper one to use for distant recon-
naissance. One squadron of planes attached to Patrol Wings One
and Two consisted of the obsolete PBY-3s which had not yet been
replaced by PBY-r)s and which could not, because of their age and
service, go "to that distance. They could, however, go to 700 miles and
were so used for a brief while, a very brief while, subsequent to the
attack on Pearl Harbor. I do not remember the starting date of the
operation involving the reenforcement of Wake. However, it was
approximately within a few days of November 27th. One of our patrol
squadrons, VP-21, had been based on Midway since early in October,
1941. At the time it was decided to reenforce Wake with a squadron
of Marine fighters, this squadron was transferred to Wake with orders
to scout and cover the advance of Admiral Halsey's task force; and a
second patrol squadron was sent out from Pearl Harbor to [583]
Midway to scout and similarly cover Admiral Halsey's advance and
retirement. I am not certain about the exact dates but I remember
that VP-22 left Wake on either the r,rd or 4th of December and arrived
back at Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December, which left just the one
squadron of VP-21 at the Island of Midway. That squadron con-
sisted of these old obsolete planes, PBY-?>s, and were approaching their
18 months service and were overdue, in fact, for overhaul, and it was
442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
planned that they would be flown back to the jSIainland very shortly,
replaced by the PBY-5s. With 0 phuies undergoing repair or out of
commission for various reasons, to the best of my knowledge I would
say that we had 12 planes at Midway and approximately GO at Pearl
Harbor and Kanehoe which could have been used for reconnaissance
to the TOO mile point.
42. Q. Then do I understand that the total naval aircraft available
for a distant reconnaissance up to 700 miles as a maximum was about
60 ])hines at Oahu or its environs, and 12 at Midway 'I Is that correct ?
A. That is correct.
43. Q. Can you recall how many Army aircraft were avaihible for
conducting a distant reconnaissance?
A. It is my recollection that the last available report we received
from the Army was 6, B-lTs. These 6 planes were the only planes
that the Army reported available to us which could go beyond 300
miles. They could go to 800 miles.
44. Q. With the combined Navy-Army aircraft that were available
for operation between 27 November and 7 December 1941. could you
have complied with a directive to conduct a long-range reconnais-
sance through 360 degrees ?
A. No. Using the most economical aircraft type of search that we
could devise, a single plane going to 700 miles would only cover a
sector of 8 degrees. Therefore, with 66 planes, only 50 percent of
which could be used continuously from a maintenance and pilot fatigue
standpoint, only 264 degrees could be covered daily. 360 degrees
could be covered only one day, possibly only two days as an emergency
measure, but it could not be maintained. It would only cover about
three-quarters of the circle day in and day out until the exhaustion
point from not only of personnel but from the materiel standpoint as
well was reached. The exhaustion period would have been reached
in materiel before it was reached in personnel. As nearly as I could
estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare
parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that 3 weeks of intensive daily
searches would have been approximately a 75 percent reduction in
material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing
planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep
other [5SJi\ planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have
kept going approximately a 6-week period, but at the end of that time
they would have all required a protracted rest period.
45. Q. Let us suppose, for example, that it was contemplated that
this long-range reconnaissance would have been maintained indef-
initely. How many planes do you feel would have been available for
such a type of patrol ?
A. I believe that under the circumstances and with planning, we
could have drawn up for daily searches the use of approximately 30
planes each day until the exhaustion period was reached, provided
that we were permitted by higher authority to operate that many for
the search alone, because that would have left us entirely without any
striking group except insofar as the other approximately 36 planes
would have been available.
46. Q. With 30 planes, what sector of 360 degrees could you cover?
A. Approximately 240 degrees, to a distance of 700 miles.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 443
47. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the condition of readiness
that was being maintained in Army aircraft between '21 November
and 7 December 1941 ?
A. No personal knowledge. The orders for condition of readiness
were B-5.
48. Q. And that was what?
A. Fifty percent of aircraft available on four hours notice.
49. Q. Had yon heard anything about an Ami}' condition of readi-
ness designed to prevent sabotage?
A. I had heard indirectly and unofficially of various rumors of
attempted sabotage and counter-measures against sabotage, none of
which api)eared at the time to be of great importance.
50. Q. I thought you had answered this question but to make sure
it is clear for the record, how many planes could you have safely and
indefinitely operated on a daily reconnaissance to 700 miles without
exhausting planes or personnel, assuming that all planes suitable for
reconnaissance were made available for that purpose?
A. Eighteen, provided a certain supply of critical spares were made
available.
[ J'S'J] 51. Q. And how many degrees of a sector of 360 degrees
could these 18 cover?
A. 144 degrees.
The court then, at 11:00 a. m., took a recess until 11: 15 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all
the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the in-
terested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Ad-
miral Husband E. Kinunel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), whose counsel were
present.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter.
Captain Logan C Ramsey, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and con-
tinued his testimony.
Examination by the judge advocate (Continued) :
52. Q. In your testimony previous to the recess you mentioned to
the effect that a squadron of patrol planes was parked on Ford Island
in a position for being readily launched. Is that a correct under-
standing ?
A. That is correct.
53. Q. Do you know whether or not the other patrol craft that were
at Ford Island were dispersed, or whether they were in a state of
rei:)air at the sheds, or what was their position f
A. Some were lined up ready for launching, in the hangars; some
were undergoing various maintenance work and in the vicinity of the
hangars ; some were in the hangars undergoing longer repair or modi-
fication. How many of the 9 out of commission and undergoing re-
pairs were in Pearl Harbor and how many in Kaneohe, I cannot
state. Broadly speaking, dispersion of patrol seaplanes was impracti-
cable due to lack of handling facilities, boats, et cetera, and the fact
that the patrol seaplane is not designed to be moved considerable dis-
444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tances on Innd. Dispersal in the water at Pearl Harlwr was imprac-
ticable due to the congestion of the harbor and difficulty of access in
the more remote, uncongested areas.
54. Q. I believe you testified that the patrol planes at Midway were
conducting reconnaissance patrols between 27 November and 7 Decem-
ber, 1941; is that correct?
A. That is substantially correct. Actually, on the morning of
December 7th, six planes were scouting to cover a task force in the
vicinity of Midway and six planes were fully manned on the water
loaded with live bombs.
[586] 55. Q. Then there were no other planes other than the
six you have mentioned which were covering a task force in the vicinity
of Midway, flying a patrol of any description from Midway?
A. Not from Midway.
56. Q. When did you first have knowledge that an enemy was attack-
ing in the Pearl Harbor area?
A. I believe the best way to answer the question is a brief narrative.
Our patrol planes covering the operating areas were carrying live
depth charges and had specific orders to sink any submerged submarine
sighted outside of the submarine sanctuary and without a close escort.
At approximately 7 : 30 on the morning of December 7th I received a
telephone call from the staff duty officer Avho informed me he had
received a message from 14-Prep-l to the effect that they had sunk
a submerged sulimarine one mile off the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
I asked him if the message had been proj-erly authenticated, because
there was in the back of my mind the feeling that it was quite possible
that it was a mistake, a drill message of some variety that hacl gotten
out by accident. So I ordered the staff duty officer to request an
authentication of the mesage immediately. However, that did not
stop me from making an immediate report of the information to the
staff duty officer of the Commandei'-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
I believe at the time that I did not consider that as definite information
of any enemy attack, I went immediately to the Command Center
and for no reason that I know of, drew- up a search plan for our aircraft
under the conditions prevailing that day. I prepared it in dispatch
form. Meanwhile, I was waiting for an authentication of this mes-
sage. There was a slight delay, and approximately 5 or 10 minutes
after I reached the Command Center, I saw, together with the staff
duty officer, a single plane making a dive on Ford Island. The single
plane apj^eared at the time to both the staff duty officer and myself in
the light of a young aviator "flathatting'' and we both tried to get his
number to make a report of the violation of flight rules. He com-
pleted his dive, pulled up and away. We were commenting together
on the fact that it was going to be difficult to find out who the pilot
was, when the delayed action bomli which he had dropped, and which
we had not seen droj), detonated, and I told the staff duty officer,
"Never mind; it's a Jap". I dashed across the hall into the radio
room, ordered a broadcast in plain English on all frequencies, "Air
raid, Pearl Harbor, This is no drill." ''The detonation of the bomb
dropped by that first plane was my first positive knowledge of an
enemy attack.
57. Q. Did you give any further orders, or did you give any orders
subsequent to making this rei:)ort, as to any action that was to be taken
by the aircraft in your [SS7] command?
' PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 445
A. Yes. Immediately after the broadcast message I ordered the
planes in the air to proceed and search the section 315 to 360 degrees
from Pearl Harbor to maximnm practical distance, followed up shortly
later by an assignment of a sector to the planes which had been con-
ducting joint tactics with submarines off the Island of Lanai. Follow-
ing that, similar orders were issued in accordance with the search plan
that I had previously drawn up to various units by the various means
of conmiunication available to me in the Command Center.
58. Q. Prior to 7 : 55 on 7 December 1041, did you have any informa-
tion of a flight of Army planes scheduled to arrive on December 7, 1941
from the Mainland ?
A. No.
59. Q. Did you ordinarily attend Army-Navy conferences on mili-
tary matters j^ertaining to aircraft operations as they were related to
defenses in Oahu ?
A. Not invariably. Captain C. F. Coe, War Plans officer on the staff
of Patrol Wing Two, and myself, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, attended all such conferences in which lower echelon commands
were present. There may have been conferences in the higher echelons
that we did not attend.
60. Q. Who, ordinarily, from your organization, attended the con-
ferences in which the higher echelons of command were meeting-
together?
A. Achuiral Bellinger usually attended such conferences, and when-
ever practicable it was his usual practice to take either Captain Coe
or myself.
61. Q. Adverting to the period from about July 1041 until the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor, wdiat is your conception of the degree of
cooperation between Army and Navy commanders during this period
of time in the Hawaiian area ?
A. I will have to take time with my answer because it is difficult
to distinguish pre-Pearl Harbor and post-Pearl Harbor opinions. As
usual in any cooperative effort, or rather, effort i-equiring cooperation,
certain individuals were extremely cooperative. Others required
more diplomatic handling. (lenerally speaking, our relations with
Army bombardment aviation, with which I was principally concerned,
were excellent. General — then Colonel — Farthing, was commander
of the Eighteenth Bombardment Wing, and my relations with him
were very close. We frequently held exercises requiring coordination
of facilities entirely outside of the structilre of [588] the Naval
Base Defense Air Fori e. For example, I was frequently able, during
the course of our own towed target-high altitude bombing practice,
to make such targets available to the Eighteenth Bombardment Wing.
We would bomb the target between, say, the hours of 10 : 00 and 11 : 00,
and they would have it between 11 : 00 and 12 : 00, and so forth. They
did a number of favors for us, particularly in the line of small machine
shop work. I am using this merely to illustrate that in the echelons
of command in which I customarily moved we got along very well
generally. There seemed to be a necessity for precise and meticulous
wording of orders. There were more difficulties in lack of coordina-
tion, as I saw them from my lower angle, in the line of the necessity
for jockeying for technical position, for maintenance of integrity of
command, and for the increased allocation of the limited aviation
facilities on the Island of Oahu itself. If I remember correctly there
446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were 8 or 10 joint boards of various descriptions and degrees of
seniority to decide various joint Army and Navy aviation matters.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[589] 62. Q. What is your opinion of the cooperation in the
exchange of important military information between Army and Navy
commanders of aircraft in the Hawaiian area between November 27,
1941 and December 7 of the same year?
A. During that particular i^eriod a considerable portion of our
effort in the Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings was directed toward the
operation involving the reenforcement of Wake. I don't remember
at the moment whether or not a naval base defense air raid drill was
held during this period.
63. Q. This was exchange of information.
A. Yes. I know of no exchange of information over and above the
usual or the customary discussion of details.
64. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is in evidence before this
court. It is a dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations dated Novem-
ber 24, 1941, and states in substance that chances of a favorable out-
come of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful and that there are
indications of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, in-
cluding an attack on Guam or the Philippines as a possibility.. Prior
to December 7. 1941, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made
acquainted with its contents?
A. No.
65. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which has been called by some wit-
nesses a "war w^arning message." I ask you to examine it and state
whether prior to December 7, 1941, you had seen this dispatch or
had been made acquainted with its contents?
A. No.
66. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, was any patrol plane which you
had available for long-range reconnaissance equipped with radar?
A. No.
67. Q. That being the case, do you consider that they were of any
value for a night search ?
A. No, except in unusual circumstances on bright, moonlight nights.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
68. Q. When you stated in your direct examination, Captain, that
there were available for continuous, effective distant reconnaissance,
on a daily basis, eighteen planes and that that would cover a sector of
144 decrees, it was on the assum])tion of a 25-mile visibility, was it not ?
A. That is correct.
[S,90] 69. Q. Was a 25-mile visibility ordinarily prevailing in
the Hawaiian area for a distance of 700 or 800 miles?
A. No, a 25-mile visibility was assumed for the search basis on the
premise that the visibility around Oahu was either very good or non-
existent or so low, rather, that aircraft scouting was impractical, as,
for example, in the dense rain areas, troi)ical storms, and bad weather
areas. It w^as assumed that the most economical expenditure of planes
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 447
^YOllld be made on the basis of maximum visibility normally expected,
and planes would nuike reports concerning which areas, due to weather
or other low visibility, were not covered by the search. That proce-
dure covered not only the period before the war but that subsequent
to December Tth and was still in force and was used during the battle
of Midway.
70. Q. Is it true in all probability, day in and day out, that there
would be certain areas where the effectiveness of the search in the
]44.clegree sector would be substantially reduced because of weather
conditions?
A, That is correct. That varied. On the SOO-degree circle from
the Island, we took weather reports covering a period of several
months and found that approximately 20% in the area for a distance
of 700 miles could be expected to have weather conditions where the
visibility might go as low as zero.
71. Q. Did you have any percentage estimate of the effectiveness
within this 144-degree sector because of weather conditions?
A. Yes, we felt that, except in the single case of a widespread and
pronounced front, we stood an excellent chance of detecting any size-
able group of surface vessels on nnj given day. That belief was
borne out by tactical exercise searches in that same area before Pearl
Harbor. We might go out in rain squalls and miss them for an hour
and get them on the return leg. If there was a widespread front,
we might miss them entirely.
72. Q. You spoke about the necessity or desirability of spare parts
for the conduct of distant reconnaissance for any continuous program.
What was the condition of the availability of critical spare parts for
distant reconnaissance planes prior to December 7?
A. For the PBY-5 planes, which had, in the case of several squad-
rons, just replaced during the months of October and November the
obsolete PBY-1, 2, and 3 plane, there was, substantially speaking, a
total absence of any spare parts whatever. We had been undergoing
the usual, shakedown difficulties with a new type of plane, and there
had been considerable difficulty because of the cracking of new engine
sections in these planes. A replacement program was under way with
the replacement of these cracked engine sections [691^ with
a new type. In addition, material for installing armor and leak-
proof tanks in these PBY-5's was just .being received, and the first
plane had just been finished in that connection on December 7.
73. Q. Were you in Pearl Harbor during the period subsequent to
December 7, when the Roberts Commission was conducting its investi-
gation ?
A. I did not leave Pearl Harbor from December 7, 1941, until late
in May 1942.
74. Q. Did you testify as a witness before the Roberts Commission?
A. No, sir.
75. Q. Exhibit 59 is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, dated 7 January
1942. It has as its enclosure a letter written December 30, 1941, from
the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force to the Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Fleet. I direct your attention to the enclosure. Captain,
and ask whether you were familiar with and generally assisted in
the preparation of that letter ?
448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I was generally familiar with this letter. I did not assist in its
preparation.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Eet.) : "
7G. Q. Captain, there was a document referred to here as Exhibit
58. In connection with that exhibit, which is referred to as the
operation plan in connection with defense matters in the Hawaiian
area, there is one annex here from which you read, being addendum
one. In that connection, you read extracts concerning the estimate of
the situation and possible enemy action. Now, am I correct in saying
that that is really a process of reasoning and that ultimately certain
decisions were reached on the basis of that information or reasoning,
which then became the decisions made in the document ?
A^. Yes.
77. Q. Will you please read paragraph 4 of the addendum? It is
entitled "Action Open to Us."
A. (Reading) "Hun chiily patrols as far as possible to seaward
through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air sur-
prise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained
with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a
practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other
intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather
narrow time limits."
[592] 78. Q. I take it that you had no more material up to
December 7 than you had at this time ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct. The estimate was dated jNIarch 31. I reported
in April. There were no changes in the Navy or, as far as I know, in
the Army air situation of sufficient importance to justify or require
a re-estimate of the situation.
70. Q. Captain, those documents which you have there, insofar as
they relate to the air matters, are documents which your superior. Rear
Admiral Bellinger, had to do with in communion with the Army
officers there at the time; is that not so? They were prepared by the
two of them ?
A. The estimate w^as prepared by the two of them. The annex
Baker to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan was pre-
pared only by Admiral Bellinger.
80. Q. Then, under those plans you did have the drills to actually
test out the plans at intervals during the period up to December 7 ?
A. That is correct.
81. Q. When you had the drills, I take it that if you noted defects
they were corrected at the time?
A. That is correct.
82. Q. Improvements that you observed or those that were observed
which seemed sensible or desirable were initiated?
A. Yes.
83. Q. It was a growing thing — general improvement clear through
in connection with the drills ; am I right in that ?
A. No, I would say that there was considerable improvement be-
tween approximately the 20th of April and the middle of October,
during which the major or more glaring errors were eradicated. Sub-
sequent to that time very little improvements was noticed in drills.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 449
84. Q. Was it not the intention to try to have these plans in such a
position, by virtue of drills, that when an emergency came along it
would be as near an automatic and a working proposition as possible?
A. That is correct.
85. Q. In connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force, is it
not a fact that that entity only came into existence, first, upon a drill?
Second, if an attack were actuall}^ made, that would vitalize it, because
orders would be issued to vitalize it ; is that right ?
A. If I may leave aside the word "entity" in your questions, I would
say the Naval Base Defense Air Force, as [oBS] a part of the
Naval Base Defense Force, was vitalized only by drills and of the
occurrence of an actual emergency. No one gave me any orders on
December 7. It was unnecessary ; it was automatic in the plan.
86. Q. iVfter vitalization became a part of the Base Defense Air
Force, Rear Admiral Bellinger was not a Naval Base Air Force per-
son, insofar as the planes were concerned, until there was a drill or
until there was an emergency; isn't that right?
A. That is correct and not in the full sense that the term or title
implies, even under those conditions. His authority did not extend
over fighting planes, radar detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns;
and his authority over Army units was limited in that he exercised
operational control through mutual agreement, and not command.
87. Q. With reference to the matter of readiness, I take it that the
planes we are here discussing are the same planes that are in PatWing
One and Two? In other words, it was just the one force of naval
patrol planes at the time ?
A. There were two separate organizations. However, Admiral
Bellinger had a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
that Patrol Wing One was to be under his command, and we were
tising the title for his correspondence — Commander, Hawaiian Based
Patrol Wings.
88. Q. Would that be the same as Task Force Nine?
A. Not entirely, because Task Force Nine consisted of Patrol Wings
One and Two, attached tenders and such other units as the Com-
mander-in-Chief might detail to that task force for specific operations.
89. Q. Under that. Patrol Wings One and Two were assigned cer-
tain tasks in connection with scouting and searching upon deployment
schedules approved by the Comandmer-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
Is that the way it ran ?
A. The situation was very complicated. We were technically desig-
nated as Task Force Nine. There were, in addition, certain patrol
squadrons assigned for tactical j^urposes to Task Forces One, Two, and
Three ; and the only way we could get quarterl}^ operating schedules
approved in those cases was to make up a complete one for our own
task force and for the three other task forces and get them approved
by all three task force commanders before we could submit our own
schedule.
90. Q. If condition of readiness A-1 for aircraft was made the
order of the day, you would be unable to carry out the missions which
were in the other documents to which you refer ?
A. Our assigned mission was in order of priority to lS94^
the various tasks: expansion training, operational training, and spe-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 30
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cific operations. In expansion training we were required to train
complete flight crews for detachment, to be sent back to the United
States to form the nuclei of squadrons just being commissioned. We
were given instructions that we were supposed to provide or allow for
a 10% reduction of our qualified combat crews — I'm not sure whether
it was every quarter or every two months, but it involved a tremendous
training program, and the vitalization of the Naval Base Defense Air
Force would have involved a practical cessation of that effort.
91. Q. I take it that, in your opinion, as an aviation officer and
being on the spot at the time, the conditions of readiness that were
in effect were adequate and sensible for the things that were then
being done ? Is that a fair statement ?
A. We were doing the best we could with what we had.
Examined by the court:
92. Q. Captain, I think you said that the Japanese would make
an attack by air in case of war.
A. I thought if they made an attack, it would be an air attack.
93. Q. Well, then, in making that mental estimate did you consider
the possible attack by submarines in the Hawaiian area ?
A. I did, sir, but I did not believe that a submarine attack could,
as I tried to point out in answer to the previous question, seriously
affect our position in the Pacific.
94. Q. Well, those mental estimates that you just testified to were
pre Pearl Harbor?
A. As nearly as I can recall, I believe they were, sir.
95. Q. In considering the whole thing after the attack, do you
think that that estimate is correct?
A. I believe so, yes, sir.
96. Q. The court has taken judicial notice of the report of the
Roberts Commission. In one of the findings they made this state-
ment: "Means were available for distance reconnaissance which would
have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack."
Do you agree with that?
A. I agree with it contingent upon a definition of the word
"measure".
[S95] 97. Q. Will you tell the court what your opinion is as to
the means available for distance reconnaissance with reference to
security against a surprise air attack?
A. The means at our disposal would have provided a certain degree
of security, but the means were inadequate for absolute security.
98. Q. Captain, I am referring to paragraph IV (a) of the adden-
dum of Exhibit 53. It is stated that the action proposed therein
cannot be "undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface
raid is probable within rather narrow time limits." Please elaborate
upon that point and cover the feature of intelligence available which
would have prompted
A. The word "intelligence," as it was explained to me later, was
used advisedly to include anything that might be received by fortui-
tous local knowledge or any source of Naval Intelligence from the
Chief of Naval Operations, the State Department, or any other agency.
99. Q. You had no such intelligence?
A. I had no knowledge of any such intelligence.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 451
100. Q. You are speaking of knowledge available to you personally
and not to Admiral Bellinger?
A. I am speaking personally, sir,
101. Q. Captain, does the court understand that on the morning
of December 7 there was no long-range reconnaissance by any planes
stationed at Oahu, although there were planes available for this
activity; is that correct?
A. Correct as to fact. The word "available" in there involves
an implication which lessens the quality of my answer. During the
earlier portion of the week we had been engaged for a period, in
accordance with our approved operation schedule known as wing
tactics. At that particular time, in drawing up the detail plans for
that wing tactics period, I drew them up so we would have a constant
daily scout on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of that
week to the northward and northwestward of the island of Oahu. As
a primary purpose for training, the distance did not extend beyond
400 miles. However, those searches w^ere made during all of that
week. In addition, we had the searches running from Midway every
day that week. On Saturday we had the arrival of the squadron
returning from the island of Wake
102. Q. Saturday, the 6th of December?
A. The 6th of December or the 5th. I forget exactly which date it
came in, I believe it came in late on the [590] afternoon of
the 5th, The 6th and 7th were planned principally as a period of
maintenance and upkeep, although we had several squadrons in a high
degree of readiness. It was j^ractically the culmination of what has
been mentioned before — The search had been made, but we were not
going ahead with it continuously in order not to depreciate the ma-
terial readiness of the planes.
103. Q. That is a very clear explanation. However, will you please
answer the question? We will put the question another way. Were
there any planes at Pearl Harbor which could have been used and were
not used for distance reconnaissance on the morning of December 7?
A. Yes, sir, there were planes that could have been used had such a
search been ordered by higher authority,
104. Q. How many of these planes were in that category?
A. For an emergency effort, approximately 60 planes could have
been made available in four hours or less.
105. Q. Who would have ordered the distance reconnaissance and
under whose authority would the directive have been made?
A. For the full utilization of all aircraft, both Army and Navy,
available on Oahu, the orders to us would have come from the Com-
mander, Naval Base Defense Force.
106. Q. Who is that?
A. The Connnandant of the 14th Naval District. Orders solely for
the Navy ])lanes would probably have come from the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet.
107. Q. Did you consider in these plans and orders which you had
that the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force was the one who
would have originated the idea of distance reconnaissance and would
have directed you or Admiral Bellinger to have sent planes out on
this mission ?
452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I would have assumed it would be the duty of auy officer higher
in the echelon of command above Admiral Bellinger to have taken
action on receipt of the information indicating that action was neces-
sary.
108. Q. Who was the officer who, in studying the general situation,
had the direct authority to order out these planes and to give Admiral
Bellinger orders to send out these planes on distance reconnaissance?
A. It was the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force. He
was the immediate superior in command in that organization.
109. Q. Who was in command of Ford Island at this time?
A. Admiral Bellinger was the Commander of the Fleet Air Detach-
ment. Captain James A. Shoemaker was Commander of the Fleet
Air Station.
[o97] 110. Q. On the morning of December 7 when you, as you
have stated, went into the room and sent out the signal: "Japanese
attack; this is no drill," how long after that was the general alarm
sounded by the station and the activities in Pearl Harbor?
A. I cannot say, sir.
110. Q. You stated that in your opinion there might be or could
be an air attack on Oahu. Had you ever thought from what direction
the air attack would come or the most probable direction?
A. Yes, sir, we had. We had great discussions on it, and in view
of the prevailing wind conditions and the presence of outlying islands
and other factors, we had decided the northwest sector was the most
likely line of approach, and in our drills the squadron in the highest
degree of readiness was always ordered to take up that sector from
315 to 00.
111. Q. Then, if you, with your limited number of planes, had sent
out distance reconnaissance, you would have sent them to the north-
west sector so as to cover that sector ?
A. For any single day, yes, sir.
112. Q. Well, let's consider for every day.
A. For every day there would have to be some variation. In other
words, it would have become known that the sector was being covered,
and it would have been easy to avoid.
113. Q. In part of your testimony you said that on the morning of
December 7 there was a search in process from 350 to 360 degrees ; is
that correct ?
A. No, sir, I do not believe I said that.
114. Q. 315 to 360?
A. No, sir, I said I ordered planes already in the air to cover that
sector after the attack.
115. Q. Why did you select that sector?
A. Because we had always decided that was the most likely direc-
tion of approach.
116. Q. But that sector was not based on the sighting of any Japa-
nese planes?
A. No, sir, it was in accordance with our estimate and pre-conceived
ideas. We always selected that sector, 315 to 00, as the first sector.
The second sector was from 315 to around 270. We placed other
sectors in their relative idea of importance.
[598] 117. Q. Did you gain any information subsequent to the
attack of December 7 as to the location of the enemy carriers from
which this attack was launched?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 453
A. Yes, sir. To the best of my belief, from the information re-
ceived, the Japanese came in from the northwest at a distance of
approximately 225 miles, turned into the wind, launched, proceeded
along that general course, and finally recovered their planes at a
distance of approximately 300 miles somewhat east of north of the
island — probably Nor'Nor'East.
118. Q. What information, if any, do you have as to the location
of the Japanese carriers when the planes were launched to make the
attack? What estimated position do you have?
A. My understanding is that subsequent information showed that
they were approximately 335 degrees true, a distance of about 225
miles from Oahu.
119. Q. Have you any data as to the number of Japanese planes
which made this attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, sir, I have an estimate based partially or wholly uf)on
subsequent information. I would estimate approximately 200 planes.
120. Q. And the approximate number shot down?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, there were from IT to
20 Japanese aircraft shot down.
121. Q. As the court understands, there were certain planes which
were sent out to cover the operating areas for the Fleet on that morn-
ing; is that correct?
A. That is correct, sir.
122. Q. And certain planes were left at Ford Island; is that cor-
rect ?
A. Yes, sir.
123. Q. Would it be possible to give this court the number of planes
actually at Ford Island on the morning of December 7, 19'41 ?
A. I may be one or two planes out in each squadron. There were
twelve planes of VP-23, thirteeen planes of VP-21, and 6 planes of
VP-24: on Ford Island. At Kaneche there were thirty-four.
124:. Q. How many of these planes were capable of taking to the
air and flying at that time?
A. Approximately sixty-three. There were nine additional planes
that were out of commission.
The court then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[599] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel with the excep-
tion of the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), whose
counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Captain Logan C. Ramsey, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and con-
tinued his testimony.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
IT. S. Navy, (Ret.) :
125. Q. Captain, this morning you mentioned the difficulty that
there was to disassociate things before Pearl Harbor from those
things after. Now, in these questions, I am going to refer specifically
to matters before December 7th, and particularly during the period
454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
November 27tli to December 7th and not restrict it to just the 7th alone.
Now at that time, how many patrol planes capable of doing distance
reconnaissance were in the Hawaiian area, as near as you recall?
A. Approximately 83 Army and Navy planes.
126. Q. And of that number there would be 6, B-17's; Army
bombers ?
A. Twelve B-l7s. You asked how many planes were in the area.
127. Q. And of those 12 Army bombers, only 6 of them during that
period were capable of actual operation ; is that your recollection ?
A. No. Presumably all of them were capable of operation. Only
6 were made available to the Naval Base Air Defense, in the last report,
which was dated 6 December, or 5 December, I forget which.
128. Q. Now, in respect of the naval planes capable of doing dis-
tance reconnaissance, those were in the patrol wings of the Hawaiian
area ; am I correct ?
A. That is correct.
129. Q. And these same patrol planes were also in Task Force
Nine ; is that correct?
A. That is correct. There is one addition. On occasion, some
squadrons were specifically assigned to other task forces. Task Forces
One, Two and Three.
130. Q. So that in any event the planes w^ere either in Task Force
Nine, or associated in other task forces there in the area?
A. That is correct.
[600'] 131. Q. Now, between these same two dates, November 27
and December 7, all these planes, whether they were in patrol wings
or in task forces, were conducting operations, they were maintaining
upkeep, and they were on operating training schedules that had been
approved by the Commander-in-Cliief of the Pacific Fleet; is that
not so?
A. Tliat is correct,
132. Q. And these operating and emplo^anent schedules of those
planes were matters that ]ay between Admiral Bellinger and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ; is that so ?
A. Yes, sir.
133. Q. And Rear Admiral Bloch, either as Com 14 or as Naval Base
Defense Officer, had nothing to do with that situation in respect of the
employment schedules ?
A. No, sir.
134. Q. Now, if it w^ere desired to institute security against surprise
carrier attack between tliese two dates, wouldn't a daily distance re-
connaissance over 360 degrees to a distance of 700 miles be about the
best way to do it ?
A. That was about the best that could have been done.
135. Q. I take it, then, from what you have previously said here
now, that the Naval Base Defense Officer or Coml4, in either of those
capacities, didn't have authority to order a complete discontinuance of
patrol plane operations and their training and overhaul schedules
as approved by the Commander-in-Chief, and to institute continuous
long-range reconnaissance on his own authority, did he?
A. I would assume that he did not.
136. Q. So that the remark this morning — and possibly I didn't
catch it accurately — that the Naval Base Defense Officer had authority
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 455
to issue orders for distance reconnaissance, what you meant, I take it,
was that in case of an immediate emergency because of the imminence
of an air attack, he could give an order or sound the alarm and then,
and only then, these planes came under the control of the Naval Base
Defense Air Force for the purpose of carrying out orders for search
and attack. Am I correct in that ?
A. You are correct in saying about the emergency. There might
have been other situations in which he could have done the same thing,
for drill, or for something for which he had received information or
instructions.
[Wl] Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
137. Q. Captain, did you know anything about the operation of the
Army radar system ?
A. To a limited extent. Approximately one week before the attack
on Pearl Harbor, or possibly ten days before. General Davidson — I
believe he was then Commander of the Seventh Fighter Command —
came over to call on Admiral Bellinger, and the purpose of his call
was to ascertain as to whether or not the Navy could furnish officer
personnel to help the Army place its radar system into 24-hour opera-
tion. It was my understanding from the conversation and the general
discussion that followed it that the equipment was set up but that
General Davidson did not have at his command sufficient officer per-
sonnel to run it on a 24-hour basis, and I am fairly positive that he
made the statement that if we couldn't help out to the extent of 6
officers for permanent assignment over there at this control center
that the Army would (>nly be able to run that during the critical
hours of the morning and evening ; they couldn't run it all throughout
the day or all night long. The final decision, you might say, was
that the Navy could not provide the officers required at that time on a
permanent basis.
138. Q. That was because they weren't available ?
A. That I cannot say. I knew the final decision but not the process
of reasoning that led up to it.
139. Q. Now, during the attack, did you undertake to find out from
the Army people whether the radar had any information that would
be of assistance for tracking the planes back?
A. No, it was more direct than that. During the process of the
several attacks, Captain Coe, Admiral Bellinger, and myself, called
and made requests by telephone, some direct as we could to the con-
trol center, some thr'ougli the teletype system, some through the tele-
phone exchanges at Pearl Harbor, and even an attempt through the
direct field telephones at Hickam Field, and in every case these several
requests, we asked the Army radar people to please see if they could
track the Japanese planes in retiring and to give us their direction,
and even included a caution in one case that I know of to please be
sure that they give us a true direction and not a reciprocal bearing;
give us the direction of the Japanese retirement. We never received
any information that we had asked for.
140. Q. During the attack, I believe that there was one of the
Japanese planesthat was shot down and a chart was found indi-
cating various retirement courses to the northard. Did you know
about that, either then [602] or shortly afterwards?
456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Sometime during the morning we received information that
a chart, apparently, from a shot-down Japanese plane had been re-
covered. It was my understanding, or my recollection at this time
without a reference to any document, that the purported rendezvous
was to the southwest of Hawaii.
141. Q. At some time, did some Army B-l7s go to the northard
that morning ?
A. Yes, sir. At approximately 12 : 30 there were four, I believe,
B-lTs — which was all they reported at that time ready for flight —
took off loaded with bomlDS accompanied by four, A-20s. The in-
structions that we issued from the Command Center, the Com-
mander of the Search and Attack groups. Naval Base Defense Air
Force, were to scout in one of these northerly sectors which we speci-
fied narrowly by degrees, giving them about 8 degrees per plane; to
scout as far as they could on the available gas supply and then return.
They came back after going out approximately 150 miles, for the
reason that that was the limit of the radius of action of the A-20s and
that the B-l7s could not go further without protection.
142. Q. While you were at Pearl Harbor, Captain, did you have
occasion at any time to see PBY planes in transit through Pearl
Harbor en route to Australia or New Zealand ?
A. I believe so. I'm more certain as to the planes destined for
the Dutch and headed for the Dutch East Indies.
143. Q. About how many were those ?
A. I would say roughly and from memory, approximately 40.
144. Q. At that time there was need for PB Ys in Hawaii ?
A. Yes, sir.
145. Q. Were those that went through of the most modern type
then in production '^
A. They were the PBY-5 planes, which was the latest type avail-
able to us at that time which we could reasonably expect to be made
available to us in quantity.
Re-examined by the judge advocate :
146. Q. Are you familiar with radar as installed on any ships in
the Pacific Fleet as of about 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir; with the CURTISS, aircraft tender attached to Patrol
Wing Two.
[603] 147. Q. Where was she in the period immediately pre-
ceding 7 December 1941 ?
A. l3n Monday and Tuesday of the week preceding Pearl Harbor,
we had sent the Curtiss down to Hilo to act as a station ship to play
a part in wing tactics, which was the approved schedule for that week.
Later on in tlie week she left Hilo, I believe late Tuesday afternoon,
and we used her during our northerly searches on Wednesday and
Thursday as a simulated target purporting to be an enemy aircraft
carrier. She came into Pearl Harbor, I believe on Saturday morning.
148. Q. What day was that?
A. December 6th. All of this is the week before December 7th.
149. Q. Are you familiar with the capabilities or efficiency of radar
operation from ships moored or anchored in Pearl Harbor?
A. I believe so.
150. Q. Will you state what sectors ships moored in Pearl Harbor
could search with their own radars, if they could search any sectors ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NA\ i' COURT OF INQUIRY 457
A. I am stopping merely to try to disassociate my present knowledge
of the subject with what I knew then, I believe that the radar of the
Curfiss could give a fair radar coverage in the sector bounded by a
tangent from her anchorage to the southern edge of Diamond Head,
all the way around to a tangent of that 4,000 foot mountain to the
westward of Oahu ; I forget the name of the range, I would say a])-
proximately a 150 to 160 degree are, generally to the southard. The
distance would have been dependent upon the altitude of the target,
151. Q. Will you tell the court upon what general prmciple a
radar can search ?
A. I can't give the principle. I can give operational features and
limitations but I can't tell how it would work.
Recross-examined bv the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Xavy, (Ret.) :
152. Q. In connection with radar. Captain, you said that the Army
told' you and Admiral Bellinger during this conference that without
the Navy officers the Army could only operate during the critical
hours. Was there any agreement between the Army and the Navy
as tp what the critical hours of the day w^ere in the operation of the
[604] radar?
A. There I find it impossible to differentiate between present and
post Pearl Harbor knowledge. I knew, and as far as I was per-
sonally concerned, I always felt, that the most dangerous period
was approximately one hour before sunrise and approximately two
hours after sunrise in the morning; and approximately the same
period with reverse overlaps in the evening. Whether or not that
was a common agreement between Army and Navy before Pearl
Harbor, I'm sorry, I just don't remember,
153. Q. Sunrise at Pearl Harbor on 7 December was approxi-
mately 6:30?
A. Approximately.
15-1, Q, So that applying that test of one hour before and two hours
afterwards, the period would have been 5:30 a, m,, until 8:30?
A. I would have imagined that the most probable time of attack
would have been during those hours.
Neither the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark nor the
interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.),
desired for cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court:
155. Q. Captain, were the planes which were placed at Ford Island
on 7 December armed?
A. Yes, sir. For several months prior to Pearl Harbor no plane
of Patrol Wing Tw^o had ever flown without all of its machine guns
and the full wartime ammunition allowance. The loading of bombs
was a constant and repeated drill, but because of the weight limita-
tion, the actual carrying of live bombs to the maximvun capacity was
not practiced. All planes on the morning search of the operating
areas were required by direct order of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, to carry live depth charges.
150. Q. Did you know of the condition of the Army planes at this
time ?
A. I cannot speak from positive personal knowledge. My under-
standing is that they usually carried machine guns and ammunition,
but not invariably.
458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
157. Q. Was there a storage place for bombs on Ford Island where
they were immediately available for the planes?
A. Yes, sir.
158. Q, When the first attack came in on the morning of 7 De-
cember will you please give the sequence of events, [605]
what orders were received as to the employment of planes on Ford
Island?
A. At 7 : 58, on my own initiative, I broadcast a message concern-
ing an attack on Pearl Harbor. By 8 : 05 I had received an ac-
knowledgment from all planes in the air regarding their assignment
to search sectors in accordance with the search plan that I had
previously drawn. The search plan was drawn up before the attack
for no other reason than to occupy myself while waiting for an
authenticator on the submarine sinking message. Additional orders
were given by me and by other officers on duty in the Command
Center at the time, under my direction, reading off the name of each
man who would be on the telephone at the different stations and the
sectors to be assigned to that particular station. As soon as that had
been completed — I'm not entirely certain exactly what time it was but
I believe the telephone part was completed before the part to the
planes In the air — I telephoned Admiral Bellinger at his quarters to
inform him of the air raid and what I had alread;^ done. For the
next few minutes there was a constant stream of information and
requests for information from various sources from Army generals,
from the Commander-in-Chief's staff', and from the Naval Base
Defense Force headquarters. The first positive order that I recall
having received — and I'm not sure what time it was received — was
from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and stated "Locate and
destroy enemy", or something to that general effect. x\t the time of
its receipt all possible action had already been taken. In a very few
minutes — although at the time it seemed like hours — Admiral Bel-
linger arrived and approved orders that had already been issued,
and immediately thereafter the attacks destroyed, at least tempo-
rarily, all means of communication, and for a period of approxi-
mately an hour and a half the only thing tliat we could do was to
handle it by runners. We would send runners to one or two of the
VJ planes that had radio sets in them which hadn't been destroyed
on the ground, turn up their propellers, and use the radio sets of
these planes to transmit. We also sent runners over to where the
TANGIER, one of our tenders, was anchored, and used the TAN-
GIER'S radio facilities until we could get our own back into opera-
tion. There was a considerable amount of confusion due to the
disruption, the temporary disruption of all communications and the
presence of an extremely large amount of black smoke which was
practically asphyxiating in its effects. We were able to divert some
of the smoke and repair radios, and from then on there was a con-
stant succession throughout the day of small orders to units when
one single plane would be reported ready. As fast as we could get
that information [606] we would send him out on a new
sector. From time to time during the day we would receive, in
some cases, orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
regarding the searching of specific sectors, and in other cases we
would receive merely information regarding purported radio bear-
ings, and so forth.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 459
159. Q. What was j'oiir understaiidino; in sucli an emergency as this
as to who would direct the patrol planes in any search, or give orders
for general search, or give orders for them to take off '^
A. Admiral Bellinger, sir.
KiO. Q. Well, who above Admiral Bellinger? Was Admiral Bell-
inger sole authority for that?
A. No, sir ; or any higher authority.
161. Q. Did you look to the Commander, Naval Base Defense
Force, for any orders to that effect ?
A. I would have looked for them normally; owing to the positive
knowledge of an emergency, I merely assumed in that circumstance
that Admiral Bloch had already sent such a message and I didn't
bother to look for it. I figured that the very best thing that could
be done under the circumstances was to get things going and check
up later on.
Ifi!^. Q. There was no order received, to j^our knowledge, to that
effect?
A. There may have been, sir. I never looked up to find out. I
assumed that it was.
163. Q. Was any order given on the field for planes capable of
taking off, to take off immediately, as soon as this attack was made?
A. Yes, sir. All planes that were capable of flight were ordered
out as rapidly as possible.
164. Q. Captain, Avhat was the manner in which the officers and
men met the situation, so far as your knowledge goes ?
A. I have nothing but the utmost praise for every officer and man
throughout the day, which came under my personal command, with
the single exception of one instance in which I criticize myself. Dur-
ing the course of the attack, the building shook and it looked as
though the building was coming down. An authoritative source on
the other end of the corridor announced, "The building is coming
down; clear the top deck." Without waiting to ask for any more
instructions, I went on the double with everybody else and went
dow^n on the ground deck. I looked down at the end of the corridor,
saw the building was not coming down, and ordered everybody back
up to their posts. No harm was done, fortunately, because at the time
we were out of communication.
[607] 165. Q. Was there any evidence, so far as you noticed,
of any unfitness for duty as a result of perhaps a night out the night
before?
A. Absolutely none, sir. •■ • •
166. Q. In any estimate that you may have made personally or
otherwise during the critical days immediately preceding the attack,
wdiat was your thought with reference to war being started by an
attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I can only state that on one occasion — the only thing I can
state positively about my opinion at that time was that in discussing
with Admiral Bellinger the possibility or probability of an attack on
Pearl Harbor — this was sometime in November — I stated at the time,
half in earnest and half in pure speculation, that if they did attack
it would be an air attack on Christmas Eve or New Years Day. I
had a strange feeling, a vague feeling, not enough to have been an
opinion, that if they did attack us at all it would probably be some-
460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time during the winter when the hours of daylight would be shorter.
That would have been the logical time for the attack.
The question was repeated.
A. I remember reading an article in Time regarding the relative
merits of Admirals Hart and Kimmel as life insurance prospects, in
which the general precis of that article w\as that they would prefer
to insure Admiral Kimmel, and I remember at the time agreeing
with the gentleman.
None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine
this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record
in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by
the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: I have one item. I
have, in various instances, expressed an opinion regarding the du-
ration of effort of the Naval Base Air Defense, generally expressing
the opinion of its inadequacy in certain respects. To illustrate how
it was able to operate continuously after Pearl Harbor and was not,
in our opinion, able to operate continuously on the basis of our pre-
Pearl Harbor opinion, I respectfully call the attention of the court
to the following facts: Before Pearl Harbor, as my assistant in the
various operational jobs, the four or five different tasks that x^dmiral
Bellinger had, I had one officer as assistant. From December 8th
on up until shortly before the Battle of [608] Midway I had
42 officer assistants to help man and provide the necessary function-
ing for the Naval Base Air Defense. Those officers were not available
to us before Pearl Harbor and were made available only because of
the sinking or placing out of commission of the battleships to which
they had been originally attached. As far as the continuous opera-
tion of the aircraft is concerned, the only reason that we were able to
operate continuously without the exhaustion of our personnel was
because a great many of our planes were destroyed on Pearl Harbor
but their pilots and combat crews remained alive and unharmed,
and when additional planes were flown out from the Mainland we
then had the necessary reserve of extra pilots and combat crews to
provide for continuous operation from a personnel standpoint.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 2 : 30 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m,, Thurs-
day, August 24, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY .461
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944.
1009] Eighteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Xavy (Ket) , President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, IT. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel,
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), mterested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the seventeenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. William E. G. Taylor, Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, attached
to the staff of the Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point, stationed at
Charleston, Rhode Island.
2. Q. Will you stated what duties were assigned you between October
1, 1941, and December 7, 1941 ?
A. I was assigned to temporary duty, to Commander Air Force
Pacific Fleet Staff. My duties were to lecture fighter squadrons on
combat tactics and on fighter direction. At tlie completion of my duties
with Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet, at the request of the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian \G1{T\ Air Force, I was loaned to
Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity verbally, to assist in an
advisory capacity in setting up the air warning system at Fort Shaffer.
3. Q. Will you state briefly what your experience was prior to 7
December, in the field of aircraft warning devices, specifically, the
radar ?
A. Well, I had two years' experience in England, mainly as a fighter
pilot; one year with the British Navy, one year with the Air Force, and
during which time I had access to and took advantage of learning the
British air warning system, both aboard ship and ashore.
462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Q. Had you any intimate acquaintance with the radar equipment
in the United States Pacific Fleet between October and December,
1941?
A. Yes, I did, I had an opportunity to see the early equipment on
four of the American carriers.
5. Q. Will you state to the court what you consider the materiel
efficiency of the radar equipment was before December 7, 1941, that you
have just stated you had familiarity with?
A. The radar equipment itself was excellent. It was almost as good
as the equipment is today. In two carriers it had just been installed
and was not completely operative.
6. Q. After what date?
A. The date I was aboard. The date varied. One was on the east
coast in September of 1941, and the other on the west coast in October
of 1941, sir.
7. Q. Did you have any contact with the radar equipment on the
U. S. S. CUKTIS?
A. No, sir.
8. Q. Was the radar equipment on the U. S. S. CUE-TIS similar to
that installed on the other ships that you have stated you were familiar
with?
A. Yes, it was.
9. Q. From your contacts with radar equipment in the U. S. Pacific
Fleet immediately prior to 7 December, 1941, can you state what the
efficiency of radar operators was in general?
A. If you mean by "operators", the fighter director officers, plotters,
and actual radar operators — they were, in general, fairly inexperienced.
10. Q. Did you consider them capable of taking bearings of aircraft
at a distance?
A. Yes, sir. The operators themselves were quite capable of operat-
ing the radar equipment. The fighter director officers were green and
inexperienced.
[^11] 11. Q. When you reported to the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department, what duties did you perform?
A. I did not report to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment. I reported to the Commanding Officer at Wheeler Field, who
was acting for the Commanding General, Interceptor Command. My
duties were then to assist in an advisory capacity in setting up the air-
craft warning system. I spent my entire time working with the Inter-
ceptor Command and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, in
assisting setting up the aircraft warning system, which consisted of
training operators, advising on communication methods. My time was
spent at staffs of the various commands in trying to work out liaison
between the aircraft warning systems and the commands.
12. Q. As of the date, 6-7 December, 1941, what would you say was
the efficiency of this organization that you have just described as hav-
ing been assisting in organizing and instructing?
A. The radar equipment was adequate to do a fair job of early
morning. The communications between the air warning system itself
and the other organizations were in, except for the lines to some of the
fighter dispersal areas, and the lines to the civilian air warning. The
communications between the fighter-director officers', or controllers',
positions, and the fighter aircraft, were totally inadequate to control
fio-hters more than five miles off shore.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 463
13. Q. What was your opinion of the efficiency of the operators of
the radar themselves, as of 6-7 December, 1941?
A. The radar operators themselves were well-trained.
14. Q. Adverting: to the period of between 27 November 1941, and
7 December, the same year, do yon know what hours this radar system
was in operation under the direction of the Army?
A. I don't remember exactly what hours the equipment was operat-
ing the entire time, but some time within ten days of December 7 .
15. Q. Before or after?
A. Before December 7, the information center received instructions,
I was told, from General Short, to close down the radar stations except
between the hours of 4 : 00 a. m. and 7 : 00 a. m.
16. Q. Under what system had these radars been operated prior to
the institution of this system of 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 in the morning?
A. As I remember, they were operating the radar sets between 8 : 00
o'clock in the morning and 4: 30 in the afternoon.
17. Q. And then when you started to operate them between [6121
4 : 00 and 7 : 00 in the morning, do you know the reason why this
change was made?
A. I was told that the change was made to save the equipment from
breaking down from long periods of use.
18. Q. Do you know why the hours of 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 in the morn-
ing were adopted in preference to some other hour of the clay?
A. No, sir, I do not.
19. Q. Can you add anything further to your testimony concern-
ing the organization of the aircraft warning system?
A. I forgot to mention that the personnel in the aircraft warning
center — we had, as I remember, only sufficient numbers of plotters
and operators for two watches. There were no liaison officers to man
any position. We had no controllers. The controller is the most im-
portant man in the information center. We had to use squadron com-
manders as controllers, and we were in the process of teaching them to
control at the time of December 7.
20. Q. Do you know the organization of the information center in
the aircraft warning system? .
A. Yes, sir, I do. -
21. Q. Will you please state it?
A. The organization is headed by a controller, or senior fighter
director officer. Under the fighter-director officer or senior controller
are several interceptor officers as liaison officers. There are search-
light officers, gun control officers, radar officers, bomber command
liaison officers, fighter command liaison officers, naval liaison officers,
surface ; naval liaison officers for air identification ; Army ground liai-
son positions. Under these officers are the plotters, the operators, and
the maintenance crews.
22. Q. Where were you at 0755 on the morning of 7 December, 1941,
when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor?
A. I was in bed at the Hawaiian Hotel.
23. Q. Do you know anything, of your own personal knowledge
or contact as to what happened in the aircraft warning system at the
time of the attack — after the attack ?
A. Yes, sir, I do. I got there between 8 : 30 and 9 : 00, and got the
general story on what had happened. One of the radar stations was
464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
continuing to operate after 7 : 00 o'clock in tlie morning, to train opera-
tors. The information he received was sent to the information center,
where it was handed to the acting controller, who was a squadron com-
mander spending his first morning in the information center, trying
to learn the system.
24. Q. Do you know who the officer was in control in the [613]
information center?
A. No, sir, I do not remember his name.
25. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. I do not remember his name, sir.
26. Q. When you arrived, as you stated you did, about 0830, was
it?-
A. Yes, sir.
27. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, what was the con-
dition of the organization of this information center?
A. The information center was in pretty great confusion. In order
to man all the necessary positions, the air warning officers had drawn
on mess cooks, linemen, every man that they could lay their hands
on — all of whom were inexperienced — to man the telephones. The
main plot had a paper overlay, ripped off the table, making the scale
of the plotting table too large for accurate plotting. The plots that
were coming in from the various radar stations were in such con-
fusion it was impossible to determine w^hat was going on.
28. Q. Do you know if there was any attempt made, after you
arrived in the information center, to plot either incoming or retiring
aircraft from the Pearl Harbor area?
A. All plots that came into the information center from the radar
stations were plotted, but the scale of the plotting table itself was
so large — so small, that there could be no accurate information plotted.
There were also other plots coming in besides the Japanese raid, to
add to the confusion,
29. Q. Do you know whether or not a plot was ever made of
I'etirino; Japanese planes ?
A. There were, as I say, plots made of everything reported by
the information centers, but the information center had no way of
knowing whether they were Japanese planes or American planes.
30. Q. Was any plot ever made of planes retiring in a northwesterly
direction to a distance of as much as 50 to 100 miles from Oahu?
A. Yes, sir.
31. Q. Will you state what that plot was, as best you can
remember ?
A. Well, the plot of the retiring planes in any one direction also
included plots retiring in other directions as well.
32. Q. Can you state what plot was made of the planes that retired,
if any did, in a northwesterly direction?
A. There was no single plot of planes in any direction made at the
time. Several days later attem]3t was made to try [614] to
assess what had happened from the tracers.
33. Q. What was your opinion as to the efficiency of the personnel
in the Army information center in interpreting radar reports?
A. They were very inexperienced.
34. Q. From your own personal knowledge of radar as it was in-
stalled in vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet, and the efficiency
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ■ • 46i
of the operators as of 6-7 December, 1941, is it your opinion that
these radar sets coukl have been employed in detecting the approach
of planes towards Pearl Harbor?
A. It Avonld depend on \Yhere the sets were installed, sir.
35. Q. I Would ask you, for a set that is installed on a vessel of
the United States Fleet, and the vessel anchored or moored in Pearl
Harbor.
A. The efficiency of the equipment aboard ships was excellent at sea.
In a land-locked harbor, particularly with mountains around, only
by very good luck would you get any performance out of radar equip-
ment aboard ship.
36. Q. In a sector in Pearl Harbor where mountains did not inter-
fere, would you be able to get efficient results from a ship moored in
Pearl Harbor?
A. Regardless of the terrain in the direction that the radar is
searching, the mountains to the rearward or the side would still effect
radar performance.
37. I would give you the hypothetical case of a ship moored in
Pearl Harbor, attempting to locate a plane to the south and west
of Pearl Harbor, wliere I believe there are no mountains interfering.
Would this set Avork from Pearl Harbor in that direction?
A. It might work and again it might not. As I said before, the
mountains to the north still affected the performance to the south.
The interested party. Admiral Harold Pv. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested partv, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. NaVy (Ret.) :
38. Q. Whose responsibility was it to operate the radar equipment
on Oahu on 7 December, 1941 ?
A. That was the Chief Signal Officer, Hawaiian Depart- [615]
ment.
39. Q. The Hawaiian Department of what service?
A. TheU. S. Army.
40. Q. In your opinion, did or did not the Navy lend all possible
assistance in placing the radar equipment of the Army in efficient con-
dition ?
A. That is quite difficult to answer, sir. The assistance that the
Navy gave to getting the radar equipment into operation was nil.
They were not asked for any assistance in putting the radar equipment
into operation.
41. Q. I think I said, "efficient condition."
A. Yes, sir, the Navy gave all assistance they were asked for in set-
ting up the air warning system, except for furnishing liaison officers.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness. Neither the interested
party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kinnnel. U. S. Navy (Ret.), nor in-
terested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), desired
to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
42. Q. You stated in a reference to the operators of the radar system
on ships of the Navy that you inspected, that they were green and
inexperienced — that is, the officer operators; is that correct?
A. Fighter directors, yes, sir.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 31
466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
43. Q. Was this due to insufficient training or newness on the job?
A. It was newness on the job, sir. The equipment had just been
installed.
44. Q. You spoke of the equipment on ships as being of excellent
efficiency.
A. Yes, sir.
45. Q. At what maximum distance ?
A. The maximum distance "would range between 80 and 140 miles,
depending on the height, sir.
46. Q. With reference to the Army mobile radar equipment, what
was the range of their equipment?
A. Their range was almost the same, but their equipment was much
cruder, much slower to operate. There were many more errors in the
plotting range and azimuth than there was in the shipboard equip-
ment.
[616'] 47. Q. Was it entirely under the control and responsi-
bility of the Army?
A. Yes, sir.
48. Q. Did you have any control or authority beyond your duties
as an instructor or adviser?
A. No, sir, my sole duties w^ere in an advisory capacity.
49. Q. So long as this Army radar equipment w^as operative and
efficient within certain limits, to which you have specified, do you know
why it was not in operation continuously during the critical period in
the days preceding December 7 ?
A. There were two reasons, sir. One reason was the shortage of
personnel to operate twenty-four hours a day. The second reason was
it was shut down by, I am told General Short's orders, to save the
equipment.
50. Q. Well, in view of the fact that personnel might be taken from
other Army organizations, do you not think this w^is so important
that this should have been done in order that they be permanently
manned ?
A. I feel and felt then these stations should have been operating
twenty-four hours a day, and the air warning system fully manned.
51. Q. Do you believe that General Short's orders not to keep in
operation continuously because of the deterioration of equipment was
a sound decision?
A. Not knowing the Army radar materiel conditions in Hawaii, I
would say his decision was not sound.
52. Q. If there was possibility of deterioration of the equipment by
having it in constant operation, w'ould not it have been practicable to
keep half of the system in operation with some degree of efficiency?
A. With some degree of efficiency. There were just enough radar
stations to cover the area of Oahu. Any one set going out w^ould mean
the loss of that coverage.
53. Q. Did you ever make any recommendations with reference to
keeping the Army system in operation ?
A. Yes, sir.
54. Q. What were they?
A. I have a copy of the recommendations I made with me, sir.
55. Q. State briefly what it was and who it was made to?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 467
A. The recommendations were made as a result of a conference held
on November 24, and were made to the Acting Commanding Officer,
Interceptor Command.
56. Q. And that was who ?
A. I can't remember his name now, sir.
[677] 57. Q. Davidson?
A. No, sir. Davidson hadn't come back. He was in the United
States then. The recommendations were also made to Colonel Mur-
phy, who was the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian
Department, who was present; to Lieutenant Commander Coe, who
was liaison officer for Patrol Wing Two, to the 18th Bombardment
Wing, the 14th Pursuit Wing, the Coast Artillery, and to the 86th
Observation Squadron.
58. Q. What is the date of this recommendation ?
A. There is no date on this recommendation, but the copy of the
minutes of the meeting was in the hands of all present within three
days after the 24th of November.
59. Q. Three days after the 24th ?
A. Within three days, yes, sir.
The court then, at 10: 15 a. m., took a recess until 10:25 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; all
the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the
interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel
were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter.
Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, the wit-
ness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and
continued his testimony.
Examined by the judge advocate :
60. Q. What is this document that you have in your possession?
A. This document is a memorandum of the minutes of a meeting
that I called at the information center on Monday, the 24th of
November, 1941. Copies of this memorandum were sent to all pres-
ent. One copy was sent to the Operations Officer on Commander-
in-Chief Pacific Fleet's staff, and one was sent to the Acting Com-
manding Officer, Interceptor Command.
The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge
advocate has examined the document in the possession of the wit-
ness, which he feels contains information that should be before the
court. He therefore recommends to the court that the document be
introduced in evidence for the purpose of reading such extracts
therefrom as may be pertinent to this inquiry, and as the court may
desire to put before it.
The court then, at 10:30 a. m., took a recess until [618]
10:44, at which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel;
all the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of
the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose
counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman fi;:st class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter.
468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, tlie wit-
ness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and
continued his testimony.
Examined by the judge advocate :
61, Q. Commander, at the time you made this memoranda, was
the subject matter of it fresh in your memory?
A. Yes, sir, it was. I wrote it the same day, within two hours of
the meeting.
62, Q. At the time you wrote the memorandum, did you con-
sider it a correct account of the events of that conference?
A, I, did.
The memorandum of the minutes, made by the witness. Com-
mander William E, G, Taylor, U, S, Naval Reserve, of a meeting
called by him on November 24, 1941, at the information center,
Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, was submitted to the interested parties
and to the court and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 62,"
63, Q, Will you read the entire document, please?
Yes, sir.
The witness read the document. Exhibit 62,
l^W] Frank L, Micldleton, yeoman second class, U, S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered, Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Examined by the court :
64, Q, Who called this conference?
A, I called it, sir.
65, Q. It was not at the initiation of the Army at all?
A. No, sir,
66, Q. Was any objection made or disagreements expressed by any
official to whom copies of the memo were given ?
A, No, sir; all were agreed,
67, Q, What action was taken as a result of this conference prior
to December 7, 1941 ?
A, Very little was clone as a result of this conference. We man-
aged to complete our communication lines. We were not able to have
either the Army or the Navy agree on an aircraft identification system.
We were not able to get men to man the information center. We were
able to get no more personnel and the information center more or less
remained as it was on 24 November. The fact that the radar stations
were shut down except for the period of 4 : 00 a. m., to 7 : 00 a. m., made
it impossible to continue to train plotters and operators for more than
three hours a day, which was not enough. That fact alone did more
to slow down the development of the information center than anything
else.
68, Q, Whose responsibility or duty was it to provide the personnel ?
Army or Navy?
A. Except for the Navy liaison officers, it was the Army's duty to
supply personnel.
69, Q, Was a request made upon the proper naval authorities for
the detail of liaison officers?
A, The request was made verbally by me, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 469
70. Q. Upon whom?
A. On Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, staff, and Com 14:'s
chief of staff, and also Admiral Bellinger.
71. Q. Was any reply made or reason given for failure or inability
to supply these liaison officers ?
A. The reply was that in all three places there were no liaison
officers available. The Commander-in-Chief's staff said that they
would order G officers as soon as possible to the information center at
Shafter. This he said after all other sources failed to produce them.
[6£0] 72. Q. There was agreement as to the desirability and
necessity for liaison officers; there was no opposition to the idea?
A. No, sir.
73. Q. Were liaison officers essential to the operation of this radar
by the Army's radar equipment?
A. Not the radar equipment; no, sir. They were necessary in
order to get the information that was needed by the information
center, and also to disseminate it back where it was needed.
74. Q. Then it was strictly the Army's province to get the informa-
tion, and the liaison were only to be used for getting the information
to the Navy ?
A. Yes, sir ; that is, Navy liaison people.
75. Q. But their absence in no way acted against the efficient use of
the radar as such?
