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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-^•^-^ 



HEARINGS 

UBFOUM THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 33 
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HAKBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEiAIBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 33 
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
"9716 WASHINGTON : 1946 



D767 
. AS*- 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE I'EAKL 
HAKBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 



SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois 
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine 
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- 
gan 
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from 
North Carolina 



I'ennsylvania 

BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 
tive from California 

FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from 
Wisconsin 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 

W'lLLiAM D. Mitchell, Oeneral Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell^ Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Seth W. Richardson, Oeneral Counsel 

Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate Oeneral Counsel 

John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 

Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part Pages Transcript Hearings 

No. pages 

1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 

3 983-1583 2587-4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 

4 1585-^063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 

7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24. 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 

8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 

10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 

11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army. Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



79716— Part 33 



INDEX TO EXHIBITS VII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT 
OF INQUIRY 



Page 

Exhibit No. 1 923 

Exhibit No. 2 924 

Exhibit No. 3 925 

Exliibit No. 4 I- — 926 

Exhibit No. 5 986 

Exhibit No. 6 1018 

Exhibit No. 7 1150 

Exhibit No. 8 1158 

Exhibit No. 9 1163 

Exhibit No. 10 1165 

Exhibit No. 11 1166 

Exhibit No. 12 1168 

Exhibit No. 13 1171 

Exhibit No. 14 1171 

Exhibit No. 15 1173 

Exhibit No. 16 1174 

Exhibit No. 17 1176 

Exhibit No. 18 1177 

Exhibit No. 19 1177 

Exhibit No. 20 1178 

Exhibit No. 21 1178 

Exhibit No. 22 1179 

Exhibit No. 23 1179 

Exhibit No. 24 1186 

Exhibit No. 25 1187 

Exhibit No. 26 , 1187 

Exhibit No. 27 1190 

Exhibit No. 28 1193 

Exhibit No. 29 1196 

Exhibit No. 30 1199 

Exhibit No. 31 1201 

Exhibit No. 32 1205 

Exhibit No. 33 1208 

Exhibit No. 34 1214 

Exhibit No. 35 1217 

Exhibit No. 36 1230 

Exhibit No. 37 1231 

Exhibit No. 38 12.34 

Exliibit No. 39 1236 

Exhibit No. 39A 1238 

Exhibit No. 40 1240 

Exhibit No. 41 1240 

Exhibit No. 42_.. 1241 

Exhibit No. 43 1243 

Exhibit No. 44 1243 

Exhibit No. 45__ 1279 

Exhibit No. 46 1280 

Exhibit No. 47 1281 

Exhibit No. 48 1282 

Exhibit No. 49 1283 

Exhibit No. 50 1284 

Exhibit No. 51 1287 

Exhibit No. 52 1291 



VIII INDEX TO EXHIBITS 



Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 



Page 

t No. 53 1294 

t No. 54 1316 

t No. 55 1318 

t No. 56 1319 

t No. 57 1319 

t No. 58 1328 

t No. 59 1332 

t No. 60 1340 

t No. 61 1341 

t No. 62_ 1344 

t No. 63 1362 

t No. 64 1387 

t No. 65 1388 

t No. 66 1390 

t No. 67 1390 

t No. 68 ■■ 1391 

t No. 69A 1348 

t No. 69B 1348 

t No. 70 1349 

t No. 71 1351 

t No. 72 1353 

t No. 73 1357 

t No. 74 1359 

t No. 75 1360 

t No. 76 1360 

t No. 77 1362 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 687 



[a] [secret] 

Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 

U. S. N. 

L^] Introduction 

This summary will point out what we consider to be the most 
important aspects of this Inquiry insofar as they affect the interests 
of Admiral Stark, designated an Interested Party by this Court. It 
is not our purpose to comment on testimony developed by this In- 
quiry which affects only one or more of the other persons designated 
as Interested Parties. 

I. MOBILIZATION FOR WORLD WAR II 

1. Mobilization meant building up the forces and distributing 
them, prior to hostilities if possible. On 7 December 1941 there were 
shortages of ships, planes and personnel, in the Pacific Fleet as well 
as in the other Naval Commands. We have had shortages at the 
beginning of all our wars. 

2. Beginning soon after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, 
we began the time-consuming task of building up our Naval Forces 
and they were very considerably increased by the end of 1941. The 
testimony concerning Admiral Stark's part in this effort is brief 
but, with what is common knowledge, does indicate his zeal and his 
accomplishments despite the difficulties which always attend such 
progress during peace. The overall result was, to state it conserva- 
tively, a much higher degree of readiness, in late 1941, than had been 
the [^] case in our previous naval war history. Moreover, 
every ship available had been placed in commission. 

3. The Distribution of Forces among the various Naval Commands 
was Admiral Stark's responsibility subject, however, to concepts and 
policies either passed to him from higher levels or which resulted 
from cooperative agreements with our Army. The entire world 
theatre had to be considered and the available forces spread in two 
oceans, even if in spots they thus appeared to be thin. Some mention 
has been made of the transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
during 1941. It must be remembered that 1941 began as a critical 
year in the European phase of the war and any realistic plan had to 
take into account the fact that our help in the Atlantic was deemed 
essential to stave off the defeat of Britain, a defeat which would 
probably have been disastrous in the European theater and also have 
seriously hampered our ability to successfully defend ourselves 
against the Japanese. The testimony indicates little if any fault in 
the overall distribution of our available forces, and indeed, no au- 
thoritative criticism on the point seems to have come from any 
source. The distribution which was in effect was realistic, as fitting 



688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the situation of late 1941. Mobilization was, in fact, as nearly com- 
plete as any effort of the Chief of Naval Operations could make it. 

4. The War Plans of 1941 were likewise realistic. Those Plans 
w^ere no longer development projects but were tailored to correspond 
to the forces available. Insofar as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, 
the initial tasks fitted the offensive power of that Fleet. However, 
as long as peace endured [3] we could not use that power 
offensively, because the Government had decided, as a matter of 
policy, that we would not commit a first overt act. The Japanese 
had the initiative. Therefore, our forces which were within reach 
of the Japanese, anywhere, had to expect attack — with or without 
a prior declaration of war — and their security, while in such situa- 
tion, had to be the primary consideration. These considerations of 
security have not been shown to be incompatible with maintaining 
a suitable readiness of our forces to execute the War Plan. 

5. How the security of the exposed forces was to be guarded. 
Admiral Stark left to the several Commanders-in-Chief. He did 
not attempt to tell them how to accomplish security and he did not 
harass them by calling for reports on what they had done or win- they 
had not done something else. Such had long been Admiral Stark's 
command method. It was not questioned by the several Commanders- 
in-Chief prior to 7 December 1941 — in fact, CINCPAC pointed out 
(in Exhibit 33) that because of the time and distance factors involved, 
the Navy Department was not always too well informed of the local 
situation, "thus making it even more necessary that the Conmiander- 
in-Chief , Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather 
than by categorical instructions.'' 

II. INFORMATION AND DIRECTIVES 

6. Pursuant to his policy of informing the Commanders-in-Chief 
of broad policy and objectives, Admiral Stark devoted considerable 
personal effort and [4] time toward informing the CinC, 
Pacific Fleet, of his conception of our situation vis a vis Japan. Our 
position was uncertain, in varying degrees, right up to the closing 
months of 1941 and was more or less bound to be so because of the 
nature of our governmental processes. However, Admiral Stark em- 
ployed much effort toward opening his mind to the Fleet Connnanders, 
and keeping them in touch with our policies and the current situation 
in the Pacific as he viewed it. Those views proved to be generally 
correct and, even today, appear to have been properly set forth. 

7. As regards the flow of information to CinC, Pacific Fleet, from 
the Department's machinery, by employing routine methods: Such 
information as concerned Japan is properly divided into tw^o cate- 
gories : 

a. The first constituted the primary function of the Navy's Intelli- 
gence agencies and concerned the strength, disposition and activities 
of Japanese forces. That class of information was always scant but 
such as was obtained w^as known to Pacific Fleet Commanders. As a 
matter of fact, one of the principal gatherers of such intelligence was 
stationed in Pearl Harber. 

b. The other category originated in Japanese political and diplo- 
matic sources and was mainly gathered by joint effort of War and 
Navy Departments. The volume of such intelligence was very great 
and only a fraction carried significance of direct naval or military 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 689 

value. It was not routine to transmit this class of information, from 
day to day, as it came in, to the CinC, Pacific [S] Fleet. Cer- 
tain items of it have been brought before this Court and many 
questions put with the indicated intention of proving serious failure 
in duty by the Chief of Naval Operations in not transmitting this 
category of intelligence to CinC, Pacific Fleet, as the various items 
became available. In studying the items of this category which are 
in the record, it isi well to keep in mind that one, or several of them, 
lifted from their place amid a great number can, in the light of 
hindsight, be made to appear f ai* more significant than would have 
been the case at the time. 

c. To have transmitted even a fraction of this category to Fleet 
Commanders, as a matter of routine, was quite inadvisable for two 
reasons : Personnel was limited and more important work would have 
been displaced. Such practice would have tended to compromise 
intelligence agencies which were a highly important part of our prep- 
arations for war. The information and directives which were sent 
did reflect intelligence from such sources. 

8. Admiral Stark did keep CinC, Pacific Fleet, informed of the 
gradual deterioration of our relations with Japan throughout 1941 
and, in late November, he warned both the Commanders-in-Chief in 
the Pacific of the probability that we ourselves would be one of the 
objectives of a Japanese surprise attack which was then expected. He 
gave out all that was known of the disposition of Japanese Naval 
units. He indicated in his despatch of 24 November 1941 that Japa- 
nese forces might make a surprise aggressive movement in any direc- 
tion. He issued an unequivocal war warning in good time — on 27 
November 1941. In [{?] this despatch, he stated: "This des- 
patch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
* * * have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected 
within the next few days." He pointed out that the Japanese distri- 
bution indicated an amphihious expedition against either the Philip- 
pines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo, which was all that 
was new concerning Japanese dispositions. That estimate of objec- 
tives did not cancel out the despatch of 24 November 1941 in which 
Admiral Stark warned of a surprise aggressive movement in any 
direction. Thereafter, he gave CinC, Pacific Fleet, most significant 
information and directives concerning the destruction of codes and 
cyphers. These despatches represented the best judgment of the CNO 
and his principal advisors and were based on the best intelligence 
available. Subsequent events proved the information and conclusions 
given in these despatches to be correct. They did not specifically pro- 
diet an attack in the Hawaiian area. There was not sufficient basis 
for such prediction, for the amphibious expedition in the Far East 
was not pointed at Hawaii. However, its composition did not include 
all the Japanese Fleet. 

in. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEARL HARBOR 

9. It is entirely clear that, under the policies of many years, and as 
laid down in "joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", the 
Army was fully responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor against 
an air attack. That responsibility extended not only to the perma- 
nent installations at the base, [7] • but also to ships within the 
Pearl Harbor area. The Naval Base was and still is the seat of our 



690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

power over the Pacific and in the last analysis the Army forces, Oahu, 
were stationed there for its defense — and for that alone. 

10. In January, 1941, the Navy Department (in Exhibit 9) pointed 
out to the War Department considerable deficiencies in the Army's 
readiness to meet its commitments for the defense of the Pearl Har- 
bor Area against air attack. The War Department (in Exhibit 24) 
acknowledged those deficiencies and undertook to remedy them. At 
that time, both the Army and the Navy were cognizant of the material 
and operational developments whereby the British had defeated Ger- 
man air attack upon England. Those developments did include 
close-in defense by anti-aircraft artillery, but the main feature was 
fighter aircraft, made effective by radar and the directive control of 
the fighters from the ground. By those methods, all of which had been 
disclosed to the U. S. officers in England, a relatively small force of 
fighter planes had repeatedly broken up heavy German bombing at- 
tacks. The same methods are still in use today. 

11. For the defense of the Pearl Harbor Area against air attack, 
thei Navy's sole responsibility was to support the Army's effort 
through the use of such elements as happened to be available, whether 
belonging to the local defense forces or units which were parts of 
the Pacific Fleet itself. Since Pearl Harbor was our one large 
navel base in the Pacific, some units of the Fleet were normally 
expected to be present. The defense of the Pearl Harbor Area, 
and of any Fleet units which happened to be there, against air at- 
tack, was not a direct responsibility of the Navy which had no 
authority over the [<?] main defensive agency — the aircraft 
warning system, the fighter planes and their direction in combat. 

12. Even had no important Fleet units been in Pearl Harbor on 
7 December, there were plenty of lucrative targets for the Japanese 
aircraft. For example, the Court will have noted the location of 
the .fuel tanks, up-hill from the all-important Submarine Base. 
The testimony shows that those tanks were practically filled to 
capacity (4,000,000 barrels). They could have been blown up and 
fired by a very few planes attacking unopposed. The Court can 
estimate how long our effort in the Pacific might have been delayed 
if the Japanese raid, on 7 December, had found no Fleet units 
present and had been directed against various Pearl Harbor installa- 
tions on shore. 

13. There was, from early in 1941, nothing new about defense 
against air raids by means of fighter aircraft made effective by 
radar and a ground control system. Such defense is comparatively 
simple, requires only a small number of personnel, is self-contained 
and is adaptable for readiness round the clock because it has only 
one single, well-defined function. The elements for such defense 
became available on Oahu in the summer of 1941, and they were 
supplied for the one purpose of defense against an air raid. The 
evidence discloses that there was nearly complete failure by Army 
Fighter Planes to oppose the attack of 7 December. 

14. Counsel submits that whatever may have been Navy failures, 
on or before 7 December 1941, failures in judgment, of commission, 
or of omission, [9'] all of those failures combined constitute 
something quite minor as compared with the failure of the Army 
Interceptor Command on Oahu. 

H. R. Stark. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 691 



[1] Statement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 
Retired, before the Naval Court of Inquiry Investigating the 
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, read before the Court on 27 
September 1944. 

It is not necessary for me to make this first part of my statement 
to the members of this Court. However, since the rumor has been 
widely circulated during the last two years and a half that I was a 
frend or intimate associate of the President of the United States, 
I desire to take this opportunity to place on the record a categorical 
denial of that story. The only meetings I ever had with the Presi- 
dent, prior to my official visit to Washington as Commander-in- 
Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet in June of 1941, approxi- 
mately six months after my appointment, were in the course of 
official routine duties and occurred more than twenty years prior 
to my taking command in the Pacific. During more than forty 
years of service in the Navy, I have never sought or owed advance- 
ment to any political connection of any nature or description. 

The following are the circumstances in connection with my retire- 
ment. I set them forth because this matter has been so frequently 
misrepresented in the press. 

On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, 
U. S. N., Commandant 12th Naval District, San Francisco, Cali- 
fornia, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. N., Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, had 
telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated 
that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the [^] Acting 
Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had sub- 
mitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that 
I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request 
for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy De- 
jjartment I had not even thouglit of submitting a request for re- 
tirement. 

On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that 
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, had tele- 
phoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General 
Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me. ^ 

I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, 
"I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determi- 
nation by the Department as to what course of action will best serve 
the intei'ests of the country and the good of the service." 

Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official 
directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a 
request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary 
of the Navy, Mr. Knox. 

On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval 
Operations, I stated in part : "I submitted this request solely to per- 
mit the Department to take whatever action they deemed best for the 



692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

interest of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure 
or punishment." 

The approval of my request for retirement included the statement : 
"This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation 
of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action," 

[<?] I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March 
1942 that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and 
specifications be prepared to bring me to trial by General Court 
Martial at some future time. 

When I took command of the fleet, it was based in Pearl Harbor. 
The decision to base the fleet there was made prior to my taking com- 
mand. I do not propose now to debate the wisdom or unwisdom of 
that decision. The reason assigned for the presence of the fleet in 
Hawaiian waters by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to 
Admiral Richardson dated 27 May 1940 (Exhibit 26) was, "the 
deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the 
Japanese going into the East Indies." My predecessor. Admiral 
Richardson, took up all phases of the decision to base the fleet in Pearl 
Harbor with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President. 

That decision, however, created fundamental problems for my con- 
sideration as Commander-in-Chief, among many other problems with 
which I had to deal. 

There were certain weaknesses in Pearl Harbor as a fleet base. 
They were well known to the Department. They had been pointed 
out by Admiral Richardson both to the Navy Department and to the 
President. On my own official trip to Washington in June of 1941, 
in conversation with Admiral Stark and the President, I pointed out 
the following facts: 

1. The fleet base at Pearl Harbor, due to the congestion of ships, fuel 
oil storage, and repair facilities, was exposed to attack, particularly 
from the air. 

[4] 2. The single entrance channel, which must be used by all 
ships, exposed them to submarine attack. 

3. The danger of blocking this single entrance channel must be 
constantly considered. 

4. In case of attack by air or otherwise with the fleet in port, it 
would take at least three hours to complete a sortie. 

5. That Pearl Harbor is the only refueling, replacement, and repair 
point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area. 

6. That ships must spend considerable time in Pearl Harbor for 
these purposes, for relaxation for the crews, and to complete the 
considerable number of alterations and additions required due to 
war experience. 

7. That the only real answer was for the fleet not to be in Pearl 
Harbor when the attack came. 

I mention these matters to indicate the basic problems created 
by the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor. It is not possible 
to draw a comparison between the security of such a base immediately 
prior to the out-break of hostilities, and its security in war time. 
After hostilities commence and tlie fleet is not restricted by any policy 
of waiting for the potential enemy to commit the first overt act, our 
own offensive operations afford a large measure of protection to the 
base. In peace time the condition and movement of the fleet at Pearl 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 693 

Harbor could scarcely be concealed from the watchful eyes of enemy 
agents. The very topography of Pearl Harbor and the large Jap- 
anese population of the islands created that dan- [S] ger. 
Once the fleet was placed there, for the assumed purpose of exerting 
a deterrent effect upon Japan, it was not maintaining a consistent 
policy thereafter to weaken the fleet, visibly and plainly, by diversion 
of powerful units to the Atlantic. 

Other Harbors besides Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands could 
not be used because of their extreme vulnerability to submarine 
attack. About a month before I became Commander-in-Chief, Ad- 
miral Richardson issued orders that no ship was to be anchored at 
Lahaina because he considered it was no longer safe against submarine 
attack. I fully agreed with and continued in effect this policy. 

Apart from the inherent handicaps of Pearl Harbor as a base, 
there were obvious deficiencies in the equipment necessary for its 
protection. The postulate in Joint Action Army-Navy 1935 (Exhibit 
6), was "Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured. 
The f'Set must ha/de no anxiety in regard to the security of its hose.'''' 
Unfortunately this was the merest theory in Pearl Harbor in the 
year 1941. The efforts made by me and my predecessor to strengthen 
the base defense are a matter of record in voluminous correspondence 
with the Department which is already before this Court. Time and 
again there were pointed out to the Navy Department in Washington, 
the weaknesses in the Army's equipment and material available for the 
exercise of its specifically assigned and assumed functions of base 
defense. The letter of January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70) addressed to 
the Chief of Naval Operations, written by my predecessor. Admiral 
Richardson, and prepared as stated therein [^] with my col- 
laboration, in paragraph T (a), (b), (cl), emphasizes "the critical in- 
adequacy of AA guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor." 
"the small number and obsolete condition of land based aircraft 
detection devices ashore." The letter stated that "it is considered 
imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the 
critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that 
these measures should take priority over the needs of continental 
districts, the training program and material aid to Great Britain." 
Again in my official letter of 26 May 1941 to the Chief of Naval 
Operations (Exhibit 33) in paragraph 5 (b) I said, "The defense 
of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. 
We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get 
more anti-aircraft gims, airplanes and radar equipment in Hawaii 
and to insure priority for this over continental and expanding Army 
needs." 

_ The deficiencies in the equipment which the Army needed to exer- 
cise its proper functions in the defense of the naval base at Pearl 
Harbor, pointed out by Admiral Richardson and myself during the 
year prior to December 7, 1941, had not been remedied at the time of 
the Japanese attack. 

One important and necessary element in the ability of the naval 
forces to exercise their appropriate duties in connection with the 
defense of the base was patrol planes. Plans of the Navy Depart- 
ment provided that ultimately there would be supplied to the Pacific 
fleet sufficient planes to cover operations of the fleet, with planes based 



694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Oahu, and still have a 
sufficient number to establish a continuous search around Oahu when 
the fleet was [7] operating in distant waters. My recollec- 
tion is that the plan allocated approximately 108 patrol planes to 
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for such searching and 
defensive operations as came within his sphere and also allocated 
more than 160 patrol planes for the use of the fleet. These patrol 
planes w^ere to be based on outlying islands, which we were developing 
as rapidly as conditions permitted to insure an adequate supply of 
fuel, bombs and other ammunition for patrol planes operating there- 
from. In addition, our seaplane tenders would permit the supply 
of seaplanes from any harbor where they could be landed and refueled. 
The total number of patrol planes assigned to the Pacific fleet and the 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District on December 7, 1041, was 81, 

Perhaps of more interest to this Court than our many deficiencies 
in equipment for base defense, were the plans made for the best utili- 
zation of what we had. There has been introduced in evidence Pa- 
cific Fleet confidential letter 2CL41 (Exhibit 8) originally promul- 
gated about two weeks after I took command, and revised under date 
of October 14, 1941. A study of this letter shows our plan for berth- 
ing ships in Pearl Harbor by sectors so that they would develop the 
maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector consistent with the 
total number of ships of all types in port. The same security order 
designated the Commandant of the 14tli Naval District as the Naval 
Base Defense Officer. His selection as Naval Base Defense Officer 
was entirely in harmony with the general purpose of the Joint Coastal 
Frontier Defense Plan worked out by the General commanding the 
Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District. [8] By joint agreement between the War and Navy 
Departments (Exhibit 6) and by the provision of war plans and 
existing instructions, the Army was charged with and made respon- 
sible for the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. No orders or 
instructions issued at any time lessened or mitigated the Army's re- 
sponsibility for such defense. The Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District was charged with the direction of the naval force made avail- 
able by me to assist the Army. The Army did not have a sufficient 
GHQ Air Force available to assume fully its responsibilities. The 
Commandant was charged with the coordination of the naval force 
with the Army effort to defend the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. 

As a part of the plan for coordinating the Army and Navy activi- 
ties for the defense of the base, there was approved on April 2, 1941, 
a plan dated March 28, 1941, entitled, "Joint Coastal Frontier De- 
fense Plan," (Exhibit 7). This plan dealt with joint air operations, 
joint communications, joint antiaircraft measures and joint use of 
munitions. There was also promulgated on March 31, 1941, Adden- 
dum 1 to Naval Base Defense Air Forces Operation Plan No. A-1-41 
signed by the Major General who commanded the Hawaiian air force 
and the Kear Admiral who was Commander of the Naval Base De- 
fense Air Force. (Exhibit 53). This document was followed by 
Addendum II Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. 
A--1-41 dated April 9, 19441 (Exhibit 53, Document 6). The plans for 
joint air operations by the Army and Navy in Oahu constituted in 
the minds of the Navy Department an outstanding example of prog- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OE INQUIRY 695 

ress in coordination between the services. Since these plans have 
been introduced in evidence before the Court, it is hardly necessary 
for me to describe them in detail. Copies of these documents were 
promptly furnished the Navy Department and were accepted. 

19] As Connnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 1 had a fleet 
to prepare for war. I liad an international situation, always of grave 
portent, to evaluate. It was my task to meet each situation which 
presented itself witliin the broad reaches of the Pacific and deal with 
it by appropriate action. 

One of my principal concerns was, of course, the men and ships of 
the fleet. After all, one does not train ships, but rather the men who 
man the ships. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine 
room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the look-outs, 
to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the 
signals, to the connnissary, and numerous other billets had to be trained 
before they were competent. A breakdown or inefficiency in any one 
of these categories might well be very costly, in time of war. Con- 
stantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the 
induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of re- 
cruits and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified 
training program. At times during my tenure as Commander-in- 
Chief, as high as 70% of the men on board individual ships had never 
heard a gun fired. Considerably more then 50% of the officers were 
newly commissioned. 

One great handicap was the constant and very large turn-over of 
enlisted men and officers. This was caused by the necessity of send- 
ing trained men to new construction and the expiration of enlist- 
ments, which necessitated the supply of large numbers of untrained 
personnel. This situation extended up to and including December 7. 
The situation was tlioroughly presented to the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions in my letter of May [10'] 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33) entitled, 
"Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." I refer the Court to 
paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of that letter wherein this condition 
is exhaustively treated. The training program extended to the air 
arm of the Navy. For example, we w^ere directed to transfer about 
twelve trained patrol plane crews per month to the mainland. 

As to the fleet, itself, on December 7, 1941, the Naval forces of the 
Pacific Fleet were inferior to the Japanese Navy in every category of 
fighting ship, inferior in cargo and troop transports and in tankers 
and other supply vessels. This fact was recognized in Washington. 
The joint memorandum of 5 November 1941 to the President signed 
by both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, a copy 
of which is in evidence ( Exhibit 39A) , states unqualifiedly that the 
Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet. As I read that 
memorandum the inferiority of tlie Pacific Fleet was the basic reason 
supporting the ultimate recommendation that no ultimatum should 
be delivered to Japan. 

Specifically, there were only 11 tankers in the entire Pacific. We 
were particularly deficient in land-based and carrier-based planes. 
The Japanese at the outbreak of hostilities had between 11 and 15 
aircraft carriers in commission and operating, 4 or 5 of which repre- 
sented converted merchant ships. We had 3 carriers in the Pacific. 
Although the battleships of the fleet were of approximately the same 



696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, they were particularly 
deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons. In general, all ships 
in the fleet were woefully deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weap- 
ons as [11] we had been unsuccessful in producing in quantity 
enough anti-aircraft artillery for mounting. This last mentioned 
deficiency we were engaged in remedying at the time of Pearl Harbor, 
but our task was only 10% completed. Anti-aircraft control gear 
for these and larger guns was not adequate. Our surface gunnery and 
our surface weapons because of constant care and attention were 
in excellent condition. 

There was an imperative need for an extensive training and target 
practice program for ever}^ ship's crew and every plane crew. By the 
early spring of 1941, target and base facilities to permit the prosecution 
of an intensive fleet training program had been transferred from the 
West Coast to Hawaii. To tow the considerable number of target 
rafts, to transport the utility and transport planes, and to bring the 
other training auxiliaries and fleet fueling facilities from the West 
Coast to Hawai especially when we were short of auxilary vessels was, 
in itself, a major task. Nor was the training program permitted to go 
on without diversion of sizable fleet units to other theaters. In May 
and June of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four 10,000 
ton light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, six transports, with practically 
all the trained and equipped marines on the West Coast, several small 
transports and some other small craft, were transferred from the 
Pacific to the Atlantic. The details of this transfer must have been 
quickly known in Japan. Tliis transfer took away approximately 
one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet, and resulted in a 
very substantial reduction in the potentialities of the Pacific Fleet. 
This same action which [12] took all the transports and the 
trained marines from the West Coast, left us only the marines required 
to man the outlying islands plus the garrison at Pearl Harbor. 

By December 7, 1941, some additional marines had been trained at 
San Diego and one transport out of a total of four under conversion 
on the West Coast had been commissioned. The training of marines 
in landing operations had of necessity been incomplete and their 
equipment was entirely inadequate. 

When I was in Washington in June, 1941, it was seriously proposed 
to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic on additional detachment 
to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of de- 
stroyers and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer 
was not made. 

In carrying out the training program, it was necessary for me to have 
precise and accurate knowledge of the appropriate time to interrupt 
training by making strategic dispositions. The international situation 
was grave from the moment I took connnand. I had to consider at all 
times the physical effect on the personnel of the fleet of long periods 
of watch standing in port in peace time and the result that such de- 
mands might destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to attain. 

Admiral Richardson has testified to the frequent communications he 
received from Washington emphasizing the jjossibility of war. (See, 
for example, Exhibit TG, Document 3). My oiiicial correspondence 
from the Chief of Naval Operations,' which is before the Court, in 
effect plots a gi'aph of recurrent tension in the international situation 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 697 

from February on. It is studded with expressions that, "what will 
happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess"; "that peace hangs by a 
slender thread" ; [JSl "that the situation is serious." An "open 
rupture" was described as a possibility on July 24 (Exhibit 71) ; the 
situation was described on July 31 as continuing to deteriorate (Ex- 
hibit 72) ; on September 23rd the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me 
that "conversations with th-e Japs have practically reached an im- 
passe." (Exhibit 37). It was never expected that these insistent, 
ominous predictions required, each time they were made, an abrupt 
discontinuance of essential training measures for all-out security dis- 
positions. Any such action would have seriously interfered with train- 
ing and in a relatively short time, reduced the efficiency of individual 
ships to a dangerous degree. In fact, in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Ex- 
hibit 73) the Chief of Naval Operations cautioned specifically, "I ad- 
vise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your 
forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called 
upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, 
I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be re- 
quired by the special operations which you envisage immediately after 
the entry of the United States into War. 

I expressed my own needs to the Chief of Naval Operations in 
my letter of May 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33), in which I. stated "Full 
and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even 
though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his present 
course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly 
applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessities for 
intensive [i^] training of a partly trained fleet must be care- 
fully weighed against the desirability of interruption of this train- 
ing by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventu- 
alities." I concluded with the suggestion "that it be made a cardinal 
principal that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately 
informed of all important developments as they occur and by the 
quickest secure means available." I fully expected to receive such 
information, I now believe that this record will show the failure of 
the Navy Department to inform me of known "impending eventu- 
alities" in the week immediately preceding December 7. I shall dis- 
cuss in more detail hereafter, mj own estimate of the situation made 
at the time in the light of the information which was given me prior 
to the attack. 

The fleet was divided into three main task forces and the schedule 
of operations required at least one task force at sea at all times, 
available to strike in the event of surprise. Often two task forces 
were at sea at the same time but never three except for concentrated 
fleet maneuvers. Each of the task forces had its mission and train- 
ing was conducted with a view to its attaining maximum efficiency, 
in carrying out its mission. However, it was necessary to afford time 
in port for all ships in order to provide for the overhauling of 
machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for 
action against the enemy. It was essential to push a material im- 
provement program covering installation, as soon as available, of 
short-range anti-aircraft guns, aircraft detection devices, look-out 
equipment, splinter protection, additional personnel accommodations 



698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and other alterations. It was also necessary to limit operations to 
the availability of replacement fuel. We were applying to the Fleet 
the lessons of war which 'were bein^j supplied us. Each installation 
and alteration, whether it was splinter protection, degaussing, or the 
installation of listening gear, required work on the ship in port. 

[IS] Naturally the ship's force was engaged in many tasks of 
installation, repair and alteration to the limit of their capacity while 
in port. It was my policy to prevent breakdowns rather than run 
the risk of breakdowns, and to have the Fleet in the best material 
condition possible at the outbreak of hostilities. It goes without say- 
ing, of course, that the necessity for refueling in port in and of itself, 
prevented keeping task forces at sea at all times. The eleven tankers 
were required to operate continuously between Pearl Harbor and the 
A¥est Coast in order that the fuel at Pearl Harbor should not be 
depleted. 

Submarines constituted a menace in the operating area around 
Hawaii. During the first week of February and the first week of my 
command of the Fleet, a submerged submarine contact was reported 
about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division 
of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours after 
which contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Jap- 
anese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete 
report to Naval Operations stating the action taken and adding that 
I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in 
our operating area around Hawaii. I was directed by despatch not 
to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three mile limit. 

[16] A similar contact in approximately the same position was 
made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers engaged in 
trailing were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. 
Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not 
actually been sighted. During the ensuing several months there were 
several more reports of strange submerged submarine contacts in the 
Hawaiian area. As late as 23 September 1941 (Exhibit 12) the Chief 
of Naval Operations wrote to me in part, "the existing orders, that 
is, not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas 
are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat, conclusive evidence is 
obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United 
States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action 
against such submarines would appear to be our next step." Such 
conclusive evidence was not obtained until the attack of December 7th. 
However, upon receipt of the despatch of November 27, 1941 (Exhibit 
17), I issued orders to depth bomb all strange submarine contacts in 
the Fleet operating area and informed the Chief of Naval Operations 
by despatch and letter of the action I had taken. 

On October IG, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me the 
despatch which has been introduced in evidence before the Court 
(Exhibit 13). This despatch indicated a strong possibility of hos- 
tilities between Japan and Russia; a possibility that Japan might 
attack the United States and Great Britain. It directed me to take 
due precautions including such preparatory deployment as would not 
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative o'^tions against 
Japan. 

[17] I particularly invite the Court's attention to the directive 
in the despatch of October 16 (Exhibit 13). I urge a comparison of 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 699 

this directive with the language contained in the later despatches of 
November 24th and November 27th (Exhibits 15 and 17). The 
admonition against disclosure of strategic intention and provocative 
action contained in the despatch of October IG (Exhibit 13) has its 
echo in the despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on November 
29 (Exhibit 19) directing my attention to the Army despatch which 
stated, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt 

act " and which required that measures taken should not 

alarm the civil population or disclose intent. The despatch of October 
16th spoke of "preparatory deployments." The so-called War Warn- 
ing of November 27th directed an "appropriate defensive deployment 
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-^G". 

Upon receipt of the despatch of October ICth, (Exhibit 13) I made 
the following dispositions ; I continued to maintain the patrol of two 
submarines at Midway; despatched 12 patrol planes to Midway and 
two submarines to Wake to arrive on October 23rd. I despatched the 
Castor and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional 
marines, ammunition and stores. The Curtis was to arrive at Wake 
on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs. I prepared to send six 
patrol planes to Midway from Pearl Harbor. I despatched addi- 
tional marines, to Palmyra. Admiral Pye who was on the West Coast, 
making a cruise, was placed on 12 hours notice after 20 October. 
I had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. 
[i«5] I put some additional security measures into effect in the 
operating areas outside Pearl Harbor and delayed the sailing of the 
West Virginia until about 17 November when she was due to go for 
an overhaul at Puget Sound. 

All these dispositions which I made as a result of the despatch of 
October 16 were specifically brought to 'the attention of the Chief of 
Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October which is in evidence. 
(Exhibit 14.) In a letter of November 7th, the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions specifically approved these dispositions (Exhibit 74) . This spe- 
cific approval of my dispositions makes it unnecessary for this Court 
to consider whether they conformed to what Admiral R. K. Turner 
testified he thinks the Department intended me to do after the October 
16 despatch. 

In the despatch of 16 October 1941 1 was formally advised that there 
was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great 
Britain. That phrase was given a definitive meaning in the Chief of 
Naval Operations letter to me of 17 October 1941, (Exhibit 38) in 
which he said, "Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to 
sail into us and in the message merely stated the possibility." To me 
that meant that when the word "possibility" was used, its connotation 
was limited — and that, when used, the meaning of the Chief of Naval 
Operations was that "possibility" was not "probability." 

The despatch of October 16th indicated a strong possibility of a 
Japanese attack upon Russia. In this connection my correspondence 
with the Chief of Naval Operations shows that the Department had 
envisaged such a Japanese movement as [i^] possible as early 
as the summer of 1941. At that time I repeatedly endeavored, without 
success, as my letters show, to find out the probable attitude of the 
United States in the event of Russo-Japanese hostilities, 

79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 2 



700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On November 24th (Exhibit 15) I received a despatch from the 
Chief of Naval Operations which is before the Court, which stated 
that the chances of favorable outcome of ne^jotiations with Japan 
were very doubtful, and that in the Department's opinion, a surprise 
aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Phil- 
ippines or Guam is a possiJbility. However, in a letter of November 
25th (Exhibit 16), to which the Chief of Naval Operations added a 
post-scrip after a presumably informative conference with the Presi- 
dent and Mr. Hull, he stated, "I still rather look for an advance into 
Thailand, Indo-China-Burma area as the most likely." And the 
Chief of Naval Operations added, "I won't go into the pros and cons 
of what the United States may do. I Avill be damned if I know. I 
wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most any- 
thing and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may 
do nothing — I think it is more likely to be 'anything'." 

I interpreted the possibility of attack on the Philippines and Guam 
in the same vein that I had been advised the word was used in the 
despatch, viz, a possibility but by no means a probability. The letter 
of 25 November (Exhibit 16) fortified my belief that this interpreta- 
tion was correct. The Chief of Naval Operations has testified that he 
did not intend that I should discontinue the training program for "all- 
out" security [^^] measures upon receipt of the despatch of 
November 24. (Exhibit 15) (See Record, pages 50-53). 

I was completely out of touch with the details of the negotiations 
proceeding between the TTapanese representatives in Washington and 
our Government. The Chief of Naval Operations in a letter of October 
17, 1941 (Exhibit 38) had told me that the Chinese incident was "The 
stumbling block." In a letter of November 14 (Exhibit 39) , the Chief 
of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the Presi- 
dent signed by himself and General Marshall which advised against 
direct armed United States intervention in China and recommended 
specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan," (Exhibit 39A) . 
This represented my general information as to how much of a "stum- 
bling block" China might prove to be in the negotiations. I did not 
know at that time, nor did I learn until I rend the official published 
State Department papers long afterwards, that the outline of a pro- 
posed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan handed 
to tlie Japanese ambassador by my Government on 26' November 
contained the following passages under steps to be taken by the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and tlie Government of Japan. 

3. The Government of .Tapan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police 
forces from China and Indo-China. 

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will 
not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in 
China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capitol 
temporal rly at Chunking. 

These passages in the note of November 26 were most significant. 
It is not within my sphere to decide whether [^i] they are 
consonant with the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Chief of Staff to the President, that no ultimatum be delivered to 
Japan. The historians of the future may ponder the question of 
whether diplomacy took a more venturesome approach than the 
judgment of the military deemed prudent. Suffice it to say that 
I did not know of the delivery of this significant document of No- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 701 

veniber 26th to the Japanese Governinent by the Government of the 
United States, and because I did not know this, the Japanese had 
vital information originated by my own Government which was 
denied me. Consequently, any possible logical connection in the se- 
quence of events between the note of November 2()th and the so-called 
"War Warning" of November 27th (Exhibit IT) was lost to me. 

The so-called, "War Warning" of November 27th has been in- 
troduced in evidence before this Court (Exhibit 17). I ask the Court 
to view it not with any meaning attached to it by hindsight after 
the event, but as it would appear to a responsible Commander at the 
time it was received. In the first place, it w^ll be noted that the des- 
patch states at the outset that the negotiations between Jajjan and 
America regarding the stabilizing of the conditions in the Pacific 
have ceased. In the second place, it will be observed that the time 
for expected Japanese movements is stated to be "within the next 
few days" and the territory against which such movements are di- 
rected is specifically stated to be "the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra 
Peninsula and possibly Boreno." In specifically mentioning these 
places as objectives of a Japanese amphibious expedition, the Depart- 
ment appeared to be limiting [22] the phrase in its despatch 
of November 24th which mentioned as a possibility, "a surprise aggres- 
sive movement in. any direction.'''' The only American Territory 
against which Japanese operations are expected is the Philippines. 
I was not in a position to evaluate the probable American action in 
the event of initial Japanese attack was made against Dutch or British 
Territory. Any commitments made by the United States with re- 
gard to the protection of the territories of these nations were not known 
to me. From the Chief of Naval Operations' post script to his letter 
of November 25th (Exhibit 16) I gitthered he had no more definite 
knowledge in this respect than I did. 

I did not know of the conversation of Mr. Dooman, the Counsellor 
of the United States Embassy at Tokio, with Mr. Ohashi, the Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, relative to what the United States would 
do if Japan attacked Singapore. (Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Japan Vol. II, p. 137). I did not know of Ambassador 
Grew's statement to Mr. Matsuoka on February 15, 1941 (ibid 138). 
This information was in the State Department on March 17, 1941. 
I was likewise denied the information of the statement by the Sec- 
retary of State to Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 16, 
1941, that "this Government could not remain silent in the face of 
such a threat, — — ," (ibid 553). I was also denied whatever in- 
formation was behind the despatch from Commander-in-Chief of the 
Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations of 7 December 1941, 
(Exhibit 76, Document 4) sent to me for information and received 
after the attack, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic had 
learned from Singapore that the United States had [;2->] as- 
sured Britain armed support under several eventualities, but con- 
cerning which the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet had not 
been advised. 

My reaction and the reaction of my staff to the so-called "War 
Warning" of November 27 was naturally affected by two despatches 
from the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibits 18 and 40), sent about 
the same time, which together with similar despatches from the War 



702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Department to General Short, proposed the relief of the garrisons at 
Midway and Wake, with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine 
planes on the islands by Army Pursuit planes. Exhibits 50 and 51, my 
personal and official letters to the Chief of Naval Operations of De- 
cember 2, 1941 contain a clear contemporaneous account of the prob- 
lems involved in this proposal. These letters show that the Army's 
despcitches to General Short went beyond the suggested reinforce- 
ment by the Army of the Marine garrisons, and indicated that the 
Army would take over the defenses of the islands. The despatches 
from the War and Navy Departments indicate that the exchange of 
planes and troops w^as of an urgent nature. This proposal did, not 
originate with me or with General Short, The members of my staff 
did not know why the exchange had to be made. Obviously the send- 
ing of some fifty per cent of the Army Fighter Pursuit strength on 
Oahu (as was proposed by the War and Navy Departments) affected 
materially the defensive strength of Pearl Harbor. It appeared to us 
at the scene, that such a proposal would not be made by the Depart- 
ments in Washington, if they anticipated the imminent impact of 
hostilities upon Oahu. Moreover, the proposed relief of the Marine 
Garrisons by Army troops necessarily entailed disruption of the de- 
fense of those islands during the entire time that one [24^] Gar- 
rison w^as preparing to depart and the other becoming installed. The 
Army had nothing comparable to a Marine Defense Battalion so that 
the Army Garrison would have had to have a new" table of organization. 
Likewise, Marine and Army Fighter Squadrons were differently or- 
ganized. The proposed change which emanated from Washington, 
on or about the time of the despatch of the so-called "War Warning" 
did not simply entail a change of personnel; it involved also a com- 
plicated logistic problem. 

Furthermore at Wake there were no harbor facilities. Material 
and personnel had to be landed from ships practically in an open sea- 
way. Wake was the most westerly and advanced of the two islands. 
Such an operation had no protection from the elements. The defense 
from enemy action could not be more ineffective. 

It seemed to us that a project of this nature would not havel been 
planned or proposed by responsible authorities in Washington under 
any situation where the defense of Pearl Harbor was a matter of im- 
mediate concern. We recommended against sending the Army 
Fighters to the islands ; first, because once landed, they could not be 
removed and; second, because at conferences on the subject. Major 
General Martin, Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, informed us 
that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles 
from land. 

On November 29 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me, as an 
information addressee, a message (Exhibit 19) wdiich was in sub- 
stance a quotation of the Chief of Staff''s despatch to General Short, 
of November 27 which General Short had previous- [25] ly 
brought to my attention. This despatch stated that "negotiations with 
Japan appear to be terminated, with only the barest possibility of re- 
sumption." It stated that "the United States desires that Japan com- 
mit the first overt act." It insisted that measures be taken, should be 
carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. 
The Chief of Naval Operations added to the substance of the Army 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 703 

message of November 27, direct instructions that, WPL52 is not appli- 
cable to the Pacific area and the further direction to "undertake no 
offensive action until Japan has committed an over act." It reiterated 
the need for preparation to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL46 so 
far as they apply to Japan. 

The recurrent note in these Army and Navy despatches of caution 
against alarming the civil population, of emphasis upon the necessity 
that the Japanese connnit the first overt act tended to create a state 
of mind which prevented any action except that consistent with a 
passive defense. I still had no explicit authorization to depth bomb 
submarine contacts in the fleet operating areas. Indeed, under a literal 
interpretation of our orders, if a Japanese naval force were to be en- 
countered at sea, we were, in effect, directed to wait until they opened 
fire. 

The "few days" stated by the Navy Department on November 27 to 
be the time for an aggressive move by Japan went by without event. 
The negotiations which on November 27th were stated to be termi- 
nated, and on November 29 to be terminated with the barest possi- 
bility of resumption, were in fact resumed. The public press and 
radio new^s broadcasts contained accounts that the negotiations were 
continuing after November 27 and after [26] November 29. I 
took into account this public information as to diplomatic develop- 
ment in the absence of more authoritative information. Indeed Ad- 
miral Turner testified that the Navy Department anticipated and 
expected I should. 

In fact, I now know that the Japanese were continuing negotia- 
tions only as a device to cover up their plans. In fact, the Japanese 
considered that the negotiations Avere ruptured after the American 
Note of November 26. The real situation was then known to the Navy 
Department in Washington. But I was never advised' that the re- 
sumption of negotiations w^as a Japanese trick, as official Washington 
knew it to be. The public resumption of negotiations after the des- 
patch of November 27, which was predicated on this termination 
naturally affected my evaluation of the international situation. It 
suggested a mitigation of the emergency which prompted the so-called 
"warning." In a public address in London on December 8, 1941, Mr. 
Churchill stated : "Japanese envoys Nomura and Kurusu were ordered 
to prolong their missions in the United States in order to keep con- 
versations going while the surprise attack was being prepared, to be 
made before the declaration of war could be delivered." As Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was not permitted to know 
what Mr. Churchill apparently knew, and the Navy Department cer- 
tainly knew, that the resumption of negotiations was a Japanese 
stratagem. 

The denial to me of knowledge of certain material facts, is not cited 
as an excuse for inaction on my part after November 27th, for I was 
by no means inactive after November 27th. After full consultation 
with my staff — all experienced and responsible officers — I undertook to 
comply with the directive [37] to make an appropriate de- 
fensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned 
in WPL46. 

I took the following action, on receipt of the so-called "War 
Warning." I ordered to Wake one Patrol Squadron, then at Mid- 



704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

way, and it proceeded on 1 December conducting reconnaissance 
sweep enronte. Patron at Midway was replaced by Patron from 
Pearl and left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting a recon- 
naissance sweep enroute Johnston and enroute Johnston to Midway. 
This squadron made daily search from Midway on three, four, five 
and six December. I sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF squad- 
ron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landing planes at Wake on 
3 December. The Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights 
with its own planes. Patron at Wake was then withdrawn; it con- 
ducted reconnaissance sweep enroute Wake to Midway and a similar 
sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor. The Lexington proceeded to 
Midway with VMF squadron departing Pearl 5 December. It con- 
ducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes enroute, and 
was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke. The Bur- 
roughs was despatched to Wake with additional forces and supplies 
including Radar, but was short of Wake when war broke. She 
departed Pearl 29 November. I directed daily reconnaissance flights 
of VP planes, based on Pearl Harbor, to cover the fleet operating areas 
and approaches tliereto. I also issued an order that any Japanese 
submarine found in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu 
should be depth bombed, and so informed the chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, as I have previously noted. Submarine patrols were continued 
at Wake and Midway. 

[£8] It is almost unnecessary to point out that the Department 
knew the operating schedule governing the particular time our three 
task forces were in and out of port. The Department at no time 
prior to December 7, criticized my dispositions or indicated that I was 
not complying with its wishes. These dispositions were calculated to 
strengthen (nir outposts to the South and West against the time when 
they should face the call of all-out hostilities. 

Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, (who were in command of 
the forces carrying reinforcement planes to Midway and Wake) Avere 
empowered to take appropriate action against any hostile attacking 
planes. 

Beginning latter part of November, a memorandum to show what 
the initial steps would be were war to come was kept up to date. The 
last provision was made on the 5th of December and was gone over 
by me on the morning of December 6th. These memoranda outlined 
steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war and are in 
evidence before the Court as Exhibits GOA and 69B. 

On 30 November, I received a despatch (Exhibit 76) stating that 
there were indications Japan was about to attack points on the Kra 
Isthmus by overseas expedition. 

On 3 December the Department sent a despatch stating that it had 
received highly reliable information that certain Japanese consular 
posts were directed to destroy most of their codes and ciphers. This 
despatch (Exhibit 20) was not a clear cut warning of any Japanese 
intention to strike the United States. It stated that the Japanese 
instructions were to destroy "most" of their codes — not all their codes, 
a point noted by me and my staff at that time. It was entirely con- 
sistent [29] with routine diplomatic precautions by Japan 
against the contingency that the United States and Britain might de- 
clare war against her and take over diplomatic residences if she took 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 705 

aggressive action against the Kra Isthmus. The significance of this 
despatch was dihited substantially by the publication of this in- 
formation in the morning newspaper in Honolulu. Both Admiral 
Pye and Admiral Smith testified that they read of this fact in the 
press before the receipt of the despatch from the Navy Department. 
The wide publicity given this certainly removed it from the category 
of secret intelligence information. 

On 6 December, the Department sent a despatch authorizing the 
destruction by the outlying Pacific Islands of secret and confidential 
documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency," (Ex- 
hibit 22). In the report of the Robert's Commission this despatch is 
mentioned, and a significant word is added in this paraphrase of the 
despatch in the Commission's report. That word is the adjective 
"tense", modifying the noun "situation". The adjective "tense" was 
not in the original despatch sent to me. 

In no despatch sent to me was there any warning of a probable or 
imminent air attack upon Pearl Harbor. The "Fortnightly Summary 
of Current National Situations," issued by the Office of the Chief oi" 
Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated 
on page 1, "Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance 
against Thailand." The same publication on page 9, under the head- 
ing, "The Japanese Naval Situation", stated definitely "the major 
capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest 
portion of the carriers." Intelligence available to me located other 
Japanese [oO] carriers in waters far distant from Hawaii. We 
knew that a raiding expedition would have to leave Japanese waters 
approximately two weeks before they could make an attack on Pearl 
Harbor. From our information therefore we had every reason to be- 
lieve that the attack would not be made at the time it was made. 

At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese inflicted upon the United States a 
tactical reverse. But Japan made a fatal strategic blunder. Had 
they sought to accomplish their program of Southern expansion, with- 
out frontal assault upon American interest or territory, American 
entry into the war might have been in doubt for some considerable 
time. Our people were not united upon the issue of the advisability of 
American entrance into the world conflict. The blow at Pearl Harbor 
instantly unified the nation. It precipitated the nation into the world 
conflict. In the long run, it was bound to be a colossal blunder from 
the Japanese viewpoint. Responsible officers in the Pacific could not 
entirely exclude from their minds the fatal long term folly of such 
action by Japan. This was a factor that we discussed and weighed 
with other elements in evaluating the situation as Admiral Pye testi- 
fied. This did not diminish our war readiness but it was bound to be 
a factor in any sober estimate of the situation. We did not know, of 
course, that Mr. Hull had told the Navy Department on or about 
December third, that he considered that the Japanese were in an irra- 
tional, mad dog state of mind. 

From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, General Short and I 
conferred frequently. Present at these conferences were Rear Admiral 
W. W. Smith, my Chief of Staff ; Captain C. H. [SI] McMorris, 
my War Plans Officer ; Captain Walter S. DeLany, my Operations Of- 
ficer; and Read Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commandant' 14th Naval Dis- 
trict. Others who were probably present were Lieutenant Commander 



706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, and Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, an 
assistant War Plans Officer in Charge of Marine Plans for outlying 
islands ; also Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. Navy, my Aviation Aide ; Rear 
Admiral Calhoun, Commander of the Base Force; Major General 
Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force; his aide; and General 
Short's aide. 

Our relations then, as ever, were cordial and cooperative. One of 
my first acts after my appointment as Commander-in-Chief was to 
make a call upon General Short to establish our relations on that 
firm and friendly basis which characterized them throughout our 
tenures of office. On the afternoon of November 27th the Army des- 
patch from the Chief of Staff to General Short was delivered to me 
by Captain J. B. Earle, USN, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff. On 
the same afternoon, I caused to be delivered to General Short a para- 
phrase of OP NAV secret despatch of that date. On November 28th 
the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed. 
We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that 
probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with 
Thailand most probably and Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies 
and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order 
named. In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate 
activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii. I 
believe that at the conference of November 28th, some discussion, 
arose as to what action the United States would take in case thci 
Japanese attacked [32] Thailand, the Kra Peninsula and 
Malaya without making war upon the United States. We knew that 
Admiral Hart's staff in the Asiatic had held staff conferences with 
the British and the Dutch and that information had been exchanged. 
However, we had not been informed of what action was to be taken 
in case the British and Dutch were attacked and the Philippines were 
not attacked. 

I was very much concerned over my orders not to take any hostile 
action and the emphasis placed upon this in both messages. I real- 
ized the enormous handicap this placed upon the Fleet. We had 
known many instances of the swift and deadly action of attacking 
aircraft both from the incidents in actual war abroad and in our own 
maneuvers. All of the information given us by the Navy Depart- 
ment and our estimates led to the conclusion that an air raid on Pearl 
Harbor was neither imminent nor probable. General Short and I 
had many times discussed the possibility of a surprise air attack 
against Pearl Harbor. We made frequent representations to Wash- 
ington pointing out the inadequacy of the forces furnished to repell 
such an attack. Washington evidently discounted heavily the prob- 
ability of an air attack against Hawaii for the means supplied to 
repell such an attack were inadequate up to and including Decem- 
ber 7th. 

Of course, it must not be overlooked that General Short's total 
concerns and duties did not completely dove-tail with mine. General 
Short was not charged with any joint responsibility with me for the 
operation of the Pacific Fleet. So far as the Navy^s part in support- 
ing the Army's defense of Pearl Harbor detailed plans were made 
by the Naval Base Defense Officer. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 707 

[SS] Among the topics which were discussed ;it the conference 
with General Short to which I have referred, in addition to the des- 
patches of November 27th were the following : 

1. The defense of Pearl Harbor. 

2. Garrisons and reliefs for the outlying islands. 

3. The transfer of fighter pursuit planes to the outlying islands. 

4. The transfer of flying Fortresses from Hawaii to the Philippines 
by way of Midway, Wake, Port Moresby and Darwin. 

5. The development of alternative land plane route to Australia 
via Palmyra, Canton, Christmas, Samoa, Fiji, Noumea. 

With regard to the defense of the base at Pearl Harbor, the evidence 
before this Court shows that the estimates and operating plans ap- 
proved by General Short and Admiral Bloch had set forth in detail 
the steps to be taken by the Army and the Navy for the defense of 
Pearl Harbor. The responsibility w^as fixed and the various elements 
of the Army and Navy knew their assigned tasks. The only action 
required was a decision to take one of the alerts or conditions of readi- 
ness. All available forces were to be employed. 

So far as the Army was concerned I knew in general the measures 
adopted by General Short as a result of the despatch of November 
27th. General Short had orders to report in detail to the Chief of 
Staff the measures he had taken. He did this. I knew he had orders 
to make such a report. General Short went on his alert No. 1 and I 
understand that through his liaison with the 14th Naval District, the 
Navy had formal information that he was on such an alert. 

For the sake of rounding out the picture, the Court will note that on 
November 28th, General Short was sent a message [o4] by the 
Adjutant General directing in effect that all necessary measures be 
taken to protect military establishments, property, and equipment 
against sabotage. The War Department knew he was on an alert 
against sabotage. Undoubtedly General Marshall satisfied the Rob- 
ert's Commission by explaining, as he did before this Court, that 
General Short's reply to the War Department's despatch of November 
27th was stapled to a message from the Philippines, which was on top 
of it, that he initialed the reply from the Philippines but did not' 
initial the reply from General Short which he could not recall seeing. 
(See Record of this Court, p. 880) . Under these circumstances, noth- 
ing is more fantastic than to attempt by some obscure reasoning to 
fasten upon the Comander-in-Cheif of the Pacific Fleet some criticism 
because General Short prescribed the form of alert which appeared 
to be required by his orders and with which the War Department was 
perfectly familiar and I might add, the Navy Department as well. 
The Robert's Report specifically charges that General Short and 
I failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on 
and after November 27th and to adopt and use the existing plans to 
meet the emergency. And again, "It was a dereliction of duty on the 
part of each of (the Commanders) not to consult and confer with the 
other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings and the ap- 
propriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostil- 
ities." I solemnly deny the truth of these charges. I am satisfied 
that the evidence before this Court establishes bevond doubt the in- 
accuracy of those charges. In fact the Court will find that tlie Roberts 
Report itself contains findings on this subject which are self-contra- 
dictory. 



708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S5] General Short had every reason to know with reasonable 
accuracy the operation of distant air reconnaissance from Oahu. Gen- 
eral Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force 
received a daily availability report of Navy planes and made a similar 
report to Admiral Bellinger. There were only six Army bombers 
on Oahu capable of performing distant reconnaissance, a fact specifi- 
cally called to the attention of the Navy Department by me in a 
despatch of November 27th (Exhibit 76, Document 4). The Navy 
carried out a daily reconnaissance of the operating areas which was 
well known to General Short and Admiral Bloch. 

On March 31, 1941, appropriate representatives of the Army and 
Navy in the Hawaiian Islands in cooperation and coordination of 
their activities, had executed a plan for the AIR DEFENSE of the 
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 53). This plan, Addendum I, 
to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, specifically discussed the 
possibility of a hostile air raid at dawn. Under the heading, 
"ACTION OPEN TO US" there is the following decision: 

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward to reduce the proba- 
bilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable, but can only be 
effectively maintained with present pei-sonnel and material for a very short 
period and as a practicable measure can not therefore be undertaken unless 
other intelligence indicates a surface raid is probable within rather narrow 
time limits. 

This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They 
knew of this decision. They had done nothing to change or alter 
the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that 
decision. 

[■36] There was no intelligence in the messages of November 
27th or in later messages available to me and General Short to indi- 
cate that "a surface raid was probable within rather narrow time 
limits." (Exhibit 53, Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force 
Operation Plan No. A-1-41.) Our estimate of the situation, made 
after frank and full discussion of the intelligence we received with 
our staffs at the meetings I have referred to, was that an air raid on 
Oahu was neither probable nor imminent. The appropriate repre- 
sentatives of the Army and Navy in Hawaii had by a coordinated 
decision made months before, concluded that distant air reconnais- 
sance through 30)0° could not be undertaken. The factors underlying 
this decision with respect to material and personnel had not changed. 
We had no basis for altering it on and after November 27th. 

I knew the Army's portable radar sets were operable. Some months 
before General Short had informed me that he could give an all around 
coverage of at least 150 miles and probably 200 miles. The Army's air- 
craft warning service including the information net was still incom- 
plete on December 7, 1941. Public telephones and special temporary 
communication methods were usable but slow and inefficient. 

The failure to man the radar after 7 : 00 A. M. Sunday, 7 December 
was apparently due to a peculiar lapse. Prior to that date, these 
temporary stations had been working from about 4 : 00 in the morning 
carrying on training operations for the greater part of the day. Of 
course, the maintenance of aircraft warning service was specifically 
the Army's function. The unfortunate last minute deviation from 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 709 

the apparent Army routine with respect to its operation was unknown 
to me. 

[37] Distant Reconnaissance: To insure Pearl Harbor against 
a surprise attack from airplanes based on a fast carrier, it is necessary 
to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree 
arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for 
a protracted period of searches of this character would require about 
three times this number. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 
300 miles is a further necessity. 100 patrol planes would be required 
for the pool for this dawn patrol. This dawn patrol is necessary 
because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter, daily, 
many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Roughly speaking, in a 
360 degree search of 800 miles radius in the Hawaiian area we cannot 
count, on an average, of more than a seventy-five percent coverage. 

Any distant search which we could have made over an extended 
period would have been incomplete and ineffective. 

The Roberts Report charges me with dereliction of duty for failure 
to operate a distant reconnaissance. Vice Admiral Bellinger has testi- 
fied exhaustively on this subject. To discuss it in detail would involve 
repetition of statistics of available planes and operational problems 
now in evidence before the Court. Now it will suffice to say that 
Admiral Bellinger, charged with the direct responsibility of this 
phase of the Navy's participation in that defense, testified that witii 
the material and personnel available any adequate search was impossi- 
ble for more than a few days. For a period of ten days, as from 
27 November until 7 December, approximately 30 planes w^ere availa- 
ble for a 700 mile daily search — not an 800 mile search. This could 
at best cover about one-third of the 360 [SS] degrees of the 
circumference. Such a search would be ineffective. Having covered 
the operating areas by air patrols, it was not prudent in my judgment 
and that of my staff, to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes 
in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability 
to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans. 
I deny that the charge in the Roberts Report is supported by any 
rational and intelligent evidence before this Court. 

I wish particularly to invite the attention of the Court to Fleet 
letter 2CL41 of 14 October 1941 (Exhibit 8). This letter deals with 
the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. It provides for all fore- 
seeable contingencies. This, and other official documents, provided 
for the use of all available forces, b^oth of the Army and the Navy in 
case of an attack on Pearl Harbor. As Commander-in-Chief of the 
Fleet I appreciated thoroughly the inadequacy of the forces available 
to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the 14th Naval 
District. By my orders, all naval forces in port at the time of an 
attack were made available and allocated to add to the forces defend- 
ing Pearl Harbor. 

I had many difficult decisions to mak.e but none which required more 
accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail 
training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of ^lert status. 
The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a 
nature that I felt training could still continue. I felt that I was en- 



710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

titled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak 
of war. I am convinced now that my estimate based upon the intelli- 
gence received was correct. 

[39] An attempt is made to read into the phrase "War Warning" 
a significance broader than the specific intelligence which the message 
contained. I submit that it should not be construed as a "catch all" 
for the contingencies hindsight may suggest. The specific intelligence 
in the message did not indicate that an attack on the Hawaiian area 
was imminent or probable. The rest of the dispatch after the phrase, 
"This is a war warning," at most states in substance that an attack is 
expected on the Philippines and some foreign territory in a few days. 
The edge of this message, so far as it affected the Philippines, was 
somewhat blunted by the passage of the few days without such an 
e^ent and by the apparent continuing of negotiations during and after 
the next few days had passed. 

The proper procedure for placing the fleets on a war basis is pre- 
scribed in Chapter II, section 2 of WPL46. This provides for mobiliz- 
ing the fleet in whole or in part or for executing this war plan in whole 
or in part prior to a declaration of war. This prescribed procedure 
is definite and understandable, by all elements of the naval service. 
The prescribed procedure was not used prior to December 7, 1941. 

In these circumstances I attempted to use the means at hand to 
take care of the most likely present dangers and the most probable 
future needs. I did not deem it wise, for reasons, I have pointed out 
at length, to expend at that time the limited number of patrol planes 
available in partial and ineffective distant reconnaissance. An attack 
in the localities indicated in the dispatch would require practically 
all types except submarines and I therefore directed extreme vigilance 
against submarine attack in the Hawaiian area. The promptness with 
[4.0] which the ships opened fire the morning of the Seventh 
speaks volumes for the readiness of the fleet in port. 

In brief, in the light of the information I had, and the means at 
hand, I adopted the measures I did, not lightly, but in the exercise 
of my most considered judgment, supported and sustained by a group 
of distinguished and experienced officers who represented a cross- 
section of the best naval brains in the world. The subsequent accom- 
plishments of these officers demonstrates their outstanding abilities. 

So far, I have analyzed my actions in the light of the information 
which was available to me. But the Pearl Harbor incident can not 
be understood or accurately depicted without an account of the infor- 
mation which was available in the Navy Department and not given 
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

I knew nothing of the American note of November 26th to Japan. 
I did not know that the terms of that note w^ere considered by some of 
the best informed officers in the Navy Department, to be utterly 
unacceptable to the Japanese, prior to any indication of the Japanese 
attitude after its receipt. 

I was told on November 27 that "negotiations have ceased". How- 
ever on November 28 a weaker statement of the status of negotiations 
was sent me by the Navy Department. This was the quotation of 
the Army dispatch, setting forth that "negotiations with Japan appear 
to be terminated to all practical purposes with onl]/ the barest pos- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 711 

sibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to 
continue." From this point on, I was left on my own by the Depart- 
ment to get such information about oflicial conversations with Japan 
as I could from the press and radio — a source which the Director of 
War Plans, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, has testified 
he [4i] deemed to be one of my most valuable sources of 
information regarding enemy "intentions and movements". 

Contrast the information available to me in the Pacific, in this 
connection with the information available to responsible officers in 
the Navy Department in Washington, indeed with the information 
available the President and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. 



712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[a] Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Claude C. 

Bloch, U. S. N. 

[i] For these many days all of us have been striving^ to recon- 
struct the facts surrounding an unique event in the annals of the mili- 
tary history of our country — the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor 
early in the forenoon of December 7, 1941. It was a surprise to the 
nation. It was no less a surprise to every witness who has appeared 
before this Court. 

The reconstruction of the situation, undertaken more than 2i^ years 
later, is difficult. That it has been accomplished at all and so well re- 
flects great credit on this Court and its Judge Advocate. 

In attempting to assemble in proper relation parts of documents and 
recollections of varying degrees of clearness, our task has been far 
simpler than that of this Court. For the task of the Court is to fit all 
these pieces of evidence together so that the Court's findings will recon- 
struct the situation as it existed, and not as it may now appear to have 
been. Hindsight, acquired after the event, cannot be permitted to influ- 
ence the factual reconstruction. Speculation now, 21/0 years later, as to 
what any one believes he would have done at the time, should not distort 
our perspective. 

It is quite certain that there is not a man in this room, who, granted 
the choice, would not have cheerfully traded his life to have prevented — 
indeed, even to have minimized — the tragic events of that forenoon, I 
do not believe that there was a naval officer of high or low rank at Pearl 
Harbor who would not have made the same choice. 

Any criticism or blame, if there be any, must be predicated upon 
this difficult reconstruction which has been derived from memories 
blurred by the many war problems and circumstances occurring since 
December 7, 1941. It goes without saying, that the findings must be 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, which leads exclusively 
to and is consistent with but a single conclusion. We know the evils 
of drawing a critical inference from conflicting and unclear evidence, or 
in using one inference to support a further inference which then is not 
supported by any proof at all. Your report will be public opinion; 
public opinion can strip an individual of his reputation and his honor. 

Hence, the preparation of your report is a serious duty and when 
completed and approved the Service, and ultimately the public, will 
recognize that "the moving finger writes, and having writ, moves on ; 
nor all our piety nor wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all 
our tears wash out a word of it." 

[2] How then can we best aid the Court ? Probably by attempt- 
ing to recapture in proper perspective the condition of things at the 
time. It was 1940. The greatest military holecaust of history was 
blazing in Europe. The United States was formally at peace; but 
concerned by the repercussions from the dictators' victories in Europe, 
it had thrown, into this maelstrom on the side of those resisting the 
dictators, its full weight and such legislated help and resources as it 
could give or lend. The point of anxiety was Europe. The Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS QF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 713 

American political and military situation then was not materially 
worse than it had been for some time — nor was it worse than it was 
to be at various times during 1941. 

At that time, Rear Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District. There, he was the head, as he was during the entire 
period, of the large and expanding industrial and service establish- 
ment at Pearl Harbor, confronted with administrative problems meas- 
urable only by the size of the enterprise and the tempo of its expan- 
sion. The United States Pacific Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. 

The Army defenses of Oahu and the naval base, and the naval local 
defense forces were indequate. They continued to be inadequate until 
after December 7, 1941. 

Recognizing that he independently could not correct the situation, 
and that remedies could only come from an informed higher authority, 
the Commandant 14th Naval District on December 30, 1940, by con- 
fidential letter, communicated with the Navy Department, via the 
then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson.^ In considerable de- 
tail, he reviewed the matter of defenses of Pearl Harbor, pointed out 
its many substantial deficiencies, and recommended increases in types 
and numbers of A. A. guns, pursuit and patrol planes, vessels, and 
other craft for local defense forces, required for an adequate defense. 
He suggested in effect that in the high level discussions on this subject 
with the War Department nothing be done which might in any way 
destroy the cooperation between the Armj'^ and Navy in Hawaii.^ 

Not only were Rear Admiral Bloch's recommendations approved by 
tlie Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, but Admiral Richardson on 
January 7, 1941, vigorously endorsed them [IS] to the Navy 
Department.-" It was following receipt of this letter that the Navy 
De]i)artment apprised the War Department of the gravity of the situ- 
ation as to the defenses at Pearl Harbor in its letter of January 24, 
1941.* This was answered by the War Department February 7, 1941.^ 
And while the specific enumeration by the Commandant 14th Naval 
District of defense material required w^as not set forth in this high 
level correspondence, nor categorically insisted upon by the Navy 
Department,*^ the representations of the War Department in this re- 
gard were accepted by the Navy Department. 

So that the matter of the conditions of defenses at Pearl Harbor 
would not be minimized or unconsciously deferred in the high com- 
mand because of the increasing gravity of Euj'opean events, Rear 
Admiral Bloch from time to time during 1941 set foi'tli in communi- 
cations to the Navy Department, through the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific Fleet the material and personnel conditions as he saw 
them, and requested remedial action.^ Admiral Kimmel saw to it 

1 Exhibit 28 — Confidential letter dater 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via 
CINCUS : SEE paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4. 5. 

3 Exhibit 28 — Confidential letter dated 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via 
CINCUS : SEE paragraph 11. 

3 Exhibit 28 — First endorsement by CINCPAC to Com 14 Confidential letter of 30 
December 1940. 

* Exhibit 9 — Secret letter dated 24 January 1941 from Secretary of the Navy to the 
Secretary of War. 

" Exhibit 24 — Secret letter dated 7 February 1941 from Secretary of War to the Secretary 
of the Navy. 

« RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 743 to 760, page 172 to 175. 

T Exhibit 41 — Confidential letter dated 7 May 1941 from Com 14 to CNO copy to 
CINCPAC : SEE paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 

Exhibit 42 — Secret letter dated 20 May 1941 from CINCPAC to CNO referencing among 
others Com 14 confidential letter of 7 May 1941 (Exhibit 41), Com 14 secret letter of 13 



714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that this information and these recommendations went on to the Navy 
Department, with realistic and vigorous endorsements of the senior 
officer present, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.^ Consequent- 
ly, the Navy Department was fully aware of the deficiencies in the 
local defense forces of the 14th Naval District and the [14] 
seriousness of the situation in general.^ 

This effort of the Commandant 14th Naval District to get that which 
he could not obtain independently is summed up in his letter of Octo- 
ber 17, 1941, where he enumerated the meager local defense forces at 
hand, and recalled the British statement of the causes of their 1940 
disasters epitomized as "too little — too late".^° 

It is significant that, right in the midst of the receipt of the dis- 
patches, sometimes characterized as "warnings," namely those of Octo- 
ber 16, November 24, 27, and 28, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District also received from the 
Navy Department under date of November 25, 1941, a reply to the 
Commandant 14th Naval District's October 17th letter, advising that 
there were no additional local defense forces available for the 14th 
Naval District — no surface craft — no aircraft.^^ 

It thus appears that, notwithstanding his efforts during the year to 
and including December 7, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District 
had as local defense forces : 4 old destroyers — which were being used 
on inshore patrol ; 4 small minesweepers — which were engaged in 
sweeping channels; 3 Coast Guard cutters — which were engaged in 
patrolling off Honolulu in addition to performing their regular Coast 
Guard duties; and the old SACRAMENTO, which had neither fire 
power with M'hich to fight nor speed with which to run.^- 

Reverting now to early 1941, a series of war plans were developed 
and issued by the Navy Department in cooperation with the War De- 
partment. These plans beginning with Rainbow 1, revised in par- 
ticulars which do not concern us here, became Rainbow 5 — WPL-46.^^ 
To insure complete understanding, the Navy Department sent an in- 
formed officer out to Pearl Harbor and Manila so that the commanders- 
in-chief of the Pacific and Asiatic fleets would see and understand this 
war plan eye to eye with the Department." To be sure, this plan has 
little application to the Commandant 14th Naval District except in 
certain particulars. 



May 1940, Com 14 secret letter of 31 October 1941 and Com 14 confidential letter of 30 
December 1040 (Exhibit 28). 

Exhibit 46 — Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC 
together with first endorsement thereto of CINCPAC to CNO. 

* Exhibit 42 — ^described in note 7 sui>ra. 

Exhibit 46 — described in note 7 supra^ 

Exhibit 44 — Annual report of CINCPAC to Secretary of the Navy via CNO dated 15 
August 1941 : SEE at page 20 under paragraph (.'?) "Hawaiian Area" — "Pearl Harbor" — 
subparagraphs a, b (1) (2) (3) (Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 768, 
page 177). 

Exhibit 10 — Memorandum for Admiral Stark, signed H. E. Kimmel, dated 4 June 1941. 
copies to General Marshall, Admiral Kinz, Admiral Towers: SEE paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. 
(Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 70 and 71, pasres 28 and 29). 

"Exhibit 45 — Confidential letter dated Aucrust 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC. 

Exhibit 47 — Secret Itr. dated 25 November 1941 from CNO jointly to CINCPAC and Com 
14 referencing among others Com 14 secret Itr. of 17 Oct. 1941 (Exhibit 46). 

RECORD, witness KIMMEL — Q. 350 and 351, page 361. 

■"• Exhibit 46 — described in note 7 supra. 

11 Exhibit 47— described in note 9 supra. 

" RECORD. Witness STAR— Q. 774 to 776, page 180 ; 

Witness KIINIMEL — Q. 352, page 361 : 

Witness BLOCH— Q. 9, 10, 11, page 386. 

" Exhibit 4 — WPL 46 

" RECORD, Witness Stark — Q. 17, page 16. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 715 

[5] In the first place the plan provided a particular and definite 
procedure to be followed by the Navy Department in case of strained 
relations, whereby mobilization or partial mobilization might be ef- 
fected prior to actual hostilities without authorizing acts of war by 
naval forces.^'^ 

The direction of mobilization or partial mobilization during a pe- 
riod of strained relations is an important means of effectuating the 
transition from peace to a war footing. By such directive for mobili- 
zation or partial mobilization, M-day is designated. Furthermore, 
many subsidiary plans become operative automatically on M-day.^*^ 

It now appears extremely unfortunate — that for reasons best known 
to the Navy Department, which was in possession of all available 
political and military information and intelligence — the established 
and well understood procedures for meeting conditions of strained re- 
lations between the United States and Japan, for designating M-day, 
and for placing all concerned on a full war f ooting,^^ were not used,^® 
And yet, strangely enough, there have been implications during this 
inquiry that, because of these strained relations, and notwithstanding 
that only fragmentary information was available in Hawaii, never- 
theless those in Pearl Harbor should have done those things which 
better informed higher authority did not find expedient to do.^^ How- 
beit — at no time prior to Decembel- 7, 1941, were these understood 
procedures used ; the Rainbow plans were not executed ; and M-day was 
not clesignated.^^ 

In the second place, prior to December 7, 1941, it was necessary that 
local plans based upon the basic war plan be prepared and issued. 
In addition, by virtue of the general Army-Navy agreement for joint 
defense embodied in the publication Joint Action Army and Navy, 
1935,-° it was necessary that local plans based upon it be prepared and 
[6] issued. We have found that both of these requirements were ac- 
complished by the joint promulgation in April 1941 of JCD-42 by 
Lieutenant General Short on the part of the Army and by Rear Ad- 
miral Bloch on the part of the Navy.^^ 

It may be well to bear in mind that plans or no plans, whether exe- 
cuted or not, it had been, was then, and continued to be at all times 
the undiluted primary responsibility of the Army to defend and pro- 
tect Pearl Harbor, from land, sea and air,^^ so that the fleet might be 
rested, refitted, refueled and provisioned in security. It was never 
more than a limited responsibility of the Navy to support the Army 
with what it happened to have present at the base in case of attack. 



15 Exhibit 4— WPL-46 : SEE Chapter II Section 1 "Execution of the Entire Plan," para- 
graph 0211 a and b, page 6 ; SEE also Chapter II Section 2 "Execution of a Part of This 
Plan", paragraphs 0221, 0222, 0223, page 7. 

i« RECORD, Witness STARK— Q 780, 781. 782, page 181. 

1' RECORD, Witness STARK — Q'. 38. 39, 40, page 19 ; Q. 41, page 20. 

IS RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 44, page 21 ; Q. 387, page 102 ; Q. 799, page 184. 

Witness DELANY — Q. 51, page 504 

^■■' RECORD. Witness STARK — Q. 783, page 181 ; Q. 792, page 182 ; Q. 131, 132, page 797. 

Witness INGERSOLL — Q. 127, page 845. 

-" Exhibit 6 — Publication "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935." 

" Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Costal Frontier. 
Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District", original April 1941 : SEE para- 
graph 2, "Basis", page 2. 

RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 211, page 260. 

^- Exhibit 6 — "Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935" — SEE paragraph a (2), heading 
"Gpneral Functions of the Armv in Peace and War." 

RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 45, page 227. 

Witness STARK — Q. 824 and R25. page 188. 

Witness BLOCH — Q. 7, page 385 (A). 

Witness MARSHALL — Q. 12, page 855 ; Q. 34, page 863. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 3 



716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

To return, this plan JCD— i2 was based upon and was in conformity 
with the Rainbow war plan.-^ And, as we have seen, it encompassed 
those principles and measures stated in Joint Action which had ap- 
plicability to the defense of the Hawaiian area.^^ JCD-4 set forth 
with particularity the individual tasks of the Army and Navy, the joint 
ones, and the particular defense measures which each service engaged 
to perform i/, av, and when this plan JCD-42 was executed.-* So in 
this matter, the Commandant 14th Naval District fully satisfied the 
local burden indicated in both the war plan and Joint Action in respect 
of the preparation of local plans. Local plans had been prepared.-^ 

[i] And now a third consideration. Were they proper plans? 
Most assuredly. They were approved by Lieutenant General Short, 
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Departments^ — and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet — Admiral Kimmel.-^ They were then 
transmitted to the Navy Department, and the joint air defense plans 
were so well regarded that they were sent out by the Department to 
other commands.-^ These plans were not materially changed after 
December 7, 1941.-^ 

The activation of JCD-42 was contingent upon the designation of 
M-day or the agreement of the local commanders. And like the war 
plans, JCD-42 could be executed by the common action of the War 
and Navy Departments.^" 

And that brings us to a fourth consideration. It has been implied 
in some of the questions asked before the Court that the local com- 
mander of the Navy ought to have placed JCD^2 in execution prior 
to December 7, 1941. Now, when it is considered that, notwithstand- 
ing the fact that the War and Navy Departments could have executed 
the war plan in whole or in part which would have automatically exe- 
cuted JCD-42 — but did not do so — and notwithstanding the fact that 
the War and Navy Departments could have designated M-day which 
would have automatically executed JCD-42 — ^but did not do so — and 
notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Department could 
have independently executed JCD — 42 ^^ — but did not do so — it is 
obvious that no responsible person in Hawaii would have reason then 
and there to place JCD-42 in execution. And when we go down the 
chain of command as far as Rear Admiral Bloch, in view of the com- 
mand relations existing at the time in Pearl Harbor, and in view of 
the circumstances just reviewed, any implication that he ought to 
have, or could have, put JCD^2 in execution is not reasonable. And 
the same can be said for establishment of unity of connnand for which 
\8'] a well understood modus operandi had been promulgated.^- 

-^ Aside from comparison of Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7, SEE also RECORD, Witness 
SHORT — Q. 200 to 208, page 259. 

'* Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, described in note 21 supra : SEE — For Army see paragraph 17, 
page 9 ; for Navy see paragraph IS, page 10. 

=5 Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, described in note 21 supra. 

Exhibit 23 — containing annexes to JCD-42 

2« RECORD, Witness SHORT— Q. 15, page 211. 

^ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 9G, page 302 at 6th line from top page 303. 

28 RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 68, page 2S ; A 268, page 82. 

=9 RECORD. Witness KITTS— Statement page 527. 

Witness SHORT — Q. 87, 88. page 234. 

3« Exhibit 7 — JCD-42 : SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8. 

RECORD, Witness SHORT— Q. 212 and 213, page 260. 

=" Exhibit 7 — JCD-42 : SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8 

RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 777 to 782, page 181. 

Witness SHORT — Q. 212 and 213, page 260. 

32 RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 67, page 27 and 28, specifically paragraph 9 b (1) (2) 
\\\a (3), page 28 : Q 73 and 74, page 29 : Q. 817 to 823, page 187 and 188. 

Witness KIMMEL— Q. 75 to 77, page 296. 

Witness SHORT — Q. 7, page 220 

Witness INGERSOLL— Q. 140, page 848. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 717 

Now a fifth consideration. In anticipation of possible execution of 
these phms, there was a need for drills, the correction of defects, and 
the making of improvements. Furthermore, material deficiencies 
must be noted and competent authority informed of conditions, to the 
end that corrective action could be initiated. This was done.^^ In 
similar anticipation, cooperation between Army and Navy should be 
genuine and complete. This it was.^* Each of these things were 
continuing procedures — not only at the level of Rear Admiral Bloch, 
but in the higher and lower naval commands in the Hawaiian area 
as well.^^ 

This brings us to a sixth matter. On July 1, 1941, the Chief of 
Naval Operations issued a directive ^° whereby certain organizational 
and command relations were changed. This resulted in a number 
of things, the most important being, first, notwithstanding General 
Order No. 143 establishing the organization of the naval forces, the 
Naval Coastal Frontier forces would not be formed ; ^^ and, second, 
in addition to General Order No, 142, under which the Commandant 
14th Naval District became an oificer of the fleet under the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch as the Commander Ha- 
waiian Naval Coastal Frontier and the local defense forces became 
subject to the [91 orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet "in all circumstances." ^^ The net effect of all this was 
that if there had existed a suggestion that, in defense and military 
matters. Rear Admiral Bloch had a status independent of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, there was no doubt that from the date 
of the directive, July 1, 1941, he was a direct subordinate ^^ of the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from February 1941 to and 
including December 7, 1941, except for a few days in the summer and 
early fall, was physically present and ashore at Pearl Harbor .^° 

Wliile, as we have seen, JCD-42 was never made operational prior 
to December 7, 1941, and as the expression "distant reconnaissance" 
does not elsewhere appear in the documents before the Court, it may 
be discussed here. We should keep clearly in mind that in no directive 
or executed operational procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was 
there any duty or responsibility prescribed in relation to Rear Ad- 
miral Bloch in any capacity to conduct "distant reconnaissance." 
"Distant reconnaissance" was set forth only in JCD-42 as a measure 
to be undertaken if, as, and ^ohen JCD-42 became operational.^^ 



S3 RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 18, page 38S. 

Witness RAMSEY — Q. 80, 81, 82, 83. page 592. 

J"! RECORD, Witness DELANY— Q. 68, page 507. 

Witness CALHOUN — Q. 23, page 936. 

w RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 72, page 232 ; Q. 183, page 257. 

Witness ROCHEFORT — Q. 5, page 471. 

^'Exliibit 4 — WPL-46 — (appearing as 9th page from cover page — not nurnhfrefl) Di- 
rective dated July 1, 1941 from CNO to Distribution List for WPL-46 — serial 071912, 
subject "The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers." 

IlECORD, Witness STAR — Also appears: Q. Ill and 112, pages 39 and 41. 