A. Their absence didn't affect the use of the radar but their absence,
had the information center been going, would have very definitely
affected the function of the information center.
76. Q. Only insofar as getting the information around was con-
cerned ?
A. The information that we needed from the Navy was just as
important as the information needed from the Army in order to
operate the center. In other words, unless the officers of the different
activities were able to identify the plots on the board from information
that they received from their parent stations, it was impossible for
the information center to operate, so each man was vital to the whole
system.
77. Q. Well, the absence of the liaison officer didn't absolutely
exclude the exchange of information, even though it might have been
slower ?
A. It would be a case, sir, of being slower, but certain information
would never get to the information center that was needed, and impor-
tant information would never go from the information center to the
Navy. As it turned out, inasmuch as there were no liaison officers
down at the information center at all, the absence of the Navy liaison
officers made very little difference.
78. Q. Lieutenant Colonel Tyler, then a lieutenant in the Army, was
sole controller, as I understand it, in the information center from
4 : 00 a. m., until 8 : 00 a. m., on 7 December 1941 ?
A. I don't remember his name, sir, but there was one squadron com-
mander; that was the first time he had [6"21] ever been in the
information center. We were using squadron commanders as the only
source of controllers we could lay our hands on. Unfortunately,
though, they had their squadrons to train which took up by far the
bulk of their time and they would never have worked out satisfactorily
in any case.
470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
79. Q. In consideration of your statement that the Army officer in
charge of the center on the morning of December 7th had not been on
duty in the center before, did the absence of Navy liaison officers in
any way affect the results that were or might have been obtained ?
A. No, sir, I do not believe it would have made much difference.
80. Q. Am I correct in the assumption or the conviction that the
information center simply was not organized and was not functioning
on the morning of December 7th ?
A. Yes, sir.
81. Q. In summation of the reasons which you have given and the
difficulties encountered, was this not due to the fact that the whole
system was in the process of being brought to a state of efficiency?
A. Yes, sir. It could have been made operative sooner had there
been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things we
needed.
82. Q. Where should this impetus have emanated ?
A. It is my opinion it should come from the Hawaiian Department
of the Army.
83. Q. Did you remain on duty with the Hawaiian Department after
the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, I remained with them for at least one month after
December 7th.
84. Q. What was the state of affairs at the end of that month with
regard to the completion of the efficiency of the organization?
A. At the end of that month, well, as a matter of fact, at the end
of 7 days, the information center was running smoothly with impro-
vised methods. We had only one very bad handicap and that was that
the radio equipment was still not adequate for directing the fighters
very far off shore.
85. Q. Was part of the deficiency in personnel supplied by reason
of the unfortunate fact that they were made available because of the
damage to the Ijattleships?
A. It made the liaison officers easier to get.
[G^] 86. Q. Commander, how long were you on duty in
Hawaii ?
A. I don't remember exactly the dates.
87. Q. About when did you report ?
A. I reported out in Hawaii, I would say, the middle of October,
1941. I left on the first of February, 1942.
88. Q. In what capacity were you to act in Hawaii ?
A. The original intention of sending me out was to talk to fighter
squadrons on combat tactics and to talk to the ships' officers on fighter
direction of fighters and to bring back to the Bureau of Aeronautics
whatever information I could pick up on the way it was used.
89. G. Well, then, you were not sent out there as a radar expert
to assist and advise the Army in radar ?
A. No, sir. When I completed my work with the Navy, CincPac
sent a dispatch to Admiral Halsey's staff saying that the Command-
ing General, Hawaiian Air Force, wanted my services as a technical
adviser.
90. Q. And you were so detailed ?
A. I was detailed verbally, sir.
91. Q. As a technical adviser for radar ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 471
A. Yes, sir. To qualify that, I'm not a radar technician. I did
know quite a bit about the air warning system as it should be set up.
92. Q. By whom w^ere you detailed to report to the Commanding
General at Hawaii ?
A. By then Captain R. Davidson.
93. Q. By whose direction?
A. By direction of Admiral Kimmel.
94. Q. As we understand, this request for your detail was made by
the Army?
A. Yes, sir.
95. Q. To the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. Yes, sir.
96. Q. About what time did you assume these special duties?
A. I believe it was somewhere around the second week of November,
sir.
97. Q. What prompted you to call this conference on 2-i November,
1941 ?
A. Mainly the hopelessness of getting the information center or-
ganized without all hands being present or a representative from
each activity being present to discuss the details necessary to set the
information center up. We had been having conferences with every
commander in Hawaii daily which took up a great deal of time, and in
[623] each case we had been able to accomplish practically nothing
because the other activities were absent.
98. Q. But as the court understands it, this radar was a primary
function of the Army ?
A. Yes, sir.
99. Q. And as such you had called the conference to advise and
suggest to them the proper installation and operation of radar in
Hawaii; Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
100. Q. You stated in your testimony that you visited the control
center on the morning of 7 December?
A. Yes, sir.
101. Q. This was the only control center?
A. Yes, sir.
102. Q. Did you meet there the officer in charge of the control
center ?
A. You mean by that, sir. General Davidson ?
103. Q. Lieutenant Tyler.
A. Yes, sir ; I met him there.
104. Q. Did you have any information as to his knowledge of being
the officer in charge of the control center prior to his going on duty ?
A. He was not, in fact, the officer in charge, sir. He was under-
studying the job of controller. There was no officer in charge.
105. Q. But there was no other officer at the control center other
than Lieutenant Tyler; is that correct?
A. That is right, sir.
106. Q. So who was there to instruct him in his duties?
A. That I don't remember, sir.
107. Q. Do you know that there was no other officer there?
A. No, sir, I do not.
108. Q. But you just stated there was no other officer there?
472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I stated I did not know that there were no other officers there.
There was usually a signal corps officer there during all the watches
to instruct the plotters and also instruct the controllers.
109. Q. Upon assuming this duty with the Army, did you make a
general survey of radar equipment of the Army ?
A, No, sir, only of the radar equipment which was installed and
of the actual radar sets that were available.
[62^] 110. Q. And how many of these sets were available?
A. As I remember, there were onlj^ 5 mobile sets available, all 5 of
which were installed.
111. Q. Will you please state where they were installed and in your
opinion were they installed in the best positions?
A. I don't remember the exact location, sir, but in my opinion they
were as well sited as was possible.
112. Q. Were there any permanent radar installations in the Island
of Oahu?
A. No, sir.
113. Q. As we understand, there was no material available to estab-
lish those permanent stations?
A. No, sir. My understanding was that there was no permanent
equipment there and it would take some months to install it had it
been there.
114. Q. Then is the court correct in assuming that the radar equip-
ment of Hawaii was under the direct control of the Army ?
A. Yes, sir.
115. Q. And that prior to December 7, 1941, the establishment of the
control center and the operation of these radar installations was in a
state of being set up to work efficiently ?
A. Yes, sir.
116. Q. In other words, it was in a state of working out the different
problems in order that they might finally have a radar which would
operate efficiently ?
A. Yes, sir.
117. Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
118. Q. Did the Army, to your knowledge, have any officer in the
Hawaiian Department who could have done the same as you did in
attempting to get action toward bringing the radar system to an
operative and efficient condition?
A, They did not have an officer who had the background knowledge
of the information center or the air warning system, but they had
officers in the Hawaiian Department who could have assisted in getting
the action we needed.
119. Q. W^ould it have been necessary to have that knowledge to
get behind this thing and push it along?
A. No, sir.
[62S] 120. Q. There is testimony before this court referring to
two enlisted men in one of the radar stations on the morning of the
attack who got certain results. Can you give us any information
about that?
A. You mean the report that the radar operator picked the report
up and passed it on to the information center where the report was
ignored ; is that it?
' PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 473
121. Q. Yes.
A. The radar operators who were being trained and picked up the
raid, which was normally to be expected, the information was passed
into the information center where the plotters, as I remember, were
t hen off duty. The plotters were only supposed to be on duty between
the same hours that the radar stations were operating. Therefore,
at 7 : 00 a. m., the regular plotters and the information center itself
was due to close down. Had the information been properly plotted
it would have been impossible to decide whether the plots picked up by
the radar station were a Japanese raid, an air group from one of our
own carriers, or some planes being ferried in from the United States.
As a matter of fact, at that time, at the time of the raid, there were
American bombers that came in from the States. But without some
method of identifying the planes that came in, no one could have told
wdiether the planes were friend or foe, and therefore no action would
have been taken. In other words. Until better organization had been
planned between the Army and the Navy for aircraft identification
and aircraft reporting, with all their liaison officers in position, the
information that was picked up by the radar station was of no value
to anybody.
122. Q. The spotting of those planes on the morning of the 7th
of December was not dependent, as we understand it, upon informa-
tion from the Navy, was it? It was simply a spot or a pip on the
radar machine?
A. That is true, sir, but without the Army and Navy working to-
gether a system to identify those planes coming in, it would have to
be assumed that they were friendly. The information center is set
up with its Army and Navy liaison officers for the single purpose of
identifying the planes that are coming in. After that time, when one
of our carriers was sending in its air group, the information was
immediately telephoned in by direct line to the naval liaison officer
giving us the direction from which they were coming, when the raid
then appeared on the board, and the naval liaison immediately identi-
fied it, and when the Army planes were coming in they were immedi-
ately identified by the Navy liaison officers. Any which were not
identified had to i3e accepted as hostile, and immediately when they
were intercepted as hostile, the air raid siren went on for people to
take cover.
[626] 123. Q. If this radar had been properly set up and had
been running efficiently, the man who discovered the spot or the plot
of these planes, it would have been his duty to report it immediately
to find out whether or not they were expected, or friendly planes; is
that correct ?
A. Yes, sir. He would call immediately on the Army and Navy
liaison officer to get them to identify the raid. If they were not able
to, then they would check back to the flying activities to check again.
124. Q. Even in the absence of a naval liaison officer, is it not a
fact that the flight of a group of B-l7s from San Francisco could have
been identified by an Army officer as a friendly flight which still would
not have determined the fact that there were enemy planes en route ?
A. Yes, sir.
125. Q. Referring to the Roberts Report, which is a public docu-
ment, the findings thereof. The statement is made that on November
474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27, 1941, there was siifRcient partially trained personnel available to
operate the aircraft warning system throughout 24 hours of the day,
as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of nearly 360 degrees
around Oahu could have been covered. Will you comment on that
with regard to the complete accuracy of the statement, as well as to
the possible efficiency of the system had it been able to be fully
manned ?
A. Tlie first part of the statement is definitely untrue. There were
not sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar
station, even partially, at any time. The radar equipment was posi-
tioned in such a way that we could get fairly good 360 degree coverage
around the Island of Oahu. There were times when planes could
come in undetected, btit not very often. But I believe in no case could
a large raid come in undetected.
126. Q. As I understand it, the manning of a station for 24 hours,
consistently for 24 hours, would have been for the purpose of rectify-
ing the deficiencies in training. Isn't that what you said ?
A. You could train your people during the daytime to operate 24
hours a day, but the point was to get thfe system going smoothly so
that it would work day and night, which takes a regular watch right
aroimd the clock. But at the time of December 7th, there was not one
complete or even partially trained team.
127. Q. It was a question, then, of the completion of the entire
system so that the several parts would operate together efficiently ?
A. Yes, sir.
[6£7] 128. Q. Had all these mobile radars been in top efficient
condition they still could not have been operated continuously because
of untrained personnel ; is that right ?
A. Yes, sir.
129. Q. At the time you began your contact with the Army were
there in evidence any efforts to organize the information center and
bring it to an efficient working condition ?
A. By two very junior officers, sir. One was the operations officer
for the Interceptor Command, Captain Berquist of the Fourteenth
Pursuit Wing, and a captain of the Signal Corps, whose name I
cannot remember, both of whom had been to the information center
school at Mitchel Field and both of whom were very eager to get
the information center set up, and I think it was at Captain Ber-
quist's request that I was asked for from the Navy. The two of
them worked very hard and tirelessly the entire time with me in
trying to get the information center operating, but they did not have
enough force to get what they needed from the various commands
to get the station operating.
130. Q. Before you entered into the picture they did make every
effort to get some action ?
A. Yes, sir.
131. Q. When was the temporary information center building com-
pleted and ready for operation, including the internal equipment?
A. The temporary information center was completed, except for
communications, radio and telephone, within two or three days of
my reporting to the Army wdiich, as I remember, was in the second
week of November.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 475
132. Q. When was the permanent, bomb-proof station completed?
A. The bomb-proof information center was still not completed
when I left the Islands in February, 1942.
133. Q. Were the communication facilities in the temporary station
completed before you left the Islands?
A. Yes, sir, they were completed except for the civilian air warn-
ing system and for the lines to several fighter squadron dispersal
points before December 7th.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
])revious questioning.
[62S~\ The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Joseph L. Lockard, First Lieutenant, Signal Corps, Esler Field,
Louisiana.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the morning of 7 De-
cember, 1941, prior to the hour of 0800?
A. I was that morning assigned as an operator on the 270 unit.
3. "\\liatisa270unit?
A. Radar unit, sir.
4. Q. "\Yliere was this radar unit located ?
A, In the northern portion of Oahu, at a site called Opana.
5. Q. What was the altitude of your operating antenna at Opana?
A. Approximately 230 feet, sir.
6. Q. What sector of a circle could you cover with your operating
set without interference from such obstacles as land or buildings?
A. Due to the nature of the equipment we got interference from
all sections. However, Ave could cover 180 degrees easily.
7. Q. That is, 180 degrees of a complete circle?
A. Yes, sir.
8. Q. And in what direction was this sector of a circle of 180
degrees?
A. From approximately northeast to west. '
9. Q. Was this in a direction through north? , ,
A. Yes, sir, we could cover north.
10. Q. What orders or instructions had you received as to what
duties you were to perform while at this station on the morning of
7 December 1941 ?
A. Our orders were to operate the equipment from 4: 00 until 7 : 00
a. m.
[629] 11. Q. Had you received any other instructions as to
exactly what to do while so operating ?
A. Normal procedure was to track for flights and intercept them and
report them to the center, the information center.
476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12. Q. You had no other instructions as to the operation of your
set, in regard to picking up flights ?
A. No specific instructions, no, sir.
13. Q. Then will you tell what your routine of operations was
between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 a. m. ? How did you proceed ?
A. At 4 : 00 o'clock we would put the equipment into operation and
all planes that were intercepted would be plotted and their coordinates
reported by telephone to the information center,
14. Q. Will you tell us the exact procedure you followed at the
radar station in Opana where you were stationed; that is, did you
make a plot there of the location of any objects you picked up with your
radar ?
A. Yes, sir. We kept an overlay and we also kept a log.
15. Q. And do I understand you to say that in addition to making
this plot and keeping a log, you telephoned certain information to the
information center?
A. All information was telephoned, sir. The overlay was merely to
reduce the azimuth and range to grid coordinates.
16. Q. Then what information were you in the habit of telephoning
from your station at Opana to the information center?
A. The exact coordinates of the plane, or whatever the object hap-
pened to be, and any other information that the station might ask of us
which we could supply.
17. Q. Wliat system of coordinates were you using?
A. Regular Army grid, sir.
18. Q. What was the organization of this radar post at which you
were stationed ?
A. We were a detachment of a company, which was the designation
of SCWH, which was under the platoon leader, who was located at
Kawailoa.
19. Q. Who was in charge of this post where you were stationed at
Opana ; I mean, physically present and in charge on the morning of 7
December 1941 ?
A. You see, sir, we didn't live at that site. We lived about 10 miles
away at Kawailoa.
[630] 20. Q. I will ask you the question in this way : Who was
the senior person present at the Opana radar station on the morning
of 7 December 1941?
A. I was, sir.
21. Q. What was your rank at that time ?
A. I was a third class specialist.
22. Q. There were no commissioned officers at this post at this time?
A. Not on that morning, sir.
23. Q. Do I understand that your unit at the time in question was
a part of the aircraft warning system in Oahu ?
A, Yes, sir.
24. Q. What sort of communication did you have with the infor-
mation center?
A. Telephone communication, sir. We also had an auxilliary radio
station.
25. Q. What method of communication were you using on the
morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. Telephone, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 477
26. Q. Was this communication functioning efficiently at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
27. Q. Will .you state what your experience was prior to the morning
of 7 December 1941 in connection with radar operation?
A. I had ojDerated the sets ever since we put them into operation in
August, 1941,
28. Q. Had you been given any instruction in the theory of elec-
tronics or radar?
A. A bare smattering.
29. Q. Do you consider that you were a qualified operator from a
practical point of view as of 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir.
30. Q. How would your set make the operator aware of the presence
of aircraft?
A. By producing what we call echoes on the face of the oscillo-
scope.
31. Q. Were these echoes visual or sonic?
A. Visual.
[6S1] 32. Q. Can you state how far away from your radar set
on this particular morning you estimate you could pick up a single
operating aircraft ?
A. That can't be stated definitely, sir.
33. Q. Approximately?
A. It is quite variable. The nature of the equipment was such that,
subject to change in its efficiency, it was a rather crude construction
at tliat time and produced variances in the tuning.
34. Q. Let us take a specific example. Suppose you had a flight
of aircraft at a distance of 100 miles under the conditions that existed
on the morning of 7 December 1941. Do you have any estimate of the
number of planes that would have to be in that flight for you to have
detected it as such?
A. It was possible to pick up one plane at that distance, and it was
also sometimes im])ossible to pick up three or four. It is too incon-
sistent to give a definite answer.
35. Q. In other words, you can't answer that question specifically?
A. No, sir.
36. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, had you been given any
information prior to 0800 as to the movement of any friendly aircraft
in the area ?
A. No, sir.
37. Q. Did you have any means of know^ing when you detected an
aircraft, by means of your radar equipment, whether or not this
aircraft was friend or foe?
A. Not at that time, sir ; no.
38. Q. What was the length of your tour of duty on the morning of
7 December 1941 ?
A. 0400 to 0700.
39. Q. What did you do after 0700 ?
A. We continued to operate the equipment, sir.
40. Q. Was this done by any specific order ?
A. No, sir.
41. Q. Did you get permission to operate it, or how did you happen
to continue operations after 0700?
478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Operating with me that morning was Sergeant Elliott, who
was rather new to the organization and who we were trying to train
as an operator. The truck to take us to Kawailoa had not arrived
and probably wouldn't arrive for some time so we decided it would
be an opportunity for him to operate the equipment.
[632'] 42. Q. How much experience had Sergeant Elliott had
up until this particular moment you are speaking about in radar
operation ?
A. Well, sir, he came to us from the Air Corps. The first occasion
I had to meet him was when we moved to Opana, which was in
November, aroun^i Thanksgiving.
43. Q. Had he been under instruction at this station from the time
he arrived around Thanksgiving up until the time of the Japanese
attack on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir.
[633] Frederick T. Lacliat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
44. Q. Did you consider him a qualified operator as of the morning
of December 7, 1941?
A. That is a personal opinion.
45. Q. That is what I am asking for.
A. No, sir.
46. Q. Had you picked up any important aircraft contacts prior to
0700 on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
A. No, sir.
47. Q. Did you make any contacts after that time?
A. Yes, sir.
48. Q. Will you state what this contact was and what you did ?
A. We discovered an unusually large response about 0702 at 136
miles in a northerly direction. It was so large, in fact, that I checked
the equipment to determine wiiether it w^as the fault of the equipment
or actually a flight of some sort. We finally decided to call when they
had come in to 132 miles.
49. Q. Whom did you call ?
A. I was tracking the flight, and I instructed Private Elliott to call
the information center and see if there was anyone around.
50. Q. Sergeant Elliott is the one who actually talked to the infor-
mation center?
A. He talked to them initially, yes, sir.
51. Q. What was the official report, if you know it, that Sergeant
Elliott made from Opana to the information center about this flight
you have just described ?
A. The only person he could get was the switchboard operator,
whom we happened to know. We asked him to look around and see
if there wasn't someone in the information center to whom we could
talk. We told the operator what we had thought we had seen. He
left his switchboard and located a person in the information center.
This information was passed on to the person in the information center
there, but the exact conversation I can't recall. I do know that we were
not satisfied with the response, so I got on the 'phone and I asked the
switchboard operator to call this person to the telephone, which he did.
[634-] 62. Q. Did the person whom you got on the telephone
identify himself ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 479
A. The switchboard operator told me he was the liaison officer, and
that is as much as I knew.
53. Q. You do not know whether he was Army or Navy or what
his position was? Do you know anything about him other than the
fact that you had information that he was a liaison officer?
A. I think at the time he was mentioned he was Army Air Corps.
54. Q. Had you asked for the officer in charge of the information
center ?
A. I asked for whoever was there, and apparently there was no one
there with this station.
55. Q. Will you state what conversation you had with this person
who identified himself as the liaison officer?
A. I can't quote it word for word, but I gave the information as to
distance, apparent size, and direction.
56. Q. What was this information that you gave him?
A. I told him that we had an unusually large flight — in fact, the
largest I had ever seen on the equipment — coming in from almost due
north at 130 some miles.
57. Q. What response did you get from this so-called liaison
officer ?
A. No response which was very satisfactory.
58. Q. What happened? Did he hang up the telephone? Was that
the end of the conversation?
A. I think I repeated the information, and he then terminated the
conversation.
59. Q. Didn't he say anything? Can't you be more specific ?
A. I can't honestly be specific on that, because I do not recall.
60. Q. Did you continue to keep this flight target on your radar?
A. Yes, sir.
(Jl. Q. For how long a period of time did this tracking continue?
A. We tracked it in to within a neighborhood of twenty miles of
the Island. At that time we lost it in the permanent distortion we had,
due to bad echoes from the mountains surrounding us.
[6S6] G2. Q. Can you state exactly where on the island of Oahu
the radar station Opana, at which you were posted, is located ?
A. It is located practically on {in artillery marker on the north-
western tip, ten miles north of Kawailoa and'just back inland a little
way from Kawela Bay.
63. Q. What did this middle plot that you got at twenty miles away
indicate to you as an operator ?
A. As far as the disappearance was concerned, we were accustomed
to that due to this distortion that we had, and it only indicated that
it had come within such a range of the island that we could no longer
track it through the distortion.
64. Q. Did you make any attempt to search visually to see whether
or not you could see the object of your radar search at a distance of
twenty miles?
A. We did when we closed up the station but not at the immediate
time of their disappearance.
65. Q. From your experience in operating the station at Opana,
Avould the confusion of the radar plot w^hich you got indicate a dis-
appearance of planes behind a land area?
A. I don't quite comprehend. !• ■ ; , i ' .
480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The question was repeated.
A. No, sir. The planes were not behind a land area. They were
still at sea, but the distortion produced by the surrounding mountains
completely obliterated our view of that section.
66. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an enemy
attack on the island of Oahu on the morning of December 7 ?
A. When we got to Kawailoa. I imagine it was around 8 : 30.
67. Q. At that time you had secured your station at Opana?
A. Yes. By "secured" you mean, closed the station?
68. Q. Yes. What did you do subsequent to receiving this infor-
mation at that time?
A. We had breakfast and went back to the unit immediately. The
remainder of our crew had gone up to the unit as we were coming
down. It was already in operation when we got there, and we con-
tinued to keep it on twenty-four hour operation from then until I
left.
[6S6] 69. Q. At what time did you arrive back at your unit at
Opana ?
A. About 9 : 30, 1 imagine, or 9 : 10.
70. Q. Did you personally observe any plots made of aircraft re-
tiring from the island of Oahu?
A. Yes, sir, there was an enormous amount of activity in the sta-
tion as we opened it. It was going every which way — away from it
and back to it.
71. Q. Did you identify any planes retiring from Oahu at a dis-
tance, let us say, in excess of fifty miles ?
A. I can't answer positively.
72. Q. Do you recall whether or not an effort was being made to
track retiring planes from Oahu at that time ?
A. Yes, sir, they were covering more than their sector in order to
get every bit of information they could.
73. Q, How long did you remain in that radar station on December
7, 1941, after you reported back there and subsequent to having had
your breakfast ?
A. We stayed there from then on. We moved our camp then to
right at the spot of the unit itself.
74. Q. Did you during the daylight of December 7, 1941, see any
plot that was made of retiring planes from Oahu ?
A. I can't answer that with any amount of certainty.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
75. Q. You said in your testimony that you picked up this flight
about 0702 and tracked it until it was about twenty miles from the
station. To the best of your belief, about what time did you lose
that flight in the distortion? Was it a half hour later or an hour
later?
A. In the neighborhood of 7 : 30, 1 should say.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
76. Q. How many people were working in your unit prior to 7
o'clock ?
A. You mean right at the station?
77. Q. That is right.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 481
A. There were two of us.
78. Q. You and Elliott?
A. Yes, sir.
[637] 79. Q. Did you have any regulations as to the number
of people who were required to operate that unit?
A. No, sir.
80. Q. Hadn't three people been the usual quota for operation?
A. Three had been what we had been using on a shift.
81. Q. When did you change from three to two?
A. You see, sir, that Sunday morning
82. Q. Was that morning the first morning that there had been but
two operating that unit ?
A. No, sir, it wasn't.
83. Q. How manv times before had there been only two operating
it? ^
A. I can't recall, but I know we had operated it with two before.
84. Q. Did the third one have any specific duties or assignments in
connection with the operation?
A. Yes, sir, he was the motor man. He maintained and operated
the generator — the Leroy engine and the generator.
85. Q. As a i-esult of his being absent, you and Elliott had to do that
in addition to what you were otherwise supposed to do ?
A. Yes, sir.
86. Q. I gathered from the way you answered the question that
there was some connection between the fact that this was Sunday
morning and that there were but two people there; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
87. Q. What is that explanation?
A. 1 would rather not answer it.
The court directed the Avitness to answer.
A. Very few people like to get up at 4 o'clock on Sunday morning.
88. Q. Was there someone else ordered to be there that Sunday
morning?
A. No, sir, it was arranged within the crew that the two of us
should operate that Sunday.
89. Q. Did any officer approve that arrangement?
A. I really don't know, sir.
[6SS] 90. Q. As senior member of the crew, did you report the
arrangement to any officer ?
A. Mv name appeared on the roster to work that day, along with
Elliott's, and that is what I did.
91. Q. Did the name of anvone else a])i)ear on the roster to work that
day?
A. No, sir, Elliott and myself.
92. Q. Who made up the roster?
A. That I don't know, sir.
93. Q. Was it an officer?
A. I can't say, sir.
94. Q. The roster was posted on some bulletin board?
A. It was a roster figuratively only. I was told.
95. Q. Who stated that you and" Elliott would be the onlv ones
there?
A. My senior non-com.
79716— 4G~-Ex. 14C. vol. 1 32
482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
96. Q. Who was he?
A. Sergeant Murphy.
97. Q. How long did you stay in the island of Oahu after Decem-
ber 7?
A. I left the island the 22nd of February. .
98. Q. Did you testify before the Roberts Commission?
A. No, sir.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
99. Q. Who did you say was responsible, if you did, for seeing that
the station was manned in accordance with the roster ?
A. Lieutenant Kasaros, who was in charge of the unit at that time
and had been since we moved it to Opana.
100. Q. What means did he use for seeing that the station was
properly manned in accordance with the orders ?
A. Well, sir, we had six men to operate the unit, and we were di-
vided into shifts of three, which gave us two shifts. It was decided
beforehand which three men would be in each shift, and since there
were only two shifts and six men, we didn't keep a written roster, but
rotated our hours dependent upon who
[639] 101. Q. Was it left to the men to get there without any
check-up to see that they were on the job?
A. I suppose so, sir.
102. Q. You don't know?
A. No.
103. When were you first detailed for duty on that station? Not
that morning but the first time you were detailed for duty ?
A. I helped move the station to its location there and helped erect
it there.
104. Q. About what date ?
A. About Thanksgiving — in November.
105. Q. That had been your duty since that time up to December 7?
A. The operation, yes, sir,
106. Q. What did you say were the s]Decified hours for duty at this
station in the morning?
A. On Sunday, sir ?
107. Q. Any day?
A. We had a different schedule for Sunday.
108. Q. Upon the morning of December 7?
A. From 0400 until 0700.
109. Q. The place where you lived was ten miles from this station ?
A. Approximately, yes, sir.
110. Q. How did you .get back and forth?
A. By truck.
111. Q. What time did tl>e truck call, as a rule?
A. Shortly after seven usually.
112. Q, What time did the truck get there that morning?
A, Rather late, sir,
113. Q, Was that the reason then, you happened to be at the station
at the time you picked up the flight?'
A. Yes, one of the reasons.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 483
114. Q. If the truck had been on time, you would have been on your
way to breakfast ?
[640] ' 115. Q. Were the hours 0400 to 0700 on Sunday different
from the hours on any other day of the week?
A. Yes, sir, throu|i;h the week we operated a normal w^orking day..
116. Q. With the radar set in operation and in connection with
the installation center?
A. Yes, sir.
117. Q. Not twenty-four hours?
A. No, a regular working day from seven in the morning until five
in the evening.
118. Q. In other words, if this attack had come on any day but
Sunday, the full system would have been in operation ?
A. Yes, sir.
119. Q. At 0702?
A. Yes, sir.
120. Q. In connection with the statement you just made to the effect
that if the truck had been on time, you would not have been at the
station at the time you picked up the flight, had you made any request
to iDe allowed to remain at that station that morning after 7 o'clock?
A. No, sir.
121. Q. You never made such a request?
A. No, sir.
122. Q. You have stated that you picked up this large flight of
planes at about 0702 on the morning of December 7, 1941; is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
123. Q. What was the estimated distance at that time of these
planes from Oahu ?
A. 136 miles.
124. Q. Did you immediately report this to the communications
center?
A. Not immediately, sir, no. .
125. Q. How long?
A. The time it takes a plane to travel four miles. It was just a
short period of time — just long enough for me to make a check or two.
126. Q. Then you reported it to the communications center?
A. Yes, sir.
[64J] 127. Q. As we understand, you did not know the officer
to whom you were speaking at the communications center?
A. No, sir.
128. Q. Have you stated that you had no knowledge that morning
of any flight of planes from the mainland to Oahu ?
A. Yes, sir.
129. Q. You had no knowledge?
A. I had no knowledge.
130. Q. Were you aware of the fact that music was playing all
night at Hawaii, and did that have any bearing on your informa-
tion of that morning?
A. I had no knowledge of that.
131. Q. The testimony before this court is that when a flight of
friendly planes was expected, music would be played all night in
Hawaii. Did you know aiiything about that ?
484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No.
132. Q. What time did you get to your station on the morning
of December 7?
A. We went up the night before.
133. Q. Were you up and on the job at 4 o'clock?
A. Yes, sir.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
134. Q. Do I understand that this Sunday morning, the 7th of
December, was the first day that the Opana station had been oper-
ated, beginning at 4 o'clock in the morning?
A. I don't think I said that.
135. Q. How long had it been operating from four in the morning
prior to December 7 ?
A. The Sunday prior to that, it was operating from four until
seven.
136. Q. Did it operate week days from four to seven?
A. No, sir, week days from seven to five in the afternoon.
137. Q. Sundays only —
A. Sundays and holidays only from four to seven.
[64^] Reexamined by the judge advocate :
138. Q. You have stated that there were six men for the detail at
Opana and that you had divided yourself up into two sections for
the purpose of standing the watches at this radar station; is that
correct ?
A. Yes, sir.
139. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, there were two men
from your section on watch. Sergeant Elliott and yourself; is that
correct ?
A. Yes, sir.
140. Q. Now, where was this other person who was in your sec
tion at this time?
A. He was off duty, sir.
141. Q. On Sunday, December 7, 1941, what did the other section
do that did not stand duty ?
A. They were off duty on Sunday.
142. Q. They had no duties to perform at the radar station at
Opana on Sunday, December 7, 1941 ?
A. No, sir.
143. Q. Well, on week days, when you stood your duties through-
out the day, as you liave testified, how did these two sections stand
the duty? '
A. Each group of three — There Avas no set procedure, sir. We
would have four hours at a trick, and the next group would have
four hours at ;i trick. That completed the eight-hour day. That
was not hidebound.
144. Q. According to your method of taking this duty, there was
always a section of three on post ?
A. Yes, sir.
145. Q. From your experience in standing these duties, do you
think it would have been possible for your two sections to have stood
continuous duty throughout the twenty-four hours?
A. Not over a very long period of time. We operated like that
immediately after.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 485
146. Q. How loiifj do you think you could have operated on a
24-hour basis with the six men you had available ? How many days
in succession?
A. It would depend upon the extent of the endurance of the men.
147. Q. Did you have an estimate of what this endurance might
A. Well, sir, we operated for a week under similar conditions,
but in addition to the operation, we were also pulling guard, so
that is not a fair estimate of the endurance.
[6/^3] Kecross-examined bv the interested party. Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
148. Q. The Roberts Report at page 11, paragraph 13, states: "On
November 27, 1D41, in connection with the order for alert No. 1, the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department ordered that this
system be operated each day during the period from 4 to 7 a. m." Did
you have any knowledge of the issuance of such orders on the 27th
of November ?
A. No, sir, I did not.
149. Q. Your station in Opana was not operated each day after
November 27 from 4 to 7 a. m.?
A. No, sir.
Reexamined by the court :
150. Q. Do you know why this station of yours was operated from
7 a. m. to 5 p. m. week days and from 4 to 7 a. m. on Sundaj^s ?
A. No, sir.
151. Q. In other words, you have no reason to know why it was
()j)erated at different hours on Sunday from what it was operated
during week days?
A. That is right.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all
the interested parties and their counsel with the exception of the inter-
ested parties. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), whose counsel were present.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
[€44] A witness called by the jud,ge advocate entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your mime, rank, and present station?
A. George E. Elliott, sergeant, headquarters company, station
complement. Camp Lee, Virginia.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the morning of
December 7, 1941?
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I was performing two dutiefe, sir, at the same time. I was on
guard from 12 o'cJcck noon, the Saturday before December 7; that is,
it was not a walking guard post. It w^as just for security purposes,
because it w^as just peace time at that time. My first duty was the
operation of the radar equipment from 4 o'clock in the morning of
7 December until 7 o'clock that morning. My duty was plotter.
3. Q. Will you state where this station was located where you were
performing this duty on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
A. It was at the north end of the island near Kahuku Point. The
name of the station was Opana. The call sign was 6QN.
4. Q. On what island was this station located ?
A, On the island of Oahu.
5. Q. Territory of Hawaii ?
A. Yes, sir.
6. Q. Will you state what your duties as plotter consisted of on this
morning ?
A. As soon as the scope operator picked up the target, he would
say "Target" and give me the range. I would take the azimuth from
the antenna. By taking the azimuth from the antenna and having
the plotting board, I was able to locate the position of aircraft as to
the direction in which it was approaching the island.
7. Q. Did this plot you have told us about consist of some sort of
chart of the island of Oahu with the surrounding water areas ?
A. Yes, sir.
8. Q. How did you put this plot on the map or chart?
A. There is a map of the islands. The center point of the compass
is the point of the location of our unit, and the radius rule has the
mileage compiled on that map. The zero point, true north on the
map, is zeroed with the antenna, and as you rotate the radius to the
degree that you [^4^] received and the mileage, you make a
point, and that will be the exact position on the map where the target
is located in relation to the islands.
9. Q. Did you do anything with this information which you re-
ceived in making this plot, other than plot it yourself?
A. This plot was not taken during our regular program. It was
after 7 o'clock.
10. Q. I have not asked you about any particular one. This is just
general.
A. Yes, sir. Since our operating problem was over and there was
no one on the other end of the head set that the plotter has
11. Q. I have not asked you about any particular time or plot. I
am asking you what your custom was in the station when you re-
ceived a radar contact and when you plotted it yourself. Was it your
custom then to do something else with the information you had in the
way of passing it on ?
A. I misunderstood you completely. From the time I made out
the plot, I would send it in over the plotter head set to the informa-
tion center. The information would go directly to the information
center.
12. Q. Who received this information on the other end, if you
know?
A. Yes, sir, I do know. The plotter on the other end that would
plot on the board at the main information center.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 487
13. Q. Had you received any instructions as to how your duties
were to be performed?
A. Yes, sir.
14. Q. Were they given to yon in written or oral form ?
A. Oral form.
15. Q. Were those instructions materially different from what you
have already testified your duties were?
A. No, sir.
16. Q. Now, what was the organization of this post at Opana where
you were stationed on the morning of December 7, 1941, with respect
to personnel?
A. Well, sir, our detachment was located at Kawailoa with another
unit. Kawailoa was about nine miles from the position where the
detector was. We had no camp at the detector. The organization of
the — that is, the title was the Signal Company Aircraft Warning,
Hawaii, with their headquarters at Fort Shafter.
[64-6] 17. Q. I am afraid that you have not understood my
question. What was the organization of this particular duty station
or radar plot at which you were stationed at about 0700 on December
7, 1941 ?
A. There were only two men there : Private Locard and myself.
18. Q. You have described the duties to which you were assigned
at that station at that time. What were Locard's duties?
A. Private Locard's duties were to operate the scope, thereby giv-
ing me the information for my plots.
19. Q. How much instruction had you had in the duties that you
were performing prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. Between a week and a half to two weeks. That is for the plot-
ting.
20. Q. Do you feel that you were at that time perfectly competent
to perform the duties that had been assigned you?
A. Very definitely, sir.
21. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, had you had any in-
formation of the movement of friendly aircraft in the vicinity of
Oahu?
A. No, sir, none whatsoever.
22. Q. I ask you specifically. Did you know of a flight of B-l7's
coming to Oahu from the mainland?
A. No, sir.
23. Q. At what time did you arrive at the Opana station for the
purpose of assuming the duties to which you were assigned between
four and seven on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
A. The time we arrived at the unit at Opana was 12 o'clock noon,
December 6. From that time we were expected to be there for a 24-
hour tour of duty, as I said, for security reasons. Within that time,
from four to seven in the morning, we were to operate our problem.
Actually, we were there from December 6 at 12 o'clock noon.
24. Q. Had you been performing duties during this period of time,
from 0400 to 0700 in the morning, on the days preceding December 7,
1941?
A. No, sir, not operating duties.
25. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, at what hours during the day
were you performing regularly assigned duties at the Opana station ?
488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Well, usually, sir, during the late morning or early afternoon.
That, sir, was when I was receiving my training as a plotter. There
were no scheduled hours.
[647] 26. Q. There were no scheduled hours ?
A. No, sir, there were no scheduled hours.
27. Q. Was the period from four to seven on December 7, 1941, a
schedule of operation at Opana ?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
28. Q. Do you know of any reason why this should have been a
scheduled period on that morning?
A. No, sir, other than the fact that it w^as just a problem and that
we knew at that time that all the plots we sent in were being recorded
and checked. That is the only assumption that we had as to our opera-
tion.
29. Q. But that period from four to seven in the morning was the
first time that you stood a tour of duty that early ?
A. That is the first time I ever stood one. They had previously other
men operating from four to seven.
80. Q. Had you been at Opana station daily for a number of days
prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir.
31. Q. Sunday, December 7, was the first morning that you had per-
formed duties between the hours of four and seven ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct.
32. Q. For a few days preceding December 7, 1941, the duties that
you performed at this station were done at some other period of time
during the day?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. Were the times for performing these duties specifically pre-
scribed as to some particular period during the day, or was it rather
discretionary as to when you performed the duties ?
A. I can't remember exactly, sir. I don't believe there were any pre-
scribed times.
34. Q. Adverting to the morning of December 7, 1941, did anything
out of the ordinary come to your attention after 0700 on that morning ?
A. Yes, sir.
35. Q. Will you state what it was ?
A. While I was at the scope receiving instructions as to its operation.
Private Locarcl noticed a large echo on the scope. He was looking over
my shoulder and could see it also. At first Private Locard thought it
was the main pulse and that the mileage scale was off kilter. Checking
the mileage scale, I found that it was actually a flight out at a distance
of 137.
\648] 36. Q. On what bearing?
A. At 2 degrees, sir.
37. Q. By true azimuth ?
A. Yes, sir. Our maps were lined up by true azimuth.
38. Q. Can you recall the time of this observation ?
A. Yes, sir, the time by our clock was two minutes after seven. How-
ever, sir, at the time I was notified to close down at the end of our
scheduled problem, the time by our clock was 0654, and actually when I
sent in the reading to the information center over the administrative
line, it was about 0706, but in explaining it to him I gave the reading as
of 0702.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 489
39. Q. When you received this information to which you have testi-
fied, was a plot made in Opana in accordance with what you said was
your custom ?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
40. Q. Who made this plot?
A. I made the plot, sir.
41. Q. "WHio did the talkin<^ between the station at Opana and the
information center?
A. I did, sir, the very first time. You see, sir, at that time, and after
Ave picked up the flight and after recording- it on the plotting table, 1
suggested to Private Locard that we send it in to our information
center. At that time Private Locard laughed at me and told me I was
crazy for wanting to do it. I kept talking of this flight that we had
received and even mentioned the fact that if it was Navy planes coming
to the islands, if the Army were to send up interceptors, it would make
a very fine problem. After speaking of it for some time, he told me
to go"ahead and send it in if I liked. At that time I tried to get the
information center over the i)lotter's head set, and there was nobody
there, so I called on the administrative line and spoke to the switch-
board operator, who was Private McDonald. I explained to him what
we had found, although I can't remember whether I gave the actual
reading, that is, the code reading and location. I know that I gave
the mileage and bearing, but I'm not sure of the other. After explaining
to Private McDonald what Private Locard and I had found. Private
McDonald stated that he did not know what to do about it, that there
was nobody in the information center. I asked Private McDonald to
get somebody who would know what to do, so with that I hung up, and
Private McDonald called back the unit a few minutes later with the
officer that was mentioned in the Roberts Report. I don't know his
name, sir, but Locard jncked up the 'phone and talked to the officer
that was calling through Private McDonald's efforts, and that is when
the officer told Private Locard that there was nothing to it and to forget
it.
[649] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frederick T. Latchat. yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
42. Q. How do you know what this officer on the other end of the
telephone told then Private Locard ?
A. The only way I know, sir, is by Private Locard relaying it to me.
43. Q. Were any succeeding plots made of this flight of aircraft
that w^as discovered at 0702 on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, I might mention, sir, that after receiving the telephone
call from the officer, Private Locard wanted to shut down and I in-
sisted on operating, and we followed the flight all the way in, taking
readings every three to six minutes. I would say, to complete the flight
all the way in to about fifteen or twenty-five miles off the island of
Oahu, at which time, due to land obstructions on the oscilloscope, it
was impossible to follow the flight any further.
44. Q. Was this plot recorded in any manner, a i)ermanent record
could have been kept of it ?
A. Yes, sir.
45. Q. Do you know^ what happened to this ])lot?
A. You mean the chart, sir?
4G. Q. The chart, the plot that you made.
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes, sir, a very few daj^s after December 7, it was around De-
cember 9 — from the information that I heard it wasn't definite — the
chart and the record of reading sheet was turned into Army G-2,
Military Intelligence.
47. Q. You have no personal knowledge of this yourself, except by
hearsay ?
A. Yes, sir.
48. Q. After the initial telephone report that you have stated you
made and the reply that then Sergeant Locard received from some one
in the information center, were any further conversations — were there
any further conversations between your post at Opana and the infor-
mation center relative to these plots that you were receiving at that
time?
A. None other, sir, than a personal telephonic conversation be-
tween Private Locard and Private McDonald. I might mention, sir,
that in correction of your statement. Private Locard, the one you
referred to, at the time was not sergeant. At the time he was private
third class, specialist.
49. Q. Then so far as your information goes, no further reports
were made from Opana to the information relative to [650] this
flight of planes ?
A. No, sir, there were not.
50. Q. Had any suggestion been made by either you or Private
Locard as to the desirability of keeping the information center in-
formed ?
A. No, sir, there was not, because it was understood that there was
nobody at the information center to receive our plots if we could
send them in.
51. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an attack
by an enemy force on the island of Oahu ?
A. At 7 : 45, Private Locard and I were relieved from our duty at
Opana by Private Lawrence and Private Hodges. The driver of the
truck that came to Opana was Private Farmbeck. Private Farmbeck
took us to our camp, which is nine miles from Opana, and upon our
arrival at the camp we found the Japs were bombing Pearl Harbor.
52. Q. About what hour of the day was this when you arrived back
at camp?
A. It was somewheres near 8 : 00 o'clock, sir. There was a highway
to the camp, although it took at least five to eight minutes to climb
down the mountain to get to the highway. It was somewhere very
close to 8 : 00 o'clock, sir, as I remember it.
53. Q. Did you return to the Opana station on 7 December, 1941?
A. Yes, sir. Our purpose for going back to camp was to get break-
fast. However, we didn't eat breakfast. We packed our field bags
and went right back to Opana.
54. Q. What time did you arrive back at Opana on the morning of
7 December 1941, if you did get back there?
A. Yes, sir, I did get back there, but I don't recall the time it was.
It must have been very close around 9 : 00 o'clock, sir, because we had
to pack up our field equipment and take our belongings out to Opana.
I don't remember, sir, what time.
55. Q. On your return to Opana about 0900, as you have testified,
did you yourself make any more plots of aircraft that day ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OP^ INQUIRY 491
A. No, sir, I did not.
56. Q. Did you observe anybody else make any plots from the
Opana station on the morning of 7 December 1941?
A. Yes, sir, and the plots were made on the same chart as the
original flight that I referred to a while ago. It [651] was
made on the same chart, for all of the flights on December 7 were
made on this one chart. That is the chart that was turned in to Armv
G-2.
57. Q. Can you recall whether or not during the time you were
making these observations on the morning of 7 December, the plot
revealed aircraft retiring from the Island of Oahu to seaward?
A. That I can't say for sure. I just know that there was quite a
few plots on that chart. I don't believe they were able to follow the
flights, that is, individual flights, because there were so many scattered
flights.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not
desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested partv. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
58. Q. I understood you to say that you closed your station under
directions at G : 54, at Opana, which you were operating ?
A. Yes, sir.
59. Q. Who directed you to close then ?
A. The plotter on the other end at the information center.
60. Q. Did your clock synchronize with his ?
A. Sir, I don't remember as to whether a time-check was made.
61. Q. Did you make a time-check before you started operating
that morning ?
A. I can't remember, sir, whether we did or not, although, sir, it
had been the usual procedure to do that.
62. Q. You had been out there at Opana for a week and a half or
two weeks prior to 7 December ?
A. Yes. sir.
63. Q. You never had been on the 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 watch before this
particular Sunday ?
A. No, sir, I had not.
64. Q. Do 3'ou know whether the station had been operating during
those morning hours, before the 7th of December?
A. Yes, sir, I am sure that it was.
65. Q. Everyday?
A. I believe so, sir.
[663] 66. Q. Although you hadn't been there?
A. No, sir, the testimony I just gave is what was told me. I mean
there were schedules to operate from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00.
67. Q. Everyday?
A. Yes, sir, and I presume they did.
68. Q. Now how many were there in the unit that was supposed
to be operating the station at any one time? How many were sup-
posed to be in the unit that operated the station at one time?
A. At that time, sir, I believe the full crew was four men, possibly
five — but I believe it was four at that time.
69. Q. What duties did they perform? You described what you
did and what Locard did — and what did the other two or three do ?
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. One man would be the crew chief. He would have taken charge
of the unit as a whole, one man operating the scope, one man plotting,
and one motorman to take care of the gasoline engine for the auxiliary
power we had.
70. Q. How many were there operating on this Sunday morning?
A. There were only two of us.
71. Q. Did only two of you go out on this 24-hour watch on Satur-
day noon ?
A. Yes, sir.
72. Q. Who directed that?
A. Sergeant Murphy. Sergeant Murphy was in charge of our de-
tachment at the time of December 7.
73. Q. Were y^i^ f>i^ the island of Oahu after the 7th of December
for any considerable length of time?
A. Yes, sir, for about six months, sir.
74. Q. Did you testify as a witness before the Eoberts Commission?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) :
75A. Q. Sergeant, this problem that you were engaged in — was
that a set-up that you had handed to you in advance? The problem
that you engaged in on this Sunday morning^ — ^were yon given the set-
up before you went on out to the station — [6o3~\ that you were
to put through the telephones ?
A. Yes, sir.
75B. Q. It was a prearranged problem ?
A. Yes, sir, the problem was operated from the standard form.
76. Q. Then you hadn't got any planes on which you had data;
your data was all imaginary, so to speak?
A. When we had actual flights we sent them in. On this particular
morning, we had no flight whatsoever.
77. Q. And those flights that were sent in were on the data that was
on your sheet of paper ; is that correct ?
A. I am sorry, sir, I don't . We had no data to send.
78. Q. You said you were on a problem, didn't you?
A. Yes. sir.
79. Q. What was the problem ?
A. The prol)lem Avas to pick up targets and send them in to our in-
formation center.
80. Q. Suppose you had got no targets; then what did you do?
A. We sent none in.
Examined by the court:
81. Q. Sergeant, were two men all that were supposed to be out there
that morning of December 1 ?
A. Sir, referring back to the gentleman's question here, as I re-
member, there should have been four men, but I can't .
82. Q. Before you left your base or your quarters or your organiza-
tion wherever it was, how many men were supposed to go out to be on
duty that morning of December 7, at that station? There was you
and Locard, and was anybody else supposed to go?
A. Yes, sir. Private Farmbeck was to go out there for motorman
for the unit.
83. Q. And why didn't he go out ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 493
A. That, sir, I don't know.
84. Q. Who was supposed to check up to see that everj^hody that
was supposed to be there actually was there? Whose duty was that?
A. Well, that would have been the duty of Serjeant ivlurphy, our
detachment sergeant.
[654] 85. Q. You don't know whether the morning hours at that
station were any different from the Sundays?
A. No, sir, they were the same, 4 : 00 o'clock until 7 : 00 in the
morning.
86. Q. Opana was about nine or ten miles from your quarters?
A. Yes, sir.
87. Q. And you were supposed to be relieved at 7 : 00 o'clock Sunday
morning, to go back to your quarters?
A. No, sir. There was no definite time that we were to be relieved
to ,go to breakfast. Our original intention was to go to breakfast and
come back to the unit and stay til 12 : 00 o'clock ; but that was changed.
The two men that came to relieve us at a quarter of 8 : 00 told us that
we need not come back; that they could take over the duties of watch-
ing the unit for security reasons.
88. Q. Didn't you know when you left the quarters what time you
were to be relieved, the hour you would be relieved? What hour did
you expect to be relieved the next morning? You left on Saturday?
A. Yes, sir, at noon.
89. Q. What time did you expect to be relieved on Sunday morning
to go back to breakfast ?
A. There was no particular time to go to breakfast, sir.
90. Q. You were supposed to close down the station at 7 : 00 o'clock?
A. Yes, sir.
91. Q. Did you make any request on any higher authority to be
allowed to remain there tliat morning?
A. Yes, sir, we had prearranged permission with the sergeant.
92. Q. Had you macle any request for that particular morning, to be
allowed to remain there overtime?
A. Well, for the operations purpose, yes, sir. We had asked Ser-
geant Murphy for permission to operate longer than 7 : 00 o'clock, for
the purpose to instruct me further in the operation of the scope.
93. Q. That was permission for the extra training, but did you ask
I^ermission to stay out there in spite of your bieakfast, in order that
you could continue your operation?
A. No, sir, at that time our .
[655] 94. Q. I just want to know what your previous arrange-
ment in the form of a request was ?
A. I am not sure, sir, that I understand you.
95. Q. Well, was then the request you speak of made after you got
to the unit?
A. No, it was prearranged. It was made before. We knew the
Saturday afternoon that we came out there that we were going to
operate longer than 7 : 00 o'clock.
96. Q. But by orders or by your request?
A. By our request, sir. This Sergeant Murphy who had charge of
our unit would give us permission to operate over our scheduled time.
97. Q. Well, ordinarily, wouldn't that interfere if the truck came
out there? Would you have to hold the truck up so you could operate
when the truck came to take you to breakfast ?
494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A, Well, I don't even recall whether we were even going back to
breakfast. I mean, they called and said they were going to send some-
one out for breakfast, or to relieve us, so we could go back to break-
fast— but other than that, I don't recall of having a specified time that
we were going to breakfast, or even that we would get any breakfast
that particular morning.
98. Q. Had you any intimation of an attack, or had you been advised
that war was becoming imminent ?
A. No, sir. One thing, sir, I might say that made me a little cautious
at that time. I had been in the Air Corps at Hickam Field and there
was a sergeant that used to roll us out in the morning by saying, "Get
up and get out; the Japs are coming!" — and every once in a while,
why someone would say, "The Japs are coming." JBut it was all in a
joking manner.
99. Q. Did you know of the existence of Alert No. 1 ?
A. At that time, no, sir.
100. Q. Do you know what Alert No. 1 signified?
A. No, sir, i don't.
101. Q. "Well, it is a matter of public record that it is a precaution
against sabotage. Were any particular precautions taken by the unit
to which you were attached ?
A. As I have stated, sir, before, we were there for security reasons.
We had the 45-pistol and 7 rounds of ammunition. At all times some-
body was present at the unit. There were always 2 men present at the
unit.
102. Q. When did this begin, this procedure ?
A. That began, sir, from the time that we moved out there. This
was about 3 weeks to a month before Pearl Harbor.
[656] 103, Q. Those were normal precautions that might be
expected to be taken for the preservation of a station of that nature —
nothing particular about it ?
A. Yes, sir.
104. Q. As I understand it, there were several, at least 5, other sta-
tions, on that warning system ?
A. Yes, sir. ,-
105. Q. Was there direct communications between the stations of
the system, or did they all have to go to the information center ?
A. Yes, sir, in order to talk from one unit to another — that didn't
hold true exactly. In a unit that was close together like say the unit
that was at our quarters and the unit at Opana, the distance of 9
miles, we had a direct line between those two units.
106. Q. I am talking about radar units now. Was there a radar
set at the place where your quarters were also ?
A. Yes, sir, that was the purpose of it. We moved out to Opana,
had no quarters whatsoever and we were quartered with this other unit
that had already been there, and it was 9 miles away.
107. Q. When you and Private Locard both found that you could
get no satisfaction over this suspicious occurrence — that is, the pres-
ence of a large number of pips on the scope — did it occur to you to
try to get in communication with any other one in authority?
A. No, sir, I mean after an officer had ordered on it, nothing more
was to be done about it. It would have been jumping over his head at
that particular time if we tried to do anything more.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 495
[6-57] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank" Miirrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
108. Q. Have you any information acquired since to the effect that
any such flight Avas detected by any of these other units?
A. Yes, the flight was detected by other units, although I believe it
was a little later than our particular unit picked it up. The range, I
believe, was (greater on ours.
109. Q. Well, it was all after 7 : 00 a. m. ?
A. Yes, sir.
110. Q. I am asking you now from your best recollection from sub-
sequent information, because you had no other information at the
time what the other stations did.
A. Well, on that morning, sir, that we returned to camp for our
breakfast by Pearl Harbor, the particular units that we were quar-
tered with had picked up a part of the flight that we had.
111. Q. Did you have any reason to believe that anybody had re-
ported anything about this flight except your own unit ?
A. Well, no, sir, just by hearsay. Other units had reported it, I
think.
112. Q. To the information center?
A. Yes, sir.
113. Q. You don't know positively that any of these other four radar
stations reported to the information center, do you?
A. No, sir, just by what I heard.
114. Q. You stated that this radar station was manned every morn-
ing from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 during the week ; is that correct ?
A. Yes, sir, I'm sure it was, sir.
115. Q. Well, you are sure, but how do you know it was manned?
Were you there to see that it was manned?
A. No, sir, I was not there.
116. Q. In other words, you simply think it was manned ; is that
correct ?
A. That is right, sir.
117. Q. Have you any idea as to the hours this station was manned ?
Do you know positively when this station was manned during week-
days ?
A. Well, yes, sir. At the time I was present, I [6-58] know it
Avas usually late in the morning or early afternoon on those weekdays.
118. Q. What do you call "late in the morning"?
A. Well, I would say anywhere from 9 : 80 until 12 : 00 ; until prob-
ably 3 : 30. I can't recall correctly just what time we did operate but I
know it was about that time.
119. Q. To clear up this reference of your going out there for a prob-
lem, which I understood was a problem for Sunday morning. Now, it
wasn't a problem, was it? . • .
A. Well, that's what we termed it, yes, sir..
120. Q. Was that what you called it ?
A. Yes, sir.
121. Q. Going on duty to guard the surrounding area and report the
presence of planes? Was that designated by the term "problem"?
496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes, sir, from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00. We knew that at that time, between
4 : 00 and 7 : 00 that all the plots that we sent in were actually being
handled down in the information center and that men from the Navy,
Marines, Coast Artillery, ami all the different branches were down in
the information center to work their problem on targets that we would
pick up.
Re-examined by the judge advocate:
122. Q. Sergeant, you stated that during the week preceding 7 De-
cember you were at the Opana station working the sets in the late morn-
ing and early afternoon. At those times when you were working the
set, was the information center functioning? Were you funneling the
information in to the information center?
A. No, sir, we were not.
123. Q. In other words, am I correct in saying that any time outside
of these 4 : 00 a. m., to 7 : 00 a. m., hours it was simply a practice session
at the individual units, and tlie whole system, including the other units
and the information center, was not in operation?
A. That, sir, I can't answer with full knowledge. I believe, though,
that at that time certain units throughout the day took over picking up
and sending in flights to the information center. One reason that we
were left out of it was that it was a new unit and we had just put it up
and there was quite a bit to be done, although I do believe some of the
otlier units did report in.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine
this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating [659] to the sub-
ject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: The Roberts Report,
that is, the published report, states, in part, that a non-commissioned
officer who was receiving training at that time picked up these planes.
That is somewhat the wording. Anyhow, it says a non-commissioned
officer. Well, at that time, sir. there was no non-commissioned officer
present at our station during the operation. However, when Private
Locard went to testify before the Roberts Commission, another staff
sergeant. Sergeant Hilton, was put in charge of our detachment the
day after Pearl Harbor. Now, he went in with him to the Roberts
Commission, although sir, I don't know whether he testified nor
whether that could have been where they got the non-commissioned
officer, but as I stated before the Commission, Lieutenant Locard
was a private at the time of December 7th.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 2 : 4.5 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., Friday,
August 25, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 497
PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUET OF INQUIRY
FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944.
[600} Nineteenth Day
Navy Department,
Waf^hington, D. C.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navv (Ret). President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbf us, U. S.^ Navy (Ret) , Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member,
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Jud<!;e Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the eighteenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnessees not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, Commander Air
Force, Atlantic Fleet, Administrative Office, Norfolk, Virginia.
2. Q. What duties were assigned you between 1 October 1941 and
7 December 1941 ?
A. In answering that question, I would like to go into considerable
detail. On December 6, 1941, and for several months prior thereto,
my duties were as follows :
(1) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander
Patrol Wing Two. Included in the larger command were the Patrol
Squadrons, aircraft tenders, \_0G1^ attached to Patrol Wings
One and Tw^o.
(2) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings
One and Two, plus other units as assigned by Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet for the conduct of specific operations,
(3) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The respon-
sibility of this function included administrative authority in local
matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl
Harbor.
' 70716—46 — Ex. ] 46, vol. 1 33
498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District for aviation
development with the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra,
and Johnston Island.
(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the follow-
ing seniors: (a) Commander Aircraft Scouting Force, who was type
commander for Patrol Wings. He was based at San Diego, (b)
Commander Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol
Wings One and Two were a part, (c) Directly under the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet in my capacity as Commander Task
Force Nine, (d) Under Commandant, 14th Naval District, in his
capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, when performing
my duties as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, (e) Com-
mander of Task Forces One, Two, and Three for operation of patrol
planes assigned tliose forces for specific operations. A change in my
status was contemplated in the current Navy Orange War Plan.
Under its provisions, the units of my command were expected to make
an early move to bases on the outlying islands in case of war, including
Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. My own headquarters were
to be shifted to Midway. That my responsibilities in this connection
were by no means light, is evidenced by the fact that just prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbor this War Plan was being plaj^ed as a
joint maneuver. Further, the squadron VP-22, designated for main-
tenance in the highest practicable degree of readiness to expedite the
initiation of War Plan move to advance bases, was in fact transferred
to Midway in October, 1941, for temporary duty. Keverting to my
status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted of those
in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March
1941, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet directed me to report
to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to prepare an air defense
plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air
Force. I so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working
directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding
General, Hawaiian Air Force, who, incidentally, was senior to me.
The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included sev-
eral subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the operations
plan of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined the
proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base
Defense Air Force. Insofar as [66'2] Naval and Marine Corps
units were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when
applicable. All the Army orders covering the function of their units
in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides for these air-
craft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based on
the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, and signed by
General Martin and me. That estimate was based on the conditions
as they existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the naval air
situation between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of suffi-
cient significance to warrant a re-estimate, and information of the
Army Air Force indicated an analogous condition. The estimate
I believed, and still believe, to be sound, but the orders based on that
estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction, and the
missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.
Specifically, the organization was designed to function through
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 499
mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy for the defense of
Pearl Harbor against air attack. As such, the Naval Base Defense
Air Force could function only in the event of an actual emergency
or when proper authority so directed. The composition of the Naval
Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of
aircraft made available to it by the various air commanders of both
Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability
was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the vari-
ous air units. Aircraft reported as available were subject to the
operational control of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
or the Army pursuit commander, in the prevailing category of readi-
ness, only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning
status. The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization
for drill was for the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in his capacity
as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading,
"Drill, danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, drill." This
placed the search and attack groups in a functioning status. On
receipt of this message I, in turn, as Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units which made planes available
to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to
place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At
this point during such drills, searches were immediately started by
planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and their efforts were
supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were reported ready
for flight. The term, "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,"
was actually a misnomer, due to the limted composition of that portion
of the air forces under his operational control, which included only
aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack
them when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detec-
tion devices, or anti-aircraft guns. The term, "Commander Naval
Base Defense Air Force," was even more of a misnomer, as it implied
authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. This
authority was non-existent [6GJ] until an emergency was
apparent, or until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base De-
fense Air Force in a functioning status, and when so called into
existence was limited in scope in that it consisted only of operational
control over Army units based upon mutual cooperation. In addi-
tion, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the search
and attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and was
non-existent so far as Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation
were concerned, which were to function under Brigadier General
H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army. To illustrate the lack of numerical
strength of aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force,
attention is invited to the report of a joint Army and Navy Board,
dated 31 October 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering
the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area. Para-
graph (4) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin
as senior Army member, and myself as senior Navy member, reads
as follows: (4) The problem confrojiting the board as pertains to
Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as fol-
lows : "The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to
be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is;
500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(1) to search for and to destroy enemy surface craft within radius
of action by bombardment aviation. (2) To detect, intercept, and
destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation."