3" Exhibit 4 — Described in note 36 supra : SEE specifically at paragraph 4, first sentenec, 
of CNO directive dated July 1, 1941. 

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 324, page 358. ^ „^ ^ 

3s Exhil)it 4 — Described in note 36 supra. SEE : specifically at paragraph 3 of CNO 
directive dated 1 July 1941, which by its terms puts into effect at that time certain parts 
of WPL-46 (Exhibit 4), and specifically those concerning command relations in Part III, 
Chapter IL Section 4. at pages 36 and 37, which are paragraphs 3241 and 3242 as applies 
to Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 

Exhibit 1 — General Order No. 142. 

Exhibit 2 — General Order No. 143. 

==• RECORD. Witness BLOCH — Q. 17. page 388. 

^« RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 261 to 266. pages 349-350. 

" Exhibit 7 — JCD-42 — SEE paragraph 18 i, page 10, providing for "distant recon- 
naissance" which by paragraph (2), middle of page 8, becomes operational on M-day or 
when the plan or part of it was executed. 



718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The essence of the "distant reconnaissance" matter is this.*^ Rear 
Admiral Bloch as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Com- 
mander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Naval Base Defense Of- 
ficer, or under any of his titles, did not have and never did have any 
long range planes under his direct command.*^ While he had requested 
a firm force of patrol planes in order that his local defense forces 
might be adequate to the tasks with which they would be confronted,^ 
he never did get them.^^ The only [lO] planes suitable for 
distant reconnaissance existent in the Hawaiian area during the entire 
period in question prior to December Tth were 81 patrol planes en- 
compassed in the Fleet Patrol Wings ONE and TWO and at the same 
time comprising Task Force NINE, plus 6 or 8 Army B-17's.*^ The 
Army bombers never were under Navy command *^ except for drills, 
because the shift of those B-l7's from Army to Navy command under 
plans approved by higher authority never was to occur, unless and 
until the Naval Base Defense Air Force was activated. The Naval 
Base Defense Air Force was to become an actual force in being under 
Rear Admiral Bellinger as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, 
at the time and only at the time that the Naval Base Defense Air Force 
was activated.*® 

The naval patrol planes — the 81 — not all of which ever were at any 
time simultaneously capable of "distant reconnaissance" — were a part 
of the fleet. As such, they were under the direct command of Rear 
Admiral Bellinger, either as Commander Patrol Wing TWO or as 
Commander Task Force NINE. Except upon activation for air raid 
drills, those planes never became a part of the Naval Base Defense Air 
Force. It had never been planned or intended that activation of the 
Naval Base Defense Air Force should occur, unless and until there 
was a hostile air attack,*^ or until there was positive information of the 
immediate imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor within narrow 
time limits, i. e., "threat of hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent 
to warrant such action." ^° Prior to December 7, 1941, there never was 
an attack, nor did [ii] there exist positive information of the 
immediate imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor .^^ . Thus, prior 



RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 312, page 356. 

« RECORD, Witness BELLINGER— Q 2, page 660 to 664. 

Witness McMORRIS— Q 22, page 890. 

« RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 775, page 180. 

■" Exhibit 46 — Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC : 
SEE paragraiih 4. 

« Exhibit 47 — Secret letter dated 25 November 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC and Com 14 ; 
SEE paragraph 5 (e). 

« RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 23, page 222 at lines 18 to 21, page 223 ; Q. 65, 
page 230. 

Witness RAMSEY— Q. 43, page 583 

Witness BELLINGER — Q. 46, page 676. 

*- RECORD, Witness PHILLIPS — Q. 52, page 483 

Witness SHORT — Q. 59, page 230 

■^RECORD, Witness RAMSEY— Q. 5 and 6, page 575 ; Q. 37 to 39. page 581-582. 

"•Exhibit 8 — Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised) dated October 14, 1941. 

Exhibit 23 — Enclosure B "addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan 
No. A-1-41", SEE page 4 at Section IV, heading "Action Open to Us", paragraph (a) and 
page 5 at paragraph (e), also pages .5-6 at Section V, heading "Decisions" paragraphs 
2 (a) (1) (2) and 2 (b) (1) (2) — (Note same document appears in Exhibit 53). 

RECORD, Witness KIMMEIj — Q. 57. page 289 — last sentence bottom of page 

•^Exhibit 23 — Annex No. VII to .Toint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, ,TCD-42 : SEE 
.Article II, paragraph 2. jiage 1. 

RECORD, Witness RAMSEY — Q 77. page 591 : Q. 85, page 592 

Witness BELLINGER— Q. 66 to 69. page 678. 

" RECORD, Witness ST.\RK — Q. 601, page 154. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 719 

(() December 7, 1941, except for simulated emergencies, that is drills, 
the Army bombers and the naval patrol planes were never a part of 
any continuing firm Naval Base Defense Air Force.^- Hence, except 
for drills, these planes capable of long range reconnaissance were never 
under Rear Admiral Bellinger in his capacity as Commander Naval 
Base Defense Air Force.'^^ Consequently, neither he nor the planes 
were ever under command of Rear Admiral Bloch as Naval Base 
Defense Officer or under his command in any capacity, except at 
planes,^* 

For these same reasons, the smaller aircraft, the short legged planes, 
the remaining naval shore based aircraft, had a similar status, and 
were circumscribed by the same resti'ictions of activation and employ- 
ment in the naval Base Defense Air Force as were the long range 
planes.^^ 

Prior to December 7, 1941, there never were enough planes, crews 
or spare parts, to establish and continue a daily distant reconnaissance 
over a protracted period. ^*^ Furthermore, high authority had put all 
the available long range naval planes in Task Force NINE some weeks 
prior to December 7, 1941, under Rear Admiral Bellinger.^' Task 
Force NINE had been assigned directly certain missions, one being "to 
conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in order to improve security of fleet units 
and bases." ^^ High authorit}^ had approved the [12] operat- 
ing, expansion "training, intertype training, and upkeep schedules for 
the period on and after November 15, 1941, for these patrol planes ;^^ 
high authority had decided not to interrupt training,*^'' and had deter- 
mined, and I quote, that "a continuous patrol over long periods of time 
was out of the question." ^^ 

"Distant reconnaissance", insofar as Rear Admiral Bloch is con- 
cerned, under whatever title you consider him, can be summarized 
thus: — he had no planes for distant reconnaissance, and he had no 
surface vessels to accomplish it otherwise.*'- Having no information 
over and above or differing from that of the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet,''^ he had no basis for dissenting from the decisions of 
the Commander-in-Chief in regard to distant reconnaissance. Fi- 



« RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 69 to 72, page 398-399. 

!!» RECORD, Witness BELLINGNER — Q. 2, page 660. 

« RECORD, Witness KIMMBIj— Q. 297, page 354 

=5 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 14, page 277 ; Q. 73, page 295 ; Q. 290 to 294, 

' Witness BELLINGER — Q. 113, page 685. 

6^ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 156, page 329 ; Q. 286 and 287, page 353. 

Witness DELANY— Q 25, page 499. 

Witness W W. SMITH — Q. 59, page 538. 

Witness RAMSEY — Q. 44, page 583 ; Q. 72, page 590. 

Witness BELLINGER — Q 36. page 672. 

s^ Exhibit 52 — Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 dated October 31, 1941, effective 
15 November 1941 : SEE page 2, heading "Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing 
TWO)". 

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 272 and 280, page 351. 

Witness RAMSEY — Q. 125 to 130, page 599. 

^ Exhibit 52 — 14CL-41 — described in note 57 supra : SEE top of page 3. 

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 285, page 352. 

^^ Exhibit 52 — 14CL-41 — described in note 57 supra: SEE at page 4, paragraph 11. 

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 2S8 and 289, page 353 

Witness RAINISEY — 0- 131 to 133, page 600. 

«» RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 43 at page 285, last sentence of answer ; Q 295 and 
296, page 353. 

"i RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 43. page 284. at line 8 of answer. 

«3 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 310, page 356. 

"3 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 35 and 38, page 281 ; Q. 102 to 104, page 304. 

Witness BLOCH — Q. 38, page 393 ; Q. 39 and 44, page 394. 



720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nally, Rear Admiral Bloch had neither authority,^* nor reason — there 
being no hostile air attack nor positive information of the imminence 
of one within narrow time limits '^^ — to independently direct the acti- 
vation of the Naval Base Defense Air Force contrary to the decision 
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,"'^ or the requirements of 
the operating and training schedules approved by the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, was the immediate superior in command.^^ 

And that brings us to the matter of conditions of readiness for both 
ships and aircraft. While something more will be said later about it, 
we do know this : first, existing conditions of readiness conformed to 
the state required by operating, training, upkeep and employment 
schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
[IS] and were sensible and appropriate for these purposes ; *^® sec- 
ond, a protracted state of complete readiness to meet a surprise air 
attack on Pearl Harbor would have completely disrupted training, 
upkeep, and maintenance ; ^^ and third, the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, had made and maintained unaltered his decision to make 
no changes in his schedules and to continue such training^" Without 
quibbling as to whether Rear Admiral Bloch's authority was that of 
"advising" or "prescribing" conditions of readiness,'^^ he^ neither pos- 
sessed any information or intelligence over and above that possessed 
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,*^^ who was present at the 
time ; nor did he possess information or intelligence that would lead, 
or for that matter logically should have led, him to differ from the 
decisions made. 

And here it may be well to examine the matter of the submarine 
reported by the WARD immediately prior to the air attack on Decem- 
ber Tth. First, there had been many false contacts in the Hawaiian 
area. Next, on 27 November 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, had directed the depth charging of any submarine running 
submerged outside the sanctuaries and not accompanied by a surface 
guard vessel.^^ The WARD was operating under such orders." 
Finally, no one ashore prior to the air attack knew whether a real 
submarine had actually been seen, nor did anyone ashore know whose 
submarine it was. Nor did anyone ashore know if the submarine had 
attacked the WARD, or whether pursuant to standing orders the 
WARD had made a sound contact and had depth charged the area.'^* 
The later information from the AVARD that it was towing in a sam- 
pan [14-] to Honolulu did not contribute to clarifying the 
occurrence. Now, what was done about it? The WARD's message 

'^ RECOKD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 411, page 374 ; Q. 446, page 380 

Witness BLOCH — Q. 89, page 402. 

"^ RECORD, Witness STARK— Q. 601, page 154 

»« RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 77, page 400. " 

"■ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY— Q. 135, page 600. 

Witness BELLINGER — Q. 7, page 665 ; Q. 54 to 61, page 677 

«8 RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 19. 20, 21, 22, page 390. 

Witness W. W. SMITH — Q. 102, page 547. 

Witness RAMSEY — Q 91, page 594. 

Witness BELLINGER— Q. 65, page 678. 

«» RECORD, Witness RAMSEY — Q. 90, page 593 

Witness BELLINGER— Q. 25, page 669 ; Q. 64, page 678 ; Q. 75, page 679. 

"* RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 43 at page 285 ; last sentence of answer ; Q. 295 and 
296 ua^'e ^^53 

'1 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 45, page 285; Q. 46, 47, 48, page 286; Q. 365 to 
308, page 364 and 365. 

« RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 600, page 154, line 13 of answer. 

Witness KIMMEL— Q. 90 at last sentence, bottom page 300. 

'^ RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q 46, page 395. 

■'* RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 173, page 332 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 721 

was transmitted to the headquarters of both the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District. A senior 
officer of the 14th Naval District went to headquarters to investigate 
and verify the situation, and in accordance wnth doctrine, immediately 
sent the ready duty destroyer to back up the WARD. Before the 
situation could be clarified, the air attack was on. The soundness 
of the "doctrine" was proven, inasmuch as the ready duty destroyer 
while proceeding out of harbor sank an enemy submarine.^^ On this 
matter of the WARD's contact, it is certain no one could have done 
more and it is probable some might have done less. But you can be 
sure that, at that time and upon the facts then at hand, no one reason- 
ably would have or should have been expected to sound an air raid 
alarm. 

There has been testimony concerning letter 2CL-41, revised, of 
October 14, 1941,'^'^ which in various places mentions the Comman- 
dant 14th Naval District and the Commandant 14th Naval District as 
Naval Defense Officer. Terming Rear Admiral Bloch "Naval Base 
Defense Officer" does not make his duties something more than or 
different from the particular duties as stated in 2CL-41.^^ The ex- 
pression "Naval Base Defense Officer" is just a name, and abbreviating 
it to initial letters as N. B. D. O. neither expended nor contracted the 
duties of Rear Admiral Bloch. 

AVlien we consider the particular provisions of Fleet Confidential 
Letter 2CL-41, revised, and what was done about them prior to 
December 7, 1941, the essential facts are these : ^^ 

As to paragraph 3 (A), "Continuous Patrols," — To the extent of 
material at hand, the Commandant 14th Naval District did administer 
and furnish the instore patrol, the boom patrol, and the harbor 
patrol.'^^ 

As to paragraph 3 (B) (3) — To the extent of material at hand, the 
Commandant 14th Naval District did operate the mine sweepers. 

The discussion of torpedo baffles may here be mentioned. This 
subject was [15] considered fully both in Pearl Harbor and 
in the Navy Department. On the basis of the best technical advice 
available in the Department — which in effect was that aerial torpedoes 
could not be successfully launched in depths obtaining in Pearl 
Harbor— the action taken by those at Pearl Harbor seemed correct 
at the time.^° The Department was informed of that action. It is 
safe to say that, if the Navy Department at any time prior to Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, had known that aerial torpedoes could be successfully 
launched in Pearl Harbor, or had believed that baffles were advisable, 

'5 RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 86, page 401 ; Q. 94, page 403. 

w Exhibit 8 — Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2LC-41 (revised) dated 14 Oct. 1941. 

■^^ RECORD. Witness KIMMEL — Q 11, page 27fi. 

•'s RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 18, page 388 to 390. 

■"' RECORD. Witness PYE — Q. 9, page 418. 

s" Exhibit 49 — Confidential Letter CNO to CINCPAC, copy to CINCLANT, CINCAF, 
dated 15 February 1941. 

Exhibit 54 — Confidential Letter CNO to Commandants of Naval Districts,, copies to 
CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 17 February 1941. 

Exhibit 55 — Confidential Letter CNO to Commandant of Naval Districts, copies to 
CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 13 June 1941. 

RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 41, page 394 ; 6 139, page 410 

Witness PYE— Q. 83, page 436. 

Witness DELANY — Q. 15, page 498. 

Witness BELLINGER— Q. 22, page 669. 



722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Navy Department would have directed their shipment and 
installation.^^ 

Revertintr to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (a) of 2CL-41, "Exercise with 
the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air 
attack" — This was effectuated by an agreement in regard to the use 
of Army planes by the Navy and naval planes by the Army in case 
of attack, which agreement was implemented by holding frequent 
drills, determining difficulties, and applying remedies. Further, any 
Marine anti-aircraft artillery present was made available to the Army, 
under the designated Army command.^^ The Army was assisted in 
their training of aircraft warning service men by sending them to the 
Fleet for instruction. 

Rather confused mention has been made of some kind of Navy 
liaison officer in connection with the air raid warning service, which 
was a responsibility of the Army.^^ General Short asked the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for such a liaison officer on August 
7, 1941, and on August 19, 1941,^* Commander Curts was designated as 
such [16] liaison officer. In addition to that, we know that 
Commander Taylor transiently present, was detailed by the C^om- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to work with the x\rmy on aircraft 
warning system matters.^^ Finally, the provision for a Navy liaison 
officer that Lieutenant General Short had written in his tentative op- 
erating procedure never became effective because the system was never 
officially established,®*^ nor did General Short ever order it established. 
In this matter of a Navy liaison officer — who was only a facility for the 
exchange of information ®^ — sight should not be lost of the fact that 
several liaison officers from the various Army commands were required 
to be present when the AWS was established,^^ and we know positively 
that on December 6-7, 1941, none were there.®^ The only Armj^ officer 
on duty that morning was a then First Lieutenant Tyler, who, inex- 
perienced and without benefit of instruction from the Arni)^, had been 
stationed in the Army's aircraft warning service information cojitrol 
center, for the second time in his life — for a few hours self-training.^° 
Tlie plain fact of the matter is that the Army's AWS was in a very 
limited training status, and not at all on an operating basis up to and 
including December 7, 1941.^^ 

Reverting to 2CL-41, paragraph 3(G) (6) (b), "Arrange with the 
Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced" — Actually the matter 
of shore based anti-aircraft guns was the exclusive responsibility of the 
Army.°- However, in carrying out his coordination duties, about Feb- 
ruary 20, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District liad a conference 
with Lieutenant General Short and emphasized the necessity of em- 
])lacing the mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field. On February 23rd, 

"' RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 65 and 66, page 291 to 293 
« RECORD, Witness SHORT— Q. 194 to 197, pasre 258. 
8^ RECORD, Witness KIMMEI. — Q. 344. page 360. 
8^ RECORD. Witness SHORT — Q. 222 to 230; pages 261 and 262. 
« RECORD, Witness TAYLOR— Q. 11. page 611 ; Q. 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, page 622. 
8" RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q 233 and 234. pages 262 and 263 
s' RECORD. Witness TAYLOR — Q. 74, page 020. 
^ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR— Q. 19 and 21. page 012. 
^'' RECORD, Witness TYLER — Q. 14, page 447. 

'"•RECORD, Witness TYLER— Q. 7, 11, 14, page 447; Q. 36, 37, page 450; Q. 69, 
pag(! 453. 

»i RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 27, page 224 ; Q. 105, page 238. 

Witness BLOCH — Q. 24, 25, page 391. 

Witness TAYLOR— Q. 80, page 621. 

■•'= RECORD, Witness KIMMEI.r— Q. 343, page 360. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 723 

the Commandant 14th Naval District was informed by the Chief of 
Staff of the Hawaiian Department that Lieutenant General Short had 
given orders that the mobile anti-aircraft artillery be kept in place as 
close to their point of emplacement as possible, having due regard for 
the ownership of land. In [77] the intervening period until 
October, the Commandant 14th Naval District personally examined the 
plans for the location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were to be 
emplaced, particularly those that were to be sited on naval reservations. 
Subordinates of the Commandant 14th Naval District were in con- 
stant touch with Army representatives, endeavoring to have guns em- 
placed. Actually, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy 
was making plans to mess and quarter Army gun crews on naval reser- 
vations so that Army objections would be removed.^^ At some date 
between October 15th and November 1st, or thereabouts, the Com- 
mandant 14th Naval District personally talked to Lieutenant General 
Short about this matter. General Short advised that he could not em- 
place these guns for several reasons, namely, the sites were not on Gov- 
ernment land, their communications would have to be out in the open — 
usually in cane fields and irrigation ditches — and subject to deteriora- 
tion, and that it would be extremely difficult for the personnel com- 
prising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted. There were ap- 
proximately 30 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in fixed emplacements, about 
20 of them being in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.^"* 

As to paragraph 3(G) (6) (c), "Exercise supervisory control over 
naval shore based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol 
Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army 
and Navy" — The matter of joint air operations has been heretofore dis- 
cussed in detail. In addition — the Commander Patrol Wing TWO was 
a flyer, was senior aviation officer present ashore, and as such, under- 
stood all the technicalities and was qualified to command aircraft 
forces. Control was exercised through him and coordination with the 
Army was planned and practiced in drills. Detailed operating plans 
were prepared. ^^ Drills were held, difficulties discovered, and improve- 
ments made. 

On paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (1), "Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft 
fire with the base defense by advising the senior officer embarked in 
Pearl Harbor exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain" — In addition to the 
previous remarks on condition of readiness — We know that arrange- 
ments for antiaircraft [18] fire had been established by the 
Fleet ;^'' sector and sector connnanders had been designated.^^ Fur- 
thermore, as to general c(mditions of readiness during the period 
prior to December 7, 1941. they Avere as we now know something 
higher than Condition 1 11.''^ It was believed by the Commander- in- 

"» RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 24 and 25, page 417. 
=* RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q 2, 3, 4, 5, pase 412, 41,3. 
"= Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, Annex VII. 

Exhibit 53 — Operational Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941 : SEE Annex B, Base 
Defense Air Force Plan. 

»« RECORD, Witness KIMMEI. — Q. IS. pa?e 278. 

" RECORD. Witness KIMMEL— Q. 346, page 360. 

Witness PYE — Q. 11, pase 419 : Q. 21, page 422. 

Witness KITTS — Q 77. page 523 

^ RECORD. Witness KIMMET. — O. 19, page 278. 

Witness PYE — Q. 14, page 419 ; Q. 15, 16, page 420 : Q. 18, 19, page 422 ; Q. 66, page 433. 

Witness KITTS — Q. 11, 12, 13, 14, page 513. 



724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAKBOR ATTACK 

Chief, Pacific Fleet, to be sufficient.^^ Communication channels had 
been provided whereby this measure could be quickly effected. Anti- 
sabotage measures had long been in effect. Having no information 
other than that had by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and 
having no information that \Yould lead the Commandant, 14th Naval 
District, to differ with the decisions in this respect made by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, no change in existing conditions of 
readiness was advised. 

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (2), "Hold necessary drills"— Drills 
were held weekly until autumn, when they were changed to be held 
every two weeks and in these bi-weekly drills arrangements were 
made to always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to 
bi-weekly drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army 
participation and also, due to tlieir frequency, there were absentees. 
The bi-weekly drills were always arranged well in advance and in- 
sured the Army participation and everybody being in each drill,'"" 

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (3), "Giving alarms for: attack, 
black-out signal, all clear signal" — Procedures had been established 
and drills had. All signals were contained in the communication 
annex to the operating plan. 

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (4), "Informing the task force 
commander at sea of the type of attacking aircraft" — This was prac- 
ticed in all drills and a communication channel was provided for the 
purpose. 

A.S to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (5), "Arranging communication 
plan" — A communication plan was promulgated prior to December 
7th, and was used in drills.^^^ 

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (6), "Notifying all naval agencies 
of the air alarm signal prescribed" — the air alarm signal prescribed 
was contained in the communication plan. 

[19] The remaining occasions in 2CL-41 where either the Com- 
mandant 14th Naval District or the Naval Base Defense Officer is 
mentioned, have no bearing on the matter in hand, because those in- 
stances were not responsibilities and could not become responsibilities 
until an attack in fact had taken place. We know that at the time of 
attack they were done in the way and at the time they should have 
been.^°- 

That these duties of coordination and preparation were conscien- 
tiously attended to is made quite evident from the testimony "^ and 
plans promulgated on this subject which are contained in Exhibit 53.^°* 
And these had the approval of Rear Admiral Bloch's immediate su- 
perior in command, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,^°® 
on the spot at the time. 



99 RECORD, Witness KIMMET. — Q. 27, page 280 : Q. 143, page 326. 
^w RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 74, p.ipre 296. 
lO' RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 28, pa?e 225. 
i<e RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 23, page 390. 
Witness RAMSEY— Q. 57, page 586. 

™ RECORD, Witness P.LOCH— Q. 15, page 387 ; Q. 16, page 388. 
Witness CALHOUN — Q. 48 and 49, page 944. 

'«♦ Exhibit 53 — Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941. 
ANNEX A — Inshore Patrol Plan. 

ANNEX B — Base Defense Air Force Plan with Addendum I, Joint Estimate. Addendum 
II, Aircraft Readiness. 

ANNEX C — Anti-aircraft Defense Plan. 

ANNEX D — Harbor Control Post Plan. 

ANNEX E — Communication Plan. 

«» RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 202, page 338-339. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 725 

In connection with this assigned task of Rear Admiral Bloch, which 
Admiral Kimmel has summarized as "coordinating the naval efiort 
with the Army,"^'^ there is considerable and detailed testimony as to 
the cordial, frequent and intimate conferences and discussions on mat- 
ters of defense that took place during the period between Admiral 
Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short and their respective staffs.^"" 
There is no gainsaying the fact that each headquarters knew its oppo- 
sites problems, conditions, policies, and views,^°^ Frequently, Rear 
Admiral Bloch was present at such conf erences,^"^ or if not present was 
presumed to be later informed of what was considered pertinent to 
him. 

[W] By close and frequent personal contact ^^° and exchange of 
information with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Ad- 
miral Bloch naturally came to know his wishes, policies, views and 
decisions as to the current tasks and problems."^ 

The measure of performance of Rear Admiral Bloch's duties and 
responsibilities can best be summarized in the words of the then Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I quote : "was in general satisfac- 
tory to the Commander-in-Chief ... If it had not been so per- 
formed, I would not have hesitated at any time to call his attention 
to the fact."^ . . . under the handicaps which he was laboring, I 
considered his performance of duty highly satisfactory." "^ 

On December 7, 1941, the practical planning, the training and the 
drilling, all designed to assure that the initiation of defense measures 
would be automatic ^" — the development of a high state of discipline 
and morale — and the material upkeep — each paid substantial divi- 
dends. 

And that brings us to one final thing that might pertain to Rear 
Admiral Bloch, namely the various dispatches of the Navy Depart- 
ment from October 16, 1941 on. While they were not all addressed 
to him, he did see them or come to know of their contents. Others did 
the same."^ In discussing these dispatches in relation to Rear Admiral 
Bloch, the question may be asked : Why did not Rear Admiral Bloch 
interpret these dispatches differently from the others at Pearl Harbor? 
Disposition of this question has been made amply by evidence before 
this Court. In the first place, there was nothing in these messages 
which so much as implied an air attack on Pearl Harbor, for the very 
good reason that even the originators of the dispatches had no such 
suspicion."*^ [^7] In the second place, although other specific 



10' RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 386, page 369 ; Q. 392, 393, 394, page 370, 371, 372. 

10' RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 10, 11, page 221 ; Q. 124, 125, page 242 ; Q. 152, 
l)age 250. 

Witness PYE — Q. Ill, page 441. 

Witness KIMMEL — Q. 39, page 282 ; Q. 40, page 283 ; Q. 380, page 367. 

Witness PHILLIPS— Q. 32, 36, page 481 ; Q. 154, page 494. 

Witness W. W. SMITH— Q. 52. page 536. 

'"■' RECORD, Witness KIMMEI> — Q. 40 and 42, page 283 ; Q. 69, page 294 ; Q. 106, page 
304 : Q 229, page 344. 

1"^ RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q 8 and 9. page 220 

"» RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q'. 32 to 34, page 392. 

"1 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 250 to 262, page 348 to 349. 

Witness BLOCH — Q. 60 to 6.S. page 397. 

"3 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 44, page 285. 

™ RECORD, Witness KIMMET^— Q. 471 and 472. page 384 

"< RECORD, Witness RAMSEY — Q. 84, page 592. 

Witness BELLINGER — Q. 70, 71, 72, page 679. 

"5 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 240 to 259, page 348 to 349. 

Witness PYE— Q. 63, 64, pase 432 ; Q. 77, page 435 

"« RECORD, Witness STARK — Q 142, 143, page 799. 

Witness INGERSOI-, — Q. 136, page 847 ; Q. 137, page 848. 

Witness MARSHALL — Q. 31, 32, page 863. 



726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

geographic objectives are mentionod, never in any dispatch is the 
Hawaiian area so designated. Nor do the dispatches designate M-day, 
nor do they direct total or partial execution of the Rainbow plan. So 
far as Rear Admiral Bloch was concerned, it is beside the point that 
during the critical period before December 7, 1941, there existed in 
the Navy Department a considerable volume of positive, specific infor- 
mation, because the Commandant 14th Naval District never received 
any such information. None of the dispatches to Pearl Harbor gave 
sufficient information upon which evaluations could be made and all 
evaluations sent by the Navy Department related to either general 
possibilities, or specified the scene of probable Japanese activities 
to be in the Far East. The Commandant 14th Naval District's opinion 
was that an air attack by the Japanese in the Hawaiian area prior to 
a declaration of war was a remote possibility ,^^^ nd he believed that 
attack would be made in order of probability as follows: "* (1) sub- 
marine attack against ships in operating areas, security against which 
was in effect; (2) blocking Pearl Harbor entrance channel, security 
against which was in effect; (3) laying magnetic or other mines off the 
entrance channel and in the approaches to the entrances to Pearl 
Harbor and Honolulu, security against which was in effect; (4) sabo- 
tage, security against which was in effect. As to surprise air attack 
prior to the declaration of war, he considered it a remote possibility,"^ 
and even for this he had prepared defense plans and held drills. And 
finally. Rear Admiral Bloch lived in the same atmosphere, saw the 
same conditions, was at the same remote distance, had the same horizon 
and had the same dependency upon the Navy Department."^ He had 
neitlier informatnon nor prophetic vision that would lead him to any 
different opinion from that of his immediate superior in command, nor 
from that of Lieutenant General Short, nor that of the informed task 
force commanders, nor of those of responsible officers on the staff of 
the Cmmander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.^^" 

[22] I have addressed myself to the consideration of all those 
matters which, as far as I can recall, might, however remotely, be 
assocated with Rear Admiral Bloch. If during your deliberations 
some question arises which touches upon him, I feel assured that 
you will be able to satisfactorily dispose of it from the evidence 
before you. During the period in question Rear Admiral Bloch did 
not seek to avoid responsibilities which were his. He does not do 
so now. With what he had at the time, Rear Admiral Bloch did all 
that anyone could do. Of the courses of action open to him, he took 
those prompted by good judgment — and he fully and conscientiously 
performed his every duty. 

C. C. Blogh. 



"' RECORD, Witness F.LOCH — Q. 40. page 394 ; Q. 1.16. 137, page 409. 

">< REPOUD. V>'itness BLOCH — Q. 1.38. page 409. 

'>'• RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 141. page 410. 

1^ RECORD. Witness KIMMEL — Q. 112, page 306: Q. 151, page 327; Q. 456, page 381. 

Witness DEL.\NY — Q. 9, 10, 11. page 497 ; Q. 62. 63. 64. page 506. 

Witness W. W. SMITH — Q. 35 to 40, page 533-534 ; Q. 91, page 545 ; Q. 153 ; page 561. 

Witness BLOCH~Q. 133, 134, 135. page 409. 

Witness MeMORRIS— Q. 18, page 889 : Q. 61. page 900. 

Witness LAYTON— Q. 40, page 911 : Q 47. page 912 : Q. 70. page 917. 

Witness CALHOUN — Q. 21, page 935; Q, 31 and 34, page 938; Q. 37, page 939. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 727 



[TOP SECRET] 

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY 
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHING- 
TON, D. C, BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE 
NAVY 

To Inquire Into the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces on 
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 

24 July 1944 

NOTICE 

The pages included in this binder are classified as "Top-Secret" and by orders 
of the Secretary of the Navy are not to be inserted in the original record nor 
is the information contained therein to be released to any person whatsoever, 
until specific authorization has been granted for such insertion or such r.elease 
by the Secretary of the Navy. This action has been taken in the interest of 
national security and the successful prosecution of the war. 

Extracted part of the record containing proceedings relative to a 
statement by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
U. S. Navy (Ret), page 58-A. 

[J5-J.] With the permission of the court, the interested party, 
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the 
following statement: In the report submitted by Admiral Hart I 
learned — that is, in the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, on page 429 — 
that he knew of a special Japanese code by means of which, on or 
about December 4, 1941, he learned the Japanese were about to attack 
both Britain and the United States. 

The statement was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground 
that the evidence referred to might be introduced before the court 
in the regular manner. 

With the permission of the court, the interested party. Rear Ad- 
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that his pur- 
pose in making the statement was only to show the reason why he had 
been endeavoring to obtain access to the secret messages in the Navy 
Department, and to appeal to the court for assistance in obtaining 
such access. 

The judge advocate withdrew his objection. 

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 159-A through 162. 

[ISO-A] 633. Q. On or about November 12, 1941, did you re- 
ceive information that the Japanese Government regarded November 
25 as an absolute immovable deadline for the negotiations then being 
conducted between Japan and America ? 

A. No; I don't remember that. I remember something about a 
date and then postponing it, but the details of that I have forgotten, 



728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and I have not refreshed on it. There was, I believe, a postponement, 
but I have forgotten the deadline, and remember only that there was a 
deadline. 

634. Q. Would it refresh your memory if I told you that Captain 
L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, testified before Admiral Hart on Page 358 
of the transcript of the record 

A. What record are you referring to ? 

635. Q. The Hart record. 

This question was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground 
that it was an attempt to show in the form or a question that there 
was certain evidence before the Hart examination, what the evidence 
was, and the fact that the evidence was given under oath. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), replied. 

The court announced that the objection was sustained. 

636. Q. You say. Admiral, that you did have some information 
relative to the fixing of a deadline on Japanese -United States negotia- 
tions ? 

A. I recall, but rather vaguely, something about a date having been 
set and then having been advanced, but it is not clear in my memory. 

637. Q. Have you any recollection as to when you received that 
information, within reasonable limits? 

A. Some time, I would say, after the middle of November, but I do 
not recall when it was. I would say some time frorii November on. 

638. Q. Do you recall whether it was prior to your dispatch of 
November 24? 

A. No, I couldn't remember a date. * I wish I could. I don't recall 
it. 

639. Q. You cannot identify it with reference to that incident, that 
is, the dispatch of November 24? 

A. No; I am just hazy on it. 

[160] 640. Q. How did you evaluate that information which you 
did receive about the dead line ? 

A. I don't recall just what impression it made at that time. 

641. Q. Do you recall whether it indicated aggressive action on 
the part of Japan against this country ? 

A. No ; I don't recall that. 

642. Q. Do you recall having any discussion over this information 
with anyone outside the department? 

A. No. I have stated that the matter is hazy in my memory, and I 
have no distinct remembrance of the matter at all, except that some 
such thing came up. 

643. Q. Do you recall whether you then considered it an important 
item of information? 

A. No; I can only repeat that the whole incident is hazy in my 
memory. 

644. Q. You do recall that the information you had fixing a dead 
line was subsequently extended to another date ? 

A. That is about what I remember. There was some talk about a 
dead line, and then about its having been extended. That is about the 
extent of it. I'm not just clear on the thing. 

645. Q. Do you recall whether you personally sent any information 
to Admiral Kimmel concerning this item of information? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 729 

A. I don't recall that I did. 

Q4:Q. Q. Do you recall whether yoii directed any of your subordi- 
nates to do so? 

A. The entire incident, including what I did or may not have done 
remains hazy. I don't remember the issue clearly at all, or the 
action taken. 

647. Q. I am only trying to assist you. 

A. I wish I could help you, but I just don't recall it. That's about 
where it winds up. I mean, I don't recall it clearly. 

648. Q. You clo not recall whether or not that indicated in your 
mind offensive action by Japan in the Southwest Pacific? 

A. My memory with regard to the thing and conclusions and so 
forth, if any, does not carry to the ]ioint of anything definite. I recall 
some such incident, and that's about all. 

[ISl] 649. Q. What was the stimulating motiye on your part 
in sending to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch of November 24? 

A. The dispatch states very clearly : "Chances of favorable outcome 
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled 
with statements of Japanese Government and movements, their naval 
and military forces, indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction" — 

650. Q. Do you recall what the statements of the Japanese Govern- 
ment were to which you made reference? 

A. I have already testified that I don't recall them. 

651. Q. On November 26 did you receive intelligence indicating a 
Jap^ese intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain 
and the United States ? 

A. No, I don't recall that. 

652. Q. You have no recollection of that whatever ? 
A. No. 

653. Q. Between December 1 and December 4 did you receive in- 
formation that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United 
States and maintain peace with Russia ? 

A. Not that I recall. 

[161-A] 654. Q. Do you recall the phrase "Winds Message"? 

A. I don't recall that at that time. I don't recall such a message. 

655. Q. Do you recall such a message at any time? 

A. During the period you mention I don't recall such a message. 

656. Q. Do you recall it at any time ? 

A. If you will produce the message, I don't know whether it would 
serve to recall my memory or not. 

657. Q. Would the production of the message assist you in refresh- 
ing your recollection ? 

A. I don't know. I don't recall having seen the so-called "Winds 
Message" or having heard of it at that time. 

658. Q. Well, do you recall having seen or heard of the "Winds 
Message" at any other time? 

A. I don't recall ever having seen it. 

[1€^] 659. Q. Do you recall having participated in any discus- 
sion concerning the Winds Message then or at any other time? 

A. Not the slightest recollection of a discussion of the so-called 
Winds Message. 



730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

660. Q." Do yon recall having heard the phrase "Winds Message" 
in connection with Japanese-United States relations during the period 
of two weeks preceding December 7, 1941? 

A. No, I do not. 

661. Q. Do you recall having had any conferences or discussions 
with Admiral Ingersoll concerning the Winds Message? 

A. No. 

662. Q. Do you recall having received any information during the 
first three or four days of December, 1941, indicating that Japan 
would attack both the United States and Britain and maintain peace 
with Eussia ? 

A. No. 

663. Q. No information or discussion of that whatever? 

A. Well, we discussed every phase of that situation. If you mean 
with reference to any document, I don't recall it. We had been dis- 
cussing for a year the Russian situation and as to what would happen. 
There was guess work. 

664. Q. Do I understand you to say that you never heard the phrase, 
"Winds Message" as applied to United States-Japanese relations dur- 
ing the month preceding December 7, 1941, until I mentioned it a few 
moments ago ? 

A. I don't have the slightest recollection of the so-called Winds 
Message for a month preceding Pearl Harbor or any time around that 
time. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

This line of questioning was objected to by the judge advocate on 
the ground that there is no evidence laid before the court of any- 
thing with reference to a Winds Message. 

The interested party, Read Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret), replied. 

The court announced that the objection Avas overruled. 

665. Q. Consequently, of course, having no knowledge yourself 
about it, you sent no word to Admiral Kimmel ? 

A. No, nor to anyone else. 

Extracted testimonv of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. 
Page 164-A. 

[164-^] 666. Q. Admiral Stark, during the two weeks prior 
to 7 December, 1941, do you recall any information of a false weather 
broadcast in plain Japanese language emanating from Japan as a 
signal for an attack on the beginning of war by Japan against the 
United States? 

A. No, I do not recall anything of that sort at that time. 

667. Q. Do you recall during the week prior to 7 December, 1941, 
receiving information that the Japanese consnl in Hawaii w^as re- 
porting twice daily the number of American warships in Pearl Harbor 
and the berth at which thev were located ? 

A. No. ' 

668. Q. You remember receiving no such information? 
A. I do not recall receiving anv such information. 

669. Q. Or anything of that character? 
A. No, I don't recall it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 731 

070. Q. During: the week preceding 7 December 1941, do you re- 
call Commander McColhmi originating and presenting to you a dis- 
patch to Admiral Kimmel which was never sent? 

A. No, I don't recall it. 

671. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Commander McCol- 
lum the middle or latter part of the week preceding 7 December 1941 
relative to a dispatch which he had drafted to Admiral Kimmel con- 
cerning information received in Commander McCollum's division ? 

A. No. 

072. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Commander 
McCollum during the week prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. No, I do not at this time. I do not recall it. 

[209-A'\ (Extracted question from the testimony of Rear Ad- 

miral R. E. Schuirmann :) 

89. Q. Along in the middle of November, do you recall receiving 
from Naval Intelligence ixwj information relative to the establish- 
ment of a deadline on negotiations between Japan and the United 
States? 

A. I don't know whether the information came from Naval Intelli- 
gence, or where it came from. I remember the question of various 
deadlines on occasions, yes, sir. I don't know whether the informa- 
tion came to me from Naval Intelligence, or what the source of the 
information was. I do remember that we had information that dead- 
lines had been established. 

\210-A'] 98. Q. Now, what was the information that was com- 
municated to you relative to the deadline? 

A. I don't remember the exact information that was communicated 
on the deadline. 

99. Q. Would it have been that November 25th was regarded as a 
deadline for all negotiations between the Japanese and the United 
States? 

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the 
disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that 
he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets. 

Examined by the court : 

100. Q. Does this cover the same line of questioning that you made 
your objection to this morning? 

A, That is correct, sir. 

101. Q. Do you mean your personal security, or 

A. I mean the security which is vital to the furtherance of the war 
effort of the United States. 

102. Q. Vital to the war effort at that time, or at present? 
A. At present. 

The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was hon- 
ored and that he need not answ^er the question. 

[^ii] Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Ad- 
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) (Continued) : 

103. Q. Do 3^ou recall whether you had information from Naval 
Intelligence that the deadline originally determined or fixed, was ex- 
tended at some later date ? 

A. That is the same line of questioning and the same objection to it. 
The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was hon- 
ored and that he need not answer the question. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 — —4 



732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The interested party, Eear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, TJ. S. 
Navy, (Ret), stated as follows: I feel that Admiral Kimmel is en- 
titled to have indicated on this record the fact that he seeks informa- 
tion from this witness, not once but as to the several items of informa- 
tion; that the cross-examination of this witness is being precluded to 
Admiral Kimmel on that ground and I see no way of accomplishing 
that other than by asking several questions on different lines of infor- 
mation more or less on the line that I asked Admiral Stark yesterday 
afternoon. 

The court announced that in view of the fact that this line of ques- 
tioning has been objected to by the witness on the ground of security 
to the war effort at present, that that line of questioning cannot be 
pursued ; that the court had no objection to putting in all the questions 
desired. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E, Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy, (Ret.), stated that he wanted to ask enough questions to ascer- 
tain the specific information which he was being denied. 

The court granted permission to ask further questions. 

104. Q. Do you recall whether you had information that the dead- 
line on negotiations between Japan and the United States was ex- 
tended to the 29th of November ? 

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the 
disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that 
he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets. 

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was hon- 
ored and that he need not answer the question. 

105. Q. Do 5^ou recall whether on or about 26 November you re- 
ceived information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that it had 
specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against 
both Britain and the UniteB States ? 

[^12] The witness stated that to answer the question would 
involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public in- 
terest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets. 

The judge advocate objected to this question on the ground that it 
went beyond the scope of the direct examination. 

The court announced that it recognized that fact, that it was not 
cross-examination on the direct examination, but in the interests of 
saving time, if there was no specific objection, the questioning may 
continue; but that the witness's claim of privilege to this question 
was honored and that he need not answer the question. 

lOG. Q. During the early part of December, December ord or 
December 4th, do you recall receiving information from the Office 
of Naval Intelligence that Japan would wage an offensive war against 
both the United States and Britain ? 

To this question the judge advocate made the following objection: 
I must object to that question on the ground that counsel is getting 
into the record the specific sort of information that he is trying to 
get, although he knows that it is objectionable on two grounds, one 
of them being national security, and the other being that it is beyond 
the scope of the direct examination. 

The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret), replied. 

The judge advocate requested that the court be cleared. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 733 

The court was cleared. 

The court was opened. 

The court announced that the objection was not sustained. 

The witness announced that to answer the question would involve 
the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and 
that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets. 

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was hon- 
ored and that he need not answer the question. 

107. Q. On December 4th or 5th, do you recall receiving information 
from the Office of Naval Intelligence that the Japanese consul in 
Hawaii was furnishing Tokyo with information as to the number of 
United States warships in Pearl Harbor, and their location in the 
harbor ? 

The judge advocate objected to this question on the same grounds 
as before. 

[2J2-A'] The court announced that the objection was not 
sustained. 

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the 
disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that 
he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets. 

The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was hon- 
ored and that he need not answer the question. 

[261- A] (Extracted question from the testimony of Lieutenant 
General Waher E. Short :) 

163. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch number 472, that 
you have given considerable testimony on, what was the next informa- 
tion you received that indicated that there was any change in- the 
worsening of relations between Japan and. the United States ? 

A. Seven hours after the attack, at 2 : 58 p. m., on the 7th. 

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. 
Navy. Page 314-A. 

[SH-A] 18. Q. Did you know of a definitive date fixed by 
Japan for the conclusion of diplomatic relations with the United 
States? 

A. Yes, there were various dates; the first one, November 25, the 
second one November 29, and thereafter there was no definitive date. 

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. 
Navy. Page 318-A. 

{SIS-A] 43. Q. Did you discuss with Admiral Stark the defi- 
nite date which you have stated as November 25, and later November 
29, of termination of diplomatic relations with Japan ? 

A. I have no definite recollection of having discussed the question 
with him. I knew he w^as informed of it and there may have been 
discussions as to the significance or what significance would be attached 
to it. 

44. Q. When the note of 2G November 1941 was presented by the 
State Department to the Japanese Ambassador for transmission to the 
Japanese government, was there much discussion in the Navy Depart- 
ment and those concerned regarding that note ? 

A. The note of November 26th ? 



734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

45. Q. Yes, sir. 

A. As I recollect, there was discussion, and the general effect was 
that this would be entirely unacceptable to Japan. 

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. 
Page 320. 

[S^O] Examined by the Judge Advocate : 

1. Q. Admiral, an official State Department document entitled 
"Peace and War" has been taken judicial notice of by this court of 
inquiry. There has been read into the record by a previous witness 
a section of a memorandum regarding a conversation between the Un- 
der Secretary of State (Welles), the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) 
and Mr. Kurusu of December 2, 1941. I would ask you to look at 
this note and then I shall ask you a question. Having read this por- 
tion of the document which relates to a statement made by Mr. Welles 
to the Japanese Ambassador, and a partial reply of the Japanese Am- 
bassador, I will ask you to state whether or not prior to 7 December 
1941 you had any knowledge of this conversation as reported in this 
document ? 

A. I do not recall that particular conversation. I do recall, as I 
have testified, some conversations on the subject of Japanese strength 
in Indo-China. 

2. Q. My understanding is that you have no present recollection of 
having knowledge of this particular conversation prior to December 
7,1941? 

A. That is correct. 
Examined by the court : 

3. Q. Admiral, it has been testified before this court that there was 
a date given out as to the termination of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the United States. Do you have any knowledge of this 
date? 

A. I have previously testified that my dispatch of 27 November was 
based on information which I had to the effect that negotiations with 
Japan had ceased. 

4. Q. The testimony to which the court refers is that subsequent to 
26 November 1941 or about that time there was a date given out as to 
the termination of diplomatic relations, which date, at first, was 25 
November, 1941 ; then later 29 November, 1941. Were you aware of 
these dates ? 

A. I do not recall specifically these dates. I do recall, although my 
remembrance is rather hazy on it, that there was a date mentioned 
which was later postponed. I don't remember the original date or 
just what the postponement was. 

5. Q. As we understand, you stated that there were no negotiations 
between Japan and the United States representatives in Washington 
subsequent to 27 November 1941 and up until 7 December 1941. Is 
that correct ? 

A. I stated that I did not recall any. Subsequent to that statement 
counsel for one of the parties showed me a note which had been dis- 
patched to Japan which I had not seen but which made it evident that 
conversations were still going on. 

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, 
Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits), and 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 735 

testimony of Rear Admiral K. E. Sclinirmanii, U. S. Navy. Paj2;es 
()9 1-732, inclusive. 

[691] The judge advocate made the following statement: The 
judge advocate has requested the introduction of certain documents in- 
to the record. If there be no objection to the introduction of these 
documents, they should be offered at this time. 

The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Rob- 
ert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness 
by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken 
was still binding. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared 
at the request of the judge advocate of this court? If so, produce 
it and state what it is. 

A. I am. I produce the file of copies, duly authenticated under of- 
ficial seal, of documents on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations, Navy Department, which was made and assembled at the- 
request of the judge advocate of this court. 

The file of copies of the documents was submitted to the interested 
parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence 
for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent 
to the subject matter of the inquiry. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made 
the following objection : We object to bringing those documents in 
on the ground that- the use which may be made of them in these pro- 
ceedings may disclose secrets which should be held inviolate for the 
best prosecution of the war. Our objection is not because of what the 
documents themselves may contain but because their use here may 
compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most 
important to the Nation's future interest. We can have no assurance 
that wide publicity of parts of even all of these proceedings will not 
eventuate. 

The court announced that the objection was not sustained. 

None of the other parties to the inquiry made objection to the in- 
troduction of the documents. They were received in evidence, marked 
"EXHIBIT 63", for reference, description appended. 

2. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared 
at the request of the judge advocate of the court? If so, please pro- 
duce this file. 

A. I am. I produce another file which contains certain dispatches — 
copies of certain dispatches — duly authenticated under official seal, 
which are on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy 
Department, Washington, D. C, which was assembled at the request 
of the judge [6921 advocate of this court. 

The file of copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under 
official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, 
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of read- 
ing therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the subject matter 
of the inquiry. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, re- 
peated the same objection he had heretofore made in the matter. 

The court announced that the objection was not sustained. 



736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

None of the other interested parties made objection to the introduc- 
tion of the file of documents consisting of copies of certain dispatches, 
duly authenticated under official seal. It was received in evidence, 
marked "EXHIBIT 64", for reference, description appended. 

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate. 

Bear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness for the judge 
advocate, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate and was 
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Admiral, I show you a file of documents which is Exhibit 63 
before this court, and refer you to document No. 7 in this file, and ask 
you if you recognize it, and if so, state what it is. 

A. I identify it to the extent of stating that it is a decoded transla- 
tion of a message originating in Tokyo addressed to the Japanese 
Embassy, Washington.. 

2. Q. Will you read the document, please? 
A. (Reading:) 

From : Tokio. 
To : Washington. 
5 November 1941. 
#736 

(Of utmost secrecy.) 

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 
I realize that this is a diflScult order, but under the circumstances it is an un- 
avoidable one. Please understand this thorougjily and tackle the problem of 
saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so 
with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

[693] This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only. 

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT) 

3. Q. I ask you. Admiral, if you have ever seen this document, or 
had you seen this document or had you been informed of its contents 
prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I was aware of the fact that such a message had been received 
and that Kurusu and Nomura had instructions to wind up conversa- 
tions on the 25th of November. 

4. Q. Adverting to this document, you will note that the document 
speaks about the signing of "this agreement". Do you know what the 
words, "this agreement" refer to ? 

A. I presume that they referred to an agreement which was under 
discussion between the State Department and the representatives of 
the Japanese Government at that time. 

5. Q. If you know what this agreement was, will you so state? 

A. As I would interpret it, it would be instead of "this agreement", 
"an agreement". I don't know whether it is the translation. That is 
the way I would interpret the message. I do not know what this 
agreement was. 

6. Q, What agreement was under discussion at the time this dis- 
patch was written which involved the State Department and the 
Imperial Government at Tokyo? 

A. There were conversations then in progress which are matters 
of public records whereby the United States and Japan were attempt- 
ing to reach some agreement whereby their differences in the Pacific 
could be ironed out. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 737 

7. Q. The date of origin to this dispatch as read was 5 November 
1941. Do you know from your duties as liaison officer in the Navy 
Department whether or not tliis dispatch or the substance thereof was 
communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 
1941? 

A. From my own personal knowledge, no. The system was that 
the material of this nature was delivered by a representative of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence who was, I believe, at the same time liaison 
with the Division of Naval Communications. I do remember that I 
knew that there had been certain dates set for the completion of the 
conversations then in progress, and that the State Department did 
know of these dates. May I add, as a possible assistance to the court, 
I believe the person best qualified to answer the questions as to who 
received the information contained in the exhibit, and the time it was 
conveyed to them, is Commander Kramer, as it was not my responsi- 
bility to either convey this information to anyone else, including the 
State Department. 

[G94-] 8. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 11 from Exhibit 
63, and ask you if you can identify it. 

A. I can identify it to the extent that it is a similar translation of 
a message from Tokyo to the Japanese representatives in Washington, 
dated November 22, 1941, and translated November 22, 1941, as shown 
on the photostatic copy. 

9. Q. Admiral, I ask you to read this document to the court. 
A. (Beading:) 

SECRET 

From : Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
November 22, 1941. 
#612. 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736." 
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to uur fixed 
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solu- 
tion we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted 
to settle Japanese- American relation by the 25th, but if within the next three or 
four days you can finisli your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing 
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth) ; if the 
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great 
Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have 
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso- 
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. 
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever 
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors 
alone. 

AHMY 25138 6710 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S) 

" See S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances 
it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed 
by the 25th of this month. 

10. Q. Admiral, had you seen this document or had you been ap- 
prised of its contents prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I don't know whether I had seen the document or not. I knew 
this information was in the Navy Department and [69S] I don't 
remember specifically the phrase, "after that things are automatically 
going to happen", but it is possible that I did see the document. Hav- 
ing examined these documents, in the last couple of weeks, it is hard for 



738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

me to tell just when I did see them or whether I saw them at all ; but I 
did know that this information was in the Department. 

11. Q. Can you state whether or not in the performance of your 
duties in the Navy Department, you showed this message or communi- 
cated the contents thereof to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 
7 December 1941 ? 

A. No, I did not communicate it in the ordinary discharge of my 
duties, I would not be the one to communicate it. 

12. Q. 1 show you a document from Exhibit 63, which purports to be 
a dispatch from Toyko to Washington, a circular number 2353, and 
ask you whether or not you recognize it as such ? 

A. I recognize it as such. 

13. Q. Will you please read the dispatch. 
A. (Keading:) 

From : Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
19 November 1941. 
Circular #2353. 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added 
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*, 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. II. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.** 

(3) Japan-British relations; NISHI NO KAZE HARE.*** 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all 
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

Voice broadcasts. 

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT) 



♦East wind rain. 
**North wind cloudy. 
***West wind clear. 

[696] 14. Q. Had you, prior to 7 December 1941, seen this 
document or had you been appraised of its contents? 

A. To the best of my recollection, which is quite hazy on this par- 
ticular message, I did know that a message of this nature was in the 
Department. 

15. Q. Did you have any communications with the Chief of Naval 
Operations with reference to this message? 

A. No. ; 

16. Q. Admiral, I show you a document, No. 16 from Exhibit 63, 
which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated 
November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such? 

A. Yes, I recognize it. 

17. Q. Will you please read the document ? 
A. (Reading:) 

BBCRET 

From : Washington. 

To : Tokyo. 

November 26, 1941. 

1180. (Parti of 2.) 

From NOMURA and KURUSU. 

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having 
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation 
remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will In- 
evitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 739 

and humiliation are complete. We miglit suggest one thing for saving the 
situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that 
President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes tliat 
Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in 
the Pacitic (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate 
for Ihis sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return 
reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also 
gainin.u" a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United 
Slates are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection 
through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose 
the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands 
India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT pro- 
posed the neutralitv of French Indo-China and Thai.) 
ARIMY" 6S91 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 

IG97] SECRET 

From : Washington. 
To : Tokyo. 
November 26, 1941. 
IISO. (Part 2 of 2.) 

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily 
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we 
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England 
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them 
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel 
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she 
would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have 
to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled. 

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have 
to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to 
the Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wfire us 
back instantly. 

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 

18. Q. Admiral, prior to 7 December 1941, had you seen this docu- 
ment or had you been apprised of its contents ? 

A. T don't remember, I probably had been apprised of its contents. 

19. Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing the contents of 
this dispatch that was just read, with the Chief of Naval Operations, 
prior to 7 December 1941? 

A. No. ^ 

20. Q. Admiral, I show you document No. 17 from Exhibit 63, 
which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated 
November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such? 

A. I recognize it as a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo. 

21. Q. Will you read the dispatch? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECRET 

P^'rom : Washington (Nomura). 

To: Tokyo. 

November 26, 1941. 

[698] 1189. (Parti of 2.) 

At 4 : 45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with 
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours. 

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been 
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the 
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 
20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At 
length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without com- 
mitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st 
and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following 
two proposals: 



740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles." 

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, 
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok. 

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, 
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of 
economic treatment in French Indo-China. 

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French 
Indo-China. 

ARIMY G896 25441 Page 1. SECRET 

SECREH" 

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in 
China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. 

(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality and concessions in China. 
ARMY 25441 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 11-28^1 (1) 

22. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made ac- 
quainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I don't remember, I believe I was acquainted with the con- 
tents of the dispatch, whether I learned it from the State Department 
or by seeing the dispatch. It reports a conversation with Mr. Hull. 

23. Q. In your previous testimony, when you were on the stand 
before, I believe you were asked a question about a note presented by 
the Secretary of State to the Japanese diplomats on November 26, 1941. 
Do you recall any such testimony? 

A. Yes. 

[699] 24. Q. After ha\ang read this dispatch, do you identify 
the contents of this dispatch as being similar to the note which Mr. 
Hull presented the Japanese diplomats? 

A. Apparently so. Possibly information could be obtained by com- 
paring that with the copy of the note. 

25. Q. Do you recall having discussed the subject matter of this 
dispatch with the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I do not remember specifically, but I believe that I probably did 
inform Admiral Stark that a note was being dispatched to the Japanese, 
and its contents. 

26. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 18 from Exhibit 63 which 
purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 
28, 1941. No. 844. Do you recognize it as such ? 

A. This is from Tokyo to Washington, correct. 

27. Q. I ask you to read the document. 
A. (Heading :) 

SKCRET 

From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
November 28, 1941. 
#644. 

Re your #1189». 

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite 
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. 
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government 
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of 
the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will 
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This 
is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the 
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc- 
tions and that, although the opinions of yoxir Government are not yet clear to 
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made 
just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. 



[700] « S. I. S. #25441, #25442. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 741 

Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory atti- 
tude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making 
it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to 
tills pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 " and he said that 
under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From 
now on do the best you can. 

The man is the Navy Minister. 

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S) 

b S. I. S. #25435, #25436. 

28. Q. Admiral, adverting to the dispatch you have just read, can 
you identify from any date on here, to what the dispatch you have 
just read refers — to what subject matter does it refer? 

A. Undoubtedly it refers to the dispatch of November 26. 

29. Q. And that is identified how? 

A. By reference to 1189 ; also its contents. 

30. Q. I ask you, did you see this dispatch or had you been made 
acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941? 

A. I don't remember ; it probably was. 

31. Q. In that event you probably do not remember whether you 
had any conversations with the Chief of Naval Operations on the 
subject matter of this dispatch prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. No. 

32. Q. Adverting to the fourth sentence of this dispatch, which I 
will ask you to read to the court 

A. (Reading:) 

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this 
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations 
will be de facto ruptured. 

33. Q. What is your interpretation of this sentence as regards the 
Japanese intention as to the negotiations at hand ? 

A. I interpret it to mean that they are going to reply to the Ameri- 
can proposal, but the reply will be such that no further negotiations 
will take place. 

34. Q. And how do you interpret by the clause, "negotiations will be 
de facto ruptured"? 

A. I suppose it, translated — the negotiations will in fact be rup- 
tured. Either that or that they are temporarily — probably in fact 
ruptured, or temporarily ruptured. 

35. Q. I show you Document 19 from Exhibit 63, which purports 
to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 857, and ask you 
if you identify it as such ? 

A. Yes, I identify it as such. 

[701] 36. Q. Will you please read the dispatch? 

A. (Reading:) i 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
29 November 1941. 

#857. 

Re my #844.* 

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines : 
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial 
position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims 
of both sides. 



*JD-1 : 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new 
U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating;. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days 
giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not 
give the impression that negotiations are broken off. 



742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it 
has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot 
be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which 
ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige 
of the Imperial Government. 

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, 
what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has 
made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these 
points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United' 
States government. 
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to 
anything like a breaking off of negotiations.) 

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 nav. 1941 (S-11) 

37. Q. Had you seen or had you been made acquainted with the 
contents of this document No. 19 prior to 7 December 1941? 

A. I was aware that they were told to make another attempt. 

[702] 38. Q. Can you recall whether or not you communicated 
this dispatch or the subject matter of its contents to the Chief of Naval 
Operations prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. No. I would not be the one to communicate the contents. 

39. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 21 from Exhibit 63, 
which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington. No. 865, 
and ask you if you identify it as such ? 

A. I identify it as such. 

40. Q. Will you please read the dispatch? 
A. (Reading:) 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
1 December 1941. 
865. 

Re my #857*. 

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation 
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States 
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others 
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, 
the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.) 

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador 
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end (if your message #1124***. Please make 
the necessary representations at your end only. 

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is 
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did 
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. I'lease make 
investigations into this matter. 

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 



*JD-1 : 6921. 
**JD-1 : 6710. 
***Not available. 

41. Q. Admiral, I ask you if you had seen or been made acquainted 
with the contents of this dispatch you have just read prior to 7 De- 
cember 1941 ? 

A. I do not remember ; I probably was. 
' [703] 42. Q. I show you Document No. 22 from Exhibit 63, 
which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 
30, 1941, and ask you if you recognize it as such ? 

A. I recognize it as such. 

43. Q. Will you read the document? 

A. (Reading:) 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OK INQUIRY 743 

SECRErr 
From : Tokyo. 
To : Berlin. 
Novomber 30, 1941 . 

#986 (Strictly ►Scirct) (To Ik- Imndled in Government code) (Part 1 of 2) 
(Secret outside the Department). 

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this 
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that 
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance 
as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the 
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely 
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United 
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying 
through these negotiations. 

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view 
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, 
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views 
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations 
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and 
French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other. 

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first 
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional 
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her 
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried 
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive 
of the United 

ARMY 6944 25554 I'age 1. 
[704] States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the estab- 
lishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the 
Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the 
Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no 
maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was 
the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a 
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri- 
partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say 
that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days has it has become 
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer 
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a 
continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause. 

ARMY 6944 25554 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR) 

44. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had yon been made 
acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941? 

A, I don't remember. I probably was. 

45. Q. I show you a document No. 38 from Exhibit 63 which pur- 
ports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington^ No. 901, and ask 
you if you recognize it as such? 

A. I recognize it as such. 

46. Q. I ask you to read the document? 



A. (Heading :) 



SECRETT 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 

#901. 

Re my #844 ^ 

1. The Government has deliberjited deeply on the American proposal of 
the 26th of November and :is a result we have drawn up a memorandum for 
the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). 

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts 

» See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot 
accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial 
Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto 
ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations 
are broken ofiC. 



744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and I imagine you will I'eceive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The 
situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please 
to keep it secret for the time being. 

[705] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United 
States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the 
meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to pre- 
sent it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions. 

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S) 

47. Q. Admiral, had yon seen this document prior to 7 December 
1941, or had yon been made acquainted with its contents? 

A. I knew on the morning of the 7th that such a message had been 
received. 

48. Q. Did yon have any discussions with the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations on the subject matter of this dispatch prior to the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 'I 

A. I believe, as I related in my previous testimony, somewhere 
around 9 : 30 we discussed the question that this note was to be de- 
livered that day to the State Department. Whether we discussed the 
actual contents'of the message, I do not remember. 

49. Q. Admiral, I show 3^ou Document 39 from Exhibit 63 which 
purports to a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington under date of 6 
December 1941, numbered 902. I ask you if you recognize this docu- 
ment as such ? 

A . I recognize the dispatcli from Toyko to Washington. 

50. Q. Will yon read the document ? 
A. (Reading:) 

From : Toyko. 
To : "Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902 (Parti of 14.) 
Separate telegram. 

MEMORANDUM 

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an ami- 
cable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that 
[106} the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the 
Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has 
continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Gov- 
ernment of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of 
Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area. 

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning 
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the 
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during 
these eight months. 

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability 
of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to 
find each BOAMPQBR place in the world. 

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China 
to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for 
the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent 
the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September 
last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy. 

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) SECRET 

From: Tokyo 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 2 of 14.) 

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every 
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 745 

ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's con- 
structive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting jiressure on 
The Notlierlands Bast Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have at- 
tempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity 
in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with 
its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, 
both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat 
to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, 
they 1707] enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic 
relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these 
countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encircle- 
ment of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very 
existence of the empire. 

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 3 of 14.) 

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, 
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for* a discussion of 
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific 
area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that 
the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached 
on fundamental — (75 letters garbled )^The Japanese Government submitted 
a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking 
fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese 
views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agree- 
ment of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, 
moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of 
difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. 
But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, 
failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotia- 
tion made no progress. 

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 
From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 4 of 14.) 

lliereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for 
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th 
still another proposal in order to arrive at an [70S] equitable solution 
of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previo^us 
proposal, stipulated the following points : 

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dis- 
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, 
in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition 
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the 
two countries are in need. 

(8) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore com"mercial relations 
to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. 

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quan- 
tity of oil. 

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to meas- 
ures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general 
peace between Japan and China. 

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed 
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and 
China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it 
is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo- 
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement. 

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 5 of 14.) 

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its rieadiness 
to accn^pt the otter of the I'resident of tlie United States to act as "Introducer" 
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an 
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the 
restoration of Sino Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct 
negotiations. 

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new pro- 
posal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; 
and [709] in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer 
of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan 
and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 
26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles 
it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally 
ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese 
Government. 

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 6 of 14.) 

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government 
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best 
to reach a settlement for which it made all possible concessions often in spite 
of great diflSculties. 

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the ne- 
gotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. 

As for the principal of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, ad- 
vocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its 
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that 
along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Govern- 
ment would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, 
and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic 
activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. 

"Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French 
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to 
carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as 
a measure of easing the situation. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

[710] From Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 4, 1941. 
902. (Part 7 of 14.) 

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree 
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciatwl by the 
American government. 

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories 
in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical princi- 
ples, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this 
attitude of the American government and the Japanese goverinnent desires t<> 
call the attention of the American govoninient esjiecially to the following points: 

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those 
principles favorable to it and urges upon the .fapanese goverinnent the acceptance 
thereof. The peace of the world may bo brought about only by discovering a 
mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation 
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores 
realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others' will scarcely serve the pur- 
pose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations. 

7143 SECRET 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 747 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 8 of 14.) 

Of the various principh^s put forward by tlie American govornment as a basis 
of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some wiiich tlie .Japanese govern- 
ment is ready to accept in princlpU\ but in view of the world's actual conditions, 
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt 
to force their immediate adoption. 

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between 
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether- 
lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the ohl concept of collective security, 
is far removed from the realities of East Asia. 

[7J1\ The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both 
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any 
third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the 
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation 
of peace throughout the Pacific area. It is presumed that the above provision 
has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations 
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in 
Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese (iovernment. 

JD:1 7143 ^avy Army Trans. 12-0— 11 (S) SECRET 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 9 of 14.) 

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be 
said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, 
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in 
aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Ger- 
many and Italy two powers that are striving to establisli a new order in Europe. 
Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the 
American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through 
peaceful meaas. 

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, 
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising 
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. 
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealng with international relations should 
be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure. 

JD-1: 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-14 (S) 

From : Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
902. (Part 10 of 14.) 

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government 
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great [712] Britain 
and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in 
China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr 

(45 letters garbled or missing) been compelled to observe 

the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and 

to sacrifice the es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese 

Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly 
runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each 
its proper place in the world. . 

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
#902. (Part 11 of 14.) 

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French 
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. 
That the six countries,— Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Nether- 
lands, China and Thailand, — excepting France, should undertake among them- 
selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China 
and equality in treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing 
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six coun- 
79716 — 46 — Es. 146, vol. 2 5 



748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position 
of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrange- 
ment cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system 
similar to then (50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament of 

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
#902. (Part 12 of 14.) 

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding 
China such as wholesale evacuation of ti'oops or unconditional application of the 
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual 
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabiliz- 
ing factor of East Asia. The [713] attitude of the American government 
in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any 
regime other than the regime at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence 
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. 
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its 
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, dem- 
onstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the 
restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of 
peace to East Asia. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-&-41 (S) 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
#902. (Part 13 of 14.) 

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as 
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual 
removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of Yen and Dollar exchange, 
or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, 
the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China 
Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and . 
prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that 
it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation. 

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the 
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese- 
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other 
interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. 
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 
26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The 
Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably i>y catering to the wishes 
of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be con- 
cluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring 
Japan's position. 

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

♦Probably "and as". 
♦♦Probably "China, can but". 

[7141 From: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 
7 December 1941. 
#902. (Part 14 of 14.) 

(Note.- — In the forwarding Instructions to the radio station handling this 
part, appeared the plain English phrase, "VERY IMPORTANT".) 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish- 
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially 
to preserve Anglo-American rights and intei-ests by keeping Japan and China 
at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present 
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust 
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pa- 
cific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 749 

ernment that in view of the attitude of the Americiui Government it cannot but 
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. 
JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT) 

51. Q. Admiral, adverting to Document 39 whicli you have just read : 
I ask you to note particularly for the record that the date upon which 
the first 13 points of this dispatch were translated in the Navy De- 
partment ? 

A. All 13 ]):irts were translated on December 6, 1941. The hour is 
not shown. Part 14 was translated on the 7th of December, 1941, 
according to the photostatic copy. 

52. Q. Is the hour of the translation shown? 
A, The hour of translation is not shown. 

53. Q. I ask you, adverting- to these first 13 points of Document No. 
3 of Exhibit 63, whether or not you had been made acquainted with 
the contents of these first 13 points on 6 December 1941 ? 

A. I was not acquainted with the contents on the 6th of December, 
1941. 

54. Q,. When did you first become acquainted with the substance of 
these first 13 points of this Document 39? 

A. I don't remember when I read, or if I read the message in its 
(entirety. I knew on the morning of December [^-^5] 7th that 
ji sharply worded note or reply to the State Department's note of No- 
vember 26th was in the Department and was scheduled for delivery, 
or that the Japanese Ambassadors had been requested by the Japanese 
Government to deliver it at 1 : 00 o'clock that afternoon. 

55. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with the sub- 
ject matter contained in Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 63? 

A. I do not remember, but the earliest that I could have possibly 
been informed of it was between somewhere around 9 : 00 or 9 : 30 on 
the morning of 7 December. 

56. Q. Did you become acquainted with all 14 parts at or about the 
same time, or the subject matter of all 14 parts at or about the same 
time? 

A. I cannot say. I cannot recollect but to the best of my recollec- 
tion I did not read the note in its entirety that day. The extent of 
my knowledge was that the sharply worded note had been received, 
which was due for presentation to the State Department that day. 

57. Q. In connection with this sharply worded note of which you 
speak, did you interpret this note as being connected with any other 
exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries, the United 
States and Japan? 

A. I naturally assumed that it was a continuation of the previous 
series of notes which had been exchanged during the course of the 
conversations w^hich had extended over a period of a month or so. 

58. Q. That being the case, this sharply worded note would be in 
reply to what United States note? 

A. The last United States note, I believe, of any importance, was 
dated November 26th. 

59. Q. I show you Document 41 from Exhibit 63, which purports to 
be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907. Do you identify 
this document as such? 

A. I identify it as a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907. 

60. Q. Will you read the dispatch ? 
A. (Reading:) 



750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



From : Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

December 7, 1041 

#907. To be handled in government code. 

Re my #902. 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos- 
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m., 
[716] on the 7th, vour time. 

JD-1 : 7143 

4S — text of Japanese reply. 

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 

61. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with this 
document or the contents thereof ? 

A. I received information which was probably based on this docu- 
ment that the Jaj^anese were going to present their reply to the State 
Department at 1 : 00 o'clock December 7th, at about 9 : 30 Decem- 
ber 7th. 

62. Q. Where were you at the time you were apprised of the con- 
tents as you have just testified? 

A. I was somewhere around the CXO's office. I believe that I saw 
Commander Kramer and he told me verbally that such instructions 
were in. 

63. Q. Did you communicate this information to the Chief of Naval 
Operations at about 0930 on 7 December 1941, or at any time prior 
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? 

A. Whether I personally conveyed it, I do not know. I met or 
was in Admiral Stark's outer office, I believe, when he came in, and 
I may have told him the message was there or the officer who ordi- 
narily delivered them, Commander Kramer, may have been there 
witli the message itself. However, I believe at about that time he 
received the information contained in that message. 

61. Q. I sliow you Document Xo. 46 from Exhibit 63, which pur- 
ports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu numbered 123. Do 
you recognize it as such ? 

A. I recognize it as a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, 123. 

65. Q. Will you read the document i 
A. (Reading:) 

SECRET 

From : Tokyo (Togo). 

To : Honolulu. 

December 2, 1941. 

.1-19. 

#123. (Secret outside the department) 

In view of the present situation, the presence in jwrt of warships, airplane 
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of 
your 'ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not 
there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indi- 
cations that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships 
are provided with antimine nets. 

[717] Note. — This message was received here on December 23. 

ARMY 27065 8007 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5) 

66. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the circumstances of the 
receipt of Document No. 46 which 3'ou have just read, by the Navy? 

A. None except that appearing in the note, "This message was re- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 751 

ceived here on December 23rd", and that it was translated on Decem- 
bei- 30, 11)41. 

The court then, at 3:30 p. m., took a recess until 3:45 p. m., at 
wliich time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all 
the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. 
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
l)()rter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, the witness under 
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned 
that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

67. Q. Admiral, when you were before the court previously you 
testified, as shown on page 217, Question 144: "Did you consider at 
that time tliat tliis note of 26 November was an ultimatum to Japan? 
Answer: To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note 
were such that there was no hope in anybody's mind — at least nobody 
with whom I discussed the question in the Navy Department — that 
the Japanese would or coulcl under the circumstances agree to the 
terms of the note." Since that time. Admiral, there has been con- 
siderable discussion about this note, and on occasions it has been 
referred to both by counsel and by the court and by witnesses before 
the court as an ultimatum. I hand you a volume entitled "Peace and 
War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", of which this court 
has taken judicial notice. I ask you to notice particularly Docu- 
ment 257, which is the note of November 26 handed by the Secretary 
of State to the Japanese Ambassador, Nomura, and also document 258, 
which is the oral statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese- 
Ambassador at the same time. 

The witness looked at the volume referred to. 

68. Q. Have you finished. Admiral ? 
A. Yes. 

[7J8] 69. Q. Having had a chance to look at these two docu- 
ments again, isn't it true that the tone of the oral statement and of the 
note handed the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State is 
not threatening in any respect and that it is not to be considered an 
ultimatum ? 

A. Well, since the term "ultimatum" is apparently connected in 
popular mind with a threat of action if terms are not accepted, this 
may be an unfortunate choice of words. Taking into account the 
background information which has been now introduc^ed in evidence 
in the form of these messages that the Japanese Ambassadors had to 
end the conversations on the 29th, as far as I can remember, the gen- 
eral impression of the Navy Department was that the terms of the 
notes would prove unacceptable to the Japanese, and that there prob- 
ably would be a discontinuance of the conversations, although the 
note and tlie oral statement of the Secretary still left the gate open in 
case the Japanese desired to surrender some of the piinciples for which 
they had stood. 



752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. Q. Admiral, is it correct to say that when this note was pre- 
sented the State Department may have considered that negotiations 
had about ceased but that, nevertheless, this note which they presented 
on the 26th was not to be considered an ultimatum in the sense that 
that term is popularly used ? 

A. As the term is popularly used, as implying a threat, it is not an 
ultimatum. I believe "ultimatum" actually means an end to negotia- 
tions rather than any implied threat that there will be force used as a 
result of such end. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

71. Q. That note, however, in Section 2, paragraph 3, proposed 
that the Government of Japan would withdraw all military, naval, 
air, and police forces from China and Indo-China ? 

A. That is correct. 

72. Q. It was not anticipated in the Navy Department or anywhere 
else by high authorities that that provision would be acceptable to 
Japan, was it? 

A. Not so far as I know, no. 

73. Q. Paragraph 4 of Section 2 provided: "The Government of 
the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — 
militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in 
China other than the National Government of the Republic of China 
with capital temporarily at Chungking." That was the Chiang Kai- 
Shek government ? 

A. That is correct. 

[719] 74. Q. It was not anticipated that that situation would 
be acceptable to Japan ? 

A. Not so far as I know in the Navy Department. However, the 
note speaks for itself. 

75. Q. Document 46 of Exhibit 63 was the last numbered message 
which you read at the suggestion of the judge advocate, being a dis- 
l^atch from Tokyo to Honolulu. I now ask you whether you can 
identify Document 40. 

A. Document 40 is a dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo dated No- 
vember 18, 1941, and translated on December 6, 1941. 

76. Q. Will you read that? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECRET 

From: Honolulu (Kita). 
To : Tokyo. 
November 18, 1941. 
J-19. 

#222. 

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my 
#219" on that clay. 

Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. 
Area C " — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser clsas were at anchor. 

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier. Enterprise, 
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, 
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were 
at anchor in Area D.** 

3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed 
entering the Harbor. Their course w^as as follows : In a single file at a distance 



" Available in MC code dated November 14. Code under study. 
" Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 
<■ East Loch. 
<• Middle Loch. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 753 

of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl 
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in 
Area C, to which they were moored, they changed couse 5 times each time roughly 
30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers 
entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side. 

Relayed to . 

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2) 

[720] 77. Q. That would indicate tliat it was translated on the 
6th of December? 
A. That is correct. 

78. Q. Were you aware of the translation of that message on the 
Gth of December? 

A. To the best of my knowledge, I was not. I do not remember hav- 
ing seen the message prior to December 7. 

79. Q. I now call your attention to Document 37 of Exhibit 63 and 
ask you whether you can identify it? 

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 18, 
1941, and translated on December 5, 1941. 

80. Q. Will you read it? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECEET 

From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To: Honolulu. 
November 18, 1941. 
J-19. 
#113. 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area 
"N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^ and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your 
investigation with great secrecy.) 

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S) 

■« Probably means Mamala Bay. 

81. Q. That indicates that it was translated on the 5th of De- 
cember ? 

A. Yes. 

82. Q. Were you aware of the receipt of the information in the 
Navy Department on or about December 5 ? 

A. No, I do not remember having seen that information. I might 
have received information that the Japanese Consul was asking about 
the location of United States ships. Since it was not a direct question 
of State Department information but more or less military, or State- 
Navy information, I may not have. 

83. Q. I now ask whether you can identify Document 36 of Ex- 
hibit 63 ? 

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 
1941. Date of translation : 12/5/41. 
[T21] 84. Q. Will you read that? 
A. (Keading:) 

From: Tokyo. 
To : Honolulu. 
29 November 1941. 
(J19). 
#122 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future 
will you also report even when there are no movements. 

JD-l: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 



754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

85. Q. That was translated on 12/5/41, which, I assume, means the 
5th of December ? 

A. Correct. 

86. Q. Since that is not a direct message concerning the State De- 
partment, I presnme that you did not have specific information of it 
at the time it was received ? 

A. That is correct. 

87. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 24 in Exhibit 63? 
A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 15 November 

1941, translated on December 3, 1941. 

88. Q. Will you read it, please? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To: Honolulu (Riyoji). 
15 November 1941. 
(J19). 
#111. 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, hut at a rate of twice a week. Although 
you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy. 

JD-1: 6994 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S) 

89. Q. Were you aware of that? 

A. No, sir, I was not aware of it, to the best of my knowledge. 

90. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 10 of Exhibit 63? 
A. This is a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 

16, 1941, and translated November 17, 1941. 

91. Q. Will you read that document, Admiral? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECKET 

[722] From: Tokyo. 
To : Washin,u:ton. 
November 16, 1941. 

# 

For your Honor's own information. 

1. I have read your #1090," and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude 
for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender 
thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. 

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I 
have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to 
the fundamental policy laid down in my #725." Will you please try to realize 
what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the 
war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the 
situation i-endei-s this out of the question. I sot the deadline for the solution of 
these negotiations in my #736," and there will be no change. Please try to 
miderstand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the 
United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them 
for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an 
immediate solution. 

» For Part 1, see S.I.S. 24877. For Tart 2. see S.I.S. 24857 in which NOMURA gives 
his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available. 

" S. I. S. #243;>0 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the 
Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the 
United States. 

<■ S. I. S. #24375 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 

JD-1: 6553 ARMY 24878 JD-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S) 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 755 

92. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 13 of Exhibit 63? 
A. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 19, 
1941, and translated on November 26, 1941. 
[7^^] 93. Q. Will you read that? 
A. (Heading :) 

From : Tokyo. 
To : "Washington. 
19 November 1941. 
(J19). 
Circular #2354. 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol- 
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts : 

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI". 

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA". 

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), 
"Nishi". 

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. 
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. 
JD-1: 6850 Sf:CRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 

94. Q. Did you have knowledge of that at or about the time of its 
translation? 

A. I had general knowledge that such a message had been received 
in the department. I am extremely hazy on whether the voice broad- 
cast mentioned in the message was received and if there was an agreed- 
upon translation of the broadcast or when the broadcast was received, 
if it was. 

95. Q. Do you now have any memory of whether the broadcast 
message referred to was received in the Document vou just read, Docu- 
ment 13 of Exhibit 63. 

A. Nothing but hearsay knowledge. I understand a broadcast was 
intercepted. 

96. Q. Do you remember now whether you knew of it prior to 
December 7? 

A. To the best of my recollection, a broadcast was received, but 
there was a lack of agreement among the intelligence people con- 
cerned as to whether that broadcast was the one described in the 
message ; either that or that there was a lack of agreement among the 
Japanese intelligence people as to the translation of the Japanese 
phrase contained in the broadcast. 

[7^4] 97. Q. Do you recall when that was? 

A. I don't remember. 

98. Q. I now show you Document 26 of Exhibit 63 and ask you 
whether you can identify it ? 

A. The message is from Tokyo to Hsingking, dated 1 December 
1941, translated on December 4. 

99. Q. Will you read that? 
A. (Reading:) 

From : Tokyo. 
To : Hsinking. 
1 December 1941. 
#893. 

In the event that Manchuria participates in the war in 

view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate 
in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England 
and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. 

A summary follows : 

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as 



756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl^ACK 

having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code tele- 
grams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden) . However it is desired 
that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable 
to that which Japan accords to consular oflScials of enemy countries resident in 
Japan. 

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private 
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by 
Japan. 

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular 
oflSces and interests will not be recognized. 

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable 
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan. 

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to 
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exer- 
cised not to antagonize Russia. 

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR) 

[72S] 100. Q. That indicates it was translated on the 4th of 
Decemberl 
A. That is correct. 

101. Q. Were you aware of the information in that message on or 
about the date of its translation ? 

A. I do not remember the message specifically, but I probably was 
aware of it. 

102. Q. Do you remember the information in it ? 

A. No, I don't recall of having had previous knowledge of the 
information. 

103. Q. I ask if you can identify Document 42 in Exhibit 63 ? 

A. It is a message from Budapest to Tokyo, dated December 7, 
1941, and translated on December 7. 1941. 

104. Q. Will you read that? 
A. (Reading:) 

SEXSET 

From : Budapest. 
To : Tokyo. 
December 7, 1941. 
lA. 
IW. 

Re my #103." 

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country 
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break 
out on the 7th. 

Relaved to Berlin. 

ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2) 

105. Q. That was translated on the 7th of December? 
A. Yes. 

106. Q. Did you see this message, Admiral ? 

A. I do not remember having seen that message until considerably 
after December 7. 

107. Q. How would the American minister on the 6th of December 
know about war breaking out? 

A. I have no idea how he would know that war was going to break 
out on the 7th. If I were evaluating the report, I would evaluate it 
as a guess by the man reporting. I haven't the faintest idea how he 
would get such information. 