It was pointed out that under the Army 54 group program, 170 B-17s
and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to
fulfill the above missions. Naval planes at that time called for 84
patrol planes and 48, VSO planes to be directly under the Command-
ant, 14th Naval District, to supplement or function in lieu of the
98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two, which might be
ordered to advance bases on the outlying islands of AVake, Midway,
Johnston, and Palmyra. Further, the planes actually present on
Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the naval base
air defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of receiving
replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18s were being replaced
by the more modern B-l7s, and in Patrol Wings One and Two,
PBY-1, 2, and 3 types were being replaced by PBY-5 types. The
new types were subject to the usual shakedown difficulties and main-
tenance problems. In the case of the naval PBY-5 planes, there
was an almost complete absence of spare parts; and in addition, a
program of the installation of leak-proof gasoline tanks was in
progress. Considerable difficulty had also been experienced with the
cracking of engine nose sections in the first planes of this type
received, and installation of modified engine nose sections was in
progress. The major eilort of Patrol Wings One and Two during
1941, prior to December 7, was in the expansion training, operational
training, security operations, the development and equipment of air
facilities — all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities
and output in the Navy at that time were considerably [66^]
behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. There-
fore, particular stress was placed by higher authority on the need for
expansion training. This necessitated a planning of operations
whereby each squadron could be required to conduct training for the
qualification of additional combat crews, not only for their own air-
craft, but to form nucleii for new squadrons being commissioned back
on the mainland as well. The highest priority was placed upon this
feature. Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort
was being made to increase the readiness for war. Squadron and
patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity for
keeing their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that any
time during a flight they could be diverted from their peacetime
objectives to combat missions. The placing of the Naval Base De-
fense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have
necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order
to concentratve on defense. With the patrol planes constantly scout-
ing to a maximum range and the bomber aircraft standing by for
attack missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein
the naval planes would have been greatly reduced in materiel readi-
ness and their combat crews approaching an operational fatigue point,
while the Army pilots would have been in need of refresher training.
Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem
has resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current
status of our relations with Japan, and necessity for specific informa-
tion as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OK INQUIRY 501
limits. The Commander Naval Base Defense Force did not have
authority to place that organization in a functioning status except
in the case of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air
Force assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of
the attack on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority.
Orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a mes-
sage, "Air raid Pearl Harljor. This is no drill'', was ordered broad-
cast at 0758 that morning.
3. Q. You have stated that certain events or directives could vitalize
the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I believe among these you
mentioned an order for a drill by the Naval Base Defense Officer, and
actual emergency, and I believe you said also, "on authority." I
would like to have you amplify your answer and say on whose author-
ity could the Naval Base Defense Air Force be vitalized.
A. I think I said, "Proper authority," and by that I meant the
Commander Naval Base Defense Force could put the Naval Base De-
fense Air Force in a functioning status by an order. I would like to
go further. I believe that if and when such order might have been
given, there would have been required to make sure that it would have
been carried out in full, some conversation with the Army command.
Jn other words, two people [005] have got to come to conclu-
sions that it was necessary to do something in the absence of an actual
emergency which would be apparent to all hands.
4. Q. Could the Connnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet have the
same authority to vitalize this air force as you have stated?
A. He would have, as the Commander Naval Base Defense Force
was functioning, on the organization as it was set up, under the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. I would like to add further that the
composition of aircraft that composed the force of the air defense
were those aircraft that were made available. They did not include
all aircraft, and whether or not aircraft w^re available depended on
the commands of the various units which had command of these air-
craft groups.
5. Q. Do I understand your answer, then. Admiral, to mean es-
sentially this — that the aircraft that became available to the Naval
Base Defense Air Force when it was vitalized would have to be as-
signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. No, in accordance with the directives then in existence concern-
ing the Naval Base Defense Air Force, the commanders reported
planes available to the other commanders concerned daily, and the
state of readiness was set by the Commander Naval Base Defense
Force. The state of readiness was in terms such as B-5. B meant
50% of the j)lanes available for this within four hours.
6. Q. Were all naval aircraft in the Hawaiian area ultimately un-
der the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet —
naval aircraft?
A. All naval fleet aircraft were under his command, as a general
command. There were only a few planes, such as utility planes at-
tached to the air stations, which came under the commandant, that
were not included in those planes. They were not, however, com-
l>atant planes.
7. Q. What officer approved in their final form the operating sched-
ules for naval aircraft in the Hawaiian area ?
502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A.TTACK
A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet made the ulti-
mate approval for naval fleet aircraft.
8. Q. I believe you have answered this question, Admiral, but it is
so important that I would like to have you set it out as a separate an-
swer to this question : During the last quarter of the calendar year
1941, what was the paramount mission of naval aircraft of the United
States Fleet in the Hawaiian area ?
A. As a general plan, I would say that what was termed [666]
expansion training was the primary objective. Of course, when I
say "expansion training" that means preparing for war in all phases.
There were other operations required which had to do with certain
security and special security measures that may have been in progress.
9. Q. Can you state wdiether this mission was changed between 1
October 1941 and 7 December, the same year ?
A. No, it was not changed.
10. Q. Adverting to addendum No. 1 of the Naval Base Defense
Air Force Operations Plan No. A-1-41, which is a part of Exhibit 53
before this court, I ask you what is the date of this addendum?
A. March 31, 1941.
11. Q. Please read for the record Paragraph 1 (e), under the head-
ing, "Summary of the Situation."
A. (Reading) "It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or
an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no
prior w^arning from our intelligence service."
12. Q. Was this your view at the time you signed this document on
31 March 1941 ?
A. I would like to invite attention to the fact that this joint estimate
covering joint Army and Navy air action was based on a study in
the event of some hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the
Hawaiian area. It was not an estimate of Japanese war plans.
13. Q. Did the view that you expressed in paragraph 1 (e), that
you have just read, change before the attack on Pearl Hairbor on 7
December 1941 ?
A. No.
14. Q. Adverting to paragraph 3 of this same addendum, under the
heading, "Possible Enemy Action", will you please read for the record
subparagraphs 1, 2, and 3, under 3(a)?
A. (Reading) "A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in
Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two."
[6671 The court then, at 10 : 25 a. m., took a recess until 10 : 35
a. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel,
the interested parties and their counsel, except the interested party
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and the interested party Rear
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), whose counsel were
present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under ex-
amination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 503
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and
continued his testimony.
Examination by the judge advocate (continued) :
15. Q. Am I to understand that this was your view on 31 March
1941?
A. It was my best thought on the subject based on considerable
thought which actually was started in the early part of 1941 prior to
this plan or estimate. In other words, we had given considerable
thought to were we ready for war and what kind of war, and in con-
nection with that I would like to invite attention to a letter which
endeavored to express my views of the situation at that time because
I felt that we were not ready and not getting ready very fast. The
letter I refer to was dated January 16, 1941 from Commander, Patrol
Wing Two to the Chief of Naval Operations, via Commander Scout-
ing Force and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, who, at that time,
was also Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. In this letter I stated
that I had arrived there on October 30, 1940 with the point of view
that the international situation was critical, and especially in the
Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather
than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking
over command of Patrol Wing Two and looking over the situation I
was surprised to find that there in the Hawaiian Islands, an important
naval advance outpost, we were operating on a shoestring, and the more
I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be. I stated that the
war readiness of patrol plane squadrons depended not only on the
planes and equipment that comprised those squadrons, but also on the
many operating needs and requirements at air stations and outlying
bases over which the patrol wing commander had no direct con-
trol. 1^08] I refer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Serial 095323, in which it was indicated to me that there was no
intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in
Patrol Wing Two prior to one year, and that Patrol Wing Two would
practically be the last wing to be furnished new planes. I stated that
this, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicated to me that
the Navy Department as a whole did not view the situation in the
Pacific with alarm, or else is not taking steps in keeping with their
views. I then endeavored to point out the need for proper planning
in the Navy Department in the various bureaus in order to coordinate
the procurement of the requirements in the preparation for war, both
with reference to the planes and to the facilities and bases from which
those planes were expected to operate, and I mentioned Pearl Harbor
Air Station, the Kaneohe Air Station, the necessity for expediting the
development of Keehi Lagoon, outlying bases at Wake, Johnston,
Palmyra and Midway, and also the situation in general.
16. Q. Adverting to Addendum No. 1 to the Naval Base Defense
Air Force operation plan from which you read a moment ago, will
you read for the record Paragraph 3 b.?
A. (Reading) "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form
of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at
present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or
inore carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles."
17. Q. Other than an air attack delivered from carrier based planes,
had you considered any other form of attack on Oahu as possible?
504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Submarines, of course, I considered were what may be present
in the operating areas and the vicinity of the entrance of Pearl Harbor
and whenever the enemy expected to use them.
18. Q. What I am trying to get at is this, Admiral : What form of
attack on the Island of Oahii itself did you envisage?
A. I envisaged an air attack, as that was the most logical or practi-
cal method of making an attack by the Japanese on Ohau if they
decided to attack Oahu.
19. Q. Coukl they have made any other form of attack on the Island
of Oahu?
A. Not with the same degree of success.
20. Q. Did you mean by an attack on Oahu, to include vessels of
the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes. I assumed they would take the most likely objectives with
tlie idea of a strike, a fast raid, so to [GOO] speak.
21. Q. In your estimate that an air attack would be the most likely
form of attack on the island of Oahu or the vessels of the United
States Fleet which might be anchored in Pearl Harbor, had you con-
sidered the form of attack that this air attack might take ? in other
v/ords, would it be bombing, torpedo plane attack, or what?
A. I was surprised that the Japanese actually, as demonstrated on
December 7th, could utilize aircraft as well as they did, and particu-
larly with torpedoes. However, I expected, as the estimate indicates,
that the most logical way that the Japanese could make an attack — and
by "attack" I mean a strike and run — would be by air bombing,
primarily.
22. Q." Why had the torpedo plan attack on the Fleet in Pearl Har-
bor surprised you ?
A. Because of the restricted water surrounding the ships, and the
depth of that water. In other w^ords, I think the Japanese weve in
advance of us considerably with torpedoes at that time.
23. Q. I ask you to examine paragraph 5-d of Addendum No. 1
which we have been discussing, and ask you what condition of ma-
terial readiness — I rej^eat, material readiness — had been prescribed for
naval patrol type aircraft in the Hawaiian area between 27 November
1941 and the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Condition B-5, which means 50 per cent on four hours notice.
Now, that means both material and personnel.
24. Q. Who had prescribed the conditions of material readiness and
the degree of readiness B-5 that you have just stated?
A. The Commander Naval Base Defense Force, The condition of
readiness was prescribed when exercises such as air raid drills were
completed and we went back to the normal status, and I think that that
condition was ordered after the last air raid drill and was then in
effect.
25. Q. Then this condition of readiness B-5 was your normal op-
erating procedure for a condition of readiness?
A. It was the normal readiness prescribed for normal conditions. I
would like to elaborate to save time, that in setting a condition of readi-
ness under normal conditions, that the condition of readiness that was
set was to permit the required operations from daj^ to day in the
schedule to continue witlioiit having them tied up standing by.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 505
26. Q. Do you know the condition of readiness of Army aircraft
^vhich were suitable for long-range reconnaissance between 27 Novem-
ber and 7 December 1941 ?
A. I have a copy of the dispatch from the headquarters of the
Hawaiian Air Force to Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force,
which stated that the aircraft enumerated therein were in condition
Easy Five. This dispatch was on December 5 and prevailed over the
weekend.
\()70] 27. Q. Did condition of readiness, Easy Five, have the
same meaning in the Army as it had in your own addendum No. 1,
Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan? In other words, did
the Army use the same system as the Navy for designating condition
of readiness so far as their aircraft were concerned?
A. The Army utilized the same code as the Navy used because they
were all based on the same directives and the "Easy" in this case
indicated that all the aircraft were conducting routine operations, none
ready for the purpose of this plan. Then the ''Five'' indicated to me
that they could be made ready in four hours.
2S. Q. What do you consider was the radius in miles for operation
of the plane PBY-3 for long-range reconnaissance under conditions
of war-time operation ?
A. In answering that question I am referring to practical Mar-
time conditions as a result of experience subsequent to December 7,
1041, and the question which required considerable thought was
whether planes on scouting missions and long-range scouting — I mean
the longest they could do — should carry bombs, or not. And we
worked under two different conditions after December 7th, both carry-
ing bombs and also without bombs, and finally it was decided that
we would consider the earliest information more valuable by this
extreme range operation that planes were capable of doing than the
effort that they might be al^le to exert with the bombs that they would
be carrying. Normally, PBY-5s searched to a radius of 700 miles.
We tried to get them out to 800 miels but practically speaking, 700
miles — that is, including the leg on the end of the triangle of the
search — was considered their practical normal limit. The PBY-3s
w^ere considered to have a practical range for that kind of duty of
()00 miles. In other words you may assign a long range to a plane
and you may think the plane has gone there, but it is very possible
that the plane did not get there, although you thought it had gone
there. In other words, what I am trying to bring out is that the
commander charged with early information and for scouting wants
to be assured at wduit range he is going to get this information and
not base any assumptions on hypothetical cases.
29. Q. Then your estimate for the maximum rangs of the PBY-3 is
()00 miles radius?
A. Yes; and the PBY-5 700 miles radius. The pre-Pearl Harbor
estimate was hoped to be 800 miles for the PBY-5s. I would like
to recall a conversation I had with General Martin, who made some
pre-Pearl Harbor studies wherein he estimated that his mission was
scouting and bombardment as well, and that he expected his planes
to go 1000 miles radius, but they were not able to do it when they
were working for me after Pearl Harbor. We thouo;ht the PBY-3
506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could go to a 700-mile radius. The radius of action that I have given
for these planes does not conform to the performance data as put
out in technical pubilcations. What I am speaking about is prac-
tical operating conditions.
[671^ 30. Q. Between 31 March 1941 and 7 December 1941,
what can you say from your own experience of the degree of har-
monious cooperation between the Army and Navy in military matters
relating to the Hawaiian area?
A. My relations with the Army were very pleasant. General
Martin arrived in the area shortly after I arrived, and practically
on our first meeting we discussed getting together on joint exercises,
and we actually did set up a plan wherein we conducted joint exercises,
that is, unofficially Patrol Wing Two and the Army Air Force Com-
mander, and they were conducted at times one day a week ; at other
times one day in two weeks. After the exercise I held a crtique over
on the air station and many of the Army officers came over to it and
attended and I would say that the cooperation between General Mar-
tin and myself was very good. Except I would like to say this : that
cooperation was good, yes, but there were many times when we could
not agree because he was working from directives that emanated
from the War Department and throught the chain of command, and
I was working in connection with the directives that emanated from
the Nav}^ Department through the chain of command, and sometimes
there was no solution to the problem, such as in the case of this joint
Army-Navy Board which I have referred to previously in my
testimony.
31. Q. But so far as the local commanders themselves in the area
were concerned, is your answer that there was reasonable cooperation ?
A. Very good cooperation. I would say that there was very good
cooperation insofar as cooperation could go. There was always
friendliness. I respected General Martin and liked him ; and I think
he did me, and when it came to a question of certain effort to be
performed, he complied as the conditions fitted his situation, which
was perfectly natural. In other words, suppose I wanted to initiate
an air raid drill, or suppose the Commander, Naval Base Defense
Force, wanted to initiate an air raid drill. Unless it suited the sit-
uation with the Army — and which I assumed was bound by their
problems — they did not always join in and say, "Yes, for the date
mentioned, we would like to participate". In other words, they were
bound by certain rules, customs, and regulations connected with their
business.
32. Q. Were you not similarly bound so far as your own organiza-
tion was concerned, to some degree ?
A. Yes, but there was friendliness and frequent conversations and
meetings and, as a matter of fact, joint boards.
[67^'] 33. Q. I show you Exhibit 15 in evidence before this
court which is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November
1941 and which sets out, in substance, that chances of favorable out-
come of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful, that there are
indications of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, in-
cluding an attack on Guam or the Philippines as a possibility. Prior
to 7 December 1941 had you seen this dispatch or had you been made
acquainted with its contents ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 507
A. No. I would like to amplify that a little bit. I remember
attending a conference in the Connnander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's
office — I have forgotten the date ; I think it was prior to that date — in
which a plan for placing ]Marine squadrons on Wake and Midway
was discussed. There was nothing in connection with that disj)atch
referred to so far as I was concerned, but I assumed that something
must have happened to cause this. It may have been, I thought at
the time, the result of a letter which T had written to the Commander-
in-Chief in October, 1941, wherein I recommended that the Navy take
steps to obtain in some form or another — either from the Army or by
assigiiment of aircraft with Army personnel — ISO, 4-engine, large
type bombing planes, and 180 ]:)ursuit planes, with the idea of utilizing
Midway and AVake for operating these planes and for bombing mis-
sions as necessary against mandated islands when the time came.
34. Q. I show you Exhibit 17 in evidence before this court which
has been popularly called by some witnesses the war warning message.
I would ask you to examine this dispatch, please. Had you seen
this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior
to 7 December 1941?
A. No.
o5. Q. Between the period 27 November and 7 December 1941 had
there been any occasion for you to confer with the Army Air Force
commander on the subject of long-range reconnaissance from Oahu?
A. No.
36. Q. "Wliat is your estimate of the sector of 300 degrees that you
could have scouted in long-range reconnaissance with Army and Navy
planes of the Naval Base Defense Air Force if you made a daily
search, commencing on 27 November 1941 and continuing this search
daily for an indefinite period of time?
A. I would like to answer that question by stating this : Consider-
ing 25 mile visibility and to search to 800 miles, or 700 miles, as the
case may be, required approximately 50 planes per day to cover 360
degrees. Therefore, on that basis, it required one plane for 7.2 de-
grees. Considering the number of planes which were available to
me from the Army and without considering any reservation for a
bombing group, there were approximately 8 bombardment planes of
the [673] B-17 type which were the only ones the Army had
that were capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance. So, con-
sidering 8 of those available and with the Navy's approximately 54
planes, that makes 62 planes that would be available. The combat
crews available for planes were scarcely more than one per plane, and
that was the reason for this expansion training I was speaking about.
The employment of combat crews on daily operations on searches out
to 7- or 800 miles, could only be carried on by dividing your combat
crews into groups of 3, and therefore there would be approximately
20 planes available per day, and figuring 7.2 degrees per plane and
20 planes gives 144 degrees. The term "indefinitely" in this case
means an undetermined number of days; in other words, not a per-
manent, continuous operation with no ending. Of course, that is on
the supposition that the planes could be maintained in an operating
state. We at that time were having great difficulties in getting spare
parts for these planes. I would like at this time to give the dates that
planes arrived in the Hawaiian area of the PBY-5 type to replace
508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL H.\RBOR ATTACK
the obsolescent planes. One squadron of 12 planes, 28 October 1941.
One squadron, G planes, 28 October 1941. One squadron, 12 planes,
23 November 1941. One squadron, 12 planes, 23 November 1941.
Which indicates those 54 planes of the PBY-5 type had arrived since
28 October and those planes were new planes and we were experi-
encing shake-down difficulties and maintenance difficulties because of
the absence of spare parts. That question of spare parts was a subject
that had been under discussion for several months. It was due, I
think, to the construction program wherein the desire was for num-
bers of planes or numbers of units, and little provision was made for
spare parts because they did not show up in the same category as units.
I would like to say this : That we had received some PBY-5 planes
of the first vintage, or earlier vintage, and we had considerable diffi-
culty with the cracking of engine nose sections, and it required a rede-
sign and a strengthening of the engine nose section. That was also
one of the problems we were involved in in changing those nose sec-
tions to eliminate that defect.
The court then, at 11 : 10 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 25 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, and his counsel, the
interested parties and their counsel, except the interested party Ad-
miral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and the interested party Rear
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), whose counsel were
present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter.
[674-] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry
were present.
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness.
He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and
continued his testimony.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy :
37. Q. Admiral, concerning your testimony about the unsatisfactory
conditions applying to your command which you found when you as-
sumed that command in Hawaii : Will you state quite briefly what
improvements were made in those deficiencies and inadequacies up
to 1 December 1941?
A. In my letter I referred to a letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations which indicated that I would get replacements for planes
in about a year. Actually, I did get replacements in just about a year,
and that was one thing I was trying to improve.
The question was repeated.
A. Considerable additions in the way of facilities were added. The
question was, Were we getting them as fast as the situation demanded
that we should have gotten them ?
38. Q. Up to 1 December.
A. I was not satisfied with the situation on 1 December. For in-
stance, the AVake Island development was not ready. Midway had
come a long ways. Work was going on at Johnston. The Ksineohe
Air Station was in use, but we had many difficulties and deficiencies
in connection with the Kaneohe Air Station. The Keehi Lagoon I
don't think is completed yet and therefore it is a question of whether
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 509
everything was done that could be done. I assume ])erhaps it was
but maybe it Avas because we hadn't started soon enough, but the
situation was not satisfactory, actually, for tlie conditions in the
Pacific.
39. But very considerable improvements in the conditions which
you first found had been effected; is that correct?
A. Considerable improvements had been effected.
40. Q. Admiral, as to the estimate by General Martin and you
of 3f March : I understand j'ou to say that you held the opinions
expressed in that paper throughout the period up to Pearl Harbor.
Is that correct?
A. I saw no reason to change any opinions expressed in that, and
I held to them.
[67S] 41. Q. I will ask you a somewhat hypothetical question:
Had you been a])prised of those two dispatches of 24 November and
of 27 November 1941, when they arrived, or soon afterward, Avould
your mind have reverted to this estimate and would you consequently
have given any advice as to steps to be taken?
A. Of course that is a hypothetical question and I would like to think
that I would have done it and I hope I would have done it, but whether
1 would have done it or not is something that God only knows.
Cross-examined bv the interested party, Kear Admiral Husabnd E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy. (Ret.) :
42. Q. Exhibit 59 is a letter which has been introduced in evidence
dated January 7, 1942, from the Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Pacific Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Fleet. There appears as an enclosure a letter dated December 30,
1941, signed by yourself. Do you recall writing that letter, Admiral?
A. Yes, sir.
43. Q. And that letter expressed as of that date your estimate
relative to search group requirements and long-range reconnaissance
in general?
A. Yes, it did, and it was written in order to express that opinion
to the Commander-in-Chief with the hope that we would get sufficient
and adequate equipment to perform the job we were required to do most
effectively, which was then our 100 percent job.
44. Q. Are the studies and estimates in that letter the basis on which
you answered the judge advocate's question as to the number of patrol
planes that were available for distance reconnaissance between 27
November and 7 December?
A. Yes, that was the basis of my answer.
45. Q. This letter, with enclosures, spells out in detail the rationale
for your conclusions in answer to the judge advocate?
A. Yes.
[676] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, rej3ortei% entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) : '
46. Q. Admiral, in the period from November 27 to and including
December 7 there were, as you said, eight B-17's of the Army which
were capable of being used in distance reconnaissance at the time?
510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•A. That remark about the eight B-l7's was so stated because of a
dispatch, which is the only dispatch I have, from the Headquarters
Hawaiian Air Force in connection with the availability of planes,
and that dispatch, which is dated December 5, gave as available eight
B-17's. I believe they had more than eight in their total output, but
eight was the number made available under the conditions of Easy 5.
47. Q. I take it that a dispatch like that was the method used in
exchanging information between the Army and you in connection
with this joint use of aircraft?
A. That is correct, and it is according to an agreed plan between
General Martin and me, and it is required in our joint plan.
48. Q. That had been in effect for some time ?
A. That had been in effect since the date of the Army plan, which
was subsequent to ours.
49. Q. So that you came to know in that fashion the condition of
readiness of the Army planes which were available ?
A. Yes, I would know the number of planes that were available
under the condition of readiness.
50. Q. During the period from November 27 to December 7 there
were, as I recall you said, about fifty-four Navy planes capable of
and available for long distance reconnaissance during that period.
A. Yes. I would like to amplify that in this way. There was
one squadron at Midway during that period, and there was one
squadron which had been away over a month approximately and
which had just returned to Oahu on December 5, so that that squad-
ron needed considerable maintenance work. Therefore, there were
fifty-four remaining planes available, and those planes were the new
PBY planes.
51. Q. These particular Navy planes we are speaking about, that
is, both the fifty-four and those which had recently come back from
Midway, comprised PatWing One and Two ?
A. One and Two.
[677] 52. Q. You were the commander of that ?
A. I w^as commander of Patrol Wing Two, and I also was given
control of PatWing One.
53. Q. Then those planes were the same ones which were also in
Task Force Nine that you referred to ?
A. Task Force Nine included everything I had.
54. Q. Now, those Navy planes you speak of during this particular
period were operating as either Patrol Wings or as Task Force Nine
or were being overhauled and were being used in training and up-
keep, extension training, intertype exercises and things of that char-
acter ; is that correct ?
A. Correct.
55. Q. In connection with operating schedules and employment
schedules, for example, for intertype training, I take it you would
arrange with Task Force commanders, and ultimately the schedules
would be approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
Is that how it wen|,?
A. Yes. Sometimes it may have been arranged by higher authori-
ties or the general plan — as a scheme, as the policy set out.
56. Q. Set out by whom ?
A. By the Commander-in-Chief, and then the details would be
worked out by the Task Force commanders.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 511
57. Q. Other than those planes which were being overhauled and
were being repaired during this period, the balance of all such planes
were occupied each day in those tasks ?
A. Yes, sir, carrying the routine schedule of operations.
58. Q. There being only one crew, of course, all the pilots and
crew were so engaged, too ; is that correct ?
A. Yes.
59. Q. The same thing was occurring with respect to shore-based
aircraft? They were carrying out routine operations during the
period, too?
A. When you speak of shore-based aircraft, I assume you mean
now the other aircraft of the Fleet on shore that may be eligible or
available for the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
60. Q. Yes.
A. Yes, under their respective commanders.
61. Q. The operating schedules and employment schedules of the
planes we have been discussing were matters which lay between those
plane commanders and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
or his subordinates?
A. Yes, through the regular channel of command.
[678^ 62. Q. In establishing a condition of readiness in respect
to those planes, I take it that if an A-1 — There would be such a thing
as A-1 ?
A. A-1 went into effect when the word came out for a drill.
63. Q. I assume if such a thing
A. For those planes that were available — Excuse me.
64. Q. We can deal only with those which were available. I take it
that if such a thing as that had been prescribed there would not have
been any further training, that crews would have had to stand by
so as to be available, and that planes would have had to have been
kept warmed up? In other words, if a high condition of readiness
had been prescribed, the training would have to be suspended?
A. Yes.
65. Q. Did you find the condition of readiness which was prescribed
at the time sensible and appropriate with respect to the missions that
lay before those planes at the time ?
A. Yes, for normal conditions that was the suitable state of readi-
ness. In other words, it was suitable from the point of view of inter-
ference with operations. I think the Army, for instance, were con-
sulted with as to how much interference with their operations would
certain degrees of readiness create.
06. Q. I assume, then, that this Naval Base Defense Air Force was
not what is called a firm force, that is to say, that it was standing
by twenty-four hours a day subject to orders in connection with de-
fense ? It was not that kind of force, was it ?
A. It was not.
67. Q. It became a force, as you described it, only upon an alarm
for a drill?
A. Alarm for a drill, yes.
68. Q. And an alarm which was based upon an immediate present
emergency of an attack?
A. An actual emergency, yes. It came into being in an actual
emergency.
512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
69. Q. Or if you received a positive directive, which itself in turn
was based upon known information of the imminence of an attack?
That is the other one, isn't it?
A. If information was the basis on which it should come into being,
then, the orders should come from the higher authority. The ques-
tion is, Who has the information and what is it?
[679] To. Q. You had planned with the Army that upon the
Naval Base Defense Air Force becoming a force certain preliminary
steps and orders would be quite automatic; am I correct in that?
A. This did not take effect until later on, after an effort w^as made
to change the situation or the understanding of the Army in connec-
tion with it. In other words, when it w^as necessary, in actual emer-
gency, for it to go into effect, the idea was that it should go into effect
without having to get higher authority to put it into effect. In other
words, bomb dropping would put it into effect. The reason for en-
deavoring to get this question straightened out with the Army was to
try to prevent what one time did happen, where the w^ord had to be
received from the high Army Command before they could go into
action in this force. I prepared a letter on this subject and recom-
mended that it be sent by Admiral Bloch to General Short.
71. Q. And it was sent?
A. Possibly with some corrections or changes.
72. Q. The thing you wished to do was done?
A. Yes.
78. Q. Now, if there was to be undertaken a daily reconnaissance in
advance of war and in advance of positive information of the immi-
nence of an attack upon Pearl Harbor, such a reconnaissance would
have to be each day and continual, would it not ? That is the best way,
rather, to do it?
A. It certainly would have to be many hours before the attack.
74. Q. Just in the absence of two features, sir? In the absence of
positive knowledge of the imminence of an attack upon Pearl Har-
bor or in the absence of knowledge that an enemy was at that time
at a particular place; and distance reconnaissance to be of use must
be conducted each day over the whole period that you have concern
about; is that right?
A. That is correct. You might find the definite answer to that
question in the details of the battle of Midway.
75. Q. If that had been undertaken, let us say, on November 27
and continued thereafter, I take it, from what you have said, that
training, intertype training, expansion training, materiel upkeep
and things of that character would have been completely disrupted
during the period that that reconnaissance was on; is that correct?
A. If the reconnaissance was made an all-out effort, yes.
[6'SO] Examined by the court :
76. Q. Admiral, had this expansive training to which you have testi-
fied as being the primary mission been stopped, say, about October 16,
1941, what would have been the general effect on the war efficiency
of the air units under your command on December 7 ?
A. In answering that question, I would have to consider the with-
drawal of personnel by the Bureau of Personnel from our area in order
to carry on the exj)ansion of the naval aeronautical organization. I
had recommended in this letter of January 16, to which I have pre-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 513
viously referred, to stabilize personnel and leave them until we could
get sutHciently manned to met a war basis.
77. Q. My question is general. If you had stopped all expansive
training on October IG, what would you have had in the way of a
competent force ?
A. A short period would have a small effect. I might say it would
have an effect, depending on the time element. It is rather difficult
to answer that question.
78. Q. If you had stopped this training and if you had used your
planes for defensive purposes, such as daily scouting, would your
force on December 1, 1941, have been as efficient and capable of oper-
ation as it would have been if you did not have this contingency?
A. No, it would not have been an efficient force. I should like to
say that from December 7 on, for some time, all questions of training
stopped, and two or three months after December 7 I began to receive
pressure as to when and how^ much training I could do, because we
were not able to do training in carrying out this all-out operation of
reconnaissance.
79. Q. Reverting to your extended answer about the operation of
planes on reconnaissance duties and assuming that you had stopped
all training operations and established a continuous, long-distance
patrol through 360 degi-ees beginning December 1, what would have
been the probable condition of your planes on December 7?
A. They undoubtedly would have been in a condition where many
of them would not have been ready for flight. I would like to add this
answer. After December 7 we had what personnel we had prior to
December 7. Then, we were reenforced by squadrons that came out
from the mainland, so that after December 7, or shortly thereafter,
when those squadrons arrived we had spare parts that could be taken
from })lanes that were damaged to help in the maintenance and upkeep
of planes, as well as having extra personnel in combat crews, because
instead of having, we will say, one [^<5-?] crew per plane, we
had about one and a half crews per plane later on on account of
squadrons being transferred to me after December 7.
80. Q. My question also referred to the planes themselves. If you
had that limited number of planes on a continuous search, how many
of those planes w'ould be still operating at the end of a week or ten
days?
A. If we had replacement parts
81. Q. Assuming what you had on hand at the time?
A. My estinuite is that there would have been a considerable per-
centage out of commission.
82. Q. If you had conducted this long-range reconnaissance and if
one of these planes had reported an enemy force on a certain course
and speed, would you have had any aircraft which could have done
anything about it?
A. I had this operational control over the Army bombardment
squadrons — the heavy bombardment. Whether or not they coidd have
hit the enemy is something I would not want to predict, but Avhat was
available was under my operational control to make the effort.
83. Q. I am assuming that they were discovered at a long distance
away, which is the only reason for the long-range reconnaissance.
7971G— 4G— Ex. 14G, vol. 1 — —34
514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The B-l7's were able to conduct a search with half a bomb load,
if I remember correctly, up to 800 miles.
84. Q. Well, is it not a fact that unless the hostile carriers had
been stopped in the act of launching the planes, the attack would have
started in, and then it would have been a question of repelling the
attack which was en route rather than preventing the attack ?
A. Actually, hind-sight indicates we might have had information
of it if we had reconnaissance planes spot them at sea, but they un-
doubtedly would not have been stopped.
85. Q. Was it not a historical fact prior to December 7, 1941, that
no airplane attack was completely stopped once it had been launched ?
A. I understood that is correct — You are speaking of carriers, I
assume ?
86. Q. Yes.
A. I understand that is correct, insofar as carriers are concerned.
87. Q. Admiral, covering the entire period of your duty in Hawaii,
wasn't there inaugurated at one time and carried out a search of the
area around Honolulu?
A. Yes, under special conditions and special orders.
[683] 88. Q. Approximately how many planes did you use in
this daily search'^
A. I'm not sure. I think it was somewhere between six and twelve
to some distance like 300 miles.
89. Q. Was this search carried on daily and if so, when did the
planes take off from Pearl Harbor and return to Pearl Harbor ?
A. As I remember, during the period when the search was ordered
they took off in the early morning.
90. Q. Before daylight?
A. Probably day was breaking.
91. Q. And when they returned ?
A. They returned after completion of their search, which meant a
flight of about 650 miles, I believe, which would mean approximately
five and a little over hours afterwards.
92. Q. Approximately when did this daily search start and when
did it end, as to period of time?
A. It is very difficult for me to remember details. I remember it was
when Admiral Andrews was in command of the scouting force.
93. Q. But, generally speaking, do you remember when it was dis-
continued ?
A. I think it was discontinued at some time prior to July, 1941.
94. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pa-
cific, discontinue this search, or was it discontinued prior to his taking
command ?
A. I think it was discontinued after he took command, but I am not
positive.
95. Q. Referring to this question of search and distance recon-
naissance, did you at any time have occasion to discuss with the Com-
mander-in-Chief the possibilities of such a daily search and the planes
that you had to accomplish such a search ?
A. No, I don't remember any detailed discussion with him in con-
nection with such a plan.
96. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief at any time suggest to you or
direct you to make a plan for such search covering any sector around
Hawaii ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 515
A. When he directed me to report to the Commandant of the i4th
Naval District and prepare these air defense plans in conjunction with
the Army, the idea was to bring about an effort in some coordinated
fashion with the Army, and I was [683] expected to make
plans so far as the forces that I commanded were concerned. There-
fore, in connection with my plans, I did have search plans.
97. Q. Did you discuss these plans with the Commander of the
Naval Base Defense Force ?
A. Whether or not I discussed them with the commander personally,
I do not remember. I have discussed many things with him and par-
ticularly at the very beginning of the effort to bring about this joint
agreement with the Army Air Force in Hawaii, but all my plans and
directives were forwarded to the Commander Naval Base Defense
Force, as he was my immediate superior in connection with these
operations.
98. Q. Well, under those conditions at any time did the Commander
of the Naval Base Defense Force discuss with you or direct you to
make available planes for distance reconnaissance?
A. No, I do not remember his doing that at all.
99. Q. Would you have looked to him to give you a directive for
such an activity ?
A. I would have looked to him or to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet for a directive to put into effect and start operations in
connection with reconnaissance.
100. Q. Did you report to the Commander Naval Base Defense
Force daily the number of planes which could be made available for
search ?
A. No, that was my business, and I did not make such report.
101. Q. As we understand, at no time was there any consideration
given to a search of a partial sector of 360 degrees around Hawaii or
the entire 360 degrees; is that correct?
A. There was no discussion in connection with that — I assume
you are speaking about prior to December 7 ?
102. Q. That is right.
A. Prior to the discontinuance of the search that was referred to
previously as having been ordered, that search, as I remember it,
covered a constantly changing sector.
103. Q. In your testimony. Admiral, you have stated that you con-
sidered that if an attack were made by an enemy, it would come as an
air attack ; is that correct?
A. That the most probable attack would come by air.
[674] 104. Q. In view of that and having in mind the assist-
ance in defense of the Pearl Harbor area, did you consider that a
daily search would add to the security of the Pearl Harbor base?
A, Undoubtedly a search would have added to the security of the
Pearl Harbor base. The question is when to put such search into
effect.
105. Q. But you did have enough planes to make a search daily of
a part or sector of the 360 degrees without seriously interfering with
your upkeep ; is that correct ?
A. Out of the number of planes that were on Pearl Harbor, cer-
tainly a portion of those could be used for any purpose, search in-
cluded.
516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
106. Q. On Sunday, December 7, was tlie usual routine of train-
ing employment, etc., going on, ancl was there any reduction in this
training activity by reason of its being Sunday ?
A. I would like to give you the summation of squadrons and the
situation. There were seven planes in the air conducting search
between 120 degrees to 170 degrees to 450 miles from Midway.
107. Q. Were those the Midway planes ?
A. Those were the planes that were out there in connection with
the security of a task force that was bringing about a reenforcement
by marine planes at Wake. Four planes were on the surface at Mid-
way, armecl with two 500-pound bombs and on ten minute notice. By
the way, these planes took departure at 10 : 30, after information of
the attack, and covered the sectors from east towards north. There
were twelve planes of VP-11 ready for flight on four hours notice.
108. Q. At Pearl Harbor ?
A. On Oahu. VP-12 had six planes ready for flight in thirty
minutes" notice and five planes ready for flight on four hours' notice.
VP-14 had three planes in the air on security patrol, armed with
depth charges ; three planes ready for flight on thirty minutes' notice
and four planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-22 had
twelve planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-23 had
eleven planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-24 had four
planes in the air conducting intertype tactics with submarines and
one plane ready for flight on thirty minutes' notice. Some time about
March 1, 1941, 1 put the Patrol wings on a seven-day operating sched-
ule, arranging details as to when squadrons would have a day off.
Sunday was a working day the same as other days. There was this
factor in connection with the Sunday work. The commanding officers
[OSS] were instructed to permit personnel to attend church con-
ferences.
109. Q. But there was no let-down in activity in your command by
reason of its being Sunday ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct. I am looking at a schedule dated 25 November
1941, and this particular schedule indicates operations every day,
some squadrons being off certain days. On Sunday, December 7,
there was one squadron particularly, which had returned from ISIid-
way, having been away for quite a while on rather strenuous work also
at Wake, and that squadron was left off duty. Therefore, on Decem-
ber 7 I would say that perhaps one squadron more than usual was off
duty.
110. Q. Was there at one time an inner patrol consisting of short-
legged planes searching daily the inner areas around Oahu ?
A. Prior to December 7 ?
111. Q. Not immediately prior, but wasn't there one?
A. I'm not sure — not under me, anyway.
112. Q. Well, was there any inner patrol, say, of twenty-five, thirty,
or fifty miles around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning
of December 7 ?
A. No. After December 7 I did take on the inner patrol with the
small planes and even organized and commissioned the unit from
those planes ol)tained from the ships that had been damaged.
113. Q. But there were short-legged planes available at Pearl Har-
bor on December 7 for such a patrol ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 517
A. No, those planes that were there were assigned to surface ships
and may have been on the beach at Pearl Harbor for certain purposes
but under the control of the ship's organization to which they were
assigned.
114. Q. Did the Army have any planes of this nature which could
have been used for this inner patrol ?
A. None that they thought were suitable, because they had objected
to sending planes out to sea and were loath to do so.
115. Q. Do you know of any time during your service at Hawaii
M'hen the Army did have light planes used as an inner patrol around
the entrances to Pearl Harbor?
A. Xo, I don't remember anything about the Army having taken
over that job or having had any activity in connection with it prior
to December, 1941, or even subsequent to December, 1941.
[686] 116. Q. In your estimate that an air attack on Pearl
Harbor or on Oahu was possible did you at any time look into the
question of the efficiency of radar installed on Oahu ?
A. I knew that the Army was setting up its organization and was
installing some sets. General Davidson at some time prior to De-
cember 7 made a trip to the mainland primarily to get information
with reference to radar organizations and equipment. There was a
lieutenant by the name of Taylor, I believe, who had had experience
with the British in connection with their interceptor command duties.
He was in Honolulu at some time shortly prior to December 7 and
had been working in some liaison capacity with the Army inter-
ceptor command, which had the radar installations under its control,
so that I was slightly informed about their situation.
117. Q. With your knowledge of radar immediately prior to De-
cember 7, did you or did you not consider that if properly used it
would be an important factor to you in any steps you would take
to defend Oahu from plane attack or for the security of your own
force ?
A. Radar was not in general use prior to December 7. A great
deal of effort was being made by everyone concerned who felt that
they needed radar installations to get their ships equipped with
radar, but there was lacking a great deal of positive information in
the service in general about the capabilities of this radar with which
we w^ere expected to equip our ships. I remember speaking particu-
larly to Admiral Halsey about it. He was very much interested in
getting his carriers equipped wnth radar. The information from
radar would not have Ijenefitted my particular command. It would
have had considerable bearing on the interceptor or ])ursuit com-
mand which had control of the fighter planes and also for the anti-
aircraft guns, but my particular command, which belonged to the
duties of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, involved the patrol
planes, which could not have done anything, particularly against a
carrier, although we were planning to use them to bomb, if necessary.
It came up as quite a moot question whether it was just sacrificing
the planes to use them as bombing planes against a carrier.
118. Q. You do not mean to state in your reply that if you had
received advanced w\arning of this attack, you could not have taken
steps to have saved a great many planes which probably were de-
stroyed otherwise; isn't that correct?
518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I doubt it very seriously, because the patrol planes are very large.
To move them, there must be a concrete surface on which to put them
or some very hard surface, or else put them in the water. The ques-
tion of dispersion of planes had been given considerable thought — that
is, patrol planes. The question is how to disperse patrol planes and
what do you gain from dispersing them ? You can put a patrol plane
perhaps where it may not be seen, [687] ' but the question is.
How long would it take to get it in the air from that place ? There-
fore, it was a give and take proposition, considering the space available
to put these planes and the time element involved in connection with
delaying operations. Even after December 7 w^e found it absolutely
impracticable to disperse patrol planes other than the way we were
doing it prior to December 7. I felt that perhaps anchoring these
planes out for dispersal purposes might be a good plan. Buoys were
put in Pearl Harbor and Kaneohi for that purpose — not all planes
but a portion of the planes. They did not happen to have any planes
at the buoy at Pearl Harbor on that day and perhaps it's a good thing.
They did have some at the buoys at Kaneohi, and all those planes were
sunk and completely ruined. Some of the planes on the beach were
damaged too badly to be put in commission, but many of them were
put back in commission.
119. Q, Did you have any information on the morning of December
7, 1941, as to the interception of enemy planes?
A, Interception of enemy planes ?
120. Q, A notice that certain enemy planes were coming in prior
to the action of the bombing attack ?
A. No, I did not ; I had no information.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) : ^
121. Q, Admiral, just so I understand about the estimate which is
contained in the document you read before : I take it that was at the
time your estimate of the eventuality that might occur at Hawaii if
Hawaii were attacked?
A. Yes.
122. Q. That is to say, if Hawaii were attacked, the most logical
form of attacking was by aircraft?
A. Correct.
123. Q. That w^as not your estimate of where the Japanese would
strike in the event of war ?
A. No, that is not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese,
This estimate was prepared because we were endeavoring, at the direc-
tion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to work out a
plan for the defense of Pearl Harbor.
Examined by the court :
124. Q. Admiral, in your familiarity with the general condition
in the Pacific, did you make, either mentally or otherwise, an estimate
as to the probability of an attack by Japan on Oahu ?
A, Not actually, no,
[68S] 125, Q. Did you think that they would not attack Oahu
as a surprise opening to this war?
A, I did not expect, as a probability, that an attack would be made
on Oahu as the opening event of a Japanese-United States war.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 519
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything rehxting to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 12 :40 p. m., adjourned until 0 :30 a. m., August
28, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 521
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INQUIRY
MONDAY, AUGUST 28, 1944.
[689] Twentieth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfiii, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolpluis Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank IVI. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the nineteenth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The judge advocate made the following statement : The judge advo-
cate has certain documents that he would like to introduce into evi-
dence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts there-
from as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
The court then, at 9 : 40 a. m., took a recess until 2 : 00 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all
the interested parties and their counsel, except Adnural Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles,
yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
[690^ The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 691
through 732, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the
record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action
was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prose-
cution of the war.
[73^-A] The court then, at 4:45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30
a. m., August 29, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 523
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAYY COURT OF INaUIRY
TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944. . '
[733] Twenty-First Day
Navy Depart3ient,
Washington, D. O.
The court met at 1) : 30 a. m.
Present: • , ,
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Eet), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. '
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the twentieth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 734 through
762, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was
taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecu-
tion of the war.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
[762- A'] The court then, at 12 : 35 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 00
p. m., at which time it reconvened.
[763'] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
rejDorter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was
informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, residence, and present occupation?
A. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Washington, D. C., special assistant to
the Secretary of State, Department of State,
524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Q. What was your position between 1 October and 7 December
1941?
A. I was an adviser on political relations, Department of State.
Examined by the court:
3. Q. In this position, Doctor Hornbeck, were you kept fully in-
formed on matters pertaining to the diplomatic relations between the
United States and Japan?
A. That would depend on the definition of fully, but for practical
purposes, I should say, yes.
4. Q. Did you see the important dispatches that came in and went
out to Japan during that period?
A. Practically all; that is. State Department dispatches.
5. Q. During this period, did you have occasion to confer with
officials of the Navy Department on matters pertaining to these
relations ?
A. I talked occasionally with some friend among the officer per-
sonnel of the Navy. I should not say that I had occasion to confer.
It is largely a question of how you define the word "confer".
6. Q. Well, were there frequent conferences at which representa-
tives of the Navy and the State Department were present?
A. There were conferences. There were frequent conferences in
the office of the Secretary of State, which dealt with matters of vari-
ous regions. When the Far East region was involved, I was often
present but by no means always.
[764] 7. Q. So you did attend some of these conferences?
A. I attended a certain ]:)ercentage.
8. Q. Could you state the names, as you remember, of the principal
officers. of the Navy who were present at these conferences?
A. Well, I remember particularly Admiral Richaixlson was present
at some earlier conferences. Admiral Stark was present at some.
Captain Schuirmann was present at some. You mean this limited
period from October?
9. Q. Yes.
A. That is all I remember for that period.
10. Q. Could you state briefly, please, the progress of these nego-
tiations between Japan and the United States during this period from
October to December 7, 1941, generally speaking?
A. By the end of October, it had become patent that we couldn't
have a meeting of minds, couldn't reconcile what the Japanese asked
of us with anything that we could commit ourselves to. Early in No-
vember the Secretary came to the conclusion that the question could
not be solved by diplomacy. The Ja])anese representatives began
pressing their proposals, and ultimately, I think on the 20th of Novem-
ber, they submitted a brief paper which they wanted this government
to consider. That paper had in it things that were impossible for us
to agree to. There were then conversations which the Secretary had
with various officers in this government and with various representa-
tives of foreign governments. On November 26, I think it was, the
Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador and his associate,
Mr, Kurusu, a paper — two papers, in fact, one of which contained an
outline of the type of agreement that we would be willing further to
discuss. The other was an explanation of that, and stated that this
was in the nature pf the kind of a thing that we could discuss toward
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 525
continiiing- the conversations. At abont that time, I think on the next
day, the Secretary for the second time said that this thing could not be
settled by diplomacy, but he still entertained a hope that the Japanese
might come forward with something further in reply to these two
documents of November 26 (or 27th). Then I should have to refresh
my mind as to what happened between the Secretary of State and the
President immediately after that, but from then on until December 7,
there were those steps that the President took, sending a message to the
Emperor of Japan. For any details, I would have to go back to the
record. That is all set out, however, in the State Department pub-
lished documents.
11. Q. So in your opinion, the possibility of arriving at [76S1
an agreement tended to worsen from October on — October 1941 ; is
that correct ?
A. Mav I answer that without saying, "Yes," or "No" ?
12. Q."Yes.
A. It became more clear that the Japanese would not accept what
we could accept. There is another way of putting that. It needs to
be kept in mind all the time that the Japanese had come to us propos-
ing a diplomatic settlement with regard to matters in the Far East.
There was no necessity that there be any diplomatic settlement. The
only thing that was needed for keeping peace in the Far East was for
the Japanese to keep within bounds, but they wanted to get from us
an assent to the program of conquest on which they were engaged in
the Far East. Therefore they came to us as the petitioners for agree-
ment, and, as I said, it became more and more evident that they would
not agree to reasonable things in our eyes, and therefore there couldn't
be any agreement. That didn't necessarily mean that w^e couldn't get
along without an agreement.
13. Q. Keferring to this note of 20 November, which the Secretary
handed to the representatives of Japan, which is a matter of record
before this court, was there a conference held prior to the delivery
of this note or subsequent thereto, with officials of the Navy Depart-
ment, say with Admiral Stark or with other officials?
A. I would have to look at the record of conferences to be able to
place one within that date.
14. Q. You haven't that record here?
A. I can't answer that, no.
15. Q. But this note was generally discussed, and it was public at
that time, wasn't it — I mean the fact that it had been sent?
A. Witliin two or three days it w\as public.
1(1. Q. But you don't remember at any time discussing this par-
ticular paper with the Chief of Operations, or any other officer of
the Navy Department?
A. My personally discussing it with him ?
17. Q. Yes, or having knowledge of it.
A. I have no memory of having any discussion of it directly with
the Chief of Naval Operations.
18. Q. And this same answer would apply to the Secretary of the
Navy, wnth reference to the discussion?
A. The same answer.
[700] 19. Q. Doctor Hornbeck, after the delivery of this note
of 26 November, did you consider this note and its contents such
526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that there was little chance after that of reaching any agreement
with Japan?
A. No, I did not so consider it; that is, I did not consider that
the chance was affected by this note.
20. Q. In other words, on November 2G or, say, November 26, did
you consider, or did you not consider, that the negotiations had
failed?
A. I considered that we were no nearer to an agreement than we
had been for a long time.
21. Q. Referring to this note, page 811, I believe it is, of this
document, "Peace and War", which document is before this court
for reference, and in paragraph three, which reads : "The Government
of Japan will witlidraw all military, naval, air and police forces
from China and from Indo-China." In your opinion, or can you
express the opinion of the State Department that this statement pre-
cluded the acceptance of any agreement between us as proposed by
the United States to Japan, along this line ?
A. If that had been a proposal initiated by the United States, I
should have said, probably; but it must be taken into account that
the things that had to be considered were the Japanese proposals
to us. The Japanese were making demands that we agree to certain
things that they wanted. In that particular document, we were
putting before them a statement of the kind of things to which we
could and would agree.
22. Q. Did you consider this note to be an ultimatum to Japan?
A. No, sir.
23. Q. Of course, the same applies to paragraph four of that state-
ment where it states: "The Government of the United States and
the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically,
economically — any government or regime in China other than the
National Government of the Republic of China with capital tempo-
rarily at Chungking," which is line with paragraph three. I suppose
your reply in reference to that paragraph would be the same as to
paragraph three?
A. I should like that with the other.
The proceedings following, pages 767 through 772, haA^e, by direc-
tion of the Court, been extracted from the record and deposited with
the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[77^-A'] The court then, at 2:55 p. m., adjourned until 9:45
a. m., August 30, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 527
PKOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
AUGUST 30, 1944. :•>'=;
[773] Twenty-Second Day :
Navy Departjvient,
, , Washington, D. G.
The court met at 9 : 45 a. m.
Present:
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ket), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Armiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) , interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-first day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, was re-
called as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding.
The proceedings following, pages 774 through 792 inclusive, have,
by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited
with the Secretai-y of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[793] Reexamined by the court :
107. Q. Achniral, the following is quoted from the report of the
Roberts Commission : "Responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area
were aware that previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Nazi
methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a
declaration of war." Were you also aware of this?
A. We always considered that possible, yes.
108. Q. In view of that, did you consider the Hawaiian area a pos-
sible or probable point of attack as a Japanese method of opening a
war with the United States?
A. I did consider it a possible spot.
109. Q. Did you consider it probable ?
A. I considered it possible. The information which we had did not
indicate its probability.
110. Q. Wliat was the quickest form of communication which could
have been used by Naval Operations on the morning of December 7
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A, It would have been the telephone. I am just assuming that the
telephone would have been normal. I can't say whether we would
have been held up by the telephone, but I assume it would have been
by telephone.
111. Q. Other testimony has indicated that it would be naval radio.
How would you compare naval radio with telephone?
A. Well, naval radio when you are pushing it is awfully fast, but
it requires coding and decoding, and I am thinking of the fastest way
which I could have gotten it through and that is by telephone.
112. Q. Does the court understand that your first knowledge that a
conference with the Secretary of State had been requested by the
Japanese diplomats to take place at 1 p. m., December 7, was derived
from General Marshall's telephone conversation with you during the
forenoon of December 7, 1941 ?
A. Wliether he gave it to me first or whether I had gotten it from
Schuirmann, with whom I was talking at that time, I am not exactly
clear. I think I had it when Marshall called. We were talking it over.
113. Q. When you finished your conversation with General Mar-
shall, having cognizance of the message he was sending to the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Area, why did you not send a mes-
sage of similar import to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet by
the fastest method available ?
A. AVell, I have stated that that is one regret that I have — ^that I
did not telephone that message.
[794] 114. Q. How did you mean your message, which has been
referred to as the "warning message" of November 27, to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to be interpreted by him with reference
to the words "warning message" ?
A. Are you referring to the words "war warning" ?
115. Q. How did you mean those words to be interpreted by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet when he got it?
A. It meant to me — I had assumed that it would mean to him —
imminence of war, that now we had to look out. At last everything
had lead up to this climax, and this was a warning for war.
IIG. Q. Then, why did you not add the words "Hawaiian Area"
along with the other areas which you specifically mentioned?
A. I gave him, as I gave the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, the
indications from the best intelligence we had as to where the blow
was most likely to fall.
117. Q. Admiral, did you not state in earlier testimony that you
considered that the specific areas mentioned did not necessarily ex-
clude the Hawaiian area?
A. I did, and in my earlier dispatch of the 24th I stated that. I
deliberately wrote into that dispatch myself the words "in any
direction."
118. Q. And did you at that time, on November 24, have in mind
that it would strike Hawaii ?
A. Not that it would but that it was possible and that Hawaii should
be on guard. The dispatch also, as you will recall, went to the Canal
and to our West Coast commands.
119. Q. There is testimony before the court that in 1941, in the
months before December 7, j^riorit}^ had been given the Atlantic area
over the Pacific area with reference to rectifying deficiencies in ships,
personnel, materiel, and so forth ; is that correct ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 529
A, My ans%yer to that is that we used wliat we had to meet the
urgencies of the situation as we saw it. It was not a case of one over
the other. It was the case of what was confronting it and what to do
with what we had.
120. Q. Well, didn't the Atlantic have any priority over the Pa-
cific? If you had things which you could not give to both, would you
give them to the Atlantic ?
A. It would d*epend on what they were and what ships were
involved.
121. Q. How was it Avorking?
A. It is covered in correspondence which is in the record. For
example, we were escorting. We had had two destroyers hit in the
Atlantic, and sound gear might have been considered more important
for them at that time than it would have been if it was a case between
certain submarine [705] detection gear for them and the Pa-
cific. When it came to personnel, so far as I can recall, the treatment
was pretty much equal. We were shy all around. We just did wliat
we considered to be best, and nobody was satisfied and I least of all.
122. Q. With reference to personnel, there has been testimony in
the record that the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Area were not
in an efficient condition for war because of the shortage of personnel,
materiel, and equipment and that the Pacific Fleet was being used to
a certain extent for training personnel, which were then taken and
transferred to the Atlantic; is that correct or do you care to comment
on that?
A. Regarding the first ])art, it is my opinion that the Pacific Fleet
was in a fine state of efficiency, as I would have expected it to have
been under the able leadership of its connnander. Regarding the trans-
fer of personnel from the Pacific Fleet for the Atlantic Fleet to the
detriment of the Pacific Fleet, I do not think it was done. We were
transferring from both for the extremely heavy production program
which was coming along, but the Pacific Fleet was, not only from
what Admiral Kimmel wrote but from others, in a high state of
efficiency in gunnery. I believed its morale to be good, and I was
delighted with the work that was being done out there.
123. Q. In the critical weeks, or pherhaps days, immediately pre-
ceding December 7 if the Navy Department had considered an attack
on the Pacific Fleet as probable or even possible, what action would
you have taken with reference to tightening up on espionage in Oahu
and on facilities for getting information valuable to Japan out of
the Island ?
A. Well, to have gone the limit and to have stopped comnumica-
tions between Japanese officials in Hawaii and Tokyo might have pre-
cipitated what we were trying to avoid, and it would have been
necessary to go the limit, I take it, to stop that sort of thing. We
stopped Japanese ships going through the Canal, We stopped our
ships from taking their re^-ular routes and routed them to the southern.
We lost only one ship, and we took a. chance on her to get the last
few marines out. To have gone further than the steps we did take
and to have intercepted what they did get might have precipitated it
earlier. Whether or not it would have been a good thing to have done
I am not prepared to state.
124. Q. Was Japan doing it from her side?
79716 — 40— Ex. 146, vol. 1 35
530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Not that I know of. I think we were in constant touch with
Grew.
125. Q. Wouldn't you have considered the stoppage of Japanese
ships through the Panama Canal and the breaking of Japanese rela-
tions on a parity with stopping communications from Honolulu to
Japan ?
A. We didn't think so. We knew it was touchy, but [796] we
did it in such a way that it was camouflaged to some extent.
126. Q. If, after sending your message on the 27th of November,
the Navy Department had considered that conditions were so critical
that war Avas perhaps in the ofihig, why didn't they disapprove the
sending of a carrier and planes to Wake Island after the report had
been made to you that the carrier was sailing on November 29?
A. I did not think that inconsistent in any way with the war warn-
ing. That a task group which was fast and able to take care of itself
in the open sea —
127. Q. The testimony indicates that the carrier carrying those
planes which could not be used was handicapped in the war task. She
was used as a cargo carrier for planes.
A. I don't know how many of her own planes she had. She prob-
ably had some. In an emergency the cargo could have been dumped
ove'rboard, and, in any event, it was along toward strengthening the
position in the Pacific and a chance which was considered favorable
to take.
128. Q. But if you had had the idea that Japan was going to attack
Pearl Harbor, it would not have been sound to have carriers withdrawn
from the area of Hawaii and to have used them as transports to Wake,
would it ?
A. If you set the question up that I knew an attack was coming on
Hawaii at a definite time.
129. Q. No, we are speaking of a possibility, and you say there was
a possibility of an attack in the immediate future on Hawaii. Now,
having that in mind, you are cognizant of the withdrawal of a carrier
used more as a cargo ship than as a carrier because of the mass of
planes on board. You withdraw that ship and send her to Wake
and withdraw one of the means of not only protecting Pearl Harbor
but of getting information in advance of an attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. Well, I would not say that it was particularly stopping the in-
formation in advance. As I recall — and the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific, who is here, can testify — there was a broad coverage to that
movement, which in itself was somewhat of a sweep, and to the best of
my knowledge and belief, from the dispatch I sent, he had no ob-
jection to it. It was generally strengthening the position. We couldn't
stop everything. We couldn't say with a dead certainty that the
thing was going to happen, and it was in line with defense.
130. Q. Is it not directed in the Rainbow Plan that this plan was
to go into effect upon the declaration of war or upon the orders of
the Navy Department ?
A. Yes, sir.
[797] 131. Q. Under the critical conditions existing at the time,
will you comment on why a directive was not sent to place it in
operation immediately on December 6 or the early morning of the
7th or prior to that ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 531
A. I commented on that before. It might have precipitated war
had it been put into effect, and it is a pretty difficult thing for the Navy
to do or for our country to do — to take the initiative in what appears
to be or certainly would be interpreted as an aggressive move toward
Japan. The United States certainly was not united, by any means,
for war in the Pacific until Pearl Harbor united it.
132. Q. However, the fact that you were executing Rainbow would
not have been general information. It would have been simply secret
information to the Fleet and to the Navy. It would not have been
apparent to the public or even to Japan, because when you give an
execute on Rainbow Plan that execute is just as secret as Rainbow
Plan. I do not quite understand your answer that by giving the
execute on Rainbow we would be disturbing Japan.
A. The plan which was in execution would have become known to
the Japs and would have been so reported. I may be wrong.
133. Q. Were you in accord with the directive which required that
no movement be taken which might excite the populace or excite
Japan ?
A. In general, but there is a wide degree of interpretation as to
what might incite, and there is a point of judgment there. Certainly
we couldn't take a chance of being shot with our hands in our pockets,
and I think Marshall's dispatch made that plain. As to the rest of
it, you may recall a couple of years earlier the wide sweep for days in
the San Pedro area when we thought there were Jap submarines op-
erating off there. It was common laiowledge and was common talk
in the papers, but it was considered necessary. I would have done
what I considered necessary.
134. Q. Admiral, we have had your opinion expressed several times
about the possible point of attack by Japan in opening a war. What
was the general opinion of your advisors in Operations on this ques-
tion with particular reference to an attack on the Hawaiian area?
A. So far as I know, there was no dissent from the dispatches
which had been sent that Hawaii was a possibility and that the in-
formation we had lead to the belief that the Philippines, Guam, and
the Kra Peninsula would be struck, because there were definite indi-
cations to that effect.
135. Q. I take it that there was a difference of opinion between you
and your officers in Operations on that point?
A. No, certainly not as to what we sent out. As to [79S]
the degrees of possibility, you probably can get that from them
directly.
136. Q. The following is a quotation from the report of the Roberts
Commission : "It seems that a sense of security resulted due to the
opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles and in
the public press that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the
Far East." May we have your opinion on that general statement?
A. Well, I have stated that I thought, from the information we
had, that the blow would most likely fall in the Far East. I have
also stated that it was a possibility that it might fall elsewhere, I
have also stated that I thought we should be on guard not only in
Hawaii but in the Canal and on the West Coast ports. I have also
stated that I was surprised at the attack on Hawaii. I did not
expect — or, at least, I had not anticipated — the Japs' striking all
532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the way across the Pacific from the Kra Peninsula to and including
Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, there was the possibility and if the
possibility existed, I felt that we should be on guard against it, and
it was for that reason I sent these dispatches for action to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific as well as to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic. We could not say the attack would not develop there, but
the evidence we had pointed to its being much farther to the westward.
137. Q. What do you mean exactly by the term "on guard''? Men-
tally alert or physically equipped and ready to prevent damage?
A. My feeling was indicated when I sent those words "war warn-
ing," and I pondered over that sentence whether they should be on
the lookout for an attack, that it might come.
138. Q. Since there was a deficiency in materiel, equipment, and
trained personnel, wouldn't considerable damage have been done in
spite of their being on the lookout, other things being equal?
A. An air raid once started is awfully difficult to stop. It is almost
certain that some of it is bound to get tlu'ough. On the other hand,
if Army fighters had had a chance at that raid coming in, I feel that
it would have been considerably less effective than it was. I was
surprised at the effectiveness of that raid.
139. Q. In that connection, if they had received three hours' ad-
vance information as to the possibility of a raid, your theory would
have proved correct; is that possible?
A. If they had had word which convinced them that an air raid
was coming in and that it was a probability three hours before, I feel
that the story might have been very different, assuming, of course,
they took action.
[799] 140. Q. By saying that the story might have been different
you do not mean that there would have been no damage?
A. No, I do not. I covered that in a previous answer. A raid
once started in force is very difficult to stop a hundred per cent.
141. Q. It would be impossible even now to estimate what the differ-
ence might have been ?
A. Yes.
142. Q. Admiral, although we have used the word "possibility"
many times in this connection, is it not a fact — and if it is not, the
court would like to have an expression of opinion from you — that your
opinion and the opinion of practically all official Washington was
that the attack would not be in Hawaii but would be in the southern
Asiatic waters ?
A. Well, I hesitate to say about all official Washington.
143. Q. Well, those with whom you conferred?
A. Yes, I think that is probably true. There may have been certain
individuals who held the possibility of an attack on Hawaii greater
than others, but, generally speaking, I think your statement is true.
144. Q. Did your opinion and the opinions which you had accumu-
lated here have any bearing on your not picking up the telephone
on the 7th of December and telephoning the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific?
A. Not the slightest. I sim])ly didn't think of it.
145. Q. In other words, you trusted the Army message completely?
A. Yes. You will recall I asked Marshall if he could get it through
very quickly, and he said, "Yes, I can get it through just as quickly
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 533
as you can."' I let it go. The teleplione is purely hind sight with
me as to wherein I was wrong that I didn't do more to alert them.
If the blow had not fallen at 1300 on the 7th, we probably would not
have thought of it. We would have had the dates of the 25th and
the 29th, but here is something, looking back on it now, that did
hook up, and we thought there was that possibility, and I regret that
I did not pick up the telephone, regardless of secrecy, as things have
turned out, and notified them.
14G. Q. And paralleled it with Naval radio?
A. I regret that.
147. Q. That is all post Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes.
[SO(J] 148. Q. The things you are expressing now?
A. Yes, it is all hind sight, and it is a search of my own conscience
as to what I might have done.
149. Q. Did you confer with the Secretary of the Xavy on the fore-
noon of December 7, 1941, at any time?
A. I think not. Of course, I saw him later on all day. I don't
remember just what time I saw him. The time there in that whole
picture is a little confused except for the message to which we had
just referred as to when I saw the Colonel and acquainted him with
what we had or what w^e had done and what had happened.
150. Q. You do not remember whether you discussed your con-
versation with Marshall with the Secretary prior to the attack?
A. No, I don't definitely. I assume if the Colonel came in, I told
him, because I kept him rather fully posted.
151. Q. Did you discuss it with the Under Secretary or see him
here ?
A. I don't recall his being here in the morning. Everybody came
in after 1300.
152. Q. Did you consider the advisability or otherwise of keeping
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet informed in detail of the
progress of events and of allowing him to evaluate the information
for his own purposes rather than to give him a comprehensive state-
ment based upon your own evaluation, upon which an interpretation
different from your own might be placed ?
A. No, I didn't. It was our job to evaluate. He had his own
job, and we sent him a mass, of stuff which was coming in here for
him to sift out. I didn't consider it. I thought it was the Depart-
ment's job. I endeavored to keep him informed of what I thought
would be most useful to him in the main trend.
153. Q. Is it not correct, recognized military procedure to furnish
commanders in the field with full information rather than mere
evaluation?
A. Well, I don't know. It was not here.
154. Q. The idea being, of course, that the man on the spot is the
best judge of the relation of the information in its application to his
circumstances.
A. Well, we left it to the man on the spot as to what to do after we
had given him the picture as we saw it, and we thought the picture we
gave was sound. Subsequent events proved them to have been pretty
sound.
[810] 155. Q. Is it or is it not a fact that at no time during
the year 1941 did the United States have at its disposal sufficient
534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
trained personnel and war equipment to meet a possible threat in
one ocean much less simultaneously in both ?
A. That is correct, and on that basis as to what we had WPL 46
was drawn.
156. Q. Wasn't the training program which was in effect in both
oceans part of an effort to rectify this deficiency ?
A. Yes, I think everything possible was being done afloat. I had
perfect confidence in all three commanders-in-chief afloat.
157. Q. The court understands that after sending your so-called
"war warning" message of November 27 you sent no directive as to
action to be taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Did you
consider that he was already authorized to suspend training opera-
tions in his discretion and that such suspension was justified in the
light of existing circumstances and in view of the existing deficiences
elsewhere ?
A. I did after that warning. As far as I was concerned, anything
he wanted to do was all right, unless he sent me something of which
the Department might have disapproved. As far as I was con-
cerned, he had a free hand.
The court then, at 12 : 25 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[802] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel ; all the interested parties and their counsel. Frank M.
Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, and an interested partj^, resumed his
seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was
still binding, and continued his testimony.
Examination by the court (Continued) :
158. Q. Admiral, you stated this morning in reply to a question
about shifting the Fleet from Pearl Harbor to San Francisco, during
this very critical period, the latter part of November 1941, that this
was out of the cards. We presume insofar as you are concerned ; but
you added, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific had authority to shift the
Fleet, is that correct ?
A. Well, I didn't mean to convey by that that he had the authority
to come to the West Coast. I meant that he had a free hand in what
to do with the Fleet in the Hawaiian area. I would have considered
that he wanted to come to the West Coast he would have asked per-
mission.
159. Q. But in view of the conditions existing at that time, you
didn't consider the shifting of the Fleet; is that correct?
A. I did not consider shifting the Fleet to the West Coast ; that is
correct.
160. Q, Was there any discussion as to the shift ?
A. I think not.
161. Q. I think this is clear in the record, but just to repeat, perhaps,
when this message of 27 November was sent to the Commander-in-
Chief Pacific — the message that you called the "war warning message",
and a similar message was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaii —
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 535
the Commanding General in answer to that stated that he was on Alert
No. 1, and that, in other words, his reply showed Alert No. 1 was alert
against sabotage. Did you have any knowledge of this reply or did
you discuss that with any Army official as to the interpretation that
the Commanding General, Hawaii, had placed on this message'^
A. I had no knowledge of it until after December 7.
162. Q. In the light of existing circumstances, existing at the time
of the critical period between 27 November and [803] 7 De-
cember 1941, it is possible a wholesale exodus of the Pacific Fleet from
Pearl Harbor might be interpreted by the Japanese as an aggressive
move on the part of the United States, and possibly precipitated action
by the Japanese ?
A. It might have been so considered, and it might have precipitated
action,
Kecross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
163. Q. Admiral, you were asked this morning whether or not you
considered the note of November 26, that was handed by the State
Department to the Japanese a very important note, and you answered,
"Yes." Now when you were explaining to the court whether you
meant by that it was an important note in the sense that it meant
negotiations with Japan were continuing, or was it important in the
sense that it indicated that this was a final clearance of the record;
what was it you meant ?
A. What I meant was that it indicated the final clearance of the
record.
164. Q. With respect to the movement of planes to Wake by carrier,
concerning which you had sent the dispatch to the Commander-in-
Chief Pacific about the same time as the war warning dispatch was
sent, isn't it true that the planes which were being ferriect to Wake
were twelve fighter planes, and that it didn't necessarily require that
any of the carrier's complement be left behind at Pearl Harbor ?
A. It is true — that is, twelve carrier planes, and in my reply this
morning I said I wasn't sure, and am not now, if any reduction was
made in the carrier's planes. The twelve fighters could have been used
as fighters. I doubted if they displaced very much, if anything.
They may actually have added to the carrier's complement, and to that
extent I would say probably did not weaken her in any way.
165. Q. Did you consider the trip of the carrier to Wake in any
way impaired the ability of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet to carry out long-range reconnaissance?
A. No.
166. Q. Admiral, did you see the Secretary of the Navy after the
attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941 ?
A. I did.
167. Q. Did you see him during the days intervening between
Sunday, December 7, 1941, and his investigation trip to Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes.
168. Q. You are familiar with the information that on [804-li
7 December, the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment w^ith
the Secretary of State at 1300, for the purpose of delivering a note,
are you not ?
A. Yes.
536 CONGRESSIO^JAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
169. Q. At any time on Sunday, December 7, after the attack, or
at any time during the period intervening between that time and his
trip to Pearl Harbor, did tlie Secretary of the Navy ever mention to
you his having received on Sunday morning, the 7th of December, at
the State Department, a memoranchnn of this information concerning
the Japanese Ambassador asking for a conference, and did he ever
mention to you that there was pinned to this memorandum a note to
the effect that 1300 was dawn at Pearl Harbor or midnight at Manila,
and that an air raid on Pearl Harbor was indicated within a few
hours ?
A. He did not.
170. Q. Did he ever say anything to you which might have indi-
cated that he had such information prior to the attack on 7 December?
A. No, he never did, and I feel reasonably certain tliat had he had
such information, he certainly would have acquainted me with it.
Moreover, I feel that if he had the information, he would have prob-
ably asked me why I didn't act on it. Colonel Knox didn't mince
words, and if that information had been available to us at that time
and not sent to Pearl Harbor, I think he would have impressed it on
me in a way that I never would have forgotten it.
171. Q. Between 7 December and the time he left for Pearl Harbor,
or any time after that?
A. Yes.
172. Q. Along the same line, Admiral, I'd like to read from the
record page 506, question 182, and 183 :
182. Q. Specifically, did tbe deficiency in information which the Navy Depart-
ment was furnishing him have any effect on what actions he took or might have
taken with respect to possible action by tlie .Japanese in the Hawaiian area?
A. Yes. I would like to state, for example, that a few days after Pearl Harbor
the late Secretary of the Navy Knox arrived in I'earl Harbor to conduct an inves-
tigation. He was with Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and I believe Admiral
Bloch all morning. I wasn't there, but I was invited to join them at 12 o'clock
for lunch. After I arrived I believe I remember the exact words of Secretary
Knox. Present at this conference were Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Pye, Admiral
Bloch, General Short, Captain Beatty, who was aide to the Secretary, and I.
Secretary Knox said, "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" We
all answered in the [S05] negative. He stated, "We learned surrepti-
tiously on the 6th of December tliat Nomura and Kurusu had orders to liold their
last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the 7th." 1 p. m. in
Washington was about 7 : 30 in Pearl Harbor, shortly before the attack. He said,
"I know that that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of
course, it was sent to you." Now, had we had that information on Saturday,
the 6th of Dec(^mber, it would have been very valuable. The Army received that
message on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor. The Navy never did receive it. The
Commander-in-Chief had no message on the order of that mentioned by Secretary
Knox.
183. Q. Did Secretary Knox say when this information first became available?
A. My recollection is on Saturday, the 6tli of December.
Did Secretary Knox ever mention to you the fact that he knew on
the 6th of December, as distinguished from the 7th of December when
you first learned of this message, the fact that he knew that the Japa-
nese Ambassador was to ask for an appointment with the Secretary
of State at 1 o'clock Sunday ?
A. He did not.
173. Q. Do you feel that if he had had that information, he would
have brought it to your attention ?
A. I certainly feel that he would have.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 537
Recross-cxaniined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kinimel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
174. Q. Referring to one of the questions asked you, Admiral, dia
you know whether or not the report that General Short made to the
War Department subsequent and as a result of the message to him
under date of 27 November was ever sent to the Navy Department —
in i^articular, the War Plans Division of Chief of Naval Operations?
A. No, I don't. My earliest recollection of that is at the time of
the Roberts Commission.
175. Q.. You said this morning in substance that if the Army had
had more fighter planes in tlie air Sunday, 7 December, tlie results of
the Ja]) attack might have been mitigated to some extent?
A. That's right.
176. Q. On die tiOth of November, in a dispatch to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific — this dispatch is Exhibit IS in the record —
you stated : "OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station
25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and [SOO] a simihir num-
ber at Wake, provided you consider this feasible and desirable."
When you sent that message, when j^ou took the action stated in this
message, did you have in mind the possibility of the effect of more
pursuit planes to which you made reference this morning?
A. The answer I made this morning was that if the Army had word
that an attack was coming in and if they had used the fighters they
had to intercept it, that the damage resulting from the Jap attack
would probably have been far less.
177. Q. Diminution of the number of fighters that they had had
by fifty would have reduced the elTectiveness of their defense, would
it not ?
A. If the planes had been taken from Oalui without replacement, it
would have.
The proceedings following, pages S07 through 808. inclusive, have,
by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited
with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest
of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[800] Examined by the court :
186. Q. Referring to this memorandum which has been mentioned
in testimony here which the Secretary of the Navy had, noting that
1 o 'clock, 1 p. m., was dawn at Honolulu and midnight in Manila, did
you discuss this, or did this fact come to you, or did you consider this
fact on Sunday morning, December 7?
A. Taking the first part of your question, yes. I never heard of
the memorandum until my present visit to Washington. Of course,
when we talked of the ]wssible coincidence of 1300 with an attack,
although the message contained nothing regarding an attack or where
it would fall, naturally I made a quick mental guess of what time it
would be in Pearl Harljor, which was 0780.
187. Q. But this did not influence your decision to confer with Ad-
miral Kimmel as soon as possible?
A. By telei)hone, no, it did not. I didn't think of the tele])hone.
We thought only in terms of the radio. I say, "we." I did not, and
nobody else mentioned telephone to me.
188. Q. These questions are in order to clear the record. In i)re-
vious testimony, when this note of the 2Cth of November— the note of
538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Secretary of State to the Japanese — was handed to the Japanese,
this question was asked you — were you familiar with this note ? You
said in substance, "this is the first time I have ever heard of this note."
This is the note from the United States Government to Japan. It
seems now the statement has been made that you considered this note
as more or less the final culmination of these negotiations.
A. Well, since then my attention has been called to the note and I
have read it and I now know all about it. At the time the question
was asked me, I hadn't seen it and did not know about it. I also be-
lieve that I stated that the general tenor of it might have been dis-
cussed with me, as a result of the question you asked me this morning
regarding Admiral Schuirmann, but when the question was first asked
me, I want to make it plain — I did not recall it.
189. Q. The question was asked, having knowledge of the testi-
mony in which you were shown the note and asked to read it, and after
you had read the note, you said, "No," you had no know^ledge of it,
and this was the first time you had any knowledge of it — and that
is why this question was asked — in order to clear the record.
A. Well, it was certainly the first time I had ever read it.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to [SIO^
examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as interested party.
The court then, at 2 : 25 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 35 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel ; all
the interested parties and their counsel, except the interested party,
Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present.
Frederick T. Latchat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
[811] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
The proceedings following, pages 812 through 815, inclusive, have,
by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and de-
posited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in
the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of
the war.
[81S-A] The court then, at 2:45p. m., adjourned until 9:45
a. m., August 31, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 539
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIEY
AUGUST 31, 1944.
[816] Twenty-Third Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 9 : 45 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
Admiral Edveard G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.^, Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret,), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested
party, and his counsel.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-second day of the in-
quiry was read and approved.
One of counsel for an interested party was called as a witness, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Royal E. Ingersoll, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the year 1941 ?
A. I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations until the last two
or three days of 1941. I do not recall the date on which I was de-
tached as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
3. Q. As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, what duties had
been assigned you by law, regulation, or superior authority?
A. There were no duties assigned to the Assistant Chief [817]
of Naval Operations by law or by regulation. The duties of the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations were prescribed in Office Orders
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. They were also described
in a general order which established the Joint Board, of which the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations was a member. The duties pre-
scribed in the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations I have not seen
for some time, so I cannot quote them exactly, but in general they
required the heads of the different divisions of Operations to take up
matters of policy with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, before
presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations. He had general
charge of the administration of the Office of Chief of Naval Opera-
540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions. In carrying out those duties, during the time that I was Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations, I endeavored to relieve the Chief of
all of the details and onerous part of his duties that I could. Once he
had established a policy, I endeavored to carry out the details, to sign
correspondence in regard to it, to release dispatches in regard to it.
However, if anything came in of which I thought he should have
knowledge, I told him about it.
4. Q. Did you also act in an advisory capacity to the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
A. Yes, the Chief of Naval Operations often asked my advice, and
on many occasions I considered it necessary to offer advice.
5. Q. Generally speaking, to what extent do you feel you knew
what matters were transacted in the OfHce of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations ?
A. I knew in a general way what was being transacted in all of
the sections of Operations.
6. Q. In matters which mutually concerned the State Department
and the Navy Department, did you feel that you were in general
familiar with what was going on ?
A. In general, yes.
7. Q. Were you familiar with the sources of information available
to the Chief of Naval Operations on political and military matters
as they iselated to Japan ?
A. In regard to political matters, I knew that the Chief of Naval
Operations had a very close touch with the State Department, both
by his personal contact with the Secretary of State, and other officers
in the State Department, and through his liaison officer with the
State Department, Captain Schuirmann. He received copies of the
dispatches received by the State Department from our ambassador in
Japan. We also received messages received from secret sources which
bore on the political situation. In regard to the military situation,
the amount of information regarding the military situation was not
very much. For years it had been difficult to obtain any [^^8]
information regarding the military situation, particularly in regard
to the naval situation; and in some cases it was almost impossible
to obtain the information as to where Japanese ships were. Two units
had been set up— I don't know when — one in Cavite, and one in Pearl
Harbor, with the object of obtaining information regarding the
whereabout of Japanese ships through radio intelligence and radio
direction finders ; and that, during the last part of 1941, was practically
the only source of information that we had regarding Japanese ships,
and it was in many cases not complete. Occasionally we got an in-
telligence report from the Chinese which gave the location of ships
sighted in China, and occasionally we got a bit of information from
the British or other nations.
8. Q. Do 3'Ou feel that you were acquainted as a matter of general
principle with this information when it arrived in the Navy Depart-
ment ?
A. In regard to the political information, yes. In regard to the
military information, no, — I mean naval and military — because the
mechanics for obtaining the military informaticm were very compli-
cated and only the results or the estimate made, after the receipt of
bearings and analyses of radio traffic had been made, were given from
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 541
time to time to tlie Chief of Naval Operations. Those estimates Avere
usually made in tlie War Plans Division, which followed the situation
as best thoy could from the more or less meager information which
was obtained.
9. Q. Did YOU see these evaluations or estimates that were finally
produced as a result of receiving all this information in the Xavy
Department from whatever source it might have originated?
A. I don't know that I saw them all. I used to examine the plot
in the Ship Movements Division on which the location of Japanese
shi]:)S and other xVxis ships were plotted. Whenever there was a
significant move, I believe I was informed by Admiral Turner or
by the Office of Naval Intelligence, but I did not see the daily inter-
cepts on which this information was based.
10. Q. Will you state in general what was the method of processing
information that came in through these sources or through the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. I do not know the details of how the information was liandled
in the communications office before it was presented to the Director
of Naval Intelligence and to the Director of War Plans. As I have
stated before, the information, when it was received, was evaluated
and prepared in the form of memorandum estimates of the situation
and were given to us when there was any significant change of which
we should be informed. Also the positions were plotted on the
Operations ['^^9] plotting sheet when they knew where any-
body was.
11. Q. What I am trying to ^et at specifically. Admiral, is did you
see these final evaluations or estimates after they were made in War
Plans or by the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?
A. I saw some of the estimates on some occasions. At the Secretary's
conferences in the morning, the question of the location and disposi-
tions of the Japanese Fleet, the German and Italian Fleet, as we knew
it, were sometimes presented either by the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence— sometimes the Director of War Plans would comment on
them. Political developments were discussed at various times. There
was no set routine method by which the information, either political
or military, was processed daily or at any routine time. It was dis-
tributed and given to the officers when there was anything important
enough to give.
12. Q. Do you recall Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who appears
to have had some liaison duties in this connection?
A. Yes, I recall an officer who had liaison duties in this connection,
and I believe the ofhcer who used to bring messages to me was
Lieutenant Kramer.
1?). Q. How did the Chief of War Plans Division assist the Chief
of Naval O]ierations in the performance of the Chief of Naval
Operations' duties?
A. The duties of the Director of the War Plans Division are
enumerated in the Office Orders to which I have referred. From
memory, the orders required the office of War Plans, as a primary
duty, to prepare war plans, to review the contributory plans which
were submitted to the commanders of fleets and naval districts. The
Director of War Plans was also a niember of the Joint Board.
Admiral Turner, Avho was then Captain, who was the Director of
542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
War Plans, conferred frequently with the Chief of Naval Operations
on both the political situation and on the military-naval situation as
he saw it, and kept him advised.
14. Q. Do you know whether the War Plans Division maintained
a current estimate of the situation as it related to the Japanese-
United States relations?
A. It made a current estimate, or it kept a current estimate of the
military-political situation. To what extent it kept a political esti-
mate my recollection is not so good, except that I do recall that
Admiral Turner conferred frequently with Admiral Stark on the
political situation, also accompanied him to various conferences from
time to time in the State Department, on the political situation. In
general, you can say that the War Plans Division did keep in touch
with the political situation.
[820] 15. Q. As you look back on these circumstances and these
estimates, how do you characterize them from the standpoint of their
accuracy and helpfulness to the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. As I stated in answer to a previous question, the military-
naval information was meager, and there were sometimes differences
in the opinion of the agencies who collected the information. The
Navy Department itself had no other means outside of the two agen-
cies for collecting naval information except an occasional dispatch
from the British or the Chinese. That information, incidentally, was
always available at the same time to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The CNO's
contact with the Secretary of State should have given him the most
accurate information regarding the political situation that anybody
could have had.
16. Q. Do you feel that you were acquainted with the major prob-
lems of the Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, as they related to per-
sonnel, materiel, and operations?
A. Yes, in a general way, although I was more acquainted with the
details of operations than I was with the details of personnel and
materiel. I might add in amplification to my answer to the question
regarding the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations that I had no
original cognizance of any matter, that all original cognizance was
taken up by the Chiefs of Sections. I only endeavored to keep in
general touch with the whole thing, and to assist the Admiral as I
could in taking the load of details off of him.
17. Q. During the period 1 October, say to 7 December 1941, what
did you consider to have been the paramount mission of the United
States Pacific Fleet?
A. The Pacific Fleet was assigned certain tasks in the current war
plan. The war plan, of course, was not to be executed until there was
a declaration of war or until a message had been sent executing the
war plan. Until that was done the primary mission of the Pacific
Fleet, as well as all of the other fleets of the United States, was to
prepare to carry out their tasks which were assigned in the plan, which
included training and preparation of subordinate plans to carry out
the war plan, also getting the ships in the best material condition,
making alterations to them to bring them up to date. In general, to
prepare for war.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVT COURT OF INQUIRY 543
18. Q. Did any development of United States-Japanese relations
take place prior to 7 December 1941, which caused a change in this
peace time mission that you have just described?
A. From what date?
[8£1] 19. Q. Any time prior to 7 December of that year,
A. On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch
to all commanders-in-chief which stated that the diplomatic relations
or negotiations with Japan had ceased, that he thought war was im-
minent, and that dispatch was prefaced by the words, "This is a war
warning." From that time on, it seemed to me that the mission of all
fleets was to get ready for war — that the training and material prepara-
tions were of secondary importance to security and deployment for
war.
20. Q. While we all know that the air force of the Pacific Fleet
was a part of the Fleet, and what you have previously testified as to
the general mission of the Fleet in war time probably did apply as
well to aircraft as to ships, but I want to bring out specifically what
your opinion was to whethier or not the mission of the air force of
the Pacific Fleet was any difl'erent from that of the ships constituting
the fleet?
A. Since the air force of the Pacific Fleet was a part of the Fleet,
I consider that in general the tasks of the air force of the Pacific
Fleet would have changed in the same manner as the ships, except
that there were certain parts of the air force of the Pacific Fleet that
were to be used in connection with the coastal defense, or frontier
defense, of the Hawaiian District.
21. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, what was your view of the pos-
sibility of a Japanese surprise attack on the United States in the
Hawaiian area ?
A. It was always a possibility.
22. Q. Wliat was your view during this same period of the pos-
sibility of a surprise attack on the United States Fleet in Pearl
Harbor?
A. It was a possibility.
23. Q. What was your view at that time of the possibility of a sur-
prise torpedo plane attack on the ships of the United States Fleet in
Pearl Harbor?
A. It was a possibility, and it occurred.
24. Q. From your discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations
during the latter part of the year 1941, did he express to you at that
time his views of the possibility of a surprise torpedo plane attack on
ships of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor?
A. The first time of which I have any recollection, and of course
it is now hindsight, was that a letter was prepared in the War Plans
Division of Operations, to the [822] Secretary of War, in
which was enumerated the various forms of attack that might be
made on the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor, and among those
was a torpedo plane attack, a bombing plane attack, and others.
Admiral Stark most certainly must have discussed that letter with
the Secretary before it was signed, and I do know that there were
discussions at Joint Board meetings regarding the vulnerability of
Pearl Harbor, subsequent to the time this letter was dispatched and
544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
subsequent to the time that the Secretary of War's reply to the letter
was received.
25. Q. Do you know if there was any concensus of opinion in the
circle of officers in the responsible positions in the Office of Chief of
Naval Operations or in the Navy Department, who had any decided
views on the possibility of a surprise torpedo plane attack on the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor about this time, during 1941 ?
A. I think it was considered by officers in Operations that a torpedo
plane attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor was a possibility.
26. Q. Can you recall whether or not this matter was discussed
with frequency?
A. I can't remember how often it was discussed, but I do recall that
after the receipt of the reply of the Secretary of War there were dis-
cussions regarding the security of ships at Pearl Harbor. The thing
that I recall most is arguments about balloon barrages and the use of
smoke; but I do recall the question of security did come up from
time to time — but how often and just when, I do not now remember.
27. Q. Had the question of anti-torpedo nets been discussed in con-
nection with the protection of the fleet at Pearl Harbor ?
A. There was correspondence with the Bureau of Ordnance which
was transmitted to the Fleet, regarding torpedo nets and the depth
of water in which torpedoes launched from planes could run.
28. Q. Can you recall whether or not the matter of supplying anti-
torpedo nets for the protection of ships in Pearl Harbor was pressed
by the Office of Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 19-tl ?
A, Without looking up the correspondence on the matter, I recall
at the moment that inquiries were addressed to the Fleet, or possibly
to the 14th Naval District, regarding the use of torpedo nets to pro-
tect ships moored at Pearl Harbor from airplane torpedoes. At first
I believe that the Bureau of Ordnance was of the opinion that the
water in [823] Pearl Harbor was too shallow for torpedoes to
run, and also there was objection from Pearl Harbor — I do not recall
now whether from the Fleeet or from the 14th naval district — that
torpedo nets were objectionable from the standpoint of making it
difficult for ships to get clear of the nets in going out in an emergency,
also that they would interfere with the take-off of seaplanes in the
very restricted areas of the harbor. I also recall that at some subse-
quent time the Bureau of Ordnance modified their previous estimate
regarding whether or not torpedoes would run in waters as shallow as
that in Pearl Harbor; and their second estimate was more or less to
the nature that is was possible for torpedoes to be launched success-
fully, provided they had a sufficient distance to run in which to arm
themselves. I can't be definite on these things, because I haven't ex-
amined the correspondence recently.
The proceedings following, pages 824 through 842, inclusive, have,
by direction of the Court, been extracted from the record and de-
posited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the
interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[84-31 Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy :
118. Q. Admii'al, do you recall whether or not there was a scrambler
telephone in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations which connected
with the Office of the Connnander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the
period between 27 November and 7 December, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 545
A. I have no knowledge that there ^Yas any telephone of that char-
acter installed in the Chief of Naval Operations office on or prior to
December 7th. So far as I know of my own knowledge the scrambler
telephones were not connected with Fleet commanders until some-
time after the first of January.
119. Q. Were there any so-called scrambler telephone facilities in
Washington which would have been avaiUible to the Chief of Naval
Operations had he desired to call the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor?
A. I understood that the War Department was connected with
scrambler telephones with all of their Department commanders over-
seas and with their principal commanders within the United States.
Whether they were corps area commanders or Army commanders, I
am not certain.
120. Q. Would you tell the court whether or not you considered this
means of communication a secure means of connnunication ?
A. I have a scrambler telephone on my flagship at the present time
and have had since early in 1942. I was informed, in regard to its
use, that it would probably defy an amateur but that an expert could
read the scrambled telephone conversation without difficulty.
121. Q. Do you know whether or not you or Admiral Stark, or both
of you, had information of this type with respect to scrambler ec[uip-
ment before 7 December 1941 ? That is, specifically, did you have any
information bearing on the security of the facilities between the War
Department and the Commanding General in the Hawaiian Area ?
A. The exact moment at which I learned that a scrambler telephone
was not a secure means of transmission I have forgotten. I prob-
ably knew it when I was inWashington.
122. Q. Do you recall whether the Office of Chief of Naval Opera-
tions made use of scrambler facilities much at that time?
A. As far as I know, the Navy Department did not install scrambled
telephones until sometime early in 1942.
123. Q. And didn't make use of the War Department's facilities
at that time ?
A. So far as I know. Admiral Stark did not, prior to December 7th
or prior to my detachment, use the scrambled telephone in the War
Department. Whether anybody else in [5^4] the Navy De-
partment used it, I don't know.
124. Q. Admiral, I hand you Exhibit 4, which is WPL-46. and ask
you to refer to Articles 3721 and 3722, and to read those two articles
to the court ?
A. (Reading) :
3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:
1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to
be mobilized preparatory to 2 ;
2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establish-
ment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and
is provided for in Part IV of this plan.
b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating
Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment
does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facili-
ties as required to perform its assigned task.
c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days
of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized.
During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through
the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 36
546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan
have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed,
even if not completely mobilized on M-day, w^ill be considered available for
immediate war service vpithin tlie limits of their capabilities. They will complete
their mobilization progressvely as opportunity permits, and as directed by their
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
125. Q. I refer you now to Page 7, Articles 0222 and 0223, and will
ask you to read those two articles to the court. That is Exhibit 4,
which is WPL-4G.
A. (Reading) :
0222, Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this
plan or any part thereof. Tlie order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.
[845] 0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating
the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and
the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the
entire plan or additional tasks thereof.
126. Q. Referring to Article 0222. Would you explain why it was
that mobilization of the Fleet was not ordered prior to 7 December
1941?
A. There were two principal reasons why mobilization, according
to the provisions of this plan, was not directed prior to the 7th of
December. One was, as stated in the subsequent part of the plan, the
Fleet was practically mobilized during the latter part of 1941. Every
ship that could be gotten ready was being commissioned, and as far
as ships and planes were concerned, the Fleet was mobilized as much
as it could be. There was another very definite reason, and that was
the one to which I have referred before, that this government did
not wish to take any action which could be construed as an overt act by
this government leading to war, and mobilization has always been
recognized as one of the steps preliminary to war and that usually
prior to a declaration of war. There are also some other reasons.
There were certain provisions which could not be carried out legally
until war was declared.
127. Q. Referring, then, to Article 0223 on the same page. Would
you explain the reasons for not executing WPL-46 in part prior to
7 December 1941, or not ordering the execution of WPL-46 in part
prior to 7 December ?
A. I can't now think of any reasons why it should not have been
done. On the other hand, I can think of no reason why it should have
been done. May I amplify that by saying that I can think of no tech-
nical or mechanical reasons so far as putting the Plan in operation
was concerned as to why it should not have been done, nor can I think
of any reason why it should have been done. The reasons for not
directing the mobilization or a partial mobilization were, as I have
stated in the answer to the previous question, the Fleet was already
mobilized for all practical purposes, and the other reason for not
ordering the mobilization was political.
128. Q. Admiral, do you think that the plan as it was written w^as
designed for partial execution ? Perhaps I can state what I am driving
at in a different way. Do you think that the war warning dispatch
was more likely to get the results which the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions wanted than would an order to partially execute WPL-46 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 547
A. The intent of the war warning dispatch was to place everybody
on the alert and to indicate to them that the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions then considered that war was imminent.
[846] Cross-examined by the interested party, Eear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
129. Q. Who j)rescribed the policy, Admiral, that the first overt
act should rest with the Japanese ?
A. I'm quite certain that that was a policy of the State Department,
but whether they received their directive from a higher authority I
am unable to state.
130. Q. Was that policy of not having the United States commit any
overt act, or the first overt act, related in any way to the lack of dis-
semination of some information to the Commander-in-Chief?
A. I think not. I think the reason is the same reason as I have
stated before, viz, to keep the record clear and to put the onus for the
declaration of war on the Japanese.
131. Q. I'm afraid you didn't quite get the question, Admiral. Was
this policy of extra-ordinary caution that the United States not com-
mit the first overt act in any way related to the fact of not disseminat-
ing cerain information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet? _ ' -
A. I don't see any connection.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
132. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibits 54, 55, 45 and 49, and ask
you if those are the letters that you were speaking about in your direct
testimony on the subject of torpedo nets? Are those the letters that
you had reference to this morning? .
A. Yes, they are the letters to which I referred.
133. Q. Just one other question. In WPI^-46, Sections 0221 and
0222, Exhibit 4, it is also provided that a preliminary period of
strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated during which
time certain preliminiary steps provided for in this plan may be di-
rected by the Chief of Naval Operations. No such orders were given
during the period up to December 1941, were they?
A. The period of strained relations had been going on for a long
time. It was getting worse. On October 16, when the dispatch re-
garding the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was sent to the three
commanders-in-chief, that dispatch contained these words, "In view
of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such pre-
paratory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor con-
stitute provocative actions against Japan." The dispatch of Novem-
ber 27th stated, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment pre-
paratory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." I consider
that those two directives taken together constitute the part of 0221
which states that "certain preliminiary steps provided for in this plan
may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations."
[84.7] 134. Q. You were not familiar at the time, were you, Ad-
miral, with what Admiral Stark wrote on, I think, the l7th of October
as to his interpretation of the October 16th message which he wrote
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. I saw some of Admiral Stark's personal letters to the various
commanders-in-chief. Whether I saw that particular letter before
548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it was sent, or a short time after it was sent, I do not now recall. The
first definite information of seeing that letter was since I have been
counsel for Admiral Stark. I probably did see it.
Examined by the court :
135. Q. If the correspondence in question were handed you — it now
being Exhibit 38 before the court — will you kindly read the reference
to Admiral Bloch's question ?
A. It is the second paragraph of the October I7th letter to Admiral
Kinunel, from Admiral Stark, Exhibit 38 in evidence (reading) :
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you merely stated the 'possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message
handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any
case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard,
at least until something indicates the trend.
The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel ; all
the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under exam-
ination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding.
Examination by the court (Continued) :
136. Q. Admiral, you have spoken of the areas of possibility of
attack. In fact, if we remember correctly, in a part of your testimony
you said that an attack on Hawaii was possible. Now, referring again
to this war warning : Did you or the OjflUce of Operations think that
an air attack or other form of attack was probable on Hawaii or Oahu ?
A. Answering first for myself, I did not think that an air attack on
Hawaii was probable. I did think that whenever war came and regard-
less of how it was precipitated, that there would be numerous sub-
marines around Hawaii, on the line of communications between Hawaii
and the West Coast, possibly on the West Coast, and I expected that
there might be raids against the outlying islands in the 14th Naval
District.
[S4S] 138. Q. In view of this, Admiral, did you think that the
probable attack, if any, in the Hawaiian area and especially Pearl
Harbor, would be confined to an attack other than that of air ?
A. I did not expect that the attack on Pearl Harbor or Oahu would
be an air attack. I expected that any attack that might be made
on Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian group would be other forms of at-
tack— submarines, or raid by surface forces.
138. Q. You have spoken of conferences in the Secretary's office
relative to the political as well as naval situation vis a vis Japan.
Do you remember if in any of these conferences the question of unity
of command of Hawaii was brought up ?
A. No. Questions of that kind would ordinarily not have been
brought up at a gathering of this kind, because here gatherings were
purely for the purpose of acquainting those present with the political
and military situation, and they included such officers as the heads
of bureaus and others who had nothing whatever to do with questions
of that kind. I think it was not the proper place to bring that up.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 549
139. Q. We are not referring to that specific type of conference, but
we understood that from time to time you were in on conferences with
the Secretary and Chief of Operations regarding the general situa-
tion ; is that correct ?
A. When I spoke of conferences in the Secretary's office, I referred
without exception to the morning conference which was held for the
benefit of everybody in the Department. I was not referring to a spec-
ial conference for a j)articular purpose.
140. Q. Well, at any time was this question of unity of command
ever discussed by the Chief of Operations with you as to a possible
action of placing unity of command in effect in Hawaii ?
A. I recall no conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, in
which the Secretary was present, where that subject was discussed.
In drawing up the war plans, there had always been the question of
command relations as between the Army and Navy. I think the Navy
would have agreed to unity of command in any area had it been vested
in the Navy, and the Army would have agreed to unity of command in
any area had it been vested in the Army, but I don't know of any oc-
casion where those two points of view could have been reconciled. I
am certain that the Navy would not have agreed to unity of command
in the Hawaiian area under the Army.
141. Q. Are you familiar with the Army and Navy Joint plans for
defense of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor?
A. Do you mean the provisions in Joint Army and Navy action, or
do you mean the specific subordinate plans which were prepared in
accordance with the war plan ?
[S4d] 142. Q. No, Joint Navy and Army action.
A. Yes, I am familiar in a general way with that.
143. Q. In that plan, who do you consider was responsible for the
defense of Oahu and Pearl Harbor?
A. May I read from the pertinent parts?
144. Q. I am asking your opinion.
A. There is no question about it. The Army was responsible,
under Joint Army and Navy action, for the defense of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base.
145. Q. Admiral, you stated this morning, referring to the war
warning dispatch of November 27, that after this war warning dis-
patch was sent, that you considered that this dispatch of 27 Novem-
ber changed the status in that training and materiel were secondary
to training for war; is that correct?
A. As I recall the question, it was phrased in this manner — was
there anything after the 27th of November which changed the mis-
sion of the Pacific Fleet ? I do not think that is the meaning that I
intended to convey.
146. Q. In general, then, if I may put it another way, did you
think this dispatch of 27 November, having been sent, would change
the general policy of the Fleet in its training, as existed prior to the
receipt of this dispatch?
A. I considered that the receipt of that dispatch would require
additional tasks by the Fleet ; that is, security of itself, readiness for
any eventuality, and to that extent training or other readiness might
have to suffer to some extent. I do not wish to give the impression
that all training should have stopped or all efforts to increase the
550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
materiel readiness of the ships should necessarily stop ; but in order
to do things of that kind, the training which had been carried out
might have to suffer to some degree.
147. Q. Do you consider that the dispatch of OpNav to Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, as of October 16, implied the same
in that regard as this war warning message ?
A. The dispatch of October 16 had directed the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet to make certain dispositions and it is my
recollection that he informed the Chief of Naval Operations of what
dispositions he had made and which were considered satisfactory.
148. Q. But did you consider after November 27 that additional
measures should be taken, in addition to what he had already
reported ?
A. I considered that after November 27, that any measures nec-
essary to be on guard against any eventuality — that is of security of
the Fleet — were then of primary importance; and those measures
applied not only to the [850] Pacific Fleet but the Asiatic and
Atlantic Fleets as well.
149. Q. Did not the war warning message enjoin the assumption
of a state of readiness to conduct offensive operations in accordance
withWPL-46?
A. That dispatch stated: "Execute an appropriate defensive de-
ployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-
46." There were numerous tasks assigned in WPL-46, some of
which were offensive, and some of which were defensive.
150. Q. Would you expand the meaning of the term, "defensive
deployment" ?
A. If I may read from the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet, the
following tasks are defensive in character:
e. Defend Samoa in category "D".
f. Defend Guam in category "F".
g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy
raiding forces.
That last phrase might be considered as offensive. Another task
was to (reading) :
h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent
the extension of enemy military power into the western hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces.
k. Route shipping of associated powers within the Fleet coastal zones.
All of those tasks are defensive in character. The deployment to
carry them out would have been the movement of the ships to carry
out those tasks.
151. Q. But they do involve movement of ships. The word "de-
ployment" involves that.
A. But also for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, it
might require thei stationing of patrols or the moving of aircraft
squadrons to outlying islands, the stationing of submarines to detect
the enemy's approach. All of such things might be termed "defense
deployment."
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 551
152. Q. Admiral, on the morning of 7 December, was there any dis-
cussion as to 1 p. m. of that date being dawn at [851] Honolulu
and midnight in Manila '?
A. I do not recall any discussion regarding time until after we had
received word that the attack had been delivered on Pearl Harbor,
and then figured out what time it had been delivered.
153. Q. Do you remember about the hour that Admiral Stark en-
tered his office on the morning of 7 December ?
A. I do not remember the exact hour.
154. Q. Do you know the approximate time that he came in?
A. No, I do not remember the time that he arrived at the Depart-
ment that morning.
155. Q. Referring to this note of November 26, which the Secretary
of State is supposed to have handed the Japanese representatives, were
you familiar with that note at that time, or immediately subsequent
thereto? This note was presenting the position of the United States
to any future agreement.
A. On November 27, a dispatch was sent to the commanders of
all fleets stating that negotiations with the Japanese had terminated.
I presume, without a definite recollection of what transpired — I do
not know that I was told in detail what had transpired — I believe that
dispatch was sent because of the delivery of the Secretary's note to
the Japanese, which could not be accepted" by the Japanese. I am not
able to determine how much of it I knew at the moment and how much
of it I have learned since. I cannot differentiate between my knowl-
edge of the two times.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and resumed his seat as counsel to
an interested party.
The court then, at 2 : 15 p. m., adjourned until 10 : 15 a. m., Saturday,
September 2, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 553
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
SEPTEMBER 2, 1944.
IS62] Twenty-Fourth Day
• Navy Department,
Washington, D. O., Septeinher i2, lOJfJf.
The court met nt 10 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Oriii G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S.'^Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolpliiis Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Commander Harold Biesemeier, tj. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and
his counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kinnnel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-third day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
The court then, at 10 : 20 a. m., took a recess until 10 : 25 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel ; all
the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
» A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will vou state your name, rank, and present duty.
A. George C. Marshall, General, Chief of Stall' of the Army.
2. Q,. What was your station and duty during the year 1941 ?
A. Washington, Chief of Stalf of the Army.
[853~\ 3. Q. How long have you been performing this duty ?
A. Since the first of July, 1939.
4. Q. Were you acquainted with the professional qualifications of
Major General Short, who was assigned to the duty of Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, during the year 1941 ?
A. Yes.
5. Q. What was your estimate of his qualifications for the position
he held?
A. Very superior officer.
6. Q. As Chief of Staff during the year 1941, had the military prob-
lems connected with the defense of Oahu and Pearl Harbor been
brought to vour attention ?
554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. They had.
7. Q. General, I am going to show you Exhibit 9, which is a letter
from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, under date of
January 24, 1941. This letter sets forth the Navy's view regarding
some of the major problems connected with the defense of Pearl Har-
bor. I ask you, were you made familiar with the contents of this
letter shortly after its receipt in the War Department ?
A. Actually, I returned from one of my inspection trips the morning
the letter came over my desk, with the proposed reply to be submitted
to the Secretary of War. The reply was not satisfactory to me, for the
reason that it offered no help for some time to come ; and I felt, speak-
ing very frankly, that the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in
view of our tremendous shortages, was jDutting the Secretary of War
in a very embarrassing position, and that under the circumstances we
had to do something drastic to meet the situation. Therefore, I
started in that morning, on my return, in relation to this letter, to see
what things we might do without too ruinous results elsewhere. Do
you wish me to go ahead ?
H. Q. Yes, sir, go ahead, General.
A. I talked to General Arnold about the air part of the require-
ments; and at that time they had in Hawaii a small number of
planes — 50 fighter planes that were quite obsolete of vintage, and
only 10 P-36's, which while more than an obsolete plane today and
inferior to Japanese planes of that date, was the best we had, largely,
in our air service. We arranged to take from our squadrons in the
United States 36 of these planes, which reduced most of our fighter
squadrons, if not all of them, down to two or three planes. That
is my recollection at the time; and to that extent almost stopped
training. I talked to Admiral Stark over the telephone [85S-A']
— I had to find out if we could get a carrier to take these planes
out, because we had to take them down, pack them, and ship them,
and it was the definite procedure. This occurred, as I recall, about
the first week in February, 1941. I might add that we had a more
modern plane, a P^O, but it was inadvisable to send out that because
it had some deficiency in the engine which was producing a great
many forced landings, and they thought that it would be a bad plan
to have them in Plawaii with the over-water work, and they would
have too many losses for peacetime operations. Some P-36's were
sent on this carrier, which also took some marine equipment and
some other equipment, and brought the Hawaiian Department at
that time in February up to fifty P-36 planes. Further, I had
General Arnold see the president of the Ciirtiss Plane Company,
which was making the P-40's, and was bringing out a more modern,
reliable-type, and he had him down here to see if they could turn out
these planes at an earlier date than was then on the schedule. Who-
ever was the head of the Curtiss plant at the time did not feel that
they could change the production program. When General Arnold
reported this, I had him go to Buffalo and see the Curtiss people
personally, and talk to a number of men in the plant as well as, of
course, the president. They put on a sort of inspirational campaign
there and moved their program up, I think, four weeks, maybe five.
Meanwhile, I talked to Admiral Stark about an additional carrier,
and he had, I think some naval requirements in relation to a carrier
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 555
if it came to the coast, and a particular time when it had to come if
it was to come, which was March 15. Therefore our deadline at the
Curtiss Plant was March 9, and they made it. We got the planes
to San Diego and sent out these, the first of our most modern fighter
planes, the P-40. I think it was 50 of these planes. However, that
may be determined by the record. Furthermore, we went into the
question of additional material — anti-aircraft, that nature. The re-
ply of the Secretary of War gives what we said could be done in that
relation. Now regarding the entire matter, at that time Hawaii was
far and away the most heavilj^ provided installation of ours in or
out of the country, for defense. It had had first priority in the
Army for years, and as to the number of troops and as to equipment,
it was far beyond anything else we had. We had nothing in Alaska,
and we were trying to provide something for Anchorage vicinity
and Kodiak Island, and the Panama defenses were very seriously
deficient. I would say off-hand if Hawaii was measured at that
time as 100%, Panama was about 20% ; so we had, aside from our
commitments in the United States, to build up in Panama, and to
make a complete start in Alaska. Along with that, a matter that
pertains to this and was one of the personnel factors, was the fact
that if we took this materiel away nobody could train; therefore,
there was no expansion. Therefore we couldn't create units. Our
great dilemma at that time was taking away the fighter planes, we
couldn't have combat fighter training adequate to the needs. When
we put additional aircraft into Hawaii, we [8Si] denied our-
selves a very large training base for the tremendous expansion of
some, I think, about 5000% that we were confronted with, so it was
not only the ordinary consideration of availability of equipment, but
it was the fact that we couldn't create an Army if we had nothing to
train with. Of course, we had the same difficulties with ammunition,
and again there we gave to the Navj? the priority on the anti-aircraft,
because they had to be prepared to go to sea on a moment's notice,
which resulted in our own availability being so seriously reduced
that we sent our anti-aircraft and some of our other units — particu-
larly anti-aircraft — in the Tunisian campaign, deplorably deficient
in their ability to shoot, because they had no ammunition with which
to conduct practice in this country, because the priority had to go
to the Navy, and those proportions to Great Britain and others to
save the various crises throughout the world. All of that related to
this letter. Does that answer your question ?
9. Q. It does, very well. General. I would like to ask you further, if
that takes you iip to about the end of the year 1941, so far as the aug-
menting of aircraft in Hawaii is concerned ?
^ A. There was additional aircraft sent to Hawaii the minute the quan-
tity production came into being. I didn't refer, as I should have in my
previous answer, to the fact that in the Philippines we had little or
nothing in the way of aircraft. We didn't push the Philippines at all.
We denied the Commander in the Philippines increases because we
couldn't jeopardize things here at home and Hawaii for something at
that distance, and we were also considering the Atlantic side and con-
sidering the threat of all the fifth column movement in Latin America,
and the approaches of the Germans through Casablanca and Dakar,
with ominous forebodings that we had in regard to that region ; so we
556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
came to a time between this February period I spoke of and December
1941, when we turned to shipment to the Philippines to try to give them
some adequate defense. I think the first materiel shipments of any kind
went — were actually started — in about April, and those were some pur-
suit planes that we got out there, and then we began to send a few other
things. It was not until the latter part of August that we started the
big planes through to the Philippines — the four-engine bombers — and
then we were accumulating supplies to try to put them in a state of
defense that woiild deter Japanese action to the south of the Philippine
Archipelago. I might add that it had been the desire — it was pressed
by Admiral Stark on several occasions, on nimierous occasions — to have
us increase the garrison, the strength of our Army, in the Philippines.
I think the general expression that I used in declining to agree with him
in that action was that what we sent to the Philippines was seed corn,
and that left us nothing back here at all — if we sent [855] the
regular troops we had literally nothing for any expansion, and we had
to send regular troops. There wasn't anything else we could send.
We had a great many limitations on personnel at that time, but the
main factor was the complete lack of adequate equipment, and until
we had quantity prodiiction in full blast for a period of time, we were
estopped from making these various moves; so this letter from the
Secretary of the Navy was a very difficult one for the Secretary of
War to answer, as it only related to one place, and that place was the
one spot where we had clone more during the preceding years than at
any other place.
10. Q. You have touched, General, on the subject of antiaircraft
guns in the Hawaiian area, and what you did immediately after the
receipt of the Secretary of the Navy's letter. Exhibit 9, which you were
shown. Would you briefly carry us through the year 1911, of the efforts
of the Army to bring its anti-aircraft groiips up to requirements?
A. There had been ordered for Hawaii 110 o-inch. 111: 37-milimeter,
and 516 50-calibre. This project was about four-fifths complete in 3-
inch anti-aircraft guns and about one-fifth complete in the lesser cali-
bres, by December 7.
11. Q. State what the general requirements were in the Hawaiian
Department for pursuit ships and long-range bombers?
A. The Hawaiian project called for 148 pursuit planes. The Air
Force Commander asked for 180 long-range bombers. Our shortages
prevented our reaching any such figures. In May, 1941, we had con-
sidered the B-17's a major objective. Our records show that on De-
cember 7 there were 12 B-l7's, 99 P-40's, 46 P-36's— the last two being
pursuit planes — in Hawaii. These numbers were attained, to a great
extent, by stripping the squadrons in the United States.
12. Q. What service was charged under current orders, plans, and
joint agreement, for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor?
A. The Army was to hold the land, seacoast, and air against attack.
The Joint Coastal Frontier Plan of April, 1941, stated the Command-
ing General, Hawaiian Department, should provide for beach and
land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor and the Navy
and Army installations of Oahu, as well as for anti-sabotage measures
and aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands.
13. Q. Can you state what the Navy responsibility w\as in connection
with this plan ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 557
A. The Navy was charged with certain security measures which in-
ckided the maintenance of long-distance plane patrol and searching
operations, establishment of inshore patrol, destroyer patrol, boom
patrol ; the organization of minesweeping patrol ; the organization of
an air striking force to.search for an attack hostile surface ships; the
organization of air defense groups for the control and distribution of
anti-aircraft fire of all shi])s anchored in Pearl Harbor.
[SS6] 14. Q. During the year 1941, were there frequent confer-
ences between yourself and Admiral Stark on questions affecting the
defenses in the Hawaiian area?
A. Yes.
15. Q. What can you say of the freedom of discussion of these
problems and the spirit of cooperativeness between the Army and
Navy, as you saw these matters?
A. The discussions were entirely free. The desire, certainly between
Admiral Stark and myself, was pronounced along the line of coopera-
tion. At the same time when you came to these things you found
within the machine all sorts of difficulties which are inherent in the
present organization, with which I am not at all in agreement.
16. Q. What is your knowledge of the spirit of cooperation between
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department in relation to military matters
of mutual interest in the Hawaiian Department during the year 1941 ?
A. At my end of the line it appeared that they had an excellent
understanding. I have here a letter from General Short, of February
1941, to me personally. He says : "Since assuming command I have
had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral
Bloch. I have found them both approachable and cooperative in
every way. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy
officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of
the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air
and aircraft." On the 14th of April, again, "I have found both
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel
steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy
Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the
situation requires. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the
increase in our air and antiaircraft defense." Now, that letter I
replied to on May 5, "It is evident that you have been on the job, and
I know that the JSfavy is delighted to have such generous cooperation."
Later, reporting on recent maneuvers, General Short stated in a letter
on May 29, "The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and
I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force,
Navy Air Force, and antiaircraft than we had during any previous
exercise.
17. Q. In the light of all you now know, have you any criticism to
ofi^er of this cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel?
A. I know of nothing. I might say in that connection that when
that tragedy occurred, my whole attention wns turned to other things
from that instant, and I didn't see a record or look at. a thing until,
as a matter of fact, the last day or two, trying to get something for
this board — so I haven't probed into the matter. I was busy with
something [857] else. That was water over the dam.
558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
18. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, and I mean by that, say the last
three or four months prior to that time, what was the state of develop-
ment of the aircraft warning system in the Army in Hawaii ? I mean
as judged by present standards.
A. The equipment was the best available, and has not been greatly
improved since. I make that statement with some hesitancy. It was
provided for me, and I assume it is correct. Twelve detector stations
were projected for the Hawaiian Department; three fixed and six
mobile had been shipped by December 7, 1941. I have not the dates of
the arrival of the installations, but the structures in which they were
to be installed were under the urgent requirement of being completed
in June. It should be easily possible to obtain the dates of the receipt
and installation in the Hawaiian Department, or here in the War
Department. With further reference to the matter of radar, or the
air warning service. In August of 1940 the War Department ap-
proved a plan for complete air warning service for Hawaii, for five
mobile and three fixed stations, which was later increased to six mobile
and six fixed stations, the increase being agreed to on May, 1941. Pre-
liminary arrangements in 1940, looking toward installation of the
detector stations, were going forward when General Short took com-
mand on February 7, 1941. On March 6, General Short, in a personal
letter, empha^zed the need for expedition in setting up the aircraft
warning service and stated that, "in the present international situa-
tion, it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all, the need
for it is now here." He went on to say that difficulty had arisen with
the Interior Department in obtaining the authority to set up the
detector station in the national park of Halekulai. That particular
difficulty was settled in May, 1941, but only after I had personally
taken it up with the Interior Department. In preparation for the air-
craft warning service in the areas to which it was assigned, a course of
instrutcion in air defense- tactics and doctrines was conducted by the
Air Defense Command in April, 1941. The course was based upon
the lessons learned by observers in England, and on the experience
of the Air Defense Command during the exercises in the northern
United States in January, 1941, and represented the latest thought
on air defense, including air warning service plans and operations.
On March 5, 1941, I wrote to General Short stating that I "would
appreciate your early view of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with reference to the defense from air attack," and that it was
highly material for representatives from Hawaii to be present to
observe air defense exercises planned for the west coast in the spring.
General Short answered on March 15, outlining the situation in his
department in re- [858] gard to air defense in some detail,
and stating that he proposed to send both General Martin, Command-
ing Hawaiian Air Force, and General Gardner, Commanding the
Hawaiian Coastal Defense, or as alternates their executives. This
letter I answered on March 28 : "Anti-aircraft and aircraft warning
service materiel to meet your project requirements is expected to be
available for delivery as follows : 16 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, Decem-
ber 1941; 115'37-miilimeter anti-aircraft guns, February 1942, and a
blank number of 50-calibre guns." (The number is missing from the
record here) "4 SCK No. 268 radar, in April of 1941; 5 SCR No. 270;
and 3 SCR No. 271, in April and May 1941. I am hopeful arrange-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY , , , 559
ments for materially augmenting your anti-aircraft artillery to pro-
vide for full strength of units of armament available to yx)U can be
made. Coastal artillery reinforcements will be held in the United
States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute." I might
insert there that as we took them out of the United States, we lost the
power of training people. That is the reason we were hesitating be-
tween the shipment of it and the proposal to send General Martin and
General Gardner, or their executives, to the west coast defense exer-
cises. Due to various reasons the exercises were postponed until Fall.
19. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, had you given any consideration
to the matter of effecting unity of command in the Hawaiian area ?
A. Yes, almost continuously.
20. Q. Had you discussed the matter with Admiral Stark or other
responsible naval officers, and if so, what were the results ?
A. We discussed it on a gi'eat many occasions, and these discussions
usually developed a multiplicity of complications. I recall that I first
proposed a unity of command under the Navy in Alaska and the
Aleutians, as a first step toward getting straightened out in Hawaii
and the Panama Canal. In each case, there were always so many
minor objections or complications that we failed to arrive at a de-
cision. I might say always that under unity of command, you can
get immediate agreement if the other fellow exercises the command,
and that refers to the British and ourselves also; and that is some-
thing I have become somewhat of an expert in dealing with all over
the world. But it is the minor objections that create the great diffi-
culty, because there are a multiplicity of those. However, in my
opinion they were always exceedingly minor, and the great practical
factors are hidden behind this screen of complications, suspicions of
one service of the other. Stark and I were pretty much in agreement
all the time, but in great departments like the War and Navy Depart-
ment, you don't do things like that by ukase.
21. Q. I refer you to the publication, "Joint Action of Army and
Navy 1935," witli special reference to section 3, 18591 article 31,
subparagraph (D), the last sentence of which reads, "Long-range air
reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for the use of the
(xeneral Headquarters Air Force." We have had in this court some
difficulty of understanding what this General Headquarters Air Force
is and what it was to be used for.
A. The G. H. Q. was established in March 1935. It was the air
force in the continental United States. In June 1941, when the Army
Air Force was created, the G. H. Q. Air Force became the Air Force
Combat Command, under the Commanding General of Army Air
Forces. It was comparable to the present Army Air Force organiza-
tion in the United States. I was not here at the time it was created,
but the purpose was to bring all the combat air forces together under
one control in the continental United States in order to develop effi-
ciency in operations, in maintenance, bombing, and everything of that
sort. General Andrews was made the head of it, and created as a
beginning, really, the technique of handling large air forces.
22. Q. In the event of an emergency, such as arose in the latter part
of 1941, could any of this General Headquarters Air Force have tieen
made immediately available in the Hawaiian area ?
560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Well, we were making it available in pieces all the time. We
were taking planes from it and we were taking personnel from it, but
the air force, as a tactical organization, was a continental United States
establishment, and I might say that the grief at the moment was that
we were wrecking it for the overseas theaters, and our daily struggle
was meeting the recriminations of the commander of G. H. Q, who
was being denied the necessary materiel and personnel to operate.
23. Q. Then am I to uinderstand that in case a sudden emergency
arose in the Hawaiian theater, it would not be possible to transfer a
large part of that force out there in order to meet such an emergency ?
A. Not at that time, because they didn't have the planes or the
personnel or the state of training. I might add that before the situa-
tion in the various parts of the world grew very critical, this was a
highly -trained unit, but the minute we started expansion and sending
planes here and sending planes there and all, we for the time being
largely wrecked the G. H. Q. air force.
24. Q. From your knowledge of the situation as it existed in 1941,
at what time during the year, or in reference to what political event,
can you state that relationship with Japan approached the critical
stage ?
A. Well, I would have to answer that, I believe, by saying that
our relations with the Japanese appeared to [860] degenerate
progressively throughout 1941, as indicated by the succession of actions
taken. One of the early decisions of the War Department, and the
Navy Department, too, I believe, was to take all of the women and
children out of the Philippines. That was in February, I think, of
1941. We did that because of the growing storm in the Pacific.
Another was the fact that I succeeded in getting authority to double
the size of the Philippine Scouts. That was in January or February,
1941. Another indication was our refusal to permit the men to return
home at the end of two years, and to hold them in the Philippines.
These things just grew from one period to another, from the indica-
tions, which were from a multiplicity of sources.