[726] 108. Q. You don't know of any direct dispatch from the 
American Minister to Washington? 

A. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 757 

109. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether 
you can identify that? 

A. It is a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet to 
the Chief of Naval Operations with the information addressees: 
Commandant, 16th Naval District; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet ; Commandant, 14th Naval District, dated 28 November 1941. 

110. Q. I ask you to read it. 
A. (Reading:) 

rrom: CINCAF. 

Date : 2S Novembpr 1941. 

Decoded by P R WHITE. 

(Addresses for action:) OPNAV. 

(Addresses for information:) COMSIXTEEN CINCPAO COMFOURTEEN. 

(Date time group:) 281430. (Deferred precedence.) 

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if 
diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed follovping words repeated five 
times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have sig- 
nificance as follows X higashi higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X 
Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei 
XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences re- 
peated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used 
XX American higashi no kaze kumori XX England X nishi no kaze hare X 
unquote X British and Comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts. 

111. Q. I show you Document 3 or Exhibit 64 and ask you whether 
you can identify it. 

A. It is a message from the Naval Attache at Batavia to the Chief 
of Naval Operations, dated 5 December 1941. 

112. Q. Will you read it? 
A. (Reading:) 

From : Alusna Batavia. 
Date: 5 Dec 1941. 
Decoded by KALAIDJIAN. 
Paraphrased by PURDY. 

[727] (Addresses for action:) OPNAV. 
(Priority:) RRRRR. 
(Date time group.) CR0222 

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. code intercept : — Japan will notify her 
consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. 
East wind rain United States : North wind cloudy Russia : West wind clear 
England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be re- 
peated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be 
introduced five times in general text. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bioch, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

[728] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

Examined by the court: 

113. Q. Admiral, you stated that Commander Kramer was the liai- 
son officer between ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations ; is that 
correct ? 

A. For tliis certain type of material ; he delivorod 't n« n =pf^c'al 
precaution. 

114. Q. Was there anyone el.se in the Department of Naval Intelli- 
gence who had similar information as to time and place of delivery of 
such messages? 

A. Not that I know of. Possibly Captain McCollum but I bel'cvc, 
in my opinion, he would not have the exact facts, 



758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

115. Q. Admiral Wilkinson was the Chief of ONI at that time; 
is that right? 

A. That is correct, sir. 

116. Q. Is there any official record kept in Naval Intelligence as 
to time of receipt and time of delivery of such messages as these to 
the Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. I have been unable to locate any such record. 

117. Q. You don't know whether one exists or not, though, do you? 
A. No, sir, I have had a search made for such a record and can 

located none. 

118. Q. In that message, your No. 11, which contains the phrase, 
"Things are going to happen automatically", did you give any special 
significance to this phrase, or did you hear it discussed? 

A. As I remember it, there were discussions as to what in the world 
this phrase meant as to what things were going to happen automati- 
cally. It is difficult to reconstruct now but at tliat time, as I remem- 
ber, the general thought of people whom I came in contact with was 
that if the Japanese moved they would move into Indo-China, Malaya, 
and perhaps the Dutch East Indies, or the Philippnies. 

119. Q. These messages to which the judge advocate referred, re- 
garding some of which he asked you if you knew or had any knowledge 
or whether or not Admiral Stark had any knowledge of the specific 
question, in some instances you said you did not know ; is that correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

[729] 120. Q. In other exhibits, he did not ask you that specific 
question. Now, taking all of these messages wliich were received from 
November 26 to December 7, at any time during that period did you 
discuss any message or any of this situation viz-a-viz Japan with 
Admiral Stark? 

A. Yes, sir. I did discuss the situation but when it came down to 
pointing out certain messages, you ask if I made a particular point of 
discussing that particular message with the Admiral and I just don't 
remember. 

121. Q. Well, in your discussions with Admiral Stark these mes- 
sages evidently were the basis of the discussion weren't they? 

A. The basis of discussion were the contents of these messages, plus 
what information we were getting from the State Department as to 
\^hat was going on here. As 3'ou will note, the sulistance of many of 
these messages we might have already received before w^e got the 
message. 

122. Q. But as a general rule, the contents of a great many of these 
messages were the subject of discussion ; is tliat vour answer? 

A. Yes. 

123. Q. On the morning of 7 December when you entered the office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations — and as the court remembers the 
testimony you entered that office about 9: 30; is that correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

124. Q. (Continuing.) — was Admiral Stark there at that time? 
A. I believe I waited for Admiral Stark; Avaited for him to come 

down. I may have gone down to Communications to see if anything 
had come in during that time. 

125. Q. He did, or you did ? 
A. I did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 759 

126. Q. And what time did he arrive, to tlie best of your recollec- 
tion? 

A. To my best knowledge, about 9 : 30, 

127. Q. When you arrived at the oflice of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, had you been informed as to the contents of the message which 
outlined the reply of the Japanese to be delivered at 1 : 00 p. m., on the 
Tth of December ? 

A. No, sir. When you say "the contents", I did not read the mes- 
sage. 

128. Q. That is why I said "contents". 

A. Yes. I did know, or was verbally informed, that this message 
was in and that it was a very sharp note. 

[730] 129. Q. And were you informed that this message was 
a repl}^ to the message of 26 November? 

A. I believe so ; yes, sir. 

130. Q. And did you so inform Admiral Stark when he came in 
that that was the information you had? 

A. Yes, sir. 

131. Q. So Admiral Stark, when he came in and you met him, 
was informed as to the general situation up to that moment? 

A. He was informed of that general situation. I think shortly 
afterwards — speaking again from memory — that Commander Kra- 
mer — when I say "shortly", it may have been half an hour or 45 min- 
utes — delivered to him what they call "the book", which was a book of 
messages received from this source the previous night. 

132. Q. In other words, a complete file of what had happened since 
he had seen the book ; is that right ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

133. Q. Was that book of files or messages which Kramer brought 
in, prior to his telephonic communication with General Marshall? 

A. I'm not certain whether it was, or not, but I think when he 
telephoned General Marshall, or General Marshall telephoned him, 
that Admiral Stark knew that a sharp reply was being delivered to 
our note of November 26th, and that it was timed for delivery — that 
the Japanese had instructions to request the Secretary of State to 
deliver the note at 1 : 00 o'clock. 

134. Q. Was this message received on 6-7 December in reply to 
the message of 26 November, received by the Army simultaneously 
with its receipt by the Navy ? 

A. I am unable to say about that. 

135. Q. In other words, what I am trying to ask is, did the Army 
have the same information that you had on the morning of 7 De- 
cember ? 

A. I'm positive that it did. 

136. Q. In these messages which have been introduced by the inter- 
ested party, linked with the messages which were previously pre- 
sented by the judge advocate, and having all of that information con- 
tained therein in your mind, did you feel that on 6-7 December the 
Japanese were going to attack this country without declaration of 
war ? 

A. No, I did not. I described the general feeling that everybody 
recognized that there was a very tense situation; that diplomatic 
relations Avere in danger of being severed, but that a severance of diplo- 



760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

matic relations did not necessarily mean that war was going to result. 
I cannot speak for anybody else but my own opinion, I must admit, 
was that Japan would go her own way in East Asia and would put 
up to the United States the onus of using force to oppose her, and in 
the light of subsequent events, maybe a [731] concentration 
on that idea 

137. Q. None of the information received in these messages changed 
that opinion with you ; is that correct ? 

A. Well, certain of the military messages weren't received; also, 
some of them came in very late, those received on the night of the 
6th or the morning of the 7th. I had never seen the so-called war 
warning before it was sent out but I did know or was told that one 
had been sent out. Those things, coupled with the message that Gen- 
eral Marshall was going to get off — which unfortunately never ar- 
rived until too late — seemed to be about everything that could be done. 

138. Q. Well, your estimate as of the morning of the 7th: did 
that change your viewpoint which you had had prior to that time, 
the information that you had, say, up to 10 : 00 o'clock on the morn- 
ing of the 7th of December? 

A. Not necessarily that Japan was going to attack the United 
States in the immediate future. 

139. Q. In your opinion, w^ere there continual negotiations and con- 
versations going on between November 27th and December 7th as 
evidenced by these reports and these messages? 

A. Well, having the beackground information that is revealed in 
the messages on the 27th of November, wherein they said the relations 
were de facto, or ruptured, plus my belief that the note that we dis- 
patched on the 26th would be totally unacceptable, I thought that the 
small conversations that would continue to go on were just for the pur- 
pose of the record, just to keep the subject boiling rather than with 
any hope of getting anywhere. 

140. Q. But in your opinion there were important messages sent 
back and forth between Tokio and this country between 27 November 
and 7 December ; is that correct? 

A. I don't recollect off-hand but I don't recall any what I would 
terra important. All the messages were important but there were no 
important changes in the negotiations. They had received our note 
on the 26th and we were awaiting a reply. 

141. Q. You include in your statement the messages received on 
6-7 December ? 

A. The message received, naturally, on 6-7 December was a very 
important message. 

142. Q. In your numerous conferences as you have stated, with 
the State Department officials, did you bring back to the Navy Depart- 
ment or to the Chief of Naval 0])erations, or messages which would 
be relayed to him, the thought of the State Department or any con- 
siderations which you thought were important for the Chief of Naval 
Operations to have ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

[7S2] 143. Q. And during this period from 27 November to 7 
December, that was daily conveyed to him; is that correct? 
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 761 

144. Q. Have you any idea as to what the State Department 
thought as to the possible attack without declaration of war? Was 
that ever expressed ? 

A. None other than the conversation with Mr. Hull which I have 
previously related in which he said these people might bite anyone 
but I didn't at that time take it to mean that he was talking about 
striking without declaration of war, although that is susceptible to 
that interpretation. 

Kecross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Hus- 
band E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

145. Q. In forming the estimate that you did no the morning of 
7 December as to the probability of what Japan would do, you did 
not have available to you the information contained in the messages 
read this afternoon relative to the inquiries from Tokyo to Honolulu 
concerning the United States warships at Pearl Harbor, and the 
answer of the Japananese consul to Tokyo in response to those mes- 
sages, did you ? 

A. No, sir. If I did, I didn't evaluate it. 

146. Q. I understood that you didn't see those messages if they 
came in? 

A. I don't believe I saw them, no. 
Reexamined by the judge advocate : 

147. Adverting to Exhibit 63 and the documents which you read 
to the court therefrom, and particularly adverting to those documents 
which treated of subject matter relating to negotiations between the 
Japanese and the United States which these dispatches indicate the 
Navy Department had : Can you recall whether or not in your capac- 
ity as liaison officer between the State Department and the Navy De- 
partment you conveyed this information as a matter of general prin- 
ciple or rule to the State Department? In other words, did you keep 
the State Department informed of what the Navy Department had 
in the way of information relating to the negotiations between the 
Japanese and the United States ? 

A. The same book that was delivered to Admiral Stark, or certainly 
the messages bearing on diplomatic relations, were always delivered 
to the Secretary of State. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, 
U. S. Naval Reserve ; Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. 
Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits) ; Captain L. F. Saf- 
ford, U. S. Navy. Pages 734-762, inclusive. 

[734] Examined by the judge advocate : « 

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station. 

A. George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
in the Cryptographic Research Section of Naval Communications. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 
7 December 1941 ? 

A. I was the Senior Watch Officer of the watch maintained in 
OPNav 20GW; the primary duty of this was the decrypting of Jap- 
anese diplomatic cryptographs. 



762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, which is in evidence before this court. 
Exhibit 63 contains some forty or fifty documents. Will you tell the 
court if you have recently examined the documents contained in 
this exhibit ? 

A. Yes, sir, I have, but not in detail ; but still I have looked at them 
in a general way. 

4. Q. Are you, in a general way, acquainted with the information 
that is contained in these documents? 

A. Yes, sir, I am. 

5. Q. In the performance of your duties between October 1 and 
7 December 1941, were you at that time acquainted in a general way 
with the dates and times in these documents, when they received in 
the Navy Department ? 

A. I am acquainted with the dates and times by merely the raw 
material. It wasn't part of my duties to inspect the finished product. 
They were available at the time, but normally I didn't have time to 
see them. I was interested particularly in the ones that applied to the 
cryptographic system and I did see those. I am familiar with the 
time that the raw material came in before processing it, the time it 
was received from our various points throughout the world. 

6. Q. You mean by processing exactly what? 

A. Decrypting, the various processes that we had to go through 
in order to make the information available. 

7. Q. Adverting to the document, that is. Exhibit 63, with which 
you say you are in a general way familiar, wall you tell the court what 
the set-up was in your division as regards the translation of these 
documents ? 

A. I think possibly in order to give the story on that I should go 
back to the interception of traffic, because it is all more or less linked 
from that point on. The Army maintained a series of interception 
stations. The Navy had the same. The Army intercepts were cleared 
through the War Department, and the Navy intercepts were cleared 
through the Navy Department. The division was made on the basis 
of [7S6] cryptographic dates. It was necessary to do some 
checking for that. The Army was responsible for the even dates. 
The Navy was responsible for the odd dates. The cryptographic date 
was merely the date it was intercepted: the filing time in the dispatch 
was something that had to be established. Each service would then 
translate its own traffic. That is, the Navy would translate the traffic 
of odd cryptographic dates, and the Army would do the same thing 
with the even dates, so translation was based— was divided — upon the 
cryptographic date of the material. 

8. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 63, 1 ask you if there is not noted on the 
bottom of these documents the date on which translation is purported 

,to have taken place ? 
A. Yes, sir. 

9. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not the dates so inscribed 
on these documents is the actual day of the month that it was trans- 
lated, or does this date also relate to the cryptographic date — was that 
the word you used? 

A. No. My understanding of all those documents — which weren't 
prepared in my section — has always been that the date is the actual 
date of translation. The date appearing at the top is the crypto- 
graphic date. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 763 

10. Q. Have you recently examined any memoranda, logs, or rec- 
ords prepared at the time of the receipt of these documents, which 
show the dates and times these documents were received in the Navy 
Department ? 

A. Yes, sir, I have, but not all of the documents in detail. I have 
on certain ones. 

11. Q. I show you a document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is in evidence 
before this court, and which is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington 
containing some fourteen parts. AVill you state whether you saw this 
document prior to T December 1911, and if so, under what circum- 
stances ? 

A. I saw some of the parts ; I did see all of the raw material. I was 
present while the finished product was being made up, and I can't say 
in detail that I have seen all fourteen parts, but I was present while 
they were being processed, and I was present while they were being 
written up in the smooth form. 

12. Q. Can you state from your examination of these official docu- 
ments or records, what was the chronological order of arrival in the 
Navy Department of the documents that composed document 39 of 
Exhibit 63, to which you have just adverted? 

A. I'd like to make one correction to my answer to the previous 
question. I did not see part fourteen. I think [7S6] we 
should consider this 902, from this point on, as possibly two separate 
dispatches. I did not see part fourteen; that came in after I left. 
Now, I have the parts grouped in the order that they were received 
from the interceptor station at Bainbridge Island, Washington. They 
came into Washington, D. C, by teletype. Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 arrived 
here at 1649 GCT on December 6, Greenwich time. That is the time 
shown on the dispatches; and incidentally, part two was from Chel- 
tenham, Maryland, and sent in, and I did not know which actual part 
was used. Nine and 10 w^ere received sometime after 1649 and some- 
time before 1951, both GCT — I can't establish the exact time on De- 
cember 6. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1951 GCT 
on December 6. Now, part 14 came in sometime in the morning of 
December 7. The time that it was intercepted at Station S was 0305 
on the 7th, GCT. That would place it about five minutes after 3 : 00 
in the morning of the 7th, Washington time. Now that material was 
sent in by teletype and with the punched tape, so there was some time 
taken at the other end to punch the tape so that 60 words could be sent 
and reduce the cost of line charges; and there may be twenty or thirty 
minutes required to do that. My reason for saying that it arrived 
before 7 : 00 o'clock, the work sheet for this particular document, part 
14, shows that it was processed by an operator that went off watch at 
7: 00 o'clock. That was the time we changed watches, and the work 
sheet bears his initials, so it was received before 7 : 00 o'clock. 

13. Q. You say part 14 was processed prior to 0700, Washington 
time, on 7 December 1941. Will you state in detail what you mean by 
this part 14 being processed? 

A. Well, yes, this part fourteen did not require translation ; these 
dispatches were in English. However, there were certain symbols 
that were used for punctuation, and the dispatches required writing 
up in smooth form before being passed on. That was done with the 
first thirteen parts. I don't know whether it was done at the time 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 6 



764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with the fourteenth part. I wasn't here at that particular time. I 
wasn' on watch at that particular time. 

14:. Q. In cases before you have mentioned GCT. Will you convert 
it into Washington time for the purpose of clarifying the record. 

A. Assuming that Washington was on plus-5, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 
would be 1149 Washington time. This will be on the 24-hour basis. I 
won't indicate a. m. 1149 on December 6. Parts 9 and 10 were re- 
ceived after 1149, Washington time, and before 1451, Washington 
time. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1451, Washington 
time. 

15. Q. You have stated that part fourteen was received in 
[7371 The Navy Department at or around 0305, Washington time, 
on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Sometime after that and before 0700. 

16. Q. Do the records show what happened to this part fourteen 
after its arrival in the Navy Department? I mean, as to the time 
that it was processed, for example. 

A. Yes, the logs will sliow and the work sheets will show the initials 
of the operator that processed it. 

17. Q. This message was not translated, you say? 
A. No, sir. it didn't require translation. 

18. Q. What service processed the document, that is, part fourteen, 
the Army or the Navy? 

A. I can't answer that. I really don't know. The Army had a 
translator on duty that night, apparently by a pre-arrangement with 
the Navy, and anything that arrived during the night of the 7th — 
was to be sent over to the Army. Now, I don't know whether part 
fourteen was sent over to the Army. 

19. Q. Can you state whether part fourteen was completely proc- 
cessed and reacly for delivery in your section on the morning of 7 De- 
cember, and if so, at what hour? 

A. Our part of the processing was completed before 0700. I don't 
know when the smooth translation was made up. I have talked to 
the watcli officer at that time, and he informs me — and he is in Wash- 
ington at the present time — that the material was all handed to Com- 
mander Kramer between 9 : 00 and 10 : 00 o'clock in the morning. 
That is the part fourteen. We haven't covered the first thirteen parts, 
which were in Commander Kramer's hands at between 9 : 00 and 
10: 00 o'clock, p. m.. on the previous evening, of the 6th, Washington 
time. 

20. Q. You don't know of your own knowledge what happened to 
these processed documents after they came into the possession of 
Commander Kramer? 

A. Commander Kramer had been pressing us for the documents all 
afternoon. He was there while they were being processed and as soon 
as the last one was finished he put them in a bi-ief case and left the 
Navy Department. 

21. Q. Yon don't know, of your own knowledge, where he went 
to deliver these processed documents? 

A. No, sir, I do not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 765 

22. Q. I show you document No. 41 from Exhibit 63, and ask you 

to examine it. Can you state what time this document arrived in the 
Xavy Department in its original form? 

A. It arrived, as far as I am able to reconstruct the situation, at 
the same time that part fourteen arrived — in the same teletype trans- 
mission. It was their custom to send in batches of messages; some- 
times it would be a single one, sometimes it might be five or six. The 
number assigned to [738] this — station serial number of Sta- 
tion S, assigned to this part — is Xo. 381. The number assigned to 
part l4 was Xo. 380. and from examining the copies of the original 
teletype, I am fairly certain that they both were in the same trans- 
mission, in arriving here in Washington. 

23. Q. Can you state whether the records show the time that docu- 
ment 41 was finally processed in the Xavy Department or the War 
Department, as it might have been done ? 

A. That, too, was processed before 0700. It was processed by the 
same man that processed part fourteen, and as I recall seeing the 
work sheet now in possession of the Army sometime ago, it had a pri- 
ority sticker attached to it, and was sent over to the Army. I have 
since talked to Lieutenant Commander Perring. When he relieved 
the watch at 0700 on the morning of the 7th, the watch officer told him 
that the Army had some material over there and he went over and 
picked it up. They were in the Munitions Building at that time. 

24. Q. Is this offi^cer a Lieutenant Perring ? 
A. Lieutenant Commander Perring. 

25. Q. Is he on duty in Washington now? 
A. He is on duty in Washington, yes, sir. 

26. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether a document, 
41, was processed and ready for distribution at 0700 on the morning 
of 7 December ? 

A. Yes, sir, according to the records. I wasn't there. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, IT. S. Navy, did 
not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Xavy (Ret) : 

27. Q. On Saturdav night, were you on duty ? 
A. I was on duty from 1600 to 2400 on the 6th. 

28. Q. How many copies did Lieutenant Commander Ki'amer take 
with him when he left on the errand of distribution ? 

A. I can't answer that. I don't know. I don't even know the 
number that was customary to make up. That was a different section. 
I am not familiar with the number that he normally made up. 

29. Q. And you didn't supervise the preparation of the copies ? 

A. Oh, incidentally, we had some help from the Army, some typists, 
and to rush up the material back and forth. I knew it was being typed 
up. but that is all I know. 

30. Q. I call your attention to document 38, of Exliibit [739] 
63, which was read in evidence yesterday. Can you tell when that 
document was ready for delivery, in the form in which it there 
appears? 



766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, sir ; I haven't been able to obtain the work sheet on that. I 
can tell about when it came in, but I can't give the whole story on 
that particular dispatch. The w^ork sheet is in the custody of the 
Army. I think I may be able to place it with respect to some of the 
others, however — say, with part fourteen. That was intercepted at 
Station S at 0720 on the morning of the 6th. 

31. Q. Is that Greenwich time or 

A. That is Washington time. 

32. Q. But you can't reconstruct when it was processed here? 

A. No, sir; without the work sheet. As a matter of fact, I don't 
know whether we processed the document, or the Army did. 

33. Q. Now will you look at document 13. 

A. I don't have any particular information on that one ; I haven't 
covered this period at all. 

34. Q. Do you know whether the execution of that document was 
received, and when? 

A. I did not see the execution of that document: At the time ap- 
parently it just by-passed me, and an effort was made to keep those 
things as quiet as possible. It is quite possible that it came in and I 
didn't see it. I didn't have it at the time. I might say, however, that 
our watch was looking for the expressions in the news broadcast. It 
didn't come in while I was on watch. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) , 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Examined by the court: 

35. Q. In order to clear up this dispatch, 30, does the court under- 
stand that the thirteen parts were received in English? 

A. Yes, sir. 

36. Q. And you received those at 2:51 p. m., Washington time, on 
6 December. 

A. Yes, sir; we had all thirteen parts in by 1451 on 6 December. 

37. Q. And all in English? 

A. Oh, no ; I am afraid I am giving the wrong impression. There 
was English under encipherment, and they enciphered what they re- 
quired. That was English, rather, and the Japanese under the en- 
cipherment — so it took considerable time to process them. 

[740] 38. Q. When were the thirteen parts in English readable 
and ready for somebody to see? 

A. I would say that processing was completed sometime between 
8 : 00 and 9 : 00 and that the finished documents were ready between 
8 : 00 and 10 :00 p. m., Washington time, on the night of the 6th. They 
were in Commander Kramer's hands at that time. Commander 
Kramer was there during the whole time the information was in the 
process of being processed. He was there when I came on watch, and 
I imagine he stayed all day, although I don't know. He was there 
right up until 9 : 00 o'clock, supervising the preparation of the docu- 
ments. 

39. Q. And the part 14 was processed and ready by 7:00 o'clock 
Washington time on the morning of 7 December? 

A. Yes, sir. To clear that, It had been deciphered and was reduced 
to English in the copies — that is, in the work slieet form. I have no 
knowledge of the smooth copy as you see it here, or whether it was 
made at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 767 

40. Q. NoAv this No. 38, which ^ives information as to when this 
note is going to come tlirough ; that was received and processed and 
ready on the morning of 6 December ? 

A. Yes, sir. As I say, the Army has the work sheet. I liaven't seen 
it, but in all likelihood it Avas processed, because we had whatever 
cryptographic information Ave needed to do the work, and the Army 
had it similarily ; and I am fairly certain that it was. 

41. Q. The only thing Ave are trying to get straight is that on the 
morning of the 6th you got notification here of that on the 6t.h — our 
6th, this note Avould come tlirough, a final ansAver to the note of Novem- 
ber 26? 

A. I didn't have that information myself. 

42. Q. It is a matter of record ? 

A. It is a matter of record. Yes, sir; that is an Army translation. 
The Army apparently processed that; they translated it. I don't 
know Avhen the information Avas made available to us. 

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine 
this witness. 

The court informed the Avitness that he Avas jjrivileged to make any 
further statement coA^ering anything relating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry Avhich he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection thereAvith, Avhich had not been fully bi'ought out by the pre- 
vious questioning. 

The witness made the f olloAving statement : 

I would just like to ask that anything I said be given the same handling, as far 
as security is concerned, as the original document. 

The Avitness Avas duly Avarned and AvithdreAv. 

[74-i^ The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Com- 
mander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a 
witness by the judge adA^ocate, and was Avarned that the oath previ- 
ously taken Avas still binding. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. I shoAv you a document. Can you identify it? 

A. I identify it as a file of documents assembled by the Federal 
Communications Commission at the request of the judge advocate of 
this court. It is certified over the signature of the Secretary of the 
Commission, .and duly authenticated under official seal, assembled 
on August 18, 1944. 

The file of documents assembled by the Federal Communications 
Commission, on August 18, 1944, certified over the signature of the 
Secretary of the Commission, and duly authenticated under official 
seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by 
the judge advocate offered in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 
65," for reference, description appended. 

2. Q. Will you read the document? 

A. (Reading:) 

SECRET 

"United States of Amekica, 
I"1i:DERAL Communications Commission, 

Washington, D. C, August 18, 19U. 
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as 
follows : 

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley 
T. Guest (noAV Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's 



768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

monitors to be on tlie lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel 
Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This 
request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT. 

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station! 
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, Decem- 
ber 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to 
contact Colonel Bratton's oflSce, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 
20-G, Watch OflScei', Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to 
accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office. 

Document No. 3 i^ a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station 
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, 
which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, 
December 5, 1941. 

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather [742] messages inter- 
cepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 
0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusen- 
bury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's oflfice at 
approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the 
Romaji version of these messages. 

On file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of 
the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of 
August, 1944. 



(Signed) T. J. Slowie, 

Secretary. 



SECRET 

Document No. 1 



GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN 
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND 
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP 

GROUP REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF 
BROADCAST 
The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the 
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941. 

SECRET 

Document No. 2 

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME 
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE 
WEATHER 

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM 
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS 

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR 'MAY BECOME 
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM 
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 
2200 GM, December 4, 1941. 

[7.^3] SECKET 

"Document No. 3 

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR 
BEGIN 

CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM 
SOUTH, (repeated 3 times) 

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 
2130 gmt December 5, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 769 

SECRET 

"Document No. J/ 

English 

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 
NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT 
THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE 
WEATHER FORECAST: 

WEST WIND, CLEAR 
WEST WIND, CLEAR 

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 
NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT 
SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE 
WEATHER FORECAST: 

WEST WIND, CLEAR 
WEST WIND, CLEAR 

Romaji 

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI- 
MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI 
KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHI- 
AGE MASU 

NI8HI NO KAZE HARE 
NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI- 
MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU 
NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE 
MASU 

NISHI NO KAZE HARE 
NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans- 
mitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness ; the witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate, 

[744] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second chxss, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, 
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Captain, please state your name, rank, and present station? 
A. L. F. Safford, Captain, United States Navy, Office of Naval 

Communications, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the second half 
of the calendar year 1941 ? 

A. I was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communica- 
tions. The Communications Security Section included security 
proper, that is, codes and ciphers, and surveillance over their use. 
That also included Communications Intelligence. The name was 
used in peace-time purely to mask the major mission of the section, 
which is collecting information from enemy or prospective enemy 
nations through their communications, and most of our effort was 
concentrated on Japan at that time. I was in charge of the intercept 
stations, direction finder exchanges, and decrypting units. 



770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this exami- 
nation. Can you identify that document? 

A. I can identify it. 

4. Q. Captain, what is the tenor of this message that you have 
before you ? 

A. That the Japanese government would announce to their diplo- 
matic officials overseas a prospective break in diplomatic relations or 
war against the United States, against England, including the Nether- 
lands East Indies, and against llussia, by means of false weather re- 
ports broadcast in the middle and at the end of their daily Japanese 
language short-wave news broadcasts. 

5. Q. On what date was this information translated and available 
in the Navy Department ? 

A. November 28, 1941. 

6. Q. Was any other confirmation of the establishment of that code 
by the Japanese received in the Navy Department 'i 

A. We received confirmation a few hours later from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station who had received it from the 
British at Singapore. We received double confirmation about the 
4th of December from the Dutch at Batavia. They gave the infor- 
mation to Consul General Foote, who sent it to the State Depart- 
ment. They also gave it to Colonel Thorpe, the senior military 
observer, who passed it on to the War Department via the Navy De- 
partment and the naval observer in Batavia. 

[74^] 7. Q. Sir, I hand you Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64 
before this examination. Are these the confirmations about which you 
have just testified? 

A. They are two of them. The message from Mr. Foote is not here. 

8. Q. Is the first of those from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet? 
A. The first is from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. And the 

second is from Colonel Thorpe, originated from Batavia. 

9. Q. Captain, I invite your attention to the fact that in the message 
which was intercepted here, that is. Document 15 of Exhibit 63, and 
in the message from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Document 2, Ex- 
hibit 64, there is a discrepancy in the code words which would indicate 
a break with the United States. Can you explain that difference be- 
tween the two codes? I specifically refer to the point that in the inter- 
cept from Tokio received in Washington, a United States-Japanese 
break would be indicated by ''Higashi No Kazeame". In the version 
received via CincAF, this same meaning would be expressed by 
''Higashi No Kaze Kumori". Is there any significance to this differ- 
ence in the last word of the code message? 

A. There is no significance ; only an indication of an error in coding. 
The coding officer left out a whole line with reference to Russia. The 
first part ties it together where it says ''Higashi Higashi Japanese 
American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England", and in the 
second part where it describes the Japanese language in the Morse code 
broadcast, there is no reference to Russia at all except tlie last word, 
which is "Kinnori". 

10. Q. In other words, Captain, the i)oint of my last question is this : 
There were only three sentences that were being looked out for; that 
this apparent discrepancy in the CinCAF dispatch was understood here 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 771 

and that was not a separate sentence that was being looked for at 
that time? 

A. That is correct. It was only a mistake and the Dutch version 
clarified it in case there had been any question in our minds. 

The court then, at 10: 45 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 00 a. m., at 
Avhich time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, tlie judoe advocate and his counsel, the 
interested parties and their counsel; except the interested party, Ad- 
miral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank 
L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Captain L, F. Safford, U. S. Navy, the w^itness under examination 
when the recess Avas taken, entered. He w^as warned that the oath 
previously taken was still binding. 

[746] Examination by the judge advocate (continued) : 

12. Q. After the receipt of these three dispatches about which you 
have testified, what steps were taken by the Communications Intelli- 
gence Unit in Washington to monitor Japanese broadcasts to intercept 
any possible use of this code? 

A. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort 
be made to monitor the Japanese stations for the prospective winds 
message. We sent teletype instructions to our intercept stations at 
Bainbridge Island, Washington, Winter Harbor, Maine, and other East 
Coast points, to guard for this message and send it in. Bainbridge 
Island was ordered to send in all plain language intercepts b}^ teletype. 
We also sent a radio message to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th 
Naval Districts giving them the latest information we had on Tokio's 
broadcast schedules. 

13. Q. In other words. Captain, were the C. I. units at Pearl Harbor 
and at Cavite also monitoring for this broadcast? 

A. They were also monitoring. They were listening for the voice 
broadcasts. Our stations in the continental United States were listen- 
ing for the Morse broadcasts. At the time Bainbridge Island was 
guarding the Trans-Pacific telephone circuit both ways and that tied 
up both recording sets and they could not listen for the voice broad- 
casts. 

14. Q. When was the first information received in the Communica- 
tions Intelligence Section here in Washington of the Japanese using 
this code? 

A. My first information was in the morning of Thursday, December 
4, at 8 : 00 o'clock or shortly thereafter. Lieutenant Murray, I be- 
lieve — possibly Lieutenant Commander Kramer — came in with a yel- 
low teletype sheet in his hand and he said, "Here it is", and he held 
it up. This was typed in Japanese language, and had the significant 
words of the winds underscored, and below was a translation in pencil, 
and the translation said "War with America; War with England; 
and peace with Russia", to the best of my recollection after almost 
three years. I have never seen a copy of this translation since about 
the 15th of December, 1941. 

15. Q. What intercept station had received this information that 
you saw that morning? 

A. I believe it came from one of the East Coast stations, but we 
cannot run that down because all the messaces from all these East 



772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Coast stations have been destroyed. Bainbridge Island files were 
intact for this period and Bainbridge Island is eliminated. 

[747] 16. Q. Were there any confirmations of the interception 
of this type of message from any other sources, either Navy, Army, 
or other Federal agencies ? 

A. No. I have a vague recollection of a second winds message but 
was unable to find any trace of it up until the time that I testified 
before Admiral Hart's investigation. Since then I received word that 
the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted a winds 
message at Portland, Oregon. I saw the message itself for the first 
time this morning and I do not recognize it. 

17. Q. Captain, I hand you Exhibit G5 before this examination, 
which are copies certified under seal of the Federal Communications 
Commission of the intercept of the Winds message which they con- 
veyed to the Navy Department. Were you familiar with this prior 
to December 7, 1941 ? 

A. If I was I have completely forgotten it. The F. C. C. had the 
telephone number of the G. W. watch officer and it is possible that one 
of my subordinates made arrangements with Colonel Guest at the time 
the F. C. C. were requested to monitor this message. I do not recall 
any of the documents which I see here in Exhibit 65. 

18. Q. Concerning tlie messages as conveyed by F. C. C. as shown 
by this certified copy, Exhibit 65 : What meaning as regards a break 
in diplomatic relations between any one of the three nations con- 
cerned is shown there ? 

A. Document No. 2 on December 4, 1941. would indicate a break 
with Kussia. Document No. 3 on December 5, 1941, would also indi- 
cate a break with Rusia. Document No. 4 on the early morning of 
December 8 — that is about 10 hours after the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor — would indicate a break with England. 

19. Q. Is it shown anywhere in these messages received from F. C. 
C. that a break of relations between the United States and Japan was 
anticipated ? 

A. Not in these F. C. C. documents. 

20. Q. Adverting back several questions to your answer that you 
saw on the morning of December 4th an intercept of the use of the 
winds code which clearly indicated a break in relations between the 
United States and Japan, Great Britain and Japan, and no break with 
Russia. Are copies of these intercepts now on file in the unit of which 
you were tlie head? 

A. They are not on file. Repeated search has been made since 
middle of November, 1943, and no trace of tliem could be found. The 
Arni}^ have been requested to furnish copies and repeated search by 
the S. I. S. has also failed to reveal a single copy. 

21. Q. Do you have any explanation for their absence or do you 
have any information as to where they might be since they are not in 
files of the C. I. Unit ? 

A. I made many discreet inquiries. Lieutenant Commander Broth- 
erhood states tliat he knows their disposition but [74^] did 
not care to tell me. I also know what happened to the Army copies, 
flirough very second-hand and devious sources. 

22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of 
the intercept using the winds code wliich you saw on the morning of 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 773 

4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war 
between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of 
the code originally which wonld indicate that a nse of that code would 
indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations? 
A. The Dutch translation said "war". The Japanese language is 
very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpreta- 
tions or translations on the same message. In very important docu- 
ments it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent 
transhitions and the differences were sometimes surprising; that is, a 
difference in degree. The general facts would be alike. However, the 
people in Communication Intelligence and the people in Signal In- 
telligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval 
Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered 
that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the Japanese war' 
plans. 

23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in Ex- 
hibit 64 which is an English language translation of the Dutch inter- 
cept. Was this your only source of information that the use of this 
code would indicate ''a war decision" which is the wording used by 
the attache in Batavia ? 

A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more 
specific. It said, "When crises leading to worst arises following will 
be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. East wind rain — war with 
United States. 2. North wind cloudy — war with Kussia. 3. West 
wind clear — war with Britain, including an attack on Thailand or 
Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a verbatim quo- 
tation from the Dutch translation. 

24. Q. In other words, the state of the record based on the informa- 
tion you had was that two sources indicated that the use of that code 
would be a break in diplomatic relations, and to others indicated 
stronger language such as "war decision"? 

A. Yes, and we also had to take into account Japanese psychology. 
They had a gift for understatement and the language officers who 
lived in Japan could interpret the meaning of a message better than 
people who were not familiar with the Japanese mentality. 

25. Q. Captain, from your own personal knowledge, to whom in 
the Navy Department was the information in regard to [749~\ 
the use of the winds code distributed? I refer to the information 
that you have just testified about that you Imew about and saw on 
the morning of December 4th ? 

A. I'm very certain that an immediate distribution was made to 
the regular people before 9 : 00 a. m., that morning, that is, the Di- 
rector of Naval Intelligence, the Director of War Plans, the Director 
of Naval Communications for his information, so he could keep track 
of what we were doing, the assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and 
of course, the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, copies 
were sent to the State Department, to the White House, and to the 
War Department. This same message was also included in the routine 
distribution, which was made around noon each day. Kramer can 
tell that exactly. I can't. 

26. Q. Just to clarify the record, Is your last answer from your 
own personal knowledge, or from what was told you by other parties ? 



774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I know that Kramer made an immediate distribution that morn- 
ing and I know what officers saw these messages every day. It is 
possible that any individual may have been absent from his office and 
might not have seen that message early in the morning. 

27. Q. Was this information, to-wit, that an intercept of an execu- 
tion of the winds code had been received, passed to either the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or the Combat Intelligence Unit of 
the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor? 

A. It was not. 

28. Q. Was any attempt made so to do ? 
A. There was. 

20. Q. Will you testify what you know from your own personal 
knowledge as to any attempt that was made to disseminate this infor- 
mation to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commandant, 14th Naval 
District? ' 

A. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, 
Commander McCollum, wrote up a long message about 4 or 5 oi' 
pages long, approximately 500 words, giving a complete and brief 
and very forceful summary of developments up to that time, up to 
4 December, 1941. I saw this message in the afternoon of the 4th. 
I was in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications; had 
submitted several dispatches to him for release or for reference to 
higher authority. All these messages were based on the presumption 
that war was imminent, and the information taken from the winds 
message. The Director of Naval Intelligence. Admiral Wilkinson, 
came in with this message and he gave it to Admiral Noyes and said, 
'T have a message here for the Conunander-in-Chief which I wish 
you would read." Admiral Noyes said, "That's fine; I have several 
going out there [750] myself I would like you to see before 
they go out and I want to get them out this afternoon." They ex- 
changed messages, and as Admiral Noyes finished a page he handed 
it over to me and I read it. I just happened to be there by chance. 
It was a very complete summary of what had happened. It began 
with the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans in July. It mentioned the evacuation of Japanese 
Nationals from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. It included 
the fact that diplomatic relations were at an impasse; that neither 
party would yield, and it had a direct reference to the winds message, 
I believe a quotation, and said that we considered that this was the 
execute of the Japanese war plans, the signal of execute of the Japanese 
war plans; that we expected that war was innnincnt. Exactly every- 
thing I cannot recall at tlie end of nearly three years but I do know 
it was very complete and that nothing important had been left out 
of it. McCollum had been working several hours on it and had done 
a very thorough job. When they got done looking at it. Admiral 
Wilkinson said, "What do you think of it, Lee? And Admiral 
Noyes said, "I think it's an insult to the intelligence of the Commander- 
in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson said, 'T do not agree with you. Ad- 
miral Kimmel is a very busy man and may not see the picture as 
clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in- 
Chief that he be given this information and I am going to send it 
if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then 
took the message and left, and I presume went to Admiral Ingersoll 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 775 

to have the messao;e released. I left Admiral Noyes' office a few min- 
utes later. The exact time is associated with other messages which 
were sent at that time, or a few minutes later, and I do have the 
filing times with me, 

80. Q. Captain, is your answer that that message was not sent? 
Am I correct in saying that this message was not sent ? 

A. That message was not sent but I did not even suspect it had 
not been sent until November, 1043. 

31. Q. Are you aware of the existence of a copy of that rough 
draft anywhere ? 

A. So far as I know there is no copy in existence. 

32. Q. What other information, if any, was received in the C. I, 
Unit in Washington prior to the evening of December Gth that indi- 
cated a break in relations between the United States and Japan? 

A. On November 5, 1941, Tokio sent Ambassador Nomura a dis- 
patch ''JD No. 6254" stating that it was absolutely necessary tliat all 
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 
25th of this month, and added "of utmost secrecv". 

[7S1] 33. Q. I hand you Document 7 of Exhibit 63. Is this the 
message to which you have just referred? 

A. It is. 

34. Q. Please continue with your answer. 

A. The day before Tokio had sent JD No. 6248 to Nomura stating 
that counter-proposals would be given in Tokio No. 726 and 727, and 
added, "Conditions both within and without our empire are so tense 
that no longer is procrastination possible. This is our last effort. 
The success or failure of the pending discussions will liave an immense 
effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan''. On November 12th, 
Tokio informed Nomura in JD 6415, "The United States is still not 
fully aware of the exceeding criticalness of the situation here. The 
date set in Message No. 736 is a definite deadline. The situation is 
nearing a climax. Time is indeed becoming short." On November 
17, Tokio told Ambassador Nomura in JD 6638, in reply to a long 
message from him in which he begged Tokio to at least wait a month or 
two to get a clear view of the world situation. "The fate of oiu* em- 
pire hangs by the slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline. 
There will be no change." 

[7S2] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middle! on, j^eoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

35. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 10 of Exhibit 63 before this 
court. Is this the document to which vou just referred ? 

A. It is. 

36. Q. Please continue. 

A. On November 22 Tokyo advised Nomura in JD 6710 : "There are 
reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Jap- 
anese-American relations by the 25th." 

37. Q. I hand you Document 11 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document 
to which you refer? 

A, Yes. 

38. Q. Please continue. 

A. On November 24 Tokyo advised in JD 6744 : "Advise Nomura the 
time limit set in my number 812 is in Tokyo time." On November 26 



776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in JD 6801 we learned tliat Tokyo advised Nomura : "Should negotia- 
tions collapse, we will completely destroy British and American power 
in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions." 
This is a circular. It was sent on November 14, 1941. We were de- 
layed twelve days in getting this information. On November 28 we 
learned in JD 6890, which is a translation of a Washington-Tokyo 
telephone conversation: "A crisis does appear imminent regarding 
negotiations. Do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand, and 
the Army is champing at the bit." This is from Kurusu to Yamamoto 
in Tokyo. On November 26 w^e learned of a Washington-Tokyo 
telephone conversation. On November 26 in JD 6891 Kurusu and 
Nomura, in commenting on the American note which Secretary Hull 
had delivered to them that date, stated : "Our failure and humiliation 
are complete." 

39. Q. I hand you Document 16 of Exhibit 63. Is this the docu- 
ment to which you just referred? 

A. It is. Have you got 6898 on November 28 ? 

40. Q. Yes. • _ 

A. On November 28 we received information contained in Docu- 
ment 18 of Exhibit 63, which I identified. On December 1 in JD 
6942 we received information of Germany's promise to aid Japan 
in case Japan would declare war against the United States. On De- 
cember 1 in JD 6943 Tokyo advised Ambassador Oshima in Berlin: 
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand rup- 
tured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is ex- 
treme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo 
Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than any- 
body dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for 
the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the 
north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy 
is." [YSS] That is December 1, and the message was dated No- 
vember 30, 1941. On December 1 we also received the information 
contained in JD 6944, which I believe you have. 

41. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 22 of Exhibit 63 before this 
court. Is this the document to which you just referred? 

A. Yes. On December 2 in JD 6974 we learned that Hsingking 
advised Tokyo : "In the event tliat war breaks out with England and 
the United States, persons to be interned: British Nationals, 339; 
American citizens, 81; Nationals of Soviet observed to be obnoxious 
characters with pro-British and American learnings are to be suitably 
taken care of." 

42. Q. Captain, in your future answers please limit yourself only 
to the documents which gave new and additional information regard- 
ing a possible war with Japan or a possible break in diplomatic rela- 
tions between the United States and Japan? 

A. On December 1 in JD 6983 Tokyo advised Washington to prevent 
the United States from becoming unduly suspicious — 

43. Q. We have that. I hand you Document 21 of Exhibit 63 before 
this court. Is this the dispatch about which you are testifying? 

A. It is. Do you liave 6984? 

44. Q. No, sir.* 

A. On December 1 in JD 6984 Tokyo advised : "The four offices 
in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 777 

to abandon the use of code machines and dispose of them. The 
machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan." 

45. Q. Was there any indication of which one of the code machines 
was being destroyed there? 

A. It was very definite to us. It is describing teclniical terms. On 
December 2 in JD G985 Tokyo sent a circular message to consular 
officials all over the world establishing a hidden-word code for use 
after they had destroyed their other code books and normal tele- 
graphic communications were not available. The message itself was 
dated November 27. We were five daj^s late in translation. On De- 
cember 3 we learned from JD G991 that Tokyo had told the Cojisul 
General in Honolulu : "Make your ships in harbor, report irregularly 
but twice a week." 

40. Q. I hand you Document 64 of Exhibit 63. Is this the docu- 
ment to which you refer ? 

A. It is. On December 3 we learned in JD 7017 that Tokyo had 
instructed Washington to burn all codes except two, stop using the 
machine and destroy completely, destroy all message files and all 
secret documents. The message was dated the 2nd. On December 
4 in JD 7029 we learned that Tokyo had instructed the consulate in 
Honolulu to investigate bases in Hawaiian reservation. The message 
was dated November 20. 

[7S4-] 47. Q. Please continue. 

A. On December 5 in JD 7063 we learned that Tokyo instructed 
Honolulu to report ships in Pearl Harbor and I\Iaunalua Bay and so 
forth. That message was dated November 18. 

48. Q. I hand you Document 37 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is 
this the message of November 18 to which you just referred? 

A. It is. On December 5 in JD 7086 we learned that Tokyo had 
instructed Honolulu: "In the future, report even when there are no 
ship movements." The message was dated November 29. 

49. Q. I hand you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 before this court. 
Is this the message of November 29 to which you have just referred? 

A. It is. On the 4th of December in JD 7092 Tokyo instructed 
Hsinking : "Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and 
America that this country will take in case war breaks out. Great 
care should be taken not to antagonize Russia." That was sent De- 
cember 1. On December 6 in JD 7111 — I think you have that — Hono- 
lulu reported on naval vessels in Pearl Harbor. 

50. Q. Yes. 

A. That takes me through the afternoon and evening of Decem- 
ber 6. 

51. Q. In addition to the foregoing, was there any information 
available to the Navy Department indicating the imminence of hostili- 
ties, as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations prior to 
the evening of December 6, 1941 ? 

A. We regarded the breaking of diplomatic relations with Japan 
and active hostilities as being synonomus, going on Japan's past 
record. We began standing continuous watches on the Japanese 
diplomatic watches the 1st of February, 1941 as soon as we had enough 
officers and men to do it, because we expected that the break would 
come over a week-end, the way all Hitler's coups had been made in 
Europe against the British and other European cabinets, and we did 



778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not want to be caught off guard. We knew it would take two or three 
months until we got into an efficient watch list. When the break 
actually came, it was just one more week-end as far as the men on 
watch were concerned. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

5:2. Q. When Lieutenant Commander Kramer left your unit to dis- 
tribute information, with how many copies of such information did he 
start ? 

A. Normally he had only one copy which was showed but not [765] 
given anybody. The one exception to that, which I know of, was 
on the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, when he made 
numerous copies, so that each party concerned could be given a copy. 
We always gave two copies of everything we had to the Army to 
handle their own filing and distribution. The Army gave us two 
copies, one for file by JD number and the other for distribution and 
file by dates. 

53. Q. You implied in your testimony that you gave high evalua- 
tions of the news coming from Batavia concerning the Winds Code. 
How long had you been giving that evaluation as to what came from 
Java ? 

A. That was the only message we ever received from Java. 

54. Q. You stated at the end of your direct examination that the 
feeling in your unit was that a severance of diplomatic relations was 
equivalent to a declaration of war. Will you expand that answer a 
little more and tell us why you had such an interpretation ? 

A. Historically speaking, Japan commenced hostilities against 
China in the Chinese-Japanese war — I think in 1890 — without any 
formal breaking of diplomatic relations. The attack on the Fleet 
was itself the severance of diplomatic relations. The same thing oc- 
curred at Port Arthur at the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. 
Because we were largely influenced by people who lived in Japan 
and studied the language out there, we had no faith in the Japanese 
at all and considered them a very tricky, underhanded bunch of dirty 
fighters who would try to hit us behind our back if they could. 

55. Q. You stated that in your unit a message about the severance 
of diplomatic relations was akin to the signal to execute the Japanese 
war plans. Upon what reason did you base that? 

A. For one thing, we were largely influenced by the importance that 
Admiral Wilkinson attributed to it before it came in. We had all 
manner of things pointing up to the beginning of the war, including the 
messages which I read off. The last one came in just about the same 
time as the message from Hsinking, telling them, above all, not to 
antagonize Russia and referring to the possibility of war against Eng- 
land and the United States. There were the messages to Berlin, but 
all these things pointed, more or less, to promises, but there was nothing 
s])ecific in regard to time other than this ultimation or the time 
limit of the '29th. The Army people expected that we were going 
to be hit on the 29tli or 80th. They were very positive and could 
not understand why they waited that long. AVe figured that they had 
some complicated move involved. It was all a question of timing, and 
they would somehow have to give a signal [7S6] to execute, 
and this was one way to give it. There was no way we could see for 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 779 

giving this information to the consuls. We thought it meant more 
than to the consuls and that it was going to the military force. It 
was our belief and that is all we had. 

50. Q. Then, that feeling was not so much contained in your unit 
as it was the feeling of the Director of Naval Intelligence ? 

A. We thought it was his feeling. We thought it was McCollum's 
feeling and it was our own. We shared that view. 

57. Q. Do you recall Commander Kramer's ever leaving your unit 
with one or more documents when he was about to present to higher 
authority the feeling that a signal for the execution of the Japanese 
w^ar plans had been given ? 

A. Yes, sir, I believe that he left twice that day, once early in the 
morning to take that around at least as far as Admiral Wilkinson, 
and he may have been asked by Admiral Wilkinson to carry it farther. 
Then, again he made his regular distribution trip on which he took it to 
everybody and ended up by giving it to the aide of the President. 

58. Q. Were those words used 'i 

A. No, sir, we were very careful not to intrude our opinions upon 
things we were reporting. As for the set-up of the war plans : Com- 
munications obtained this information, and it was the duty and re- 
sponsibility of Naval Intelligence to collate it and disseminate it, and 
we felt that we would have been over-stepping the bounds if we at- 
tempted to put our interpretations in. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Eet.) : 

59. Q. Do you know what your unit did Saturday afternoon and 
evening, December 6, and Sunday morning, December 7? 

A. I know that very well, because I talked with all the officers 
who were on watch during that period, as well as seeing the written 
record. 

60. Q. Will you tell the court, in general, what your unit did on 
the 6th and 7th of December in regard to this matter? 

A. On a week-end traflic usually fell off to nothing. On this week- 
end we handled about three times the normal messages for a busy day. 
The most important was a very long, 14-part message which contained 
the Japanese declaration of war, vv^hich was delivered Sunday after- 
noon around, I believe it was, 2 : 15 or 2 : 30 p. m. to the Secretary of 
State. We had the first thirteen parts of that and had them translated 
or decoded by 7 p. m. Saturday night, December 6, 1941. Then we 
spent about two hours making smooth copies and numerous [757] 
other copies. The Army came over and helped us. They did some 
of the translation and also furnished a copy. The Army was given 
three copies about nine o'clock. At nine o'clock Kramer got on the 
telephone and told Admiral Wilkinson what he had and asked for 
instructions. Wilkinson told him to come right out and leave a copy 
at the White House en route. That was clone. Kramer went out to 
Admiral Wilkinson's, and I believe Admiral Wilkinson was entertain- 
ing the Naval Aide to the President. He got a station wagon, stopped 
at the White House en route, and left these copies with the White House 
Aide. At the time, the President was entertaining and could not be 
seen immediately. 

The judge advocate objected to the answer of the witness on the 
ground that it was hearsay. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 7 



780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Examined by tlie court : 

()1. Q. Is that an official report'^ 

A. That is what Kramer tohl me officially as his commanding officer, 
':o account for his movements. I asked him some very searching 
questions. 

The judge adocate withdrew the objection. 

62. Q. Continue with your answer. 

A. As well as I can recollect, Admiral Wilkinson telephoned to 
Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and also to Admiral 
Turner, the Director of War Plans. I know that Admiral Turner 
was informed that night. My recollections have been hazy. He may 
have been a guest of Admiral Wilkinson, and Kramer may have sent 
Admiral Turner a copy of the message, and Turner may have talked 
to Stark over the telephone. I asked Kramer about the Secretary of 
State, and he said that he understood that Colonel Brat ton, or some- 
body else in the Army, had delivered to Secretary Hull a copy of the 
message by 10 : 30 and that Secretary Hull called Secretary Knox and 
Stimson on the 'phone and made appointments for them, plus Kramer 
and Bratton, to be present at a conference in the State Department in 
Secretary Hull's office at 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. They 
all attended. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 
a. m. on December 7 to see if part 14 had come in or any other news. 
Then he w^ent home and left word he was going to be down early the 
next morning, because he had instructions to gi^'e these documents to 
Admiral Stark in his office at 9 o'clock. About 4 or 5 a. m, December 7, 
1941, two other important messages came in by teletype from the West 
Coast. One was part 14 of the long message which was a declaration 
of war. This was decoded immediately and was ready for distribution 
by 7 a. m. of December 7, 1941. [758] The other message was 
Tokyo's serial No. 907, and when decoded it proved to be in Japanese. 
That was sent over to the War Department for translation about 7 a. m. 
on December 7, 1941. The translation came back from the War De- 
partment a little after 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7. That was 
the message which instructed Kurusu and Nomura to deliver the dec- 
laration of war to the Secretary of State, if possible, at 1 p. m. on 
Sunday, December 7, 1941, Washington time. Specifically, it was to 
deliver Tokyo serial No. 902. 

63. Q. That was the message of which there were fourteen parts? 
A. That was the 14-part message. 

- 64. Q. Do you know anything about the dissemination of the 14th 
part and the second message to which you just referred that came in 
on the morning of Sunday, December 7 ? 

A. Kramer came into the Navy Department somewhere about 8 a. m., 
by the recollection of himself, December 7, 1941, and took that mes- 
sage — and there were some other inconsequential ti'anslatioiis at the 
same time, plus the other l-\ parts — uj) to Admii-al Stark's office first. 
He either gave them to Admiral Stark personally or left them with his 
aide. My memory is not clear on that i)oint. Then he went to the 
Wliite House and left a copy with Admiral Beardall, who was at the 
White House. Then he went to the State Department and arrived in 
time for his 10 a. m. appointment with Secretary Hull and Secretary 
Knox. Colonel Bratton was there, and so was Secretary Stimson. 

The judge advocate moved to strike from the record the testimony 
of this witness relating to information which had been told him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 781 

The court announced that it did not sustain tlie motion to strike out 
the testimony, 

{)5. You may proceed. 

A. Kramer delivered he material and stayed a few minutes and 
then went back to the Navy Department. About the time he got back, 
the translation of Tokyo's serial No. 907 came in, which Kramer saw 
immediately was very important. There also came a message in the 
hidden-word code, which I have referred to and which was translated 
rery hurriedly. The translation, as circulated, said, ''Relations with 
England are not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste, 
as I discovered later, they left out one of the hidden words, and the 
message should have read 

[759] 66. Q. What was reported to you? 

A. Those two messages were redistributed immediately by Kramer. 
He first went to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There 
was a conference in progress there. He gave them to Admiral Stark's 
aide. Then he went to the White House and gave them to the Aide 
of the President. Then he got to the State Department, arriving there 
about 11 a. m. and gave copies to the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
of War, and the Secret ai'j^ of the Navy ; and to the copy he gave the 
Secretary of the Navy there was a note appended which stated the 
time of delivery was sunrise in Honolulu and nearly midnight in 
Manila, and it undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor 
in a few hours. 

The judge advocate moved that the entire answer to this question be 
stricken from the record on the ground that it is hearsay. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, joined 
in the motion. 

Examined by the court : 

67. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge what you have stated in 
that answer? 

A. I only know from what Kramer told me. 

The court announced that the motion to strike out the answer was 
sustained. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), 
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Examined by the court : 

68. Q. Captain, from your general knowledge of messages received 
and passing through your office, did you have the impression and did 
your office have the impression that they were important messages being 
received from sources, subsequent to November '27, which had a direct 
bearing on this war condition you mentioned? 

A. Yes, sir, they were. 

69. Q. You said that the messages were distributed when they were 
received. Did you have a list of distribution in your office, or did you 
know where those messages or copies of messages were being sent? 

A. There were written orders confining tlie distribution of these 
messages to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of 
Naval Operations, the Director of War Flans, the Director of Naval 
Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director 
of the Far Eastern [760] Section, plus the cryptanalysts and 
the translators working on them. If anybody else in the Navy De- 
partment saw them, it was done on the orders of higher authority. 



782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. Q. Have you any knowledge that any information concerning 
the messages which you have outlined was sent to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District? 

A. The only information sent him was with reference to the Japan- 
ese destroying their code machines. 

71. Q. The message of December 1, which contained an important 
message to Berlin stating that war with the United States and Great 
Britain might come sooner than expected, was not sent? 

A. That was not sent. 

72. Q. As information to the Commander-in-Chief? 

A. Neither to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet nor the Com- 
onander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 

73. Q. Has it been customary at any time within your experience 
in Communications or in the Navy Department to find that a message 
has been taken out of the files or has been misplaced from the files ? 

A. It has not. A great many messages and other material were mis- 
placed during frequent moves consequent to the growth of the Naval 
Intelligence organization, but subsequently, I think, everything was 
located or accounted for, and this Winds Message is verj'^ conspicuous 
by its absence. 

74. Q. You know of no other messages which have disappeared 
similar to this one? 

A. No other message that I knew about and wanted have we failed 
to find eventually. In some cases it took two or three months and they 
were found. 

75. Q. Has a diligent search been made for these messages? 

A. A diligent search was made by 20-G, and later I borrowed the 
files where they should have been. Commander Lynn assisted me, but 
we couldn't find any trace of them. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret.):" 

76. Q. Captain, can you find the communication which you had in 
reference to orders to 'Japanese diplomats to destroy their codes ? Can 
you get that? 

A. Here it is ; December 1 is the first one. 

[7^il 77. Q. The substance of that information was what? 

A. (Reading) "The four offices in London, Hong Kong. Singapore, 
and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of code machines 
and dispose of them. The machine at Batavia has been returned to 
Japan." 

78. Q. You had another one prior to December 3 on that same sub- 
ject? 

A. Yes. That one was the first. On the second one — a similar 
message was sent, but in more detail, to Washington. 

79. Q. I call your attention to Exhibit 20, the communication "of 
December 3, 1941. I observe that Exhibit 20 states that only some 
of the codes and some of the material is being destroyed. That was 
not your information at the time, was it ? Your information at the 
time was that all the codes were being destroyed? 

A. I did not write this. 

80. Q. I am not asking you that. 

A. The exhibit you refer to is incomplete and ambiguous. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 783 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy: 

81. Q. Captain, some of these documents of Exhibit 63 bear a stamp 
like the one on No. 1 and a great many have no stamp whatever. Will 
you explain to the court the significance of that stamp and what the 
omission may mean ? 

A. I cannot explain what the stamp means or the significance of 
the stamp or the lack of it. Kramer might be able to. 

82. Q. Captain, referring again to No. 39 of this exhibit, which is 
the 14-part message of December 6, will you glance at it and explain 
why you repeatedly refer to that dispatch from Tokyo as a declara- 
tion of war? 

A. Tokyo serial No. 901 stated that their 902 in English would be 
the answer to the American note of November 20, 1941. Up to this 
time, the language implied had been very courteous. Because of the 
harsh and abusive language used throughout this, there was no doubt 
in the minds of the men who were on watch at the time that the Japan- 
ese meant war and that this was their declaration. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ- 
ous questioning. 

[762] The witness made the following statement: The translation date 
of JD 7469 is December 15, 1941. The message itself was dated December 11 
and gives Tokyo's explanation of the presentation of serial No. 902 and the 
fact that they considered it their declaration of war. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Doctor Stanley K. Hornbeck. Pages 767- 
772, inclusive. 

[767] 24. Q. Do you remember receiving, or having knowledge 
of, information on 26 November 1941, setting forth the Japanese of- 
ficial views as to the successful outcome of the agreement under con- 
sideration between the United States and Japan? 

A. I think we had something on that from intercept material. 

25. Q. Did you know the source of this information? 
A. I knew the approximate source, at least. 

26. Q. Between the dates, November 27 and December 7, 1941, were 
negotiations continuing with Japan ? 

A. Well, there was some further conversation, and then there was 
the President's message to the Emperor, but that is all in the record, 
also. 

27. Q. But there were conversations and parleys going on in that 
period of time ? 

A. Yes. 

28. Q. Did you, being aware of that information that came in 
to you, or flowed into the State Department during this period, No- 
vember 27 to December 7, consider that information, received at that 
time, had an important bearing on the negotiations? 

A. During those few days? 



784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

29. Q. Yes, sir; that is, practically subsequent to the note of 26 
November. 

A. I doubt whether it had. 

30. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 7, which is now before 
this court, and which purports to be a communication from the Jap- 
anese Government dated 5 November 1941, to the Japanese representa- 
tives in Washington, and which urges tlie agreement be completed 
by November 25, '41, will you please state whether or not you had 
been informed of the contents of this document, and about the time 
you received this information ? 

A. I have no recollection of having seen this particular document. 

31. Q. And naturally you would not know whether or not the State 
Department had discussed it with the officials of the Navy Depart- 
ment, including the Secretary of the Navy ? 

A. No, sir. 

32. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 18, which is now before 
this court, which document is a comnnuiication from the Japanese 
Government to the Japanese representatives in Washington, and 
which sets out views as to the de facto termination of negotiations, 
would you please refer to this document stating whether or not you 
have seen it, or whether or not \^'(^^] you had been informed 
as to its contents ? 

A. Yes, sir, I think 1 had seen that document. 

33. 'Q. Do you remember, Doctor Hornbeck, about the time you 
got that information or saw it ? 

A. No, sir, 1 could not say when. These things were coming to us 
with reasonable promptness at that time, but I couldn't possible say 
at what moment I had seen it. 

34. Q. You know approximately what is the date of the document? 
A. The document is dated November 28. 

35. Q. iTou couldn't have seen it prior to the 28th, could you? 
A. That is clear. 

36. Q. Isn't this very important information which showed the 
trend of events and really showed rather concisely the position of 
Japan? 

A. Had the United States been in the position of the affirmant, that 
is, of the party pressing for an agreement, I should say, yes. Inas- 
much as the United States was not in that position, it was Japan that 
was pressing for the agreement, I should say this does not give a 
clear indication. 

37. Q. But in your opinion, by reason of this telegram and other 
information at that time, were the negotiations in de facto termi- 
nated on the date of that telegram. 2S November 1941 ? 

A. I should say the telegram indicated that theie would be no 
further negotiations. 

38. Q. During the period 26 November to 7 December 1941, did 
you keep familiar with information being published in the press 
with relation to the progress of negotiations between Japan and the 
United States? 

A. Far more so, I think, llian the average reader; yes, sir. 

39. Q. Could you give in general your thought of this, I mean as 
your memory serves, as to what this press information consisted of? 

A. Well, the press was discussing the question of the meaning of 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 785 

(he latesf developments, the developments between the 20th and the 
ii()tli. In some parts of the i)ress they were talkin<2; of the possibility 
of war. Editorial Avriters were discussing the wisdom or the un- 
wisdom of the position which had been taken by this Government 
in delivering the note of the 2()th. I do not remember that there was 
any definite trend or any definite balance of opinion or prognostica- 
tion or of speculation. It was still a scattering thing. 

[769] 40. Q. At what time did you become familiar with the 
note which was the Japanese reply to the note of 26 November to 
them ? 

A, Well, their official re{>ly was made on December 7. 

41. Q. Did you have any information prior to the handing of this 
note by the Japanese to the Secretary of State, as to the contents 
of this reply ? 

A. My recollection is that we had intercept material on that subject. 

42. Q. Was there any conference held with naval officials on the 
morning of the 7th, in regard to this reply, prior to its actual de- 
livery ? 

A. To my recollection, there were naval officers at the Department 
that morning wdien I went down at about 10 : 30. 

43. Q. Did you attend the conference? 
A. No, sir. 

44. Q. Do you have any recollection as to the officers who were 
there? 

A. No, I couldn't tell you that. 

45. Q. Doctor Hornbeck, in the general set-up of the State De- 
partment relative to conferences and so on, wdio was the represent- 
ative, the State Department official, who actually handled these mat- 
ters with the Navy Department, as to the delivery of information, 
as to the flow of information between the two departments, the 
liaison ? 

A. There had been set up an arrangement whereby Mr. Welles 
and the Chiefs of Staffs met from time to time. 

46. Q. Pardon me, by "Chiefs of Staff" you mean? 

A. I mean Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations; and 
there Avere periods in which they met frequently, and periods in 
wdiich they met rather infrequently. Sometimes I was informed of 
their having had a meeting and what had transpired. Sometimes 
I was not. Mr. Welles would be the only man of our establishment 
who could tell you how often those meeting had been held or could 
give you any record of dates and so forth. Other than that, there 
were these meetings in the office of the Secretary of State, where, 
at times, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were 
present, and then there would be officers of the Navy and of the 
Army, and sometimes some of us in the Department were called in 
and sometimes it would be one group, sometimes another group, de- 
pending on what parts of the word or what problem was being 
discussed. Those were the principal [770] points of contact 
there at high level. I have never known what officers of the Depart- 
ment, or of your department, or the War Department, actually engaged 
in the physical handing back and forth of telegraphic and other 
material at a much lower level. 



786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Frank L, Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[771] 47. Q. Aside from the actual handling of information, 
dispatches and so on, was there any representative of tlie State De- 
partment which acted as liaison officer with the Navy Department? 
In other words, in discussing certain matters which would be carried 
to higher authorities, the Secretary of State, for instance? 

A. Well, in a later period. I do not think it was in the case as it 
was in 19il. Mr. Orme Wilson was the liaison officer of the Depart- 
ment of State with the Navy Department and the War Department. 

48. Q. I am speaking for the purpose of exchange in dispatches 
and information of that kind. In other words, suppose the State 
Department receives an important dispatch relative to Japan, and 
similarly, suppose the Navy Department receives it. Now, was there 
an official in the State Department who said, "This is important for 
the Navy," and the Secretary of State has this man to confer with 
the Navy and see that this dispatch is transmitted to the Navy ? 

A. I had always understood there was some man engaged in that, 
but who it was I do not know. Mr. Hamilton would probably be able 
to tell you. Officers immediately attached to the Secretary of State 
and officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs gave instant atten- 
tion to this matter. 

49. Q. Mr. Hamilton isn't here, is he? 
A. No. 

Neither the judge advocate nor the interested party. Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

50. Q, I understood you to say. Dr. Hornbeck, that in the days 
following the 26th of November after the delivery of the note that 
day, there were newspaper discussions concerning the note and its 
contents ? 

A. I think so. 

51. Q. Isn't it true that that note was released to the news press 
for the first time on the 7th of December, in the afternoon? I read 
a paragraph from "Foreign Relations", Volume 2, of which this court 
has taken judicial notice, page 793, a statement by the Secretary of 
State, December 7, 1941. I read the third paragraph: "I am now 
releasing for the information of the American people the statement 
of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United 
States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peace settle- 
ment covering the entire Pacific area which I handed to Japanese 
Ambassador on November 26, 1941." Does that refresh your recol- 
lection as to when that statement, the note of November 26th, was 
released to the press ? 

A. That relates to the text. The text was released on December 7. 
But on evening of November 26 the press was informed that reply 
had been made. On next day, in a conference with the press, the 
Secretary stressed the gravity of the [77^] situation both in 
Europe and in the Far East. During the next few days, in confer- 
ences with the Secretary and with the Under Secretary, and in their 
contacts Avith diplomatic missions, the correspondents continued to 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 787 

ask questions about developments in the 'exploratory conversation' 
and about various features of the international situation, especially 
about American-Japanese relations; and the press, piecing bits to- 
gether and making surmises and engaging in speculation, discussed 
a variety of possibilities and made comments from many angles. They 
talked about the American-Japanese exchange of communications 
rather than about the exact contents of the communications. I do 
not recall that what appeared in the press indicated any special, new 
or peculiar trend of thought beyond giving evidence of an increasing 
realization that this country was confronted with a very serious prob- 
lem in our foreign relations both in Europe and in the Far East. In 
the news as such, President Roosevelt's return to Washington, state- 
ments of Japanese officials, and developments in and around Indo- 
China were among the important items. 

52. Q. Does that appear in either "Peace and War" or the book en- 
titled "Foreign Relations?" 

A. No, I think not. 

53. Q. That is, the release that was prior to December 7th and fol- 
lowing the 26th of November ? 

A. It may or may not have been a release but there was a press con- 
ference in which the press was informed of the general situation. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), 
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which he had not fully brought out by the previ- 
ous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 774-792, inclusive. 

[774'] Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. There is evidence before the court that an established pro- 
cedure in the Navy Department had been set up whereby certain 
classified information was delivered to you as Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions daily. Will you state, briefly, what this procedure was during 
the period from about November, 1941, to 7 December, 1941? 

A. The procedure of giving me classified information, generally, 
was that of bringing it to my Flag Secretary, Commander Wellborn, 
who would bring it in to me, although at the time if I were free, it 
might have come in directly by the officer who brought it, in Naval 
Intelligence. 

2. Q. Who was the officer that normally brought it from Naval 
Intelligence ? 

A. Kramer. 

3. Q. Was the information that was delivered to you by the office of 
Naval Intelligence evaluated before it came to your hands, or not? 

A. Sometimes information was evaluated, and sometimes dispatches 
may have come to me direct before I received the evaluation; but 



788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there was a running evaluation kept by those agencies who were in 
Operations who were designated to do it. 

4. Q. What agencies in Operations were designated to evaluate 
intelligence for you? 

A. The Office of Naval Intelligence, and also War Plans ; also they 
were usually gone over by Admiral IngersoU, Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

5. Q. If information arrived in the Navy Department outside of 
office hours was there any established procedure for getting it to you 
at the earliest practicable moment ? 

A. Yes, there was. It would go to the watch officer. Operations 
Watch Officer, who in turn, using his judgment, would send it to the 
duty officer, who was usually a Captain out in town who was regu- 
larly designated. He in turn would exercise his judgment as to 
whether or not I was to be called and given the information. 

G. Q. Was the system of distributing military intelligence in the 
Navy Department during the critical period preceding 7 December 
1941, such that you feel that you received all important information 
on Japanese-United States relationships? 

A. I felt that I was receiving it. 

7. Q. I show you document No. 11, of Exhibit G3, which purports 
to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 Novem- 
ber. Before 7 December 1941, had you seen this document or had 
you been made acquainted with its contents? 

A. I do not recall exactly this message, but I undoubted- [775] 
ly was acquainted with it, either as it is, or brought to me and talked 
over verbally. 

8. Q. It bears translation date of November 22, 1941. Can you 
state when it probably came to your knowledge in the routine course 
of office procedure? 

A. Well, it might very well have come on that date or the day fol- 
lowing, which would have been the 23rd. 

9. Q. Did you send the substance of this information to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? 

A. I sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet on the 24th, which very well may have been based upon or cer- 
tainly had taken into consideration this Exhibit. 

10. Q. The word "agreement" is used in this document, No. 11. 
What agreement in your opinion was there being discussed? 

A. I would say that it was the agreement pending between the 
negotiators for Japan and our State Department. 

11. Q. Did the deadline of 29 I^ovember, as stated in document No. 
11, have any special significance to you? 

A. The date of 29th of November and the previous date of the 
25th, did have a significance, as a break in the negotiatioiLs might 
come at that time. I may state that I did not send, as noted from our 
dispatches, information to either of the Pacific connnands, as to the 
specific dates given herein. I had become leery of dates. We had 
sources of information which looked authentic, from time to time, as 
to when Italy would come in, and frequently they were changed. If 
I had set a date of the 25th, for example, and nothing happened on the 
25th, it would have, in my opinion, been bad ball. Again, if I had sent 
a date of the 29th, which I could not be sure of it, and it must be 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 7g9 

remembered that this message had to be evahiated not just as it stands 
but in connection with a lot of other information — but if I had sent 
that date of the 29th and nothing had happened, again it would prob- 
ably have weakened the dispatch which we did send, and which, in my 
opinion, covered the situation. Judging by what is now perhaps hind- 
sight, I am glad that I did not include the dates. 

12. Q. Of what dispatch are you speaking, Admiral, in your answer 
to the question? 

A. I am speaking of our dispatch which was sent on the 24th. 

13. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, Admiral, and ask you if this is the 
dispatch to which you refer as bearing date of 24 November 1941? 

A. Yes, and I may state further that in our dispatch [776] of 
three days later, any reference to specific dates was left out, and we 
confined ourselves in that later dispatch to the expression, "In the 
next few days." That is the dispatch that was sent on the 27th. 

14. Q. I sliow you Exhibit 17, in evidence before the court, and ask 
you if this dispatch is the one of 27 November 1941, to which you refer 
in your last answer? 

A. Yes. 

15. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, and point our document 15 contained 
therein. This document 15 has been popularly referred to in testi- 
mony as the "winds code." Had you seen this document, or had you 
been informed of its contents prior to 7 Deceml^er 1941? 

A. As I have previously testified, I do not recall having seen this 
document. I assume that if received it was evaluated. It adds 
nothing to my disjiatch of the 27th. It covers the cutting off of inter- 
national connnunications. I stated in my disi)atch of the 27th that 
negotiations had ceased. Certainly I do not think this disj^atch 
would have strengthened my dispatch of the 2Tth; it miglit ])ossibly 
have weakened it. 

16. Q. I show you document No. 18 from Exhibit 63, which states 
in substance that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which 
will be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. 
However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the nego- 
tiations are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you 
been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941 — or 
did you see this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I may have seen it, or its evaluation. He had already covered 
it. It added nothing to what I had already sent in the dispatch of 
the 27th. 

17. Q. Did you inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
of the contents of this document ? 

A. No, nothing in addition to what I had sent on the 27th. 

18. Q. Document No. 18 speaks of "negotiations." What negotia- 
tions, in your opinion, were being referred to therein? 

A. Negotiations between the representatives of the Japanese Gov- 
ernment and our State Department. 

19. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63. This document 
sets out in substance the Secretary of State's note of 26 November 
1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed of the 
subject matter contained therein, on [777~\ or before 7 Decem- 
ber 1941 ? 

A. I have previously testified that I did not recall seeing the docu- 
ment. It may very well have been discussed. 



790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

20. Q. Had the Japanese made a reply to the Secretary of State's 
note of 26 November? That is document 17-prior to 6 December 
1941? 

A. No. 

21. Q. Adverting back to the words in the document, 18, which you 
testified to in the question before this — "with the views of the Imperial 
Government, which will be sent in a few days." What views did you 
think they would referring to in that document, by the views of the 
Imperial Government? 

A. I assume that it was the views of the Imperial Government, 
which were to be sent. 

22. Q. And these views of the Imperial Government — would they 
be in reply to this note of 26 November ? 

A. Yes, that would be my interpretation. 

23._ Q. The language of document 18 is that with the receipt of 
the views of the Imperial Government in a few days, the negotiations 
will be de facto ruptured. Is not this statement in your opinion 
tantamount to an assertion that negotiations were broken as of the 
time of making the document ? 

A. I would say, as I now see it, looking at this dispatch, yes; but 
I would also state that our dispatch of the 27th had also so stated. 
It will be recalled that the dispatch of the 27th stated negotiations 
had ceased. 

24. Q. Your dispatch of November 27 is Exhibit 17, is it not ? 
A. Yes. 

25. Q. This document. No. 18, was translated on 28 November 
1941. That is more than a week before the actual attack on Pearl 
Harbor, is it not? 

A. Yes. 

26. Q. Between 28 November and 7 December 1941, were any direc- 
tives for fleet dispositions made? 

A. No directives additional to the directive contained in our dis- 
patch of the 27th. 

27. Q. Were any additional security measures directed by the Chief 
of Naval Operations during this period of time, [778^ as they 

. applied to the United States Pacific Fleet or the Hawaiian area? 

A. No. The code message was sent, regarding destruction of codes, 
but nothing else as regards security. 

28. Q. You have testified that the language of document No. 18, 
which is to the effect that on receipt of the views of the Imperial Gov- 
ernment in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured — 
that looking back on it you considered that they were then ruptured 
as of the date of the dispatch? 

A. Yes. 

29. Q. Was there any reason why the United States Pacific Fleet 
should not have been immediately moved from Pearl Harbor? 

A. Do you mean as to any reasons whv I should not have moved it? 

30. Q. That is correct. Sir. 

A. Well, if I had ordered the Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, I would 
probably have had to have given a destination, as for example, bring- 
ing them back to the coast, something which I just considered out of 
the cards. But I left matters of this sort to the commanders in the 
field. I had two fleets in the Pacific. One in the Asiatic, and one in 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 791 

the Hawaiian area, and I left it up to the commanders on the spot as 
to what to do, after I had given them the information that I had, my 
interpretation of it, and the directive contained in the dispatch of 27 
November. 

31. Q. I show you document 21. from Exhibit 63, which states in 
substance, that "they are advising the press that negotiations are still 
continuing," Had you seen this document, or had you been advised 
of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I do not recall having seen this document in just this form, but 
it may very well have been discussed at that time. I might state in 
general in connection with these dispatches — this document, for ex- 
ample — it is just one of a great many that were coming in along with 
a lot of other material. It was physically impossible for me to read 
them all or to see them all. Some of them I saw directly. Some 
came to me with evaluations. Sometimes some came to me with a 
general picture — sometimes orally, sometimes on a written memoran- 
dum. To take a single dispatch with a specific question, we may read 
into it now, in the light of hindsight, what we couldn't see then. We 
didn't have hindsight to guide us, and we had to evaluate without it. 
I can only say I [779'\ was in complete touch — at least that I 
assumed I was in complete touch — with the broad general trend ; that 
our conclusions we aimed to keep the commanders in the field advised 
of, we did not send them every specific document. I think to have 
done so would have been prejudicial to the larger picture. For ex- 
ample, a good deal has been stated as to what happened between late 
November and December 7. We unquestionably were continually 
talking things over, but I should like to state that no evaluations or 
opinions were brought to me as a result of the study by those whose 
business it was to study everything which came in, which in any way 
altered the considered opinion and directive which we sent out on the 
27th. On the contrary, as I have testified before, what was highly 
confirmatory evidence to me was the burning of the codes, and again 
our action in our dispatch to Guam and again to CinCPac on this 
subject, showing that we had not changed in any way our opinion 
regarding the message of the 27th — but if anything were strength- 
ening it. 

32. Q. In several instances in your answer. Admiral, you referred 
to your dispatch of 27 November. Do you mean Exhibit 17 ? 

A. Yes. 

33. Q. The document 21, about which you have been testifying, 
states : "We are advising the press that negotiations are still con- 
tinuing." Who was this message set out in document 21 from? 

A. It is from Tokyo to Washington, and I assume that "we" means 
the Japanese, 

34. Q. Did you advise the Commander-in-Chief of the .Pacific 
Fleet of the substance contained in document 21 ? 

A. No. As I have stated, it added nothing, in my opinion, to what 
had been sent. It was typical of Japan to carry on material of this 
sort right up to rupture. 

35. Q. Eef erring to document 11, about which you have testified, 
which was received on or about 22 November, 1941, and which sets out 
(hat the absolute deadline for the negotiations was 29 November; 
also the statement contained in document 21, which was received in 



792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Navy Department about 1 December, 1941, and which asserts that 
"we are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing" — 
how did you evaluate the information that they were simulating a 
continuance of negotiations after a deadline for concluding them had 
passed ? 

A. Well, I think I have already answered that question. They 
nuiy have changed their date again. We had the deadline of the 25th 
passed. We liad the deadline of the 29th passed ; and as I have stated, 
it was typical of them to keej) talking [/W] and giving an idea 
that negotiations might be continuing right up to the point of rupture. 
This in no way changed the estimate wliich we made, that negotiations 
had ceased, or alters what we had sent in any respect. 

HG. Q. Referring to document 38 of Exhibit 63, translated on Decem- 
ber 6, 1941, which sets out in substance that a reply to Mr. Hull's note 
of 26 November will be sent on December 7. That is to be kept secret 
and the time to present the reply will be in a separate message. Had 
you seen this document or had you been nuide cognizant of its contents 
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941? 

A. I do not recall seeing this document. However, I again would 
point out that we had covered the contingency in our dispatch of the 
27th. 

37. Q. Referring to document 39 of Exhibit (53, this document 
contains fourteen points which are apparently in reply to Mr. Hull's 
note of 26 November, 1941. The draft indicates the first thirteen 
points to have been translated on 6 December 1941. Did you, prior 
to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941, see this document, or had 
you been made acquainted with its contents? 

A. I had not seen it, and I haven't the slightest recollection of 
having seen its contents. The message wliich was sent by the Armv 
on the forenoon of the 7th, of course, covered it, so far as its general 
effect was concerned, and to that extent I was familiar. 

38. Q. A witness before this court testified at great length concern- 
ing a memorandum which had been prepared by Commander McCol- 
lum. This was about a five hundred word summary of his own esti- 
mate, probably, of the military situation that existed on or about 
4 December, 1941 — up to the time of 4 December 1941. The witness 
stated that this sunnnary liad beiin passed along in the echelon through 
Admiral Noyes, who was then the director of Naval Communications, 
who had made the comment that he felt that "to send it to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet would be in effect an insult, that 
he believes that this 5()()-word summary of the estimate of the situation 
was carried by Admiral Wilkinson further up the echelon of com- 
mand, and that later he discovered that the dispatch so prepared 
had never been sent to the Connnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet — 
some months later he discovered that this disj^atch had never been sent 
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet." Do you have any 
knowledge of this dispatch that the witness w:is talking about? 

A. No. 

[781] Frank L. Middleton. yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

39. Q. Exhibit 13 before this court-, which is a Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations dispatch of 16 October 1941 directs, among other things, "Take 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 793 

due precautions includiuf; such prepuratory deployments as will not 
disclose strateojic intention nor constitute provocative action against 
Japan"; and Exhibit 19, which is a Chief of Naval Operations dis- 
patch of November 28, 1041, purports to set out a dispatch from the 
Army to Commander, Western Defense. In this dispatch there ap- 
pears the language : "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance 
as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as 
not repeat not to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent." In 
your dispatch of 16 October 1041, Exhibit 13, and the Army's dispatch 
which was quoted to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Exhibit 10 of 
28 November, was it your intention in your injunction with regard to 
alarming the ])opulace as set out in these two dispatches should be a 
continuing one? 

A. The disi^atch of the 16th of October was still in effect. The 
dispatch of 28 November w^as a dispatch of information to CinCPac. 
It was to our coastal forces giving them information which their 
Army opposite had and directing them, in case of hostilities, to carry 
out their part of WPL-16. I gave no directive regarding reconnais- 
sance measures in that dispatch. I was quoting a dispatch of the War 
Department to the Commander, AVestern Defense Command. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, did 
not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. vS. Navy, (Ret) : 

40. Q. I call your attention. Admiral, to Document 24 of Exhibit 
63. That, in substance, was the inquiry or request from Tokyo to 
Honolulu to make reports relative to ships in Pearl Harbor. That 
appears to have been translated on December 3rd. Did you see that 
document on or about December 3rd ? 

A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. We knew and had 
long known that the Japs were reporting a great mass of information 
and assumed that every move w^e were making in that area or on the 
Pacific Coast or in the Far East was known, and we had already sent 
our dispatch giving the gravity of the situation. 

41. Q. Will you look at Document 36. That is another document 
from Tokyo to Honolulu relative to ships in Pearl [782] Har- 
bor and was translated on the 5th of December. Did you see that on 
or about December 5th ? 

A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. As I have stated, 
these reports were evaluated, taken into consideration with everything 
else. I may have had conversations on it but it in no way changed 
anything I had sent. It affirms the other dispatch for negative 
information. 

42. Q. Now, Avill you look at Document 37 of Exhibit 63. That is 
a request from Tokyo to Honolulu for information as to particular 
areas in Pearl Harbor? 

A. Yes, and Manila Bay. 

43. Q. That was translated when, please? 
A. That was translated on the 5th. 

44. Q. Did you see that document? 
A. I do not recall it at this time. 

45. Q. Well, do you recall any discussions about the information 
contained therein? 



794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, I do not. They may have taken place but I do not remembet 
disciissino; this message. 

46. Q. Will you look at Document 40, please, in Exhibit 63? 
A. Yes, I have it. 

47. Q. That is information from Honolulu to Tokyo relative to the 
movements of American warships in Pearl Harbor, the courses taken 
and speeds maintained, is it not? 

A. Yes. 

48. Q. Wlien was that translated ? 

A. That was translated by the Army on the 6th of December. 

49. Q. Do you recall seeing that document? 
A. No, I do not. 

50. Q. Or learning of the information contained therein? 
A. No, I can't recall that document at this time. 

51. Q. I call your attention to Document 2 in Exhibit 64, which 
was a dispatch from Chief of Asiatic to yourself under date of 28 
November ? 

A. Yes. 

52. Q. Did you receive that dispatch ? 

A. No. This again refers to the winds message which I do not 
recall. I note, however, that it was sent to Coml6, C-in-C Pacific, and 
Coml4, so that it may possibl}^ have accounted for my not seeing it 
because it had already been sent to the Hawaiian area, but I have no 
clear recollection, as t have stated before, of the winds message. 

[7S3] 53. Q. Now, will you look at Document 3 in Exhibit 64. 
This is a dispatch from Alusna, Batavia, to OpNav under date of 
5 December and is a general reference to the winds message? 

A. Yes. 

54. Q. Did you see that dispatch to you ? 

A. No, I do not recall any dispatches in this connection. Our 
dispatch — of course, again referring to our own war warning — had 
been sent. That fact, together with the fact that this dispatch had 
been sent to the Hawaiian area, was known in the Far East and may 
have accounted for its not having been brought to me, and again it 
referred to rupture of relations in the original one which was presented 
to me this morning. 

55. Q. Document 3 from Alusna, Batavia, puts a different inter- 
pretation on the message, referring to war rather than a break in 
relations? 

A. Yes, it does; from Alusna, Batavia. 

56. Q. Not having seen any of the first part of the winds message, 
I assume you heard nothing of anything connected with its execution? 

A. No, I have no recollection of it. 

57. Q. Referring back to these documents relative to the ships in 
Pearl Harbor and information back and forth between Honolulu and 
Japan : Was any information concerning that sent by you to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet? 

A. No I think not. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy, (Ret) : ^ 

58. Q. Admiral, with reference to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which 
you read : You say that a copy of it had gone to Coml4? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 795 

A. Document No. 2 here. It was from C-in-C, Asiatic Fleet, to 
OpNav, info Coml6, CinCPac, Coml4. It is one of the winds 
messages. 

59. Q. But you are unable to say in that connection as to whether 
or not Coml4 was ever informed bj'^ anyone of the execution of the 
winds message ; you don't know that ? 

A. No, I do not. 

The court then, at 10 : 53 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 10 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all 
the interested parties and their counsel. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman 
second class. U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter. 

[T84] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry 
Were present. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was 
warned that the oath prcAaously taken was still binding, and continued 
his testimony. 

Examined by the court : 

60. Q. Admiral, you have testified to the general effect that there 
were many, many messages — and I think you used the expression 
"thousands of messages" — coming into the Department, and that you 
naturally couldn't remember or take cognizance of all of them, but 
weren't many of these messages simply routine things? 

A. Weren't many of them what, sir? 

61. Q. Weren't many of these messages that you say were coming 
in dailv, routine messages ? 

A. Yes. 

62. Q. Now, weren't some of them perhaps of unusual importance? 
A. Yes. 

63. Q. What orders had you issued by which these could be distin- 
guished so that certain ones could be brought direct to you without 
waiting for an evaluation, and to whose judgment was that left? 

A. Well, I don't recollect having issued any orders but it certainly 
was the understanding that if there was anj'thing important or de- 
manded immediate attention, I assume that it would have been brought 
to me. 

64. Q. Who, down the echelon of officers in Operations immediately 
below you would have the authority to decide whether a message 
could be stopped before it got to you, or whether it had to be taken to 
you? It wasn't left to the Communications Division itself, was it? 
Who would have that authority? 

A. Well, messages might have been handled by Admiral IngersoU. 
He had full discretion to answer what he saw necessary. "\^Tien mes- 
sages went to War Plans where they were evaluated I was in constant 
touch with War Plans. Intelligence was in much the same condi- 
tion, and I just felt that they were keeping me informed or bringing 
me really important messages. 

65. Q. Well, specifically, referring back to the one question asked 
you in which the question covered a long dispatch of 500 words or so 
which had been prepared by Communications and which, the testi- 
mon}^ showed, they considered of intense value and that it not only 
served the purpose of giving the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 8 



796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7SS\ Fleet the evaluation of dispatches that had come in over a 
period of time, in other words, bringing him up to date with the 
conception you had ; and further, it served the advantage of filling a 
blank of messages that perhaps never got to him ; if that was so im- 
portant in the opinion of the people who prepared it and it got up as 
far as Admirals Wilkinson and Noyes, who would have stopped that 
message from coming to you to decide whether it should go to the 
Commander-in-Chief, or not, in view of the importance given it a little 
further down the echelon ? 

A. I don't know. It may have been gone over with War Plans and 
have been decided — T am not saying whether rightly or wrongly — 
that the situation had been covered, or it might have been talked over 
between War Plans and Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall the 
slightest recollection of ever having seen or read that message. 

()6. Q. Well, it never got to you ? 

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it did not. 

67. Q. If it got to you and you didn't send it, was it because some- 
body above you stopped it? 

A. No, sir. No, I would have accepted the full responsibility. 

68. Q. In that file of documents in Exhibit 63, there are many 
messages which would seem to cast the shadows of what's coming, and 
it is your testimony that you have no recollection of ever having seen 
any of the ones we have shown you. Now, are we to assume that it is 
a matter of recollection, or that you never saw them? 

A. It is a matter of recollection. For example, I would like to quote 
a paragraph in my letter to Admiral Kimmel a month before Pearl 
Harbor, written on November 7th, and after looking at some of these 
dispatches and assuming that they were talked over, they undoubtedly 
had a bearing on this. I quote, "Things seem to be moving steadily 
toward a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can 
tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written 
you before. It continually gets worser and worser. A month may 
see literally most anything. Two irreconciliable policies cannot go 
on forever, particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It 
doesn't look good." Then again, I think the dispatches we did send 
reflect the information in some of the dispatches which were brought 
to my attention this morning and which, while I don't clearly remem- 
ber the dispatch as I see it, they were undoubtedly subjects which we 
were talking about and which I think my letters and dispatches did 
cover. It is nearly three j^ears, and to pick out a single dispatch 
and recognize it as is, unless it is something very outstanding, is diffi- 
cult. Again, with reference to the material which was brought to- 
gether after the dispatch of the '27th. my feeling is that if there had 
been anything brought to me which in any way altered what I had 
said, I would have remembered it and would have changed it, but we 
had a big area on our hands. The Atlantic was in a turmoil, if you 
remember, about that time. I was continually being [786] 
pressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic because he lacked 
forces. Along late in October and early November, as I recall, we 
had three ships sunk. We were at our wits end for escort vessels in 
the Atlantic. I was being pressed to bring escort vessels from the 
Pacific into the Atlantic. Colonel Knox jiressed me for it. and I 
resisted. There is one other i^oint in that connection which I might 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 797 

bring up with reference to the transfer of vessels from the Pacific to 
the Athmtic, a question which was asked me by Admiral Kimmel's 
counsel and which seemed rather strange that I might not have remem- 
bered because he put the question so clearly, but that was with ref- 
erence to taking three more battleships from the Pacific into the At- 
lantic, and that Admiral Kimmel, when he was here in early June, 
went to the White House and got this straightened out. I wrote 
Admiral Kimmel on the 25th of May, which was very close to his 
arrival here, that we had no intention of taking anything further from 
the Pacific Fleet. I confirmed it in September. In the memorandum 
of November 5th, we again reiterated our adherence to the plan and 
the only suggestions of possible transfers were those in accordance 
with WPL-46, which was another division of heavy cruisers and 
which didn't take place at that time. 

69. Q. Well, Admiral, that is all very pertinent, but my line of 
questioning is entirely on the question of these various messages and 
whether or not they got to you and the evaluation and so forth. 

A. Well, my feeling was that my letters and my dispatch covered 
in general the dispatches which had been sent. 

70. Q. Well, it doesn't even mean that; it means about the messages 
getting to you. 1 am trying to find out where they were stopped be- 
fore they got to you, in view of your statement that you have no recol- 
lection of seeing them. The court wants more information now at 
this particular point and we are trying to bring out the procedure for 
these messages and why they didn t get to you, if they didn't. 

A. Well, some of these messages, as I stated, I think their meaning 
has been covered by what I wrote or what we put in dispatches. I may 
have seen them. I may have talked over their substance. They may 
have been brought to me for evaluation. I feel they were covered. 
But to look at a single dispatch and definitely recall that dispatch at 
that time is difficult. Nevertheless, some of those that I say I can't 
recall specifically having seen have been covered. 

71. Q. Well, with the danger of war hovering around, wouldn't 
messages that were intercepted from a government with which our 
relations were getting in a very critical condition have been of suffi- 
cient importance that those [787] down the echelon of com- 
mand should have had orders that all of those dispatches should come 
to you? I am not questioning your not having issued the order but 
I am trying to find out if any such directive or orders were issued? 

A. I don't recall having issued any orders as to a line of demarca- 
tion. It was just procedure that anything of importance would have 
been brought to me. 

72. Q. Admiral, is it correct to state that each day a booklet or a 
compilation of all of these secret messages having an important bear- 
ing on Japan were brought in to you by either Commander Kramer — 
as I understand, he was probably the liaison officer — or some other 
officer? 

A. The general routine, as I recall, on important messages of that 
nature, was that they would be brought to my office. If I were busy 
they might be left with Wellborn to bring in to me as soon as I was free. 

73. Q. But they were brought in, weren't they ? 

A. Yes, I assume that anything that was set up as of sufficient impor- 
tance down the line for me to see was brought in. I either saw them 



798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

or saw their evaluation or talked them over. Many were brought in. 

74. Q. Weren't all of them bearing on this question brought in? I 
don't mean routine messages, but messages of importance bearing on 
the Japanese situation which, we understand from testimony before 
this court, were daily brought in to you by an officer for your perusal. 
Is that not correct ? 

A. Important messages were brought in to me by an officer. 

75. Q. Then in that event if they were brought in, did you look at 
them? 

A. Yes, if they were brought in to me, of course. 

76. Q. Then if that is the case, you were conversant, or should have 
been, with all important messages that came through daily; is that 
correct ? 

A. Yes, but again, what may appear important now may not have 
at that time to those who were to bring it in to me, if they considered it 
had been covered in some other way. I can't say that everything was 
brought in. I endeavored to cover that in the general statement. 

77. Q. But in all of this time did you consider the relationship be- 
tween this country and Japan of primary importance to this govern- 
ment? 

A. Yes. 

78. Q. Therefore, you naturally would take an interest in the dis- 
patches relative to Japan ; isn't that correct ? 

A. Yes. 

[788] 79. Q. And you would have kept yourself informed as to 
those conditions ? 
A. Right. 

80. Q, That leads to this question of this note which was handed by 
the Secretary of State to the Japanese on 26 November which set forth 
the conditions under which the United States would consider an agree- 
ment or further conversations with Japan. Had you ever heard of 
that note ? You said that you didn't see it, and one time in your jDrevi- 
ous testimony you said you had never heard of such a note. Is that a 
correct assumption? 

A. Well, I didn't see it. I don't recall it. Its contents may have 
been talked over but as to the specific note sent on the 26th, I don't 
recall it. I was given to understand that negotiations had ceased. 
This may have been talked over or mentioned to me by Admiial 
Schuirmann — then Captain Schuirmann — but I don't recall as I saw 
it when it was brought to me here. 

81. Q. As you see it now, however, that was probably a very impor- 
tant note, wasn't it? 

A. Yes, it was a very important note. 

82. Q. A most important one ? 

A. It was a summary and a set-up that did not, in my opinion, in 
any way change the thought that we had and that we had been given 
to understand that negotiations had ceased. Marshall put it "practi- 
cally ceased". It was my opinion they had ceased and my opinion was 
borne out and I was in close touch with Mr. Hull. 

83. Q. Admiral, with all of these secret messages, these very secret 
messages which flowed in to you from 27 November to 7 December, 
didn't you conceive by those notes that this activity was continuing and 
that the negotiations and parleys were still going on? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 799 

A. I didn't consider that anything I saw gave any hope of a re- 
newal of negotiations or that led me to the slightest conclusion that 
what I had said, namely, "negotiations have ceased", that that state- 
ment was incorrect. We were talking things over constantly but 1 
had nothing to the contrary, and as I have stated, what does stand 
out in my memory is the confirmation of it. 

84. Q. Referring to the night of 6-7 December, and the morning of 
7 December ; in your testimony you stated that your information was 
confined to the fact that a note was to be delivered at 1 : 00 o'clock the 
next day ? 

A. Yes. 

[789] 85. Q. And that is all you knew about it. The note or the 
answer to the note of the Secretary of State to Japan of 26 November 
was received in the Department on 6 December in the afternoon, was 
translated, 13 parts, and was distributed — according to testimony — 
at 9 : 00 o'clock p. m., or 2100 on the night of 6 December ; is that 
correct ? 

A. Well, I assume that it is. 

86. Q. Did you see those ? 
A. No, I did not. 

87. Q. In other words, you had no information whatsoever, with all 
of this coming in, regarding what was going to be done at 1 : 00 o'clock 
on 7 December, except that that note was going to be delivered ; is that 
correct. 

A. That is correct. When I got in the office, I learned that Sunday 
morning. 

88. Q. But when you arrived in the office Sunday morning, 7 De- 
cember, weren't you informed upon your arrival as to the receipt and 
translation of this answer to the note of 26 November ? 

A. Well, the outstanding thing in my mind that morning is that the 
Japs were to deliver a note which shut things off, and the time of 1300 
sticks in m^ memory. I don't remember the conversation about the 
rest of it. 

[790] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

89. Q. You do not remember Admiral Schuirmann's coming in to 
report on this to you ? 

A. No, I remember very clearly talking to Admiral Schuirmann 
about the picture and about the one o'clock business, but just what the 
thirteen points gave, I have no clear remembrance. We realized it was 
a turn-down, but what it was I don't recall. The outstanding thing 
that stands out in my memory is that things were off and that Mr. Hull 
was to be told at 1300. 

90. Q. When Admiral Schuirmann arrived at your office, you do not 
remember whether he gave you a full picture of things which hap- 
pened up to that time ? 

A. He may have. 

91. Q. It is reasonable to suppose that he did ? 

A. Yes, it is reasonable to suppose that he did, if we were talking 
there. 

92. Q. With reference to those secret messages sent from Honolulu 
to Japan and from Japan to Honolulu asking about the ships in harbor 



800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and where the ships were anchored, all of which came in here on 

December 5 

A. Yes. 

93. Q. Didn't those messages impress you with the fact that some- 
thing was going on specifically relative to Honolulu? 

A. They were specifically with regard to Honolulu, Of course, we 
knew the Japs had intensively, for years before the present war, been 
getting everything they could from anywhere, including diagrams of 
underground lines on the West Coast, but those particular messages 
did not impress me with the necessity of sending anything beyond what 
I had sent — if I saw them. I do not recollect just what we talked 
over with reference to them or having seen the specific dispatches. 

94. Q. Don't you think at that time that Japan's asking Honolulu 
for specific information regarding ships had a very definite bearing 
on Honolulu ? 

A. Well, if you take the message in the light of hind sight, standing 
out by itself and coupled with everything, and again if you forget the 
fact that we had said that war may be expected within the next few days 
or that Japan may make an aggressive movement, well, then that 
stands out quite clearly ; but if you take the fact that it was routine 
for the Japs to report practically everything — and we knew that they 
were reporting practically everything — ['^'91] it might not 
have had the same significance at that time which can be read into it 
now. 

95. Q. In your opinion, would it luive been of value to send those 
messages to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific for his evaluation ? 

A. I do not know just what they would liave meant to him if lie 
had gotten them, in addition to what we had sent. 

9G. Q. Wouldn't that be a good reason for your sending them? 
A. I don't know; I can't tell what his i-enction woukl have been. 

97. Q. Wouldn't that be a good i-eason for your sending them, since 
you didn't know how he would take them, and let him make his own 
evaluation ? 

A. We had made our broad evaluation of the picture and had sent it. 
Whether or not this additional information would have been useful to 
him, I am not prepared to state. 

98. Q. But with this information coming in on December 5. as it did. 
specifying the getting of special information regarding Honolulu, did 
it occur to any one of your subordinates that they may be planning to 
strike by air or some other means on Honolulu? Didn't it emphasize 
and bring out prominently the Hawaiian area? 

A. There was no evaluation and no recommendation to make regard- 
ing the transmitting of this information. 

99. Q. I refer you again to this Winds Message. Your recollection 
is that you never heard of any message, regardless of its name, "Wind" 
or otherwise, to the effect that a message from Japan had been inter- 
cepted, showing conclusively that at some time in the future they 
were going to send out a secret execute for conditions for breaking off 
diplomatic relations or designating war with the United States and 
Great Britain ; is that correct? 

A. I stated I have no recollection of it. 

100. Q. You realize that was a very important message in the light 
of present conditions ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 801 

A. I may question the statement that it was a very important mes- 
sage. Except for the Batavia end of it, the reliability of which I could 
not say, the Winds Message spoke of breaking off negotiations, and we 
had covered that. 

101. Q. Are you aware of the fact that information was received 
that there were different interpretations and different translations 
wherein the breaking of diplomatic relations was interpreted by some 
as war ? 

A. I am not, but with regard to the war part of it, we had stated 
that Japan might make an aggressive movement within the next few 
days — in a late November dispatch. 

[793] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, U. S. Navy : 

102, Q. Admiral, I show you Document 15 in Exhibit 68, which 
establishes the Winds Code, and I will ask you to say what the docu- 
ment shows with respect to the date of translation? 

A. The date of translation is November 28, 1941. 

108. Q. Is it true, then, that that document was not available to 
the Navy Department until after CNO had sent this dispatch to 
CincPac. saying that negotiations had ceased? 

A. That is true. 

104. Q. There seems to be some confusion as to whether you received 
on the night of December 6 information to the effect that the Japanese 
ambassadors woiulcl ask for a conference with the Secretary of State at 
1300, December 7. In order to clear up the record on that point, I 
show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to state what that 
document shows as to the date of translation? 

A. December 7, 1941. 

105. Q. Did you have any information on the evening or during 
the night of December 6 and 7th to the effect that the J'apanese am- 
bassadors would ask the Secretary of State for an appointment at 
1300, Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note? 

A. No, not at that time. 

106. Q. You had no information concerning that appointment until 
you arrived at your office about 10 : 30, I believe you said, on Sunday 
morning? 

A. That is correct. 

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 807-808, inclusive. 

[807] 178. Q. I just want to be quite certain about this Saturday 
situation. As I understand it, at no time on Saturday, the 6th of 
December, did you know, either directly or indirectly, by telephone 
or visual examination, or otherwise, that there was in the Navy Depart- 
ment thirteen parts of a Japanese message that was at some time to be 
delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the United States Govern- 
ment ? 

A. That is correct. I did not know it. 



802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

179. Q. And that at no time on Satfurday, the 6th of December, 
did you know, directly or indirectly, or by telephone or otherwise, that 
the Navy Department had information that the precise hour of de- 
livery of the message, of which the thirteen parts constituted a portion, 
was to be sent shortly, within the next day ? 

A. No, I did not know that. 

180. Q. You had no information concerning that on Saturday? 
A. No. ■ 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

181. Q. Admiral Stark, the documents, the messages contained in 
Exhibits 63 and 64 — those are the secret messages — I take it none of 
those were sent, as far as j^ou know, to the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District, other than the one you mentioned this morning? 

A. You mean contained in that Exhibit 63, or 64 ? 

182. Q. Of the ones that you have looked at in that Exhibit — none 
of those was sent to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District ex- 
cept one that you mentioned this morning ? 

A. I think that is correct. Without checking back, I assume it is 
correct. 

Recross- examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

183. Q. Did you ever see the report that Secretary Knox made to 
the President after his return the week following 7 December, after 
his return from Oahu ? 

A. I remember his report ? Do you mean the report that was sub- 
sequently published ? 

184. Q. No, I don't think it was published. It was introduced as 
an Exhibit before the Roberts Commission. 

A. I don't recall it at the moment. I think I saw it. I mean if 
it was introduced in the Roberts Commission I probably saw it. 

185. Q. Assuming that in that report of Secretary Knox to 
[SOS] the President, he stated that the War Department, as dis- 
tinguished from the Navy Department, sent a special war warning to 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Saturday night, the 
6th of December. Have you any information as to where he might 
have learned that — "he". Secretary Knox ? 

A. No. I remember his published report. There was quite an article 
published by him in the press. As to the official report, of course I 
knew his thought. He talked it over with all of us, but to your 
question, I do not remember any such information. 

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, 
U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 812-815, inclusive. 

[SIS'] Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station? 

A. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
presently assigned to the Naval Communications. Naval Operations. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 6th and 7th of 
December, 1941 ? 

A. I was the watch officer for Op 20-G. 

3. Q. Were you on watch on Op 20-G on the night of December 6, 
1941? 

A. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 803 

4. Q. What time on the niornino- of December 7, 1941, did you come 
on watch ? 

A. At 7 a. m. 

5. Q. I hand yf^u Document oO of Exhi])it Go before this court. 
Can yon identify this document? 

A. Yes, I recall this document, 

6. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that this document is in 14 
parts. At the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock in the morning of 
December 7, 1941, were you advised as to the disposition that had been 
made of the first 13 parts of this dispatch? 

A. They had been previously delivered to Commander Kramer 
during the evening of December 6. 

7. Q. Had part 14 been received and delivered to Kramer at the time 
you came on watch at 7 o'clock ? 

A. No, it hadn't. 

8. Q. What stage of processing was part 14 in at the time you came 
on watch ? 

A. Part 14 was completed and ready for delivery to Commander 
Kramer at 7 a. m., December 7. 

9. Q. At what time was this part 14 delivered to Commander 
Kramer ? 

A. It was delivered to Commander Kramer between 9 and 10. I 
don't recall the exact hour, but it was between 9 and 10, December 7. 

10. Q. Was that the time of his arrival at 20-G? 
A. Right. 

11. Q. I hand you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 before this examina- 
tion. Can you identify this dispatch? 

A. Yes, I can identify that dispatch. 

[81 S] 12. Q. Had that message been received in 20-G at the 
time you came on watch at 7 o'clock? 
A. No, it hadn't. 

13. Q,. At what time was that message received ? 
A. About 7: 15 a. m., December 7, 1941. 

14. Q. From what source was it received at 7:15? 
A. From the Army translator. 

15. Q, Had the Army initially intercepted that message or had it 
been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy? 

A. It had been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy. 

16. Q. When you came on watch at 7 o'clock, was any report made 
to you of the fact that this message was then in the hands of the 
Army for translation ? 

A.* Yes. 

17. Q. Was it reported to you at what time it had been received 
in the Navy ? 

A. I can't recall exactlv. It was during the mid watch of December 
7, 1941. 

18. Q. After you received this message from the Army translators 
at approximately 7 : 15 a. m., December 7, 1941, what disposition was 
made of it? 

A. It was held in abeyance until Commander Kramer arrived. 

19. Q. Under the then existing instructions in the section of Com- 
munications on which you were on watch, was any other procedure 
possible ? 



804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, that was our general order: to deliver all translations to 
G-Z, tlint is Commander Kramer and his group, if there were any 
of them there. Of course, that morning he was the only one avail- 
able. 

20. Q. Did yon have any authority to go over their heads in their 
absence if urgent information was received? 

A. No authority. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did 
not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, N. S. NaVy (Ret.) : 

21. Q. I call yonr attention to Document 15 of Exhibit 63. Some 
witnesses have referred to that as the Winds Message.. Do you know 
whether any execution of that document was received by the Navy 
Department ? 

A. I have no knowledge of anything in regard to the execution of 
this particular message. I knew of it but of no execution. 

[8141 22. Q. As far as you knew? 

A. That is right. As far as I was concerned, it had not been ex- 
ecuted. I had never seen any execution. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Examined by the court : 

23. Q. Was there any provision for communicating with Com- 
mander Kramer in his absence and advising him that an important 
message was ready for delivery? 

A. He had been advised by telephone by the previous watch officer, 
Mr. Brotlierhood. 

24. Q. That this particular message -was ready? 
A. The Winds Message or the other? 

25. Q. No, the other one. 

A. Yes, he had been advised of that. 

26. Q. You state that there was no provision made, in the case of 
the absence of Commander Kramer, for you or any of your officers 
to go direct to some higher authority? 

A. No, there was no provision. 

27. Q. No matter how urgent the message was, it had to await 
delivery to Commander Kramer? 

A. In some cases we couldn't tell tlie urgency, because being in 
Japanese, it would have to go tlirough a translator, and since the 
Army was the only one who had translators on at that time I had 
no power to go to anybody else. 

28. Q. Were these Army translators physically in the Army War 
Department or here? 

A. No. the}' were actually in the other building in the War De- 
partment. 

29. Q. In the War Department building? 
A. That is right. 

30. Q. Was Commander Kramer the only man in that section who 
could handle a message of that sort. In other words, if he were out 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 805 

of town for a week, would you liave to hold the message until he got 
back ? 

A. No, there were other officers who could act. He was the only 
one in this particular case, and he had beeu there until niidni<i'ht 
Avatching this stuli' come out and was fully cognizant of what it was. 
He had seen the first 13 parts. 

[S15] 31. Q. The fact that he was the only one to handle it that 
night was because he had handled it until midnight and had went 
away for a little rest, I asiune, and he was the one selected because 
of the continuity of the whole alfair '( 

A. Yes, because of his tie-up with the State and the rest of the 
Nav3^ Department. 

None of the parties to the inquiiy desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry Avhich he thought should be a matter of record in 
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the 
previous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 824-842, inclusive. 

[8^4] -9. Q. You have testified. Admiral, that you remember 
an officer in the Navy Department by the name of Kramer, whom yon 
believe was the officer who processed the information betw^een the 
Office of Director of Naval Communications and the Office of Chief 
of Naval Operations. Did you, as a general rule, see the information 
that this officer brought for the Chief of Naval Operations ? In other 
words, did he show it to you as a matter of custom ? 

A. Yes. I recall, of course, definitely, that an officer, Lieutenant 
Kramer or some other officer in a similar capacity, frequently, possibly 
almost daily, brought a small sheaf of dispatches to my office. Some- 
times there w"ere only a very few messages and at other times there 
were quite a number. By "quite a number", I mean maybe 20 or 30. 
These messages were of every conceivable character. Some pertained 
to the United States-Japanese diplomatic relations and other per- 
tained to Japanese relations with other capitals. There was some- 
times information regarding Japanese merchant ships and numerous 
other subjects. Whether these were all of the messages that were re- 
ceived by this means, I do not know\ These messages, so far as I know, 
were shown or were given to one of the aides of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, to show to Admiral Stark. I believe they were also shown 
to the Secretary of the Navy, possibily to the Assistant Secretaries, 
although I am not certain on that point. They were also, I believe, 
shown to the President and to the Secretary of State, possibly to other 
officers in the State Department. They were showm to the Director 
of the War Plans Division, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, and 
I think Captain Schuirmann also saw them. 

30. Q. I am interested in particular as to whether or not you, as a 
matter of custom, saw^ these dispatches when they were delivered by 
Lieutenant Kramer or any other liaison officer detailed by the Direc- 
tor of Naval Communications. 



806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I saw a number of dispatches almost daily, as a mater of routine, 
but whether or not they were all the messages that were received in 
this manner, I do not know, or whether they were only selected mes- 
sages. 

31. Q. Admiral, I show you document 11 of Exhibit 63, which pur- 
ports to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 
November. I would ask you to examine this document and state 
whether on 7 December or prior thereto, you had seen it or had been 
made acquainted with its contents ? 

A. I cannot state definitely whether or not I saw this message. 
The date, November 29, rings no bell in my memory. 

32. Q. Can you state whether or not you had been informed of its 
contents ? 

A. I do not recall now of being aware that the Japanese Ambassador 
had been directed to set a deadline on any date. 

[8£6] 33. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This 
document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as the "winds 
code." State whether on or before December 7 1941, you had seen or 
been informed of the contents of this document ? 

A. Yes, I had been. I remember a message of this character. 

34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within 
your cognizance? 

A. This document bears the inscription, "translated on November 
28." According to the system, I probably saw that on the following 
day, on the 29th. I also recall that at the time this message was re- 
ceived, or possibly the execution which is referred to in the message, 
that there was some difference of opinion among the translators as 
to just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the 
form as it appears there or not I am not certain. However, I did 
know definitely that they were Setting up a code to be used in a weather 
broadcast. 

35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed 
by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark? 

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed wnth Admiral Stark 
or not. 

36. Q. Did you take any action 3'ourself as a result of the informa- 
tion that was contained in this document 15? 

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that 
time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt 
in the minds of translators as to just what the translation should be. 

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was? 

A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to 
whether they had an exact translation — a diiference of opinion among 
the translators as to what the Japanese words meant. 

38. Can you recall whether this diiference of opinion I'elated to the 
subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of 
negotiations, or what the discussion was about — can you remember 
that? 

A. No, I don't remember that point now. 

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did j'ou receive any infor- 
mation as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy 
Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the 
so-called "winds" message? 

A. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 807 

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances ? 

A, I recall that some time I did see the messages [8^6] which 
were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, 
into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 
or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7, 1 am quite sure that 
would have been considered confirmation of the information which 
had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on 
December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at 
London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated defi- 
nitely that war was imminent. 

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, 
any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a 
result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" 
code which you state you saw? 

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, 
whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after 
December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in 
sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent 
out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding 
the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, 
or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be brokea off, and that 
this dispatch was only confirmatory. 

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch 
or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the 
"winds" code? 

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of 
any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December, 
1941. 

43. Q. I show you document 18 of Exhibit 63, which states in sub- 
stance, that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which will 
be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." 
"However, I do not wish 3^ou to give the impression that the negotia- 
tions are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you been 
informed of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I may or may not have seen it. In the dispatch it bears the date 
of translation of November 28. If I saw it, I saw it on November 29. 
On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the com- 
manders of all fleets the war warning message which stated that nego- 
tiations with the Japanese had broken off. This dispatch merely con- 
firms that, but tells them to keep up a pretense. 

44. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether the information con- 
tained in this dispatch was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of 
Pacific Fleet on or prior to 7 December 1941? 

A. It was not transmitted. 

[827] 45. Q. Adverting to document 18, what negotiations in 
your opinion are being referred to in this document? 

A. They refer to the negotiations between the State Department 
and the Japanese Ambassador. 

46. Q. I show you document 17, Exhibit 63. This document sets 
out in the substance the Secretary of State's note of the 26th of No- 
vember, 1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed 
of the subject matter it contained on or prior to 7 December 1941? 

A. My answer to the question is similar to the foregoing one. This 



808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK 

(locumt'iil bcMis (lie diitc ol" ( liiiislal ioii of llif L'Sdi of NovcmiiIkt. If 
I saw it iit all, I saw it on the 'JtXli. 1 (l«» iiol ivcall. llowovcr, this 
(lociiiiUMit simply ivlales what tiic Sin-ivlai y of State had told the ,Iap- 
anese Ambassador, and tiir dalo'of the (lispateh from the ,Jai)anes(i 
was the 2()th of November. It simply was eoniii'med by the Navy 
Department's disi)at('h of tbe 'JTtli, wliicli stated that negotiations 
with the ,Ja|)anese had stopped. This simply rtn-onnts terms which 
Japan conld not accept, probably we knew they wonid not accept 
when it was snbmitted. 

47. Q. Adverting to tiu' W(»i'ds in docnment IS, which 1 (juoto, 
"With the views of the Im})erial Government, which will be sent in 
a few days," — Avhat \iews did yon think wer(> beino- iclerred to in 
this docnment 'i 

A. As T (h) not recall delinilely whether or not 1 saw the docnment, 
I don't know what \iews were beinjj; refei-ri'd to. 

4S. Q. Between the date of 'JS Nox'ember ID 1 1 and 7 DeciMnber, were 
any direct i\es for secnrity of the Fleet issned by the Ollice of the Chief 
of Naval ()i)erations(' 

A. May I see the exhibit which contains tlu> war wai'nin<i;'^ 

49. Q. "Yes, sir. 

A. On the 'i7th of November, a (lis|)alch was sent to the Com- 
mander-in-C'hief Asiatic Fleet, and the C(»nnnander-in-(^hitd" Facilic. 
This dispatch contained I he w oids, "Fxecnte an appi'opriate dtd'ensive 
deployment prepaiatory to carry in<^' out the tasks assioiu'd in 
AVPLr-4()'". Fxcept for those words, I do not recall that any dispatch 
directing that specific st'cnrity measnres be taken was s(>nt. 

50. Q. I show yon docnment 21 from Exhibit (>.'?, which stales, 
^'We are adxisin*;' the press that negotiations are still cont innin<i"."' 
Had yon seen this docnment oi- had yon been adxised of its contents 
on or prior to 7 December 1041 ( 

A. I nuiy or may not have seen this dispatch, it bears the date 
of translation of December 1. If I saw it all all. I probably saw it 
on the iind of Decemb m'. I do not now rt'call the particnlai' tiling in 
the dispatch ; that is, "t ha I wc are adx'isino- the press and others to state 
that negotiations are conlimiin<;.'" I do not recall seeing' the part 
abont the President's I'clniii to the cajjital. 

\S.JS\ Q. That bein^" the case, yon probably have no iccollection 
of whether this infoi-nnit ion was sent to the (\>nnnaniler-in-('hief 
Pacific Fleet? 

A. In my recollection of the dispatches that were sent to the Com- 
numder-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet as well as Asiatic Fleet, 1 do not 
recall a dispati'h alon^' these lines hi'in^ sent to eithei' of them. 

5*2. Q. Advert inii to docmnent ;5S of Fxhibit (V.), which was trans- 
lated on Decembei' (>, 1!) II, and which sets ont that a reply to Mr. 11 nil's 
note of 2() No\ember will be sent on December 7, that it is to l)e kept 
secret and the tiyie to present the i-eply will be in a separate message, 
had yon seeji this docnment 38 or Innl yon been made co<;nizant of its 
contents on oi' prior to 7 1 )ecember 11)41 ( 

A. I don't know whether T saw this i)articidai' dispatch or not. It 
refers to the very lon^' messa<i"e which 1 did set> \'erv late on Di'cembei- 
or vei'v early in t he morning of 1 )ecember 7, and w hether or not 1 saw 
this dispatch 1 do not recall. 



vnoc.KKhiNdH or navy foiin oi ir.uj ikv S>()0 

5.'1 (2- Well, now, llic iiic^-;s!i|.M' h'.U'vh ((» »i. icply uliidi in (o ()(•. i-oil, 
on 7 I >c<cml»('r. Wfic yoii on I Ik- iilcrf, prior lo 7 I)cc('nil)<'r lor komh' 
inc«)inin;_'; nM'ss;i^(^ llnit would ,<•( ont (In- ,l;i|)iin<' ,r- r«'|>ly (o Sccicljiry 
J lull's no((' of 20 NovcnilxT'^ 

A. SonM'- (inn*, <{nfni}i llic ni^'lil, of l>c'ciiil)ci' <» 7. Ilicrc w;i,s iMouglil, 
(o my lionsc ji xcvy lonj/ mt'y.'nuiic. Ironi I lie .Jiipjinc!-:*' (iovcrniiM'nI. (,o 
(he Afnl)!iH.s;i'lor in W!i:-liin^'(,on, wliicji ■-,(•( fojlli I In- .liipjinosf* poni- 
lio/i. 'I'Ik' HH'SSii^c. v\!i.s nol coniplclc. iui'l I l^i'licvc llnil I In- iiii-l pur*(, 
of du' )n<'ssji//(', w'tih rnissin^'. VVIh-iIu'I' or not, I hiiw (hih pn-liminury 
iM((HS!i;(<', ill, lliJil lime or noL I do nol, rcr'till. 'I'Ik^ I"H^ mc.sHJi^c, whh 
u r(',-Htiit('fn«Mi( of llic .l;i.p!in<'S(', p<»Hi(ion und contfiincd nolliin^ new 
in i(, al sill, I'xrcpi the lon(* wan a liltlc hil diderctnf,, 

54. Q. I licdicvc my (jiicHlion wmh, Admiral, were you <,u llic ulerl. 
for tliih lon^ m<*HHa^<^ by virhjc of any notirte you lia<l li;id pi loi lo ilH 
r('(;('ifjl. 

A. No. 

I^^/V) Krcdcrirk 'I . \jnc\iu\, ycoffian i'lVHi elawH, [J. S. Naval R<t- 

W'l've, r<'porl«-j-, ('nl,cr('i|. i<";af)k .VI. Si'kh'h, y<'om?in lir^l r-hihs, 11, S. 
Naval K(fS('i'V(^, r(![)ort<*,r, witljdnnv. 

55. Q. I lj<'lic,v<* my (|ii<;Htion was, VVer<' you jn I fir- jijcil for ihis l<(n|_' 
iiHtHHuiji: hy virliK- of any notice yon fiad liad p/ior lo il -, rccipi < 

A. No. 

56. Q. Vou have le>:l,ifi<-d llial you did mm* a jallie/' |f>njjr dihpal<-li. 
Did you nay il wjison lli<; tnis\il of l)c<j'.ut\)cr 0? 

A. il was home lime dujin^ I he ni^hl, of iJercmhc/' (; <,f 7(h. I df<n I 
know whelhej- il wa:s before or afler midjii^dil. 

57. Q. You do nol mean ihe /)ij:^ht of iJecemlxir 7? 

A. il waH w>nie lime during iJie very \ntAi eveninj< of Der-ernber 6 or 
the early morning' of i)eeemf>er 7. VVhelher or nol il was before or 
afl<'r midni^hl. I doji'l re,r;!tll. 

58. Q. Vou have al;-;o le:-,tified Ihal, as you remember. Ihe hiile/- por- 
tion of this rathe/- lon^ me-ha^e, was mihHi»i^'i< 

A. As I reniember, the riflieer who bronchi the dispaleh i.o the hous'-. 
Htated thai there was a fiarl of the message iniwhin^. i lliink he told 
tub it waH tlie latter part. 

59. Q. Did the lone of thin ratlier lonf( message whi'h you Kay you 
rw,'eived on the ni^ht of 0lh-7lh of iJeeember, VMl. indicate a friendly 
or r^'^nci I ialo ry Hpirit on the [jarl of the Japanew? 

A. No, be^.-auHe it merely con/irnied the whole course of negotiations 
from the vitty Ui^rinnintr. 'ibis njessajre was nothing but a Hinoke 
screen, eye wash, and window dressing for the re/;ord. 

C/}. Q. Did you fiave any opinion al the time you saw thiK diHf)atrfli 
that dipioniat]c negotiations wi'nt then broken off officially? 

A. So far an the Navy Department was cinn'Mvm'A, negotiations with 
the J'apanes*'. had )iUt\)\)i'A about the 27th of Novemlx^r. 

61. Q. i do not think your answer is respont-ive Ut Ihe quention. 

'ihe qiiestion was rep« at<^d U) the witness. 

A. ()u \)('rA'.Ui\}('V 4, Of just prior to I )('(■(' tn'obv 4. we knew irihtnictions 
iia<J be^-n s^^nt f/> Japa lewi njissionK in various ('jmnttiinH to <l<i«trov 
their c^xles and ciphcr-s tniniul'mUtly and to destroy ojmi'uhtutvd] pubh- 
cations. Diat was an in Jication | -^/Xy | ( iiat difilomatic /legotia- 
tionH were f/oinj/ to U- broken off in tlje ve/y near future. As I did not 



810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

know when this note was to be presented, I did not know exactly when 
diplomatic negotiations were going to be ruptured. 

62. Q. When you saw this long message and the tone of the note 
which the message contained, did you not at that point think that dip- 
lomatic negotiations were then officially broken off, as contrasted with 
other information which you had had previously and which you knew 
had broken them off de facto ? 

A. I could not tell when the Japanese were going to inform the 
State Department that they had broken off diplomatic relations. This 
long dispatch simply indicated tlie situation was very, very tense and 
that the break might come at any time, which we had previously stated 
some time ago to our Fleets. 

63. Q. A witness has stated in testimony substantially that Com- 
mander McCoUum, who was then on duty in the office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, had prepared about a 500-word summary of the 
international situation as it had developed up to about December 4, 
1941. He further stated that this message was presented, along with 
a number of others, to Admiral Leigh Noyes, then D. N. C, who made 
a comment when this long message was to be released to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet something to the effect, "I think you 
are insulting the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief. He is a busy 
man." The testimony shows further that this long summary of in- 
formation was passed somewhere up the echelon of command. Ad- 
miral Stark testified that he had never seen this dispatch before its 
release. I am asking you. Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, can you recall whether or not such a summary was presented 
to you on or prior to December 7, 1941, for release to the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ? 

A. I do not recall any such alleged message, nor do I recall any 
circumstances of the incident which you have related. 

The court then, at 10: 50 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 00 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the 
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
interested party, whose counsel were present. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected witli the inquiry were present. 

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath 
previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony. 

[8S1] Cross-examined bv the interested party. Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, U. S. Navy : 

64. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was available in the Navy 
Department prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor any information to 
the effect that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed by his 
government to seek an appointment with the Secretary of State at 
1300 Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note? 

tain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not. 

A. Yes, some time on the morning of December 7 I learned that the 
Japanese Ambassador had requested a meeting with the Secretary of 
State that afternoon, but just what hour I heard it and just how I 
heard it, I don't recall now. 

65. Do you know from whom you first learned it? 
A. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 811 

66. Q. Do you recall whether or not Commander Wellborn, the Flag 
Secretary, was in the office on the morning of December 7 ? 

A. Admiral Stark's aides were usually in the Navy Department 
^Yhenever Admiral Stark was there, and I don't recall whether Cap- 
tain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not. 

67. Q. I suppose you do not recall Lieutenant Commander Smed- 
berg or Captain McCrea ? 

A. No. 

68. Q. Do you know with whom Admiral Stark discussed this 
information that morning about the Japanese Ambassador's 
appointment ? 

A. At some time he told me he had discussed this matter with Gen- 
eral Marshall during the forenoon of December 7, but just when I 
learned that I don't recall now. 

69. Q. Do you recall his mentioning anyone else with whom he dis- 
cussed it? 

A. No. 

70. Q. Did Admiral Stark mention to you during the morning of 
December 7 or at any time immediately thereafter that he had re- 
ceived this information about the prospective appointment the night 
of December 6? 

A. No. 

71. Q. Did he tell jou wh«n he did first learn of it? 

A. No, I don't recall that. Of course, we learned of the attack at 
Pearl Harbor that day, which practically took everything out of our 
mind as to what had happened in regard to hours and minutes, and I 
don't recall that now. 

[832] 72. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63, 
which is the document instructing the Japanese Ambassador to submit 
to the United States Government the reply of the Japanese Govern- 
ment to the United States note at 1300 on the 7th of December. Will 
you please look at that document and tell the court what it shows as to 
the time of translation ? 

A. This document bears the date "translated 12/7/41." 

73. Q. And was it an Army or Navy translation ? 

A. I presume it is Army, because it bears the word "Army" with the 
No. 7145. 

74. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before this court that Colonel 
Knox on his visit to Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack told certain 
members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
that this information concerning the prospective appointment was 
available to to him (Colonel Knox) on the night of Saturday, Decem- 
ber 6. Did you ever hear, either from Colonel Kjiox or from Admiral 
Stark, any indication that Colonel Knox knew of this information on 
the night of December 6 ? 

A. I have no knowledge that Colonel Knox ever saw the dispatch. 

75. Q. Do you have any knowledge of his ever having this informa- 
tion, whether or not he saw the dispatch? 

A. I have stated, in answer to one of my questions, that dispatches 
received from this source were shown to the Secretary of the Navy. 
If that dispatch was included in one of the folders which were shown 
to various officers in the Navy Department, he might have, as a matter 
of routine, seen it. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 9 



812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

76. Q. Did you ever hear Admiral Stark mention that he had heard 
Secretary Knox say that he knew of this prospective appointment 
on the night before, that is, Saturday night? 

A. No. 

77. Q. I assume that you, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, 
received much of the same information which the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations received, particularly with respect to estimates on the Far 
Eastern situation and intelligence concerning it; is that correct? 

A. With regard to military and naval information, I think I re- 
ceived practically the same information that the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions received. With regard to political information, that which I 
received, in many cases, was second-hand, because the Chief of Naval 
Operations saw the President and the Secretary of State personally. 
I never attended those conferences, and what I knew about such con- 
ferences was what he told me. He probably had more information re- 
garding the political situation, from first-hand knowledge, than I did. 

[383] 78. Q. But you usually knew what Admiral Stark knew 
concerning these conferences which he attended? He usually re- 
counted them to you ? 

A. I felt Admiral Stark kept me informed of ' every thing that I 
should know. I do not recall anything now that I thought he should 
have told me that he did not tell me. 

79. Q. Admiral Stark has testified that he does not remember 
seeing many of these documents which are included in Exhibit 63 in 
the form presented here. Your testimony is much to the same effect 
concerning certain of these documents. Do you consider the fact 
that you did not see these documents in the same form in which they 
are now presented to you particularly significant? 

A. I am not quite sure that I know what you mean by "in the 
same form." 

80. Q. They have been shown you as documents which are part 
of that exhibit. You say that you do not recall having seen them 
as a message in that form. Do you consider the fact that you did 
not see them, perhaps, in the same form as they are now presented 
to you particularly significant? Would you have gotten that in- 
formation in other ways, for example? 

A. Those messages which I saw, which were received from the 
source about which you are speaking, were typed on flimsy paper 
or were carbon copies of messages typed on flimsy paper. May I 
see the exhibit? 

The witness was handed Exhibit 63. 

A. These messages appear to be in the form in which I saw them, 
and the first message I turn to bears my initials, so I must have 
seen this particular dispatch in this form. 

81. Q. Admiral, what I mean is that you have testified and 
Admiral Stark has testified that some of those messages shown you 
this morning you do not recall having seen at the time. Is it possible, 
however, that the information which is contained in those messages 
might have come to you in some other way, as, for example, the 
morning conferences in the Secretary's office or reports of memoranda 
made by the head of War Plans or ONI ; so it is not particularly im- 
portant if you did not see the basic information from which those 
estimates were drawn? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 813 

A. I see what you are driving at. As I stated before, I am not 
certain that I saw every dispatch which was received from this 
source. It is not particularly significant that I either did not see 
them or that I do not recall them, because \S34^ during the 
course of any one day there were hundreds of dispatches regarding 
every conceivable subject— our own operations, administrative dis- 
patches. There were written reports of every character, not to men- 
tion the pounds of correspondence. There was a conference in the 
Secretary's office each morning at which the whole world situation, 
not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, 
and the Far East was explained. There was a discussion following 
these presentations, which was usually made by the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, in which the situation as of that day was threshed 
out. So it is quite probable that some of these dispatches might 
not have been shown to us, or if they were shown to us, we did not 
consider each one individually, because we knew we would get the 
general tenor of it after it had been evaluated by the sections of 
War Plans, Communications, and Naval Intelligence, who were 
charged with the details of such matters. 

82. Q. It has been testified that, with the exception of the in- 
formation concerning the destruction of codes, concerning which a 
dispatch was sent on December 3, none of the information which is 
included in Exhibit 63, which you have before you, was sent to 
CinCPac. Did the Navy Department ordinarily send all the infor- 
mation received of this type to CinCPac or any other of its com- 
manders-in-chief ? 

A. No, the information was not sent in this exact form to any 
of the commanders-in-chief. I know it was the aim of the Chief 
of Naval Operations to keep the commanders-in-chief informed of 
the situation as he saw it. Some of it he did by personal letters and 
from time to time he sent dispatches which related to the inter- 
national situation and to the military situation. I think it would 
have been an unusual burden on Communications in general and on 
the staffs of the commanders-in-chief to have had to translate all 
of these messages, and I think that there were better facilities in 
Washington for evaluating the messages than there were in any of 
the Fleets. I know that would be the case in the Atlantic Fleet today 
if I had to receive all these things. I have neither the staff nor the 
facilities for evaluating information of that kind. I think that the 
summaries which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations with 
regard to the political situation — and most of these dispatches do 
refer to the political situation — were accurate. 

8. Q. Do you feel that you were reasonably well informed during 
the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, with respect to 
the Japanese situation either through seeing these basic sources of 
information or through the estimates which were given you by War 
Plans and Intelligence? 

A. I have answered that same question in considerable detail in 
regard to the political situation and in a different [8S5] de- 

gree as to the military-naval situation. Yes, I think I was as well 
informed as it was possible to be informed, generally speaking. 

84. Q. Did you concur in the dispatch of November 27, which is 
known as the "war warning" dispatch and which was sent by the 



814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and 
to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic ? 

A. This dispatch was prepared by Op. 12, which means it was pre- 
pared in the War Plans Division. I remember distinctly that this 
dispatch was under discussion, and I remember particularly the use 
of the words, "This dispatch is to be considered as a war warning." 
Words of that kind had never been used in any dispatch before. The 
words which have been inserted in pencil in this dispatch are in my 
handwriting, and I am absolutely sure I concurred in this dispatch, 
and I know it was released only after I knew Admiral Stark had con- 
curred and approved of every word in it. 

85. Q. Was any information brought to your attention during the 
period from November 27 to December 7 either from sources outside 
the Navy Department, such as the State Department, for example, or 
from C. N. O. subordinates within the department, which indicated 
to you that the war warning dispatch and the directive which it con- 
tained should be modified or strengthened in any respect ? 

A. The tenor of this dispatch was never modified by any subse- 
quent dispatches nor was it relaxed in any way. The only subse- 
quent information which I considered important and which was sent 
to the commanders-in-chief was the one on December 3 informing 
them that the Japanese diplomatic missions had been directed to de- 
stroy their codes and ciphers. That message and the "war warning" 
message, I thought, were the two most important messages which were 
sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations, and they are the two which 
I remember very distinctly. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

86. Q. I show you Document 24 in Exhibit 63 and ask whether you 
recall seeing that or learning of its contents ? Document 24 is one of 
those from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting ships in Pearl Harbor. 

A. No, I have no recollection of ever seeing that dispatch. 

87. Q. Or learning of its contents? 

A. I am not certain whether I learned of its contents at some time 
after December 7 or not. I recall being very much surprised when 
Mr. Knox returned from his visit to [8S6] Honolulu and said 

that the Japanese aviators had little maps which showed the location 
of the ships, which indicated that they must have known where in- 
dividual ships were moored. I remember being astonished by that 
exhibit which he brought back. 

88. Q. You do not recall having seen Document 24 prior to Decem- 
ber 7 or having learned of its contents ? 

A. Definitely not. Whether I saw it later or whether I was told 
about it, I do not recall now. 

89. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63, which is a message 
from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting shi^D^ movements. I ask you 
whether you saw that on or prior to December 7 or learned of its 
contents? 

A. No. 

90. Q. You did neither? 

A. No. I would not have attached any particular importance to 
this dispatch regarding movements, because it was so easy to see what 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 815 

movements were being made in the Hawaiian Islands that I presumed 
they were being made as a matter or routine anyway. 

91. Q. I call your attention to Document 37 from Tokyo to Hono- 
lulu, translated on December 5, relative to locations of ships in Pearl 
Harbor. I ask you whether you saw that document on or prior to 
December 7 or learned of its contents ? 

A. 1 do not remember this one at all. Area "N" rings no bell in 
my memory. 

92. Q. It appears to have been translated on the 5th of December. 

A. The document states that it was translated on the 5th of Decem- 
ber, and, according to the system, unless it was taken around espec- 
ially, it would have been seen by those to whom it had been shown 
on the 6th. 

93. Q. I call your attention to Document 40 from Honolulu to 
Tokyo, translated on December 6, which reports courses and speeds 
of American war ships coming into Pearl Harbor. I ask you whether 
you saw that document prior to December 7 or learned of its contents? 

A. I am absolutely positive I never saw this document before this 
moment. 

94. Q. Was there any record kept of who did see these documents 
which were carried around by officer messenger and shown to you 
and to various other people who have testified ? 

A. I don't know. I have apparently initialed some dispatches. I 
note my initials on one of them in this [837] exhibit. I also 
recall that when a dispatch was brought to my house, I was required to 
sign that I had seen it, and I think I recall having signed for the dis- 
patch which was delivered at my house on the night of December 6-7. 

95. Q. It was one which was taken around and shown, as I under- 
stand it ? 

A. I recall definitely having seen that particular dispatch. It was 
usually my custom to put an "I" on messages that I saw. 

96. Q. At what time did you get to the office on Sunday morning. 
December 7 ? 

A. I do not recall now the exact hour at which I arrived at the 
Navy Department on the morning of December 7. I had gone to the 
Navy Department every Sunday morning for the last year, and 1 
probably got there somewhere between 8 and 9 o'clock. The exact 
hour I do not now recall. 

97. Q. Do you recall how long after you got to the Navy Depart- 
ment you were apprised of the information in these dispatches which 
were available that morning? 

A. Are you referring to the dispatch which directed the Japanese 
ambassadors to deliver their message to the Secretary of State at a par- 
ticular time ? 

98. Q. Not only to that but also to the 14th part of the long mes- 
sage which you had seen the night before ? 

A. I don't know at what time I became aware of the dispatch which 
directed the Japanese ambassadors to see the Secretary of State at 1 
o'clock that day. I do not recall whether or not I discussed the long 
message with Admiral Stark that morning. I do not recall that I 
ever saw the 14th part or the last part of the very long message. 



816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

99. Q. Do you recall whether there were discussions about the Japa- 
nese situation shortly after you arrived in the Department that morn- 
ing? 

A. I do not recall that I had any discussions with anybody regard- 
ing the Japanese situation that morning until I was informed by Ad- 
miral Stark that he and General Marshall had discussed the dispatch 
which directed the Japanese ambassadors to present their reply to 
the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock that afternoon. 

100. Q. Do you recall whether you had been in conference' with 
Admiral Stark on that morning prior to his telling you that? 

A. I don't recall now whether I saw Admiral Stark before he told 
me that or not. I probably saw him coming into the office — I couldn't 
have helped it — but what he [8S8] said prior to that I don't 
recall now. 

101. Q. You have testified in direct examination that these docu- 
ments, the character of which are in Exhibit 63, were, as a matter 
of routine, shown to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State, 
the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of 
Naval Operations, the War Plans officer, the Director of Naval Intel- 
ligence, possibly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and possibly 
to Captain Schuirmann, who is now Admiral Schuirmann. Have I 
mentioned the complete list ? 

A. I admire your memory. I think you have enumerated every 
person I stated. 

102. Q. Do you know whether the information was also shown to the 
War Department ? 

A. I am quite certain that it was, but I don't know what officials in 
the War Department received such dispatches. As I recall now, the 
messages received in code were translated on one day by the Navy 
Department and on the following day were translated by the War De- 
partment, and they were charged with keeping the other department 
informed of what had been received and translated. Just what the 
process of distributing these messages to the War Department was 
I don't know. It wasn't my detailed responsibility to see that that 
was done. 

103. Q. If my arithmetic is correct, the list I have enumerated comes 
to either nine or ten, the difference being my doubt as to whether the 
Assistant Secretary received one. 

A. I think I said secretaries. 

[S39] Frank L, Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

104. Q. And yet it was the specific policy of the Office of Naval 
Operations to deny this information to responsible commanders-in- 
chief in the Pacific and in the Asiatic; is that correct? 

A. I did not say it was the policy of the Navy Department to deny 
this information to the commanders-in-chief in the Pacific. I stated 
that it would have been a burden on communications to have trans- 
mitted every dispatch of this character to have transmitted every dis- 
patch of this character which was received to the commanders-in-chief 
afloat. 

105. Q. If a selected process had been used the burden on communi- 
cations would have been correspondingly relieved, would it not ? 

A. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 817 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

106. Q. In that connection, Admiral, may I show you, please, 
Exhibit 17, which is the war warning dispatch dated November 27, 
1941. You mentioned that the pencil marks on the document are in 
your handwriting, sir? 

A. The pencil insertion of the word "Thai" and all that follows, be- 
ginning "Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take ap- 
propriate measures against sabotage. Copy to War Plans Division, 
War Department" are in my handwriting. 

107. Q. And this word "probably" that is stricken out, is that your 
handwriting, sir? 

A. I can't identify a straight line as being done by me, and I do not 
remember having struck it out. 

108. Q. To complete the document which has not yet been read 
in evidence because it has only at this point been identified, is the 
last passage to the November 27th message which reads, "Continental 
Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against 
sabotage." I invite your attention to Exhibit 20, Admiral, which is 
the December 3rd dispatch. Can you recall whether the last line was 
stricken out by yourself or someone else, or do you know anything 
about it. 

A. Unfortunately, the punch has gone through the number indicat- 
ing the Office of Operations in which this dispatch originated, but 
due to the fact that it has typed "Released by T. S. Wilkinson" it was 
undoubtedly prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I remember 
this dispatch very clearly. It is perfectly obvious that the words 
which were stricken out were not desired to be sent. I released this 
dispatch and just the reason for not wanting to send those words I do 
not now recall but looking at the [840] dispatch now, the di- 
rections to burn codes at the places mentioned, which included Wash- 
ington, Manila and London, did not necessarily mean that "From 
foregoing infer that orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." 
It was simply confined to giving them the definite information that the 
codes were to be destroyed in those places. 

109. Q. Admiral, sir, in connection with that last line, and in re- 
lation to the message, would it be a fair statement that that line that 
was stricken out amounted to an evaluation of the message? 

A. All I can saw now is that we did not want those words sent at 
that time. 

110. Q. Would the words "From foregoing infer that orange plans 
early action in Southeast Asia" indicate an evaluation of the other in- 
formation that is in it ? 

A. I have stated that it was not necessarily the correct evaluation 
to be placed upon the destruction of codes in the places enumerated 
in that dispatch. 

111. Q. Admiral, just one other question, sir : Was there anything 
in this message that evaluated that information? It was just the 
raw information, was it not, sir? 

A. The inference to be inferred from this dispatch was that Japan 
was assumed to be at war with Britain, the Dutch, and the United 
States, because they were directed to destroy their codes at places in 
the countries of those nations, including the capitals. The capital of 
Holland was then in the possession of the Germans. 



818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

112. Q. Do you recall, sir, whether or not the information that was 
in the possession of the Navy Department at the time when this De- 
cember 3rd message was written, was to the effect that the Japanese 
instructions were to burn, as I recall, all their codes and destroy their 
cipher machines? Do you recall whether that was the information 
on which this was based ? That is, this document only says "some of 
their codes" and I don't think it means their machines. 

A. That dispatch was undoubtedly prepared from information re- 
ceived from the secret source about which we have been talking for 
some time. Whether it is an exact quotation of a Japanese dispatch, 
I cannot tell without seeing the dispatch on which it is based. 

Examined by the court : 

113. Q. Admiral, with reference to your answers in which you 
stated that the breaking off of negotiations, and so forth, simply 
confirmed your previous information. In that connection you also 
referred a number of times to "indicated war was imminent". Isn't 
the breaking off of negotiations an indication of imminence of break- 
ing out of war, in your [84^] opinion? 

A. Not necessarily, but the fact that the Japanese were massing 
large numbers of ships in Southeastern China, in Formosa, and in 
Hainan; that they had large numbers of landing craft there, indi- 
cated that they were getting ready for a military movement of large 
proportions. At just what time we received information that those 
forces were on the move to the south I cannot now recall but it was 
within the week prior to December Yth. They were followed by 
planes from the Asiatic Fleet around the southeast corner of Siam 
and we were not sure when they got there just what direction they 
would take, whether they would go up into Siam proper, or whether 
they would go towards the Kra Peninsula. It was also quite evident 
that if the Japanese were going to go to war with the United States 
the Philippines were a probable objective. We expected that Guam 
would drop like a ripe plum. 

114. Q, Just to complete that picture, would a movement in the 
South Pacific around Thailand and the Gulf of Siam area and so 
forth necessarily mean war with the United States? In your opin- 
ion, I mean. 

A. The fact that we expected it would be war with the United 
States was indicated in the dispatch which told them to destroy their 
codes in Washington. The political and military situations were 
in perfect concert, which indicated that they were going to go to war 
with us shortly. That was the estimate made by Admiral Stark on 
the 27th of November and proved to be true. 

115. Q. Well, can you state, then, if that was Admiral Stark's 
opinion why did he merely emphasize a message by calling it a war 
warning and then naming certain areas in which they might attack 
and he did not name the Hawaiian area? And further, why he 
didn't definitely stop with "this is a war warning" instead of com- 
plicating it by referring to certain areas and leaving out the Ha- 
waiian area? 

A. There was placed in the dispatch that there were certain objec- 
tives in the Far East which we felt were reasonably certain would 
be objectives because the massing of ships and troops in that area 
indicated that there was an aggressive movement in that area. We 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 819 

had no definite information of an aggressive movement in any other 
area. 

116. Q. I am putting so much emphasis on this war warning 
message because you have put so much emphasis on it. Don't you 
believe that if they were so certain of their estimate it would have 
been better to stop and say "War is imminent ; this is a war warning" 
and forget everything else where they were going to operate? 

A. That was the intention of the war message, that he wanted to 
state that he felt war was likely to come at any moment. On the 
other hand, there was a wish not to take any step on the part of the 
United States which would provoke war with Japan. 

[8^^] 117. Q. Well, the message I speak of, if you had simply 
stopped with "This is a war warning", that wouldn't have started 
anything necessarily, any more than the one that was sent ? 

A. So far as I know. Admiral, no commander-in-chief afloat ever 
told the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch or otherwise that he 
didn't understand any of the directives that were sent to him or he 
never asked for an amplification or elaboration on any of the instruc- 
tions that he received. In the absence of any such you could only 
assume that they were understood. 

Extracted testimony of General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army. 
Pages 869-884, inclusive. 

[869] 41. Q. After November 6, 1941, when did you have in- 
formation that negotiations, so far as the Japanese were concerned, 
had been terminated ? 

A. On the morning of November 27 the Secretay of State, as I 
recall, told General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division of 
the War Department, that the conversation had been terminated with 
the barest possibility of resumption. I was out of the city at the time 
and did not reach the War Department until the following morning, 
November 28. I assume I was given this information at that time. 

42. Q. Did you, after the release of the dispatch which is referred 
to in Exhibit 19, send a further directive as to the action to be taken 
in the Hawaiian Department relative to any security measures there ? 

A. Yes, on December 7. 

43. Q. I show you Exhibit 48 before this court and ask you if that 
is the directive to which you refer and which you sent on December 
7, 1941 ? 

A. Yes. However, the message was sent from a longhand pencil 
draft of mine. This is a formal copy of the latter, typed. 

44. Q. Then, between the time ol your dispatch, which is Exhibit 19 
and at which you have just been looking, and the dispatch of December 
7, 1941, you had sent no directives as to security measures in the 
Hawaiian area? 

A. On November 28, 1941, two additional measures warning against 
the possibility of sabotage were sent to the Hawaiian Department, 
one to the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, the 
Western Department, the Panama Canal — That, of course, includes 
Alaska — and the other to the Army at large in the continental United 
States as well as overseas. The first one was sent by the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2, General Sherman Miles, which went to the various 
overseas Western Defense Commanders, and was a reminder of the 



820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sabotage problem. I didn't see that myself until, I think, the time 
of the Koberts Commission. The other message which went to the 
continental United States, as well as overseas, had been prepared by 
General Arnold's staff, and then the G-2 staff involved themselves 
in it to make certain it clearly stated the case, and it was sent, but it 
related to sabotage, suspicions or beliefs, that occurred here in the 
United States rather than overseas and perhaps of German or Jap- 
anese origin. The Air Corps at that time felt they were having acci- 
dents to planes which could be explained only by some form of sabotage, 
and they felt that they had fairly concrete evidence of this. There- 
fore, those were two War Department messages which I personally 
was not involved in, but mine was sent on December 7. 

[870] 45. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63, which pur- 
ports to state the deadline of November 29, 1941, as being absolute 
for signing the agreement. State whether you saw the contents of 
this document, or had been informed of the subject matter contained 
therein, on or about November 22, 1941, the date when it was pur- 
ported to have been translated. 

A. I don't recall. These were highly secret matters and papers. 
The papers were carefully guarded, and our War Department copies 
today do not indicate when I saw them. I am reasonably certain, 
however, that I did see them or was informed concerning these papers 
at the time. I learned finally what had happened was that in order 
to safeguard this material, they would keep one record, which was 
their basic paper, in the Intelligence or G-2 section. The result of 
that has been that the duplicate copy comes to me. All of those have 
been destroyed. Therefore, on those particular papers there is no 
existing record of my initials on any of them, because they had only 
one paper which they received and destroyed each day, as they do 
now. I see them each day and then they are destroyed. In this case I 
am not certain that I saw or knew about this message. 

[871'] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Eeserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

46. Q. This document mentions 29 November as an absolute dead- 
line for signing the agreement. Did this absolute deadline have any 
special significance to you at that time ? 

A. Well, to go to the original date, which I think was November 
25th, we conjectured at that time what that meant, and the only 
solution that could be offered — which was not accepted ; it was merely 
considered — was that that was the anniversary of the signing of the 
anti-Comintern pact and that they wanted the negotiations to get 
cleared to a certain point in relation to the renewal of that pact. How- 
ever, when the message came in to which you just referred, and gave 
a new date, that, of course, brushed aside, apparently, the possibility 
that these dates referred to anything of that nature, and left us with 
merely a guess as to how critical the matter was. I might interject 
now and say that when the final message came in that indicated the 
7th, and an hour, that, of course, was quite a different matter. That 
was a specific hour of Washington time, as well as a day. That meant 
something, somewhere, very definitely was related to that hour. There 
was no doubt in our mind about that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 821 

47. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63 which transmits Mr. 
Hull's note of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese government. Were 
you shown this document, or had you been made acquainted with its 
contents on or about the date of its translation, which is set out as 28 
November, 1941 ? 

A. I do not recall. 

48. Q. I show you Document No. 18 of Exhibit 63, which is pur- 
ported to have been translated on 28 November 1941, and which sets 
out in substance that with the views of the Imperial Government 
which will be sent in two or three days the negotiations will be rup- 
tured. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that ne- 
gotiations are broken off. Had you seen this document or had you 
been made acquainted with its contents on or before the day of its 
translation, 28 November 1941 ? 

A. I have no recollection of seeing that specific message but I am 
reasonably certain that I must have seen it. 

49. Q. The message says "with the views of the Imperial Govern- 
ment which are forthcoming." What did you consider those views 
were that they were going to send ? 

A. I don't know quite how to answer that at the moment. I know 
what they are now and I don't know what I thought. 

50. Q. In the dispatch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department concerning which you have testified already and which 
expressed the view that negotiations with Japan appear to be termi- 
nated for all practical purposes, did the language of Document 18 
contain that view on the progress of negotiations ? 

A. I don't recall that. 

[872] 51. Q. It is noted that these views, which are, "To ter- 
minate de facto the negotiations will be sent in two or three days." 
Did you consider the de facto termination of the negotiations had any 
connection with the Japanese military operations? 

A. I imagine that I did. 

52. Q. Do you recall whether or not you associated that with any 
particular operation? 

A. No, other than we had definite evidence of what appeared to be 
to us hostile preparations in the Far East. 

53. Q. Did. the words "These views which are to be sent in two or 
three days" have any significance in connection with the expected 
reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November ? 

A. I don't recall. 

54. Q. Do you recall whether or not before 6 December 1941 you 
were on the alert for the receipt of any views or a reply to Mr. Hull's 
note of 26 November ? 

A. I have no definite recollection. I presume that I was because 
this thing was going along all the time. 

55. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 which is purported 
to have been translated on 28 November, 1941. This document has 
been popularly termed in circles where known as the Winds code. 
Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with 
its contents on or about the day of its translation, that is, 28 November 
1941? 

A. My very dim recollection is that that was referred to in a Joint 
Board meeting. I'm quite certain that I was aware of it ; I'm quite 
certain of that. 



822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

56. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 
December 1941 receive any information which put any part of this 
code in effect? 

A. I don't recall that. 

57. I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63. This document contains 
the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 No- 
vember 1941. Will you state when you first saw this document or 
were made aware of its contents ? 

A. I went to the War Department on Sunday morning, December 
7th. I don't just recall at what time. And I was given this docu- 
ment. I read it through, naturally carefully, and some parts of it 
several times to get the full significance of it. _ As I finished it I found 
another page which was the message referring to 1 : 00 p. m. Inci- 
dentally, I was told that that had been monitored at 6 : 30 that morn- 
ing, Western Time, Northwest, the Puget Sound area, I believe. But 
I did not reach that until some 10 or 15 minutes after 11 : 00, 1 think, 
I spent quite a long time reading this thing. _ It is quite a remarkable 
document. Therefore, I lost quite a lot of time reading that. I will 
go ahead with the procedure if you want me to. 

[873] 5S. Q. Please continue. I think that will be better. 

A. So I called up Admiral Stark on the 'phone — he was at his desk — 
and proposed that we send a message. One or the other of us always 
tried to avoid, to safeguard the codes, both sending a message about 
the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama, 
Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines. At first, he 
thought it might be inadvisable ; that they would be confused with too 
many of these messages. I then wrote out in longhand the message 
that you have here, and just as it was leaving the room he called me 
back and asked me if I had sent any message yet, and I said it was 
just going, and he said he would like to have added to it the usual 
thing, "Notify naval opposite." So I added that to it and sent it in 
that form with Colonel Bracken, I think his name is, who is the man 
who has charge of these special papers. When he came back I queried 
him as to the time of dispatch and all. I didn't get a very clear 
understanding of the thing so I sent him back with Colonel Bundy, 
who was the member of the War Plans Division who was in charge 
of matters pertaining to the Philippines and Hawaii and Panama. 
He and Colonel Bundy then went back to the message center, the 
coding room, and came back — I've forgotten what time they came 
back — and told me. It had to do with how long it took to deliver the 
message, and as I recall, when they came back they said it was 30 
minutes, or that it took 30 minutes and it would be in the hands of 
the recipients. At that time there was something still further 
unclarified to me so I had them return the second time — which meant 
the third time for Bracken — and they came back and answered me, 
apparently, to my entire satisfaction. At least I understood what 
the thing was. The actual time, I think, of the departure of the mes- 
sage was about noon, something of that sort, Washington time, and 
I believe the records will show that it reached Hawaii at 7 : 32, 1 think 
on the morning of the 7th. I have no time for the reading of this 
big long document, or the time I talked to Stark. The interval 
between the talks with Stark couldn't have been over two or three 
minutes because it was a very short message and I wrote it off in long- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 823 

hand. I think I have some notes here. It says, "And at 11 : 45 East- 
ern Standard Time, Admiral Stark asked that the various Army 
commanders who had received the message be instructed to convey 
it to the naval opposites" and it was sent to that effect. It was 
received in the message center at 11 : 50 and it was sent by radio to all 
points except Hawaii and they were unable to raise the Hawaiian 
station ; therefore, they sent it on a straight Western Union circuit 
into San Francisco and they had something out to Hawaii. I didn't 
know that until afterwards. It went everywhere else on straight 
Army radio without any delay. They couldn't raise Hawaii by the 
radio. It went everywhere else, the Philippines it went right 
through; Panama and San Francisco, but they couldn't raise the 
Hawaiian station for some reason [874] on the radio. They 
then sent it through the Western Union through a connection they 
had into San Francisco. They can tell you out there what happened ; 
I don't know. This is pure hearsay on my part. I know at the time 
I was told they had a teletype from the Western Union station in 
Honolulu to the Commanding General of the Army forces, but that 
didn't function. 

59. Q. Did I understand you to state. General, that you had not 
received any part of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note, that is, 
the 14 points, until Sunday morning, January 7, 1941 ? 

A. Yes. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U. S. Navy: 

60. Q. General, you have before you Exhibit 63, the document that 
contains the various documents that you have been looking at. I want 
to ask you some questions about that. I take it that you are familiar in 
a general way with the type of material that is contained in that 
exhibit, whether or not you are familiar with the exact messages that 
are in there, I don't know, but you are familiar with the general type 
of information? 

A. Quite familiar. 

61. Q. You are familiar with the fact that during the period imme- 
diately preceding 7 December those messages indicate that they were 
broken partly by the Army and partly by the Navy ; that there was a 
joint arrangement in existence between the two services that, I believe, 
one day the Army broke them and the next day the Navy broke them ? 

A. I don't know about that but I know they were both involved in it. 

62. Q. And that they had a method for exchanging the information 
that they got from the messages which each service broke ? 

A. I believe so. 

63. Q. Now, would you tell the court how the messages were handled 
in the War Department as nearly as you can, from their initial break- 
ing and translation by the S. I. S? In other words, we have had 
explained to the court here by the Navy representatives how these 
things were handled in the Navy Department and I think it would 
help to establish the picture. 

A. You will have to get one of the people that handled it. I get it 
in my hands under a special cover. I read it and sign it and it is taken 
out very specially and nobody else sees it, and then it goes back to its 
source. I couldn't give you the minutia of its arrangement, but it 
would be very simple to have someone come in and report on it. 



824j CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[875] 64. Q. Do you understand that all the messages that are 
received of this type are brought to you personally for inspection, or 
is there some screening that is set up some place in the War Depart- 
ment where they decide which of these messages are considered im- 
portant enough for you to be bothered with or for you to see ? 

A. know that there is screening at the present time because I have 
directed it. 

65. Q. Do you recall what the situation was before December 7th? 
A. I don't recall at that particular moment what it was. In other 

words, it was entirely too voluminous for me ; I would retire as Chief 
of Staff and read every day. 

66. Q. You have no present recollection as to what the situation was 
at that time? 

A. I know they were too long ; there was too much of it. 

67. Do you recall whether prior to 7 December these messages 
were being passed to the appropriate field commanders who might be 
concerned with the subject matter? 

A. I'm not entirely familiar with that particular aspect of it. 
As I understood it at the time, the source of most of these came in 
from naval monitoring stations. I had thought at the time that the 
commander in the Philippines and the Commander in Hawaii got 
part of the information because the monitoring stations are there. 
I have been told since, I believe, that they did not, but that is a matter 
of fact which conjecture on my part isn't suitable testimony. 

68. Q. More specifically, then. General, did you decide when you 
saw a particular message, or did you feel called upon to decide when 
you saw a particular message, whether or not it should be passed to 
an appropriate field commander, or where the messages only passed 
to you for information and whatever decision should be made in that 
respect made by some one of your subordinates ? 

A. Well, you are going now into the whole operation of any com- 
mander. I see the thing. These people make proposals. Again I 
direct without waiting for the proposals. That would apply in this 
particular case. They go through the things very carefully and accu- 
rately because they are concentrated on everything that pertains to this 
particular thing. I am related to that and also the matters on the 
Hill and to matters all over the world. In an example I have just 
testified to here, I read the message and wrote the reply immediately. 
I didn't consult anybody other than Admiral Stark about that. It 
was perfectly clear-cut. I knew what should be done immediately. 
The preceding message that we sent of November 27th which I stated 
General Gerow thought that I did not see, I'm pretty certain I did not 
see it, and I'm reasonably certain that I was concerned in the drafting 
of the message of warning, the alert, because that would be something 
that would indicate to me that very positive action was necessary. 
Now, the very positive action [876] probably would be done 
in the War Plans Division, General Gerow for example, or I might 
act direct or they might bring it to me. The same thing applies to your 
question about screening. They go through all of it. I can't possibly 
do that. And they bring to me the most essential portions that refer 
to things that are of a critical nature. If they fail, why, I change 
the man, that's all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 825 

69. Q. General, I call your attention to Document 40 of Exhibit 63, 
which contains information sent from Kita, in Honolulu, to Tokyo, 
dated November 18, 1941, and showing on its face that it was handled 
by the Army and was translated on December 6, 1941j and I ask you 
whether or not you recall having seen that message prior to 7 Decem- 
ber, 1941? 

A. I am not certain but I think I saw this message after the event. 

70. Q. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, General, which is a 
message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated November 18, 1941, bearing 
the notation that it was handled by the Army and was translated on 5 
December 1941. Do you recall having seen that message prior to 7 
December 1941? 

A. I don't recall that. 

71. Q. As I understand your testimon;7, then. General, in most cases 
involving material of this type, the decision as to whether it should be 
passed on to the appropriate Army commander might have been your 
decision in some cases, or might have been the decision of the Chief of 
War Plans Division, I believe you said, or some other appropriate sub- 
ordinate whose duty it was to read and evaluate these messages? 

A. Normally, it wouldn't be his decision but it would be his proposal 
to me for me to approve. 

72. Q. And did you personally approve those proposals? That is, 
in the event that it was decided to send a message to the appropriate 
field commanders forwarding this information, did you personally 
approve the forwarding of that message, or was it just sent in your 
name as is ordinarily the case? 

A. Well, that isn't an ordinary message, as a rule. I should imagine 
that in most instances, I did. Of course, I was away a great deal 
myself. I might add that I was traveling about 60,000 miles a year 
then and I was traveling a great deal. We were making an army. 

73. Q. Then does it sum up the situation accurately, General^ to say 
that the information of this type and the other information which you 
had in the War Department on 27 November was considered by you to 
be generally summarized and sent to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department in your war warning dispatch of 27 November? 
That is, that that dispatch reflected the entire picture that you had at 
that time, including information of this type, and other elements ? 

A. I wouldn't say that it reflected the entire picture, [877] It 
gave the state of a crisis and the direction for action. 

74. Q. In that sense, though, it did reflect certain information which 
you had in the War Department but had not passed on in its original 
form to the Commanding General ? 

A. That's it. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : 

75. Q. On the 6th of December, Saturday, General, were you ac- 
quainted with the fact that Japan had sent to her ambassadors 13 of 14 
parts of a message or note to be delivered or transmitted at some later 
date to our Secretary of State? 

A. I do not recall that I was aware of such information. 

76. Q. There has been evidence adduced before this court indicating 
that information to that effect was available in the Navy Department 
in Washington in readable English and smooth form not later than 



826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9 : 15 to 9 : 30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, on Saturday, the 6th of 
December. If you did not get the information on Saturday, the 6th of 
December, General, that would be due, would it not, to some failure in 
the echelons of command in transmitting the information to you? 

A. I couldn't say that offliand. It would depend on where I was, 
which I do not recall on that particular Saturday. I might have been 
quite a number of places. I don't know now where I actually was. I 
have this recollection of the day of December 7th : that when I came to 
the War Department I was told by the officer in charge of this special 
type of information that they had been working all night, as I under- 
stood him to express it at the time, on this matter ; that the deciphering 
had taken a long time ; that quite a bit of the Japanese deciphered thing 
was sent over to the War Department to be translated into English, 
and as I gathered at the time — I am just speaking from a dim recollec- 
tion of that time — this had gone on during the night ; the deciphering 
had been done on the Navy side but the translation into English, on ac- 
count of the length of this thing, had bogged them down and they had 
called on the War Department s similar agency to assist in the trans- 
lation from Japanese into English. Then, as I said, this final mes- 
sage — I am merely giving my recollection now — had been monitored at 
6 : 30 that morning on the West Coast ; I presume Washington. That, 
again, had to come in, be deciphered and be translated. I got the im- 
pression at this time that they got all this thing together and they sent 
for me. As I recall, I had been horseback riding and I came in imme- 
diately after the ride and went straight tothe War Department and ran 
into this long message. That is my only recollection of the affair. 

[878] 77. Q. I have only asked about Saturday at the moment. 
There has been evidence adduced before this court that the underlying 
language of the long message which was to be delivered by the Japa- 
nese Ambassador to our State Department was English rather than 
Japanese. 

A. I don't know abput that. I would suggest this : You are asking 
me to guess about something that I have not the facts concerning and I 
have not investigated and we have the officer that knows and you can 
call him here and he can testify. 

78. Q. I have only been trying to direct my questions generally 
to the time when you acquired a knowledge. 

A. Mine was very specifically on Sunday morning. 

79. Q. And you had no knowledge of the fact that another mes- 
sage was coming designating the time of delivery, on Saturday ? 