25. Q. It is the understanding of the judge advocate that your
answer is that this situation became progressively worse, and you
don't feel able to put your finger on any one event, and say that was
the start of a critical situation ?
A. Well, I might be correct to say that in July and August the situa-
tion became conspicuously critical. That was the time, as I recall, of
the enforcement of the economic sanctions against Japan, and apropos
of that, on July 7 and again on July 25, the Army Overseas Command
was warned of these developments.
26. Q. Can you state whether or not at any time during the year
1941, you felt that war between the United States and the Imperial
Japanese Government was imminent ?
A. Yes, I thought for some time that war was imminent ; and our
state of mind in that period — ^I am referring now to both Stark and
myself — was to do all in our power here at home, with the State De-
partment or otherwise, to try to delay this break to the last moment,
because of our state of unpreparedness and because of our involve-
ments in other parts of the world.
27. Q. Did you lay any special emphasis, after forming this opinion,
on augmenting the defenses in the Hawaiian area ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY 561
A. We did everything possible consistent with the meeting of the
other demands of greater urgency, such as those of the Philippines, I
spoke of, and the Panama Canal and Alaska.
28. Q. As of the time you considered war imminent, what was your
estimate of the probable intention of the Japanese, or was that a
changing situation ?
A. The information that we obtained from the Japanese actions
in China, and particularly as they approached Indo-China, as well as
from our most secret sources, pointed to an evident intention to move
into Thailand, whether to pass on through or whether to pause there
was a matter of conjecture. It seemed to us that they were definitely
going to take some action to cut the Burma Road, possibly closing
the port of Rangoon. It seemed evident to us [S6'l] that
Malaysia — the Malay-Kra Peninsula — was very definitely threatened.
It was plainly evident to us that they were accumulating supplies to
go into Indo-China, and apparently were going into Thailand. We
had no specific indications that I recall at the moment, of their inten-
tions regarding the Philippines other than those which automatically
suggested themselves to us geographically. I recall that in November,
possibly in October, we had reports of movements of convoys down
the coast of Indo-China, and as these movements accumulated, it was
quite evident they were on the verge of very definite action. I think
I am sure the record shows that the Chiefs of Staff, or rather the Joint
Board, proposed that any movement of the Japanese out of 10 north
would be considered as leading to war, because we felt that if they
entered the Gulf of Siam, there could be no other possible interpreta-
tion of what they were doing or what they had in mind. As I recall,
we had no indication of finj Japanese plans in preparation for an
assault on Hawaii. I recall that, I think it was in August, that we
discovered that all Japanese shipping on the east coast of the United
States had been directed to proceed immediately to the Caribbean,
through the Panama Canal, certain boats on certain days, and finally
sizeable numbers of boats in a very short period of time. Just what
that meant we didn't know, of course. Since the canal has been de-
veloped we have always thought of sabotage there as being our greatest
menace, and this had that possibility connected with it; so the Presi-
dent authorized the closing of the canal to such traffic, and it was
closed, the records will show when that was. I don't remember. So
there were these various indications, in addition to those that came
out of the diplomatic conversations, which plainly indicated a crisis
approaching, and which we were most anxious to stall off in some way
or other until more equipment, materiel, and trained men, were avail-
able. I recall, I think, in early September, Mr. Hull at a meeting with
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, at which Admiral
Stark and I were present, asked Admiral Stark and I how soon we
thouo:ht we could be in a sufiiciently strong posture of defense in the
Philippines. We had just begun to move sizeable quantities of equip-
ment to the Philippines, really, in August; we were just getting
started. We were collecting this material as it came from the first
quantity production and endeavoring to get the ships to furnish trans-
portation. I gave him a date of either December 5 or December 10,
1941, 1 have forgotten just which — as being the earliest moment that
we could hope to have any reasonable defense. Admiral Stark felt
79716— 4G— Ex. 146, vol. 1 37
562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that on the naval side he couldn't be adequate far into January or
early February, 1942. What actually happened, so far as the date
that I had hazarded in September, was that two things intervened
and very much delayed procedure. One was that heavy bombers,
to which we attached great importance at that time — there was a delay
in delivering from the plants, but what was far more serious, after
they were delivered — [8621 and we had 45 to follow the
original 35 accumulated on the West Coast — adverse winds to
Hawaii at a period when they were not normally expected kept those
planes on the ground there, I think, three weeks. As a matter of fact,
the initial squadron arrived in Hawaii in the middle of the Japanese
attack to add to the complications of the moment. The other was
that we had great trouble in getting ships. At that time we couldn't
commandeer things the way we could the day war was declared. We
had already taken in a great many passenger vessels from various runs,
which was creating, according to statements of the Under Secretary of
State, as I recall, a very embarrassing situation throughout Latin
America, as we were cutting down on all their ordinary shipping ; and
we had to get those vessels — I believe Matson line vessels — or we
couldn't carry out our purpose. We finally succeeded in getting the
shipping, but we were about three or four weks late in getting through
the various moves, governmental and otherwise, to make that shipping
available — and as the records, I believe, show, at sea at the time of
the crisis, when it should have completed its voyage before that time.
[8€S] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ee-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
29. Q. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, consider that the
Japanese might make a surprise attack on United States territory
without a prior declaration of war ?
A. Do you mean by United States territory Hawaii, the Panama
Canal, and Alaska?
30. Q. Any United States territory.
A. I was always in fear of that. ^ '
31. Q. Did you have an estimate as to what territory would be
the objective if they should deliver this form of attack?
A. We thought, as I recall at the time, that the probabilities pointed
to the Panama Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii.
32. Q. From the information that you had between the specific
dates of November 28 and December 7, 1941, what was your estimate
of the situation as to the intentions of the Japanese with respect to
delivering a surprise attack in the Hawaiian area ?
A. As I recall, we had no Army indications — and I am quite cer-
tain we received no report from the Navy — which showed a threat
against Hawaii. We did have, as I previously mentioned, indications
of a very curious procedure in the Panama Canal. We did have very
serious threats in the Far East which might immediately relate to
the Philippines and certainly were directed farther south. I don't
recall any specific indications regarding Hawaii. I do recall, within
f orty-eiglit hours after the attack of December 7, we obtained certain
messages that came in late, which very plainly showed what was
probably going to happen.
■ PROCEEDINGS OP NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 563
33. Q. In the lioht of developments to date, what is your opinion
of the soundness of the Japanese decision to make this surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor?
A. Well, a surprise, if it is successful, is a triumph ; if it fails, it is
a catastrophe. This was a success. We have several problems like
that in the conduct of the war at the present moment.
34. Q. What was the paramount mission of the Army Air Force
in the Hawaiian Department during the year 1941 ?
A. To defend the island of Oahu against attacks by enemy aircraft,
in cooperation with the Fleet aircraft, and to attack hostile vessels.
That is set forth in Field Orders No. 41, Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, on the subject of Army Operating Defense Plans as of
April, 1941.
[864] 35. Q. Did you have any peace time missions, such as
training the Army Air Force, during this period of time?
A. I presume they were at that all the time. I recall bringing up
with the air people at one time the sending of new heavy bomber
pilots out there to fly these reconnaissance flights, because we had
such few planes in the United States, and they were burning up their
engines, particularly the previous summer when they flew from June
to some time in August in heavy reconnaissance — I think they were
B-18s at that time — out to sea to Hawaii ; so I would say that training
was going on all the time.
3G. Q. Do you consider during the critical period preceding De-
cember 7, 1941, that you were in possession of most of the available
political and military information so far as Japanese-United States
relations were concerned?
A. So far as I was familiar with important political and military
information available to the State, Navy, and War Departments.
37. Q. What is your view of the cooperation of the Army and
Navy in the exchange of intelligence in Washington during the criti-
cal period preceding December 7?
A. The exchange of intelligence is much more accurately com-
plete today than it was. Our field intelligence agencies were not
nearly as well coordinated as they are today. I think that all per-
tinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy. That is the case so
far as I can find in the records. We received intelligence from naval
sources but did not, as we do today, receive detailed information
regarding Japanese naval movements ' otr deployments. In other
words, what we did not receive as a matter of routine then was the
movement of Japanese naval craft.
38. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before this
court and is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations under
date of 28 November 1941, purporting to quote an Army dispatch
which was sent to the Commander of the Western Defense Command.
Were you familiar with that part of this dispatch in which the Navy
set out what the Army sent to its commander ?
A. This message which you have handed to me quotes an Army
message to the Western Defense Command. A similar message was
sent to the Hawaiian Department, the Panama Canal, and to the
Philippine Department of the Army. I personally was absent from
the War Department from about noon of the 26th until the morning
564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the 28th, and the message of the War Department is dated the
27th. General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division at that
time, I believe stated that I did not see the message. I personally
have a distinct recollection that I did see it. It may have been either
before it was sent in its final draft or upon my return to the War
Department on the morning of the 28th. My recollection [865]
is stimulated by this portion of the message : "If hostilities cannot be
avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt
act." I have a very clear recollection of that. It was the instruction
of the President. I also have a rather clear recollection of the fol-
lowing sentence : "This policy should not be construed as restricting
you to a course of action which might jeopardize your defense." My
dimmer recollection is that I discussed that with General Gerow.
He thinks I did not see the message. I may not have, but my recol-
lection is quite clear in relation to the President's instructions, be-
cause as I recall that, they came to me personally, and therefore I
would have had to translate this into this message rather than General
Gerow, who would not have known.
39. Q. This message contains the injunction: "Undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." What
did you expect these Army commanders to do with respect to the direc-
tive? Did you expect them to make long-range reconnaissance flights
with bombers ?
A. I am having difficulty in answering that, because I don't know
whether I'm talking from hind sight or not. The message, in
part, had to be written around the directive that we were to avoid
an overt act and at the same time provide for the necessary security
measures. They had plans out there as to W'ho was to do what, and,
as I say, I don't know whether I am talking from hind sight or fore-
sight. The point is that we wanted to make clear that we were not
restricting them in their security measures, and reconnaissance, of
course, is the foremost security measure.
40. Q. In reply to one of my former questions, I believe you in-
cluded in your answ^er a statement to the effect that the President
directed that these measures be carried out so as not to alarm the
civil population; is that correct?
A. I don't recall that. I don't recall that that was the President's
direction. It may have been ; I don't recall. It may have been ours,
meaning the War Department's. I might say, in connection with
all of this, that we started with these alerts about 1907 and went
through a series of them in the Philippines and so on. I think in
1913 when I was there w-e moved the troops to Corregidor. The
orders were to occupy Corregidor under the pretext of maneuvers.
This thing has been going on through the years. The pretext of
maneuvers was, as in this case, not to alarm the civil population. As
I recall — and I may be wrong in this — the State Department was
very desirous that we do nothing to upset the apple cart in the middle
of these negotiations. We were hoping that they could stall any
precipitate action by the Japanese of a war-lfke nature. That is my
recollection, and I am hesitant about expressing that. That is my
dim recollection. I would like permission of the court to include in
the record here a letter that I wrote to General Short on Februar}^ 7,
1941. [866] Perhaps it is already in the record, I wrote the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 565
letter on February 7, 1941, in which I informally expressed my own
personal views. I said:
My Dbiar Short: I believe you take over command today. However, the
reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.
Admiral Stark said that Kinimel had written him at length about the defi-
ciences of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred
specitically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course, the facts are as he
represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber
.50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What
Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel
throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other
command in the Army.
The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration
for us ; there can be little question about that ; but the Navy itself makes
demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difticult for
us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yester-
day— He had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns
in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a
number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet — at the present
time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little
for Corregidor. By unobstrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now
in the field in active training, we have obtained 20 3-inch guns for innnediate
shipcient to the Philipitines. However, before the shipment had been gotten
under way the Navy requested IS of these guns for Marine battalions to be
specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacitic. So I am left with
two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until
quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in
these matters.
I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there
are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns
that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. How-
ever, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day,
some of it in four hours.
You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that
is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas instal-
lations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of
the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days.
This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the
Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives
you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50
P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego.
These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity
basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.
[867] The .Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently
appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an
houi', a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20 mm and two .30 cal.
guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of
360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It
will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanaese plane. It will have leak-proof
tanks and armor.
We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August
and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii be-
cause of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over
water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium
bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into pro-
duction, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of
3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour — a
ti'emendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate
with bombs 040 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We
plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question
of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.
I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-Tip,
but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regard-
ing barrage ballons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manu-
facture, and 3,000 to be procured if the president will release our estimates.
566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looliing into
the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us
and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in
June will probably be made in Hawaii.
You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited
materiel we have, for Alaska, for Panama, not to mention the new leased bases.
However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first
concern is to protect the Fleet.
My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The
risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by sub-
marine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any
landinig threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to
protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purjMJse should be made
clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yes-
terday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and
Navy feuds, engendered from fights over [868] appropriations, with the
usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of
national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least
so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and hap-
pily I might say. Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and
that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 868 through
884, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from, the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was
taken in the interest of National security and the successful prosecu-
tion of the war.
[885] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to ex-
amine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything realting to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 1 : 00 p. m., took an adjournment subject to the
call of the president.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 567
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INOUIRY
SEPTEMBER 9, 1944
[886] Twenty-fifth Day
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor,
Ter?'itory of Hawaii.
The court met at 10 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and iiii»'
counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-fourth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
The court then, at 10 : 40 a. m., took a recess until 2 : 00 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel ; all the
interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. _C. H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff of
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
2. Q. Will you state the duties you were performing in the latter
half of the year 1941 ?
A. War Plans Officer on the Staff of Commander-in-Chief of Pacific
Fleet.
[887] 3. Q. As War Plans Officer under the Commander-in-
Chief of Pacific Fleet, was it your custom to maintain a current estimate
of the situation on Japanese-United States relationships ?
A. No formal written estimate was maintained.
4. Q. Did you maintain some sort of mental current estimate?
A. Yes, and there was a vast amount of information with regard to
that situation maintained in the files.
568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. Q. Would you say in a few words, in general, what the estimate
of the situation was about the first of October, 1941, if you remember '(
A. The relationships between the United States and Japan were con-
sidered strained, and a possibility was estimated that the United States
and Great Britain might become involved in a war with Japan. About
that time, however, it was considered at least a possibility that the
Japanese might become involved in a war with Russia, and it was our
estimate that in that event the United States w^ould not become so in-
volved. We also estimated that conflict between Japan on the one hand
and Great Britain and the Dutch on the other was distinctly possible
without the United States becoming, initially, involved.
6. Q. I show you Exhibit 13 before this court. Admiral, which is the
Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of October 16, 1941, of which the
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet is an addressee, and ask you to
just read it to yourself, please. Were you familiar with this dispatch in
the neighborhood of 16 October, 1941 ?
A. I recall this dispatch and about that time was doubtless familiar
with it at that time.
7. Q. Did the receipt of this dispatch change in any material way the
estimate of the situation that you described a moment ago, that you had
as of about 1 October 1941 ?
A. I would say that it tended to confirm the belief that I had just
expressed, but that it increased the probability in my mind that we
might become engaged or might become a belligerent.
8. Q. What was your estimate of the possibility of a Japanese attack
in the Hawaiian area as a result of the information you received in this
dispatch ?
A. I don't know that this dispatch alone resulted in any conclusion,
but certainly about that time — possibl}- earlier, possibly somewhat
later — I felt that sabotage or submarine attacks were a distinct pos-
sibility in the Hawaiian area.
9. Q. What form of attack did you consider that the Japanese would
deliver in the event that they did make any attack in the Hawaiian area
at this time ?
A. Submarine.
10. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, what was your estimate of
[88S] the possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack on ships in
Pearl Harbor ?
A. Up to the time of the actual attack, I considered the probability
very remote.
11. Q. Will you state what fundamental considerations determined
this view ?
A. There had become increasing evidence of Japanese movements
toward the Kra Peninsula, of the concentration of troops in the South
China Sea d:rea, and in the movement of combatant ships from the
Empire to the South. While not recalling now any specific letters or
dispatches, my general recollection is that some of the warnings from
the Navy Department indicated possibility hostilities breaking out in
that area, and the possibilities of an attack on the Philippines, or the
movement of Japanese forces into Halmahera. The possibility of an
air attack in the Hawaiian area by Japanese forces had been given
consideration, and the probability of it was greatly discounted because
of the distance involved and the logistic problems that would have to
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 569
be met; that although torpedo attacks within the Pearl Harbor area
had been considered, particularly after the British attack on the Italian
Fleet in southern Italy, I deemed it doubtful that such an attack could
be successful in Pearl Harbor, partially because of the depth of war,
partially because of the short distance the torpedo would have to run,
and partially because of considerable confidence in the AA defenses
against torpedo planes. I did not believe that we could effectively
make a profitable attack against the Japanese homeland by such means,
and I did not believe that the Japanese could successfully inflict great
damage upon us.
12. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 17, which is Chief of Naval
Operations dispatch of 27 November 1941, and ask you if you will
read it to yourself. Will you state at about what time the contents
of this dispatch came to your attention ?
A. It must have been the 27th of November, possibly the 28th. I do
not recall the exact date.
13. Q. Will you state what action, if any, the Commander-in-Chief
of Pacific Fleet took on the receipt of this dispatch ?
A. Discussion took place between the Commander-in-Chief and his
principal advisers, of his staff, of which I was one. I do not recall
who else may have been brought into the discussion ; but in any event,
the determination was made that the directions were largely in effect
already. It was about this time, however, and either in connection
with this dispatch or with others received about this time, that de-
fensive aircraft was sent to Wake and Midway, being transported by
carriers. I recall that special injunction was given to the forces then
at sea, to be particularly alert with regard to detection of submarines,
and I believe that it was in connection with this dispatch that direc-
tives were issued to depth charge any submarine contact believed to be
hostile. The practice was initiated about this time of furnishing the
Commander- [889^ in-Chief, either daily or every other day, a
recommendation as to the specific action to be taken in case hostilities
broke out within the ensuing 24 hours. While I cannot say definitely,
it is my impression that the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier was
verbally directed to be particularly alert against sabotage. It was
shortly after receipt of this dispatch that a discussion took place in
Admiral Kimmel's ofKce between him and the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department with regard to the utilization of Army
aircraft from Oahu to strengthen the defenses of Midway and Wake.
There was also discussed a proposal to utilize some of the troops from
Oahu to replace the Marine Defense Battalion units at those two places.
14. Q. Can you state whether any consideration had been given at
this time to the desirability of clearing Pearl Harbor of all United
States ships ?
A. I think not. Consideration was given to moving all combatant
ships from Pearl Harbor as early as possible if hostilities commenced,
but not as a defense measure, but toward a movement to initiate of-
fensive operations towards the Marshalls. They thought to initiate
matters toward putting into effect the War Plan as promptly as pos-
sible.
15. Q. Do you feel that this dispatch. Exhibit 17, that you have just
read, added anything to your information on the imminence of war
between the United States and Japan, that you didn't have prior to its
receipt ?
570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. It indicated that the probability of war was increasing.
16. Q. What did the words at the beginning of this dispatch, "This
dispatch is to be considered a war warning," mean to you ?
A. It would be difficult to say what my mental reaction was at the
time, but certainly it indicated to me that the authorities in Washing-
ton believed there was great probability of the United States and Japan
becoming engaged in war with each other.
17. Q. This dispatch also contains the words "An aggressive move is
expected by Japan within the next few days." What did these words
mean to you in reference to the imminence of war between the United
States and Japan ?
A. Just what the words said.
18. Q. Can you recall what your estimate of the situation was as to
the Japanese objective of attack against the United States, if one
were made?
A. I felt the greatest probability of attack would be in the Philip-
pines, but felt that it was possible that raids might be made against
Wake and possibly but less probably, Midway, and Guam would be
seriously endangered.
19. Q. Did this dispatch indicate to you any possibility of [890]
an attack further eastward than Guam ?
A. I considered it unlikely that there would be an attack further
eastward than Guam, except as I said, possible raids on Wake or
Midway. I would like to add that we felt submarine attacks within
the Hawaiian area, or even toward the Pacific Coast, were highly prob-
able.
20. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' dispatch of 28 November 1941, and purports to quote a dispatch
the Army sent to the Commander Western Defense Command. I ask
you to read this dispatch to yourself.
A. I recall having seen this dispatch before.
21. Q. I will ask you, Admiral, did the information contained in
this dispatch, although it is merely quoting an Army dispatch, have
any influence on your estimate of the situation, in view of its directive
to conduct reconnaissance?
A. No, with the addressees for that dispatch. I considered the recon-
naissance to be expected would be that by aircraft who would look
for submarines or a possible cruiser that might be there for a hit
and run action.
22. Q. Did you or did you not at this time consider the advisability
of conducting a long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu ?
A. Yes, not only at this time, but had the greater part of the pre-
vious year. The matter was discussed in conjunction with the various
dispatches that came in about this time, of increasing the search from
Oahu and various factors were weighed — the availability of patrol
planes, the status of the training of those planes, the employment
which they might be called upon to carry out, the offensive operations
laid down in the War Plans, the importance of covering the surface
ship training areas against submarine attack, the necessity for sup-
plying personnel for new squadrons, and various factors of that nature.
From time to time during the preceding year or two certain long-
range searches had been made from Oahu, but always through narrow
sectors because of the limited number of planes available, or of plane
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 571
crews available. These sectors had been rotated from day to day.
After due consideration, it was determined that the searches would
not be initiated. It was my opinion that they would be largely token
searches that would give only limited effectiveness, and that training
would suffer heavily and that if we were called upon to conduct a
war, that we would find a large proportion of our planes needing
engine overhaull at the time we most required their services. At any
rate, the matter was given considerable thought, and the searches were
not established. I should say in this connection that I do not recall
any formal conference or detailed conversation with the Commander-
in-Chief on the subject, although it is highly probable that the mat-
ter was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and Captain DeLany,
the Operations Officer, Captain Davis, the Aviation Officer, and myself ;
but what I have just outlined expresses my personal views, and the
discussion that we had within the War Plans section as to whether
or not to make any recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief
with regard to utilizing available patrol planes for long- [<?Pi]
range search. We were of the opinion that the danger of a raid in
the Hawaiian area was not very great, and were most anxious to get
all patrol planes that we could in readiness to move to the Midway-
Wake area, to support offensive operations which we anticipated might
be necessary in the near future, in the event of war.
23. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 19, which you have before you.
Admiral, there is an injunction in this dispatch, although it is ad-
dressed to Army Command, which directs that Operations be con-
ducted so as not to alarm the civil population. Did this consideration
not to alarm the civil population have any bearing on any action that
you took about that time in regard to reconnaissance or other war
preparations ?
A. I think not.
24. Q. I show you an exhibit, which is Chief of Naval Operations
dispatch of November 26, of which the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific
Fleet is an addressee, and which has reference to transferring of planes
to Wake. Can you state what j^our views were at that time on the
imminence of war between the United States and Japan as a result
of any information contained in this dispatch?
A. There were a number of dispatches, including this one, re-
ceived about the same time, and whatever views or ideas resulted, prob-
ably came from the series of dispatches and all the attendant back-
ground ; but the question of moving Army planes into this advanced
area was given extensive consideration, and the determination was
made that the defensive planes should go into Midway and Wake, and
that it was preferable to send Marine planes. It is probably not worth
while to discuss here the considerations that prompted the decision
to use Marine planes. I should say, however, that it was only the
lack of facilities at Wake that had prevented defensive planes being
placed there earlier ; and that it was about this time that the situation
was regarded as so serious that it was felt the time had come when
other handicaps must be accepted and some planes for defensive pur-
poses put in Wake, because we anticipated operating a number of
patrol planes from the base if war should start, and we felt it im-
perative that they had some protective fighters there.
572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25. Q. Did you feel there was any danger in sending a carrier to
this area at this time, in view of all the information you had on the
imminence of war with Jai)an ?
A. We felt that there was a possibility that the carrier might en-
counter a Japanese combat craft, and that some clash might result.
It was one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships
attached to the task force, that included the carrier, behind, so that the
slower speed of the battleship would not handicap the carrier with its
attendant light forces. I might add that when this carrier was sent
to [S92] Wake, a squadron of patrol planes was moved there
in advance of the carrier to maintain a search over her path of advance
and of the surrounding area while she was discharging her planes.
Because of the inability of Wake to sustain any considerable number
of planes for any but a brief time, that patrol squadron was withdrawn
immediately after the carrier had discharged her planes to Wake.
The possibility of a fight was realized, and considerable discussion
was had with Admiral Halsey as to what reduction, if any, of the
carrier group might be necessary in order to carry the Marine planes.
It was determined, however, that the effectiveness of the carrier would
not be unduly reduced since only twelve fighters. Marine fighters, I
believe, were to be left at Wake. It was believed that if chance en-
counter occurred, that it would likely be with a raiding force rather
than with a very strong enemy force, and that the speed and capabil-
ities of the carrier and its light forces would permit us to profit rather
than to lose by such contact as we thought might occur.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, withdrew.
[893] 26. Q. There lias been some comment in the press since
this court of inquiry has been convened, Admiral, which is to the effect
that the Navy Department or some other persons in authority had
directed the United States Pacific Fleet to be in Pearl Harbor over the
period in which the Japanese attack took place. From your own
knowledge of the directives to the Pacific Fleet and as to the reasons
for their being in any particular place, will you state whether or not
the Fleet was operating under any orders other than your quarterly
schedule ?
A. The Pacific Fleet, as a whole, had been in the Hawaiian area for
well over a year prior to 7 December 1941. The presence or absence of
any units from Pearl Harbor at any particular time was entirely in
the hands of the Fleet Commander. There was no directive received
to have any portion of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at the time in
question.
27. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet receive
any information after the 27th of November, 1941, which indicated
that Japanese-United States negotiations were still being continued?
I would remind you that the dispatch of 27 November stated, "Nego-
tiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased."
A. I don't recall any subsequent dispatches indicating a resumption
of negotiations.
28. Q. Did you have any information from any other source that
negotiations were continuing ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 573
A. I don't recall now, but it is my recollection that the press may
have so indicated, but frankly I don't know.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S.Na^^:
29. Q. Admiral, do you still remember what WPL^G, Rainbow 5
meant? Do you remember the documents?
A. In substances, yes.
30. Q. Do you recall, during the weeks precedino; 7 December 1941,
whether or not ^^ou feel that the forces available to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet for his initial tasks under that plan were suf-
ficient or otherwise ?
A. There was, of course, keen realization of all deficiencies, real and
fancied. We were lacking in amphibious craft and felt in need of
various other vessels, but none the less, I felt that the forces we had
available could be used with a considerable degree of effectiveness to
carr}^ out the mission of WPL-46.
31. Q. Do you recall if WPL-46 was written with the expectation
that we or the Japanese would initiate a Pacific war?
A. Doubtless the Japanese.
[&94] 32. Q. Now, in regard to your own plan contributory to
Rainbow 5, the Pacific Fleet WPL— 16, was it contemplated as that plan
was prepared and subsequently studied that any part of it, or even all
of it, would ever be executed prior to the start of actual hostilities ?
A. I think not, but without refreshing my memory as to just what
was in that plan in detail, I hesitate to give a positive answer.
33. Q. Assuming that you see no reason to make any change in
that answer, do you recall how it was proposed to alert the ships of
the Pacific Fleet, including all of the task forces, when the situation
became tense and war seemed to be imminent ?
A. Probably by dispatch.
34. Q. You mentioned that the practice was discarded of letting the
duty officer, I believe, have notes as to what to do if war occurred in
very short notice. Can you tell us wliat was provided in the way of
alerting the Fleet under the command of the Pacific Fleet Commander ?
A. While a copy of the notes to which I have referred was given to
the duty officer, they were primarily for the Commander-in-Chief him-
self. Either the Commander-in-Chief or I or Captain DeLany, the
Operations Officer, or, more frequently, all of us were in immediate
touch with the office, and it was not contemplated that anything so
imjDortant would be left entirely in the hands of the duty officer. Those
notes to which I have referred may or may not have included the
sending of a notification to the Fleet of hostilities. Very possibly they
did as something of a check-off list.
35. Q. But you do not remember any specific method, which was in
mind in the offices of the Commander-in-Chief, of alerting the Fleet
at very short notice?
A. I think not, because we doubtless considered axiomatic that it
would be done by an urgent dispatch. I have taken this question to
mean — means of apprising the Fleet of the commencement of hostili-
ties. If, however, it meant advising the Fleet that the situation was
tense, that had been done for some time. In fact, I do not now recall
when the Fleet was, to all intents and purposes, on a war footing,
whenever ships left the harbor. Certainly when Admirals Halsey
574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and Newton moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of marine air-
craft, they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence
before they again entered port. The ships in training in the Hawaiian
area had long since carried on provisions for water-tight integrity and
for certain watches far more rigorous than would have been carried
on in normal times. In point of fact, I recall that discussion was had
after the receipt of the message of 27 November as to whether or not
any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those in
the training and [895] operating areas, and it was felt that
the situation was already well in hand and would, in effect, be a mes-
sage to keep doing what you are doing now. To the best of my recol-
lection, the only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for
possible enemy submarines.
36. Q. Then, Admiral, would it be correct to say that no partial
execution of the Navy Department's WPL-46 or of your own con-
tributory plan was necessary during those last few days in order
to put the Fleet upon a war footing ?
A. Without reference to the publication in question, I would say
that the Fleet was on a war footing.
37. Q. I hand you Exhibit 20 before this court, which is an
OpNav dispatch of 3 December 1941, advising that the Japanese
were taking certain steps toward destroying codes and ciphers, etc.
Will you read it and please note that the last sentence which was
scratched off there was not received by you? Do you remember
having seen that dispatch ?
A. Yes, sir.
38. Q. Was that a particularly significant piece of information
to you at the time?
A. Yes, I felt that that message, more definitely than anything
that had gone before, indicated the probability of a war with Japan
that would involve the United States.
39. Q. Admiral, recalling the conversations upon the receipt of
that message, insofar as you can, can you state whether or not the
reaction which you have just expressed was prevalent on the staff
of the Commander-in-Chief and in the Commander's-in-Chief own
mind?
A. I don't know that I can. In the early days of December cer-
tainly the general thought within the staff — and I believe in the
mind of the Commander-in-Chief — was that war wasi extremely
probable, although many^ of the discussions still indicated some
doubt on the part of some individuals as to whether the Japanese
would initially take the Philippines or whether some overt act of a
minor nature might be seized upon to bring about a state of war.
40. Q. Gdi'ng back to the proposal from Washington to send
Army planes and troops into Midway and Wake, do you recall
whether, in regard to the carrying on of your own work, those in-
structions in any way weakened what was said in the war warning
message ?
A. No, as far as I was concerned, it did not weaken the war
warning message. My views remained the same in that connection,
but because I considered that the outposts of Wake and Midway
were highly important for us and might be subject to attack, I felt
that it was a most inauspicuous time to effect a change and was
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 575
rather surprised at what I regarded as a lack of appreciation on
the part of the Navy Department of the importance of those phices
and of the [Sd6\ serious weakening of their defenses that
would necessarily result from such a change at that time.
41. Q. Wasn't the change, however, considerably a matter of re-
enforcement rather than substitution? To refresh your recollection,
I will show you dispatches, exhibits 18 and 40.
A. Partially, yes, but it would have involved a mixed command,
and some of the ground units to support planes were, to the best of
my recollection, already in those advanced positions.
42. Q. Also is it not a fact that no directive was contained in
tJiose dispatches? It was a proposal and a request for advice; is
that correct?
A. That is correct, and the recommendation was against the pro-
posals and the recommendations were accepted. In connection with
the possibility of reenforcements, however, it was agreed that the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would prepare
and equiji certain units along the lines of marine defense battalions,
so that they could be moved forward. At the time these proposals
v/ere made, the Army had no organization in the Hawaiian area
that combined the various elements for small garrisons, such as con-
stituted a marine defense battalion.
43. Q. Admiral, if you can recall it well enough, will you state
what your opinion was during the last half of 1941 as to the ad-
visibility of basing the Fleet in Hawaiian waters ?
A. It was a moot question. I personally felt that the Hawaiian
waters were the proper place to base the Pacific Fleet.
44. Q. Where did the real responsibility actually rest for the de-
fense against air raid attack on installations at Pearl Harbor and
on ships berthed in the harbor?
A. On the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
45. Q. Were you in any way familiar with the ability of the
Hawaiian Department during, say, November, 1941, to defeat an
attack through the air?
A. I had some general familiarity with the scheme of defense
and, on the whole, personally felt that it was pretty good. I had
at one time made a tour of the defenses of Oahu, including the anti-
aircraft defenses, and attended a presentation on the subject by
general Gardner, who at that time was charged w^ith the AA de-
fenses. I knew that radar had been installed since my inspection
and that additional guns and communication facilities had been in-
stalled. I had never felt that AA guns could give immunity, and
although there was definite need, as expressed by the Commanding
General and by Admiral Kimmel at one time or another for addi-
tional air power, I believed from my limited knowledge that danger
was not very great from enemy aircraft.
A. No, sir, I did not.
[897] 4C). Q. I have a hypothetical question which I should like
to ask you because of your very long and exceedingly varied experi-
ence in Hawaii and its waters. On your assumption that you had
known, in early December, 1941, what would be the actual perform-
ance of the Army, in the light of what did occur, what would have
576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
been the correct measure for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet to have taken as regards the disposition of his Fleet?
A. On the assumption that some few days before the arrival of
enemy forces in this area I had been aware that they were en route
to attack and on the assumption that I knew at that time that the
AA defenses would not be effective, either because of not being manned
or because of lack of proficiency, I should certainly have had tiie harbor
clear of ships; but if I had had knowledge of such an ajoproach and
had known beyond doubt that the AA defenses would have shot down
every plane that arrived before they could get in and attacked, I
would also have had the Fleet at sea in an endeavor to get them in a
position where they would inflict damage on the attacking forces.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this
witness.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
[89S] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Examined by the court :
47. Q. Admiral, in answering the hypothetical question, would you
mind distinguishing, or stating, whether your action would have been
the same regardless of whether or not a state of war existed ?
A. In the general strained situation that existed at that time I
would not only have recommended, I would have urged that we take
the action which I have outlined. There would, in point of fact, of
course, have been time to apprise the Navy Department that such
action was being taken, but it would certainly have been unwise, even
under our Constitution, to defer action.
48. Q. This assumes, however, that the warning came to you in time
for you to vacate the harbor and make the proper dispositions outside.
Would not that have required that you have advance information
for a considerable time ahead and which would, in turn, require some
intelligence ?
A. Unquestionably.
49. Q. On the evening of December 6th, had a long-range search
been in effect, and had a detachment of carriers been sighted at a dis-
tance, say, of 700 miles standing toward Hawaii, what steps could the
Commander-in-Chief have taken, either offensive or defensive, to pre-
vent an enemy carrier attack on Pearl Harbor at that time?
A. He probably could not have prevented the attack. He doubtless
would have sent the ships in Pearl Harbor to sea to intercept the
enemy, if possible. He doubtless would have diverted the two carrier
task forces that were then at sea enroute to Pearl Harbor to intercept.
He doubless would have had the shore based aircraft of his command
made available to the Sea Frontier Commander in accordance with
the existing plan. But I might add that in my opinion had that been
done, our losses might well have been more serious than those that
actually occurred.
50. Q. Well, would not the shore based aircraft to which you refer
be the planes which had located the hostile vessel? In other words,
were there enough planes to have made this long-range search and
also have some back in Pearl Harbor to take the air?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 577
A. Doubtless the patrol planes would have been out for search the
next morning, even though the crews had been employed the day before,
and single double crews were not available for planes, some of the patrol
planes would have been inoperative the day before. There were also
here, I believe, some small number of Marine planes and it is prob-
able [89d] that there were a few carrier planes shore based.
The total number, however, would have been small. On the other hand,
of course, the Army planes, too, would have been alerted and undoubt-
edly would have done some damage to the enemy but that damage, in
my opinion, would have been principally by Army fighters to enemy
attacking planes, and I doubt very much if the enemy carriers would
have suffered very seriously.
51. Q. Now, in your previous testimony concerning the inadvisabil-
ity of conducting this long-range search, were you not referring to the
patrol planes attached to the Fleet ?
A. Yes. All patrol planes were attached to the Fleet, but either by
the Pacific Fleet War Plan or by the Navy Department's plan, I do
not recall which, there was a minimum number of patrol planes that
were to be left at all times under control of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier
Commander.
52. Q. Is it not a fact that the planes that were left under the control
of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier Commander were not the same ones each
day ? In other words, they were not under his exclusive control every
day ; they still continued to be Fleet planes made available to him in
emergency ?
A. That is correct. Admiral Bellinger, commander of the Fleet Air
Wing, operated m something of a dual capacity and the planes were,
to the best of my recollection, rotated.
53. Q. Then is it not a fact that it is not the function of the Fleet or
of the units thereof to provide its own protection while within the
limits of a permanent naval base?
A. In general, yes. But the Commander-in-Chief is always con-
cerned over the safety of his forces, and in Pearl Harbor he felt that
responsibility of repeatedly urging strengthening of defense in partic-
ular which he regarded as necessary.
54. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that he was forced to a make-shift
arrangement because of the inadequacy of the forces supplied the com-
mander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier? In other words, had this
deficiency not existed he would not have been under the necessity of
having undue concern ?
A. Yes. If he had been satisfied that all defenses were ample he
would not have felt called upon to make improvised or supplementary
arrangements.
55. Q. Admiral McMorris, did you feel, after conferring from time
to time with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, that he was
kept fully and adequately informed of the conditions existing in Wash-
ington relative to the status of Japan and the United States subsequent
to 27 November 1941 ?
A. I was not then, nor am I now, in position to judge the adequacy
or fullness of the information that was supplied. Such information
that was received was taken at its face value and the presumption was
that we were being furnished such information as was available that
would assist the Commander-in-Chief to carry out his duties.
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 38
578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[WO] 56. Q. Did you have any information as to Japanese car-
riers being in the Marshall Islands at about the latter part oi: November
or the first part of December, 1941 ?
A. No.
57. Q. Were you, in your position as War Plans Officer, familiar
with what had been done on the Island of Oahu regarding radar equip-
ment and installation of radar ?
A. Not in any considei'able detail. In fact, I was not as concerned
as was the Commander-in-Chief and possibly some other officer on
the staff as to the adequacy of the local defenses. It may be that because
my own interests and duties lay in other fields but I knew that the
radar equipment had been very materially improved during the course
of 1941.
58. Q. Were you familiar, or did you hear of any reply made by the
Army to the dispatch from the War Department similar to the one
sent by the Navy Department as of November 27th to Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet?
A. I do not now recall.
59. Q. Was it general information in the staff of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, that a squadron of plans had departed from Hamil-
ton Field on 6 December for Oahu ?
A. Certainly several of the senior members of the staff were aware
that some large bombers were flying from California to Oahu at that
time.
60. Q. Did you at any time in your War Plans or in your considera-
tions think that Japan would make a surprise attack by air on the Island
of Oahu or on Pearl Harbor ?
A. I did not.
61. Q. And from your testimony the court presumes that you had
in mind the expression of the staff's opinion that if any attack occurred
it would be by submarine ?
A. I felt that the only serious danger to the Fleet in this area was by
sabotage or by submarines.
62. Q. Admiral, because of your close association with the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet just preceding the attack on
Pearl Harbor, will you state your opinion as to the personal and official
relations between the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the commander
of the Hawaiian Area, and the cooperation that existed between them ?
A. I felt that the relations between the two were cordial and co-
operative. The Commanding General was frequently in conference
with the Commander-in-Chief ; sometimes only with the Commander-
in-Chief and members of his staff ; sometimes with other flag officers
present, including the commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier and
various flag officers from the Fleet. In the development of plans for
local defense and of plans for utilization of Fleet units in port for
local defense, there may, from time to time, have been differences of
opinion, but the relationships were habitually pleasant. For in-
stance, in late November or early December [Wl] when dis-
cussion was taking place with regard to re-enforcement of Midway
by moving Army troops from this area to Midway, the Commanding
General very positively expressed the idea that Midway would then,
of necessity, be under the command of an Army officer. The Com-
mander-in-Chief considered that a naval officer should continue in
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 579
command. It is my recollection that each of those officers made such
recommendations to their respective departments, but there was a
free interchange of views, a difference of opinion, but no friction or
unpleasantness in regard thereto.
63. Q. Referring to the conferences between the two officers,
Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and with special reference to
the dispatches of October 16 and November 27, were conferences fre-
quent on these messages coming in at various times ?
A. I don't remember particular conferences following particular
dispatches after this lai)se of three years, but I do remember partici-
pating in numerous conferences between those two officers during
1941 up to and including the last critical days preceding the war.
61. Q- Did you detect in the attitude of either Admiral Kimmel
or General Short any lack of interest in the measures undertaken by
the other to carry out the responsibilities assigned for the joint de-
fense in view or the warnings and directions to take appropriate
action between November 27 and December 7 ?
A. No, I did not detect any lack of such interest. There was, to
my mind, a general feeling of mutual confidence and respect, and a
proper regard on the part of each for the duties and prerogatives of
the other. As can well be understood, the greatest difficulties envi-
saged were with regard to communications, and while certain ar-
rangements had been made and promulgated between the Commander
of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier and the Commanding General with
regard to communications and exercise of control, the defenses were
still being improved and arrangements made as to command posts,
and interchange of information and so forth were still being
developed.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U.S. Navy: ]
65. Q. Admiral, in connection with the War Plans: I think the
observation was made that when the War Plans were executed it was
planned that a certain minimum number of patrol planes would be
left here at Pearl Harbor for that sort of work; is that correct?
A. That is my recollection, that War Plans called for the greater
part of the patrol planes operating directly under the Commander
of the Fleet being advanced to the Wake-Midway area for certain
operations, but that there was a minimum number that were to be
left under the control of the sea frontier based on Pearl Harbor.
[902] 66. Q. And that would be when the War Plans were
executed ?
A. That is correct.
67. Q. And War Plans were not executed up to December 7th?
A. That is correct.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The court then, at 4: 10 p. m., took a recess until 4:20 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all
the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 903 through
910, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of
the war.
[OlOA] NOTE: The witness on the stand at this point is
Captain Edwin T. Lay ton, U. S. Navy.
[911] Recross-examined bv the interested party, Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy:
38. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, known as the War Warning dis-
patch. Will you state what your own reactions were when you first
saw that dispatch?
A. It is pretty hard to remember your exact reactions after the
passage of so many months, but as I recall it, it seemed to fit in with
the picture as we saw it from the various reports — from the China
coast, from the C and C Asiatic, and from other secret sources, regard-
ing the development of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed to
the south. Movements of troops, tanks, and amphibious boats, land-
ing craft, transports, and naval vessels, were all sighted — forming
and moving to the south. The use of the words "Kra Peninsula"
fitted in with some information from secret sources regarding intrigues
in Malaya, and the attempt on the part of the Japanese to entice the
British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand, so that Thai-
land could then call the British an aggressor, and call upon Japan for
aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-
fledged ally, and making air bases in the Kra Peninsula available,
maintaining their position and carrying out any further operations
along Malaya if planned.
39. Q. I show you that same document. Exhibit 20 ; when you saw
that. Captain, were you in any way influenced while you were evalu-
ating what it said, by what you had seen in the local press or heard
over the public radio?
A. I believe that no one can read these highly important messages
that deal with the nation, and hold them alone in the mind, without
listening to the local press and radio regarding negotiations under
way, or without regarding news commentators' think-pieces. I
wouldn't say the news or the radio influenced me, but I think it would
have an influencing part on one's judgment.
40. Q. During the last two weeks, say, before 7 December 1941, did
you hold any personal apprehension of an attack upon Hawaii similar
to the one that did occur on 7 December ?
A. I don't believe I did.
41. Q. Had you at one time studied the document, or a publication,
issued by the Japanese Navy, secret probably, in which they talked
about such an attack?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 581
A. Yes, I translated a noval published in Tokyo to inflame public
opinion toward larger armament money in the Diet, in which they
discussed the great Pacific war, and wherein an attack on Pearl Har-
bor with carriers, battleships, and cruisers was academically dis-
cussed. I showed my translation of this to Admiral Kimmel, and the
matter'had been discussed at some time. The time that I showed it to
Admiral Kimmel, however, was, I believe, three or four months, pos-
sibly, before December 7.
[91£] 42. Q. Did you receive any information in the latter part
of November concerning the rejDorted presence of two or more carriers
in the Marshall Islands ?
A. Yes.
43. Q. Had you ever had any information of, say equal value to
that, previously, which showed carriers as far from the homeland
as that?
A. Yes.
44. Q. Do you recall when, and where they were?
A. Late May and early June, 1941, I reported to the Commander-
in-Chief that there were, good indications that part of the Japanese
Nav}^ was holding maneuvers in the mandated islands, and that some
carriers were present, and that the maneuvers would extend into the
Marshall Islands, but the main base would probably be at Truk.
45. Q. Concerning that information about the two or more carriers
in late November, was its receipt somewhat concurrent with the date of
the war warning message?
A. I believe that information, plus information from other sources
at the same time, was the source of the war warning message, since
the war warning message followed those very closely.
Examined by the court :
46. Q. Captain, you stated, I believe, your interpretation of this
war warning messaf^e of November 27 ; from this war warning message
and your information at that particular time, where did you think
Japan was going to attack ?
A. Thailand, sir.
47. Q. Did you think it at all probable that Japan would attack
the Hawaiian Islands either by carrier or otherwise?
A. The matter was under considerable discussion, hinging on
whether or not Japan could afford to leave the Philippine Islands on
their flank. I was inclined to believe they could not afford to leave
the Philippine Islands on their flank ; and in tlie course of these dis-
cussions I expressed the opinion that, after the Japanese forces had
been sighted by our search planes from Manila— these Japanese forces
were sighted off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam — that the
war warning message therefore was being brought out by the presence
of these forces in the place where we had every intelligence indication
to show they were going to be there. Therefore, the situation was
unfolding in accordance with the evidence. I believe Admiral Kimmel
made the decision to count all submarines in this area as enemy, as a
precaution based first on intelligence, second, on reconnaissance, and
third, on a summation of the whole picture.
[913] 48. Q. And did you so report your estimate to the Com-
mander-in-Chief— this estimate that you just expressed?
582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I did, sir.
49. Q. And do we glean from that in your opinion an attack on
Pearl Harbor was remote?
A. I thought the possibility at that time was remote. It was a
capability of the Japanese, but the possibility of its execution at
that time was considered remote,
50. Q. In your studies of the Japanese character and the trans-
lation of your book, what opinion or estimate did you form as to
the possibility of a surprise attack without a declaration of war?
A. As one of their capabilities, and which had historically been
seen before.
51. Q. And did you think in all probability they would follow
their historical movements, as to surprise attack?
A. Aside from these capabilities, we have to consider his forces
available. On 1 December 1941, at Admiral Kimmel's request, I
submitted to him my estimated locations of all major units of the
Japanese Navy. After I had drawn this message and had it typed,
more recent information at hand caused it to be changed in red ; and
it showed available in the Empire, 4 aircrqjft carriers, 6 battleships,
with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question
mark after them, and 12 destroyers — available for use in the home
area. This force was but a portion of the entire Japanese Navy,
the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and impli-
cated in the impending moves, from our sources of information. To
go back to the translation of the book, the Japanese in this trans-
lation, stated it would be a very dangerous venture — that a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor, using carriers, battleships, and cruisers,
would be a very dangerous venture, fraught with the possibility of
considerable losses; and with Japan staking its national existence
on this move to the south which had been its lifetime policy, it
could not afford to gamble the defenses required to maintain a long-
time war by the sending of some of these 4 carriers, 6 battleships,
and 4 heavy cruisers on a raid wherein the Empire was completely
denuded of vessels. That was, generally, the line of my reasoning.
[914.] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
52. Q. Referring again to this critical period of November 27 to
December 7, were you impressed with the importance of guarding
against sabotage in these islands in counter distinction to an outside
attack and how did you place them in order of priority?
A. Continental naval disricts, plus Guam and Samoa, were warned
against sabotage, and I did not receive any distinct impression that
warnings against sabotage were underlined. My concern was only
with the Fleet itself, and I left the matter of local sabotage in the
hands of the District Intelligence Officer.
53. Q. Well, was there any discussion in higher authority, to your
knowledge, os to the importance of guarding against internal sabo-
tage here?
A. If there was, I was not present.
54. Q. Were you at any time familiar with the note of November
26, handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese officers in
Washington, as to the decision of this government toward Japan ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 583
A. As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief was at no time
apprised of the details or outline of the negotiations that were being
carried on in Washington.
55. Q. Are you familiar now with that note of November 26?
A. I haven't seen it, sir.
56. Q. As intelligence officer, is it your opinion that the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept fully informed as to what was
going on in Washington relative to Japan, which knowledge would
have had any influence upon his action in this area?
A. I can answer that by quoting, as I recall, Admiral Kimmel's
words, "I wish they would let us know more what is going on back
there." I myself feel that the Commander-in-Chief should have been
kept more fully aware of the broader pictures concerning the national
destiny.
57. Q. Aside from the national destiny, do you feel that he could
have been kept more fully informed ?
A. Yes, sir.
58. Q. In view of the knowledge up to the present time and if
that knowledge had flown to him from Washington, do you feel he
would have had a clearer picture of the situation as regards Japan?
A. I feel, with the additional information, he would have had
a clearer conception of the state of affairs versus Japan.
[915'] 59. Q. Well, even with that additional information
which he might have received, would that have had any effect upon
his preparations for a surprise attack by air without a declaration
of war?
A. I can't say that it would or would not, but it is my opinion that
it would not have greatly changed the present state of mind of the
American people of which we were a part.
60. Q. Wasn't the trend of the information, as time went on,
merely to the effect that war was becoming more and more imminent ?
A. War was becoming more and more imminent.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 916 through
918, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was
taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecu-
tion of the war.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 585
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INaUIEY
SEPTEMBER 11, 1944
[919] Twenty-sixth Day
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Nayal Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), interested party,
and his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E'. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-fifth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
The court then, at 9 : 45 a. m., took a recess until 9 : 50 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel ; all
the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 919-A through
930, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of National security and the successful prosecution of
the war.
[931] A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station ?
A. W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Service
Force, Pacific.
2. Q. Will you state what duties you were performing during the
year 1941?
A. Commander Base Force, United States Fleet.
Examined by the court :
586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Q. Admiral, for the month or perhaps two months preceding
December 1941, will you state in general what specific duties you had?
A. I was Commander Base Force, United States Fleet, charged
with the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet, assisting Commandant
14th Naval District with services in Pearl Harbor and, as necessary,
to the outlying island bases of the 14th Naval District. I was in
command of Fleet security measures until relieved by the Comman-
dant of the 14th Naval District in the latter part of 1941 — August
or September. We had specific orders from the Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Fleet to cooperate fully, placing whatever services were in the
base force at the disposition of the Commandant 14th Naval District
as were necessary to support the Fleet, and support and construct
outlying island bases ; also Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval
Shore Patrol.
4. Q. You were aware, were you not, of the increasingly critical
state of negotiations with Japan during these two months, of October
and November?
A. I feel that I was fully aware of this situation as described to
the commanding officers of the Fleet here. Admiral Kimmel kept us
fully informed at all times.
5. Q. You were also informed, were you not, of the provisions of
WPI^-46?
A. Yes, sir.
6. Q. Were you also familiar with the preparations that were being
made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as preliminary
to the execution of tasks assigned in that document ?
A. Yes.
7. Q. Did you consider that the logistic support that was provided
vv'as adequate for the support of those operations ?
A. They were not adequate in all types of naval auxiliaries, I
have here Base Force schedule of employment, second quarter of 1941,
which itemizes the ships of my command [932] at that time.
Realizing the size of our Fleet, it would have been inadequate to sup-
port advances forward. I served with three Commanders-in-Chief
up to December 7, 1941 : Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. Navy ; Admiral
Joseph Eichardson, TJ. S. Navy ; and Admiral Husband Kimmel, U. S.
Navy — all of whom had made every possible effort to increase the
Fleet auxiliaries; and referring to the Base Schedule of employment
for the second quarter of 1941, it will be seen that a number of Fleet
units were being added to the Fleet — a number of auxiliary Fleet
units were being added to the Base Force, but had not yet reported.
8. Q. Do you not consider that it was the understanding of respon-
sible officers that it was the inability of the national government to
supply these deficiencies in the short time that they had available ?
A. Definitely so, sir.
9. Q. With particular reference to fuel, were the supplies in Pearl
Harbor adequate for the support of a Fleet based solely on Pearl
Harbor?
A. Entirely adequate, sir.
10. Q. There was no trouble about the supply from the mainland
to Pearl Harbor ?
A. The best answer to that is that our storages here were almost
filled on December 7, 1941. We had received excellent assistance from
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 587
the Commandant of the 12th Naval District, to whom vessels had been
made available for filling our fuel supply at Pearl Harbor. I refer
to diesel, gasoline, aviation gasoline, and fuel oil. The real shortage
in storage at that time existed only in aviation gasoline, but the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District took very prompt action in
obtaining certain civil tankage which we rapidly filled.
11. Q. How many tankers did the Base Force have at its disposal
for use in connection with the Fleet operating from Pearl Harbor ?
A. There were eleven tankers attached to the Base Force ; four of
the Kanawha type, 14 knots, about 40,000 barrels ; three of the Ramapo
type, 10 knots, about 65,000 barrels ; four of the new Cimarron class
of Fleet tanker, 18 knots, 105,000 barrels— total, eleven tankers.
12. Q. Were any or all of these tankers equipped for fueling vessels
at sea ?
A. All tankers were equipped for fueling vessels at sea and had had
considerable experience in fueling all ships. The new Cimarron class
of Fleet tanker had proved very adaptable and was an excellent type
of tanker for this work able to fuel from four stations at one time.
13. Q. Do you consider that the eleven tankers under your com-
mand were sufficient to have supplied the Fleet if the [9S3]
Fleet had vacated Pearl Harbor, in addition to keeping the Pearl
Harbor supply up ?
A. Eleven tankers alone were not sufficient for the needs of a Fleet
operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor,
particularly if carriers and cruisers and destroyers operated at high
speeds. None of the tankers would have been available for keeping
up the Pearl Harbor storages. The eleven tankers would not have
been sufficient to have maintained the Pacific Fleet in this area on a
campaign into the Western Pacific. There were in the Atlantic the
approxnnate number of tankers that there were in the Pacific, and
four of them were also of the new fleet tanker type. Had they been
rushed into this area, with the limited number of carriers we had at
that time in this area, with that assistance we could have supported
the fleet probably as far as Wake. There were only three provision
ships in the Pacific, two, the Arctic and Boreas, capable only of about
10 knots; the Bridge, capable of about 12 knots. These three would
have been hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the
Pacific Fleet as it existed at that time. The first of the new 15-knot
provision ships of the Aldebaran type was on her way, but arrived
after December 7. There was assigned to the Base Force at that time
only one ammunition ship, the Pyro. There were assigned two AKS
of Fleet issue store ships, the Castor, the Fleet sea-going type, and
the Antares, which could have been used only between Pearl Harbor
and the mainland, due to the fact that her speed was around 9 knots.
There was one hospital ship, two repair ships, and two fleet salvage
tugs.
14. Q. That answer, I take it. Admiral, which is rather complete,
refers to only supplying the Fleet in advance movement, without tak-
ing consideration into the logistics, particularly between the mainland
and Pearl Harbor ?
A. That is correct, sir.
15. Q. Admiral, in view of the logistic requirements as you have
stated, did you have the ships available to supply this Fleet if an-
588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK >
chored in the Hawaiian Islands at another place than Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, the Base Force had supported the entire Fleet anchored in
Lahaina, and by making use of the facilities of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict, could easily have supplied the Fleet in any other Hawaiian
anchorage with almost the same facilities as here, except for fresh
water and for hospitalization.
16. Q. You stated that you were familiar with the general policy
of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and we presume that you were
also familiar with the strategical set-up and information regarding
Japan.
A. Yes, Admiral.
17. Q. Did you form in your own mind an opinion as to the
[934] possibility of attack on these islands by Japan ?
A. I believed that some day war with Japan would come, and at
no too-far-distant date. I am one of the people that were deceived
by the envoy of peace in Washington, and I did not believe that Japan
would strike while the envoy of peace was in Washington. I did not
believe that Japan could get a fleet of carriers and the necessary sup-
porting ships across the ocean to attack Pearl Harbor as they did,
with the complete secrecy and surprise as they did. I had formed
the opinion that our intelligence would undoubtedly have caught that.
Once before the Fleet went on a war footing because certain units of
the Japanese carrier and submarine force had disappeared. That
led me to believe that we were following Japanese forces very
carefully. Everybody in Pearl Harbor under Admiral Kimmel's
command was making every possible effort to be ready for any eventu-
ality. As Calhoun, I did not expect any attack on Pearl Harbor at
the time. It came at a time when I did not expect it at the time, or
in the immediate vicinity of that time; although I knew from con-
ferences with Admiral Kimmel, which I attended daily, that the situ-
ation was very strained, and that we were all supposed to be ready
for any sudden orders or emergency that might arise. We were not
on a war footing in Pearl Harbor, inasmuch as liberty was permitted
over week-ends. We were not in the higher conditions of readiness,
and the security patrols of which I was in charge up to the time I was
relieved by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, were based
on the acts of irresponsible nationals in committing sabotage, rather
than any direct attack by a national. Those security orders had been
in effect in the Fleet since the arrival in May of 1940, and the basis
on which they were issued was to secure the Fleet against the acts of
irresponsible nationals ; although in the preamble to these instructions,
various forms of attack on Pearl Harbor were discussed as possible.
[935] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
18. Q. Were you familiar with the dispatch received by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific from OpNav on November 27 and known as
the "war warning" message ?
A. I was present in Admiral Kimmel's office when that was read to
every flag officer in this area who was not absent with one of the task
forces which were always at sea.
19. Q. How did you interpret that dispatch ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 589
A. I will have to answer that I interpreted that dispatch in accord-
ance with other information which we had also received from the
Department. Whenever the Commander-in-Chief complained about
men and ships being taken away from him — and as I was Fleet Person-
nel Officer, I was the principal complainer — he was told on one occa-
sion that he was lucky to be in the Pacific and not to have the trials
and tribulations of the Atlantic and the Asiatic and that he would con-
tinue to lose men and ships. I had formed the opinion, from informa-
tion that I had gathered, that we were to consider the situation in the
Atlantic and Asiatic more serious than here. I gained the impression
from the war warning telegram that if negotiations in Washington
fell down completely, that then trouble with Japan might ensue.
20. Q. From this dispatch. Admiral, of November 27 did you form
any opinion as to where Japan would strike in the event of war with
Japan ?
A. I was definitely of the opinion that war would start with Japan
by an attack on the Philippine Islands with everything the Japs had
and that they would take that quickly before we could get there with
help.
21. Q. Did you have any idea here that Japan would strike by air
on Pearl Harbor at that time ?
A. I did not, sir. Admiral Kimmel gave all of us flag officers every
bit of information he had. I am positive of that. We met in confer-
ence every morning, and as I was not a Fleet Task Force commander,
I was never at sea and was always at the conference. I missed very
few, if any. I have repeatedly heard Admiral Kimmel ask Admiral
Halsey, Admiral Pye, Admiral Downes, Admiral Leary, Admiral
Draemel, Admiral Calhoun, and Admiral Furlong if they had any con-
structive suggestions or criticisms to offer on the conduct of training of
the Fleet, plans of the Fleet, and preparations for the use of the Fleet ;
and I am certain that any such suggestions from the responsible com-
manders in this area would have been welcomed by Admiral Kimmel.
We all sat together; we all had the information, and, speaking only
for myself, I did not expect an [936] attack. I would not have
hesitated to go to Admiral Kimmel with any suggestion, no matter
how radical, had I felt it necessary, and I am sure that Admiral
Kimmel would have listened carefully to anything I had to say, as I
would have done with any of the others. He made it very clear that
he wanted his commanders to speak out loud in the meeting. I at-
tended all conferences right up to and including December 6, and
there was certainly no belief in that conference of any attack being
imminent. I was absent from Pearl Harbor on the night of Saturday,
December 6, and returned in the early morning of the 7th, which
speaks for itself. Naturally, I would not have left if there was in my
mind the slightest question of an attack.
22. Q. Having atendecl these conferences. Admiral, and being
familiar with the information at hand, do you feel that the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept thoroughly informed by Washing-
ton or that there was any information in Washington about which you
afterwards learned that would have assisted him in making a better
estimate of the situation between November 27 and December 7, 1941 ?
A. I am only aware officially of the information I heard at Admiral
Kimmels conferences. There are many rumors of information that
590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
existed, but I have no official knowledge of that and can only say that
having been allowed to read most of the letters from the Chief of
Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, I believe that I knew all the in-
formation that Kimmel received. If there was other information, I
am not aware of it. If it did exist, it never officially reached the lower
echelon of command of my rank.
23. Q. Admiral, will you, in brief, give us your opinion as to the
personal and official relations between Admiral Kimmel and General
Short and the cooperation which existed between them during the days
immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, with a special
reference to the time from November 27 to December 7 ?
A. One of my duties, given me by Admiral Kimmel, practically
made me an assistant to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District,
Admiral C. C. Bloch, and because of my logistic duties and the fact
that the Navy had agreed that we would care for all aviation gasoline,
I was continually in touch with the Army. I knew General Short well.
I knew him personally. Naturally, I was intimately acquainted with
Admiral Kimmel. I believed at that time — and nothing has caused
me to change my mind since that time — that Admiral Kimmel and
General Short were on perfectly good terms of cooperation and
mutual friendship. On the Joint Frontier Coastal War Plans, which
were the plans drawn up by the Army and the 14th Naval District
for the defense of this area and for what participation the Fleet might
have to take, if they happened to be here at the time, I know that Ad-
miral Kimmel, through his representative. Admiral Bloch, had come
to very [9S7] satisfactory arrangements with the Army. As
to the period from November 27 to December 7, 1 feel quite sure there
was no difference there between the previous periods. I had been
present on a number of occasions when General Short and Admiral
Kimmel and the higher ranking officials had conferences and discus-
sions, and I never at any time saw anything that lead me to believe
that there was other than complete cooperation. I am a little more
familiar with the cooperation which existed between the 14th Naval
District and the Army because of my work with Admiral Bloch,
and I am certain that they were working as a team.