A. That is my recollection. 

80. Q. And you have no recollection of where you were on Saturday 
night ? 

A. No, I haven't. 

81. Q. Whether you were at home, or whether you were in the 
Department, or where you were ? 

A. I don't know where I was. I never thought of it until this 
instant. 

82. Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether you talked to 
Admiral Stark on Saturday? 

A. Saturday evening? 

83. Q. Yes. • 

A. I have no recollection whatever of that. Tlie probability is that 
I did not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 827 

84. Q. There is evidence before the court that the full 14 parts of 
the long message to which you have made reference and a shorter mes- 
sage indicating 1 : 00 o'clock as the time of delivery had been processed 
and were in smooth, readable English form before 8 : 00 o clock on 
Sunday morning, 7 December. Can you fix more definitely the hour 
that you learned of those facts ? 

A. No, other than the time that was given here that I spoke to 
Admiral Stark over the 'phone would have to be used as the finish of 
the affair and then we would have to estimate how long it took me 
to digest this thing before I came to this 1 : 00 o'clock affair at the end 
of it. I read fairly rapidly. This was a most unusual message, of 
course. I recall distinctly re-reading parts of it and reflecting on it 
when I was reading, but I think I read much more rapidly than the 
average man. That is all I could give you on it, which would indicate 
that probably [879^ I arrived there about half-past 10 : 00 ; I'm 
just guessing. 

85. Q. Well, assuming the fact to be as I stated of the evidence 
here. General, that this information was available to the Navy Depart- 
ment by 8 : 00 o'clock, what is the explanation for there being a 2-hour 
delay of that information getting to you ? 

A. All I can think of at the moment is that if it came across — when 
it did come across — the officer who was in charge of it, because it was 
very secret, whether he sat down and read it before he gave it to me. 
If he did, you would have to add on his time of reading on it. 

86. Q. In your conversation with Admiral Stark — this is after you 
had finished reading it, you called him as I understood it? 

A. I called him on the White House 'phone. 

87. Q. (Continuing.) — did Admiral Stark in any form of words 
inquire of you as to the rapidity of the means of communication that 
were available to you for the transmission of this message ? 

A. No, our conversation was very brief and entirely confined to 
whether or not the message should be sent, and then to having it 
referred to the naval opposite. 

88. Q. There was no conversation in which you in effect said that 
you thought you could get it out as quickly as the Navy Department ? 

A. None whatever. 

89. Q. Prior to the sending of the message that you dispatched, or 
that was dispatched by the War Department to the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, among others, on the 27th of November, had you learned of the 
delivery by the State Department to the Japanese Government of a 
diplomatic note dated the 26th of November ? It is a long document. 

A. Yes. I don't recall. I imagine I knew something about it. I 
don't recall. 

90. Q. You have no recoFection as to whether you then regarded 
that note as an ultimatum, or not? 

A. No. 

91. Q. Did you learn frora the Navy Department of the dispatch 
sent by it — the Navy Department — on the even date, that is, the 27th 
of November, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

A. What is the question ? 

92. Q. When did you learn from the Navy Department the fact that 
they had sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet on the 27th of November ? 

A. I don't recall that. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 IQ 



828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[880] 93. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conversation 
with any Navy people about it, about the coincident message? 
A. I don't recall that. I wasn't here on the 27th, for one thing. 

94. Q. Or the 26th? 

A. I left the War Department about noon of the 26th and didn't 
get back to the War Department until the morning of the 28th. 

95. Q. Do you recall any conversation with the Navy Department 
on the 26th about sending some message of that character ? 

A. No, I don't recall any specific conversation about it. I don't 
mean to imply that I didn't have it ; I just don't recall it. 

96. Do you recall having any conversations with Admiral Stark 
relative to the diplomatic note of the 26th of November? 

A. I don't recall that. 

97. Q. Either one way or the other ? 
A. No. 

98. Q. You made a joint recommendation to the President with 
Admiral Stark including, among other things, the affirmative recom- 
mendation that no ultimatum should be sent. That is in evidence 
here. It was dated, I believe, on the 5th of November. Did you 
regard the note of the 26th of November as sympathetic and parallel 
with your joint recommendation to the President? 

A. I don't recall. 

99. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Admiral Stark 
on that phase of the case ? 

A. No, I don't. I must explain to you gentlemen, if I saw these 
things I saw them this morning. It is a long time. 

100. Q. I am talking about this diplomatic note. 

A. Yes. Well, I am talking about this thing. My reminder was 
this morning. Some things I have a very clear recollection of, and 
others I do not. 

101. Q. Do you recall seeing the answers that General Short sent 
to your dispatch, or the War Department's dispatch, of the 27th and 
the subsequent one on the 28th ? 

A. No, I don't know about that. What actually shows, so far as 
we can determine, is that the reply from the Philippines and the reply 
from Hawaii came in together and were fastened with one of these 
staples that go through. I initialed the one from the Philippines 
which was on top, and I did not initial the one from Hawaii. This 
was the one I was referring to (indicating) . 

[881] 102. Q. You don't recall having seen that (indicating) ? 

A. Well, I am explaining. I have no recollection one way or the 
other. The message in the records came with a staple fastened to the 
one from the Philippines, and this was on the bottom. I have ini- 
tialed the Philippines one but I haven't initialed this one. The trou- 
ble in this connection is, I had a conversation regarding its meaning 
with Colonel Bundy, who is the officer in charge of that thing, I think 
the afternoon of December 7th after we knew the attack was on ; that 
is my recollection of it. My recollection of tliat is, Bundy was ex- 
plaining his interpretation of the message. The unfortunate part of 
the thing is that he was killed right after that when I sent him out 
to Hawaii. He left about two days later, I think, and was killed en 
route out there, so I don't recall this and I am confused in the conver- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ^^9 

sation that I had— I'm pretty certain after the event— in relation to 
what I might have been thinking about before the event. 

103. Q. Do you have any recollection of knowing between the 27th 
of November and the 7th of December what precautions General Short 
had actually inaugurated ? 

A. No, I don't recall that. I was away two or three times in that 
particular period and the War Plans people were checking all these 
things from the various departments that came in, 

104. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conferences with Ad- 
miral Stark in that 10-day period from the 27th of November until 
the 7th of December ? 

A. On any subject? 

105. Q. Well, on any subject in connection with the Pacific and Jap- 
anese situation ? 

A. No, I don't. I suppose the records would show. We were hav- 
ing very frequent meetings of the Joint Board and he and I were 
having even more frequent meetings and were talking over the tele- 
phone almost every day. 

106. Q. You were both members of the Joint Board ? 
A. Yes. He was the senior member. 

107. Q. Well it is your recollection that during the days that you 
were in Washington in this interval from the 27th of November to 
the 7th of December that you did confer with Admiral Stark ? 

A. I couldn't say that I did every day, but we were in frequent 
conference and had a habit of telephoning almost daily about this and 
that. I might add also that we were going to frequent meetings with 
Mr. Hull. 

108. Q. Do you recall whether any of these talks that you had just 
prior to the 7th of December with Admiral Stark dealt with the prob- 
lem of the defense of the Hawaiian Frontier ? 

A. No, I don't recall that. I might say that my recollection would 
be that we thought they had been working on [882] defense 
plans in Hawaii through the years. They had just reached what 
seemed to be a very workable arrangement and the normal assump- 
tion would be that they were pretty well coordinated. Our grea^t 
problems were out in the Philippines where the means were no' slack 
that it was quite a problem what they were going to do out there. 

109. Q. But you have no recollection of any specific talk one way 
or the other ? 

A. No, I have not. 

110. Q. Did you have any conferences with Admiral Stark at any 
time relative to the transmission to the responsible commanders in 
Hawaii of any of the information contained in Document 63 ? 

A. I don't recall that. 

111. Q. One way or the other, or do you recall that there was none ? 
A. I don't recall that there was any conversation of that nature. 

112. Q. Do you recall whether you and Admiral Stark at any time 
shortly prior to the 7th of December conferred relative to the impact 
of the information contained in Exhibit 63 on the defense of the 
Hawaiian Frontier? 

A. I don't recall that. 



830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 
Examined by the court : 

113. Q. None of the evidence that has been presented before this 
court indicates that the attack on Pearl Harbor was other than a sur- 
prise. Does the court understand that the attack came as a surprise 
to you ? 

A. Yes. 

114. Q. General, could you express to the court your general opin- 
ion as to the probability of attack by air on Hawaii on December 7th 
as you gathered from general conversation here. In other words, 
what was the general opinion as to the probability of an air attack 
on Oahu ? 

A. Well, in the first place, as far as I can recall my conception 
at the present time, which was partly in the letter I showed you in 
February, I had thought the possibilities in Hawaii in the way of 
attack were a combined sabotage and air attack, and I assumed that 
air attack was much more easy to deal with than the sabotage attack 
because unless we were all disposed in advance to meet the latter, it 
ment a deployment of the troops. In a way, it is very hard to maintain 
deployments over a long period of time, although they had made very 
intricate plans for managing it. To go further, it appeared to me, as 
I recall at the time, that [883] there was a strong probability — 
really a certainty — that there was a definite evil intent immediately 
in the cards in the Far East. There could be little doubt about that. 
The question was. When it would blow, or explode; to what extent 
it would be on this infiltration basis where they would virtually sur- 
round the victim with all their arrangements before they pounced. 
By that I mean, it was not beyond the possibilities, considering what 
the Japanese had already been permitted to do, and our own limita- 
tions at the time, that they might go into Siam and just set up all the 
rear and dominate the whole Malaya Peninsula even up to Rangoon. 
Whether or not they were going to make an open assault immediately 
was a matter of conjecture. But to our minds that was a certainty. 
I referred earlier in my testimony to the indications of a peculiar 
nature with relation to the Canal. We always felt a great sensitivity 
with regard to the Canal and hearing something very peculiar merely 
fortified us in our fears always that again you could commit a sabotage 
act there that would be quite fatal to us for quite a time. But those 
things took priority, in my opinion, to the probability of the attack on 
Hawaii. We had there, as I say, more resources than we had any- 
where else, and they had labored long, and apparently diligently, over 
various plans and preparations of one kind and another. 

115. Q. On the morning of December 7th, General, in your phone 
conversation with Admiral Stark relative to sending this message to 
Hawaii, did Admiral Stark impress upon you, or did you impreste 
upon him, tlie urgency of quick transit of this message i 

A. No. I think that was implied in what we both said. The only 
issue between us at the moment was whether we would confuse these 
people still further inasmuch as there had been so many messages 
sent, and the decision was that one should be sent immediately and I 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 831 

don't know how long it was between our two conversations but I should 
imagine it was about three or four minutes when he came back and 
the message was then leaving the room, which indicated the imme- 
diancy of the action. As I told you, he was leaving the room when 
I called him back, because I had written it very hurriedly in longhand 
after I spoke to Admiral Stark the first time. I took, I should say, 
from the time I read the message until I wrote the message I sent, I 
don't imagine there was more than five or six minutes involved, in- 
cluding my conversations with Admiral Stark. 

116. Q. Did you consider the proposed severance or the contem- 
plated severance of the diplomatic relations practically a declaration 
of war ? 

A. My recollection of that today is that I was not [SS^I cer- 
tain of that. They have so many devious ways of doing things 
nowadays that whether or not their first move would be an out-and-out 
act of war was not any certainty in my mind. I was certain that 
they were going ahead in the Far East but whether they would do 
it overtly or whether they would do it over some severance of diplo- 
matic relations or moves of that kind, I wasn't clear in my mind. I 
might say that we had had a number of discussions, particularly 
Admiral Stark with members of the State Department and with the 
President at which I was present, with relation to the imposing of 
economic sanctions against the Japanese, particularly in regard to 
fuel oil and gasoline, and it was the opinion that if you moved so far 
you provoked them to the point where something overt would happen 
right away. I musn't speak for him but this was discussed by him 
very often as to what would happen if you caught them on the fuel 
oil business cold ; whether or not they would be provoked into action, 
all of which meant, in my mind, whether they moved directly — as 
they did — or whether they moved more circuitously under the cover 
of various diplomatic ruptures and things of that sort. 

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, 
Junior (relative to introduction of exhibit) ; and Captain Edwin T. 
Layton, U. S. Navy, Pages 903-910, inclusive. 

[903] Robert D. Powers, Jr., counsel for the judge advocate, 
was recalled by the judge advocate and was warned that his oath was 
still binding. 

Examination by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. I hand j^^ou a document. Can you identify it ? 

A, I can. It is a copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a 
dispatch dated 3 December 1941 from OpNav addressed to Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Coml6 for action ; and to CinCPac and 
Coml4 for information. 

The only authenticated copy of a dispatch dated 3 December 1941 
from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Coml6 foi action; 
and to CinCPac and Coml4 for information, was submitted to the 
interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered 
in evidence. 

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EX- 
HIBIT 66". 



832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECKET 



A. (Beading:) 

Q. Will you please read the dispatch ? 



From: OPNAV. 

Date : 3 December 1941. 

Action Addressees. To : CINCAF. 

COM SIXTEEN. 
Info: CINPAO 

COM FOURTEEN. 
Priority. 
Date time group : 031855. 

Text : Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered 
London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy pui'ple machine XX 
Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also 
directed destroy purple X all but one copy of other systems X and all secret 
documents XX British admiralty London today reports embassy London 
has complied. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre- 
vious questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and resumed his seat as counsel for 
the judge advocate. 

[904] A witness called by the judge advocate, entered, was duly 
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station. 

A. Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. I am Intelligence 
Officer, Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the first of October 
and 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Pacific Fleet. 

3. Q. Will you state in general what were the sources of information 
available to you during that time ? 

A. The main sources of information were from Chief of Naval 
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, who forwarded us reports 
from naval observers, naval attaches, other competent observers. State 
Department, consular agents. Also from Chief of Naval Operations 
via Office of Naval Intelligence or Office of Naval Communications 
certain highly secret information under the classification of com- 
munication intelligence. Also local reports from the local district 
intelligence office here regarding local security conditions; through 
liaison with British Intelligence of the Secret Intelligence Service ; in- 
telligence as to Japan's activities in the Far East. Also from the com- 
mandants of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Naval Districts and Panama 
Sea Frontier regarding movements of Japanese merchant vessels ; re- 
ports also from the Commandant of the Third Naval District regard- 
ing movements of Japanese merchant vessels. I think that is all. 

4. Q. What method did you employ in passing this information 
along to the Comjnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 833 

A. I passed it to him by hand. 

5. Q. Was this information that you received evaluated before you 
passed it to him, or did you give it to him direct in the form in which 
received ? 

A. I gave it to him in the original form. If the original message 
were an intelligence report and it was long, I would write a short 
brief of it, appending that to the original report. 

6. Q. I show you Exhibit 66, which has just been introduced into 
evidence before this court and ask you to read it to yourself. Will you 
state whether you saw the contents of this message on or before 7 
December 1941 ? 

A. I did. 

7. Q. Did this message have any special significance to you when 
you read it ? 

A. This message, like many others received at that time having to 
do with the Japanese activities, could only be read [905] and 
considered along with the rest of them as it tended to indicate Japan's 
intentions and activities. 

8. Q. The fact that the message mentioned destroying a certain 
type of machine, did that have any special significance to you? 

A, Only insofar as I knew that was the cipher machine. 

9. Q. Did it have any more significance to you by designating a 
machine by this particular name than if it had been any other sort 
of a cipher machine ? 

A. I asl^ed the security officer, Lieutenant Coleman, who had come 
from Washington, just what was meant by the word "purple machine" 
and he explained that it was an electrical coding machine, roughly 
similar to the type we used, that was used in the passing of messages 
between Japanese consuls and diplomats and the home office. The 
word "purple" was to designate the type of the machine as an improve- 
ment over the old one called the "red". 

10. Q. Then am I to understand that the fact that they used this 
particular name had no special significance to you regarding the 
security of the type of messages it was designed to handle ? 

A. Well, we know that the Japanese Navy had an electrical coding 
machine, that the Japanese naval attache had a coding machine, that 
this was a diplomatic coding machine, and therefore the diplomatic 
machines were being broken, or destroyed, but other than the fact that 
it was a diplomatic machine, no, it had no special significance. 

11. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether 
or not you had seen this document on or before 7 December 1941, 
or had you been informed of its contents ? 

A, I did not see this original document. The message we received 
stated this same thing in substance but to my recollection this exact 
document was not translated verbatim. The use of the winds and 
the code for relations was in the message but the verbatim, word-for- 
word, was not as we received it in the telegraph. 

1. Q. What, to your own knowledge, was done to intercept the 
broadcast which used the words to execute this code ? 

A. Upon receipt of this. Commander Rochefort, who headed the 
Coml4 intelligence unit, placed special watches on all the Japanese 
weather and news and other broadcasts, both in the Japanese and 
English language, and told them to maintain communications with 



i 
834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

him by telephone and to call him the instant one of these code words 
was heard and he was to call either myself or Admiral Kimmel in 
person in case I happened to be away. He would call me if I were 
there. Also the intelligence officer, who at that time was monitoring 
certain news broadcasts, was inferentially warned to watch for any 
weather reports being put on the end of news broadcasts and to inform 
him or me — that is, Rochefort or myself — of any such appendage or 
insertion in a regular broadcast. 

[906] 13. Q. Did you ever receive any information prior to 7 
December 1941 which executed any portion of this document 15 that 
you have just read? 

A. We did not. 

14. Q. Prior to 7 December 7 1941 were you aware of any messages 
sent between the Hawaiian Islands and the Japanese Government 
which contained military information relative to the movement of 
ships in Pearl Harbor or the location of ships there ? 

A. No, sir. 

15. Q. I show you Documents 36, 37 and 40 of Exhibit 63 which 
are communications between Japan and the Japanese authorities in 
Honolulu and which either request or give information concerning 
ship movements in Pearl Harbor. I will ask you to look at these doc- 
uments and state whether or not you had seen them or been appraised 
of their contents prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I will state categorically that none of these were received here, 
nor were we appraised of their existence. 

16. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 did you have any other informa- 
tion other than Exhibit 66 which I showed you first concerning the 
Japanese destroying codes and confidential documents ? 

A. On 5 December we received word from the naval observer at 
Wellington that the Japanese consul at Wellington was destroying 
his codes and had sent a code word to Tokyo in compliance with in- 
structions. 

17. Q. Was this information given to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific Fleet? 

A. It was. 

18. Q. Do you recall whether any evaluation was placed on the sig- 
nificance of this directive ? 

A. The significance of these messages was considered along with 
other messages during that period and were the subject of discussions 
in the Admiral's cabin. I pTesumed that when he discussed it with 
the War Plans Officer and others that it was a matter of discussion 
because after receiving that he had various officers in for a conference. 
One particular point of this was the destruction of codes and ciphers, 
the ones in Hong Kong, Singapore, Wellington, as well as Batavia. 
I believe, were included along with London and Washington. This 
seemed to indicate that Japan was preparing for any or all eventuali- 
ties and at that time we had received messages from the British and 
from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information 
indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula scheduled for 
about 1 December. This seemed to dovetail with the information 
received and its evaluation, and while all possibilities were not ruled 
out, it fit like a glove. 

[907] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, U. S. Navy : 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 835 

19. Q. I show you Document No. 2 of Exhibit 64, concerning the 
winds code, being a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic 
Fleet. Did you have that at about the same time you had had that 
other document that was shown you in your direct testimony? 

A. It was abut the same time ; yes, sir. 

20. Q. When you examined the two together, did it leave any un- 
certainty in your mind as to the mechanism of that code which the 
Japanese were setting up? 

A. None whatsoever. 

21. Q. Did you at that time take it to mean that one of those code 
words, say the one which referred to us, was the equivalent of inform- 
ing the Japanese that they were at war with the United States, or in 
a state of somewhat lesser importance? 

A. It is rather difficult to recall my exact impression but as I recall 
it now I believe it was more than a rupture of diplomatic relations 
had taken place and that necessarily, anything else could happen. 

Frank Murrell Sickle^, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

[908] 22. Q. Exhibit G6, which you have just been shown, car- 
ries the initials, LFS. Do you known who that would be? 

A. Yes, sir. 

23. Q. Who? 

A. I believe that is Captain Safford. 

24. Q. Did you know at the time or did you think at the time that 
this purple cipher mentioned would be one of their very high class 
ciphers ? 

A. Yes, carrying as it did the material from Embassies and Counsel 
General to the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and vice versa, it was con- 
sidered to be a high class cipher. 

25. Q. Knowing the Japanese as of course you do, was it not rather 
an extreme measure to destroy anything as expensive as one of those 
machines ? 

A. The thought of the cost did not enter my mind. I rather thought 
that since the one from Bangkok had been removed, it was due to their 
forces being there ; while the ones in Hong Kong, Manila, and Wash- 
ington, and London, could not be physically transported without 
some danger of compromise. We know that they take elaborate pre- 
cautions to move these into foreign countries. 

26. Q. Captain, do you know whether or not your opposite number 
in the Army was obtaining from the War Department any informa- 
tion derived from sources like these that we have been discussing? 

A. I do not know, sir. He at least did not pass any on to me, or 
to Admiral Kimmel, to my knowledge and I am sure that if any 
were passed on to Admiral Kimmel, I would have seen them. The 
liaison between the G-2, Hawaiian Department, was maintained 
through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Railey, who, 
when he established the liaison, said that he was doing this on the 
instructions of G-2, since the air force and the Navy would operate 
in the closest conjunction while the Army was a defensive garrison. 
Colonel Railey passed on to me no such information, and since I 
did inform him of the contents, in general, of some of this highly 
secret information, I feel positive in my mind that had he known it, 



836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

he would have informed us; and therefore he had no such source 
of information available. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy; (Ret) : 

27. Q. Did you know prior to 6 December, 1941, that any unit 
of the Navy Department had intercepted the execution of the winds 
message ? 

A. 1 did not. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) , 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 
[909] Examined by the court: 

28. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the operations of the F. B. I., 
and Intelligence Service here in Honolulu, during that period of 
time? 

A. I was kept apprised of the general situation ashore, inasmuch 
as it influenced the security of the Fleet, which was here based. I 
knew in general their set-up, how they operated, and the general 
situation, but did not concern myself with details. 

29. Q. Do you know of any restrictions placed on the Japanese 
representatives or Japanese officials of Honolulu, as to the transmission 
of messages to Tokyo ? 

A. To my best knowledge and belief, there were no such restrictions 
at any time. 

30. Q. Was there any information — or were any means of obtain- 
ing information through the F. B. I., or otherwise, as to the messages 
flowing to Tokyo from Honolulu ? 

A. The F. B. I. wouldn't be a party to that, because it is against 
the laws of the United States. I know that there had been attempts 
made through various high officials. Naval, Military, and civilian, to 
obtain files of Japanese outgoing and incoming messages that were 
handled on American communications systems, and I know that it was 
refused in many cases. I know in some cases it was done with special 
permission of some very high authority. I understand that attempts 
were made locally here to obtain these messages. 

31. Q. What I want to know — was this information obtained and 
in your hand or anyone's hands here in Honolulu ? 

A. There was no information obtained from any sources, of the 
Japanese Consul General, or others here — none to my knowledge at all. 

32. Q. In other words, you had no information as to what action 
was being transmitted from the Japanese officials or otherwise here 
in Honolulu, to Tokyo ? 

A. No, sir. We had no information. Attempts were made to get it. 

33. Q. We have had introduced in this testimony that certain mes- 
sages were received in Washington whereby the Japanese requested 
information as to the number of ships in Pearl Harbor, and also the 
entrance of ships here. Were you familiar with those messages? 

A. Not until after December 7. 

34. Q. But you did not have them at the time? 
A. I did not, sir. 

35. Q. And they were not transmitted to you or to the Commander- 
in-Chief of Pacific? 

A. They weren't available, sir. They weren't decrypted [910] 
until after December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 837 

36. Q. Does that include the so-called winds message ? 

A. No, sir, the winds message did not come locally. The winds 
message originated in Tokyo, saying that they would do a certain 
thing a certain place at a certain time. 

37. Q. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet did not receive the 
winds message before December 7 ? 

A. He knew of the winds message. These wind messages did not 
originate here in Honolulu. 

Extracted testimony of Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 916-918, inclusive. 

[916] Reexamined by the judge advocate : 

61. Q. You have testified that you did not feel that the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had been kept as fully informed as he 
might have been, in view of the information which you know now 
was in Washington. Will you tell us some of the information which 
you think would have influenced the decision of the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific at that time had he known it ? 

A. I know that there were certain de-crypted messages in the War 
Department and in the Navy Department in Washington, which by 
themselves do not mean so much, but, added together, would certainly 
be more of a warning toward this locality than we received in any 
other message — the ones you showed me, plus the ones not introduced 
in this court and which are in the possession of the Army, I under- 
stand. 

62. Q. Could you give briefly the information which these docu- 
ments contained? What was the subject matter of them? 

A. Further inquiries regarding ship movements in Pearl Harbor 
and stressing movements of aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor. 

63. Q. Do you recall any others ? 

A. Other messages of the nature of those from the purple machine 
regarding the situation existing at that time. 

64. Q. Could you be just a little more specific? 

A. I am trying to phrase this but I can't. Without quoting a docu- 
ment, I can only say I have received the impression from certain docu- 
ments which I know were available before December 7 that the phras- 
eology of certain passages in there may be considered quite important 
had that material been at hand. For instance, there was one expres- 
sion to the effect that Japan must have a settlement of the negotiations 
in Washington by the 25th and the fact that when the note from 
Secretary Hull was delivered, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany 
was told to call on Hitler and get Hitler's promise. The Japanese 
Ambassador to Italy called on Mussolini and received Mussolini's 
promise of full aid. Those were definitely warlike indications. 

Reexamined by the court : 

65. Q. Referring to your last answer, were any of these directed 
against Pearl Harbor particularly ? 

A. No, sir. 

66. Q. You consider, however, that if they had them here, they 
would have influenced the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific ? 

A. I think it would for this reason: The Japanese is [917] 
an Oriental, and he is a great bargainer. We saw negotiations ap- 
parently broken down with Mr. Kurusu suddenly being rushed 
through so as to inject new blood. The negotiations, we were told, 



838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

had broken down and there was little possibility of their being re- 
sumed. Yet we have seen in the past that negotiations were resumed, 
and Japan devised some new formula, some new approach for a prob- 
lem almost as insoluable as the one facing her then. We received two 
very fine estimates of the situation from Captain Creighton, the 
naval resident officer at Singapore, and from the intelligence officer 
of the Asiatic Fleet, in which they independently of one another, 
from their wide contacts in the Far East, came to the conclusion that 
war against America at this time would not be the Japanese decision, 
but, rather, they would cut across Thailand to cut off the Burma 
Road and Burma, which was, at best, unstable at that time, in an 
attempt to find a solution to the so-called China incident without 
involving America and Great Britain, if possible. 

Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

67. Q. Would not the receipt of the execution of the Winds Mes- 
sage be one of the clues to which you have referred and which would 
have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief? 

A. I feel positive that had one of the Winds messages execute been 
received, it would have been acted upon with rapidity and aggressively. 

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U.S. Navy: 

68. Q. Will you state what action you believe would have been 
taken ? 

A. I believe all personnel would have been immediately recalled 
to their ships — This is my belief. I believe all vessels would have 
been ordered to be prepared to sail at the earliest possible moment. 
I believe that intense anti-submarine patrol and distant patrold would 
have been inaugurated. I believe the task force would have sortied 
and proceeded to sea to perform what missions under the War Plan 
the Commander-in-Chief deemed appropriate. 

69. Q. This would have been upon receipt of the code message 
which said diplomatic relations with the United States were ter- 
minated ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

70. Q. Didn't tile "war warning" dispatch say practically the same 
thing ? 

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge. The message said negotiations 
had ceased. The fact that negotiations were then [91S] under 
way in Washington — and which had been under way since, I believe, 
April or May, 1941 — did not necessarily mean that diplomatic rela- 
tions were going to be ruptured or that a state of war was going to 
be declared to exist after a rupture. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make 
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat- 
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in 
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the 
previous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 839 

[91SA] The court then, at 5:25 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 
a. m., September 11, 1944. 

[919] Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander F. M. 
Brotherhood, U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 919-A — 930, inclusive. 

[919-A] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was 
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station. 

A. F. M. Brotherhood, lieutenant commander, U. S. N. R. At pres- 
ent, I am attached to FRUPAC under orders to return to Washington. 

2. Q. What duty were you performing during the month imme- 
diately preceding 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I was one of the watch officers in Op-20-G, in the office of 
Director of Naval Communications. 

[920] 3. Q. I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this 
court. Do you recall having seen this document prior to 7 December 
1941? 

A. I recall seeing the original of this document prior to 7 December. 

4. Q. Do you recall on what date you first saw that document, or 
were informed as to its contents ? 

A. I don't remember the date. 

5. Q. What is the best approximation you can give as to that date? 
A. About November 30th. 

6. Q. At the time you saw this document, was it made available 
to all of the watch officers in Op-20-G ? 

A. I do not know. 

7. Q. As a watch officer in Op-20-G, what instructions were given 
to you with regard to procedure to be followed if and when any 
intercept of a Japanese message using this code was received? 

A. I recall only that portion which ordered me to call Admiral 
Noyes on the telephone in the event that any intercept of this type 
was received. 

8. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 was any message emanating from 
Japan received in Op-20-G in which this code was used? 

A. I know of one that was at the time presumed to be in this code. 

9. Q. When was that message that you speak of received ? 
A. I think of it as a Thursday night before Pearl Harbor. 

10. Q. Sir, for the sake of the record, will you compute the day of 
the month that that Thursday night before Pearl Harbor would have 
been? 

A. The 4th of December. 

11. Q. During what hours on the evening of 4 December 1941 were 
you on watch in Op-20-G ? 

A. From 4 : 00 in the evening until midnight. 

12. Q. From whom did you receive a message containing these 
code words? Relate the details pertaining to the receipt of such 
message. 

A. In the course of the evening of December 4th I received a tele- 
phone call from the Federal Communications Commission from an 
officer whose name I don't remember. Unfortunately I don't remember 
at this time the text of the dispatch but I know what it did not say. I 
recall, in receiving it, that there seemed to be something missing from 
what I was looking [921] for and that is, he gave me the first 



840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

portion of it. I asked liim if there was not more and I made a pencil 
note of the transmission as he gave it to me over the telephone only for 
my own records so that I would give it accurately to Admiral Noyes. 
When I say that the text was not what I was looking for, I mean that 
it did not contain the phrase in Japanese Higashi no Kazeame, which, 
to me, would have indicated that diplomatic relations severance, fol- 
lowed by war, would come to the United States. I remember this be- 
cause of the feeling of relief that I had that it was not that. Immedi- 
ately upon receipt of this telephone conversation through the very 
secret channel that we had set up for the purpose of transmitting this 
information I was able to reach Admiral Noyes by telephone and gave 
him the dispatch as I had it, and he said to me words which indicated 
to me that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction 
and thanked me, and at this time I don't remember whether he gave 
me oral instructions to ask the F, C. C. to continue to look. That part 
of it I don't remember. From this distance it seems to me that I called 
the F. C. C. later, though what I said at that time I don't remember. 
Those are the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the winds mes- 
sage referred to in this document. 

13. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 2 of Exhibit 65 before the court. 
Can you identify this document as being the information which was 
passed to you by telephone on the evening of 4 December 1941 from the 
F. C. C? 

A. I have just said that I had forgotten the text. If I had been asked 
to quote the text of this dispatch I would have been unable to do so. 
However, I will say that this appears to me to be the text of the mate- 
rial that I received over the telephone from the Federal Communica- 
tions Commission. 

14. Q. Sir, I ask you to refer again to the first document which you 
were handed, Document 15 of Exhibit 63 in connection with the docu- 
ment which you now hold, Document 2 of Exhibit 64 : Taking those 
two together, what information is conveyed with regard to a break of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and any other nation in this 
intercept message, Document 2 of Exhibit 64 ? 

A. I remember what it meant to me without referring to this docu- 
ment. I will say that it conveyed the impression that there would be 
a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States but with 
the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that that is what caused Admiral 
Noyes to say that the wind is blowing from a funny direction. 

15. Q. Commander, a few minutes ago, you testified that you made 
a written memorandiun of the oral telephone conversation with an 
official of the F. C. C. Do you have any information as to whether or 
not the F. C. C. followed up that telephone call with a confirming let- 
ter or memoranda at any time subsequent to the evening of 4 Decem- 
ber? 

A. I don't have any recollection of such a confirmation. 

[922] 16. Q. Was your pencil, written memoranda made a part 
of the files of Op-2a-G at that time? 

A. I don't know that either. 

17. Q. Do you recall what disposition you did make of your memo- 
randa? 

A. Yes. I left it on the —well, we will say on the desk of the watch 
officer. I turned it over, in fact, to the succeeding watch officer. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 841 

18. Q. Since that time have you had any occasion to look in the 
files of Op-20-G to locate your memorandum or any other written 
memorandum pertaining to the receipt of the message about which 
you have been testifying? 

A. No. 

19. Q. I hand you Document 3 of Exhibit 64 before the court which, 
according to this exhibit, was intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2130 on 
the evening of December 5 and which according to the exhibit, was 
communicated to the Army. Will you look at this document and say 
what break in diplomatic relations is indicated by that code message ? 

A. It would indicate to me that the relations had been broken, or 
were about to be broken with the Soviet Union. 

20. Q. In other words, this Document 3, received a day later than 
the one which you received over the telephone on the 4th, is merely 
a repetition, in substance, of what had been received on the night of the 
4th pertaining only to the Soviet Union ? 

A. As I see it here, it would appear that way. 

21. Q. Do you know whether or not this second intercept pertain- 
ing to a break with the Soviet Union was ever received in Op-20-G ? 

A. I do not. 

22. Q. In addition to the intercept pertaining to the Soviet Union 
about which you have been testifying, did you ever see any other inter- 
cepts using the so-called winds code in Op-20-G ? 

A. No. 

23. Q. Did you ever have any information of the receipt of any 
additional messages? 

A. No. 

24. Q. Under the set-up in Op-20-G at that time, would it have 
been likely that you would have known, either by seeing official reports 
or by informal information from 'the other watch officers, of the receipt 
of any additional messages using this code ? 

A. Very likely. 

[92S] 25. Q. Will you elaborate on that and give reasons for 
that last answer? 

A. I was part of the group that had the duty of reporting any such 
message as this. I was one of the three officers who, in the course of 
a day, would have cognizance if such a message had come in. Further 
than that, had the message come in while I was not on watch, it seems 
to me that it would have passed down the chain of the watch officers 
to the responsible party. Further, my associations with the other 
watch officers was so close that had there been any rumor of such a 
dispatch I believe I would have heard about it. 

26. Q. Do you know of any attempts that were made to notify the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the receipt of a message 
utilizing the winds code ? 

A. I do not, except that Admiral Noyes said he would see that the 
proper people were informed of this intercept. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) , 
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) : 



842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

27. Q. Was this message that was received from the F. C. C. given 
to you in the Japanese language, or in the equivalent English trans- 
lation? 

A. It seems to me that it was given to me, Captain Lavender, as it 
appears here, in the testimony. 

28. Q. By that, I take it, then, that it was given to you in English 
terms, English words? 

A. It seems to me that it was. 

29. Q. When you received this dispatch, were you completely satis- 
fied, then, when receiving it, as you remember it, in English terms, 
as to the translation? 

A. I was completely satisfied that I had gotten it correctly and I 
understood it. 

30. Q. Did you at that time communicate with any of the other 
officers who might be familiar with that system, or a verification of 
the translation ? 

A. Captain Lavender, our instructions were very explicit. The 
person to whom I was to report had sufficient information of what we 
could expect to receive so that I think had it come in Japanese or Eng- 
lish, the recipient of my telephone call would have understood without 
the assistance of a translator. 

31. Q. But did you verify in any way the meaning of the dispatch 
as it was given to you ? 

A. Only by consulting the memorandum of instructions which had 
had been given to me. 

[924.] 32. Q. What other officers did you refer to when you 
said there were three officers that were doing routine duties, rotation 
duties similar to yours? 

A. Their names. Captain Lavender ? 

33. Q. Yes. 

A. Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering; Lieutenant Commander 
Murray, whose initials I don't remember; and Lieutenant Com- 
mander Brown. I don't remember his initials. 

34. Q. What were your relations with Commander Kramer? 

A. Commander Kramer was the officer in charge of the translation 
section of our group. My relations with him were friendly. 

35. Q. I mean your official relations. Do you know what duties 
Commander Kramer was performing in December, 1941 ? 

A. He was in charge of the translation section of our group, as I 
have said. 

36. Q. Did you consult with him at all on the translation of this 
ditspatch ? 

A. Not at the time, Captain. Commander Kramer had been pretty 
busy and he was home getting some needed rest. 

37. Q. Did you ask the Federal Communications Commission to 
send you a confirmation copy ? 

A. I don't recall. 

38. Q. Do you recall whether or not you considered at that time 
that this message was of some importance ? 

A. I recall that I considered it of considerable importance. 

39. Q. And you made only a memorandum of that message and 
turned it over to your relief without making any other copies f 

A. According to my instructions, I did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 843 

40. Q. Who gave you those instructions ? 

A. There was a written instruction signed by a responsible officer 
in my section. I don't recall whether it was Commander Kramer, or 
whether it was Captain Safford. 

41. Q. Do you recall whether the officer that gave you the infor- 
mation over the telephone, that is, in the Federal Communications 
Commission, mentioned the Japanese words at all? 

A. I don't remember that he did. 

42. Q. Did you know any Japanese at that time? 

A. I knew pretty much the material that was covered in this dis- 
patch. I knew some other diplomatic Japanese. 

[9i2S] 43. Q. It has been indicated that there has been no trace 
of the original message as recorded bj^ you, or any confirmation copy, 
in the files of the Navy Department. Can you account in any way 
for the inability of the Navy Department to produce this dispatch? 

A. I can account for it from my own viewpoint only and that was, 
we were instructed to pass the word orally. This matter at the time 
was considered of greatest urgency and the most important single 
job we had to do. Each of us was very anxious to be sure that noth- 
ing happened to our carrying out our orders. I know this because 
it was talked informally with the other officers involved since that 
time regarding this dispatch. For my part, when I received it, my 
orders left me no alternative but to make my telephone call to Ad- 
miral Noyes at once. I was not in the position, nor was I expected, 
to evaluate or pass on the worth of the contents of this dispatch. 
I was simply ordered to see that it was speeded on its way. 

44. Q. And you were ordered to see that it was speeded on its way 
and emphasized as to speed and emphasized as to oralness but not 
emphasized as to any record that would be kept of such an important 
message ? 

A. As to the matter of record, I don't believe we were instructed 
to make a record. 

45. Q. Now, coming to the morning of 7 December, what watch 
did you have ? 

A. The morning of 7 December I came on duty at 12 : 01 a. m., and 
remained until relieved sometime after 7 : 00 a. m. 

46. Q. Do you recall what dispatches came to your attention dur- 
ing that watch ? 

A. I recall one particular dispatch. There were a number handled 
by that watch. 

47. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was the 14th part of a 14- 
part ditspatch intercepted between Japan and the ambassador in 
Washington that was received at that time ? 

A. Ever since December 7 there has been a question in my mind 
whether there were 13 or 14 parts. May I refer to the part that 
you call "14" as the last part? 

48. Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 

49. Q. Did you receive during that watch a dispatch indicating the 
time of delivery of all of the parts of that long dispatch to the 
Secretary of State ? 

A. At the time I didn't recognize it as such a dispatch, except there 
was, to me, a certain indication that there was some urgency in con- 
nection with the long diplomatic message. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 11 



844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[926] 50. Q. Will you state how the two dispatches just re- 
ferred to were handled, and trace them in their delivery and dis- 
tribution as far as you know of your own personal knowledge? 

A. The first dispatch which was mentioned, the long diplomatic 
message, was perfectly clear to me. It was in English and when I 
finished with it, except for making a record, it would be ready for 
dissemination through the customary chaainels. At the time of 
December 7th we were sharing the work on this diplomatic traffic with 
the Army. The message regarding time of delivery was in Japanese. 
It required the services of a translator. I have tried since December 
7th to remember whether or not the Army translator was on duty at 
the time. The reason for that is this : I know the translator was not 
present at the Navy Department, and for the reason that we were 
sharing the duties on this diplomatic traffic we worked on odd and 
even days. At this time I don't remember whether the odd day of 
the week or the odd day of the month was the Navy's day of duty, 
or the Army's. I don't remember whether the Army translator was 
there that early in the morning — I will say by 4 : 00 o'clock in the 
morning — but in the exchange of traffic back and forth we made cus- 
tomary trips in which we carried this traffic over by hand ourselves. 
It was not trusted to an enlisted man, and I believe that prior to 7 : 00 
o'clock on the morning of December 7th I had made one, perhaps two, 
such trips to the Army. It is quite possible that I would not know 
whether there was a translator on duty in the Army section because, 
as I say, these activities were veiled in so much secrecy that I knew 
very little about the personnel employed by the Army. So far as I 
was concerned, it meant carrying some documents over to a very 
impersonal receiver. Does that answer your question, Captain 
Lavender ? 

51. Q. F'artially. I will bring the rest out by questions. How 
long did you remain in the Navy Department on the morning of 7 
December ? 

A. I left sometime after 7 : 00. 

52. Q. Did you leave before Commander Kramer came in? 
A. I left before Commander Kramer came in, yes, sir. 

53. Q. And you left the dispatches there for delivery to Commander 
Kramer, however ? 

A. Those dispatches which were supposed to be delivered to him, 
I don't remember, but I presume that I left them there for him. 
Re-examined by the judge advocate : 

54. Q. Commander, referring to the testimony that you have just 
given : At the time you left the Department at 7 : 00 o'clock on the 
morning of 7 December 1941, had the English translation of the Jap- 
anese message which you had taken to the Army for translation been 
returned to you? 

A. I wish I could remember that. I have tried to remember whether 
the original copy had come back, or not. I can't remember. I would 
like to know if anyone ever finds out. 

[9^7] Examined by the court: 

55. Q. Referring again to this winds message: Did you at any time 
discuss this winds message with Connnander Kramer, or with Admiral 
Noyes ? 

A. Admiral, I delivered it to Admiral Noyes. 

56. Q. By 'phone? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 845 

A. By telephone, yes, sir, and since that time I have not discussed 
it with him. 

57. Q. Well, I am speaking of the immediate time of that date. 
Did you discuss it with him at that time, other than 'phone him ? 

A. No, sir. 

58. Q. When this supposed answer of "execute winds message" 
came in — and you say that in accordance with your translation or the 
information you received, it meant that Japan was going to war with 
the Soviet Union — did'nt that seem rather odd to you in view of the 
critical situation existing at that time between this country and Japan? 

A. It did. 

59. Q. Did you hear Commander Kramer or Admiral Noyes express 
any opinion as to the queer interpretation of this message? 

A. Admiral, I testified as to something that Admiral Noyes said in 
regard to it ; it is in the record. 

60. Q. Were you present or did you hear while on duty there, that 
Commander Kramer came in with a reply to this question, that said 
"Here it is" ; in reply to this winds message ; or, "Here it is, we've got 
it"? 

A. I don't recall that. 

61. Q. You have been asked as to how these messages were han- 
dled. Now, referring to the winds message. Do you know how that 
was handled from your office and where it went to? Did it go to the 
Chief of Naval Operations, or where did it go ? 

A. I don't know that. Admiral. I only know as far as Admiral 
Noyes is concerned. 

[928] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

62. Q. Were you by chance present when there was a summary 
of events or a summary of the estimate drawn up and presented to 
Admiral Noyes for his consideration, to pass on to higher authority? 

A. No. 

63. Q. Do you remember when you saw the English translation 
of part 14 of these messages received on the night of 6-7 December ? 

A. I think it took us about an -hour to get that out, to break it 
out ; seems to me we finished it and checked it for accuracy and possible 
mistakes by 4 : 00 in the morning. 

64. Q. that was the last part? 
A. The last part, yes, sir. 

65. Q. The last part which came in was in the Japanese language 
and had been translated? 

A. No, sir, that was in English, The last part of the long diplo- 
matic message was in English. 

66. Q. The last part that I referred to, you stated in your testi- 
mony was in the Japanese language. The other parts were in English. 

A. I don't believe I said that. 

67. Q. What did you say? 

A. I understood Captain Lavender asked me about a dispatch stat- 
ing that this certain long diplomatic dispatch must be delivered by 
a given time. If I didn't say that it was that dispatch that was in 
Japanese, I made a mistake, but I think I did. The long diplomatic 
dispatch of fourteen parts was in English; that did not require 
translation. 



846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

68. Q. The lon^ part of the message; was that in English? 
A. The long diplomatic message was in English. 

69. Q. Now the short part was in Japanese, the short and last 
part? 

A. Yes, they were not associated by number. They were only asso- 
ciated by inference. 

70. Q. Now, what I asked you — the short part and last part that 
was in Japanese — when did you see the English translation of that? 

A. I didn't see the English translation of the little Japanese dis- 
patch until some time after December 7. 

71. Q. Now referring to the long dispatch, do you know what 
[929] happened to that, where it went to — the long part of the 
dispatch? Did you have an3^thing to do with the delivery of that 
long part of the dispatch ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

72. Q. What did you do with it ? 

A. Those dispatches were carried over by us as officer messenger 
to the Army. 

73. Q. War Department ? 

A. To the War Department, yes, sir; and I presume at that time — 
I don't remember, I haven't kept a diary — I presume I carried those 
over as it was my obligation to do. 

74. Q. Did you carry them to any other place ; did you carry them 
to the State Department? 

A. No, sir. 

75. Q. Did you carry them to OpNav? 
A. Not me. 

76. -Q. What? 
A. No, sir. 

77. Q. You have stated that you know only few phrases in Jap- 
anese ? 

A. That's correct, sir. 

78. Q. You are not a Japanese translator? 
A. No, sir. 

79. Q. And when these Japanese words came to you — the words 
of the wind messages — you took the translation as given you by some- 
one else; is that correct? Did you take the word of the translator? 

A. I took it as it was given to me by the F. C. C. It says here (indi- 
cating) it is in English. If you would have asked me, I would have 
been unable to tell you before I refreshed my memory. Admiral, I 
hope I have made clear that I was not entitled, nor was I expected, 
to evaluate the contents of any messages that would be delivered. 

The interested party. Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, did 
not desire to recross-examine this witness. 

Recross-exn mined bv the interested part}^. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

80. Q. Just to bring out my own understanding of some of your 
testimony, all parts of the long diplomatic dispatch that was received 
finally on 7 December were in English when decrypted? 

A. I said that with this reservation in mind, that there is always 
at the beginning of one of these dispatches, whether in English or 
not, certain material that is necessary for the Japanese record. That 
was in their conventional method of representation, which was a sub- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 847 

stitution of cipher below the [930] cipher machine. There 
was that type of stuff at the beginning, but that had nothing to do 
with the context. • 

81. Q. But all of the part of that long dispatch that was to be de- 
livered to the Secretary of State came out in English when it was 
decrypted ? 

A. It seems to me that it did. 

82. Q. Did the other dispatch which was received at the time and 
that related to the specific hour at which the long dispatch was to be 
delivered — when that was decoded it came out in Japanese and 
required translation ; is that true ? 

A. That is true to the best of mj^ memory. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), 
did not desire to recross-examine this witness. 
Reexamined by the judge advocate : 

83. Q. I hand you document 39 of Exhibit 63 before this court, 
which is a message from Tokyo to Washington, No. 902, labelled at the 
top, "Part 1 of 14 parts." I should say document 39 covers all 14 parts 
of that. Is part 14 included in this that you have been speaking of as 
the long message ? 

A. It is. 

84. Q. And what you speak of as the short dispatch is what? 

A. This short dispatch carrying instructions to the Ambassador 
regarding the delivery of the long dispatch. 

85. Q. And is this document 41 of Exhibit 63 the message that you 
referred to as the short dispatch ? 

A. That is it— 41. 

86. Q. Part 14 of docunient 39 of Exhibit 63— is this the part that 
you mentioned as coming in English ? 

A. This and others. 

87. Q. Is document 41 of Exhibit 63, which you have referred to as 
the short dispatch giving instructions on the time of delivery — is that 
the one that you mentioned as coming in Japanese ? 

A. That is the one that I referred to as coming in Japanese. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of 
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec- 
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous 
questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 950-987, inclusive. 

[9S0] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly 
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station? 

A. Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. I am at present at- 
tached at CinCPac. I just reported this morning to CinCPac. 

2. Q. What duties are you presently performing other than this 
temporary dut/^ 



848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I have been permanently attached to SoPac and have now 
reported to CinCPac and have not yet been assigned to duty. 

3. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 7 
December 1941 ? 

A. I was attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy 
Department, Washington, on loan to OP-20-G, Office of Naval 
Communications. 

4. Q. Will you state the general characteristics of the duties that 
you were performing in that station ? 

A. I was head of the translation section of the communication 
security group. That consisted of translating all decrypted traffic 
obtained from intercepts and delivering it to the Office of Naval In- 
telligence and any persons in the Navy Department or outside of the 
Navy Department that the Director Naval Intelligence or the Chief 
of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy wanted delivery 
made to. 

6. Q. Did you have any routine addressees to whom you were in the 
custom of delivering all traffic to ? 

A. Yes. 

6. Q. Who were they? 

A. We prepared 14 copies of every decrypted translation. Seven 
copies went to Army. The other 7 were for delivery to senior officers 
in the Navy Department and also to either the White House or State 
Department, the responsibility of which rotated between the War 
Department and the Navy Department. At the time referred to in 
your earlier question I had responsibility for delivery to the White 
House ; Army to the State Department. The addressees in the Navy 
Department that normally got copies which I delivered were the aide 
to the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Beatty, or to the Secretary of 
the Navy directly; Chief of Naval Operaticms, Admiral Stark; the 
head of Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East 
section, then Commander McCollum; Admiral Noyes as Director of 
Naval Communications; Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans. 
Occasionally there were certain other individuals I was directed to 
show it to. 

[951] 7. Q. I note that the specific addresses only add up to six. 

A. The seventh copy was a file copy. 

8. Q. This intercepted traffic : Was it passed along to the addressees 
as it was received, or was some sort of summary made for delivery? 

A. A complete version of every message went into one of 6 separate 
folders, delivery being made several times a day, depending on 
urgency. Earlier in 1941 I had been in the habit of preparing a sum- 
mary of all the traffic in the day's folder because of its volume. In this 
summary I briefed the subject of the message, asterisked it with one 
or two asterisks showing those things which were most important or 
of urgent character so that the senior addressees to which I delivered it 
could look through the summary to see what they would want to take 
time to see. The volume was so heavy that they rarely had time to 
look through the whole book, volumes running into sometimes as much 
as 130 messages in one day. I made a point of seeing that the more 
important ones were seen and read by the senior addressees that I 
delivered personnally to. In some cases, of course, sujli as the Secre- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 849 

tary of the Navy, Captain Beatty would make actual delivery and 
consequently I do not know just what ones he read. 

9. Q. Do I understand your responsibility then to have been that 
you had in your possession for the purpose of showing to addressees, 
all intercept traffic and it was a matter of the party's own decision as to 
whether or not he would look into all the dispatches that you had in 
your possession, or only to the ones that you had singled out as being 
of importance; is that correct? 

A. That is, in general, correct, yes, sir. 

10. Q. Was there any intermediary between you and the decrypting 
section of the Office of the Director of Naval Communications who 
made any decision as to whether or n*)t the messages that were re- 
ceived were passed to you? I mean by that, did you have in your 
possession for delivery all the traffic that came in, or was there some 
sort of a separation process which enabled you to have only what was 
probably considered the more important ones? 

A. Every bit of traffic that was broken down into Japanese plain 
language, or partly broken down from those systems and not com- 
pletely recovered, was passed to my section for translation or further 
code recovery and for translation and distribution and writing up. 
The filtering process to which you referred might be intercepted as 
applying to the partially recovered systems which came in in con- 
siderable volume, some of which, however, could not be adequately 
broken down to get much intelligence out of it. 

11. Q. Are you a Japanese language student yourself ? 
A. Yes, sir, I am. 

[9521 12. Q. Did you yourself translate all dispatches, or how 
was that done ? 

A. I had a staff of civilian translators, professional Civil Service 
employees in the Navy Department. Those messages that were of 
high importance I normally glanced over in the nature of editing 
before they were typed up. Otherwise, the great majority of the 
material was translated by my civilian assistants. It was only an 
occassional message I translated myself. 

13. Q. You have testified in effect — and I wish you would correct 
me if I put the wrong interpretation on your testimony — that there 
was no filtering process between you and the source of information. 
In other words, you had in your possession for delivery to addresses 
all information that was received ? 

A. I will have to repeat again a reference to the filtering process. 
When you use the statement "all information" there were many 
other messages which my section did not get which were in various 
states of recovery in the G. Y. section, in the decryption or cipher 
recovery section of Op-20-G, which I did not get or oftentimes got 
several weeks later. In other words, with the large volume of traffic 
coming in on a new system, it might be weeks before I would get 
material from that system. I would not get it until it was sufficiently 
broken down to start pulling intelligible information out of it. 

14. Q. I am assuming. Commander, that there was a pool of 
intelligence information, and what I am trying to bring out 

A. Intelligence was the word I used. In other words, a sketchily 
recovered message, you might be able to trainslate to the extent 
of a phrase here and a word there, but it would not make sense 



850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

enough or would not warrent writing up for distribution to the 
senior offiers in the Navy Department, so a message would have 
to be in a system that was sufficiently recovered to pull intelligible 
information out of it before I would get it for translation and 
distribution. 

15. Q. I am assuming that you had such a pool of intelligible 
intelligence force available to you. Now, what I am trying to find 
out is, did you take all this intelligence and pass it along, or did you 
or someone else act as a filter to sort out the information that was 
passed along? 

A. Because of the high volume that we got and the srnall number 
of translators we had — ther« were three at that time — it was not 
feasible or possible to translate everything that came to us. Conse- 
quently, we concentrated on the more secure systems which, in general, 
had the more important information in them. All the others were 
looked over and a brief summary made by the translators. Every 
one of those messages, before going into the file — in other words, 
before finally being disposed of — was looked at by me as a final check 
to see whether the information warranted being translated. Every- 
think that was translated in full that warranted distribution was 
written up and distributed. 

[953] 16. Q. That is what I am trying to get at : Who made the 
decision as to whether or not information that was received and that 
was translated and was intelligible from the translation should be 
passed from this pool to higher authority ? 

A. That decision was the responsibility of the Office of Naval In- 
telligence. In making decisions on most points myself, I was simply 
acting for the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and more 
directly for the head of the Far East section. That discretion was 
left to me but I made a point, on occasion, of taking those things 
up for final confirmation of my decision to Captain McCollum, as a 
rule. The occasions were rather rare, however. 

17. Q. Then as a matter of, let us say, routine procedure, you had 
on the one hand a pool of intelligence information that had been 
received and had been translated and was understandable, and one the 
other hand you had 14 copies of information going up to higher 
authority everyday? 

A. Yes, sir. 

18. Q. As I understand it, you were the officer who, as a routine mat- 
ter, made the decision of wliat matter you would take out of this 
pool and pass along to higher authority ; is that correct? 

A. That is, in substance, correct ; yes, sir. 

19. Q. And this matter that you passed along to higher authority, 
that is, your 7 addressees or 6 addressees, received this information 
from you directly from this pool as you selected it, without reference 
to, let us say the Director of Naval Communications or other persons 
in the Navy Department before you passed it along; is that correct? 

A. That is not strictly correct, although in practice it often worked 
that way. As a rule, an attempt was made to bring the whole book to' 
Captain McCollum as head of the Far East section, and to the Direc- 
tor of Naval Intelligence first because the director oftentimes made 
a point of taking that into the C. N. O. himself. It occasionally 
happened during 1941 that the Director would take an item into the 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 851 

C. N. O. himself, but because of the large volume of that stuff through 
'41 it was left more and more to me. 

20. Q. When you took this volume of traffic that you had assem- 
bled yourself, say to Commander McCollum, or to the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, did they ever detach any of the information, 
that is, weed it out and throw it away, or did they confirm what you 
had selected, or just exactly what was done when you referred it to 
these other people who, in a way, let us say, sat over you ? 

A. There was no eliminating of anything from this volume of 
traffic since each of the books were made up in the same way. Occa- 
sionally, however, the Director would indicate something as being of 
greater or lesser interest to the C N. O., or the Secretary. 

[9S4] 21. Q. You mean, then, that which you had indicated 
yourself as being of interest to these addressees ? 

A. Yes, sir, greater or less than I had indicated. That refers more 
specifically to the period when I was making the summary of the 
day's traffic. It usually ran two or three pages with from one to 
five lines in a summary of the subject matter of the contents of th6 
message. In the case of the latter part of '41, however, because of 
the large volume again, I used a system of clipping the items of 
greater importance and actually showing the original translation 
to the Director. 

22. Q. As I understand you, you say that you frequently made 
some sort of a summary of a subject matter of information and 
clipped it on to the file yourself ; is that correct ? 

A. That was earlier in the year before the volume got so heavy 
that we couldn't take time for those summaries. 

23. Q. What was your practice the latter part of the year, say 
the week preceding 7 December 1941? Did you make any summary 
of important messages at that time for the information of addressees? 

A. No, sir, I did not, ancl had not been doing it since about the 
middle of '41, because of the very high volume of traffic concerned 
with the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. The volume was not only high, 
but individual messages often went to four or five or more, sometimes 
15 typewritten pages. It was impracticable to summarize for that 
reason alone, but also because of the fact that those messages fre- 
quently had reference to half a dozen or more earlier messages, 
diplomatic notes, and so forth. Consequently, in preparing these 
books my principal objective was to get a brief reference foot-note 
for each one of those references or break out the originals of those 
earlier translations, attaching to those current messages, so that the 
book itself would be as complete as possible, as self-contained as pos- 
sible, when these senior officers were looking at them. 

24. Q. It strikes me, Commander, as a matter of a practical thing, 
that as the volume of dispatches or separate items increased, the de- 
mand for a summary would have been greater than when the dis- 
patches were less ? 

A. I don't believe that was quite the case, since the earlier sum- 
maries were intended to weed out the more important items from a 
large volume of material covering the whole world. The greatest 
percentage of the traffic in the fall of '41 had to do with two main 
types of material : One was the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, and the 
other was the circuit from Berlin to Tokyo, because of the fact that 



852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

those two categories of traffic were being followed with considerable 
interest and detail by all the senior addressees, almost every nies- 
sage in folders in the latter part of '41 bore on those two subject 
matters, that is, Japanese relations with the Germans, or German 
information on their war in Europe being passed to the Japanese, 
or on the current negotiations going on in Washington in which all 
these addressees had a [9SS'\ direct interest, or hand. They 
therefore wanted to see those things as promptly as possible, par- 
ticularly those bearing on the Washington negotiations, because often- 
times it was an item of information that we would be able to break 
down, have it translated, only an hour or two before the Secretary 
of State, for example, would be meeting the Japanese ambassador. 
Hence it was more important to get the material to those people 
promptly rather than to take time to brief these things, except to 
the extent of indicating the subject matter of references contained 
in those messages. Earlier in the year, to go back to those sum- 
maries again, it normally took from one to two hours to make up a 
summary, dictate it, that is, glancing through the book and dictat- 
ing to the yeoman, followed by his immediately typing it up. That 
delay was just not permissible during the fall of '41 at many times. 

25. Q. The judge advocate understands, and he asks you this as a 
matter of repetition, to make sure that the record is clear that you did, 
however, indicate what jDarticular items of information that you 
were delivering were of importance ? 

A. That is true, yes, sir, by attaching clips to the messages in the 
folders that were of most immediate interest in the day's volume. 

26. Q. Can you recall from your experience in delivering these dis- 
patches to these addressees — and let us use as an example the Office 
of Chief of Naval Operations — did the Chief of Naval Operations as a 
matter of custom usually read the entire file of dispatches that you 
brought to him for his information ? 

A. The majority of times the folder was left with his aide. Just 
how much of that he read, I don't know, but in such cases I made a 
point of pointing out to his aide, his flag secretary, which were the 
things of most immediate importance or interest to the Admiral. 
Occasionally I would indicate that the Admiral should see them at 
once, or as soon as possible. At other times when a particular hot 
item — if I may use that term — came in, I would request permission 
to see the Admiral directly and would take it in. That happened 
quite frequently during the fall of '41. By "frequently" I would say 
two or three or four times a week. 

27. Q. Then am I to understand that your custom of delivering 
this file of information to the Chief of Naval Operations was by 
leaving it with his aide ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

28. Q. But when you had items that you considered of great 
urgency you presented it to the Chief of Naval Operations direct; 
is that correct ? 

A. I arranged with his aide to take it directly in, yes, sir, and waited 
while the Admiral read it. 

[956] 29. Q. I suppose if the Chief of Naval Operations were 
not in his office at the time you arrived to make a delivery, you would 
have left the information with his aide for later delivery; is that 
correct ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 853 

A. I would normally leave it with his aide for later delivery, yes, 
sir, but in the meantime, of course, I would have gotten it to the Di- 
rector of Naval Intelligence and as a rule would indicate whether 
Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox had seen it yet, or not. Admiral 
Wilkinson would oftentimes then make a point of following it up to 
see that the Admiral got the word. 

30. Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and 
ask you if you saw them on or iDefore the 7th of December, 1941. 
The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63 ? 

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section. 

31. Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it? 

A, The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate 
that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the 
first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was re- 
ceived by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly 
after received. 

32. Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to in- 
tercepting any communications which would have executed the 
phrases of this code ? 

A. On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the 
Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some 
cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes. 
He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave 
them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do 
know that he ararnged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, 
the section of Communications that handled this material, to have 
any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, 
not only in OP-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the 
Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people 
who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions con- 
tained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Because of that special ar- 
rangement for this particular plain language message, when such a 
message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of Decem- 
ber, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it 
as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Saff ord's office, and 
from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain 
Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, 
because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and be- 
cause of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle 
this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I 
did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one 
of the third or fourth. 

[957] 33. Q. You say it is your recollection that you received 
some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the 
language set out in Document 15 ; is that correct? 

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it. 

34. Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese 
language words you received ? 

A. Higashi No Kazeame. I am quite certain. The literal meaning 
of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese 
language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a 
break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the 
eastward, the United States. 



854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

35. Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that 
you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, 
Higashi No Kazeame ? 

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten, I believe it was on 
teletype paper. 

36. Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you 
saw it ? 

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, how- 
ever, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down 
current systems that were being read. 

37. Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that 
was contained in this communication ? 

A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is 
that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. NaVy 
intercept station. 

38. Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge 
of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it ; 
is that correct ? 

A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be infer- 
ence. 

39. Q. Have you seen that communication since ? 
A. I have had no occasion to ; no, sir. 

40. Q. The question was, have you seen it since ? 

A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to. 

41. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 65, Avhich is in evidence before 
this court. I will ask you to examine Documents 1, 2, 3 and 4 in this 
exhibit and state whether or not you had seen or been informed of 
these documents on or before 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I may have seen one or more of these messages, but since every 
one of these is of the nature I have earlier described, I didn't handle 
any of these. I know I saw one wiiich I previously referred to, which 
was the first one of this category referred to. There may have been 
others of [9S8] the same nature come through handled as I 
indicated that first one was handled, but I have no recollection of such 
further messages. 

42. Q. Can you recall in the distribution of the information which 
was your custom to do directly, whether or not any matter pertaining 
to these Japanese words had been taken by you to the list of distributees 
in the govermnent in Washington ? 

A. Not by me, no, sir. Special arrangements, as I referred to earlier, 
had been made for handling this particular type of message. 

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, 
entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, withdraw. 

[959] 43. Q. Then adverting to Exhibit 65, which you have 
just examined, it is the judge advocate's understanding that you 
do not recall having seen any one of the documents concerned therein, 
although you may have seen them ? 

A. That is correct, yes, sir. In fact, I can amplify by saying that 
I believe I saw at least one and possibly more of those. 

44. Q. Would you be able to state to the court which ones you think 
you saw ? 

A. I could not be certain ; no, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 855 

45. Q. I show you exhibit 66, which is a dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations dated 3 December 1941, and released by J. R. 
Redmond, and having to do with the destruction of certain confiden- 
tial matters ; will you state whether or not you saw this dispatch on 
or before 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Yes, sir, I drafted this message. 

46. Q. That message refers to the destruction of purple machines 
in certain areas. Did that language, the destruction of a particular 
type of machine in certain places, have any special significance to 
you? 

A. This particular message was not drafted as an interpretation 
of the decrypted traffic from which it was taken, but simply a brief 
of that traffic addressed to four addressees who were familiar with 
the character of that traffic, because of the narrow channel that this 
traffic, this Kopek message was confined to and the fact that only 
the addressees on that narrow channel would know what it meant. 
Normally, i nfact I will go further by stating that almost without ex- 
ception, this channel was not intended or used as a channel for inter- 
preting that traffic. It was a technical channel. Any interpretation 
or evaluation would normally go from the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence or War Plans, or the CNO's office. 

47. Q. Will you tell the court what special significance this mes- 
sage should have to an addressee who understood it ? 

A. To the four addressees to whom it was sent, the interpretation 
would presumably be the same as I inferred personally when I 
drafted the message and indicated the desirability of sending it out; 
in other words, an interpretation that the destruction of codes normal- 
ly preceded an intended break in relations or else a serious diplo- 
matic crisis. 

48. Q. It that all that message inferred ? 

A. The fact that only United States, British, and Dutch addressees 
were included as action addressees by the Japanese traffic, indicated 
that the nations referred to were very likely one or more of those 
two. By "indicated", I of course referred to my previous answer, as 
being the nations most likely involved in a probable diplomatic crisis, 
or actual break, or possibly even war. 

[960] 49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20 before this court, which is 
a dispatch from OpNav to certain addressees and also sets out infor- 
mation that the Japanese in certain areas are destroying codes and 
ciphers and burning important confidential and secret documents. 
I ask you if you were acquainted with that message on or before 
7 December 1941 ? 

A. Yes, sir, I did see this message, after it went, however. 

50. Q. Can you state what the purpose of sending Exhibit 66 was. 
when Exhibit 20 had been sent on the same day to practically the 
same addressees ; in other words, is there anything added by 66 that 
was not sent in Exhibit 20 ? 

A. Exhibit 20 was drafted, I believe, by then Commander McCol- 
lum, head of the Far East section; and as an example of an inter- 
preting message for this Japanese decrypted traffic being sent out, to 
which I referred a question or two before, this exhibit here, No. 66 — 
the Kopek channel was purely the technical channel giving a brief 
of the actual decrypted traffic ; 20 was the interpreting message from 
the Director of Naval Intelligence. 



856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

51. Q. Can you state whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations 
had been informed of the information contained in Exhibit 66? 

A. I can only state that I am almost certain he was. I can't swear 
he was, because I am not certain whether the folder with that par- 
ticular message was shown him by myself or his aide. 

52. Q. Do you have any recollection of a dispatch containing about 
500 words which is purported to have been prepared by Commander 
McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and which dispatch was 
supposed to have contained a summary of information on late develop- 
ments in Japanese-United States relationships, and which dispatch 
was intended to have been sent to certain addressees outside of Wash- 
ington ? I ask you, do you have any knowledge of such a document or 
dispatch having been prepared ? 

A. I first heard of that several weeks after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. I have never seen the message and have no first-hand knowl- 
edge of it. 

53. Q. Do you have any first-hand knowledge of what happened to 
the message ; that is, whether it was sent or whether it was not ? 

A. As I stated, I first heard of its existence only several weeks 
later and my information is rather sketchy in various ramifications of 
how it was handled. 

54. Q. I am going to show you a series of documents from Exhibit 
63, which relate as a matter of general information to [961] an 
exchange of dispatches between the Japanese home government and 
the Hawaiian area, and having to do with the location of ships, or a 
request for information concerning ships. The first is document 
24. I will ask you if you saw it on or before 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Yes, sir, I did. 

55. Q. Can you recall whether it was referred to the Chief of Naval 
Operations or not at or about the time of its receipt? 

A. Again I am not positive whether the Chief of Naval Operations 
actually saw it, but I know that it would have been in a folder that 
was left in his office. 

56. Q. I show you document 36 from the same exhibit and ask you 
whether you saw that document on or before 7 December 1941. 

A. Yes, sir, I saw this. I would like to remark on this as well as 
the previous message that it was not at all an unusual type of mes- 
sage. The same sort of things had been going to Japanese counsuls 
and diplomatic posts all over the world for the past year or more. 
Furthermore, the United States Government had been sending similar 
sorts of messages through Navy channels, liaison officers, naval at- 
taches, as well as via diplomatic channels to places where there were 
no naval representatives — watching ship movements. We know that 
with the abrogation or termination of the commercial treaty with 
Japan, and a short time previously with the closing of the canal to 
Japanese shipping, at about the time we know Japanese shipping was 
being recalled from the Atlantic, the Japanese were watching ship 
movements even more closely than they had before. These two mes- 
sages you have shown me were somewhat more emphatic messages 
of that nature. Directives were going out from Tokyo periodically ; 
that is, every few months, sometimes indicated as being the request 
of the Navy Minister, to watch ship movements. We know that the 
Japanese diplomatic service was doing it, and doing a conscientious 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 857 

job on it. In fact, I recall the Japanese consul in Seattle stating in 
one report that he had gone down to the docks and seen certain ships, 
and so reported. 

57. Q. I am going to show you document 39 from Exhibit 63. This 
document, or certain parts of it, is a message that has been testified was 
received in the Navy Department on the evening of 6 December 1941. 
In order to save a lot of categorical questions, I am going to ask you 
to relate in detail the information that you yourself know about this 
message from the time it first came to your attention until it was 
delivered to the various distributees in the government at Washington, 
to whom you usually made delivery. 

A. I recognize this message as the one, the fiirst [OS^] thir- 
teen parts of which we received on 6 December 1941. I was about 
to leave the office the middle of Saturday afternoon, 6 December, when 
I made a final check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was 
anything apparently hot coming in, particularly in view of the fact 
that we had beea expecting a reply for a week or ten days to the United 
States note of 26 November. In view of other developments that 
we had seen taking place in the diplomatic traffic and otherwise, it 
was apparent things were shaping up to some sort of a crisis — conse- 
quently, the reply should be coming through momentarily. At 3 :00 
o'clock on the 6th, the message was coming in — so I waited and held 
my team of translators there, and it turned out to be a part of the reply. 
We turned to, and by 9 :00 o'clock Saturday, the evening of the 6th 
of December, had received, broken down, translated, and had typed 
ready for delivery, thirteen of those parts, several of them somewhat 
garbled. At 9 :05 approximately, I phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his 
home, telling him in guarded language the nature of what I had and 
what I proposed to do with it. He confirmed, or rather, approved, my 
plan for distribution. I accordingly proceeded at once to the White 
House, left a folder with that 13-part message and one or two others 
with an aide of Admiral Beardall, who was aide to the President, with 
rather emphatic instructions to get to the President as quickly as 
possible. The President was entertaining at the moment. I then 
proceeded at once to Secretary Knox's apartment on Connecticut 
Avenue, and waited there while he read the message, the traffic. 
Mrs. Knox was also present, as well as a business associate, I be- 
lieve acting manager of his newspaper, the Chicago Daily "News". 
After Secretary Knox read the material, we had a brief discussion in 
one corner, chiefly because there were a number of references to previous 
messages in that particular 13-part message, and I remember we dis- 
cussed certain points about it. He made some phone calls, I believe to 
Mr. Stimson and to Mr. Hull ; and after these calls indicated that there 
would be a meeting at the State Department at 10 :00 o'clock the follow- 
ing morning, Sunday, and he wanted me there with that material and 
anything else that had come in. From there I went to Admiral Wil- 
kinson's residence in Arlington, where I knew Admiral Beardall, the 
President's aide, also was at dinner, and was there until about 12 :15, 
past midnight, while he read the material I had, and I indicated who 
had received it. Admiral AVilkinson made some phone calls which 
included, I believe. Admiral Stark, and I think Admiral Turner, 
though I am not certain. I had tried both of these officers' residences 
earlier in the evening — Stark and Turner's — but neither were at home ; 



858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and left Admiral Wilkinson's home about 12 :15 a. m. December 7, and 
went back to the Navy Department about 12 : 30. My return to the 
Navy Department was for two reasons : to leave these folders under 
proper safeguards, safe, as well as to check up on any possible new 
traffic that might have come in, particularly part 14, which was still 
missing. Nothing [963] was in of importance at that time, 
so I went home. I would like to insert parenthetically in connection 
with that going home, that I was on tap any hour of the day and night 
by GY Watch Officers, for anything that appeared to be of interest. 
\Vlien we were expecting anything of importance, I made a point of 
instructing them to call me if messages with a certain originator, such 
as Tokyo or Berlin, had come in. 

58. Q. Is it correct that you did not deliver the 13 parts of this 
message you have just been testifying about on the night of 6-7 
December, to Admiral Stark? 

A. I did" not deliver that 13-part message to Admiral Stark the 
night of 6-7 December. I did, however, get the word to Admiral 
Wilkinson, as I stated earlier, and I am almost certain that Admiral 
Wilkinson was in touch with Admiral Stark or his aids, because at 
the time I left Admiral Wilkinson's home he indicated to me that 
I was to have all that material, as well as any new material that 
came in, ready for them in the Navy Department the first thing in 
the morning. 

59. Q. It is my understanding that you had been expecting such 
a dispatch as this Exhibit 39 for some days? 

A. That is correct, yes, sir. 

60. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63, and ask you if you 
were familiar with that document on or prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I am almost certain that this is one of many that I did see. I 
cannot swear about this particular one, because it is of the same nature 
as probably 200 others of that form. 

61. Q. As you inspect this document, is that the type of document 
that you would have normally included in your file to show to the 
distributees in the Navy Department ? 

A. Yes, sir, it is. 

62. Q. Adverting again to this message that started to come in on 
the evening of 6 December, and of which you received thirteen parts, 
will you state when you again became acquainted with any other 
matter that related to these thirteen parts — that is a continuation 
thereof? 

A. I received no phone calls during the night, and consequently 
arrived at the Navy Department not before about 7:30 in the morn- 
ing. At that time, other material was coming in. That was being 
translated, checked, written up, and at about 9 : 00 o'clock the 13-part 
message, together with the new material, was left at Admiral Stark's 
office, where there was apparent 1}^ a meeeting. My recollection is 
that it was about 9 : 00 o'clock. There was a meeting apparently gath- 
ering, not yet in progress. I returned at once to my office to finish 
preparation of the other folders and get together material for the 
Secretary, left the Navy Department about 9 : 30 to make delivery to 
the White House, for which the Navy Department was at that time 
responsible, and was at the State Department at about ten minutes 
to 10 : 00, waiting for Mr. Knox, to whom I [OGJ^] gave that 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 859 

material. The material concerned in this particular folder was the 
thirteen parts received the night before plus one or two other ones, 
plus the fourteenth part, which had arrived early in the morning, 
plus one or two other ones. This particular delivery did not include 
the message directing delivery of their note to the United States at 
1300. That had arrived at the Navy Department when I got back 
to my office, and was being translated. 

The court then, at 11 : 00 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 10 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: AH the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; 
all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold 
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were 
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S'. Naval Reserve, ' 
reporter. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were 
present. 

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the 
oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony. 

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

[96S] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

63. Q. You may continue with your testimony. 

A. When I had returned to the Navy Department at approximately 
1020, a message directing in rather emphatic language that delivery 
be made to the Secretary of State at 1300 had been received, together 
with a series of other messages, one of which directed final destruction 
of Japanese codes still on hand — those remaining after the earlier di- 
rective on the destruction of codes the week before. There was another 
message thanking the ambassador for his services, another addressed 
to the embassy staff, and one or two others of like nature. That mate- 
rial was delivered within ten to fifteen minutes to Admiral Stark's 
office — to the meeting then in progress. I then left, very much in a 
hurry, to go to the White House and to the meeting at the State De- 
partment to deliver that new material. The delay between the time 
I had returned to the Navy Department at 1020 and when I started 
delivery was simply a clerical detail entailed in typing and putting it 
in the folder. When I delivered this new material, including the direc- 
tive of delivery of the Japanese diplomatic note to be made at 1300 
to the State Department, I made a point of verbally inviting the atten- 
tion of Mr. Knox to the times involved. The reason I did that was the 
fact that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy, 
might not have seen at first glance the implications of the times. We 
had known that for some weeks passed the Japs were negotiating with 
certain elements in Thailand, specifically the Thailand Chief of Staff, 
with the view of forcing the hand of the Thai premier, who had stated 
earlier he was maintaining a neutral position and that if any nation, 
whether the Japanese or British, crossed his borders, it would mean 
that he would call on the other party to come to his assistance. The 
Japs came and apparently involved either a demonstration or an actual 
landing at Kota Bharu, Just below the Thai border on the Malay pen- 

79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 12 



860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

insula. Because of the tactical terrain features there, it was expected 
that the British would cross the Thai border, heading for the rail center 
of Singora. With that expectation in mind, namely, of forcing the 
British to cross the Thai border, the Japanese, together with the Thai 
Chief of Staff, could force the premier to call on the Japanese for help, 
in line with his earlier statement of policy. In addition, we knew the 
way the United States-Japanese negotiations had been heading up. 
We knew that on 30 November the Japanese for the first time during 
1941 had opened up on the subject and progress of these negotiations 
to the Germans, their allies. Up to this message of 30 November, the 
Germans had been kept largely in the dark, including the Japanese 
Ambassador, Oshima, in Berlin. We received that message, I believe, 
either the 1st or 2nd of December and distributed it the same date. I 
emphasize that [966] message, because in that message there 
was one statement which, in translation, came very close to what we 
had used in our write-up of the message, namely, — and I quote — "that 
sooner than anyone imagined Japan would be at war with the Anglo 
Saxons." Subsequent to that we had the directive on the partial de- 
struction of codes. We also had a rather urgent message around the 
2nd or 3rd directing the Jap Embassy in Washington to have the Sec- 
ond Secretary Takahashi, as I recall his name, leave the country at 
once. We knew that this Second Secretary, ever since his arrival 
earlier in the spring, was an especially trained espionage man and he 
had a number of especially trained men with him. His chief concern 
during the summer was in setting up an espionage establishment in 
Latin America. The fact that he was directed to leave was a further 
straw in the wind. We made a point of seeing that he did not leave 
before the break. All these things, together with the sighting of a 
large movement of Japanese ships down the coast of French Indo 
China about Thursday, its subsequent sightings on Friday and Sat- 
urday, and its position on Saturday, December 6, approximately a 
day's run from Kota Bharu, added up in my mind, at least, to some- 
thmg more than coincidence. In other words, the directive for deliv- 
ery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7 : 30 at Pearl 
Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu. I simply 
pointed out the coincidence of those times to the Secretary. I did not 
feel it necessary to point out such a thing to the officers of the Navy 
Department, since it would be quite apparent to them. From that 
point, there was no further traffic. 
Examined by the court : 

64. Q. Where did you go after you left the Secretary? 

A. To my office. The remarks I made at the State Department were 
not to the Secretary directly 

65. Q. Are you speaking of Hull or Knox? 

A. Knox. But to a State Department Foreign Service Officer who 
regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull and to whom I made simi- 
lar remarks inviting attention to the importance of the material I was 
delivering; and it was this officer who took the folder into Mr. Knox, 
together with my remarks. I then returned to the Navy Department, 
and no further traffic on the Japanese system came in. I should amend 
that. No further traffic to Washington in the Japanese system came in. 

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) : 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 861 

66. Q. Does the judge advocate understand that you delivered in 
person this document containing the information about the delivery 
of the Japanese note to the State Department at 1300 to the Chief of 
Naval Operations in person ? 

A. When I called at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations be- 
tween approximately 10 : 30 and a quarter to eleven — I'm not certain 
of the time — a meeting was still in progress [967] there with 
probably fifteen officers present. I asked for Admiral Stark's aide, 
who came out. I told him I had something else that was highly im- 
portant and handed it to him and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's 
desk. 

Examined by the court : 

67. Q. What was that? 

A. That included the message on the 1300 delivery. 

68. Q. Who was it? 

A. Admiral Stark's aide, Flag Secretary Wellburn. 
Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

69. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if that 
is the message to which you refer in connection with delivering a diplo- 
matic reply to the Secretary of State at 1300 ? 

A. Yes, sir, that is. This particular message was translated by 
Army. 

Examined by the court : 

70. Q. Will you tell us what time it came to the Navy Department? 

A. This was one which had been received by my office when I re- 
turned from the first delivery to the State Department and the Wliite 
House at about 10 : 20, and I delivered them at about 10 : 30 to the 
conference then in Admiral Stark's office. This is the 1 p. m. message. 

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

71. Q. Do you of your own knowledge know at what time Admiral 
Stark first got the information contained in document 41 ? 

A. I don't know of my own knowledge. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

72. Q. Would you mind repeating the statement which you just 
made off the record as to the delivery of this message ? 

A. As I stated, I have no direct knowledge of whether Admiral 
Stark had already received that information. It is possible, however, 
that he had, since the message was written up and distributed by 
Army. Consequently, General Marshall would very likely have re- 
ceived it some minutes before my office did and General Marshall 
might very well have 'phoned Admiral Stark. 

[968] 73. Q. I direct your attention to Exhibit 63 in this pro- 
ceeding and particularly call your attention to the fact on some of the 
documents contained in that exhibit there appears a rubber stamp and 
on other documents that rubber stamp is absent. On some of the 
documents which contain the rubber stamp there is a pencil mark 
surrounding certain of the figures. Will you explain to the court the 
significance or lack of significance of the stamp on certain of those 
documents ? I am particularly interested in loiowing whether or not 
it represents anything with respect to the routing of those documents. 

A. That stamp was made up by my office at the time we stopped 
making summaries of the day's book around the middle of 1941. The 



862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

first two items in the upper left-hand corner are intended to mean a 
single or double asterisk. In other words, a single asterisk, as I 
earlier used, indicated an item of interest. A double asterisk indi- 
cated items of the highest interest or immediate urgency. "One" 
referred to Secretary Knox, "Ten" to Admiral Stark, "Twelve" to 
Admiral Turner of War Plans. I normally used that stamp when we 
were not too pressed for time. In the fall of 1941, however, there 
were many occasions when the urgency of delivery was greater than 
taking time to stamp the half-dozen copies to indicate interest. In 
other words, I made a point in such cases of verbally indicating in- 
terest. As a rule, those items would be only a few in a special, single 
folder. 