24. Q. Do you know whether conferences between Admiral Kimmel
and General Short were rare or frequent, especially after the message
of November 27 was received ?
A. I don't know. I have no knowledge as to whether they were
frequent.
25. Q. It has been stated officially, "the attitude of each" — Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Short — "that he was not required to inform
himself and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the
other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the
provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of
each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and
inherent in their positions as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." Can you comment on
that from your first-hand observation of their work together in the
common interest ?
A. Without hesitation or qualification, based on my knowledge, any
such statement is not founded on fact.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 591
26. Q. Admiral, as one who is familiar with WPL-46, you are also
familiar, I assume, with the initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet
by WPL-46?
A. Yes.
27. Q. You have outlined to the court the deficiencies in training
which existed at that time. Regardless of those deficiencies, would
you say that the training was adequate to support the Pacific Fleet in
its initial tasks as outlined in WPL-46?
[Notation in margin :] H B.
A. Yes. I want to qualify that answer. There might have been
a good deal of living on dry provisions. Had there been engagements
and wounded, hospital facilities would have been very meager. If
salvage were to be performed, our equipment and vessels were very
small and would not have been capable of major salvage operations.
The entire situation would have depended on the speed that would
have been required in that initial task had the enemy imposed his
will on us.
[938] 28. Q. Having in mind the limited nature of the tasks
assigned to WPL-46, it would have been possible to carry them out
with what you had ?
A. Yes.
29. Q. I should like to show you Exhibit 20. This is the dispatch
of December 3 with respect to the burning of the codes. I ask you
whether or not that dispatch was brought to your attention at the
time it was received ?
A. I have a pretty good memory. I don't remember ever having
seen this dispatch.
30. Q. Do you recall having had that information which is con-
tained in that dispatch brought to your attention at one of Admiral
Kimmel's conferences ?
A. I don't remember.
31. Q. Admiral, I believe you have testified that after the war warn-
ing dispatch had been received by the Commander-in-Chief you did
not consider that the Pacific Fleet was on a war footing. Would you
care to elaborate a little on that and tell the court whether or not
there were any discussions at that time as to whether or not the Fleet
should go on a war footing and what considerations governed the
not putting of the Fleet on a war footing at that time?
A. The Commander-in-Chief discussed with the officers of the
Fleet — and I feel quite sure it was definitely stated that similar dis-
cussions were held with the Army — as to the patrols that were being
flown. The task force commanded by Vice Admiral Halsey was at
sea, and the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor and could have, in a very
short time, been ready for its initial tasks. I repeat that nobody
expected war immediately. If any expectation existed, it was not
manifested either bv the Commander-in-Chief or by the high com-
mand of the admirals here in Pearl Harbor, and I believe that every-
one felt that the training, the amount of fuel, and the logistic support
which existed at Pearl Harbor made the Fleet ready to comply with
this initial task in case a notification came for them to do so.
32. Q. Admiral, as I understood your testimony, in answer to ques-
tions by the court, you stated that you were familiar with the war
warning dispatch ?
592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■ A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. And that you considered it to mean that if negotiations with
these peace envoys broke down, trouble might ensure ?
A. That is correct.
34. Q. I should like to show you Exhibit 17 before this court, which
is the so-called "war warning" dispatch, and ask you to state, if you
will, what you considered the first sentence of the dispatch to mean :
"This message is to be [9S9] considered a war warning," and
also what you considered the phrase to mean: "Negotiations with
Japan have ceased"?
A. In addition to this dispatch, we had also received — just how
Admiral Kimmel received it now I don't remember — an order that
U. S. naval forces were not to commit any overt acts. My memory
has evidently played me false, as I thought that was a part of this
dispatch. I considered this dispatch, when read to me, to mean that
the Navy Department in Washington believed that the situation was
not bright. I did not believe from this telegram and from the pre-
vious information that existed — and I must connect that with this
dispatch — that any attack would be made except against Manila, and
I am quite sure that in this war warning telegi'am the specific localities
mentioned are those in the East, and the only United States possibility
mentioned is the Philippine Islands. In connection with other in-
formation which I had received officially, I felt that Washington con-
sidered the Atlantic and the Asiatic as the hot spots where immediate
trouble might start. I did not consider that this was a war warning
for the Fleet here at Pearl Harbor to go into Condition One and to
remain on a war footing, for if these negotiations did break down,
the first attack would undoubtedly mean the Philippine Islands.
35. Q. Doesn't that dispatch state, "Negotiations have ceased,"
thereby not leaving that to any interpretation by the commander here?
A. Yes.
36. Q. To whom is that dispatch addressed for action ?
A. Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pa-
cific Fleet, CincLant, SpeNavO.
37. Q. It was considered here that when a dispatch was sent to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific saying that it was to be considered a
war warning, it did not necessarily mean that the Fleet here would
have to go on a war footing or that war was imminent ?
A. That was Calhoun's impression, and from what I gathered, actu-
ally being present at this conference where this telegram was read, it
was the impression of the other officers there. I knew that a cross
section of the best naval talent in the world was sitting in that room
when this telegram was read, and the general impression of that cross
section of naval talent, which cannot be denied, was not to put the
Fleet in immediate battle stations as battle conditions. I feel certain
that they expected that the attack, if any came, would be against the
Philippine Islands.
The court then, at 11 : 55 a. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[940] Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his coun-
sel ; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 593
present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Ke-
serve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Vice Admiral W. L. Calhomi, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
The witness requested permission to elaborate on an answer made
to a question asked him.
The court stated that permission was granted.
The witness stated as follows : I would like to enlarge on some of
the answers to the questions that you asked me just previous to the
recess. There is no doubt that having looked over the list of Fleet
auxiliaries that exist today and considering their construction periods
that it was the effort of the Commander-inChief of the Fleet in 1940
and 1941 that, with the splendid cooperation from the Navy Depart-
ment, resulted in an early flow of those ships into the Fleet almost im-
mediately after Pearl Harbor and a continual flow of them since that
time ; that while those ships were possibly not immediately available,
evidently they had been planned for and steps were being taken to
send them to the Fleet, and it was because of those steps that we have
them today in sufficient quantity where I can say that we are prepared
to support the Fleet anywhere, any time. In regard to war footing
or war preparations of the Fleet, I realize that I am testifying before
a Naval Court where we all speak the same language, but that my
statements may not be understood outside of naval circles. This
Fleet was on a war footing and had been for some months ready to
conduct any ordered sortie where 24 to 36 hours advance notice was
given. Before the war warning telegram came, orders had been is-
sued that the moment a task force returned to this port they were to be
boarded by fuel, provision and maintenance officers; that they were
to be fully fueled, they were to be fully provisioned, and the same with
ammunition. If they stayed in port any length of time their com-
manders had orders to request that the small oil barges come around
and top them off so that they were practically filled with fuel at all
times. I meant, when I said "not on a war footing", we did not take
any of the prescribed conditions of readiness for battle, nor were any
of those conditions for readiness prescribed in the security orders ; but
at the slightest knowledge that an attack was coming, those steps could
have been and would have been [^^^] easily and readily taken.
To have placed the Fleet in battle condition would have interfered with
the orderly system of strenuous training which was in effect. Each
task force, as it went to sea, conducted target practices and maneuvered
in every way possible to improve its battle condition. That is what
I meant by not being on a war footing. I should have said we w^ere
not on a battle footing but we were on a war footing and had been for
some time. The Fleet was ready to execute the preliminary maneuvers
of the existing war plans and WPL and sufficient auxiliaries did exist
for the ordered deployments had they come. However, the total capac-
ity of the tankers available to the Pacific Fleet was 760,000 barrels of
fuel oil and in the first nine days after Pearl Harbor we pumped into
the Fleet 750,000 barrels. That is what I meant by the fact that the
tankers would not have been able to take care of the Fleet away from
Pearl Harbor if any amount of high speed steaming had been con-
ducted.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 39
594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cross-examination by the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, (Continued) :
38. Q. One further thing in connection with the dispatch of No-
vember 27th, the so-called war warning dispatch. You have am-
plified your answer to that and explained to the court what you
meant by the Fleet being on a war footing, but I believe that I am
correct in saying that nothing that you have said by the way of
amplification changes your previous answer which indicated that
the Fleet institutecl no additional measures after receipt of the dis-
patch of November 27th to put it in a greater condition of readiness
for war ?
A. I am aware of a certain happening, the details of which I
cannot state, but I do know that certain air patrols were instituted
somewhere around the first or second of December, or maybe earlier,
above those that had been in effect previous to that time. I am
aware of the fact that there was discussion by Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Bellinger — he is the one that I am certain of — as to the
fact that these new orders placed into effect would fly every plane
capable of making a search up to the limit of endurance of planes
and pilots. That was done, either after November 27th or just
before that time. The details of that, I don't know, but I do know
that such an order was given.
39. Q. That is the only additional security measure of which you
feel you have any knowledge ?
A. That is correct, sir.
40. Q. Admiral, I believe you testified in your direct exeamination
that from time to time you, as personnel officer of the Fleet, had
asked for additional personnel, and I believe you said made the
squawks about personnel, and that word had been received by the
Commander-in-Chief that not only were these deficiencies not to
be made up but that it might be possible that additional personnel
and ships would have to be [94^1 taken from the Pacific Fleet
for other purposes. Is that correct ?
A. That is my absolute recollection of the facts. Exactly how that
was received I do not know, but I am certain that in conference with
Admiral Kimmel. then Captain W. W. Smith, Captain McMorris,
we discussed the fact brought about by ordering away our only two
salvage tugs which, after they started for the Coast and we com-
plained so bitterly, were turned around and brought back; that if
they took ships from us and if they took men from us by continuing
to have us send our replacements for new crews without replacing
them, the Fleet would soon be in a bad way.
41. Q. I also understood that you felt that you were acquainted
with the details of the correspondence that flowed between Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Stark during the period, say, six months
previous to 7 December 1941 ?
A. That is right.
42. Q. Were you aware that at any time during this period Admiral
Stark assured Admiral Kimmel that he was contemplating taking no
further forces from the Pacific Fleet?
A. T know that, but whether I knew it after December or before,
I can't state. I think it was before. T feel sure it was before. If
I am allowed to say what T feel, I can't state under oath definitely
whether it was before or after but I think it was before.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 595
43. Q. May I show you Exhibit 12 before this court, which is a
letter dated 23 September 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral
Kimmel, and ask you to look at the second full paragraph on page
2, and see whether or not that refreshes your memory. Do you re-
member seeing that letter at the time it was received by Admiral
Kimmel ?
A. I saw a similar paragraph to the one marked, either before
December 7th or shortly after. I would have to look at this whole
letter to tell you whether or not I saw the letter.
44. Q. What I am getting at, Admiral. I don't think that is
necessary unless you particularly want to. What I am getting at
is, whether or not you felt, prior to 7 December 1941 that the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific had been assured by the Chief of Naval
Operations that no further units would be taken from the Pacific
Fleet other than those contemplated by WPL-46?
A. I believe that I had that information before December 7th.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
45. Q. Do you have any recollection as to the time that the orders
were given by Admiral Kimmel, if they were given, as to the depth
bombing of submarines in the vicinity of Oahu?
A. I had been relieved as Commander Base Force of the [^^3]
security patrol, but I am aware of the fact that orders were issued
that the destroyers of the security patrol should, if they contacted
a submerged submarine in the restricted sea area, stick with it, at-
tempt to identify it, attempt to make it come to the surface, but if
they knew beyond any reasonable doubt that there was a submarine
down there not one of our own, that they would attack it with depth
charges and destroy it. I also know that the security patrol, while
previously ordered to have their guns loaded just before December
7th — maybe a month — received orders that guns were no longer to
be loaded but they were to be handy and in the ready ammunition
boxes. There wasn't any question about the fact that if they had
encountered a Japanese submarine out here that thay were to destroy
it; not in my mind.
46. Q. With your knowledge of tlie conditions of the Fleet as
regards security matters between November 28th and the 7th of De-
cember, do you know of any other possible security measures that
could have been taken than those that were in force and effect at
that time?
A. I do not, considering that I had read the joint coastal frontier
plans — I think that is the proper designation — and knew that the
Fleet was to be called upon only if present in port to use its anti-
aircraft guns on an attack if so requested by the Army Command. I
believe that by flying the additional patrols which I knew Admiral
Kimmel ordered — but just how or what I can't state — he was doing
everything that he could do. I made no suggestions to him for in-
creased alert and I would have felt perfectly free to do so if I had
had the mentality or the thought or the idea that anything else I
could suggest would help.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Re-examined by the court :
596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
47. Q. Admiral, you were the Fleet Personnel Officer. Will you
state in general the officer and enlisted personnel situation from the
standpoint of adequacy of numbers, ratings, and permanency; that
is, the need for furnishing personnel to other commands?
A. The adequacy of ratings was excellent due to the fact that very
little advancement occurred. The minute they took any petty officer
from you, you had the petty officer material ready for replacing them.
There was a long waiting list, particularly for chief petty officers,
waiting to be rated, but because of the numbers of personnel allowed
in the Navy and in the Fleet at that time, the vacancies did not exist.
Ships of the destroyer class were then woefully under-manned.
Maybe we didn't know it then but we do know it now, due to the fact
that because of the assigned complements, even though the comple-
ments were filled, they could only, under battle conditions, probably
man 75 per cent of their stations. The tankers could not possibly
have fueled at sea [044] and be ready for any form of defense.
The tanker crews have almost been doubled since pre-Pearl Harbor.
The destroyer crews have almost been doubled. The permanency of
personnel was fair. We sometimes lost men, and the Fleet was never
in excess, more rapidly than we got replacements, but at that time,
with the assigned complements, I again repeat that ratings didn't
bother us. We had a long waiting list for promotions. Officer per-
sonnel, I can give my opinion on and definite facts as to the Base
Force. I was not Fleet Officer Personnel Officer. The auxiliaries
of the Base Force had all the officer personnel that they could possibly
need or use. As to the rest of the Fleet, I heard in Admiral Kimmel's
conferences of various types that they would like to have more officers
and men, but as to the details of the officers, I do not know. The base
force officer personnel was sufficient as to rank and permanency.
Enlisted men in the Base Force was sufficient as to rank and per-
manency, except the tankers would have been under-manned for sea
cruising with a task force. That knowledge is hindsight. The Fleet
was never in excess and always 5 to 10 per cent short of the enlisted
men allowed. The state of training of the men was excellent. Their
morale was, in my opinion, extremely high, I saw Pearl Harbor on
the 7th of December from a grandstand seat in an auxiliary that
apparently was in no danger; was not subject to attack, and the way
the personnel conducted themselves that day speaks yolumes for the
training and the fighting heart that had been instilled in those men by
their responsible commanders.
48. Q. Admiral, having been security officer, did you feel that
adequate security measures had been taken by the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District who, I understand, relieved you, for the
defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, sir, and if I hadn't thought so I wouldn't have hesitated
for one moment to go to him, and I know that he would have gladly
entertained and considered any information or advice I had to give.
I was fully conversant with the orders that he issued after taking
over from me, and the orders issued by the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District were a little bit more warlike than those issued by
myself as Commander Base Force. Again I repeat, mine were issued
based entirely on the acts of irresponsible nationals and the fact that
nationals would not attack the Fleet at Pearl Harbor or the Fleet
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 597
at sea, but when the Commandant of the 14th Naval District took
over, that shade of distinction was a little bit broadened and it was
more of a warlike security measure than had been in existence when
it was handled by the Base Force ; considerably more so.
49, Q. Do you consider that the lookouts and all for the entrances
to Pearl Harbor were adequate and on the alert?
A. Definitely so, sir.
[94^] 50. Q. You are aware of the fact that a submarine en-
tered on the morning of the 7th into Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, sir; a midget submarine.
51, Q. And is it your understanding that there was no report of
that midget submarine until it got well inside the harbor ?
A. It isn't a question of understanding. I definitely feel sure it
would have reached me because I had many mine craft and tugs to
go after them. I had no warning that a submarine was in Pearl
Harbor until the IMEDUSA and CUETISS informed me that they
]iad fired on a midget submarine and sunk it on the other side of
Ford Ishand.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he though should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated as follows : I regret that I did not carefully dis-
tinguish between war footing as I considered the Fleet on December 7th
and just prior to that and what it is today. Today there are con-
ditions of readiness maintained at all times. Certain watches man
guns, and battle stations are partially manned. Task Forces One,
Two and Three, which composed the Pacific Fleet, were continually
making sweeps, cruising and training. One task force was always
at sea and it was relieved by the second, which meant that for short
periods two-thirds of the Fleet was at sea. They steamed in all-to-
gether battle conditions, darkened fleet, ship, and everything as ex-
ists today. They were ready to fight had they been attacked. Here
in Pearl Harbor, I meant that after the war warning telegram we
didn't go to general quarters at daylight and then follow it up by
setting certain conditions of readiness as is done in the Fleet today,
but I do consider that we had been making strenuous warlike prepa-
rations ever since the day in 1940 when we were told that the Fleet
was not to return to the Coast but would remain in the Hawaiian
Islands. The Fleet was training for war and preparing for war in
every way they knew how. That includes urging the proper build-
ing of auxiliaries, the extension of storage facilities at Pearl Harbor
in which Commander Base Force was interested, and arrangements
such that NTS and WSA would assist in the logistic supply of the
Islands and necessarily of the Fleet. I would like to correct any
impression that I gave that the Fleet was not ready for war, and by
stating that we were not on a war footing, I meant that we had not
[94s] assumed or taken conditions of readiness for battle sta-
tions, and that onliy. I do consider that the Fleet was ready for
war and could have, in a very short time, due to the continued logistic
598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
preparations that were made, have been ready for the necessary
sorties and placed into execution advanced deployments that would
have been called for by placing the WPL into effect.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 2 : 15 p. m., took a recess until 3 : 00 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all
the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reported.
[5^7] A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.
A. C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of
the year 1941 ?
A. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department.
Examined by the court :
3. Q. Admiral, in testimony before this court, reference has been
made to shortage of personnel, officer and enlisted, in the Pacific
Fleet, and of the drains made from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic
Fleet and to new construction. Will you briefly describe the situation
as it existed during 1941, prior to December 7 ?
A. The statement which I will make will have to be in general
terms, as I do not have access to records or figures or percentages.
The year 1941 was characterized by a great expansion in the Navy,
particularly in the naval air arm. Training activities were greatly
expanded. Large drafts were made on the Fleet in both oceans for
personnel to assist in the training, and for trained personnel to form
the nucleii of ships and units being placed in commission. Large
numbers of transports were being taken over by the Navy and Navy-
manned. Every effort was being made to bring back into active
service all officers and men on the retired list and on the Fleet Re-
serve, who were capable of performing active duty. In spite of the
reserves which we had available, it was necessary to call on the fleets
in both oceans and in about the same ratio, although the Pacific Fleet
was slightly favored, for officers and men to man the new ships.
There was a constant struggle between the desire to maintain a
stability of personnel in the Fleets and a desire to man new con-
struction. Inasmuch as the country was not yet in war, and inas-
much as it was vitally necessary to strengthen the fleet for new con-
struction, ships nearing completion — considerable numbers of officers
and men were drained from the fleets. The Asiatic Fleet did not
participate in this furnishing of men, and was kept practically up
to strength, although there were some few officers and men even from
that Fleet. To the best of my recollection, in about December of '41,
the ships were fully manned as regards numbers of officers and about
90% manned as regards numbers of men. There was, however, a high
proportion of reserve officers in the officers' rosters of all ships, and
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 599
a large proportion of the men were relatively untrained, having had
anywhere from a month to something under two months of training
at training stations. The rapidly expanding training system, par-
ticularly naval air stations, [948] absorbed large numbers of
trained aviators to Iveep tlie training program going. I would like
to add that at this time, about December of 1941, prior to the 7th,
there had been an increase in the anti-aircraft batteries of our com-
batant units, and steps were already under way to provide the neces-
sary personnel for these batteries, so the 90% figure includes per-
sonnel for those batteries and included enough men to man anti-
aircraft batteries almost on a watch-and-watch basis. kSince De-
cember 7 there has been a tremendous increase in the anti-aircraft
armaments of all of our ships, which has greatly increased the num-
bers of men aboard ship.
4. Q. Admiral, do you consider that during this time, the principal
acivity of the United States Fleet was centered in the Atlantic, as
to actual active conditions ?
A. In my capacity, as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, I was
not concerned with the operations of the Fleet, but I was aware of
the fact that withdrawals had been made from the Pacific Fleet into
the Atlantic Fleet, particularly one division of battleships, three in
number ; some destroyers, number I don't recollect — but there had been
a number of witlidrawals. I am not a good witness as to the relative
importance of the two areas, except that the fighting was actually
going on in the Atlantic at that time and was not going on in the
Pacific.
5. Q. Admiral, would not suspension of training activity have had
a serious effect upon your ability to supply personnel to new con-
struction ?
A. It would have been impossible to produce trained aviation
personnel without the training activities centered ashore. It was
possible,_of course, to train deck hands by taking men newly inducted
and placing them aboard ships and requiring ships to do the training,
but the general preparedness efforts would have been considerably
retarded.
None of the interested parties desired to cross-examine tliis witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which lie thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: "None except to offer
the suggestion that the Bureau of Navigation records will contain a
very complete story of tlie efforts that were being made at that time
to obtain personnel, and the efforts were very strenuous."
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 3: 20 p. m., adjourned subject to the call of the
president.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 601
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAYY COURT OF INQUIRY
SEPTEMBER 13, 1944
[949] TWENTY-SEV-ENTH DaY
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navv (Eet), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphiis Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Block, U. S. Navy, (Ret), interested party and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-sixth dnj of the in-
quiry was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The proceedings following directly hereafter. Pages 950 through
987, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of National Security and the successful prosecution of
the war.
[9S7A] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to
examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry he thought should be a matter of record in connection
therewith, which had not been full}^ brought out by the previous ques-
tioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 2:45 p. m., adjourned subject to the call of the
president.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 603
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
SEPTEMBER 15, 1944
[988] Twenty-eighth Day
Federal Building,
San Francisco, California,
The court met at 2 : 30 p. m.
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navv (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward G. KalMus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphiis Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member. _
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh day of the
inquiry was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy, Commander of the Am-
phibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
2. Q. What duties were you performing between the first of July
and 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was Director of War Plans in the Office of Chief of Naval
Operations.
3. Q. Will you state in general language what your relations with the
Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of your duties were as
Chief of the War Plans Division?
A. I was one of the five or six major assistants below the Assistant
Chief, and my official and personal relations with Admiral Stark were
very close. A great many [980'] of the projects wliich the De-
partment had in mind were referred to the War Plans Division for
comment and recommendations so that the War Plans Division was
cognizant of most of the things that went on in the Department.
4. Q. Did your duties include being a sort of a professional adviser
to the Chief of Naval Operations on matters pertaining to military
operations ?
604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes, particularly with regard to preparation for war and with
regard to future operations and with regard to relationships with the
Army and to some extent, w^ith the State Department.
5. Q. The United States, by an executive order, in July, 1941, froze
Japanese assets in the United States. What were your views at that
time as to probable Japanese reactions to this executive order ?
A. I will say this: That that order was issued without any par-
ticular advance knowledge on my part. I heard it mentioned but
it more or less came out of a clear sky. I do not know just how much
Admiral Stark knew about it in advance. I had expressed the opinion
previously, and I again expressed it, that that would very definitely
briing on war with Japan. There was no possibility of composing
matters after that unless Japan made a complete backdown, which it
was very apparent she w^as not going to do,
6. Q. You have stated that you thought there would be a war with
Japan. Do you mean by that, a Japanese-United States war?
A. Yes.
7. Q. I show you Exhibit 13 which is in evidence before this court,
and it is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 16 October, 1941. I
will ask you to examine it and state whether you were acquainted with
this dispatch at or about the time of its release ?
A. Yes, I wrote the dispatch. It had some slight changes in it but
I wrote it and presented it to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
and to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by them it was, as I recall,
presented to the Joint Board and the Joint Board, I don't believe,
took any official action on it as a serial before them, but approved it.
8. Q. This dispatch sets out, as you will note, that there is a possi-
bility that Japan may attack the United States and Great Britain.
Upon what considerations was this conclusion predicated?
A. By that time British and United States relationships had become
very close and I know nothing about what assurances were given by the
President to Great Britain, but I was convinced then that if Japan
attacked Britain in the Far East that the United States would im-
mediately enter the war against [990] Japan., The Japanese
for some years before 1941 had apparently determined that they were
going to drive Britain out of the Far East. I believe that a certain
section of the Japanese heirarchy were very anxious to keep the
United States out of the war, that is, keep the United States from
assisting Great Britain, but many of the moves that had been made
against Japan during 1940 and '41 were made by the United States.
The whole political situation, their interest in the Philippines, con-
vinced me that war would be not far off and that it would be against
the United States and Great Britain.
9. Q. You speak of a war between the United States and Japan.
Had you formed any estimate as to what nation would take the initial
step towards this war ?
A. Yes. It was absolutely certain that the nation that would take
the initial steps would be Japan. There was no desire in the United
States political circles to declare war against Japan unless she did
something which was impossible to accept. Great Britain had her
hands full and we would, I am quite sure, have gone on indefinitely
if Japan had not attacked us.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 005
10. Q. Had you made any estimate of where such an attack might
be made?
A. Yes. In January of 1941 we issued a War Plan based on the
situation called Rainbow Three, and that was not a joint war plan
because we couldn't get the Army to go in wath us on it at that time
and we had to get a plan out. That plan issued at that time — and we
saw^ no reason later to change it — envisaged a major attack, a major
line of effort of Japan against the Philippines and either Borneo or
Malaya; ultimately both, depending on the direction or tlie strength
that they had available. At the same time we issued that war plan
we prepared a letter for the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary
of War and stated that w^e considered that any attack of that nature
would almost s»rely be accompanied by an attack on the Hawaiian
Islands and the Fleet of one or more forms of attack — air, submarine.
Fleet, or a combination of any of tliose. That letter went out signed
by the Secretary of the Navy, as I recall it, in January of 1941 ; went
to tlie Secretary of War w^ho agreed with it; and letters derived from
those two letters were sent out to the Commanders-in-Chief, but the
major concept of the war as given in Rainbow Three was an attack
on the Philippines accompanied either with Malaya or Borneo.
11. Q. I show you Exhibit 9, Admiral, in evidence before this court,
which is the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941. I ask
you to examine it and state whether or not that is the letter to which
you have just referred?
A. That is the letter.
[991^ _ 12. Q. Exhibit 9 bears date of 24 January 1941.
A. That is the letter you were speaking of.
13. Q. The letter that you have just examined. You were pre-
viously being questioned with reference to Exhibit 13, which was the
Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 10 October 1941. Was it your
view at this time in October that the same considerations governing
Japanese action might still be maintained?
A. Yes.
14. Q. Can you recall whether or not you had any discussions or
conferences with the Chief of Naval Operations at that time in which
these views were discussed ?
A. Do you mean in which these same considerations were
brought up ?
15. Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
16. Q. To-wit, the possible objectives of a Japanese attack in the
event of the Japanese taking war-like action.
A. Those questions w^ere continuously under discussion from the
time — probably had been before, but from the time I went to the
Department in October of 1940, until the time of the Japanese attack.
The pros and cons and the methods and just how the Japanese would
do that were under discussion all the time in my section, and between
myself and Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and immediate
members of his staff.
^ 17. Q. Exhibit 13 directs, in effect, that addressees take due precau-
tions, including preparatory deployments. What was desired to be
conveyed by this directive "take due precautions including prepara-
tory deployments"?
606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Our preparatory deployments were intended to include sending
submarines out to the westward along approximately the 180th merid-
ian. There was no such order given, of course, but that was our
intention, to send some out just east of the Marshalls, to have the
Fleet at sea, or part of it, a considerable part of the time to the west-
ward of Hawaii and up generally in a supporting position for Midway
and Wake and covering positions for Palmyra and Johnston, and it
was expected that they would be in a position from previous deploy-
ments so that we could get warning of any attack that was coming
so that they could take measures against any Japanese force that
came in. As I recall it, as a result of that dispatch, or shortly after-
wards in any case, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet issued
the order that Japanese submarines would be attacked by our forces
if found any place in the vicinity of the Hawaiian islands. I don't
know whether those orders were issued in detail ; we didn't see them.
[992] 18. Q. This dispatch of 16 October also contains the
directive to take precautions as will not constitute provocative action
against Japan. Do you know who was responsible for those words
being in the dispatch ?
A. I was.
19. Q. For what reason were the}^ placed in the dispatch ?
A. The State Department and the Navy Department, I think, were
in accord that we should get as much time as we ourselves could to
prepaie in a material way for the war. We had finally been able to
get appropriations that would assist in a material way very much
better, and we had also opened up the enlistments again and we wanted
to be in better shape so that we could carry on the war more effectively.
Now, in addition to that there were conversations going on constantly
with the Japanese which appeared on the surface to be possibly a
solution so that there wouldn't be any war and that was the desire of
the government, that we not get into war with Japan at that time.
Therefore, we did not want our Fleet, for example, to cruise over near
the Marshalls and assume a threatening attitude. We didn't want
them to arrest all the Iniown disloyal elements in Hawaii and we
didn't want to send any submarines out near the Japanese islands. It
was an attempt to retain the peace as long as possible and to make sure
that when war came that it would be initiated by Japan and not by the
United States.
20. Q. At tlie time of preparing this dispatch of 16 October for
release, had any consideration been given to the advisability of shift-
ing the base of the Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor to another area ?
A. The question of shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast of the
United States had been discussed more or less continuously from the
time the Fleet stopped out there in Pearl Harbor after conclusion of
the spring maneuvers in 1940. There were reasons unconnected with
the war which made it desirable to have the Fleet back on the Coast.
One of them was because of better logistics and better contentment
of personnel; and then there was the very troublesome question of
whether or not the Fleet, being in Hawaii, would not cause a very
unfavorable reaction in the Japanese and directly lead to war rather
than to prevent it. In other words, some people in the Department
and the government felt that we could bluff Japan. Other people
felt we couldn't bluff Japan and that question came in. The matter
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 607
of movintr the Fleet back to tlie Coast was put up to the President
several times after I went to the Department and each time the deci-
sion was made to retain it out there, except that a scheme was worked
out so I think a fourth or a third of tlie Fleet would come back to the
States for repairs and for liberty and leave for the personnel.
21. Q. Those were the considerations that had goverened the basing
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor for a long period of time, but I
am asking you specifically as of IG October and thereafter, had any
consideration been given to the advisability of changing the base of the
Pacific Fleet [99'J] in view of the impending diplomatic devel-
opments?
A. No. By that time I believe that everyone in authority in Wash-
ington was convinced that the Fleet ought to remain based on Pearl
Harbor ; war was too imminent.
The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 994 through
1008, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record
and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken
in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of
the war.
[1009] The court then, at 4:25 p. m., took a recess until 4:35
p. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel;
all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank
M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy, the witness under exam-
ination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding and continued his testimony.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy :
113. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before this court that in the
half year, perha])s longei", prior to 7 December 1941, there had been
discussions between the War and Navy Departments concerning the
principle and the application of the principle of unity of command.
Would you state for the court what the situation was immediately
prior to 7 December 1941 with respect to these discussions concerning
unity of command?
A. The discussion had never reached a conclusion. Therefore, the
situation on December 7 was one of cooperation between the two
services.
114. Q. Would you suggest the reasons why there had not been
any conclusion at that time ?
A. We had been unable to arrive at any other agreement than of
leaving the command set-up as it had been before. There were never
any very clear, explicit proposals for placing one service under the
conmiand of the other. There had been a great deal of discussion,
but rather vague in nature. It was a new idea. I don't believe there
was any position taken by either Department along a firm line. That
is to say, there were some people in the Navy Department who wished
to see some kind of a unity of command. There were some in the War
608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department. There were others in both departments that felt that
the existing system was as good as anything that we could get up.
There had been, specifically, proposals made by the Navy Department
with regard to Hawaii and Panama, and the Carribean Naval Coastal
Frontier, and 1 don't remember whether that proposal, which was a
paper draft in my office, brought the Philippines in it or not. The
proposal was gone into in considerable detail that the Panama Naval
Coastal Frontier would be under the Army, that the Carribean would
be under the Navy, but that document had not been accepted by the
War Department. We had made a considerable number of changes
in it. We were approaching a solution, I believe, but it had not been
arrived at, as I recall.
115. Q. Prior to 7 December?
A. Prior to T December.
116. Q. Admiral, during the six months preceding 7 December
1941, did you feel that your office and the other units of [1010]
Office of Chief of Naval Operation kept the Commander-in-Chief
of all three Fleets, the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Asiatic, fully in-
formed of diplomatic and military developments so far as you knew
them, with particular reference to relations between Japan and the
United States?
A. Yes, we did, principally through the medium of official letters
written in the personal form, exchanged between the Commander-in-
Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations and by means of rather
frequent visits by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet and
infrequent visits to Washington by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet. We sent one or two officers out to Hawaii and on to
Manila with instructions to talk to the Commander-in-Chief and
acquaint him with the views of the department on the diplomatic and
military situation.
117. Q. I gathered from your direct testimony in this connection
that you and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations considered that on 7 December 1941, the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet had received adequate directions to
prepare himself for war, from the Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
without regard to other information which may or may not have been
made available to him?
A. Yes.
118. Q. Adverting for a moment to the British staff conferences,
I think you stated that you felt that if Japan attacked Great Britain
in the Far East, that the United States would join with Great Britain ;
do 3^ou know of any commitment made on behalf of the United States
during tliese staff conversations or at any other time to the effect that
if Great Britain were attacked by Japan in the Far East the United
States would come to the assistance of Great Britain?
A. There was no such commitment specifically. We were asked by
the British to make such commitments, and particularly with respect
to the Asiatic station. We were unable to make any such commitment
because unless we ourselves were attacked it would require an Act of
Congress to enter the war. However, we believed, particularly toward
the end, that we would enter the war if Great Britain were attacked
in the Far East.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 609
119. Q. Do you know whether or not the feeling in the Office of
Chief of Naval Operations was conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I do noth know ; I think not.
120. Q. When did you become head of War Plans in the Office of
Chief of Xaval 0])erations, Admiral ^
A. Octol)er 23, 1910.
121. Q. During your tour of duty in that capacity, what effort was
made by the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, through the War
Plans Division, toward the production and dissemination of a war
plan which was definitely realistic UOll] and had in mind
the forces available to the United States for the prosecution of the
war ?
A. On October 28, 1940, the only War Plan in existence was the
Orange W^ar Plan, which was most unrealistic. There was a memo-
randum or letter in rather general terms, written by the Chief of
Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, concerning
his movements and tasks in the case of war with Japan. I immedi-
ately started the preparation of a War Plan which was known as
Rainbow 3, and was put out. I believe, in January 1941. The War
Department would not agree to making that a joint plan, although
they indicated that they would in general terms go along with that
plan, so that was purely a naval plan, based on the concept of Japaii
attacking the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies and Ha-
waii, and it involved sending a detachment of the Pacific Fleet out to
join the Asiatic Fleet. That plan was thoroughly discussed by the
principal officers in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and with
one or two members of the General Board, and agreed on and ap-
proved by the Chief of Naval Operations. We undertook during
January discussions with the Army on what Avas called Rainbow 5.
A lot of work had been done on Rainbow 4, which was practically a
purely defensive plan for South America, and with ourselves fighting
Germany and Japan, but that was dropped because it was not realistic.
The discussions of Rainbow 5 had not proceeded very far before the
opening of the conversations with the British, which was in February
of 1941. Rainbow 5 was in reality the implementation of the agree-
ments which we made with the British during those conversations.
As soon as we got out Rainbow 3, War Plans made recommendations
which were approved to inunediately start moving ships and men and
materials to positions envisaged by Rainbow 3. As soon as Rainbow
5 was produced, which was — I think we issued that in May of 1941 —
we again tried to implement that plan by ]:)utting the forces where
they were called for and deployment was made, practically completed,
in August of 1941. However, a change had occurred in which we
were required to move an additional number of ships from the Pacific
to the Atlantic because of proposals for certain operations in the At-
lantic with respect to Germany. I would like to add that some of
these vessels that went to the Atlantic were sent back to the Pacific,
and on December T, 1941, tlie deployment was substantially in accord-
ance with Rainbow 5 — WPL-46.
[1012] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
79716 — 4G — Ex. 14G, vol. 1 40
610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
122. Q. In your opinion, then, Admiral, was WPL— i6 a realistic
war plan ?
A. Yes.
123. Q. Do yon consider that subsequent events during the first
year of the war changed your estimate of the plan at all as to its being
a realistic war plan?
A. No. It must be understood that a war plan issued by the De-
partment is substantially the initiation of war, the opening steps with
major tasks that go into the far future but without any detailed tasks
except for the opening movements.
124. Q. Admiral, I would like to read you Article 0222 from Ex-
hibit 4, which is WPL 40. This article reads as follows: "Mobiliza-
tion may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or
any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of
Avar." Would you explain why mobilization was not ordered prior
to 7 December 1941 ? '
A. It is not practicable in a democracy, in my opinion, to mobilize
without the authority of Congress, and the authority of Congress to
mobilize would be tantamount to a declaration of war. That matter
of mobilization had appeared in great detail in previous war plans.
This was put in to try to make it realistic but with the knowledge
that the chances were that no order would be given. As a matter of
fact, however, the Navy — and to a large extent the Army — was mobi-
lized. We were at our war stations. Reserves had been called into
service and mobilization, so far as the Navy was concerned, would
have accomplished exactly zero. The only thing that we could have
accomplished by mobilization would have been the taking over mer-
chant shipping and taking over direct control of the ports, but that
again is not within the power of the executive; unless you are actually
in war you cannot take over property without the authority of
Congress.
125. Q. Referring now to Article 0223 of Exhibit 4, WPL-46. I
would like to read that article : "This plan may be executed in part
by a dispatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks
to be executed or accepted, and the ]:)reliminary measures to be taken
in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks
thereof." Would you explain why it was that partial execution of
WPL-4() was not ordered prior to 7 December 1941 by CNO?
A. Execution of any part of WPL-4G would have constituted an act
of war which the Chief of Naval Operations nor the President were
authorized to commit. That particular paragraph was put in there
because it might well have been that we would have gone to war with
Germany— that is, the United States against Germany — without going
to war with Japan. Therefore, when WPT-40 is put into effect, or
when any part of it is put into effect, that is war, and we felt that there
was a decided possibility that we would go to war with Germany
without at the same time going to war against Ja])an.
[1013'] 126. Q. Do I understand, then, Admiral, that the partial
execution mentioned in this article contemplated war with Germany
and not war with Japan, rather than partially executing the war plan
with respect to one of those possible enemy powers?
A. That is correct.
127. Q. Do you recall when merchant shipping was diverted from
the Central Pacific, Admiral?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 611
A. Yes. I do not recall the exact date. It was, I believe, the latter
part of October, 1941.
128. Q. Would you explain why it was that the Chief of Naval
Operations ordered that diversion of merchant shippinijj from the
Central Pacific?
A. The Chief of Naval Operations was convinced that war was
coming. AVe were shipping out to the Philippines extremely valuable
cargoes in the form of troops, guns, and airplanes. We needed those
men and that equipment in the Phili])pines very badly and we were
afraid that these ships might be attacked by the Japanese. Some of
the ships were Dutch and the seizure of the Dutch ships by Japan
would have created a very difficult kind of a ])roblem. So that those
ships, first, were diverted and then, on the formation of the Tojo
cabinet, we felt that war was very close and the Chief of Naval Op-
erations diverted the ships down to the south so that they would not
be captured.
129. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Command-
er-in-Chief, Pacific, informed of this action by the Chief of Naval
Operations?
A. Yes. I feel quite sure they were. The order was issued written
by Admiral Ingersoll, and my recollection is that both of them were
informed.
130. Q. Admiral, did you think during the year 1941 that the
diplomatic and economic steps ^aken by the government of the United
States were kept in step with the state of preparedness for war at that
time; that is, our country's state of preparedness for war?
A. Yes, in general.
131. Q. Do you know o fany ste])s taken by the Navy Department
during the last half of 1941 to have the United States-Japanese nego-
tiations so conducted that the Army and tlie Navy would have a chance
to better their war preparations?
A. That i^artjcular point came up several times at conferences be-
tween representatives of the State Department and the War and Navy
Departments. On several occasions Mv. Hull specifically asked if the
two departments wanted time to better their readiness for war, and
the answer every time, even up to the last, was in the affirmative. The
Departments Avanted the war with Japan put off^ as long as it could
be put t)ff so that we could be in a better position.
\J01Ji] Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy^(Ret.) :
132. Q. Admiral, in your recent testimony you have indicated that
you believed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet up
until 7 December 1941 had been given all the information add direc-
tives and so forth that he required to go ahead with his various duties
in connection with the war plans. In your testimony at that time did
3'ou include in your general analysis of Avhat had been given to him
that he was continually receiving the special information that had been
discussed previously at this meeting but which is recorded separately?
A. Yes, but I believe now, and I believed then, that he was kept
adequately informed by official communications to him.
133. Q. Do you know that the official communications to him which
included a great many letters in a personal form, that the details of
this special information were included in those letters to the same
612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
extent as the particular documents in which this information was
contained ?
A. I believe that he received adequate information in official com-
munications to him, and that no more was necessary. The tremendous
number of details that were in this separate information were, in my
opinion, not necessary for a proper understanding of the situation and
for the conduct of the war.
134. Q. But do you consider that none of that information would
have assisted him in his evaluation of the situation from time to time?
A. No.
135. Q. Then some of that information would have helped him in
determining the situation as it changed?
A. I don't know whether it w^ould have helped him, or not.
136. Q. But at least it was not given to him in detail ?
A. I don't know that to be a fact.
137. Q. Do you know whether it was given in detail in this official
correspondence to which you have just now referred?
A. It was given in sufficient detail, and in my opinion, much of our
estimate of the situation was based on reading the newspapers and of
public statements issued by the Japanese government, and of specific
movements that the Japanese were making in Indo-China and here,
there, and the other place. That information, in my opiion, on the
whole, was far more valuable in making up your mind as to the situa-
tion. It Avas to me a great deal more valuable than all the other types
of information that were obtained.
138. Q. Then you expected, as head of the War Plans Division of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation, that the Connnander-in-
Chief should keep readers of the public press so that they could get
their information as to wdrat was going on?
A. I expected him to read the newspapers, yes.
[lOlS] 139. Q. In this connection, reading the newspapers,
were you aware from the newspapers that the negotiations with the
Japanese were continuing, apparently on the surface, after the 29th
of November, 19-11, until the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. Yes, there was something in the papers every day about it.
140. Q. Was that matter discussed with the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions as to what information was received from newspapers and other-
wise ?
A. I think not.
141. Q. Did the Chief of Naval Operations use the newspaper pub-
lications for coming to a conclusion as to what our relations with
Japan were at that time ?
A. Presumably he did. I don't know what he used ; everything that
he did use.
142. Q. In connection with keeping the Commander-in-Chief in-
formed of the situation from time to time, are you familiar with a
joint memorandum that was prepared by General Marshall and the
Chief of Naval Operations to the President in regard to the prepara-
tion of the Navy and the Army of the United States to meet the Jap-
anese situation as it was developing?
A. I would like to refresh my memory with it.
143. Q. Yes. I show you Exhibit 39-A, which is the memorandum
dated November 5, 1941 addressed to the President on the subject of
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 613
the estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation, and I direct j'our
attention particularly to the last sentence thereof.
A. Yes, I remember this. It was prepared in the "War Department
and some changes were made — it was discussed between the "War Plans
Division and some changes were made and submitted. Xow, what was
the question?
144. Q. I direct your attention to the last paragraph and ask 5'ou
to read specifically what is recommended. Read it into the record,
please.
A. (Reading:)
Specilically they recommend tliat the dispatch of United States armed forces
for intervention against Japan in China be disappi-oved ; that material aid to ,
China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our
own forces ; that aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and ac-
celerated to the maximum practicable extent; tliat no ultim.atum be delivered to
Japan.
145. Q. In connection with this exhibit aud referring to the note
of the United States to Japan of 26 November 1941, did you consider,
when you became familiar with that note, that the note was, in effect,
an ultimatum in that it contained conditions that would be wholly
unacceptable to Japan?
A. I did not consider it an ultimatum.
146. Q. Did you expect that the conditions set forth in the note of
26 November 1941 would be accepted bv Japan?
A. No.
[IOKj] 147. Q. What action by Japan did you expect?
A. My previous testimony said that in my opinion that note was
delivered by the State Department purely for the purpose of con-
tinuing conversations with the Japanese as long as possible, and rep-
resented a more or less final view of the State Department as to the
conditions necessary for continued peace and agreement with Japan.
14S. Q. And then you expected that the continued peace would be
disrupted uj^jon the rejJy to that note?
A. I don't believe that I thought anything about it in that con-
n.ection because I knew a war was coming in just a few days.
149. Q. You will observe that the note of November 26, 1941 was
approximately 20 days after the joint memorandum of the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Had any material progress
been made in those interveuing 20 days that were so extensive as to
have placed the United States in a much better position to carry on
the war that appeared at that time to be so close.
A. The policy of the government was to delay war with Japan as
long as possible.
150. Q. But did you think that the United States was prepared
A. Twenty da3^s delay was that much delay and by that amount we
were better |>repai'ed.
151. Q. But did you think that these 20 days Avere going to bring
the state of preparedness of the United States to such a point that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, for instance, could carry
out its war plans any better than they did before ?
A. I don't get the sense of the question. I couldn't predict, for
example, at the time of this other occurence, that we were going to war
in 20 days, or 10 days, or any other iiumber of days. The policy of
614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the oovernment was to delay war with Japan as long as possible.
What I thonght abont it had no bearing.
152. Q. But isn't it a fact that within 20 days after a formal memo-
randnm was given by the Chief of Naval Operations that no ultimatum
should be delivered, that a note was actually sent to the Japanese, the
conditions of which you believed they would not accept?
A. No note ever given by one government to another, probably, in
general terms, ever is acceptable at first. That was an effort to prolong
the negotiations. I'm not defending that note in the slightest degree.
I had nothing to do with the note and the note was sent. I saw a draft
of it before it went, a preliminary affair, and that was somewhat
changed, but then it was sent without further reference to the Navy
Department.
153. Q. Do you know whether Admiral Stark saw that draft before
it was sent ?
A. I do not know.
\_1017] 154. Q. Did you feel at the time of November 26, 1941,
that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared
to carry out the missions as required by the War Plans?
A. Yes.
155. Q. Do you consider that it was to be carried out as more than
just an initial attack, or a continued operation?
A. Wliose operation?
156. Q. A continued operation by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Pleet?
A. If you will read that letter you just referred to, you will find
there that our attitude w^as a defensive attitude to be taken ; it was a
defensive attitude. We were not in position to make an offensive
movement at that time and I considered then, and consider now, that
the means he had at hand he was able to put up a defense and continue
defensive operations.
157. Q. Do you consider that his operations were only to extend
to the Hawaiian Islands, Wake and Midway without any movements
whatever toward the Marshalls or other islands in the Central Pacific?
A. He was not in a position, he didn't have the material to attack
the Marshalls with the idea of holding them and it would have been,
at that stage of the game, a very bad move, and the Department had
no intention of making any such suggestions. Whether he could make
raids there was something else. That was up to the Commander-in-
Chief to work out a scheme and make a pi'oposal, the same way as is
done at the present time. But he was in a position to undertake the
defense of that area and of the Pacific Coast.
I1018'\ Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Ke-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, wnthdrew.
158. Q. Do you recall expressing before the Roberts Commission
any belief that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was perfectly
familiar with all of the intelligence information, including the special
intelligence to which reference has been made in this testimony?
A. I don't recall specifically making that statement. I probably
did, because that was my belief.
Examined by the court :
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 615
159. Q. Admiral, did you consider that negotiations and conversa-
tions were going on between the Japanese representatives and our
State Department between 27 November and 7 December? Did you
know this to be a fact or not ?
A. I think there were one or tw^o visits to the Department by the
two Japanese ambassadors during that i)eriod, but my recollection is
that for the last five or six days there were none.
160. Q. Did you from time to time accompany the Chief of Naval
Operations to the conferences at the State Department?
A. Yes, sir, I usually attended the State Department conferences.
161. Q. Was any statement made at these State Department con-
ferences about Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii would be
attacked suddenly?
A. Never hear of it before until it came out in the papers.
162. Q. You speak of this October 16 incident and your idea of
deployment of the Pacific Fleet to the westward and the dispersal of
submarines. Was any specific intimation given to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific, as to such plan you had in mind : The deployment
of that fleet or the dispersal of submarines?
A. During the fall — I have forgotten the date — of 1041 the Com-
mander-in-Chief and some of his staff visited Washington for the
purpose of discussing the entire situation. During that time I talked
to the Connnander-in-Chief and to his ojierations officer at some
length. We exchanged views on what would be the proper method of
conducting the initial phases of the war. I don't recall the details
of the conversation at all. I presume I expressed the view that is
expressed here, wdiich was what I held at that time, that it would
be impossible for us to undertake for a considerable period of time
any offensive against territory and that we recognized [1019]
the desirability of getting more ships from the Atlantic and putting
them over there and that some would be moved there, but at that time
we could not do anytliing more.
163. Q. You testified here that at that time and subsequent to Octo-
ber, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief. Pacific, had issued an order to
attack submarines to the westward; is that correct?
A. No, sir. He issued an order, as I recall it, that submarines in and
near the operating areas around Hawaii would be attacked, and
actually there were, I believe, two attacks made on sound contacts.
164. Q. Wasn't it immediately prior to 7 December 1941 when these
actual attacks were made?
A. I think he issued that order after the receipt of either the Novem-
ber 24 or November 27 dispatch.
165. Q. But prior to that time did the Chief of Naval Operations
approve the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation to attack sub-
marines? Did he approve it or disapprove it?
A. He approved that order issued by the Commander-in-Chief.
166. Q. This was subsequent to 27 November?
A. That is my recollection.
167. Q. But prior to November 27, 1941, did the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific make any recommendations or requests that he be
allowed to attack submarines in this immediate operating area?
A. I don't remember. I don't remember that.
616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1G8. Q. Did the Navy Department and the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions recommend at any time in the last six months of 1941 a shift of
the Fleet to the West Coast ?
A. The Commander-in-Chief recommended on several occasions
that the Fleet be moved to the West Coast. On two or three of those
occasions the Chief of Naval Operations took the matter up with the
President alone. Now, I don't believe that the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions made a specific recommendation to move them to the coast. He
discussed it with the President, and the President would not approve
the idea. Does that answer the question?
169. Q. Yes, only in your answer you refer to the Commander-in-
Chief. Which Commander-in-Chief?
A. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
170. Q. Do you refer to Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Richardson?
A. Both. Both of them made that same recommendation, as I
recall.
171. Q. With respect to the war warning message of November 27,
we understand that you w^rote that message, discussed it with the Chief
of Naval ()]ierations, and that it was sent with your recommendation?
A. Yes, sir.
[1020] 172. Q. Why was it in that message the Hawaiian
Islands were not included as a possible objective for Japan?
A. The objectives which were put in there were the strategic objec-
tives. We did not believe that Japan would launch an amphibious
attack against the Hawaiian Islands.
173. Q. Did you think that Japan would launch an air attack
against the Hawaiian Islands?
A. I thought it was one of the possibilities.
174. Q. Did you think it was a probability?
A. Yes.
175. Q. Were you surprised on the morning of the 7th when Japan
made an air attack on the Hawaiian Islands?
A. Not the least.
176. Q. In other words, you felt an air attack was coming about
that date ?
A. That an attack was coming, and I was not at all surprised at the
air attack. I knew our carriers were out, and with the warnings
which had been given, I felt we would give them a pretty bad beating
before they got home by our shore-based aircraft and by our carriers.
177. Q. Well, if you felt this so strongly. Admiral, did you discuss
this probability with the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. I don't want to give a false imression. The matter of the attack
on Hawaii was part and parcel of the whole war situation. We had
done what we could to take precautions against the attack carrying
through. The order was issued to deploy the Fleet in a defensive
deployjnent.
178. Q. You said an order was given to deploy the Fleet in a defen-
sive deployment ?
A. Yes, sir, that is in the war message, and if we had not anticipated
an attack, why, no such order would have been giv^n- — a major attack
with their fleet. The order was given for the purpose of detecting at
a distance. A specific warning against a particular thing at that time
was against policy, and I agree with that policy. To add to that an-
swer and to show my state of mind on the thing, we had out there a
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 617
circular letter, which Avas a defensive arrangement of the steps to be
taken to defend the Fleet, both in harbor and at sea. When Tojo's
cabinet fell, I sent out to my office for that order and read it over very
carefully to see whether something ought to be added to it. At the
time we sent the war warning, I sent for it again and studied it over
to see if there was something that ought to be done that was not being
done by existing orders, and after reading the thing over, I felt that,
in general terms, it was an adequate order.
[1021] 179. Q. Did you feel that the Fleet should be deployed
and take defensive formations in these areas on October 16, when
the cabinet fell ^
A. Yes, as soon as they could make the necessary arrangements.
Naturally, it would take some days to get the fuel together and make
the necessary arrangements.
180. Q. And you felt the same way on the 27th of November ?
A. Yes, sir.
181. Q. Suppose the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
A. One other addition to that. Defensive arrangements on October
16 also involved increasing the defenses at both Midway and Wake,
and we immediately went to work to build those defenses up and did
build them up to some extent.
18*2. Q. Well, if the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific had had in mind
the same plan that you had regarding the dispersal of the Fleet and
the deployment of the Fleet at sea on October 16, would it or would
it not have been possible to have maintained that Fleet without ever
entering Pearl Harbor ?
A. You said "dispersal of the Fleet."
183. Q. Yes.
A. I never said dis^Dersal of the Fleet. I said deployment of the
Fleet. I think it has a different connotation. Yes, I think the^^ could
have kept the Fleet at sea with only occasional returns in small num-
bers to Pearl Harbor.
184. Q. Were you aware of the fact that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet had his Fleet divided into really three parts?
A. Yes, sir.
185. Q. And were you further aware of the fact that at certain
intervals one part or two parts of that Fleet would return to Pearl
Harbor?
A. Yes, sir.
186. Q. Did the Chief of Naval Operations approve that Plan?
Was he cognizant of it ?
A, He was cognizant of it. I don't recall any details of the discus-
sions. It was mentioned. Of course, that wasn't too much under me.
It was Operations, Ship Movements, and the Assistant Chief's of
Naval Operations business. I know he knew about it and made no
change in it.
187. Q. Were any suggesions made as to following your plan with
respect to the disposition of the Fleet and maintaining them at sea
rathei" than coming into port at certain intervals?
A. Well, I expected some of them would come into port at certain
intervals. That plan of dividing it into three parts and rotating them
seemed to be generally satisfactory.
\1022] Q. But that plan did not keep all the Fleet at sea, did it ?
A. No.
618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
189. Q. It left some of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, and I think that some of them would have had to come there
from time to time. I think they could have stayed out a good deal
longer than they were doing.
190. Q. You spoke of an officer's being sent to Pearl Harbor to
acquaint the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with conditions. Was any
officer sent out there to acquaint him with tJie conditions subsequent to
the sending of the war Ava ruing on November 27 '^
A. No, sn% not that I know of.
191. Q. You spoke of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, being aware
of the fact that if Japan attacked Great Britain, the United States
would aid Britain ?
A. No, sir, I did not make that statement. The question asked was,
Had he been acquainted by the Chief of Naval Operations with that
opinion? My answ^er was, "I do not believe he was so acquainted."
192. Q. You spoke also of depending upon the newspapers to give
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, information. Are you of the opin-
ion that our Commanders-in-Chief of our different forces, well sep-
arated from Washington, should be dependent upon the press for their
information and their estimate of the situation in order to make their
decisions '?
A. I certainly believe they should take the reports that are made
into consideration in their estimate of the situation. As I said before,
that is where w^e get a very large part of the information. There was
very little intelligence information as to the prospective moves by
Japan, but when a cabinet falls, when somebody of a particular char-
acter is put in the cabinet, when the cabinet issues a statement, when
conferences are held in forming the cabinet, and when they go into
Indo China and other places, why, all that information is certainly of
unlimited value — far more valuable than all this other stuff.
193. Q. Did you or did you not know whether or not the Comman-
der-in-Chief, Pacific, had information regarding the delivery of this
note of 26 November to the Japanese?
A. I don't know whether or not he knew it.
194. Q. Did you feel that this note was a very important document ?
A. No, sir.
195. Q. If the note of November 26, with its stipulations with re-
spect to Japan's reverting to her status quo prior to the capture of
Manchuko, had not been delivered and had not been given to Japan
by the United States, in your opinion [10£3] would the time
of war been deferred or not ?
A. Its delivery, in my opinion, actually had no effect whatsoever
on the situation, because they were already on the move.
196. Q. And the contents of the note had no effect on the situation?
A. None whatever,
197. Q. In view of your statement that you thought that war was
going to happen in a day or two subsequent to November 27, did that
have any bearing on the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
plan to send a carrier to Wake at about 29 November ?
A. The matter of putting increased defenses on Wake was taken up,
as I recall it, immediately after the Tojo cabinet was formed, and we
sent some additional anti-aircraft guns out at that time to Wake. We
wanted to get planes thei^. The field had not been read3\ We asked
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 619
them to rush the field, and the Naval Coastal Frontier was putting
every effort out there to get the field ready — I am wrong about that.
The field had been in commission for, I guess, about two months. We
did not have the planes. We did not have the fighter planes to put
out there. I believe that was it. We were doing everything we could
to get as much strength there as possible. Now, sending those planes
and the men out there on the carrier was the best way to do it, and
that was part of the deployment.
198. Q. But in view of the fact that you anticipated an air attack
on Hawaii about that time, did you realize that Hawaii and its im-
mediate vicinity w^as devoid of carriers on 7 Deceml)er?
A. No, I thought that that carrier had gotten back before that. I
believe that there was a delay of a couple of days in her getting away
from the date originally set, and my impression was that she had gotten
back, but I do not believe that tliey were devoid of carriers. There
was one carrier out there — two carriers at sea at that time, one of
them without its planes.
199. Q. Did you feel, in knowing the strength of the Pacific Fleet,
that there was "a sufficient number of patrol planes to patrol properly
and to have distance patrol around the Hawaiian Islands?
A. We did not believe that there were enough planes to create a
fully satisfactory defense or that there were the proper ty]ies of
planes. We were constantly urging the War Department to increase
their airplanes out there and their anti-aircraft, and they were doing,
I believe, as much as they could, considering all other matters.
200. Q. Having full knowledge of the strength of the Pacific Fleet
and the surroundings as of December 7, do you think that the attack
by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor could have been averted?
A. I do not think it could have been averted. If
met \10^-!f^ ^vith the force that we had at hand there, I believe
that a good many of their planes could have been destroyed. I
think the destructive effect could have been considerably lessened, but
I don't believe that the attack could have been stopped from coming
in, except by luck.
201. Q. If those carriers which launched the planes in the attack
had been discovered by a patrol plane, did we have anything in the
Pacific Fleet to destroy those carriers at that time in their immediate
vicinity ?
A. No, sir, there was nothing up there. It was always recognized, I
think, by people who have concerned themselves with the defense of
the Hawaiian Islands that the northern flank on Oahu is a very weak
place. We put the defenses on the southern islands and to the west-
ward, but the northern flank is devoid of outposts, and unless outposts
had been stationed out there to cover that flank with scouting planes,
or by a scouting line, why, it is very easy to get in there undetected.
202. Q. Under the conditions you were operating on December 7
for the deployment of the Fleet, did we have any ships to even form
a scouting line and in enough capacity with respect to speed and gun
fire to destroy carriers in that area ?
A. You can destroy carriers with cruisers. They are faster with
the cruisers. We can catch up with them. We can discover them.
If some ships had been deployed to the northward, there would have
been a considerable better possibility of detecting them to the north-
620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ward and westward — a considerable better possibility of detecting
them at a distance and attacking them by shore-based aircraft and
bringing our carriers in also to attack.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 6 : 00 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a, m., September
16, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 621
PROCEEDINGS OF NAYY COUET OF INQUIRY
SEPTEMBER 16, 1944
[1025] ' Twenty-ninth Day
Federal Building,
San Francisco^ California.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphiis Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party.
Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
interested party.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-eighth day of the in-
quiry was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The proceedings following, pages 1026 through 1051, inclusive,
have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and
deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in
the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the
war.
[lOSl-A] The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., adjourned subject to
the call of the president.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 623
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUET OF INQUIEY
SEPTEMBER 21, 1944
[1052'] Thirtieth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. C.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Miirfin, U. S. Navy (Ket) , President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfiis, U. S. Navy (Ket), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andre^YS. U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. "Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Block, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the twenty-ninth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and
was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Admiral James O. Richardson, U. S. Navy, retired. I am
assigned to dut}' in the OfBce of the Secretary of the Nav}^, and by him
assigned to three or four other jobs.
2. Q. What duties had been assigned to you, since attaining Flag
rank, other than the one just stated — during the year 1040? What
duties w^ere assigned you during the year 1940?
A. Well, at the beginning of 1940 I was in command of the Battle
Force, United States Fleet, and on the 6th of January 1940, 1 relieved
Admiral Bloch as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet;
and on the first day of February, 1941, I turned over command of the
Fleet to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, whose title then was Com-
mander-in-Chief [1(153] Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. Did you at any time while Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Fleet maintain an aircraft patrol in the Hawaiian area, which
was adequate in spacing and radius to detect an approaching combat
force having as its intention the delivery of an attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. No, if you mean by the delivery of an attack one that was designed
to take place around 8 : 00 o'clock in the morning.