74. Q. When there is a pencilled circle around the number, I assume 
that means that the message was delivered to the persons indicated by 
the circled figures ; is that correct? 

A. It indicates that of course, but it does not infer that other mes- 
sages w^ere not so delivered. 

75. Q. With respect to the particular message, does it mean that it 
was not delivered to others than those whose numbers are circled ? 

A. No, it does not. 

76. Q. What was the purpose of circling the numbers when you did 
use the stamp ? 

A. It was a matter of special interest or otherwise to those indi- 
viduals. In other words, one message might be of much interest to 
Secretary Knox, who was following the negotiations with Japan very 
closely. Another message having to do with the change of the Japa- 
nese system might be of much interest to Admiral Noyes — the techni- 
cal aspects of it. Another message might be of much interest to 
London, not only technical but those directly affecting London. It 
was purely a matter of interest. 

77. Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code 
and the execute message following it you stated that the execute was 
taken to mean that strained relations or a break in relations or, pos- 
sibly, war might follow between Japan and the United States. 
Would you indicate to [9€9] the court why you phrased your 
answer that way, that is, indicating tliat it might mean any one of 
those three things rather than one of those three specifically? 

A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese lan- 
guage in that they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by indirec- 
tion and by inference. 

78. Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section could not 
have stated categoricall}^ that this message meant war or merely a 
break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities 
were available to anyone interpreting that message? 

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not 
interpret that message as meaning definitely war. 

79. Q. In connection with the 14-part message, did you consider 
the first 13 parts of tlie message, which you had received up to a par- 
ticular point when you made your first distribution, particularly sig- 
nificant with respect to the imminence of war, or were you waiting 
for the information that might be contained in some subsequent parts 
before making that evaluation? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 863 

A. The tone of the first 13 parts was so much stronger than had 
been the tone of earlier Japanese notes that it was quite apparent tliat 
with the delivery of this note the Japanese had in view a termination 
of the negotiations which had been going on through 1941. Further 
than that, it was purely a matter of deduction. 

80. Q. Would you say that you felt in your own mind that diplo- 
matic relations were being ruptured until you had seen the 14th part 
of the message?. 

A. Even seeing the 14th part I could not state definitely that diplo- 
matic relations were ruptured, only that the negotiations reaching an 
understanding with the United States on trade and so forth were being 
terminated. 

81. Q. In answer to a question you related certain background 
which you had in mind when you called the attention of the Secre- 
tary, through the Foreign Service officer, to the time of delivery of 
this note. To whom had this information which you have recounted 
here been given so far as the higher echelons in the Navy Department 
were concerned, or was this merely a matter of your own personal 
background which assisted you in the work of your section ? 

A. Every message I referred to in my earlier statement had been 
delivered to all the six addressees that I referred to previously. 

82. Q. But had the detailed background which you recounted here 
been assembled in a formal statement and presented, for example, 
to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director [970'\ of 
Naval Communications, or the Chief of Naval Operations, or was this 
matter which you had gathered from these same dispatches ? 

A. These were simply matters that occurred to me on the way over 
to the meeting at the State Department at 11 : 00 o'clock. However, 
they were all matters of which the other addressees were fully cog- 
nizant, having seen the traffic concerned earlier as they were trans- 
lated and delivered. ; 

The court then, at 11 : 50 a. m., took a recess until 1 : 30 p. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

[971] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his 
counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel 
were present. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter. 

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the 
oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

83. Q. Will you please give a very brief statement as to the reasons 
for the Kopek Channel and the limitations of the type of communi- 
cations that were sent in that channel ? 

A. That code word "Kopek" was simply a code designator for 
material in a crypt channel having to do with technical aspects of 



864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

this decryption. Exchange was made in that channel only between 
the three stations, namely, Navy Department, Washington; Pearl 
Harbor, and the Asiatic Station in that channel. 

84. Q. To what oiRcerS were these dispatches particularly directed 
in the various areas? 

A. The purpose of having those stations set up where they were, 
more specifically at Pearl and in the Asiatic Station, was to service 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, 
Asiatic Fleet. Consequently, delivery to those stations in that chan- 
nel involved the presumption that the officers handling that material 
at those stations would supplement it with any local material they 
may have picked up by intercept and comparable decrypting activi- 
ties there and furnish it to the flag officers concerned. 

85. Q. I show you Document 38 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you 
saw this about the 6th of December, 1941, and if so at what time. 
This is the dispatch informing the Japanese legation that a long 
dispatch would be transmitted shortly and setting forth that a defi- 
nite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long dispatch. 

A. I believe that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th, 
along with the first 13 parts. 

86. Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your 
previous testimony as being some of the "other material"? 

A. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 
[972] (sic.) that by stating that I am not positive that this is one of 
them, although it very probably was. I put it that way because of 
the fact that the existence of 14 parts of the message would be indi- 
cated internally in each one of the 14 parts, so having received just 
one part we would know there were 14 parts to it because it would 
be so indicated in that one part, but I believe this is one of the 
messages received the evening before. 

87. Q. Will you give as best you can recall what you told the 
Secretary of the Navy on the evening of 6 December 1941 at the time 
that you delivered the first 13 parts of the long message and the 
other dispatches? 

A. Initially I didn't tell him anything, other than to state in my 
earlier 'phone call and when I appeared in his apartment that I had 
something that appeared very important. He spent about 15 or 20 
minutes reading the material I had and then some minutes more 
making 'phone calls. And then for about another 10 or 15 minutes 
there was a rather informal conversation, the first part of which was 
only between the Secretary and myself, and then later on we talked 
about diversified things not connected with this but the general politi- 
cal picture in which Mr. Knox and his manager of the Chicago 
Daily News also joined. The conversation in that more open dis- 
cussion didn't concern this technical material so much because of the 
security aspects and the strictness we were under regarding handling 
and who should know about it. The convei'sation of mine with Mr. 
Knox chiefly concerned some of the references appearing and men- 
tioned some of the previous points that were brought up in that long 
13-part message. 

[Notation in margin :] H B. 

88. Q. Do you recall any particular evaluation that was given by 
the Secretary on these dispatches in the general relations between 
Japan and the United States ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 865 

A. No, I don't. He did not comment particularly on what his 
views were on the prospects of a break. In other words, that was in 
line with a characteristic of Mr. Knox, particularly at the end of 
about a year after he had first been shown this material and had 
been repeatedly indoctrinated — and I use that word advisedly — by 
myself and Admiral Wilkinson on the security features in handling 
this type of material. Mr. Knox was thoroughly conversant with 
this material and fully backed us up on any measures the Director 
of Naval Intelligence wanted to take relative to the security of that 
material. I would say it was with that security feature in mind that 
he did not express himself in the presence of that business associate 
of his, and possibly his wife. 

89. Q. When you took this same material to Admiral Wilkinson, 
will you state as best you can recall what reaction or comments that 
he made on the reading of these dispatches? 

A. I couldn't put words in his mouth. Nothing stood out particu- 
larly in the course of our conversation. It was obvious, though, that 
things were reaching a crisis and Admiral Wilkinson expressed him- 
self along those lines as well as myself; that is, in the course of the 
informal conversation there was a general agreement on the fact that 
things were shaping up in some sort of a crisis so far as negotiations 
and [97S] relations with Japan were concerned. Admiral 
Beardall was present, of course, too, and took part in that conversa- 
tion as well. 

90. Q. Wlio were at the conference in the office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I was so pressed for time that morning that I'm not certain just 
who was there. I have a general impression that when I made the 
hurried delivery at 9 : 00 o'clock that there was about 12 or 15 officers 
present. Most of the heads of divisions in the Navy Department and 
those that attended the Admirals' conference were there. I know that 
Admiral Wilkinson was there, and in fact I felt a sense of relief that 
he was there because I was able to deliver a copy of the thing to him 
and let him carry the ball with Admiral Stark as far as any further 
explanation or references were concerned. 

91. Q. Do you know about what time Admiral Stark came to his 
office on Sunday morning, the 7th of December, 1941 ? 

A. No, I don't. 

92. Q. To whom did you actually deliver the dispatches on the 
morning of 7 December 1941 at the White House; that is, who 
received them? 

A. I'm not certain of the name but it was one of Admiral Beardall's 
assistants in the situation room which he had set up around for the 
White House. I believe — I am again not positive — it was Lieutenant 
Commander Leahy who was senior assistant to Admiral Beardall. 

93. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you 
have seen this dispatch before, and if so, when? This dispatch is 
from Tokyo to Honolulu and relates to the receiving of reports on ship 
movements and includes the instructions that Honolulu will report 
even when there are no movements. 

A. Yes, sir, I received that. , 

94. Q. About what time did you see it ? 



866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. The fact that the date 5 December is on here would indicate 
that I saw it that day ; since it was a Navy translation it is one that 
I would have reviewed before it was written up. 

95. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, which is a copy of a 
dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports of ships in defi- 
nite areas at Pearl Harbor, and ask you whether you have seen that 
dispatch before, and if so, when? 

A. I believe I have seen this also, and the fact that the date 5 De- 
cember is on this also would indicate that I received it or first saw it 
about that date. It is an Army translation. 

[974.] 96. Q. I show you Document 40 of Exhibit 63 which is a 
dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo giving the location of battleships 
ancl other ships in definite areas in Pearl Harbor on the date that the 
dispatch was sent, and also gives the courses and distances on such 
courses of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor, and ask you 
whether or not you have seen this dispatch, and if so, when ? 

A. Yes, sir, I am quite certain I have seen this also. The only clue 
I have to the time I saw it would be the date appearing on this thing, 
namely, 6 December 1941. I might amplify further: This message, 
as well as those others you have shown me, was only some of quite a 
few of that category which had been appearing through the year. 
The Jap Consul had been reporting on our major unit moves about 
the training grounds in the vicinity of Pearl and any other informa- 
tion on our ship movements that he could get. Sometimes it was on 
the direction of Tokyo ; sometimes on his own initiative. 

97. Q. Were these other dispatches to which you have just referred 
gone into with such meticulous details as to the ships that were going 
to be in certain definite areas and a certain definite harbor at a certain 
definite time? 

A. No, sir. This is the first one, I believe, in which specific areas in 
Pearl Harbor were mentioned. They had previously referred to the 
location of things by names of places such as Ford Island or the Fuel 
Dock, or things like that, rather than these specific, defined areas. 

98. Q. Now, referring to your previous examination as to the inter- 
pretation of the winds message in which you have divided the possi- 
ble interpretation into three general classes: strained relations, a 
break in diplomatic relations, or war. During the period of, say, 
from the 2nd or 3rd of December 1941 to tlie 7th of December 1941 
wherein all of these dispatches indicated specific areas in which the 
Japanese were particularly interested, did you come to any particu- 
lar deduction at that time as to which of the three meanings was 
really intended by the winds message? 

A. The inference I gained from these was to the effect that the Jap- 
anese were concerned about locations of major U. S. Naval units. 
They had been similarly concerned, however, about locations, types 
and numbers of planes in the Philippines. They had been similarly 
concerned about almost all aspects of military establishments, forces 
and so forth in the Netherlands East Indies. 

[97S] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve, 
reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

99. Q. You have previously made reference to an intercepted dis- 
patch between Tokyo and Berlin in which Tokyo had informed Berlin 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 867 

that there would be war with the Anglo-Saxons in the immediate 
future. 

A. The expression I used, which was the closest we could come to a 
precise translation of the Japanese, was, "Sooner than anyone 
imagines." 

100. Q. In view of the dispatch between Tokyo and Berlin as to 
the proximity of war with the Anglo-Saxons, did that dispatch and 
these other dispatches just now shown you, lead you to any deductions 
as to whether the wind message really meant a strained relationship 
or a break in diplomatic relations or war — and the execution of that 
dispatch would bring about one of those three classes of decisions? 

A. To go back first to my interpretation of the sense of that wind 
message, I did not mean to infer that there was any definite implica- 
tion of war. "What I did mean, what I think I stated, was that it 
implied a severe straining of relations, which could be inferred to 
imply as including an actual rupture of relations, or possibly even 
war. To come back to your specific question now, we knew they were 
planning something against Britain. I have already referred to the 
negotiations with the Thai people. We knew, too, that the Japs were 
very much aware of the fact we were doing a great deal for the British 
in their war and working closely with them. In fact, it was almost 
a joint front as regards negotiations with the Japs. That note that 
we had handed the Japanese on 26 November had only been given 
to them after consultation, with Japanese knowledge, with the Dutch 
and Chinese as well as the British. Consequently, the inference on 
this particular attention to ship movements in Pearl Harbor was that 
the Japs were very concerned about what action we were taking, where 
our Fleet might be, what action we might take in case the Japs did 
make a move against the "British. There was no slightest indication 
at any time of any overt intentions directed against the United States, 
from this material. 

' 101. Q. But you have testified that it was the first time that there 
had been any inquiry made as to the exact locations of certain definite 
ships and certain definite areas in Pearl Harbor, have you not? 

A. It was the first time they had used that particular means of 
identifying areas. They had been getting information and asking 
for information not only about Pearl but other places — the locations 
of our ships. 

102. Q. But it was the first time, was it not, that they had asked 
for it in such detail as in these dispatches ? 

A. Yes, sir, that is true of Pearl Harbor. 

\9^6^^ Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude 
C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

103. Q. Referring to Exhibit 20, which is the December 3 message 
from OpNav to addressees, saying that certain codes were destroyed 
and also referring to Exhibit 66, which is from OpNav on the Kopek 
circuit saying approximately the same thing, I refer you to your tes- 
timony this morning and ask you if you did not say that in the OpNav 
message of December 3, it was an example of the evaluation of intelli- 
gence information ? 

A. I believe that is the expression I used. 

104. Q. And in connection with that, in Exhibit 20 what portion 
of the message did you refer to as being an example of the evaluation ; 
could you just repeat the words, or dictate the words? 



868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I had nothing to do with the drafting of this message from 
OpNav. OpNav had been given the same information which I had 
sent in the Kopek channel, and O. N. I. in this case I happened to know 
Commander McCollum felt he was warranted in drafting a dispatch 
on the subject of this destruction of codes. I didn't see this message 
until some days later, as a matter of fact. 

105. Q. Well, the point, Commander, sir — in Exhibit 20 what por- 
tion of the message were you referring to when you were referring to 
the evaluation? 

A. Evaluation was perhaps not quite the right word. The more 
precise statement of their function in that regard would be that In- 
telligence sent it out as intelligence, rather than simply the technical 
channel of exchange. 

106. Q. In the last portion of this document there are the words, 
which have a line drawn through them, which say, "From information 
infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." Would 
that be the language of evaluation of that information ? 

A. That of course is an evaluation of the information appearing 
earlier in the dispatch. 
Examined by the court : 

107. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge that Secretary Kjiox 
himself received the so-called 1 : 00 p. m. message while at the State 
Department, or that the oral interpretation of the situation of the 
time of delivery — that is, 1 : 00 p. m. — was transmitted to him person- 
ally by the State Department official mentioned ? 

A. I was not present, so I am not certain of my own knowledge, but 
as certain as I can be otherwise, because the Secretary to Mr. Hull, who 
handled that, had only about ten feet to go to deliver that message to 
those three secretaries sitting around the table there. 

108. Q. I was wondering more as to the interpretation orally given 
about the daylight — the situation as to 1 : 00 p. m. — whether the man 
who translated it understood what it was about. 

A. I explained that to him so that he would have the [977] 
picture. 

109. Q. But it wasn't written down at all? 
A. No, sir. 

110. Q. That message was transmitted by the War Department? 
A. Yes, sir. 

111. Q. And the War Department had the same procedure that you 
did — they sent copies to the Navy Department, copies to the White 
House, and copies to the State Department? 

A. No, sir. The War Department had responsibility at that time 
to the State Department, Navy Department, and the White House. 

112. Q. So the chances are that that message was sent by the War 
Department to the Secretary of State at the same time it was sent 
to the Navy Department? 

A. That" is correct. Colonel Bratton was at the State Department 
at 10:00 o'clock with material for Mr. Hull as well as Mr. Stimson. 
He was again there about 11:00 o'clock— about the same time I was 
there with new material. 

113. Q. So that if the note got to the Secretary of the Navy when 
he was with the Secretary of State, he perhaps had that at the same 
time you got it in the Navy Department ? 

A. Yes, sir, all three secretaries got it about the same time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 869 

114. Q. Commander, you have discussed these different supersecret 
messages flowing into the Navy Department and being delivered. Do 
you recall that you delivered personally any of these messages to the 
Chief of Operations and discussed them with him? 

A. No, sir, I did not. I do know that it was delivered at about 
9 : 00 o'clock on December 7, because I was just inside the door of 
Admiral Stark's office while his aide. Commander Wellborn, took 
the messages over to his desk. 

115. Q. Did you see Admiral Stark at 9:00 o'clock in his office on 
the morning of December 7? 

A. Admiral Stark was there with Admiral Wilkinson. 

116. Q. At 9:00 o'clock that morning? 

A. It was approximately 9 : 00 o'clock ; I am not positive of that 
time. 

117. Q. And at that time, at 9:00 o'clock, you delivered to his 
aide, and you are sure you say that Admiral Stark got them — the 
tliirteen parts that you have been discussing; is that correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

118. Q. Then at 10:20 when you came back, and you got this 
message of 1 : 00 p. m. time of delivery, you went in and delivered 
[978] that message — did you go and deliver that message to the 
Chief of Operations' office ? 

A. In that case I did not step inside the door, but Commander 
AVellborn came to the door and I handed it to him. 

119. Q. Admiral Stark was there at that time? 

A. I believe so, although I can't state positively he was at his 
desk or in there. 

120. Q. In your activities in Washington as delivering these mes- 
sages, did you at any time, or were you at any time present at con- 
ferences with State Department, War Department oflScials, and with 
the Chief of Naval Operations, discussing these secret and super- 
secret messages ? 

A. No, sir. 

121. Q. Keferring to the letter of November 26, which the Secre- 
tary of State handed to the Japanese officials, were you fully cognizant 
of the contents of that letter ? 

A. Not until it was sent out in the Japanese circuit. 

122. Q. When did it go out on the Japanese circuit? 
A. I believe it was the 27th, sir ; I am not certain. 

123. Q. Did you deliver the substance of this message to the office 
of Chief of Naval Operations; was that in the daily reports going 
in to him ? 

A. I don't believe I ever saw the text of our message. Admiral. 

124. Q. It was a plain language message as handed in English by 
the Secretary of State ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

125. Q. And I asked you if you were familiar with the contents 
of that message. 

A. By stating I knew of it on the 26th, I knew it had gone out — 
that the Japanese had transmitted such a message. 

126. Q. And you were familiar with its contents ? 

A. Only in a general way, knowing the tenor of the negotiations 
of the previous week. 



870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

127. Q. From November 27 to December 7, did you consider, having 
been cognizant of these messages flowing in — did you consider that 
negotiations and conversations were continuing between the State 
Department and the Japanese representatives ? 

A. I knew some conversations were continuing, but we also had 
had a message from Tokyo in which Tokyo directed such conversa- 
tions continue. 

128. Q. To continue? 
A Y^ps sir 

129. Q.' Kef erring to document 7 of Exhibit 63, in which [979] 
Tokyo directs all arrangements for signing of agreement be com- 
pleted by 25 November, are you familiar with that? 

A. Yes, sir, I am. 

130. Q. Was this message which you have in hand delivered to the 
Office of Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. Yes, sir, it was. 

131. Q. Do you assume that he was cognizant of that message? 
A. I assume that he was, yes, sir. 

132. Q. Referring to document 11 of Exhibit 63, in which Tokyo 
regrets signing of agreement can't be made by 25th, are you familiar 
with that message ? 

A. Yes, sir, I am. 

133. Q. Referring to document 16, from Washington to Tokyo, 
dated 26 November and translated on November 28, in which is 
stated that the Japanese Ambassador states that rupture of negotia- 
tions does not necessarily mean war between United States and 
Japan; are you familiar with that message and have you seen it 
before ? 

A. I am quite certain I have, yes, sir. 

134. Q. Was that message sent to the Office of Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir. » 

135. Q. You have already testified to document 17, from Washing- 
ton to Tokyo, giving translation of note of 26 November, haven't 
you ? 

A. I believe that came up once before, yes, sir. 

136. Q. Referring to document 18, Tokyo to Washington, trans- 
lated 28 November, stating that Tokyo says the views of the Imperial 
Government will be sent in two or three days ; are you familiar with 
that message? 

A. I am quite certain I saw this too, yes, sir. 

[980] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

137. Q. And this message was delivered to the office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

A. Yes, sir, this would be one that was delivered, as all the negotia- 
tion messages were delivered, to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

138. Q. In other words, there is no question but that all these im- 
portant messages were delivered to the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

A. I am certain as I can be of that, yes, sir. 

139. Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar 
with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 871 

future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used cer- 
tain words, it meant certain things ? 
A. Yes, sir. 

140. Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? 
Did you consider it important enough that when that message was 
received it would be a most important message in reply? In other 
words, were you on the lookout for that answer ? 

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer". 

141. Q. Well, the execute of the message. 

A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization 
were very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer 
to that as a warning. 

142. Q, When this execute came in, did you receive it? 

A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch 
officer who receives the information coming off the teletype. 

143. Q. Were you the officer who v>ent to the communications offi- 
cer and said, "Here it is." 

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch 
officer to Commander Saff ord's office. 

144. Q. You had that information then? 

A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the 
meaning well in mind. 

145. Q. About what was the time and date when you got that ? 

A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. 
It may have been the 3rd. 

146. Q. What did you do with it? 

A. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all. 

[981] 147. Q. Who handled it? 

A. I left Commander Saffcrd's office as soon as I knew he had the 
picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once 
went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was 
highly interested in that particular plain language code because of 
his previous instructions to me to make out these cards so that he 
could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with 
the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was 
any time of the day or night. 

• 148. Q. When the original winds message was received, was that 
to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions ? 

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir. 

149. Q. Were you familiar with the rapidity of means of com- 
munication between Washington and Honolulu ? 

A. No, sir, only in a general way from my general communication 
knowledge. 

150. Q. While you were there suppose you had a very important 
message where the time element was of primary importance. Which 
way would you have sent it to reach Honolulu at the quickest pos- 
sible time? 

A. That would not have been a decision of mine, sir. 

151. Q. Well, I mean in your general information; I know it 
wasn't your decision. 

A. I knew there was the telephone. 

152. Q. You were not familiar with the others ? 
A. No, sir. 



872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

153. Q, On the morning of December 7th when you arrived at 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9:00 o'clock, 
as you have testified, was Admiral Wilkinson there? 

A. Yes, sir. 

154. Qj. Did you acquaint him with everything you had up to 
that time ? 

A. Yes, sir, I gave him the folder, including the material of the 
previous night, and indicated that part 14 had been received and 
left the picture with him and did not take time to explain it to any- 
one else, since Admiral Wilkinson could do that. 

155. Q. In explaining to the State Department official on the morn- 
ing of December 7th your ideas regarding 1 : 00 o'clock time in Hono- 
lulu and 1 : 00 o'clock Asiatic, did that seem to impress the State 
Department official to the extent that you felt certain he would tell 
that to Secretary Knox ? 

A. I believe it did, yes, sir. 

156. Q. When you arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's house on the 
night of December 6th, did you ask him if he had given this informa- 
tion with respect to the 13 points to the Chief of Naval Operations 
by telephone or otherwise? 

A. I did not ask him, no, sir. Admiral Wilkinson, as head of 
Naval Intelligence, of course had the ultimate responsibility of get- 
ting it to the Chief of Naval Operations. I was a subordinate of his, 
and in these deliveries I was [983] acting as his subordinate, 
and normally always kept him apprised of who got it and attenuated, 
as a rule, to get it to him at first. If he was not immediately avail- 
able, I made distribution in any case and let him know. 

157. Q. You testified that you telephoned Admiral Stark's house 
and found he was out ? 

A. Yes, sir, I did, 

158. Q. When you went to Admiral Wilkinson we presume you 
told him that you had 'phoned Admiral Stark? 

A. I told him Admiral Stark had not received it. In other words, 
that was a general practice, to inform each of the recipients who else 
had received it. 

159. Q, When you informed Admiral Wilkinson that you had 
'phoned Admiral Stark and found him out, did Admiral Wilkinson 
say he would call him? 

A. No, he did not tell me, but he did make some 'phone calls. 

160. Q. To whom ? 
A. I'm not certain. 

161. Q. Keviewing your testimony of your daily routine in con- 
nection with the delivery of messages, is the court correct in under- 
standing that each day when messages were received — and there were 
numerous messages 

A, Yes, sir. 

162. Q. Continuing.) You took those messages to the office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, delivered them, and had marked or 
clipped those messages in their original translation as to their im- 
portance ; is that correct ? 

A. That, in general, is correct. I did not actually use clips. In 
that case, only a few messages would be of importance; on some days 
folders were made up of the important ones. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 873 

163. Q. Were you familiar with the war warning message sent out 
by OpNav to the different forces on 27 November ? 

A. I did not hear about that until after the Roberts Committee. 
I am familiar, however, with a directive from OpNav to our attaches 
in Japan and China, as well as to the Governor in Guam, on de- 
structing codes. 

164. Q. That was sent sometime about December 3 ? 

A. It was sent the day after we received the Japanese message on 
the destruction of codes. I think it was Thursday or Friday of that 
week preceding Pearl Harbor. I was in Admiral Noyes' office when 
he drafted that. 

165. Q. Can you recall, or could you let the court know, the name 
of that State Department official with whom you conferred on the 
morning of 7 December immediately prior to sending in your 
messages to Secretary Knox? 

A. I can't be certain, sir. Two of the people that [983] 
took delivery for Mr. Hull had been especially indoctrinated by both 
Colonel Bratton and me over a period of time on security. One was 
named Stone and the other Brown. I don't recall, for the moment, 
the others. 

166. Q. Subsequent to November 26, 1941, the date of the impor- 
tant note of the Secretary of State to the Japanese officials, were you 
and other in the Intelligence Department at the Navy Department 
awaiting and expecting a reply to that with interest ? 

A. Very much, yes, sir. 

167. Q. In other words, that was the culminating point of the whole 
business. A note was sent to Japan, and this was going to be the 
answer ? 

A. At least my own feeling was that there would be no action taken 
until a reply came. 

168. Q. During that interval there was expectancy as to this im- 
portant answer ? 

A. Yes, sir. Of course, during that period of waiting these other 
developments took place ; that dispatch to Berlin, the development in 
Thailand, and the destruction of codes. That was all during the pe- 
riod of waiting. 

169. Q. The information received from Berlin and the dispatch to 
Berlin from Tokyo were all in your file ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

170. Q. Those files were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations ? 
A. Yes, sir, all those recipients received that. I might amplify my 

last remark by stating the White House was so interested in that 
particular message 

171. Q. What particular message? The reply message? 

A. No, sir, the one to Berlin. (Continuing) that on the Naval 

Aide's instruction I prepared a special paraphrased version of that 
for Mr. Roosevelt, which he retained; otherwise, neither the State 
Department nor the White House were ever permitted — I say that 
advisedly — to retain any of these dispatches. 

172. Q. These super-secret dispatches ? 
A. Yes. 

173. Q. Do you know whether the winds message or its execution, 
or either of them was transmitted in substance to the Commander-in- 
Chief , Pacific Fleet ? 



874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I don't know, sir. 

174. Q. Are you aware of any cryptic messages or their contents, 
other than the messages with respect to the destruction of codes and 
so on, being transmitted by the Navy Department to the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific, between 27 November and 7 December ? 

A. I am not certain. There may have been one or two others but 
not more than that. 

[984] 175. Q. You don't know of any? 

A. No, sir, I don't know of any. If I looked through everything, 
I might be able to refresh my memory, but I don't know now. 

Re-cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U.S. Navy: 

176. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether 
or not you have seen this dispatch before? This is the message of 
28 November from CinCAF to OpNav, information of Coml6, 
CinCPac, and Coml4, setting forth the net intercept translation re- 
ceived from Singapore concerning the winds code. 

A. I believe I did see this. 

177. Q. Does that message contain substantially the same informa- 
tion concerning the winds code which you had in your unit in Wash- 
ington ? 

A. Yes, it does. 

178. Q. That message shows on its face what addressees ? 

A. Action, OpNav; information, Coml6, CinCPac, and Com 14. 

179. Q. What is the date of that message ? 
A. 28 November. 

180. Q. Would you refer to Document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is 
the intercept that you had in your unit in Washington, and state the 
date that message first became available to you in intelligible form? 

A. I would have to depend on the date appearing on this — 28 
November. 

181. Q. That is the same date as the date of the dispatch from 
CinCAF to OpNav to which you have just referred? 

A. That is true. 

182. Q. When you talked to the State Department official with re- 
spect to the message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver 
the note at 1300 and asked him to show it to Secretary Knox, did you 
do more than suggest to him that 1300 in Washington was dawn at 
Pearl Harbor and midnight in the Far East ; that is, did you discuss 
with him any significance in that timing, or did you just ask him to 
inform the Secretary that those were the facts? 

A. The expressions I used were that 1 : 00 o'clock delivery time 
in Washington was 7 : 30 at Pearl Harbor and a few hours before 
dawn at Kota Bharu. This State Department man was fully cogni- 
zant of the significance of that term "Kota Bharu", since he was see- 
ing these dispatches every day. Furthermore, the information on 
the Jap convoy movement had been toward Kota Bharu around Indo- 
China, and was also definitely Imown among high officials in Wash- 
ington. 

[985] 183. Q. You did not suggest to him that 1300 Washington 
time was drawn at Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack 
at Pearl Harbor, or ask him to make that suggestion to the Secretary ? 

A. I did not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 875 

184. Q. Before you went to the State Department that morning 
with the dispatch, turning over in your mind the background, had 
you had any discussion with anyone in the Navy Department, par- 
ticularl}'^ in your unit, concerning the significance of this timing? 

A. When that particular folder containing that message was being 
made up, I draw a little circle, as a navigator does, to figure out his 
hour angles and remarked at the time to some of the people in my 
office— no one in particular — that this 1 : 00 o'clock delivery time in 
Washington was just before dawn at Kota Bharu. 

185. Q. You mean Kota Bharu, or Pearl Harbor? 
A. Kota Bharu. 

186. Q, Before dawn at Kota Bharu ? 

A. Before dawn at Kota Bharu. I was possibly more specific in 
stating that it certainly looked as though the Japs were going ahead 
with that planned enterprise down there. 

187. Q. Did you have any thought from this material at that time 
that this meant a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? 

A. From this material which was normally the only source of in- 
formation I had, there was not the slightest indication at anj^ time 
to indicate a Japanese overt intention of attacking the United States. 
From that point of view, I had at various times while I was handling 
this material pointed out to high officials that this source of informa- 
tion was, of necessity, in complete, that as far as it went it was highly 
valuable information, but it was not complete and therefore there 
might be other things going on of which we were not aware. That 
was repeated so frequently throughout the couple of years I was 
handling this material that it was almost automatically inferred. 
When a particular item of that kind was delivered you had to reach 
your own deductions and conclusions from just a possible thought 
fragment of the picture we had in this material. Only a percentage of 
tliis traffic was being broken, for one thing. Some days we did not have 
enough traffic to break a ke}'. Some days keys in certain instances 
were not broken at all. That is just another item supporting the 
statement I made that the picture received from this source of in- 
telligence was incomplete. It could, of course, be supplemented and 
oftentimes was displaced by actual courier crypts. 

188. Q. Do you think the Chief of Naval Operations was cognizant 
of the limitations of this material ? 

A. I'm sure he was. 

[986] 189. Q, And that he must rely on other sources for more 
precise information with respect to relations between Japan and the 
United States? 

A. I'm quite certain he was. 

190. Q. Did you have any discussion with Captain Safford on 
the morning of 7 December before you went to the State Department ? 

A. I don't recall any. I was pressed for time that morning mak- 
mg deliveries. 

191. Q. How long were you in that section after 7 December 1941 ? 
A. Until June, 1943. 

192. Q. Did you ever hear Captain Safford express himself — and 
this answer I should like to have you divide between 7 December and 
subsequent to 7 December — as to whether the message concerning the 
delivery of the note definitely indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor 
at approximately dawn of December 7th ? 

79716 — i6— Ex. 146, vol. 2 13 



876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I can almost positively state that no such statement was made 
to me or in my presence. 

193. Q. Do you feel that if Captain Safford had such thoughts on 
this important matter you ^Yould have heard about them? In other 
words, were your relations with Captain Safford close enough that 
you might reasonably expect to receive such an expression from him ? 

A. I would say yes. 

194. Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to 
Captain Safford and, I believe, said, "Here it is", did you mean by 
that exclamation, "Here it is", that this was the execution of the 
Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with 
Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the 
message which executed the Japanese War Plan ? 

A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the mes- 
sage myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to 
Commander Safford's office, and the expression, "Here it is", simply 
meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come 
through — a message which we had been looking for many days and 
that we had made special provisions to handle for many days. 

195. Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here 
is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan 
and the United States"? 

A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not 
refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It re- 
ferred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations con- 
cerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or 
relations which could very well involve a break. 

[987] 196. Q. To your mind it did not necessarily mean war? 

A. Not necessarily at all. 

197. Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the 
translation unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either 
the "Winds" code, that is the message setting up the code, or in the 
message of execution ? 

A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatso- 
ever of the literal translation of these terms. 

198. Q. Your section had no difficulty in making the translation? 
A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language. 

Extracted testimonv of Vice Admiral K. K. Turner, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 994-1008, inclusive. 

[994,1 22. Q. Were you a regular distributee of information 
received by way of communication intercepts? 
A. Yes. I saw all such dispatches. 

23. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations Dispatch of 27 November 1941. I ask you to examine it and 
state to the court what connection, if any, you had in the preparation 
of this dispatch? 

A. I prepared that dispatch after discussion of the situation with 
the Chief of Naval Operations and after we had received certain 
secret information connected with the activities of special Ambassador 
Kurusu. 

24. Q. Will you state what you meant by the first sentence, "This 
dispatch is to be considered a war warning" ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 877 

A. I meant just exactly what is said, it is to be considered a warn- 
ing of approaching war. 

25. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to 
examine it. 

A. Yes, I am familiar with that. 

26. Q. Did you see this document on or about 22 November 1941, 
the date of its translation? 

A. I saw it immediately after it was translated. 

27. Q. This document contains the words, referring to the date 
November 29, "The deadline absolutely cannot be changed." What 
significance did these words have to you at that time? 

A. That the Japanese were going to attack the United States or 
Great Britain, or both, on or about that date. 

28. Q. There are also the words, "After that things are automati- 
cally going to happen". What significance did these words have to 
you at that time ? 

A. That movements of forces at this time were already under way 
and they could not be changed. The forces would not be recalled. 
We knew that they were already under way at that time. We knew 
that from sightings and from dispatches from China, that very con- 
siderable troop convoys were moving south. I think by then some 
had already moved into Indo-China. We knew that there had been 
a great activity in radio traffic over a period of two or three weeks 
and then suddenly at a date prior to this, the thing had ceased. It 
had been naval traffic and therefore we deduced that the Japanese 
Fleet had gone to sea. I don't recall the date of that. 

29. Q. Can you recall seeing any intercept traffic between Berlin 
and Tokyo in which the Japanese government was alleged to have 
said, in effect, that there was going to be war between Japan and the 
Anglo-Saxons sooner than any one thinks ? 

A. That strikes a familiar chord but I can't specifically recall any 
such dispatch. 

[995] 30. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63. It con- 
tains the Secretary of State's note to Japan of 26 November 1941. 

A. I remember that dispatch. 

31. Q. Did this dispatch come to your attention on or about the 
date of its translation, which is set out in the lower right-hand corner 
as about 28 November 1941 ? 

A. Yes, immediately. 

32. Q. Did you know the substance of this note from any source 
other than this intercept, if you will remember ? 

A. As I recall it. Captain Schurmann, who then was head of the 
Central Division and was liaison officer with the State Department, 
brought this note over to the Navy Department from Mr. Hull to get 
Admiral Stark's advice on it. Now, there were several pages but I'm 
not too clear in my memory on the thing, but that is the way I remem- 
ber it. 

33. Q. Did you discuss the substance of this note of November 26, 
1941 with the Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. I did. 

34. Q. Do you recall if he expressed any views as to its significance 
at that time, what it meant? 



878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Well, he expressed the view that there wasn't any possibility that 
Japan would accept it. 

35. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 17, which was that war warn- 
ing dispatch: This dispatch contains the conclusion, "Negotiations 
with Japan have ceased". Upon what information was this conclu- 
sion based? 

A. Mr. Hull told Admiral Stark over the inter-office 'phone, as I 
recall it — it might have been personally — that to all intents and 
purposes the thing was all over as far as negotiations were concerned, 
and I believe he said that he was not going to close them ; he was going 
to keep them open, but for all useful purposes, why the thing was 
finished. 

36. Q. And it is your recollection that Admiral Stark was in on 
this discussion? 

A. Yes; I know he was. Mr. Hull kept Admiral Stark informed 
at all times, I don't know that he informed him of everything he 
knew but he kept him very well informed. Their relations were very 
close and cordial. 

37. Q. At the time of drafting this war warning message of 27 
November, what was your personal estimate of the Japanese inten- 
tions regarding a surprise attack in the Hawaiian area, if you had 
any? 

A. I expected it. I expected they would make some sort of an 
attack on Hawaii. 

38. Q. Was this estimate or expectation communicated to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

A. It was communicated to him here. There is another dispatch 
dated two or three days before, November 2J:th I think, which warned 
against the matter and to take precautions. The Department — and 
the same applied to the War Department [996'] was averse in 
being too specific as to what they believed might happen for the 
reason — wisely, I believe — that that might lead the Commanders- 
in-Chief not to guard other matters under their cognizance, and there 
were various proposals made in writing this dispatch and in the other 
as to how to be more specific about it, and it was decided that the 
Commanders-in-Chief had received full information as to what was in 
the minds of the Department, and therefore it was their duty to cover 
their entire field of responsibility. 

39. Q. I show you Exhibit 15 which is the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions dispatch of 24 November, 1941, and ask you to examine it. Is 
that the disiDatch about which you liave just testified? 

A. That is the dispatch I referred to. That dispatch, also, was dis- 
cussed in the Joint Board. The Joint Board was holding almost daily 
meetings, as I recall it. Admiral Stark and General Marshall con- 
ferred daily about the situation. The War Plans Divisions were in 
constant contact. I prepared that dispatch and it was changed in one 
or two particulars by Admiral IngersoU and Admiral Stark, and then 
was referred to General Marshall, and the War Department made a few 
changes in it, mainly along the line that I have mentioned, of keeping 
the thing from being too specific. By this time, Avhy, I was personally 
convinced that they were going to go into Siam and also into the 
Malay Peninsula as the initial move and also attack the Philippines; 
that is, the major strategic moves. Whether that would be simul- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 879 

taneous, or not, or follow slightly after, I didn't know and didn't 
particularly care. 

40. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states, "A surprise, aggressive 
movement in any direction is indicated." This language is omitted 
from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there 
is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omis- 
sion from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally ? 

A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two 
dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "A surprise, aggressive 
movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any 
direction could be by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or 
anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "An amphibious ex- 
pedition is enroute." It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those 
two are quite different. They don't cover the same kind of a subject, 
and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We 
knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That 
was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not 
only the movement of amphibious forces but the movement of any 
forces. 

41. Q. In the war warning dispatch of 27 November, there is the 
the directive, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment". What 
action was desired of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleot 
in complying with this directive ? 

A. To send scouting forces out of different kinds, to [997] 
deploy submarines in threatened directions, to put the Fleet to sea 
and in a covering position for the Hawaiian Islands and a support- 
ing position for Midway. 

42. Q. Were these expectations that you have just discussed con- 
tained in War Plans or in any other directive to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

A. Not in the detail that I have indicated, because the practice of 
the Navy Department was then and is now to give to the Commander- 
in-Chief a broad task, to provide him with sufficient forces or such 
forces and equipment and material as is available, and then to let 
the Commander-in-Chief do the work. Admiral Stark, in particular, 
was insistent that we not tell the Commander-in-Chief how to do 
his job. 

48. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding, then, that with the 
information and directives contained in the dispatch of 27 November 
1941, the Navy Department from there on expected the Commander- 
in-Chief to take appropriate action in view of the war warning ex- 
pressed without further orders ? 

A. That is correct. 

44. Q. At any time before 7 December 1941, did you believe an air 
torpedo attack on ships moored in Pearl Harbor was technically pos- 
sible of accomplishment? 

A. Yes. I always believed it was possible. There had been corre- 
spondence, there had been tests made by the Bureau of Ordnance and 
correspondence initiated by the Bureau of Ordnance and passed on 
by the Navy Departmen twhich, I think it was in the latter part of 
1944 or the first part of 1941, indicated that in their opinion you had 
to have a 90-foot depth of water before you could make torpedos 



880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACIt 

successfully run. Well, that was quite true with American torpedoes, 
but I personally never saw any reason at all why torpedoes couldn't 
run in 10 feet of water, or maybe, say, 20 feet of water, dropped from 
airplanes. Now, the Bureau of Ordnance at a subsequent time con- 
ducted additional tests, and as I recall it, in June of 1941, a letter went 
out from the Department stating that they had now changed their 
mind on that and I think they said that torpedoes could successfully 
run in 60 feet of water, something on that order. 

45. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to ex- 
amine it? 

A. Yes, I have seen that. 

[998] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re- 
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

46. Q. This document has been familiarly termed by witnesses 
before this court as the "Winds" code. Did you discuss this docu- 
ment with the Chief of Naval Operations at or about the time of its 
translation, as indicated on the document? 

A. Yes, very briefly. I think the Chief of Naval Operations men- 
tioned it. I think there was an instruction given to watch for those 
words. 

47. Q. To your knowledge, were any of these code words in Eng- 
lish or Japanese ever received in the Navy Department prior to the 
Japanese attack on 7 December 1941? 

A. Not to my knowledge, 

48. Q, There is evidence before this court that a Commander Mc- 
CoUum in the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a 
summary of information on the Japanese-United States relationship 
over a period some time preceding the 3rd or 4th of December, 1941, 
which was for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of such a 
dispatch ? 

A. Yes, we had discussed the advisability of making such a sum- 
mary, and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum 
the details of the various points and the details of the relationships 
and their intentions and so on. We had spent a great deal of time 
talking the thing over. Then Commander McCollum — I will say we 
found ourselves in very close agreement — prepared a dispatch — ^I 
have forgotten its terms — and brought it to me to check over, which 
I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and made sug- 
gestions of a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I don't re- 
member just what was in the dispatch. 

49. Q, Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it 
ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet? 

A. I don't know. We don't know at this time. 

50. Q, To your knowledge, did it ever reach the Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

A, I don't know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to Mc- 
Collum so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval 
Operations by the Office of Naval Intelligence with my own concur- 
rence. That is my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of 
Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral 
Wilkinson. 



( 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 881 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness on the secret por- 
tion of the testimony. 

[W9] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) : 

51. Q. Admiral, with regard to these intercepted dispatches, were 
you aware on the night of December 6 of any particular Japanese 
dispatches which were received in the Department and distributed? 
I refer particularly to a dispatch the 13 parts of which were received 
on Saturday afternoon and were ready for distribution at 9 o'clock. 

A. That night? 

52. Q. That night, and at the same time there was another dispatch 
which directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver this long dis- 
patch, the first 13 parts of which I have just referred to, together 
with the rest of the dispatch, at an hour to be designated by a later 
dispatch. Do you remember having information on Saturday night 
of the coming in of that long dispatch and the fact that it was to be 
delivered at a date to be designated later? 

A. I don't recall at the moment. I don't recall such a long dispatch. 

53. Q. I show you document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is the long 
dispatch and is the reply of the Japanese to the American note of 
November 26. 

A. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of De- 
cember. I don't remember when I saw it. 

54. Q. I show you document 38 of Exhibit 63, which is a dispatch 
from Tokyo to Washington, in which instructions are given that the 
time of presenting the memorandum which I have just shown you, 
Exhibit 39, will be designated later in a separate dispatch. I ask 
you whether or not you saw that message and if so, at what time, to 
the best of your recollection? 

A. I don't remember when I saw that.« I saw it. 

55. Q. Will you please state when you came down to the Navy 
Department on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. About 10: 30 or 11 o'clock the Chief of Naval Operations called 
me up and said he had a matter concerning sometliing which the 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet had written and wanted me to 
come down and see him about it. 

56. Q. Were you in conference with the Chief of Naval Operations 
on that morning at about the time stated, 10 o'clock, and if so, what 
other officers were present at that conference ? 

A. I went into the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the exact 
time I don't recall. He showed me a letter from the Commander-in- 
Chief, Asiatic Fleet and told me to prepare a reply. In addition to 
that, he showed me a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required 
the ambassador to present [IWO] the 14-part note to the Sec- 
]-etary of State on that date, that is, on the 7th. I asked him what, 
if anything, had been done about warning the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet about this dispatch, and he said he had already talked 
the matter over with General Marshall and that General Marshall had 
sent a dispatch out immediately to the Army authorities in Hawaii 
as soon as he had seen this dispatch, inviting their attention to this 
matter. I don't recall the terms of the dispatch that he sent. I did 
not get there in time, anyway. Admiral Stark said that he believed 



882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that the Commander-in-Chief already had the decrypted dispatch in 
his possession, because they were actually doing more of the decrypting 
in Pearl Harbor than we were in Washington. 
Examined by the court : 

57. Q. To which decrypted dispatch are you referring? 

A. The decrypted dispatch about the time of presenting the long 
dispatch, and we felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was 
himself in possession of both those decrypted dispatches, because we 
got them from him — not decrypted. We decrypted these diplomatic 
dispatches in Washington, and my understanding of it is that in Pearl 
Harbor they decrypted the diplomatic dispatches and also the naval 
dispatches and made traffic analysis. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Kear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) (Continued) : 

58. Q. Do you recall the particular hour at which the 14-part mes- 
sage was to be delivered to the Secretary of State ? 

A. I think it was to be delivered about 10 : 30 in the morning, but 
the Secretary of State told Admiral Stark over the 'phone that he 
had not been able to give the Japanese Ambassador an appointment 
at that time, and he had set it, I believe, for 2 : 30 in the afternoon 
Washington time. 

59. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63, which may refresh 
your memory somewhat as to the time of delivery of these dispatches. 

A. I can state from my own memory it was at 1 o'clock, but I 
believe the appointment actually was made for 2 : 30. 

60. Q. Did the instructions for delivery of that dispatch at 1 o'clock 
p. m. Washington time have any particular significance to you at the 
time you learned it was to be delivered at that hour? 

A. Yes, I thought the attack was going to come that day or the next. 
If I can amend it, I would say I thought the Japanese would make 
their attack on the British cm the United States or both on that day 
or the day following. 

[1001] Q. 61. Were you familiar while in Washington on your 
tour of duty in December, 1941, of the long distance telephones that 
were available for talking directly to Pearl Harbor? 

A. Yes. 

62. Q. Had you used that telephone on any occasion to speak to per- 
sons at Pearl Harbor before ? 

A. I never had. I think the Chief of Naval Operations had, but 
we had all been warned by the Director of Naval Communications 
that in his opinion we could not depend on the security of that tele- 
phone. Therefore, it was not used by the Navy Department a great 
deal for secret matters. The War Department used it a great deal 
then and later, but the scrambler was not supposed to be secure. The 
one in use at that time was not supposed to be secure. 

63. Q. You have testified as to the preparation of a reply to a mes- 
sage from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the preparation of 
which was assigned you by Admiral Stark on 7 December 1941. Did 
that relate to answering the request of the Commander-in-Chief, 
Asiatic Fleet, for information as to what assurances had been given 
Britain as to any armed support under conditions of several eventual- 
ities? 

A. No, it related primarily to the question of whether the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, would remain in Manila at the out- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 883 

break of war with Japan, that is, whether he, with most of his Fleet, 
would remain in the Manila area at the outbreak of war with Japan 
or would send the Fleet to the southward initially and later proceed 
there himself. 

64. Q. Did you have any information prior to 7 December 1941 as 
to a movement of Japanese carriers to the eastward from Japan? 

A. No. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Bet.) : 

65. Q. Admiral, I may have misunderstood you, but this has to 
do with a remark I believe you made about the decrypting of dis- 
patches at Pearl Harbor, My understanding is that all that was 
ever dealt with in the form of decrypted information at Pearl Harbor 
had to do with the location of ships and ship movements; am I not 
correct in that ? 

A. I don't know. On several occasions I inquired from the Director 
of Naval Communications as to whether or not in the case of a partic- 
ular dispatch the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was getting that 
dispatch or whether we should not send him a dispatch and quote it. 
On every occasion I was assured that the Commander-in-Chief was 
getting as much as we were, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
he was getting it sooner than we were. 

[1002 \ 66. Q. That came to you through a second party? 

A. That came to me from the Director of Naval Communications. 
I don't know what the system was. 

Examined by the court : 

67. Q. In the further amplification of your reply concerning the 
significance of 1 p. m. time for delivery of the dispatch, you stated 
that you expected an attack by the Japanese against the United States 
or Great Britain, or both, on that day, December 7, or the next day. 
Would you say where you expected that attack to be delivered ? 

A. Yes, I expected a landing on certainly the Kra Peninsula, a land- 
ing in Siam and attacks of one nature or another, air probably, on the 
Philippines, because we had scouting planes out there, and some form 
of attack in Hawaii. 

68. Q. But I do not gather, then, that there was anything specific 
in your mind concerning an attack against Pearl Harbor on that day 
or the next ? No indication ? 

A. Nothing further than that the attack made by the Japanese in 
the East would be accompanied by one or more of the five forms of 
attack on our forces in Hawaii, which had been mentioned in the pre- 
vious correspondence. 

69. Q. Did you have knowledge of the dispositions of the Japanese 
Fleet to the extent that you were able to say whether you considered 
an attack at a distance across the whole Pacific Ocean to be within the 
capabilities of the Japanese Fleet, considering the other movements 
they had under way ? 

A. We did not know where the major portion of the Japanese Fleet 
was. Our deductions from what we had seen — not from decryptions 
but from what we had actually seen — were that there was to be a cover- 
ing force generally in the Marshalls-Caroline area and that the so- 
called China Fleet, the Third Fleet, with additions of some sort, would 
carry on the naval missions in the China Sea. 



884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. Q. Were you familiar with the bulletin which the Director of 
Naval Intelligence issued as of December 1, 1941, which is quoted in 
the Roberts Report and of which this court has judicial notice, concern- 
ing the Japanese naval situation ? 

A. I have forgotten the terms of that dispatch. 

71. Q. I refer you particularly to the last sentence (indicating). 
A. I remember that and believe that I saw that before it was put 

out and concurred. 

72. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that the information available to the 
United States concerning the location of the Japanese Fleet was ex- 
tremely vague ? 

A. I can't answer that categorically. "Vague" is a relative term. 
We had a great deal of information about the movements and oper- 
ations of the Japanese. We never had enough, and we never do have 
enough. 

[1003'] 73. Q. Well, inexact and incomplete ? 

A. I will answer that it was incomplete. 

74. Q. Admiral, speaking of these decrypted messages being at 
hand in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, do we under- 
stand that all these messages which had been decrypted and which 
are before this board, that you had the impression that all the infor- 
mation contained therein was in the hands of the Commander-in- 
Chief , Pacific ? 

A. I had been informed that was the case by the Director of Naval 
Communications on several occasions. 

75. Q. Was that the reason you did not inform the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet as to the contents of these messages? 

A. Yes, sir. 

76. Q. Was there any check made to see that the Commander-in- 
Chief had the same information in these decrypted messages he ought 
to have had ? 

A. I made none, except I brought the matter up with the Director of 
Naval Communications on several occasions. The first time was prob- 
ably March or April, 

77. Q. Who was the Director of Naval Communications at that 
time ? 

A. Admiral Noyes. 

78. Q. The court is speaking of messages which have been reviewed 
here as super-secret messages and which you stated in your under- 
standing were all decrypted in Honolulu. 

A. That was my impression at that time. Now, I have been in- 
formed since then tliat tlie diplomatic messages were decrypted in 
Washington. Whether the}' were sent out to the Commander-in-Chief 
or not and whether he decr3'pted them, I don't know of my own knowl- 
edge. I understood lie also decrypted them out there. 

79. Q. That understanding came from Admiral Noyes? 
A. Yes, sir. 

80. Q. I refer you to document 40, document 37, document 36, and 
document 24 and ask if you at any time were cognizant of the contents 
of these documents ? 

A. I saw document 24. I don't remember document 37. I don't 
remember document 36. 

81. Q. Did you have any information of them? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 885 

A. I would like to make a general answer to that question. I don't 
specifically remember any of these except 24, for the reason that we 
were getting these reports and had been getting them for months, and 
I would occasionally glance at them to see the nature of the informa- 
tion which was being sent by the secret agents, but I did not read all 
of them unless there was some particular thing that was necessary for 
me to see. [lOOJf] Lieutenant Mott of the Office of Naval In- 
telligence would bring these dispatches around. There would be a 
great many dispatches, and he would mark the important ones. I 
would glance through and look at all the others and see if there was 
something I wanted to see, but to those movement reports, which had 
been going on for months, I paid no particular attention. 

82. Q. We are well aware of the movement reports, but what we 
had in mind specifically was the dispatch which requested information 
from Honolulu as to the exact berthing of different ships in the harbor, 
which, according to testimony brought out heretofore, was a rather 
unusual dispatch. 

A. No. 37 says, "Please report as to the following areas as to vessels 
anchored therein: Pearl Harbor, Mamola Bay, and the areas adjacent 
thereto." It wants to know the vessels in Area "N" but not their 
exact anchorage. 

83. Q. There is another dispatch requesting the exact berthing. 
A. I don't recall seeing such a dispatch. Number 40 — Area "A". 

A battleship, Oklahoma class, entered and one tanker left port, and 
then Area "C", but there is no exact anchorage. Area "A" and "C" I 
know nothing about. 

84. Q. Admiral, in this proposed dispatch from OpNav to Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific about December 4, giving a summary of in- 
formation which you stated you discussed with Commander McCollum 
and that you initialed, did you feel, in going over that dispatch, that 
this information would be valuable to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific for his information regarding the status as of that date ? 

A. My memory is quite vague on that subject. I remember at some 
time in that period discussing with Commander McCollum and read- 
ing a dispatch on that subject. I believe I initialed it and returned 
it to him and expected the Director of Naval Intelligence to send it, 
but I'm not too sure of it. 

85. Q. You initials would indicate that you concuri-ed in sending it? 
A. Yes, sir. 

86. Q. Eeferring to this so-called "Wind's" message, are we correct 
in understanding that you had no knowledge of any execute of that 
message designating the objective of Japan ? 

A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes 
called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don't recall. 
I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: "The 
Winds message came in," or something of that sort. 

87. Q. Did he report to you what the "Winds" message meant and 
what it was interpreted as ? 

A. Yes. 

[loos'] 88. Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware of that, 
either from information from you or otherwise ? 

A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him. 

89. Q. Was any discussion had as to the importance of sending that 
reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? 



886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Not SO far as I know. I did not participate in any such dis- 
cussion. I assumed that the Commander-in-Chief had that. 

90. Q. With reference to all of these super-secret decrypted message, 
was it your understanding, as War Plans officer, that the Cliief of Naval 
Operations was fully conversant with all of them and their contents, 
and did you discuss some of them or all of them ? 

A. Frequently we discussed them. I believe he had a special folder 
with one set of them that was given to him. Then there was another 
folder that was carried around by Lieutenant Mott and shown to cer- 
tain other officers in the Department. 

91. Q. Did you discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations at any 
time the importance of transmitting the contents of some of these 
messages to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? 

A. No, sir. I discussed it on several occasions with the Director 
of Naval Communications and was assured that he had them. 

92. Q. And you were assured that the Commander-in-Chief had de- 
crypted these messages and had full information ? 

A. Yes. 

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
TI. S. Navy: 

93. Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63, 
which is the message which set up the so-called Winds code, do you 
recall whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds 
code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United 
States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely 
meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic rela- 
tions between the United States and Japan ? 

A. My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatic 
relations and probably war. 
Reexamined by the court: 

94. Q. When you heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an exe- 
cute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of 
such high significance that action should be taken immediately to 
transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? 

A. No, I assumed that he had it. On Fridav there was a discussion 
between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general 
situation — 

[1006^ ^ 95. Q. Friday, December 5 ? 

A. Yes, sir. There was a discussion among the three of us, and 
we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of com- 
mand preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary. 

Recross-examined bv the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (R«t.) : ^ 

96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes 
as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system, 
was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese 
relations? 

A. Yes. 

97. Q. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you re- 
ceived information that the Commander-in-Chief was not receiving 
this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after 
December 7, 1941, that you received that information? 



i 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 887 

A. I have never received such information. I have never been 
informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypt- 
ing the diplomatic dispatches. 

Keexamined by the court : 

98. Q. In your statement with respect to your conference with Ad- 
mirals Stark and Ingersoll on 5 December you said that you felt that 
you had all agreed that the Commander-in-Chief had sufficient infor- 
mation ; is that correct ? 

A. And directives. 

99. Q. And directives? 
A. Yes, sir. 

100. Q. Principally, do we understand by that that the war message 
of November 27 was one of them to which you had reference with 
respect to directives and instructions? 

A. That is one of them. There were quite a number of additional 
messages that went out about that time and for several days thereafter 
concerning the destruction of codes at the outlying islands and in China 
and so on, and then there was, I think, another message of about De- 
cember 4. It seems to me there was a message of December 4 that may 
have been with respect to the destruction of codes. We sent some to the 
islands and some to the Commander-Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and gave 
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet informationon all of them, ex- 
cept one or two that primarily concerned the Commander-in-Chief, 
Asiatic. 

[1007] 101. Q. But these messages you referred to were destruc- 
tion of code messages, were they not ? 

A. Most of the messages I referred to were orders issued by the 
Chief of Naval Operations for the destruction of our own codes. How- 
ever, there were two other dispatches. Exhibit 66 and Exhibit 20, which 
informed the Commander-in-Chief that approximately December 1 
these officials in London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, Batavia, and 
Washington, have been ordered to destroy their code machines and 
codes. 

102. Q. Admiral, in reply to your former question, where you 
stated in that and in this conference when you stated that you felt 
that you three officers — Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and your- 
self — felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had full information, 
did the fact that you felt that he had decrypted all of these super- 
secret messages have an effect upon your approval of that decision ? 

A. It wasn't so much that we were concerned about the information 
that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet had. We were con- 
cerned as to the instructions he had received for carrying on the war 
when attacked, and for taking on necessary precautionary measures. 
We felt that he had been kept informed continuously by the Depart- 
ment as to the major changes in the situation, and that we believed 
that he had as complete a picture of the situation as we had in Wash- 
ington. It was always Admiral Stark's endeavor to keep them com- 
pletely up to date in regard to the situation. 

103. Q. But what we are trying to bring out is this : You had certain 
information in Washington, super secret messages which we have 
referred to in this testimony. Those messages gave certain informa- 
tion which would or would not have been valuable to the Commander- 



888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in-Chief. In your testimony you stated that you assumed that the 
Commander-in-Chief had decrypted these messages. Now we tried 
to ask you the question: that your assuming that he had decrypted 
these messages had a weight in your feeling that he had full informa- 
tion on the subject? 

A. Probably it did, Admiral. I don't recall thinking of that par- 
ticular point. Probably it did. 

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

104. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 22, and ask you if that is one 
of the messages from the Navy Department to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet regarding the destruction of codes, to which 
you referred in your testimony ? 

A. That is one of them. 

105. Q. Do you find anything in that dispatch which directs the 
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet or any other person to destroy 
codes ? 

A. No, there is nothing in that dispatch. My recollection is that 
there were one or more dispatches to the Commander Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier, concerning some of the [1008] islands — 
"Wake, for example — which directed it. My recollection is that. 

106. Q. I draw attention to this exhibit, that the origin number of 
that dispatch is 061743. What time was that dispatch originated, in 
Washington time? 

A. I don't know. I had nothing to do with preparing that dispatch. 

107. Q. Would it refresh your memory any to state that at the time 
of the origin of that dispatch those numbers referred to Greenwich 
civil time? 

A. I saw the dispatch before it went. I had nothing to do with its 
preparation nor its sending. 

108. Q. I will ask you if you can identify in this dispatch whether 
or not this dispatch was not sent in the lowest classification of sending 
dispatches, namley, deferred ? 

A. I don't know what precedence it was given. I had nothing to 
do with sending the dispatch. 

109. Q. I invite your attention to the fact that on the blanks where 
"priority," "routine," or "deferred" may be indicated, that there are 
no X's or checks opposite either priority or routine. 

A, What is the question, please ? 

110. Q. And then from that information, Admiral, you are still 
unable to state whether or not that dispatch was indicated as to be 
transmitted as a deferred dispatch? 

A. I don't know the precedence it has. It has no marking. I had 
nothing to do with the preparation or sending of this dispatch. 

Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, 
U. S. Navy (Ret) : _ 

111. Q. Admiral, you mentioned that you recalled a communication, 
a dispatch, being sent to the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal 
Frontier, in respect to the destruction of codes at Wake. I show you 
Exhibit 21 and ask you if that is the dispatch you had in mind. 

A. No, this was with regard to Guam, and it is addressed to NavSta, 
Guam. My recollection is that a dispatch went to the Commander of 
the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier concerning the devStruction of 
codes on Wake. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 889 

^ 112. Q, So such a dispatch as you recall might not have actually 
been sent ? You wouldn't know, first-hand ? 

A. The answer is, my recollection is that such a message was sent. 

Extracted testimony of Bear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy. 
Pages 1026-1051, inclusive. 

[1026] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly 
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. 
Examined by the judge advocate : 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station? 

A. Leigh Noyes, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Senior Member, Board 
of Inspection and Survey, Pacific Coast section. 

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the dates of 15 
October 1941 and December 7, 1941 ? 

A. Director Naval Communications. 

3. Q. Will you state in general the organization of your office as of 
that time as it relates to the function of checking and distributing 
intelligence information — the organization in general ? 

A. The handling of communication intelligence was a joint affair 
between the Office of Naval Communications and the Office of Naval 
Intelligence, which of course are both divisions of the Office of Chief 
of Naval Operations. In general, the Director of Naval Communica- 
tions was responsible for the mechanics of crypto-analysis, including 
interception which could be done by naval means, which amounts to in- 
tercepting radio transmissions. Crypto-analysis was carried on by the 
Director of Naval Communications with assistance from the Office 
of Naval Intelligence, and when such intelligence as developed was 
turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence to handle according 
to their usual procedure. Not the usual procedure, because this par- 
ticular form of intelligence was considered most secret — a much 
higher degree of secrecy than the ordinary designation, "Secret", due 
to the fact that it is useless if any inkling reaches the enemy of the 
fact that we are able in any way to read his communications. 

4. Q. Did all intelligence information that was checked in your 
division pass through your hands before it went to other offices or 
echelons of command ? 

A. You mean my personal hands ? 

5. A. Yes. 

A. No, my office was organized like any other office during the 
emergency. It worked twenty-four hours a day. At various times 
I had some other duty ; someone else was acting head of the division. 
I was on two or three selection boards. Those were the main times 
I was away from the office. 

6. Q. In the event of your absence from the office, what system 
was there to release information to other officers or higher authority? 

A. In this particular respect you are speaking of communication 
intelligence ? 

[1027] 7. Q. Exactly nothing else, sir. 

A. Under normal conditions, the Director of Naval Intelligence and 
I worked together. If one of us wasn't immediatey available, the 
other one acted for him to see that action was taken ; and if there was 
anything that was really hot, you might say, when either one of us 
was temporarily away, the next acting officer took over, and we had 
a 24-hour watch, both of us, which handled these matters continuously. 



890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. Q. Well, in the event that important information came into your 
office outside of the working hours of the Navy Department, when 
neither you nor the Director of Naval Intelligence would be in the 
office, what arrangements were made for the distribution of this infor- 
mation to other officers or higher authority ? 

A. There was a 24-hour watch of officers in my own especial watch, 
aside from the ordinary communications watch. Anything that came 
up that was considered important, during the night, the officer would 
call me and come up in an automobile to my house and bring me 
whatever the paper was, and if I considered it important enough I'd 
go with him to Admiral Stark's quarters or to Anderson or whoever 
it happened to be. In other words, we covered twenty-four hours 
a day according to the circumstances. It didn't often happen that 
things turned out that required that quick action, but that did develop 
several times. 

9. Q. Adverting to this intelligence information that arrived in 
your office, did you filter out any information before it passed to higher 
authority, or did you pass along everything that came to your hands 
of that nature ? 

A. The material we had to work with, of course, consisted of thou- 
sands of messages, and the general trouble was to get action quickly 
enough to be of value, not to always be working from the bottom of 
the pile. The usual procedure, in the case of matter that was obvi- 
ously inconsequential, was to lay it aside, and we never were able 
to keep up; we always had something to work on, because we could 
always work back into past history. It was all available to the repre- 
sentatives of the various offices concerned. 

10. Q. Exactly what I am trying to get at. Admiral — who did this 
weeding-out process, of deciding what information was to be sent 
other officers or higher authority and what was to be kept on file in 
your office for future reference if that were required ? 

A. Well, the translators; only a few people read Japanese. The 
people who read Japanese, when they got as far as to see a thing was 
obviously something about an allotment for typewriters or something 
like that, they didn't go any further. It was impossible to cover 
everything, and when they saw a thing that seemed not to be worth 
while, they went ahead until they found something that seemed to 
be of value. 

[10^8] 11. Q. Having covered the field of when a message was 
not translated — in the event that a message was completely translated 
and made available, in the case of this type of message, did you or any 
other officer in the chain of command weed out any information from 
there on before it was passed on to other officers or higher authority? 

A. No. 

12. Q. Now this information that was finally collected and on which 
a decision was made to pass it on to other officers or higher authority, 
did you or anyone else that you know of evaluate this informatiton 
before it went to an officer — say the Chief of Naval Operatitons ? 

A. No, the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a mentioned, was re- 
sponsible for the finished information. It was turned over to him. 
I was responsible for the mechanics of obtaining it, and after that it 
was turned over to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who handled 
it personally, and we only had one book — one copy in a book — and he 
took that book to the people that he was directed to show it to. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 891 

13. Q. As the judge advocate understands the situation from Com- 
mander Kramer, who testified before this court in Pearl Harbor, the 
system was to take all messages that had been translated in the Com- 
munications Intercept Division directly to the distributees in the Navy 
Department and in the government circles without evaluation or with- 
out changing the messages in any way except that sometimes he put 
a note or a clip on important messages. As I understand your tes- 
timony now, it was to the effect that sometimes the Director of Naval 
Intelligence exercised the function of evaluating this information ; is 
that understanding correct? 

A. No, I didn't intend to say that. You asked me to say that the 
Director of Naval Intelligence did, and I wasn't in a position to say 
exactly what he did. The system was for him to take the book. Lieu- 
tenant Commander Kramer was his representative in my office, and 
he may have carried the book for him some times when he wasn't avail- 
able — something like that, but generally, the Director of Naval In- 
telligence handled the matter very much himself. 

14. Q. Well, do you know of your own knowledge, from having con- 
tact wtih that officer and with other officers in the Navy Department, 
whether it was the custom of the Director of Naval Intelligence to 
evaluate this information before he passed it along? Do you know 
that of your own knowledge ? 

A. It is my understanding that he did not, because as I understand 
it, it was taken immediately. As soon as possible after 8 : 30 in the 
morning I used to go over whatever was available, and we made it a 
matter of minutes to get it through the machinery. 

15. Q. In other words, do I understand correctly, that documents 
were taken directly from the translators, or through [1209] you, 
to the distributees without delaying or evaluating the information and 
changing its form ? 

A. In general, we didn't have distributees. There was a copy in 
the book, and the book was carried around to the various people who 
were supposed to see the book. 

16. Q. Commander Kramer told this court in Pearl Harbor there 
were seven copies made for the Navy Department and seven copies 
for the Army — that these copies were delivered to regularly designated 
distributees in the Navy Department, and delivered at their offices as 
a complete copy ; is that your understanding of the method of distribu- 
tion? 

A. I think he is talking about a later date myself. I think prob- 
ably it did develop into that as the war went along. The original 
plan was to have only one copy. It is true we had to exchange with 
the Army, because we worked together. We pooled our combined in- 
tercept resources, and each took a part of the material, and we ex- 
changed copies. 

17. Q. Well, is it your testimony, then, that prior to 7 December 
1941, as you remember it, only one booklet or copy was made of de- 
crypted traffic for persons in the government circles that the Navy was 
responsible for keeping informed ? 

A. Well, I wouldn't like to contradict Lieutenant Commander Kra- 
mer, because he was the one that did the work, and he probably has 
got a better memory tlian I have of that subject. I did not mean to 
convey the impression that only one copy was made. There were file 
copies, there were copies for the Army, but originally, a book was 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 14 



892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

made up with one copy to be shown to people outside the people tech- 
nically concerned with obtaining the information. 

18. Q. Would it be your answer, then, that distributees like Admiral 
Stark, the Secretary of State, and the President, and the Secretary of 
the Navy, would all see the same copy; is that the meaning you in- 
tend to convey by your answer? 

A. No, I have to add the President and the Secretary of State ; that 
is part of the seven. I thought you were talking about the Navy De- 
partment. I didn't realize you meant the other people concerned. 

19. Q. Well, can you recall whether or not the distributing system 
required that a copy be left with the Chief of Naval Operations for 
his sole and independent use? 

A. He didn't ; that is not my memory. I thought the book was taken 
to him at that time. 

20. Q. But you do not know whether he was left a copy? 
A. No. 

21. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval 
Operations' dispatch of 27 November 1941, and has been [lOSO] 
popularly called by witnesses before this court the "war warning 
dispatch." Were you acquainted with the contents of this dispatch 
on or bofer 7 December 1941 ? 

A. These are my initials on this draft ; those are my initials. 

22. Q. Were you present at any conference or discussion regarding 
this dispatch prior to its having been released ? 

A. As I remember it, Admiral Turner showed me the dispatch before 
he took it in for release. These are his initials. (Indicating.) These 
are mine. (Indicating) It was- prepared by Opl2, which was War 
Plans. 

23. Q. Do you know what was intended to be conveyed by the 
first sentence of this dispatch — "This is a war warning?" 

A. I understood it to mean that there was a warning to the address- 
ees that war with Japan was imminent. 

24. Q. This dispatch also contains another statement: "Negotia- 
tions with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the 
Pacific have ceased." Do you know what information this sentence 
was based on? 

A. I do not. 

25. Q. Well, had negotiations as of 27 November 1941 ceased in 
fact? 

A. I don't remember at this time on what information it was based ; 
it wasn't based on any information that came through me. Whatever 
the statement was, I assumed at the time it was correct. I hadn't 
any doubt it was correct. I will be glad to express an opinion. It 
is purely my recollection — a general recollection ; it may not be correct. 
I think that at that time Nomura and Kurusu stated that they were 
through. The United States hadn't accepted what they had proposed, 
and negotiations were supposed to be over. Afterwards, they were 
reopened, like all diplomatic situations ; it was a case of bluff at the 
time — a diplomatic bluff in regard to the ceasing of negotiations, but 
that is purely my memory, and that wasn't anything that I had any 
official knowledge of. 

26. Q. Whose duty was it in the Navy Department between 1 
October and 7 December 1941 to see that the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific Fleet was supplied with all available intelligence? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 893 

A. Well, I should say it was the joint responsibility of the Office 
of Chief of Naval Operations and — intelligence is a pretty broad 
subject. It came from a good many sources; this particular thing 
must have come from the State Department in Washington. Pri- 
marily, the Director of Naval Intelligence is concerned with the dis- 
semination of intelligence, but he is a subordinate to the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

27. Q. Admiral, I will be a little more specific; as re- U031] 
gards the intercepted, decrypted intelligence traffic that was received 
in your office, who was responsible for seeing that the Commander- 
in-Chief of Pacific Fleet was kept informed of information of an 
important character contained in this category? 

A. As I mentioned previously, it came under the specific cog- 
nizance of the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a subordinate of 
the Chief of Naval Operations. We all worked together on this 
particular matter. 

28. Q. I show you Exhibit 21. This is a Chief of Naval Operations 
dispatch of December 4, 1941, directing the Naval Station, Guam, 
to destroy all secret and confidential publications. Will you state 
the reasons that this dispatch was sent, if you know them? 

A. This was one of a series of dispatches sent, directing the destruc- 
tion of all secret publications in the Pacific that could be spared 
in view of the imminence of war. I prepared it. It was sent on the 
4th of December. This is my handwriting (indicating) ; and 1 
prepared this dispatch, Avhich is one of some others. 

29. Q. Imminence of war with what country. Admiral? 
A. Japan. 

30. Q. Could you set out in brief the information you had as of 
the time you prepared this dispatch that lead you to believe that 
a war with Japan was then imminent? 

A. Well, I would say that there never was any question in my 
mind following the dispatch of the 27th of November, that the pos- 
sibilities of war with Japan were strong. 

31. Q. Did you base youj- dispatch then, directing the destruction 
of codes and ciphers in Guam, solely on the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions' dispatch of 27 November ? 

A. No, Admiral Turner and I discussed it, and we decided that the 
time had come when everything that could be spared had better be 
destroyed, because we didn't want to have our communications ruined 
by sudden attack. 

32. Q. The judge advocate is trying to get a record of what your 
concept was of the imminence of w'ar at that time — in other words, 
what facts, or upon what facts, did vou base vour opinion that this 
dispatch was necessary — the one of December 4, 1941 ? 

A. The seriousness of the situation in the Pacific. I couldn't give 
you the exact items as they came uji between the 27th and the 4th. 
Things had gotten progressively worse ; this dispatch directed all pos- 
sible confidential publications except those essential for current pur- 
poses and special intelligence be destroyed. You will notice the orig- 
inal dispatch as written said "for operations", and after w^e discussed it, 
we cut out that and said, "current purposes and special intelligence." 
Those were retained, and they were directed to be [103^] pre- 

pared to destroy the ones remaining. They would be prepared to 
destroy them instantly in event of final emergency. The same dispatch 



S94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, and the Commander-in- 
Chief Pacific. This one went to Guam. 

33. Q. But you have not yet told us the developments since 27 No- 
vember 1941, which made you think this dispatch was necessary? Be- 
tween 27 November and 4 December 1941. 

A. No, I don't think I could give you the exact sequence of events 
between those two dates. Ambassador Nomura, and I expect. Am- 
bassador Kurusu, were in Washington, and the negotiations were 
apparently not proceeding well. There was no specific event that 
occurred on the morning of the 4th that caused me to send this dispatch. 

34. Q. Who was responsible for the decision that the sending of this 
dispatch, Exhibit 21, was necessary? 

A. Chief of Naval Operations. I prepared the dispatch, as re- 
leased by Admiral Ingersoll. I sent it in to him. I suppose that he 
took it up, as it was customary for him to do before actually releasing 
after discussing things, with the Chief of Naval Operations. 

35. Q. Did you initiate this dispatch? 
A. Yes. 

36. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding, then, that you pre- 
pared this dispatch for release by the Chief of Naval Operations 
because you then thoughtjthat such a dispatch was advisable ? 

A. Yes, sir. Is it perfectly clear that on these dispatches where it 
says, "released", that the authority who released the despatch in these 
cases is Ingersoll, who was Assistant Chief of Operations, and cus- 
tomarily did the signing of his name. He conferred with the Chief of 
Naval Operations, and I suppose got his authority before he released 
them. I did insist that any important dispatches should be released 
by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

37. Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which 
has been familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to ex- 
amine it and state whether you had seen this document on or after 
the date of its translation, which is noted in the right-hand corner 
as being 28 November 1941? 

A. Yes. 

38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document 
when it was brought to your attention ? 

A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations 
to cover this point. 

39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these [1033] 
steps to get intercepts from your stations, will 3'ou state whether any 
of the code words as set out in document 15 were received in the Navy 
Department, either in Japanese or in plain English ? 

A. They were not. 

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 
and Document No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications 
Commission. I ask };ou whether you were ever acquainted with the 
information contained in these documents prior to the Japanese attack 
on 7 December 1941. 

A. I have no recollsction of ever having seen this document. 

41. Q. Either 2 or 3 — either document? 
A. No, sir. 

42. Q. Had yooi ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941? 

A. Not to the best of my knowledge. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 895 

43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an officer in your Division 
made any telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter 
contained in this winds code, of document 15, that you have previously 
been shown? 

A No. 

44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, havin<r been informed by some 
officer in the Navy Department that there had been received in the 
Navy Department certain information about winds, and that your 
reply was, "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange direction," or 
words to that effect ? Do you have any recollection of such a conversa- 
tion ? 

A. I do not. 

45. Q. I would like to refer you to document 17 of Exhibit 63, which 
you have before you, and ask you whether you ever saw or had been 
informed of the contents of this document on or before 7 December 
1941. This document is the Secretary of State's note of November 26, 
1941. 

A. I couldn't say whether I was familiar with this particular paper 
or not. 

46. Q. Can you state whether you knew, on or after November 26, 
1941, whether or not Mr. Hull had delivered a note to the Japanese 
diplomats in Washington with reference to the negotiations that were' 
then in progress? 

A. No, I couldn't answer that question. That is three years ago. I 
can't say on what day. This traffic which has my initials, and things 
that I prepared, I am glad to testify to, but I cannot say exactly when 
I saw or if I did see many [1034-] of these hundreds of dis- 
patches. No, I cannot state. 

47. Q. Before 7 December 1941, had you been expecting to receive 
any information in the Navy Department with reference to the nego- 
tiations that had been in progress between the United States and 
Japan ? 

A. I don't understand that question. 
At the direction of the court, the question was repeated. 
A. During this period we were making every effort to obtain any 
information possible in regard to the United States-Japanese relations. 

48. Q. We have testimony before this court. Admiral, from sub- 
ordinates who were in your office as of this period immediately pre- 
ceding 7 December 1941, that all personnel were on the alert for the 
receipt of some very important — or of a very important answer from 
the Japanese Government. Do you have any knowledge of this situ- 
ation ? 

A. From the time of the 27 of November, gradually getting more 
acute, we were making every effort to obtain any information possible. 
I couldn't say that we expected any particular message. 

49. Q. Or any particular information ? 

A. Anything that had to do with the relations between ourselves 
and Japan was of the highest priority. 

50. Q. But were you expecting any information of importance 
immediately preceding 7 December 1941, from the Japanese Govern- 
ment? 



896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I might say we were hoping. I couldn't say we were expecting. 

[1035] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. 
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

51. Q. I want to show you Document No. 39 of Exhibit 63 and re^er 
you to Parts 1 to 13 of this document and ask you whether or not 
prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 you had seen or been 
informed of the subject matter contained therein? 

A. Not before the 7th of December. 

52. Q. Will you state when, if ever, you were made acquainted 
with the contents of Parts 1 to 13 of this Document 39? 

A. No, I couldn't say the day I saw it. 

53. Q. Can you state where you were on the night of 6 December 
1941, after working hours ? 

A. I was at my office until about 8 : 00 o'clock. 

64, Q. Can you state where you were between 8 : 00 o'clock and mid- 
night on 6 December 1941 ? 

A. I don't know whether I came back down to the office or whether 
I stayed at home. 

55. Q. But your present recollection is that you have no knowledge 
of having seen that document, Parts 1 to 13, on the night of 6 De- 
cember 1941 ? 

A. That is my recollection. 

56. Q. Nor at any time subsequent thereto? 

A. No. As I I'emember it, the next morning, which was the 7th 
of December, I was down at my office about 9 : 00 o'clock. The con- 
ference was being held of Japanese representatives at the State De- 
partment. I imagine the note was delivered before the translation 
reached me. 

57. Q. Were you present in Admiral Stark's office at or about 10 : 00 
a. m., on the morning of 7 December 1941 ? 

A. I don't think so. 

58. Q. I AYould like to show you Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 
63, and ask you to state whether or not this part of this document 
ever came to your attention, and if so, when? 

A. This message wasn't translated until the 7th of December. 

59. Q. Had you ever been informed of it at any time, and if so, 
when ? 

A. I will have to say I don't remember. 

60. Q. I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you 
were ever made acquainted with the contents of this document? 

A. Yes. 

[1036] 61. Q. AVill you state when, and the circumstances sur- 
rounding it? 

A. I could not, except to make the statement that I did not see it 
until after the 7th of December. It was handled by the Army, it was 
an Army message, and I have heard from my colleague, General Mo- 
brun, the chief signal officer of the Army, that that was the message 
which they tried to forward to Pearl Harbor and it was not received 
until after the attack. That is hearsay on my part. 

62. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding from your answer 
that you did not see this document 41 at any time on the date of 7 
December 1941? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 897 

A. Yes. I spent the forenoon of Sunday, the 7th of December, in 
my office on various important communication matters, one of which 
was caused by the reported sighting of a Japanese convoy in the Far 
East, and I was sitting at my desk at 1 : 00 o'clock when the report of 
tl>e air raid on Pearl Harbor was sent out from Pearl Harbor. It 
was copied direct by the Navy Department and from then on the 
rest of the afternoon there were very many important communication 
matters going on. As to when I saw any one of these intelligence 
messages, I couldn't say. 

63. Q. Can you recall ever having informed the Chief of the War 
Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the Navy organizations 
in the Pearl Harbor area were decrypting this Japanese diplomatic 
cipher about which you have testified in a number of instances this 
morning, and which is before you now in the form of Exhibit 63 ? 

A. These messages we have discussed came in many different ciphers. 
1 would never have made the statement that all ciphers could be trans- 
lated in Pearl Harbor. 

64. Q. Did you ever inform the Chief of the War Plans Division, 
Captain Turner, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that 
which you were receiving in the Navy Department? 

A. No. 

65. Q. Did the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner, 
ever ask you or discuss with you whether or not the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet was being kept informed on the latest intelli- 
gence information that was being received through your division of 
the Office of Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. I saw Turner almost daily and we continually discussed the status 
of matters of interest to him. The work was broken up between 
different stations which he should have understood. 

[1037] 66. Q. But can you recall whether Captain Turner of 
the War Plans Division had ever raised the question with you as to 
whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in this 
period preceding 7 December 1941 was receiving an adequate amount 
of intelligence information from the Navy Department ? 

A. So far as I know. Turner, Wilkinson and myself were in entire 
agreement. This was a matter of continual discussion among the 
three mentioned and so far as I know there was never any question 
of this agreement. I can only say that we conferred almost daily 
on the question of what was being done and I thought that Admiral 
Turner had a clear understanding of what was being received in Pearl 
Harbor, as far as we could tell, and what was not. 