624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Q. Did you, while Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Fleet, initiate any kind of an aircraft patrol, and if you did, will you
state the kind of patrol and why you did it?
A. Any testimony that I might give Avould be of a general nature,
because after three and one-half years, it is impossible to remember
details; and furthermore, specific detail, original evidence, is available
in the records of either the Fleet or the Navy Department. Upon
arrival in the Hawaiian area, as a part of the Fleet exercise and in
conformity with the long-established practice, anti-submarine patrols,
close-in air patrols, and long-range air patrols, were established.
These patrols were primarily to simulate war conditions, and the dis-
tant patrol was neither adequate in spacing or radius to detect with
certainty a force approaching the Hawaiian Islands with the intention
of delivering an attack near dawn. At the conclusion of the Fleet
exercises, in May 1940, 1 received from the Chief of Naval Operations
a dispatch directing me to announce to the press that the Fleet would
remain in Hawaiian waters at my request to carry out exercises which
I had in mind. Being uncertain as to the duration of our stay or pur-
pose for which we were retained, practically the same patrols that had
been established in connection with the Fleet exercises were continued,
and as time passed and no information was available as to the probable
duration of our stay, and in view of the fact that constant and repeated
warnings were received of the possible outbreak of the war in the imme-
diate future, these patrols were continued, sometimes in modified form,
depending upon the number of patrol aircraft available. At one time
this distant patrol was designed to cover adequately and with respect
to spacing, a given sector of the circle, and was daily rotated so that
during a short period of time the whole circle was covered — but the
whole circle, particularly that part of it to the eastward, was not cov-
ered. Near the end of my period of service in command of the Fleet,
we planned a change in the character of the distant patrol, with the
intention of restricting it to adequate coverage of the operating areas,
with small planes covering the sortie and entrance of the Fleet. I can-
not state with certainty whether this modification was placed in effect
before I was relieved or after I was relieved, but I know that it was the
intention of my relief to continue the same kind of a patrol that I had
in existence when he relieved me.
5. Q. Did you, while Commander-in-Chief of the United [1054]
States Fleet, as a matter of policy or otherwise, reduce the period
which ships of the Fleet might stay in Pearl Harbor for overhaul
and recreation?
A. I can cover that only in a general way. When the Fleet arrived
in Peairl Harbor in the spring of 1940. I believe the latter part of
April, a part of the Fleet was stationed in Hawaii, known as the Ha-
waiian detachment. In view of the fact that there was great un-
certainty as to the probable leng-th of the stay of the whole Fleet in
the Hawaiian waters, the Hawaiian detachment remained in its exist-
ing relation to the Fleet and carried out its schedule as arranged before
the arrival of the main Fleet, and that part of the Fleet spent almost
every week-end in Honolulu, in accordance with plans previously
arranged. The Battle Force remained a majority of the time away
from Pearl Harbor, basing largely on Lahaina Roads, and returning
to Pearl Harbor periodically for replenishment of stores, supplies,
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 625
and recreation. Xear the end of my tour of duty, due to the increasing
number of warnings, I decided not to permit any of the heavy ships
to anchor outside of Pearl Harbor, and if outside, they were to remain
under way. Likewise, near the end of my tour of duty, a pLin of
operation was prepared under which one-third of the Fleet would be
at sea, some of the ships would be on the West Coast, and the others
would be in Pearl Harbor undergoing overhaul. At times, the num-
ber which I cannot recall, there were more ships of the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor while I was in command than were actually present the morn-
ing of the attack. I am not positive as to the date on which this new
plan went into effect, but it is my impression that it went into effect
after the Christmas holidays in early January, 1941.
6. Q. Will you state in a general way what the demands were which
had been made on you by the Navy Department, during your tour
lof duty as Commander-in-Chief, for training personnel for new
construction and for other purposes?
A. While I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, the Navy De-
partment was never able to provide more than 85% of the complement
required to man the ships, and no demands were made upon me for
training the men that I had, but men that I needed in the Fleet were
detached for the purpose of training other people.
The interestecl party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S,
Navy (Ret) , did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ,
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
T. Q. Admiral, upon your arrival as Commander-in-Chief of
[1055] the Fleet in Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1910, do you
remember the number of planes available to the Fleet for patrol duty,
for distance patrol ?
A. I have no idea ; it would be pure guess-work.
8. Q. The patrol which you inaugurated, which you had kept going
in the Hawaiian area, do you remember the approximate sector which
was covered by this air patrol ?
A. Well, the sector which was primarily covered more adequately
and more frequently than any other sector was from about 170 degrees
to the westward to about 350 degrees.
9. Q. Isn't it true that the sector covered by this patrol was pri-
marily in the western semi-circle, especially to the southwest?
A. Southwest, yes.
10. Q. Do you remember how far this patrol extended?
A. To the best of my memory, it was 300 miles. I think on one
occasion, when the Commanding General received an order from the
Chief of Staff of the Army to alert his command against a possible
overseas raid, that the radius of that patrol might have been extended.
In addition, we established a dawn and dusk patrol.
11. Q. In other words, in establishing this patrol, you had primarily
the idea that if an attack would come, it would come from the west-
ward rather than from the north or northeast; is that correct?
A. Well, I had in mind that if an attack should be delivered, the
most probable point of approach would be to the southwestwarcl, but
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 1 41
626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of course the patrol was not established or continued entirely as a.
means of security. It was partly for the training of the people under
my command, and also an effort to impress upon the officers and men
of the Fleet the necessity for preparing for Avar, which I believed was
impending.
12. Q. You say that you received an increasing number of warn-
ings at that time. When you received this warning, what condition
of readiness did 3H)U place the Fleet in ?
A. Wliich warning do you refer to ?
13. Q. You stated here that you received an increasing number of
warnings.
A. I made no change, but by the end of the period of my command,
about all of the precautions that could be put in effect and continue in
operation were in effect, including steaming of ships darkened at
night; but the warnings which I received were not official. They
were not clear-cut ; they were not definite. They were in personal
letters, the general tenor being — "I hope you will keep ever present in
your mind the possibility that we may be at war tomorrow."
14. Q. When did these frequent warnings start, Admiral,
[10S6] approximately?
A. The first warning that I recall did not come from the Navy De-
partment. It was this warning that came from the War Department
to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and that
was received as neai'ly as my memory serves me, on the 19th of June,
when I was in Lahaina in 1940, and the Commander of the Hawaiian
detachment, at the request of the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District established or increased the patrol in existence, and estab-
lished a dawn and dusk patrol. I reported the receipt of this warn-
ing by the Commanding General, and asked the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations for infoimation regarding it. I received no reply. I had a
patrol plane come out and take me into Pearl Harbor where I had a
conference with the Commanding General, the Commandant of the
14th Naval District, and I am not positive whether the Commander,
Scouting Force, was there or not; but I asked the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department whether or not this dispatch was a
drill or a real, honest-to-goodness warning. He stated that he had
no idea, that he was acting as though it were a real warning of an
impending attack.
15. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you did take precautions in
view of these numerous rumors; regarding ships at sea, what state of
readiness did you place the ships in, upon entrance to Pearl Harbor?
A. Before I left command of the Fleet, I was doing everything I
could, including the sweeping of the channel with a — .
16. Q. I know you did. But what condition of readiness were these
ships in when they entered Pearl Harbor and tied up to the dock, as to
a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. Any reply that I would give to that question might later be
disclosed to be entirely inaccurate. If you will seek the original
evidence — .
17. Q. Well, the court would like to know what orders you gave as
to ships actually tied up in Pearl Harbor, as to continuous manning
of their guns, and ammunition at guns, or whatever other means you
took to defend or help defend ships in Pearl Harbor against possible
attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 627
A. I do not recall that any time, either entering Pearl Harbor or
while in Pearl Harbor, I issned any order requiring the guns to be
manned or the ammunition to be at hand ; but there was a plan worked
out by my direction under which the ship in a berth was assigned a
certain part of the overhead space to cover with anti-aircraft guns in
case of an air attack.
18. Q. Did you have at that time any orders issued as to the action
to be taken in case of attack by air on the ships in Pearl Harbor?
A. That is another question about which my memory is [1057^
wholly inadequate, if it is essential information, because the record
would show the published record — but ni}^ recollection is that the
Commandant was informed as to what ships would cover various areas
in view of the fact that he might be the senior man there, and he was
primarily charged with contact and relations with the Army. I think
it possible that he was informed as to the area of the heavens to be
covered by certain berths, and I am not certain whether he was
charged with the responsibility of directing them to open fire. I do
not know.
19. Q. In view of these increasing number of rumors which you
speak of, did you anticipate an attack by air on Pearl Harbor by the
Japanese, or did you think that there would be an attack by air on
Pearl Harbor, as an opening war effort on the part of Japan?
A. I do not believe that I thought so during the period while I was
in Command of the Fleet.
20. Q. You speak of anchoring ships at Lahaina Roads; did you
c(msider Lahaina Koads as a safe anchorage for the ships in the face
of the very critical situation existing between the United States and
Japan ?
A. No, and I so informed the powers that be.
21. Q. In considering the Hawaiian area, what was the safe anchor-
age existing there for the Fleet?
A. There was no safe anchorage, but the one that offered the greatest
degree of security was Pearl Harbor.
22. Q. So Pearl Harbor was the only anchorage there available for
the Fleet with any amount of security ; is that correct ?
A. Yes.
23. Q. Admiral, during the time you were in the Hawaiian area,
and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, did you
consider the basing of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, and did
you make any specific recommendations to the Navy Department as to
the proper base in the Pacific, at which in your opinion the Fleet
should be placed?
A. I made such representations both unofficially, orally, and in
writing, and I happen to have one.
24. Q. What were thej^, please? What were the recommenda-
tions?
A. Well, I have one in my pocket, if you want it.
25. Q. Briefly, just generally — just state it, if you please?
A. Well, I stated that the operating areas were not adequate, either
for surface ships or air ; there were no air [-?^r5<S'] fields ade-
quate to care for the planes that were on carriers, and could not be
trained from the carriers because of the shortage of fuel. The only
safe anchorage was Pearl Harbor, and it was entirely inadequate to
handle the Fleet ; the distance from the West Coast increased the cost
628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and the delay and the difficulty of maintaining and supplying the
Fleet; that there were no recreational facilities; that in time of peace
the men and officers could not see any reason for remaining for such a
long time away from home ; that they were two thousand miles nearer
a possible enemy; that we were unprepared to undertake offensive
operations from Pearl Harbor, and that if we were involved in war,
it would be necessary for us to return to the West Coast for stripping
and mobilization and preparation for war; and that our presence in
the Hawaiian area, when we were absolutely not trained, couldn't
make any military people believe that we were planning offensive
operations.
26. Q. Where did you recommend that the Fleet be based ?
A. Normal West Coast bases, except a detachment to remain in
Pearl Harbor that could be adequately cared for by the facilities
there.
27. Q. Did you consider the Fleet mobilized at this time ?
A. Mobilized?
28. Q. Yes.
A. No. It wasn't adequately manned, wasn't properly trained,
wasn't fully equipped.
29. Q. Did you consider that those things were necessary for mobili-
zation ?
A. It is a part of it.
30. Q. Admiral, did you receive orders at any time to keep the
Fleet more f I'equently in Pearl Harbor ?
A. No. _
31. Q. Did you at any time fail to comply with Presidential orders
to keep the Fleet more frequently concentrated within Pearl Harbor ?
A. During my period as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, I re-
ceived no orders from the President or any of his subordinates as to
the number of ships I would maintain in Pearl Harbor at any time.
32. Q. Did you ever hear, or did it come to your attention, that such
a policy of keeping the Fleet concentrated in Pearl Harbor, was
insisted upon by the Japanese Government?
A. I have heard of many lies, but I believe that that escaped my
notice.
33. Q. You have stated that you recommended that the Fleet
[1059] be based on West Coast ports. Do you know the reasons
for the final decision of keeping this Fleet based on Pearl Harbor, and
in the Hawaiian area?
A. Yes.
34. Q. Will you please state it?
A. For the restraining influence it might exercise on the action of
the Japanese nation.
35. Q. While you were in the Hawaiian area as Commander-in-
Chief, did you feel that you were kept fully and completely informed
legarding any negotiations, conversations, or otherwise, between the
United States and the Japanese Government?
A. I knew that I received practically no information along those
lines, except what I acquired over the radio or in the public press.
36. Q. Did you request such information?
A. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 629
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[1060] 37. Q. At this time and in view of these rmnors of a
possible war with Japan, what was your estimate as to a surprise
attack on Hawaii? Did you believe that the Japanese would make
a surprise attack, and if so, how?
A. While I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet I was primarily
concerned with the possibility of an attack by submarines.
38. Q. In other words, you considered that the means of attack
would be by submarines rather than by air?
A. Yes, although in a statement, in a letter prepared which is before
the court, presenting the inadequacies of the defenses of Pearl Har-
bor, I did point out and particularly stress the inadequacies with
respect to anti-aircraft defense, and we did consider at one time the
advisability of establishing a balloon barrage, abandoning the idea,
so that we were not entirely without concern over the possibilities of a
surprise air attack.
39. Q. AVliile you were Commander-in-Chief of the Hawaiian area,
did you dispose the Fleet or any ships of the Fleet as a possible
scouting force or means of information through surface craft as to
the possible approach of Japanese ships ?
A. No.
40. Q. Were the ships of the Fleet at that time confined to drill,
operations, and training alone in preparation for war?
A. Yes. and training of men.
41. Q. But there were no submarines or other ships placed to
reconnoiter or to cover the surface approach of ships ?
A. No effect was made to secure by surface ship or sub-surface ship,
strategic information or to cover the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
42. Q. And this air patrol which you speak of was, as you have
stated, used primarily as training for the patrol planes ; is that correct?
A. I would not say "primarily" ; in part.
43. Q. Well, did you feel that this air patrol was of any great
value, as such, to you in protecting the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. No, but I was in the position of being repeatedly warned that
we might be involved in a war, and from 20 years study of the Japa-
nese I felt certain that the war would come as a surprise, and there-
fore I felt that I had to maintain some semblance of a patrol con-
sistent with the means available to do it.
44. Q. But it wasn't a complete control?
A. It wasn't complete and it wasn't adequate, as I have already
stated.
[1061'] 45. Q. Admiral, just in line with that, you stated that
you cannot, from memory, give the number of patrol planes that
you had during the latter part of your command, but did you have
enough to have a 700-mile distance reconnaissance on the entire 360
degree arc?
A. By no means, and I believe that the number that I had pre-
viously had available had been reduced by the detachment of one
squadron for the Asiatic Fleet.
46. Q. That was later in the year 1941 ?
A. While I was there.
630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
47. Q. Admiral, suppose this reconnaissance patrol had siirhted the
Japanese detachment standing toward Pearl Harbor. Were you
either in position to stop them or had you means to stop them, or
could you have stopped them under existing conditions?
A. Well, my recollection is that none of the planes was armed and
certainly they could not have stopped them.
48. Q. Did you have a striking force available which could have
been sent out in time?
A. No indeed.
49. Q. If you had had one would you have taken action to stop
them ?
A. I would have obeyed what I conceived to be the intent of the
leadership of this country. I would have done nothing until I was
attacked.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thouglit should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at lO : 30 a. m., took a recess until 12 : 00 noon, at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
11062] A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, residence, and present position?
A. Joseph Clark Grew; residence, Washington, D. C. My present
position is Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department
of State.
2. Q. What position did you hold during the year 1941 ?
A. During 1941, up to December 7th, I was Ambassador to Japan.
Examined by the court :
3. Q. Mr. Ambassador, there is information before this court which
alleges that on or about January 27, 1941, you transmitted informa-
tion to our government that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor.
Is that correct, sir?
A. Admiral, the information which I then transmitted was in the
nature of a rumor that had reached me but a rumor which came from
sources which I considered reliable.
4. Q. Did these rumors persist? Did they continue, with special
reference to an attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. So far as I can now recollect, that was the only occasion on which
I received a definite intimation that there might be, in case of war
or in case of a break between Japan and the United States, an attack
on Pearl Harbor. I do not recollect other occasions on which Pearl
Harbor was mentioned in that connection.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 631
5. Q. Subsequent to this date, that is, January, 1941, and subse-
quent to this report ^Yhich 3'ou made to the State Department, did
you, prior to December 7, 1941, make a simihir report as to a possible
or probable attack on Pearl Harbor i
A. In the further reports which I made between January and De-
cember, 1941, I do not recollect that Pearl Harbor was actually men-
tioned, although I sent a number of reports warning our government
that Japan might strike with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.
6. Q. Such a report as that was made by you on or about Novem-
ber 3rd ^
A. Yes, sir.
7. Q. In making this report that Japan might strike with dramatic
or dangerous suddenness, did you have in mind at that time the area
or the position which she would strike with dramatic and dangerous
suddenness ?
A. No, sir, I did not, specifically, and in one of my reports to our
government I stated that our government [1063] should not
depend upon me to tell them where and when Japan might strike be-
cause I would not know, the Japanese being past masters at secrecy.
8. Q. The information before this court also alleges that on or about
November 17, 1941, you warned our government that Japan might
attack us by a surprise in regions not involved in the China-Japanese
conflict. Is that correct?
A. Admiral, may I refresh my memory by looking at the document
in question?
9. Q. Please do.
A. Mixy 1 read you the first paragraph of the report which you
have in mind, namely of November 17^
10. Q. Yes, sir.
A. This is a close paraphrase of the telegram which I sent to the
Department of State on that date : "The Ambassador, referring to his
previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence,
emphasizes the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or mili-
tary actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese
theater of operations. He is taking into account, therefore, the prob-
ability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage,
such as surprise and initiative."
11. Q. Did you have in mind, sir, that the surprise and initiative
would take place in the south, the Philippines, or in the Dutch Indies,
or did you have in mind that they would advance their activities to
the eastward in the Hawaiian area?
A. This, of course, is a matter of opinion and recollection. Admiral,
and I can't guarantee that I can recollect precisely what my thoughts
were at that moment but I can recollect that in general I did not feel
that we in the embassy in Tokyo would know in advance where Japan
might strike and it was perfectly possible, in our opinion, that she
might strike anywhere, including the areas to the South. We did not
rule out the possibility of a strike on Hong Kang, the Philippines,
Singapore, the Dutch East Indies. We felt that a blow might occur
in any direction.
12. Q. But in this connection did you rule out the Hawaiian area,
and did you confine your estimate or the conclusions of your estimate
to the southern area, that is, to the Dutch East Indies, et cetera?
632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. In my estimates, Admiral, I avoided indicating that I believed
there might be a blow in any specific direction because I didn't know
and I had no evidence to justify the expression of an opinion to that
effect. So, therefore, my estimates in that respect were entirely of a
general nature; not of a specific nature.
[1064] l''^- Q- r^if^ you feel, Mr. Ambassador, that the Japanese
would strike before a declaration of war?
A. Yes sir, I did, and I based my then opinion on the fact that
Japan had, in the Russo-Japanese war, struck in precisely that way,
and in the case of another war would be very likely to adopt precisely
the same tactics.
14. Q. Wliile you were Ambassador to Japan, were you aware of
any so-called Korean Independence Group, and the fact that they
had another group there known as the Korean Underground Group,
which supposedly had plans or intended plans of Japan in any declara-
tion of war ?
A. May I ask what kind of plnns you have in mind, sir ?
15. Q. We have in mind, sir, the possible plan of movement or a
plan of attack on a certain government. Great Britain, the United
States, for instance. It lias come to the attention of this court that
it was reported that these Koreans, this underground movement, did
have some secret information as to what the intentions of Japan were.
A. No, sir, I had iio evidence to that effect.
16. Q. Did you have any knowledge that about 72 hours prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbor the Australian Government h^d advised
or was advising our government as to a possibe aircraft carrier task
force of Japan approaching Pearl Harbor, or headed in that direc-
tion?
A. No, sir, I did not.
17. Q. Similarly, there was no such report or information coming
to you about 48 hours prior to this attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. There was not.
18. Q. And similarly, 24 hours, of course, the answer would be the
same ?
A. Yes, sir.
19. Q. Did you have, sir, any reliable information, secret or other-
wise, as to the movements of the Japanese Fleet in any direction?
A. It is very difficult for me to answer that question precisely.
Admiral, without refreshing my memory on the point that you raise.
I did, from time to time, receive indications that the Japanese Fleet
was moving in a given direction, or was present at a given place. But
as I say, I cannot now recall specifically what that information was.
20. Q. AVhen did you consider that the relations with Japan, after
these numerous conferences and negotiations, had ceased?
A. That what had ceased, sir?
21. Q. The negotiations with Japan.
A. I did not consider that they had definitely ceased until 3 hours
after the attack on Pearl Harbor when the foreign minister, Mr.
Togo, asked me to come to his office, [10G5] and at that time he
stated that as tlie conversations between the two governments had
failed in making progress, the Japanese Government had decided to —
I have forgotten what word he used now, but the meaning was that
they had decided to call them off, to break them off. That, however.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 633
had been done before, at the time the Japanese had sent their troops
into Indo-China and the conversations had been resumed thereafter.
22. Q. Did you consider tliat the negotiations had ceased about 27
November 1941 ?
A. No, sir, I did not.
2-3. Q. Were you kept informed as to tlie continuance of these nego-
tiations and conferences between Noveml)er 27th and December 7th?
A. I was kept informed of all of tlie otiicial conversations that took
place in Washington. I cannot now recollect whether I received re-
]iorts during that particular period, or not, but I am inclined to think
that I did. I am inclined to think that I continued to receive reports
of such conversations up to the end.
24. Q. During your tenure of office in Japan, j^ou were aware, of
course, of the general mind and feeling of the Ja))anese people. Were
there any strong expressions of opinion in Japan objecting to the main-
tenance of our Fleet in the Hawaiian area?
A. You refer to official exj^ressions, or informal expressions?
25. Q. I would refer to both, if you may answer, please?
A. So far as I can recall, no official, or at least no formal official
representations were made to me in that connection. I think it is pos-
sible that in the course of conversations with certain Japanese officials,
they may have expressed the hope that our Fleet would eventually
move into the Atlantic away from the Pacific because its presence in
the Pacific was used by what they called the Jingoes in Japan to
stir up anti-American feeling. But I'm afraid my answer to that ques-
tion must be indefinite. Admiral, because I have no precise recollection.
26. Q. That is quite a aood answer, sir. From your estimate, Mr.
Ambassador, and being thoroughly conversant with the conditions in
Japan, when did jou think, or when did you make any estimate as to
a possible time of attack by Japan against either Great Britain or the
United States?
A, Of a specific date, you mean?
27. Q. Of a general date.
A. No, sir, I did not. I knew for many years that Japan was
preparing for whatever might happen but I do not think that any
time I felt that I could put my finger on any [1066] particular
date when such an attack would likely come about.
28. Q. In view of the conversations which took place in Washing-
t(m between November 27th and December 7th, 1041, did you feel that
war was extremely imminent and that some act b}^ Japan woidd take
}'lace in the immediate future?
A. Admiral, I would rather go back a little further than that. In
a telegram which I sent to the Department of State in early Novem-
ber, I think probably it was ni}^ telegram of November 3rd, I said the
sands were running fast. Ihat meant it was an expression of my
(>pinion that something might break at any moment but I do not
lecoUect that I felt that that danger was necessarily any more intense
during the period mentioned than in the period directly preceding
that time.
29. Q. In other words, prior to 7 December 1941, immediately prior
to that, you did not change your opinion?
A. I did not. I had no evidence to justify changing my opinion in
that respect.
634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cross-examined by the judge advocate:
30. Q. I have a document which is a letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet under date
of February 1, 1941. It purports to quote information which, under
date of 27 January 1941, the American Ambassador at Tokyo tele-
graphed the State Department. I would ask you to examine the
quoted part of this document to see whether or not it contains the sub-
stance of a report that you, in fact, made ?
A. That, in general, is the substance of my report, although it is
really a paraphrase of the actual text. I think my memory has played
me false here. I said before it was the Portuguese Minister as being
the source of my information. It states here "the Peruvian IVIinister."
I think that is accurate.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
31. Q. Mr. Ambassador, going back to your dispatch of 27 January
1941 concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. If you feel free to do so,
will you elaborate upon your answer and give the source of the rumors
and information which caused you to send that dispatch?
A, Yes, sir. The dispatch states : "A member of the Embassy was
told by me" — this is a close paraphrase — " colleague that
from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a
surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese
military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United
States; that source was the Peruvian Minister, a man in whom I had a
considerable degree of confidence.
32. Q. Do you recall any other source that came to you [1007]
with this information about that time or just previously, to the same
effect?
A. I do not recall any specific source. My colleague said that he was
prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many
sources, although the plan seemed fantastic. I do not now recollect
that that precise report came to me from any other source.
33. Q. But as to that, you did give it a rather high evaluation in your
own mind ; is that correct, Mr. Ambassador ?
A. That is a very difficult question to answer. Admiral, but I will
say this : Although my Peruvian colleague labeled the report as fan-
tastic, I still considered that it was of such utmost importance that I
could not afford to regard it as fantastic, and for that reason I passed
it on the the Secretary of State. I don't think I can go further than
that in answering your question.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Real Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
34. Q. Will you refer to Page 137 of the second volume of Foreign
Relations, Mr. Ambassador. This is a letter written by you under
date of February 26, 1941 to the Secretary of State : "Sir : I have the
honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation which the
Counselor of the Embassy had on February 14 with the Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs, the substance of which was reported to the Depart-
ment in the Embassy's 230, February 14, 8 p. m. The ])resentation by
Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as
gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi
astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily direct
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 635
and sparing of words. Upon listening attentatively to what Mr.
Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr.
Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and
then burst forth with the question 'Do you mean to say that if Japan
were to attack Singapore there would be war with the United States?'
Mr. Dooman replied, 'The logic of the situation would inevitably raise
that question.' " I then skip a paragraph and come to the last para-
graph, Mr. Ambassador : "I propose to say to jSIr. Matsuoka, with whom
I have an appointment this morning, that the statements made by Mr.
Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my prior knowledge and have
my full approval." Are you at liberty to tell the court, Mr. Ambas-
sador, what information or instructions the Embassy had which was
the basis of Mr. Dooman's conversation with Mr. Ohashi at that time?
A. I think, sir, that it is stated here that Mr. Dooman had just re-
turned from a leave of absence to the United States [106S] and
I am inclined to think that his talk with Mr. Ohashi was based on his
estimate of public opinion in the United States and what he had picked
up here in general, rather than upon any specific document or instruc-
tion from our government. I'm afraid I'm not in a position to tell
you exactly what Mr. Dooman said. Mr. Dooman, himself, probably
would be in a better position than I to do that, although no doubt the
record is available.
35. Q. But there appears on the next page, page lo8 and pfige 139, a
copy of the memorandum pi-epared by Mr. Dooman covering that in-
cident. I read one sentence on Page 139 : "If, therefore, Japan or any
other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications,
either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace
those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict
with the United States." That is referring to communications of
Britain in the Southewest Pacific. Do you recall whgther, subsequent
to that time, the 1-tth of February, you received from the State De-
partment any amplification or qualification of further information
along that line?
A. I do not recollect, sir, whether I did or not. I could not answer
that question without exploring.
3C). Q. I call your attention to Page 553 of the same volume which
is a memorandum prepared by the Secretary of State under date of
the 16th of August, 1941, and I quote one of the sentences toward the
bottom of the page. This was a memorandum of a conversation be-
tween the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Wash-
ington. "I said" — that is, the Secretary of State — ''as the matter
stands Japan with her Army, Navy and air forces was establishing
many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy
of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior
to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon
by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British
success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere,
including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government
could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, espe-
cially if it should be carried forward to any further extent." Do you
recall receiving any information from the State Department as to that
conversation, Mr. Ambassador?
636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I cannot recall that specific report at this moment, sir. I was in
general informed of the conversations as they came along. I cannot
specifically remember that particular report at this moment.
37. Q. Well, in general, can you remember any information re-
ceived from the State Department as to the probability of the United
States coming into armed conflict with Japan if [1069] Japan
was at war with Britain in the Pacific?
A. I could not answer that question, sir, without exploration.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry deesired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 12 : 30 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[1070] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel was
present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was
iniornied of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Will you state your name, residence, and present assignment?
A. Maxwell M. Hamilton. I have no permanent residence in Wash-
ington at this time, because I just came to Washington. I am tem-
porarily residing at the Presidential Apartments, 1026 16th Street. I
am Foreign Service Officer, Class 1, assigned to the Department of
State.
2. Q. What position did you hold in the latter part of 1941?
A. Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department
of State.
3. Q. If your duties or responsibilities brought you in contact with
matters of interest to the Navy Department during the latter part of
1941, will you state what those duties or responsibilitiees were with
respect to the Navy Department?
A. I know of no expressed order of the Department of State, defin-
ing with any precision, or defining at all. the duties of the Chief of
the Division with respect to the Navy Department. Consequently,
the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs with respect to the Navy Department are of a general
character. For as long as I have been associated with the Department
of State the Division of Far Eastern Affairs has had a tradition of
close cooperation with the Navy Department in the interchange of
information considered by either department to be of concern or
interest to the other.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 637
■i. Q. There is testimony before this court that you at times, at
least, performed the function of a liaison officer between the State
Department and the Navy Department and that your contacts were,
in fjeneral with Captain, now Admiral Schuirmann. Is this informa-
tion correct ?
A. It depends on the definition of liaison officer. As Chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs I had rather frequent contact with
Admiral Schuirnumn, then Captain Schuirmann, who was in the
central division of the Navy [1071] Department. Do you
want me to state "s^hat those were?
5. Q. If you please.
A. In 194:1 my recollection is that my relations with Captain Schuir-
mann related largely to operational matters, and by that I mean spe-
cific questions which came up for decision, which involved both mat-
ters of foreign policy and naval policy. My recollection is that Cap-
tain Schuirmann was not, in his relation with me, nor was I, in rela-
tions with him, the liaison officer for the interchange of general in-
formation. At certain specific conferences held in the office of the
Secretary of State, at which there were present higher officers of the
State Department and of the Navy Department, Captain Schuirmann
and I both were present. I may say I have known Captain Schuir-
mann for a good many years. I had contacts with him when he was
on duty in the Navj^ Department some years previously, at which time
he also functioned in contact with the Department of State.
(). Q. During the last half of the year 1911 was there a system set up
in the State Department for informing the Navy Department on mat-
ters pertaining to United States- Japanese relations?
A. During the latter part of 1941 there were in existence in the State
Department several procedures for communicating information to the
Navy Department. One of these procedures was the Office of Liaison,
AA'hich Avas charged with communicating copies or paraphrases of tele-
grams, as we call them, or dispatches, as you call them, or mail reports
to the Navy Department which were deemed to be of interest and con-
cern. In addition, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs transmitted
paraphrases of some telegrams and mail reports from the Far East,
those deemed to be of interest and concern, to the Navy Department.
A further procedure was that of a direct conference and consultation
among the Secretary of State and the Secretaries of War and the Navy,
some of which were attended by other high officers of the State and
Navy De]Dartment; conferences between the Secretary of State and
Admiral Stark and General Marshall; meetings of the War Council
and then meetings of the Cabinet itself.
7. Q. In a general way, were you familiar with negotiations which
were taking place between the United States and the Japanese Govern-
ment during the period from about 15 October to 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes.
8. Q. Did you at any time during the year 1941 transmit any infor-
mation to the representatives of the Navy Department which had to
do with a surprise Japanese attack on the United States in the
Hawaiian area ?
A. The Far Eastern Division sent paraphrased copies of the tele-
gram from Ambassador Grew to the Department of State on January
27.
638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[_1072'] 9. Q. What year?
A. 1941, to ONI and MID in strict confidence.
10. Q. Do you recall any other information whicli you communi-
cated to the Xavy Department on the subject of the intentions of the
Japanese to make an attack on the Hawaiian Area ?
A. No.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
11. Q. Mr. Hamilton, w^ere you, acting in the capacity which you
have mentioned in the State Department, familiar with all informa-
tion, super secret and otherwise, flowino- into the State Department
regarding the United States-Japanese situation?
A. I think so. There may have been some confidential information
furnished the Secretary of State or Mr. Welles in reference to the
disposition of our armed forces in the Far East which, at times, I may
not have been familiar with.
12. Q. Was this information transmitted to the Navy Department?
A. I thought you were inquiring about information which came
from the Navy Department to us.
13. Q. No, was the independent information received by the State
Department transmitted to the Navy Department?
A. I'm sorry ; I don't understand.
14. Q. For example, you sj^eak of a message or communication from
Ambassador Grew as of January 27, 1941.
A. Yes, sir,
15. Q. Was that information transmitted to the Navy Department?
A. Yes.
K). Q. Similarly, was information, or the substance of it, gained by
you through that source or otherwise transmitted to the Navy De-
partment ?
A. In general, yes. sir.
[1073'] 17. Q. In other words, you kept the Navy Department
informed as to this situation ?
A. Yes, sir. I personally did not. It was done by one of the three
procedures which I have mentioned.
18. Q. Are you familiar with the note of 26 November 1941, which
was handed to the Japanese rei^resentatives by the Secretary of State ?
A. Yes, sir.
19. Q. Was a copy of that note or the substance of it sent to the
Navy Department ?
A. We have no record of all the itemized steps in the discussions
with the Japanese at that period.
20. Q. Was tliat note discussed with representatives of the Navy
Department?
A. During that period there were almost daily conferences between
the Secretary of State and the Secretaries of the Navy and War, or
with Admiral Stark or General Marshall or General Gerow. I was
not present at those discussions.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 639
21. Q. So you do not know whether or not that note was discussed?
A. I know, from the verj^ definite reports made to ns by the Secre-
tary of State prior to and immediately following such conferences,
that it was his desire and intent, which he carried out, in his judg-
ment, to communicate the substance and the text of documents. Some
documents were given to the Navy. As far as my understanding goes,
they were available for examination by the Navy and War Department
officers. We have no record with regard to the question of the actual
passing of each document.
22. Q. Did you attend any conferences where the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval
Operations, were present discussing any over-all picture of the situa-
tion between Japan and the United States?
A. I attended none where the secretaries were present. I have at-
tended some where Admiral Stark was present.
23. Q. About what time ? Do 3- ou recall ?
A. I have a record of it here.
2-1. Q. You may refresh your memory.
A. (Eef erring to paper) On November 21 there was a conference
with the Secretary of State, at which Admiral Stark, General Gerow,
and JVIessrs, Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Ballentine were present.
25. Q. What is the date?
A. November 21, 1941.
[1074] 26. Q. Do you know what was discussed at that particular
conference ?
A. Not with any precision. It was the general displomatic and mili-
tary situation in the Pacific, and on November 24, 1941 — No, I was not
present at that. I was not present at the conference on November
25 among the three secretaries. There were meetings of the war coun-
cil on November 25 and 28th, at which I was not present.
27. Q. From the period of November 27 to December 7 were con-
fei-ences and negotiations continuing between the State Department
and the Japanese representatives?
A. There were some meetings. My recollection is that they met —
I don't know the last date — with the President on one occasion. It
is in this book, if you care to have me refresh my memory. I don't
recall exactly. My impression is that they did continue but not on the
subject of this communication of November 26, 1941 — on the general
subject.
28. Q. The communication of November 26 was simply a step in the
negotiations; is that correct?
A. From our point of view, it was a general summing up of the
situation as of that time.
29. Q. When did you consider that negotiations between the United
States and Japan had ceased ?
A. I personally or the State Department?
30. Q. You in your capacity in the State Department?
A. November 26.
31. Q. But you just stated that there were negotiations subsequent
to that date.
A. Yes, sir. There was an extreme, bare possibility that diplomatic
conversations might be continued after November 26, but the estimate
640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the Secretary of State, as expressed to me and to others at that
time, was that the conversations in the diplomatic effort virtually
reached a conclusion, and from that point on the matter was one for
the Armed Services.
32. Q. When the note of November 26, 1941, was presented by the
State Department officials here, did you have any estimate of the
time that it would take to get a reply to that note ?
A. No, sir.
33. Q. Did you feel that when you received your reply that that
would end the negotiations or that there would be a continuance of
the negotiations after the reply ?
A. I thought there was no chance of receiving a reply of a character
to mak*» possible a continuance of the negotiations.
[107S\ 34. Q. Was that an assumption based on the contents
and the requirements of the United States Government as announced
in that notei'
A. It was based on the record of the Japanese negotiators and the
position of the Japanese Government.
35. Q. Were you present in the State Department on the morning
of December 7, ID-tl 'i
A. Yes, sir.
36. Q. W^ere you there when the Secretary of War and the Secre-
tary of the Navy conferred with the Secretary of State?
A. Yes, sir.
37. Q. Were you at that conference ?
A. ]No, sir.
38. Q. Did you discuss with anyone from the Navy Department
what they were going to bring out at this conference on the morning
of December 7 ?
A. What the Japanese would bring out ?
39. Q. No, what would be the subject of discussion on that morn-
mcr
A. Among the three secretaries ?
40. Q. Yes.
A. No, sir, not specifically. I did not know that there was to be
a conference.
41. Q. Did you have any specific information on the morning of
the 7th which you transmitted to the State Department relative to
this conference '(
A. No, sir.
42. Q. From youi' general observation and study of the Far East-
ern situation, did you form any= conclusion as to the possible time of
attack contemplated by Japan ?
A. No, sir, I did not expressly. My judgment was the judgment
of the Secretar}^ of State: If some diplomatic arrangement couldn't
be worked out with Japan, she would continue with her course of
armed aggression. As to when and where, I had no idea.
43. Q. Did you feel, in your study of the Far Eastern situation,
that there would be a certain area in which Japan would be the
aggressor or would make an attack ?
A. As nearly as I recollect my opinion some time ago, I felt Japan
was definitely bent on moving southward. I did not exclude from
my estimate an attack on the United States or American possessions.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 641
[1076] 44. Q. Did you feel in your estimate at that time that
there would be a surprise attack to take the place of a declaration
of war or a surprise attack prior to a declaration of war ?
A. I know that the opinion expressed by the Secretary of State
was that the Japanese were likely to use the element of surprise. I
had no opinion on the subject.
45. Q. Did you consider the probability of an attack on Hawaii ?
A. I wasn't sufficiently trained in military tactics or strategy to
have an opinion.
46. Q. We are not requesting an answer from the standpoint of a
tactician or strategist, but as a result of your general information,
your study of the Far Eastern situation, and your knowledge of the
proposed "intent of the Japanese Government, did you feel that their
attack, if any, would be to the southward, toward the Dutch East
Indies, or otherwise ; or did you feel that there was a very good proba-
bility of their attacking the Hawaiian Islands?
A. I had no opinion.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
47. Q. I understood you to say that you were at the State Depart-
ment on Sunday morning, December 7 ?
A. That is correct.
48. Q. But you did not attend the conference among the three sec-
retaries ?
A. That is right.
49. Q. Did anyone attend that conference other than the three
secretaries ?
A. Not so far as I know. It was not customary, and I do not
think anyone else was present. There were a number of us in the
outer office waiting to confer with the Secretary of State when the
conference broke up.
50. Q. When diet the conference break up ?
A. I couldn't give you the exact hour. I have no precise recollec-
tion. We were waiting at least an hour.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the Avitness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out hj the pre-
vious questioning.
[1077] The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was in-
formed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. H. H. Smith-Hutton, Captain, U. S. Navy, Headquarters of
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
2. Q. Will you state what your duties were in the year 1941?
A. I was naval attache at the American Embassy in Tokyo.
Examined by the court :
3. Q. Captam, as naval attache were you not part of the organiza-
tion of the Office of Naval Intelligence ?
79716 — 46-r-Ex. 146, vol. 1 42
642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes, sir.
4. Q. While in Tokyo during your tour of duty as naval attache, did
you have difRculty in obtaining information concerning Japanese
military and naval activities?
A. Very great difficulty, yes, sir.
5. Q. Were you able to obtain during the month of November any
information at all which indicated a movement, other than a move-
ment, which is well known to have been started, toward southeast Asia ?
A. No, sir.
6. Q. Did you get any information of any tangible character during
the month of November or early December, 1941 ?
A. No, sir. During that period I made a trip to Western Japan, to
the inland sea area, in an effort to observe all that was possible from
the places where I was allowed to visit, but during that entire trip I
saw no naval craft and received no information which would indicate
any movement by the Japanese Fleet.
7. Q. You heard no conversations on the part of the Japanese which
you thought might be of value?
A. None, sir.
8. Q. The newspapers gave you none ?
A. The movements of naval and military units did not appear in
the Japanese press.
[1078] 9. Q. When you received information during your tour
of duty in Japan regarding Japan or the Japanese Fleet or its move-
ments, how did you transmit that information to higher authority?
A. By Japanese cable to the 4th marine radio station in Shanghai,
which re-transmitted it to Washington or to Manila.
10. Q. In other words, you transmitted your information direct
to the Navy Department through that means of communication?
A. Yes, sir.
11. Q. Did you parallel this by reports to the Ambassador?
A. Yes, sir, and by written reports to the Navy Department by the
diplomatic pouch.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Eeserve, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class. U. S. Naval Reserve,
withdrew.
[1079] 12. Q. In your knowledge of the movements, insofar as
you were able to ascertain, of the Japanese Fleet, did you at any time
feel that there would be an attack on the Hawaiian Islands or Pearl
Harbor ?
A. There were, of course, for a period of more than a year, various
rumors as to what the Japanese might do ; but there was no informa-
tion reached m.e, or as far as I know, any other American official in
Japan, which would indicate that the Japanese contemplated an at-
tack on Pearl Harbor.
13. Q. Did Ambassador Grew depend upon you for information
regarding movement of ships or the general situation as pertains to
the Japanese Navy ?
A, He expected me, as Naval Attache, and as Senior Naval Adviser,
to keep him informed of any developments as regards the Japanese
Navy.
14. Q. Did you keep conversant with other information that he had
from other sources as to such activities?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 643
A. In general, yes, sir. The Ambassador kept all of the senior
members of his staff informed of the important communications re-
ceived from Washington, or important information which he re-
ceived from Tokyo. I am not certain, sir, that I received all that the
Ambassador did, but I believe that he took me into his confidence as
much as he felt I needed to be in his confidence.
15. Q. In the latter part of 1941, did you, from your own estimate?
and your own knowledge of the situation, feel that war was imminent?
A. I felt, sir, that the Japanese were going to make an attack in
Southeast Asia. That was brought out quite clearly from reports
which we received from time to time from our officials in Shanghai, in
Hongkong, and in the Philippines, and it appeared as though an at-
tack on Thailand would be made. It was, however, only by inference
that we felt that it might possibly involve our own country. Since
July of 1941, when we placed an embargo upon various commodities
going to Japan, we felt in Tokyo that the Japanese would make some
effort to relieve the critical economic situation that would confront
them if that embargo were effective for a long time.
16. Q. Did you form any estimate as to when they would attack?
A. From the information wliich I had, sir, and of course I received
only the information which came from certain units in China, it was
impossible for me to arrive at any such estimate.
17. Q. Did the attack on Pearl Harbor come as a surprise to you?
A. Yes, sir.
18. Q. In any of the reports that you made to the Navy Department
during the month of November and early December, 1941, were you
able to give anything in the way of information [1080] as to
the situation, militarily and naval — or did j^ou state that you had no
information ?
A. After I returned from this inspection, or a trip to Western Jap-
an, sir, I reported that I had seen in the harbor of Hiroshima approx-
imately thirty-five Japanese transports at anchor there; and I don't
recall the exact date, but I could find the message, sir, in which I re-
ported that my movements in Japan and the movements of my subor-
dinate officers, were so restricted in that I had to report to the Japanese
Navy Department every time I left Tokyo, that it would be impracti-
cable for me to give an estimate as to Japanese intentions, based on my
own observations, and on the facts as I saw them — and I implied, sir,
that if Washington were depending upon me to keep them informed as
to Japanese naval movements, that I felt that I could not comply with
any instructions that I might receive in that regard.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
10. Q. Captain, this is a document of which the court has taken
judicial notice, a State Department publication — "Peace and War."
Are you familiar with it ?
A. Yes, sir, in general.
20. Q. On page 113 appears a passage which concerns a report that
Ambassador Grew made on 27 January 1941, in which a surprise at-
tack on Pearl Harbor is mentioned. Do you recall being in any dis-
cussion concerning that before the dispatch was sent ?
A. No, sir, not before the dispatch was sent, because as I recall it,
the Ambassador was reporting what one of his staff had learned from
644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a diplomatic colleague. Subsequent to the transmittal of this dis-
patch, I did have occasion to discuss it with the Ambassador and var-
ious other members of the Embassy staff.
21. Q. Do you recall what your own evaluation of that information
wasat the time?
A. We evaluated it as a rumor, sir. "We felt that for a period of
approximately three years the Japanese had observed the greatest
secrecy in their military and naval movements, and we felt that in
case this were a plan on the part of the Japanese, that it was highly
improbable that it would have any current circulation among diplo-
matic circles in Tokyo. We gave it a low evaluation at the time, sir.
22. Q. You say you are familiar with that document?
A. Yes, sir.
23. Q. Have you noted any other similar report of any naval in-
formation appearing in that document ?
A. None I recall, sir,
24. Q. Have you any idea why that, which you say is in [lOSl'}
the rumor class, should have been given such prominence in that
publication ?
A. No, sir. I feel that the statement at the time ; that is, the report
at the time, received comparatively little notice. I can't understand
why it should receive any particular prominence now, sir, except for
possible reasons unknown to me.
Neither the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), nor the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Robert
D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the judge
advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. I show you a document; can you identify it?
A. I identify this as a copy of a letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated Feb-
ruary 1, 1941, duly authenticated under official seal, having been
prepared at the request of the judge advocate.
The letter, a copy of a letter from the Chief of Naval Opejrations to
the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, dated February 1, 1941, duly
authenticated under official seal, was submitted to the interested parties
and to the court and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked
"EXHIBIT 67."
2. Q. Will you read the entire document, please?
A. YeSj sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 645
The witness read the document, Exhibit 67.
[10S2] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to
examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel to the judge advocate.
Tlie judge advocate stated that he had no more witnesses.
The court then, at 2 : 40 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m., tomorrow,
September 22, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 647
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUET OF INQUIRY
SEPTEMBER 22, 1944
[loss] Thirty-First Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the thirtieth day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was
informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Thomas Withers, Rear Admiral," U. S. Navy, Commandant,
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
2. Q. Will you state what duty you were performing during the
latter part of the year 1941 ?
A. Commander Submarines, Pacific.
Examined by the court :
3. Q. Admiral, as Commander of Submarine, Pacific, will you
please state to the court very briefly the daily activities of these sub-
marines during the latter part of the year 1941 ?
A. The submarine force in general at that time — the \^108Jf]
submarines under my command in the Pacific — were training for war.
The training had been changed very much from the ordinary peace-
time training, so that they were very busy training for war purposes.
During the month of November, 1941, some submarines were sent
out for observation purposes and to be in position in case war should
come. On December 7 I remember, for instance, that there were two
vessels, the TROUT and the ARGONAUT, off Midway, and two off
WAKE, the TAMBOR and, I think, the TRITON. They were there
to observe and report anything, and should hostilities start, of course,
to be in a position to get anything they could.
648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Q. What was the general position as to scouting, observation,
or otherwise, other than these submarines off MIDWAY and WAKE ?
Was there any line of submarines, or any submarines sent out, to
cover the surrounding area of the Hawaiian group ?
A. No, sir.
5. Q. How were these submarines employed at this time — I mean
your general employment of submarines ?
A. Other than those four that I have mentioned, there was one
division on the West Coast.
6. Q. We are speaking particularly of the submarines at the West
Coast.
A. One of the divisions that belonged to Hawaii that was on the
West Coast had completed overhaul; on the 7th of December they
were about one day away from Pearl Harbor. The other subma-
rines— one or two may have been in Pearl Harbor in overhaul at
different times. The others were more generally over at Lahaina or
in that area in training.
7. Q. How many submarines were in the Hawaiian area at that
time, based on Pearl Harbor — the approximate number ?
A. I don't remember, but probably about twenty-four.
8. Q. What was the total number of submarines under your com-
mand ?
A. Probably I am mistaken about the twenty-four. Probably
about eighteen.
9. Q. That was the number based on Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes.
10. Q. And what was the total under your command ?
A. About thirty-two.
11. Q. And the organization?
A. I'm sorry I don't remember; but there were six S-boats that
were under my command, but they were on the West Coast. They
were in other places.
12. Q. What was the condition of readiness of the submarines?
A. The submarines were ready for war.
[1085] 13. Q. Was there any special condition of readiness for
the submarines while in port at Pearl Harbor ?
A. No, there was nothing. They were loaded with torpedoes, and
as much of their supplies as they could take, other than the fresh
stuff, and were ready for war; but there was no other particular
readiness, as I remember.
14. Q. In your schedule of employment. Admiral, what was the pro-
portionate number of submarines in Pearl Harbor, and the propor-
tionate number operating at sea ?
A. Generally, about one-third in Pearl Harbor.
15. Q. Overhaul and repairs and upkeep f
A. Yes, sir.
16. Q. Were you present at Pearl Harbor on about 27 November
1941?
A. Yes, sir.
17. Q. Were you cognizant, or did you have information regarding,
a message received from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-
in-Chief of Pacific, known as the "war warning message."
A. I know of one such message, yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 649
18. Q. I show you Exhibit 17. Will you please read that message
and state whether or not you have seen it, and about the time you saw
it?
A. I think this was the message ; I think this is the message that I
know of. I am not sure. It was either this message or one similar,
that I saw, knew about.
19. Q. Were vou present at a conference held by the Commander-
in-Chief of Pacific on or about 28 November 1941, when this war mes-
sage was received ?
A. Yes, sir.
20. Q. Will you please state briefly any matters pertaining to this
conference, of which you have knowledge— those people who were
present, and the discussion?
A. At the time of this conference I had gone into Honolulu, from
Pearl Harbor, and I got out as quickly as I could when I received a
message. I think I was the last Flag officer to arriver at the confer-
ence, and if I remember, all other Mag officers were already there.
21. Q. Admiral Kimmel had called this conference ?
A. Yes. Admiral Kimmel handed me this dispatch to read. I
read it, and he said, "What do you think that means?" I said, "I
think it means war." Then I think Admiral Bloch, who was present,
sort of made fun of me; I had that impression — asked me what I
would do, would I sink ships ? And I said I would sink ships if they
came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back.
[10S6] 22. Q. Did you notice General Short at this conference?
A. No, sir, he was not' there. There was another thing happened
at this conference, that impressed me at the time. About the time
that I completed my statement about sinking ships. Captain Davis,
who was on the staff of the Comander-in-Chief , came in, and Admiral
Kimmel asked him if he had seen General Short, and he said, "Yes,"
that he had. He asked him what he said, and he said that, "Somebody
is drawing a long bow."
23. Q. Was there any order by the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific
to sink ships within five hundrecl miles of Hawaii ?
A. Not that I knew of, sir.
24. Q. Did you have any orders, as Comander Submarine Force,
to take offensive action against any enemy ships in that area ?
A. No, sir.
25. Q. In your general estimate of the situation, having been pres-
ent, and I presume keeping in touch with general conditions vis a vis
Japan, did you anticipate an attack on Hawaii, or did you think there
would be an attack on Hawaii ?
A. Yes, sir, but I had thought that beforehand, so this simply con-
firmed what I had thought before that. I had warned every one of
my commanding officers when any submarines went on any trips, other
than the usual training trips, that I expected hostilities to start before
their return.
26. Q. Wliat form of attack did you think would take place, if it
took place ?
A. I didn't go that far into it, sir. I never came to a decision in my
own mind about that.
27. Q. Were you kept generally informed as to the existing condi-
tions there, as Flag officer ?
650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Well, I knew from general information that we were close to war.
In fact, I had felt that for months, but I got no specific information
from time to time.
28. Q. In your organization, were your submarines at that time as-
signed to task forces, and at any time did they operate as task forces
in conjunction with other ships of the task?
A. Yes, sir, for training.
29. Q. Will you state generally the set-up in that respect ?
A. AVell, for the first time in all my experience in submarines, we
had plenty of other ships to operate with. We had destroyers to
attack our submarines; we acted as targets for the destroyers to
search for submerged submarines; [1087] we made attacks
upon the Fleet, upon units of the Fleet; we had airplanes to bomb
our submarines, and they actually did bomb with little bits of bombs
that were close enough that they told the submarines when the bombs
were going off. We actually made one attack on the Fleet where
we fired torpedoes at the battleships.
30. Q. All of this in preparation for war ; is that correct ?
A. Yes, sir.
31. Q. Was this so-called training and task groups which you have
described — had that been stepped up or increased in its intensity dur-
ing the latter part of 1941 ?
A. Yes sir
32. Q. 'Up to December 7?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. On December 7, 1941, did you consider your forces ready
and prepared for war?
A. Yes, sir.
34. Q. Did you consider your submarines mobilized ?
A. Yes, they were mobilized. There were, as I mentioned before,
some boats coming to Hawaii — on the way to Hawaii from the West
Coast — that had completed an overhaul.
35. Q. And what was the condition of personnel, as to comple-
ments ?
A. It was excellent.
36. Q. And the numbers were sufficient, and there was a complete
complement on board each ship?
A. Yes, sir.
37. Q. I'd like to advert to that answer of yours that you had not
made any decision about the point of the attack that you expected.
May I ask you to look again at that exhibit, the War Warning Mes-
sage, Exhibit 17, and ask you whether the suggestion contained there
about the Philippines made any impression on you ?
A. Yes, sir; it did. I felt that attack miglit come anywhere, but
I thought it would be on the Philippines; I thought the chances were
much in favor of it being on the Philippines.
38. Q. Isn't that a reasonable interpretation of that dispatch, as
it is worded, in the absence of any other locality being mentioned?
A. Yes, sir, because it mentioned other localities; it didn't men-
tion Hawaii.
39. Q. Plow was your submarine force organized as to task
[1088] forces, and as to operations with other forces ?
A. Maneuvers were planned, and when the orders came out for
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 651
these maneuvers in which there were generally two opposing forces,
submarines were assigned to one or the other force, and the sub-
marines actually maneuvered and operated with that force. In order
to prevent the artificialitj'^ that so often came into our maneuvers
when submarines were included, I invariably consulted with the
Task Force Commander of the force in which we belonged, and
planned maneuvers with him, and submarines were used with these
task forces as they might be used in actual war.
40. Q. Then separately, Achniral, did you have your submarines
divided up into groups, as task groups of any description, insofar as
covering the training and outside of these jDarticular maneuvers
which you mentioned ?
A. No, sir; not other than our ordinary squadron and division
organization.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Eear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
41. Q. Do you remember how- many submarines you had actually
available for war operations between 27 November and 7 December ?
Isn't it a fact that we sent a large number of submarines to the West
Coast to get some extra distilling apparatus, or something of that
kind?
A. Yes, they were sent to the West Coast for alteration and over-
haul. One squadron of twelve submarines had been sent to Manila
early in November, I think, 1941, and actually at Pearl Harbor at
that time, or in the Hawaiian area, there was a small number. I
have forgotten what the number was.
42. Q. Isn't it a fact that we had — I won't say difficulty — but that
we even had to count a little bit to get the four submarines, the two
to Wake and the two to Midway, on account of the shortage of sub-
marines that were available, due to these that had to go back to the
coast ?
A. I think I always had four. At times I had to arrange the over-
haul of those in order to have four long-legged boats ready for that
duty.
43. Q. Now you have testified that you had full crews on your sub-
marines and that they were well trained. Isn't it a fact that you were
endeavoring to train relief crews at this time for the submarines, and
also crews for transfer, and that you were unable to obtain a sufficient
number [1089] of personnel to keep your school fully manned?
A That is so, yes, sir.
44. Q. And did we not consider that we had a shortage of personnel
in the submarine force in Hawaii at that time ?
A. Yes, sir; I had an acute shortage and was complaining about
it most of the time : In view of the proximity of war, I had made a
study of what was to be expected in the way of submarine personnel
requirements in time of war. I knew that I needed two reserve crews
for each division of six boats. I also knew that there was a large sub-
marine-building program, and that trained men would be neecled for
those new boats. We had established schools there at Pearl Harbor
to try to train these men as well as we could, and I kept asking for
men to keep these schools going to fill up these reserve crews. I got
652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
some men, but most of them were recruits, which were not the material
that we should have had for submarines, as the proportion of petty
officers in the submarine is higher than in any other type of ship. We
were very short of pett}^ oflicers, and we didn't have enough men even
with the recruits.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
45. Q. Admiral, Exhibit 52 before this court indicates that Task
Force Seven, which was under your command, as Commander Sub-
marines, contained 1 SM, 8 SS, 12 SS, 6 SS, 4 SS— looks like 31 sub-
marines. I would like to know if you can tell me from your recollec-
tion how many of those were actually in the Hawaiian area during
the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941 ?
A. Your question indicates that there were 31 submarines assigned
to Task Force 7, which was ni}^ command at that time, but Squadron
10, indicated here as 4 SS, was still in the United States; Squadron
8 — I think 2 boats of that squadron had arrived in Pearl Harbor, as
I remember ; 1 division of the G SS boats was on the West Coast of the
United States; and another division of submarines was on the way
from the coast of the United States to Hawaii, on December 7. Actu-
ally, in Pearl Harbor on December 7, there were about four subma-
rines— five submarines.
46. Q. The number was scarcely adequate to throw out a scouting
line to protect the patrol ships and other craft ?
A." No, sir ; totally inadequate.
47. Q. -You say you had five in Pearl Harbor; how many did you
have in the Hawaiian area?
A. That is correct; that five was all that were there,
[1090] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to
examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ-
ous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The pages following directly hereafter, pages 1091 through 1108,
inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the
record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action
was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prose-
cution of the war.
[1J09] The court then, at 11 : 10 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 20
a, m., at which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interetsed parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
interested party, Avhose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The court then, at 11 : 25 a. m., adjourned to 9 : 30 a."m., September
25,1944. •' ' *
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 653
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUKT OF INQUIRY
SEPTEMBER 25, 1944
[1110'] Thirty-second Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. G.
The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret) , President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus. U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Vice Admiral Adolplius Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret) , Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles ,yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the thirty-first day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, was recalled as a witness by the interested party. Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , and was warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
1. Q. Admiral Kimmel, after the receipt of Exhibit 17, the war
warning dispatch of November 27, did you cause to be inaugurated in
the administration of the Fleet the practice of preparing orders or pro-
grams to be inaugurated in the event of unexpected hostilities?
A. I did, and I have here two memoranda. One is dated 30 Novem-
ber 1941. It is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, submitted by
the War Plans Officer, and in it he has prepared and I approved the
action which we would take in case [-?-?ii] hostilities should
suddenly break out. I thought it was well to be prepared and ready to
take action immediately. That I revised as necessary, and again on
December 5, 1941, another memorandum which supersedes the first one,
was prepared and approved and put in the hands of the Staff Duty
Officer, the officer on duty there at my headquarters, so that he would
know exactly what to do, and they could initiate action in case of an
emergency.
654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Q. Are those two documents you have in your hand the two
memoranda you have described?
A. These are the two memoranda.
The memoranda of November 30, 1941, and December 5. 1941 sub-
mitted by his War Plans Officer to him and approved by the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific, were submitted to the judge advocate, to the
interested parties, and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence.
There being no objection, the memoranda were so received, copies
appended, marked "EXHIBIT G9-A", and "EXHIBIT 69-B."
3. Q. Will you please read the memoranda, Admiral?
A. Yes.
The witness read the memoranda. Exhibit 69-A and Exhibit 69-B.
4. Q. By whom were these memoranda signed?
A. It was signed by McMorris ; the second copy was signed by Mc-
Morris. It was put in the hands of the Staff Duty Officer as a reminder
of what to do. Of course, nothing would have been done without my
approval, but it was a check-off. That is what it amounted to.
5. Q. Admiral, did you receive copies of any of the information con-
tained in any of the documents contained in Exhibits 63 or 64, between
November 1, 1941, and 7 December 1941?
A. None of these messages contained in Exhibits 63 or 64 were sup-
plied to me.
6. Q. Did you receive any of the information contained in those mes-
sages, other than that might be inferred from the dispatches you re-
ceived, of November 24, November 27, and December 1, which are in
evidence ?
A. I received none.
7. Q. Did you or your staff or the staff of the Commandant of the
14th Naval District have any facilities, materiel or personnel, for the
processing of information contained in Exhibits 63 and 64?
A. We did not.
[1112] 8. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can
identify it.
A. '^es, I identify this as a letter signed by Admiral Richardson,
and directed to the Chief of Naval Operations, with regard to Chief
of Naval Operations' Plan DOG, and it is dated January 25, 1941.
In the last paragraph of this letter it states that, "This letter has been
prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief
of U. S. Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents
his as well as my own views."
The letter from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, dated January 25, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate,
to the interested parties, and to the court, and hj the interested party,
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evi-
dence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts as may be perti-
nent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, description appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 70."
9. Q. Will you read. Admiral Kimmel, paragraph 7, (A), (B), and
(D), and paragraph 10.
A. (Reading:)
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 655
In connection with the execution of the foregoing taslis, and with particular
reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out
that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the Local Defense
Forces of the Fourteentli Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet
for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and
rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upl^eep of material
installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required
to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both
men and material cannot but result in impaired readiness for active operations
at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet
are (a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl
Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port, (b)
The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating
constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for
local patrons, (d) Lacli of aircraft detection devices ashore.
(10) This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Adminal H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It
represents his, as well as my own, views.
10. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify
[JUS] it, Admiral.
A. This is a letter written by the Chief of Naval Operations to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of 24: July 1941.
11. Q. And does it have an enclosure?
A. It has an enclosure of a letter from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.
The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated 24 July 1941, together with en-
closure of letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, was submitted to the judge advo-
cate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested
party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , offered
in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts as may
be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, description appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 71."
12. Q. Will you read, Admiral, the third paragraph of the enclosure
of Exhibit Tl ; that is, from the copy of the letter from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the Chief of the Asiatic Fleet ?
A. (Reading:)
I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and
again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an
appointment vrith the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will
come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate
such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse.
However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know
that I am.
13. Q. I hand you a document and ask you if you can identify it,
Admiral.
A. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated 2 August 1941, together
with enclosure, which is a copy of a letter written by the Chief of
Naval Operations to then Captain Charles M. Cook, Junior, who was
in command of my Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, at that time. It
is dated 31 July 1941.
The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated August 2, 1941, with enclosure of
656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Captain Charles M.
Cook, Junior, dated Julj^ 31, 1941, was [^4-] submitted to the
judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by
the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret.) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading pertinent ex-
tracts therefrom.
There being no objective, it was so received, description appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 72."
[iiiJ] Frank L. Middleton, yoeman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yoeman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
14. Q. Will you read. Admiral, from Exhibit 72, the second post-
script of the letter enclosure, which was a letter from the Chief of
Naval Operations to Captain Cooke?
A. (Reading) :
P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel
which lie can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is
as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but
anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you alL
Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one
thing that is factual.
15. Q. I show you another document. Admiral, and ask you if you
can identify it?
A. Yes, 1 identify this as a letter from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic; Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, dated April 3, 1941. This
is an official letter.
The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific ; Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic ; and Commander-in-
Chief, Atlantic, dated 3 April 1941, was submitted to the judge ad-
vocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the in-
terested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kinmael, U. S. Nav}'^ (Ret.),
offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts
as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, description appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 73".
16. Q. I ask you to read, Admiral, from Exhibit 73, the last para-
graph. No. 12.
A. (Reading) :
12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be avail-
able to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units
may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has ar-
rived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required
by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the
United States into war.
17. Q. I show you anotlier document. Admiral, and ask you if you
can identify it?
A. This is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated November 7, 1941. This is a
personal letter.
[Ills'] The personal letter from the Chief of Naval Operations
to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated November 7, 1941, was
submitted to the judge advocate to the interested parties, and to the
court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
PROCEEMNGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 657
U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading
therefrom such parts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received, description appended,
marked "EXHIBIT 74".
18. Q. Will you read. Admiral, the first paragraph of this letter?
A. (Reading) :
This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from
you and to learn that you are in tine fettle. Ok on the dispositions which you made
in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question
is— What next?!
19. Q. The letter of October 22nd is Exhibit 14, Admiral, the letter
which you wrote outlining to the Chief of Naval Operations the dispo-
sitions that you had made in response to his dispatch to vou of October
ICth?
A. That is correct. The dispatch of October 16th told of the fall
of the Japanese Cabinet. As a result of that dispatch I made certain
dispositions in the Fleet. On October 22nd I wrote a letter to the
Chief of Naval Operations informing him of exactly what I had done.
In the letter of November 7th. he answers and states that the dispo-
sitions I reported in my letter of October 22nd are O. K.
20. Q. And the letter of November 7th is Exhibit 74 that has just
been offered?
A. That is correct.
Cross-examined bv the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
21. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 74, which is the letter
of 7 November 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, and
ask you to read, in addition to the two paragraphs which you just
read at the beginning of the letter, the last paragraph of that letter?
A. (Reading) :
Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when
it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I
have written you before ; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month
may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on for-
ever— ^particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look
good.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret)
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
[1117~\ Examined by the court:
22. Q. Admiral Kimmel, the memoranda which you introduced
this morning and was read before this court as of November 30th :
Were they in the form of orders or directives, or simply for informa-
tion of the watch officer on duty ?
A. They were simply for my information, the information of the
War Plans Division, and the watch officer on duty. They went no
further than that. It was on the off-chance that something migh?;
happen.
23. Q. Is it true that you felt that you were not required to inform
yourself of the means vmdertaken by the Commanding General of
"the Hawaiian Department with reference to defenses of Pearl Harbor
and the defenses of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?
A. No. I think the evidence before this court indicates that I took
a great interest in the defenses of the Hawaiian Department and did
inform myself.
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 43
658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
24. Q. In view of the evidence before the court in which you state
that you did confer with General Short on defenses, did you consider
that between the dates of November 27 and December 7, 1941, the situ-
ation was so critical that you should confer further with him, and did
you do so ?
A. To the best of my recollection I conferred with him four or five
times during that period, and during those conferences, some of which
lasted two or three hours, we reviewed every phase of the situation
that existed.
25. Q. Do we understand that this has particular reference to the
war warning message of 27 November 1941, and the days following?
A. Yes, sir.
26. Q. You are familiar, Admiral, with the operating orders of the
Fleet immediately prior to your taking over command in February,
1941. Could you state briefly the [mS'\ changes you made in
fleet operations immediately subsequent to your taking over command
and during the succeeding year?
A, Immediately on taking over command I made no changes in the
operating plans for the Fleet. My predecessor. Admiral Kichardson,
had established the two task force principle, one out and one in, which
we kept in effect for about two months. At the end of that two months
I changed to the three task force plan, all of which has been presented
to this court. I did that because I was assured by various subordinate
commanders that they were not getting enough time for upkeep and
for the changes which were required in the material changes in the
ships. The other changes that I made during the year had to do with
some changes in target practices, some in ship organization in which
we put the four-section watch in general use in the Fleet, the orders
in regard to readiness of the batteries, particularly the readiness of
ammunition on deck in the ready boxes. We went into the question
of loading bombs on planes, both on board ship and on the air fields,
and we took steps to supply bombs which did not exist in the Hawaiian
area when I took over. I can recall no very drastic change in the
Fleet operations. We did initiate and consummate the question of air
coordination betwixt the Army and Naval air forces on shore in
Hawaii. We drew in all loose ends in regard to the Fleet's part in the
defense of Oahu and in the use of Pearl Harbor as an operating base,
and all the security measures required therefor were put into this
order 2CL-41. I think nothing comparable to 2CL-41 existed prior
to my taking command, although certain features that were later
contained in 2CL-41 were in effect prior to my taking command.
27. Q. During this time did you give any consideration to chang-
ing the training of the Fleet and disposing it in some defensive disposi-
tion to the westward of the Hawaiian Islands, or not especially "de-
fensive" but for information and security for Hawaii?
A. I gave a great deal of consideration to all matters of that kind
and all the steps that we could take to be effective could not be con-
tinued indefinitely. There had to be some time limit. When I first
took command of the Fleet we were undergoing a scare, an emergency,
and we had had a warning dated January, 1941, in which the terms
"if war should eventuate we will do so and so". I wanted to con-
tinue the training of the Fleet as long as I could. Had I stopped the
training in January and had gone out to full security measures, we
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 659
never would have had the Fleet training, it just couldn't have been
trained under those conditions with the large influx of new men that
were coming into the Fleet. And all the time I was considering when
to institute these stringent security measures. I put into effect all the
security measures that I thought we could put into effect, and still
continue the training at anywhere near a satisfactory condition. When
these warnings came of November 27th, and prior thereto, they fol-
lowed a pattern that had continued for some time. I felt that before
[1119] hostilities 'came that there would be additional informa-
tion, that we would get something more definite, and when the attack
came without this information, of course I was inclined to blame myself
for not having been much smarter than I was. But when I found,
some time later, that the information was, in fact, available in the
Navy Department ; that the information which, if it had been given
me, would have changed my attitude and would have changed the
dispositions, I ceased to blame myself so much.
28. Q. Admiral, what information do you refer to in your state-
ment ?
A. I refer to the information that was contained in Exhibit 63 in
particular.
29. Q. Had you had this information, Admiral, what would you
have done, and what orders would you have given relative to the
Fleet?
A. That is a very difficult question to answer at this time. It is
something after the fact, but the least that I would have done had I
had this information would have been to thoroughly alert all shore-
going activities in the Hawaiian Islands, including the Army. I
would have, in all probability, had the Fleet put to sea, and in gen-
eral I would have had them take a station probably 300 miles west of
Oaliu in an intercepting position for an}^ attacking force that would
come either to the northward or to the southward. But I would have
had to consider the question of fueling these units of the Fleet. I
couldn't have put them too far fi'om Hawaii and I would have put
them just far enough so they couldn't be readily located. I was torn
betwixt a desire for the securit}^ of the Fleet and for preparations to
make the initial moves in case of war with Japan. I was in a very
difficult position in any event. Any Fleet which sits and waits to be
attacked labors under an enormous handicap. However, briefly, I
think it is fair to state now that I would have alerted everything on
shore to its maximum that could be maintained over a long period.
I would have instituted the reconnaissance to the best of our ability
and I would have had the Fleet put to sea.
30. Q. You state that you would have alerted the Army. Did you
have an}' authority to alert the Army ?
A. No. I mean by that that I would have urged them. No, I had
no authority over the Army, none v.'hatsoever.
31. Q. Yon have stated. Admiral, in this connection and in referring
to certain information which you did not have, that you did not have
any knowledge whatsoever of the contents of the note of November
26, 1941, which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese repre-
sentatives. Is that correct?
A. That is correct. And I had, on several occasions, pointed out to
the Chief of Naval Operations, and through him to the Navy Depart-
660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment, the fact that it was essential [U'dP] that I be kept in-
formed of these developments, and I recall that in February ol 1941
Admiral Wilson Brown told me that there was some question in the
Navy Department as to who was to supply me with intelligence infor-
mation and that he, in going from one place to the other here, had, as
I recall it, gotten some idea that communications thought that ONI
was doing it and ONI thought communications was doing it. Any-
how, there were two agencies that were mixed up in it. I wrote a letter
to the Chief of Naval Operations at once, datecl sometime in Febru-
ary— it is around here somewhere — in which I called attention to this
report that Brown had given and told him I was disturbed by it and I
thought it ought to be remedied here in the Navy Department. I
subsequently received a letteer from him in which he said that he had
gone into the matter and I was getting all the information.
The court then, at 10 : 55 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 10 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
interested party, whose counsel were present.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, IT. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the witness
under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued
his testimony.
Examination by the court (continued) :
32. Q. Continuing, Admiral, regarding this note of 26 November,
did you read that note prior to this time?
A. I have read the note now, but I had not seen it prior to 7 Decem-
ber 1941, nor did I know that any such note — I mean that any note
containing any such terms had been given to Japan.
33. Q. If you had had any indication that there would be a reply
to this note in a comparatively short time would this have in any
way changed your orders regarding security measures for the Fleet?
A. Everybody is wise after the act. I don't want to be misunder-
stood, but i feel and believe that had I known the contents of this note
and the fact that, as has been testified before this court, the Navy
Department generally thought that it would prove entirely unaccept-
able to the Japanese Government, as I mj^self undoubtedly would have
felt at the time, I am sure it would have affected me and my outlook
on the situation very considerably.
[1120 A] The pages following directly hereafter. Pages 1121
through 1123, inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted
from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This
action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful
prosecution of the war.
[11^4] 42. Q. Admiral, having in mind the testimony which
you have just given and your stating that you would take the Fleet
to sea, and in view of the fact that you have previously stated that
you feared a submarine rather than an air attack, will you please state
now how you would have disposed your Fleet and whether you would
have had sufficient defense for the Fleet against a large submarine
attack by the enemy ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 661
A. I made this statement to the best of my present beUef, From
what I knew at the time prior to December 7th, I probably would have
taken the Fleet to sea. You must remember that the efficiency of the
Japanese Air Force was, I think, a surprise to the Navy Department
as well as to the people in Hawaii. We had on the ships no adequate
antiaircraft defense. That applied particularly to the battleships and
more particularly to the short-range weapons. The destroyers were
somewhat better, as were the liaht cruisers. The heavy cruisers were
poor in that respect. We had three aircraft carriers, and at the time
of the attack they were pretty well scattered over the Pacific Ocean.
We had one of them on the Coast. In the event of an attack such
as was delivered at Hawaii, together with submarines — and I have
reason to believe that a great many submarines were in the Hawaiian
area at the time of the attack — it is well within the realm of possibility
that had I taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater
than they actually were from submarine and air attack. However,
you must also realize that you presuppose then that they would have
found our Fleet and that they would have been able to deliver an
attack. It is not impossible that, had the Fleet gone to sea, the Jap-
anese would not have attacked at that time at all. They might have
deferred the attack. We all know how difficult it is to locate a Fleet
at sea, particularly if they do not want to be located. All this is in
the realm of conjecture, but I think it is fair to say that there are
some things to be said for keeping the Fleet in port, and the only change
we would make would be to go to a little higher state of alert than
we had at the time. I think that I would not have done that. I think
that I would have taken the Fleet to sea. You gentlemen are quite as
competent as I am to say what should have been done under the con-
ditions that existed at Pearl Harbor at the time and in a better posi-
tion now than I was when I was sitting on the lid out in Pearl Harbor,
because you know more about the Japs.
43. Q. The question was intended to convey the idea : What could
have been done rather than what would have been done? What were
your capabilities? 'Wliat line of action was open within your limits?
A. I think one general line of action was to take the Fleet to sea.
The other line of action was to keep it in port.
44. Q. If you had increased the alert, would that have done any
more than man a few anti-aircraft giuis ?
A. At best, it might have manned a few anti-aircraft guns, and it
might have enabled the intercepting fighters to come into action a
little better.
[1J,^5] 45. Q. I was speaking of the Navy rather than the com-
bined forces.
A. That is right, but those forces had to have some warning, you
know. They were good for only an hour in the air, as I recall, and
fifteen miles from land, as testified by the Major General commanding
the Hawaiian Air Force.
46. Q. You are speaking of Army fighters?
A. Yes, pursuit ships, I think they call them.
47. Q. It has been testified here that prior to your assuming com-
mand there were reconnaissance planes used on patrol in certain sec-
tors around Oahu. Did you discontinue this patrol?
A. To the best of my recollection, the patrol, as such, was not in
effect when I took command of the Fleet. A patrol covering the
662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
operating area was in effect, and I continued that patrol. In any
event, I thoroughly considered the question of running patrols, and
I had to make a decision between training and the running of patrols.
I was told by the commander of the patrol planes, and also by the
Army, of their training difficulties. In addition to that, we did not
have a sufficient number to maintain an adequate patrol over a long
period of time, and a patrol out to 300 miles or less is of very doubtful
value, particularly against air raid. I even go so far as to say that a
300-mile patrol, guarding against an air raid, is almost useless. That
was my opinion then. I have had no reason to change it. Of course,
any patrol run has some value. I will admit that as far as surface
ships are concerned.
48. Q. Were those patrol planes and those planes based on shore
Fleet planes under your direct operation ?
A. Ye,s.
49. Q. And you assumed the direct responsibility of employing
them, either in protection of the operating areas of the Fleet or for
reconnaissance?
A, Yes, I do with the proviso that the Commandant of the 14th
District was charged with the execution of that part of the plan
which required the search, and he always had the right to request
these planes and to request that searches be made. He did that on
one or two occasions, and I ran the searches for a couple of days.
However, I want it clearly understood it was my responsibility and
that I did give the orders to the planes.
50. Q. The court understands, then, that the planes under your
command at this time were used in conjunction with the Fleet to
protect operating areas and in training in preparation for war; is
that correct?
A. Yes, and we believed that by my doing so we were employing
them to the very best advantage.
[11261 51. Q. Admiral, if you had a reconnaissance in effect,
even at 700 miles, and had to meet a strange force, did you have any
way to stop that force from delivering an attack?
A. I did not, except by the means you know about. I could have,
if I had located the force, used all the planes available to attack. Of
course, had the patrol planes, plus all the Army bombers, been out on
search, we would not have had any striking force left, and you must
remember, sir, that almost day by day we were promised additional
planes, so that we thought this was going to be improved, particularly
in regard to Army bombers.
52. Q. You did not, as we understand it, have a surface striking
force available which could have gone to the location and supported a
carrier attack?
A. Well, we had two carriers that were in areas where they could
have been very useful. One of tliem was 400 miles southeast of Mid-
way, and one was about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, and had we
known the location of the enemy, we could probably have delivered a
very effective attack, first, with one and, then, with the other. The
LEXINGTON was full of fuel or practically full of fuel. She had
run only from Pearl to the position where she was, but the ENTER-
PRISE was pretty well down in fuel.
53. Q. You are speaking of this particular time?
A. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 663
54. Q. I am speaking, in general, of the situation which would
warrant your holding the forces in readiness.
A. We would have been torn between a desire to hold in readiness
and get them full of fuel.
55. Q. Is it not a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid
you must know in advance that the carrier is on its way ?
A. Yes, I think so.
56. Q. And within the narrow limits of its time of arrival at a
certain place, presumably on a dark circle and in a general sector
within narrow limits?
A. I think that is true, and what you say is multiplied every time
you rechice the forces waiting for them. To fuel your forces, the
more necessity there is to know when the carrier is coming. We have
seen time and again — if I read the newspapers correctly — how our own
Navy has gone in and made attacks on Japanese-held positions at'
Saipan, Palau, and Manila, to cite the ones within the last three or
four weeks. They have in each case effected what amounts to a tac-
tical surprise, and I can understand perfectly why they have. They
have been at war for nearly three j^ears, and what is so often over-
looked in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair is that we were
still at peace [1127] and still conducting conversations, and
there were limits that I could take with planes and aviators. We
were still in the peace psychology, and I myself was affected by it
just like everybody else. I had been very seriously criticized by local
papers for killing too many aviators, anyhow. I had told Bill Hal-
sey that nobody regretted killing them anymore than I did, but we
simply had to do certain things. We had to learn how to do it, and
I think we did learn a great deal.
57. Q. Had you sighted that force at the outer rim of a distant patrol
and, in accordance with your directive, let them make the first war
move, could you have done anything other than to alert your
command ?
A. Admiral, I could not have done anything under the orders which
I had at the time, and had I attacked the Japanese naval force 700
miles from Oahu, I would have violated my orders, just as I violated
them when I gave the order to bomb the submarines in the Hawaiian
area. I again don't know what I would have done, but if we had
sighted anything 700 miles from -Oahu, I think I would have found
some means to handle the situation, insofar as the forces I had avail-
able would have permitted me.
58. Q. Admiral, it has been testified to that on or about 1 December
194:1 the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, issued a bul-
letin which set forth the activities of Japan at that time. It is fur-
ther understood that this bulletin was mailed to officers in key posi-
tions on or about 1 December. Did you receive that bulletin, and
if so, will you please state the information contained therein.
A. In the first place, this ONI bulletin, dated 1 December 1941, was
received in my office and was called to my attention, I think, prior to
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I cannot be positive as to that,
but I can be positive that the essential information contained in that
bulletin in regard to the Japanese situation was in accordance with
the information which we had available at my headquarters.
59. Q. And what was that information ?
664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The part to which I referred was this paragraph "C", "The
Japanese Naval Situation": (Keacling from Exhibit 57) "Deploy-
ment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that
extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same
time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down
from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently
for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to
the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the
organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will
probably take sharper [1128] form in the next few days. To
date this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief,
Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task'groups,
one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic Coast, the
other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of
heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer
and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home
waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing
boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control,
consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but
also of construction material •with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
60. Q. Admiral, it has been noted in the testimony that in corre-
spondence with the Navy Department you invited attention to Army
radar installations on Oahu and the importance of their installation
being made as soon as possible ; is that correct ?
A. Yes, sir, I think on several occasions I called attention to it.
61. Q. Were you familiar with the radar installations and the radar
available to the Army on Oahu ?
A. In general terms, yes. I never saw the radar installations of
the Army, but I was informed they were getting along pretty well.
They had delays of this and that, and as I have testified to here, I was
under the impression they could give us a coverage up to about 150
miles, possibly 200. I got that from General Short, and, as a matter
of fact, they did state they picked up these planes at 132 miles.
62. Q. Did you at any time request General Short to expedite these
fixed installations and did you at any time stress upon him the impor-
tance of these fixed installations with respect to the informing of
the approach of possibly enemy planes ?
A. I did not write any letters to General Short .on the subject that
I can now recall, but I am quite certain that in many conversations
which I had with General Short I did stress the necessity for an air-
craft warning system, as well as for all other elements in the defense of
Pearl Harbor. I think the court will recall the testimony of General
Marshall that he was writing Short to calm Kimmel down out there
and not ask for so much.
63. Q. Were you familiar with the hours of operation of these radar
sets?
A. No. In general, I knew that they were being manned during a
greater portion of the day. I didn't know the exact [1129]
hours.
64. Q. Did you ever discuss with General Short the importance of
having these radar sets manned prior to and immediately subsequent
to dawn of each day ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 665
A. I think we discussed the time when an attack would be expected,
yes, and in the joint estimate of the situation that time is set forth.
I do not recall that I thought it necessary to discuss this with Gen-
eral Short, except in general terms, anymore than I did a great many
other details.
65. Q. Did General Short at any time report to you verbally or
otherwise that he was in great need of experienced operators for radar
and request you to furnish some from the naval forces ?
A. I knew that he was in need of experienced operators, and we did
everything we could to assist him in training his radar operators,
both before and after he received his equipment. That testimony has
been given before this court, I think, in considerable detail. General
Short never requested me to supply him with any naval operators to be
used in the operation of his radar in Oahu, and, so far as I am aware,
he made no such request of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
66. Q. Did he ask you for liaison officers and did you furnish them ?
A. He asked me for a liaison officer in July, 1941. I answered his
letter promptly and detailed my communications officer, Commander
Curtis, to act as liaison officer for that purpose. That was the only
letter that I received from General Short asking for liaison officers
to be detailed, and as I answered it promptly, I though the matter
was covered completely. The liaison officers, about whom General
Short, after Pearl Harbor, spoke about and about whom there has
been considerable testimony, were in reality watch officers to stand
watch in the communications center, and I would not have recognized
the term "liaison officer" if I had heard about it. However, the proper
individual to supply him with such liaison officers was Admiral Bloch,
and he normally would have made his request on Admiral Bloch for
such liaison officers or watch standers in the office. I have been in-
formed that prior to December 7, 1941, General Short did not, in fact,
make a request on the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for such
watch officers. That you will have to get definitely from other sources.
We stood ready to supply General Short with some type of watch
officers when he requested them, and I think there is no question but
that they would have been supplied if h-e had requested them. You
must realize that this was the Army's function, and we butted in a good
deal trying to help them.
[1130] 67. Q. While it was an Army function, wasn't it essential
for a Navy man to be at the center to screen out Navy planes for any
information that might come in ?
A. I think it is desirable, but I don't think it was essential. I think
it could have worked another way, and they could have got this infor-
mation where the planes are. Just becouse this man has a naval
uniform, he could not, by any God-given faculty, tell where the Navy
planes were. He would have to get that from the Navy, who had
sent the planes out, and I think an Army man could have done it just
as well.
68. Q. Wouldn't a Navy man have been better informed as to where
to send the information and where to get the information?
A. Probably, but I don't think it is a sine qua non.
69. Q. Did you detail Commander E. J. Taylor to assist the Army
in this set-up ?
A. Yes. I have forgotten who came to me. One of my staff, as I
666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
recall it now. They said they wanted Taylor over there because he
had some experience, and General Martin, I believe, asked for him.
I said, "Certainly. I will be very glad to send him over to help in any
way I can," and I had Taylor in and talked to him.
70. Q. Did you consider the Commandant, 14th Naval District,
Admiral Bloch, as the officer more directly concerned with handling-
radar matters with the Army, or did you consider it a direct function
of your and your staff ?
A. I knew Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle all
matters in connection with that. My staff and I wanted to assist him
in any way we could and to assist the Commanding General, also.
71. Q. But you did consider radar as an essential part of the de-
fense of Oahu and also essential for the partial defense of the Fleet
while in port ; is that correct ?
A. It was a thing that should have been pushed to the limit,
and whether you can go so far as to say that it is absolutely essential
or not, I don't know.
72. Q. It is one of the essentials, then ?
A. Yes, it is one of the essentials.
73. Q. Admiral, did you in any w^ay ignore the defense measures
for the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and sacrifice them to the training of the
Fleet?
A. No, I took the measures that I deemed were justified on the in-
formation I had. I was, of course, influenced in putting into effect
the security measures in the way they would affect the training of
the Feet.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, withdrew.
[1131] 74. Q. Did you at any time discuss with General Short
the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the means
and the plan which he had or proposed for intercepting such an air
attack ?
A. I discussed the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor with
the Commanding General on various occasions. We simulated such
attack; we sent planes in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how
many times, but several times, during the year I was out there, and
we put the defending planes or other elements into operation. Both
Admiral Bloch and I had discussed the various features with the
Commanding General. The details at all times I tried to leave to
Admiral Bloch. I did not wish to encroach on his part of the job,
and I took particular pains to keep Admiral Bloch informed, and I
think he as well, took particular pains to keep me informed of the
things he thought would be of interest to me. I think it is fair
to state that we discussed the subject exhaustively and our principal
concern at all times was the few forces we had to meet an attack.
75. Q). This may be a repetition of a question. Were you familiar
with the reply which General Short sent to the War Department
about 28 November, in reply to the war warning message, regarding
his stage of alertness against sabotage?
A. He did not supply me with a copy of his answer, but I had
a copy of the message, and I knew that he had replied. He had
replied to two messages on the state of alert that he took, one of
which was a brief message and one of which was in detail.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 667
76. Q. Where you aware of the fact that the Army, in its general
conception of defense of Hawaii, had in mind primarily internal
sabotage ?
A. In general, yes ; all the messages stressed that, you see.
77. Q. And did you know that the Army had so arranged and
parked its planes, in accordance with this thought of internal sabo-
tage?
A. I didn't know the method they used to park the planes at the
time. That was something that I didn't think was my business.
78. Q. You stated in your testimony that you were of the opinion
that in the event of an air attack on Oahu, it would come about
dawn. Did you ever give consideration to placing all available
planes in the air each morning, by reason of this probable attack?
A. No, I didn't. We gave consideration to all those things, but
I did not think the time had arrived to take any such measures as
that.
[11S2] 79. Q. Why wouldn't any time during an emergency be
a time to start that ? Why wouldn't any time during an emergency,
when you were receiving all these messages that might be considered
warning messages, be the time to put that into effect ?
A. These emergencies were continuing all the time, and we couldn't
do these things indefinitely, because of the personnel. We didn't
have enough personnel trained, the materiel wouldn't stand it. I
doubt if we had enough gas to keep all these planes manned all the
time. There were great difficulties there. I don't know about the
gas, but the personnel and materiel were inadequate. Most of that
would have developed upon the Army, and they were reporting to
me that they were in a very bad case as to both materiel and the
state of training of their personnel. I considered it impracticable.
In any event, with the limited time in the air of these Army pursuit
ships, I think that subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, I have
seen a report which states that they tried to put their pursuit ships
into the air and after a few days they stopped it entirely, because
they just couldn't do it.
80. Q. Couldn't keep it up, you mean?
A. Couldn't keep it up.
81. Q. Admiral, we are speaking more particularly of the planes
in the Fleet, and the planes of the Fleet based on shore. You did
have a number of PBY's, did you not?
A. Yes.
82. Q. Based on shore. And the question was mainly asked as to
your consideration of putting these planes in the air.
A. I misunderstood your question to that extent. I was thinking
more of the fighter planes, Army pursuits. It would have been
possible to put some of those planes in the air, but I doubt whether
it would have helped very much. Those PBY's are not very maneu-
verable, and they are vulnerable to attack. They were never in-
tended for bombing missions, nor for fighters. 1 will put it this
way: If we considered the situation such that we should have put
them in the air, we wouldn't have used them to be in the air at dawn,
waiting for attack; we would have had them out searching if we
had put them out at all. I think that is a fair statement.
668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
83. Q. But you would have put them out prior to dawn; is that
correct.
A. Yes, sir, probably.
84. Q. What other planes did you have there besides these PBY's
you speak of ?
A. What others?
85. Q. Yes.
A. A few Marine planes, and that is all. All the [IISSI car-
riers were at sea ; we didn't have any of those.
86. Q. But if you had a few hours' advance information as to a
probable attack, you would have put all of these planes in the air?
A. That is another thing, yes, indeed ; I would have started out to
find the people that were coming in. I would have used everything.
87. Q. There has been quite a little testimony here in which there
has been mentioned "appropriate defense deployment." What is
your conception of appropriate defensive deployment, as applied to
the Fleet under your command, and under existing conditions about
the latter part of November '41 ?
A. The first time that term was used, as I recall it, was in the dis-
patch of October 16, in which a defensive deployment was spoken of.
I reported in my letter of 22 October exactly what I considered that to
mean, inasmuch as I told the Chief of Naval Operations what I had
done. I think you will recall that, I placed a couple of submarines
off Wake and a couple off Midway, and took six or seven other steps
which I can get out of that letter more accurately than I can give you
now, and having received an approval of that on November 7 in a letter,
I thought when I got the message of November 27, that I would con-
tinue the motion, as it were, and that that was what the Chief of
Naval Operations meant. I thought I was justified in assuming that.
88. Q. What else could you have done ?
A. I don't know.
89. Q. Testimony here has revealed that the carrier ENTERPRISE
was returning from Wake, and the LEXINGTON was on its way to
Midway.
A. That's correct.
90. Q. Had you known of a probable break within ten days or two
weeks after the note of 26 November was delivered, would you have
recommended this operation for these two ships ?
A. I think maybe the break alone, I might have considered it worth
while to take a chance and let them go, because they were a fast force
and could get away, and had within themselves, each one of them,
considerable fighting power; but had I thought that there was a very
good chance of an air attack on Oahu at the time, I might have had a
different idea about it.
91. Q. What did the escort of these ships consist of?
A. Three heavy cruisers, and a squadron of destroyers, each one.
92. Q. Under your orders, were they proceeding under war con-
ditions ?
A. Oh, yes.
[nU] . 93. Q. In all respects?
A. Yes, sir. I think when Halsey went back to the ship — he has
told me since — he armed everything and told them to sink every
Japanese ship that they found.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COUHT OF INQUIRY 669
94. Q. The operating schedule which you issued about September
'41 ; was that a classified document, secret, confidential, restricted?
A. Confidential.
95. Q. In view of the fact that two of three task forces were sched-
uled for upkeep in Pearl Harbor during the period which includes
T December, is it possible that Japanese agents might have had access
to this operating schedule ?
A. Oh, I think it is possible, yes.
96. Q. If they had had access to it, might there have been a basis
provided for the time of attack?
A. I think so, yes. We took all the steps that we considered prac-
ticable at that time to keep this thing from circulation, but people talk ;
and they have got to know when they are going to come in port and
when they are going out. I went to great lengths on occasion to keep
things secret, and went over to the club and had a Navy wife tell me all
about it. We have all been through that.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not
desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined bv the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navf (Ret) :
97. Q. You were asked, Admiral, concerning the feasibility of hav-
ing all the planes in the air. I am assuming that means both Army
and Navy planes, in the morning twilight. Could that be done in a
manner without alarming the civil population or disclosing the intent
of operations, both of which features were specifically forbidden in the
Army message, dispatch, of 27 November?
A."^ I think there is no question but what if we had put all the planes
in the air each morning at daylight, that it would very materially have
alarmed the civil population.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
98. Q. Wouldn't the movement of the Fleet in and out of the
Harbor alarm the population to that extent?
A. I don't think so.
99. Q. Why? With the number of planes you had, wouldn't
[1135] the poi^ulation have thought it was training, just the same
as taking the ships in and out ?
A. The movement of the ships in and out had been going on for
some time. It vras a part, you might say, of the routine operations out
there. Putting all the planes in the air at daylight would have kicked
up a rumpus. All of the aviators would have been talking about it.
All of their families would liave been talking about it, and that every
one of the planes had to go in the air. I think there is no doubt but
that it would have alarmed the civil population. It would have been
quite different from what we had been doing.
Recross-examined by the judge advocate :
100. Q. You haA-e testified. Admiral, that you did not receive the
information that was contained in Mr. Hull's note to the Japanese
Government under date of 20 November 1941, and you have testified
what you would have done vrith the Fleet had you had that informa-
tion. Now the judge advocate would like to have j'OU state what in-
formation was contained in this note of November 2G regarding the
670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
situation between the United States and Japan, that was not contained
in Exhibit 17, wherein the Chief of Naval Operations told you that
"negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific
have ceased?" In other words, what would the note of 2G November
have conveyed to you, had you known it, that the Exhibit 17, under
date of 27 November, did not convey ?
A. Well, without looking into tlie exact wording, which you know,
the note, as has been testified to by a good many before this court,
was a veritable ultimatum ; and tlie "terms of this ultimatum were such
that it was known that the Japanese v/ould not conform to it, and that
they were forced to do something. When you force a man to do some-
thing, why you put liim in a place, as Mr. Hull testified — in a "mad-dog
position."" He's got to do something.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he Avas privileged to make any
further statement covering anytliing relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry Avhich he thought "should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as interested party.
The court then, at 12 : 20 a. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at
which time it reconvened,
[J1S6] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold
K. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected ynth the inquiry were present.
The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert
D. Powers, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the
interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) ,
and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the interested partv, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : " ,
1. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, dated Novem-
ber 28. 1941 ? If so, please produce it.
A. I am. I produce a photostatic copy of a dispatch from Chief of
Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, date time group
282054, duly authenticated under official seal, dated 28 November 1941.
The certified copy of a dis])atch from Chief of Naval Operations to
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, date time group 282054 was submitted to
the judge advocate, to the other interested parties, and to the court, and
by the interested party, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.),
offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 75",
copy appended.
2. Q. Please read the dispatch.
The witness read the dispatch. Exhibit 75.
3. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of copies of dispatches
280027, dated 28 November 1941, 300419 dated 30 November, 1941,
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 671
212155 dated 21 January 1941, and 070615 dated 7 December 1941 ? If
so, please produce them.
A. I am the authorized custodian of photostatic copies of the dis-
patches mentioned, duly authenticated under official seal, and I here-
with j)roduce them. They \vere assembled under one certificate and for
easy reference have been numbered 1. 2, 3 and 4 within the certificate.
The duly authenticated copies of dispatches 280627 dated 28 No-
vember 1941, 300419 dated 30 November, 1941, 212155 dated 21 Jan-
uary 1941, and 070645 dated 7 December 1941 were submitted to the
judge advocate, to the other interested parties, and to the court, and
by the interested party, [1137] Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence.
There being no objection, they were so received, marked "EX-
HIBIT 76", copies appended.
4. Q. Please read these dispatches.
The witness read the dispatches. Exhibit 76.
5. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of CinCPac dispatch 292350
dated 30 November 1941, and Chief of Naval Operations dispatch
301709 dated 30 November 1941 ? If so, please produce them.
A. I am the authorized custodian of photostatic copies of these
dispatches duly authenticated under official seal. These two dis-
patches are covered by one certificate and for easy reference these dis-
patches have beexi numbered 1 and 2 within the certificate.
The duly authenticated copies of CinCPac dispatches 292350 dated
30 November 1941 and 301709 dated 30 November 1941 were submitted
to the judge advocate, to the other interested parties,, and to the court,
and by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret) offered in evidence.
There being no objection, they were so received, marked "EX-
HIBIT 77", copies appended.
6. Q. Will you please read these dispatches ?
The witness read the dispatches, Exhibit 77.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.
The interested party, Admiralj Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
requested permission to introduce a series of additional personal cor-
respondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific, during the year 1941, which had not been previously
introduced.
The judge advocate objected unless it were shown that the docu-
ments were pertinent to the inquirv.
[1138] The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, stated: It has a material bearing in this respect: As it now
appears there is testimony in the record to the effect that Admiral
Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel rather regularly. The record, how-
ever, discloses only certain letters that have been taken from time to
672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time and put into the record. It doesn't disclose any rep:ular writing
on the part of Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. We don't pro-
pose to read into the record from these letters but we do want them
in the record with their dates to show the regular sequence of Admiral
Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel over the period of a year.
The court stated : Yes, but everything that has been introduced by
Admiral Kimmel was introduced for the purpose of reading certain
parts therefrom, which was done. You have tlie same right, but to
just tack things on the record without using them in any way is not
permissible.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated :
It is usable in this respect : That unless you have all the letters before
you, you can't tell whether Admiral Stark did, in fact, write to
Admiral Kimmel regularly over a period of years.
The court stated : You must get somebody to testify to that effect,
if it is desired that they be introduced for any particular point, or
read any part you want ; but just to tack something on there, we can't
allow that. We won't accept them in that form. They must be in-
troduced for some purpose ; I mean, reading from them or reading all
of them, but just simply adding them on to the record, that is not per-
missible. You can put yourself on the stand if you want to and state
that these letters cover a certain period, if that is your idea, and go
ahead and put in the record that there was an indefinite number of
letters written back and forth.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark. U. S. Navy, stated :
Mr. President, it isn't for the purpose of just making the exhibits in
the record more voluminous. It is for the purpose of showing that
there was a definite regularity of letters. They are introduced for a
purpose. They are introduced for the purpose alone to show that
there was a definite pattern to Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kim-
mel during the year, that is, that he regularly wrote those letters.
The court stated : All right; then put somebody on the stand to tes-
tify to that effect.
[1139] The interested party, Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S.
Navy, stated : It has been testified to but we submit the letters them-
selves are the best evidence.
The court stated : The objection is sustained.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.)
was recalled as a witness by the court, and was warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the court :
1. Q. Admiral Bloch, it has come out in this testimony before the
court that you had the power under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
to request patrol planes for reconnaissance. Will you please state to
the court if and when you made such requests and how these planefi
were employed ?
A. I think I made a request in June, 1940. from General Herron, who
came to me and told me that he had received a dispatch from the War
Department. He was Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment. He came to me and stated that he had received a dispatch
from the Chief of Staff. United States Army, to the effect that he must
be on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation. When
he came to me I informed him that I had no patrol planes for that
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 673
purpose, and suggested that he go with me to the senior oflicer present,
^Yho was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, who was then Commander,
Hawaiian Detachment. We went on board Admiral Andrews' flagship
and General Herron explained the matter, and Admiral Andrews in-
stituted a dawn to dusk patrol service, informing the Commander-in-
Chief, Admiral Richardson, of the circumstances. Admiral Richard-
son was at sea. Admiral Ricliardson flew in, and I think he related the
rest of it in his testimony, that he discussed the thing with Vice Ad-
miral Andrews and General Herron and myself and finally sent a
dispatch to the Navy Department and asked them about it, and the
Navy Department never replied to him. Now, I don't know how long
they continued that dawn to dusk reconnaissance. The second time
that I recall was sometime in the summer of 1941 ; I don't remember
the exact date. It was caused by some intelligence information that
I had received and I thought that it would be advisable to make a long
distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit, that is, a medial
line of a [^^4-^] sector pointing to Jaluit. and I think it was 15
degrees on either side. I went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended
that he put in this service. I don't remember the number of miles the
search went out ; I think it was 500 miles ; I'm not sure. However, it
was in effect and the purpose of the search was to detect movements of
Japanese submarines or any other Japanese ships in the direction of
Hawaii from Jaluit. Now, if there was any other time that I made
a request, I don't recall it. I felt that I had a right, as every other
subordinate of the Fleet had, of going to the Commander-in-Chief of
the Fleet, whose office door was always open, and make any recom-
mendation that I saw fit, but I knew that any recommendation must
be backed by good reason ; I must have a good reason for the recom-
mendation.
2. Q. But you considered, did you not, that the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific, had left the matter of reconnaissance to you and that
you would make application for planes in case you thought it advis-
able?
A. No, I didn't have any such understanding as that. I knew that
I had a right to recommend reconnaissance when I had a good reason
for recommending it, but I didn't feel that the Commander-in-Chief
depended on me to make a recommendation before he would make a
reconnaissance. I felt that he might initiate one himself on somebody
else's recommendation, or on his own initiative.
3. Q. But you didn't feel that it was your province to take the initia-
tive in making recommendations as to reconnaissance?
A. Only when I had good reason.
4. Q. What planes, if any, were assigned to you for routine tasks
as Naval Base Air Defense Officer?
A. I was not the Naval Base Air Defense Officer. I was the Naval
Base Defense Officer and I had no planes assigned to me as a firm force.
5. Q. How many planes could have been assigned to you in case of
an emergency?
A. Well, in case of activation of the Naval Base Defense Force,
which was only in case of drill or in case of an actual attack, all avail-
able planes were assigned, but that was only in case of an attack or
in case of drill.
6. Q. All available Fleet planes ; is that correct ?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 1 44
674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. All availabe shore-based panes. That incuded patrol planes and
whatever happened to be on Ford Island.
7. Q. But all naval shore-based planes were made automatically
available to you upon an air-raid alarm ; is that correct?
A. Yes; they were mde available to Admiral Bellinger who com-
manded the Base Defense Air Force.
[1141^ 8. Q. It has been testified that they were made avail-
able to you as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.
A. They were made available to the Naval Base Defense Air
Force, which was commanded by Admiral Bellinger and not by me.
I was Naval Base Defense Officer and Admiral Bellinger was Com-
mander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
9. Q. That is rather confusing to the court. Will you explain this
set-up? We have never gotten straight on that yet. You were in
command and you were not in command. I mean, there is a certain
distinction there between Naval Base Defense Air Force and Naval
Base Defense Force.
A. There was no Naval Base Defense Force mentioned in Admiral
Kimmel's order. I was called the Naval Base Defense Officer. The
air force consisted of all shore-based naval planes or Fleet planes
there. They were only under my supervisory control. Admiral
Bellinger was loaned to me by Admiral Kimmel as Commander of
the Naval Base Defense Air Force and he commanded the air force
and his operation order was a part of Exhibit 53. It is very clear
what he did.
10. Q. Was he subject to your orders in any way while that force
was acting as defense?
A. He was subject to my orders insofar as related to readiness of
the planes. I was supposed to assign the condition of readiness of
the planes to this air force. I was supposed, in case of an air raid,
to sign the air raid alarm. I was supposed to see that they launched
the search and attack, and that was all provided for by frequent
drills which made all this automatic. , In other words, I had super-
visory control — and that is so stated in Admiral Kimmel's order,
that I was in supervisory control. I was also in supervisory control
in exactly the same way of the Army-Navy Air Defense. Now, that
was assigned to me by Admiral Kimmel and that circular doesn't
mean that I had any command functions in the Army when I had
that supervisory control of the Army.
11. Q. In case of alarm or attack, did you tell him how to search?
A. No.
12. Q. You had no control over that?
A. I had control over it if I wanted to change it, but he had prac-
tically autonomous control over the air force. He was the Air
Force Commander. I had the whole thing and he had the air part
of it, a task group under me, and the drills had been conducted and
he had his search arrangements made and he went out without any
further orders from me, just as soon as the air raid alarm sounded.
13. Q. But did he decide as to the area of search or as to the
composition of search, or anything like that? Was he a subordinate
of yours to such an extent that you could [^4^] give him
orders in directing him what to do?
A. I could give him orders and the Commander-in-Chief could
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 675
give him orders, but Admiral Bellinger was a flying officer, he was
a rear admiral in the Navy, he had drilled this thing, he had search
arrangements made, and he went out on search in his group.
14. Q. But as a matter of fact, he was under your command on
that search?
A. I could give him orders, unquestionably. I don't think there
is any use to discuss that. Any orders I would give him, he could
accept. I don't think there is any question about it, but he was in
command of the Air Force.
15. Q. While he was doing that, he was really in the set-up of the
Air Base Defense?
A. He was the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
16. Q. You were the Naval Base Defense Officer and had him
under your control?
A. That is correct. And when the order came out, I issued an
operation plan, and I gave him as one of the task groups and told
him to get out his order and I approved his order.
17. Q. He was very definitely under your command, then ?
A. Well, the reason I brought the question up was to be technically
correct in accordance with the existing orders. The existing orders
said that all these planes were under my supervisory control. When
the order was issued to put this Base Defense Air Force under the
whole thing in accordance with 2CL, I got out an operation plan.
The operation plan sets out the various task groups. It gave Naval
Base Defense Air Force (Admiral Bellinger in command) and all
the rest of it. And then they all had orders calling their attention
to this 2CL, and that they were to submit their operation orders,
which they all did, and Admiral Bellinger submitted his too.
18. Q. Did you understand the Commander-in-Chief held you re-
sponsible for the plan and the operation of these planes?
A. No, I didn't understand that.
19. Q. In other words, your subordinate had the responsibility,
although you were in command of the subordinate?
A. That is correct.
20. Q. Suppose you had had planes of your own which, as I under-
stand it, is part of the defense of a permanent naval base: Would
you not then have had direct charge of those planes?
A. I would have had an air officer in command.
[11^3] 21. Q. You would probably have had an air officer?
A. I would have had an air officer and he would have been in com-
mand of the task group in my district and he would have run them
subject to m}' orders.
22. Q. Isn't it a fact that in the chain of command from the top
down that the top is in command ?
A. Oh, yes ; I don't think there is any use to argue about that.
23. Q. Still leaves a lot of doubt, though, the way you have ex-
pressed it.
A. In what respect, sir ?
24. Q. As to whether or not you had command of that air force
when they were placed under you?
A. Well, they were only under Admiral Bellinger as a Naval Base
Defense Air Force when they were activated, and they were only
activated, while I was there, for drill and for that one time when we
676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were attacked ; those are the only times. Every time they went out to
drill we simulated conditions. Very frequently Admiral Kimmel
had a carrier out there and would send planes in. Admiral Bellinger
drew up his search plans and he had his search plans made for this
thing to go out, and he had his operation order and I approved his
operation order, and I accepted the responsibility for approving his
operation order. It was full and complete.
25. Q. You couldn't have done that unless he was under your com-
mand.
A. I will admit he was in my chain of command, but the order
didn't say it. It said "supervisory control".
26. Q. Suppose Admiral Kimmel had taken every vessel of the
Pacific Fleet away from Pearl Harbor and left only the PatWing
Two, or whatever you call it ; and j^ou, being the senior naval officer
present then, had received some information which indicated that
something ought to be done with regard to the use of planes : Would
you then have given direct orders to Admiral Bellinger «
A. Yes, of course, if everybody else had gone away and I was the
senior officer present in the Fleet. In that case I was the senior officer
present in the Fleet and I was senior to Admiral Bellinger and I could
give him those instructions.
27. Q. I think what the court is trying to develop is the question
of whether or not you were in a position to have judged from circum-
stances whether or not a direct order to Admiral Bellinger to modify
his operation order was demanded ?
A. I don't know of any correction that was needed in Admiral Bel-
linger's operation order. I don't know whether I'm quite clear on
what you mean.
[ii^-^] 28. Q. When something comes up that isn't covered by
the operation order, some rumor or some report that you get yourself
before anybody else does.
A. Yes, but I think the misunderstanding is based on something
else which is a little deeper. Take for instance an air attack comes
in on Pearl Harbor and the air raid alarm is sounded either by radar
warning or whatever. The Base Defense Air Force is activated at
once. Admiral Bellinger is in direct command of them. Now, the
fighter planes go out and join the Army fighters to fight these bombers
that are coming in; and the search and attack group, which is Ad-
miral Bellinger's force over the sea, is joined by the Sixth Army
bombers and goes out to find the carriers. Now, they will go to the
carriers. If they have a radar indication or radio direction indica-
tion, they are told where that is and Admiral Bellinger takes them
there. If, on the other hand, they have no knowledge of where this
attack may be, as was the case on December 7th, they must make a
360-degree search, for which he had a plan. Does that clarify the
situation ?
29. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that the arrangement which was in
effect was a make-shift one caused by the fact that you had no patrol
planes with which you could make reconnaissance, that duty being the
one with which you were charged ?
A. Yes. I had no patrol planes for distance reconnaissance, so con-
sequently Admiral Kimmel had a make-shift arrangement whereby
he would furnish patrol planes to the Base Defense Air Force for
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 677
reconnaissance in case of air attack to locate carriers. It was also for
the further purpose of supplementing the deficienc}' in Army fighters.
The Army was responsible? for all pursuit plane operations, that is,
fighter opeiations fighting attacking bombers.
30. Q. Then is it not a fact that because of the deficiency in the
equipment supplied you, the Fleet was forced to participate in its own
defense while in a permanent naval base ?
A. Yes ; deficiency in Army equipment and Navy equipment.
31. Q. I3ut Admiral, even though you state that no planes were
supplied you directly, there were planes under xYdmiral Bellinger
which would have been under your control had you requested them and
the Commander-in-Chief had approved; is that correct?
A. If I had requested it, I assume Admiral Kimmel would have
done it.
32. Q. If you had anticipated an air attack on Pearl Harbor at any
time by reason of information that you had received, would you have
felt at liberty to have immediately ordered Admiral Bellinger to take
a certain course of procedure as to reconnaissance or as to search?
A. No, not for a protracted daily reconnaissance. For [^^45]
a protracted daily reconnaissance over a period of time I would have
had to see Admiral Kimmel in advance and get his authority because
if I instituted any such thing contrary to his decision — which he made
on November 27th that he would not make any distance reconnais-
sance— and upset his complete operating schedule, I would have needed
his authority to do it so I could not put any protracted reconnaissance
plan into effect without his authority.
33. Q. Did you ever make any recommendation to the Commander-
in-Chief to make a distance reconnaissance ?
A. Only the occasions which I have told you about, and in this par-
ticular case between October 15th and December 7th, I had no infor-
mation anything different from Admiral Kimmel's. We had the same
information. I couldn't possibly arrive at any different conclusions
with him.
34. Q. Will you please state to the court, Admiral, the orders, if any,
which you gave to anyone on the morning of December 7th at the time
of this attack ?
A. Well, I think I enumerated them in my previous testimony.
I know I gave orders to flood the drydock, that is. the No. 1 drydock.
I also gave orders to flood the floating drydock. I gave orders about
certain tugs ; I have forgotten the details of them. The air raid alarm,
I also gave the orders that that was to be sounded when I knew about
the attack, and it was sounded. I also gave an order cbout sending a
dispatch out to all ships and all stations about an air raid being in
effect, and the location of it. There were innumerable orders that I
gave in the course of the attack that I can't recall what they were.
35. Q. You gave an order to close the gate, didn't you?
A. The order to close the gate was given by the Captain of the yard
who was charged, by me, with the operation of the gate, and he gave
the order to close the gate. He sent it out at any rate.
3G. Q. Did your intelligence officers have any means of obtaining
information from certain messages or regarding certain messages that
have been presented to this court ?
A. They had no equipment and they could not do it.
678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
37. Q. Were these Marine Corps anti-aircraft defense guns manned
at the time of attack on December 7th?
A. I have ascertained that at that timie there were three, 3-inch,
50-calibre guns, and five, 50-calibre guns in the Navy Yard belonging
lo the Marines. By agreement with tlie Army, they were to be turned
over to the Army when the Army deployed their guns, and the Army
started deploying their guns immediately on the attack and these guns
went out with them.
[114^] 38. Q. Weren't they used there on the station ?
A. No, they were turned over for the Army to control and every-
thing. The Army had complete cognizance of all shore-based anti-
aircraft weapons.
39. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the radar set up by the
Army on the Island of Oahu ?
A. Generally speaking, yes.
40. Q. Did you confer with the Commanding General, General
Short, as to the equipment, its efficiency of operation, and so on?
A. I talked to General Short. I can't recall any conferences that
were especially directed toward the radar but I knew from General
Short, and I also knew from members of my staff who were in contact
with the members of General Short's staff, what the conditions were.
41. Q. Did you know that they were deficient in men to efficiently
operate this radar equipment?
A. General Short wrote me a letter and told me that he was having
difficulty training his operators and asked if I would arrange with
Admiral Kimmel to have his operators sent on board ship, and I took
that up with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Kimmel took them to sea
with him and trained them.
42. Q. Did he ever ask you or request of you additional operators or
liaison officers?
A. He never requested additional operators from the Navy and he
never requested any liaison officer from me. Now, on this question of
liaison officer, it seems to be somewhat confused. This liaison officer
was a watch officer. He was a man who sat at a telephone and talked,
got information, and if in a center, the interceptor center, telephoned
in to the Harbor Control Post in the naval district, and from the in-
formation he gave us we were supposed to claim our own aircraft and
we were supposed to claim our own ships in case it was a surface target.
In that category of watch officers there was not only a naval officer
there ; there were at least 6 or 7 Army watch officers too.
43. Q. Where?
A. In the interceptor center standing watch. One of them came
from the ground troops ; another one, I think, came from the bomber
command; another one came from civilian air defense; another one
came from something else, I've forgotten where. There were five or
six other people there who were in the same position of this naval
officer and when anything was sighted on the surface or in the air it
was sent out by all these people to the various commands to see if they
could claim it. Now, on the mornings of December 6th and 7th, no-
body had anybody there. None of the Army watch officers nor the
Navy watch officers were there because the Army never asked for them
to come.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 679
[77^7] 44. Q. Wasn't that a matter of routine procedure to have
these officers there, or was it on account of being Sunday morning that
they weren't there?
A. No, it wasn't on account of Sunday morning. In the joint agree-
ment in regard to this anti-aircraft warning service, it was stated
that when the warning service was established, that is, wlien it was
finished and ready to go, that we would furnish this man and it had
never been established and General Short testified before this inquiry
that it had never been established and it wasn't established until
December 7th.
45. Q. In other words, on December 7th and prior thereto, it was
in a preliminary state and was not officially established as to routine!
A. It was in a very formative state. As a matter of fact, on De-
cember 4th or 5th— I don't remember which— General Davidson, who
had charge of this and who had been in the United States to find out
how to do it. just returned two days before the attack on Pearl Harbor
with the information of what he wanted to do.
46. Q. It has been mentioned in the testimony by certain officers
that there was quite a little information regarding the Japanese situa-
tion in the newspapers. Did you receive or can you remember whether
or not you received any accurate information in the nawspapers, and
whether or not you depended on newspapers to form your estimate at
that time ?
A. Well, I read the newspapers, two of them in Honolulu — one
morning and one afternoon — good papers. I listened to the radio
broadcasts, not only the Hawaiian but the Mainland broadcasts when I
could get it. I did everything in my power not to be influenced by
what I heard or read, but I was influenced. I was subconsciously in-
fluenced and couldn't avoid it. I didn't know I was but I realize now
that I was.
47. Q. How were you influenced ?
A. Well, for one thing, I read in the newspapers — I think on Friday
or Saturday, December 5th or 6th, 1941 — that the President of the
United States had written a note to the Emperor of Japan in which he
was imploring that further negotiations be had and that this thing be
smoothed out and one thing and another, I had not other background
than what I read there in the paper and I didn't know whether to be-
lieve it, or not, but actually I find that I believed that this thing was
going to have some effect.
48. Q. In what way ?
A. I believed that the Japanese Government would take no action
such as it did on the 7th of December when the head of another nation
was actually sending them a telegram one or two days ahead, you
know, asking for more time, and all that business.
[1148^ 49. Q. Did you have any information as to the back-
ground which led up to the President's letter to the Emperor of Japan ?
Had you sufficient information from the Department to give you a
background for that diplomatic information ?
A. I had no information. I didn't know until April 5, 1942, that
there had ever been a note of 26 November, I learned it when I
joined the General Board, I think it was on April 5, 1942.
50. Q. From your best knowledge, there was no notice of it or
reference regarding it in the Honolulu press ?
680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.A. If there was, it made no impression on me. I have no recollec-
tion of it.
51. Q. If you had known of this note of November 26th, and had you
been familiar with its contents as you probably are now, would that
have had any bearing on your estimate of the situation ?
A. Of course I don't know. That is a very hypothetical question
but I don't see how anybody who had any knowledge of Japanese-
American diplomatic history could possibly avoid forming a very
definite conclusion that the United States note to Japan w-as very
extreme when it demanded that Japan recognize Chiang Kai-shek,
that they get all Japanese out of China day after tomorrow. You
must understand that that is a very serious situation, particularly to
put up to an Oriental nation.
52. Q. In other words, had you known of the contents of this note
it may, in all probability, have had a very marked bearing on your
ideas as to the situation ?
A. Well, I can't discuss myself singly in this thing because I feel
that my contact with Admiral Kimmel was so complete and, you
might say, continuous, that any bit of information like that we took
over to him and we discussed it and lie had a very competent staff.
I had no staff to speak of — one or two people — and w^e would discuss
this thing from A to Z. I have no doubt we would have discussed it
with General Short before much time had passed. However, all of it
is hypothetical and I am just telling you what I think would have
taken place.
53. Q. Were you aware of General Short's ideas as to internal
sabotage on the Island of Oahu ?
A. Well, of course, I knew General Short and the Army at large
had very much fear of sabotage. They were responsible for all anti-
sabotage measures taken outside the Navy Yards. They had their
water-works and the power plants, telephone plants, all of those
things, and they considered that a very serious obligation. I felt that
they felt very keenly their responsibility in that regard. I also felt
that they were invasion conscious. Most of their maneuvers w^ere
patterned towards the repulsion of overseas invasions.
[114^] 54. Q. Did you know that his planes and so on were
grounded and placed in accordance with his ideas against sabotage?
A. No, sir, I did not know it.
55. Q. I would just like to have this question of the inshore air
patrol cleared up in my own mind. I understand that that was in
charge of the Army ?
A. That is correct.
56. Q. Is it not a proper charge for the Navy?
A. I think it should be.
57. Q. Did you not request sea planes for that purpose and have
them refused ?
A. Yes, sir.
58. Q. Isn't it true. Admiral, that in the instance which you speak
of in 1940, that the senior officer present at that time conferred with
the Army and that the Army did have and did detail an inshore air
patrol of 25 miles and 50 miles at the entrance of Pearl Harbor?
A. No, sir, I don't know that.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 681
59. Q. Do you remember how long this so-called distance patrol by
PBY planes was continued?
A. You mean the one where General Herron asked Vice Admiral
Andrews?
GO. Q. Yes.
A. To the best of my recollection it was three days. Admiral Kich-
ardson discontinued it when he returned from sea.
61. Q. Wasn't it started again afterwards?
A. I don't know.
The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this wit-
ness.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret)
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The judge advocate stated that he did not desire to cross-examine
this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
[1150] The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.
The court then, at 2 : 55 p. m., took an adjournment until 10 : 30 a. m.,
Wednesday, September 27, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 683
PEOCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INOUIEY
SEPTEMBER 27, 1944
\_1151'\ THrRTY-THIRD DaY
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. G.
The court met at 10 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his
counsel.
Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and
his counsel.
Rear Admiral Husbands E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, and his counsel.
The record of the proceedings of the thirty-second day of the inquiry
was read and approved.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, IT. S. Naval
Reserve, counsel to the judge advocate, was recalled as a witness by
the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy :
1. Q. Do you have in your possession certain letters from Admiral
Stark to Admiral Kimmel, written during the year 1941 ?
A. I do. I have in my possession a file of photostatic copies of
personal letters from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, consisting
of ten letters, as follows: Januarv 29, 1941; April 4, 1941; April
19, 1941 ; April 26, 1941 ; May 15, 1941 ; May 24, 1941 ; June 26, 1941 ;
July 3, 1941, July 25, 1941; and August 21, 1941.
None of the parties to the inquiry nor the judge advocate [1J52'\
desired further to examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was previleged to many any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel to the judge advocate.
684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire any more witnesses.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), made the following statement: We now would like to
have Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, and Captain A. H.
McCollum, U, S. Navy, available as witnesses.
The judge advocate made the following reply: The judge advocate
presents to the court, for prefixing to the record, a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy, dated September 22, 1944.
The judge advocate read the letter, original prefixed hereto, marked
"D".
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), made the following statement: We have no further
witnesses.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
stated that he did not desire any more witnesses.
The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge ad-
vocate feels that the court will remember the numerous instances in
the earlier stages of the proceedings when the interested party, Rear
Admiral Kimmel, stated in the record that certain documents in the
files of the Navy Department were being denied him and this denial
in effect not only prevented a proper presentation of the evidence
that he felt should be presented to the court, but also would prevent
the court from arriving at a full finding of the facts it was directed
to inquire into. The judge advocate at this time requests a categorical
statement for the record from Admiral Kimmel, as to whether there
are now any documents that have been denied him for presentation
to the court.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, [1153]
U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following reply: Admiral Kimmel has
been supplied with all the documents requested in the statements refer-
red to by the judge advocate, and possibly in letters, that we have been
assured are available in the Nav}' Department. We call attention to the
fact that there was one document which would normally go in Exhibit
63, of which evidence has been adduced showing that at one time it
was in the Navy Department, but it is no longer present.
The judge advocate made the following statement : Other than this
one document that you have just mentioned, is it the judge advocate's
understanding that you have got all oth.er documents and correspon-
dence from the files of the Navy and Navy Department that you de-
sire for presentation to this Court of Inquiry ?
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), made the following reply: We have received all that we
have requested.
The page following directly hereafter, page 1154, has, by direction
of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the
Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of na-
tional security and the successful prosecution of the war.
[1155] Neither the court, the judge advocate, nor any party to the
inquiry desired any more witnesses.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested Party, submitted a
written statement, which statement was read and is appended.
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 685
party, submitted a written statement, the readinfj of which was begun.
The court then, at 12 :30 p. m., during the reading of tlie statement
of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kinnnel, U. S. Navy (Ret) , took a recess
until 1 :45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel ; all the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R.. Stark,
U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M,
Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
The reading of the statement of the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was resumed and completed,
and a copy thereof is appended.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, sub-
mitted a written statement, which statement was read and is appended.
The judge advocate made the following statement : The judge advo-
cate has presented to this court all the evidence that he can find that he
feels bears on the subject matter under inquiry. This evidence is very
voluminous and has been, for the most part, duplicated in many ways,
so that the facts, he feels, are firmly impressed in the court's mind, and
he therefore does not feel that it would serve any useful purpose for
him, at this time, to make any argument based on these facts.
Neither the interested party, Adnurai Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy ;
the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
(Ret) ; nor the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy
(Ret) , desired to make any argument.
The record of proceedings of the thirty-third day of the inquiry was
read and approved.
The inquiry was finished, all parties tliereto withdrawing.
X
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