67. Q. From the testimony of Admiral Turner as he gave it on the 
stand yesterday, the judge advocate understood that witness to state 
that he had specifically asked you on one or more occasions whether 
or not this decrypted information that was received immediately prior 
to 7 December 1941 was being transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific Fleet. I ask you, Admiral, whether or not Captain 
Turner did discuss this matter with you? 

A. I said I discussed it. 

68. Q. Did he ask you that question ? 



898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. It is my remembrance that Admiral Turner asked what was our 
set-up in regard to intercepted messages and it was fully explained 
to him. 

69. Q. Was your explanation to Captain Turner that the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was or was not getting this 
intercepted traffic ? 

A. The messages that are in this file and that we have discussed 
were sent in many different enemy codes. Some of them we could 
read; some of them we could not. Some days we could read them; 
some days we could not. There is no such thing as a simple answer 
as to what was or was not being received. There was an intercept 
station fully staffed at Pearl Harbor. They specialized in certain 
codes that were most easily intercepted by them. They forwarded 
it to Washington, what they were able to make out of their particular 
task, and the same was true of the Asiatic Station. But to say that 
any individual message was received, it was also physically impossible 
to exchange every message. Right here is about two days traffic 
(indicating Exhibit 63). 

70. QT Do you know how intelligence information was transmitted 
in the purple code ? That is, by radio, cable, or what ? 

A. Usually by cable. 

71. Q. Did the Navy have any facilites in Pearl Harbor for inter- 
cepting information sent in the purple code by cable ? 

A. At the time there were no legal facilities for intercepting cable. 

[1038] 72. Q. Can you state whether or not the naval organiza- 
tion in Pearl Harbor was or was not receiving these purple code dis- 
patches sent by cable prior to 7 December 1941 ? 

A. No. 

The court then, at 11 : 06 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 15 a. m., at 
which time it reconvened. 

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the 
reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, interested party, whose counsel were present. 

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. 

Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina- 
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath 
previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony. 

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued) : 

73. Q. Do I understand your answer to mean that they were not 
receiving these cable dispatches transmitted in the purple code? 

A. I should say they probably were not. 

74. Q. Did you ever give Captain Turner, the Chief of the War 
Plans, any impression that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet was getting information of the type contained in the purple code 
intercepts? 

A. Not intentionally. 

75. Q. On 7 December 1941 what was the quickest means of com- 
munication between the Navy Department, Washington, and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor? 

A. Direct radio circuit between the Navy Department and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, if we could raise him ; if not, through Coml4. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 899 

76. Q. Was there telephonic communication between the Navy De- 
partment, Washington, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941 ? 

A. Not direct. 

77. Q. Will you state what circuits were involved in a telephonic cir- 
cuit between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor ? 

A. There is a regular commercial telephone circuit from the United 
States to Oahu, but as I understood it, the nearest outlet was several 
miles from the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters at Pearl Harbor. 

[10S9] 78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor on 7 December 1941 was there brought to your attention a 
dispatch that had been prepared by Commander McCoUum in the 
Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far Eastern Division in which there 
was a summary or resume of intelligence information to be trans- 
mitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? 

A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with 
me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communi- 
cation intelligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. 
I told him that in my opinion estimates of the situation should come 
from the Chief of Naval Operations. 

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message 
was ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

A. I do not. 

80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department 
with regard to releasing this dispatch ? 

A. I cannot, I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except 
to see that they were properly released. 

The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated 
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Hear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) : 

81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was 
prepared and being considered for transmission to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, do you remember whether any reference 
was made to the winds code system ? 

A. I do not. 

82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your 
office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code sys- 
tem if and when the execution signal was received ? 

A. We had a special 24-hour watch for all communication intel- 
ligence matters. 

83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese 
words that were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered 
to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly inter- 
ested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal ? 

A. I couldn't say. 

[IO4O] 84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there 
has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of 
the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and these 
had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would 



900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest 
moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was 
established ? 

A. No, I couldn't say. 

85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that 
the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thor- 
ough search in the Navy Department files had failed to reveal a copy 
of the execution signal. Would the Director of Naval Communica- 
tions files be the normal place in which that record would be kept? 

A. If it was received by naval means, yes ; if not, no, 

86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of 
the Director of Naval Communications the normal repository of such 
messages ? 

A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 

87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been re- 
ceived by naval intercepting means and therefore the record of this 
message would naturally be kept in the files of the Director of Naval 
Communications, would it not ? 

A. Yes. 

88. Q. Can you explan why this document is missing from the files 
of the Director of Naval Communications? 

A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think 
that any such message was received by naval means. 

89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution 
of the winds message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone 
of the execution in any form of the winds message? Is that the 
way you want to leave your testimony on that subject ? 

A. That is right; yes. 

90. Q. In your testimony before this court at the time that you 
were examining Exhibit 21, which was the dispatch from OpNav to 
Guam, directing them to destroy confidential publications, you used 
the expression in your testimony as being contained in tliis dispatch, 
"In view of the imminence of war." Is there such an expression in 
that dispatch ? 

A. There is not. 

91. Q. I show you Exhibit 22 that is before this court which is a 
dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, information 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and ask you if you can identify this 
dispatch, and if so, the approximate time that you saw it, and whether 
or not you prepared the dispatch ? 

A. I did. 

l^lOJfl^ 92. Q. Did you prepare that dispatch at your own initia- 
tive, or was it prepared by one of your subordinates at his initiative? 

A. I would say that I discussed this with Captain Safford in 20-G ; 
as to whether I suggested it to liim or he to me, I couldn't say. I 
discussed it with Admiral Turner, definitely, and with Admiral Wilkin- 
son, and sent it in to the Chief of Operations for release. 

[76*4^] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

93. Q. Do you remember whether or not the wording in this dis- 
patch was the same as proposed by Captain Safford ? 

A. This is my writing here — that correction. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 901 

94. Q. Do you remember whether Captain Safford in discussing this 
dispatch with you desired to insert the words, "in view of the imminence 
of war" ? 

A. I have no such recollection. It might be. 

95. Q. Will you please tell the court the Washington time of origin 
of this dispatch. 

A. It would be 12 : 43 on the Gth. 

96. Q. Will you tell the court in what classification that dispatch waa 
transmitted as to priority of sending i 

A. It was sent secret in ECM. 

97. Q. The preceding question was meant to cover the precedence 
in forwarding the dispatch, that is, whether or not it was sent priority, 
routine, or deferred ? 

A. It doesn't show on the copy. As a matter of fact, messages are 
transmitted direct to the Commander-in-Chief. 

98. Q. But was it not a rule in Communications at that time, in indi- 
cating the order in sending dispatches, that if there were "X" marks 
or checks against ''priority" it would be sent in that category, that if 
the checks were against "routine", it would be so sent, but that if 
there were no checks against "routine", it would be sent deferred ? 

A. That was the routine. 

99. Q. That was the procedure or rule at that time, was it not? 
A. Yes. 

100. Q. Then, this dispatch which you have referred to as being sent 
"in view of the imminence of war," was sent deferred as late as noon 
of the 6th of December ; isn't that so ? 

A. That is not so. 

101. Q. Why not? 

A. Because I handled the message personally. The routine was as 
you say. I was Director of Naval Conmiunications, and I sent mes- 
sages simply when they were to go specially. 

102. Q. After you directed that this message be sent was not its 
classification deferred, so that it could be delivered at nine o'clock the 
following working day without violating the communications regula- 
tions? 

A, No, 

[■104S] 103. Q. Will you point out in this dispatch where you 
have directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy any 
codes? 

A, It did not direct the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy 
his codes. 

104. Q, Did it direct him to have any codes destroyed ? 

A, The wording was, "You may authorize the destruction." 

105. Q, Did you consider that that was an order to destroy? 

A, The Chief of Naval Operations did not desire us to use language 
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that was not necessary. I 
drew this up for the release of the Chief of Naval Operations, and it 
met with his approval. (Beading) "In view of the international situa- 
tion and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may 
authorize" 

106. Q. Couldn't the Commander-in-Chief in his own discretion do 
as much ? 

A. In an emergency, yes. 

107. Q, Then, what was the object of this dispatch? 



902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. I should say the Commander-in-Chief would have hesitated to do 
it without some sort of directive from the Navy Department, and it 
was an appropriate authority to give him. 

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) , 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Examined by the court : 

108. Q. Referring to the radio communications system in effect be- 
tween Washington and Pearl Harbor: How long should it take to 
uncode a 20-word, special priority dispatch and transmit it from Wash- 
ington to Pearl Harbor, assuming no delay in reaching the addressee ? 

A. In the case of any special message, such as this one, if I was given 
the word in time by someone else who originated the message, in order 
to let me know it was coming or, as in this case, when I knew it was 
coming, the procedure was to have the message unciphered before its 
release, clear the Commander-in-Chief, set up the radio circuit, and 
just before the message was released it was transmitted. It took time 
to transmit the message. 

109. Q. I was also figuring on the time for uncoding. 

A. I handled all these special messages myself. Whenever they had 
to do with the war, that was the procedure we followed, and that was 
the reason for no priority appearing on that particular message. It 
was handled by hand. We also could not get the Commander-in-Chief 
direct. That meant a [1044] relay through Coml4, but when 
we did get the Commander-in-Chief direct, we cut the tape. We trans- 
mitted by tape and the message would go through in about a minute. 
When the Secretary landed at Pearl Harbor on a trip, Admiral Bloch 
sent a message reporting his arrival, and it was received in the Navy 
Department a minute and a half after he landed. 

110. Q. Wouldn't an hour be ample allowance, under these special 
circumstances, for getting the dispatch from the inception of sending 
it to the uncoding stage, transmission and decoding, and receipt by 
the addressee ? 

A. In general, yes, if it was not stopped by something else. There 
were peaks of traffic. 

111. Q. Assuming that the Chief of Naval Operations had written 
out a dispatch of not more than twenty words and sent it to you directly, 
designating the special urgency of the circumstances, would not an 
hour have been ample allowance to get it through either Coml4 or the 
Commander-in-Chief ? 

A. Get it as far as Coml-4 or the Commander-in-Chief himself. 

112. Q. Admiral, do you know of any message, other than that with 
respect to the destruction of codes, which was sent to the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific from November 27 to December 7, giving him the 
secret information you had received during that period! 

A. Oh, yes, a great deal of this went. I could not tell from memory. 

113. Q. Do you know whether any of these deciphered messages went 
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? 

A. Certain messages were sent to the Commander-in-Chief with a 
cipher on the original message, so that we deciphered there, but I 
could not say which ones were from here. 

114. Q. Do you have any knowledge of having sent any of these 
decrypted messages, the purple code messages, or anv information con- 
tained therein, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 903 

A. I could give you a negative answer. I could say the note was 
not sent. I could not say just which ones were sent, because when I 
had finished my responsibility was the mechanics of the crypto-analysis. 
The messages were turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence. 
Who saw them in the Navy Department or whether they went on was 
primarily a matter for Naval Intelligence. 

115. Q. If any one of these messages, or the contents of any of these 
so-called decrypted messages, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific, such message would have been sent through Naval Communi- 
cations, would it not? 

A. Well, it might have been sent by air mail or pouch. 

[104s'] 116. Q. I am speaking of Naval Oommunications aa 
such. 

A. I would not necesarily have seen it, no. 

117. Q. Was there any system in your office by which, generally 
speaking, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept informed as to 
the contents of these decrypted messages ? I am speaking now of the 
purple code. 

A. The purple code is just one method of communication. To handle 
that long message, for instance, the 14-part message, to take an ex- 
treme case, was a very difficult matter for us. Wherever it happened 
to be picked up, and we got hold of it, it required first decrypting, for 
which we often did not have the key. 

The court directed that the reporter read the question. 

A. The office of Coml4 was primarily set up to read naval matters. 
This so-called purple code, which was quite new, was, as far as we 
were concerned used primarily for diplomatic matters. 

118. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was kept informed of the contents of these purple 
code messages ? 

A. Of all these purple messages? 

119. Q. You have heard the question. 

A. Not all of these purple messages. It would have been a physical 
impossibility to do it. 

120. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the most 
important of these purple messages, and the information contained 
therein, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief for his information? 

A. Whenever the Director of Naval Intelligence or War Plans 
Division or the Chief of Naval Operations himself — Whenever any- 
one directed or requested that a message be forwarded, it was done. 

121. Q. But there was no system in your office by which the im- 
portant messages were transmitted ? 

A. Not the diplomatic messages. 

122. Q. Or to get checks on them to see that they had been received by 
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific? 

A. Not the diplomatic mesages. 

123. Q. When these important decrypted messages were received, 
did you have anything to do with sending them in to the Chief of Naval 
Operations, or did you insist on some initialing or something to show 
that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen these particular messages? 

A. It goes back to the question of Lieutenant Commander Kramer, 
who said that he had a separate book, as I understood 1.1046'] it, 



904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

for the Chief of Naval Operations. Originally, there was one book for 
the people in the Navy Department, which was carried by hand, first 
of all, by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Then it was directed to 
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who carried the book himself to 
the people concerned, first of all, the Chief of Naval Operations. 

124. Q. As Director of Naval Communications did you try to keep 
informed about the very important traffic flowing through? 

A. I did. 

125. Q. There has been referred to in this testimony the note of 26 
November, which was really the beginning, probably, of the message 
which you state Mr. Hull gave the Chief of Naval Operations with 
respect to the breaking off of negotiations. Did you have any idea 
about November 26 as to this note ? It is document 17 of Exhibit 63. 

A. No. 

126. Q. Did you know that the officers in your department were 
standing by and were anticipating a reply to this note from 26 Novem- 
ber to 7 December, 1941 ? 

A. We had set up a continuous watch, established direct telephone 
communication between the War Department and ourselves and had 
taken every step to get immediate action on anything important 
received. 

127. Q. But you had no reference to this special note of Novem- 
ber 26? 

A. No. It was not done on account of that. It was done on account 
of the general thing. There was no special step in regard to a particular 
note. 

128. Q. But due to the importance of this message, everybody was 
on the alert awaiting its answer? 

A. I gather from the question that somebody had said that they 
were giving that particular message — In my own mind, it was all 
important. 

129. Q. When the reply of this note of 26 November came in and 
was received, in accordance with the testimony heretofore given, on 
the afternoon of December 6, and those thirteen parts were translated 
and ready for delivery at 9 p. m. on December (>, did you hear at that 
time anything at all regarding this reply? I am asking this question 
in view of the fact that you stated in your testimony that if any im- 
portant reply came in, night or day, the watch officer would imme- 
diately inform you. 

A. I was there. I was in my own office at 8 : 30 Sunday morning. 
[1047] 130. Q. I am speaking of Saturday, December 6. 
A. Not to the best of my recollection at that time. 

131. Q. Did you see the reply consisting of those 13 parts on the 
morning of December 7? 

A. I could not say just when I first saw it. 

132. Q. You stated that if any of these decrypted messages were 
received in Honolulu, they were forwarded to Washington; is that 
correct ? 

A. No. 

133. Q. I meant that anything decrypted was forwarded to Wash- 
ington or the information contained therein? 

A. You have here a very small part of the mass of material that 
we had. The general plan was that the Commander-in-Chief pri- 
marily tried to build up the naval codes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 905 

134. Q. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific ? 

A. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. It was really Coml4. Coml4 
was on shore. It was a long process — a group here and a group there. 
From all that material they endeavored to get these naval codes in 
Coml4's establishment in readable shape. From time to time they 
sent their values to Washington, which was behind but kept up as 
material came in. The same way, there was a return exchange from 
Washington to Honolulu. A good deal of it was done by air mail 
and special messenger on account of the bulk of the traffic and the 
danger of what we were doing being discovered. 

135. Q. Admiral, we are discussing these important messages which 
have a bearing on information which was or was not sent to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific. We well realize that there were thousands 
of messages coming in, but these messages had a particular bearing 
on information which could have been used by the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific, and that is what we are discussing. 

A. Those messages are picked out of many other messages. 

136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of 
the "Winds Message" : Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant 
Commander Kramer came in with the execute to the "Winds Message" 
and said, "Here it is" ? 

A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which 
afterwards turned out not to be correct. That information was taken 
to mean that an execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. 
It turned out not to be correct. 

137. Q. You speak of a naval radio circuit. During your experi- 
ence in Washington was this Naval radio circuit quicker than the 
Army's means of communication between Washington and Honolulu? 

A. Yes. 

[J048] 138. Q. In other words, if you had had a very important 
message which was to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, for 
his information, even if originating by the Army, you would have 
sent it immediately by naval radio circuit ; is that correct? 

A. Yes. 

139. Q. Do you think a considerable time would have been saved 
thereby ? 

A. By following the procedure I outlined, that is the fastest that 
could be done. 

140. Q. By naval radio rather than Army circuit ? 

A. Faster than any means there was available, but that required 
some preparation. 

Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : • 

141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did 
you learn from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any 
form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." 
I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that 
subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just 
testified that you did receive some information. From where did this 
information come ? 

A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, there 
was a false alarm about it. 



906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was 
it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did 
not take it away from that particular subject, did it? 

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could. 

143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution 
of the ''Winds Message" ; is that right ? 

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution 
of the so-called "Winds Message" was finally received. 
Reexamined by the court : 

144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt 
of it with the Chief of Naval Operations ? 

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it 
more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only 
said that relations were strained. 

145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it? 

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally ? 
[1049] 146. Q. Yes. 
A. No. 

147. Q. Did you give him any information? 
A. He got a copy of it. 

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message 
from Alusna, Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether 
or not you have seen that dispatch, or whether j^ou recognize it, and if 
so, at what time did you see it? 

A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it. 

149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, 
please? 

A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department." 

150. Q. And continue for the first three lines. 

A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls 
of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end." 

151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations? 
A. It was his interj^retation apparently of the same message that 

had already been received. 

152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the 
War Department of the Japanese code would have reached about 
the same conclusion, in that they had the same words to work from? 

A. This was not necessarily 

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made 
the following statement : I call the court's attention to the fact that 
this was not a translation made in the War Department. This came 
from Batavia that way. 

The witness made the following statement : Somebody in Batavia 
had gained that information. 

153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same 
code system which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the 
"Winds Code" system? 

A. Probably. We discussed it with the War Department. They 
did not have mucli confidence, as I remember it, in the information 
from there as against the rechecking that was done in Washington. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 907 

154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds 
Message" was received ; that is, who gave it to you ? 

A. No. 

[lOSO] 155. Q. But you do not recollect that you did hear 
about the execution of this before 7 December 1941 ? 

A. It has been stated and it lias been testified to that there were 
six copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my recollec- 
tion for three years back as against my assistants. These people who 
handled the details were my subordinates, and their recollection of 
details is probably better than mine. 

Reexamined by the judge advocate: 

156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, 
what this false report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was? 

A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe 
there must have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that 
it was not finally found to be correct. 

157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain. Admiral, is the wording 
of the report which you received and which later you determined 
to be false? 

A. I don't know. 

158. Q. Do vou know from whom it was received? 
A. I don't. ' 

159. Q. Adverting again to document 3 of Exhibit 64, in which 
counsel for an interested party pointed out to you the words, "Japan 
will inform her consuls of war decision": His question seems to 
infer that this was a translation of the Japanese weather code. 
Might not the words, "war decision", have been an evaluation from 
other information as well as the weather code, as set up ? 

A. Except that the message states "code intercept." I don't 
think that this is an exact translation. It is a paraphrase. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make 
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject 
matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record 
in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by 
the previous questioning. 

The witness made the following statement: I would merely like 
to say that I am sorry not to have been able to answer the questions 
more specifically. Three years ago I had all the communications 
business of the De])artment to handle. This was one part of my 
duties. I realize that the court considers some of these messages 
of greater [lOol'] import than they were considered then. 

We made every attempt at the time to cull what we could handle. 
We had thousands of these messages. We had to get the best in- 
formation we could from them. Messages such as that note we 
could not have possibly transmitted in a secure means back to the 
field. It was most important that there should be no inkling of 
the fact to Japan that we could read any of her codes. There is no 
better way to have that discovered than to re-cipher a message 
which has been already sent by somebody. That is exactly what we 
did do in the ones we considered sufficiently important, but we had 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 15 



908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to keep down on the number of messages that were sent for those 
reasons. Although it was not my decision, I do not think that the 
details of the purely diplomatic matters were as important as some 
of the others. There are many more messages which at the time 
looked very important, but those particular ones were culled. We 
handled all we could with the personnel and the system we had 
available. It was very difficult for us to get Japanese translators. 
There are very few reliable Japanese translators in this country. We 
worked with the War Department. We split our work with them, 
and we had a great deal of difficulty in working in a foreign lan- 
guage, plus putting in an enemy secret code. It is not just an open 
and shut proposition. 
The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Eobert D. Powers, 
Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (Relative to introduction of exhibit), 
and Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U. S. Navy. Pages 1091- 
1108, inclusive. 

[10911 Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, 
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Robert 
D. Powers, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by 
the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and 
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding. 

Examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 

1. Q. Have you in your possession a document requested by the 
interested party, Admiral Stark? 

A. I have. It is a document containing intercepted dispatches 
prepared for the interested party, Admiral Stark, at the request of 
the judge advocate, by the Director of Naval Communications. It 
contains sixteen documents, duly authenticated under official seal. 

The document referred to was submitted to the judge advocate, to 
the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party. 
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the 
purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may 
be considered pertinent to the inquiry. 

There being no objection, it was so received and marked 
"EXHIBIT 68" for reference, description appended. 

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate, 
none of the parties to the inquiry desiring further to examine him. 

A witness called by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of 
the subject matter of the inquiry. 

Examined by the judge advocate: 

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station? 

A. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Com- 
munications, attached to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
U.S. Navy: 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 909 

2. Q. What duties were yt)ii performing during the latter half 
of 1941? 

A. Assistant Director of Naval Communications. 

3. Q. Admiral, 1 show you Exliibit 68, whicli contains sixteen sep- 
arate documents. Do yon recognize it ? 

A. These are extracts from the files of the Communications-Intelli- 
gence organization which relate to diplomatic traffic [1002] 
which had been intercepted and translated by the organization under 
the Director of Naval Communii-ations. 

4. Q. Will you read Document 1 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECRET 

From: Seattle (Sato). 

To : Tokyo. 

November 10, 1941. 

J-19: (Priority.) 

#165: (Message to Wasliington Circular #80.) 

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I 
have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on succes- 
sive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston. 

Relayed to and liOs Angeles. 

ARMY 24990 SECRET Trans. 11/19/41 (2) 

5. Q. Will you read Document 2 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Manilo (Nihro). 
To : Tokyo. 
1 November 1941. 
( Purple. ) 
#723. (Re your #318)* 

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is ex- 
tremely difiicult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the 
following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present. 

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Ai-my is 
progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the 
incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the 
various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis 
is being placed on the concentration of military strength. 

Localities are as follows : 

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino (several groups missing). 

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers sta- 
tioned in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneu- 
vers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may he a tem- 
porary measure. 

[1093] 2. In the vinicity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being 
used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more 
than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there. 

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry troops 
left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above 
place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are 
being built there and the docks are being enlarged. 

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is iSaid that 
even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited. 

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) 
and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not 
been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between 



910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Worlt is being carried on 
day and night and tlie progress is amazing. 

4. In Iba tliere are 30 or 50 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several 
score of altitude planes ( f ) it is said. 

Details by mail. 

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT) 



*JD-1 : 5681 : "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along 
the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, 
strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest. 

6. Q. Will you read Document 3 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

From : Tokyo. 

To : Manila. 

5 November 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#355. For Secretary Yuki. 

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the 
follovping items. Please arrange as yoxx think best for the same : 

[1094] These items in regard to each port of call: 

(1) Conditions at air ports on land. 

(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes. 

(3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces. 

(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments. 

JD-1: 6424 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-13^1 (6-AR) 

7. Q. Will you read Document 4 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Manila (Nihro). 

To : Tokyo. 

1 November 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#722. 

1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers 
entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st, 
destination unknown. 

2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison 
left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain). 

3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources 
the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands 
is as follows : 

(a) Military Planes. 
Large bombers, 29. 
Scout planes, 324. 
The same, B type, 62. 
Fighters, 317. 

The same, B type, 131. 
Pursuit planes, 302. 
The same, D type, 69. 
Training planes, 49. 
Total, 1283. 

(b) Naval planes. 
Large flying boats, 26. 

[1095] 4. Ships in port on the 1st; MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*, 
BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite : 
RET*, PASU*, 2 Z. 

5. According to a reiwrt from the De La Rama steamship company two of 
their ships, the Dona E.staban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), 
had been renuisitioned by the local American Army. 

JD-I: a335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (&-AR) 



♦Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are TON (Houston) : MADDO (Marble- 
head) ; HON (Heron) ; BUKKU (Black Hawk) ; PISU (Canopus) ; BERU (Isabel) ; REl 
(Langley) ; PASU (Canopus). 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 911 

Navy Department 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Office of Naval Intelligence 

Washington 

In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2. 
Secret November 27, 1941. 

U. 8. Air Forces in the Philippines 

NAVT 
Tj/po strength 

PBY-4 (Patrol) 14 

PBY-4 (Patrol) 14 

SOC-3 (Scout Observation) 4 

SOC-1 (Scout Observation) 2 

J2F^ (Utility) 3 

SOC-1 (Scout Observation) 2 

SOC-2 (Scout Observation) 2 

052U-2 (Observation) 2 

Total 43 

2 squadrons of 0S2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the 
Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be 
shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942. 

army 

B-18 (Heavy Bomber) 18 

B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber) 35 

P-35A ( VF) 52 

P-40B ( VF) 30 

P-40E ( VF) 117 

[1096] 0^6A (VO) 7 

0-49 (VO) 3 

0-52 (VO) 10 

A-27 (Dive bomber) 9 

C-39 (Combat) 1 

C-49 (Combat) 1 

P-26A ( VF) 15 

Total 298 

111 addition to the al)ove 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been 
shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive rein- 
forcements have been approved for completed delivery by February, 
1942. 

SUMMARY 

Bombers Fighters Combat Patrol Observation Utility Total 
62 214 2 28 32 3 341 

Japanese Estiruates of U. S. Air Forces in Philippines 

MILITARY PLANES 
Type Strength 

Large bombers 29 

Scout planes 324 

The same, B type 62 

Fighters 317 

The same, B type : 131 

Pursuit planes 302 

The same, D type 69 

Training planes 49 

Total 1,283 



912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

NAVAL PLANES 

Large flying boats 26 



8. Q. Will you read Document 5 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Tokyo (Togo). 

To: Manila. 

5 November 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#349. 

Re your #722*. 

Please vpire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports 
mentioned in paragraph 3.* 

JD-1 : 6335. Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine 
Islands. 

JD-1: 6423 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (6-AR) 

[1097] 9. Will you read Document 6? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECEEH" 

From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 8, 1941. 
Purple. 
#742. 

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows : The Marble- 
head, the Black Hawk, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the Heron, the Woho- 
tosu," The Isabel, and the tanker Trinity (the latter arrived on the 8th). 

ARMY 6478 24745 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6) 



" Kana spelling. 

10. Will you read Document 7 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECBETT 

From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 10, 1941. 
Purple. 
#745. 

1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th. 

2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown. 

3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the 
names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing, 2,300 soldiers. 

ARMY 6487 24755 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6) 

11. Q. Will you read Document 8? 
A. (Reading:) 

SEcEE:r 
From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 12, 1941. 
Purple. 
753. 

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered 

port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on . It is thought 

likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. 
This vessel preceded the cruiser into port. 

ARMY 6573 24923 SECRET Trans. 11/18/41 (6) 



J 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 913 

[10,98] 12. Q. Will you read Document 9 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECBETT 

From: Tokyo (Togo). 

To : Manila. 

November 20, 1941. 

Purple. 

#372. (Strictly Secret.) 

Please advise immediately the results of your investigation as to tlie type of 
draft — presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay ". 

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as 
to Tokyo. 

ARMY 6805 25314 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (6) 



" Near Manila, P. I. 

13. Q. Will you read Document 10? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECBETT 

From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 22, 1941. 
Purple. 
#785. 

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 
8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of tlie 21st and anchored 
at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown. 

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) 
entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material. 

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were : 

Manila- — Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black 
Hawk ; Isabel ; Heron ; Wohotosu " ; Pisu " ; one mine layer ; 9 destroyed ; 
20 submarines. 

Cavite — Houston ( ?) ; Canopus. 
ARMY 6902 25471 SECRET Trans. 11/29/41. (6) 



* Kana spelling. 

14. Q. Will you read Document 11? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Washington (Nomura). 

To: Seattle. 

25 November 1941. 

(J19.) 

#026. 

[1099] Regarding War Spite, a British war ship now under repair at 
Bremerton. 

Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day 
and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report. 

JD-1: 7034 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) 

15. Q. Will you read Document 12? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Manila (Nihro). 

To: Tokyo. 

25 November 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#790. 

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thou- 
sand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. 

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown. 

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left i)ort, destination unknown. 
JD-1: 7035 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR) 

• Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND (of 8000 tons). 



914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

16. Q. Will you read Document 13? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECKET 

From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 28, 1941. 
Purple. 
#799. 

Reecntly they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and 
another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila 
from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the 
city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear 
and windless, squalls come once a day. 

ARMY 70S4 25764 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (fi) 

[1100] 17. Q. Will you read Document 14? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Tokyo. 

To : San Francisco. 

29 November 1941. 

(J19.) 

Circular #2431. 

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following : 

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it 

arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure. 

etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian 

Ocean, and South China Sea. 
JD-1: 7037 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2) 

18. Q. Will you read Document 15 ? 
A. (Reading:) 

From: Tokyo. 

To : Singapore. 

5 December 1941. 

(PA-K2.) 

#377 (Alstract) 

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships. 
JD-1: 7446 SECRET (A) Navy Trans. 12-13^1 (AR) 

19. Q. Will you read Document 16? 
A. (Reading:) 

SECEET 

From : Seattle. 

To: Tokyo. 

December 6, 1941. 

PA-K2. 

#184. (Urgent intelligence.) 

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out 
of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado. 

2. The Saratoga sailed the same dav. 

ARMY 7177 25876 SECRET Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT) 

[1101] 20. Q. Admiral, from what you remember, as you exam- 
ined the class of information from -which these are extracts during the 
last few months of the war, were there, in addition to those which you 
have just read, a considerable number of other reports from Japanese 
consuls or other agents giving our ship movements and dispositions, 
which came to your notice ? 

A. Why, the general tenor of the Japanese traffic was in a searching 
expedition all over the world as to movements not only in United States 
ports but also in those of foreign countries. 

21. Q. Had that been going on for some time? 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF XAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 915 

A. During the several months preceding December, 1941, it was 
intensified and had been going on for a considerable period. 

22. Q. As you recall, was the physical volume of that traffic which 
was translated considerable or not ? 

A. In the early part of 1041 it wasn't so gi'eat, but towards Decem- 
ber it built up month by month. I refreshed my memory yesterday. 
There were about 700 of these diplomatic dispatches in our hands 
during the month of November, 1041. 

23. Q. Referring to all the translations made by the Army and 
the Navy during the last two months of peace in 1041, can you give 
a fair estimate of the nmnber of those translations which were aver- 
aged per day? 

A. Well, the diplomatic traffic during that month averaged about 
2G messages a day. 

24. Q. During the last month? 
A. The last month. 

25. Q. How was it during the preceding month ? 

A, September and October were also heavy, but it increased in 
November. I will say this. It was beyond the capacity of the staff 
we had to handle all those translations expeditiously. 

26. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before the court to the effect 
that this class of information, which was recovered by the organza- 
tion under you, was not transmitted to commanders at sea, particu- 
larly the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you give the court 
uny reasons why that should not have been transmitted to all com- 
manders in the Pacific, including the coastal frontier commanders on 
the Pacific Coast? 

A. Well, first, I would like to indicate the method in which this 
[comn intellig] information was handled. It was the function of the 
Director of the Naval Communications organization to procure it. 
It was then passed to the Office of Naval [1102] Intelligence, 
whose function it was to evaluate and disseminate. In regard to our 
part in it. Naval Communications had always objected, for security 
reasons, to any of this traffic being passed other than in a secure 
cryptographic sj'stem. Only the intercept traffic itself, which was 
available to any intercepting agent, was allowed to go by air mail. 
The rest of it would have to be put in the naval cryptographic sys- 
tems. That volume was such, with the staff available, that it was not 
all disseminated, and we would have objected seriously if it had been 
loaded on the naval communications system. We would have objected 
to its being passed by air mail, because had it been known and com- 
promised, we would have lost our source of information. 

27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your answer, the translations, if 
passed by the quickest means, would have to be uncoded in one of our 
own systems before transmission; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

28. Q. Do you mean that the personnel available was not sufficient 
for that work? 

A. Yes, we only had four watch officers to handle the naval traffic 
coding here before the war without taking on a load of this intelli- 
gence information. 

29. Q. Well, would such uncoding have been a great increase pro- 
portionately in the work of those officers? 

A. Yes, I would say at least it would have doubled it. 



916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

30. Q. Will you further elaborate your reply, giving the reasons 
which you mentioned, for not transmitting this information, at least, 
to Pearl Harbor by air mail ? 

A. Well, in accordance with the regulations, secret matter is not 
sent out, even today, beyond the continental limits by air mail, and 
this information was considered, at least, on a level above our own 
naval administrative secret, and we would not permit any of this to 
go by air mail. We do not today transmit any of it by air mail. 

31. Q. Just why was the level of required secrecy so high? 

A. You jeopardize your source of intelligence if the enemy knows 
your degree of success. 

32. Q. Has it developed that the maintenance of that secrecy has 
been very important in carrying on the war since December 7, 1941 ? 

A. I would say it has been vital to the war ejffort. 

Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : 

[llOS] 33. Q. There has been testimony before the court, Ad> 
miral, relative to what was known as the "Winds Message". Were 
you Assistant Director of Naval Communications at the time of the 
"Winds Message"? 

A. If you will give me the date in relation to the "Winds Message", 
I can answer. 

34. Q. November and December, 1941. 

A. I was the Assistant Director at that time. 

35. Q. Do you recall the receipt of the execute of the "Winds Mes- 
sage"? Would you like to see it? 

A. Yes, I would. I never have. 

36. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. 

A. Yes, I have seen this message. This is not the one I thought 
you alluded to that set up the procedure. Yes, I have seen thati 
message. 

37. Q. Did you see what has been called the execute? 
A. No, that is the one I referred to. I never did see it. 

38. Q. Did you hear about it ? 

A. Yes, I heard about it in discussion. 

39. Q. At or about the time it was received? 
A. That is right. 

40. Q. Do you recall approximately when that was. Admiral? 

A. Well, this is just a hazy recollection. It was about the 6th or 
7th of December. I would say right in that period. I don't know 
exactly when the message was sent, but I heard the discussions about 
it. I never saw it. 

41. Q. Can you fix it as being before or after the Pearl Harbor 
attack ? 

A. No, I can't. What impresses it upon my mind is that there was 
some discussion as to the exact meaning of that message, whether it 
actually applied to this one or not. 

42. Q. With whom did you discuss it, Admiral? 

A. I really wasn't in the discussion. I heard about it from the 
Director, who was Admiral Noyes, and the officer who had charge of 
the folder, who was Lieutenant Commander Kramer. 

43. Q. In answer to one of Admiral Hart's questions you said tliat 
there were several hundred of these intercepted diplomatic matters 
during the month of November; is that right? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 917 

A. That is right. I obtained that information from the file 
yesterday. 

[1104] 44. Q. That number included all the diplomatic inter- 
cepts ? 

A. All diplomatic that they had. 

45. Q. It did not refer only to inquiries concerning ships or ship 
movements ? 

A. Oh, no, the diplomatic intercepts for the month. 

46. Q. How many of the 700 during the month of November are of 
the character of those contained in Exhibit 68? 

A. I couldn't answer that. I would have to take the file and dig 
the information out of it. 

47. Q. Did you select all of the documents which were included 
in Exhibit 68? 

A. I had nothing to do with it. 

48. Q. I note that 11 of the 16 were from here to Manila. Is that 
a fair portion of the inquiries or answers to inquiries concerning 
ships which emanated from here and were directed to Japanese rep- 
resentatives in the Philippines ? 

A. I couldn't answer that either without making a study of the file. 

49. Q. Would you look at document 40 of Exhibit 63? 
A. I have it here. 

50. Q. Insofar as the information in that document purports to 
place various ships in certain areas, is that an unusual document of 
the character of which we have been talking ? 

A. Well, it was more specific than any of the others I saw. 

51. Q. It was most specific ? 
A. Yes. 

52. Q. There was nothing specific from any continental ports ? 

A. No, the continental ones more or less referred to movements in 
and out of port. 

63. Q. It was even more specific than any answer from Manila ? 

A. Yes, because this apparently referred to some particular chart 
upon which he was reporting. 

54. Q. Now, you told Admiral Hart that it was not feasible to un- 
code and transmit by our system all the diplomatic intercepts to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor was it secure to do it by any 
other means. 

A. I did not say "any other means." I said by air mail. 

55. Q. Were there any other means? 

A. You could have put a courier on the job and sent him. 
[1105] 56. Q. Was a courier used ? 
A. No. 

57. Q. Was any of the information obtained in this manner trans- 
mitted directly or indirectly to those who were vitally interested in 
acquiring the information? 

A. In perusing this file recently, I noticed that there were messages 
sent from Manila to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, into Wash- 
ington with information copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. 
They related to the information which was gained out there in that 
theatre. 

58. Q. Was any of the information which was processed in Wash- 
ington transmitted in any way to the Commander-in-Chief? 



918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. You are asking me something which I would have to gain from 
knowledge of the files, because, as I have previously testified, we did 
not disseminate the information. It was disseminated by ONI, but 
when it came to translating these exacts, as we call them, we did not 
transmit them. 

59, Q. So far as you know — and I appreciate that your knowledge 
was limited — was any of it transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief ? 

GO. Q. The exact messages, I don't believe, were transmitted. 
There were other messages relating to the situation which were sent. 
They were not, however, originated by the Director of Naval Com- 
munications. The only traftic that the Director of Naval Communi- 
cations originated had to do with the destruction of codes and ciphers 
and information relating to the code and cipher system of the enemy. 

61. Q. Was the reason why the messages could not be transmitted 
applicable to a condensed digest of the information? 

A. That goes back to the functions of ONI. I would say, yes, we 
could have handled digests. 

62. Q. The information would not be of much use unless either it 
or some evaluation of it was made available to some of those in the 
tield, would it? 

A. That is correct, but, again, that was the function of ONI to 
evaluate information. 

The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), 
did not desire to cross-examine this witness. 

Cross-examined by the judge advocate: 

63. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet or the Com- 
mandant of the 14th Naval District, in his intelligence organization 
or his intercept command, have the same facilities for receiving and 
for translating messages of the type contained in Exhibits 63 and 68 ? 

A. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific had any of [1106] 
the intercepts, he could not have worked on them, because he did not 
have the machines to do it. The problem was never assigned to 
Honolulu, and all the translations were accomplished here in Wash- 
ington. 

Examined by the court : 

64. Q. Admiral, in order to clear this question of transmitting in- 
formation to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or other commanders 
in the field, and having in mind these intercepts of a very secret 
nature, aren't there means other than by air or courier of sending 
a brief of such information by dispatch in code ? 

A. Oh, yes, that is a brief of it, but I was referring to the exact 
translation, that is, the total. 

65. Q. But you could have sent a brief, giving full information ? 
A. We could have handled that, yes. 

66. Q. We have had testimony before this court that on or about 
December 3 there was a dispatch made up and discussed with the 

■Chief of Naval Communications, which was a summary of informa- 
tion received in Washington. There was a suggestion that this dis- 
patch be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Are you aware 
of any such dispatch, or were you familiar with the conversation 
among Admiral Wilkinson, Captain McCollum, and Rear Admiral 
Noyes regarding the sending of such a dispatch ? 
A. No, sir, I was not. 

67. Q. You have no knowledge of such a dispatch? 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 919 

A. That is correct. 

68. Q. Have you any knowledge of any dispatch reporting a sum- 
mary of information, having in mind these very secret documents, 
being sent to the Coniniander-iu-Chief, Pacific, or the Commander- 
in-Chief, Asiatic? 

A. I have not. There were one or two dispatches which originated 
from the Chief of Naval Operations and which indicated what you 
might call a situation out there, but they didn't allude to what we call 
ultra information. 

69. Q. Did those dispatches give any information included in the 
intercepted messages ? 

A. I think the best way is to let the dispatches speak for them- 
selves. They are in the files. 

70. Q. Were the dispatches you referred to based on that informa- 
tion ? 

A. Oh, partially, yes. I don't know what dispatches this court has 
before it. 

[1107] 71. Q. Do we understand that certain dispatches were 
sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, which gave information 
contained in these ultra secret dispatches? 

A. No, they were based on that information. They were situa- 
tion dispatches. It is a long time since I saw those dispatches. 
One was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, which alerted 
him as to the passage of a Japanese force into China and alerted him 
as to a possible attack in Manila, and some of these dispatches did 
include the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and some did not, and the 
best way I know of is to get those dispatches from the files. 

72. Q. Have you in mind any particular dispatch sent to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, along these lines ? 

A. There was one, as I remember it, which told him to execute 
War Plan 46 or 47. 

73. Q. Execute it? When? 

A. No, that came after it. It said to take measures in accordance 
with that War Plan. 

74. Q. Do you have reference to Exhibit 13 ? 
A. (Referring to Exhibit 13.) It says. 

By Japan for her present desperate tsiuation there is a possibility that Japan 
may attack these two powers. 

That is the background of ultra information. 

75. Q. What date was that? 

A. That is under the 16th of October. It states : 

In view of these possibilities, you will talse due precautions, including such 
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute 
provocative actions against Japan. 

and so forth. 

76. Q. The question had particular reference to information being 
transmitted from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific, between the dates of 27 November and 7 December, 

A. I could take the whole file and go through it. Here is one of 
November 27 which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic. It states, "This despatch is to 
be considered a war warning." 

The question was repeated by the reporter. 



920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Well, the only information I have is a recollection of these 
dispatches which were sent and which were in the files of the office. 

77. Q. You have no recollection of anything else ? 
A. No. 

[IIOS] Keexamined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. 
Stark, U. S. Navy : 

78. Q. I show you Exhibits 15 and 17 before this court. You have 
been asked several questions concerning the transmission of sum- 
maries, briefs, etc., of the information in the super secret class. Would 
that serve as a fair example of what you meant in your replies ? 

A. It would, because it states here, "Chances of favorable outcome 
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled 
with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval 
and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise, aggressive 
movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam 
is a possibility." Those statements in there came from ultra sources. 

Reexamined by the court : 

79. Q. In the Roberts Report it is stated that on December 1 the 
Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the 
caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated at considerable length the 
elements of a situation existing at that time. Was that transmitted 
by radio ? 

A. That I could not answer. If I saw it, I could tell, I can say off 
hand it was not transmitted by a dispatch. 

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this 
witness. 

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any 
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter 
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con- 
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ- 
ous questioning. 

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. 

The witness was duly warned and withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret). Pages 1121-1123, inclusive. 

[ii^i] 34. Q. Admiral, youi have stated that had you been 
aware of this information which was not conveyed to you between 
27 November and 7 December 1941, you would have had, in all proba- 
bility, taken the Fleet to sea. Did any of this information to which 
you refer, and which you state you did not receive, bear any indication 
that there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

A. I think that the series of messages inquiring as to the disposition 
of ships inside Pearl Harbor itself, wanting to know which ones were 
in areas, the report of the Japanese Consul giving in detail the courses 
taken by those in the harbor, would have indicated to me that they 
were not only interested in the ships that were in the Pearl Harbor 
area but that they were interested in exactly where they were in Pearl 
Harbor proper. There are only two forms of attack that would be 
effective against the ships inside Pearl Harbor. One is for submarines 
to come into the harbor, and at that time I did not know that they had 
any midget submarines, and I would have discounted largely the sub- 
marine attack and would have considered that about the only thing 
that could get in would be a bombing attack. I would also and did 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 921 

discount the aircraft torpedo attack for reasons which have been pre- 
sented to this court, and in view of that I would have said, "Well, they 
probably are going to make an air bombing raid here." I do not see 
any other conclusion you can draw from it unless you put it down to 
Japanese stupidity in wanting all this information, and I do not 
think they were so stupid. 

35. Q. In view of the fact they were also making inquiries about the 
disposition of ships at Pu^et Sound and Manila Bay, would that have 
indicated, reading those dispatches collectively. Pearl Harbor particu- 
larly or rather a desire for information as to what to do in case hostili- 
ties were opened? 

A. Well, the dispatches I have seen in regard to Puget Sound and 
Manila Bay indicate an interest only in the ships that were there, 
whether the ships were in port or whether they had left. Where they 
are is something that is of interest always. Every ship located reduces 
the number of those unknown, and if a carrier and a battleship are 
located in the Navy Yard at Puget Sound, that is very definite infor- 
mation that they are not in Hawaii. However, they did not ask in 
Puget Sound nor in Manila, so far as I am informed, whether the 
ships were tied up in a certain area, or where they were. They did 
do that, I believe, in Pearl Harbor. 

36. Q. What effect would the knowledge of the existence of the 
Winds Message and so forth have had upon you? 

A. Again I must say that I do not want to be so wise now that every- 
thing has happened, but still I have a right to an opinion, and I will 
give it for what it is worth. The definite fact that Japan, at least, was 
going to break off diplomatic relations and, at most, was going to war 
with us [1122] would have had a very great effect on me and 
all my advisors. That would have been something definite. I think 
that Commander Layton, who was my Fleet Intelligence Officer and 
the Japanese language student, has already testified that had that come 
through, he would have advised an all-out alert, to put it briefly. 

37. Q. I am interested to know what good that would have done? 
A. I don't know. That, I think, is open to question also. 
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, 

entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, 
reporter, withdrew. 

Cross-examined by the judge advocate: 

38. Q. You have testified that had you had the information con- 
tained in the "winds message", that you might have taken certain action 
with regard to security or disposition of the United States Pacific 
Fleet. What information was contained in the "winds message" as 
regards the possible relations of the United States and Japan, as you 
recall it? 

A. In that Exhibit 63, there are several messages leading up to the 
"winds message." 

39. Q. I am asking only about the "winds message" at this time. 

A. I am trying to answer about the "winds message." The "winds 
message" contained a statement that at most they were going to declare 
war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East 
Indies; they were going to have peace with Russia; and that at the 
least, they stated, that Japan was going to break off diplomatic 
relations with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands 
East Indies, and maintain diplomatic relations with Russia — and a 



922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

very strong belief by most of Japanese students that the translation in 
fact meant that they were going to declare war, anda definite statement 
such as that — would have lead me to know that the war was coming, 
and coming almost immediately. 

40. Q. Did not the dispatch. Exhibit 17, say in effect the same thing, 
for the reason that it sets out that "negotiations have ceased, and an 
aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few days," 
and it sets out territory of the United States as an objective ? 

A. It doesn't convey the same thing to me at all, and I have testi- 
fied at length as to my reactions when I received the message of No- 
vember 27, and I can add nothing to that now. 

Examined by the court : 

41. Q. Referring to these Fleet planes. Admiral, if you [IISS} 
had received the message which you did receive several hours sub- 
sequent to the attack on 7 December, relative to the delivery of the 
answer by the Japanese, what would have been you action regarding 
these planes based on shore ? 

A. I hate to make statements as to what I would have done under 
theoretical circumstances. It is difficult for me to answer that. I 
think I would have taken action. I would have gotten the planes, in 
the air, at least, and taken all the steps possible, at least until a day or 
two had elapsed, because that definite time for delivery must have 
meant something. However, I do believe that the message sent by 
General Marshall to General Short could have been a much clearer 
message than the one that was sent. 

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re- 
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval 
Reserve, reporter, withdrew. 

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. 
Navy (Ret). Page 1154. 

[7-?5^] The court questioned the interested party, Rear Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), as follows : To what document 
did you refer in your preceding answer? 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested 
party, made the following reply: I referred to the "execute" of the 
Winds Message. I might further identify the first part of the Winds 
Message as Documents 13 and 15, Exhibit 63, and Documents 2 and 3 
in Exhibit 64. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 923 



EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 

Volume I 
No. 1 to 29 (both inclusive) 

Note. — Exhibits No. 11 and 29 contain privileged matter, which though not "Top- 
Secret", do contain matter which is against the public interest to release for any 
purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by under- 
lining in "red", together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its 
classification. 

/S/ H. BlESEMEIEK, 

Captain, U. 8. Navy, 

Judge Advocate. 

Exhibit No. 1 

General Okdeb Navt Department, 

No. 142 Washington, D. C, Jan. 10, 1941. 

Status of Commandants Fifth, Tenth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Naval Districts 

1. General Orders Nos. 109, 119, and 128 are hereby cancelled, and this order 
substituted therefor effective February 1, 194J.. 

2. The Commandants of the Tenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Naval Districts, 
the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United 
States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Bermuda, and the 
Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far as pertains to Alaska and 
the Aleutian Islands are hereby assigned a dual status as follows : 

(a) As Commandants of their respective Naval Districts, operating under 
the orders of the Navy Department. 

(b) As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of a 
Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such, and 
(2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and as directed 
by its Commander-in-Chief. 

3. As commandants of their respective districts, they will be governed by all 
existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts. 
The units under their command will be those prescribed in existing regulations 
and instructions, and will include the Local Naval Defense Forces as well as the 
usual shore activities. 

4. Their exercise of duties as officers of a Fleet will be guided by such instruc- 
tions as the Commander-in-Chief of that Fleet may consider desirable. 

5. Upon assuming command of their respective districts, commandants will 
further report to the officers indicated below in order that they may carry out 
their Fleet duties as indicated above : 

(a) The Commandants of the Fifth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts will 
report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet. 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 16 



924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) The commandants of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Districts will 
report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

Frank Knox. 
A true copy. Attest : 
H. Biesemeier, 

H. BlESEMEIEK, 

Captain, U. S. Navy, 

Judge Advocate. 



Exhibit No. 2 
Genebai. Order Navy De^'Artment, 

No. 143 Washington, D. C, February 3, 1941. 

Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States 

1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled. 

2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this 
order organized into: 

The United States Fleet, comprising : 

(a) The United States Atlantic Fleet, 

(b) The United States Pacific Fleet, 

(c) The United States Asiatic Fleet; 
The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, 
Special Task Forces, 

Special Duty Ships, 

The Naval Transportation Service, 

Naval District Craft, 
The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the fore- 
going will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special orders 
or in the "Assignment of Units in tbe Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the 
U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations." 

3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the 
United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and nor- 
mally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is 
under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief, United 
States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits of com- 
mand of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the 
Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit 
shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian 
east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia, 
Africa, and, sourth of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich. 

4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the 
United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the United States Fleet, whose 
commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the 
component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for 
training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets 
are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other. 

5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Fleet, will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of train- 
ing for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will 
be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing 
Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as po.ssible, the type commander 
will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. 

6. The Commander-in Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Com- 
manders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating 
in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible 
to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations. 

7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and 
task organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders. 
Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them. 
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval Coastal Forces" and 
"Naval Local Defen.se Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Com- 
manders and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 925 

Coastal Frontiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces consist only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Comiuandants of Naval Dis- 
tricts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Fi'ontiers have administrative respon- 
sibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval 
Coastal Forces, respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have 
task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations lor Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces. 

8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief 
of Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks. 

9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey 
duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under 
orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or 
under the Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are 
performing. 

10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be 
assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly 
under the Chief of Naval Operations. 

11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the 
naval district or station to vphich assigned. They consist of such naval craft 
and floating equipnient of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense 
Forces." 

F^NK Knox, 
Secretary of the Navy. 
A true copy. Attest: 
11. Biesemeier, 
H. Bdeskmeiek, 
Captain, U. 8. Navy, 

Judge Advocate. 



Exhibit No. 3 
General Ordeb 
No. 170 

Navy Department, 
Washington, D. C, March 23, 1942. 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, 

United States Fleet 

1. Pursuant to Executive Order of the President the duties of the Commander 
in Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations 
have been combined and placed under one officer who has the title "Commander 
in Cliief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations", with the rank and 
title of Admiral. This officer is the principal naval adviser to the President 
on the conduct of the war, and the principal naval adviser and executive to the 
Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment. 

2. As Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, the officer holding tthe com- 
bined offices has supreme command of the operating forces comprising the sev- 
eral fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the Navy and is directly 
responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the 
President therefor. 

3. The staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, is composed of — 

(a) A Chief of Staff, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who, in the temporary 
absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and 
Chief of Naval Operations", shall act as Commander in Chief, United States 
Fleet ; 

(b) Such deputy and assistant chiefs of staff as may be necessary ; and 

(c) Such other officers as may be appropriate and necessary to enable the 
"Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" to 
perform tlie duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. 

4. As Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding the combined offices is 
charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the preparation, 
readiness and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several 
fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the Navy, and with the coordi- 



926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nation and direction of effort to this end of tlie bureaus and offices of the Navy 
Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the 
Navy may specifically exempt. Duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be 
contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, 
United States Fleet. 

5. The staff of the Chief of Naval Operations is composed of — 

(a) A "Vice Chief of Naval Operations, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who 
has all necessary authority for executing the plans and policies of the "Com- 
mander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" so far 
as pertains to the duties herein prescribed for the Chief of Naval Operations. 
In the temporary absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United 
States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" he shall act as Chief of Naval 
Operations ; 

(b) An Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, with the title of Sub Chief 
of Naval Operations and the rank of Rear Admiral, and such additional assistant 
Chiefs of Naval Operations as may be required ; and 

(c) Such other officers as may be considered to be appropriate and necessary 
for the performance of the duties at present prescribed for the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

6. During the temporary absence of the Secretary of the Navy, the Under 
Secretary of the Navy, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the "Com- 
mander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" shall be 
next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy. In the temporary absence of 
all of these officers the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, 
United States Fleet, respectively, shall be next in succession to act as Secretary 
of the Navy. 

Frank Knox. 
Secretary of the Navy. 
A true copy. Attest: 
H. Biesemeier, 

H. BlESEMEIEai, 

Captain, U. S. Navy, 

Judge Advocate. 



[i] SECRET 

Exhibit No, 4 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, May 26, 1941. 
Op-12B-5-McC 

(SC)A16(R-5) 
Serial 060512 

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To: Distribution List for WPL^46. 

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46). 

Enclosures: 

(A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 92, including List of EflFective Pages. 

(B) Receipt form in duplicate. 

1. Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith. 

2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B). 

3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans 
required by WPI/-46. 

4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accom- 
plished with the least possible delav. To this end, all planning based upon the 
directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL^44 will be discontinued 
until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed. 

5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Trans- 
portation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed 
prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for 
the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



927 



6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan — 
Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited 
to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning," and in the 
"Registered Publication Manual". 

7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of 
vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix 
II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of 
WPI^S. 

[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" 
stowage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual". 

9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR- 
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY 
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDI- 
NATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION. 

H. R. Stark. 



[iii] 



Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 



Subject Matter 



Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC)Al6(R-5) 
of May 26, 1941. 

List of Effective Pages 

Table of Corrections ■_ 

Distribution List - - - -- 

Title Page 

Table of Contents 

Introduction v. 

Parti 

Chart 

Part I (Cont'd) 

Part II - 

Part III -- 

Part IV 

Party 

Appendix I„; - 

Appendix II; 

Title Page 

Chapter I, 

Chapter II 

Table ATF-1 

Chapter III 

Table PAF-1 

Table PAF-2 

Chapter IV; 

Table SEP-1 

Chapter V: 

Table ASF-1 

Chapter VI .- - -. 

Table NE-1 

Table NE-2 

Chapter VII: 

Table CNO-1... 

Chapter VIII.... 

Table NACF 

Table SCF 

Table CACF 

Table PACF 

Table PSCF 

Table PNCF 

Table HCF 

Table PhCF 

Chapter IX 



Page or Sheet No. 



1, u 

iii 

iv 

V, vi 

1 

2 to 4 inc.. 
5 to 8 inc.. 

9, 10 

11. 

12 

13, 14 

15 to 60 inc 
61 to 80 inc 

81,82 

1 to 51 inc.. 

1 

2,3 

4,5 

1 to 3 inc... 

6 

1 to 3 inc... 
1 

1 

1,2 

7 

1.. 

1... 

1 

8 to 10 inc.. 
1 to 5 inc... 
1 to 4 inc.. 

1 

1 

1 to 3 inc... 

1 

1 

1- 

11 



Change 
in Effect 



Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 

Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 



m 


TABLE OP CORRECTIONS 


R. P. M. or Change No. 


Date of 
entry 


Signature and rank of officer entering change.! 


1 


26-7-44 


Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R. 







928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, June 3, 1941- 
Op-12B-5-McC 
(SC)A16(R-5) 
Serial 064112 

Secret 

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46. 
Subject: Change No. 1, WPI^46. 

1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46: 

(a) On Page 45 

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line— Change 13,400 to 6,400. 
Paragraph 3511.a.2(g), first line— Change 23,600 to 12,600. 
Paragraph 3511.a.2.(i), first line— Change 44,000 to 23,000. 

(b) On Page 80 

Paragraph 4601, first line, — after "will be" insert "prepared as". 

(c) On Page 30 of Appendix I 

Paragraph 51. a. (13), first line— Change 13,400 to 6,400. 
Paragraph 51. a. (14), first line— Change 23,600 to 12,600. 

(d) On Page 31 of Appendix I 

Paragraph 51.a.(16), first line— Change 44,000 to 23,000. 

2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46. 

3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the 
addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore 
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the 
continental limits of the United States. 

R. E. Ingersoll, Acting. 

DISTRIBUTION LIST 

[V] 

Official to whom issued Registered Nos. 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.. - - 1 

Commander, Battle Force - - - 2 

Commander, Battleships, Battle Force 3 

Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld) 4 

Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld) - 5 

Commander, Battleship Division Three 6 

Commander, Battleship Division Five 7 

Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force - --- - - 8 

Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force - 9 

Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force -.- -.- 10 

Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force 11 

Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force 12 

Commander, Scouting Force - - 13 

Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force 14 

Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force _ 15 

Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force.. ..- 16 

Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet. ..- -.. 17 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet -.. 18 

Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet 19 

Commander, Cruiser Division Two, .Vtlantic Fleet 20 

Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet -.. 21 

Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet 22 

Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet - 23 

Commander, Support F'orce, Atlantic Fleet 24 

Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet 25 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ..- 26 

Commanding Oeneral, Fleet Marine Division 27 

Commanding General, Second Marine Division -.. 28 

Operations — Director, War Plans Division 29,30,31 

— Director, Xaval Intelligence Division 32 

— Director, Naval Communications Division.- 33 

— Director, Fleet Maintenance Division 34 

— Director, Ship Movements Division 35 

— Director, Naval Districts Division 36 

—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements 

Division). 37 

Chief of Bureau of Navigation 38,39 

Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.. 40 

Chief of Bureau of Ships 41 

Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks. 42 

Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics. 43 

Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 44,45 

Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 46 

[VI] Judge Advocate General, U. S. K'avy 47 

Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 48 

Director, Shore Establishment Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy) 49 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 929 

DISTRIBUTION LIST— Continued 
Official to whom issued Registered Nos. 

War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department 50 

President, Naval War College -. 61 

Commandant, First Naval District 62,53 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland 64 

Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H 55 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I 66 

Commandant, Third Naval District- 67, 58 

Commandant, Fourth Naval District - ..- ..- 59,60 

Commandant, Fifth Naval District 61,62 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda 63 

Commandant, Sixth Naval District— - 64,65 

Commandant, Seventh Naval District - 66 

Commandant, Eighth Naval District - 67,68 

Commandant, Ninth Naval District.. 69 

Commandant, Tenth Naval District 70 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba 71 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad 72 

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District 73,74 

Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 75,76 

Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District 77,78 

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 79 

Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 80 

Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District 81 

Commanding General, Department of Pacific, U. S. Marine Corps, San Francisco, California 82 

Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va 83 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif 84 

Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa 85 

United States Military Mission in London 86,87 

United States Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada _ 88 

British Military Mission in Washington 89 

U. S. Naval Attache, Melbourne, Australia 90 

Registered Publication Section, — Working Copy 91 

Registered Publication Section, —Library Copy.. 92 

Registered Publication Section, —Reserve Copies 93, 

94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 

Op-12B-McC Navy Department, 

(SC)A16(R-5) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Serial 071912 Washington, July 1, 1941. 

Secret 

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. 

To: The Distribution List for WPL-46. 

Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

lleference : 

(a) GO No. 142. 

(b) GO No. 143. 

(c) WPI^46. 

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 
of WPL-46 are hereby established. 

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, 
Appendix I, WPI^46. 

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and 
Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in 
accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of 
General Order No. 142 are suspended. 

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General 
Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval 
Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assign- 
ments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to 
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense 
Forces. 

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional 
duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated: 
Commandant, 3rd Naval District — Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal 

Frontier; 

Commandant, 6th Naval District — Commander, Southern Naval Coastal 
Frontier; 

Commandant, 10th Naval District — Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal 
Frontier; 

Commandant, 15th Naval District — Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier; 



930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



12th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Southern Naval 
13th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Northern Naval 
14th Naval District — Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal 



Commandant, 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 16th Naval District — Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal 

Frontier. 

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the 
commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of 
the Naval Coastal Frontiers remain in a SECRET classification. Correspond- 
ence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature. 

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental 
limits of the United States is authorized. 

/s/ H. R. Stark. 
[1] W. P. L.— 46 

NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES 

NAVY 



[S] TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Subject 
Introduction: rage' 

Chapter I. Origin, Basis, and Scope of this Plan 5 

Chapter II. Execution of this Plan 6 

Section 1. Execution of the Entire Plan 6 

Section 2. Execution of a part of this Plan 7 

Chapter III. Agreements with Associated Powers other than the British Commonwealth 8 

Part I. Task Organization, Information and Assumptions: 

Chapter I. Task Organization 9 

Chart Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers 11 

Chapter II. Information and Assumptions 12 

Part II. Outline of Tasks: 

Chapter I. Concept of the War 13 

Chapter II. The General Task 14 

Part III. Assignment of Tasks: 

Chapter I. Forces in the Western Atlantic Area 15 

Section 1. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet 15 

Section 2. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 21 

Sections. Command Relations 25 

Chapter II. Forces in the Pacific Area 27 

Section 1. The U. S. Pacific Fleet 27 

Section 2. The Southeast Pacific Force 31 

Section 3. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 33 

Section 4. Command Relations 36 

Chapter III. Forces in the Far East Area 38 

Section 1. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier 38 

Chapter IV. Forces in the United Kmgdom and British Home Waters Area 42 

Section 1. The U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe 42 

Chapter V. The Services '.. 44 

Section 1. The Naval Transportation Service 44 

Section 2. The Naval Communication Service 47 

Section 3. The Naval Intelligence Service 48 

Chapter VI. The Shore Establishment 49 

Chapter VII. Instructions Jointly Applicable to Task Forces 60 

Section 1. Forming the Task Forces SO 

Section 2. Mobilization 51 

[S] Sections. The Routing and Protection of Shipping 53 

Section 4. Rules of Warfare _ 68 

Section 5. Intelligence Liaison between Commanders of Associated Forces in the Field 60 

Part IV. Logistics: 

Chapter I. The Shore Establishment 61 

Chapter II. General Directives 62 

Section 1. Personnel 62 

Section 2. Material 63 

Sections. Transportation 64 

Section 4. Legal Services 66 

Section 5. Augmentation and Maintenance of the Shore Establishment 67 

Section 6. Priorities 68 

Chapter III. The Operating Forces and Services 69 

Section 1. Preparation for War Service.. .. 69 

Section 2. Maintenance 73 

Section 3. Augmentation 77 

Chapter IV. Advanced Bases 78 

Chapter V. Salvage 79 

Chapter VI. Plans to be prepared by the Shore Establishment- 80 

Part V. Special Prorisions: 

Chapter I. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure 81 

Chapter II. Joint Plans Covering Intelligence Service, Censorship and Publicity, and Mobiliza* 

tion of Resources 82 

* Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original exhibit. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 931 

APPENDICES 

Subject Page « 

Appendix I. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow No. 5-.. 1-36 

Annex I. Coastal Frontiers --- 37-51 

[4] Appendix II. The Composition of Forces 

Title Page 1 

Chapter I. Introduction - 2 

Chapter II. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet _ 4 

Table ATF-1 _. Sheets 1 to 

Chapter III. The U. S. Pacific Fleet 6 

Table PAF-1 Sheets 1 to 3 

Table PAF-2— Sheet 1 

Chapter IV. The Southeast Pacific Force 

Table SEP-1, Sheet 1 

Chapter V. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet 

Table ASF-1 Sheets 1,2 

Chapter VI. U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe 7 

Table NE-1 -- Sheet 1 

Table NE-2- Sheet 1 

Chapter VII. Vessels Operating under the Chief of Naval Operations 

Table CNO-1 Sheet 1 

Chapter VIII. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces --- 8 

Table NACF. ---. Sheets 1 to 5 

Table SCF --.- Sheets 1 to 4 

Table CACF --- — - Sheet 1 

Table PACE .'. Sheet 1 

Table PSCF Sheets 1 to 3 

Table PNCE Sheet 1 

Table HCF... Sheet 1 

Table PhCF Sheet 1 

Chapter IX. Naval Transportation Service _ 11 

[5] Introduction 

chapter i. origin, basis, and scope of this plan 

0101. This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the 
direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conver- 
sations (Short Title ABO-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan 
(Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow . 
No. 5. 

0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint 
Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited dis- 
tribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan 
by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, 
are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, 
which is included in this plan as Appendix I. 

0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and 
tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War. 

0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be 
made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in 
the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization 
of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to 
Naval Districts and Naval Stations." 

[6] CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN 

Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN 

0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval 
Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, includ- 
ing acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5". 

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise 
designated. 

[?] Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN 

0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is antici- 
pated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may 
be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan 
or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. 

1 Pages referred to are represented by Italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original exhibit. 



932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations 
to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary 
measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or addi- 
tional tasks thereof. 

[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE 

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 

030 L The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than 
those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate 
to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan, 
as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction. 

0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has 
agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and 
BAHIA. 

a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports. 

b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and 
delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited 
capacities of the ports. 

c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port. 

d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be 
given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States 
Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard 
to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance 
are not required. 

e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local 
arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, 
through the United States Naval Observer. 

[9] Part I. Task Organization. Information and Assumptions 

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION 

1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow 
No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is 
prescribed below: 

a. THE OPERATING FORCES, under command of the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

1. THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET, under command of 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

2. THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, under command of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

3. THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, under 
command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE. 

4. THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, under command of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

5. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, 
under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, 
NORTH EUROPE. 

6 THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, under the command 
of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of: 

(a) THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES: 

(b) THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES. 

b. THE SERVICES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 

2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE. 

3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. 

c. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, under the direction of the appropriate 
Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department. 

[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsi- 
bility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix 
I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea, 
designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Ap- 
pendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 933 

1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas'^for which the 
United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations 
will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in 
paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in 
Appendix I, "Section V." 

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the world 
showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers." This 
map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBIT-ILLUS- 
TRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound 
together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.) 

[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 

1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III." 
[IS] Part II. Outline of Tasks 

CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR 

2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV." 

14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK 

2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of 
Appendix I. 

2202. The Navy General Task is as' follows: 

a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of 
the other Associated Powers, will: 

1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC 
AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY 

BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA; 

2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR 
EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN; 

3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United 
States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED 
KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR|EAST 
AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA; 

4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or 
Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Asso- 
ciated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and 

5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and 
CAROLINE ISLANDS. 

[16] Part III. Assignment of Tasks 

CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 

3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially 
be organized into task forces as follows: 

a. OCEAN ESCORT; 

b. STRIKING FORCE; 

c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE; 

d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE; 

e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO; 

f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE; 

g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE; 

h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA; 

i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COM- 
MANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within 
the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA: 



934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET— Continued 

a. TASK 

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1); 

b. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR 
DESTROYING VESSELS^TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 
[16] c. TASK 

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS 
AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER 
INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND 
AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND 
POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE; 
d. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. 
ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C"; 
6. TASK 

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER FORCES; 
f. TASK 

PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE 
ISLANDS. 

3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC 
AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface 
forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from 
bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC. 

b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH 
HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH 
ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC 
AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, wiU remain under the strategic direc- 
tion of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the 
naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable. 

3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO wiU operate under the strategic direc- 
tion of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in 
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 

[17] h. This force will be assigned the following task bv the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET: 
1. TASK 

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO 
GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS. 

c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC 
AREA this force will execute the following task: 

1 TA ^K 

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING 
THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFI- 
CER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC. 

d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC 
FLEE T for administrative purposes. 

3115. a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE Sind SUBMARINE FORCE 
THREE will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM 
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 935 

b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander 
in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET: 
L TASK 

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO 

BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRinSH HOME 

WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS. 

[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME 

WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE 

FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be 

assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter 

are to be foimd in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1. 

3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange 
for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter 
III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources 
designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and 
outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from 
United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For 
this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC 
FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Trans- 
portation Service. 

b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States 
forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated 
herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service. 

1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supple- 
mented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH 
ATLANTIC AREA. 

2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States 
sources. 

3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and tem- 
porary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented bj^ use of 
available British facilities. 

4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States 
sources. 

[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of 
the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of 
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the 
NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in 
that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately 
obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic 
deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available. 

d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander, 
TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect 
to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including per- 
sonnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUB- 
MARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, 
NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1. 

3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the 
preparation of the following plans: 

1. U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 
5 (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5) ; 

2. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of 
this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOT- 
LAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b)) ; 

3. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of 
this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS 
AREA; 



936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the 
movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for 
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH 
ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared. 
b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[31] Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 

3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is 
prescribed in General Order No. 143. 

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal 
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the 
Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I. 

3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA 
are: 

a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 

1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR. 

3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appen- 
dix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES 
INDICATED BELOW: 

CATEGORY B— THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER. 
—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 
CATEGORY D— THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRON- 
TIER. 
—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 
[22] b. TASK 

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SEC- 
TION 3; 
c. TASK 

SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC. FLEET; 

SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE 
COASTAL FRONTIER. 

e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PAN- 
AMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task: 

1. TASK 

SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE. 

3124. a. The following plans will be prepared: 

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this 
plan; 

2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONtlER,'and SOUTHERN NAVAL'COASTAL FRONTIER: 

(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 5, including 
an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval 
Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5); 

3. Bv Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL ^COASTAL FRONTIER, 
and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER," and by Commandants, 
FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH 
NAVAL DISTRICTS: 

[23] (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5); 
(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48; 

4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Com- 
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts. 

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the 
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 937 



2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts^will 
be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respec- 
tive Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval 
Districts. 

4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH 
ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and 
Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and 
PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their 
review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination 
with the' Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operation Plans and 
Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchor- 
ages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be 
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for com- 
ment, if he so requests. 

5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[25] Sections. COMMAND RELATIONS 

313L In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. 
ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in 
the execution of tasks requiring mutual support; the following provisions shall 
apply : 

a. On M-dav, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the 
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are 
assigned a dual status as follows : 

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations; 

2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders 
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of 
task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief 
thereof. 

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require 
the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, tempo- 
rarilv and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking 
temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned 
in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

L The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require 

task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their 

respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the 

Chief of Naval Operations. 

[26] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while 

the provisions of this paragraph are in effect. 

3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is as- 
signed as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and 
task purposes. 

3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval 
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval 
Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern 
the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval 
Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of 
the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to 
the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft as- 
signed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. 

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of 
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the 



938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense 
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be 
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Flan — Rainbow No. 5, Appen- 
dix I, after ABC-22 has been approved. 

[27] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organ- 
ized into task forces as follows: 

a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET; 

b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA; 

c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM. 

3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the 
PACIFIC AREA: 

a. TASK 

SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE 
FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM 
THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE 
OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON 
ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS; 

b. TASK 

PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER 
THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ES- 
TABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK; 

c. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR 
DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 

d. TASK 

SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF 
THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST; 

[28] e. TASK 

DEFEND SAMOA IN CATAGORY "D"; 

f. TASK 

DEFEND GUAM IN CATAGORY "F"; 

g. TASK 

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) ; 
h. TASK 

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS 
IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF 
ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING 
LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE 
OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE; 
i. TASK 

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
FORCES; 
j. TASK 

ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS 
FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE; 
k. TASK 

ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE 

FLEET CONTROL ZONES. 

[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in 

Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, 

to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be 
established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
when so directed by that officer. 

c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT 
and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 939 

by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent 
to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the 
CANAL ZONF] twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their 
transfer from the PACIFIC AREA. 

3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for 
the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental 
United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by 
the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. 
(See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the 
transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supple- 
mented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service. 

b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service 
will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including 
personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU. 

c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the 
Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRON- 
TIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and trans- 
portation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the 
Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may, 
at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders 
of other Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

[SO] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will 
re(iuire the folloVing plans to be prepared: 

1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 6 (Navy Plan 0-1, RAINBOW No. 5); 

2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the 
availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the 
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 
180M; 

3. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval Station Samoa Plan 0-5 
RAINBOW No. 5); 

4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct. 

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating 
Plan — RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be 
prepared. 

NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the 
distribution of this Naw Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5. 
[31] Section 2. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 

3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will 
be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations 
upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE. 

3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in 
SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the 
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC 
AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between 
the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West. 

3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING 
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY: 

b. TASK 

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE .ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES; 

c. TASK 

SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR: 

d. TASK 

PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS 
IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 17 



940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S^] s ., 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC! FORCE, will 
arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from 
Shore Establishment sources hi the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from 
foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). Transporta- 
tion will be provided by the Naval Transjjortation Service. 

b. In circumstances where transportation facihties provided by the NAVAL 
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTH- 
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels 
immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent 
logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if 
available. 

3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require 
the preparation of the following plans: 

1. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN- 
RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5); 

2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, 
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct. 

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 
[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 

3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 
is prescribed in General Order No. 143. 

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frt)ntiers, Coastal 
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the 
Navv, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I. 

3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are: 

a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 

3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Ap- 
pendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES 
INDICATED BELOW: 

CATEGORY fi— THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER. 
—THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR. 
CATEGORY C— THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC 
NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, 
EXCEPT UNALASKA. 
CATEGORY i)— UNALASKA.— THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COAST- 
AL FRONTIERi 
[34] b. TASK 

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SEC- 
TION 3; 

c. TASK 

SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET; 

d. TASK 

SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN 
THE COASTAL FRONTIERS. 

3234. a. The following plans will be prepared: 

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix T, paragraph 48; 

2. Bv the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 

frontip:r: 

(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan — RAINBOW No. 5, 
including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal 
Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5); 

3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by 
the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS: 

(a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 5 
(Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5); 

(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 
48; 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 941 

[S5] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed 
by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval 
Districts, 
b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Com- 
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be 
reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC 
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local 
Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief 
of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operat- 
ing Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and 
Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet 
anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be 
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for 
comment, if he so requests. 

4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[36] Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS 

3241. In order to provide for unitv of command of task groups of the U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTH- 
ERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring 
mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242) : 

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will bfe 
assigned a dual status as follows: 

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the 
orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in com- 
mand of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Com- 
mander in Chief thereof. 

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafte- 
require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his comr 
mand, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval 
Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, 
when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard 
for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers 
by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, wiU not 
require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the 
limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon 
authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while 
the provisions of this paragraph are in effect. 

[37] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command 
relations of the Commander in Chief. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Com- 
mander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circum- 
stances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execu- 
tion of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances. 

3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTH- 
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Com- 
mander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force 
and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if 
this situation arises. 

3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval 
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Com- 
mandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in 



942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence 
Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given 
to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily, 
to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft 
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. 

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph. Commanders of 
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the 
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense 
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. 

3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be 
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, Appendix 
I, after ABC-22 has been approved. 

[S8] CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER 

3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.: 

"Far East Area 

"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military 
forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East 
Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA wiU, subject to the approval of the Dutch 
authorities, be effected as follows: 

"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers 
will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in 
that area. 

"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be 
the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces 
concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual 
support as may be practicable and appropriate. 

"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces 
of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting 
the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval 
Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED 
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of 
naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES." 

3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate 
superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, 
who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II). 

b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order 
No. 143. 

[39] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER. 
and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are 
defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I 
of Appendix I. 

d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER Mill 
employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned bv the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its 'joint 
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, under the 
direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the 
following tasks: 

a. TASK 

RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY 
AXIS FORCES; 

b. TASK 

SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF 
THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED 
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF 
THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE 
CONTINUES.); 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 943 

c TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING 
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 
d. TASK 

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES; 

[40] e. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIP- 
PINE COASTAL FRONTIER— CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E"; 
f. TASK 

ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED 
POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA. 

3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to 
BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion. 

3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for 
the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIX- 
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from com- 
mercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch 
governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). 

b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical 
materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources 
in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS. 

c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources 
in the United States. 

d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be 
employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval 
Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United 
States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be 
retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that 
.\rea. 

through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance 
with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine 
registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the 
transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC 
FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a 
time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of 
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States 
registry will be employed if available. 

3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the 
following plans to be prepared: 

1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-2, RAINBOW No. 5) ; 

2. Local Joint Plans required bv Appendix I, Paragraph 48; 

3. SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE 
FORCE OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5. (Sixteenth Naval 
District Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5) ; 

4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct. 

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 



944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS 

AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE 

3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH 
EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United^States Military Mission in 
London. 

b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the 
administrative command of the Commander in Chief, L^. S. NAVAL FORCES, 
NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM 
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 

3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, 
Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows: 

1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE; 

2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE. 

b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM 
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 

3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME 
WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH 
EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks: 

a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE 

1. TASK 

ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROAQHES, 
ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE 
BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN AP- 
PROACHES; 

b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE 

1. TASK 

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, 
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE 
ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES. 
US] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH 
EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Sec- 
tion 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service 
or from vessels assigned to the task forces. 

a. Fuel from United States and British sources. 

b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from 
United States sources. 

c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facili- 
ties assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities. 

d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources. 

e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided bv the NAVAL TRANS- 
PORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, 
or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of 
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States 
registry will be employed, if available. 

3415. a. Outline operating plans for the emplovment of the U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared bv the prospective Commander 
of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective 
Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review 
by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After 
review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 945 

[44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES 

Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 

3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix 
II) is assigned the following task: 

a. TASK 

PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVE- 
MENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY 
FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE 
TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND 
OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE. 

1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels 
of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require. 

2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as 
indicated in this paragraj^h. Larger movements may be made eventually, 
as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans 
for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

(a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First 
contingent — 10,500 troops embark on 24 M. Second contingent — 
16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by 
British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan 
contemplates use of United States transports. 

(b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on lOM. 
NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on lOM. 

(1) These two forces will move in one convoy. 

(c) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark 
on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] 
transported. Part of this force mav be moved before M-day. 

(d) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 
15M. 

(e) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M. 

(f) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark 
on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 

(g) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 
embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 

(h) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark 
on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before 
M-day. 

(i) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 
embark on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressivelj^ as 
ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before 
M-day. 

3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be 
transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indi- 
cated in Appendix I, paragraph 57. 

3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Com- 
manders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in 
Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3. 

[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the 
Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and 
will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans — Rain- 
bow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval 
Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts. 

[47] Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE 

3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following 
tasks: 

a. TASK 

INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES 
AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE 
NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION 
OF THIS PLAN; 



946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. TASK 

IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOV- 
ERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND 
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, 
PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR 
THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVI 
SIGN, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION 
STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL. 

3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following: 

a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department; 

b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants 
of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of command- 
ers of forces afloat, including aircraft. 

3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, viill prepare the Principal 
Naval Communication Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe 
therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5 
which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and 
Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of 
Naval Districts. 

U8] Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. 

3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following 
tasks: 

a. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED 
POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH 
INFORMATION. PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, 
ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND 
FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN- 
RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTAB- 
LISHMENT; 

b. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPART- 
MENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF 
MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY. 

3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following: 

a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navj- Department, including 
naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under tlie Director 
of Naval Intelligence; 

b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Comman- 
dants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C, and Outlying Naval 
Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities. 

3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal 
Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe 
therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5, whicli 
are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activi- 
ties or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval 
Districts. 

49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 

3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV, 

[50] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES 

Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES 

3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if 
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and 
U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief 
of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to 
which assigned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 947 

b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), 
designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed 
by tlie Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of 
task organizations to which assigned. 

c. Vessels to be mobilized, uj)on completion of mobilization, and when directed 
by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the 
commanders of task organizations to which assigned. 

3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels 
of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the 
Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require. 

3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establish- 
ments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, 
will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set 
forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." 

b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units 
coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organiza- 
tions as indicated in Appendix II of this plan. 

[51] Section^. MOBILIZATION 

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz: 

1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be 
mobilized preparatory to 2; 

2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establish- 
ment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is 
provided for in Part IV of this plan. 

b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating 
Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment 
does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and 
facilities as required to perform its assigned task. 

c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of 
the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. 
During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through 
the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV. 

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan 
have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, 
even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for 
immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete 
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their 
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Cliief of 
Naval Operations. 

3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan 
applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to 
the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be 
taken over from private sources or other government departments. 

[5S] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of 
vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned 
to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II. 

[53] Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING 

3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V"; 

a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protec- 
tion of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British author- 
ities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United 
States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping 
of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities 
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. 

"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned 
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and pro- 
tected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British 
Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North 
Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom. 

"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the 
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment 
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval 
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange 
for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter 



948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service 
Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas 
will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations." 

b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes 
all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, 
except protection. 

Definitions 

3732. a. ROUTING. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this 
plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure 
from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meet- 
ing points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions 
for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the 
scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a 
part of routing. 

b. INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers 
proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District. 

c. INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the ,% Associated 
Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 

d. INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers, 
not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, 
or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier. 

e. FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING. All shipping of the Associated 
Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone. 

f. OVERSEAS SHIPPING is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose 
route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier; 
except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada 
is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. 

Instructions for routing shipping 

3733. INTRA-DISTRICT, INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER 
SHIPPING. 

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval 
Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier, 
and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and 
Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and 
interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by 
them. 

[56] b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier 
and Inter-Frontier Shipping. 

c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval 
District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier. 

3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING. 

a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as 
Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping: 

1. CLASS A. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of 
strategic responsibility of the United States; 

2. CLASS B. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic 
responsibility of the LInited States, and one point in the areas of strategic 
responsibility of the United Kingdom. 

b. WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. 

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom 
Cbief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas 
Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and 
UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south. 

2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Over- 
seas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In 
the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing 
instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Dis- 
tricts in which are the ports of assembly of the convovs, with copies to the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, apprbpriate Naval Coastal 
Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. 
In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of 
Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal 
Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN- 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 949 

TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the 
general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders 
of vessels. 
c. PACIFIC AREA. 

1. Under the general direction of the Cliief of Naval Operations, the 
Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by 
the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, 
with the following exceptions: 

(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route 
shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES; 

(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, 
will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA; 

(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the 
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged 
directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. 
The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United 
Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer. 

Instructions for the "protection of shipping 

3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the 
Operating Forces. 

[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by 
covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combina- 
tion of these methods. 

c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic 
responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Com- 
manders in Chief, Commanders of Sub- Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and 
by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing 
situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers 
will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval 
forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping. 

d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be 
viewed as having an especial importance, 

[58] Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE 

3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by 
the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime 
Warfare". 

3742. Except under extroardinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are 
available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing 
ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States 
prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously 
been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United 
States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents 
itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department 
shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United 
States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly 
notified. 

3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy, 

3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the 
WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategi- 
cal Areas" as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the 
exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the 
Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used, 
means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant 
aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or 
aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would 
be detrimental to our own forces. 

[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, 
or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside 
the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated 
Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom- 



950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to 
be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval 
Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify 
shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid, 
before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases 
appropriate local notification should be made by th'e Commander in Chief con- 
cerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed. 

\60] Section B. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS 
OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task 
force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task 
force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating mat- 
ters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.) 

[61] Pakt IV. Logistics 

CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 

4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT 
THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES; 

b. TASK 

PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ES- 
TABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES; 

c. TASK 

PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC 
OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA, 
WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED 
STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING 
UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN 
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA. 

4102. Each Chief of Bureavi or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and 
each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute 
such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his 
cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV. 

[6^] CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES 

Section 1. PERSONNEL 

4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for: 

a. Preparing for war servcie, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating 
Forces and the Services; 

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities; 

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases; 

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service. 

4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54. 

"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met 
by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940". 

4213. a. Personnel will be suppUcd in accordance with the Basic Priorities 
established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261). 

b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the 
Services cannot be suppHed from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval 
District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel 
for such period of time as found to be necessary. 

[63] Section .?. MATERIAL 

4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for: 

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces 
and the Services; 

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities; 

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases; 

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service. 

4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the 
Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial 
Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurenient Plans, The procurement of material 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 951 

will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive 
Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and 
Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58). 

4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the 
Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such 
material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means. 

4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities estab- 
lished in Section 6 (paragraph 4261). 

[64] Section 3. TRANSPORTATION 

4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by: 

1. THE OPERATING FORCES; 

2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 

b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and 
material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable. 

4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading. 

b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and 
the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding 
material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transporta- 
tion may be provided. 

c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels 
designated by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Dis- 
trict Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities 
of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57). 

b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, 
and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the 
Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regard- 
ing the safety of vessels. 

c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army peronnel 
while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered 
vessels) ; the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals 
embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel 
embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army 
personnel. 

(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will 
establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, 
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison 
duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by 
fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service. 

[66] Section 4- LEGAL SERVICES 

4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the 
Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, neces- 
sary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment. 

4242. These services will include: 

a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Estab- 
lishment; 

b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such 
Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the 
Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan; 

c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legisla- 
tion and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive 
Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the 
execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 
(Appendix I, paragraph 59). 

[67] Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE 
SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 

4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by 
providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned 
tasks. 

4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in 
excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met 
locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking 
over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners 
for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both govern- 
ment and private requirements. 



952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[68] Section 6. PRIORITIES 

4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance 
with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERV- 
ICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the pri- 
orities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several 
items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance. 

a. PRIORITY ONE 

1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial move- 
ments to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA, 
TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII. 

2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. 
NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE 
THREE, U. S. NAVAU FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. 

3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

b. PRIORITY TWO 

1. Initial movements to ICELAND. 

2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET. 

3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 
not specified under PRIORITY ONE. 

c. PRIORITY THREE 

1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES. 

2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under 
PRIORITIES ONE and TWO. 

d. PRIORITY FOUR 

1. New Construction. 

[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES 

Section 1. PREPARATION FOR \f AR SERVICE 

4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTAB- 
LISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPER- 
ATING FORCES and SERVICES Usted in Appendix II, which are not then in 
condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and 
providing personnel to perform their war tasks. 

- 4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel, 
repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION pre- 
scribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and 
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

4313. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the 
current Operating Force Plan. 

a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the 
current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most 
of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. 
Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for imme- 
diate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. The.y will complete 
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed l)y their 
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

4314. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in 
the current Operating Force Plan. 

a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in 
Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobiliza- 
tion Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are 
responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for 
mobilization. 

b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization 
District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will 
employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service. 

[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day 
Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of 
Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far 
in advance as practicable. 

c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day 
Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the 
mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established 
and other related instructions. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 953 

d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the 
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with 
navy personnel before being considered ready for war service. 

e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STAND- 
ARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the 
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing 
them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits. 

f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in 
STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except 
as follows: 

1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for 
war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sani- 
tary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled 
voyage; 

2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered 
ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, 
medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled 
voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication 
group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required; 

[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for 
voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready 
for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for 
which scheduled; 

4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered 
ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service 
for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a com- 
munication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as 
may be required; 

5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for 
the installation of batteries and magazines. 

g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to 
be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION 
after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits. 

h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal 
Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II. 

4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled 
to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent 
stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or 
by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies 
to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels. 

b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable 
number of officers and men as follows: 

1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 6 

[7S] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 8 

3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 8 

4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 6 

[73] Sections. MAINTENANCE 

4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the 
Services in condition of readiness for war by: 

a. Replacement of personnel and material; 

b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities; 

c. Hospitalization of personnel ; 

d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and 
welfare of personnel. 

Replacements 

4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the 
Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Depart- 
ment concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon 
estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These 
rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel 
and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and 
the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each 
type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub- Areas listed in para- 
graph 1102 of this plan. 



954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to 
time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the 
Services, as determined by war experience. 

c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement 
rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. 
A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained 
available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation 
to destination. 

d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate 
to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material alloted to low 
priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until defi- 
ciencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates. 

e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replace- 
ments of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Estab- 
lishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transporta- 
tion Service will submit their requests for replacements. 

f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission 
of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery. 

g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows: 

1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. 
ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers 
designated by them; 

2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based; 

3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the 
commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where 
delivery is desired; 

4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants 
of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these 
units are established. 

h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the 
Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material 
replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replace- 
ments obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements 
made to Shore Establishment activities. 

[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the Services 
will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested. 

Repairs 

4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating 
Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment 
activities. 

b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore 
Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following: 

1. The geographic disposition of the various forces; 

2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work 
required; 

3. The degree of urgency of the work required; 

4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities; 

5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers. 

4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which 
a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates. 

Hospitalization and evacuation 

4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for .sick and wounded 
personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, 
in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units. 

[76] h. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or 
wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore 
Establishment activities. 

4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activ- 
ities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other 
available vessels having adequate medical facilities. 

4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will 
be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 955 

b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by 
the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army 
hospitals or field medical units. 

Recreation and welfare 

4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and 
welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps 
personnel. 

b. Provisions for these activities will include: 

1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Estab- 
lishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are 
concentrated, and at Training Stations; 

2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the 
above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies 
and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel. 

\77] Sections. AUGMENTATION 

4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the 
Services by: 

a. New construction of vessels and aircraft; 

b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of 
vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply 
and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service; 

c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy 
from other Government Departments; 

d. Acquisition of material. 

4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of 
Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local 
representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission. 

[78] CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES 

4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required 
for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with in- 
structions issued in separate directives. 

[79] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE 

4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render sal- 
vage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas 
prescribed in paragraph 4101. c. 

b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available 
by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own 
forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United 
States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced 
Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.C. 

4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or 
other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within 
the waters of the United States. 

4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will 
acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels: 

1. From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY 

PIONEER, 

GUIDE. 

DISCOVER; 

2. From the COAST GUARD 

REDWING, 
b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of 
Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and 
two on the Pacific Coast of the United States. 

[80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 

4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in 
Part V, WPI^S, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128. 

4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the 
estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies. 

79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 IS 



956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
\81] Part V. Special Provisions 

CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE 

5101, The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60: 

"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy- 
Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic 
pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, trans- 
portation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means." 

5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint 
plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. 

[8S] CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CEN- 

SORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES 

5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61: 

"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government. 

"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the 
Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following 
subjects: 

a. Intelligence Service; 

b. Censorship and Publicity; 

c. Mobilization of Resources." 

5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will 
act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for 
the Intelligence Service. 

(^ b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and 
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act 
for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censor- 
ship and Publicity. 

c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the 
Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in 
the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources. 

[1] Appendix I. To WPL-46, The Joint Army and Navy Basic War 

Plan — Rainbow No. 5 

[2] SECTION I. directive 

1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5, 
contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October 
14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in 
paragraph 2 of this paper. 

2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint 
Army and Navv Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of 
United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and 
upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), now in process of 
drafting. 

[3] section II. DEFINITIONS 

3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British 
Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of 
either Power. 

4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and 
other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as 
including all such Powers. 

5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settle- 
ments, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes 
the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an 
easterlv direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia, 

6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as 
including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed 
as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 957 

\4] SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 

7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the 
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugo- 
slavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war 
against the Axis Powers, comprising either: 

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or 

h. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 

8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 
and ABC-22. 

9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility 
of their intervention must be taken into account. 

10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be 
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical 
materials, from sources in that general region. 

11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive 
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct 
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be 
available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense. 

[5] SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR 

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of 
ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by 
the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 
of April 5, 1941. 

"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the 
defeat of Germany and her Allies. 

"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic de- 
fense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must 
take account are: 
(a) United States 

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western 
Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such 
dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of 
European or Asiatic political or Military power. 
(6) British Commonwealth 

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circum- 
stances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must 
maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate 
security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of 
British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as 
will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the 
maintenance of its war effort, 
(c) Sea Communications 

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential 
to the continuance of their war effort. 

[6\ "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal 
offensive policies against the Axis Powers: 

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all 
other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplo- 
matic and financial measures. 

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supple- 
mented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which 
contribute to that power. 

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis. 

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated 
Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis 
Military strength. 

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Asso- 
ciates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in 
resistance to the Axis Powers. 

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against 
Germany. 

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive. 
"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will 

likewise be governed by the following: 



958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, 
the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. 
The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, 
and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted 
in such a manner as to facilitate that effort. 

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, 
the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be 
the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of 
the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches 
to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval 
effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary im- 
portance. 

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and 
Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to 
prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa. 

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the 
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy 
their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan 
does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. 
The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength 
in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively 
in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to 
support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength 
away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces 
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth 
will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 

[S] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated 
Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation 
in all theatres. 

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated 
Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the 
Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands 
of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack. 

(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air 
forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in 
the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained 
and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule, 
provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used pri- 
marily by United States forces. 

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the 
British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated 
Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward 
providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplish- 
ment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent 
air operations against the sources of Axis military power. 

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land 
and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or 
operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availabilitj' 
of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense 
of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States 
forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may 
be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate 
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against 
German Military power at its source. 

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic 
support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. 
Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and 
supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the 
other as required for the successful prosecution of the war." 
13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will 
be governed by the following: 

(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the 
Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and 
submarine forces. 

(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations 
against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States 
Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to 
such operations as will not materially delay this effort. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 959 

[W] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM 

RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS 

14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United 
Kingdom relating to war operations. 

In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and 
ABC-22). 

15. Principles of Coturnand of the Forces of the United States and the United 
Kingdom.- a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the 
United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of 
responsibility of their own Power. 

h. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting 
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations 
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances. 

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic 
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their 
type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific 
strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own 
commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces 
of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the 
temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks. 

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised 
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of 
time in grade. 

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate 
under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United 
States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their 
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups. 

/. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth 
in paragraph 16. 

[11] 16. Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces, a. 
United States Areas. Upon entering the war, the United States will assume 
responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces 
in the following areas: 

(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con- 
tinental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° 

West, except: 

(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which 
lies east of Longitude 40° West. 

(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility 
for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United 
States-Canada Joint Agreements. 

(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con- 
tinental land areas, as follows: 

(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East; 

(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East; 

(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South Ameri- 
can coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in 
which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military 
forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada .Joint Agreements. The 
United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south 
of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

[12] b. The Far East Area. Coordination in the planning and execution of 
operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and 
Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the 
Dutch authorities, be effected as follows: 

(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will 
collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area. 

(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the 
responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. 
These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may 
be practicable and appropriate. 

(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the 
Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense 
of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, 
China. The Commander-in-Chief," United States Asiatic Fleet, will be 
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defensa 
pf the Philippines, 



960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from 
the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, 
thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence 
south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence 
westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Lati- 
tude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 
20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma. 
[IS] c. Joint Land Offensives. Responsibility for the strategic direction of 
the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance 
with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circum- 
stances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established. 

d. British CommonweaUh Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume 
responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other 
areas not described in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c next above. These areas as 
initiallv delimited are: 

■(1) The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA comprises the 
Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° 
and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, 
is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated 
Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area. 

(2) The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA 
comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the 
Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the 
islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United 
States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be 
exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. 
This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization 
and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) 
and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry. 

(3) The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 

(a) Northern boundary. Latitude 43° North, 

(b) Southern boundary. Latitude 20° North, 

[14] (c) Western boundary. Longitude 40° West, 

(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and 
Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous 
thereto. 

(e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar 
will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when 
he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows: 

To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations 
in the Western Mediterranean. 

To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations 
in the Central Atlantic. 

(/) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will 
be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United 
States Atlantic Fleet. 

(4) The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA comprises: 

(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the 
west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast. 

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between 
Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas 
contiguous thereto. 

(5) The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS comprise 
the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the 
islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of opera- 
tions in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also 
included in this area. 

[15] (6) The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA comprises: 

(a) India. 

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the 
West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by 
the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station. 

(c) The islands in the above ocean area. 

17. Collaboration in Planning, a. The High Commands of the United States 
and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execu- 
tion of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. 
They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 961 

nSfS collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be 
undertaken jouitly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will 
apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately the 
extent of co laboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed 
mutually when the general policy has been decided ^ agreea 

To effect the conal)oration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph and to 
IT.Zt f'Vn-rTlf-]\''^ administrative action and command between the United 
States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will 
exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer 

^+/^ n?"/''?^?^'^"^, jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff 
of rhipf!fnf°^f^ff?f .?^' p''^'°''! being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group 
of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of 
collaboration in the [16] formulation of Militarv policies and plans 
govermng the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes 
responsibility for strategic direction. ^66-umes> 

(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Militarv 
Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which 
they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that 
Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction 
or.^' J, , ^/u''^'^''K''I^ '''''^'*''' Mission shall not become members of any regularly 
constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accrldited 
Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches 
and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are IccredSed ^'^'''^^' 
a. the United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with 
Canada Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between 
United States and Dominion forces. ucLween 

e To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military trans- 
portation service will be established between England and the Un ted States 
Ships and airplanes wiU be assigned to this service by the United States and the 
United Kingdom as may be found necessary. 

/. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate 
as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison wi-iSi each 
other in order to ensure the fuU and prompt exchange of pertinent information 
ihr^uT.f. ""A^rfP'^^^f""- ^Intelligence liaison will be establlhed iToronly 
through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the 
field with respect to matters which affect their operations. 

'■■''^J Communications 

" A^Jr^^h^ Fn^'''^ ^^^^""^ .^"d the United Kingdom will establish in London the 

Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows 

TW.H ^tP^e«e^,*ati^e of the United States Army and a representative ofThe 

Kion in LondJ7' ^'' n^embers of the staff of the Unitea States Military 

KingdJ.m'"^^^''*^*'''^^ °^ *^^ ■^"^'"^ Combined Signals Board in the United 

hniv Jf^lf iw-"''*.^'^-S°°'"'"''^'^*-^°''^ Committee wUl be the supreme controlling 
body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire visual and sound 
affectmg the armed services and the merchant marines of t™wo nations 

Control and Protection of Shipping . 

«f !S-,,J^^ British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection 
of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities 
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Militarv forces. Unfted States 
authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of th| 

respons bmtv^rfh'''''^"^'^' ^h'^' I" which the United States authoi'^tiesls ume 
responsibihty for the strategic direction of Military forces 

tn on. plit w ^ ^"""^ ^"^^'^ shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned 
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and 
5dS? by agreement between the respective naval authorities The British 

botSo'^anitTtr sr^^^^^ ^°"^^°^ ^' ^^^PP^"^ - ^^^ ^-^^ ^*^-^^« 

^vfio"^^? -^^^^^^ ^^""^^ Control Service Organization will continue in the 
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment 



962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval 
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange 
for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or 
charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control 
Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States 
areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

23. Special Relationship between Canada and the United States. Joint Agree- 
ments are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United 
States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United 
States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. 
When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will 
be incorporated in this plan. 

[19] SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS 

24. Joint General Task. In cooperation with the other Associated Powers, 
defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by: 

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a 
sustained air offensive; 

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and 
air offensive; 

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers; 

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic 
military power; and by 

e. Protecting outlying Militarj- base areas and islands of strategic importance 
against land, air, or sea-borne attack. 

[20] ' SECTION VII. TASKS 

25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those 
listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III. 

26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which ma}- be furnished 
by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce 
the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations. 

The Western Atlantic Area 

27. Definition . The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous 
continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West 
except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of 
Longitude 40° West. 

28. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory 
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into 
the W^estern Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by 
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that 
Hemisphere. 

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against 
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling 
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere. 

c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of 
the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by 
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating 
radius of occupied ^^r bases. 

d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba. 

e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, 
St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana. 

[21] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense 
Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in 
paragraph 47. 

g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against 
Germany. 

h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if 
such garrisons have been established. 

29. Army Forces, a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detach- 
ments. 

b. Local defense forces. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 963 

c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces 
maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons 
and Latin American Republics. 

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51. 

30. Navy Tasks, a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers 
bj' escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. 

h. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of 
enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expe- 
ditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the 
use of land positions in that hemisphere. 

d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified 
localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 

\23] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones. 
/. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. 

31. Navy Forces, a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments. 
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. 

The Pacific Area. 

32. Definition. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous 
continental land areas, is as follows: 

a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East. 

b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East. 

c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast 
and Longitude 74° West. 

33. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory 
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into 
the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by 
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in 
that Hemisphere. 

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin Ajnerican Republics against 
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling 
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere. 

[23] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications 
of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by 
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating 
radius of occupied air bases. 

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command 
Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 

34. Army Forces, a. Local defense forces. 

b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the 
United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the 
West Coast of South America. 

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51. 

35. Navy Tasks, a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far 
East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the 
denial and capture of positions in the Alarshalls, and through raids on enemj' 
sea communications and positions. 

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific 
Area. 

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as 
Longitude 155° East. 

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by 
destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces 
in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere. 

/. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area. 

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam. 

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal frontiers and specified locali- 
ties in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 

7. Route shipping in the Pacific Area. 

36. Navy Forces, a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments. 
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. 



964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Far East Area 

37. Army Tasks. In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal 
Frontier — Category of Defense "E". 

38. Army Forces. Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel 
and facilities as are available locally. 

39. Navy Tasks, a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis 
forces. 

b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Asso- 
ciated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that 
defense continues.) 

[25] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels 
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, 
and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. 

e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier — 
Category of Defense "E". 

40. Navy Forces, a. The Asiatic Fleet. 

United Kingdom and British Home Waters 

41. Definition, a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the 
Northward of Latitude 43° North. 

6. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area. 

42. Army Tasks, a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offen- 
sive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted 
invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation. 

b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those 
general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States 
Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed 
upon. 

c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles. 

[36] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and 
in cooperation with the Navy defend that island — Category of Defense "D". 

43. Army Forces. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces: 

a. British Isles. 

3 Heavy Bombardment Groups 

2 Medium Bombardment Groups 

3 Pursuit Groups 

Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments 
Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases) 
One reinforced Regiment (Token Force) 

b. Iceland,. 

One reinforced Division. 
Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51. 

44. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Northwest Escort Force. 

Task. Escort Convoj^s in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic 
direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches. 

b. Submarine Force Three. 

Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the 
strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines. 

North Atlantic Area. 

[27] 45. Definition. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows: 

a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North. 

b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North. 

c. Western boundary. Longitude 40° West. 

d. Eastern boundarv, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 
5° West. 

46. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Submarine Force Two. 

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction 
of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer 
Commanding North Atlantic. 

Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the 
Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this 
area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different 
decision. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 965 

b. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, 
covering, and patrollhig, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. 

c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directlv or indirectly with the enemy. 

d. Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Medi- 
terranean. 

[28] 47. Categories of Defense. The Categories of Defense listed in this 
paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval 
Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions. 

Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, 

except United States Bases in Newfoundland Category B 

United States Bases in Newfoundland Category C 

Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier Category B 

Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal 

Frontiers Category D 

Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except 

Alaska Category B 

Alaska, Less Unalaska Category C 

Unalaska Category D 

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D 

Philippine Coastal Frontier Category E 

Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine 
Coastal Frontier. 

Bermuda Category C 

Iceland Category D 

Midway, Johnston, Palmyra - Category D 

Guam Category F 

48. Joint Plans lo be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action 
of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will 
be disregarded. 

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans. 

b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for New- 
foundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as 
required by ABC-22. 

c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed 
bj' the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans. 

d. Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified 
in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of 
Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports 
are located. 

[29] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS 

49. Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required. 

50. Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the 
continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the 
Army Transport Service. 

51. Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is 
based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. 
Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless 
M-day has occurred before such date. 

a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop 
movements specified in this subparagraph a. 

(1) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. 
First contingent— 10,500 troops embark on 24-M. 

Second contingent — 16,000 troops embark on 57-M. 

These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements 
can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States trans- 
ports. 

(2) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M. 

(3) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M. 

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. 
The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy. 

(4) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 
18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. 
Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 



966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[SO] (5) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark 
September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to 
destination. 

(6) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 
1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported. 

(7) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 
1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported. 

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy. 

(8) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark 
November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported. 

(9) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 
1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported. 

(10) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on 
February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be 

(11) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 
15-M. 

(12) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M. 

(13) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 
20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become 
available. Part of this force mav be moved before M-day. 

(14) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 
embark 20-M. The remainder ■vd'ill be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-dav. 

[31] (15) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark 
on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become 
available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day. 

(16) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 

embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 

become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day. 

b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon 

unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make 

specific plans for these movements in advance of M-dav. 

(1) GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA, 24,000 
troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the 
Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco. 

(2) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN 
AMERICA, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The 
56 aircraft may be flown to destination. 

(3) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINA- 
TIONS, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum 
I ate of movement 60,000 troops per month. 

(4) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions, 
will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M. 

SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES 

[3S] 52. Theaters of Operation. The designation and delimitation of addi- 
tional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation 
covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect. 

53. Time of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this 
Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile 
acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate 
or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day. 

54. Personnel. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will 
be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 

55. Ports of Embarkation. The Army will establish, when required, additional 
ports of embarkation at: 

New Orleans, La. 
Galveston, Texas 
Boston, Mass. 
Charleston, S. C. 

56. Material. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the 
United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain 
material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate 
United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 967 

o the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under 
this plan will come from existinsi reserves of the respective services and from pro- 
duction sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all 
cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet 
requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible 
for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their 
respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other 
with the material involved. 

57. Supply Levels. Sui)ply levels will be maintained for forces operating in 
the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this para- 
graph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established 
after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved. 

a. Supplies other than ammunition. 

(1) Iceland 30 days, build up to 60 days within six 

months. 

(2) British Isles Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 

60 days within six months. 
Pursuit Aircraft 
60 days, build up to 120 days within six 

months. 

(3) Panama and Caribbean 30 days, build up to 45 days within six 

Coastal Frontiers. months. 

(4) Newfoundland and Alaska 30 days, build up to 60 days within six 

(Less Unalaska). months. 

(5) Unalaska 60 days, build up to 90 days within six 

months. 

(6) Bermuda Maintain at 30 days. 

(7) Hawaii Maintain at 70 days. 

[34] (8) Philippines As the situation may permit, the desirable 

standard being the maintenance of stocks 
at 90 days' supply. 

b. Ammunition for places listed under 57 a: 

(1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then 
maintain at that level. 

(2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then main- 
tain five times the mobilization allowance. 

(3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation 
in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days 
within six months. 

(4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' opera- 
tions; build up to 120 days within six months. 

58. Industrial Planning. For Industrial planning purposes, and with due 
regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to^other Associated 
Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with 
the following general policy: 

a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial 
needs. 

b. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the 
requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as neces- 
sary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board 
and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with 
national policy. 

[35] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver 
material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such 
material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made. 
Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and 
the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army 
may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole. 

59. Supporting Legislative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly 
shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential 
Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as 
are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan, 

60. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export 
Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and 
programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained 



968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial rela- 
tionships and all related means. 

61. Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government. The War and Navy 
Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government, 
shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects: 

a. Intelligence Service. 

h. Censorship and Publicity. 

c. Mobilization of Resources. 

SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES 

[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should 
be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United 
States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemi- 
sphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land 
bases. 

63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the 
defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications 
may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and 
commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the 
African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal 
zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the 
Island of Ferando do Noronha. 

64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing 
the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when 
necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa. 

65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, 
to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage 
opposition to the Axis Powers. 

66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective 
occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government. 

37] ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS 

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. 

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic 
War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), 
as indicated herein. 

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read: 
"33. Joint organization and command. 

"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which 
an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces 
and the Navy forces; respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have 
been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective 
coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. 
These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The 
system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, 
as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together 
with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and 
after M-day and the necessary peacetime i)lanning therefor, are as stated below. 
NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies 
Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a). 

"h. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is 
responsible for the coordination or prepnration, and for the execution of all plans 
for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command 
boimdarles ; where pertinent, a Defense Command Includes one or more coastal 
frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached siiowing defense 
commands in continental United States.) 

"c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to 
the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be in- 
cluded in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier Includes 
waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier. 

[38] "d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the 

North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of 
the territory and coastal waters of Canada. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 969 

t 

"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations 
shall be bv the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of para- 
graph 9 b." 

3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows: 
"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier. 
"a. Boundaries. 

Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States, but including United 
States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22. 

Southern. — Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern 
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C), Albemarle Sound, Chowan 
River, Virginia — North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an 
officer, designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Third Naval District, whojis designa.ted as 
the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also 
commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal 
force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the 
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the 
commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will 
arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of 
the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. 
[39] "c. Sectors. — The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the 
following defense sectors: 

(1) Newfoundland sector. 

(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22. 

The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army.^ — 'As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — -Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland. 

(2) New England sector. 

(a) Boundaries. 

Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States. 
Southern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, 
inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designatsd by Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, First Naval District. 

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport 
subsectors, with boundaries as follows: 

[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: 
Northern boundary of Massachusetts. 

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip 
Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit 
Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to 
Boston subsector. 

(3) New York sector. 

(a) Boundaries. 

Northern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, 
exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary. 

Southern. — Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, 
inclusive. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — Commandant, Third Naval District. 

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey 
subsectors with boundary as follows: 

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York 
Bay to the Long Island subsector. 



970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) Dola\varc-('hosai)eake sootcir. 

(a) Boundaries. 

Northern. ^ — -Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton 
exclusive. 

[41] Southern.- — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, 
inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C), 
Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina bound- 
ary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into 
the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as 
Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern 
and western boundary of Delaware. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — There is no naval commander of this sector. The 
Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local 
defense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant, 
Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in 
the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval Dis- 
trict, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local 
defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts." 

4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows: 
"35. Southern coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries, 

Northern. — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern 
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C); Albemarle Sound, Chowan 
River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive. 

[43] Southern. — The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends south- 
eastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean 
naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of 
Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that 
boundary. 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an 
officer designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the 

Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command 

over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force 

under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the 

Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command 

of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named 

will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, 

of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. 

"c. Sectors.-^-This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, 

Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth 

Naval Districts, respectively." 

5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs: 
"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries. 

All United States territories and possessions, and Laiited States military 
and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded 
as follows: 

[43] Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32' 
West thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, 
thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, 
thence by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence 
by a line direct to the place of beginning. The coastal zone includes all 
of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal 
points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary. 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or 
an officer designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated 
as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also 
commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint 
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 971 

"c. Sectors. — The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following 
defense sectors: 

(1) Guantanamo sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying 
westward of a line passing through Cape Isabcla and Beata Point, His- 
paniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal 
frontier boundaries. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

[44] Navy. — C'onimander, Naval Operating Base, Guan- 
tanamo, Cuba. 

(2) Puerto Rico sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The . area within the Caribbean coastal frontier 
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and 
northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude. 
(6) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District. 

(3) Trinidad sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier 
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and 
southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad." 
6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph: 
"35B. Panama coastal frontier. 
[4'5] "a. Boundaries. 

All United States territories and possessions, and United States 
military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within 
the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land 
areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal 
frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas 
betvi^een the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn 
from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South, 
longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal 
zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea 
lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries. 
"b. Commanders. 
Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, 
or an officer designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is desig- 
nated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer 
also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its 
joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, 
"c. Sectors. 

The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense 
sectors : 

(1) Atlantic sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Panama coastal fron- 
tier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continen- 
tal divide. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District. 
(2) Pacific sector. 

(a) Boundaries.— The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying 
between the continental divide and the western and southern boundaries. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy." — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District." 
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 19 



972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph: 

"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas 
lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama 
coastal frontier." 

8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read: 
"36. Pacific coastal frontier. 

"o. Boundaries. 

Northern.- — Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part 
of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required 
by ABC-22. 

[47] Southern. — Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal 
zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico. 

(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers. — The Pacific coastal frontier is 
divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval 
coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The 
boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern 
boundary of California, 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an 
officer designated bj' him. 
Navy. — 

(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also desig- 
nated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier. 

(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also 
commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed 
of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval 
local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under 
the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. 

(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the 
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands 
the naval local defense force assigned to his district. 

(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and 
the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange 
for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the 
naval forces assigned to their respective commands. 

[48] "c. Sectors. — This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, 
Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows: 

(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California 
sectors, Santa Maria River. 

(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern 
sector is the northern boundary of California. 

(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern bound- 
ary of Washington. 

(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector. 

"d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with bound- 
aries as follows: 

(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive. 

(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria 
River, exclusive. 

(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, 
inclusive. 

(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern bound- 
ary of California. 

(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to 
Moclips, Wash., inclusive. 

(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary 
of Washington. 

[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West. 
(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West. 
9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs: 
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier. 
"a. Boundaries. 

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea 
areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a dis- 
tance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and 
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 973 

"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 
Navy. — The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated 
as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also 
commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its 
joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army. 
"36B. Philippine coastal frontier, 
"a. Boundaries. 

The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and 
sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of 
the sea approaches to the coastal frontier. 
[50] "b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Philippine Department. 
Navy. — The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as 
the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also com- 
mands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint 
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. 

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the United 
States showing the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex 
I. Coastal Frontiers". This map ^vi]l be found reproduced as Item 
No. 2, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. 
These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits 
of the Navy Court of Inquiry.) 

[1] Appendix II to WPL-46, Composition of Forces 

[2] chapter I. INTRODUCTION 

2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating 
Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service. 

2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number, 

b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name. 

c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken 
over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning pur- 
poses, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the 
system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.). 

2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard 
vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names. 

b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control, 
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign 
to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature 
(AP 60, AK 90, PY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of 
the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the 
Bureau of Ships. 

2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned 
to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized 
at the time of issue of this plan. 

2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the 
heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and 
aircraft belong, as follows: 

A — Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day; 
B — Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under 
construction; 

C — Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government 
to be commissioned in the Navy; 

[SI D — Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either 
Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis; 

E — Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis; 
CG — Coast Guard vessels. 

[4] CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 

2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC 
FLEET as of July 1, 1941. 

2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, sub- 
marine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE 



974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TWO. Not. less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE 
BASE, COCO SOLO. 

b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for 
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 

2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, 
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the 
Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as 
may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation. 

2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty, 
patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task 
Forces indicated herein: 

1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE. 

18 VPB and necessary tenders; 

2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders; 

3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders. 

b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph 
will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN- 
TIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of 
the Commander in Chief. 

[6] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to 
the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
for the transportation of Army troops. 

2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and sub- 
marines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in 
these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional 
circumstances. 



TABLE ATF-1 






Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


BATTLESHIPS 

Batdiv 3 --- --- 


BB 
BB 

CA 
CA 
CL 
CL 

AD 
ODD 
ODD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 

CV 
CV 

VPB 
VPB 
AVD 
AVP 

VPB 
VPB 
AVD 
AVP 

PG 

ASR 
OSS 
OSS 

AG 
OSS 

SS 


3 
3 

1 
4 
4 
4 

2 
3 
4 
4 
9 
9 
8 
8 

2 

1 

12 
12 
2 
2 

12 
12 
1 
2 

1 

1 
8 
7 

1 
2 

1 




Batdiv 5 




CRUISERS 

CA 31 - - 




Cradiv7 . -- 




Cmdiv 8 




Crudiv 2 - 




DESTROYERS 

AD 2, 12 --- - 




DD 141 187 343 - 




Desdiv 54 . - - -- 




Desdiv 22 - 














1,850 tons. 






AIRCRAFT 

Cardiv 3 




OV 5 - 




Patwing S 

VP 31 -- 




VP 32 




AVD 4, 9 -- 




AVP 1,9 - -- 




PntwinQ 5 

VP 51 




VP 52 - - 




AVD 13 - --- 




AVP 3, 8 




SUBMARINES 

PG 53 . 




Subron / 

S/M Base, New I-ondon 

ASR 2 - - 




Subdiv 11 




Subdiv 12 




Exdiv 1 

AG 24 --- 




SS 20, 48 




SS204 





\)iO 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ^i"-^ 

TABLE ATF-1— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


SUBMARINE— Continued. 
SubTon 3 

S/M Base, Coco Solo 
ASR4 . 


ASR 

OSS 
OSS 

AS 
OSS 
OSS 

AF 
AG 
AKS 
AO 
AT 
AE 

DMS 
AM 

AP 
APD 

PC 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 

AG 

IX 


1 
6 
6 

2 
3 

7 

2 

1 
1 
8 
2 

i 

4 

7 

4 

2 

5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

1 




Subdiv 31 - 




Subdiv32 




SuhTon 7 

ASS, 21 _ 




Subdiv 71 .... 




Subdiv 72 




Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2 
SIM Base. St. Thomas 
TRAIN VESSELS 
AF 1, 9 


AFl to be assigned in August, 1941. 


AO 17 - 


AKS 3 


AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941. 


AO 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26 


AT 37, 66 




AE 2 


To be assigned in August, 1941. 


MINECRAFT 
Minron 7 

Mindiv 13 


Mindiv 14 




TRANSPORTS 

Transdiv 1 . 




Transdivll 




PATROL CRAFT 

Siibchasordiv 31 .. . 




DUANE (CG) 




INGHAM (CO) 




CAMPBELL (CG) 




SPENCER (CG) 




HAMILTON (CG) 




BIBB (CG) 




NORTH STAR (CG) 




NORTHLAND (CG) 




AG 21) 




UNCLASSIFIED 

IX 20 




NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA 
MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL NO. 1 
MARINE CORPS FORCES 
First Marine Division 




First Marine Aircraft Group 




Fifth Defense Battalion 









[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. 8. PACIFIC FLEET 

2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET as of July 1, 1941. 

b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REEN- 
FORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

2-3C2. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, 
patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task 
Forces indicated herein: 

1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders, 

2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR) ; 

2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders. 

b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain 
under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 
Rotation of units may be made periodicallj at the discretion of the Commander 
in Chief. 

2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally 
continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under 
exceptional circumstances. 



976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TABLE PAF-l 



Unit— Vessel 

BATTLESHIPS 

Batdiv 1.. . 

Batdiv 2 

Batdiv4 . 

CRUISERS 

Crudiv 4 

Crudiv 6 

Cradiv9 

DESTROYERS 

Desflot 1 

CL 7 

ADS, 4 

Desron 1 dess one Desdiv) 

Desron 3, 5 _ 

Desflot S 

CL8 

AD 11, 14 

Desron 4, 6 

Desdiv 50 

MINECRAFT 

CM 4 

Mindiv 1, 2 ._ 

AIRCRAFT 

Cardiv 1 

Cardiv 2 (less CV 5)._ 

Patwing 1 

VPll 

VP 12 

VP13 

VP14 

AVI 

AVD6, 10 

AVP4 

Patwing 2 

VP21 

VP22 . 

VP 23. 

VP24 

AV4 

AVD 11, 14 

AVP7 - 

Patwing 4 

VP41 

VP42 

VP43 

VP44 

AVD 2, 12... 

AVP 5,6 

SUBMARINES 

CL9 

Subron S 

AS3 

ASR 5.... 

Subdiv 21 

Subdiv 22 

Sithron i 

S/M Base, Pearl Harbor 

DD336 

AM 30 

ASRl. 

Subdiv 41... 

Subdiv 42 

Subdiv 43... 

Subron ff' 

Subdiv 61 

Subdiv 62 

BASE FORCE 

TRAIN VESSELS 

AE 1 

AF 7,8, 11 

AG 16,31. 

AH 1 

AKS 1,2 

AM 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43, 52... .... 

AO 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 

AR 1, 4 

ARbl 

ARD 1 

AT 12,23.33,34,64,65 

TRANSPORTS 

Transdiv 2 

Transdiv 4 

Transdiv 12 



Sym- 
bol 


No. 


BB 


3 


BB 


3 


BB 


3 


CA 


4 


CA 


4 


CL 


5 


CL 


1 


AD 


2 


DD 


5 


DD 


18 


CL 


1 


AD 


2 


DD 


18 


ODD 


4 


CM 
DM 


1 

8 


CV 


2 


CV 
VPB 


1 
12 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


5 


VPB 


12 


AV 
AVD 


1 
2 


AVP 


1 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


AV 


1 


AVD 


2 


AVP 


1 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


6 


AVD 


2 


AVP 


2 


CL 


1 


AS 


1 


ASR 


1 


ss 


6 


ss 


6 


ODD 


1 


AM 


1 


ASR 


1 


OSS 


6 


ss 


4 


ss 


5 


ss 


3 


ss 


3 


AE 


1 


AF 


3 


AO 


2 


AH 


1 


AKS 


2 


AM 


10 


AO 


14 


AR 


2 


ARb 


1 


ARD 


1 


AT 


6 


AP 


f) 


AP 


2 


APD 


4 



Notes 



To be formed about October 1, 1941. 



Includes SM 1. 



To be assigned in Aupust, 1941. 



EX AD 13. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 
TABLE PAF-1— Continued 



977 



Unit— Vessel 


Sym- 
bol 


No. 


Notes 


BASE FORCE— Continued 
MINE SQUADRON S 
DMS 13 


DMS 
DMS 
DMS 
DMS 


1 
4 
4 
4 




Mindiv 4 




Mindiv 5 

Mindiv 6 




NAVAL STATION. GUAM _.__ 




NAVAL STATION. SAMOA 

Seventh Defense Battalion _ 

MARINE CORPS FORCES 

Second Marine Division . 




Second Marine Aircraft Group 

Second Defense Battalion 

Sixth Defense Battalion. 





TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


CRUISERS 

Crudiv 5 


CA 


4 









CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 

2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST 
PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941. 

TABLE SEP-1 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


CRUISERS 

Crudiv 3 

DESTROYERS 

Desdiv 1 or 2 


CL 
DD 


2 
4 


As assigned by CinCpac. 







CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 



2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANS- 
PORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be re- 
tained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 



TABLE ASF-1 



Unit— Vessel 



CRUISERS 

CA 30. __ 

CL 12 ._ 

DESTROYERS 

AD 9 

Desron 29 

AIRCRAFT 
Patwing 10 

VP 101 

VP 102 

AV 3 

AVD 1, 7... 

AVP 2 

SUBMARINES 
Subron SO 

AS 9, 20 

ASR 6 

Subdiv 201- 

Subdiv202._ 

Subdiv 203- . 

PATROL CRAFT 

PG 21, 22 

PR3. 4, 6, 7, 8._ 
PYIO 



Symbol 


No. 


CA 
CL 


1 
1 


AD 
ODD 


1 
13 


VPB 
VPB 
AV 
AVD 

AVP 


12 
12 

1 
2 

1 


AS 
ASR 
OSS 

SS 

ss 


2 

1 
6 
4 

7 


PG 
PR 
PY 


2 

5 

1 



Notes 



978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TABLE ASF— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


TRAIN 

AO 6, 13 

AT 32 


AO 
AT 
AM 
AM 


2 
1 
2 

4 




Mindiv 3 




MindivO 




MARINE CORPS FORCES 

Marine Detachments 

Fourth Marines (Shanghai)... .. .. 




Marine Detachments 

(North China) 




Marine Detachments 

(Philippines) 





[7] 



CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE 



2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, 
show the initial composition as of Julv 1, 1941. 

a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE— TABLE NE-1. 

1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service wili be temporarily 
assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material prep- 
aration. 

b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE— TABLE NE^2. 

TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


DESTROYERS 
AD 15 


AD 
DD 
ODD 
ODD 
DD 

VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
AV 
AVD 

VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
VPB 

AVD 

VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
VPB 

AM 
AMr 


1 
9 
18 
5 
4 

12 
12 
9 
9 

1 
2 

12 
12 
12 
12 
1 

12 
12 
12 
12 

4 
H 




Desron 7 --. 




Desrons 30, 31 




DD .341, Desdiv 53 




Desdiv 2L. 




Mobile Destoyer Repair Units 1, 2 

AIRCRAFT 

Patwing 7 
VP 71... 




VP 72 . 




VP73 




VP 74 




AV5 




AVD 3,8..- 




Patwing 8 
VP 81 .. 




VP82 




VP83 




VP84 




AVD 5.. 




Patwing 9 

VP91 


] 


VP92 


1 This wing will be formed following 


VP93 


1 completion of Patwing 8. 


VP94 


J 


Mnt)i!e Aircraft Repair Units l,t... . 




TRAIN VESSELS 

AM 73, 74, 75, 77 




AMc36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50 




MARINE CORPS FORCES 

Eleventh Provisional Marine Company 





TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE 


THREE 




Unit— Vessel 


Sym- 
bol 


No. 


Notes 


SUBMARINES 
Subron 5 

AS 13 


AS 
ASR 
OSS 
OSS 
OSS 


1 

1 
7 
4 
6 






ASR3 

Subdiv 51 . 




Subdiv 52 




Subdiv 53 




Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3 









PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



979 



CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the 
Chief of Naval Operations. 

TABLE CNO-1. 



t'nlt— Vessel 



AO k 

A(i 23. 

AO 2.'i, 26 

AO 30, 32 

AM 40 

P0 52 

MTB Squadron 1 

MTB Squadron 2 

Subchaser Squaiiron 1 
COATANCHE (CO). 
ALOONQUIN (CO) 

MODOC (CG) 

RARITAN (CG) 

1X50... 

SS 206 to 211 incl 



Sym- 
. bol 


No. 


AG 


1 


AO 


1 


AG 


2 


AG 


2 


AM 


1 


PG 


1 


PT 


6 


PT 


7 


PTC 


4 


XPY 


1 


XPY 


1 


XPG 


1 


XYT 


1 


IX 


1 


SS 


6 



Notes 



ReoNav Yacht. 

Presideut's Yacht and tender. 

Survey vessels. 

BuOrd duty. 

Tender for PT's and PTC's. 



Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

In commission or to be commis- 
sioned and to operate either un- 
der the CNO or CinClant for 
temporary duty. To be a.ssigned 
to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 



CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 



[8] 

2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES. 

2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been 
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval 
Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such 
commands. Commandants of 'Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will 
assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to 
Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following 
general rules: 

a. TO THE NAVAL WCAL DEFENSE FORCES 

1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' 
Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"). 

2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval 
Local Defense Forces. 

3. District Craft (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval 
Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and 
boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant. 

b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT 

1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force. 

c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft 
will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or in the status "in 
commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in 
accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as 
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in 
commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of 
the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are oper- 
ating. 

[9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding 
paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix IT, will be employed in the Naval Local 
Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the 
Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United 
States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts 
will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also 
assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior 
to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast 
Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard. 

b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as 
modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy, 



980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces in tabular form. 

1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) Column (1), 

2. Sub-group Column (2) . 

3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be 

detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to 
be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the 
Chief of Naval Operations) Column (3) . 

4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which 

the vessel is to be mobilized) Column (4). 

b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship. 

2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval 
Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of 
the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in 
Column (4) , where mobilization will take place. 

[10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to 
convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units 
are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration 
of the following: 

a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the 
Mobilization; 

b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion; 

c. Equipment available; 

d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion; 

e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no 
conversion. 

2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal 
Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal 
Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval 
Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts. 

TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 


Sub- 
group 


From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


Notes 


(1) 


(2) 


(3) 


(4) 


(5) 


NAVAL COASTAL FORCE 










Navy Vessels 










PE 19, 27, 48, 55, 56. 5 PE 


A 








PY 12, 13, 15, 16 4 PY 


A 








PO 17, 18, 54. 3 PG 


A 








VPB 18VPB 


A 


USAF 




(Administration in 


AV or AVD or AVP number as required.. 


A 


USAF 




\ U. S. ATLAN- 
I TIC FLEET. 


ZNP 6 ZNP 


A 


IV ND 






Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 










Air Station, Salem, Mass .._ 










Air Station, New York, N. Y 




Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C 




Vessels from Other Sources 










XPG 1. 1 XPG 


D 


CNO 


I 




XPG 2,3 2 XPG 


1) 


CNO 


III 




NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FIRST 










NAVAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 










be assigned by the Commander, North At- 










lantic Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










Vessels from Other Sources 










XYPltoSOincl 30XYP 


D 
D 


I ND 
I ND 






XAGs 1, 2 2XAGS 




XAM 1 to4incl 4XA1M 


D 


I ND 






XAMb 1 to 9 incl 9 XAMb 


1) 
I) 


I ND 
I ND 






XAMc 1, 2 2XAMC 




Units Ashore 










As indicated in I ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 











PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 981 

TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 


Sub- 
group 


From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


Notes 


(1) 


(2) 


(3) 


(4) 


(5) 


NA^'AL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— THIRD 










NA VAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 










he assigned by the Commander, North Atlan- 










tic Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Ouard ^'essels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










1 'essels from Other Sources 










XYP 31 1 XYP 


D 


III ND 


III 




XAM 5 to 13 incl 9 XAM 


D 


IND 


I 




XAMb 10 to 14 incl 5 XAMb 


D 
D 


IND 
IND 


I 
I 




XAMcS to 16 incl 14 XAMc 




Units Ashore 




As indicated in III ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 


















Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2. RAINBOW No. 5. 










NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FOURTH 










NAVAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 










assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic 










Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










Vessels from Other Sources 










XCMcl 1 XCMc 


D 


IND 


I 




XPYcl, 2 2XPYC 


D 


HIND 


III 




XPYcS, 4 2XPYc 


D 


IV ND 


IV 




XAGs3 _ 1 XAOs 


D 


IV ND 


IV 




XAM 14 to 21 incl 8 XAM 


D 
D 
D 


IND 

IND 

IV ND 


I 

I 

IV 




XAMb 15 to 24 incl 10 XAMb 




XAMc 17 to 19 incl... 3 XAMc 




XAMc20 IXAMc 


D 


IND 


I 




Units Ashore 










As indicated in IV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No. 5 










NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FIFTH 










NAIAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 










assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic 










Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










Vessels from Other Sources 










XCMc2 1 XCMc 


D 


VND 


V 




XYP 32 to 38 incl 7 XYP 


D 
D 


VND 
VND 


V 
V 




XAGs4__. 1 XAGs 




XAM 22,23 2 XAM 


D 


I ND 


I 




XAMc 21 to 31 incl... 11 XAMc 


D 


VND 


V 




Units Ashore 




As indicated in V ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 








4 


Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 











982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TABLE SCF— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 
(1) 




NAVAL COASTAL FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

None 

Coast Guard Vessels 

MOJAVE, TAMPA 240' 2XPO 

TALLAPOOSA Misc. 1 XPY 

MOHAWK 16£' IXPY 

Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 

Air Station, Charleston, S. C 

Air Station, Miami, Fla _ 

Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla 

Air Station, Biloxi, Miss. -.. -. 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPG 4 IXPO 

XPYl to4inel 4 XPY 

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— SIXTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 
assigned by the Commander. Southern Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 

XCMc3- IXCMc 

XPYc5. 6-- 2XPYC 

XYP 39 to 44 incL 6 XYP 

XAGs5, 6 2XAGS 

XAM 24 to 27 incl - 4 XAM 

XAMb 25 to 31 incl 7 XAMb 

XAMb 32 to 34 incl __._ 3 XAMb 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in VI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned In Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SEVENTK 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 
be assigned by the Commander, Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard "^'essels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
\''essels from Other Sources 

XPYc7, 8 2XPYC 

XPYc9, 10 2XPYC 

XAGS7, 8 2XAGs 

XAM 28, 29 2 XAM 

XAMb 35, 36 2 XAMb 

XAMc 32 to 35 incl 4 XAMc 

As indicated in VII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
N^avy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 
be assigned by the Commander, Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard ^''essels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 

XCMe4 1 XCMc 

XPYc 11 to 18 incl - 8 XPYc 

XYP 45 to 50 incl- 6 XYP 

XYP 51 to 55 incl 5 XYP 

XAGs9 to 11 incl 3 XAGs 

XAMb 37 to 40 incl 4 XAMb 

XAMc 36 to 40 inch. 5 XAMc 

XAMc 41 to 43 incl 3»XAMc 



CO 
CQ 
CO 



VI ND 
VI ND 
IV ND 



CNO 
III ND 



III ND 
ni ND 
VI ND 
VI ND 
I ND 
I ND 
VI ND 



IND 
HIND 
VII ND 
IND 
IND 
IND 



VI 
VI 
VI 



VI 

III 



Notes 
(5) 



III 
III 
VI 
VI 

I 

I 
VI 



I 
III 

VII 

I 
I 
I 



III ND 


III 


IX ND 


VIII 


VIII ND 


VIII 


V ND 


V 


VIII ND 


VIII 


VIII ND 


VIII 


I ND 


I 


VI ND 


VI 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 983 

TABLE SCF.— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 
(1) 


Sub- 
group 

(2) 


From 
(3) 


Mob. 
Dist. 

(4) 


Notes 
(5) 


NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— EIGHTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT— Continu3d 
Units Ashore 

As indicated in VIII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 











TABLE CACF— CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67 5 ODD 

PY 18 1 PY 

VPB.- 12 VPB 

AV or AVP or AVD number as required 

Coast Guard 'l^essels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803. Appendix II. 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPO 6,7 2 XPG 

XPC 2,3,4 3 XPC 

XPY 8 1 XPY 

XPY 9, 10 2 XPY 

XPYc 24 to 27 incl 4 XPYe 

XPYc 28 to 31 incl 4 XPYc 

XYP 128 to 131 incl 4 XYP 

XAM 42 to 47 incl 6 XAM 

XAMbei to 66 incl 6XAMb 

XAMb67to 70 incl 4XAMb 

_XAMc93 to 102 incl 10 XAMc 

As indicated in X ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 

No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 

C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating 

Base, Guantanamo, Cuba. 



USAF 
USAF 



CNO 
III ND 

V ND 
III ND 

III ND 
I ND 

IV ND 
I ND 

V ND 
I ND 
I ND 



X 
III 

V 
III 
III 

I 
IV 

I 

V 

I 
I 



(Administration in 
\ U. S. ATLAN- 
[ TIC FLEET. 



TABLE PACF.— PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODD Desdiv 67.. __ 4 ODD 

PG 50 1 PG 

VPB 12 VPB 

AV or AVP or AVD number as required 

Coast Guard Vessels: 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 

Vessels from Other Sources. 

XCMc6 1 XCMc 

XPC 6, 6 2XPC 

XPY 11 to Hincl 4 XPY 

XPYc 32 to 43 incl 12 XPYc 

XPYc 44 to 46 incl 3 XPYc 

XPYc47 1 XPYc 

XYP 132 to 141 10 XYP 

XAGsl6, 17 2XAGs 

XAM 48 to 50 incl- 3 XAM 

XAMb 71, 72 2 XAMb 

XAMc 103 to 116 incl 14 XAMc 

As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5,RAINBO W 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 



USAF 




USAF 




V ND 


V 


III ND 


III 


IX ND 


VIII 


III ND 


III 


V ND 


V 


VI ND 


VI 


IV ND 


IV 


VIII ND 


VIII 


I ND 


I 


V ND 


V 


V ND 


V 



{Administration in 
U. S. ATLAN- 
TIC FLEET. 



984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
TABLE PSCF— PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 


Sub- 
group 


From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


Notes 


(1) 


(2) 


(3) 


(4) 


(5) 


NAVAL COASTAL FORCE 










Navy Vessels 










ODD Desdiv 70, 83 8 ODD 


A 








PE32.38 2 PE 


A 








PY14 1 PY 


A 
A 


USPF 






VPB 12 VPB 


(Administration in 


AV or AVD or AVP number as required 


A 


USPF 




I U. S. PACIFIC 
I FLEET. 


Coast Guard Vessels 










TANEY 327' 1 XPG 


CG 
CG 


IXVND 

XII ND 


XI 
XII 




SHAWNEE Misc. 1 XPY 


1 


Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 










Air Station, San Francisco, Calif 










Air Station, San Diego, Calif 










Vessels from Other Sources 










XPG 5 1 XPG 


D 


CNO 


XII 




XPY5, 6, 7 3 XPY 


D 


XI ND 


XI 




NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— ELEV- 










ENTH NAVAL DISTRICT: 










Navy Vessels: 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 










assigned by the Commander, Pacific South- 










ern Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels: 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










Vessels from Other Sources: 










XCMc5 1 XCMc 


D 


HIND 


III 




XPC 1 _ 1 XPC 


D 


XI ND 


XI 




XYP 93 to 97 incl 5 XYP 


D 
D 
D 
D 
D 


XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 


XI 
XI 
XI 
XI 
XI 




XAGs 14 1 XAGs 




XAM 39 to 41 incl 3 X.VM 




XA Mb 51 to 60 incl 10 XAMb 




XAMc65 to 86 incl 22 XAMc 




Units Ashore: 




As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces: 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 










NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— TWELFTH 










NAVAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 










be assigned by the Commander, Pacific 










Southern Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










Vessels from Other Sources 










XYP 98 to 127 incl 30 XYP 


D 


XII ND 


XII 




XAGs 15 1 XAGs 


D 


XII ND 


XII 




XAMc 87 to 92 incl 6 XAMc 


D 


XII ND 


XII 




Units Ashore 




As indicated in XII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 










BOW No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2. RAINBOW No. 5. 











TABLE PNCF.— PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— ThIR- 
TEENTE NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODD Desdiv 82 5 ODD 

PG51 1 PO 

PE57 1 PE 

SS 2SS 

ASR 1 ASR 

VPB 12 VPB 

AV or AVD or AVP number as required 



I'SPF 
USPF 
USPF 
USPF 



I Administration in 
I U. S. PACIFIC 
f FLEET. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 985 

TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 
(1) 



Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-803, Appendix II. 
AURORA 165' B 1 XPC 

Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 

Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash. 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPVc 19 to 23 incl 5 XPYc 

XYP 56 to 92 incl - 37 XYP 

XAGsl2, 13 2XAGs 

XAM 30 to 38 incl 9 XAM 

XAMb 41 to 50 incl 10 XAMb 

XAMc 44 to 64 incl 21 XAMc 

XAOb 1, 2 _ 2XA0b 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in XIII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 

Marirte Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 



From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


(3) 


(4) 


XI ND 


XIII 


XI ND 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


XI ND 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


CNO 


XIII 



Notes 
(5) 



TABLE HCF.— HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 
(1) 


Sub- 
group 

(2) 


From 
(3) 


Mob. 
Dist. 

(4) 


Notes 
(5) 


NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragrapii 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODDDesdivSO 4 ODD 

PQ 19 1 PG 

Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-803, Appendix II. 
DAPHNE - . .. 165'B 1 XPC 


A 
A 

CG 

D 

D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 


XII ND 

V ND 
XIV ND 

I ND 
XII ND 
XIV ND 

CNO 
XIV ND 


XII 

V 
XIV 

I 

XII 
XIV 
XIV 
XIV 




Vessels from Other Sources 

XCMc7 1 XCMc 

XYP 142 to 167 incl 26 XYP 




XAM 51 to 55 incl- 5 XAM 




XAM 56 1 XAM 




XAMcll7 to 119incL- 3 XAMc 




XAOb 3, 4 2 XAOb 

XYFlto5incl 5 XYF 




Units Ashore 

As indicated in XIV ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. .. . 




First Defense Battalion.. .. . . 




Third Defense Battalion.. 















TABLE PhCF.— PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIX- 
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 
Such suitable vessels as are locally available and 
additional vessels and aircraft as assigned 
by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC 
FLEET. 

As indicated in XVI ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 



[11] CHAPTER XI. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 

2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the 
Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. 



986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 5 

My 

SECRET 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac file no. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial 063 W 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 25, 1941. 
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46. 
Subject: WPPac-46. 

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet 
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in efi'ect 
prior to the receipt of such approval. 

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the 
Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. 
At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for 
approval by the Commander-in-Chief: 

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander 
Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the 
Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.) 

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for 
the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this 0-1 Plan by 
including suitable measures in their 0-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare 
separate siipporting plans for this 0-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific 
Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for 
operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval 
Operations for approval. 

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the 
Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be 
incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations 
to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed 
and approved. 

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this 
command. 

H. E. Kimmel. 
H. E. Kimmel. 

[i] SECRET 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
CinCpac File 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial 056W. 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 21, 1941. 
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46. 
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of. 
Enclosures: 

(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of eflfective pages. 

(B) Receipt form in duplicate. 

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1, 
Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and 
the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning 
and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief 
of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section). 

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the 
instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and 
the Registered Publication Manual. 

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be 
kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



987 



5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR- 
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY 
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED 
FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION 
MANUAL. 

6. SPECIAL WARNING — the contents of this publication shall be given 
the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the sub- 
ordinate plans. 

P. C. Crosley, H. E. Kimmel. 

P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1, 

Rainbow Five) 

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES— WPPac-i6 



Subiect Matter 



Page Number 



Change 
in Effect 



Promulgating letter: CincPac file A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W 
of July 21, 1941. 

List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46. 

Table of Corrections 

Distribution List - 

Title Page 

Table of Contents 

Parts I to V (incl.) _ 

Annex I ^ . _ 

Annex II 

Annex III,_ 

Annex IV 



1 

2, 2a. 2b 

3-52 incl 

52a-52h incl 

53-56 incl 

56a-56dincl 

57-74 incl 

I-l tol-llincl... 
II-l toII-9incl._ 
III-l to III-5 incl 
IV-1 toIV-3incl. 



Original 



[iii] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS 


Change No. 


Date of 
entry 


Signature and rank of ofEcer entering change 





















[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST 

Regis' 

tered 

Official to Whom Issued Nos. 

C hief of Naval Operations __ 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet : '7]8 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 9 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 10, 11 

Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor) 12,13 

Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor) 14, 15 

Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor) 16,17 

Commander, Battleships Battle Force 18 

Commander, Battleship Division One 19 

Commander, Battleship Division Two 20 

Commander, Cruisers Battle Force 22 

Commander. Cruiser Division Three 23 

Commander, Carrier Division One ^ 25 

Commander, Destroyers Battle Force 26 

Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One 27 

Commander, Minocraft Battle Force 28 

Commander, Cruisers Scouting Force 29 

Commander, Cruiser Division Five .30 

Commander, Cruiser Division Six 31 

Commander, -\ircraft Scouting Force 32 

Commander, Patrol Wing Two 33 

Commander, Submarines Scouting Force 34 

Commander, Base Force 35,36 

Commanding General, Second Marine Division.. 37 

Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa 38 

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District 39 

Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 40 

Commandant, Thirteenth Naval D istrict 41 

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 42 

Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 43 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 2], 24, and 44 to 60 in 
reserve. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 20 



988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE 
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

WPPac-46 

[«] TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Subject Page Nos. 

Introduction: 

Chapter I. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) 3 

Ciiapter II. Format of Fleet Plans 4 

Chapter III. Subordinate Plans 6 

Chapter IV. Mobilization 8 

Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information: 

Chapter I. Task Orcanization .._ _ 9 

Chapter II. Assumptions 15 

Section 1. General Assumptions 15 

Section 2. Special Assumption _ 16 

Chapter III. Information.. _ 17 

Section 1. General Information 17 

Section 2. Enemy Information 20 

Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 21 

Part II. Outline of Tasks: 

Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan,— Mission 24 

Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions 25 

Part III. Task Assignment: 

Chapter I. Phase I 28 

Section 1. Task Force One 28 

Section 2. Task Force Two _ 29 

Section 3. Task Force Three _ 30 

Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 32 

Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 33 

Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 34 

Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 35 

Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 36 

Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 38 

[Sa] Chapter II. Phase lA 39 

Section 1. Task Force One 39 

Section 2. Task Force Two 40 

Section 3. Task Force Three 41 

Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 42 

Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 45 

Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 48 

Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 49 

Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 50 

Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 51 

Chapter III. Phases Succeeding Phase lA 52 

Section 1. Task Force One 52 

Section 2. Task Force Two. , 52a 

Section 3. Task Force Three 52b 

Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 52c 

Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 52d 

Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 52e 

Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). _ ._. 52f 

Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 52g 

Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 52h 

Chapter IV. Execution of the Plan S3 

Chapter V. Initial Transfer of Units 54 

Part IV. Logistics: 

Chapter 1. General. 56 

Chapter II. Transportation 56a 

Chapter III. Hospitalization and Evacuation 56b 

Chapter IV. Prize Crews 56c 

Chapter V. Salvage 56d 

Part V. Special Provisions: 

Chapter I. Time to be Used 57 

Chapter II. Communications 58 

Chapter III. Location of Commander-in-Chief 59 

Chapter IV. Tentative Operations Plans— Phase I and lA 60 

Section l. Phase I 61 

Section 2. Phase lA 68 

[Sb] Annex I. Patrol and Sweeping Plan I-l to I-ll 

Annex II. Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan II-l to II-9 

Annex III. Communication Plan.. III-l to III-5 

Annex IV. Command Relationship and (Coordination of Activities at Outlying Bases IV-1 to IV-3 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 989 

[3\ SECRET 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE 
iNAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

Introduction 

chapter i. navy basic war plan (rainbow five) 

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in 
so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the 
Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only 
particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do 
chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks. 

[^] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS 

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small 
variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemi- 
nation on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows: 

a. In Part I the order of presentation is: 

Chapter I — Task Organization. 
Chapter II — Assumptions. 
Chapter III — Information. 

b. In Part II are incorporated: 

Chapter I — Task assigned by Basic Plan. 

Chapter II — Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accom- 
plishing the assigned mission together with (in a few in- 
stances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried 
out. 

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of 
those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate 
section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped togetlier. Perti- 
nent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given 
therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this 0-1 Plan. Where a 
task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made 
to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action. 

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans 
which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, 
and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized 
in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five), are 
considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect tlie measures 
of Phase I and Phase lA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could 
be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes 
[5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to 
have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional 
form with which all concerned are familiar. 

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in- 
Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occa- 
sion requires. The fortes affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of 
the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order 
by despatch or letter. 

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the 
next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes. 

[6\ CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS 

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared 
as follows: 

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in 
Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned 
task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning. 

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard 
form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operat- 
ing Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan 
for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is 
not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in- 
Chief's annexes, several plans may be required. 



990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed 
below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-!", the 
second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task as- 
signed at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a 
commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant. 

Task Force One A-1, etc. 

Task Force Two B-1, " 

Task Force Three .._. C-1, " 

Aircraft Scouting Force D-1, " 

Submarines Scouting Force E-1, " 

Minecraft Battle Force ^ F-1, " 

Base Force G-1, " 

Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier H-1, " 

Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier J-1, " 

Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier K-1, " 

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task 
organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than 
by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available. 

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations 
which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a 
brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendum to 
his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be ap- 
pended as addenda to the task force commander's plan. 

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further 
preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group com- 
manders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in 
the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but 
will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to 
the task force commander for acceptance. 

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic 
requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such 
addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, 
copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force. 

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum 
possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, 
plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably 
attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, 
is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this 
shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take 
immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence 
through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Com- 
mander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they 
occur. 

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal 
system of numbering subdivisions. 

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, 
lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above 
will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One 
will be "a-1". 

[8] CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION 

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually 
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl 
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can 
be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. 
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which 
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout 
the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated 
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day. 

[9] Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information 

CHAPTER I. TASK 0RGANIZ.\TI0N 

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix 
II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, 
Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 991 

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. 
Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject 
to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. 

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the 
current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to 
become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below. 

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their 
broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows: 

Task Force One. — for covering operations — Commander Battle Force in 
command. 

Task Force Two. — for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations — Com- 
mander Aircraft Battle Force in command. 

Task Force Three. — for landing attack operations — Commander Scouting 
Force in command. 

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is 
designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn 
the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. 
It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred 
between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, 
and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of 
the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in 
this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases 
the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to 
accomplish the assigned task. 

[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION 

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be 
effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up 
particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. 
It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show 
the task organizations at that time. 

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organiza- 
tion that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will 
thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned 
until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will 
release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the 
period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassign- 
ment is made by competent authority. 

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows: 

1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force 

Batdivs 2, 4 6 BB 

SARATOGA 1 CV 

Crudivs 3, 9 5 CL 

Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9 ._ . _ 4 OCL# 

2 DL 
16 DD# 
2 AD 
(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.) 

2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force 

Batdiv 1 3 BB 

Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN 1 CV 

Crudiv 5 4 CA# 

Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50 _.--._ 1 OCL 

8 DD 
2 AD 

(llncludes Atlantic Reenforcement of 4 CA.) 

3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force 

Crudivs 4, 6 _ . . . 8 CA 

Cardiv Hess SARATOGA 1 CV 

Desrons 4, 5 2 DL 

16 DD 

Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6 5 DM 

Available Transports Base Force — AP 

— APD 

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt. 
2d Marine Air Group. 



992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[12] 4. TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft 
Scouting Force 

AH units of Aircraft Scouting Force 107 VP 

2 AV 
2 AVP 
4 AVD 
Utility Squadron from Base Force 10 VJR 

5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines Scouting 
Force 

All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School.- 30 SS 

2 OSS 
1 SM 

1 ODD 

3 AS 

2 ASR 
1 AM 

6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force) Commander Minecraft Battle 
Force 

All units of Minecraft Battle Force 1 CM 

8 DM 

7. TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force) Commander Base Force 

All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less 8 DMS 
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ. 4 AF 

6 AT 

1 AH 
13 AO 

2 AR 

1 ARD 

2 AK 
2 AE 

1 AKS 
10 AM 

4 AG 
Utility 

Wing 
[13] 8. TASK FORCE FOUR (Ilaivaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 
Local defense forces. 

9. TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com- 
mandant, Twelfth Naval District. 

Coastal and local defense forces. 

10. TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com- 
mandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 

Local defense forces. 
[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement, 
composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, T'. S. 
Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They 
will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent 
their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered. 

[16] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS 

Section 1. General Assumptioris 

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are: 

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the 
British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern- 
ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, 
comprising either: 

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or 

2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, 
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of 
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan. 

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility 
of their intervention must be taken into account. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 993 

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive 
elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct 
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will 
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense. 

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the 
Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so con- 
ducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific 
Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional 
transfers may become necessary. 

6. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that 
eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reenforcements will be made 
in the Far East. 

[16] Section 2. Special Assumption 

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, 
but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces 
immediately available by about one-fifth. 

[17] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION 

Section 1. General Information 

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean: 

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East. 

2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East. 

3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American 
Coast and Longitude 74° West. 

4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military 
forces. 

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces 
in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the 
Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West 
Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West. 

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone 
extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of 
Mexico. 

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Co?,stal Frontier includes the coastal zone of 
the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, 
and, in addition, Alaska. 

f . The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal 
zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala 
boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the 
Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the sruthern and western 
borders of that zone. 

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the 
land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to 
a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and 
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef. 

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 
30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east 
to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on 
the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, 
thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence 
north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma. 

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval 
forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the 
defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in- 
Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be 
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of 
the Philippines. 

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New 
Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. 
The British Naval Commande'r-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic 
direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powders operating in this Area. 

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to 
cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con- 



994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-I). 
Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of 
preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being 
made, 

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain: 

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United 
Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsi- 
bility of their own Power. 

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting 
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operation.s 
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances. 

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic 
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their 
type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic 
tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will 
not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. 
Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension 
of the normal strategic tasks. 

d. "VVlien units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised 
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of 
time in grade. 

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate 
under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United 
States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their 
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups. 

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows: 
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their 
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does 
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen- [20] 
sive. The ITnited States does not intend to add to its present military 
strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet 
offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, 
and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese 
strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its 
forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth 
will be in a jjosition to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 

Section 2. Enemy Information 

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the exe- 
cution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports. 

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task 
is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes. 

[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be 
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional 
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser. 

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows: 

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia 
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong. 

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American 
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, 
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions. 

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only. 

d. The principal defensive efforts to be: 

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces. 

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central 
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced 
bases. 

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches. 

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action 
will be toward: 

a. Capture of Guam. 

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and 
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced 
bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and 
naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 995 

c. Capture of Northern Borneo. 

(1. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas 
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light 
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet. 

o. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval 
forces. 

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying 
United States positions. 

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows: 

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong 
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, 
and comparative!}' weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls. 

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position 
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the 
Mandates. 

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main 
base in Halmahera). 

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces 
in that area. 

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the 
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack imits as can be supported there. 

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub- 
marines in the Hawaiian Area. 

[33] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas 
of lines of communication. 

h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of 
usual routes. 

[24] Part II. Outline of Tasks 

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN MISSION 

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks 
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet: 

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting 
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture 
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications 
and positions; 

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk; 

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy; 

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as 
longitude 155° east; 

e. Defend Samoa in category "D"; 

f. Defend Guam in category "F"; 

g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, 
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy 
raiding forces: 

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent 
the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying 
liostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy 
the use of land positions in that hemisphere; 

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces; 

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as 
circumstances require; 

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones. 

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSION 

2201. It wuU be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based 
upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks 
the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and divides the 
tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows: 

a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war. 

b. PHASE lA — Initial tasks — Japan in the war. 

c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks. 

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows: 



996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter main- 
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service. 

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea. 

c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered. 

d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered. 

e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a 
similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day. 

f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern 
Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day. 

g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by 
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups 
as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator 
as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway. 

(26) 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the 

possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the 
Navy Department. 

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, 
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. 

k. Continue training operations as practicable. 

1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii 
for training in landing operations. 

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan. 

Phase I A 

2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows: 

a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k. 

b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been com- 
pleted. 

c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and 
tenders in the northern Pacific. 

d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the asso- 
ciated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering opera- 
tions. 

e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands. 

2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids 
against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto. 

f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against 
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland. 

g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and 
outlying bases. 

[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, be- 
tween the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast. 

i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established. 

j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier 
as necessary. 

k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the 
Second Marine Division. 

1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area. 

Phase II and subsequent phases 

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at 
this time are: 

a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island 
Area. 

b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary 
for further advance to the westward. 

c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications. 

d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk. 

e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase lA. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 997 

[28] Part III. Tm^k Assignment 

CHAPTER I. PHASE I 

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE 

3111. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division 
to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy basic plan. 

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I). 
[S9] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO 

3121. Task Force Two will: 

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 
[30] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE 

3131. Task Force Three will perform the tasks assigned in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

3133. a. Move from San Uiego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of 
the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports. 

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the 
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan 
for capture of Eniwetok. 

c. 1. Special Information. 

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are 
as follows: 

MIDWAY —34 ofl^cers 
750 men 

6 5' 751 caliber guns 
12 3"/50 caliber AA guns 
30 0.50 caliber machine guns 
30 0.30 caliber machine guns 
4 searchlights. 
JOHNSTON— 18 men 

2 5"/51 caliber guns 
4 0.30 caliber machine guns 
PALMYRA —4 officers 
101 men 

4 5'751 caliber guns 
4 3'750 caliber AA guns 
4 0.50 caliber machine guns 
4 0.30 caliber machine guns 
[31] OAHU —32 oflicers 

620 men 

4 5'751 caliber guns 
8 3' 750 caliber A A guns 
20 0.50 caliber machine guns 
16 0.30 caliber machine guns 

Note: The above personnel are defense battalion person- 
nel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard 
duty, barracks duty, etc. 
WAKE —None. 

2. Task 

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the 
Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

[32] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)] 

3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the 
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue admin- 
istration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion. 

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 



998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[33] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE) 

3151. Ta.sA: Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3152. a. Special Information. 

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall 
area. 

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deploy- 
ment suitable for this eventuality. 

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of 
aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes. 

b. Task. 

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 

c. Special Logistics. 

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway. 

3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for land- 
ing attack training. 

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to 
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan 
sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion. 

[34] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE) 
3161. Task Force Eight will: 
Continue operations and training under commanders Task Forces One and Two 

[35] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE) 

3171. Task Force Six wiU perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs. 

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander 
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases. 

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an 
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the 
loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of V. S. 
and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier for the same purposes. 

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander Ta.^k Force Nine. 

[36] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) 

3181. Special Information. 

The Basic Plan assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Frontier: 

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in C'ategory "D". (Category 
"D" — Mav be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Crnunaiider-in-Chicf, 
U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase L) 

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal 
Frontier. 

3182. By this Fleet Plan, Task Force Four is assigned the tasks below. 

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Frontier, in coop.>ration with the Army and the units concerned. 
(As of the date of issue of this plan, the security i)lan of tlu^ Commander, Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect). 

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, 
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the 
development of Samoa and (!uam. 

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in 
the vicinit}'; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate 
with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military 
activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COXTRT OF INQUIRY 999 

11. S. PACIFIC FLEHT OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE 
(NAVY PLAN 01. RAINBOW FIVE) 

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT 

CHAPTER I. PHASE I 

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for 
the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, 
Wake and Canton. 

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern 
Naval Coastal Frontier) 

3183. Commanders Task Forces Five and Ten perform tasks assigned by the 
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

[38] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE 

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal 
Frontiers will perform the following tasks: 

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the 
end of four W-day: units designated for early operations complete mobilization 
prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the 
Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible. 

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service. 

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating 
with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those 
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces. 

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief 
may direct. 

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed. 

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the 
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera- 
tions as directed by the commander-in-chief. 

[39] CHAPTER II. PHASE lA 

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE 

3211. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 

3213. Reenforce and support operations of Task Force two as required in the 
Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II). 

[40] Section f. TASK FORCE TWO 

3221. Task Force Two will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graph. 

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as 
required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II). 

[41] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE 

3231. Task Force Three will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required 
in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

3233. Peenforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance 
and Raiding Plan (Annex II). 

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of 
the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises. 

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2. 

[42] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE) 

3241. Task Force Nine will perform tasks as required in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3242. a. Special Information. 

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and 
Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the 



1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. 
Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of Julv 1, 1941, 
tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities 
may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the 
improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has 
been approved. 

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will 
habitually operate offensively in enemy waters. 

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 
1. Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged 
with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol 
plane operations. 

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane searc 
will comprise: 

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along 
our lines of communication. 

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of commimications. 

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, 
Palmyra and Canton. - 

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu. 

b. Tasks. 

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol 
planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest 
possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only 
when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of 
damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on 
the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result. 

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces. 

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan 
(Annex II). 

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same 
general area. 

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid dis- 
proportionate losses. 

[\j,.] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be V. J. 
Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of 
major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at dis- 
cretion, mav be temporarily transferred to commander Task Force Four (Hawai- 
ian Naval Coastal Frontier). 

c. Special Logistics. 

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Fontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways 

facilities. 

[45] Sections. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE) 

3251. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph. 

3252. a. 1. Special Information 

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by 
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and 
Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the cap- 
ture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas 
and the Japanese Homeland. 

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and 
Johnston Islands. 

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. 
Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been 
reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe- 
lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft 
usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami 
Oshima. 

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is be- 
leved that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol 
planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 1001 

5. The main units of the Jai.anese Fleet will probably be operating from the 
Inland Sea. 

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines 
and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be 
expected. 

[46] 32ri2. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications 
from Japan may bo considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are 
very important. 

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be 
operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. 
Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later. 

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to 
extend the Pacific Area sufficientlv for submarines to pass through the Nansei 
Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N. 

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The 
specific authority for such mining will be issued later. 

b. Tasks 

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway. 

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and 
thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating condi- 
tions, giving Stations the following priority. 

YOKOHAMA 

BUNCO CHANNEL 

KII CHANNEL 

TSUSHIMA 

NAGASAKI 

SHIMONOSEKI 

TSUGARU 

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing 
torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire. 

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of 
attack mission is not thereby jeopardized. 

c. Special Logistics. 

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol. 

[48] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE) 

3261. Task Force Eight will: 

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the 
local defense forces during this phase. 

[49] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE) 

3271. Task Force Six will: 

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the 
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding 
plan (annex II). 

[50] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 

3281. Task Force Five (Pacific Northern; and Task Force Ten (Pacific Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier; will: 

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the 
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I). 

3282. Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will: 
Continue tasks assigned for phase I. 

[61] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE 
3291. All task forces concerned: 

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191. 

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I). 

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA 

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE 

3311. Task Force One \\\\\: 

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex — ), 
and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines. 



1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[52a] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO 

3321. Task Force Two will: 

Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans 
and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed. 

[52b] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE 
3331. Task Force Three wUl: 

a. Continue training for landing attacks. 

b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other operations 
involving landing attacks. 

c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans. 

d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2. 

[52c] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE) 
3341. Task Force Nine will: 

a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. 

b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for 
the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines. 

[52d] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE) 

3351. Task Force Seven will: 

a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4. 

b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for 
the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines. 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE 
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT 

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA 

[52e] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE) 

3361. Task Force Eight will: 

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) 
and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed. 

[52f] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL 
FORCE) 

3371. Task Force Six will: 

a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174. 

b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and 
a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured. 

[52g] Section S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 
3381. Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten will: 
Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183. 

[52h] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE 
3391. All task forces concerned: 
Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291. 

[58] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN 

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on 
Avhether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution. 

a. If action against European Axis Powers onlv is to be taken the despatch will 
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE 
PHASE ONE". 

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will 
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE 
PHASE ONE AFIRM". 

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against theUnited 
States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the seniorcommander 
on the spot to take such action in the defense of his conunand and thenational 
interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior 
authority at once. 



PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 



1003 



[64] CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS 

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers 
to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organ- 
ization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made 
upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be 
made when the execution of Phase lA is ordered. Units concerned will report by 
despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring. 



From 


To 


Unit transferred 


Transfer effected 


Remarks 


Taskfor 1 


Southeastern Pa- 
cific For. 
Taskfor 3 . 


/2 OCL 


jwhen directed. - 
W-Day . . . 






11 Desdiv 

1 CL 


For rotation on patrol 

until J-Day. 
For rotation on patrol 


Taskfor 2 


Taskfor 3 


1 CA 


W-Day.- 

When directed. . 
When directed.. 

[w-Day 




Atlantic Reen 

Taskfor 2 _-.. 

PSNCF 


4 CA - . 


until J-Day. 
If Atlantic Reen. is de- 


Taskfor 3 


2CA 


tached. 
If Atlantic Reen. is de- 




fl2 VPB 


tached. 
fAdministration remains. 
\ Units may be rotated. 




h AVD 




PNNCF 

PNNCF.. 

Taskfor 3 


h AVP. 


I W-Day 




fl2VPB 


(■Administration remains. 
\ Units may be rotated. 


Taskfor 9 (Patrol 


h AVD 

[1 AVP 


Plane Force). 


}w-Day 






f2SS 


(■Administration remains. 
\ Units may be rotated. 




U ASR . 




W-Day 

|j-Day 




NARWHAL or 
NAUTILUS. 

fl CM 




166] 

Taskfor 8 (Minfor). 


Hawaiian NCF... 
Taskfor 3 


on J-Day. 
Until further orders. 


\8 DM. 




W-Day 




Taskfor 6 (Logistic 


1 AO 


Base Samoa, released on 


and Control For). 


Taskfor 2 


1 AO . 


J-Day . 


J-Day. 
For fueling at sea ships 




2 AO 


J-Day 


in initial sweep. To 

revert when released. 

For fueling at sea ships 




Taskfor 9 

Hawaiian NCF... 
Task for fi (Logistic 

and Control 

Force). 


lOVJR 


J-Day 


in initial reconnais- 
sance of MARSH ALLS 
To revert when re- 
leased. 
Until further orders. 


All Forces 


As directed 

Any ship passing 
between West 
Coast and Ha- 
waii. 


When directed.. 

Prior to sched- 
uled date of 
departure. 






For escort duty. To re- 
vert on completion. 



[56] 



Part IV. Logistics 



CHAPTER I. GENERAL 



4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged 
with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task 
Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present out- 
lying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required 
by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer 
in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal 
Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of 
material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a 
reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. 
After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of 
supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transporta- 
tion facilities available. 

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left 
the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet. 

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included 
in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan. 

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other 
task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic require- 
ments as far as they can be foreseen. 

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest 
priority classification by paragraph 42G1 of the Navy Basic Plan. 



79716 — 46— Ex. 146, voL 2- 



-21 



1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[56a] CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION 

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his 
liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and per- 
sonnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service. 

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the sup- 
ply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, 
Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed 
for transportation farther westward than Hawaii. 

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from 
the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION 

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced 
base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospi