PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-^•^-^
HEARINGS
UBFOUM THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 33
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HAKBOE ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEiAIBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 33
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
"9716 WASHINGTON : 1946
D767
. AS*-
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE I'EAKL
HAKBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi-
gan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from
North Carolina
I'ennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
tive from California
FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from
Wisconsin
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
W'lLLiAM D. Mitchell, Oeneral Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell^ Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, Oeneral Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate Oeneral Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Pages Transcript Hearings
No. pages
1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 983-1583 2587-4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4 1585-^063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24. 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 110.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army. Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
79716— Part 33
INDEX TO EXHIBITS VII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT
OF INQUIRY
Page
Exhibit No. 1 923
Exhibit No. 2 924
Exhibit No. 3 925
Exliibit No. 4 I- — 926
Exhibit No. 5 986
Exhibit No. 6 1018
Exhibit No. 7 1150
Exhibit No. 8 1158
Exhibit No. 9 1163
Exhibit No. 10 1165
Exhibit No. 11 1166
Exhibit No. 12 1168
Exhibit No. 13 1171
Exhibit No. 14 1171
Exhibit No. 15 1173
Exhibit No. 16 1174
Exhibit No. 17 1176
Exhibit No. 18 1177
Exhibit No. 19 1177
Exhibit No. 20 1178
Exhibit No. 21 1178
Exhibit No. 22 1179
Exhibit No. 23 1179
Exhibit No. 24 1186
Exhibit No. 25 1187
Exhibit No. 26 , 1187
Exhibit No. 27 1190
Exhibit No. 28 1193
Exhibit No. 29 1196
Exhibit No. 30 1199
Exhibit No. 31 1201
Exhibit No. 32 1205
Exhibit No. 33 1208
Exhibit No. 34 1214
Exhibit No. 35 1217
Exhibit No. 36 1230
Exhibit No. 37 1231
Exhibit No. 38 12.34
Exliibit No. 39 1236
Exhibit No. 39A 1238
Exhibit No. 40 1240
Exhibit No. 41 1240
Exhibit No. 42_.. 1241
Exhibit No. 43 1243
Exhibit No. 44 1243
Exhibit No. 45__ 1279
Exhibit No. 46 1280
Exhibit No. 47 1281
Exhibit No. 48 1282
Exhibit No. 49 1283
Exhibit No. 50 1284
Exhibit No. 51 1287
Exhibit No. 52 1291
VIII INDEX TO EXHIBITS
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Exhib
Page
t No. 53 1294
t No. 54 1316
t No. 55 1318
t No. 56 1319
t No. 57 1319
t No. 58 1328
t No. 59 1332
t No. 60 1340
t No. 61 1341
t No. 62_ 1344
t No. 63 1362
t No. 64 1387
t No. 65 1388
t No. 66 1390
t No. 67 1390
t No. 68 ■■ 1391
t No. 69A 1348
t No. 69B 1348
t No. 70 1349
t No. 71 1351
t No. 72 1353
t No. 73 1357
t No. 74 1359
t No. 75 1360
t No. 76 1360
t No. 77 1362
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 687
[a] [secret]
Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. N.
L^] Introduction
This summary will point out what we consider to be the most
important aspects of this Inquiry insofar as they affect the interests
of Admiral Stark, designated an Interested Party by this Court. It
is not our purpose to comment on testimony developed by this In-
quiry which affects only one or more of the other persons designated
as Interested Parties.
I. MOBILIZATION FOR WORLD WAR II
1. Mobilization meant building up the forces and distributing
them, prior to hostilities if possible. On 7 December 1941 there were
shortages of ships, planes and personnel, in the Pacific Fleet as well
as in the other Naval Commands. We have had shortages at the
beginning of all our wars.
2. Beginning soon after the outbreak of World War II in 1939,
we began the time-consuming task of building up our Naval Forces
and they were very considerably increased by the end of 1941. The
testimony concerning Admiral Stark's part in this effort is brief
but, with what is common knowledge, does indicate his zeal and his
accomplishments despite the difficulties which always attend such
progress during peace. The overall result was, to state it conserva-
tively, a much higher degree of readiness, in late 1941, than had been
the [^] case in our previous naval war history. Moreover,
every ship available had been placed in commission.
3. The Distribution of Forces among the various Naval Commands
was Admiral Stark's responsibility subject, however, to concepts and
policies either passed to him from higher levels or which resulted
from cooperative agreements with our Army. The entire world
theatre had to be considered and the available forces spread in two
oceans, even if in spots they thus appeared to be thin. Some mention
has been made of the transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic
during 1941. It must be remembered that 1941 began as a critical
year in the European phase of the war and any realistic plan had to
take into account the fact that our help in the Atlantic was deemed
essential to stave off the defeat of Britain, a defeat which would
probably have been disastrous in the European theater and also have
seriously hampered our ability to successfully defend ourselves
against the Japanese. The testimony indicates little if any fault in
the overall distribution of our available forces, and indeed, no au-
thoritative criticism on the point seems to have come from any
source. The distribution which was in effect was realistic, as fitting
688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the situation of late 1941. Mobilization was, in fact, as nearly com-
plete as any effort of the Chief of Naval Operations could make it.
4. The War Plans of 1941 were likewise realistic. Those Plans
w^ere no longer development projects but were tailored to correspond
to the forces available. Insofar as the Pacific Fleet was concerned,
the initial tasks fitted the offensive power of that Fleet. However,
as long as peace endured [3] we could not use that power
offensively, because the Government had decided, as a matter of
policy, that we would not commit a first overt act. The Japanese
had the initiative. Therefore, our forces which were within reach
of the Japanese, anywhere, had to expect attack — with or without
a prior declaration of war — and their security, while in such situa-
tion, had to be the primary consideration. These considerations of
security have not been shown to be incompatible with maintaining
a suitable readiness of our forces to execute the War Plan.
5. How the security of the exposed forces was to be guarded.
Admiral Stark left to the several Commanders-in-Chief. He did
not attempt to tell them how to accomplish security and he did not
harass them by calling for reports on what they had done or win- they
had not done something else. Such had long been Admiral Stark's
command method. It was not questioned by the several Commanders-
in-Chief prior to 7 December 1941 — in fact, CINCPAC pointed out
(in Exhibit 33) that because of the time and distance factors involved,
the Navy Department was not always too well informed of the local
situation, "thus making it even more necessary that the Conmiander-
in-Chief , Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather
than by categorical instructions.''
II. INFORMATION AND DIRECTIVES
6. Pursuant to his policy of informing the Commanders-in-Chief
of broad policy and objectives, Admiral Stark devoted considerable
personal effort and [4] time toward informing the CinC,
Pacific Fleet, of his conception of our situation vis a vis Japan. Our
position was uncertain, in varying degrees, right up to the closing
months of 1941 and was more or less bound to be so because of the
nature of our governmental processes. However, Admiral Stark em-
ployed much effort toward opening his mind to the Fleet Connnanders,
and keeping them in touch with our policies and the current situation
in the Pacific as he viewed it. Those views proved to be generally
correct and, even today, appear to have been properly set forth.
7. As regards the flow of information to CinC, Pacific Fleet, from
the Department's machinery, by employing routine methods: Such
information as concerned Japan is properly divided into tw^o cate-
gories :
a. The first constituted the primary function of the Navy's Intelli-
gence agencies and concerned the strength, disposition and activities
of Japanese forces. That class of information was always scant but
such as was obtained w^as known to Pacific Fleet Commanders. As a
matter of fact, one of the principal gatherers of such intelligence was
stationed in Pearl Harber.
b. The other category originated in Japanese political and diplo-
matic sources and was mainly gathered by joint effort of War and
Navy Departments. The volume of such intelligence was very great
and only a fraction carried significance of direct naval or military
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 689
value. It was not routine to transmit this class of information, from
day to day, as it came in, to the CinC, Pacific [S] Fleet. Cer-
tain items of it have been brought before this Court and many
questions put with the indicated intention of proving serious failure
in duty by the Chief of Naval Operations in not transmitting this
category of intelligence to CinC, Pacific Fleet, as the various items
became available. In studying the items of this category which are
in the record, it isi well to keep in mind that one, or several of them,
lifted from their place amid a great number can, in the light of
hindsight, be made to appear f ai* more significant than would have
been the case at the time.
c. To have transmitted even a fraction of this category to Fleet
Commanders, as a matter of routine, was quite inadvisable for two
reasons : Personnel was limited and more important work would have
been displaced. Such practice would have tended to compromise
intelligence agencies which were a highly important part of our prep-
arations for war. The information and directives which were sent
did reflect intelligence from such sources.
8. Admiral Stark did keep CinC, Pacific Fleet, informed of the
gradual deterioration of our relations with Japan throughout 1941
and, in late November, he warned both the Commanders-in-Chief in
the Pacific of the probability that we ourselves would be one of the
objectives of a Japanese surprise attack which was then expected. He
gave out all that was known of the disposition of Japanese Naval
units. He indicated in his despatch of 24 November 1941 that Japa-
nese forces might make a surprise aggressive movement in any direc-
tion. He issued an unequivocal war warning in good time — on 27
November 1941. In [{?] this despatch, he stated: "This des-
patch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
* * * have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected
within the next few days." He pointed out that the Japanese distri-
bution indicated an amphihious expedition against either the Philip-
pines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo, which was all that
was new concerning Japanese dispositions. That estimate of objec-
tives did not cancel out the despatch of 24 November 1941 in which
Admiral Stark warned of a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction. Thereafter, he gave CinC, Pacific Fleet, most significant
information and directives concerning the destruction of codes and
cyphers. These despatches represented the best judgment of the CNO
and his principal advisors and were based on the best intelligence
available. Subsequent events proved the information and conclusions
given in these despatches to be correct. They did not specifically pro-
diet an attack in the Hawaiian area. There was not sufficient basis
for such prediction, for the amphibious expedition in the Far East
was not pointed at Hawaii. However, its composition did not include
all the Japanese Fleet.
in. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEARL HARBOR
9. It is entirely clear that, under the policies of many years, and as
laid down in "joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", the
Army was fully responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor against
an air attack. That responsibility extended not only to the perma-
nent installations at the base, [7] • but also to ships within the
Pearl Harbor area. The Naval Base was and still is the seat of our
690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
power over the Pacific and in the last analysis the Army forces, Oahu,
were stationed there for its defense — and for that alone.
10. In January, 1941, the Navy Department (in Exhibit 9) pointed
out to the War Department considerable deficiencies in the Army's
readiness to meet its commitments for the defense of the Pearl Har-
bor Area against air attack. The War Department (in Exhibit 24)
acknowledged those deficiencies and undertook to remedy them. At
that time, both the Army and the Navy were cognizant of the material
and operational developments whereby the British had defeated Ger-
man air attack upon England. Those developments did include
close-in defense by anti-aircraft artillery, but the main feature was
fighter aircraft, made effective by radar and the directive control of
the fighters from the ground. By those methods, all of which had been
disclosed to the U. S. officers in England, a relatively small force of
fighter planes had repeatedly broken up heavy German bombing at-
tacks. The same methods are still in use today.
11. For the defense of the Pearl Harbor Area against air attack,
thei Navy's sole responsibility was to support the Army's effort
through the use of such elements as happened to be available, whether
belonging to the local defense forces or units which were parts of
the Pacific Fleet itself. Since Pearl Harbor was our one large
navel base in the Pacific, some units of the Fleet were normally
expected to be present. The defense of the Pearl Harbor Area,
and of any Fleet units which happened to be there, against air at-
tack, was not a direct responsibility of the Navy which had no
authority over the [<?] main defensive agency — the aircraft
warning system, the fighter planes and their direction in combat.
12. Even had no important Fleet units been in Pearl Harbor on
7 December, there were plenty of lucrative targets for the Japanese
aircraft. For example, the Court will have noted the location of
the .fuel tanks, up-hill from the all-important Submarine Base.
The testimony shows that those tanks were practically filled to
capacity (4,000,000 barrels). They could have been blown up and
fired by a very few planes attacking unopposed. The Court can
estimate how long our effort in the Pacific might have been delayed
if the Japanese raid, on 7 December, had found no Fleet units
present and had been directed against various Pearl Harbor installa-
tions on shore.
13. There was, from early in 1941, nothing new about defense
against air raids by means of fighter aircraft made effective by
radar and a ground control system. Such defense is comparatively
simple, requires only a small number of personnel, is self-contained
and is adaptable for readiness round the clock because it has only
one single, well-defined function. The elements for such defense
became available on Oahu in the summer of 1941, and they were
supplied for the one purpose of defense against an air raid. The
evidence discloses that there was nearly complete failure by Army
Fighter Planes to oppose the attack of 7 December.
14. Counsel submits that whatever may have been Navy failures,
on or before 7 December 1941, failures in judgment, of commission,
or of omission, [9'] all of those failures combined constitute
something quite minor as compared with the failure of the Army
Interceptor Command on Oahu.
H. R. Stark.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 691
[1] Statement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Retired, before the Naval Court of Inquiry Investigating the
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, read before the Court on 27
September 1944.
It is not necessary for me to make this first part of my statement
to the members of this Court. However, since the rumor has been
widely circulated during the last two years and a half that I was a
frend or intimate associate of the President of the United States,
I desire to take this opportunity to place on the record a categorical
denial of that story. The only meetings I ever had with the Presi-
dent, prior to my official visit to Washington as Commander-in-
Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet in June of 1941, approxi-
mately six months after my appointment, were in the course of
official routine duties and occurred more than twenty years prior
to my taking command in the Pacific. During more than forty
years of service in the Navy, I have never sought or owed advance-
ment to any political connection of any nature or description.
The following are the circumstances in connection with my retire-
ment. I set them forth because this matter has been so frequently
misrepresented in the press.
On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade,
U. S. N., Commandant 12th Naval District, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. N., Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, had
telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated
that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the [^] Acting
Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had sub-
mitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that
I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request
for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy De-
jjartment I had not even thouglit of submitting a request for re-
tirement.
On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, had tele-
phoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General
Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me. ^
I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated,
"I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determi-
nation by the Department as to what course of action will best serve
the intei'ests of the country and the good of the service."
Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official
directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a
request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary
of the Navy, Mr. Knox.
On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval
Operations, I stated in part : "I submitted this request solely to per-
mit the Department to take whatever action they deemed best for the
692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
interest of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure
or punishment."
The approval of my request for retirement included the statement :
"This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation
of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action,"
[<?] I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March
1942 that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and
specifications be prepared to bring me to trial by General Court
Martial at some future time.
When I took command of the fleet, it was based in Pearl Harbor.
The decision to base the fleet there was made prior to my taking com-
mand. I do not propose now to debate the wisdom or unwisdom of
that decision. The reason assigned for the presence of the fleet in
Hawaiian waters by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to
Admiral Richardson dated 27 May 1940 (Exhibit 26) was, "the
deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the
Japanese going into the East Indies." My predecessor. Admiral
Richardson, took up all phases of the decision to base the fleet in Pearl
Harbor with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President.
That decision, however, created fundamental problems for my con-
sideration as Commander-in-Chief, among many other problems with
which I had to deal.
There were certain weaknesses in Pearl Harbor as a fleet base.
They were well known to the Department. They had been pointed
out by Admiral Richardson both to the Navy Department and to the
President. On my own official trip to Washington in June of 1941,
in conversation with Admiral Stark and the President, I pointed out
the following facts:
1. The fleet base at Pearl Harbor, due to the congestion of ships, fuel
oil storage, and repair facilities, was exposed to attack, particularly
from the air.
[4] 2. The single entrance channel, which must be used by all
ships, exposed them to submarine attack.
3. The danger of blocking this single entrance channel must be
constantly considered.
4. In case of attack by air or otherwise with the fleet in port, it
would take at least three hours to complete a sortie.
5. That Pearl Harbor is the only refueling, replacement, and repair
point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area.
6. That ships must spend considerable time in Pearl Harbor for
these purposes, for relaxation for the crews, and to complete the
considerable number of alterations and additions required due to
war experience.
7. That the only real answer was for the fleet not to be in Pearl
Harbor when the attack came.
I mention these matters to indicate the basic problems created
by the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor. It is not possible
to draw a comparison between the security of such a base immediately
prior to the out-break of hostilities, and its security in war time.
After hostilities commence and tlie fleet is not restricted by any policy
of waiting for the potential enemy to commit the first overt act, our
own offensive operations afford a large measure of protection to the
base. In peace time the condition and movement of the fleet at Pearl
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 693
Harbor could scarcely be concealed from the watchful eyes of enemy
agents. The very topography of Pearl Harbor and the large Jap-
anese population of the islands created that dan- [S] ger.
Once the fleet was placed there, for the assumed purpose of exerting
a deterrent effect upon Japan, it was not maintaining a consistent
policy thereafter to weaken the fleet, visibly and plainly, by diversion
of powerful units to the Atlantic.
Other Harbors besides Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands could
not be used because of their extreme vulnerability to submarine
attack. About a month before I became Commander-in-Chief, Ad-
miral Richardson issued orders that no ship was to be anchored at
Lahaina because he considered it was no longer safe against submarine
attack. I fully agreed with and continued in effect this policy.
Apart from the inherent handicaps of Pearl Harbor as a base,
there were obvious deficiencies in the equipment necessary for its
protection. The postulate in Joint Action Army-Navy 1935 (Exhibit
6), was "Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured.
The f'Set must ha/de no anxiety in regard to the security of its hose.''''
Unfortunately this was the merest theory in Pearl Harbor in the
year 1941. The efforts made by me and my predecessor to strengthen
the base defense are a matter of record in voluminous correspondence
with the Department which is already before this Court. Time and
again there were pointed out to the Navy Department in Washington,
the weaknesses in the Army's equipment and material available for the
exercise of its specifically assigned and assumed functions of base
defense. The letter of January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70) addressed to
the Chief of Naval Operations, written by my predecessor. Admiral
Richardson, and prepared as stated therein [^] with my col-
laboration, in paragraph T (a), (b), (cl), emphasizes "the critical in-
adequacy of AA guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor."
"the small number and obsolete condition of land based aircraft
detection devices ashore." The letter stated that "it is considered
imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the
critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that
these measures should take priority over the needs of continental
districts, the training program and material aid to Great Britain."
Again in my official letter of 26 May 1941 to the Chief of Naval
Operations (Exhibit 33) in paragraph 5 (b) I said, "The defense
of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern.
We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get
more anti-aircraft gims, airplanes and radar equipment in Hawaii
and to insure priority for this over continental and expanding Army
needs."
_ The deficiencies in the equipment which the Army needed to exer-
cise its proper functions in the defense of the naval base at Pearl
Harbor, pointed out by Admiral Richardson and myself during the
year prior to December 7, 1941, had not been remedied at the time of
the Japanese attack.
One important and necessary element in the ability of the naval
forces to exercise their appropriate duties in connection with the
defense of the base was patrol planes. Plans of the Navy Depart-
ment provided that ultimately there would be supplied to the Pacific
fleet sufficient planes to cover operations of the fleet, with planes based
694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Oahu, and still have a
sufficient number to establish a continuous search around Oahu when
the fleet was [7] operating in distant waters. My recollec-
tion is that the plan allocated approximately 108 patrol planes to
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for such searching and
defensive operations as came within his sphere and also allocated
more than 160 patrol planes for the use of the fleet. These patrol
planes w^ere to be based on outlying islands, which we were developing
as rapidly as conditions permitted to insure an adequate supply of
fuel, bombs and other ammunition for patrol planes operating there-
from. In addition, our seaplane tenders would permit the supply
of seaplanes from any harbor where they could be landed and refueled.
The total number of patrol planes assigned to the Pacific fleet and the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District on December 7, 1041, was 81,
Perhaps of more interest to this Court than our many deficiencies
in equipment for base defense, were the plans made for the best utili-
zation of what we had. There has been introduced in evidence Pa-
cific Fleet confidential letter 2CL41 (Exhibit 8) originally promul-
gated about two weeks after I took command, and revised under date
of October 14, 1941. A study of this letter shows our plan for berth-
ing ships in Pearl Harbor by sectors so that they would develop the
maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector consistent with the
total number of ships of all types in port. The same security order
designated the Commandant of the 14tli Naval District as the Naval
Base Defense Officer. His selection as Naval Base Defense Officer
was entirely in harmony with the general purpose of the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan worked out by the General commanding the
Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District. [8] By joint agreement between the War and Navy
Departments (Exhibit 6) and by the provision of war plans and
existing instructions, the Army was charged with and made respon-
sible for the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. No orders or
instructions issued at any time lessened or mitigated the Army's re-
sponsibility for such defense. The Commandant of the 14th Naval
District was charged with the direction of the naval force made avail-
able by me to assist the Army. The Army did not have a sufficient
GHQ Air Force available to assume fully its responsibilities. The
Commandant was charged with the coordination of the naval force
with the Army effort to defend the fleet base at Pearl Harbor.
As a part of the plan for coordinating the Army and Navy activi-
ties for the defense of the base, there was approved on April 2, 1941,
a plan dated March 28, 1941, entitled, "Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan," (Exhibit 7). This plan dealt with joint air operations,
joint communications, joint antiaircraft measures and joint use of
munitions. There was also promulgated on March 31, 1941, Adden-
dum 1 to Naval Base Defense Air Forces Operation Plan No. A-1-41
signed by the Major General who commanded the Hawaiian air force
and the Kear Admiral who was Commander of the Naval Base De-
fense Air Force. (Exhibit 53). This document was followed by
Addendum II Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No.
A--1-41 dated April 9, 19441 (Exhibit 53, Document 6). The plans for
joint air operations by the Army and Navy in Oahu constituted in
the minds of the Navy Department an outstanding example of prog-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OE INQUIRY 695
ress in coordination between the services. Since these plans have
been introduced in evidence before the Court, it is hardly necessary
for me to describe them in detail. Copies of these documents were
promptly furnished the Navy Department and were accepted.
19] As Connnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 1 had a fleet
to prepare for war. I liad an international situation, always of grave
portent, to evaluate. It was my task to meet each situation which
presented itself witliin the broad reaches of the Pacific and deal with
it by appropriate action.
One of my principal concerns was, of course, the men and ships of
the fleet. After all, one does not train ships, but rather the men who
man the ships. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine
room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the look-outs,
to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the
signals, to the connnissary, and numerous other billets had to be trained
before they were competent. A breakdown or inefficiency in any one
of these categories might well be very costly, in time of war. Con-
stantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the
induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of re-
cruits and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified
training program. At times during my tenure as Commander-in-
Chief, as high as 70% of the men on board individual ships had never
heard a gun fired. Considerably more then 50% of the officers were
newly commissioned.
One great handicap was the constant and very large turn-over of
enlisted men and officers. This was caused by the necessity of send-
ing trained men to new construction and the expiration of enlist-
ments, which necessitated the supply of large numbers of untrained
personnel. This situation extended up to and including December 7.
The situation was tlioroughly presented to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in my letter of May [10'] 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33) entitled,
"Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." I refer the Court to
paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of that letter wherein this condition
is exhaustively treated. The training program extended to the air
arm of the Navy. For example, we w^ere directed to transfer about
twelve trained patrol plane crews per month to the mainland.
As to the fleet, itself, on December 7, 1941, the Naval forces of the
Pacific Fleet were inferior to the Japanese Navy in every category of
fighting ship, inferior in cargo and troop transports and in tankers
and other supply vessels. This fact was recognized in Washington.
The joint memorandum of 5 November 1941 to the President signed
by both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, a copy
of which is in evidence ( Exhibit 39A) , states unqualifiedly that the
Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet. As I read that
memorandum the inferiority of tlie Pacific Fleet was the basic reason
supporting the ultimate recommendation that no ultimatum should
be delivered to Japan.
Specifically, there were only 11 tankers in the entire Pacific. We
were particularly deficient in land-based and carrier-based planes.
The Japanese at the outbreak of hostilities had between 11 and 15
aircraft carriers in commission and operating, 4 or 5 of which repre-
sented converted merchant ships. We had 3 carriers in the Pacific.
Although the battleships of the fleet were of approximately the same
696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, they were particularly
deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons. In general, all ships
in the fleet were woefully deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weap-
ons as [11] we had been unsuccessful in producing in quantity
enough anti-aircraft artillery for mounting. This last mentioned
deficiency we were engaged in remedying at the time of Pearl Harbor,
but our task was only 10% completed. Anti-aircraft control gear
for these and larger guns was not adequate. Our surface gunnery and
our surface weapons because of constant care and attention were
in excellent condition.
There was an imperative need for an extensive training and target
practice program for ever}^ ship's crew and every plane crew. By the
early spring of 1941, target and base facilities to permit the prosecution
of an intensive fleet training program had been transferred from the
West Coast to Hawaii. To tow the considerable number of target
rafts, to transport the utility and transport planes, and to bring the
other training auxiliaries and fleet fueling facilities from the West
Coast to Hawai especially when we were short of auxilary vessels was,
in itself, a major task. Nor was the training program permitted to go
on without diversion of sizable fleet units to other theaters. In May
and June of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four 10,000
ton light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, six transports, with practically
all the trained and equipped marines on the West Coast, several small
transports and some other small craft, were transferred from the
Pacific to the Atlantic. The details of this transfer must have been
quickly known in Japan. Tliis transfer took away approximately
one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet, and resulted in a
very substantial reduction in the potentialities of the Pacific Fleet.
This same action which [12] took all the transports and the
trained marines from the West Coast, left us only the marines required
to man the outlying islands plus the garrison at Pearl Harbor.
By December 7, 1941, some additional marines had been trained at
San Diego and one transport out of a total of four under conversion
on the West Coast had been commissioned. The training of marines
in landing operations had of necessity been incomplete and their
equipment was entirely inadequate.
When I was in Washington in June, 1941, it was seriously proposed
to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic on additional detachment
to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of de-
stroyers and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer
was not made.
In carrying out the training program, it was necessary for me to have
precise and accurate knowledge of the appropriate time to interrupt
training by making strategic dispositions. The international situation
was grave from the moment I took connnand. I had to consider at all
times the physical effect on the personnel of the fleet of long periods
of watch standing in port in peace time and the result that such de-
mands might destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to attain.
Admiral Richardson has testified to the frequent communications he
received from Washington emphasizing the jjossibility of war. (See,
for example, Exhibit TG, Document 3). My oiiicial correspondence
from the Chief of Naval Operations,' which is before the Court, in
effect plots a gi'aph of recurrent tension in the international situation
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 697
from February on. It is studded with expressions that, "what will
happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess"; "that peace hangs by a
slender thread" ; [JSl "that the situation is serious." An "open
rupture" was described as a possibility on July 24 (Exhibit 71) ; the
situation was described on July 31 as continuing to deteriorate (Ex-
hibit 72) ; on September 23rd the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me
that "conversations with th-e Japs have practically reached an im-
passe." (Exhibit 37). It was never expected that these insistent,
ominous predictions required, each time they were made, an abrupt
discontinuance of essential training measures for all-out security dis-
positions. Any such action would have seriously interfered with train-
ing and in a relatively short time, reduced the efficiency of individual
ships to a dangerous degree. In fact, in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Ex-
hibit 73) the Chief of Naval Operations cautioned specifically, "I ad-
vise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your
forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called
upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived,
I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be re-
quired by the special operations which you envisage immediately after
the entry of the United States into War.
I expressed my own needs to the Chief of Naval Operations in
my letter of May 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33), in which I. stated "Full
and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even
though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his present
course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly
applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessities for
intensive [i^] training of a partly trained fleet must be care-
fully weighed against the desirability of interruption of this train-
ing by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventu-
alities." I concluded with the suggestion "that it be made a cardinal
principal that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately
informed of all important developments as they occur and by the
quickest secure means available." I fully expected to receive such
information, I now believe that this record will show the failure of
the Navy Department to inform me of known "impending eventu-
alities" in the week immediately preceding December 7. I shall dis-
cuss in more detail hereafter, mj own estimate of the situation made
at the time in the light of the information which was given me prior
to the attack.
The fleet was divided into three main task forces and the schedule
of operations required at least one task force at sea at all times,
available to strike in the event of surprise. Often two task forces
were at sea at the same time but never three except for concentrated
fleet maneuvers. Each of the task forces had its mission and train-
ing was conducted with a view to its attaining maximum efficiency,
in carrying out its mission. However, it was necessary to afford time
in port for all ships in order to provide for the overhauling of
machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for
action against the enemy. It was essential to push a material im-
provement program covering installation, as soon as available, of
short-range anti-aircraft guns, aircraft detection devices, look-out
equipment, splinter protection, additional personnel accommodations
698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and other alterations. It was also necessary to limit operations to
the availability of replacement fuel. We were applying to the Fleet
the lessons of war which 'were bein^j supplied us. Each installation
and alteration, whether it was splinter protection, degaussing, or the
installation of listening gear, required work on the ship in port.
[IS] Naturally the ship's force was engaged in many tasks of
installation, repair and alteration to the limit of their capacity while
in port. It was my policy to prevent breakdowns rather than run
the risk of breakdowns, and to have the Fleet in the best material
condition possible at the outbreak of hostilities. It goes without say-
ing, of course, that the necessity for refueling in port in and of itself,
prevented keeping task forces at sea at all times. The eleven tankers
were required to operate continuously between Pearl Harbor and the
A¥est Coast in order that the fuel at Pearl Harbor should not be
depleted.
Submarines constituted a menace in the operating area around
Hawaii. During the first week of February and the first week of my
command of the Fleet, a submerged submarine contact was reported
about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division
of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours after
which contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Jap-
anese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete
report to Naval Operations stating the action taken and adding that
I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in
our operating area around Hawaii. I was directed by despatch not
to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three mile limit.
[16] A similar contact in approximately the same position was
made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers engaged in
trailing were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine.
Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not
actually been sighted. During the ensuing several months there were
several more reports of strange submerged submarine contacts in the
Hawaiian area. As late as 23 September 1941 (Exhibit 12) the Chief
of Naval Operations wrote to me in part, "the existing orders, that
is, not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas
are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat, conclusive evidence is
obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United
States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action
against such submarines would appear to be our next step." Such
conclusive evidence was not obtained until the attack of December 7th.
However, upon receipt of the despatch of November 27, 1941 (Exhibit
17), I issued orders to depth bomb all strange submarine contacts in
the Fleet operating area and informed the Chief of Naval Operations
by despatch and letter of the action I had taken.
On October IG, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me the
despatch which has been introduced in evidence before the Court
(Exhibit 13). This despatch indicated a strong possibility of hos-
tilities between Japan and Russia; a possibility that Japan might
attack the United States and Great Britain. It directed me to take
due precautions including such preparatory deployment as would not
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative o'^tions against
Japan.
[17] I particularly invite the Court's attention to the directive
in the despatch of October 16 (Exhibit 13). I urge a comparison of
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 699
this directive with the language contained in the later despatches of
November 24th and November 27th (Exhibits 15 and 17). The
admonition against disclosure of strategic intention and provocative
action contained in the despatch of October IG (Exhibit 13) has its
echo in the despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on November
29 (Exhibit 19) directing my attention to the Army despatch which
stated, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt
act " and which required that measures taken should not
alarm the civil population or disclose intent. The despatch of October
16th spoke of "preparatory deployments." The so-called War Warn-
ing of November 27th directed an "appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-^G".
Upon receipt of the despatch of October ICth, (Exhibit 13) I made
the following dispositions ; I continued to maintain the patrol of two
submarines at Midway; despatched 12 patrol planes to Midway and
two submarines to Wake to arrive on October 23rd. I despatched the
Castor and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional
marines, ammunition and stores. The Curtis was to arrive at Wake
on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs. I prepared to send six
patrol planes to Midway from Pearl Harbor. I despatched addi-
tional marines, to Palmyra. Admiral Pye who was on the West Coast,
making a cruise, was placed on 12 hours notice after 20 October.
I had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.
[i«5] I put some additional security measures into effect in the
operating areas outside Pearl Harbor and delayed the sailing of the
West Virginia until about 17 November when she was due to go for
an overhaul at Puget Sound.
All these dispositions which I made as a result of the despatch of
October 16 were specifically brought to 'the attention of the Chief of
Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October which is in evidence.
(Exhibit 14.) In a letter of November 7th, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions specifically approved these dispositions (Exhibit 74) . This spe-
cific approval of my dispositions makes it unnecessary for this Court
to consider whether they conformed to what Admiral R. K. Turner
testified he thinks the Department intended me to do after the October
16 despatch.
In the despatch of 16 October 1941 1 was formally advised that there
was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great
Britain. That phrase was given a definitive meaning in the Chief of
Naval Operations letter to me of 17 October 1941, (Exhibit 38) in
which he said, "Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to
sail into us and in the message merely stated the possibility." To me
that meant that when the word "possibility" was used, its connotation
was limited — and that, when used, the meaning of the Chief of Naval
Operations was that "possibility" was not "probability."
The despatch of October 16th indicated a strong possibility of a
Japanese attack upon Russia. In this connection my correspondence
with the Chief of Naval Operations shows that the Department had
envisaged such a Japanese movement as [i^] possible as early
as the summer of 1941. At that time I repeatedly endeavored, without
success, as my letters show, to find out the probable attitude of the
United States in the event of Russo-Japanese hostilities,
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 2
700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On November 24th (Exhibit 15) I received a despatch from the
Chief of Naval Operations which is before the Court, which stated
that the chances of favorable outcome of ne^jotiations with Japan
were very doubtful, and that in the Department's opinion, a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Phil-
ippines or Guam is a possiJbility. However, in a letter of November
25th (Exhibit 16), to which the Chief of Naval Operations added a
post-scrip after a presumably informative conference with the Presi-
dent and Mr. Hull, he stated, "I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China-Burma area as the most likely." And the
Chief of Naval Operations added, "I won't go into the pros and cons
of what the United States may do. I Avill be damned if I know. I
wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most any-
thing and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may
do nothing — I think it is more likely to be 'anything'."
I interpreted the possibility of attack on the Philippines and Guam
in the same vein that I had been advised the word was used in the
despatch, viz, a possibility but by no means a probability. The letter
of 25 November (Exhibit 16) fortified my belief that this interpreta-
tion was correct. The Chief of Naval Operations has testified that he
did not intend that I should discontinue the training program for "all-
out" security [^^] measures upon receipt of the despatch of
November 24. (Exhibit 15) (See Record, pages 50-53).
I was completely out of touch with the details of the negotiations
proceeding between the TTapanese representatives in Washington and
our Government. The Chief of Naval Operations in a letter of October
17, 1941 (Exhibit 38) had told me that the Chinese incident was "The
stumbling block." In a letter of November 14 (Exhibit 39) , the Chief
of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the Presi-
dent signed by himself and General Marshall which advised against
direct armed United States intervention in China and recommended
specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan," (Exhibit 39A) .
This represented my general information as to how much of a "stum-
bling block" China might prove to be in the negotiations. I did not
know at that time, nor did I learn until I rend the official published
State Department papers long afterwards, that the outline of a pro-
posed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan handed
to tlie Japanese ambassador by my Government on 26' November
contained the following passages under steps to be taken by the Gov-
ernment of the United States and tlie Government of Japan.
3. The Government of .Tapan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police
forces from China and Indo-China.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in
China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capitol
temporal rly at Chunking.
These passages in the note of November 26 were most significant.
It is not within my sphere to decide whether [^i] they are
consonant with the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Staff to the President, that no ultimatum be delivered to
Japan. The historians of the future may ponder the question of
whether diplomacy took a more venturesome approach than the
judgment of the military deemed prudent. Suffice it to say that
I did not know of the delivery of this significant document of No-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 701
veniber 26th to the Japanese Governinent by the Government of the
United States, and because I did not know this, the Japanese had
vital information originated by my own Government which was
denied me. Consequently, any possible logical connection in the se-
quence of events between the note of November 2()th and the so-called
"War Warning" of November 27th (Exhibit IT) was lost to me.
The so-called, "War Warning" of November 27th has been in-
troduced in evidence before this Court (Exhibit 17). I ask the Court
to view it not with any meaning attached to it by hindsight after
the event, but as it would appear to a responsible Commander at the
time it was received. In the first place, it w^ll be noted that the des-
patch states at the outset that the negotiations between Jajjan and
America regarding the stabilizing of the conditions in the Pacific
have ceased. In the second place, it will be observed that the time
for expected Japanese movements is stated to be "within the next
few days" and the territory against which such movements are di-
rected is specifically stated to be "the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra
Peninsula and possibly Boreno." In specifically mentioning these
places as objectives of a Japanese amphibious expedition, the Depart-
ment appeared to be limiting [22] the phrase in its despatch
of November 24th which mentioned as a possibility, "a surprise aggres-
sive movement in. any direction.'''' The only American Territory
against which Japanese operations are expected is the Philippines.
I was not in a position to evaluate the probable American action in
the event of initial Japanese attack was made against Dutch or British
Territory. Any commitments made by the United States with re-
gard to the protection of the territories of these nations were not known
to me. From the Chief of Naval Operations' post script to his letter
of November 25th (Exhibit 16) I gitthered he had no more definite
knowledge in this respect than I did.
I did not know of the conversation of Mr. Dooman, the Counsellor
of the United States Embassy at Tokio, with Mr. Ohashi, the Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs, relative to what the United States would
do if Japan attacked Singapore. (Foreign Relations of the United
States, Japan Vol. II, p. 137). I did not know of Ambassador
Grew's statement to Mr. Matsuoka on February 15, 1941 (ibid 138).
This information was in the State Department on March 17, 1941.
I was likewise denied the information of the statement by the Sec-
retary of State to Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 16,
1941, that "this Government could not remain silent in the face of
such a threat, — — ," (ibid 553). I was also denied whatever in-
formation was behind the despatch from Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations of 7 December 1941,
(Exhibit 76, Document 4) sent to me for information and received
after the attack, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic had
learned from Singapore that the United States had [;2->] as-
sured Britain armed support under several eventualities, but con-
cerning which the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet had not
been advised.
My reaction and the reaction of my staff to the so-called "War
Warning" of November 27 was naturally affected by two despatches
from the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibits 18 and 40), sent about
the same time, which together with similar despatches from the War
702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department to General Short, proposed the relief of the garrisons at
Midway and Wake, with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine
planes on the islands by Army Pursuit planes. Exhibits 50 and 51, my
personal and official letters to the Chief of Naval Operations of De-
cember 2, 1941 contain a clear contemporaneous account of the prob-
lems involved in this proposal. These letters show that the Army's
despcitches to General Short went beyond the suggested reinforce-
ment by the Army of the Marine garrisons, and indicated that the
Army would take over the defenses of the islands. The despatches
from the War and Navy Departments indicate that the exchange of
planes and troops w^as of an urgent nature. This proposal did, not
originate with me or with General Short, The members of my staff
did not know why the exchange had to be made. Obviously the send-
ing of some fifty per cent of the Army Fighter Pursuit strength on
Oahu (as was proposed by the War and Navy Departments) affected
materially the defensive strength of Pearl Harbor. It appeared to us
at the scene, that such a proposal would not be made by the Depart-
ments in Washington, if they anticipated the imminent impact of
hostilities upon Oahu. Moreover, the proposed relief of the Marine
Garrisons by Army troops necessarily entailed disruption of the de-
fense of those islands during the entire time that one [24^] Gar-
rison w^as preparing to depart and the other becoming installed. The
Army had nothing comparable to a Marine Defense Battalion so that
the Army Garrison would have had to have a new" table of organization.
Likewise, Marine and Army Fighter Squadrons were differently or-
ganized. The proposed change which emanated from Washington,
on or about the time of the despatch of the so-called "War Warning"
did not simply entail a change of personnel; it involved also a com-
plicated logistic problem.
Furthermore at Wake there were no harbor facilities. Material
and personnel had to be landed from ships practically in an open sea-
way. Wake was the most westerly and advanced of the two islands.
Such an operation had no protection from the elements. The defense
from enemy action could not be more ineffective.
It seemed to us that a project of this nature would not havel been
planned or proposed by responsible authorities in Washington under
any situation where the defense of Pearl Harbor was a matter of im-
mediate concern. We recommended against sending the Army
Fighters to the islands ; first, because once landed, they could not be
removed and; second, because at conferences on the subject. Major
General Martin, Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, informed us
that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles
from land.
On November 29 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me, as an
information addressee, a message (Exhibit 19) wdiich was in sub-
stance a quotation of the Chief of Staff''s despatch to General Short,
of November 27 which General Short had previous- [25] ly
brought to my attention. This despatch stated that "negotiations with
Japan appear to be terminated, with only the barest possibility of re-
sumption." It stated that "the United States desires that Japan com-
mit the first overt act." It insisted that measures be taken, should be
carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.
The Chief of Naval Operations added to the substance of the Army
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 703
message of November 27, direct instructions that, WPL52 is not appli-
cable to the Pacific area and the further direction to "undertake no
offensive action until Japan has committed an over act." It reiterated
the need for preparation to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL46 so
far as they apply to Japan.
The recurrent note in these Army and Navy despatches of caution
against alarming the civil population, of emphasis upon the necessity
that the Japanese connnit the first overt act tended to create a state
of mind which prevented any action except that consistent with a
passive defense. I still had no explicit authorization to depth bomb
submarine contacts in the fleet operating areas. Indeed, under a literal
interpretation of our orders, if a Japanese naval force were to be en-
countered at sea, we were, in effect, directed to wait until they opened
fire.
The "few days" stated by the Navy Department on November 27 to
be the time for an aggressive move by Japan went by without event.
The negotiations which on November 27th were stated to be termi-
nated, and on November 29 to be terminated with the barest possi-
bility of resumption, were in fact resumed. The public press and
radio new^s broadcasts contained accounts that the negotiations were
continuing after November 27 and after [26] November 29. I
took into account this public information as to diplomatic develop-
ment in the absence of more authoritative information. Indeed Ad-
miral Turner testified that the Navy Department anticipated and
expected I should.
In fact, I now know that the Japanese were continuing negotia-
tions only as a device to cover up their plans. In fact, the Japanese
considered that the negotiations Avere ruptured after the American
Note of November 26. The real situation was then known to the Navy
Department in Washington. But I was never advised' that the re-
sumption of negotiations w^as a Japanese trick, as official Washington
knew it to be. The public resumption of negotiations after the des-
patch of November 27, which was predicated on this termination
naturally affected my evaluation of the international situation. It
suggested a mitigation of the emergency which prompted the so-called
"warning." In a public address in London on December 8, 1941, Mr.
Churchill stated : "Japanese envoys Nomura and Kurusu were ordered
to prolong their missions in the United States in order to keep con-
versations going while the surprise attack was being prepared, to be
made before the declaration of war could be delivered." As Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was not permitted to know
what Mr. Churchill apparently knew, and the Navy Department cer-
tainly knew, that the resumption of negotiations was a Japanese
stratagem.
The denial to me of knowledge of certain material facts, is not cited
as an excuse for inaction on my part after November 27th, for I was
by no means inactive after November 27th. After full consultation
with my staff — all experienced and responsible officers — I undertook to
comply with the directive [37] to make an appropriate de-
fensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
in WPL46.
I took the following action, on receipt of the so-called "War
Warning." I ordered to Wake one Patrol Squadron, then at Mid-
704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
way, and it proceeded on 1 December conducting reconnaissance
sweep enronte. Patron at Midway was replaced by Patron from
Pearl and left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting a recon-
naissance sweep enroute Johnston and enroute Johnston to Midway.
This squadron made daily search from Midway on three, four, five
and six December. I sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF squad-
ron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landing planes at Wake on
3 December. The Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights
with its own planes. Patron at Wake was then withdrawn; it con-
ducted reconnaissance sweep enroute Wake to Midway and a similar
sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor. The Lexington proceeded to
Midway with VMF squadron departing Pearl 5 December. It con-
ducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes enroute, and
was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke. The Bur-
roughs was despatched to Wake with additional forces and supplies
including Radar, but was short of Wake when war broke. She
departed Pearl 29 November. I directed daily reconnaissance flights
of VP planes, based on Pearl Harbor, to cover the fleet operating areas
and approaches tliereto. I also issued an order that any Japanese
submarine found in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu
should be depth bombed, and so informed the chief of Naval Opera-
tions, as I have previously noted. Submarine patrols were continued
at Wake and Midway.
[£8] It is almost unnecessary to point out that the Department
knew the operating schedule governing the particular time our three
task forces were in and out of port. The Department at no time
prior to December 7, criticized my dispositions or indicated that I was
not complying with its wishes. These dispositions were calculated to
strengthen (nir outposts to the South and West against the time when
they should face the call of all-out hostilities.
Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, (who were in command of
the forces carrying reinforcement planes to Midway and Wake) Avere
empowered to take appropriate action against any hostile attacking
planes.
Beginning latter part of November, a memorandum to show what
the initial steps would be were war to come was kept up to date. The
last provision was made on the 5th of December and was gone over
by me on the morning of December 6th. These memoranda outlined
steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war and are in
evidence before the Court as Exhibits GOA and 69B.
On 30 November, I received a despatch (Exhibit 76) stating that
there were indications Japan was about to attack points on the Kra
Isthmus by overseas expedition.
On 3 December the Department sent a despatch stating that it had
received highly reliable information that certain Japanese consular
posts were directed to destroy most of their codes and ciphers. This
despatch (Exhibit 20) was not a clear cut warning of any Japanese
intention to strike the United States. It stated that the Japanese
instructions were to destroy "most" of their codes — not all their codes,
a point noted by me and my staff at that time. It was entirely con-
sistent [29] with routine diplomatic precautions by Japan
against the contingency that the United States and Britain might de-
clare war against her and take over diplomatic residences if she took
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 705
aggressive action against the Kra Isthmus. The significance of this
despatch was dihited substantially by the publication of this in-
formation in the morning newspaper in Honolulu. Both Admiral
Pye and Admiral Smith testified that they read of this fact in the
press before the receipt of the despatch from the Navy Department.
The wide publicity given this certainly removed it from the category
of secret intelligence information.
On 6 December, the Department sent a despatch authorizing the
destruction by the outlying Pacific Islands of secret and confidential
documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency," (Ex-
hibit 22). In the report of the Robert's Commission this despatch is
mentioned, and a significant word is added in this paraphrase of the
despatch in the Commission's report. That word is the adjective
"tense", modifying the noun "situation". The adjective "tense" was
not in the original despatch sent to me.
In no despatch sent to me was there any warning of a probable or
imminent air attack upon Pearl Harbor. The "Fortnightly Summary
of Current National Situations," issued by the Office of the Chief oi"
Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated
on page 1, "Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance
against Thailand." The same publication on page 9, under the head-
ing, "The Japanese Naval Situation", stated definitely "the major
capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest
portion of the carriers." Intelligence available to me located other
Japanese [oO] carriers in waters far distant from Hawaii. We
knew that a raiding expedition would have to leave Japanese waters
approximately two weeks before they could make an attack on Pearl
Harbor. From our information therefore we had every reason to be-
lieve that the attack would not be made at the time it was made.
At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese inflicted upon the United States a
tactical reverse. But Japan made a fatal strategic blunder. Had
they sought to accomplish their program of Southern expansion, with-
out frontal assault upon American interest or territory, American
entry into the war might have been in doubt for some considerable
time. Our people were not united upon the issue of the advisability of
American entrance into the world conflict. The blow at Pearl Harbor
instantly unified the nation. It precipitated the nation into the world
conflict. In the long run, it was bound to be a colossal blunder from
the Japanese viewpoint. Responsible officers in the Pacific could not
entirely exclude from their minds the fatal long term folly of such
action by Japan. This was a factor that we discussed and weighed
with other elements in evaluating the situation as Admiral Pye testi-
fied. This did not diminish our war readiness but it was bound to be
a factor in any sober estimate of the situation. We did not know, of
course, that Mr. Hull had told the Navy Department on or about
December third, that he considered that the Japanese were in an irra-
tional, mad dog state of mind.
From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, General Short and I
conferred frequently. Present at these conferences were Rear Admiral
W. W. Smith, my Chief of Staff ; Captain C. H. [SI] McMorris,
my War Plans Officer ; Captain Walter S. DeLany, my Operations Of-
ficer; and Read Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commandant' 14th Naval Dis-
trict. Others who were probably present were Lieutenant Commander
706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, and Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, an
assistant War Plans Officer in Charge of Marine Plans for outlying
islands ; also Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. Navy, my Aviation Aide ; Rear
Admiral Calhoun, Commander of the Base Force; Major General
Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force; his aide; and General
Short's aide.
Our relations then, as ever, were cordial and cooperative. One of
my first acts after my appointment as Commander-in-Chief was to
make a call upon General Short to establish our relations on that
firm and friendly basis which characterized them throughout our
tenures of office. On the afternoon of November 27th the Army des-
patch from the Chief of Staff to General Short was delivered to me
by Captain J. B. Earle, USN, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff. On
the same afternoon, I caused to be delivered to General Short a para-
phrase of OP NAV secret despatch of that date. On November 28th
the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed.
We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that
probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with
Thailand most probably and Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies
and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order
named. In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate
activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii. I
believe that at the conference of November 28th, some discussion,
arose as to what action the United States would take in case thci
Japanese attacked [32] Thailand, the Kra Peninsula and
Malaya without making war upon the United States. We knew that
Admiral Hart's staff in the Asiatic had held staff conferences with
the British and the Dutch and that information had been exchanged.
However, we had not been informed of what action was to be taken
in case the British and Dutch were attacked and the Philippines were
not attacked.
I was very much concerned over my orders not to take any hostile
action and the emphasis placed upon this in both messages. I real-
ized the enormous handicap this placed upon the Fleet. We had
known many instances of the swift and deadly action of attacking
aircraft both from the incidents in actual war abroad and in our own
maneuvers. All of the information given us by the Navy Depart-
ment and our estimates led to the conclusion that an air raid on Pearl
Harbor was neither imminent nor probable. General Short and I
had many times discussed the possibility of a surprise air attack
against Pearl Harbor. We made frequent representations to Wash-
ington pointing out the inadequacy of the forces furnished to repell
such an attack. Washington evidently discounted heavily the prob-
ability of an air attack against Hawaii for the means supplied to
repell such an attack were inadequate up to and including Decem-
ber 7th.
Of course, it must not be overlooked that General Short's total
concerns and duties did not completely dove-tail with mine. General
Short was not charged with any joint responsibility with me for the
operation of the Pacific Fleet. So far as the Navy^s part in support-
ing the Army's defense of Pearl Harbor detailed plans were made
by the Naval Base Defense Officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 707
[SS] Among the topics which were discussed ;it the conference
with General Short to which I have referred, in addition to the des-
patches of November 27th were the following :
1. The defense of Pearl Harbor.
2. Garrisons and reliefs for the outlying islands.
3. The transfer of fighter pursuit planes to the outlying islands.
4. The transfer of flying Fortresses from Hawaii to the Philippines
by way of Midway, Wake, Port Moresby and Darwin.
5. The development of alternative land plane route to Australia
via Palmyra, Canton, Christmas, Samoa, Fiji, Noumea.
With regard to the defense of the base at Pearl Harbor, the evidence
before this Court shows that the estimates and operating plans ap-
proved by General Short and Admiral Bloch had set forth in detail
the steps to be taken by the Army and the Navy for the defense of
Pearl Harbor. The responsibility w^as fixed and the various elements
of the Army and Navy knew their assigned tasks. The only action
required was a decision to take one of the alerts or conditions of readi-
ness. All available forces were to be employed.
So far as the Army was concerned I knew in general the measures
adopted by General Short as a result of the despatch of November
27th. General Short had orders to report in detail to the Chief of
Staff the measures he had taken. He did this. I knew he had orders
to make such a report. General Short went on his alert No. 1 and I
understand that through his liaison with the 14th Naval District, the
Navy had formal information that he was on such an alert.
For the sake of rounding out the picture, the Court will note that on
November 28th, General Short was sent a message [o4] by the
Adjutant General directing in effect that all necessary measures be
taken to protect military establishments, property, and equipment
against sabotage. The War Department knew he was on an alert
against sabotage. Undoubtedly General Marshall satisfied the Rob-
ert's Commission by explaining, as he did before this Court, that
General Short's reply to the War Department's despatch of November
27th was stapled to a message from the Philippines, which was on top
of it, that he initialed the reply from the Philippines but did not'
initial the reply from General Short which he could not recall seeing.
(See Record of this Court, p. 880) . Under these circumstances, noth-
ing is more fantastic than to attempt by some obscure reasoning to
fasten upon the Comander-in-Cheif of the Pacific Fleet some criticism
because General Short prescribed the form of alert which appeared
to be required by his orders and with which the War Department was
perfectly familiar and I might add, the Navy Department as well.
The Robert's Report specifically charges that General Short and
I failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on
and after November 27th and to adopt and use the existing plans to
meet the emergency. And again, "It was a dereliction of duty on the
part of each of (the Commanders) not to consult and confer with the
other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings and the ap-
propriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostil-
ities." I solemnly deny the truth of these charges. I am satisfied
that the evidence before this Court establishes bevond doubt the in-
accuracy of those charges. In fact the Court will find that tlie Roberts
Report itself contains findings on this subject which are self-contra-
dictory.
708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S5] General Short had every reason to know with reasonable
accuracy the operation of distant air reconnaissance from Oahu. Gen-
eral Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force
received a daily availability report of Navy planes and made a similar
report to Admiral Bellinger. There were only six Army bombers
on Oahu capable of performing distant reconnaissance, a fact specifi-
cally called to the attention of the Navy Department by me in a
despatch of November 27th (Exhibit 76, Document 4). The Navy
carried out a daily reconnaissance of the operating areas which was
well known to General Short and Admiral Bloch.
On March 31, 1941, appropriate representatives of the Army and
Navy in the Hawaiian Islands in cooperation and coordination of
their activities, had executed a plan for the AIR DEFENSE of the
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 53). This plan, Addendum I,
to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, specifically discussed the
possibility of a hostile air raid at dawn. Under the heading,
"ACTION OPEN TO US" there is the following decision:
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward to reduce the proba-
bilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable, but can only be
effectively maintained with present pei-sonnel and material for a very short
period and as a practicable measure can not therefore be undertaken unless
other intelligence indicates a surface raid is probable within rather narrow
time limits.
This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They
knew of this decision. They had done nothing to change or alter
the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that
decision.
[■36] There was no intelligence in the messages of November
27th or in later messages available to me and General Short to indi-
cate that "a surface raid was probable within rather narrow time
limits." (Exhibit 53, Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force
Operation Plan No. A-1-41.) Our estimate of the situation, made
after frank and full discussion of the intelligence we received with
our staffs at the meetings I have referred to, was that an air raid on
Oahu was neither probable nor imminent. The appropriate repre-
sentatives of the Army and Navy in Hawaii had by a coordinated
decision made months before, concluded that distant air reconnais-
sance through 30)0° could not be undertaken. The factors underlying
this decision with respect to material and personnel had not changed.
We had no basis for altering it on and after November 27th.
I knew the Army's portable radar sets were operable. Some months
before General Short had informed me that he could give an all around
coverage of at least 150 miles and probably 200 miles. The Army's air-
craft warning service including the information net was still incom-
plete on December 7, 1941. Public telephones and special temporary
communication methods were usable but slow and inefficient.
The failure to man the radar after 7 : 00 A. M. Sunday, 7 December
was apparently due to a peculiar lapse. Prior to that date, these
temporary stations had been working from about 4 : 00 in the morning
carrying on training operations for the greater part of the day. Of
course, the maintenance of aircraft warning service was specifically
the Army's function. The unfortunate last minute deviation from
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 709
the apparent Army routine with respect to its operation was unknown
to me.
[37] Distant Reconnaissance: To insure Pearl Harbor against
a surprise attack from airplanes based on a fast carrier, it is necessary
to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree
arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for
a protracted period of searches of this character would require about
three times this number. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of
300 miles is a further necessity. 100 patrol planes would be required
for the pool for this dawn patrol. This dawn patrol is necessary
because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter, daily,
many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Roughly speaking, in a
360 degree search of 800 miles radius in the Hawaiian area we cannot
count, on an average, of more than a seventy-five percent coverage.
Any distant search which we could have made over an extended
period would have been incomplete and ineffective.
The Roberts Report charges me with dereliction of duty for failure
to operate a distant reconnaissance. Vice Admiral Bellinger has testi-
fied exhaustively on this subject. To discuss it in detail would involve
repetition of statistics of available planes and operational problems
now in evidence before the Court. Now it will suffice to say that
Admiral Bellinger, charged with the direct responsibility of this
phase of the Navy's participation in that defense, testified that witii
the material and personnel available any adequate search was impossi-
ble for more than a few days. For a period of ten days, as from
27 November until 7 December, approximately 30 planes w^ere availa-
ble for a 700 mile daily search — not an 800 mile search. This could
at best cover about one-third of the 360 [SS] degrees of the
circumference. Such a search would be ineffective. Having covered
the operating areas by air patrols, it was not prudent in my judgment
and that of my staff, to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes
in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability
to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans.
I deny that the charge in the Roberts Report is supported by any
rational and intelligent evidence before this Court.
I wish particularly to invite the attention of the Court to Fleet
letter 2CL41 of 14 October 1941 (Exhibit 8). This letter deals with
the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. It provides for all fore-
seeable contingencies. This, and other official documents, provided
for the use of all available forces, b^oth of the Army and the Navy in
case of an attack on Pearl Harbor. As Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet I appreciated thoroughly the inadequacy of the forces available
to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District. By my orders, all naval forces in port at the time of an
attack were made available and allocated to add to the forces defend-
ing Pearl Harbor.
I had many difficult decisions to mak.e but none which required more
accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail
training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of ^lert status.
The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a
nature that I felt training could still continue. I felt that I was en-
710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
titled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak
of war. I am convinced now that my estimate based upon the intelli-
gence received was correct.
[39] An attempt is made to read into the phrase "War Warning"
a significance broader than the specific intelligence which the message
contained. I submit that it should not be construed as a "catch all"
for the contingencies hindsight may suggest. The specific intelligence
in the message did not indicate that an attack on the Hawaiian area
was imminent or probable. The rest of the dispatch after the phrase,
"This is a war warning," at most states in substance that an attack is
expected on the Philippines and some foreign territory in a few days.
The edge of this message, so far as it affected the Philippines, was
somewhat blunted by the passage of the few days without such an
e^ent and by the apparent continuing of negotiations during and after
the next few days had passed.
The proper procedure for placing the fleets on a war basis is pre-
scribed in Chapter II, section 2 of WPL46. This provides for mobiliz-
ing the fleet in whole or in part or for executing this war plan in whole
or in part prior to a declaration of war. This prescribed procedure
is definite and understandable, by all elements of the naval service.
The prescribed procedure was not used prior to December 7, 1941.
In these circumstances I attempted to use the means at hand to
take care of the most likely present dangers and the most probable
future needs. I did not deem it wise, for reasons, I have pointed out
at length, to expend at that time the limited number of patrol planes
available in partial and ineffective distant reconnaissance. An attack
in the localities indicated in the dispatch would require practically
all types except submarines and I therefore directed extreme vigilance
against submarine attack in the Hawaiian area. The promptness with
[4.0] which the ships opened fire the morning of the Seventh
speaks volumes for the readiness of the fleet in port.
In brief, in the light of the information I had, and the means at
hand, I adopted the measures I did, not lightly, but in the exercise
of my most considered judgment, supported and sustained by a group
of distinguished and experienced officers who represented a cross-
section of the best naval brains in the world. The subsequent accom-
plishments of these officers demonstrates their outstanding abilities.
So far, I have analyzed my actions in the light of the information
which was available to me. But the Pearl Harbor incident can not
be understood or accurately depicted without an account of the infor-
mation which was available in the Navy Department and not given
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
I knew nothing of the American note of November 26th to Japan.
I did not know that the terms of that note w^ere considered by some of
the best informed officers in the Navy Department, to be utterly
unacceptable to the Japanese, prior to any indication of the Japanese
attitude after its receipt.
I was told on November 27 that "negotiations have ceased". How-
ever on November 28 a weaker statement of the status of negotiations
was sent me by the Navy Department. This was the quotation of
the Army dispatch, setting forth that "negotiations with Japan appear
to be terminated to all practical purposes with onl]/ the barest pos-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 711
sibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to
continue." From this point on, I was left on my own by the Depart-
ment to get such information about oflicial conversations with Japan
as I could from the press and radio — a source which the Director of
War Plans, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, has testified
he [4i] deemed to be one of my most valuable sources of
information regarding enemy "intentions and movements".
Contrast the information available to me in the Pacific, in this
connection with the information available to responsible officers in
the Navy Department in Washington, indeed with the information
available the President and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.
712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[a] Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Claude C.
Bloch, U. S. N.
[i] For these many days all of us have been striving^ to recon-
struct the facts surrounding an unique event in the annals of the mili-
tary history of our country — the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor
early in the forenoon of December 7, 1941. It was a surprise to the
nation. It was no less a surprise to every witness who has appeared
before this Court.
The reconstruction of the situation, undertaken more than 2i^ years
later, is difficult. That it has been accomplished at all and so well re-
flects great credit on this Court and its Judge Advocate.
In attempting to assemble in proper relation parts of documents and
recollections of varying degrees of clearness, our task has been far
simpler than that of this Court. For the task of the Court is to fit all
these pieces of evidence together so that the Court's findings will recon-
struct the situation as it existed, and not as it may now appear to have
been. Hindsight, acquired after the event, cannot be permitted to influ-
ence the factual reconstruction. Speculation now, 21/0 years later, as to
what any one believes he would have done at the time, should not distort
our perspective.
It is quite certain that there is not a man in this room, who, granted
the choice, would not have cheerfully traded his life to have prevented —
indeed, even to have minimized — the tragic events of that forenoon, I
do not believe that there was a naval officer of high or low rank at Pearl
Harbor who would not have made the same choice.
Any criticism or blame, if there be any, must be predicated upon
this difficult reconstruction which has been derived from memories
blurred by the many war problems and circumstances occurring since
December 7, 1941. It goes without saying, that the findings must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence, which leads exclusively
to and is consistent with but a single conclusion. We know the evils
of drawing a critical inference from conflicting and unclear evidence, or
in using one inference to support a further inference which then is not
supported by any proof at all. Your report will be public opinion;
public opinion can strip an individual of his reputation and his honor.
Hence, the preparation of your report is a serious duty and when
completed and approved the Service, and ultimately the public, will
recognize that "the moving finger writes, and having writ, moves on ;
nor all our piety nor wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all
our tears wash out a word of it."
[2] How then can we best aid the Court ? Probably by attempt-
ing to recapture in proper perspective the condition of things at the
time. It was 1940. The greatest military holecaust of history was
blazing in Europe. The United States was formally at peace; but
concerned by the repercussions from the dictators' victories in Europe,
it had thrown, into this maelstrom on the side of those resisting the
dictators, its full weight and such legislated help and resources as it
could give or lend. The point of anxiety was Europe. The Japanese
PROCEEDINGS QF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 713
American political and military situation then was not materially
worse than it had been for some time — nor was it worse than it was
to be at various times during 1941.
At that time, Rear Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District. There, he was the head, as he was during the entire
period, of the large and expanding industrial and service establish-
ment at Pearl Harbor, confronted with administrative problems meas-
urable only by the size of the enterprise and the tempo of its expan-
sion. The United States Pacific Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor.
The Army defenses of Oahu and the naval base, and the naval local
defense forces were indequate. They continued to be inadequate until
after December 7, 1941.
Recognizing that he independently could not correct the situation,
and that remedies could only come from an informed higher authority,
the Commandant 14th Naval District on December 30, 1940, by con-
fidential letter, communicated with the Navy Department, via the
then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson.^ In considerable de-
tail, he reviewed the matter of defenses of Pearl Harbor, pointed out
its many substantial deficiencies, and recommended increases in types
and numbers of A. A. guns, pursuit and patrol planes, vessels, and
other craft for local defense forces, required for an adequate defense.
He suggested in effect that in the high level discussions on this subject
with the War Department nothing be done which might in any way
destroy the cooperation between the Armj'^ and Navy in Hawaii.^
Not only were Rear Admiral Bloch's recommendations approved by
tlie Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, but Admiral Richardson on
January 7, 1941, vigorously endorsed them [IS] to the Navy
Department.-" It was following receipt of this letter that the Navy
De]i)artment apprised the War Department of the gravity of the situ-
ation as to the defenses at Pearl Harbor in its letter of January 24,
1941.* This was answered by the War Department February 7, 1941.^
And while the specific enumeration by the Commandant 14th Naval
District of defense material required w^as not set forth in this high
level correspondence, nor categorically insisted upon by the Navy
Department,*^ the representations of the War Department in this re-
gard were accepted by the Navy Department.
So that the matter of the conditions of defenses at Pearl Harbor
would not be minimized or unconsciously deferred in the high com-
mand because of the increasing gravity of Euj'opean events, Rear
Admiral Bloch from time to time during 1941 set foi'tli in communi-
cations to the Navy Department, through the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet the material and personnel conditions as he saw
them, and requested remedial action.^ Admiral Kimmel saw to it
1 Exhibit 28 — Confidential letter dater 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via
CINCUS : SEE paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4. 5.
3 Exhibit 28 — Confidential letter dated 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via
CINCUS : SEE paragraph 11.
3 Exhibit 28 — First endorsement by CINCPAC to Com 14 Confidential letter of 30
December 1940.
* Exhibit 9 — Secret letter dated 24 January 1941 from Secretary of the Navy to the
Secretary of War.
" Exhibit 24 — Secret letter dated 7 February 1941 from Secretary of War to the Secretary
of the Navy.
« RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 743 to 760, page 172 to 175.
T Exhibit 41 — Confidential letter dated 7 May 1941 from Com 14 to CNO copy to
CINCPAC : SEE paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6
Exhibit 42 — Secret letter dated 20 May 1941 from CINCPAC to CNO referencing among
others Com 14 confidential letter of 7 May 1941 (Exhibit 41), Com 14 secret letter of 13
714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that this information and these recommendations went on to the Navy
Department, with realistic and vigorous endorsements of the senior
officer present, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.^ Consequent-
ly, the Navy Department was fully aware of the deficiencies in the
local defense forces of the 14th Naval District and the [14]
seriousness of the situation in general.^
This effort of the Commandant 14th Naval District to get that which
he could not obtain independently is summed up in his letter of Octo-
ber 17, 1941, where he enumerated the meager local defense forces at
hand, and recalled the British statement of the causes of their 1940
disasters epitomized as "too little — too late".^°
It is significant that, right in the midst of the receipt of the dis-
patches, sometimes characterized as "warnings," namely those of Octo-
ber 16, November 24, 27, and 28, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District also received from the
Navy Department under date of November 25, 1941, a reply to the
Commandant 14th Naval District's October 17th letter, advising that
there were no additional local defense forces available for the 14th
Naval District — no surface craft — no aircraft.^^
It thus appears that, notwithstanding his efforts during the year to
and including December 7, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District
had as local defense forces : 4 old destroyers — which were being used
on inshore patrol ; 4 small minesweepers — which were engaged in
sweeping channels; 3 Coast Guard cutters — which were engaged in
patrolling off Honolulu in addition to performing their regular Coast
Guard duties; and the old SACRAMENTO, which had neither fire
power with M'hich to fight nor speed with which to run.^-
Reverting now to early 1941, a series of war plans were developed
and issued by the Navy Department in cooperation with the War De-
partment. These plans beginning with Rainbow 1, revised in par-
ticulars which do not concern us here, became Rainbow 5 — WPL-46.^^
To insure complete understanding, the Navy Department sent an in-
formed officer out to Pearl Harbor and Manila so that the commanders-
in-chief of the Pacific and Asiatic fleets would see and understand this
war plan eye to eye with the Department." To be sure, this plan has
little application to the Commandant 14th Naval District except in
certain particulars.
May 1940, Com 14 secret letter of 31 October 1941 and Com 14 confidential letter of 30
December 1040 (Exhibit 28).
Exhibit 46 — Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC
together with first endorsement thereto of CINCPAC to CNO.
* Exhibit 42 — ^described in note 7 sui>ra.
Exhibit 46 — described in note 7 supra^
Exhibit 44 — Annual report of CINCPAC to Secretary of the Navy via CNO dated 15
August 1941 : SEE at page 20 under paragraph (.'?) "Hawaiian Area" — "Pearl Harbor" —
subparagraphs a, b (1) (2) (3) (Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 768,
page 177).
Exhibit 10 — Memorandum for Admiral Stark, signed H. E. Kimmel, dated 4 June 1941.
copies to General Marshall, Admiral Kinz, Admiral Towers: SEE paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
(Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 70 and 71, pasres 28 and 29).
"Exhibit 45 — Confidential letter dated Aucrust 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC.
Exhibit 47 — Secret Itr. dated 25 November 1941 from CNO jointly to CINCPAC and Com
14 referencing among others Com 14 secret Itr. of 17 Oct. 1941 (Exhibit 46).
RECORD, witness KIMMEL — Q. 350 and 351, page 361.
■"• Exhibit 46 — described in note 7 supra.
11 Exhibit 47— described in note 9 supra.
" RECORD. Witness STAR— Q. 774 to 776, page 180 ;
Witness KIINIMEL — Q. 352, page 361 :
Witness BLOCH— Q. 9, 10, 11, page 386.
" Exhibit 4 — WPL 46
" RECORD, Witness Stark — Q. 17, page 16.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 715
[5] In the first place the plan provided a particular and definite
procedure to be followed by the Navy Department in case of strained
relations, whereby mobilization or partial mobilization might be ef-
fected prior to actual hostilities without authorizing acts of war by
naval forces.^'^
The direction of mobilization or partial mobilization during a pe-
riod of strained relations is an important means of effectuating the
transition from peace to a war footing. By such directive for mobili-
zation or partial mobilization, M-day is designated. Furthermore,
many subsidiary plans become operative automatically on M-day.^*^
It now appears extremely unfortunate — that for reasons best known
to the Navy Department, which was in possession of all available
political and military information and intelligence — the established
and well understood procedures for meeting conditions of strained re-
lations between the United States and Japan, for designating M-day,
and for placing all concerned on a full war f ooting,^^ were not used,^®
And yet, strangely enough, there have been implications during this
inquiry that, because of these strained relations, and notwithstanding
that only fragmentary information was available in Hawaii, never-
theless those in Pearl Harbor should have done those things which
better informed higher authority did not find expedient to do.^^ How-
beit — at no time prior to Decembel- 7, 1941, were these understood
procedures used ; the Rainbow plans were not executed ; and M-day was
not clesignated.^^
In the second place, prior to December 7, 1941, it was necessary that
local plans based upon the basic war plan be prepared and issued.
In addition, by virtue of the general Army-Navy agreement for joint
defense embodied in the publication Joint Action Army and Navy,
1935,-° it was necessary that local plans based upon it be prepared and
[6] issued. We have found that both of these requirements were ac-
complished by the joint promulgation in April 1941 of JCD-42 by
Lieutenant General Short on the part of the Army and by Rear Ad-
miral Bloch on the part of the Navy.^^
It may be well to bear in mind that plans or no plans, whether exe-
cuted or not, it had been, was then, and continued to be at all times
the undiluted primary responsibility of the Army to defend and pro-
tect Pearl Harbor, from land, sea and air,^^ so that the fleet might be
rested, refitted, refueled and provisioned in security. It was never
more than a limited responsibility of the Navy to support the Army
with what it happened to have present at the base in case of attack.
15 Exhibit 4— WPL-46 : SEE Chapter II Section 1 "Execution of the Entire Plan," para-
graph 0211 a and b, page 6 ; SEE also Chapter II Section 2 "Execution of a Part of This
Plan", paragraphs 0221, 0222, 0223, page 7.
i« RECORD, Witness STARK— Q 780, 781. 782, page 181.
1' RECORD, Witness STARK — Q'. 38. 39, 40, page 19 ; Q. 41, page 20.
IS RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 44, page 21 ; Q. 387, page 102 ; Q. 799, page 184.
Witness DELANY — Q. 51, page 504
^■■' RECORD. Witness STARK — Q. 783, page 181 ; Q. 792, page 182 ; Q. 131, 132, page 797.
Witness INGERSOLL — Q. 127, page 845.
-" Exhibit 6 — Publication "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935."
" Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Costal Frontier.
Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District", original April 1941 : SEE para-
graph 2, "Basis", page 2.
RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 211, page 260.
^- Exhibit 6 — "Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935" — SEE paragraph a (2), heading
"Gpneral Functions of the Armv in Peace and War."
RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 45, page 227.
Witness STARK — Q. 824 and R25. page 188.
Witness BLOCH — Q. 7, page 385 (A).
Witness MARSHALL — Q. 12, page 855 ; Q. 34, page 863.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 3
716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
To return, this plan JCD— i2 was based upon and was in conformity
with the Rainbow war plan.-^ And, as we have seen, it encompassed
those principles and measures stated in Joint Action which had ap-
plicability to the defense of the Hawaiian area.^^ JCD-4 set forth
with particularity the individual tasks of the Army and Navy, the joint
ones, and the particular defense measures which each service engaged
to perform i/, av, and when this plan JCD-42 was executed.-* So in
this matter, the Commandant 14th Naval District fully satisfied the
local burden indicated in both the war plan and Joint Action in respect
of the preparation of local plans. Local plans had been prepared.-^
[i] And now a third consideration. Were they proper plans?
Most assuredly. They were approved by Lieutenant General Short,
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Departments^ — and the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet — Admiral Kimmel.-^ They were then
transmitted to the Navy Department, and the joint air defense plans
were so well regarded that they were sent out by the Department to
other commands.-^ These plans were not materially changed after
December 7, 1941.-^
The activation of JCD-42 was contingent upon the designation of
M-day or the agreement of the local commanders. And like the war
plans, JCD-42 could be executed by the common action of the War
and Navy Departments.^"
And that brings us to a fourth consideration. It has been implied
in some of the questions asked before the Court that the local com-
mander of the Navy ought to have placed JCD^2 in execution prior
to December 7, 1941. Now, when it is considered that, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the War and Navy Departments could have executed
the war plan in whole or in part which would have automatically exe-
cuted JCD-42 — but did not do so — and notwithstanding the fact that
the War and Navy Departments could have designated M-day which
would have automatically executed JCD-42 — ^but did not do so — and
notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Department could
have independently executed JCD — 42 ^^ — but did not do so — it is
obvious that no responsible person in Hawaii would have reason then
and there to place JCD-42 in execution. And when we go down the
chain of command as far as Rear Admiral Bloch, in view of the com-
mand relations existing at the time in Pearl Harbor, and in view of
the circumstances just reviewed, any implication that he ought to
have, or could have, put JCD^2 in execution is not reasonable. And
the same can be said for establishment of unity of connnand for which
\8'] a well understood modus operandi had been promulgated.^-
-^ Aside from comparison of Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7, SEE also RECORD, Witness
SHORT — Q. 200 to 208, page 259.
'* Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, described in note 21 supra : SEE — For Army see paragraph 17,
page 9 ; for Navy see paragraph IS, page 10.
=5 Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, described in note 21 supra.
Exhibit 23 — containing annexes to JCD-42
2« RECORD, Witness SHORT— Q. 15, page 211.
^ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 9G, page 302 at 6th line from top page 303.
28 RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 68, page 2S ; A 268, page 82.
=9 RECORD. Witness KITTS— Statement page 527.
Witness SHORT — Q. 87, 88. page 234.
3« Exhibit 7 — JCD-42 : SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8.
RECORD, Witness SHORT— Q. 212 and 213, page 260.
=" Exhibit 7 — JCD-42 : SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8
RECORD, witness STARK — Q. 777 to 782, page 181.
Witness SHORT — Q. 212 and 213, page 260.
32 RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 67, page 27 and 28, specifically paragraph 9 b (1) (2)
\\\a (3), page 28 : Q 73 and 74, page 29 : Q. 817 to 823, page 187 and 188.
Witness KIMMEL— Q. 75 to 77, page 296.
Witness SHORT — Q. 7, page 220
Witness INGERSOLL— Q. 140, page 848.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 717
Now a fifth consideration. In anticipation of possible execution of
these phms, there was a need for drills, the correction of defects, and
the making of improvements. Furthermore, material deficiencies
must be noted and competent authority informed of conditions, to the
end that corrective action could be initiated. This was done.^^ In
similar anticipation, cooperation between Army and Navy should be
genuine and complete. This it was.^* Each of these things were
continuing procedures — not only at the level of Rear Admiral Bloch,
but in the higher and lower naval commands in the Hawaiian area
as well.^^
This brings us to a sixth matter. On July 1, 1941, the Chief of
Naval Operations issued a directive ^° whereby certain organizational
and command relations were changed. This resulted in a number
of things, the most important being, first, notwithstanding General
Order No. 143 establishing the organization of the naval forces, the
Naval Coastal Frontier forces would not be formed ; ^^ and, second,
in addition to General Order No, 142, under which the Commandant
14th Naval District became an oificer of the fleet under the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch as the Commander Ha-
waiian Naval Coastal Frontier and the local defense forces became
subject to the [91 orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet "in all circumstances." ^^ The net effect of all this was
that if there had existed a suggestion that, in defense and military
matters. Rear Admiral Bloch had a status independent of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, there was no doubt that from the date
of the directive, July 1, 1941, he was a direct subordinate ^^ of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from February 1941 to and
including December 7, 1941, except for a few days in the summer and
early fall, was physically present and ashore at Pearl Harbor .^°
Wliile, as we have seen, JCD-42 was never made operational prior
to December 7, 1941, and as the expression "distant reconnaissance"
does not elsewhere appear in the documents before the Court, it may
be discussed here. We should keep clearly in mind that in no directive
or executed operational procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was
there any duty or responsibility prescribed in relation to Rear Ad-
miral Bloch in any capacity to conduct "distant reconnaissance."
"Distant reconnaissance" was set forth only in JCD-42 as a measure
to be undertaken if, as, and ^ohen JCD-42 became operational.^^
S3 RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 18, page 38S.
Witness RAMSEY — Q. 80, 81, 82, 83. page 592.
J"! RECORD, Witness DELANY— Q. 68, page 507.
Witness CALHOUN — Q. 23, page 936.
w RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 72, page 232 ; Q. 183, page 257.
Witness ROCHEFORT — Q. 5, page 471.
^'Exliibit 4 — WPL-46 — (appearing as 9th page from cover page — not nurnhfrefl) Di-
rective dated July 1, 1941 from CNO to Distribution List for WPL-46 — serial 071912,
subject "The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers."
IlECORD, Witness STAR — Also appears: Q. Ill and 112, pages 39 and 41.
3" Exhibit 4 — Described in note 36 supra : SEE specifically at paragraph 4, first sentenec,
of CNO directive dated July 1, 1941.
RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 324, page 358. ^ „^ ^
3s Exhil)it 4 — Described in note 36 supra. SEE : specifically at paragraph 3 of CNO
directive dated 1 July 1941, which by its terms puts into effect at that time certain parts
of WPL-46 (Exhibit 4), and specifically those concerning command relations in Part III,
Chapter IL Section 4. at pages 36 and 37, which are paragraphs 3241 and 3242 as applies
to Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Exhibit 1 — General Order No. 142.
Exhibit 2 — General Order No. 143.
==• RECORD. Witness BLOCH — Q. 17. page 388.
^« RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 261 to 266. pages 349-350.
" Exhibit 7 — JCD-42 — SEE paragraph 18 i, page 10, providing for "distant recon-
naissance" which by paragraph (2), middle of page 8, becomes operational on M-day or
when the plan or part of it was executed.
718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The essence of the "distant reconnaissance" matter is this.*^ Rear
Admiral Bloch as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Com-
mander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Naval Base Defense Of-
ficer, or under any of his titles, did not have and never did have any
long range planes under his direct command.*^ While he had requested
a firm force of patrol planes in order that his local defense forces
might be adequate to the tasks with which they would be confronted,^
he never did get them.^^ The only [lO] planes suitable for
distant reconnaissance existent in the Hawaiian area during the entire
period in question prior to December Tth were 81 patrol planes en-
compassed in the Fleet Patrol Wings ONE and TWO and at the same
time comprising Task Force NINE, plus 6 or 8 Army B-17's.*^ The
Army bombers never were under Navy command *^ except for drills,
because the shift of those B-l7's from Army to Navy command under
plans approved by higher authority never was to occur, unless and
until the Naval Base Defense Air Force was activated. The Naval
Base Defense Air Force was to become an actual force in being under
Rear Admiral Bellinger as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
at the time and only at the time that the Naval Base Defense Air Force
was activated.*®
The naval patrol planes — the 81 — not all of which ever were at any
time simultaneously capable of "distant reconnaissance" — were a part
of the fleet. As such, they were under the direct command of Rear
Admiral Bellinger, either as Commander Patrol Wing TWO or as
Commander Task Force NINE. Except upon activation for air raid
drills, those planes never became a part of the Naval Base Defense Air
Force. It had never been planned or intended that activation of the
Naval Base Defense Air Force should occur, unless and until there
was a hostile air attack,*^ or until there was positive information of the
immediate imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor within narrow
time limits, i. e., "threat of hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent
to warrant such action." ^° Prior to December 7, 1941, there never was
an attack, nor did [ii] there exist positive information of the
immediate imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor .^^ . Thus, prior
RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 312, page 356.
« RECORD, Witness BELLINGER— Q 2, page 660 to 664.
Witness McMORRIS— Q 22, page 890.
« RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 775, page 180.
■" Exhibit 46 — Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC :
SEE paragraiih 4.
« Exhibit 47 — Secret letter dated 25 November 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC and Com 14 ;
SEE paragraph 5 (e).
« RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 23, page 222 at lines 18 to 21, page 223 ; Q. 65,
page 230.
Witness RAMSEY— Q. 43, page 583
Witness BELLINGER — Q. 46, page 676.
*- RECORD, Witness PHILLIPS — Q. 52, page 483
Witness SHORT — Q. 59, page 230
■^RECORD, Witness RAMSEY— Q. 5 and 6, page 575 ; Q. 37 to 39. page 581-582.
"•Exhibit 8 — Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised) dated October 14, 1941.
Exhibit 23 — Enclosure B "addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan
No. A-1-41", SEE page 4 at Section IV, heading "Action Open to Us", paragraph (a) and
page 5 at paragraph (e), also pages .5-6 at Section V, heading "Decisions" paragraphs
2 (a) (1) (2) and 2 (b) (1) (2) — (Note same document appears in Exhibit 53).
RECORD, Witness KIMMEIj — Q. 57. page 289 — last sentence bottom of page
•^Exhibit 23 — Annex No. VII to .Toint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, ,TCD-42 : SEE
.Article II, paragraph 2. jiage 1.
RECORD, Witness RAMSEY — Q 77. page 591 : Q. 85, page 592
Witness BELLINGER— Q. 66 to 69. page 678.
" RECORD, Witness ST.\RK — Q. 601, page 154.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 719
(() December 7, 1941, except for simulated emergencies, that is drills,
the Army bombers and the naval patrol planes were never a part of
any continuing firm Naval Base Defense Air Force.^- Hence, except
for drills, these planes capable of long range reconnaissance were never
under Rear Admiral Bellinger in his capacity as Commander Naval
Base Defense Air Force.'^^ Consequently, neither he nor the planes
were ever under command of Rear Admiral Bloch as Naval Base
Defense Officer or under his command in any capacity, except at
planes,^*
For these same reasons, the smaller aircraft, the short legged planes,
the remaining naval shore based aircraft, had a similar status, and
were circumscribed by the same resti'ictions of activation and employ-
ment in the naval Base Defense Air Force as were the long range
planes.^^
Prior to December 7, 1941, there never were enough planes, crews
or spare parts, to establish and continue a daily distant reconnaissance
over a protracted period. ^*^ Furthermore, high authority had put all
the available long range naval planes in Task Force NINE some weeks
prior to December 7, 1941, under Rear Admiral Bellinger.^' Task
Force NINE had been assigned directly certain missions, one being "to
conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in order to improve security of fleet units
and bases." ^^ High authorit}^ had approved the [12] operat-
ing, expansion "training, intertype training, and upkeep schedules for
the period on and after November 15, 1941, for these patrol planes ;^^
high authority had decided not to interrupt training,*^'' and had deter-
mined, and I quote, that "a continuous patrol over long periods of time
was out of the question." ^^
"Distant reconnaissance", insofar as Rear Admiral Bloch is con-
cerned, under whatever title you consider him, can be summarized
thus: — he had no planes for distant reconnaissance, and he had no
surface vessels to accomplish it otherwise.*'- Having no information
over and above or differing from that of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet,''^ he had no basis for dissenting from the decisions of
the Commander-in-Chief in regard to distant reconnaissance. Fi-
« RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 69 to 72, page 398-399.
!!» RECORD, Witness BELLINGNER — Q. 2, page 660.
« RECORD, Witness KIMMBIj— Q. 297, page 354
=5 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 14, page 277 ; Q. 73, page 295 ; Q. 290 to 294,
' Witness BELLINGER — Q. 113, page 685.
6^ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 156, page 329 ; Q. 286 and 287, page 353.
Witness DELANY— Q 25, page 499.
Witness W W. SMITH — Q. 59, page 538.
Witness RAMSEY — Q. 44, page 583 ; Q. 72, page 590.
Witness BELLINGER — Q 36. page 672.
s^ Exhibit 52 — Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 dated October 31, 1941, effective
15 November 1941 : SEE page 2, heading "Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing
TWO)".
RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 272 and 280, page 351.
Witness RAMSEY — Q. 125 to 130, page 599.
^ Exhibit 52 — 14CL-41 — described in note 57 supra : SEE top of page 3.
RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 285, page 352.
^^ Exhibit 52 — 14CL-41 — described in note 57 supra: SEE at page 4, paragraph 11.
RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 2S8 and 289, page 353
Witness RAINISEY — 0- 131 to 133, page 600.
«» RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 43 at page 285, last sentence of answer ; Q 295 and
296, page 353.
"i RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 43. page 284. at line 8 of answer.
«3 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 310, page 356.
"3 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 35 and 38, page 281 ; Q. 102 to 104, page 304.
Witness BLOCH — Q. 38, page 393 ; Q. 39 and 44, page 394.
720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nally, Rear Admiral Bloch had neither authority,^* nor reason — there
being no hostile air attack nor positive information of the imminence
of one within narrow time limits '^^ — to independently direct the acti-
vation of the Naval Base Defense Air Force contrary to the decision
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,"'^ or the requirements of
the operating and training schedules approved by the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, was the immediate superior in command.^^
And that brings us to the matter of conditions of readiness for both
ships and aircraft. While something more will be said later about it,
we do know this : first, existing conditions of readiness conformed to
the state required by operating, training, upkeep and employment
schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
[IS] and were sensible and appropriate for these purposes ; *^® sec-
ond, a protracted state of complete readiness to meet a surprise air
attack on Pearl Harbor would have completely disrupted training,
upkeep, and maintenance ; ^^ and third, the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, had made and maintained unaltered his decision to make
no changes in his schedules and to continue such training^" Without
quibbling as to whether Rear Admiral Bloch's authority was that of
"advising" or "prescribing" conditions of readiness,'^^ he^ neither pos-
sessed any information or intelligence over and above that possessed
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,*^^ who was present at the
time ; nor did he possess information or intelligence that would lead,
or for that matter logically should have led, him to differ from the
decisions made.
And here it may be well to examine the matter of the submarine
reported by the WARD immediately prior to the air attack on Decem-
ber Tth. First, there had been many false contacts in the Hawaiian
area. Next, on 27 November 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, had directed the depth charging of any submarine running
submerged outside the sanctuaries and not accompanied by a surface
guard vessel.^^ The WARD was operating under such orders."
Finally, no one ashore prior to the air attack knew whether a real
submarine had actually been seen, nor did anyone ashore know whose
submarine it was. Nor did anyone ashore know if the submarine had
attacked the WARD, or whether pursuant to standing orders the
WARD had made a sound contact and had depth charged the area.'^*
The later information from the AVARD that it was towing in a sam-
pan [14-] to Honolulu did not contribute to clarifying the
occurrence. Now, what was done about it? The WARD's message
'^ RECOKD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 411, page 374 ; Q. 446, page 380
Witness BLOCH — Q. 89, page 402.
"^ RECORD, Witness STARK— Q. 601, page 154
»« RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 77, page 400. "
"■ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY— Q. 135, page 600.
Witness BELLINGER — Q. 7, page 665 ; Q. 54 to 61, page 677
«8 RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 19. 20, 21, 22, page 390.
Witness W. W. SMITH — Q. 102, page 547.
Witness RAMSEY — Q 91, page 594.
Witness BELLINGER— Q. 65, page 678.
«» RECORD, Witness RAMSEY — Q. 90, page 593
Witness BELLINGER— Q. 25, page 669 ; Q. 64, page 678 ; Q. 75, page 679.
"* RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 43 at page 285 ; last sentence of answer ; Q. 295 and
296 ua^'e ^^53
'1 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 45, page 285; Q. 46, 47, 48, page 286; Q. 365 to
308, page 364 and 365.
« RECORD, Witness STARK — Q. 600, page 154, line 13 of answer.
Witness KIMMEL— Q. 90 at last sentence, bottom page 300.
'^ RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q 46, page 395.
■'* RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 173, page 332
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 721
was transmitted to the headquarters of both the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District. A senior
officer of the 14th Naval District went to headquarters to investigate
and verify the situation, and in accordance wnth doctrine, immediately
sent the ready duty destroyer to back up the WARD. Before the
situation could be clarified, the air attack was on. The soundness
of the "doctrine" was proven, inasmuch as the ready duty destroyer
while proceeding out of harbor sank an enemy submarine.^^ On this
matter of the WARD's contact, it is certain no one could have done
more and it is probable some might have done less. But you can be
sure that, at that time and upon the facts then at hand, no one reason-
ably would have or should have been expected to sound an air raid
alarm.
There has been testimony concerning letter 2CL-41, revised, of
October 14, 1941,'^'^ which in various places mentions the Comman-
dant 14th Naval District and the Commandant 14th Naval District as
Naval Defense Officer. Terming Rear Admiral Bloch "Naval Base
Defense Officer" does not make his duties something more than or
different from the particular duties as stated in 2CL-41.^^ The ex-
pression "Naval Base Defense Officer" is just a name, and abbreviating
it to initial letters as N. B. D. O. neither expended nor contracted the
duties of Rear Admiral Bloch.
AVlien we consider the particular provisions of Fleet Confidential
Letter 2CL-41, revised, and what was done about them prior to
December 7, 1941, the essential facts are these : ^^
As to paragraph 3 (A), "Continuous Patrols," — To the extent of
material at hand, the Commandant 14th Naval District did administer
and furnish the instore patrol, the boom patrol, and the harbor
patrol.'^^
As to paragraph 3 (B) (3) — To the extent of material at hand, the
Commandant 14th Naval District did operate the mine sweepers.
The discussion of torpedo baffles may here be mentioned. This
subject was [15] considered fully both in Pearl Harbor and
in the Navy Department. On the basis of the best technical advice
available in the Department — which in effect was that aerial torpedoes
could not be successfully launched in depths obtaining in Pearl
Harbor— the action taken by those at Pearl Harbor seemed correct
at the time.^° The Department was informed of that action. It is
safe to say that, if the Navy Department at any time prior to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, had known that aerial torpedoes could be successfully
launched in Pearl Harbor, or had believed that baffles were advisable,
'5 RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 86, page 401 ; Q. 94, page 403.
w Exhibit 8 — Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2LC-41 (revised) dated 14 Oct. 1941.
■^^ RECORD. Witness KIMMEL — Q 11, page 27fi.
•'s RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q. 18, page 388 to 390.
■"' RECORD. Witness PYE — Q. 9, page 418.
s" Exhibit 49 — Confidential Letter CNO to CINCPAC, copy to CINCLANT, CINCAF,
dated 15 February 1941.
Exhibit 54 — Confidential Letter CNO to Commandants of Naval Districts,, copies to
CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 17 February 1941.
Exhibit 55 — Confidential Letter CNO to Commandant of Naval Districts, copies to
CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 13 June 1941.
RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 41, page 394 ; 6 139, page 410
Witness PYE— Q. 83, page 436.
Witness DELANY — Q. 15, page 498.
Witness BELLINGER— Q. 22, page 669.
722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Navy Department would have directed their shipment and
installation.^^
Revertintr to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (a) of 2CL-41, "Exercise with
the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air
attack" — This was effectuated by an agreement in regard to the use
of Army planes by the Navy and naval planes by the Army in case
of attack, which agreement was implemented by holding frequent
drills, determining difficulties, and applying remedies. Further, any
Marine anti-aircraft artillery present was made available to the Army,
under the designated Army command.^^ The Army was assisted in
their training of aircraft warning service men by sending them to the
Fleet for instruction.
Rather confused mention has been made of some kind of Navy
liaison officer in connection with the air raid warning service, which
was a responsibility of the Army.^^ General Short asked the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for such a liaison officer on August
7, 1941, and on August 19, 1941,^* Commander Curts was designated as
such [16] liaison officer. In addition to that, we know that
Commander Taylor transiently present, was detailed by the C^om-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to work with the x\rmy on aircraft
warning system matters.^^ Finally, the provision for a Navy liaison
officer that Lieutenant General Short had written in his tentative op-
erating procedure never became effective because the system was never
officially established,®*^ nor did General Short ever order it established.
In this matter of a Navy liaison officer — who was only a facility for the
exchange of information ®^ — sight should not be lost of the fact that
several liaison officers from the various Army commands were required
to be present when the AWS was established,^^ and we know positively
that on December 6-7, 1941, none were there.®^ The only Armj^ officer
on duty that morning was a then First Lieutenant Tyler, who, inex-
perienced and without benefit of instruction from the Arni)^, had been
stationed in the Army's aircraft warning service information cojitrol
center, for the second time in his life — for a few hours self-training.^°
Tlie plain fact of the matter is that the Army's AWS was in a very
limited training status, and not at all on an operating basis up to and
including December 7, 1941.^^
Reverting to 2CL-41, paragraph 3(G) (6) (b), "Arrange with the
Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced" — Actually the matter
of shore based anti-aircraft guns was the exclusive responsibility of the
Army.°- However, in carrying out his coordination duties, about Feb-
ruary 20, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District liad a conference
with Lieutenant General Short and emphasized the necessity of em-
])lacing the mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field. On February 23rd,
"' RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 65 and 66, page 291 to 293
« RECORD, Witness SHORT— Q. 194 to 197, pasre 258.
8^ RECORD, Witness KIMMEI. — Q. 344. page 360.
8^ RECORD. Witness SHORT — Q. 222 to 230; pages 261 and 262.
« RECORD, Witness TAYLOR— Q. 11. page 611 ; Q. 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, page 622.
8" RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q 233 and 234. pages 262 and 263
s' RECORD. Witness TAYLOR — Q. 74, page 020.
^ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR— Q. 19 and 21. page 012.
^'' RECORD, Witness TYLER — Q. 14, page 447.
'"•RECORD, Witness TYLER— Q. 7, 11, 14, page 447; Q. 36, 37, page 450; Q. 69,
pag(! 453.
»i RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 27, page 224 ; Q. 105, page 238.
Witness BLOCH — Q. 24, 25, page 391.
Witness TAYLOR— Q. 80, page 621.
■•'= RECORD, Witness KIMMEI.r— Q. 343, page 360.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 723
the Commandant 14th Naval District was informed by the Chief of
Staff of the Hawaiian Department that Lieutenant General Short had
given orders that the mobile anti-aircraft artillery be kept in place as
close to their point of emplacement as possible, having due regard for
the ownership of land. In [77] the intervening period until
October, the Commandant 14th Naval District personally examined the
plans for the location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were to be
emplaced, particularly those that were to be sited on naval reservations.
Subordinates of the Commandant 14th Naval District were in con-
stant touch with Army representatives, endeavoring to have guns em-
placed. Actually, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy
was making plans to mess and quarter Army gun crews on naval reser-
vations so that Army objections would be removed.^^ At some date
between October 15th and November 1st, or thereabouts, the Com-
mandant 14th Naval District personally talked to Lieutenant General
Short about this matter. General Short advised that he could not em-
place these guns for several reasons, namely, the sites were not on Gov-
ernment land, their communications would have to be out in the open —
usually in cane fields and irrigation ditches — and subject to deteriora-
tion, and that it would be extremely difficult for the personnel com-
prising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted. There were ap-
proximately 30 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in fixed emplacements, about
20 of them being in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.^"*
As to paragraph 3(G) (6) (c), "Exercise supervisory control over
naval shore based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol
Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army
and Navy" — The matter of joint air operations has been heretofore dis-
cussed in detail. In addition — the Commander Patrol Wing TWO was
a flyer, was senior aviation officer present ashore, and as such, under-
stood all the technicalities and was qualified to command aircraft
forces. Control was exercised through him and coordination with the
Army was planned and practiced in drills. Detailed operating plans
were prepared. ^^ Drills were held, difficulties discovered, and improve-
ments made.
On paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (1), "Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft
fire with the base defense by advising the senior officer embarked in
Pearl Harbor exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific
Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain" — In addition to the
previous remarks on condition of readiness — We know that arrange-
ments for antiaircraft [18] fire had been established by the
Fleet ;^'' sector and sector connnanders had been designated.^^ Fur-
thermore, as to general c(mditions of readiness during the period
prior to December 7, 1941. they Avere as we now know something
higher than Condition 1 11.''^ It was believed by the Commander- in-
"» RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 24 and 25, page 417.
=* RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q 2, 3, 4, 5, pase 412, 41,3.
"= Exhibit 7 — JCD-42, Annex VII.
Exhibit 53 — Operational Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941 : SEE Annex B, Base
Defense Air Force Plan.
»« RECORD, Witness KIMMEI. — Q. IS. pa?e 278.
" RECORD. Witness KIMMEL— Q. 346, page 360.
Witness PYE — Q. 11, pase 419 : Q. 21, page 422.
Witness KITTS — Q 77. page 523
^ RECORD. Witness KIMMET. — O. 19, page 278.
Witness PYE — Q. 14, page 419 ; Q. 15, 16, page 420 : Q. 18, 19, page 422 ; Q. 66, page 433.
Witness KITTS — Q. 11, 12, 13, 14, page 513.
724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAKBOR ATTACK
Chief, Pacific Fleet, to be sufficient.^^ Communication channels had
been provided whereby this measure could be quickly effected. Anti-
sabotage measures had long been in effect. Having no information
other than that had by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and
having no information that \Yould lead the Commandant, 14th Naval
District, to differ with the decisions in this respect made by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, no change in existing conditions of
readiness was advised.
As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (2), "Hold necessary drills"— Drills
were held weekly until autumn, when they were changed to be held
every two weeks and in these bi-weekly drills arrangements were
made to always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to
bi-weekly drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army
participation and also, due to tlieir frequency, there were absentees.
The bi-weekly drills were always arranged well in advance and in-
sured the Army participation and everybody being in each drill,'""
As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (3), "Giving alarms for: attack,
black-out signal, all clear signal" — Procedures had been established
and drills had. All signals were contained in the communication
annex to the operating plan.
As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (4), "Informing the task force
commander at sea of the type of attacking aircraft" — This was prac-
ticed in all drills and a communication channel was provided for the
purpose.
A.S to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (5), "Arranging communication
plan" — A communication plan was promulgated prior to December
7th, and was used in drills.^^^
As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (6), "Notifying all naval agencies
of the air alarm signal prescribed" — the air alarm signal prescribed
was contained in the communication plan.
[19] The remaining occasions in 2CL-41 where either the Com-
mandant 14th Naval District or the Naval Base Defense Officer is
mentioned, have no bearing on the matter in hand, because those in-
stances were not responsibilities and could not become responsibilities
until an attack in fact had taken place. We know that at the time of
attack they were done in the way and at the time they should have
been.^°-
That these duties of coordination and preparation were conscien-
tiously attended to is made quite evident from the testimony "^ and
plans promulgated on this subject which are contained in Exhibit 53.^°*
And these had the approval of Rear Admiral Bloch's immediate su-
perior in command, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,^°®
on the spot at the time.
99 RECORD, Witness KIMMET. — Q. 27, page 280 : Q. 143, page 326.
^w RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 74, p.ipre 296.
lO' RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 28, pa?e 225.
i<e RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 23, page 390.
Witness RAMSEY— Q. 57, page 586.
™ RECORD, Witness P.LOCH— Q. 15, page 387 ; Q. 16, page 388.
Witness CALHOUN — Q. 48 and 49, page 944.
'«♦ Exhibit 53 — Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941.
ANNEX A — Inshore Patrol Plan.
ANNEX B — Base Defense Air Force Plan with Addendum I, Joint Estimate. Addendum
II, Aircraft Readiness.
ANNEX C — Anti-aircraft Defense Plan.
ANNEX D — Harbor Control Post Plan.
ANNEX E — Communication Plan.
«» RECORD, Witness KIMMEL— Q. 202, page 338-339.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 725
In connection with this assigned task of Rear Admiral Bloch, which
Admiral Kimmel has summarized as "coordinating the naval efiort
with the Army,"^'^ there is considerable and detailed testimony as to
the cordial, frequent and intimate conferences and discussions on mat-
ters of defense that took place during the period between Admiral
Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short and their respective staffs.^""
There is no gainsaying the fact that each headquarters knew its oppo-
sites problems, conditions, policies, and views,^°^ Frequently, Rear
Admiral Bloch was present at such conf erences,^"^ or if not present was
presumed to be later informed of what was considered pertinent to
him.
[W] By close and frequent personal contact ^^° and exchange of
information with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Ad-
miral Bloch naturally came to know his wishes, policies, views and
decisions as to the current tasks and problems."^
The measure of performance of Rear Admiral Bloch's duties and
responsibilities can best be summarized in the words of the then Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I quote : "was in general satisfac-
tory to the Commander-in-Chief ... If it had not been so per-
formed, I would not have hesitated at any time to call his attention
to the fact."^ . . . under the handicaps which he was laboring, I
considered his performance of duty highly satisfactory." "^
On December 7, 1941, the practical planning, the training and the
drilling, all designed to assure that the initiation of defense measures
would be automatic ^" — the development of a high state of discipline
and morale — and the material upkeep — each paid substantial divi-
dends.
And that brings us to one final thing that might pertain to Rear
Admiral Bloch, namely the various dispatches of the Navy Depart-
ment from October 16, 1941 on. While they were not all addressed
to him, he did see them or come to know of their contents. Others did
the same."^ In discussing these dispatches in relation to Rear Admiral
Bloch, the question may be asked : Why did not Rear Admiral Bloch
interpret these dispatches differently from the others at Pearl Harbor?
Disposition of this question has been made amply by evidence before
this Court. In the first place, there was nothing in these messages
which so much as implied an air attack on Pearl Harbor, for the very
good reason that even the originators of the dispatches had no such
suspicion."*^ [^7] In the second place, although other specific
10' RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 386, page 369 ; Q. 392, 393, 394, page 370, 371, 372.
10' RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q. 10, 11, page 221 ; Q. 124, 125, page 242 ; Q. 152,
l)age 250.
Witness PYE — Q. Ill, page 441.
Witness KIMMEL — Q. 39, page 282 ; Q. 40, page 283 ; Q. 380, page 367.
Witness PHILLIPS— Q. 32, 36, page 481 ; Q. 154, page 494.
Witness W. W. SMITH— Q. 52. page 536.
'"■' RECORD, Witness KIMMEI> — Q. 40 and 42, page 283 ; Q. 69, page 294 ; Q. 106, page
304 : Q 229, page 344.
1"^ RECORD, Witness SHORT — Q 8 and 9. page 220
"» RECORD, Witness BLOCH— Q'. 32 to 34, page 392.
"1 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 250 to 262, page 348 to 349.
Witness BLOCH — Q. 60 to 6.S. page 397.
"3 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 44, page 285.
™ RECORD, Witness KIMMET^— Q. 471 and 472. page 384
"< RECORD, Witness RAMSEY — Q. 84, page 592.
Witness BELLINGER — Q. 70, 71, 72, page 679.
"5 RECORD, Witness KIMMEL — Q. 240 to 259, page 348 to 349.
Witness PYE— Q. 63, 64, pase 432 ; Q. 77, page 435
"« RECORD, Witness STARK — Q 142, 143, page 799.
Witness INGERSOI-, — Q. 136, page 847 ; Q. 137, page 848.
Witness MARSHALL — Q. 31, 32, page 863.
726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
geographic objectives are mentionod, never in any dispatch is the
Hawaiian area so designated. Nor do the dispatches designate M-day,
nor do they direct total or partial execution of the Rainbow plan. So
far as Rear Admiral Bloch was concerned, it is beside the point that
during the critical period before December 7, 1941, there existed in
the Navy Department a considerable volume of positive, specific infor-
mation, because the Commandant 14th Naval District never received
any such information. None of the dispatches to Pearl Harbor gave
sufficient information upon which evaluations could be made and all
evaluations sent by the Navy Department related to either general
possibilities, or specified the scene of probable Japanese activities
to be in the Far East. The Commandant 14th Naval District's opinion
was that an air attack by the Japanese in the Hawaiian area prior to
a declaration of war was a remote possibility ,^^^ nd he believed that
attack would be made in order of probability as follows: "* (1) sub-
marine attack against ships in operating areas, security against which
was in effect; (2) blocking Pearl Harbor entrance channel, security
against which was in effect; (3) laying magnetic or other mines off the
entrance channel and in the approaches to the entrances to Pearl
Harbor and Honolulu, security against which was in effect; (4) sabo-
tage, security against which was in effect. As to surprise air attack
prior to the declaration of war, he considered it a remote possibility,"^
and even for this he had prepared defense plans and held drills. And
finally. Rear Admiral Bloch lived in the same atmosphere, saw the
same conditions, was at the same remote distance, had the same horizon
and had the same dependency upon the Navy Department."^ He had
neitlier informatnon nor prophetic vision that would lead him to any
different opinion from that of his immediate superior in command, nor
from that of Lieutenant General Short, nor that of the informed task
force commanders, nor of those of responsible officers on the staff of
the Cmmander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.^^"
[22] I have addressed myself to the consideration of all those
matters which, as far as I can recall, might, however remotely, be
assocated with Rear Admiral Bloch. If during your deliberations
some question arises which touches upon him, I feel assured that
you will be able to satisfactorily dispose of it from the evidence
before you. During the period in question Rear Admiral Bloch did
not seek to avoid responsibilities which were his. He does not do
so now. With what he had at the time, Rear Admiral Bloch did all
that anyone could do. Of the courses of action open to him, he took
those prompted by good judgment — and he fully and conscientiously
performed his every duty.
C. C. Blogh.
"' RECORD, Witness F.LOCH — Q. 40. page 394 ; Q. 1.16. 137, page 409.
">< REPOUD. V>'itness BLOCH — Q. 1.38. page 409.
'>'• RECORD, Witness BLOCH — Q. 141. page 410.
1^ RECORD. Witness KIMMEL — Q. 112, page 306: Q. 151, page 327; Q. 456, page 381.
Witness DEL.\NY — Q. 9, 10, 11. page 497 ; Q. 62. 63. 64. page 506.
Witness W. W. SMITH — Q. 35 to 40, page 533-534 ; Q. 91, page 545 ; Q. 153 ; page 561.
Witness BLOCH~Q. 133, 134, 135. page 409.
Witness MeMORRIS— Q. 18, page 889 : Q. 61. page 900.
Witness LAYTON— Q. 40, page 911 : Q 47. page 912 : Q. 70. page 917.
Witness CALHOUN — Q. 21, page 935; Q, 31 and 34, page 938; Q. 37, page 939.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 727
[TOP SECRET]
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHING-
TON, D. C, BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
To Inquire Into the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces on
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941
24 July 1944
NOTICE
The pages included in this binder are classified as "Top-Secret" and by orders
of the Secretary of the Navy are not to be inserted in the original record nor
is the information contained therein to be released to any person whatsoever,
until specific authorization has been granted for such insertion or such r.elease
by the Secretary of the Navy. This action has been taken in the interest of
national security and the successful prosecution of the war.
Extracted part of the record containing proceedings relative to a
statement by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret), page 58-A.
[J5-J.] With the permission of the court, the interested party,
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the
following statement: In the report submitted by Admiral Hart I
learned — that is, in the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, on page 429 —
that he knew of a special Japanese code by means of which, on or
about December 4, 1941, he learned the Japanese were about to attack
both Britain and the United States.
The statement was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground
that the evidence referred to might be introduced before the court
in the regular manner.
With the permission of the court, the interested party. Rear Ad-
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that his pur-
pose in making the statement was only to show the reason why he had
been endeavoring to obtain access to the secret messages in the Navy
Department, and to appeal to the court for assistance in obtaining
such access.
The judge advocate withdrew his objection.
Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Pages 159-A through 162.
[ISO-A] 633. Q. On or about November 12, 1941, did you re-
ceive information that the Japanese Government regarded November
25 as an absolute immovable deadline for the negotiations then being
conducted between Japan and America ?
A. No; I don't remember that. I remember something about a
date and then postponing it, but the details of that I have forgotten,
728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and I have not refreshed on it. There was, I believe, a postponement,
but I have forgotten the deadline, and remember only that there was a
deadline.
634. Q. Would it refresh your memory if I told you that Captain
L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, testified before Admiral Hart on Page 358
of the transcript of the record
A. What record are you referring to ?
635. Q. The Hart record.
This question was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground
that it was an attempt to show in the form or a question that there
was certain evidence before the Hart examination, what the evidence
was, and the fact that the evidence was given under oath.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), replied.
The court announced that the objection was sustained.
636. Q. You say. Admiral, that you did have some information
relative to the fixing of a deadline on Japanese -United States negotia-
tions ?
A. I recall, but rather vaguely, something about a date having been
set and then having been advanced, but it is not clear in my memory.
637. Q. Have you any recollection as to when you received that
information, within reasonable limits?
A. Some time, I would say, after the middle of November, but I do
not recall when it was. I would say some time frorii November on.
638. Q. Do you recall whether it was prior to your dispatch of
November 24?
A. No, I couldn't remember a date. * I wish I could. I don't recall
it.
639. Q. You cannot identify it with reference to that incident, that
is, the dispatch of November 24?
A. No; I am just hazy on it.
[160] 640. Q. How did you evaluate that information which you
did receive about the dead line ?
A. I don't recall just what impression it made at that time.
641. Q. Do you recall whether it indicated aggressive action on
the part of Japan against this country ?
A. No ; I don't recall that.
642. Q. Do you recall having any discussion over this information
with anyone outside the department?
A. No. I have stated that the matter is hazy in my memory, and I
have no distinct remembrance of the matter at all, except that some
such thing came up.
643. Q. Do you recall whether you then considered it an important
item of information?
A. No; I can only repeat that the whole incident is hazy in my
memory.
644. Q. You do recall that the information you had fixing a dead
line was subsequently extended to another date ?
A. That is about what I remember. There was some talk about a
dead line, and then about its having been extended. That is about the
extent of it. I'm not just clear on the thing.
645. Q. Do you recall whether you personally sent any information
to Admiral Kimmel concerning this item of information?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 729
A. I don't recall that I did.
Q4:Q. Q. Do you recall whether yoii directed any of your subordi-
nates to do so?
A. The entire incident, including what I did or may not have done
remains hazy. I don't remember the issue clearly at all, or the
action taken.
647. Q. I am only trying to assist you.
A. I wish I could help you, but I just don't recall it. That's about
where it winds up. I mean, I don't recall it clearly.
648. Q. You clo not recall whether or not that indicated in your
mind offensive action by Japan in the Southwest Pacific?
A. My memory with regard to the thing and conclusions and so
forth, if any, does not carry to the ]ioint of anything definite. I recall
some such incident, and that's about all.
[ISl] 649. Q. What was the stimulating motiye on your part
in sending to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch of November 24?
A. The dispatch states very clearly : "Chances of favorable outcome
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled
with statements of Japanese Government and movements, their naval
and military forces, indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction" —
650. Q. Do you recall what the statements of the Japanese Govern-
ment were to which you made reference?
A. I have already testified that I don't recall them.
651. Q. On November 26 did you receive intelligence indicating a
Jap^ese intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain
and the United States ?
A. No, I don't recall that.
652. Q. You have no recollection of that whatever ?
A. No.
653. Q. Between December 1 and December 4 did you receive in-
formation that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United
States and maintain peace with Russia ?
A. Not that I recall.
[161-A] 654. Q. Do you recall the phrase "Winds Message"?
A. I don't recall that at that time. I don't recall such a message.
655. Q. Do you recall such a message at any time?
A. During the period you mention I don't recall such a message.
656. Q. Do you recall it at any time ?
A. If you will produce the message, I don't know whether it would
serve to recall my memory or not.
657. Q. Would the production of the message assist you in refresh-
ing your recollection ?
A. I don't know. I don't recall having seen the so-called "Winds
Message" or having heard of it at that time.
658. Q. Well, do you recall having seen or heard of the "Winds
Message" at any other time?
A. I don't recall ever having seen it.
[1€^] 659. Q. Do you recall having participated in any discus-
sion concerning the Winds Message then or at any other time?
A. Not the slightest recollection of a discussion of the so-called
Winds Message.
730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
660. Q." Do yon recall having heard the phrase "Winds Message"
in connection with Japanese-United States relations during the period
of two weeks preceding December 7, 1941?
A. No, I do not.
661. Q. Do you recall having had any conferences or discussions
with Admiral Ingersoll concerning the Winds Message?
A. No.
662. Q. Do you recall having received any information during the
first three or four days of December, 1941, indicating that Japan
would attack both the United States and Britain and maintain peace
with Eussia ?
A. No.
663. Q. No information or discussion of that whatever?
A. Well, we discussed every phase of that situation. If you mean
with reference to any document, I don't recall it. We had been dis-
cussing for a year the Russian situation and as to what would happen.
There was guess work.
664. Q. Do I understand you to say that you never heard the phrase,
"Winds Message" as applied to United States-Japanese relations dur-
ing the month preceding December 7, 1941, until I mentioned it a few
moments ago ?
A. I don't have the slightest recollection of the so-called Winds
Message for a month preceding Pearl Harbor or any time around that
time.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
This line of questioning was objected to by the judge advocate on
the ground that there is no evidence laid before the court of any-
thing with reference to a Winds Message.
The interested party, Read Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret), replied.
The court announced that the objection Avas overruled.
665. Q. Consequently, of course, having no knowledge yourself
about it, you sent no word to Admiral Kimmel ?
A. No, nor to anyone else.
Extracted testimonv of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Page 164-A.
[164-^] 666. Q. Admiral Stark, during the two weeks prior
to 7 December, 1941, do you recall any information of a false weather
broadcast in plain Japanese language emanating from Japan as a
signal for an attack on the beginning of war by Japan against the
United States?
A. No, I do not recall anything of that sort at that time.
667. Q. Do you recall during the week prior to 7 December, 1941,
receiving information that the Japanese consnl in Hawaii w^as re-
porting twice daily the number of American warships in Pearl Harbor
and the berth at which thev were located ?
A. No. '
668. Q. You remember receiving no such information?
A. I do not recall receiving anv such information.
669. Q. Or anything of that character?
A. No, I don't recall it.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 731
070. Q. During: the week preceding 7 December 1941, do you re-
call Commander McColhmi originating and presenting to you a dis-
patch to Admiral Kimmel which was never sent?
A. No, I don't recall it.
671. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Commander McCol-
lum the middle or latter part of the week preceding 7 December 1941
relative to a dispatch which he had drafted to Admiral Kimmel con-
cerning information received in Commander McCollum's division ?
A. No.
072. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Commander
McCollum during the week prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. No, I do not at this time. I do not recall it.
[209-A'\ (Extracted question from the testimony of Rear Ad-
miral R. E. Schuirmann :)
89. Q. Along in the middle of November, do you recall receiving
from Naval Intelligence ixwj information relative to the establish-
ment of a deadline on negotiations between Japan and the United
States?
A. I don't know whether the information came from Naval Intelli-
gence, or where it came from. I remember the question of various
deadlines on occasions, yes, sir. I don't know whether the informa-
tion came to me from Naval Intelligence, or what the source of the
information was. I do remember that we had information that dead-
lines had been established.
\210-A'] 98. Q. Now, what was the information that was com-
municated to you relative to the deadline?
A. I don't remember the exact information that was communicated
on the deadline.
99. Q. Would it have been that November 25th was regarded as a
deadline for all negotiations between the Japanese and the United
States?
The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the
disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that
he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.
Examined by the court :
100. Q. Does this cover the same line of questioning that you made
your objection to this morning?
A, That is correct, sir.
101. Q. Do you mean your personal security, or
A. I mean the security which is vital to the furtherance of the war
effort of the United States.
102. Q. Vital to the war effort at that time, or at present?
A. At present.
The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was hon-
ored and that he need not answ^er the question.
[^ii] Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Ad-
miral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) (Continued) :
103. Q. Do 3^ou recall whether you had information from Naval
Intelligence that the deadline originally determined or fixed, was ex-
tended at some later date ?
A. That is the same line of questioning and the same objection to it.
The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was hon-
ored and that he need not answer the question.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 — —4
732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The interested party, Eear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, TJ. S.
Navy, (Ret), stated as follows: I feel that Admiral Kimmel is en-
titled to have indicated on this record the fact that he seeks informa-
tion from this witness, not once but as to the several items of informa-
tion; that the cross-examination of this witness is being precluded to
Admiral Kimmel on that ground and I see no way of accomplishing
that other than by asking several questions on different lines of infor-
mation more or less on the line that I asked Admiral Stark yesterday
afternoon.
The court announced that in view of the fact that this line of ques-
tioning has been objected to by the witness on the ground of security
to the war effort at present, that that line of questioning cannot be
pursued ; that the court had no objection to putting in all the questions
desired.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E, Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, (Ret.), stated that he wanted to ask enough questions to ascer-
tain the specific information which he was being denied.
The court granted permission to ask further questions.
104. Q. Do you recall whether you had information that the dead-
line on negotiations between Japan and the United States was ex-
tended to the 29th of November ?
The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the
disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that
he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.
The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was hon-
ored and that he need not answer the question.
105. Q. Do 5^ou recall whether on or about 26 November you re-
ceived information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that it had
specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against
both Britain and the UniteB States ?
[^12] The witness stated that to answer the question would
involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public in-
terest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.
The judge advocate objected to this question on the ground that it
went beyond the scope of the direct examination.
The court announced that it recognized that fact, that it was not
cross-examination on the direct examination, but in the interests of
saving time, if there was no specific objection, the questioning may
continue; but that the witness's claim of privilege to this question
was honored and that he need not answer the question.
lOG. Q. During the early part of December, December ord or
December 4th, do you recall receiving information from the Office
of Naval Intelligence that Japan would wage an offensive war against
both the United States and Britain ?
To this question the judge advocate made the following objection:
I must object to that question on the ground that counsel is getting
into the record the specific sort of information that he is trying to
get, although he knows that it is objectionable on two grounds, one
of them being national security, and the other being that it is beyond
the scope of the direct examination.
The interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret), replied.
The judge advocate requested that the court be cleared.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 733
The court was cleared.
The court was opened.
The court announced that the objection was not sustained.
The witness announced that to answer the question would involve
the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and
that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.
The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was hon-
ored and that he need not answer the question.
107. Q. On December 4th or 5th, do you recall receiving information
from the Office of Naval Intelligence that the Japanese consul in
Hawaii was furnishing Tokyo with information as to the number of
United States warships in Pearl Harbor, and their location in the
harbor ?
The judge advocate objected to this question on the same grounds
as before.
[2J2-A'] The court announced that the objection was not
sustained.
The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the
disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that
he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.
The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was hon-
ored and that he need not answer the question.
[261- A] (Extracted question from the testimony of Lieutenant
General Waher E. Short :)
163. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch number 472, that
you have given considerable testimony on, what was the next informa-
tion you received that indicated that there was any change in- the
worsening of relations between Japan and. the United States ?
A. Seven hours after the attack, at 2 : 58 p. m., on the 7th.
Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S.
Navy. Page 314-A.
[SH-A] 18. Q. Did you know of a definitive date fixed by
Japan for the conclusion of diplomatic relations with the United
States?
A. Yes, there were various dates; the first one, November 25, the
second one November 29, and thereafter there was no definitive date.
Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S.
Navy. Page 318-A.
{SIS-A] 43. Q. Did you discuss with Admiral Stark the defi-
nite date which you have stated as November 25, and later November
29, of termination of diplomatic relations with Japan ?
A. I have no definite recollection of having discussed the question
with him. I knew he w^as informed of it and there may have been
discussions as to the significance or what significance would be attached
to it.
44. Q. When the note of 2G November 1941 was presented by the
State Department to the Japanese Ambassador for transmission to the
Japanese government, was there much discussion in the Navy Depart-
ment and those concerned regarding that note ?
A. The note of November 26th ?
734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
45. Q. Yes, sir.
A. As I recollect, there was discussion, and the general effect was
that this would be entirely unacceptable to Japan.
Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Page 320.
[S^O] Examined by the Judge Advocate :
1. Q. Admiral, an official State Department document entitled
"Peace and War" has been taken judicial notice of by this court of
inquiry. There has been read into the record by a previous witness
a section of a memorandum regarding a conversation between the Un-
der Secretary of State (Welles), the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)
and Mr. Kurusu of December 2, 1941. I would ask you to look at
this note and then I shall ask you a question. Having read this por-
tion of the document which relates to a statement made by Mr. Welles
to the Japanese Ambassador, and a partial reply of the Japanese Am-
bassador, I will ask you to state whether or not prior to 7 December
1941 you had any knowledge of this conversation as reported in this
document ?
A. I do not recall that particular conversation. I do recall, as I
have testified, some conversations on the subject of Japanese strength
in Indo-China.
2. Q. My understanding is that you have no present recollection of
having knowledge of this particular conversation prior to December
7,1941?
A. That is correct.
Examined by the court :
3. Q. Admiral, it has been testified before this court that there was
a date given out as to the termination of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the United States. Do you have any knowledge of this
date?
A. I have previously testified that my dispatch of 27 November was
based on information which I had to the effect that negotiations with
Japan had ceased.
4. Q. The testimony to which the court refers is that subsequent to
26 November 1941 or about that time there was a date given out as to
the termination of diplomatic relations, which date, at first, was 25
November, 1941 ; then later 29 November, 1941. Were you aware of
these dates ?
A. I do not recall specifically these dates. I do recall, although my
remembrance is rather hazy on it, that there was a date mentioned
which was later postponed. I don't remember the original date or
just what the postponement was.
5. Q. As we understand, you stated that there were no negotiations
between Japan and the United States representatives in Washington
subsequent to 27 November 1941 and up until 7 December 1941. Is
that correct ?
A. I stated that I did not recall any. Subsequent to that statement
counsel for one of the parties showed me a note which had been dis-
patched to Japan which I had not seen but which made it evident that
conversations were still going on.
Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers,
Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits), and
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 735
testimony of Rear Admiral K. E. Sclinirmanii, U. S. Navy. Paj2;es
()9 1-732, inclusive.
[691] The judge advocate made the following statement: The
judge advocate has requested the introduction of certain documents in-
to the record. If there be no objection to the introduction of these
documents, they should be offered at this time.
The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Rob-
ert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness
by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared
at the request of the judge advocate of this court? If so, produce
it and state what it is.
A. I am. I produce the file of copies, duly authenticated under of-
ficial seal, of documents on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, Navy Department, which was made and assembled at the-
request of the judge advocate of this court.
The file of copies of the documents was submitted to the interested
parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence
for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent
to the subject matter of the inquiry.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made
the following objection : We object to bringing those documents in
on the ground that- the use which may be made of them in these pro-
ceedings may disclose secrets which should be held inviolate for the
best prosecution of the war. Our objection is not because of what the
documents themselves may contain but because their use here may
compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most
important to the Nation's future interest. We can have no assurance
that wide publicity of parts of even all of these proceedings will not
eventuate.
The court announced that the objection was not sustained.
None of the other parties to the inquiry made objection to the in-
troduction of the documents. They were received in evidence, marked
"EXHIBIT 63", for reference, description appended.
2. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared
at the request of the judge advocate of the court? If so, please pro-
duce this file.
A. I am. I produce another file which contains certain dispatches —
copies of certain dispatches — duly authenticated under official seal,
which are on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy
Department, Washington, D. C, which was assembled at the request
of the judge [6921 advocate of this court.
The file of copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under
official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court,
and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of read-
ing therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the subject matter
of the inquiry.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, re-
peated the same objection he had heretofore made in the matter.
The court announced that the objection was not sustained.
736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
None of the other interested parties made objection to the introduc-
tion of the file of documents consisting of copies of certain dispatches,
duly authenticated under official seal. It was received in evidence,
marked "EXHIBIT 64", for reference, description appended.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.
Bear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness for the judge
advocate, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate and was
warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Admiral, I show you a file of documents which is Exhibit 63
before this court, and refer you to document No. 7 in this file, and ask
you if you recognize it, and if so, state what it is.
A. I identify it to the extent of stating that it is a decoded transla-
tion of a message originating in Tokyo addressed to the Japanese
Embassy, Washington..
2. Q. Will you read the document, please?
A. (Reading:)
From : Tokio.
To : Washington.
5 November 1941.
#736
(Of utmost secrecy.)
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
I realize that this is a diflScult order, but under the circumstances it is an un-
avoidable one. Please understand this thorougjily and tackle the problem of
saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so
with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
[693] This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)
3. Q. I ask you. Admiral, if you have ever seen this document, or
had you seen this document or had you been informed of its contents
prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was aware of the fact that such a message had been received
and that Kurusu and Nomura had instructions to wind up conversa-
tions on the 25th of November.
4. Q. Adverting to this document, you will note that the document
speaks about the signing of "this agreement". Do you know what the
words, "this agreement" refer to ?
A. I presume that they referred to an agreement which was under
discussion between the State Department and the representatives of
the Japanese Government at that time.
5. Q. If you know what this agreement was, will you so state?
A. As I would interpret it, it would be instead of "this agreement",
"an agreement". I don't know whether it is the translation. That is
the way I would interpret the message. I do not know what this
agreement was.
6. Q, What agreement was under discussion at the time this dis-
patch was written which involved the State Department and the
Imperial Government at Tokyo?
A. There were conversations then in progress which are matters
of public records whereby the United States and Japan were attempt-
ing to reach some agreement whereby their differences in the Pacific
could be ironed out.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 737
7. Q. The date of origin to this dispatch as read was 5 November
1941. Do you know from your duties as liaison officer in the Navy
Department whether or not tliis dispatch or the substance thereof was
communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December
1941?
A. From my own personal knowledge, no. The system was that
the material of this nature was delivered by a representative of the
Office of Naval Intelligence who was, I believe, at the same time liaison
with the Division of Naval Communications. I do remember that I
knew that there had been certain dates set for the completion of the
conversations then in progress, and that the State Department did
know of these dates. May I add, as a possible assistance to the court,
I believe the person best qualified to answer the questions as to who
received the information contained in the exhibit, and the time it was
conveyed to them, is Commander Kramer, as it was not my responsi-
bility to either convey this information to anyone else, including the
State Department.
[G94-] 8. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 11 from Exhibit
63, and ask you if you can identify it.
A. I can identify it to the extent that it is a similar translation of
a message from Tokyo to the Japanese representatives in Washington,
dated November 22, 1941, and translated November 22, 1941, as shown
on the photostatic copy.
9. Q. Admiral, I ask you to read this document to the court.
A. (Beading:)
SECRET
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 22, 1941.
#612.
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736."
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to uur fixed
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solu-
tion we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted
to settle Japanese- American relation by the 25th, but if within the next three or
four days you can finisli your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth) ; if the
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors
alone.
AHMY 25138 6710 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)
" See S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances
it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed
by the 25th of this month.
10. Q. Admiral, had you seen this document or had you been ap-
prised of its contents prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I don't know whether I had seen the document or not. I knew
this information was in the Navy Department and [69S] I don't
remember specifically the phrase, "after that things are automatically
going to happen", but it is possible that I did see the document. Hav-
ing examined these documents, in the last couple of weeks, it is hard for
738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
me to tell just when I did see them or whether I saw them at all ; but I
did know that this information was in the Department.
11. Q. Can you state whether or not in the performance of your
duties in the Navy Department, you showed this message or communi-
cated the contents thereof to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to
7 December 1941 ?
A. No, I did not communicate it in the ordinary discharge of my
duties, I would not be the one to communicate it.
12. Q. 1 show you a document from Exhibit 63, which purports to be
a dispatch from Toyko to Washington, a circular number 2353, and
ask you whether or not you recognize it as such ?
A. I recognize it as such.
13. Q. Will you please read the dispatch.
A. (Keading:)
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
Circular #2353.
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*,
(2) Japan-U. S. S. II. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
(3) Japan-British relations; NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
Voice broadcasts.
JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)
♦East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.
[696] 14. Q. Had you, prior to 7 December 1941, seen this
document or had you been appraised of its contents?
A. To the best of my recollection, which is quite hazy on this par-
ticular message, I did know that a message of this nature was in the
Department.
15. Q. Did you have any communications with the Chief of Naval
Operations with reference to this message?
A. No. ;
16. Q. Admiral, I show you a document, No. 16 from Exhibit 63,
which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated
November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such?
A. Yes, I recognize it.
17. Q. Will you please read the document ?
A. (Reading:)
BBCRET
From : Washington.
To : Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
1180. (Parti of 2.)
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation
remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will In-
evitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 739
and humiliation are complete. We miglit suggest one thing for saving the
situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that
President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes tliat
Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in
the Pacitic (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate
for Ihis sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return
reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also
gainin.u" a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United
Slates are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection
through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose
the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands
India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT pro-
posed the neutralitv of French Indo-China and Thai.)
ARIMY" 6S91 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
IG97] SECRET
From : Washington.
To : Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
IISO. (Part 2 of 2.)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she
would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have
to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have
to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to
the Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wfire us
back instantly.
ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
18. Q. Admiral, prior to 7 December 1941, had you seen this docu-
ment or had you been apprised of its contents ?
A. T don't remember, I probably had been apprised of its contents.
19. Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing the contents of
this dispatch that was just read, with the Chief of Naval Operations,
prior to 7 December 1941?
A. No. ^
20. Q. Admiral, I show you document No. 17 from Exhibit 63,
which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated
November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such?
A. I recognize it as a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo.
21. Q. Will you read the dispatch?
A. (Reading:)
SECRET
P^'rom : Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
[698] 1189. (Parti of 2.)
At 4 : 45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the
20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At
length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without com-
mitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st
and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following
two proposals:
740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."
B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo,
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands,
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of
economic treatment in French Indo-China.
(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
ARIMY G896 25441 Page 1. SECRET
SECREH"
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in
China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality and concessions in China.
ARMY 25441 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 11-28^1 (1)
22. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made ac-
quainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I don't remember, I believe I was acquainted with the con-
tents of the dispatch, whether I learned it from the State Department
or by seeing the dispatch. It reports a conversation with Mr. Hull.
23. Q. In your previous testimony, when you were on the stand
before, I believe you were asked a question about a note presented by
the Secretary of State to the Japanese diplomats on November 26, 1941.
Do you recall any such testimony?
A. Yes.
[699] 24. Q. After ha\ang read this dispatch, do you identify
the contents of this dispatch as being similar to the note which Mr.
Hull presented the Japanese diplomats?
A. Apparently so. Possibly information could be obtained by com-
paring that with the copy of the note.
25. Q. Do you recall having discussed the subject matter of this
dispatch with the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I do not remember specifically, but I believe that I probably did
inform Admiral Stark that a note was being dispatched to the Japanese,
and its contents.
26. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 18 from Exhibit 63 which
purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated November
28, 1941. No. 844. Do you recognize it as such ?
A. This is from Tokyo to Washington, correct.
27. Q. I ask you to read the document.
A. (Heading :)
SKCRET
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 28, 1941.
#644.
Re your #1189».
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of
the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This
is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-
tions and that, although the opinions of yoxir Government are not yet clear to
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made
just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific.
[700] « S. I. S. #25441, #25442.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 741
Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory atti-
tude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making
it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to
tills pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 " and he said that
under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From
now on do the best you can.
The man is the Navy Minister.
ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)
b S. I. S. #25435, #25436.
28. Q. Admiral, adverting to the dispatch you have just read, can
you identify from any date on here, to what the dispatch you have
just read refers — to what subject matter does it refer?
A. Undoubtedly it refers to the dispatch of November 26.
29. Q. And that is identified how?
A. By reference to 1189 ; also its contents.
30. Q. I ask you, did you see this dispatch or had you been made
acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?
A. I don't remember ; it probably was.
31. Q. In that event you probably do not remember whether you
had any conversations with the Chief of Naval Operations on the
subject matter of this dispatch prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. No.
32. Q. Adverting to the fourth sentence of this dispatch, which I
will ask you to read to the court
A. (Reading:)
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations
will be de facto ruptured.
33. Q. What is your interpretation of this sentence as regards the
Japanese intention as to the negotiations at hand ?
A. I interpret it to mean that they are going to reply to the Ameri-
can proposal, but the reply will be such that no further negotiations
will take place.
34. Q. And how do you interpret by the clause, "negotiations will be
de facto ruptured"?
A. I suppose it, translated — the negotiations will in fact be rup-
tured. Either that or that they are temporarily — probably in fact
ruptured, or temporarily ruptured.
35. Q. I show you Document 19 from Exhibit 63, which purports
to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 857, and ask you
if you identify it as such ?
A. Yes, I identify it as such.
[701] 36. Q. Will you please read the dispatch?
A. (Reading:) i
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
29 November 1941.
#857.
Re my #844.*
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines :
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial
position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims
of both sides.
*JD-1 : 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new
U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating;. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days
giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not
give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it
has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot
be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which
ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige
of the Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem,
what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has
made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these
points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United'
States government.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to
anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)
JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 nav. 1941 (S-11)
37. Q. Had you seen or had you been made acquainted with the
contents of this document No. 19 prior to 7 December 1941?
A. I was aware that they were told to make another attempt.
[702] 38. Q. Can you recall whether or not you communicated
this dispatch or the subject matter of its contents to the Chief of Naval
Operations prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. No. I would not be the one to communicate the contents.
39. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 21 from Exhibit 63,
which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington. No. 865,
and ask you if you identify it as such ?
A. I identify it as such.
40. Q. Will you please read the dispatch?
A. (Reading:)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
1 December 1941.
865.
Re my #857*.
1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States,
the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end (if your message #1124***. Please make
the necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. I'lease make
investigations into this matter.
JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1 : 6921.
**JD-1 : 6710.
***Not available.
41. Q. Admiral, I ask you if you had seen or been made acquainted
with the contents of this dispatch you have just read prior to 7 De-
cember 1941 ?
A. I do not remember ; I probably was.
' [703] 42. Q. I show you Document No. 22 from Exhibit 63,
which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin dated November
30, 1941, and ask you if you recognize it as such ?
A. I recognize it as such.
43. Q. Will you read the document?
A. (Reading:)
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OK INQUIRY 743
SECRErr
From : Tokyo.
To : Berlin.
Novomber 30, 1941 .
#986 (Strictly ►Scirct) (To Ik- Imndled in Government code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department).
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance
as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying
through these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and
French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive
of the United
ARMY 6944 25554 I'age 1.
[704] States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the estab-
lishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the
Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the
Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no
maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was
the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-
partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say
that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days has it has become
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a
continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
ARMY 6944 25554 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)
44. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had yon been made
acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?
A, I don't remember. I probably was.
45. Q. I show you a document No. 38 from Exhibit 63 which pur-
ports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington^ No. 901, and ask
you if you recognize it as such?
A. I recognize it as such.
46. Q. I ask you to read the document?
A. (Heading :)
SECRETT
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
#901.
Re my #844 ^
1. The Government has deliberjited deeply on the American proposal of
the 26th of November and :is a result we have drawn up a memorandum for
the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts
» See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot
accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial
Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto
ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations
are broken ofiC.
744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and I imagine you will I'eceive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The
situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please
to keep it secret for the time being.
[705] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United
States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the
meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to pre-
sent it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.
ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S)
47. Q. Admiral, had yon seen this document prior to 7 December
1941, or had yon been made acquainted with its contents?
A. I knew on the morning of the 7th that such a message had been
received.
48. Q. Did yon have any discussions with the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations on the subject matter of this dispatch prior to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 'I
A. I believe, as I related in my previous testimony, somewhere
around 9 : 30 we discussed the question that this note was to be de-
livered that day to the State Department. Whether we discussed the
actual contents'of the message, I do not remember.
49. Q. Admiral, I show 3^ou Document 39 from Exhibit 63 which
purports to a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington under date of 6
December 1941, numbered 902. I ask you if you recognize this docu-
ment as such ?
A . I recognize the dispatcli from Toyko to Washington.
50. Q. Will yon read the document ?
A. (Reading:)
From : Toyko.
To : "Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902 (Parti of 14.)
Separate telegram.
MEMORANDUM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an ami-
cable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that
[106} the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the
Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has
continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Gov-
ernment of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of
Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during
these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability
of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to
find each BOAMPQBR place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China
to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for
the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent
the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September
last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) SECRET
From: Tokyo
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 2 of 14.)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 745
ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's con-
structive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting jiressure on
The Notlierlands Bast Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have at-
tempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity
in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with
its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China,
both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat
to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit,
they 1707] enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic
relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these
countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encircle-
ment of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very
existence of the empire.
JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 3 of 14.)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed,
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for* a discussion of
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific
area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that
the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached
on fundamental — (75 letters garbled )^The Japanese Government submitted
a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking
fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese
views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agree-
ment of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal,
moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of
difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement.
But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal,
failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotia-
tion made no progress.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 4 of 14.)
lliereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th
still another proposal in order to arrive at an [70S] equitable solution
of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previo^us
proposal, stipulated the following points :
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dis-
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China,
in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the
two countries are in need.
(8) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore com"mercial relations
to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quan-
tity of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to meas-
ures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general
peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and
China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it
is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 5 of 14.)
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its rieadiness
to accn^pt the otter of the I'resident of tlie United States to act as "Introducer"
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the
restoration of Sino Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct
negotiations.
The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new pro-
posal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek;
and [709] in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer
of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan
and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November
26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles
it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally
ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese
Government.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 6 of 14.)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best
to reach a settlement for which it made all possible concessions often in spite
of great diflSculties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the ne-
gotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principal of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, ad-
vocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that
along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Govern-
ment would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China,
and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic
activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
"Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to
carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as
a measure of easing the situation.
JD:1 7143 SECRET SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
[710] From Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 4, 1941.
902. (Part 7 of 14.)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciatwl by the
American government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories
in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical princi-
ples, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this
attitude of the American government and the Japanese goverinnent desires t<>
call the attention of the American govoninient esjiecially to the following points:
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the .fapanese goverinnent the acceptance
thereof. The peace of the world may bo brought about only by discovering a
mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores
realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others' will scarcely serve the pur-
pose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
7143 SECRET
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 747
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 8 of 14.)
Of the various principh^s put forward by tlie American govornment as a basis
of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some wiiich tlie .Japanese govern-
ment is ready to accept in princlpU\ but in view of the world's actual conditions,
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt
to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether-
lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the ohl concept of collective security,
is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
[7J1\ The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any
third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation
of peace throughout the Pacific area. It is presumed that the above provision
has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in
Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese (iovernment.
JD:1 7143 ^avy Army Trans. 12-0— 11 (S) SECRET
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 9 of 14.)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be
said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand,
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in
aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Ger-
many and Italy two powers that are striving to establisli a new order in Europe.
Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the
American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through
peaceful meaas.
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds,
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power.
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealng with international relations should
be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-14 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 10 of 14.)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great [712] Britain
and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in
China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr
(45 letters garbled or missing) been compelled to observe
the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and
to sacrifice the es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese
Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly
runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each
its proper place in the world. .
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
#902. (Part 11 of 14.)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy.
That the six countries,— Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Nether-
lands, China and Thailand, — excepting France, should undertake among them-
selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China
and equality in treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six coun-
79716 — 46 — Es. 146, vol. 2 5
748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position
of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrange-
ment cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system
similar to then (50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament of
JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
#902. (Part 12 of 14.)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding
China such as wholesale evacuation of ti'oops or unconditional application of the
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabiliz-
ing factor of East Asia. The [713] attitude of the American government
in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any
regime other than the regime at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation.
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, dem-
onstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the
restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of
peace to East Asia.
JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-&-41 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
#902. (Part 13 of 14.)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual
removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of Yen and Dollar exchange,
or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however,
the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China
Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and .
prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that
it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.
6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other
interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government.
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November
26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The
Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably i>y catering to the wishes
of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be con-
cluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring
Japan's position.
JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
♦Probably "and as".
♦♦Probably "China, can but".
[7141 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
7 December 1941.
#902. (Part 14 of 14.)
(Note.- — In the forwarding Instructions to the radio station handling this
part, appeared the plain English phrase, "VERY IMPORTANT".)
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish-
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
to preserve Anglo-American rights and intei-ests by keeping Japan and China
at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pa-
cific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 749
ernment that in view of the attitude of the Americiui Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)
51. Q. Admiral, adverting to Document 39 whicli you have just read :
I ask you to note particularly for the record that the date upon which
the first 13 points of this dispatch were translated in the Navy De-
partment ?
A. All 13 ]):irts were translated on December 6, 1941. The hour is
not shown. Part 14 was translated on the 7th of December, 1941,
according to the photostatic copy.
52. Q. Is the hour of the translation shown?
A, The hour of translation is not shown.
53. Q. I ask you, adverting- to these first 13 points of Document No.
3 of Exhibit 63, whether or not you had been made acquainted with
the contents of these first 13 points on 6 December 1941 ?
A. I was not acquainted with the contents on the 6th of December,
1941.
54. Q,. When did you first become acquainted with the substance of
these first 13 points of this Document 39?
A. I don't remember when I read, or if I read the message in its
(entirety. I knew on the morning of December [^-^5] 7th that
ji sharply worded note or reply to the State Department's note of No-
vember 26th was in the Department and was scheduled for delivery,
or that the Japanese Ambassadors had been requested by the Japanese
Government to deliver it at 1 : 00 o'clock that afternoon.
55. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with the sub-
ject matter contained in Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 63?
A. I do not remember, but the earliest that I could have possibly
been informed of it was between somewhere around 9 : 00 or 9 : 30 on
the morning of 7 December.
56. Q. Did you become acquainted with all 14 parts at or about the
same time, or the subject matter of all 14 parts at or about the same
time?
A. I cannot say. I cannot recollect but to the best of my recollec-
tion I did not read the note in its entirety that day. The extent of
my knowledge was that the sharply worded note had been received,
which was due for presentation to the State Department that day.
57. Q. In connection with this sharply worded note of which you
speak, did you interpret this note as being connected with any other
exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries, the United
States and Japan?
A. I naturally assumed that it was a continuation of the previous
series of notes which had been exchanged during the course of the
conversations w^hich had extended over a period of a month or so.
58. Q. That being the case, this sharply worded note would be in
reply to what United States note?
A. The last United States note, I believe, of any importance, was
dated November 26th.
59. Q. I show you Document 41 from Exhibit 63, which purports to
be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907. Do you identify
this document as such?
A. I identify it as a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907.
60. Q. Will you read the dispatch ?
A. (Reading:)
750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 7, 1041
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #902.
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m.,
[716] on the 7th, vour time.
JD-1 : 7143
4S — text of Japanese reply.
ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
61. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with this
document or the contents thereof ?
A. I received information which was probably based on this docu-
ment that the Jaj^anese were going to present their reply to the State
Department at 1 : 00 o'clock December 7th, at about 9 : 30 Decem-
ber 7th.
62. Q. Where were you at the time you were apprised of the con-
tents as you have just testified?
A. I was somewhere around the CXO's office. I believe that I saw
Commander Kramer and he told me verbally that such instructions
were in.
63. Q. Did you communicate this information to the Chief of Naval
Operations at about 0930 on 7 December 1941, or at any time prior
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. Whether I personally conveyed it, I do not know. I met or
was in Admiral Stark's outer office, I believe, when he came in, and
I may have told him the message was there or the officer who ordi-
narily delivered them, Commander Kramer, may have been there
witli the message itself. However, I believe at about that time he
received the information contained in that message.
61. Q. I sliow you Document Xo. 46 from Exhibit 63, which pur-
ports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu numbered 123. Do
you recognize it as such ?
A. I recognize it as a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, 123.
65. Q. Will you read the document i
A. (Reading:)
SECRET
From : Tokyo (Togo).
To : Honolulu.
December 2, 1941.
.1-19.
#123. (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in jwrt of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of
your 'ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not
there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indi-
cations that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships
are provided with antimine nets.
[717] Note. — This message was received here on December 23.
ARMY 27065 8007 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
66. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the circumstances of the
receipt of Document No. 46 which 3'ou have just read, by the Navy?
A. None except that appearing in the note, "This message was re-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 751
ceived here on December 23rd", and that it was translated on Decem-
bei- 30, 11)41.
The court then, at 3:30 p. m., took a recess until 3:45 p. m., at
wliich time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all
the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
l)()rter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned
that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
67. Q. Admiral, when you were before the court previously you
testified, as shown on page 217, Question 144: "Did you consider at
that time tliat tliis note of 26 November was an ultimatum to Japan?
Answer: To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note
were such that there was no hope in anybody's mind — at least nobody
with whom I discussed the question in the Navy Department — that
the Japanese would or coulcl under the circumstances agree to the
terms of the note." Since that time. Admiral, there has been con-
siderable discussion about this note, and on occasions it has been
referred to both by counsel and by the court and by witnesses before
the court as an ultimatum. I hand you a volume entitled "Peace and
War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", of which this court
has taken judicial notice. I ask you to notice particularly Docu-
ment 257, which is the note of November 26 handed by the Secretary
of State to the Japanese Ambassador, Nomura, and also document 258,
which is the oral statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese-
Ambassador at the same time.
The witness looked at the volume referred to.
68. Q. Have you finished. Admiral ?
A. Yes.
[7J8] 69. Q. Having had a chance to look at these two docu-
ments again, isn't it true that the tone of the oral statement and of the
note handed the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State is
not threatening in any respect and that it is not to be considered an
ultimatum ?
A. Well, since the term "ultimatum" is apparently connected in
popular mind with a threat of action if terms are not accepted, this
may be an unfortunate choice of words. Taking into account the
background information which has been now introduc^ed in evidence
in the form of these messages that the Japanese Ambassadors had to
end the conversations on the 29th, as far as I can remember, the gen-
eral impression of the Navy Department was that the terms of the
notes would prove unacceptable to the Japanese, and that there prob-
ably would be a discontinuance of the conversations, although the
note and tlie oral statement of the Secretary still left the gate open in
case the Japanese desired to surrender some of the piinciples for which
they had stood.
752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
70. Q. Admiral, is it correct to say that when this note was pre-
sented the State Department may have considered that negotiations
had about ceased but that, nevertheless, this note which they presented
on the 26th was not to be considered an ultimatum in the sense that
that term is popularly used ?
A. As the term is popularly used, as implying a threat, it is not an
ultimatum. I believe "ultimatum" actually means an end to negotia-
tions rather than any implied threat that there will be force used as a
result of such end.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
71. Q. That note, however, in Section 2, paragraph 3, proposed
that the Government of Japan would withdraw all military, naval,
air, and police forces from China and Indo-China ?
A. That is correct.
72. Q. It was not anticipated in the Navy Department or anywhere
else by high authorities that that provision would be acceptable to
Japan, was it?
A. Not so far as I know, no.
73. Q. Paragraph 4 of Section 2 provided: "The Government of
the United States and the Government of Japan will not support —
militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in
China other than the National Government of the Republic of China
with capital temporarily at Chungking." That was the Chiang Kai-
Shek government ?
A. That is correct.
[719] 74. Q. It was not anticipated that that situation would
be acceptable to Japan ?
A. Not so far as I know in the Navy Department. However, the
note speaks for itself.
75. Q. Document 46 of Exhibit 63 was the last numbered message
which you read at the suggestion of the judge advocate, being a dis-
l^atch from Tokyo to Honolulu. I now ask you whether you can
identify Document 40.
A. Document 40 is a dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo dated No-
vember 18, 1941, and translated on December 6, 1941.
76. Q. Will you read that?
A. (Reading:)
SECRET
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#222.
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my
#219" on that clay.
Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C " — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser clsas were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier. Enterprise,
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class,
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were
at anchor in Area D.**
3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed
entering the Harbor. Their course w^as as follows : In a single file at a distance
" Available in MC code dated November 14. Code under study.
" Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
<■ East Loch.
<• Middle Loch.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 753
of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in
Area C, to which they were moored, they changed couse 5 times each time roughly
30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers
entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.
Relayed to .
ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)
[720] 77. Q. That would indicate tliat it was translated on the
6th of December?
A. That is correct.
78. Q. Were you aware of the translation of that message on the
Gth of December?
A. To the best of my knowledge, I was not. I do not remember hav-
ing seen the message prior to December 7.
79. Q. I now call your attention to Document 37 of Exhibit 63 and
ask you whether you can identify it?
A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 18,
1941, and translated on December 5, 1941.
80. Q. Will you read it?
A. (Reading:)
SECEET
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#113.
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area
"N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^ and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your
investigation with great secrecy.)
ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)
■« Probably means Mamala Bay.
81. Q. That indicates that it was translated on the 5th of De-
cember ?
A. Yes.
82. Q. Were you aware of the receipt of the information in the
Navy Department on or about December 5 ?
A. No, I do not remember having seen that information. I might
have received information that the Japanese Consul was asking about
the location of United States ships. Since it was not a direct question
of State Department information but more or less military, or State-
Navy information, I may not have.
83. Q. I now ask whether you can identify Document 36 of Ex-
hibit 63 ?
A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November
1941. Date of translation : 12/5/41.
[T21] 84. Q. Will you read that?
A. (Keading:)
From: Tokyo.
To : Honolulu.
29 November 1941.
(J19).
#122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even when there are no movements.
JD-l: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
85. Q. That was translated on 12/5/41, which, I assume, means the
5th of December ?
A. Correct.
86. Q. Since that is not a direct message concerning the State De-
partment, I presnme that you did not have specific information of it
at the time it was received ?
A. That is correct.
87. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 24 in Exhibit 63?
A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 15 November
1941, translated on December 3, 1941.
88. Q. Will you read it, please?
A. (Reading:)
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu (Riyoji).
15 November 1941.
(J19).
#111.
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, hut at a rate of twice a week. Although
you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
JD-1: 6994 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
89. Q. Were you aware of that?
A. No, sir, I was not aware of it, to the best of my knowledge.
90. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 10 of Exhibit 63?
A. This is a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November
16, 1941, and translated November 17, 1941.
91. Q. Will you read that document, Admiral?
A. (Reading:)
SECKET
[722] From: Tokyo.
To : Washin,u:ton.
November 16, 1941.
#
For your Honor's own information.
1. I have read your #1090," and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude
for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender
thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I
have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to
the fundamental policy laid down in my #725." Will you please try to realize
what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the
war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the
situation i-endei-s this out of the question. I sot the deadline for the solution of
these negotiations in my #736," and there will be no change. Please try to
miderstand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the
United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them
for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an
immediate solution.
» For Part 1, see S.I.S. 24877. For Tart 2. see S.I.S. 24857 in which NOMURA gives
his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.
" S. I. S. #243;>0 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the
Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the
United States.
<■ S. I. S. #24375 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
JD-1: 6553 ARMY 24878 JD-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 755
92. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 13 of Exhibit 63?
A. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 19,
1941, and translated on November 26, 1941.
[7^^] 93. Q. Will you read that?
A. (Heading :)
From : Tokyo.
To : "Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2354.
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol-
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.),
"Nishi".
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
JD-1: 6850 Sf:CRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
94. Q. Did you have knowledge of that at or about the time of its
translation?
A. I had general knowledge that such a message had been received
in the department. I am extremely hazy on whether the voice broad-
cast mentioned in the message was received and if there was an agreed-
upon translation of the broadcast or when the broadcast was received,
if it was.
95. Q. Do you now have any memory of whether the broadcast
message referred to was received in the Document vou just read, Docu-
ment 13 of Exhibit 63.
A. Nothing but hearsay knowledge. I understand a broadcast was
intercepted.
96. Q. Do you remember now whether you knew of it prior to
December 7?
A. To the best of my recollection, a broadcast was received, but
there was a lack of agreement among the intelligence people con-
cerned as to whether that broadcast was the one described in the
message ; either that or that there was a lack of agreement among the
Japanese intelligence people as to the translation of the Japanese
phrase contained in the broadcast.
[7^4] 97. Q. Do you recall when that was?
A. I don't remember.
98. Q. I now show you Document 26 of Exhibit 63 and ask you
whether you can identify it ?
A. The message is from Tokyo to Hsingking, dated 1 December
1941, translated on December 4.
99. Q. Will you read that?
A. (Reading:)
From : Tokyo.
To : Hsinking.
1 December 1941.
#893.
In the event that Manchuria participates in the war in
view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate
in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England
and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.
A summary follows :
1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as
756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl^ACK
having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code tele-
grams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden) . However it is desired
that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable
to that which Japan accords to consular oflScials of enemy countries resident in
Japan.
2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by
Japan.
3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
oflSces and interests will not be recognized.
However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exer-
cised not to antagonize Russia.
JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)
[72S] 100. Q. That indicates it was translated on the 4th of
Decemberl
A. That is correct.
101. Q. Were you aware of the information in that message on or
about the date of its translation ?
A. I do not remember the message specifically, but I probably was
aware of it.
102. Q. Do you remember the information in it ?
A. No, I don't recall of having had previous knowledge of the
information.
103. Q. I ask if you can identify Document 42 in Exhibit 63 ?
A. It is a message from Budapest to Tokyo, dated December 7,
1941, and translated on December 7. 1941.
104. Q. Will you read that?
A. (Reading:)
SEXSET
From : Budapest.
To : Tokyo.
December 7, 1941.
lA.
IW.
Re my #103."
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break
out on the 7th.
Relaved to Berlin.
ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)
105. Q. That was translated on the 7th of December?
A. Yes.
106. Q. Did you see this message, Admiral ?
A. I do not remember having seen that message until considerably
after December 7.
107. Q. How would the American minister on the 6th of December
know about war breaking out?
A. I have no idea how he would know that war was going to break
out on the 7th. If I were evaluating the report, I would evaluate it
as a guess by the man reporting. I haven't the faintest idea how he
would get such information.
[726] 108. Q. You don't know of any direct dispatch from the
American Minister to Washington?
A. No, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 757
109. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether
you can identify that?
A. It is a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet to
the Chief of Naval Operations with the information addressees:
Commandant, 16th Naval District; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet ; Commandant, 14th Naval District, dated 28 November 1941.
110. Q. I ask you to read it.
A. (Reading:)
rrom: CINCAF.
Date : 2S Novembpr 1941.
Decoded by P R WHITE.
(Addresses for action:) OPNAV.
(Addresses for information:) COMSIXTEEN CINCPAO COMFOURTEEN.
(Date time group:) 281430. (Deferred precedence.)
Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if
diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed follovping words repeated five
times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have sig-
nificance as follows X higashi higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X
Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei
XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences re-
peated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used
XX American higashi no kaze kumori XX England X nishi no kaze hare X
unquote X British and Comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.
111. Q. I show you Document 3 or Exhibit 64 and ask you whether
you can identify it.
A. It is a message from the Naval Attache at Batavia to the Chief
of Naval Operations, dated 5 December 1941.
112. Q. Will you read it?
A. (Reading:)
From : Alusna Batavia.
Date: 5 Dec 1941.
Decoded by KALAIDJIAN.
Paraphrased by PURDY.
[727] (Addresses for action:) OPNAV.
(Priority:) RRRRR.
(Date time group.) CR0222
From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. code intercept : — Japan will notify her
consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end.
East wind rain United States : North wind cloudy Russia : West wind clear
England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be re-
peated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be
introduced five times in general text.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bioch, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
[728] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Examined by the court:
113. Q. Admiral, you stated that Commander Kramer was the liai-
son officer between ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations ; is that
correct ?
A. For tliis certain type of material ; he delivorod 't n« n =pf^c'al
precaution.
114. Q. Was there anyone el.se in the Department of Naval Intelli-
gence who had similar information as to time and place of delivery of
such messages?
A. Not that I know of. Possibly Captain McCollum but I bel'cvc,
in my opinion, he would not have the exact facts,
758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
115. Q. Admiral Wilkinson was the Chief of ONI at that time;
is that right?
A. That is correct, sir.
116. Q. Is there any official record kept in Naval Intelligence as
to time of receipt and time of delivery of such messages as these to
the Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. I have been unable to locate any such record.
117. Q. You don't know whether one exists or not, though, do you?
A. No, sir, I have had a search made for such a record and can
located none.
118. Q. In that message, your No. 11, which contains the phrase,
"Things are going to happen automatically", did you give any special
significance to this phrase, or did you hear it discussed?
A. As I remember it, there were discussions as to what in the world
this phrase meant as to what things were going to happen automati-
cally. It is difficult to reconstruct now but at tliat time, as I remem-
ber, the general thought of people whom I came in contact with was
that if the Japanese moved they would move into Indo-China, Malaya,
and perhaps the Dutch East Indies, or the Philippnies.
119. Q. These messages to which the judge advocate referred, re-
garding some of which he asked you if you knew or had any knowledge
or whether or not Admiral Stark had any knowledge of the specific
question, in some instances you said you did not know ; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
[729] 120. Q. In other exhibits, he did not ask you that specific
question. Now, taking all of these messages wliich were received from
November 26 to December 7, at any time during that period did you
discuss any message or any of this situation viz-a-viz Japan with
Admiral Stark?
A. Yes, sir. I did discuss the situation but when it came down to
pointing out certain messages, you ask if I made a particular point of
discussing that particular message with the Admiral and I just don't
remember.
121. Q. Well, in your discussions with Admiral Stark these mes-
sages evidently were the basis of the discussion weren't they?
A. The basis of discussion were the contents of these messages, plus
what information we were getting from the State Department as to
\^hat was going on here. As 3'ou will note, the sulistance of many of
these messages we might have already received before w^e got the
message.
122. Q. But as a general rule, the contents of a great many of these
messages were the subject of discussion ; is tliat vour answer?
A. Yes.
123. Q. On the morning of 7 December when you entered the office
of the Chief of Naval Operations — and as the court remembers the
testimony you entered that office about 9: 30; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
124. Q. (Continuing.) — was Admiral Stark there at that time?
A. I believe I waited for Admiral Stark; Avaited for him to come
down. I may have gone down to Communications to see if anything
had come in during that time.
125. Q. He did, or you did ?
A. I did.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 759
126. Q. And what time did he arrive, to tlie best of your recollec-
tion?
A. To my best knowledge, about 9 : 30,
127. Q. When you arrived at the oflice of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, had you been informed as to the contents of the message which
outlined the reply of the Japanese to be delivered at 1 : 00 p. m., on the
Tth of December ?
A. No, sir. When you say "the contents", I did not read the mes-
sage.
128. Q. That is why I said "contents".
A. Yes. I did know, or was verbally informed, that this message
was in and that it was a very sharp note.
[730] 129. Q. And were you informed that this message was
a repl}^ to the message of 26 November?
A. I believe so ; yes, sir.
130. Q. And did you so inform Admiral Stark when he came in
that that was the information you had?
A. Yes, sir.
131. Q. So Admiral Stark, when he came in and you met him,
was informed as to the general situation up to that moment?
A. He was informed of that general situation. I think shortly
afterwards — speaking again from memory — that Commander Kra-
mer — when I say "shortly", it may have been half an hour or 45 min-
utes — delivered to him what they call "the book", which was a book of
messages received from this source the previous night.
132. Q. In other words, a complete file of what had happened since
he had seen the book ; is that right ?
A. Yes, sir.
133. Q. Was that book of files or messages which Kramer brought
in, prior to his telephonic communication with General Marshall?
A. I'm not certain whether it was, or not, but I think when he
telephoned General Marshall, or General Marshall telephoned him,
that Admiral Stark knew that a sharp reply was being delivered to
our note of November 26th, and that it was timed for delivery — that
the Japanese had instructions to request the Secretary of State to
deliver the note at 1 : 00 o'clock.
134. Q. Was this message received on 6-7 December in reply to
the message of 26 November, received by the Army simultaneously
with its receipt by the Navy ?
A. I am unable to say about that.
135. Q. In other words, what I am trying to ask is, did the Army
have the same information that you had on the morning of 7 De-
cember ?
A. I'm positive that it did.
136. Q. In these messages which have been introduced by the inter-
ested party, linked with the messages which were previously pre-
sented by the judge advocate, and having all of that information con-
tained therein in your mind, did you feel that on 6-7 December the
Japanese were going to attack this country without declaration of
war ?
A. No, I did not. I described the general feeling that everybody
recognized that there was a very tense situation; that diplomatic
relations Avere in danger of being severed, but that a severance of diplo-
760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
matic relations did not necessarily mean that war was going to result.
I cannot speak for anybody else but my own opinion, I must admit,
was that Japan would go her own way in East Asia and would put
up to the United States the onus of using force to oppose her, and in
the light of subsequent events, maybe a [731] concentration
on that idea
137. Q. None of the information received in these messages changed
that opinion with you ; is that correct ?
A. Well, certain of the military messages weren't received; also,
some of them came in very late, those received on the night of the
6th or the morning of the 7th. I had never seen the so-called war
warning before it was sent out but I did know or was told that one
had been sent out. Those things, coupled with the message that Gen-
eral Marshall was going to get off — which unfortunately never ar-
rived until too late — seemed to be about everything that could be done.
138. Q. Well, your estimate as of the morning of the 7th: did
that change your viewpoint which you had had prior to that time,
the information that you had, say, up to 10 : 00 o'clock on the morn-
ing of the 7th of December?
A. Not necessarily that Japan was going to attack the United
States in the immediate future.
139. Q. In your opinion, w^ere there continual negotiations and con-
versations going on between November 27th and December 7th as
evidenced by these reports and these messages?
A. Well, having the beackground information that is revealed in
the messages on the 27th of November, wherein they said the relations
were de facto, or ruptured, plus my belief that the note that we dis-
patched on the 26th would be totally unacceptable, I thought that the
small conversations that would continue to go on were just for the pur-
pose of the record, just to keep the subject boiling rather than with
any hope of getting anywhere.
140. Q. But in your opinion there were important messages sent
back and forth between Tokio and this country between 27 November
and 7 December ; is that correct?
A. I don't recollect off-hand but I don't recall any what I would
terra important. All the messages were important but there were no
important changes in the negotiations. They had received our note
on the 26th and we were awaiting a reply.
141. Q. You include in your statement the messages received on
6-7 December ?
A. The message received, naturally, on 6-7 December was a very
important message.
142. Q. In your numerous conferences as you have stated, with
the State Department officials, did you bring back to the Navy Depart-
ment or to the Chief of Naval 0])erations, or messages which would
be relayed to him, the thought of the State Department or any con-
siderations which you thought were important for the Chief of Naval
Operations to have ?
A. Yes, sir.
[7S2] 143. Q. And during this period from 27 November to 7
December, that was daily conveyed to him; is that correct?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 761
144. Q. Have you any idea as to what the State Department
thought as to the possible attack without declaration of war? Was
that ever expressed ?
A. None other than the conversation with Mr. Hull which I have
previously related in which he said these people might bite anyone
but I didn't at that time take it to mean that he was talking about
striking without declaration of war, although that is susceptible to
that interpretation.
Kecross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Hus-
band E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
145. Q. In forming the estimate that you did no the morning of
7 December as to the probability of what Japan would do, you did
not have available to you the information contained in the messages
read this afternoon relative to the inquiries from Tokyo to Honolulu
concerning the United States warships at Pearl Harbor, and the
answer of the Japananese consul to Tokyo in response to those mes-
sages, did you ?
A. No, sir. If I did, I didn't evaluate it.
146. Q. I understood that you didn't see those messages if they
came in?
A. I don't believe I saw them, no.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
147. Adverting to Exhibit 63 and the documents which you read
to the court therefrom, and particularly adverting to those documents
which treated of subject matter relating to negotiations between the
Japanese and the United States which these dispatches indicate the
Navy Department had : Can you recall whether or not in your capac-
ity as liaison officer between the State Department and the Navy De-
partment you conveyed this information as a matter of general prin-
ciple or rule to the State Department? In other words, did you keep
the State Department informed of what the Navy Department had
in the way of information relating to the negotiations between the
Japanese and the United States ?
A. The same book that was delivered to Admiral Stark, or certainly
the messages bearing on diplomatic relations, were always delivered
to the Secretary of State.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Naval Reserve ; Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S.
Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits) ; Captain L. F. Saf-
ford, U. S. Navy. Pages 734-762, inclusive.
[734] Examined by the judge advocate : «
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve,
in the Cryptographic Research Section of Naval Communications.
2. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and
7 December 1941 ?
A. I was the Senior Watch Officer of the watch maintained in
OPNav 20GW; the primary duty of this was the decrypting of Jap-
anese diplomatic cryptographs.
762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, which is in evidence before this court.
Exhibit 63 contains some forty or fifty documents. Will you tell the
court if you have recently examined the documents contained in
this exhibit ?
A. Yes, sir, I have, but not in detail ; but still I have looked at them
in a general way.
4. Q. Are you, in a general way, acquainted with the information
that is contained in these documents?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
5. Q. In the performance of your duties between October 1 and
7 December 1941, were you at that time acquainted in a general way
with the dates and times in these documents, when they received in
the Navy Department ?
A. I am acquainted with the dates and times by merely the raw
material. It wasn't part of my duties to inspect the finished product.
They were available at the time, but normally I didn't have time to
see them. I was interested particularly in the ones that applied to the
cryptographic system and I did see those. I am familiar with the
time that the raw material came in before processing it, the time it
was received from our various points throughout the world.
6. Q. You mean by processing exactly what?
A. Decrypting, the various processes that we had to go through
in order to make the information available.
7. Q. Adverting to the document, that is. Exhibit 63, with which
you say you are in a general way familiar, wall you tell the court what
the set-up was in your division as regards the translation of these
documents ?
A. I think possibly in order to give the story on that I should go
back to the interception of traffic, because it is all more or less linked
from that point on. The Army maintained a series of interception
stations. The Navy had the same. The Army intercepts were cleared
through the War Department, and the Navy intercepts were cleared
through the Navy Department. The division was made on the basis
of [7S6] cryptographic dates. It was necessary to do some
checking for that. The Army was responsible for the even dates.
The Navy was responsible for the odd dates. The cryptographic date
was merely the date it was intercepted: the filing time in the dispatch
was something that had to be established. Each service would then
translate its own traffic. That is, the Navy would translate the traffic
of odd cryptographic dates, and the Army would do the same thing
with the even dates, so translation was based— was divided — upon the
cryptographic date of the material.
8. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 63, 1 ask you if there is not noted on the
bottom of these documents the date on which translation is purported
,to have taken place ?
A. Yes, sir.
9. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not the dates so inscribed
on these documents is the actual day of the month that it was trans-
lated, or does this date also relate to the cryptographic date — was that
the word you used?
A. No. My understanding of all those documents — which weren't
prepared in my section — has always been that the date is the actual
date of translation. The date appearing at the top is the crypto-
graphic date.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 763
10. Q. Have you recently examined any memoranda, logs, or rec-
ords prepared at the time of the receipt of these documents, which
show the dates and times these documents were received in the Navy
Department ?
A. Yes, sir, I have, but not all of the documents in detail. I have
on certain ones.
11. Q. I show you a document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is in evidence
before this court, and which is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington
containing some fourteen parts. AVill you state whether you saw this
document prior to T December 1911, and if so, under what circum-
stances ?
A. I saw some of the parts ; I did see all of the raw material. I was
present while the finished product was being made up, and I can't say
in detail that I have seen all fourteen parts, but I was present while
they were being processed, and I was present while they were being
written up in the smooth form.
12. Q. Can you state from your examination of these official docu-
ments or records, what was the chronological order of arrival in the
Navy Department of the documents that composed document 39 of
Exhibit 63, to which you have just adverted?
A. I'd like to make one correction to my answer to the previous
question. I did not see part fourteen. I think [7S6] we
should consider this 902, from this point on, as possibly two separate
dispatches. I did not see part fourteen; that came in after I left.
Now, I have the parts grouped in the order that they were received
from the interceptor station at Bainbridge Island, Washington. They
came into Washington, D. C, by teletype. Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 arrived
here at 1649 GCT on December 6, Greenwich time. That is the time
shown on the dispatches; and incidentally, part two was from Chel-
tenham, Maryland, and sent in, and I did not know which actual part
was used. Nine and 10 w^ere received sometime after 1649 and some-
time before 1951, both GCT — I can't establish the exact time on De-
cember 6. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1951 GCT
on December 6. Now, part 14 came in sometime in the morning of
December 7. The time that it was intercepted at Station S was 0305
on the 7th, GCT. That would place it about five minutes after 3 : 00
in the morning of the 7th, Washington time. Now that material was
sent in by teletype and with the punched tape, so there was some time
taken at the other end to punch the tape so that 60 words could be sent
and reduce the cost of line charges; and there may be twenty or thirty
minutes required to do that. My reason for saying that it arrived
before 7 : 00 o'clock, the work sheet for this particular document, part
14, shows that it was processed by an operator that went off watch at
7: 00 o'clock. That was the time we changed watches, and the work
sheet bears his initials, so it was received before 7 : 00 o'clock.
13. Q. You say part 14 was processed prior to 0700, Washington
time, on 7 December 1941. Will you state in detail what you mean by
this part 14 being processed?
A. Well, yes, this part fourteen did not require translation ; these
dispatches were in English. However, there were certain symbols
that were used for punctuation, and the dispatches required writing
up in smooth form before being passed on. That was done with the
first thirteen parts. I don't know whether it was done at the time
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 6
764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with the fourteenth part. I wasn't here at that particular time. I
wasn' on watch at that particular time.
14:. Q. In cases before you have mentioned GCT. Will you convert
it into Washington time for the purpose of clarifying the record.
A. Assuming that Washington was on plus-5, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4
would be 1149 Washington time. This will be on the 24-hour basis. I
won't indicate a. m. 1149 on December 6. Parts 9 and 10 were re-
ceived after 1149, Washington time, and before 1451, Washington
time. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1451, Washington
time.
15. Q. You have stated that part fourteen was received in
[7371 The Navy Department at or around 0305, Washington time,
on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. Sometime after that and before 0700.
16. Q. Do the records show what happened to this part fourteen
after its arrival in the Navy Department? I mean, as to the time
that it was processed, for example.
A. Yes, the logs will sliow and the work sheets will show the initials
of the operator that processed it.
17. Q. This message was not translated, you say?
A. No, sir. it didn't require translation.
18. Q. What service processed the document, that is, part fourteen,
the Army or the Navy?
A. I can't answer that. I really don't know. The Army had a
translator on duty that night, apparently by a pre-arrangement with
the Navy, and anything that arrived during the night of the 7th —
was to be sent over to the Army. Now, I don't know whether part
fourteen was sent over to the Army.
19. Q. Can you state whether part fourteen was completely proc-
cessed and reacly for delivery in your section on the morning of 7 De-
cember, and if so, at what hour?
A. Our part of the processing was completed before 0700. I don't
know when the smooth translation was made up. I have talked to
the watcli officer at that time, and he informs me — and he is in Wash-
ington at the present time — that the material was all handed to Com-
mander Kramer between 9 : 00 and 10 : 00 o'clock in the morning.
That is the part fourteen. We haven't covered the first thirteen parts,
which were in Commander Kramer's hands at between 9 : 00 and
10: 00 o'clock, p. m.. on the previous evening, of the 6th, Washington
time.
20. Q. You don't know of your own knowledge what happened to
these processed documents after they came into the possession of
Commander Kramer?
A. Commander Kramer had been pressing us for the documents all
afternoon. He was there while they were being processed and as soon
as the last one was finished he put them in a bi-ief case and left the
Navy Department.
21. Q. Yon don't know, of your own knowledge, where he went
to deliver these processed documents?
A. No, sir, I do not.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 765
22. Q. I show you document No. 41 from Exhibit 63, and ask you
to examine it. Can you state what time this document arrived in the
Xavy Department in its original form?
A. It arrived, as far as I am able to reconstruct the situation, at
the same time that part fourteen arrived — in the same teletype trans-
mission. It was their custom to send in batches of messages; some-
times it would be a single one, sometimes it might be five or six. The
number assigned to [738] this — station serial number of Sta-
tion S, assigned to this part — is Xo. 381. The number assigned to
part l4 was Xo. 380. and from examining the copies of the original
teletype, I am fairly certain that they both were in the same trans-
mission, in arriving here in Washington.
23. Q. Can you state whether the records show the time that docu-
ment 41 was finally processed in the Xavy Department or the War
Department, as it might have been done ?
A. That, too, was processed before 0700. It was processed by the
same man that processed part fourteen, and as I recall seeing the
work sheet now in possession of the Army sometime ago, it had a pri-
ority sticker attached to it, and was sent over to the Army. I have
since talked to Lieutenant Commander Perring. When he relieved
the watch at 0700 on the morning of the 7th, the watch officer told him
that the Army had some material over there and he went over and
picked it up. They were in the Munitions Building at that time.
24. Q. Is this offi^cer a Lieutenant Perring ?
A. Lieutenant Commander Perring.
25. Q. Is he on duty in Washington now?
A. He is on duty in Washington, yes, sir.
26. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether a document,
41, was processed and ready for distribution at 0700 on the morning
of 7 December ?
A. Yes, sir, according to the records. I wasn't there.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, IT. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Xavy (Ret) :
27. Q. On Saturdav night, were you on duty ?
A. I was on duty from 1600 to 2400 on the 6th.
28. Q. How many copies did Lieutenant Commander Ki'amer take
with him when he left on the errand of distribution ?
A. I can't answer that. I don't know. I don't even know the
number that was customary to make up. That was a different section.
I am not familiar with the number that he normally made up.
29. Q. And you didn't supervise the preparation of the copies ?
A. Oh, incidentally, we had some help from the Army, some typists,
and to rush up the material back and forth. I knew it was being typed
up. but that is all I know.
30. Q. I call your attention to document 38, of Exliibit [739]
63, which was read in evidence yesterday. Can you tell when that
document was ready for delivery, in the form in which it there
appears?
766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, sir ; I haven't been able to obtain the work sheet on that. I
can tell about when it came in, but I can't give the whole story on
that particular dispatch. The w^ork sheet is in the custody of the
Army. I think I may be able to place it with respect to some of the
others, however — say, with part fourteen. That was intercepted at
Station S at 0720 on the morning of the 6th.
31. Q. Is that Greenwich time or
A. That is Washington time.
32. Q. But you can't reconstruct when it was processed here?
A. No, sir; without the work sheet. As a matter of fact, I don't
know whether we processed the document, or the Army did.
33. Q. Now will you look at document 13.
A. I don't have any particular information on that one ; I haven't
covered this period at all.
34. Q. Do you know whether the execution of that document was
received, and when?
A. I did not see the execution of that document: At the time ap-
parently it just by-passed me, and an effort was made to keep those
things as quiet as possible. It is quite possible that it came in and I
didn't see it. I didn't have it at the time. I might say, however, that
our watch was looking for the expressions in the news broadcast. It
didn't come in while I was on watch.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ,
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court:
35. Q. In order to clear up this dispatch, 30, does the court under-
stand that the thirteen parts were received in English?
A. Yes, sir.
36. Q. And you received those at 2:51 p. m., Washington time, on
6 December.
A. Yes, sir; we had all thirteen parts in by 1451 on 6 December.
37. Q. And all in English?
A. Oh, no ; I am afraid I am giving the wrong impression. There
was English under encipherment, and they enciphered what they re-
quired. That was English, rather, and the Japanese under the en-
cipherment — so it took considerable time to process them.
[740] 38. Q. When were the thirteen parts in English readable
and ready for somebody to see?
A. I would say that processing was completed sometime between
8 : 00 and 9 : 00 and that the finished documents were ready between
8 : 00 and 10 :00 p. m., Washington time, on the night of the 6th. They
were in Commander Kramer's hands at that time. Commander
Kramer was there during the whole time the information was in the
process of being processed. He was there when I came on watch, and
I imagine he stayed all day, although I don't know. He was there
right up until 9 : 00 o'clock, supervising the preparation of the docu-
ments.
39. Q. And the part 14 was processed and ready by 7:00 o'clock
Washington time on the morning of 7 December?
A. Yes, sir. To clear that, It had been deciphered and was reduced
to English in the copies — that is, in the work slieet form. I have no
knowledge of the smooth copy as you see it here, or whether it was
made at that time.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 767
40. Q. NoAv this No. 38, which ^ives information as to when this
note is going to come tlirough ; that was received and processed and
ready on the morning of 6 December ?
A. Yes, sir. As I say, the Army has the work sheet. I liaven't seen
it, but in all likelihood it Avas processed, because we had whatever
cryptographic information Ave needed to do the work, and the Army
had it similarily ; and I am fairly certain that it was.
41. Q. The only thing Ave are trying to get straight is that on the
morning of the 6th you got notification here of that on the 6t.h — our
6th, this note Avould come tlirough, a final ansAver to the note of Novem-
ber 26?
A. I didn't have that information myself.
42. Q. It is a matter of record ?
A. It is a matter of record. Yes, sir; that is an Army translation.
The Army apparently processed that; they translated it. I don't
know Avhen the information Avas made available to us.
None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine
this witness.
The court informed the Avitness that he Avas jjrivileged to make any
further statement coA^ering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry Avhich he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection thereAvith, Avhich had not been fully bi'ought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness made the f olloAving statement :
I would just like to ask that anything I said be given the same handling, as far
as security is concerned, as the original document.
The Avitness Avas duly Avarned and AvithdreAv.
[74-i^ The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Com-
mander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a
witness by the judge adA^ocate, and was Avarned that the oath previ-
ously taken Avas still binding.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. I shoAv you a document. Can you identify it?
A. I identify it as a file of documents assembled by the Federal
Communications Commission at the request of the judge advocate of
this court. It is certified over the signature of the Secretary of the
Commission, .and duly authenticated under official seal, assembled
on August 18, 1944.
The file of documents assembled by the Federal Communications
Commission, on August 18, 1944, certified over the signature of the
Secretary of the Commission, and duly authenticated under official
seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by
the judge advocate offered in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT
65," for reference, description appended.
2. Q. Will you read the document?
A. (Reading:)
SECRET
"United States of Amekica,
I"1i:DERAL Communications Commission,
Washington, D. C, August 18, 19U.
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as
follows :
Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley
T. Guest (noAV Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's
768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
monitors to be on tlie lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel
Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This
request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.
Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station!
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, Decem-
ber 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to
contact Colonel Bratton's oflSce, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood,
20-G, Watch OflScei', Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to
accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.
Document No. 3 i^ a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941,
which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST,
December 5, 1941.
Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather [742] messages inter-
cepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between
0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusen-
bury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's oflfice at
approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the
Romaji version of these messages.
On file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of
the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of
August, 1944.
(Signed) T. J. Slowie,
Secretary.
SECRET
Document No. 1
GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUP REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF
BROADCAST
The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.
SECRET
Document No. 2
TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE
WEATHER
KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR 'MAY BECOME
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2200 GM, December 4, 1941.
[7.^3] SECKET
"Document No. 3
TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
BEGIN
CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM
SOUTH, (repeated 3 times)
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2130 gmt December 5, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 769
SECRET
"Document No. J/
English
THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT
THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE
WEATHER FORECAST:
WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR
THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT
SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE
WEATHER FORECAST:
WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR
Romaji
NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI
KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHI-
AGE MASU
NI8HI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU
NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE
MASU
NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE
Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans-
mitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness ; the witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate,
[744] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second chxss, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn,
and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Captain, please state your name, rank, and present station?
A. L. F. Safford, Captain, United States Navy, Office of Naval
Communications, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the second half
of the calendar year 1941 ?
A. I was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communica-
tions. The Communications Security Section included security
proper, that is, codes and ciphers, and surveillance over their use.
That also included Communications Intelligence. The name was
used in peace-time purely to mask the major mission of the section,
which is collecting information from enemy or prospective enemy
nations through their communications, and most of our effort was
concentrated on Japan at that time. I was in charge of the intercept
stations, direction finder exchanges, and decrypting units.
770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this exami-
nation. Can you identify that document?
A. I can identify it.
4. Q. Captain, what is the tenor of this message that you have
before you ?
A. That the Japanese government would announce to their diplo-
matic officials overseas a prospective break in diplomatic relations or
war against the United States, against England, including the Nether-
lands East Indies, and against llussia, by means of false weather re-
ports broadcast in the middle and at the end of their daily Japanese
language short-wave news broadcasts.
5. Q. On what date was this information translated and available
in the Navy Department ?
A. November 28, 1941.
6. Q. Was any other confirmation of the establishment of that code
by the Japanese received in the Navy Department 'i
A. We received confirmation a few hours later from the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station who had received it from the
British at Singapore. We received double confirmation about the
4th of December from the Dutch at Batavia. They gave the infor-
mation to Consul General Foote, who sent it to the State Depart-
ment. They also gave it to Colonel Thorpe, the senior military
observer, who passed it on to the War Department via the Navy De-
partment and the naval observer in Batavia.
[74^] 7. Q. Sir, I hand you Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64
before this examination. Are these the confirmations about which you
have just testified?
A. They are two of them. The message from Mr. Foote is not here.
8. Q. Is the first of those from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet?
A. The first is from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. And the
second is from Colonel Thorpe, originated from Batavia.
9. Q. Captain, I invite your attention to the fact that in the message
which was intercepted here, that is. Document 15 of Exhibit 63, and
in the message from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Document 2, Ex-
hibit 64, there is a discrepancy in the code words which would indicate
a break with the United States. Can you explain that difference be-
tween the two codes? I specifically refer to the point that in the inter-
cept from Tokio received in Washington, a United States-Japanese
break would be indicated by ''Higashi No Kazeame". In the version
received via CincAF, this same meaning would be expressed by
''Higashi No Kaze Kumori". Is there any significance to this differ-
ence in the last word of the code message?
A. There is no significance ; only an indication of an error in coding.
The coding officer left out a whole line with reference to Russia. The
first part ties it together where it says ''Higashi Higashi Japanese
American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England", and in the
second part where it describes the Japanese language in the Morse code
broadcast, there is no reference to Russia at all except tlie last word,
which is "Kinnori".
10. Q. In other words, Captain, the i)oint of my last question is this :
There were only three sentences that were being looked out for; that
this apparent discrepancy in the CinCAF dispatch was understood here
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 771
and that was not a separate sentence that was being looked for at
that time?
A. That is correct. It was only a mistake and the Dutch version
clarified it in case there had been any question in our minds.
The court then, at 10: 45 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 00 a. m., at
Avhich time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, tlie judoe advocate and his counsel, the
interested parties and their counsel; except the interested party, Ad-
miral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank
L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Captain L, F. Safford, U. S. Navy, the w^itness under examination
when the recess Avas taken, entered. He w^as warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding.
[746] Examination by the judge advocate (continued) :
12. Q. After the receipt of these three dispatches about which you
have testified, what steps were taken by the Communications Intelli-
gence Unit in Washington to monitor Japanese broadcasts to intercept
any possible use of this code?
A. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort
be made to monitor the Japanese stations for the prospective winds
message. We sent teletype instructions to our intercept stations at
Bainbridge Island, Washington, Winter Harbor, Maine, and other East
Coast points, to guard for this message and send it in. Bainbridge
Island was ordered to send in all plain language intercepts b}^ teletype.
We also sent a radio message to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th
Naval Districts giving them the latest information we had on Tokio's
broadcast schedules.
13. Q. In other words. Captain, were the C. I. units at Pearl Harbor
and at Cavite also monitoring for this broadcast?
A. They were also monitoring. They were listening for the voice
broadcasts. Our stations in the continental United States were listen-
ing for the Morse broadcasts. At the time Bainbridge Island was
guarding the Trans-Pacific telephone circuit both ways and that tied
up both recording sets and they could not listen for the voice broad-
casts.
14. Q. When was the first information received in the Communica-
tions Intelligence Section here in Washington of the Japanese using
this code?
A. My first information was in the morning of Thursday, December
4, at 8 : 00 o'clock or shortly thereafter. Lieutenant Murray, I be-
lieve — possibly Lieutenant Commander Kramer — came in with a yel-
low teletype sheet in his hand and he said, "Here it is", and he held
it up. This was typed in Japanese language, and had the significant
words of the winds underscored, and below was a translation in pencil,
and the translation said "War with America; War with England;
and peace with Russia", to the best of my recollection after almost
three years. I have never seen a copy of this translation since about
the 15th of December, 1941.
15. Q. What intercept station had received this information that
you saw that morning?
A. I believe it came from one of the East Coast stations, but we
cannot run that down because all the messaces from all these East
772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Coast stations have been destroyed. Bainbridge Island files were
intact for this period and Bainbridge Island is eliminated.
[747] 16. Q. Were there any confirmations of the interception
of this type of message from any other sources, either Navy, Army,
or other Federal agencies ?
A. No. I have a vague recollection of a second winds message but
was unable to find any trace of it up until the time that I testified
before Admiral Hart's investigation. Since then I received word that
the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted a winds
message at Portland, Oregon. I saw the message itself for the first
time this morning and I do not recognize it.
17. Q. Captain, I hand you Exhibit G5 before this examination,
which are copies certified under seal of the Federal Communications
Commission of the intercept of the Winds message which they con-
veyed to the Navy Department. Were you familiar with this prior
to December 7, 1941 ?
A. If I was I have completely forgotten it. The F. C. C. had the
telephone number of the G. W. watch officer and it is possible that one
of my subordinates made arrangements with Colonel Guest at the time
the F. C. C. were requested to monitor this message. I do not recall
any of the documents which I see here in Exhibit 65.
18. Q. Concerning tlie messages as conveyed by F. C. C. as shown
by this certified copy, Exhibit 65 : What meaning as regards a break
in diplomatic relations between any one of the three nations con-
cerned is shown there ?
A. Document No. 2 on December 4, 1941. would indicate a break
with Kussia. Document No. 3 on December 5, 1941, would also indi-
cate a break with Rusia. Document No. 4 on the early morning of
December 8 — that is about 10 hours after the attack on Pearl Har-
bor — would indicate a break with England.
19. Q. Is it shown anywhere in these messages received from F. C.
C. that a break of relations between the United States and Japan was
anticipated ?
A. Not in these F. C. C. documents.
20. Q. Adverting back several questions to your answer that you
saw on the morning of December 4th an intercept of the use of the
winds code which clearly indicated a break in relations between the
United States and Japan, Great Britain and Japan, and no break with
Russia. Are copies of these intercepts now on file in the unit of which
you were tlie head?
A. They are not on file. Repeated search has been made since
middle of November, 1943, and no trace of tliem could be found. The
Arni}^ have been requested to furnish copies and repeated search by
the S. I. S. has also failed to reveal a single copy.
21. Q. Do you have any explanation for their absence or do you
have any information as to where they might be since they are not in
files of the C. I. Unit ?
A. I made many discreet inquiries. Lieutenant Commander Broth-
erhood states tliat he knows their disposition but [74^] did
not care to tell me. I also know what happened to the Army copies,
flirough very second-hand and devious sources.
22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of
the intercept using the winds code wliich you saw on the morning of
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 773
4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between
the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war
between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of
the code originally which wonld indicate that a nse of that code would
indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations?
A. The Dutch translation said "war". The Japanese language is
very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpreta-
tions or translations on the same message. In very important docu-
ments it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent
transhitions and the differences were sometimes surprising; that is, a
difference in degree. The general facts would be alike. However, the
people in Communication Intelligence and the people in Signal In-
telligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval
Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered
that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the Japanese war'
plans.
23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in Ex-
hibit 64 which is an English language translation of the Dutch inter-
cept. Was this your only source of information that the use of this
code would indicate ''a war decision" which is the wording used by
the attache in Batavia ?
A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more
specific. It said, "When crises leading to worst arises following will
be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. East wind rain — war with
United States. 2. North wind cloudy — war with Kussia. 3. West
wind clear — war with Britain, including an attack on Thailand or
Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a verbatim quo-
tation from the Dutch translation.
24. Q. In other words, the state of the record based on the informa-
tion you had was that two sources indicated that the use of that code
would be a break in diplomatic relations, and to others indicated
stronger language such as "war decision"?
A. Yes, and we also had to take into account Japanese psychology.
They had a gift for understatement and the language officers who
lived in Japan could interpret the meaning of a message better than
people who were not familiar with the Japanese mentality.
25. Q. Captain, from your own personal knowledge, to whom in
the Navy Department was the information in regard to [749~\
the use of the winds code distributed? I refer to the information
that you have just testified about that you Imew about and saw on
the morning of December 4th ?
A. I'm very certain that an immediate distribution was made to
the regular people before 9 : 00 a. m., that morning, that is, the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence, the Director of War Plans, the Director
of Naval Communications for his information, so he could keep track
of what we were doing, the assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and
of course, the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, copies
were sent to the State Department, to the White House, and to the
War Department. This same message was also included in the routine
distribution, which was made around noon each day. Kramer can
tell that exactly. I can't.
26. Q. Just to clarify the record, Is your last answer from your
own personal knowledge, or from what was told you by other parties ?
774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I know that Kramer made an immediate distribution that morn-
ing and I know what officers saw these messages every day. It is
possible that any individual may have been absent from his office and
might not have seen that message early in the morning.
27. Q. Was this information, to-wit, that an intercept of an execu-
tion of the winds code had been received, passed to either the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or the Combat Intelligence Unit of
the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor?
A. It was not.
28. Q. Was any attempt made so to do ?
A. There was.
20. Q. Will you testify what you know from your own personal
knowledge as to any attempt that was made to disseminate this infor-
mation to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commandant, 14th Naval
District? '
A. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence,
Commander McCollum, wrote up a long message about 4 or 5 oi'
pages long, approximately 500 words, giving a complete and brief
and very forceful summary of developments up to that time, up to
4 December, 1941. I saw this message in the afternoon of the 4th.
I was in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications; had
submitted several dispatches to him for release or for reference to
higher authority. All these messages were based on the presumption
that war was imminent, and the information taken from the winds
message. The Director of Naval Intelligence. Admiral Wilkinson,
came in with this message and he gave it to Admiral Noyes and said,
'T have a message here for the Conunander-in-Chief which I wish
you would read." Admiral Noyes said, "That's fine; I have several
going out there [750] myself I would like you to see before
they go out and I want to get them out this afternoon." They ex-
changed messages, and as Admiral Noyes finished a page he handed
it over to me and I read it. I just happened to be there by chance.
It was a very complete summary of what had happened. It began
with the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from the Atlantic
and Indian Oceans in July. It mentioned the evacuation of Japanese
Nationals from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. It included
the fact that diplomatic relations were at an impasse; that neither
party would yield, and it had a direct reference to the winds message,
I believe a quotation, and said that we considered that this was the
execute of the Japanese war plans, the signal of execute of the Japanese
war plans; that we expected that war was innnincnt. Exactly every-
thing I cannot recall at tlie end of nearly three years but I do know
it was very complete and that nothing important had been left out
of it. McCollum had been working several hours on it and had done
a very thorough job. When they got done looking at it. Admiral
Wilkinson said, "What do you think of it, Lee? And Admiral
Noyes said, "I think it's an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-
in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson said, 'T do not agree with you. Ad-
miral Kimmel is a very busy man and may not see the picture as
clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-
Chief that he be given this information and I am going to send it
if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then
took the message and left, and I presume went to Admiral Ingersoll
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 775
to have the messao;e released. I left Admiral Noyes' office a few min-
utes later. The exact time is associated with other messages which
were sent at that time, or a few minutes later, and I do have the
filing times with me,
80. Q. Captain, is your answer that that message was not sent?
Am I correct in saying that this message was not sent ?
A. That message was not sent but I did not even suspect it had
not been sent until November, 1043.
31. Q. Are you aware of the existence of a copy of that rough
draft anywhere ?
A. So far as I know there is no copy in existence.
32. Q. What other information, if any, was received in the C. I,
Unit in Washington prior to the evening of December Gth that indi-
cated a break in relations between the United States and Japan?
A. On November 5, 1941, Tokio sent Ambassador Nomura a dis-
patch ''JD No. 6254" stating that it was absolutely necessary tliat all
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the
25th of this month, and added "of utmost secrecv".
[7S1] 33. Q. I hand you Document 7 of Exhibit 63. Is this the
message to which you have just referred?
A. It is.
34. Q. Please continue with your answer.
A. The day before Tokio had sent JD No. 6248 to Nomura stating
that counter-proposals would be given in Tokio No. 726 and 727, and
added, "Conditions both within and without our empire are so tense
that no longer is procrastination possible. This is our last effort.
The success or failure of the pending discussions will liave an immense
effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan''. On November 12th,
Tokio informed Nomura in JD 6415, "The United States is still not
fully aware of the exceeding criticalness of the situation here. The
date set in Message No. 736 is a definite deadline. The situation is
nearing a climax. Time is indeed becoming short." On November
17, Tokio told Ambassador Nomura in JD 6638, in reply to a long
message from him in which he begged Tokio to at least wait a month or
two to get a clear view of the world situation. "The fate of oiu* em-
pire hangs by the slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline.
There will be no change."
[7S2] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middle! on, j^eoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
35. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 10 of Exhibit 63 before this
court. Is this the document to which vou just referred ?
A. It is.
36. Q. Please continue.
A. On November 22 Tokyo advised Nomura in JD 6710 : "There are
reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Jap-
anese-American relations by the 25th."
37. Q. I hand you Document 11 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document
to which you refer?
A, Yes.
38. Q. Please continue.
A. On November 24 Tokyo advised in JD 6744 : "Advise Nomura the
time limit set in my number 812 is in Tokyo time." On November 26
776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in JD 6801 we learned tliat Tokyo advised Nomura : "Should negotia-
tions collapse, we will completely destroy British and American power
in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions."
This is a circular. It was sent on November 14, 1941. We were de-
layed twelve days in getting this information. On November 28 we
learned in JD 6890, which is a translation of a Washington-Tokyo
telephone conversation: "A crisis does appear imminent regarding
negotiations. Do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand, and
the Army is champing at the bit." This is from Kurusu to Yamamoto
in Tokyo. On November 26 w^e learned of a Washington-Tokyo
telephone conversation. On November 26 in JD 6891 Kurusu and
Nomura, in commenting on the American note which Secretary Hull
had delivered to them that date, stated : "Our failure and humiliation
are complete."
39. Q. I hand you Document 16 of Exhibit 63. Is this the docu-
ment to which you just referred?
A. It is. Have you got 6898 on November 28 ?
40. Q. Yes. • _
A. On November 28 we received information contained in Docu-
ment 18 of Exhibit 63, which I identified. On December 1 in JD
6942 we received information of Germany's promise to aid Japan
in case Japan would declare war against the United States. On De-
cember 1 in JD 6943 Tokyo advised Ambassador Oshima in Berlin:
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand rup-
tured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is ex-
treme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo
Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than any-
body dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for
the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the
north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy
is." [YSS] That is December 1, and the message was dated No-
vember 30, 1941. On December 1 we also received the information
contained in JD 6944, which I believe you have.
41. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 22 of Exhibit 63 before this
court. Is this the document to which you just referred?
A. Yes. On December 2 in JD 6974 we learned that Hsingking
advised Tokyo : "In the event tliat war breaks out with England and
the United States, persons to be interned: British Nationals, 339;
American citizens, 81; Nationals of Soviet observed to be obnoxious
characters with pro-British and American learnings are to be suitably
taken care of."
42. Q. Captain, in your future answers please limit yourself only
to the documents which gave new and additional information regard-
ing a possible war with Japan or a possible break in diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and Japan?
A. On December 1 in JD 6983 Tokyo advised Washington to prevent
the United States from becoming unduly suspicious —
43. Q. We have that. I hand you Document 21 of Exhibit 63 before
this court. Is this the dispatch about which you are testifying?
A. It is. Do you liave 6984?
44. Q. No, sir.*
A. On December 1 in JD 6984 Tokyo advised : "The four offices
in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 777
to abandon the use of code machines and dispose of them. The
machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan."
45. Q. Was there any indication of which one of the code machines
was being destroyed there?
A. It was very definite to us. It is describing teclniical terms. On
December 2 in JD G985 Tokyo sent a circular message to consular
officials all over the world establishing a hidden-word code for use
after they had destroyed their other code books and normal tele-
graphic communications were not available. The message itself was
dated November 27. We were five daj^s late in translation. On De-
cember 3 we learned from JD G991 that Tokyo had told the Cojisul
General in Honolulu : "Make your ships in harbor, report irregularly
but twice a week."
40. Q. I hand you Document 64 of Exhibit 63. Is this the docu-
ment to which you refer ?
A. It is. On December 3 we learned in JD 7017 that Tokyo had
instructed Washington to burn all codes except two, stop using the
machine and destroy completely, destroy all message files and all
secret documents. The message was dated the 2nd. On December
4 in JD 7029 we learned that Tokyo had instructed the consulate in
Honolulu to investigate bases in Hawaiian reservation. The message
was dated November 20.
[7S4-] 47. Q. Please continue.
A. On December 5 in JD 7063 we learned that Tokyo instructed
Honolulu to report ships in Pearl Harbor and I\Iaunalua Bay and so
forth. That message was dated November 18.
48. Q. I hand you Document 37 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is
this the message of November 18 to which you just referred?
A. It is. On December 5 in JD 7086 we learned that Tokyo had
instructed Honolulu: "In the future, report even when there are no
ship movements." The message was dated November 29.
49. Q. I hand you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 before this court.
Is this the message of November 29 to which you have just referred?
A. It is. On the 4th of December in JD 7092 Tokyo instructed
Hsinking : "Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and
America that this country will take in case war breaks out. Great
care should be taken not to antagonize Russia." That was sent De-
cember 1. On December 6 in JD 7111 — I think you have that — Hono-
lulu reported on naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.
50. Q. Yes.
A. That takes me through the afternoon and evening of Decem-
ber 6.
51. Q. In addition to the foregoing, was there any information
available to the Navy Department indicating the imminence of hostili-
ties, as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations prior to
the evening of December 6, 1941 ?
A. We regarded the breaking of diplomatic relations with Japan
and active hostilities as being synonomus, going on Japan's past
record. We began standing continuous watches on the Japanese
diplomatic watches the 1st of February, 1941 as soon as we had enough
officers and men to do it, because we expected that the break would
come over a week-end, the way all Hitler's coups had been made in
Europe against the British and other European cabinets, and we did
778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not want to be caught off guard. We knew it would take two or three
months until we got into an efficient watch list. When the break
actually came, it was just one more week-end as far as the men on
watch were concerned.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
5:2. Q. When Lieutenant Commander Kramer left your unit to dis-
tribute information, with how many copies of such information did he
start ?
A. Normally he had only one copy which was showed but not [765]
given anybody. The one exception to that, which I know of, was
on the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, when he made
numerous copies, so that each party concerned could be given a copy.
We always gave two copies of everything we had to the Army to
handle their own filing and distribution. The Army gave us two
copies, one for file by JD number and the other for distribution and
file by dates.
53. Q. You implied in your testimony that you gave high evalua-
tions of the news coming from Batavia concerning the Winds Code.
How long had you been giving that evaluation as to what came from
Java ?
A. That was the only message we ever received from Java.
54. Q. You stated at the end of your direct examination that the
feeling in your unit was that a severance of diplomatic relations was
equivalent to a declaration of war. Will you expand that answer a
little more and tell us why you had such an interpretation ?
A. Historically speaking, Japan commenced hostilities against
China in the Chinese-Japanese war — I think in 1890 — without any
formal breaking of diplomatic relations. The attack on the Fleet
was itself the severance of diplomatic relations. The same thing oc-
curred at Port Arthur at the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war.
Because we were largely influenced by people who lived in Japan
and studied the language out there, we had no faith in the Japanese
at all and considered them a very tricky, underhanded bunch of dirty
fighters who would try to hit us behind our back if they could.
55. Q. You stated that in your unit a message about the severance
of diplomatic relations was akin to the signal to execute the Japanese
war plans. Upon what reason did you base that?
A. For one thing, we were largely influenced by the importance that
Admiral Wilkinson attributed to it before it came in. We had all
manner of things pointing up to the beginning of the war, including the
messages which I read off. The last one came in just about the same
time as the message from Hsinking, telling them, above all, not to
antagonize Russia and referring to the possibility of war against Eng-
land and the United States. There were the messages to Berlin, but
all these things pointed, more or less, to promises, but there was nothing
s])ecific in regard to time other than this ultimation or the time
limit of the '29th. The Army people expected that we were going
to be hit on the 29tli or 80th. They were very positive and could
not understand why they waited that long. AVe figured that they had
some complicated move involved. It was all a question of timing, and
they would somehow have to give a signal [7S6] to execute,
and this was one way to give it. There was no way we could see for
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 779
giving this information to the consuls. We thought it meant more
than to the consuls and that it was going to the military force. It
was our belief and that is all we had.
50. Q. Then, that feeling was not so much contained in your unit
as it was the feeling of the Director of Naval Intelligence ?
A. We thought it was his feeling. We thought it was McCollum's
feeling and it was our own. We shared that view.
57. Q. Do you recall Commander Kramer's ever leaving your unit
with one or more documents when he was about to present to higher
authority the feeling that a signal for the execution of the Japanese
w^ar plans had been given ?
A. Yes, sir, I believe that he left twice that day, once early in the
morning to take that around at least as far as Admiral Wilkinson,
and he may have been asked by Admiral Wilkinson to carry it farther.
Then, again he made his regular distribution trip on which he took it to
everybody and ended up by giving it to the aide of the President.
58. Q. Were those words used 'i
A. No, sir, we were very careful not to intrude our opinions upon
things we were reporting. As for the set-up of the war plans : Com-
munications obtained this information, and it was the duty and re-
sponsibility of Naval Intelligence to collate it and disseminate it, and
we felt that we would have been over-stepping the bounds if we at-
tempted to put our interpretations in.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Eet.) :
59. Q. Do you know what your unit did Saturday afternoon and
evening, December 6, and Sunday morning, December 7?
A. I know that very well, because I talked with all the officers
who were on watch during that period, as well as seeing the written
record.
60. Q. Will you tell the court, in general, what your unit did on
the 6th and 7th of December in regard to this matter?
A. On a week-end traflic usually fell off to nothing. On this week-
end we handled about three times the normal messages for a busy day.
The most important was a very long, 14-part message which contained
the Japanese declaration of war, vv^hich was delivered Sunday after-
noon around, I believe it was, 2 : 15 or 2 : 30 p. m. to the Secretary of
State. We had the first thirteen parts of that and had them translated
or decoded by 7 p. m. Saturday night, December 6, 1941. Then we
spent about two hours making smooth copies and numerous [757]
other copies. The Army came over and helped us. They did some
of the translation and also furnished a copy. The Army was given
three copies about nine o'clock. At nine o'clock Kramer got on the
telephone and told Admiral Wilkinson what he had and asked for
instructions. Wilkinson told him to come right out and leave a copy
at the White House en route. That was clone. Kramer went out to
Admiral Wilkinson's, and I believe Admiral Wilkinson was entertain-
ing the Naval Aide to the President. He got a station wagon, stopped
at the White House en route, and left these copies with the White House
Aide. At the time, the President was entertaining and could not be
seen immediately.
The judge advocate objected to the answer of the witness on the
ground that it was hearsay.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 7
780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Examined by tlie court :
()1. Q. Is that an official report'^
A. That is what Kramer tohl me officially as his commanding officer,
':o account for his movements. I asked him some very searching
questions.
The judge adocate withdrew the objection.
62. Q. Continue with your answer.
A. As well as I can recollect, Admiral Wilkinson telephoned to
Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and also to Admiral
Turner, the Director of War Plans. I know that Admiral Turner
was informed that night. My recollections have been hazy. He may
have been a guest of Admiral Wilkinson, and Kramer may have sent
Admiral Turner a copy of the message, and Turner may have talked
to Stark over the telephone. I asked Kramer about the Secretary of
State, and he said that he understood that Colonel Brat ton, or some-
body else in the Army, had delivered to Secretary Hull a copy of the
message by 10 : 30 and that Secretary Hull called Secretary Knox and
Stimson on the 'phone and made appointments for them, plus Kramer
and Bratton, to be present at a conference in the State Department in
Secretary Hull's office at 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. They
all attended. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1
a. m. on December 7 to see if part 14 had come in or any other news.
Then he w^ent home and left word he was going to be down early the
next morning, because he had instructions to gi^'e these documents to
Admiral Stark in his office at 9 o'clock. About 4 or 5 a. m, December 7,
1941, two other important messages came in by teletype from the West
Coast. One was part 14 of the long message which was a declaration
of war. This was decoded immediately and was ready for distribution
by 7 a. m. of December 7, 1941. [758] The other message was
Tokyo's serial No. 907, and when decoded it proved to be in Japanese.
That was sent over to the War Department for translation about 7 a. m.
on December 7, 1941. The translation came back from the War De-
partment a little after 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7. That was
the message which instructed Kurusu and Nomura to deliver the dec-
laration of war to the Secretary of State, if possible, at 1 p. m. on
Sunday, December 7, 1941, Washington time. Specifically, it was to
deliver Tokyo serial No. 902.
63. Q. That was the message of which there were fourteen parts?
A. That was the 14-part message.
- 64. Q. Do you know anything about the dissemination of the 14th
part and the second message to which you just referred that came in
on the morning of Sunday, December 7 ?
A. Kramer came into the Navy Department somewhere about 8 a. m.,
by the recollection of himself, December 7, 1941, and took that mes-
sage — and there were some other inconsequential ti'anslatioiis at the
same time, plus the other l-\ parts — uj) to Admii-al Stark's office first.
He either gave them to Admiral Stark personally or left them with his
aide. My memory is not clear on that i)oint. Then he went to the
Wliite House and left a copy with Admiral Beardall, who was at the
White House. Then he went to the State Department and arrived in
time for his 10 a. m. appointment with Secretary Hull and Secretary
Knox. Colonel Bratton was there, and so was Secretary Stimson.
The judge advocate moved to strike from the record the testimony
of this witness relating to information which had been told him.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 781
The court announced that it did not sustain tlie motion to strike out
the testimony,
{)5. You may proceed.
A. Kramer delivered he material and stayed a few minutes and
then went back to the Navy Department. About the time he got back,
the translation of Tokyo's serial No. 907 came in, which Kramer saw
immediately was very important. There also came a message in the
hidden-word code, which I have referred to and which was translated
rery hurriedly. The translation, as circulated, said, ''Relations with
England are not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste,
as I discovered later, they left out one of the hidden words, and the
message should have read
[759] 66. Q. What was reported to you?
A. Those two messages were redistributed immediately by Kramer.
He first went to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There
was a conference in progress there. He gave them to Admiral Stark's
aide. Then he went to the White House and gave them to the Aide
of the President. Then he got to the State Department, arriving there
about 11 a. m. and gave copies to the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of War, and the Secret ai'j^ of the Navy ; and to the copy he gave the
Secretary of the Navy there was a note appended which stated the
time of delivery was sunrise in Honolulu and nearly midnight in
Manila, and it undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor
in a few hours.
The judge advocate moved that the entire answer to this question be
stricken from the record on the ground that it is hearsay.
The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, joined
in the motion.
Examined by the court :
67. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge what you have stated in
that answer?
A. I only know from what Kramer told me.
The court announced that the motion to strike out the answer was
sustained.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
68. Q. Captain, from your general knowledge of messages received
and passing through your office, did you have the impression and did
your office have the impression that they were important messages being
received from sources, subsequent to November '27, which had a direct
bearing on this war condition you mentioned?
A. Yes, sir, they were.
69. Q. You said that the messages were distributed when they were
received. Did you have a list of distribution in your office, or did you
know where those messages or copies of messages were being sent?
A. There were written orders confining tlie distribution of these
messages to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations, the Director of War Flans, the Director of Naval
Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director
of the Far Eastern [760] Section, plus the cryptanalysts and
the translators working on them. If anybody else in the Navy De-
partment saw them, it was done on the orders of higher authority.
782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
70. Q. Have you any knowledge that any information concerning
the messages which you have outlined was sent to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?
A. The only information sent him was with reference to the Japan-
ese destroying their code machines.
71. Q. The message of December 1, which contained an important
message to Berlin stating that war with the United States and Great
Britain might come sooner than expected, was not sent?
A. That was not sent.
72. Q. As information to the Commander-in-Chief?
A. Neither to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet nor the Com-
onander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
73. Q. Has it been customary at any time within your experience
in Communications or in the Navy Department to find that a message
has been taken out of the files or has been misplaced from the files ?
A. It has not. A great many messages and other material were mis-
placed during frequent moves consequent to the growth of the Naval
Intelligence organization, but subsequently, I think, everything was
located or accounted for, and this Winds Message is verj'^ conspicuous
by its absence.
74. Q. You know of no other messages which have disappeared
similar to this one?
A. No other message that I knew about and wanted have we failed
to find eventually. In some cases it took two or three months and they
were found.
75. Q. Has a diligent search been made for these messages?
A. A diligent search was made by 20-G, and later I borrowed the
files where they should have been. Commander Lynn assisted me, but
we couldn't find any trace of them.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret.):"
76. Q. Captain, can you find the communication which you had in
reference to orders to 'Japanese diplomats to destroy their codes ? Can
you get that?
A. Here it is ; December 1 is the first one.
[7^il 77. Q. The substance of that information was what?
A. (Reading) "The four offices in London, Hong Kong. Singapore,
and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of code machines
and dispose of them. The machine at Batavia has been returned to
Japan."
78. Q. You had another one prior to December 3 on that same sub-
ject?
A. Yes. That one was the first. On the second one — a similar
message was sent, but in more detail, to Washington.
79. Q. I call your attention to Exhibit 20, the communication "of
December 3, 1941. I observe that Exhibit 20 states that only some
of the codes and some of the material is being destroyed. That was
not your information at the time, was it ? Your information at the
time was that all the codes were being destroyed?
A. I did not write this.
80. Q. I am not asking you that.
A. The exhibit you refer to is incomplete and ambiguous.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 783
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy:
81. Q. Captain, some of these documents of Exhibit 63 bear a stamp
like the one on No. 1 and a great many have no stamp whatever. Will
you explain to the court the significance of that stamp and what the
omission may mean ?
A. I cannot explain what the stamp means or the significance of
the stamp or the lack of it. Kramer might be able to.
82. Q. Captain, referring again to No. 39 of this exhibit, which is
the 14-part message of December 6, will you glance at it and explain
why you repeatedly refer to that dispatch from Tokyo as a declara-
tion of war?
A. Tokyo serial No. 901 stated that their 902 in English would be
the answer to the American note of November 20, 1941. Up to this
time, the language implied had been very courteous. Because of the
harsh and abusive language used throughout this, there was no doubt
in the minds of the men who were on watch at the time that the Japan-
ese meant war and that this was their declaration.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ-
ous questioning.
[762] The witness made the following statement: The translation date
of JD 7469 is December 15, 1941. The message itself was dated December 11
and gives Tokyo's explanation of the presentation of serial No. 902 and the
fact that they considered it their declaration of war.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Doctor Stanley K. Hornbeck. Pages 767-
772, inclusive.
[767] 24. Q. Do you remember receiving, or having knowledge
of, information on 26 November 1941, setting forth the Japanese of-
ficial views as to the successful outcome of the agreement under con-
sideration between the United States and Japan?
A. I think we had something on that from intercept material.
25. Q. Did you know the source of this information?
A. I knew the approximate source, at least.
26. Q. Between the dates, November 27 and December 7, 1941, were
negotiations continuing with Japan ?
A. Well, there was some further conversation, and then there was
the President's message to the Emperor, but that is all in the record,
also.
27. Q. But there were conversations and parleys going on in that
period of time ?
A. Yes.
28. Q. Did you, being aware of that information that came in
to you, or flowed into the State Department during this period, No-
vember 27 to December 7, consider that information, received at that
time, had an important bearing on the negotiations?
A. During those few days?
784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29. Q. Yes, sir; that is, practically subsequent to the note of 26
November.
A. I doubt whether it had.
30. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 7, which is now before
this court, and which purports to be a communication from the Jap-
anese Government dated 5 November 1941, to the Japanese representa-
tives in Washington, and which urges tlie agreement be completed
by November 25, '41, will you please state whether or not you had
been informed of the contents of this document, and about the time
you received this information ?
A. I have no recollection of having seen this particular document.
31. Q. And naturally you would not know whether or not the State
Department had discussed it with the officials of the Navy Depart-
ment, including the Secretary of the Navy ?
A. No, sir.
32. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 18, which is now before
this court, which document is a comnnuiication from the Japanese
Government to the Japanese representatives in Washington, and
which sets out views as to the de facto termination of negotiations,
would you please refer to this document stating whether or not you
have seen it, or whether or not \^'(^^] you had been informed
as to its contents ?
A. Yes, sir, I think 1 had seen that document.
33. 'Q. Do you remember, Doctor Hornbeck, about the time you
got that information or saw it ?
A. No, sir, 1 could not say when. These things were coming to us
with reasonable promptness at that time, but I couldn't possible say
at what moment I had seen it.
34. Q. You know approximately what is the date of the document?
A. The document is dated November 28.
35. Q. iTou couldn't have seen it prior to the 28th, could you?
A. That is clear.
36. Q. Isn't this very important information which showed the
trend of events and really showed rather concisely the position of
Japan?
A. Had the United States been in the position of the affirmant, that
is, of the party pressing for an agreement, I should say, yes. Inas-
much as the United States was not in that position, it was Japan that
was pressing for the agreement, I should say this does not give a
clear indication.
37. Q. But in your opinion, by reason of this telegram and other
information at that time, were the negotiations in de facto termi-
nated on the date of that telegram. 2S November 1941 ?
A. I should say the telegram indicated that theie would be no
further negotiations.
38. Q. During the period 26 November to 7 December 1941, did
you keep familiar with information being published in the press
with relation to the progress of negotiations between Japan and the
United States?
A. Far more so, I think, llian the average reader; yes, sir.
39. Q. Could you give in general your thought of this, I mean as
your memory serves, as to what this press information consisted of?
A. Well, the press was discussing the question of the meaning of
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 785
(he latesf developments, the developments between the 20th and the
ii()tli. In some parts of the i)ress they were talkin<2; of the possibility
of war. Editorial Avriters were discussing the wisdom or the un-
wisdom of the position which had been taken by this Government
in delivering the note of the 2()th. I do not remember that there was
any definite trend or any definite balance of opinion or prognostica-
tion or of speculation. It was still a scattering thing.
[769] 40. Q. At what time did you become familiar with the
note which was the Japanese reply to the note of 26 November to
them ?
A, Well, their official re{>ly was made on December 7.
41. Q. Did you have any information prior to the handing of this
note by the Japanese to the Secretary of State, as to the contents
of this reply ?
A. My recollection is that we had intercept material on that subject.
42. Q. Was there any conference held with naval officials on the
morning of the 7th, in regard to this reply, prior to its actual de-
livery ?
A. To my recollection, there were naval officers at the Department
that morning wdien I went down at about 10 : 30.
43. Q. Did you attend the conference?
A. No, sir.
44. Q. Do you have any recollection as to the officers who were
there?
A. No, I couldn't tell you that.
45. Q. Doctor Hornbeck, in the general set-up of the State De-
partment relative to conferences and so on, wdio was the represent-
ative, the State Department official, who actually handled these mat-
ters with the Navy Department, as to the delivery of information,
as to the flow of information between the two departments, the
liaison ?
A. There had been set up an arrangement whereby Mr. Welles
and the Chiefs of Staffs met from time to time.
46. Q. Pardon me, by "Chiefs of Staff" you mean?
A. I mean Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations; and
there Avere periods in which they met frequently, and periods in
wdiich they met rather infrequently. Sometimes I was informed of
their having had a meeting and what had transpired. Sometimes
I was not. Mr. Welles would be the only man of our establishment
who could tell you how often those meeting had been held or could
give you any record of dates and so forth. Other than that, there
were these meetings in the office of the Secretary of State, where,
at times, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were
present, and then there would be officers of the Navy and of the
Army, and sometimes some of us in the Department were called in
and sometimes it would be one group, sometimes another group, de-
pending on what parts of the word or what problem was being
discussed. Those were the principal [770] points of contact
there at high level. I have never known what officers of the Depart-
ment, or of your department, or the War Department, actually engaged
in the physical handing back and forth of telegraphic and other
material at a much lower level.
786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Frank L, Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[771] 47. Q. Aside from the actual handling of information,
dispatches and so on, was there any representative of tlie State De-
partment which acted as liaison officer with the Navy Department?
In other words, in discussing certain matters which would be carried
to higher authorities, the Secretary of State, for instance?
A. Well, in a later period. I do not think it was in the case as it
was in 19il. Mr. Orme Wilson was the liaison officer of the Depart-
ment of State with the Navy Department and the War Department.
48. Q. I am speaking for the purpose of exchange in dispatches
and information of that kind. In other words, suppose the State
Department receives an important dispatch relative to Japan, and
similarly, suppose the Navy Department receives it. Now, was there
an official in the State Department who said, "This is important for
the Navy," and the Secretary of State has this man to confer with
the Navy and see that this dispatch is transmitted to the Navy ?
A. I had always understood there was some man engaged in that,
but who it was I do not know. Mr. Hamilton would probably be able
to tell you. Officers immediately attached to the Secretary of State
and officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs gave instant atten-
tion to this matter.
49. Q. Mr. Hamilton isn't here, is he?
A. No.
Neither the judge advocate nor the interested party. Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
50. Q, I understood you to say. Dr. Hornbeck, that in the days
following the 26th of November after the delivery of the note that
day, there were newspaper discussions concerning the note and its
contents ?
A. I think so.
51. Q. Isn't it true that that note was released to the news press
for the first time on the 7th of December, in the afternoon? I read
a paragraph from "Foreign Relations", Volume 2, of which this court
has taken judicial notice, page 793, a statement by the Secretary of
State, December 7, 1941. I read the third paragraph: "I am now
releasing for the information of the American people the statement
of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United
States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peace settle-
ment covering the entire Pacific area which I handed to Japanese
Ambassador on November 26, 1941." Does that refresh your recol-
lection as to when that statement, the note of November 26th, was
released to the press ?
A. That relates to the text. The text was released on December 7.
But on evening of November 26 the press was informed that reply
had been made. On next day, in a conference with the press, the
Secretary stressed the gravity of the [77^] situation both in
Europe and in the Far East. During the next few days, in confer-
ences with the Secretary and with the Under Secretary, and in their
contacts Avith diplomatic missions, the correspondents continued to
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 787
ask questions about developments in the 'exploratory conversation'
and about various features of the international situation, especially
about American-Japanese relations; and the press, piecing bits to-
gether and making surmises and engaging in speculation, discussed
a variety of possibilities and made comments from many angles. They
talked about the American-Japanese exchange of communications
rather than about the exact contents of the communications. I do
not recall that what appeared in the press indicated any special, new
or peculiar trend of thought beyond giving evidence of an increasing
realization that this country was confronted with a very serious prob-
lem in our foreign relations both in Europe and in the Far East. In
the news as such, President Roosevelt's return to Washington, state-
ments of Japanese officials, and developments in and around Indo-
China were among the important items.
52. Q. Does that appear in either "Peace and War" or the book en-
titled "Foreign Relations?"
A. No, I think not.
53. Q. That is, the release that was prior to December 7th and fol-
lowing the 26th of November ?
A. It may or may not have been a release but there was a press con-
ference in which the press was informed of the general situation.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which he had not fully brought out by the previ-
ous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Pages 774-792, inclusive.
[774'] Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. There is evidence before the court that an established pro-
cedure in the Navy Department had been set up whereby certain
classified information was delivered to you as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions daily. Will you state, briefly, what this procedure was during
the period from about November, 1941, to 7 December, 1941?
A. The procedure of giving me classified information, generally,
was that of bringing it to my Flag Secretary, Commander Wellborn,
who would bring it in to me, although at the time if I were free, it
might have come in directly by the officer who brought it, in Naval
Intelligence.
2. Q. Who was the officer that normally brought it from Naval
Intelligence ?
A. Kramer.
3. Q. Was the information that was delivered to you by the office of
Naval Intelligence evaluated before it came to your hands, or not?
A. Sometimes information was evaluated, and sometimes dispatches
may have come to me direct before I received the evaluation; but
788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
there was a running evaluation kept by those agencies who were in
Operations who were designated to do it.
4. Q. What agencies in Operations were designated to evaluate
intelligence for you?
A. The Office of Naval Intelligence, and also War Plans ; also they
were usually gone over by Admiral IngersoU, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations.
5. Q. If information arrived in the Navy Department outside of
office hours was there any established procedure for getting it to you
at the earliest practicable moment ?
A. Yes, there was. It would go to the watch officer. Operations
Watch Officer, who in turn, using his judgment, would send it to the
duty officer, who was usually a Captain out in town who was regu-
larly designated. He in turn would exercise his judgment as to
whether or not I was to be called and given the information.
G. Q. Was the system of distributing military intelligence in the
Navy Department during the critical period preceding 7 December
1941, such that you feel that you received all important information
on Japanese-United States relationships?
A. I felt that I was receiving it.
7. Q. I show you document No. 11, of Exhibit G3, which purports
to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 Novem-
ber. Before 7 December 1941, had you seen this document or had
you been made acquainted with its contents?
A. I do not recall exactly this message, but I undoubted- [775]
ly was acquainted with it, either as it is, or brought to me and talked
over verbally.
8. Q. It bears translation date of November 22, 1941. Can you
state when it probably came to your knowledge in the routine course
of office procedure?
A. Well, it might very well have come on that date or the day fol-
lowing, which would have been the 23rd.
9. Q. Did you send the substance of this information to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. I sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet on the 24th, which very well may have been based upon or cer-
tainly had taken into consideration this Exhibit.
10. Q. The word "agreement" is used in this document, No. 11.
What agreement in your opinion was there being discussed?
A. I would say that it was the agreement pending between the
negotiators for Japan and our State Department.
11. Q. Did the deadline of 29 I^ovember, as stated in document No.
11, have any special significance to you?
A. The date of 29th of November and the previous date of the
25th, did have a significance, as a break in the negotiatioiLs might
come at that time. I may state that I did not send, as noted from our
dispatches, information to either of the Pacific connnands, as to the
specific dates given herein. I had become leery of dates. We had
sources of information which looked authentic, from time to time, as
to when Italy would come in, and frequently they were changed. If
I had set a date of the 25th, for example, and nothing happened on the
25th, it would have, in my opinion, been bad ball. Again, if I had sent
a date of the 29th, which I could not be sure of it, and it must be
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 7g9
remembered that this message had to be evahiated not just as it stands
but in connection with a lot of other information — but if I had sent
that date of the 29th and nothing had happened, again it would prob-
ably have weakened the dispatch which we did send, and which, in my
opinion, covered the situation. Judging by what is now perhaps hind-
sight, I am glad that I did not include the dates.
12. Q. Of what dispatch are you speaking, Admiral, in your answer
to the question?
A. I am speaking of our dispatch which was sent on the 24th.
13. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, Admiral, and ask you if this is the
dispatch to which you refer as bearing date of 24 November 1941?
A. Yes, and I may state further that in our dispatch [776] of
three days later, any reference to specific dates was left out, and we
confined ourselves in that later dispatch to the expression, "In the
next few days." That is the dispatch that was sent on the 27th.
14. Q. I sliow you Exhibit 17, in evidence before the court, and ask
you if this dispatch is the one of 27 November 1941, to which you refer
in your last answer?
A. Yes.
15. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, and point our document 15 contained
therein. This document 15 has been popularly referred to in testi-
mony as the "winds code." Had you seen this document, or had you
been informed of its contents prior to 7 Deceml^er 1941?
A. As I have previously testified, I do not recall having seen this
document. I assume that if received it was evaluated. It adds
nothing to my disjiatch of the 27th. It covers the cutting off of inter-
national connnunications. I stated in my disi)atch of the 27th that
negotiations had ceased. Certainly I do not think this disj^atch
would have strengthened my dispatch of the 2Tth; it miglit ])ossibly
have weakened it.
16. Q. I show you document No. 18 from Exhibit 63, which states
in substance that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which
will be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the nego-
tiations are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you
been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941 — or
did you see this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941 ?
A. I may have seen it, or its evaluation. He had already covered
it. It added nothing to what I had already sent in the dispatch of
the 27th.
17. Q. Did you inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
of the contents of this document ?
A. No, nothing in addition to what I had sent on the 27th.
18. Q. Document No. 18 speaks of "negotiations." What negotia-
tions, in your opinion, were being referred to therein?
A. Negotiations between the representatives of the Japanese Gov-
ernment and our State Department.
19. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63. This document
sets out in substance the Secretary of State's note of 26 November
1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed of the
subject matter contained therein, on [777~\ or before 7 Decem-
ber 1941 ?
A. I have previously testified that I did not recall seeing the docu-
ment. It may very well have been discussed.
790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
20. Q. Had the Japanese made a reply to the Secretary of State's
note of 26 November? That is document 17-prior to 6 December
1941?
A. No.
21. Q. Adverting back to the words in the document, 18, which you
testified to in the question before this — "with the views of the Imperial
Government, which will be sent in a few days." What views did you
think they would referring to in that document, by the views of the
Imperial Government?
A. I assume that it was the views of the Imperial Government,
which were to be sent.
22. Q. And these views of the Imperial Government — would they
be in reply to this note of 26 November ?
A. Yes, that would be my interpretation.
23._ Q. The language of document 18 is that with the receipt of
the views of the Imperial Government in a few days, the negotiations
will be de facto ruptured. Is not this statement in your opinion
tantamount to an assertion that negotiations were broken as of the
time of making the document ?
A. I would say, as I now see it, looking at this dispatch, yes; but
I would also state that our dispatch of the 27th had also so stated.
It will be recalled that the dispatch of the 27th stated negotiations
had ceased.
24. Q. Your dispatch of November 27 is Exhibit 17, is it not ?
A. Yes.
25. Q. This document. No. 18, was translated on 28 November
1941. That is more than a week before the actual attack on Pearl
Harbor, is it not?
A. Yes.
26. Q. Between 28 November and 7 December 1941, were any direc-
tives for fleet dispositions made?
A. No directives additional to the directive contained in our dis-
patch of the 27th.
27. Q. Were any additional security measures directed by the Chief
of Naval Operations during this period of time, [778^ as they
. applied to the United States Pacific Fleet or the Hawaiian area?
A. No. The code message was sent, regarding destruction of codes,
but nothing else as regards security.
28. Q. You have testified that the language of document No. 18,
which is to the effect that on receipt of the views of the Imperial Gov-
ernment in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured —
that looking back on it you considered that they were then ruptured
as of the date of the dispatch?
A. Yes.
29. Q. Was there any reason why the United States Pacific Fleet
should not have been immediately moved from Pearl Harbor?
A. Do you mean as to any reasons whv I should not have moved it?
30. Q. That is correct. Sir.
A. Well, if I had ordered the Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, I would
probably have had to have given a destination, as for example, bring-
ing them back to the coast, something which I just considered out of
the cards. But I left matters of this sort to the commanders in the
field. I had two fleets in the Pacific. One in the Asiatic, and one in
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 791
the Hawaiian area, and I left it up to the commanders on the spot as
to what to do, after I had given them the information that I had, my
interpretation of it, and the directive contained in the dispatch of 27
November.
31. Q. I show you document 21. from Exhibit 63, which states in
substance, that "they are advising the press that negotiations are still
continuing," Had you seen this document, or had you been advised
of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I do not recall having seen this document in just this form, but
it may very well have been discussed at that time. I might state in
general in connection with these dispatches — this document, for ex-
ample — it is just one of a great many that were coming in along with
a lot of other material. It was physically impossible for me to read
them all or to see them all. Some of them I saw directly. Some
came to me with evaluations. Sometimes some came to me with a
general picture — sometimes orally, sometimes on a written memoran-
dum. To take a single dispatch with a specific question, we may read
into it now, in the light of hindsight, what we couldn't see then. We
didn't have hindsight to guide us, and we had to evaluate without it.
I can only say I [779'\ was in complete touch — at least that I
assumed I was in complete touch — with the broad general trend ; that
our conclusions we aimed to keep the commanders in the field advised
of, we did not send them every specific document. I think to have
done so would have been prejudicial to the larger picture. For ex-
ample, a good deal has been stated as to what happened between late
November and December 7. We unquestionably were continually
talking things over, but I should like to state that no evaluations or
opinions were brought to me as a result of the study by those whose
business it was to study everything which came in, which in any way
altered the considered opinion and directive which we sent out on the
27th. On the contrary, as I have testified before, what was highly
confirmatory evidence to me was the burning of the codes, and again
our action in our dispatch to Guam and again to CinCPac on this
subject, showing that we had not changed in any way our opinion
regarding the message of the 27th — but if anything were strength-
ening it.
32. Q. In several instances in your answer. Admiral, you referred
to your dispatch of 27 November. Do you mean Exhibit 17 ?
A. Yes.
33. Q. The document 21, about which you have been testifying,
states : "We are advising the press that negotiations are still con-
tinuing." Who was this message set out in document 21 from?
A. It is from Tokyo to Washington, and I assume that "we" means
the Japanese,
34. Q. Did you advise the Commander-in-Chief of the .Pacific
Fleet of the substance contained in document 21 ?
A. No. As I have stated, it added nothing, in my opinion, to what
had been sent. It was typical of Japan to carry on material of this
sort right up to rupture.
35. Q. Eef erring to document 11, about which you have testified,
which was received on or about 22 November, 1941, and which sets out
(hat the absolute deadline for the negotiations was 29 November;
also the statement contained in document 21, which was received in
792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Navy Department about 1 December, 1941, and which asserts that
"we are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing" —
how did you evaluate the information that they were simulating a
continuance of negotiations after a deadline for concluding them had
passed ?
A. Well, I think I have already answered that question. They
nuiy have changed their date again. We had the deadline of the 25th
passed. We liad the deadline of the 29th passed ; and as I have stated,
it was typical of them to keej) talking [/W] and giving an idea
that negotiations might be continuing right up to the point of rupture.
This in no way changed the estimate wliich we made, that negotiations
had ceased, or alters what we had sent in any respect.
HG. Q. Referring to document 38 of Exhibit 63, translated on Decem-
ber 6, 1941, which sets out in substance that a reply to Mr. Hull's note
of 26 November will be sent on December 7. That is to be kept secret
and the time to present the reply will be in a separate message. Had
you seen this document or had you been nuide cognizant of its contents
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?
A. I do not recall seeing this document. However, I again would
point out that we had covered the contingency in our dispatch of the
27th.
37. Q. Referring to document 39 of Exhibit (53, this document
contains fourteen points which are apparently in reply to Mr. Hull's
note of 26 November, 1941. The draft indicates the first thirteen
points to have been translated on 6 December 1941. Did you, prior
to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941, see this document, or had
you been made acquainted with its contents?
A. I had not seen it, and I haven't the slightest recollection of
having seen its contents. The message wliich was sent by the Armv
on the forenoon of the 7th, of course, covered it, so far as its general
effect was concerned, and to that extent I was familiar.
38. Q. A witness before this court testified at great length concern-
ing a memorandum which had been prepared by Commander McCol-
lum. This was about a five hundred word summary of his own esti-
mate, probably, of the military situation that existed on or about
4 December, 1941 — up to the time of 4 December 1941. The witness
stated that this sunnnary liad beiin passed along in the echelon through
Admiral Noyes, who was then the director of Naval Communications,
who had made the comment that he felt that "to send it to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet would be in effect an insult, that
he believes that this 5()()-word summary of the estimate of the situation
was carried by Admiral Wilkinson further up the echelon of com-
mand, and that later he discovered that the dispatch so prepared
had never been sent to the Connnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet —
some months later he discovered that this disj^atch had never been sent
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet." Do you have any
knowledge of this dispatch that the witness w:is talking about?
A. No.
[781] Frank L. Middleton. yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
39. Q. Exhibit 13 before this court-, which is a Chief of Naval Oper-
ations dispatch of 16 October 1941 directs, among other things, "Take
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 793
due precautions includiuf; such prepuratory deployments as will not
disclose strateojic intention nor constitute provocative action against
Japan"; and Exhibit 19, which is a Chief of Naval Operations dis-
patch of November 28, 1041, purports to set out a dispatch from the
Army to Commander, Western Defense. In this dispatch there ap-
pears the language : "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance
as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as
not repeat not to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent." In
your dispatch of 16 October 1041, Exhibit 13, and the Army's dispatch
which was quoted to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Exhibit 10 of
28 November, was it your intention in your injunction with regard to
alarming the ])opulace as set out in these two dispatches should be a
continuing one?
A. The disi^atch of the 16th of October was still in effect. The
dispatch of 28 November w^as a dispatch of information to CinCPac.
It was to our coastal forces giving them information which their
Army opposite had and directing them, in case of hostilities, to carry
out their part of WPL-16. I gave no directive regarding reconnais-
sance measures in that dispatch. I was quoting a dispatch of the War
Department to the Commander, AVestern Defense Command.
The interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. vS. Navy, (Ret) :
40. Q. I call your attention. Admiral, to Document 24 of Exhibit
63. That, in substance, was the inquiry or request from Tokyo to
Honolulu to make reports relative to ships in Pearl Harbor. That
appears to have been translated on December 3rd. Did you see that
document on or about December 3rd ?
A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. We knew and had
long known that the Japs were reporting a great mass of information
and assumed that every move w^e were making in that area or on the
Pacific Coast or in the Far East was known, and we had already sent
our dispatch giving the gravity of the situation.
41. Q. Will you look at Document 36. That is another document
from Tokyo to Honolulu relative to ships in Pearl [782] Har-
bor and was translated on the 5th of December. Did you see that on
or about December 5th ?
A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. As I have stated,
these reports were evaluated, taken into consideration with everything
else. I may have had conversations on it but it in no way changed
anything I had sent. It affirms the other dispatch for negative
information.
42. Q. Now, Avill you look at Document 37 of Exhibit 63. That is
a request from Tokyo to Honolulu for information as to particular
areas in Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, and Manila Bay.
43. Q. That was translated when, please?
A. That was translated on the 5th.
44. Q. Did you see that document?
A. I do not recall it at this time.
45. Q. Well, do you recall any discussions about the information
contained therein?
794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, I do not. They may have taken place but I do not remembet
disciissino; this message.
46. Q. Will you look at Document 40, please, in Exhibit 63?
A. Yes, I have it.
47. Q. That is information from Honolulu to Tokyo relative to the
movements of American warships in Pearl Harbor, the courses taken
and speeds maintained, is it not?
A. Yes.
48. Q. Wlien was that translated ?
A. That was translated by the Army on the 6th of December.
49. Q. Do you recall seeing that document?
A. No, I do not.
50. Q. Or learning of the information contained therein?
A. No, I can't recall that document at this time.
51. Q. I call your attention to Document 2 in Exhibit 64, which
was a dispatch from Chief of Asiatic to yourself under date of 28
November ?
A. Yes.
52. Q. Did you receive that dispatch ?
A. No. This again refers to the winds message which I do not
recall. I note, however, that it was sent to Coml6, C-in-C Pacific, and
Coml4, so that it may possibl}^ have accounted for my not seeing it
because it had already been sent to the Hawaiian area, but I have no
clear recollection, as t have stated before, of the winds message.
[7S3] 53. Q. Now, will you look at Document 3 in Exhibit 64.
This is a dispatch from Alusna, Batavia, to OpNav under date of
5 December and is a general reference to the winds message?
A. Yes.
54. Q. Did you see that dispatch to you ?
A. No, I do not recall any dispatches in this connection. Our
dispatch — of course, again referring to our own war warning — had
been sent. That fact, together with the fact that this dispatch had
been sent to the Hawaiian area, was known in the Far East and may
have accounted for its not having been brought to me, and again it
referred to rupture of relations in the original one which was presented
to me this morning.
55. Q. Document 3 from Alusna, Batavia, puts a different inter-
pretation on the message, referring to war rather than a break in
relations?
A. Yes, it does; from Alusna, Batavia.
56. Q. Not having seen any of the first part of the winds message,
I assume you heard nothing of anything connected with its execution?
A. No, I have no recollection of it.
57. Q. Referring back to these documents relative to the ships in
Pearl Harbor and information back and forth between Honolulu and
Japan : Was any information concerning that sent by you to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. No I think not.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy, (Ret) : ^
58. Q. Admiral, with reference to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which
you read : You say that a copy of it had gone to Coml4?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 795
A. Document No. 2 here. It was from C-in-C, Asiatic Fleet, to
OpNav, info Coml6, CinCPac, Coml4. It is one of the winds
messages.
59. Q. But you are unable to say in that connection as to whether
or not Coml4 was ever informed bj'^ anyone of the execution of the
winds message ; you don't know that ?
A. No, I do not.
The court then, at 10 : 53 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 10 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present : All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all
the interested parties and their counsel. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman
second class. U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
[T84] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry
Were present.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was
warned that the oath prcAaously taken was still binding, and continued
his testimony.
Examined by the court :
60. Q. Admiral, you have testified to the general effect that there
were many, many messages — and I think you used the expression
"thousands of messages" — coming into the Department, and that you
naturally couldn't remember or take cognizance of all of them, but
weren't many of these messages simply routine things?
A. Weren't many of them what, sir?
61. Q. Weren't many of these messages that you say were coming
in dailv, routine messages ?
A. Yes.
62. Q. Now, weren't some of them perhaps of unusual importance?
A. Yes.
63. Q. What orders had you issued by which these could be distin-
guished so that certain ones could be brought direct to you without
waiting for an evaluation, and to whose judgment was that left?
A. Well, I don't recollect having issued any orders but it certainly
was the understanding that if there was anj'thing important or de-
manded immediate attention, I assume that it would have been brought
to me.
64. Q. Who, down the echelon of officers in Operations immediately
below you would have the authority to decide whether a message
could be stopped before it got to you, or whether it had to be taken to
you? It wasn't left to the Communications Division itself, was it?
Who would have that authority?
A. Well, messages might have been handled by Admiral IngersoU.
He had full discretion to answer what he saw necessary. "\^Tien mes-
sages went to War Plans where they were evaluated I was in constant
touch with War Plans. Intelligence was in much the same condi-
tion, and I just felt that they were keeping me informed or bringing
me really important messages.
65. Q. Well, specifically, referring back to the one question asked
you in which the question covered a long dispatch of 500 words or so
which had been prepared by Communications and which, the testi-
mon}^ showed, they considered of intense value and that it not only
served the purpose of giving the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 8
796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[7SS\ Fleet the evaluation of dispatches that had come in over a
period of time, in other words, bringing him up to date with the
conception you had ; and further, it served the advantage of filling a
blank of messages that perhaps never got to him ; if that was so im-
portant in the opinion of the people who prepared it and it got up as
far as Admirals Wilkinson and Noyes, who would have stopped that
message from coming to you to decide whether it should go to the
Commander-in-Chief, or not, in view of the importance given it a little
further down the echelon ?
A. I don't know. It may have been gone over with War Plans and
have been decided — T am not saying whether rightly or wrongly —
that the situation had been covered, or it might have been talked over
between War Plans and Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall the
slightest recollection of ever having seen or read that message.
()6. Q. Well, it never got to you ?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it did not.
67. Q. If it got to you and you didn't send it, was it because some-
body above you stopped it?
A. No, sir. No, I would have accepted the full responsibility.
68. Q. In that file of documents in Exhibit 63, there are many
messages which would seem to cast the shadows of what's coming, and
it is your testimony that you have no recollection of ever having seen
any of the ones we have shown you. Now, are we to assume that it is
a matter of recollection, or that you never saw them?
A. It is a matter of recollection. For example, I would like to quote
a paragraph in my letter to Admiral Kimmel a month before Pearl
Harbor, written on November 7th, and after looking at some of these
dispatches and assuming that they were talked over, they undoubtedly
had a bearing on this. I quote, "Things seem to be moving steadily
toward a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can
tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written
you before. It continually gets worser and worser. A month may
see literally most anything. Two irreconciliable policies cannot go
on forever, particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It
doesn't look good." Then again, I think the dispatches we did send
reflect the information in some of the dispatches which were brought
to my attention this morning and which, while I don't clearly remem-
ber the dispatch as I see it, they were undoubtedly subjects which we
were talking about and which I think my letters and dispatches did
cover. It is nearly three j^ears, and to pick out a single dispatch
and recognize it as is, unless it is something very outstanding, is diffi-
cult. Again, with reference to the material which was brought to-
gether after the dispatch of the '27th. my feeling is that if there had
been anything brought to me which in any way altered what I had
said, I would have remembered it and would have changed it, but we
had a big area on our hands. The Atlantic was in a turmoil, if you
remember, about that time. I was continually being [786]
pressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic because he lacked
forces. Along late in October and early November, as I recall, we
had three ships sunk. We were at our wits end for escort vessels in
the Atlantic. I was being pressed to bring escort vessels from the
Pacific into the Atlantic. Colonel Knox jiressed me for it. and I
resisted. There is one other i^oint in that connection which I might
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 797
bring up with reference to the transfer of vessels from the Pacific to
the Athmtic, a question which was asked me by Admiral Kimmel's
counsel and which seemed rather strange that I might not have remem-
bered because he put the question so clearly, but that was with ref-
erence to taking three more battleships from the Pacific into the At-
lantic, and that Admiral Kimmel, when he was here in early June,
went to the White House and got this straightened out. I wrote
Admiral Kimmel on the 25th of May, which was very close to his
arrival here, that we had no intention of taking anything further from
the Pacific Fleet. I confirmed it in September. In the memorandum
of November 5th, we again reiterated our adherence to the plan and
the only suggestions of possible transfers were those in accordance
with WPL-46, which was another division of heavy cruisers and
which didn't take place at that time.
69. Q. Well, Admiral, that is all very pertinent, but my line of
questioning is entirely on the question of these various messages and
whether or not they got to you and the evaluation and so forth.
A. Well, my feeling was that my letters and my dispatch covered
in general the dispatches which had been sent.
70. Q. Well, it doesn't even mean that; it means about the messages
getting to you. 1 am trying to find out where they were stopped be-
fore they got to you, in view of your statement that you have no recol-
lection of seeing them. The court wants more information now at
this particular point and we are trying to bring out the procedure for
these messages and why they didn t get to you, if they didn't.
A. Well, some of these messages, as I stated, I think their meaning
has been covered by what I wrote or what we put in dispatches. I may
have seen them. I may have talked over their substance. They may
have been brought to me for evaluation. I feel they were covered.
But to look at a single dispatch and definitely recall that dispatch at
that time is difficult. Nevertheless, some of those that I say I can't
recall specifically having seen have been covered.
71. Q. Well, with the danger of war hovering around, wouldn't
messages that were intercepted from a government with which our
relations were getting in a very critical condition have been of suffi-
cient importance that those [787] down the echelon of com-
mand should have had orders that all of those dispatches should come
to you? I am not questioning your not having issued the order but
I am trying to find out if any such directive or orders were issued?
A. I don't recall having issued any orders as to a line of demarca-
tion. It was just procedure that anything of importance would have
been brought to me.
72. Q. Admiral, is it correct to state that each day a booklet or a
compilation of all of these secret messages having an important bear-
ing on Japan were brought in to you by either Commander Kramer —
as I understand, he was probably the liaison officer — or some other
officer?
A. The general routine, as I recall, on important messages of that
nature, was that they would be brought to my office. If I were busy
they might be left with Wellborn to bring in to me as soon as I was free.
73. Q. But they were brought in, weren't they ?
A. Yes, I assume that anything that was set up as of sufficient impor-
tance down the line for me to see was brought in. I either saw them
798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
or saw their evaluation or talked them over. Many were brought in.
74. Q. Weren't all of them bearing on this question brought in? I
don't mean routine messages, but messages of importance bearing on
the Japanese situation which, we understand from testimony before
this court, were daily brought in to you by an officer for your perusal.
Is that not correct ?
A. Important messages were brought in to me by an officer.
75. Q. Then in that event if they were brought in, did you look at
them?
A. Yes, if they were brought in to me, of course.
76. Q. Then if that is the case, you were conversant, or should have
been, with all important messages that came through daily; is that
correct ?
A. Yes, but again, what may appear important now may not have
at that time to those who were to bring it in to me, if they considered it
had been covered in some other way. I can't say that everything was
brought in. I endeavored to cover that in the general statement.
77. Q. But in all of this time did you consider the relationship be-
tween this country and Japan of primary importance to this govern-
ment?
A. Yes.
78. Q. Therefore, you naturally would take an interest in the dis-
patches relative to Japan ; isn't that correct ?
A. Yes.
[788] 79. Q. And you would have kept yourself informed as to
those conditions ?
A. Right.
80. Q, That leads to this question of this note which was handed by
the Secretary of State to the Japanese on 26 November which set forth
the conditions under which the United States would consider an agree-
ment or further conversations with Japan. Had you ever heard of
that note ? You said that you didn't see it, and one time in your jDrevi-
ous testimony you said you had never heard of such a note. Is that a
correct assumption?
A. Well, I didn't see it. I don't recall it. Its contents may have
been talked over but as to the specific note sent on the 26th, I don't
recall it. I was given to understand that negotiations had ceased.
This may have been talked over or mentioned to me by Admiial
Schuirmann — then Captain Schuirmann — but I don't recall as I saw
it when it was brought to me here.
81. Q. As you see it now, however, that was probably a very impor-
tant note, wasn't it?
A. Yes, it was a very important note.
82. Q. A most important one ?
A. It was a summary and a set-up that did not, in my opinion, in
any way change the thought that we had and that we had been given
to understand that negotiations had ceased. Marshall put it "practi-
cally ceased". It was my opinion they had ceased and my opinion was
borne out and I was in close touch with Mr. Hull.
83. Q. Admiral, with all of these secret messages, these very secret
messages which flowed in to you from 27 November to 7 December,
didn't you conceive by those notes that this activity was continuing and
that the negotiations and parleys were still going on?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 799
A. I didn't consider that anything I saw gave any hope of a re-
newal of negotiations or that led me to the slightest conclusion that
what I had said, namely, "negotiations have ceased", that that state-
ment was incorrect. We were talking things over constantly but 1
had nothing to the contrary, and as I have stated, what does stand
out in my memory is the confirmation of it.
84. Q. Referring to the night of 6-7 December, and the morning of
7 December ; in your testimony you stated that your information was
confined to the fact that a note was to be delivered at 1 : 00 o'clock the
next day ?
A. Yes.
[789] 85. Q. And that is all you knew about it. The note or the
answer to the note of the Secretary of State to Japan of 26 November
was received in the Department on 6 December in the afternoon, was
translated, 13 parts, and was distributed — according to testimony —
at 9 : 00 o'clock p. m., or 2100 on the night of 6 December ; is that
correct ?
A. Well, I assume that it is.
86. Q. Did you see those ?
A. No, I did not.
87. Q. In other words, you had no information whatsoever, with all
of this coming in, regarding what was going to be done at 1 : 00 o'clock
on 7 December, except that that note was going to be delivered ; is that
correct.
A. That is correct. When I got in the office, I learned that Sunday
morning.
88. Q. But when you arrived in the office Sunday morning, 7 De-
cember, weren't you informed upon your arrival as to the receipt and
translation of this answer to the note of 26 November ?
A. Well, the outstanding thing in my mind that morning is that the
Japs were to deliver a note which shut things off, and the time of 1300
sticks in m^ memory. I don't remember the conversation about the
rest of it.
[790] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
89. Q. You do not remember Admiral Schuirmann's coming in to
report on this to you ?
A. No, I remember very clearly talking to Admiral Schuirmann
about the picture and about the one o'clock business, but just what the
thirteen points gave, I have no clear remembrance. We realized it was
a turn-down, but what it was I don't recall. The outstanding thing
that stands out in my memory is that things were off and that Mr. Hull
was to be told at 1300.
90. Q. When Admiral Schuirmann arrived at your office, you do not
remember whether he gave you a full picture of things which hap-
pened up to that time ?
A. He may have.
91. Q. It is reasonable to suppose that he did ?
A. Yes, it is reasonable to suppose that he did, if we were talking
there.
92. Q. With reference to those secret messages sent from Honolulu
to Japan and from Japan to Honolulu asking about the ships in harbor
800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and where the ships were anchored, all of which came in here on
December 5
A. Yes.
93. Q. Didn't those messages impress you with the fact that some-
thing was going on specifically relative to Honolulu?
A. They were specifically with regard to Honolulu, Of course, we
knew the Japs had intensively, for years before the present war, been
getting everything they could from anywhere, including diagrams of
underground lines on the West Coast, but those particular messages
did not impress me with the necessity of sending anything beyond what
I had sent — if I saw them. I do not recollect just what we talked
over with reference to them or having seen the specific dispatches.
94. Q. Don't you think at that time that Japan's asking Honolulu
for specific information regarding ships had a very definite bearing
on Honolulu ?
A. Well, if you take the message in the light of hind sight, standing
out by itself and coupled with everything, and again if you forget the
fact that we had said that war may be expected within the next few days
or that Japan may make an aggressive movement, well, then that
stands out quite clearly ; but if you take the fact that it was routine
for the Japs to report practically everything — and we knew that they
were reporting practically everything — ['^'91] it might not
have had the same significance at that time which can be read into it
now.
95. Q. In your opinion, would it luive been of value to send those
messages to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific for his evaluation ?
A. I do not know just what they would liave meant to him if lie
had gotten them, in addition to what we had sent.
9G. Q. Wouldn't that be a good reason for your sending them?
A. I don't know; I can't tell what his i-enction woukl have been.
97. Q. Wouldn't that be a good i-eason for your sending them, since
you didn't know how he would take them, and let him make his own
evaluation ?
A. We had made our broad evaluation of the picture and had sent it.
Whether or not this additional information would have been useful to
him, I am not prepared to state.
98. Q. But with this information coming in on December 5. as it did.
specifying the getting of special information regarding Honolulu, did
it occur to any one of your subordinates that they may be planning to
strike by air or some other means on Honolulu? Didn't it emphasize
and bring out prominently the Hawaiian area?
A. There was no evaluation and no recommendation to make regard-
ing the transmitting of this information.
99. Q. I refer you again to this Winds Message. Your recollection
is that you never heard of any message, regardless of its name, "Wind"
or otherwise, to the effect that a message from Japan had been inter-
cepted, showing conclusively that at some time in the future they
were going to send out a secret execute for conditions for breaking off
diplomatic relations or designating war with the United States and
Great Britain ; is that correct?
A. I stated I have no recollection of it.
100. Q. You realize that was a very important message in the light
of present conditions ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 801
A. I may question the statement that it was a very important mes-
sage. Except for the Batavia end of it, the reliability of which I could
not say, the Winds Message spoke of breaking off negotiations, and we
had covered that.
101. Q. Are you aware of the fact that information was received
that there were different interpretations and different translations
wherein the breaking of diplomatic relations was interpreted by some
as war ?
A. I am not, but with regard to the war part of it, we had stated
that Japan might make an aggressive movement within the next few
days — in a late November dispatch.
[793] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy :
102, Q. Admiral, I show you Document 15 in Exhibit 68, which
establishes the Winds Code, and I will ask you to say what the docu-
ment shows with respect to the date of translation?
A. The date of translation is November 28, 1941.
108. Q. Is it true, then, that that document was not available to
the Navy Department until after CNO had sent this dispatch to
CincPac. saying that negotiations had ceased?
A. That is true.
104. Q. There seems to be some confusion as to whether you received
on the night of December 6 information to the effect that the Japanese
ambassadors woiulcl ask for a conference with the Secretary of State at
1300, December 7. In order to clear up the record on that point, I
show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to state what that
document shows as to the date of translation?
A. December 7, 1941.
105. Q. Did you have any information on the evening or during
the night of December 6 and 7th to the effect that the J'apanese am-
bassadors would ask the Secretary of State for an appointment at
1300, Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note?
A. No, not at that time.
106. Q. You had no information concerning that appointment until
you arrived at your office about 10 : 30, I believe you said, on Sunday
morning?
A. That is correct.
The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Pages 807-808, inclusive.
[807] 178. Q. I just want to be quite certain about this Saturday
situation. As I understand it, at no time on Saturday, the 6th of
December, did you know, either directly or indirectly, by telephone
or visual examination, or otherwise, that there was in the Navy Depart-
ment thirteen parts of a Japanese message that was at some time to be
delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the United States Govern-
ment ?
A. That is correct. I did not know it.
802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
179. Q. And that at no time on Satfurday, the 6th of December,
did you know, directly or indirectly, or by telephone or otherwise, that
the Navy Department had information that the precise hour of de-
livery of the message, of which the thirteen parts constituted a portion,
was to be sent shortly, within the next day ?
A. No, I did not know that.
180. Q. You had no information concerning that on Saturday?
A. No. ■
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) :
181. Q. Admiral Stark, the documents, the messages contained in
Exhibits 63 and 64 — those are the secret messages — I take it none of
those were sent, as far as j^ou know, to the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District, other than the one you mentioned this morning?
A. You mean contained in that Exhibit 63, or 64 ?
182. Q. Of the ones that you have looked at in that Exhibit — none
of those was sent to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District ex-
cept one that you mentioned this morning ?
A. I think that is correct. Without checking back, I assume it is
correct.
Recross- examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
183. Q. Did you ever see the report that Secretary Knox made to
the President after his return the week following 7 December, after
his return from Oahu ?
A. I remember his report ? Do you mean the report that was sub-
sequently published ?
184. Q. No, I don't think it was published. It was introduced as
an Exhibit before the Roberts Commission.
A. I don't recall it at the moment. I think I saw it. I mean if
it was introduced in the Roberts Commission I probably saw it.
185. Q. Assuming that in that report of Secretary Knox to
[SOS] the President, he stated that the War Department, as dis-
tinguished from the Navy Department, sent a special war warning to
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Saturday night, the
6th of December. Have you any information as to where he might
have learned that — "he". Secretary Knox ?
A. No. I remember his published report. There was quite an article
published by him in the press. As to the official report, of course I
knew his thought. He talked it over with all of us, but to your
question, I do not remember any such information.
Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering,
U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 812-815, inclusive.
[SIS'] Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, U. S. Naval Reserve,
presently assigned to the Naval Communications. Naval Operations.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 6th and 7th of
December, 1941 ?
A. I was the watch officer for Op 20-G.
3. Q. Were you on watch on Op 20-G on the night of December 6,
1941?
A. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 803
4. Q. What time on the niornino- of December 7, 1941, did you come
on watch ?
A. At 7 a. m.
5. Q. I hand yf^u Document oO of Exhi])it Go before this court.
Can yon identify this document?
A. Yes, I recall this document,
6. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that this document is in 14
parts. At the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock in the morning of
December 7, 1941, were you advised as to the disposition that had been
made of the first 13 parts of this dispatch?
A. They had been previously delivered to Commander Kramer
during the evening of December 6.
7. Q. Had part 14 been received and delivered to Kramer at the time
you came on watch at 7 o'clock ?
A. No, it hadn't.
8. Q. What stage of processing was part 14 in at the time you came
on watch ?
A. Part 14 was completed and ready for delivery to Commander
Kramer at 7 a. m., December 7.
9. Q. At what time was this part 14 delivered to Commander
Kramer ?
A. It was delivered to Commander Kramer between 9 and 10. I
don't recall the exact hour, but it was between 9 and 10, December 7.
10. Q. Was that the time of his arrival at 20-G?
A. Right.
11. Q. I hand you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 before this examina-
tion. Can you identify this dispatch?
A. Yes, I can identify that dispatch.
[81 S] 12. Q. Had that message been received in 20-G at the
time you came on watch at 7 o'clock?
A. No, it hadn't.
13. Q,. At what time was that message received ?
A. About 7: 15 a. m., December 7, 1941.
14. Q. From what source was it received at 7:15?
A. From the Army translator.
15. Q, Had the Army initially intercepted that message or had it
been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy?
A. It had been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy.
16. Q. When you came on watch at 7 o'clock, was any report made
to you of the fact that this message was then in the hands of the
Army for translation ?
A.* Yes.
17. Q. Was it reported to you at what time it had been received
in the Navy ?
A. I can't recall exactlv. It was during the mid watch of December
7, 1941.
18. Q. After you received this message from the Army translators
at approximately 7 : 15 a. m., December 7, 1941, what disposition was
made of it?
A. It was held in abeyance until Commander Kramer arrived.
19. Q. Under the then existing instructions in the section of Com-
munications on which you were on watch, was any other procedure
possible ?
804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, that was our general order: to deliver all translations to
G-Z, tlint is Commander Kramer and his group, if there were any
of them there. Of course, that morning he was the only one avail-
able.
20. Q. Did yon have any authority to go over their heads in their
absence if urgent information was received?
A. No authority.
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, N. S. NaVy (Ret.) :
21. Q. I call yonr attention to Document 15 of Exhibit 63. Some
witnesses have referred to that as the Winds Message.. Do you know
whether any execution of that document was received by the Navy
Department ?
A. I have no knowledge of anything in regard to the execution of
this particular message. I knew of it but of no execution.
[8141 22. Q. As far as you knew?
A. That is right. As far as I was concerned, it had not been ex-
ecuted. I had never seen any execution.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
23. Q. Was there any provision for communicating with Com-
mander Kramer in his absence and advising him that an important
message was ready for delivery?
A. He had been advised by telephone by the previous watch officer,
Mr. Brotlierhood.
24. Q. That this particular message -was ready?
A. The Winds Message or the other?
25. Q. No, the other one.
A. Yes, he had been advised of that.
26. Q. You state that there was no provision made, in the case of
the absence of Commander Kramer, for you or any of your officers
to go direct to some higher authority?
A. No, there was no provision.
27. Q. No matter how urgent the message was, it had to await
delivery to Commander Kramer?
A. In some cases we couldn't tell tlie urgency, because being in
Japanese, it would have to go tlirough a translator, and since the
Army was the only one who had translators on at that time I had
no power to go to anybody else.
28. Q. Were these Army translators physically in the Army War
Department or here?
A. No. the}' were actually in the other building in the War De-
partment.
29. Q. In the War Department building?
A. That is right.
30. Q. Was Commander Kramer the only man in that section who
could handle a message of that sort. In other words, if he were out
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 805
of town for a week, would you liave to hold the message until he got
back ?
A. No, there were other officers who could act. He was the only
one in this particular case, and he had beeu there until niidni<i'ht
Avatching this stuli' come out and was fully cognizant of what it was.
He had seen the first 13 parts.
[S15] 31. Q. The fact that he was the only one to handle it that
night was because he had handled it until midnight and had went
away for a little rest, I asiune, and he was the one selected because
of the continuity of the whole alfair '(
A. Yes, because of his tie-up with the State and the rest of the
Nav3^ Department.
None of the parties to the inquiiy desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry Avhich he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy.
Pages 824-842, inclusive.
[8^4] -9. Q. You have testified. Admiral, that you remember
an officer in the Navy Department by the name of Kramer, whom yon
believe was the officer who processed the information betw^een the
Office of Director of Naval Communications and the Office of Chief
of Naval Operations. Did you, as a general rule, see the information
that this officer brought for the Chief of Naval Operations ? In other
words, did he show it to you as a matter of custom ?
A. Yes. I recall, of course, definitely, that an officer, Lieutenant
Kramer or some other officer in a similar capacity, frequently, possibly
almost daily, brought a small sheaf of dispatches to my office. Some-
times there w"ere only a very few messages and at other times there
were quite a number. By "quite a number", I mean maybe 20 or 30.
These messages were of every conceivable character. Some pertained
to the United States-Japanese diplomatic relations and other per-
tained to Japanese relations with other capitals. There was some-
times information regarding Japanese merchant ships and numerous
other subjects. Whether these were all of the messages that were re-
ceived by this means, I do not know\ These messages, so far as I know,
were shown or were given to one of the aides of the Chief of Naval
Operations, to show to Admiral Stark. I believe they were also shown
to the Secretary of the Navy, possibily to the Assistant Secretaries,
although I am not certain on that point. They were also, I believe,
shown to the President and to the Secretary of State, possibly to other
officers in the State Department. They were showm to the Director
of the War Plans Division, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, and
I think Captain Schuirmann also saw them.
30. Q. I am interested in particular as to whether or not you, as a
matter of custom, saw^ these dispatches when they were delivered by
Lieutenant Kramer or any other liaison officer detailed by the Direc-
tor of Naval Communications.
806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I saw a number of dispatches almost daily, as a mater of routine,
but whether or not they were all the messages that were received in
this manner, I do not know, or whether they were only selected mes-
sages.
31. Q. Admiral, I show you document 11 of Exhibit 63, which pur-
ports to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29
November. I would ask you to examine this document and state
whether on 7 December or prior thereto, you had seen it or had been
made acquainted with its contents ?
A. I cannot state definitely whether or not I saw this message.
The date, November 29, rings no bell in my memory.
32. Q. Can you state whether or not you had been informed of its
contents ?
A. I do not recall now of being aware that the Japanese Ambassador
had been directed to set a deadline on any date.
[8£6] 33. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This
document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as the "winds
code." State whether on or before December 7 1941, you had seen or
been informed of the contents of this document ?
A. Yes, I had been. I remember a message of this character.
34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within
your cognizance?
A. This document bears the inscription, "translated on November
28." According to the system, I probably saw that on the following
day, on the 29th. I also recall that at the time this message was re-
ceived, or possibly the execution which is referred to in the message,
that there was some difference of opinion among the translators as
to just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the
form as it appears there or not I am not certain. However, I did
know definitely that they were Setting up a code to be used in a weather
broadcast.
35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed
by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?
A. I don't remember whether it was discussed wnth Admiral Stark
or not.
36. Q. Did you take any action 3'ourself as a result of the informa-
tion that was contained in this document 15?
A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that
time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt
in the minds of translators as to just what the translation should be.
37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?
A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to
whether they had an exact translation — a diiference of opinion among
the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.
38. Can you recall whether this diiference of opinion I'elated to the
subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of
negotiations, or what the discussion was about — can you remember
that?
A. No, I don't remember that point now.
39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did j'ou receive any infor-
mation as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy
Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the
so-called "winds" message?
A. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 807
40. Q. Will you state the circumstances ?
A, I recall that some time I did see the messages [8^6] which
were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th,
into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7
or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7, 1 am quite sure that
would have been considered confirmation of the information which
had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on
December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at
London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated defi-
nitely that war was imminent.
41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941,
any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a
result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds"
code which you state you saw?
A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer,
whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after
December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in
sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent
out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding
the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent,
or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be brokea off, and that
this dispatch was only confirmatory.
42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch
or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the
"winds" code?
A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of
any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December,
1941.
43. Q. I show you document 18 of Exhibit 63, which states in sub-
stance, that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which will
be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured."
"However, I do not wish 3^ou to give the impression that the negotia-
tions are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you been
informed of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I may or may not have seen it. In the dispatch it bears the date
of translation of November 28. If I saw it, I saw it on November 29.
On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the com-
manders of all fleets the war warning message which stated that nego-
tiations with the Japanese had broken off. This dispatch merely con-
firms that, but tells them to keep up a pretense.
44. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether the information con-
tained in this dispatch was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of
Pacific Fleet on or prior to 7 December 1941?
A. It was not transmitted.
[827] 45. Q. Adverting to document 18, what negotiations in
your opinion are being referred to in this document?
A. They refer to the negotiations between the State Department
and the Japanese Ambassador.
46. Q. I show you document 17, Exhibit 63. This document sets
out in the substance the Secretary of State's note of the 26th of No-
vember, 1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed
of the subject matter it contained on or prior to 7 December 1941?
A. My answer to the question is similar to the foregoing one. This
808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK
(locumt'iil bcMis (lie diitc ol" ( liiiislal ioii of llif L'Sdi of NovcmiiIkt. If
I saw it iit all, I saw it on the 'JtXli. 1 (l«» iiol ivcall. llowovcr, this
(lociiiiUMit simply ivlales what tiic Sin-ivlai y of State had told the ,Iap-
anese Ambassador, and tiir dalo'of the (lispateh from the ,Jai)anes(i
was the 2()th of November. It simply was eoniii'med by the Navy
Department's disi)at('h of tbe 'JTtli, wliicli stated that negotiations
with the ,Ja|)anese had stopped. This simply rtn-onnts terms which
Japan conld not accept, probably we knew they wonid not accept
when it was snbmitted.
47. Q. Adverting to tiu' W(»i'ds in docnment IS, which 1 (juoto,
"With the views of the Im})erial Government, which will be sent in
a few days," — Avhat \iews did yon think wer(> beino- iclerred to in
this docnment 'i
A. As T (h) not recall delinilely whether or not 1 saw the docnment,
I don't know what \iews were beinjj; refei-ri'd to.
4S. Q. Between the date of 'JS Nox'ember ID 1 1 and 7 DeciMnber, were
any direct i\es for secnrity of the Fleet issned by the Ollice of the Chief
of Naval ()i)erations('
A. May I see the exhibit which contains tlu> war wai'nin<i;'^
49. Q. "Yes, sir.
A. On the 'i7th of November, a (lis|)alch was sent to the Com-
mander-in-C'hief Asiatic Fleet, and the C(»nnnander-in-(^hitd" Facilic.
This dispatch contained I he w oids, "Fxecnte an appi'opriate dtd'ensive
deployment prepaiatory to carry in<^' out the tasks assioiu'd in
AVPLr-4()'". Fxcept for those words, I do not recall that any dispatch
directing that specific st'cnrity measnres be taken was s(>nt.
50. Q. I show yon docnment 21 from Exhibit (>.'?, which stales,
^'We are adxisin*;' the press that negotiations are still cont innin<i"."'
Had yon seen this docnment oi- had yon been adxised of its contents
on or prior to 7 December 1041 (
A. I nuiy or may not have seen this dispatch, it bears the date
of translation of December 1. If I saw it all all. I probably saw it
on the iind of Decemb m'. I do not now rt'call the particnlai' tiling in
the dispatch ; that is, "t ha I wc are adx'isino- the press and others to state
that negotiations are conlimiin<;.'" I do not recall seeing' the part
abont the President's I'clniii to the cajjital.
\S.JS\ Q. That bein^" the case, yon probably have no iccollection
of whether this infoi-nnit ion was sent to the (\>nnnaniler-in-('hief
Pacific Fleet?
A. In my recollection of the dispatches that were sent to the Com-
numder-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet as well as Asiatic Fleet, 1 do not
recall a dispati'h alon^' these lines hi'in^ sent to eithei' of them.
5*2. Q. Advert inii to docmnent ;5S of Fxhibit (V.), which was trans-
lated on Decembei' (>, 1!) II, and which sets ont that a reply to Mr. 11 nil's
note of 2() No\ember will be sent on December 7, that it is to l)e kept
secret and the tiyie to present the i-eply will be in a separate message,
had yon seeji this docnment 38 or Innl yon been made co<;nizant of its
contents on oi' prior to 7 1 )ecember 11)41 (
A. I don't know whether T saw this i)articidai' dispatch or not. It
refers to the very lon^' messa<i"e which 1 did set> \'erv late on Di'cembei-
or vei'v early in t he morning of 1 )ecember 7, and w hether or not 1 saw
this dispatch 1 do not recall.
vnoc.KKhiNdH or navy foiin oi ir.uj ikv S>()0
5.'1 (2- Well, now, llic iiic^-;s!i|.M' h'.U'vh ((» »i. icply uliidi in (o ()(•. i-oil,
on 7 I >c<cml»('r. Wfic yoii on I Ik- iilcrf, prior lo 7 I)cc('nil)<'r lor komh'
inc«)inin;_'; nM'ss;i^(^ llnit would ,<•( ont (In- ,l;i|)iin<' ,r- r«'|>ly (o Sccicljiry
J lull's no((' of 20 NovcnilxT'^
A. SonM'- (inn*, <{nfni}i llic ni^'lil, of l>c'ciiil)ci' <» 7. Ilicrc w;i,s iMouglil,
(o my lionsc ji xcvy lonj/ mt'y.'nuiic. Ironi I lie .Jiipjinc!-:*' (iovcrniiM'nI. (,o
(he Afnl)!iH.s;i'lor in W!i:-liin^'(,on, wliicji ■-,(•( fojlli I In- .liipjinosf* poni-
lio/i. 'I'Ik' HH'SSii^c. v\!i.s nol coniplclc. iui'l I l^i'licvc llnil I In- iiii-l pur*(,
of du' )n<'ssji//(', w'tih rnissin^'. VVIh-iIu'I' or not, I hiiw (hih pn-liminury
iM((HS!i;(<', ill, lliJil lime or noL I do nol, rcr'till. 'I'Ik^ I"H^ mc.sHJi^c, whh
u r(',-Htiit('fn«Mi( of llic .l;i.p!in<'S(', p<»Hi(ion und contfiincd nolliin^ new
in i(, al sill, I'xrcpi the lon(* wan a liltlc hil diderctnf,,
54. Q. I licdicvc my (jiicHlion wmh, Admiral, were you <,u llic ulerl.
for tliih lon^ m<*HHa^<^ by virhjc of any notirte you lia<l li;id pi loi lo ilH
r('(;('ifjl.
A. No.
I^^/V) Krcdcrirk 'I . \jnc\iu\, ycoffian i'lVHi elawH, [J. S. Naval R<t-
W'l've, r<'porl«-j-, ('nl,cr('i|. i<";af)k .VI. Si'kh'h, y<'om?in lir^l r-hihs, 11, S.
Naval K(fS('i'V(^, r(![)ort<*,r, witljdnnv.
55. Q. I lj<'lic,v<* my (|ii<;Htion was, VVer<' you jn I fir- jijcil for ihis l<(n|_'
iiHtHHuiji: hy virliK- of any notice yon fiad liad p/ior lo il -, rccipi <
A. No.
56. Q. Vou have le>:l,ifi<-d llial you did mm* a jallie/' |f>njjr dihpal<-li.
Did you nay il wjison lli<; tnis\il of l)c<j'.ut\)cr 0?
A. il was home lime dujin^ I he ni^hl, of iJercmhc/' (; <,f 7(h. I df<n I
know whelhej- il wa:s before or afler midjii^dil.
57. Q. You do nol mean ihe /)ij:^ht of iJecemlxir 7?
A. il waH w>nie lime during iJie very \ntAi eveninj< of Der-ernber 6 or
the early morning' of i)eeemf>er 7. VVhelher or nol il was before or
afl<'r midni^hl. I doji'l re,r;!tll.
58. Q. Vou have al;-;o le:-,tified Ihal, as you remember. Ihe hiile/- por-
tion of this rathe/- lon^ me-ha^e, was mihHi»i^'i<
A. As I reniember, the riflieer who bronchi the dispaleh i.o the hous'-.
Htated thai there was a fiarl of the message iniwhin^. i lliink he told
tub it waH tlie latter part.
59. Q. Did the lone of thin ratlier lonf( message whi'h you Kay you
rw,'eived on the ni^ht of 0lh-7lh of iJeeember, VMl. indicate a friendly
or r^'^nci I ialo ry Hpirit on the [jarl of the Japanew?
A. No, be^.-auHe it merely con/irnied the whole course of negotiations
from the vitty Ui^rinnintr. 'ibis njessajre was nothing but a Hinoke
screen, eye wash, and window dressing for the re/;ord.
C/}. Q. Did you fiave any opinion al the time you saw thiK diHf)atrfli
that dipioniat]c negotiations wi'nt then broken off officially?
A. So far an the Navy Department was cinn'Mvm'A, negotiations with
the J'apanes*'. had )iUt\)\)i'A about the 27th of Novemlx^r.
61. Q. i do not think your answer is respont-ive Ut Ihe quention.
'ihe qiiestion was rep« at<^d U) the witness.
A. ()u \)('rA'.Ui\}('V 4, Of just prior to I )('(■(' tn'obv 4. we knew irihtnictions
iia<J be^-n s^^nt f/> Japa lewi njissionK in various ('jmnttiinH to <l<i«trov
their c^xles and ciphcr-s tniniul'mUtly and to destroy ojmi'uhtutvd] pubh-
cations. Diat was an in Jication | -^/Xy | ( iiat difilomatic /legotia-
tionH were f/oinj/ to U- broken off in tlje ve/y near future. As I did not
810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
know when this note was to be presented, I did not know exactly when
diplomatic negotiations were going to be ruptured.
62. Q. When you saw this long message and the tone of the note
which the message contained, did you not at that point think that dip-
lomatic negotiations were then officially broken off, as contrasted with
other information which you had had previously and which you knew
had broken them off de facto ?
A. I could not tell when the Japanese were going to inform the
State Department that they had broken off diplomatic relations. This
long dispatch simply indicated tlie situation was very, very tense and
that the break might come at any time, which we had previously stated
some time ago to our Fleets.
63. Q. A witness has stated in testimony substantially that Com-
mander McCoUum, who was then on duty in the office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, had prepared about a 500-word summary of the
international situation as it had developed up to about December 4,
1941. He further stated that this message was presented, along with
a number of others, to Admiral Leigh Noyes, then D. N. C, who made
a comment when this long message was to be released to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet something to the effect, "I think you
are insulting the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief. He is a busy
man." The testimony shows further that this long summary of in-
formation was passed somewhere up the echelon of command. Ad-
miral Stark testified that he had never seen this dispatch before its
release. I am asking you. Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, can you recall whether or not such a summary was presented
to you on or prior to December 7, 1941, for release to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ?
A. I do not recall any such alleged message, nor do I recall any
circumstances of the incident which you have related.
The court then, at 10: 50 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 00 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the
interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark,
interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected witli the inquiry were present.
Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
[8S1] Cross-examined bv the interested party. Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy :
64. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was available in the Navy
Department prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor any information to
the effect that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed by his
government to seek an appointment with the Secretary of State at
1300 Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note?
tain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not.
A. Yes, some time on the morning of December 7 I learned that the
Japanese Ambassador had requested a meeting with the Secretary of
State that afternoon, but just what hour I heard it and just how I
heard it, I don't recall now.
65. Do you know from whom you first learned it?
A. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 811
66. Q. Do you recall whether or not Commander Wellborn, the Flag
Secretary, was in the office on the morning of December 7 ?
A. Admiral Stark's aides were usually in the Navy Department
^Yhenever Admiral Stark was there, and I don't recall whether Cap-
tain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not.
67. Q. I suppose you do not recall Lieutenant Commander Smed-
berg or Captain McCrea ?
A. No.
68. Q. Do you know with whom Admiral Stark discussed this
information that morning about the Japanese Ambassador's
appointment ?
A. At some time he told me he had discussed this matter with Gen-
eral Marshall during the forenoon of December 7, but just when I
learned that I don't recall now.
69. Q. Do you recall his mentioning anyone else with whom he dis-
cussed it?
A. No.
70. Q. Did Admiral Stark mention to you during the morning of
December 7 or at any time immediately thereafter that he had re-
ceived this information about the prospective appointment the night
of December 6?
A. No.
71. Q. Did he tell jou wh«n he did first learn of it?
A. No, I don't recall that. Of course, we learned of the attack at
Pearl Harbor that day, which practically took everything out of our
mind as to what had happened in regard to hours and minutes, and I
don't recall that now.
[832] 72. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63,
which is the document instructing the Japanese Ambassador to submit
to the United States Government the reply of the Japanese Govern-
ment to the United States note at 1300 on the 7th of December. Will
you please look at that document and tell the court what it shows as to
the time of translation ?
A. This document bears the date "translated 12/7/41."
73. Q. And was it an Army or Navy translation ?
A. I presume it is Army, because it bears the word "Army" with the
No. 7145.
74. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before this court that Colonel
Knox on his visit to Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack told certain
members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
that this information concerning the prospective appointment was
available to to him (Colonel Knox) on the night of Saturday, Decem-
ber 6. Did you ever hear, either from Colonel Kjiox or from Admiral
Stark, any indication that Colonel Knox knew of this information on
the night of December 6 ?
A. I have no knowledge that Colonel Knox ever saw the dispatch.
75. Q. Do you have any knowledge of his ever having this informa-
tion, whether or not he saw the dispatch?
A. I have stated, in answer to one of my questions, that dispatches
received from this source were shown to the Secretary of the Navy.
If that dispatch was included in one of the folders which were shown
to various officers in the Navy Department, he might have, as a matter
of routine, seen it.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 9
812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
76. Q. Did you ever hear Admiral Stark mention that he had heard
Secretary Knox say that he knew of this prospective appointment
on the night before, that is, Saturday night?
A. No.
77. Q. I assume that you, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations,
received much of the same information which the Chief of Naval Op-
erations received, particularly with respect to estimates on the Far
Eastern situation and intelligence concerning it; is that correct?
A. With regard to military and naval information, I think I re-
ceived practically the same information that the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions received. With regard to political information, that which I
received, in many cases, was second-hand, because the Chief of Naval
Operations saw the President and the Secretary of State personally.
I never attended those conferences, and what I knew about such con-
ferences was what he told me. He probably had more information re-
garding the political situation, from first-hand knowledge, than I did.
[383] 78. Q. But you usually knew what Admiral Stark knew
concerning these conferences which he attended? He usually re-
counted them to you ?
A. I felt Admiral Stark kept me informed of ' every thing that I
should know. I do not recall anything now that I thought he should
have told me that he did not tell me.
79. Q. Admiral Stark has testified that he does not remember
seeing many of these documents which are included in Exhibit 63 in
the form presented here. Your testimony is much to the same effect
concerning certain of these documents. Do you consider the fact
that you did not see these documents in the same form in which they
are now presented to you particularly significant?
A. I am not quite sure that I know what you mean by "in the
same form."
80. Q. They have been shown you as documents which are part
of that exhibit. You say that you do not recall having seen them
as a message in that form. Do you consider the fact that you did
not see them, perhaps, in the same form as they are now presented
to you particularly significant? Would you have gotten that in-
formation in other ways, for example?
A. Those messages which I saw, which were received from the
source about which you are speaking, were typed on flimsy paper
or were carbon copies of messages typed on flimsy paper. May I
see the exhibit?
The witness was handed Exhibit 63.
A. These messages appear to be in the form in which I saw them,
and the first message I turn to bears my initials, so I must have
seen this particular dispatch in this form.
81. Q. Admiral, what I mean is that you have testified and
Admiral Stark has testified that some of those messages shown you
this morning you do not recall having seen at the time. Is it possible,
however, that the information which is contained in those messages
might have come to you in some other way, as, for example, the
morning conferences in the Secretary's office or reports of memoranda
made by the head of War Plans or ONI ; so it is not particularly im-
portant if you did not see the basic information from which those
estimates were drawn?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 813
A. I see what you are driving at. As I stated before, I am not
certain that I saw every dispatch which was received from this
source. It is not particularly significant that I either did not see
them or that I do not recall them, because \S34^ during the
course of any one day there were hundreds of dispatches regarding
every conceivable subject— our own operations, administrative dis-
patches. There were written reports of every character, not to men-
tion the pounds of correspondence. There was a conference in the
Secretary's office each morning at which the whole world situation,
not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean,
and the Far East was explained. There was a discussion following
these presentations, which was usually made by the Director of
Naval Intelligence, in which the situation as of that day was threshed
out. So it is quite probable that some of these dispatches might
not have been shown to us, or if they were shown to us, we did not
consider each one individually, because we knew we would get the
general tenor of it after it had been evaluated by the sections of
War Plans, Communications, and Naval Intelligence, who were
charged with the details of such matters.
82. Q. It has been testified that, with the exception of the in-
formation concerning the destruction of codes, concerning which a
dispatch was sent on December 3, none of the information which is
included in Exhibit 63, which you have before you, was sent to
CinCPac. Did the Navy Department ordinarily send all the infor-
mation received of this type to CinCPac or any other of its com-
manders-in-chief ?
A. No, the information was not sent in this exact form to any
of the commanders-in-chief. I know it was the aim of the Chief
of Naval Operations to keep the commanders-in-chief informed of
the situation as he saw it. Some of it he did by personal letters and
from time to time he sent dispatches which related to the inter-
national situation and to the military situation. I think it would
have been an unusual burden on Communications in general and on
the staffs of the commanders-in-chief to have had to translate all
of these messages, and I think that there were better facilities in
Washington for evaluating the messages than there were in any of
the Fleets. I know that would be the case in the Atlantic Fleet today
if I had to receive all these things. I have neither the staff nor the
facilities for evaluating information of that kind. I think that the
summaries which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations with
regard to the political situation — and most of these dispatches do
refer to the political situation — were accurate.
8. Q. Do you feel that you were reasonably well informed during
the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, with respect to
the Japanese situation either through seeing these basic sources of
information or through the estimates which were given you by War
Plans and Intelligence?
A. I have answered that same question in considerable detail in
regard to the political situation and in a different [8S5] de-
gree as to the military-naval situation. Yes, I think I was as well
informed as it was possible to be informed, generally speaking.
84. Q. Did you concur in the dispatch of November 27, which is
known as the "war warning" dispatch and which was sent by the
814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and
to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic ?
A. This dispatch was prepared by Op. 12, which means it was pre-
pared in the War Plans Division. I remember distinctly that this
dispatch was under discussion, and I remember particularly the use
of the words, "This dispatch is to be considered as a war warning."
Words of that kind had never been used in any dispatch before. The
words which have been inserted in pencil in this dispatch are in my
handwriting, and I am absolutely sure I concurred in this dispatch,
and I know it was released only after I knew Admiral Stark had con-
curred and approved of every word in it.
85. Q. Was any information brought to your attention during the
period from November 27 to December 7 either from sources outside
the Navy Department, such as the State Department, for example, or
from C. N. O. subordinates within the department, which indicated
to you that the war warning dispatch and the directive which it con-
tained should be modified or strengthened in any respect ?
A. The tenor of this dispatch was never modified by any subse-
quent dispatches nor was it relaxed in any way. The only subse-
quent information which I considered important and which was sent
to the commanders-in-chief was the one on December 3 informing
them that the Japanese diplomatic missions had been directed to de-
stroy their codes and ciphers. That message and the "war warning"
message, I thought, were the two most important messages which were
sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations, and they are the two which
I remember very distinctly.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
86. Q. I show you Document 24 in Exhibit 63 and ask whether you
recall seeing that or learning of its contents ? Document 24 is one of
those from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting ships in Pearl Harbor.
A. No, I have no recollection of ever seeing that dispatch.
87. Q. Or learning of its contents?
A. I am not certain whether I learned of its contents at some time
after December 7 or not. I recall being very much surprised when
Mr. Knox returned from his visit to [8S6] Honolulu and said
that the Japanese aviators had little maps which showed the location
of the ships, which indicated that they must have known where in-
dividual ships were moored. I remember being astonished by that
exhibit which he brought back.
88. Q. You do not recall having seen Document 24 prior to Decem-
ber 7 or having learned of its contents ?
A. Definitely not. Whether I saw it later or whether I was told
about it, I do not recall now.
89. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63, which is a message
from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting shi^D^ movements. I ask you
whether you saw that on or prior to December 7 or learned of its
contents?
A. No.
90. Q. You did neither?
A. No. I would not have attached any particular importance to
this dispatch regarding movements, because it was so easy to see what
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 815
movements were being made in the Hawaiian Islands that I presumed
they were being made as a matter or routine anyway.
91. Q. I call your attention to Document 37 from Tokyo to Hono-
lulu, translated on December 5, relative to locations of ships in Pearl
Harbor. I ask you whether you saw that document on or prior to
December 7 or learned of its contents ?
A. 1 do not remember this one at all. Area "N" rings no bell in
my memory.
92. Q. It appears to have been translated on the 5th of December.
A. The document states that it was translated on the 5th of Decem-
ber, and, according to the system, unless it was taken around espec-
ially, it would have been seen by those to whom it had been shown
on the 6th.
93. Q. I call your attention to Document 40 from Honolulu to
Tokyo, translated on December 6, which reports courses and speeds
of American war ships coming into Pearl Harbor. I ask you whether
you saw that document prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?
A. I am absolutely positive I never saw this document before this
moment.
94. Q. Was there any record kept of who did see these documents
which were carried around by officer messenger and shown to you
and to various other people who have testified ?
A. I don't know. I have apparently initialed some dispatches. I
note my initials on one of them in this [837] exhibit. I also
recall that when a dispatch was brought to my house, I was required to
sign that I had seen it, and I think I recall having signed for the dis-
patch which was delivered at my house on the night of December 6-7.
95. Q. It was one which was taken around and shown, as I under-
stand it ?
A. I recall definitely having seen that particular dispatch. It was
usually my custom to put an "I" on messages that I saw.
96. Q. At what time did you get to the office on Sunday morning.
December 7 ?
A. I do not recall now the exact hour at which I arrived at the
Navy Department on the morning of December 7. I had gone to the
Navy Department every Sunday morning for the last year, and 1
probably got there somewhere between 8 and 9 o'clock. The exact
hour I do not now recall.
97. Q. Do you recall how long after you got to the Navy Depart-
ment you were apprised of the information in these dispatches which
were available that morning?
A. Are you referring to the dispatch which directed the Japanese
ambassadors to deliver their message to the Secretary of State at a par-
ticular time ?
98. Q. Not only to that but also to the 14th part of the long mes-
sage which you had seen the night before ?
A. I don't know at what time I became aware of the dispatch which
directed the Japanese ambassadors to see the Secretary of State at 1
o'clock that day. I do not recall whether or not I discussed the long
message with Admiral Stark that morning. I do not recall that I
ever saw the 14th part or the last part of the very long message.
816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
99. Q. Do you recall whether there were discussions about the Japa-
nese situation shortly after you arrived in the Department that morn-
ing?
A. I do not recall that I had any discussions with anybody regard-
ing the Japanese situation that morning until I was informed by Ad-
miral Stark that he and General Marshall had discussed the dispatch
which directed the Japanese ambassadors to present their reply to
the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock that afternoon.
100. Q. Do you recall whether you had been in conference' with
Admiral Stark on that morning prior to his telling you that?
A. I don't recall now whether I saw Admiral Stark before he told
me that or not. I probably saw him coming into the office — I couldn't
have helped it — but what he [8S8] said prior to that I don't
recall now.
101. Q. You have testified in direct examination that these docu-
ments, the character of which are in Exhibit 63, were, as a matter
of routine, shown to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State,
the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations, the War Plans officer, the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence, possibly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and possibly
to Captain Schuirmann, who is now Admiral Schuirmann. Have I
mentioned the complete list ?
A. I admire your memory. I think you have enumerated every
person I stated.
102. Q. Do you know whether the information was also shown to the
War Department ?
A. I am quite certain that it was, but I don't know what officials in
the War Department received such dispatches. As I recall now, the
messages received in code were translated on one day by the Navy
Department and on the following day were translated by the War De-
partment, and they were charged with keeping the other department
informed of what had been received and translated. Just what the
process of distributing these messages to the War Department was
I don't know. It wasn't my detailed responsibility to see that that
was done.
103. Q. If my arithmetic is correct, the list I have enumerated comes
to either nine or ten, the difference being my doubt as to whether the
Assistant Secretary received one.
A. I think I said secretaries.
[S39] Frank L, Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
104. Q. And yet it was the specific policy of the Office of Naval
Operations to deny this information to responsible commanders-in-
chief in the Pacific and in the Asiatic; is that correct?
A. I did not say it was the policy of the Navy Department to deny
this information to the commanders-in-chief in the Pacific. I stated
that it would have been a burden on communications to have trans-
mitted every dispatch of this character to have transmitted every dis-
patch of this character which was received to the commanders-in-chief
afloat.
105. Q. If a selected process had been used the burden on communi-
cations would have been correspondingly relieved, would it not ?
A. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 817
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
106. Q. In that connection, Admiral, may I show you, please,
Exhibit 17, which is the war warning dispatch dated November 27,
1941. You mentioned that the pencil marks on the document are in
your handwriting, sir?
A. The pencil insertion of the word "Thai" and all that follows, be-
ginning "Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take ap-
propriate measures against sabotage. Copy to War Plans Division,
War Department" are in my handwriting.
107. Q. And this word "probably" that is stricken out, is that your
handwriting, sir?
A. I can't identify a straight line as being done by me, and I do not
remember having struck it out.
108. Q. To complete the document which has not yet been read
in evidence because it has only at this point been identified, is the
last passage to the November 27th message which reads, "Continental
Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against
sabotage." I invite your attention to Exhibit 20, Admiral, which is
the December 3rd dispatch. Can you recall whether the last line was
stricken out by yourself or someone else, or do you know anything
about it.
A. Unfortunately, the punch has gone through the number indicat-
ing the Office of Operations in which this dispatch originated, but
due to the fact that it has typed "Released by T. S. Wilkinson" it was
undoubtedly prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I remember
this dispatch very clearly. It is perfectly obvious that the words
which were stricken out were not desired to be sent. I released this
dispatch and just the reason for not wanting to send those words I do
not now recall but looking at the [840] dispatch now, the di-
rections to burn codes at the places mentioned, which included Wash-
ington, Manila and London, did not necessarily mean that "From
foregoing infer that orange plans early action in Southeast Asia."
It was simply confined to giving them the definite information that the
codes were to be destroyed in those places.
109. Q. Admiral, sir, in connection with that last line, and in re-
lation to the message, would it be a fair statement that that line that
was stricken out amounted to an evaluation of the message?
A. All I can saw now is that we did not want those words sent at
that time.
110. Q. Would the words "From foregoing infer that orange plans
early action in Southeast Asia" indicate an evaluation of the other in-
formation that is in it ?
A. I have stated that it was not necessarily the correct evaluation
to be placed upon the destruction of codes in the places enumerated
in that dispatch.
111. Q. Admiral, just one other question, sir : Was there anything
in this message that evaluated that information? It was just the
raw information, was it not, sir?
A. The inference to be inferred from this dispatch was that Japan
was assumed to be at war with Britain, the Dutch, and the United
States, because they were directed to destroy their codes at places in
the countries of those nations, including the capitals. The capital of
Holland was then in the possession of the Germans.
818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
112. Q. Do you recall, sir, whether or not the information that was
in the possession of the Navy Department at the time when this De-
cember 3rd message was written, was to the effect that the Japanese
instructions were to burn, as I recall, all their codes and destroy their
cipher machines? Do you recall whether that was the information
on which this was based ? That is, this document only says "some of
their codes" and I don't think it means their machines.
A. That dispatch was undoubtedly prepared from information re-
ceived from the secret source about which we have been talking for
some time. Whether it is an exact quotation of a Japanese dispatch,
I cannot tell without seeing the dispatch on which it is based.
Examined by the court :
113. Q. Admiral, with reference to your answers in which you
stated that the breaking off of negotiations, and so forth, simply
confirmed your previous information. In that connection you also
referred a number of times to "indicated war was imminent". Isn't
the breaking off of negotiations an indication of imminence of break-
ing out of war, in your [84^] opinion?
A. Not necessarily, but the fact that the Japanese were massing
large numbers of ships in Southeastern China, in Formosa, and in
Hainan; that they had large numbers of landing craft there, indi-
cated that they were getting ready for a military movement of large
proportions. At just what time we received information that those
forces were on the move to the south I cannot now recall but it was
within the week prior to December Yth. They were followed by
planes from the Asiatic Fleet around the southeast corner of Siam
and we were not sure when they got there just what direction they
would take, whether they would go up into Siam proper, or whether
they would go towards the Kra Peninsula. It was also quite evident
that if the Japanese were going to go to war with the United States
the Philippines were a probable objective. We expected that Guam
would drop like a ripe plum.
114. Q, Just to complete that picture, would a movement in the
South Pacific around Thailand and the Gulf of Siam area and so
forth necessarily mean war with the United States? In your opin-
ion, I mean.
A. The fact that we expected it would be war with the United
States was indicated in the dispatch which told them to destroy their
codes in Washington. The political and military situations were
in perfect concert, which indicated that they were going to go to war
with us shortly. That was the estimate made by Admiral Stark on
the 27th of November and proved to be true.
115. Q. Well, can you state, then, if that was Admiral Stark's
opinion why did he merely emphasize a message by calling it a war
warning and then naming certain areas in which they might attack
and he did not name the Hawaiian area? And further, why he
didn't definitely stop with "this is a war warning" instead of com-
plicating it by referring to certain areas and leaving out the Ha-
waiian area?
A. There was placed in the dispatch that there were certain objec-
tives in the Far East which we felt were reasonably certain would
be objectives because the massing of ships and troops in that area
indicated that there was an aggressive movement in that area. We
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 819
had no definite information of an aggressive movement in any other
area.
116. Q. I am putting so much emphasis on this war warning
message because you have put so much emphasis on it. Don't you
believe that if they were so certain of their estimate it would have
been better to stop and say "War is imminent ; this is a war warning"
and forget everything else where they were going to operate?
A. That was the intention of the war message, that he wanted to
state that he felt war was likely to come at any moment. On the
other hand, there was a wish not to take any step on the part of the
United States which would provoke war with Japan.
[8^^] 117. Q. Well, the message I speak of, if you had simply
stopped with "This is a war warning", that wouldn't have started
anything necessarily, any more than the one that was sent ?
A. So far as I know. Admiral, no commander-in-chief afloat ever
told the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch or otherwise that he
didn't understand any of the directives that were sent to him or he
never asked for an amplification or elaboration on any of the instruc-
tions that he received. In the absence of any such you could only
assume that they were understood.
Extracted testimony of General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army.
Pages 869-884, inclusive.
[869] 41. Q. After November 6, 1941, when did you have in-
formation that negotiations, so far as the Japanese were concerned,
had been terminated ?
A. On the morning of November 27 the Secretay of State, as I
recall, told General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division of
the War Department, that the conversation had been terminated with
the barest possibility of resumption. I was out of the city at the time
and did not reach the War Department until the following morning,
November 28. I assume I was given this information at that time.
42. Q. Did you, after the release of the dispatch which is referred
to in Exhibit 19, send a further directive as to the action to be taken
in the Hawaiian Department relative to any security measures there ?
A. Yes, on December 7.
43. Q. I show you Exhibit 48 before this court and ask you if that
is the directive to which you refer and which you sent on December
7, 1941 ?
A. Yes. However, the message was sent from a longhand pencil
draft of mine. This is a formal copy of the latter, typed.
44. Q. Then, between the time ol your dispatch, which is Exhibit 19
and at which you have just been looking, and the dispatch of December
7, 1941, you had sent no directives as to security measures in the
Hawaiian area?
A. On November 28, 1941, two additional measures warning against
the possibility of sabotage were sent to the Hawaiian Department,
one to the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, the
Western Department, the Panama Canal — That, of course, includes
Alaska — and the other to the Army at large in the continental United
States as well as overseas. The first one was sent by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, General Sherman Miles, which went to the various
overseas Western Defense Commanders, and was a reminder of the
820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sabotage problem. I didn't see that myself until, I think, the time
of the Koberts Commission. The other message which went to the
continental United States, as well as overseas, had been prepared by
General Arnold's staff, and then the G-2 staff involved themselves
in it to make certain it clearly stated the case, and it was sent, but it
related to sabotage, suspicions or beliefs, that occurred here in the
United States rather than overseas and perhaps of German or Jap-
anese origin. The Air Corps at that time felt they were having acci-
dents to planes which could be explained only by some form of sabotage,
and they felt that they had fairly concrete evidence of this. There-
fore, those were two War Department messages which I personally
was not involved in, but mine was sent on December 7.
[870] 45. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63, which pur-
ports to state the deadline of November 29, 1941, as being absolute
for signing the agreement. State whether you saw the contents of
this document, or had been informed of the subject matter contained
therein, on or about November 22, 1941, the date when it was pur-
ported to have been translated.
A. I don't recall. These were highly secret matters and papers.
The papers were carefully guarded, and our War Department copies
today do not indicate when I saw them. I am reasonably certain,
however, that I did see them or was informed concerning these papers
at the time. I learned finally what had happened was that in order
to safeguard this material, they would keep one record, which was
their basic paper, in the Intelligence or G-2 section. The result of
that has been that the duplicate copy comes to me. All of those have
been destroyed. Therefore, on those particular papers there is no
existing record of my initials on any of them, because they had only
one paper which they received and destroyed each day, as they do
now. I see them each day and then they are destroyed. In this case I
am not certain that I saw or knew about this message.
[871'] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Eeserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
46. Q. This document mentions 29 November as an absolute dead-
line for signing the agreement. Did this absolute deadline have any
special significance to you at that time ?
A. Well, to go to the original date, which I think was November
25th, we conjectured at that time what that meant, and the only
solution that could be offered — which was not accepted ; it was merely
considered — was that that was the anniversary of the signing of the
anti-Comintern pact and that they wanted the negotiations to get
cleared to a certain point in relation to the renewal of that pact. How-
ever, when the message came in to which you just referred, and gave
a new date, that, of course, brushed aside, apparently, the possibility
that these dates referred to anything of that nature, and left us with
merely a guess as to how critical the matter was. I might interject
now and say that when the final message came in that indicated the
7th, and an hour, that, of course, was quite a different matter. That
was a specific hour of Washington time, as well as a day. That meant
something, somewhere, very definitely was related to that hour. There
was no doubt in our mind about that.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 821
47. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63 which transmits Mr.
Hull's note of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese government. Were
you shown this document, or had you been made acquainted with its
contents on or about the date of its translation, which is set out as 28
November, 1941 ?
A. I do not recall.
48. Q. I show you Document No. 18 of Exhibit 63, which is pur-
ported to have been translated on 28 November 1941, and which sets
out in substance that with the views of the Imperial Government
which will be sent in two or three days the negotiations will be rup-
tured. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that ne-
gotiations are broken off. Had you seen this document or had you
been made acquainted with its contents on or before the day of its
translation, 28 November 1941 ?
A. I have no recollection of seeing that specific message but I am
reasonably certain that I must have seen it.
49. Q. The message says "with the views of the Imperial Govern-
ment which are forthcoming." What did you consider those views
were that they were going to send ?
A. I don't know quite how to answer that at the moment. I know
what they are now and I don't know what I thought.
50. Q. In the dispatch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department concerning which you have testified already and which
expressed the view that negotiations with Japan appear to be termi-
nated for all practical purposes, did the language of Document 18
contain that view on the progress of negotiations ?
A. I don't recall that.
[872] 51. Q. It is noted that these views, which are, "To ter-
minate de facto the negotiations will be sent in two or three days."
Did you consider the de facto termination of the negotiations had any
connection with the Japanese military operations?
A. I imagine that I did.
52. Q. Do you recall whether or not you associated that with any
particular operation?
A. No, other than we had definite evidence of what appeared to be
to us hostile preparations in the Far East.
53. Q. Did. the words "These views which are to be sent in two or
three days" have any significance in connection with the expected
reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November ?
A. I don't recall.
54. Q. Do you recall whether or not before 6 December 1941 you
were on the alert for the receipt of any views or a reply to Mr. Hull's
note of 26 November ?
A. I have no definite recollection. I presume that I was because
this thing was going along all the time.
55. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 which is purported
to have been translated on 28 November, 1941. This document has
been popularly termed in circles where known as the Winds code.
Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with
its contents on or about the day of its translation, that is, 28 November
1941?
A. My very dim recollection is that that was referred to in a Joint
Board meeting. I'm quite certain that I was aware of it ; I'm quite
certain of that.
822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
56. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941 receive any information which put any part of this
code in effect?
A. I don't recall that.
57. I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63. This document contains
the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 No-
vember 1941. Will you state when you first saw this document or
were made aware of its contents ?
A. I went to the War Department on Sunday morning, December
7th. I don't just recall at what time. And I was given this docu-
ment. I read it through, naturally carefully, and some parts of it
several times to get the full significance of it. _ As I finished it I found
another page which was the message referring to 1 : 00 p. m. Inci-
dentally, I was told that that had been monitored at 6 : 30 that morn-
ing, Western Time, Northwest, the Puget Sound area, I believe. But
I did not reach that until some 10 or 15 minutes after 11 : 00, 1 think,
I spent quite a long time reading this thing. _ It is quite a remarkable
document. Therefore, I lost quite a lot of time reading that. I will
go ahead with the procedure if you want me to.
[873] 5S. Q. Please continue. I think that will be better.
A. So I called up Admiral Stark on the 'phone — he was at his desk —
and proposed that we send a message. One or the other of us always
tried to avoid, to safeguard the codes, both sending a message about
the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama,
Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines. At first, he
thought it might be inadvisable ; that they would be confused with too
many of these messages. I then wrote out in longhand the message
that you have here, and just as it was leaving the room he called me
back and asked me if I had sent any message yet, and I said it was
just going, and he said he would like to have added to it the usual
thing, "Notify naval opposite." So I added that to it and sent it in
that form with Colonel Bracken, I think his name is, who is the man
who has charge of these special papers. When he came back I queried
him as to the time of dispatch and all. I didn't get a very clear
understanding of the thing so I sent him back with Colonel Bundy,
who was the member of the War Plans Division who was in charge
of matters pertaining to the Philippines and Hawaii and Panama.
He and Colonel Bundy then went back to the message center, the
coding room, and came back — I've forgotten what time they came
back — and told me. It had to do with how long it took to deliver the
message, and as I recall, when they came back they said it was 30
minutes, or that it took 30 minutes and it would be in the hands of
the recipients. At that time there was something still further
unclarified to me so I had them return the second time — which meant
the third time for Bracken — and they came back and answered me,
apparently, to my entire satisfaction. At least I understood what
the thing was. The actual time, I think, of the departure of the mes-
sage was about noon, something of that sort, Washington time, and
I believe the records will show that it reached Hawaii at 7 : 32, 1 think
on the morning of the 7th. I have no time for the reading of this
big long document, or the time I talked to Stark. The interval
between the talks with Stark couldn't have been over two or three
minutes because it was a very short message and I wrote it off in long-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 823
hand. I think I have some notes here. It says, "And at 11 : 45 East-
ern Standard Time, Admiral Stark asked that the various Army
commanders who had received the message be instructed to convey
it to the naval opposites" and it was sent to that effect. It was
received in the message center at 11 : 50 and it was sent by radio to all
points except Hawaii and they were unable to raise the Hawaiian
station ; therefore, they sent it on a straight Western Union circuit
into San Francisco and they had something out to Hawaii. I didn't
know that until afterwards. It went everywhere else on straight
Army radio without any delay. They couldn't raise Hawaii by the
radio. It went everywhere else, the Philippines it went right
through; Panama and San Francisco, but they couldn't raise the
Hawaiian station for some reason [874] on the radio. They
then sent it through the Western Union through a connection they
had into San Francisco. They can tell you out there what happened ;
I don't know. This is pure hearsay on my part. I know at the time
I was told they had a teletype from the Western Union station in
Honolulu to the Commanding General of the Army forces, but that
didn't function.
59. Q. Did I understand you to state. General, that you had not
received any part of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note, that is,
the 14 points, until Sunday morning, January 7, 1941 ?
A. Yes.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. Navy:
60. Q. General, you have before you Exhibit 63, the document that
contains the various documents that you have been looking at. I want
to ask you some questions about that. I take it that you are familiar in
a general way with the type of material that is contained in that
exhibit, whether or not you are familiar with the exact messages that
are in there, I don't know, but you are familiar with the general type
of information?
A. Quite familiar.
61. Q. You are familiar with the fact that during the period imme-
diately preceding 7 December those messages indicate that they were
broken partly by the Army and partly by the Navy ; that there was a
joint arrangement in existence between the two services that, I believe,
one day the Army broke them and the next day the Navy broke them ?
A. I don't know about that but I know they were both involved in it.
62. Q. And that they had a method for exchanging the information
that they got from the messages which each service broke ?
A. I believe so.
63. Q. Now, would you tell the court how the messages were handled
in the War Department as nearly as you can, from their initial break-
ing and translation by the S. I. S? In other words, we have had
explained to the court here by the Navy representatives how these
things were handled in the Navy Department and I think it would
help to establish the picture.
A. You will have to get one of the people that handled it. I get it
in my hands under a special cover. I read it and sign it and it is taken
out very specially and nobody else sees it, and then it goes back to its
source. I couldn't give you the minutia of its arrangement, but it
would be very simple to have someone come in and report on it.
824j CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[875] 64. Q. Do you understand that all the messages that are
received of this type are brought to you personally for inspection, or
is there some screening that is set up some place in the War Depart-
ment where they decide which of these messages are considered im-
portant enough for you to be bothered with or for you to see ?
A. know that there is screening at the present time because I have
directed it.
65. Q. Do you recall what the situation was before December 7th?
A. I don't recall at that particular moment what it was. In other
words, it was entirely too voluminous for me ; I would retire as Chief
of Staff and read every day.
66. Q. You have no present recollection as to what the situation was
at that time?
A. I know they were too long ; there was too much of it.
67. Do you recall whether prior to 7 December these messages
were being passed to the appropriate field commanders who might be
concerned with the subject matter?
A. I'm not entirely familiar with that particular aspect of it.
As I understood it at the time, the source of most of these came in
from naval monitoring stations. I had thought at the time that the
commander in the Philippines and the Commander in Hawaii got
part of the information because the monitoring stations are there.
I have been told since, I believe, that they did not, but that is a matter
of fact which conjecture on my part isn't suitable testimony.
68. Q. More specifically, then. General, did you decide when you
saw a particular message, or did you feel called upon to decide when
you saw a particular message, whether or not it should be passed to
an appropriate field commander, or where the messages only passed
to you for information and whatever decision should be made in that
respect made by some one of your subordinates ?
A. Well, you are going now into the whole operation of any com-
mander. I see the thing. These people make proposals. Again I
direct without waiting for the proposals. That would apply in this
particular case. They go through the things very carefully and accu-
rately because they are concentrated on everything that pertains to this
particular thing. I am related to that and also the matters on the
Hill and to matters all over the world. In an example I have just
testified to here, I read the message and wrote the reply immediately.
I didn't consult anybody other than Admiral Stark about that. It
was perfectly clear-cut. I knew what should be done immediately.
The preceding message that we sent of November 27th which I stated
General Gerow thought that I did not see, I'm pretty certain I did not
see it, and I'm reasonably certain that I was concerned in the drafting
of the message of warning, the alert, because that would be something
that would indicate to me that very positive action was necessary.
Now, the very positive action [876] probably would be done
in the War Plans Division, General Gerow for example, or I might
act direct or they might bring it to me. The same thing applies to your
question about screening. They go through all of it. I can't possibly
do that. And they bring to me the most essential portions that refer
to things that are of a critical nature. If they fail, why, I change
the man, that's all.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 825
69. Q. General, I call your attention to Document 40 of Exhibit 63,
which contains information sent from Kita, in Honolulu, to Tokyo,
dated November 18, 1941, and showing on its face that it was handled
by the Army and was translated on December 6, 1941j and I ask you
whether or not you recall having seen that message prior to 7 Decem-
ber, 1941?
A. I am not certain but I think I saw this message after the event.
70. Q. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, General, which is a
message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated November 18, 1941, bearing
the notation that it was handled by the Army and was translated on 5
December 1941. Do you recall having seen that message prior to 7
December 1941?
A. I don't recall that.
71. Q. As I understand your testimon;7, then. General, in most cases
involving material of this type, the decision as to whether it should be
passed on to the appropriate Army commander might have been your
decision in some cases, or might have been the decision of the Chief of
War Plans Division, I believe you said, or some other appropriate sub-
ordinate whose duty it was to read and evaluate these messages?
A. Normally, it wouldn't be his decision but it would be his proposal
to me for me to approve.
72. Q. And did you personally approve those proposals? That is,
in the event that it was decided to send a message to the appropriate
field commanders forwarding this information, did you personally
approve the forwarding of that message, or was it just sent in your
name as is ordinarily the case?
A. Well, that isn't an ordinary message, as a rule. I should imagine
that in most instances, I did. Of course, I was away a great deal
myself. I might add that I was traveling about 60,000 miles a year
then and I was traveling a great deal. We were making an army.
73. Q. Then does it sum up the situation accurately, General^ to say
that the information of this type and the other information which you
had in the War Department on 27 November was considered by you to
be generally summarized and sent to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department in your war warning dispatch of 27 November?
That is, that that dispatch reflected the entire picture that you had at
that time, including information of this type, and other elements ?
A. I wouldn't say that it reflected the entire picture, [877] It
gave the state of a crisis and the direction for action.
74. Q. In that sense, though, it did reflect certain information which
you had in the War Department but had not passed on in its original
form to the Commanding General ?
A. That's it.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
75. Q. On the 6th of December, Saturday, General, were you ac-
quainted with the fact that Japan had sent to her ambassadors 13 of 14
parts of a message or note to be delivered or transmitted at some later
date to our Secretary of State?
A. I do not recall that I was aware of such information.
76. Q. There has been evidence adduced before this court indicating
that information to that effect was available in the Navy Department
in Washington in readable English and smooth form not later than
826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9 : 15 to 9 : 30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, on Saturday, the 6th of
December. If you did not get the information on Saturday, the 6th of
December, General, that would be due, would it not, to some failure in
the echelons of command in transmitting the information to you?
A. I couldn't say that offliand. It would depend on where I was,
which I do not recall on that particular Saturday. I might have been
quite a number of places. I don't know now where I actually was. I
have this recollection of the day of December 7th : that when I came to
the War Department I was told by the officer in charge of this special
type of information that they had been working all night, as I under-
stood him to express it at the time, on this matter ; that the deciphering
had taken a long time ; that quite a bit of the Japanese deciphered thing
was sent over to the War Department to be translated into English,
and as I gathered at the time — I am just speaking from a dim recollec-
tion of that time — this had gone on during the night ; the deciphering
had been done on the Navy side but the translation into English, on ac-
count of the length of this thing, had bogged them down and they had
called on the War Department s similar agency to assist in the trans-
lation from Japanese into English. Then, as I said, this final mes-
sage — I am merely giving my recollection now — had been monitored at
6 : 30 that morning on the West Coast ; I presume Washington. That,
again, had to come in, be deciphered and be translated. I got the im-
pression at this time that they got all this thing together and they sent
for me. As I recall, I had been horseback riding and I came in imme-
diately after the ride and went straight tothe War Department and ran
into this long message. That is my only recollection of the affair.
[878] 77. Q. I have only asked about Saturday at the moment.
There has been evidence adduced before this court that the underlying
language of the long message which was to be delivered by the Japa-
nese Ambassador to our State Department was English rather than
Japanese.
A. I don't know abput that. I would suggest this : You are asking
me to guess about something that I have not the facts concerning and I
have not investigated and we have the officer that knows and you can
call him here and he can testify.
78. Q. I have only been trying to direct my questions generally
to the time when you acquired a knowledge.
A. Mine was very specifically on Sunday morning.
79. Q. And you had no knowledge of the fact that another mes-
sage was coming designating the time of delivery, on Saturday ?
A. That is my recollection.
80. Q. And you have no recollection of where you were on Saturday
night ?
A. No, I haven't.
81. Q. Whether you were at home, or whether you were in the
Department, or where you were ?
A. I don't know where I was. I never thought of it until this
instant.
82. Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether you talked to
Admiral Stark on Saturday?
A. Saturday evening?
83. Q. Yes. •
A. I have no recollection whatever of that. Tlie probability is that
I did not.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 827
84. Q. There is evidence before the court that the full 14 parts of
the long message to which you have made reference and a shorter mes-
sage indicating 1 : 00 o'clock as the time of delivery had been processed
and were in smooth, readable English form before 8 : 00 o clock on
Sunday morning, 7 December. Can you fix more definitely the hour
that you learned of those facts ?
A. No, other than the time that was given here that I spoke to
Admiral Stark over the 'phone would have to be used as the finish of
the affair and then we would have to estimate how long it took me
to digest this thing before I came to this 1 : 00 o'clock affair at the end
of it. I read fairly rapidly. This was a most unusual message, of
course. I recall distinctly re-reading parts of it and reflecting on it
when I was reading, but I think I read much more rapidly than the
average man. That is all I could give you on it, which would indicate
that probably [879^ I arrived there about half-past 10 : 00 ; I'm
just guessing.
85. Q. Well, assuming the fact to be as I stated of the evidence
here. General, that this information was available to the Navy Depart-
ment by 8 : 00 o'clock, what is the explanation for there being a 2-hour
delay of that information getting to you ?
A. All I can think of at the moment is that if it came across — when
it did come across — the officer who was in charge of it, because it was
very secret, whether he sat down and read it before he gave it to me.
If he did, you would have to add on his time of reading on it.
86. Q. In your conversation with Admiral Stark — this is after you
had finished reading it, you called him as I understood it?
A. I called him on the White House 'phone.
87. Q. (Continuing.) — did Admiral Stark in any form of words
inquire of you as to the rapidity of the means of communication that
were available to you for the transmission of this message ?
A. No, our conversation was very brief and entirely confined to
whether or not the message should be sent, and then to having it
referred to the naval opposite.
88. Q. There was no conversation in which you in effect said that
you thought you could get it out as quickly as the Navy Department ?
A. None whatever.
89. Q. Prior to the sending of the message that you dispatched, or
that was dispatched by the War Department to the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, among others, on the 27th of November, had you learned of the
delivery by the State Department to the Japanese Government of a
diplomatic note dated the 26th of November ? It is a long document.
A. Yes. I don't recall. I imagine I knew something about it. I
don't recall.
90. Q. You have no recoFection as to whether you then regarded
that note as an ultimatum, or not?
A. No.
91. Q. Did you learn frora the Navy Department of the dispatch
sent by it — the Navy Department — on the even date, that is, the 27th
of November, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. What is the question ?
92. Q. When did you learn from the Navy Department the fact that
they had sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet on the 27th of November ?
A. I don't recall that.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 IQ
828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[880] 93. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conversation
with any Navy people about it, about the coincident message?
A. I don't recall that. I wasn't here on the 27th, for one thing.
94. Q. Or the 26th?
A. I left the War Department about noon of the 26th and didn't
get back to the War Department until the morning of the 28th.
95. Q. Do you recall any conversation with the Navy Department
on the 26th about sending some message of that character ?
A. No, I don't recall any specific conversation about it. I don't
mean to imply that I didn't have it ; I just don't recall it.
96. Do you recall having any conversations with Admiral Stark
relative to the diplomatic note of the 26th of November?
A. I don't recall that.
97. Q. Either one way or the other ?
A. No.
98. Q. You made a joint recommendation to the President with
Admiral Stark including, among other things, the affirmative recom-
mendation that no ultimatum should be sent. That is in evidence
here. It was dated, I believe, on the 5th of November. Did you
regard the note of the 26th of November as sympathetic and parallel
with your joint recommendation to the President?
A. I don't recall.
99. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Admiral Stark
on that phase of the case ?
A. No, I don't. I must explain to you gentlemen, if I saw these
things I saw them this morning. It is a long time.
100. Q. I am talking about this diplomatic note.
A. Yes. Well, I am talking about this thing. My reminder was
this morning. Some things I have a very clear recollection of, and
others I do not.
101. Q. Do you recall seeing the answers that General Short sent
to your dispatch, or the War Department's dispatch, of the 27th and
the subsequent one on the 28th ?
A. No, I don't know about that. What actually shows, so far as
we can determine, is that the reply from the Philippines and the reply
from Hawaii came in together and were fastened with one of these
staples that go through. I initialed the one from the Philippines
which was on top, and I did not initial the one from Hawaii. This
was the one I was referring to (indicating) .
[881] 102. Q. You don't recall having seen that (indicating) ?
A. Well, I am explaining. I have no recollection one way or the
other. The message in the records came with a staple fastened to the
one from the Philippines, and this was on the bottom. I have ini-
tialed the Philippines one but I haven't initialed this one. The trou-
ble in this connection is, I had a conversation regarding its meaning
with Colonel Bundy, who is the officer in charge of that thing, I think
the afternoon of December 7th after we knew the attack was on ; that
is my recollection of it. My recollection of tliat is, Bundy was ex-
plaining his interpretation of the message. The unfortunate part of
the thing is that he was killed right after that when I sent him out
to Hawaii. He left about two days later, I think, and was killed en
route out there, so I don't recall this and I am confused in the conver-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ^^9
sation that I had— I'm pretty certain after the event— in relation to
what I might have been thinking about before the event.
103. Q. Do you have any recollection of knowing between the 27th
of November and the 7th of December what precautions General Short
had actually inaugurated ?
A. No, I don't recall that. I was away two or three times in that
particular period and the War Plans people were checking all these
things from the various departments that came in,
104. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conferences with Ad-
miral Stark in that 10-day period from the 27th of November until
the 7th of December ?
A. On any subject?
105. Q. Well, on any subject in connection with the Pacific and Jap-
anese situation ?
A. No, I don't. I suppose the records would show. We were hav-
ing very frequent meetings of the Joint Board and he and I were
having even more frequent meetings and were talking over the tele-
phone almost every day.
106. Q. You were both members of the Joint Board ?
A. Yes. He was the senior member.
107. Q. Well it is your recollection that during the days that you
were in Washington in this interval from the 27th of November to
the 7th of December that you did confer with Admiral Stark ?
A. I couldn't say that I did every day, but we were in frequent
conference and had a habit of telephoning almost daily about this and
that. I might add also that we were going to frequent meetings with
Mr. Hull.
108. Q. Do you recall whether any of these talks that you had just
prior to the 7th of December with Admiral Stark dealt with the prob-
lem of the defense of the Hawaiian Frontier ?
A. No, I don't recall that. I might say that my recollection would
be that we thought they had been working on [882] defense
plans in Hawaii through the years. They had just reached what
seemed to be a very workable arrangement and the normal assump-
tion would be that they were pretty well coordinated. Our grea^t
problems were out in the Philippines where the means were no' slack
that it was quite a problem what they were going to do out there.
109. Q. But you have no recollection of any specific talk one way
or the other ?
A. No, I have not.
110. Q. Did you have any conferences with Admiral Stark at any
time relative to the transmission to the responsible commanders in
Hawaii of any of the information contained in Document 63 ?
A. I don't recall that.
111. Q. One way or the other, or do you recall that there was none ?
A. I don't recall that there was any conversation of that nature.
112. Q. Do you recall whether you and Admiral Stark at any time
shortly prior to the 7th of December conferred relative to the impact
of the information contained in Exhibit 63 on the defense of the
Hawaiian Frontier?
A. I don't recall that.
830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
113. Q. None of the evidence that has been presented before this
court indicates that the attack on Pearl Harbor was other than a sur-
prise. Does the court understand that the attack came as a surprise
to you ?
A. Yes.
114. Q. General, could you express to the court your general opin-
ion as to the probability of attack by air on Hawaii on December 7th
as you gathered from general conversation here. In other words,
what was the general opinion as to the probability of an air attack
on Oahu ?
A. Well, in the first place, as far as I can recall my conception
at the present time, which was partly in the letter I showed you in
February, I had thought the possibilities in Hawaii in the way of
attack were a combined sabotage and air attack, and I assumed that
air attack was much more easy to deal with than the sabotage attack
because unless we were all disposed in advance to meet the latter, it
ment a deployment of the troops. In a way, it is very hard to maintain
deployments over a long period of time, although they had made very
intricate plans for managing it. To go further, it appeared to me, as
I recall at the time, that [883] there was a strong probability —
really a certainty — that there was a definite evil intent immediately
in the cards in the Far East. There could be little doubt about that.
The question was. When it would blow, or explode; to what extent
it would be on this infiltration basis where they would virtually sur-
round the victim with all their arrangements before they pounced.
By that I mean, it was not beyond the possibilities, considering what
the Japanese had already been permitted to do, and our own limita-
tions at the time, that they might go into Siam and just set up all the
rear and dominate the whole Malaya Peninsula even up to Rangoon.
Whether or not they were going to make an open assault immediately
was a matter of conjecture. But to our minds that was a certainty.
I referred earlier in my testimony to the indications of a peculiar
nature with relation to the Canal. We always felt a great sensitivity
with regard to the Canal and hearing something very peculiar merely
fortified us in our fears always that again you could commit a sabotage
act there that would be quite fatal to us for quite a time. But those
things took priority, in my opinion, to the probability of the attack on
Hawaii. We had there, as I say, more resources than we had any-
where else, and they had labored long, and apparently diligently, over
various plans and preparations of one kind and another.
115. Q. On the morning of December 7th, General, in your phone
conversation with Admiral Stark relative to sending this message to
Hawaii, did Admiral Stark impress upon you, or did you impreste
upon him, tlie urgency of quick transit of this message i
A. No. I think that was implied in what we both said. The only
issue between us at the moment was whether we would confuse these
people still further inasmuch as there had been so many messages
sent, and the decision was that one should be sent immediately and I
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 831
don't know how long it was between our two conversations but I should
imagine it was about three or four minutes when he came back and
the message was then leaving the room, which indicated the imme-
diancy of the action. As I told you, he was leaving the room when
I called him back, because I had written it very hurriedly in longhand
after I spoke to Admiral Stark the first time. I took, I should say,
from the time I read the message until I wrote the message I sent, I
don't imagine there was more than five or six minutes involved, in-
cluding my conversations with Admiral Stark.
116. Q. Did you consider the proposed severance or the contem-
plated severance of the diplomatic relations practically a declaration
of war ?
A. My recollection of that today is that I was not [SS^I cer-
tain of that. They have so many devious ways of doing things
nowadays that whether or not their first move would be an out-and-out
act of war was not any certainty in my mind. I was certain that
they were going ahead in the Far East but whether they would do
it overtly or whether they would do it over some severance of diplo-
matic relations or moves of that kind, I wasn't clear in my mind. I
might say that we had had a number of discussions, particularly
Admiral Stark with members of the State Department and with the
President at which I was present, with relation to the imposing of
economic sanctions against the Japanese, particularly in regard to
fuel oil and gasoline, and it was the opinion that if you moved so far
you provoked them to the point where something overt would happen
right away. I musn't speak for him but this was discussed by him
very often as to what would happen if you caught them on the fuel
oil business cold ; whether or not they would be provoked into action,
all of which meant, in my mind, whether they moved directly — as
they did — or whether they moved more circuitously under the cover
of various diplomatic ruptures and things of that sort.
Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers,
Junior (relative to introduction of exhibit) ; and Captain Edwin T.
Layton, U. S. Navy, Pages 903-910, inclusive.
[903] Robert D. Powers, Jr., counsel for the judge advocate,
was recalled by the judge advocate and was warned that his oath was
still binding.
Examination by the judge advocate :
1. Q. I hand j^^ou a document. Can you identify it ?
A, I can. It is a copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a
dispatch dated 3 December 1941 from OpNav addressed to Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Coml6 for action ; and to CinCPac and
Coml4 for information.
The only authenticated copy of a dispatch dated 3 December 1941
from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Coml6 foi action;
and to CinCPac and Coml4 for information, was submitted to the
interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered
in evidence.
There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EX-
HIBIT 66".
832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECKET
A. (Beading:)
Q. Will you please read the dispatch ?
From: OPNAV.
Date : 3 December 1941.
Action Addressees. To : CINCAF.
COM SIXTEEN.
Info: CINPAO
COM FOURTEEN.
Priority.
Date time group : 031855.
Text : Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered
London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy pui'ple machine XX
Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also
directed destroy purple X all but one copy of other systems X and all secret
documents XX British admiralty London today reports embassy London
has complied.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the pre-
vious questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and resumed his seat as counsel for
the judge advocate.
[904] A witness called by the judge advocate, entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. I am Intelligence
Officer, Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.
2. Q. What duties were you performing between the first of October
and 7 December 1941 ?
A. Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. Will you state in general what were the sources of information
available to you during that time ?
A. The main sources of information were from Chief of Naval
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, who forwarded us reports
from naval observers, naval attaches, other competent observers. State
Department, consular agents. Also from Chief of Naval Operations
via Office of Naval Intelligence or Office of Naval Communications
certain highly secret information under the classification of com-
munication intelligence. Also local reports from the local district
intelligence office here regarding local security conditions; through
liaison with British Intelligence of the Secret Intelligence Service ; in-
telligence as to Japan's activities in the Far East. Also from the com-
mandants of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Naval Districts and Panama
Sea Frontier regarding movements of Japanese merchant vessels ; re-
ports also from the Commandant of the Third Naval District regard-
ing movements of Japanese merchant vessels. I think that is all.
4. Q. What method did you employ in passing this information
along to the Comjnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 833
A. I passed it to him by hand.
5. Q. Was this information that you received evaluated before you
passed it to him, or did you give it to him direct in the form in which
received ?
A. I gave it to him in the original form. If the original message
were an intelligence report and it was long, I would write a short
brief of it, appending that to the original report.
6. Q. I show you Exhibit 66, which has just been introduced into
evidence before this court and ask you to read it to yourself. Will you
state whether you saw the contents of this message on or before 7
December 1941 ?
A. I did.
7. Q. Did this message have any special significance to you when
you read it ?
A. This message, like many others received at that time having to
do with the Japanese activities, could only be read [905] and
considered along with the rest of them as it tended to indicate Japan's
intentions and activities.
8. Q. The fact that the message mentioned destroying a certain
type of machine, did that have any special significance to you?
A, Only insofar as I knew that was the cipher machine.
9. Q. Did it have any more significance to you by designating a
machine by this particular name than if it had been any other sort
of a cipher machine ?
A. I asl^ed the security officer, Lieutenant Coleman, who had come
from Washington, just what was meant by the word "purple machine"
and he explained that it was an electrical coding machine, roughly
similar to the type we used, that was used in the passing of messages
between Japanese consuls and diplomats and the home office. The
word "purple" was to designate the type of the machine as an improve-
ment over the old one called the "red".
10. Q. Then am I to understand that the fact that they used this
particular name had no special significance to you regarding the
security of the type of messages it was designed to handle ?
A. Well, we know that the Japanese Navy had an electrical coding
machine, that the Japanese naval attache had a coding machine, that
this was a diplomatic coding machine, and therefore the diplomatic
machines were being broken, or destroyed, but other than the fact that
it was a diplomatic machine, no, it had no special significance.
11. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether
or not you had seen this document on or before 7 December 1941,
or had you been informed of its contents ?
A, I did not see this original document. The message we received
stated this same thing in substance but to my recollection this exact
document was not translated verbatim. The use of the winds and
the code for relations was in the message but the verbatim, word-for-
word, was not as we received it in the telegraph.
1. Q. What, to your own knowledge, was done to intercept the
broadcast which used the words to execute this code ?
A. Upon receipt of this. Commander Rochefort, who headed the
Coml4 intelligence unit, placed special watches on all the Japanese
weather and news and other broadcasts, both in the Japanese and
English language, and told them to maintain communications with
i
834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
him by telephone and to call him the instant one of these code words
was heard and he was to call either myself or Admiral Kimmel in
person in case I happened to be away. He would call me if I were
there. Also the intelligence officer, who at that time was monitoring
certain news broadcasts, was inferentially warned to watch for any
weather reports being put on the end of news broadcasts and to inform
him or me — that is, Rochefort or myself — of any such appendage or
insertion in a regular broadcast.
[906] 13. Q. Did you ever receive any information prior to 7
December 1941 which executed any portion of this document 15 that
you have just read?
A. We did not.
14. Q. Prior to 7 December 7 1941 were you aware of any messages
sent between the Hawaiian Islands and the Japanese Government
which contained military information relative to the movement of
ships in Pearl Harbor or the location of ships there ?
A. No, sir.
15. Q. I show you Documents 36, 37 and 40 of Exhibit 63 which
are communications between Japan and the Japanese authorities in
Honolulu and which either request or give information concerning
ship movements in Pearl Harbor. I will ask you to look at these doc-
uments and state whether or not you had seen them or been appraised
of their contents prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I will state categorically that none of these were received here,
nor were we appraised of their existence.
16. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 did you have any other informa-
tion other than Exhibit 66 which I showed you first concerning the
Japanese destroying codes and confidential documents ?
A. On 5 December we received word from the naval observer at
Wellington that the Japanese consul at Wellington was destroying
his codes and had sent a code word to Tokyo in compliance with in-
structions.
17. Q. Was this information given to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet?
A. It was.
18. Q. Do you recall whether any evaluation was placed on the sig-
nificance of this directive ?
A. The significance of these messages was considered along with
other messages during that period and were the subject of discussions
in the Admiral's cabin. I pTesumed that when he discussed it with
the War Plans Officer and others that it was a matter of discussion
because after receiving that he had various officers in for a conference.
One particular point of this was the destruction of codes and ciphers,
the ones in Hong Kong, Singapore, Wellington, as well as Batavia.
I believe, were included along with London and Washington. This
seemed to indicate that Japan was preparing for any or all eventuali-
ties and at that time we had received messages from the British and
from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information
indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula scheduled for
about 1 December. This seemed to dovetail with the information
received and its evaluation, and while all possibilities were not ruled
out, it fit like a glove.
[907] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy :
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 835
19. Q. I show you Document No. 2 of Exhibit 64, concerning the
winds code, being a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet. Did you have that at about the same time you had had that
other document that was shown you in your direct testimony?
A. It was abut the same time ; yes, sir.
20. Q. When you examined the two together, did it leave any un-
certainty in your mind as to the mechanism of that code which the
Japanese were setting up?
A. None whatsoever.
21. Q. Did you at that time take it to mean that one of those code
words, say the one which referred to us, was the equivalent of inform-
ing the Japanese that they were at war with the United States, or in
a state of somewhat lesser importance?
A. It is rather difficult to recall my exact impression but as I recall
it now I believe it was more than a rupture of diplomatic relations
had taken place and that necessarily, anything else could happen.
Frank Murrell Sickle^, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
[908] 22. Q. Exhibit G6, which you have just been shown, car-
ries the initials, LFS. Do you known who that would be?
A. Yes, sir.
23. Q. Who?
A. I believe that is Captain Safford.
24. Q. Did you know at the time or did you think at the time that
this purple cipher mentioned would be one of their very high class
ciphers ?
A. Yes, carrying as it did the material from Embassies and Counsel
General to the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and vice versa, it was con-
sidered to be a high class cipher.
25. Q. Knowing the Japanese as of course you do, was it not rather
an extreme measure to destroy anything as expensive as one of those
machines ?
A. The thought of the cost did not enter my mind. I rather thought
that since the one from Bangkok had been removed, it was due to their
forces being there ; while the ones in Hong Kong, Manila, and Wash-
ington, and London, could not be physically transported without
some danger of compromise. We know that they take elaborate pre-
cautions to move these into foreign countries.
26. Q. Captain, do you know whether or not your opposite number
in the Army was obtaining from the War Department any informa-
tion derived from sources like these that we have been discussing?
A. I do not know, sir. He at least did not pass any on to me, or
to Admiral Kimmel, to my knowledge and I am sure that if any
were passed on to Admiral Kimmel, I would have seen them. The
liaison between the G-2, Hawaiian Department, was maintained
through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Railey, who,
when he established the liaison, said that he was doing this on the
instructions of G-2, since the air force and the Navy would operate
in the closest conjunction while the Army was a defensive garrison.
Colonel Railey passed on to me no such information, and since I
did inform him of the contents, in general, of some of this highly
secret information, I feel positive in my mind that had he known it,
836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he would have informed us; and therefore he had no such source
of information available.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy; (Ret) :
27. Q. Did you know prior to 6 December, 1941, that any unit
of the Navy Department had intercepted the execution of the winds
message ?
A. 1 did not.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) ,
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
[909] Examined by the court:
28. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the operations of the F. B. I.,
and Intelligence Service here in Honolulu, during that period of
time?
A. I was kept apprised of the general situation ashore, inasmuch
as it influenced the security of the Fleet, which was here based. I
knew in general their set-up, how they operated, and the general
situation, but did not concern myself with details.
29. Q. Do you know of any restrictions placed on the Japanese
representatives or Japanese officials of Honolulu, as to the transmission
of messages to Tokyo ?
A. To my best knowledge and belief, there were no such restrictions
at any time.
30. Q. Was there any information — or were any means of obtain-
ing information through the F. B. I., or otherwise, as to the messages
flowing to Tokyo from Honolulu ?
A. The F. B. I. wouldn't be a party to that, because it is against
the laws of the United States. I know that there had been attempts
made through various high officials. Naval, Military, and civilian, to
obtain files of Japanese outgoing and incoming messages that were
handled on American communications systems, and I know that it was
refused in many cases. I know in some cases it was done with special
permission of some very high authority. I understand that attempts
were made locally here to obtain these messages.
31. Q. What I want to know — was this information obtained and
in your hand or anyone's hands here in Honolulu ?
A. There was no information obtained from any sources, of the
Japanese Consul General, or others here — none to my knowledge at all.
32. Q. In other words, you had no information as to what action
was being transmitted from the Japanese officials or otherwise here
in Honolulu, to Tokyo ?
A. No, sir. We had no information. Attempts were made to get it.
33. Q. We have had introduced in this testimony that certain mes-
sages were received in Washington whereby the Japanese requested
information as to the number of ships in Pearl Harbor, and also the
entrance of ships here. Were you familiar with those messages?
A. Not until after December 7.
34. Q. But you did not have them at the time?
A. I did not, sir.
35. Q. And they were not transmitted to you or to the Commander-
in-Chief of Pacific?
A. They weren't available, sir. They weren't decrypted [910]
until after December 7.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 837
36. Q. Does that include the so-called winds message ?
A. No, sir, the winds message did not come locally. The winds
message originated in Tokyo, saying that they would do a certain
thing a certain place at a certain time.
37. Q. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet did not receive the
winds message before December 7 ?
A. He knew of the winds message. These wind messages did not
originate here in Honolulu.
Extracted testimony of Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy.
Pages 916-918, inclusive.
[916] Reexamined by the judge advocate :
61. Q. You have testified that you did not feel that the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had been kept as fully informed as he
might have been, in view of the information which you know now
was in Washington. Will you tell us some of the information which
you think would have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific at that time had he known it ?
A. I know that there were certain de-crypted messages in the War
Department and in the Navy Department in Washington, which by
themselves do not mean so much, but, added together, would certainly
be more of a warning toward this locality than we received in any
other message — the ones you showed me, plus the ones not introduced
in this court and which are in the possession of the Army, I under-
stand.
62. Q. Could you give briefly the information which these docu-
ments contained? What was the subject matter of them?
A. Further inquiries regarding ship movements in Pearl Harbor
and stressing movements of aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor.
63. Q. Do you recall any others ?
A. Other messages of the nature of those from the purple machine
regarding the situation existing at that time.
64. Q. Could you be just a little more specific?
A. I am trying to phrase this but I can't. Without quoting a docu-
ment, I can only say I have received the impression from certain docu-
ments which I know were available before December 7 that the phras-
eology of certain passages in there may be considered quite important
had that material been at hand. For instance, there was one expres-
sion to the effect that Japan must have a settlement of the negotiations
in Washington by the 25th and the fact that when the note from
Secretary Hull was delivered, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany
was told to call on Hitler and get Hitler's promise. The Japanese
Ambassador to Italy called on Mussolini and received Mussolini's
promise of full aid. Those were definitely warlike indications.
Reexamined by the court :
65. Q. Referring to your last answer, were any of these directed
against Pearl Harbor particularly ?
A. No, sir.
66. Q. You consider, however, that if they had them here, they
would have influenced the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific ?
A. I think it would for this reason: The Japanese is [917]
an Oriental, and he is a great bargainer. We saw negotiations ap-
parently broken down with Mr. Kurusu suddenly being rushed
through so as to inject new blood. The negotiations, we were told,
838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
had broken down and there was little possibility of their being re-
sumed. Yet we have seen in the past that negotiations were resumed,
and Japan devised some new formula, some new approach for a prob-
lem almost as insoluable as the one facing her then. We received two
very fine estimates of the situation from Captain Creighton, the
naval resident officer at Singapore, and from the intelligence officer
of the Asiatic Fleet, in which they independently of one another,
from their wide contacts in the Far East, came to the conclusion that
war against America at this time would not be the Japanese decision,
but, rather, they would cut across Thailand to cut off the Burma
Road and Burma, which was, at best, unstable at that time, in an
attempt to find a solution to the so-called China incident without
involving America and Great Britain, if possible.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
67. Q. Would not the receipt of the execution of the Winds Mes-
sage be one of the clues to which you have referred and which would
have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief?
A. I feel positive that had one of the Winds messages execute been
received, it would have been acted upon with rapidity and aggressively.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U.S. Navy:
68. Q. Will you state what action you believe would have been
taken ?
A. I believe all personnel would have been immediately recalled
to their ships — This is my belief. I believe all vessels would have
been ordered to be prepared to sail at the earliest possible moment.
I believe that intense anti-submarine patrol and distant patrold would
have been inaugurated. I believe the task force would have sortied
and proceeded to sea to perform what missions under the War Plan
the Commander-in-Chief deemed appropriate.
69. Q. This would have been upon receipt of the code message
which said diplomatic relations with the United States were ter-
minated ?
A. Yes, sir.
70. Q. Didn't tile "war warning" dispatch say practically the same
thing ?
A. No, sir, not to my knowledge. The message said negotiations
had ceased. The fact that negotiations were then [91S] under
way in Washington — and which had been under way since, I believe,
April or May, 1941 — did not necessarily mean that diplomatic rela-
tions were going to be ruptured or that a state of war was going to
be declared to exist after a rupture.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in
connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the
previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 839
[91SA] The court then, at 5:25 p. m., adjourned until 9:30
a. m., September 11, 1944.
[919] Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander F. M.
Brotherhood, U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 919-A — 930, inclusive.
[919-A] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. F. M. Brotherhood, lieutenant commander, U. S. N. R. At pres-
ent, I am attached to FRUPAC under orders to return to Washington.
2. Q. What duty were you performing during the month imme-
diately preceding 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was one of the watch officers in Op-20-G, in the office of
Director of Naval Communications.
[920] 3. Q. I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this
court. Do you recall having seen this document prior to 7 December
1941?
A. I recall seeing the original of this document prior to 7 December.
4. Q. Do you recall on what date you first saw that document, or
were informed as to its contents ?
A. I don't remember the date.
5. Q. What is the best approximation you can give as to that date?
A. About November 30th.
6. Q. At the time you saw this document, was it made available
to all of the watch officers in Op-20-G ?
A. I do not know.
7. Q. As a watch officer in Op-20-G, what instructions were given
to you with regard to procedure to be followed if and when any
intercept of a Japanese message using this code was received?
A. I recall only that portion which ordered me to call Admiral
Noyes on the telephone in the event that any intercept of this type
was received.
8. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 was any message emanating from
Japan received in Op-20-G in which this code was used?
A. I know of one that was at the time presumed to be in this code.
9. Q. When was that message that you speak of received ?
A. I think of it as a Thursday night before Pearl Harbor.
10. Q. Sir, for the sake of the record, will you compute the day of
the month that that Thursday night before Pearl Harbor would have
been?
A. The 4th of December.
11. Q. During what hours on the evening of 4 December 1941 were
you on watch in Op-20-G ?
A. From 4 : 00 in the evening until midnight.
12. Q. From whom did you receive a message containing these
code words? Relate the details pertaining to the receipt of such
message.
A. In the course of the evening of December 4th I received a tele-
phone call from the Federal Communications Commission from an
officer whose name I don't remember. Unfortunately I don't remember
at this time the text of the dispatch but I know what it did not say. I
recall, in receiving it, that there seemed to be something missing from
what I was looking [921] for and that is, he gave me the first
840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
portion of it. I asked liim if there was not more and I made a pencil
note of the transmission as he gave it to me over the telephone only for
my own records so that I would give it accurately to Admiral Noyes.
When I say that the text was not what I was looking for, I mean that
it did not contain the phrase in Japanese Higashi no Kazeame, which,
to me, would have indicated that diplomatic relations severance, fol-
lowed by war, would come to the United States. I remember this be-
cause of the feeling of relief that I had that it was not that. Immedi-
ately upon receipt of this telephone conversation through the very
secret channel that we had set up for the purpose of transmitting this
information I was able to reach Admiral Noyes by telephone and gave
him the dispatch as I had it, and he said to me words which indicated
to me that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction
and thanked me, and at this time I don't remember whether he gave
me oral instructions to ask the F, C. C. to continue to look. That part
of it I don't remember. From this distance it seems to me that I called
the F. C. C. later, though what I said at that time I don't remember.
Those are the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the winds mes-
sage referred to in this document.
13. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 2 of Exhibit 65 before the court.
Can you identify this document as being the information which was
passed to you by telephone on the evening of 4 December 1941 from the
F. C. C?
A. I have just said that I had forgotten the text. If I had been asked
to quote the text of this dispatch I would have been unable to do so.
However, I will say that this appears to me to be the text of the mate-
rial that I received over the telephone from the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.
14. Q. Sir, I ask you to refer again to the first document which you
were handed, Document 15 of Exhibit 63 in connection with the docu-
ment which you now hold, Document 2 of Exhibit 64 : Taking those
two together, what information is conveyed with regard to a break of
diplomatic relations between Japan and any other nation in this
intercept message, Document 2 of Exhibit 64 ?
A. I remember what it meant to me without referring to this docu-
ment. I will say that it conveyed the impression that there would be
a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States but with
the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that that is what caused Admiral
Noyes to say that the wind is blowing from a funny direction.
15. Q. Commander, a few minutes ago, you testified that you made
a written memorandiun of the oral telephone conversation with an
official of the F. C. C. Do you have any information as to whether or
not the F. C. C. followed up that telephone call with a confirming let-
ter or memoranda at any time subsequent to the evening of 4 Decem-
ber?
A. I don't have any recollection of such a confirmation.
[922] 16. Q. Was your pencil, written memoranda made a part
of the files of Op-2a-G at that time?
A. I don't know that either.
17. Q. Do you recall what disposition you did make of your memo-
randa?
A. Yes. I left it on the —well, we will say on the desk of the watch
officer. I turned it over, in fact, to the succeeding watch officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 841
18. Q. Since that time have you had any occasion to look in the
files of Op-20-G to locate your memorandum or any other written
memorandum pertaining to the receipt of the message about which
you have been testifying?
A. No.
19. Q. I hand you Document 3 of Exhibit 64 before the court which,
according to this exhibit, was intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2130 on
the evening of December 5 and which according to the exhibit, was
communicated to the Army. Will you look at this document and say
what break in diplomatic relations is indicated by that code message ?
A. It would indicate to me that the relations had been broken, or
were about to be broken with the Soviet Union.
20. Q. In other words, this Document 3, received a day later than
the one which you received over the telephone on the 4th, is merely
a repetition, in substance, of what had been received on the night of the
4th pertaining only to the Soviet Union ?
A. As I see it here, it would appear that way.
21. Q. Do you know whether or not this second intercept pertain-
ing to a break with the Soviet Union was ever received in Op-20-G ?
A. I do not.
22. Q. In addition to the intercept pertaining to the Soviet Union
about which you have been testifying, did you ever see any other inter-
cepts using the so-called winds code in Op-20-G ?
A. No.
23. Q. Did you ever have any information of the receipt of any
additional messages?
A. No.
24. Q. Under the set-up in Op-20-G at that time, would it have
been likely that you would have known, either by seeing official reports
or by informal information from 'the other watch officers, of the receipt
of any additional messages using this code ?
A. Very likely.
[92S] 25. Q. Will you elaborate on that and give reasons for
that last answer?
A. I was part of the group that had the duty of reporting any such
message as this. I was one of the three officers who, in the course of
a day, would have cognizance if such a message had come in. Further
than that, had the message come in while I was not on watch, it seems
to me that it would have passed down the chain of the watch officers
to the responsible party. Further, my associations with the other
watch officers was so close that had there been any rumor of such a
dispatch I believe I would have heard about it.
26. Q. Do you know of any attempts that were made to notify the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the receipt of a message
utilizing the winds code ?
A. I do not, except that Admiral Noyes said he would see that the
proper people were informed of this intercept.
The interested party. Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) ,
stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :
842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. Q. Was this message that was received from the F. C. C. given
to you in the Japanese language, or in the equivalent English trans-
lation?
A. It seems to me that it was given to me, Captain Lavender, as it
appears here, in the testimony.
28. Q. By that, I take it, then, that it was given to you in English
terms, English words?
A. It seems to me that it was.
29. Q. When you received this dispatch, were you completely satis-
fied, then, when receiving it, as you remember it, in English terms,
as to the translation?
A. I was completely satisfied that I had gotten it correctly and I
understood it.
30. Q. Did you at that time communicate with any of the other
officers who might be familiar with that system, or a verification of
the translation ?
A. Captain Lavender, our instructions were very explicit. The
person to whom I was to report had sufficient information of what we
could expect to receive so that I think had it come in Japanese or Eng-
lish, the recipient of my telephone call would have understood without
the assistance of a translator.
31. Q. But did you verify in any way the meaning of the dispatch
as it was given to you ?
A. Only by consulting the memorandum of instructions which had
had been given to me.
[924.] 32. Q. What other officers did you refer to when you
said there were three officers that were doing routine duties, rotation
duties similar to yours?
A. Their names. Captain Lavender ?
33. Q. Yes.
A. Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering; Lieutenant Commander
Murray, whose initials I don't remember; and Lieutenant Com-
mander Brown. I don't remember his initials.
34. Q. What were your relations with Commander Kramer?
A. Commander Kramer was the officer in charge of the translation
section of our group. My relations with him were friendly.
35. Q. I mean your official relations. Do you know what duties
Commander Kramer was performing in December, 1941 ?
A. He was in charge of the translation section of our group, as I
have said.
36. Q. Did you consult with him at all on the translation of this
ditspatch ?
A. Not at the time, Captain. Commander Kramer had been pretty
busy and he was home getting some needed rest.
37. Q. Did you ask the Federal Communications Commission to
send you a confirmation copy ?
A. I don't recall.
38. Q. Do you recall whether or not you considered at that time
that this message was of some importance ?
A. I recall that I considered it of considerable importance.
39. Q. And you made only a memorandum of that message and
turned it over to your relief without making any other copies f
A. According to my instructions, I did.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 843
40. Q. Who gave you those instructions ?
A. There was a written instruction signed by a responsible officer
in my section. I don't recall whether it was Commander Kramer, or
whether it was Captain Safford.
41. Q. Do you recall whether the officer that gave you the infor-
mation over the telephone, that is, in the Federal Communications
Commission, mentioned the Japanese words at all?
A. I don't remember that he did.
42. Q. Did you know any Japanese at that time?
A. I knew pretty much the material that was covered in this dis-
patch. I knew some other diplomatic Japanese.
[9i2S] 43. Q. It has been indicated that there has been no trace
of the original message as recorded bj^ you, or any confirmation copy,
in the files of the Navy Department. Can you account in any way
for the inability of the Navy Department to produce this dispatch?
A. I can account for it from my own viewpoint only and that was,
we were instructed to pass the word orally. This matter at the time
was considered of greatest urgency and the most important single
job we had to do. Each of us was very anxious to be sure that noth-
ing happened to our carrying out our orders. I know this because
it was talked informally with the other officers involved since that
time regarding this dispatch. For my part, when I received it, my
orders left me no alternative but to make my telephone call to Ad-
miral Noyes at once. I was not in the position, nor was I expected,
to evaluate or pass on the worth of the contents of this dispatch.
I was simply ordered to see that it was speeded on its way.
44. Q. And you were ordered to see that it was speeded on its way
and emphasized as to speed and emphasized as to oralness but not
emphasized as to any record that would be kept of such an important
message ?
A. As to the matter of record, I don't believe we were instructed
to make a record.
45. Q. Now, coming to the morning of 7 December, what watch
did you have ?
A. The morning of 7 December I came on duty at 12 : 01 a. m., and
remained until relieved sometime after 7 : 00 a. m.
46. Q. Do you recall what dispatches came to your attention dur-
ing that watch ?
A. I recall one particular dispatch. There were a number handled
by that watch.
47. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was the 14th part of a 14-
part ditspatch intercepted between Japan and the ambassador in
Washington that was received at that time ?
A. Ever since December 7 there has been a question in my mind
whether there were 13 or 14 parts. May I refer to the part that
you call "14" as the last part?
48. Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
49. Q. Did you receive during that watch a dispatch indicating the
time of delivery of all of the parts of that long dispatch to the
Secretary of State ?
A. At the time I didn't recognize it as such a dispatch, except there
was, to me, a certain indication that there was some urgency in con-
nection with the long diplomatic message.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 11
844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[926] 50. Q. Will you state how the two dispatches just re-
ferred to were handled, and trace them in their delivery and dis-
tribution as far as you know of your own personal knowledge?
A. The first dispatch which was mentioned, the long diplomatic
message, was perfectly clear to me. It was in English and when I
finished with it, except for making a record, it would be ready for
dissemination through the customary chaainels. At the time of
December 7th we were sharing the work on this diplomatic traffic with
the Army. The message regarding time of delivery was in Japanese.
It required the services of a translator. I have tried since December
7th to remember whether or not the Army translator was on duty at
the time. The reason for that is this : I know the translator was not
present at the Navy Department, and for the reason that we were
sharing the duties on this diplomatic traffic we worked on odd and
even days. At this time I don't remember whether the odd day of
the week or the odd day of the month was the Navy's day of duty,
or the Army's. I don't remember whether the Army translator was
there that early in the morning — I will say by 4 : 00 o'clock in the
morning — but in the exchange of traffic back and forth we made cus-
tomary trips in which we carried this traffic over by hand ourselves.
It was not trusted to an enlisted man, and I believe that prior to 7 : 00
o'clock on the morning of December 7th I had made one, perhaps two,
such trips to the Army. It is quite possible that I would not know
whether there was a translator on duty in the Army section because,
as I say, these activities were veiled in so much secrecy that I knew
very little about the personnel employed by the Army. So far as I
was concerned, it meant carrying some documents over to a very
impersonal receiver. Does that answer your question, Captain
Lavender ?
51. Q. F'artially. I will bring the rest out by questions. How
long did you remain in the Navy Department on the morning of 7
December ?
A. I left sometime after 7 : 00.
52. Q. Did you leave before Commander Kramer came in?
A. I left before Commander Kramer came in, yes, sir.
53. Q. And you left the dispatches there for delivery to Commander
Kramer, however ?
A. Those dispatches which were supposed to be delivered to him,
I don't remember, but I presume that I left them there for him.
Re-examined by the judge advocate :
54. Q. Commander, referring to the testimony that you have just
given : At the time you left the Department at 7 : 00 o'clock on the
morning of 7 December 1941, had the English translation of the Jap-
anese message which you had taken to the Army for translation been
returned to you?
A. I wish I could remember that. I have tried to remember whether
the original copy had come back, or not. I can't remember. I would
like to know if anyone ever finds out.
[9^7] Examined by the court:
55. Q. Referring again to this winds message: Did you at any time
discuss this winds message with Connnander Kramer, or with Admiral
Noyes ?
A. Admiral, I delivered it to Admiral Noyes.
56. Q. By 'phone?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 845
A. By telephone, yes, sir, and since that time I have not discussed
it with him.
57. Q. Well, I am speaking of the immediate time of that date.
Did you discuss it with him at that time, other than 'phone him ?
A. No, sir.
58. Q. When this supposed answer of "execute winds message"
came in — and you say that in accordance with your translation or the
information you received, it meant that Japan was going to war with
the Soviet Union — did'nt that seem rather odd to you in view of the
critical situation existing at that time between this country and Japan?
A. It did.
59. Q. Did you hear Commander Kramer or Admiral Noyes express
any opinion as to the queer interpretation of this message?
A. Admiral, I testified as to something that Admiral Noyes said in
regard to it ; it is in the record.
60. Q. Were you present or did you hear while on duty there, that
Commander Kramer came in with a reply to this question, that said
"Here it is" ; in reply to this winds message ; or, "Here it is, we've got
it"?
A. I don't recall that.
61. Q. You have been asked as to how these messages were han-
dled. Now, referring to the winds message. Do you know how that
was handled from your office and where it went to? Did it go to the
Chief of Naval Operations, or where did it go ?
A. I don't know that. Admiral. I only know as far as Admiral
Noyes is concerned.
[928] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
62. Q. Were you by chance present when there was a summary
of events or a summary of the estimate drawn up and presented to
Admiral Noyes for his consideration, to pass on to higher authority?
A. No.
63. Q. Do you remember when you saw the English translation
of part 14 of these messages received on the night of 6-7 December ?
A. I think it took us about an -hour to get that out, to break it
out ; seems to me we finished it and checked it for accuracy and possible
mistakes by 4 : 00 in the morning.
64. Q. that was the last part?
A. The last part, yes, sir.
65. Q. The last part which came in was in the Japanese language
and had been translated?
A. No, sir, that was in English, The last part of the long diplo-
matic message was in English.
66. Q. The last part that I referred to, you stated in your testi-
mony was in the Japanese language. The other parts were in English.
A. I don't believe I said that.
67. Q. What did you say?
A. I understood Captain Lavender asked me about a dispatch stat-
ing that this certain long diplomatic dispatch must be delivered by
a given time. If I didn't say that it was that dispatch that was in
Japanese, I made a mistake, but I think I did. The long diplomatic
dispatch of fourteen parts was in English; that did not require
translation.
846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
68. Q. The lon^ part of the message; was that in English?
A. The long diplomatic message was in English.
69. Q. Now the short part was in Japanese, the short and last
part?
A. Yes, they were not associated by number. They were only asso-
ciated by inference.
70. Q. Now, what I asked you — the short part and last part that
was in Japanese — when did you see the English translation of that?
A. I didn't see the English translation of the little Japanese dis-
patch until some time after December 7.
71. Q. Now referring to the long dispatch, do you know what
[929] happened to that, where it went to — the long part of the
dispatch? Did you have an3^thing to do with the delivery of that
long part of the dispatch ?
A. Yes, sir.
72. Q. What did you do with it ?
A. Those dispatches were carried over by us as officer messenger
to the Army.
73. Q. War Department ?
A. To the War Department, yes, sir; and I presume at that time —
I don't remember, I haven't kept a diary — I presume I carried those
over as it was my obligation to do.
74. Q. Did you carry them to any other place ; did you carry them
to the State Department?
A. No, sir.
75. Q. Did you carry them to OpNav?
A. Not me.
76. -Q. What?
A. No, sir.
77. Q. You have stated that you know only few phrases in Jap-
anese ?
A. That's correct, sir.
78. Q. You are not a Japanese translator?
A. No, sir.
79. Q. And when these Japanese words came to you — the words
of the wind messages — you took the translation as given you by some-
one else; is that correct? Did you take the word of the translator?
A. I took it as it was given to me by the F. C. C. It says here (indi-
cating) it is in English. If you would have asked me, I would have
been unable to tell you before I refreshed my memory. Admiral, I
hope I have made clear that I was not entitled, nor was I expected,
to evaluate the contents of any messages that would be delivered.
The interested party. Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy, did
not desire to recross-examine this witness.
Recross-exn mined bv the interested part}^. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
80. Q. Just to bring out my own understanding of some of your
testimony, all parts of the long diplomatic dispatch that was received
finally on 7 December were in English when decrypted?
A. I said that with this reservation in mind, that there is always
at the beginning of one of these dispatches, whether in English or
not, certain material that is necessary for the Japanese record. That
was in their conventional method of representation, which was a sub-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 847
stitution of cipher below the [930] cipher machine. There
was that type of stuff at the beginning, but that had nothing to do
with the context. •
81. Q. But all of the part of that long dispatch that was to be de-
livered to the Secretary of State came out in English when it was
decrypted ?
A. It seems to me that it did.
82. Q. Did the other dispatch which was received at the time and
that related to the specific hour at which the long dispatch was to be
delivered — when that was decoded it came out in Japanese and
required translation ; is that true ?
A. That is true to the best of mj^ memory.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret),
did not desire to recross-examine this witness.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
83. Q. I hand you document 39 of Exhibit 63 before this court,
which is a message from Tokyo to Washington, No. 902, labelled at the
top, "Part 1 of 14 parts." I should say document 39 covers all 14 parts
of that. Is part 14 included in this that you have been speaking of as
the long message ?
A. It is.
84. Q. And what you speak of as the short dispatch is what?
A. This short dispatch carrying instructions to the Ambassador
regarding the delivery of the long dispatch.
85. Q. And is this document 41 of Exhibit 63 the message that you
referred to as the short dispatch ?
A. That is it— 41.
86. Q. Part 14 of docunient 39 of Exhibit 63— is this the part that
you mentioned as coming in English ?
A. This and others.
87. Q. Is document 41 of Exhibit 63, which you have referred to as
the short dispatch giving instructions on the time of delivery — is that
the one that you mentioned as coming in Japanese ?
A. That is the one that I referred to as coming in Japanese.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of
the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connec-
tion therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous
questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy.
Pages 950-987, inclusive.
[9S0] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. I am at present at-
tached at CinCPac. I just reported this morning to CinCPac.
2. Q. What duties are you presently performing other than this
temporary dut/^
848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I have been permanently attached to SoPac and have now
reported to CinCPac and have not yet been assigned to duty.
3. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 7
December 1941 ?
A. I was attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy
Department, Washington, on loan to OP-20-G, Office of Naval
Communications.
4. Q. Will you state the general characteristics of the duties that
you were performing in that station ?
A. I was head of the translation section of the communication
security group. That consisted of translating all decrypted traffic
obtained from intercepts and delivering it to the Office of Naval In-
telligence and any persons in the Navy Department or outside of the
Navy Department that the Director Naval Intelligence or the Chief
of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy wanted delivery
made to.
6. Q. Did you have any routine addressees to whom you were in the
custom of delivering all traffic to ?
A. Yes.
6. Q. Who were they?
A. We prepared 14 copies of every decrypted translation. Seven
copies went to Army. The other 7 were for delivery to senior officers
in the Navy Department and also to either the White House or State
Department, the responsibility of which rotated between the War
Department and the Navy Department. At the time referred to in
your earlier question I had responsibility for delivery to the White
House ; Army to the State Department. The addressees in the Navy
Department that normally got copies which I delivered were the aide
to the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Beatty, or to the Secretary of
the Navy directly; Chief of Naval Operaticms, Admiral Stark; the
head of Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East
section, then Commander McCollum; Admiral Noyes as Director of
Naval Communications; Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans.
Occasionally there were certain other individuals I was directed to
show it to.
[951] 7. Q. I note that the specific addresses only add up to six.
A. The seventh copy was a file copy.
8. Q. This intercepted traffic : Was it passed along to the addressees
as it was received, or was some sort of summary made for delivery?
A. A complete version of every message went into one of 6 separate
folders, delivery being made several times a day, depending on
urgency. Earlier in 1941 I had been in the habit of preparing a sum-
mary of all the traffic in the day's folder because of its volume. In this
summary I briefed the subject of the message, asterisked it with one
or two asterisks showing those things which were most important or
of urgent character so that the senior addressees to which I delivered it
could look through the summary to see what they would want to take
time to see. The volume was so heavy that they rarely had time to
look through the whole book, volumes running into sometimes as much
as 130 messages in one day. I made a point of seeing that the more
important ones were seen and read by the senior addressees that I
delivered personnally to. In some cases, of course, sujli as the Secre-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 849
tary of the Navy, Captain Beatty would make actual delivery and
consequently I do not know just what ones he read.
9. Q. Do I understand your responsibility then to have been that
you had in your possession for the purpose of showing to addressees,
all intercept traffic and it was a matter of the party's own decision as to
whether or not he would look into all the dispatches that you had in
your possession, or only to the ones that you had singled out as being
of importance; is that correct?
A. That is, in general, correct, yes, sir.
10. Q. Was there any intermediary between you and the decrypting
section of the Office of the Director of Naval Communications who
made any decision as to whether or n*)t the messages that were re-
ceived were passed to you? I mean by that, did you have in your
possession for delivery all the traffic that came in, or was there some
sort of a separation process which enabled you to have only what was
probably considered the more important ones?
A. Every bit of traffic that was broken down into Japanese plain
language, or partly broken down from those systems and not com-
pletely recovered, was passed to my section for translation or further
code recovery and for translation and distribution and writing up.
The filtering process to which you referred might be intercepted as
applying to the partially recovered systems which came in in con-
siderable volume, some of which, however, could not be adequately
broken down to get much intelligence out of it.
11. Q. Are you a Japanese language student yourself ?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
[9521 12. Q. Did you yourself translate all dispatches, or how
was that done ?
A. I had a staff of civilian translators, professional Civil Service
employees in the Navy Department. Those messages that were of
high importance I normally glanced over in the nature of editing
before they were typed up. Otherwise, the great majority of the
material was translated by my civilian assistants. It was only an
occassional message I translated myself.
13. Q. You have testified in effect — and I wish you would correct
me if I put the wrong interpretation on your testimony — that there
was no filtering process between you and the source of information.
In other words, you had in your possession for delivery to addresses
all information that was received ?
A. I will have to repeat again a reference to the filtering process.
When you use the statement "all information" there were many
other messages which my section did not get which were in various
states of recovery in the G. Y. section, in the decryption or cipher
recovery section of Op-20-G, which I did not get or oftentimes got
several weeks later. In other words, with the large volume of traffic
coming in on a new system, it might be weeks before I would get
material from that system. I would not get it until it was sufficiently
broken down to start pulling intelligible information out of it.
14. Q. I am assuming. Commander, that there was a pool of
intelligence information, and what I am trying to bring out
A. Intelligence was the word I used. In other words, a sketchily
recovered message, you might be able to trainslate to the extent
of a phrase here and a word there, but it would not make sense
850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
enough or would not warrent writing up for distribution to the
senior offiers in the Navy Department, so a message would have
to be in a system that was sufficiently recovered to pull intelligible
information out of it before I would get it for translation and
distribution.
15. Q. I am assuming that you had such a pool of intelligible
intelligence force available to you. Now, what I am trying to find
out is, did you take all this intelligence and pass it along, or did you
or someone else act as a filter to sort out the information that was
passed along?
A. Because of the high volume that we got and the srnall number
of translators we had — ther« were three at that time — it was not
feasible or possible to translate everything that came to us. Conse-
quently, we concentrated on the more secure systems which, in general,
had the more important information in them. All the others were
looked over and a brief summary made by the translators. Every
one of those messages, before going into the file — in other words,
before finally being disposed of — was looked at by me as a final check
to see whether the information warranted being translated. Every-
think that was translated in full that warranted distribution was
written up and distributed.
[953] 16. Q. That is what I am trying to get at : Who made the
decision as to whether or not information that was received and that
was translated and was intelligible from the translation should be
passed from this pool to higher authority ?
A. That decision was the responsibility of the Office of Naval In-
telligence. In making decisions on most points myself, I was simply
acting for the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and more
directly for the head of the Far East section. That discretion was
left to me but I made a point, on occasion, of taking those things
up for final confirmation of my decision to Captain McCollum, as a
rule. The occasions were rather rare, however.
17. Q. Then as a matter of, let us say, routine procedure, you had
on the one hand a pool of intelligence information that had been
received and had been translated and was understandable, and one the
other hand you had 14 copies of information going up to higher
authority everyday?
A. Yes, sir.
18. Q. As I understand it, you were the officer who, as a routine mat-
ter, made the decision of wliat matter you would take out of this
pool and pass along to higher authority ; is that correct?
A. That is, in substance, correct ; yes, sir.
19. Q. And this matter that you passed along to higher authority,
that is, your 7 addressees or 6 addressees, received this information
from you directly from this pool as you selected it, without reference
to, let us say the Director of Naval Communications or other persons
in the Navy Department before you passed it along; is that correct?
A. That is not strictly correct, although in practice it often worked
that way. As a rule, an attempt was made to bring the whole book to'
Captain McCollum as head of the Far East section, and to the Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence first because the director oftentimes made
a point of taking that into the C. N. O. himself. It occasionally
happened during 1941 that the Director would take an item into the
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 851
C. N. O. himself, but because of the large volume of that stuff through
'41 it was left more and more to me.
20. Q. When you took this volume of traffic that you had assem-
bled yourself, say to Commander McCollum, or to the Director of
Naval Intelligence, did they ever detach any of the information,
that is, weed it out and throw it away, or did they confirm what you
had selected, or just exactly what was done when you referred it to
these other people who, in a way, let us say, sat over you ?
A. There was no eliminating of anything from this volume of
traffic since each of the books were made up in the same way. Occa-
sionally, however, the Director would indicate something as being of
greater or lesser interest to the C N. O., or the Secretary.
[9S4] 21. Q. You mean, then, that which you had indicated
yourself as being of interest to these addressees ?
A. Yes, sir, greater or less than I had indicated. That refers more
specifically to the period when I was making the summary of the
day's traffic. It usually ran two or three pages with from one to
five lines in a summary of the subject matter of the contents of th6
message. In the case of the latter part of '41, however, because of
the large volume again, I used a system of clipping the items of
greater importance and actually showing the original translation
to the Director.
22. Q. As I understand you, you say that you frequently made
some sort of a summary of a subject matter of information and
clipped it on to the file yourself ; is that correct ?
A. That was earlier in the year before the volume got so heavy
that we couldn't take time for those summaries.
23. Q. What was your practice the latter part of the year, say
the week preceding 7 December 1941? Did you make any summary
of important messages at that time for the information of addressees?
A. No, sir, I did not, ancl had not been doing it since about the
middle of '41, because of the very high volume of traffic concerned
with the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. The volume was not only high,
but individual messages often went to four or five or more, sometimes
15 typewritten pages. It was impracticable to summarize for that
reason alone, but also because of the fact that those messages fre-
quently had reference to half a dozen or more earlier messages,
diplomatic notes, and so forth. Consequently, in preparing these
books my principal objective was to get a brief reference foot-note
for each one of those references or break out the originals of those
earlier translations, attaching to those current messages, so that the
book itself would be as complete as possible, as self-contained as pos-
sible, when these senior officers were looking at them.
24. Q. It strikes me, Commander, as a matter of a practical thing,
that as the volume of dispatches or separate items increased, the de-
mand for a summary would have been greater than when the dis-
patches were less ?
A. I don't believe that was quite the case, since the earlier sum-
maries were intended to weed out the more important items from a
large volume of material covering the whole world. The greatest
percentage of the traffic in the fall of '41 had to do with two main
types of material : One was the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, and the
other was the circuit from Berlin to Tokyo, because of the fact that
852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
those two categories of traffic were being followed with considerable
interest and detail by all the senior addressees, almost every nies-
sage in folders in the latter part of '41 bore on those two subject
matters, that is, Japanese relations with the Germans, or German
information on their war in Europe being passed to the Japanese,
or on the current negotiations going on in Washington in which all
these addressees had a [9SS'\ direct interest, or hand. They
therefore wanted to see those things as promptly as possible, par-
ticularly those bearing on the Washington negotiations, because often-
times it was an item of information that we would be able to break
down, have it translated, only an hour or two before the Secretary
of State, for example, would be meeting the Japanese ambassador.
Hence it was more important to get the material to those people
promptly rather than to take time to brief these things, except to
the extent of indicating the subject matter of references contained
in those messages. Earlier in the year, to go back to those sum-
maries again, it normally took from one to two hours to make up a
summary, dictate it, that is, glancing through the book and dictat-
ing to the yeoman, followed by his immediately typing it up. That
delay was just not permissible during the fall of '41 at many times.
25. Q. The judge advocate understands, and he asks you this as a
matter of repetition, to make sure that the record is clear that you did,
however, indicate what jDarticular items of information that you
were delivering were of importance ?
A. That is true, yes, sir, by attaching clips to the messages in the
folders that were of most immediate interest in the day's volume.
26. Q. Can you recall from your experience in delivering these dis-
patches to these addressees — and let us use as an example the Office
of Chief of Naval Operations — did the Chief of Naval Operations as a
matter of custom usually read the entire file of dispatches that you
brought to him for his information ?
A. The majority of times the folder was left with his aide. Just
how much of that he read, I don't know, but in such cases I made a
point of pointing out to his aide, his flag secretary, which were the
things of most immediate importance or interest to the Admiral.
Occasionally I would indicate that the Admiral should see them at
once, or as soon as possible. At other times when a particular hot
item — if I may use that term — came in, I would request permission
to see the Admiral directly and would take it in. That happened
quite frequently during the fall of '41. By "frequently" I would say
two or three or four times a week.
27. Q. Then am I to understand that your custom of delivering
this file of information to the Chief of Naval Operations was by
leaving it with his aide ?
A. Yes, sir.
28. Q. But when you had items that you considered of great
urgency you presented it to the Chief of Naval Operations direct;
is that correct ?
A. I arranged with his aide to take it directly in, yes, sir, and waited
while the Admiral read it.
[956] 29. Q. I suppose if the Chief of Naval Operations were
not in his office at the time you arrived to make a delivery, you would
have left the information with his aide for later delivery; is that
correct ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 853
A. I would normally leave it with his aide for later delivery, yes,
sir, but in the meantime, of course, I would have gotten it to the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence and as a rule would indicate whether
Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox had seen it yet, or not. Admiral
Wilkinson would oftentimes then make a point of following it up to
see that the Admiral got the word.
30. Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and
ask you if you saw them on or iDefore the 7th of December, 1941.
The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63 ?
A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.
31. Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?
A, The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate
that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the
first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was re-
ceived by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly
after received.
32. Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to in-
tercepting any communications which would have executed the
phrases of this code ?
A. On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the
Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some
cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes.
He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave
them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do
know that he ararnged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G,
the section of Communications that handled this material, to have
any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers,
not only in OP-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the
Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people
who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions con-
tained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Because of that special ar-
rangement for this particular plain language message, when such a
message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of Decem-
ber, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it
as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Saff ord's office, and
from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain
Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again,
because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and be-
cause of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle
this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I
did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one
of the third or fourth.
[957] 33. Q. You say it is your recollection that you received
some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the
language set out in Document 15 ; is that correct?
A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.
34. Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese
language words you received ?
A. Higashi No Kazeame. I am quite certain. The literal meaning
of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese
language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a
break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the
eastward, the United States.
854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
35. Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that
you saw which contained the words about which you have testified,
Higashi No Kazeame ?
A. I am almost certain it was typewritten, I believe it was on
teletype paper.
36. Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you
saw it ?
A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, how-
ever, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down
current systems that were being read.
37. Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that
was contained in this communication ?
A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is
that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. NaVy
intercept station.
38. Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge
of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it ;
is that correct ?
A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be infer-
ence.
39. Q. Have you seen that communication since ?
A. I have had no occasion to ; no, sir.
40. Q. The question was, have you seen it since ?
A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to.
41. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 65, Avhich is in evidence before
this court. I will ask you to examine Documents 1, 2, 3 and 4 in this
exhibit and state whether or not you had seen or been informed of
these documents on or before 7 December 1941 ?
A. I may have seen one or more of these messages, but since every
one of these is of the nature I have earlier described, I didn't handle
any of these. I know I saw one wiiich I previously referred to, which
was the first one of this category referred to. There may have been
others of [9S8] the same nature come through handled as I
indicated that first one was handled, but I have no recollection of such
further messages.
42. Q. Can you recall in the distribution of the information which
was your custom to do directly, whether or not any matter pertaining
to these Japanese words had been taken by you to the list of distributees
in the govermnent in Washington ?
A. Not by me, no, sir. Special arrangements, as I referred to earlier,
had been made for handling this particular type of message.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter,
entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, withdraw.
[959] 43. Q. Then adverting to Exhibit 65, which you have
just examined, it is the judge advocate's understanding that you
do not recall having seen any one of the documents concerned therein,
although you may have seen them ?
A. That is correct, yes, sir. In fact, I can amplify by saying that
I believe I saw at least one and possibly more of those.
44. Q. Would you be able to state to the court which ones you think
you saw ?
A. I could not be certain ; no, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 855
45. Q. I show you exhibit 66, which is a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations dated 3 December 1941, and released by J. R.
Redmond, and having to do with the destruction of certain confiden-
tial matters ; will you state whether or not you saw this dispatch on
or before 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, I drafted this message.
46. Q. That message refers to the destruction of purple machines
in certain areas. Did that language, the destruction of a particular
type of machine in certain places, have any special significance to
you?
A. This particular message was not drafted as an interpretation
of the decrypted traffic from which it was taken, but simply a brief
of that traffic addressed to four addressees who were familiar with
the character of that traffic, because of the narrow channel that this
traffic, this Kopek message was confined to and the fact that only
the addressees on that narrow channel would know what it meant.
Normally, i nfact I will go further by stating that almost without ex-
ception, this channel was not intended or used as a channel for inter-
preting that traffic. It was a technical channel. Any interpretation
or evaluation would normally go from the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence or War Plans, or the CNO's office.
47. Q. Will you tell the court what special significance this mes-
sage should have to an addressee who understood it ?
A. To the four addressees to whom it was sent, the interpretation
would presumably be the same as I inferred personally when I
drafted the message and indicated the desirability of sending it out;
in other words, an interpretation that the destruction of codes normal-
ly preceded an intended break in relations or else a serious diplo-
matic crisis.
48. Q. It that all that message inferred ?
A. The fact that only United States, British, and Dutch addressees
were included as action addressees by the Japanese traffic, indicated
that the nations referred to were very likely one or more of those
two. By "indicated", I of course referred to my previous answer, as
being the nations most likely involved in a probable diplomatic crisis,
or actual break, or possibly even war.
[960] 49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20 before this court, which is
a dispatch from OpNav to certain addressees and also sets out infor-
mation that the Japanese in certain areas are destroying codes and
ciphers and burning important confidential and secret documents.
I ask you if you were acquainted with that message on or before
7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, I did see this message, after it went, however.
50. Q. Can you state what the purpose of sending Exhibit 66 was.
when Exhibit 20 had been sent on the same day to practically the
same addressees ; in other words, is there anything added by 66 that
was not sent in Exhibit 20 ?
A. Exhibit 20 was drafted, I believe, by then Commander McCol-
lum, head of the Far East section; and as an example of an inter-
preting message for this Japanese decrypted traffic being sent out, to
which I referred a question or two before, this exhibit here, No. 66 —
the Kopek channel was purely the technical channel giving a brief
of the actual decrypted traffic ; 20 was the interpreting message from
the Director of Naval Intelligence.
856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
51. Q. Can you state whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations
had been informed of the information contained in Exhibit 66?
A. I can only state that I am almost certain he was. I can't swear
he was, because I am not certain whether the folder with that par-
ticular message was shown him by myself or his aide.
52. Q. Do you have any recollection of a dispatch containing about
500 words which is purported to have been prepared by Commander
McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and which dispatch was
supposed to have contained a summary of information on late develop-
ments in Japanese-United States relationships, and which dispatch
was intended to have been sent to certain addressees outside of Wash-
ington ? I ask you, do you have any knowledge of such a document or
dispatch having been prepared ?
A. I first heard of that several weeks after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. I have never seen the message and have no first-hand knowl-
edge of it.
53. Q. Do you have any first-hand knowledge of what happened to
the message ; that is, whether it was sent or whether it was not ?
A. As I stated, I first heard of its existence only several weeks
later and my information is rather sketchy in various ramifications of
how it was handled.
54. Q. I am going to show you a series of documents from Exhibit
63, which relate as a matter of general information to [961] an
exchange of dispatches between the Japanese home government and
the Hawaiian area, and having to do with the location of ships, or a
request for information concerning ships. The first is document
24. I will ask you if you saw it on or before 7 December 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
55. Q. Can you recall whether it was referred to the Chief of Naval
Operations or not at or about the time of its receipt?
A. Again I am not positive whether the Chief of Naval Operations
actually saw it, but I know that it would have been in a folder that
was left in his office.
56. Q. I show you document 36 from the same exhibit and ask you
whether you saw that document on or before 7 December 1941.
A. Yes, sir, I saw this. I would like to remark on this as well as
the previous message that it was not at all an unusual type of mes-
sage. The same sort of things had been going to Japanese counsuls
and diplomatic posts all over the world for the past year or more.
Furthermore, the United States Government had been sending similar
sorts of messages through Navy channels, liaison officers, naval at-
taches, as well as via diplomatic channels to places where there were
no naval representatives — watching ship movements. We know that
with the abrogation or termination of the commercial treaty with
Japan, and a short time previously with the closing of the canal to
Japanese shipping, at about the time we know Japanese shipping was
being recalled from the Atlantic, the Japanese were watching ship
movements even more closely than they had before. These two mes-
sages you have shown me were somewhat more emphatic messages
of that nature. Directives were going out from Tokyo periodically ;
that is, every few months, sometimes indicated as being the request
of the Navy Minister, to watch ship movements. We know that the
Japanese diplomatic service was doing it, and doing a conscientious
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 857
job on it. In fact, I recall the Japanese consul in Seattle stating in
one report that he had gone down to the docks and seen certain ships,
and so reported.
57. Q. I am going to show you document 39 from Exhibit 63. This
document, or certain parts of it, is a message that has been testified was
received in the Navy Department on the evening of 6 December 1941.
In order to save a lot of categorical questions, I am going to ask you
to relate in detail the information that you yourself know about this
message from the time it first came to your attention until it was
delivered to the various distributees in the government at Washington,
to whom you usually made delivery.
A. I recognize this message as the one, the fiirst [OS^] thir-
teen parts of which we received on 6 December 1941. I was about
to leave the office the middle of Saturday afternoon, 6 December, when
I made a final check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was
anything apparently hot coming in, particularly in view of the fact
that we had beea expecting a reply for a week or ten days to the United
States note of 26 November. In view of other developments that
we had seen taking place in the diplomatic traffic and otherwise, it
was apparent things were shaping up to some sort of a crisis — conse-
quently, the reply should be coming through momentarily. At 3 :00
o'clock on the 6th, the message was coming in — so I waited and held
my team of translators there, and it turned out to be a part of the reply.
We turned to, and by 9 :00 o'clock Saturday, the evening of the 6th
of December, had received, broken down, translated, and had typed
ready for delivery, thirteen of those parts, several of them somewhat
garbled. At 9 :05 approximately, I phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his
home, telling him in guarded language the nature of what I had and
what I proposed to do with it. He confirmed, or rather, approved, my
plan for distribution. I accordingly proceeded at once to the White
House, left a folder with that 13-part message and one or two others
with an aide of Admiral Beardall, who was aide to the President, with
rather emphatic instructions to get to the President as quickly as
possible. The President was entertaining at the moment. I then
proceeded at once to Secretary Knox's apartment on Connecticut
Avenue, and waited there while he read the message, the traffic.
Mrs. Knox was also present, as well as a business associate, I be-
lieve acting manager of his newspaper, the Chicago Daily "News".
After Secretary Knox read the material, we had a brief discussion in
one corner, chiefly because there were a number of references to previous
messages in that particular 13-part message, and I remember we dis-
cussed certain points about it. He made some phone calls, I believe to
Mr. Stimson and to Mr. Hull ; and after these calls indicated that there
would be a meeting at the State Department at 10 :00 o'clock the follow-
ing morning, Sunday, and he wanted me there with that material and
anything else that had come in. From there I went to Admiral Wil-
kinson's residence in Arlington, where I knew Admiral Beardall, the
President's aide, also was at dinner, and was there until about 12 :15,
past midnight, while he read the material I had, and I indicated who
had received it. Admiral AVilkinson made some phone calls which
included, I believe. Admiral Stark, and I think Admiral Turner,
though I am not certain. I had tried both of these officers' residences
earlier in the evening — Stark and Turner's — but neither were at home ;
858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and left Admiral Wilkinson's home about 12 :15 a. m. December 7, and
went back to the Navy Department about 12 : 30. My return to the
Navy Department was for two reasons : to leave these folders under
proper safeguards, safe, as well as to check up on any possible new
traffic that might have come in, particularly part 14, which was still
missing. Nothing [963] was in of importance at that time,
so I went home. I would like to insert parenthetically in connection
with that going home, that I was on tap any hour of the day and night
by GY Watch Officers, for anything that appeared to be of interest.
\Vlien we were expecting anything of importance, I made a point of
instructing them to call me if messages with a certain originator, such
as Tokyo or Berlin, had come in.
58. Q. Is it correct that you did not deliver the 13 parts of this
message you have just been testifying about on the night of 6-7
December, to Admiral Stark?
A. I did" not deliver that 13-part message to Admiral Stark the
night of 6-7 December. I did, however, get the word to Admiral
Wilkinson, as I stated earlier, and I am almost certain that Admiral
Wilkinson was in touch with Admiral Stark or his aids, because at
the time I left Admiral Wilkinson's home he indicated to me that
I was to have all that material, as well as any new material that
came in, ready for them in the Navy Department the first thing in
the morning.
59. Q. It is my understanding that you had been expecting such
a dispatch as this Exhibit 39 for some days?
A. That is correct, yes, sir.
60. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63, and ask you if you
were familiar with that document on or prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. I am almost certain that this is one of many that I did see. I
cannot swear about this particular one, because it is of the same nature
as probably 200 others of that form.
61. Q. As you inspect this document, is that the type of document
that you would have normally included in your file to show to the
distributees in the Navy Department ?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
62. Q. Adverting again to this message that started to come in on
the evening of 6 December, and of which you received thirteen parts,
will you state when you again became acquainted with any other
matter that related to these thirteen parts — that is a continuation
thereof?
A. I received no phone calls during the night, and consequently
arrived at the Navy Department not before about 7:30 in the morn-
ing. At that time, other material was coming in. That was being
translated, checked, written up, and at about 9 : 00 o'clock the 13-part
message, together with the new material, was left at Admiral Stark's
office, where there was apparent 1}^ a meeeting. My recollection is
that it was about 9 : 00 o'clock. There was a meeting apparently gath-
ering, not yet in progress. I returned at once to my office to finish
preparation of the other folders and get together material for the
Secretary, left the Navy Department about 9 : 30 to make delivery to
the White House, for which the Navy Department was at that time
responsible, and was at the State Department at about ten minutes
to 10 : 00, waiting for Mr. Knox, to whom I [OGJ^] gave that
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 859
material. The material concerned in this particular folder was the
thirteen parts received the night before plus one or two other ones,
plus the fourteenth part, which had arrived early in the morning,
plus one or two other ones. This particular delivery did not include
the message directing delivery of their note to the United States at
1300. That had arrived at the Navy Department when I got back
to my office, and was being translated.
The court then, at 11 : 00 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 10 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: AH the members; the judge advocate and his counsel;
all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold
R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were
present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S'. Naval Reserve, '
reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were
present.
Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) :
[96S] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
63. Q. You may continue with your testimony.
A. When I had returned to the Navy Department at approximately
1020, a message directing in rather emphatic language that delivery
be made to the Secretary of State at 1300 had been received, together
with a series of other messages, one of which directed final destruction
of Japanese codes still on hand — those remaining after the earlier di-
rective on the destruction of codes the week before. There was another
message thanking the ambassador for his services, another addressed
to the embassy staff, and one or two others of like nature. That mate-
rial was delivered within ten to fifteen minutes to Admiral Stark's
office — to the meeting then in progress. I then left, very much in a
hurry, to go to the White House and to the meeting at the State De-
partment to deliver that new material. The delay between the time
I had returned to the Navy Department at 1020 and when I started
delivery was simply a clerical detail entailed in typing and putting it
in the folder. When I delivered this new material, including the direc-
tive of delivery of the Japanese diplomatic note to be made at 1300
to the State Department, I made a point of verbally inviting the atten-
tion of Mr. Knox to the times involved. The reason I did that was the
fact that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy,
might not have seen at first glance the implications of the times. We
had known that for some weeks passed the Japs were negotiating with
certain elements in Thailand, specifically the Thailand Chief of Staff,
with the view of forcing the hand of the Thai premier, who had stated
earlier he was maintaining a neutral position and that if any nation,
whether the Japanese or British, crossed his borders, it would mean
that he would call on the other party to come to his assistance. The
Japs came and apparently involved either a demonstration or an actual
landing at Kota Bharu, Just below the Thai border on the Malay pen-
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 12
860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
insula. Because of the tactical terrain features there, it was expected
that the British would cross the Thai border, heading for the rail center
of Singora. With that expectation in mind, namely, of forcing the
British to cross the Thai border, the Japanese, together with the Thai
Chief of Staff, could force the premier to call on the Japanese for help,
in line with his earlier statement of policy. In addition, we knew the
way the United States-Japanese negotiations had been heading up.
We knew that on 30 November the Japanese for the first time during
1941 had opened up on the subject and progress of these negotiations
to the Germans, their allies. Up to this message of 30 November, the
Germans had been kept largely in the dark, including the Japanese
Ambassador, Oshima, in Berlin. We received that message, I believe,
either the 1st or 2nd of December and distributed it the same date. I
emphasize that [966] message, because in that message there
was one statement which, in translation, came very close to what we
had used in our write-up of the message, namely, — and I quote — "that
sooner than anyone imagined Japan would be at war with the Anglo
Saxons." Subsequent to that we had the directive on the partial de-
struction of codes. We also had a rather urgent message around the
2nd or 3rd directing the Jap Embassy in Washington to have the Sec-
ond Secretary Takahashi, as I recall his name, leave the country at
once. We knew that this Second Secretary, ever since his arrival
earlier in the spring, was an especially trained espionage man and he
had a number of especially trained men with him. His chief concern
during the summer was in setting up an espionage establishment in
Latin America. The fact that he was directed to leave was a further
straw in the wind. We made a point of seeing that he did not leave
before the break. All these things, together with the sighting of a
large movement of Japanese ships down the coast of French Indo
China about Thursday, its subsequent sightings on Friday and Sat-
urday, and its position on Saturday, December 6, approximately a
day's run from Kota Bharu, added up in my mind, at least, to some-
thmg more than coincidence. In other words, the directive for deliv-
ery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7 : 30 at Pearl
Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu. I simply
pointed out the coincidence of those times to the Secretary. I did not
feel it necessary to point out such a thing to the officers of the Navy
Department, since it would be quite apparent to them. From that
point, there was no further traffic.
Examined by the court :
64. Q. Where did you go after you left the Secretary?
A. To my office. The remarks I made at the State Department were
not to the Secretary directly
65. Q. Are you speaking of Hull or Knox?
A. Knox. But to a State Department Foreign Service Officer who
regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull and to whom I made simi-
lar remarks inviting attention to the importance of the material I was
delivering; and it was this officer who took the folder into Mr. Knox,
together with my remarks. I then returned to the Navy Department,
and no further traffic on the Japanese system came in. I should amend
that. No further traffic to Washington in the Japanese system came in.
Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) :
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 861
66. Q. Does the judge advocate understand that you delivered in
person this document containing the information about the delivery
of the Japanese note to the State Department at 1300 to the Chief of
Naval Operations in person ?
A. When I called at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations be-
tween approximately 10 : 30 and a quarter to eleven — I'm not certain
of the time — a meeting was still in progress [967] there with
probably fifteen officers present. I asked for Admiral Stark's aide,
who came out. I told him I had something else that was highly im-
portant and handed it to him and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's
desk.
Examined by the court :
67. Q. What was that?
A. That included the message on the 1300 delivery.
68. Q. Who was it?
A. Admiral Stark's aide, Flag Secretary Wellburn.
Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) :
69. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if that
is the message to which you refer in connection with delivering a diplo-
matic reply to the Secretary of State at 1300 ?
A. Yes, sir, that is. This particular message was translated by
Army.
Examined by the court :
70. Q. Will you tell us what time it came to the Navy Department?
A. This was one which had been received by my office when I re-
turned from the first delivery to the State Department and the Wliite
House at about 10 : 20, and I delivered them at about 10 : 30 to the
conference then in Admiral Stark's office. This is the 1 p. m. message.
Examined by the judge advocate (Continued) :
71. Q. Do you of your own knowledge know at what time Admiral
Stark first got the information contained in document 41 ?
A. I don't know of my own knowledge.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold K. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
72. Q. Would you mind repeating the statement which you just
made off the record as to the delivery of this message ?
A. As I stated, I have no direct knowledge of whether Admiral
Stark had already received that information. It is possible, however,
that he had, since the message was written up and distributed by
Army. Consequently, General Marshall would very likely have re-
ceived it some minutes before my office did and General Marshall
might very well have 'phoned Admiral Stark.
[968] 73. Q. I direct your attention to Exhibit 63 in this pro-
ceeding and particularly call your attention to the fact on some of the
documents contained in that exhibit there appears a rubber stamp and
on other documents that rubber stamp is absent. On some of the
documents which contain the rubber stamp there is a pencil mark
surrounding certain of the figures. Will you explain to the court the
significance or lack of significance of the stamp on certain of those
documents ? I am particularly interested in loiowing whether or not
it represents anything with respect to the routing of those documents.
A. That stamp was made up by my office at the time we stopped
making summaries of the day's book around the middle of 1941. The
862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
first two items in the upper left-hand corner are intended to mean a
single or double asterisk. In other words, a single asterisk, as I
earlier used, indicated an item of interest. A double asterisk indi-
cated items of the highest interest or immediate urgency. "One"
referred to Secretary Knox, "Ten" to Admiral Stark, "Twelve" to
Admiral Turner of War Plans. I normally used that stamp when we
were not too pressed for time. In the fall of 1941, however, there
were many occasions when the urgency of delivery was greater than
taking time to stamp the half-dozen copies to indicate interest. In
other words, I made a point in such cases of verbally indicating in-
terest. As a rule, those items would be only a few in a special, single
folder.
74. Q. When there is a pencilled circle around the number, I assume
that means that the message was delivered to the persons indicated by
the circled figures ; is that correct?
A. It indicates that of course, but it does not infer that other mes-
sages w^ere not so delivered.
75. Q. With respect to the particular message, does it mean that it
was not delivered to others than those whose numbers are circled ?
A. No, it does not.
76. Q. What was the purpose of circling the numbers when you did
use the stamp ?
A. It was a matter of special interest or otherwise to those indi-
viduals. In other words, one message might be of much interest to
Secretary Knox, who was following the negotiations with Japan very
closely. Another message having to do with the change of the Japa-
nese system might be of much interest to Admiral Noyes — the techni-
cal aspects of it. Another message might be of much interest to
London, not only technical but those directly affecting London. It
was purely a matter of interest.
77. Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code
and the execute message following it you stated that the execute was
taken to mean that strained relations or a break in relations or, pos-
sibly, war might follow between Japan and the United States.
Would you indicate to [9€9] the court why you phrased your
answer that way, that is, indicating tliat it might mean any one of
those three things rather than one of those three specifically?
A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese lan-
guage in that they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by indirec-
tion and by inference.
78. Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section could not
have stated categoricall}^ that this message meant war or merely a
break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities
were available to anyone interpreting that message?
A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not
interpret that message as meaning definitely war.
79. Q. In connection with the 14-part message, did you consider
the first 13 parts of tlie message, which you had received up to a par-
ticular point when you made your first distribution, particularly sig-
nificant with respect to the imminence of war, or were you waiting
for the information that might be contained in some subsequent parts
before making that evaluation?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 863
A. The tone of the first 13 parts was so much stronger than had
been the tone of earlier Japanese notes that it was quite apparent tliat
with the delivery of this note the Japanese had in view a termination
of the negotiations which had been going on through 1941. Further
than that, it was purely a matter of deduction.
80. Q. Would you say that you felt in your own mind that diplo-
matic relations were being ruptured until you had seen the 14th part
of the message?.
A. Even seeing the 14th part I could not state definitely that diplo-
matic relations were ruptured, only that the negotiations reaching an
understanding with the United States on trade and so forth were being
terminated.
81. Q. In answer to a question you related certain background
which you had in mind when you called the attention of the Secre-
tary, through the Foreign Service officer, to the time of delivery of
this note. To whom had this information which you have recounted
here been given so far as the higher echelons in the Navy Department
were concerned, or was this merely a matter of your own personal
background which assisted you in the work of your section ?
A. Every message I referred to in my earlier statement had been
delivered to all the six addressees that I referred to previously.
82. Q. But had the detailed background which you recounted here
been assembled in a formal statement and presented, for example,
to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director [970'\ of
Naval Communications, or the Chief of Naval Operations, or was this
matter which you had gathered from these same dispatches ?
A. These were simply matters that occurred to me on the way over
to the meeting at the State Department at 11 : 00 o'clock. However,
they were all matters of which the other addressees were fully cog-
nizant, having seen the traffic concerned earlier as they were trans-
lated and delivered. ;
The court then, at 11 : 50 a. m., took a recess until 1 : 30 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.
[971] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his
counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel
were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.
Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the
oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
83. Q. Will you please give a very brief statement as to the reasons
for the Kopek Channel and the limitations of the type of communi-
cations that were sent in that channel ?
A. That code word "Kopek" was simply a code designator for
material in a crypt channel having to do with technical aspects of
864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
this decryption. Exchange was made in that channel only between
the three stations, namely, Navy Department, Washington; Pearl
Harbor, and the Asiatic Station in that channel.
84. Q. To what oiRcerS were these dispatches particularly directed
in the various areas?
A. The purpose of having those stations set up where they were,
more specifically at Pearl and in the Asiatic Station, was to service
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet. Consequently, delivery to those stations in that chan-
nel involved the presumption that the officers handling that material
at those stations would supplement it with any local material they
may have picked up by intercept and comparable decrypting activi-
ties there and furnish it to the flag officers concerned.
85. Q. I show you Document 38 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you
saw this about the 6th of December, 1941, and if so at what time.
This is the dispatch informing the Japanese legation that a long
dispatch would be transmitted shortly and setting forth that a defi-
nite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long dispatch.
A. I believe that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th,
along with the first 13 parts.
86. Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your
previous testimony as being some of the "other material"?
A. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
[972] (sic.) that by stating that I am not positive that this is one of
them, although it very probably was. I put it that way because of
the fact that the existence of 14 parts of the message would be indi-
cated internally in each one of the 14 parts, so having received just
one part we would know there were 14 parts to it because it would
be so indicated in that one part, but I believe this is one of the
messages received the evening before.
87. Q. Will you give as best you can recall what you told the
Secretary of the Navy on the evening of 6 December 1941 at the time
that you delivered the first 13 parts of the long message and the
other dispatches?
A. Initially I didn't tell him anything, other than to state in my
earlier 'phone call and when I appeared in his apartment that I had
something that appeared very important. He spent about 15 or 20
minutes reading the material I had and then some minutes more
making 'phone calls. And then for about another 10 or 15 minutes
there was a rather informal conversation, the first part of which was
only between the Secretary and myself, and then later on we talked
about diversified things not connected with this but the general politi-
cal picture in which Mr. Knox and his manager of the Chicago
Daily News also joined. The conversation in that more open dis-
cussion didn't concern this technical material so much because of the
security aspects and the strictness we were under regarding handling
and who should know about it. The convei'sation of mine with Mr.
Knox chiefly concerned some of the references appearing and men-
tioned some of the previous points that were brought up in that long
13-part message.
[Notation in margin :] H B.
88. Q. Do you recall any particular evaluation that was given by
the Secretary on these dispatches in the general relations between
Japan and the United States ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 865
A. No, I don't. He did not comment particularly on what his
views were on the prospects of a break. In other words, that was in
line with a characteristic of Mr. Knox, particularly at the end of
about a year after he had first been shown this material and had
been repeatedly indoctrinated — and I use that word advisedly — by
myself and Admiral Wilkinson on the security features in handling
this type of material. Mr. Knox was thoroughly conversant with
this material and fully backed us up on any measures the Director
of Naval Intelligence wanted to take relative to the security of that
material. I would say it was with that security feature in mind that
he did not express himself in the presence of that business associate
of his, and possibly his wife.
89. Q. When you took this same material to Admiral Wilkinson,
will you state as best you can recall what reaction or comments that
he made on the reading of these dispatches?
A. I couldn't put words in his mouth. Nothing stood out particu-
larly in the course of our conversation. It was obvious, though, that
things were reaching a crisis and Admiral Wilkinson expressed him-
self along those lines as well as myself; that is, in the course of the
informal conversation there was a general agreement on the fact that
things were shaping up in some sort of a crisis so far as negotiations
and [97S] relations with Japan were concerned. Admiral
Beardall was present, of course, too, and took part in that conversa-
tion as well.
90. Q. Wlio were at the conference in the office of the Chief of
Naval Operations on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was so pressed for time that morning that I'm not certain just
who was there. I have a general impression that when I made the
hurried delivery at 9 : 00 o'clock that there was about 12 or 15 officers
present. Most of the heads of divisions in the Navy Department and
those that attended the Admirals' conference were there. I know that
Admiral Wilkinson was there, and in fact I felt a sense of relief that
he was there because I was able to deliver a copy of the thing to him
and let him carry the ball with Admiral Stark as far as any further
explanation or references were concerned.
91. Q. Do you know about what time Admiral Stark came to his
office on Sunday morning, the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. No, I don't.
92. Q. To whom did you actually deliver the dispatches on the
morning of 7 December 1941 at the White House; that is, who
received them?
A. I'm not certain of the name but it was one of Admiral Beardall's
assistants in the situation room which he had set up around for the
White House. I believe — I am again not positive — it was Lieutenant
Commander Leahy who was senior assistant to Admiral Beardall.
93. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you
have seen this dispatch before, and if so, when? This dispatch is
from Tokyo to Honolulu and relates to the receiving of reports on ship
movements and includes the instructions that Honolulu will report
even when there are no movements.
A. Yes, sir, I received that. ,
94. Q. About what time did you see it ?
866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The fact that the date 5 December is on here would indicate
that I saw it that day ; since it was a Navy translation it is one that
I would have reviewed before it was written up.
95. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, which is a copy of a
dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports of ships in defi-
nite areas at Pearl Harbor, and ask you whether you have seen that
dispatch before, and if so, when?
A. I believe I have seen this also, and the fact that the date 5 De-
cember is on this also would indicate that I received it or first saw it
about that date. It is an Army translation.
[974.] 96. Q. I show you Document 40 of Exhibit 63 which is a
dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo giving the location of battleships
ancl other ships in definite areas in Pearl Harbor on the date that the
dispatch was sent, and also gives the courses and distances on such
courses of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor, and ask you
whether or not you have seen this dispatch, and if so, when ?
A. Yes, sir, I am quite certain I have seen this also. The only clue
I have to the time I saw it would be the date appearing on this thing,
namely, 6 December 1941. I might amplify further: This message,
as well as those others you have shown me, was only some of quite a
few of that category which had been appearing through the year.
The Jap Consul had been reporting on our major unit moves about
the training grounds in the vicinity of Pearl and any other informa-
tion on our ship movements that he could get. Sometimes it was on
the direction of Tokyo ; sometimes on his own initiative.
97. Q. Were these other dispatches to which you have just referred
gone into with such meticulous details as to the ships that were going
to be in certain definite areas and a certain definite harbor at a certain
definite time?
A. No, sir. This is the first one, I believe, in which specific areas in
Pearl Harbor were mentioned. They had previously referred to the
location of things by names of places such as Ford Island or the Fuel
Dock, or things like that, rather than these specific, defined areas.
98. Q. Now, referring to your previous examination as to the inter-
pretation of the winds message in which you have divided the possi-
ble interpretation into three general classes: strained relations, a
break in diplomatic relations, or war. During the period of, say,
from the 2nd or 3rd of December 1941 to tlie 7th of December 1941
wherein all of these dispatches indicated specific areas in which the
Japanese were particularly interested, did you come to any particu-
lar deduction at that time as to which of the three meanings was
really intended by the winds message?
A. The inference I gained from these was to the effect that the Jap-
anese were concerned about locations of major U. S. Naval units.
They had been similarly concerned, however, about locations, types
and numbers of planes in the Philippines. They had been similarly
concerned about almost all aspects of military establishments, forces
and so forth in the Netherlands East Indies.
[97S] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Keserve,
reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
99. Q. You have previously made reference to an intercepted dis-
patch between Tokyo and Berlin in which Tokyo had informed Berlin
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 867
that there would be war with the Anglo-Saxons in the immediate
future.
A. The expression I used, which was the closest we could come to a
precise translation of the Japanese, was, "Sooner than anyone
imagines."
100. Q. In view of the dispatch between Tokyo and Berlin as to
the proximity of war with the Anglo-Saxons, did that dispatch and
these other dispatches just now shown you, lead you to any deductions
as to whether the wind message really meant a strained relationship
or a break in diplomatic relations or war — and the execution of that
dispatch would bring about one of those three classes of decisions?
A. To go back first to my interpretation of the sense of that wind
message, I did not mean to infer that there was any definite implica-
tion of war. "What I did mean, what I think I stated, was that it
implied a severe straining of relations, which could be inferred to
imply as including an actual rupture of relations, or possibly even
war. To come back to your specific question now, we knew they were
planning something against Britain. I have already referred to the
negotiations with the Thai people. We knew, too, that the Japs were
very much aware of the fact we were doing a great deal for the British
in their war and working closely with them. In fact, it was almost
a joint front as regards negotiations with the Japs. That note that
we had handed the Japanese on 26 November had only been given
to them after consultation, with Japanese knowledge, with the Dutch
and Chinese as well as the British. Consequently, the inference on
this particular attention to ship movements in Pearl Harbor was that
the Japs were very concerned about what action we were taking, where
our Fleet might be, what action we might take in case the Japs did
make a move against the "British. There was no slightest indication
at any time of any overt intentions directed against the United States,
from this material.
' 101. Q. But you have testified that it was the first time that there
had been any inquiry made as to the exact locations of certain definite
ships and certain definite areas in Pearl Harbor, have you not?
A. It was the first time they had used that particular means of
identifying areas. They had been getting information and asking
for information not only about Pearl but other places — the locations
of our ships.
102. Q. But it was the first time, was it not, that they had asked
for it in such detail as in these dispatches ?
A. Yes, sir, that is true of Pearl Harbor.
\9^6^^ Cross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude
C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
103. Q. Referring to Exhibit 20, which is the December 3 message
from OpNav to addressees, saying that certain codes were destroyed
and also referring to Exhibit 66, which is from OpNav on the Kopek
circuit saying approximately the same thing, I refer you to your tes-
timony this morning and ask you if you did not say that in the OpNav
message of December 3, it was an example of the evaluation of intelli-
gence information ?
A. I believe that is the expression I used.
104. Q. And in connection with that, in Exhibit 20 what portion
of the message did you refer to as being an example of the evaluation ;
could you just repeat the words, or dictate the words?
868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I had nothing to do with the drafting of this message from
OpNav. OpNav had been given the same information which I had
sent in the Kopek channel, and O. N. I. in this case I happened to know
Commander McCollum felt he was warranted in drafting a dispatch
on the subject of this destruction of codes. I didn't see this message
until some days later, as a matter of fact.
105. Q. Well, the point, Commander, sir — in Exhibit 20 what por-
tion of the message were you referring to when you were referring to
the evaluation?
A. Evaluation was perhaps not quite the right word. The more
precise statement of their function in that regard would be that In-
telligence sent it out as intelligence, rather than simply the technical
channel of exchange.
106. Q. In the last portion of this document there are the words,
which have a line drawn through them, which say, "From information
infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." Would
that be the language of evaluation of that information ?
A. That of course is an evaluation of the information appearing
earlier in the dispatch.
Examined by the court :
107. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge that Secretary Kjiox
himself received the so-called 1 : 00 p. m. message while at the State
Department, or that the oral interpretation of the situation of the
time of delivery — that is, 1 : 00 p. m. — was transmitted to him person-
ally by the State Department official mentioned ?
A. I was not present, so I am not certain of my own knowledge, but
as certain as I can be otherwise, because the Secretary to Mr. Hull, who
handled that, had only about ten feet to go to deliver that message to
those three secretaries sitting around the table there.
108. Q. I was wondering more as to the interpretation orally given
about the daylight — the situation as to 1 : 00 p. m. — whether the man
who translated it understood what it was about.
A. I explained that to him so that he would have the [977]
picture.
109. Q. But it wasn't written down at all?
A. No, sir.
110. Q. That message was transmitted by the War Department?
A. Yes, sir.
111. Q. And the War Department had the same procedure that you
did — they sent copies to the Navy Department, copies to the White
House, and copies to the State Department?
A. No, sir. The War Department had responsibility at that time
to the State Department, Navy Department, and the White House.
112. Q. So the chances are that that message was sent by the War
Department to the Secretary of State at the same time it was sent
to the Navy Department?
A. That" is correct. Colonel Bratton was at the State Department
at 10:00 o'clock with material for Mr. Hull as well as Mr. Stimson.
He was again there about 11:00 o'clock— about the same time I was
there with new material.
113. Q. So that if the note got to the Secretary of the Navy when
he was with the Secretary of State, he perhaps had that at the same
time you got it in the Navy Department ?
A. Yes, sir, all three secretaries got it about the same time.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 869
114. Q. Commander, you have discussed these different supersecret
messages flowing into the Navy Department and being delivered. Do
you recall that you delivered personally any of these messages to the
Chief of Operations and discussed them with him?
A. No, sir, I did not. I do know that it was delivered at about
9 : 00 o'clock on December 7, because I was just inside the door of
Admiral Stark's office while his aide. Commander Wellborn, took
the messages over to his desk.
115. Q. Did you see Admiral Stark at 9:00 o'clock in his office on
the morning of December 7?
A. Admiral Stark was there with Admiral Wilkinson.
116. Q. At 9:00 o'clock that morning?
A. It was approximately 9 : 00 o'clock ; I am not positive of that
time.
117. Q. And at that time, at 9:00 o'clock, you delivered to his
aide, and you are sure you say that Admiral Stark got them — the
tliirteen parts that you have been discussing; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
118. Q. Then at 10:20 when you came back, and you got this
message of 1 : 00 p. m. time of delivery, you went in and delivered
[978] that message — did you go and deliver that message to the
Chief of Operations' office ?
A. In that case I did not step inside the door, but Commander
AVellborn came to the door and I handed it to him.
119. Q. Admiral Stark was there at that time?
A. I believe so, although I can't state positively he was at his
desk or in there.
120. Q. In your activities in Washington as delivering these mes-
sages, did you at any time, or were you at any time present at con-
ferences with State Department, War Department oflScials, and with
the Chief of Naval Operations, discussing these secret and super-
secret messages ?
A. No, sir.
121. Q. Keferring to the letter of November 26, which the Secre-
tary of State handed to the Japanese officials, were you fully cognizant
of the contents of that letter ?
A. Not until it was sent out in the Japanese circuit.
122. Q. When did it go out on the Japanese circuit?
A. I believe it was the 27th, sir ; I am not certain.
123. Q. Did you deliver the substance of this message to the office
of Chief of Naval Operations; was that in the daily reports going
in to him ?
A. I don't believe I ever saw the text of our message. Admiral.
124. Q. It was a plain language message as handed in English by
the Secretary of State ?
A. Yes, sir.
125. Q. And I asked you if you were familiar with the contents
of that message.
A. By stating I knew of it on the 26th, I knew it had gone out —
that the Japanese had transmitted such a message.
126. Q. And you were familiar with its contents ?
A. Only in a general way, knowing the tenor of the negotiations
of the previous week.
870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
127. Q. From November 27 to December 7, did you consider, having
been cognizant of these messages flowing in — did you consider that
negotiations and conversations were continuing between the State
Department and the Japanese representatives ?
A. I knew some conversations were continuing, but we also had
had a message from Tokyo in which Tokyo directed such conversa-
tions continue.
128. Q. To continue?
A Y^ps sir
129. Q.' Kef erring to document 7 of Exhibit 63, in which [979]
Tokyo directs all arrangements for signing of agreement be com-
pleted by 25 November, are you familiar with that?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
130. Q. Was this message which you have in hand delivered to the
Office of Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
131. Q. Do you assume that he was cognizant of that message?
A. I assume that he was, yes, sir.
132. Q. Referring to document 11 of Exhibit 63, in which Tokyo
regrets signing of agreement can't be made by 25th, are you familiar
with that message ?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
133. Q. Referring to document 16, from Washington to Tokyo,
dated 26 November and translated on November 28, in which is
stated that the Japanese Ambassador states that rupture of negotia-
tions does not necessarily mean war between United States and
Japan; are you familiar with that message and have you seen it
before ?
A. I am quite certain I have, yes, sir.
134. Q. Was that message sent to the Office of Chief of Naval
Operations ?
A. I am sure it was, yes, sir. »
135. Q. You have already testified to document 17, from Washing-
ton to Tokyo, giving translation of note of 26 November, haven't
you ?
A. I believe that came up once before, yes, sir.
136. Q. Referring to document 18, Tokyo to Washington, trans-
lated 28 November, stating that Tokyo says the views of the Imperial
Government will be sent in two or three days ; are you familiar with
that message?
A. I am quite certain I saw this too, yes, sir.
[980] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
137. Q. And this message was delivered to the office of the Chief
of Naval Operations?
A. Yes, sir, this would be one that was delivered, as all the negotia-
tion messages were delivered, to the Chief of Naval Operations.
138. Q. In other words, there is no question but that all these im-
portant messages were delivered to the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
A. I am certain as I can be of that, yes, sir.
139. Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar
with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 871
future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used cer-
tain words, it meant certain things ?
A. Yes, sir.
140. Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message?
Did you consider it important enough that when that message was
received it would be a most important message in reply? In other
words, were you on the lookout for that answer ?
A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer".
141. Q. Well, the execute of the message.
A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization
were very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer
to that as a warning.
142. Q, When this execute came in, did you receive it?
A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch
officer who receives the information coming off the teletype.
143. Q. Were you the officer who v>ent to the communications offi-
cer and said, "Here it is."
A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch
officer to Commander Saff ord's office.
144. Q. You had that information then?
A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the
meaning well in mind.
145. Q. About what was the time and date when you got that ?
A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December.
It may have been the 3rd.
146. Q. What did you do with it?
A. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all.
[981] 147. Q. Who handled it?
A. I left Commander Saffcrd's office as soon as I knew he had the
picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once
went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was
highly interested in that particular plain language code because of
his previous instructions to me to make out these cards so that he
could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with
the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was
any time of the day or night.
• 148. Q. When the original winds message was received, was that
to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions ?
A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.
149. Q. Were you familiar with the rapidity of means of com-
munication between Washington and Honolulu ?
A. No, sir, only in a general way from my general communication
knowledge.
150. Q. While you were there suppose you had a very important
message where the time element was of primary importance. Which
way would you have sent it to reach Honolulu at the quickest pos-
sible time?
A. That would not have been a decision of mine, sir.
151. Q. Well, I mean in your general information; I know it
wasn't your decision.
A. I knew there was the telephone.
152. Q. You were not familiar with the others ?
A. No, sir.
872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
153. Q, On the morning of December 7th when you arrived at
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9:00 o'clock,
as you have testified, was Admiral Wilkinson there?
A. Yes, sir.
154. Qj. Did you acquaint him with everything you had up to
that time ?
A. Yes, sir, I gave him the folder, including the material of the
previous night, and indicated that part 14 had been received and
left the picture with him and did not take time to explain it to any-
one else, since Admiral Wilkinson could do that.
155. Q. In explaining to the State Department official on the morn-
ing of December 7th your ideas regarding 1 : 00 o'clock time in Hono-
lulu and 1 : 00 o'clock Asiatic, did that seem to impress the State
Department official to the extent that you felt certain he would tell
that to Secretary Knox ?
A. I believe it did, yes, sir.
156. Q. When you arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's house on the
night of December 6th, did you ask him if he had given this informa-
tion with respect to the 13 points to the Chief of Naval Operations
by telephone or otherwise?
A. I did not ask him, no, sir. Admiral Wilkinson, as head of
Naval Intelligence, of course had the ultimate responsibility of get-
ting it to the Chief of Naval Operations. I was a subordinate of his,
and in these deliveries I was [983] acting as his subordinate,
and normally always kept him apprised of who got it and attenuated,
as a rule, to get it to him at first. If he was not immediately avail-
able, I made distribution in any case and let him know.
157. Q. You testified that you telephoned Admiral Stark's house
and found he was out ?
A. Yes, sir, I did,
158. Q. When you went to Admiral Wilkinson we presume you
told him that you had 'phoned Admiral Stark?
A. I told him Admiral Stark had not received it. In other words,
that was a general practice, to inform each of the recipients who else
had received it.
159. Q, When you informed Admiral Wilkinson that you had
'phoned Admiral Stark and found him out, did Admiral Wilkinson
say he would call him?
A. No, he did not tell me, but he did make some 'phone calls.
160. Q. To whom ?
A. I'm not certain.
161. Q. Keviewing your testimony of your daily routine in con-
nection with the delivery of messages, is the court correct in under-
standing that each day when messages were received — and there were
numerous messages
A, Yes, sir.
162. Q. Continuing.) You took those messages to the office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, delivered them, and had marked or
clipped those messages in their original translation as to their im-
portance ; is that correct ?
A. That, in general, is correct. I did not actually use clips. In
that case, only a few messages would be of importance; on some days
folders were made up of the important ones.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 873
163. Q. Were you familiar with the war warning message sent out
by OpNav to the different forces on 27 November ?
A. I did not hear about that until after the Roberts Committee.
I am familiar, however, with a directive from OpNav to our attaches
in Japan and China, as well as to the Governor in Guam, on de-
structing codes.
164. Q. That was sent sometime about December 3 ?
A. It was sent the day after we received the Japanese message on
the destruction of codes. I think it was Thursday or Friday of that
week preceding Pearl Harbor. I was in Admiral Noyes' office when
he drafted that.
165. Q. Can you recall, or could you let the court know, the name
of that State Department official with whom you conferred on the
morning of 7 December immediately prior to sending in your
messages to Secretary Knox?
A. I can't be certain, sir. Two of the people that [983]
took delivery for Mr. Hull had been especially indoctrinated by both
Colonel Bratton and me over a period of time on security. One was
named Stone and the other Brown. I don't recall, for the moment,
the others.
166. Q. Subsequent to November 26, 1941, the date of the impor-
tant note of the Secretary of State to the Japanese officials, were you
and other in the Intelligence Department at the Navy Department
awaiting and expecting a reply to that with interest ?
A. Very much, yes, sir.
167. Q. In other words, that was the culminating point of the whole
business. A note was sent to Japan, and this was going to be the
answer ?
A. At least my own feeling was that there would be no action taken
until a reply came.
168. Q. During that interval there was expectancy as to this im-
portant answer ?
A. Yes, sir. Of course, during that period of waiting these other
developments took place ; that dispatch to Berlin, the development in
Thailand, and the destruction of codes. That was all during the pe-
riod of waiting.
169. Q. The information received from Berlin and the dispatch to
Berlin from Tokyo were all in your file ?
A. Yes, sir.
170. Q. Those files were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. Yes, sir, all those recipients received that. I might amplify my
last remark by stating the White House was so interested in that
particular message
171. Q. What particular message? The reply message?
A. No, sir, the one to Berlin. (Continuing) that on the Naval
Aide's instruction I prepared a special paraphrased version of that
for Mr. Roosevelt, which he retained; otherwise, neither the State
Department nor the White House were ever permitted — I say that
advisedly — to retain any of these dispatches.
172. Q. These super-secret dispatches ?
A. Yes.
173. Q. Do you know whether the winds message or its execution,
or either of them was transmitted in substance to the Commander-in-
Chief , Pacific Fleet ?
874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I don't know, sir.
174. Q. Are you aware of any cryptic messages or their contents,
other than the messages with respect to the destruction of codes and
so on, being transmitted by the Navy Department to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific, between 27 November and 7 December ?
A. I am not certain. There may have been one or two others but
not more than that.
[984] 175. Q. You don't know of any?
A. No, sir, I don't know of any. If I looked through everything,
I might be able to refresh my memory, but I don't know now.
Re-cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U.S. Navy:
176. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether
or not you have seen this dispatch before? This is the message of
28 November from CinCAF to OpNav, information of Coml6,
CinCPac, and Coml4, setting forth the net intercept translation re-
ceived from Singapore concerning the winds code.
A. I believe I did see this.
177. Q. Does that message contain substantially the same informa-
tion concerning the winds code which you had in your unit in Wash-
ington ?
A. Yes, it does.
178. Q. That message shows on its face what addressees ?
A. Action, OpNav; information, Coml6, CinCPac, and Com 14.
179. Q. What is the date of that message ?
A. 28 November.
180. Q. Would you refer to Document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is
the intercept that you had in your unit in Washington, and state the
date that message first became available to you in intelligible form?
A. I would have to depend on the date appearing on this — 28
November.
181. Q. That is the same date as the date of the dispatch from
CinCAF to OpNav to which you have just referred?
A. That is true.
182. Q. When you talked to the State Department official with re-
spect to the message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver
the note at 1300 and asked him to show it to Secretary Knox, did you
do more than suggest to him that 1300 in Washington was dawn at
Pearl Harbor and midnight in the Far East ; that is, did you discuss
with him any significance in that timing, or did you just ask him to
inform the Secretary that those were the facts?
A. The expressions I used were that 1 : 00 o'clock delivery time
in Washington was 7 : 30 at Pearl Harbor and a few hours before
dawn at Kota Bharu. This State Department man was fully cogni-
zant of the significance of that term "Kota Bharu", since he was see-
ing these dispatches every day. Furthermore, the information on
the Jap convoy movement had been toward Kota Bharu around Indo-
China, and was also definitely Imown among high officials in Wash-
ington.
[985] 183. Q. You did not suggest to him that 1300 Washington
time was drawn at Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack
at Pearl Harbor, or ask him to make that suggestion to the Secretary ?
A. I did not.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 875
184. Q. Before you went to the State Department that morning
with the dispatch, turning over in your mind the background, had
you had any discussion with anyone in the Navy Department, par-
ticularl}'^ in your unit, concerning the significance of this timing?
A. When that particular folder containing that message was being
made up, I draw a little circle, as a navigator does, to figure out his
hour angles and remarked at the time to some of the people in my
office— no one in particular — that this 1 : 00 o'clock delivery time in
Washington was just before dawn at Kota Bharu.
185. Q. You mean Kota Bharu, or Pearl Harbor?
A. Kota Bharu.
186. Q, Before dawn at Kota Bharu ?
A. Before dawn at Kota Bharu. I was possibly more specific in
stating that it certainly looked as though the Japs were going ahead
with that planned enterprise down there.
187. Q. Did you have any thought from this material at that time
that this meant a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. From this material which was normally the only source of in-
formation I had, there was not the slightest indication at anj^ time
to indicate a Japanese overt intention of attacking the United States.
From that point of view, I had at various times while I was handling
this material pointed out to high officials that this source of informa-
tion was, of necessity, in complete, that as far as it went it was highly
valuable information, but it was not complete and therefore there
might be other things going on of which we were not aware. That
was repeated so frequently throughout the couple of years I was
handling this material that it was almost automatically inferred.
When a particular item of that kind was delivered you had to reach
your own deductions and conclusions from just a possible thought
fragment of the picture we had in this material. Only a percentage of
tliis traffic was being broken, for one thing. Some days we did not have
enough traffic to break a ke}'. Some days keys in certain instances
were not broken at all. That is just another item supporting the
statement I made that the picture received from this source of in-
telligence was incomplete. It could, of course, be supplemented and
oftentimes was displaced by actual courier crypts.
188. Q. Do you think the Chief of Naval Operations was cognizant
of the limitations of this material ?
A. I'm sure he was.
[986] 189. Q, And that he must rely on other sources for more
precise information with respect to relations between Japan and the
United States?
A. I'm quite certain he was.
190. Q. Did you have any discussion with Captain Safford on
the morning of 7 December before you went to the State Department ?
A. I don't recall any. I was pressed for time that morning mak-
mg deliveries.
191. Q. How long were you in that section after 7 December 1941 ?
A. Until June, 1943.
192. Q. Did you ever hear Captain Safford express himself — and
this answer I should like to have you divide between 7 December and
subsequent to 7 December — as to whether the message concerning the
delivery of the note definitely indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor
at approximately dawn of December 7th ?
79716 — i6— Ex. 146, vol. 2 13
876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I can almost positively state that no such statement was made
to me or in my presence.
193. Q. Do you feel that if Captain Safford had such thoughts on
this important matter you ^Yould have heard about them? In other
words, were your relations with Captain Safford close enough that
you might reasonably expect to receive such an expression from him ?
A. I would say yes.
194. Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to
Captain Safford and, I believe, said, "Here it is", did you mean by
that exclamation, "Here it is", that this was the execution of the
Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with
Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the
message which executed the Japanese War Plan ?
A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the mes-
sage myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to
Commander Safford's office, and the expression, "Here it is", simply
meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come
through — a message which we had been looking for many days and
that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.
195. Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here
is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan
and the United States"?
A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not
refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It re-
ferred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations con-
cerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or
relations which could very well involve a break.
[987] 196. Q. To your mind it did not necessarily mean war?
A. Not necessarily at all.
197. Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the
translation unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either
the "Winds" code, that is the message setting up the code, or in the
message of execution ?
A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatso-
ever of the literal translation of these terms.
198. Q. Your section had no difficulty in making the translation?
A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language.
Extracted testimonv of Vice Admiral K. K. Turner, U. S. Navy.
Pages 994-1008, inclusive.
[994,1 22. Q. Were you a regular distributee of information
received by way of communication intercepts?
A. Yes. I saw all such dispatches.
23. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations Dispatch of 27 November 1941. I ask you to examine it and
state to the court what connection, if any, you had in the preparation
of this dispatch?
A. I prepared that dispatch after discussion of the situation with
the Chief of Naval Operations and after we had received certain
secret information connected with the activities of special Ambassador
Kurusu.
24. Q. Will you state what you meant by the first sentence, "This
dispatch is to be considered a war warning" ?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 877
A. I meant just exactly what is said, it is to be considered a warn-
ing of approaching war.
25. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to
examine it.
A. Yes, I am familiar with that.
26. Q. Did you see this document on or about 22 November 1941,
the date of its translation?
A. I saw it immediately after it was translated.
27. Q. This document contains the words, referring to the date
November 29, "The deadline absolutely cannot be changed." What
significance did these words have to you at that time?
A. That the Japanese were going to attack the United States or
Great Britain, or both, on or about that date.
28. Q. There are also the words, "After that things are automati-
cally going to happen". What significance did these words have to
you at that time ?
A. That movements of forces at this time were already under way
and they could not be changed. The forces would not be recalled.
We knew that they were already under way at that time. We knew
that from sightings and from dispatches from China, that very con-
siderable troop convoys were moving south. I think by then some
had already moved into Indo-China. We knew that there had been
a great activity in radio traffic over a period of two or three weeks
and then suddenly at a date prior to this, the thing had ceased. It
had been naval traffic and therefore we deduced that the Japanese
Fleet had gone to sea. I don't recall the date of that.
29. Q. Can you recall seeing any intercept traffic between Berlin
and Tokyo in which the Japanese government was alleged to have
said, in effect, that there was going to be war between Japan and the
Anglo-Saxons sooner than any one thinks ?
A. That strikes a familiar chord but I can't specifically recall any
such dispatch.
[995] 30. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63. It con-
tains the Secretary of State's note to Japan of 26 November 1941.
A. I remember that dispatch.
31. Q. Did this dispatch come to your attention on or about the
date of its translation, which is set out in the lower right-hand corner
as about 28 November 1941 ?
A. Yes, immediately.
32. Q. Did you know the substance of this note from any source
other than this intercept, if you will remember ?
A. As I recall it. Captain Schurmann, who then was head of the
Central Division and was liaison officer with the State Department,
brought this note over to the Navy Department from Mr. Hull to get
Admiral Stark's advice on it. Now, there were several pages but I'm
not too clear in my memory on the thing, but that is the way I remem-
ber it.
33. Q. Did you discuss the substance of this note of November 26,
1941 with the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. I did.
34. Q. Do you recall if he expressed any views as to its significance
at that time, what it meant?
878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Well, he expressed the view that there wasn't any possibility that
Japan would accept it.
35. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 17, which was that war warn-
ing dispatch: This dispatch contains the conclusion, "Negotiations
with Japan have ceased". Upon what information was this conclu-
sion based?
A. Mr. Hull told Admiral Stark over the inter-office 'phone, as I
recall it — it might have been personally — that to all intents and
purposes the thing was all over as far as negotiations were concerned,
and I believe he said that he was not going to close them ; he was going
to keep them open, but for all useful purposes, why the thing was
finished.
36. Q. And it is your recollection that Admiral Stark was in on
this discussion?
A. Yes; I know he was. Mr. Hull kept Admiral Stark informed
at all times, I don't know that he informed him of everything he
knew but he kept him very well informed. Their relations were very
close and cordial.
37. Q. At the time of drafting this war warning message of 27
November, what was your personal estimate of the Japanese inten-
tions regarding a surprise attack in the Hawaiian area, if you had
any?
A. I expected it. I expected they would make some sort of an
attack on Hawaii.
38. Q. Was this estimate or expectation communicated to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. It was communicated to him here. There is another dispatch
dated two or three days before, November 2J:th I think, which warned
against the matter and to take precautions. The Department — and
the same applied to the War Department [996'] was averse in
being too specific as to what they believed might happen for the
reason — wisely, I believe — that that might lead the Commanders-
in-Chief not to guard other matters under their cognizance, and there
were various proposals made in writing this dispatch and in the other
as to how to be more specific about it, and it was decided that the
Commanders-in-Chief had received full information as to what was in
the minds of the Department, and therefore it was their duty to cover
their entire field of responsibility.
39. Q. I show you Exhibit 15 which is the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions dispatch of 24 November, 1941, and ask you to examine it. Is
that the disiDatch about which you liave just testified?
A. That is the dispatch I referred to. That dispatch, also, was dis-
cussed in the Joint Board. The Joint Board was holding almost daily
meetings, as I recall it. Admiral Stark and General Marshall con-
ferred daily about the situation. The War Plans Divisions were in
constant contact. I prepared that dispatch and it was changed in one
or two particulars by Admiral IngersoU and Admiral Stark, and then
was referred to General Marshall, and the War Department made a few
changes in it, mainly along the line that I have mentioned, of keeping
the thing from being too specific. By this time, Avhy, I was personally
convinced that they were going to go into Siam and also into the
Malay Peninsula as the initial move and also attack the Philippines;
that is, the major strategic moves. Whether that would be simul-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 879
taneous, or not, or follow slightly after, I didn't know and didn't
particularly care.
40. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states, "A surprise, aggressive
movement in any direction is indicated." This language is omitted
from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there
is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omis-
sion from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally ?
A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two
dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "A surprise, aggressive
movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any
direction could be by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or
anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "An amphibious ex-
pedition is enroute." It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those
two are quite different. They don't cover the same kind of a subject,
and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We
knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That
was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not
only the movement of amphibious forces but the movement of any
forces.
41. Q. In the war warning dispatch of 27 November, there is the
the directive, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment". What
action was desired of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleot
in complying with this directive ?
A. To send scouting forces out of different kinds, to [997]
deploy submarines in threatened directions, to put the Fleet to sea
and in a covering position for the Hawaiian Islands and a support-
ing position for Midway.
42. Q. Were these expectations that you have just discussed con-
tained in War Plans or in any other directive to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. Not in the detail that I have indicated, because the practice of
the Navy Department was then and is now to give to the Commander-
in-Chief a broad task, to provide him with sufficient forces or such
forces and equipment and material as is available, and then to let
the Commander-in-Chief do the work. Admiral Stark, in particular,
was insistent that we not tell the Commander-in-Chief how to do
his job.
48. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding, then, that with the
information and directives contained in the dispatch of 27 November
1941, the Navy Department from there on expected the Commander-
in-Chief to take appropriate action in view of the war warning ex-
pressed without further orders ?
A. That is correct.
44. Q. At any time before 7 December 1941, did you believe an air
torpedo attack on ships moored in Pearl Harbor was technically pos-
sible of accomplishment?
A. Yes. I always believed it was possible. There had been corre-
spondence, there had been tests made by the Bureau of Ordnance and
correspondence initiated by the Bureau of Ordnance and passed on
by the Navy Departmen twhich, I think it was in the latter part of
1944 or the first part of 1941, indicated that in their opinion you had
to have a 90-foot depth of water before you could make torpedos
880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACIt
successfully run. Well, that was quite true with American torpedoes,
but I personally never saw any reason at all why torpedoes couldn't
run in 10 feet of water, or maybe, say, 20 feet of water, dropped from
airplanes. Now, the Bureau of Ordnance at a subsequent time con-
ducted additional tests, and as I recall it, in June of 1941, a letter went
out from the Department stating that they had now changed their
mind on that and I think they said that torpedoes could successfully
run in 60 feet of water, something on that order.
45. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to ex-
amine it?
A. Yes, I have seen that.
[998] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Re-
serve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
46. Q. This document has been familiarly termed by witnesses
before this court as the "Winds" code. Did you discuss this docu-
ment with the Chief of Naval Operations at or about the time of its
translation, as indicated on the document?
A. Yes, very briefly. I think the Chief of Naval Operations men-
tioned it. I think there was an instruction given to watch for those
words.
47. Q. To your knowledge, were any of these code words in Eng-
lish or Japanese ever received in the Navy Department prior to the
Japanese attack on 7 December 1941?
A. Not to my knowledge,
48. Q, There is evidence before this court that a Commander Mc-
CoUum in the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a
summary of information on the Japanese-United States relationship
over a period some time preceding the 3rd or 4th of December, 1941,
which was for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of such a
dispatch ?
A. Yes, we had discussed the advisability of making such a sum-
mary, and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum
the details of the various points and the details of the relationships
and their intentions and so on. We had spent a great deal of time
talking the thing over. Then Commander McCollum — I will say we
found ourselves in very close agreement — prepared a dispatch — ^I
have forgotten its terms — and brought it to me to check over, which
I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and made sug-
gestions of a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I don't re-
member just what was in the dispatch.
49. Q, Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it
ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. I don't know. We don't know at this time.
50. Q, To your knowledge, did it ever reach the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
A, I don't know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to Mc-
Collum so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval
Operations by the Office of Naval Intelligence with my own concur-
rence. That is my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of
Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral
Wilkinson.
(
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 881
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness on the secret por-
tion of the testimony.
[W9] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) :
51. Q. Admiral, with regard to these intercepted dispatches, were
you aware on the night of December 6 of any particular Japanese
dispatches which were received in the Department and distributed?
I refer particularly to a dispatch the 13 parts of which were received
on Saturday afternoon and were ready for distribution at 9 o'clock.
A. That night?
52. Q. That night, and at the same time there was another dispatch
which directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver this long dis-
patch, the first 13 parts of which I have just referred to, together
with the rest of the dispatch, at an hour to be designated by a later
dispatch. Do you remember having information on Saturday night
of the coming in of that long dispatch and the fact that it was to be
delivered at a date to be designated later?
A. I don't recall at the moment. I don't recall such a long dispatch.
53. Q. I show you document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is the long
dispatch and is the reply of the Japanese to the American note of
November 26.
A. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of De-
cember. I don't remember when I saw it.
54. Q. I show you document 38 of Exhibit 63, which is a dispatch
from Tokyo to Washington, in which instructions are given that the
time of presenting the memorandum which I have just shown you,
Exhibit 39, will be designated later in a separate dispatch. I ask
you whether or not you saw that message and if so, at what time, to
the best of your recollection?
A. I don't remember when I saw that.« I saw it.
55. Q. Will you please state when you came down to the Navy
Department on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. About 10: 30 or 11 o'clock the Chief of Naval Operations called
me up and said he had a matter concerning sometliing which the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet had written and wanted me to
come down and see him about it.
56. Q. Were you in conference with the Chief of Naval Operations
on that morning at about the time stated, 10 o'clock, and if so, what
other officers were present at that conference ?
A. I went into the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the exact
time I don't recall. He showed me a letter from the Commander-in-
Chief, Asiatic Fleet and told me to prepare a reply. In addition to
that, he showed me a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required
the ambassador to present [IWO] the 14-part note to the Sec-
]-etary of State on that date, that is, on the 7th. I asked him what,
if anything, had been done about warning the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet about this dispatch, and he said he had already talked
the matter over with General Marshall and that General Marshall had
sent a dispatch out immediately to the Army authorities in Hawaii
as soon as he had seen this dispatch, inviting their attention to this
matter. I don't recall the terms of the dispatch that he sent. I did
not get there in time, anyway. Admiral Stark said that he believed
882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that the Commander-in-Chief already had the decrypted dispatch in
his possession, because they were actually doing more of the decrypting
in Pearl Harbor than we were in Washington.
Examined by the court :
57. Q. To which decrypted dispatch are you referring?
A. The decrypted dispatch about the time of presenting the long
dispatch, and we felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was
himself in possession of both those decrypted dispatches, because we
got them from him — not decrypted. We decrypted these diplomatic
dispatches in Washington, and my understanding of it is that in Pearl
Harbor they decrypted the diplomatic dispatches and also the naval
dispatches and made traffic analysis.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Kear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) (Continued) :
58. Q. Do you recall the particular hour at which the 14-part mes-
sage was to be delivered to the Secretary of State ?
A. I think it was to be delivered about 10 : 30 in the morning, but
the Secretary of State told Admiral Stark over the 'phone that he
had not been able to give the Japanese Ambassador an appointment
at that time, and he had set it, I believe, for 2 : 30 in the afternoon
Washington time.
59. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63, which may refresh
your memory somewhat as to the time of delivery of these dispatches.
A. I can state from my own memory it was at 1 o'clock, but I
believe the appointment actually was made for 2 : 30.
60. Q. Did the instructions for delivery of that dispatch at 1 o'clock
p. m. Washington time have any particular significance to you at the
time you learned it was to be delivered at that hour?
A. Yes, I thought the attack was going to come that day or the next.
If I can amend it, I would say I thought the Japanese would make
their attack on the British cm the United States or both on that day
or the day following.
[1001] Q. 61. Were you familiar while in Washington on your
tour of duty in December, 1941, of the long distance telephones that
were available for talking directly to Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes.
62. Q. Had you used that telephone on any occasion to speak to per-
sons at Pearl Harbor before ?
A. I never had. I think the Chief of Naval Operations had, but
we had all been warned by the Director of Naval Communications
that in his opinion we could not depend on the security of that tele-
phone. Therefore, it was not used by the Navy Department a great
deal for secret matters. The War Department used it a great deal
then and later, but the scrambler was not supposed to be secure. The
one in use at that time was not supposed to be secure.
63. Q. You have testified as to the preparation of a reply to a mes-
sage from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the preparation of
which was assigned you by Admiral Stark on 7 December 1941. Did
that relate to answering the request of the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, for information as to what assurances had been given
Britain as to any armed support under conditions of several eventual-
ities?
A. No, it related primarily to the question of whether the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, would remain in Manila at the out-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 883
break of war with Japan, that is, whether he, with most of his Fleet,
would remain in the Manila area at the outbreak of war with Japan
or would send the Fleet to the southward initially and later proceed
there himself.
64. Q. Did you have any information prior to 7 December 1941 as
to a movement of Japanese carriers to the eastward from Japan?
A. No.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Bet.) :
65. Q. Admiral, I may have misunderstood you, but this has to
do with a remark I believe you made about the decrypting of dis-
patches at Pearl Harbor, My understanding is that all that was
ever dealt with in the form of decrypted information at Pearl Harbor
had to do with the location of ships and ship movements; am I not
correct in that ?
A. I don't know. On several occasions I inquired from the Director
of Naval Communications as to whether or not in the case of a partic-
ular dispatch the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was getting that
dispatch or whether we should not send him a dispatch and quote it.
On every occasion I was assured that the Commander-in-Chief was
getting as much as we were, and to the best of my knowledge and belief,
he was getting it sooner than we were.
[1002 \ 66. Q. That came to you through a second party?
A. That came to me from the Director of Naval Communications.
I don't know what the system was.
Examined by the court :
67. Q. In the further amplification of your reply concerning the
significance of 1 p. m. time for delivery of the dispatch, you stated
that you expected an attack by the Japanese against the United States
or Great Britain, or both, on that day, December 7, or the next day.
Would you say where you expected that attack to be delivered ?
A. Yes, I expected a landing on certainly the Kra Peninsula, a land-
ing in Siam and attacks of one nature or another, air probably, on the
Philippines, because we had scouting planes out there, and some form
of attack in Hawaii.
68. Q. But I do not gather, then, that there was anything specific
in your mind concerning an attack against Pearl Harbor on that day
or the next ? No indication ?
A. Nothing further than that the attack made by the Japanese in
the East would be accompanied by one or more of the five forms of
attack on our forces in Hawaii, which had been mentioned in the pre-
vious correspondence.
69. Q. Did you have knowledge of the dispositions of the Japanese
Fleet to the extent that you were able to say whether you considered
an attack at a distance across the whole Pacific Ocean to be within the
capabilities of the Japanese Fleet, considering the other movements
they had under way ?
A. We did not know where the major portion of the Japanese Fleet
was. Our deductions from what we had seen — not from decryptions
but from what we had actually seen — were that there was to be a cover-
ing force generally in the Marshalls-Caroline area and that the so-
called China Fleet, the Third Fleet, with additions of some sort, would
carry on the naval missions in the China Sea.
884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
70. Q. Were you familiar with the bulletin which the Director of
Naval Intelligence issued as of December 1, 1941, which is quoted in
the Roberts Report and of which this court has judicial notice, concern-
ing the Japanese naval situation ?
A. I have forgotten the terms of that dispatch.
71. Q. I refer you particularly to the last sentence (indicating).
A. I remember that and believe that I saw that before it was put
out and concurred.
72. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that the information available to the
United States concerning the location of the Japanese Fleet was ex-
tremely vague ?
A. I can't answer that categorically. "Vague" is a relative term.
We had a great deal of information about the movements and oper-
ations of the Japanese. We never had enough, and we never do have
enough.
[1003'] 73. Q. Well, inexact and incomplete ?
A. I will answer that it was incomplete.
74. Q. Admiral, speaking of these decrypted messages being at
hand in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, do we under-
stand that all these messages which had been decrypted and which
are before this board, that you had the impression that all the infor-
mation contained therein was in the hands of the Commander-in-
Chief , Pacific ?
A. I had been informed that was the case by the Director of Naval
Communications on several occasions.
75. Q. Was that the reason you did not inform the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet as to the contents of these messages?
A. Yes, sir.
76. Q. Was there any check made to see that the Commander-in-
Chief had the same information in these decrypted messages he ought
to have had ?
A. I made none, except I brought the matter up with the Director of
Naval Communications on several occasions. The first time was prob-
ably March or April,
77. Q. Who was the Director of Naval Communications at that
time ?
A. Admiral Noyes.
78. Q. The court is speaking of messages which have been reviewed
here as super-secret messages and which you stated in your under-
standing were all decrypted in Honolulu.
A. That was my impression at that time. Now, I have been in-
formed since then tliat tlie diplomatic messages were decrypted in
Washington. Whether the}' were sent out to the Commander-in-Chief
or not and whether he decr3'pted them, I don't know of my own knowl-
edge. I understood lie also decrypted them out there.
79. Q. That understanding came from Admiral Noyes?
A. Yes, sir.
80. Q. I refer you to document 40, document 37, document 36, and
document 24 and ask if you at any time were cognizant of the contents
of these documents ?
A. I saw document 24. I don't remember document 37. I don't
remember document 36.
81. Q. Did you have any information of them?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 885
A. I would like to make a general answer to that question. I don't
specifically remember any of these except 24, for the reason that we
were getting these reports and had been getting them for months, and
I would occasionally glance at them to see the nature of the informa-
tion which was being sent by the secret agents, but I did not read all
of them unless there was some particular thing that was necessary for
me to see. [lOOJf] Lieutenant Mott of the Office of Naval In-
telligence would bring these dispatches around. There would be a
great many dispatches, and he would mark the important ones. I
would glance through and look at all the others and see if there was
something I wanted to see, but to those movement reports, which had
been going on for months, I paid no particular attention.
82. Q. We are well aware of the movement reports, but what we
had in mind specifically was the dispatch which requested information
from Honolulu as to the exact berthing of different ships in the harbor,
which, according to testimony brought out heretofore, was a rather
unusual dispatch.
A. No. 37 says, "Please report as to the following areas as to vessels
anchored therein: Pearl Harbor, Mamola Bay, and the areas adjacent
thereto." It wants to know the vessels in Area "N" but not their
exact anchorage.
83. Q. There is another dispatch requesting the exact berthing.
A. I don't recall seeing such a dispatch. Number 40 — Area "A".
A battleship, Oklahoma class, entered and one tanker left port, and
then Area "C", but there is no exact anchorage. Area "A" and "C" I
know nothing about.
84. Q. Admiral, in this proposed dispatch from OpNav to Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific about December 4, giving a summary of in-
formation which you stated you discussed with Commander McCollum
and that you initialed, did you feel, in going over that dispatch, that
this information would be valuable to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific for his information regarding the status as of that date ?
A. My memory is quite vague on that subject. I remember at some
time in that period discussing with Commander McCollum and read-
ing a dispatch on that subject. I believe I initialed it and returned
it to him and expected the Director of Naval Intelligence to send it,
but I'm not too sure of it.
85. Q. You initials would indicate that you concuri-ed in sending it?
A. Yes, sir.
86. Q. Eeferring to this so-called "Wind's" message, are we correct
in understanding that you had no knowledge of any execute of that
message designating the objective of Japan ?
A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes
called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don't recall.
I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: "The
Winds message came in," or something of that sort.
87. Q. Did he report to you what the "Winds" message meant and
what it was interpreted as ?
A. Yes.
[loos'] 88. Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware of that,
either from information from you or otherwise ?
A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him.
89. Q. Was any discussion had as to the importance of sending that
reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Not SO far as I know. I did not participate in any such dis-
cussion. I assumed that the Commander-in-Chief had that.
90. Q. With reference to all of these super-secret decrypted message,
was it your understanding, as War Plans officer, that the Cliief of Naval
Operations was fully conversant with all of them and their contents,
and did you discuss some of them or all of them ?
A. Frequently we discussed them. I believe he had a special folder
with one set of them that was given to him. Then there was another
folder that was carried around by Lieutenant Mott and shown to cer-
tain other officers in the Department.
91. Q. Did you discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations at any
time the importance of transmitting the contents of some of these
messages to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. No, sir. I discussed it on several occasions with the Director
of Naval Communications and was assured that he had them.
92. Q. And you were assured that the Commander-in-Chief had de-
crypted these messages and had full information ?
A. Yes.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
TI. S. Navy:
93. Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63,
which is the message which set up the so-called Winds code, do you
recall whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds
code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United
States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely
meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and Japan ?
A. My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatic
relations and probably war.
Reexamined by the court:
94. Q. When you heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an exe-
cute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of
such high significance that action should be taken immediately to
transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. No, I assumed that he had it. On Fridav there was a discussion
between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general
situation —
[1006^ ^ 95. Q. Friday, December 5 ?
A. Yes, sir. There was a discussion among the three of us, and
we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of com-
mand preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary.
Recross-examined bv the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (R«t.) : ^
96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes
as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system,
was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese
relations?
A. Yes.
97. Q. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you re-
ceived information that the Commander-in-Chief was not receiving
this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after
December 7, 1941, that you received that information?
i
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 887
A. I have never received such information. I have never been
informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypt-
ing the diplomatic dispatches.
Keexamined by the court :
98. Q. In your statement with respect to your conference with Ad-
mirals Stark and Ingersoll on 5 December you said that you felt that
you had all agreed that the Commander-in-Chief had sufficient infor-
mation ; is that correct ?
A. And directives.
99. Q. And directives?
A. Yes, sir.
100. Q. Principally, do we understand by that that the war message
of November 27 was one of them to which you had reference with
respect to directives and instructions?
A. That is one of them. There were quite a number of additional
messages that went out about that time and for several days thereafter
concerning the destruction of codes at the outlying islands and in China
and so on, and then there was, I think, another message of about De-
cember 4. It seems to me there was a message of December 4 that may
have been with respect to the destruction of codes. We sent some to the
islands and some to the Commander-Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and gave
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet informationon all of them, ex-
cept one or two that primarily concerned the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic.
[1007] 101. Q. But these messages you referred to were destruc-
tion of code messages, were they not ?
A. Most of the messages I referred to were orders issued by the
Chief of Naval Operations for the destruction of our own codes. How-
ever, there were two other dispatches. Exhibit 66 and Exhibit 20, which
informed the Commander-in-Chief that approximately December 1
these officials in London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, Batavia, and
Washington, have been ordered to destroy their code machines and
codes.
102. Q. Admiral, in reply to your former question, where you
stated in that and in this conference when you stated that you felt
that you three officers — Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and your-
self — felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had full information,
did the fact that you felt that he had decrypted all of these super-
secret messages have an effect upon your approval of that decision ?
A. It wasn't so much that we were concerned about the information
that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet had. We were con-
cerned as to the instructions he had received for carrying on the war
when attacked, and for taking on necessary precautionary measures.
We felt that he had been kept informed continuously by the Depart-
ment as to the major changes in the situation, and that we believed
that he had as complete a picture of the situation as we had in Wash-
ington. It was always Admiral Stark's endeavor to keep them com-
pletely up to date in regard to the situation.
103. Q. But what we are trying to bring out is this : You had certain
information in Washington, super secret messages which we have
referred to in this testimony. Those messages gave certain informa-
tion which would or would not have been valuable to the Commander-
888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in-Chief. In your testimony you stated that you assumed that the
Commander-in-Chief had decrypted these messages. Now we tried
to ask you the question: that your assuming that he had decrypted
these messages had a weight in your feeling that he had full informa-
tion on the subject?
A. Probably it did, Admiral. I don't recall thinking of that par-
ticular point. Probably it did.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
104. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 22, and ask you if that is one
of the messages from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet regarding the destruction of codes, to which
you referred in your testimony ?
A. That is one of them.
105. Q. Do you find anything in that dispatch which directs the
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet or any other person to destroy
codes ?
A. No, there is nothing in that dispatch. My recollection is that
there were one or more dispatches to the Commander Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier, concerning some of the [1008] islands —
"Wake, for example — which directed it. My recollection is that.
106. Q. I draw attention to this exhibit, that the origin number of
that dispatch is 061743. What time was that dispatch originated, in
Washington time?
A. I don't know. I had nothing to do with preparing that dispatch.
107. Q. Would it refresh your memory any to state that at the time
of the origin of that dispatch those numbers referred to Greenwich
civil time?
A. I saw the dispatch before it went. I had nothing to do with its
preparation nor its sending.
108. Q. I will ask you if you can identify in this dispatch whether
or not this dispatch was not sent in the lowest classification of sending
dispatches, namley, deferred ?
A. I don't know what precedence it was given. I had nothing to
do with sending the dispatch.
109. Q. I invite your attention to the fact that on the blanks where
"priority," "routine," or "deferred" may be indicated, that there are
no X's or checks opposite either priority or routine.
A, What is the question, please ?
110. Q. And then from that information, Admiral, you are still
unable to state whether or not that dispatch was indicated as to be
transmitted as a deferred dispatch?
A. I don't know the precedence it has. It has no marking. I had
nothing to do with the preparation or sending of this dispatch.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
U. S. Navy (Ret) : _
111. Q. Admiral, you mentioned that you recalled a communication,
a dispatch, being sent to the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier, in respect to the destruction of codes at Wake. I show you
Exhibit 21 and ask you if that is the dispatch you had in mind.
A. No, this was with regard to Guam, and it is addressed to NavSta,
Guam. My recollection is that a dispatch went to the Commander of
the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier concerning the devStruction of
codes on Wake.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 889
^ 112. Q, So such a dispatch as you recall might not have actually
been sent ? You wouldn't know, first-hand ?
A. The answer is, my recollection is that such a message was sent.
Extracted testimony of Bear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy.
Pages 1026-1051, inclusive.
[1026] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate :
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Leigh Noyes, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Senior Member, Board
of Inspection and Survey, Pacific Coast section.
2. Q. What duties were you performing between the dates of 15
October 1941 and December 7, 1941 ?
A. Director Naval Communications.
3. Q. Will you state in general the organization of your office as of
that time as it relates to the function of checking and distributing
intelligence information — the organization in general ?
A. The handling of communication intelligence was a joint affair
between the Office of Naval Communications and the Office of Naval
Intelligence, which of course are both divisions of the Office of Chief
of Naval Operations. In general, the Director of Naval Communica-
tions was responsible for the mechanics of crypto-analysis, including
interception which could be done by naval means, which amounts to in-
tercepting radio transmissions. Crypto-analysis was carried on by the
Director of Naval Communications with assistance from the Office
of Naval Intelligence, and when such intelligence as developed was
turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence to handle according
to their usual procedure. Not the usual procedure, because this par-
ticular form of intelligence was considered most secret — a much
higher degree of secrecy than the ordinary designation, "Secret", due
to the fact that it is useless if any inkling reaches the enemy of the
fact that we are able in any way to read his communications.
4. Q. Did all intelligence information that was checked in your
division pass through your hands before it went to other offices or
echelons of command ?
A. You mean my personal hands ?
5. A. Yes.
A. No, my office was organized like any other office during the
emergency. It worked twenty-four hours a day. At various times
I had some other duty ; someone else was acting head of the division.
I was on two or three selection boards. Those were the main times
I was away from the office.
6. Q. In the event of your absence from the office, what system
was there to release information to other officers or higher authority?
A. In this particular respect you are speaking of communication
intelligence ?
[1027] 7. Q. Exactly nothing else, sir.
A. Under normal conditions, the Director of Naval Intelligence and
I worked together. If one of us wasn't immediatey available, the
other one acted for him to see that action was taken ; and if there was
anything that was really hot, you might say, when either one of us
was temporarily away, the next acting officer took over, and we had
a 24-hour watch, both of us, which handled these matters continuously.
890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. Q. Well, in the event that important information came into your
office outside of the working hours of the Navy Department, when
neither you nor the Director of Naval Intelligence would be in the
office, what arrangements were made for the distribution of this infor-
mation to other officers or higher authority ?
A. There was a 24-hour watch of officers in my own especial watch,
aside from the ordinary communications watch. Anything that came
up that was considered important, during the night, the officer would
call me and come up in an automobile to my house and bring me
whatever the paper was, and if I considered it important enough I'd
go with him to Admiral Stark's quarters or to Anderson or whoever
it happened to be. In other words, we covered twenty-four hours
a day according to the circumstances. It didn't often happen that
things turned out that required that quick action, but that did develop
several times.
9. Q. Adverting to this intelligence information that arrived in
your office, did you filter out any information before it passed to higher
authority, or did you pass along everything that came to your hands
of that nature ?
A. The material we had to work with, of course, consisted of thou-
sands of messages, and the general trouble was to get action quickly
enough to be of value, not to always be working from the bottom of
the pile. The usual procedure, in the case of matter that was obvi-
ously inconsequential, was to lay it aside, and we never were able
to keep up; we always had something to work on, because we could
always work back into past history. It was all available to the repre-
sentatives of the various offices concerned.
10. Q. Exactly what I am trying to get at. Admiral — who did this
weeding-out process, of deciding what information was to be sent
other officers or higher authority and what was to be kept on file in
your office for future reference if that were required ?
A. Well, the translators; only a few people read Japanese. The
people who read Japanese, when they got as far as to see a thing was
obviously something about an allotment for typewriters or something
like that, they didn't go any further. It was impossible to cover
everything, and when they saw a thing that seemed not to be worth
while, they went ahead until they found something that seemed to
be of value.
[10^8] 11. Q. Having covered the field of when a message was
not translated — in the event that a message was completely translated
and made available, in the case of this type of message, did you or any
other officer in the chain of command weed out any information from
there on before it was passed on to other officers or higher authority?
A. No.
12. Q. Now this information that was finally collected and on which
a decision was made to pass it on to other officers or higher authority,
did you or anyone else that you know of evaluate this informatiton
before it went to an officer — say the Chief of Naval Operatitons ?
A. No, the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a mentioned, was re-
sponsible for the finished information. It was turned over to him.
I was responsible for the mechanics of obtaining it, and after that it
was turned over to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who handled
it personally, and we only had one book — one copy in a book — and he
took that book to the people that he was directed to show it to.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 891
13. Q. As the judge advocate understands the situation from Com-
mander Kramer, who testified before this court in Pearl Harbor, the
system was to take all messages that had been translated in the Com-
munications Intercept Division directly to the distributees in the Navy
Department and in the government circles without evaluation or with-
out changing the messages in any way except that sometimes he put
a note or a clip on important messages. As I understand your tes-
timony now, it was to the effect that sometimes the Director of Naval
Intelligence exercised the function of evaluating this information ; is
that understanding correct?
A. No, I didn't intend to say that. You asked me to say that the
Director of Naval Intelligence did, and I wasn't in a position to say
exactly what he did. The system was for him to take the book. Lieu-
tenant Commander Kramer was his representative in my office, and
he may have carried the book for him some times when he wasn't avail-
able — something like that, but generally, the Director of Naval In-
telligence handled the matter very much himself.
14. Q. Well, do you know of your own knowledge, from having con-
tact wtih that officer and with other officers in the Navy Department,
whether it was the custom of the Director of Naval Intelligence to
evaluate this information before he passed it along? Do you know
that of your own knowledge ?
A. It is my understanding that he did not, because as I understand
it, it was taken immediately. As soon as possible after 8 : 30 in the
morning I used to go over whatever was available, and we made it a
matter of minutes to get it through the machinery.
15. Q. In other words, do I understand correctly, that documents
were taken directly from the translators, or through [1209] you,
to the distributees without delaying or evaluating the information and
changing its form ?
A. In general, we didn't have distributees. There was a copy in
the book, and the book was carried around to the various people who
were supposed to see the book.
16. Q. Commander Kramer told this court in Pearl Harbor there
were seven copies made for the Navy Department and seven copies
for the Army — that these copies were delivered to regularly designated
distributees in the Navy Department, and delivered at their offices as
a complete copy ; is that your understanding of the method of distribu-
tion?
A. I think he is talking about a later date myself. I think prob-
ably it did develop into that as the war went along. The original
plan was to have only one copy. It is true we had to exchange with
the Army, because we worked together. We pooled our combined in-
tercept resources, and each took a part of the material, and we ex-
changed copies.
17. Q. Well, is it your testimony, then, that prior to 7 December
1941, as you remember it, only one booklet or copy was made of de-
crypted traffic for persons in the government circles that the Navy was
responsible for keeping informed ?
A. Well, I wouldn't like to contradict Lieutenant Commander Kra-
mer, because he was the one that did the work, and he probably has
got a better memory tlian I have of that subject. I did not mean to
convey the impression that only one copy was made. There were file
copies, there were copies for the Army, but originally, a book was
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 14
892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
made up with one copy to be shown to people outside the people tech-
nically concerned with obtaining the information.
18. Q. Would it be your answer, then, that distributees like Admiral
Stark, the Secretary of State, and the President, and the Secretary of
the Navy, would all see the same copy; is that the meaning you in-
tend to convey by your answer?
A. No, I have to add the President and the Secretary of State ; that
is part of the seven. I thought you were talking about the Navy De-
partment. I didn't realize you meant the other people concerned.
19. Q. Well, can you recall whether or not the distributing system
required that a copy be left with the Chief of Naval Operations for
his sole and independent use?
A. He didn't ; that is not my memory. I thought the book was taken
to him at that time.
20. Q. But you do not know whether he was left a copy?
A. No.
21. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval
Operations' dispatch of 27 November 1941, and has been [lOSO]
popularly called by witnesses before this court the "war warning
dispatch." Were you acquainted with the contents of this dispatch
on or bofer 7 December 1941 ?
A. These are my initials on this draft ; those are my initials.
22. Q. Were you present at any conference or discussion regarding
this dispatch prior to its having been released ?
A. As I remember it, Admiral Turner showed me the dispatch before
he took it in for release. These are his initials. (Indicating.) These
are mine. (Indicating) It was- prepared by Opl2, which was War
Plans.
23. Q. Do you know what was intended to be conveyed by the
first sentence of this dispatch — "This is a war warning?"
A. I understood it to mean that there was a warning to the address-
ees that war with Japan was imminent.
24. Q. This dispatch also contains another statement: "Negotia-
tions with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased." Do you know what information this sentence
was based on?
A. I do not.
25. Q. Well, had negotiations as of 27 November 1941 ceased in
fact?
A. I don't remember at this time on what information it was based ;
it wasn't based on any information that came through me. Whatever
the statement was, I assumed at the time it was correct. I hadn't
any doubt it was correct. I will be glad to express an opinion. It
is purely my recollection — a general recollection ; it may not be correct.
I think that at that time Nomura and Kurusu stated that they were
through. The United States hadn't accepted what they had proposed,
and negotiations were supposed to be over. Afterwards, they were
reopened, like all diplomatic situations ; it was a case of bluff at the
time — a diplomatic bluff in regard to the ceasing of negotiations, but
that is purely my memory, and that wasn't anything that I had any
official knowledge of.
26. Q. Whose duty was it in the Navy Department between 1
October and 7 December 1941 to see that the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet was supplied with all available intelligence?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 893
A. Well, I should say it was the joint responsibility of the Office
of Chief of Naval Operations and — intelligence is a pretty broad
subject. It came from a good many sources; this particular thing
must have come from the State Department in Washington. Pri-
marily, the Director of Naval Intelligence is concerned with the dis-
semination of intelligence, but he is a subordinate to the Chief of
Naval Operations.
27. Q. Admiral, I will be a little more specific; as re- U031]
gards the intercepted, decrypted intelligence traffic that was received
in your office, who was responsible for seeing that the Commander-
in-Chief of Pacific Fleet was kept informed of information of an
important character contained in this category?
A. As I mentioned previously, it came under the specific cog-
nizance of the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a subordinate of
the Chief of Naval Operations. We all worked together on this
particular matter.
28. Q. I show you Exhibit 21. This is a Chief of Naval Operations
dispatch of December 4, 1941, directing the Naval Station, Guam,
to destroy all secret and confidential publications. Will you state
the reasons that this dispatch was sent, if you know them?
A. This was one of a series of dispatches sent, directing the destruc-
tion of all secret publications in the Pacific that could be spared
in view of the imminence of war. I prepared it. It was sent on the
4th of December. This is my handwriting (indicating) ; and 1
prepared this dispatch, Avhich is one of some others.
29. Q. Imminence of war with what country. Admiral?
A. Japan.
30. Q. Could you set out in brief the information you had as of
the time you prepared this dispatch that lead you to believe that
a war with Japan was then imminent?
A. Well, I would say that there never was any question in my
mind following the dispatch of the 27th of November, that the pos-
sibilities of war with Japan were strong.
31. Q. Did you base youj- dispatch then, directing the destruction
of codes and ciphers in Guam, solely on the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' dispatch of 27 November ?
A. No, Admiral Turner and I discussed it, and we decided that the
time had come when everything that could be spared had better be
destroyed, because we didn't want to have our communications ruined
by sudden attack.
32. Q. The judge advocate is trying to get a record of what your
concept was of the imminence of w'ar at that time — in other words,
what facts, or upon what facts, did vou base vour opinion that this
dispatch was necessary — the one of December 4, 1941 ?
A. The seriousness of the situation in the Pacific. I couldn't give
you the exact items as they came uji between the 27th and the 4th.
Things had gotten progressively worse ; this dispatch directed all pos-
sible confidential publications except those essential for current pur-
poses and special intelligence be destroyed. You will notice the orig-
inal dispatch as written said "for operations", and after w^e discussed it,
we cut out that and said, "current purposes and special intelligence."
Those were retained, and they were directed to be [103^] pre-
pared to destroy the ones remaining. They would be prepared to
destroy them instantly in event of final emergency. The same dispatch
S94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, and the Commander-in-
Chief Pacific. This one went to Guam.
33. Q. But you have not yet told us the developments since 27 No-
vember 1941, which made you think this dispatch was necessary? Be-
tween 27 November and 4 December 1941.
A. No, I don't think I could give you the exact sequence of events
between those two dates. Ambassador Nomura, and I expect. Am-
bassador Kurusu, were in Washington, and the negotiations were
apparently not proceeding well. There was no specific event that
occurred on the morning of the 4th that caused me to send this dispatch.
34. Q. Who was responsible for the decision that the sending of this
dispatch, Exhibit 21, was necessary?
A. Chief of Naval Operations. I prepared the dispatch, as re-
leased by Admiral Ingersoll. I sent it in to him. I suppose that he
took it up, as it was customary for him to do before actually releasing
after discussing things, with the Chief of Naval Operations.
35. Q. Did you initiate this dispatch?
A. Yes.
36. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding, then, that you pre-
pared this dispatch for release by the Chief of Naval Operations
because you then thoughtjthat such a dispatch was advisable ?
A. Yes, sir. Is it perfectly clear that on these dispatches where it
says, "released", that the authority who released the despatch in these
cases is Ingersoll, who was Assistant Chief of Operations, and cus-
tomarily did the signing of his name. He conferred with the Chief of
Naval Operations, and I suppose got his authority before he released
them. I did insist that any important dispatches should be released
by the Chief of Naval Operations.
37. Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which
has been familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to ex-
amine it and state whether you had seen this document on or after
the date of its translation, which is noted in the right-hand corner
as being 28 November 1941?
A. Yes.
38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document
when it was brought to your attention ?
A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations
to cover this point.
39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these [1033]
steps to get intercepts from your stations, will 3'ou state whether any
of the code words as set out in document 15 were received in the Navy
Department, either in Japanese or in plain English ?
A. They were not.
40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2
and Document No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications
Commission. I ask };ou whether you were ever acquainted with the
information contained in these documents prior to the Japanese attack
on 7 December 1941.
A. I have no recollsction of ever having seen this document.
41. Q. Either 2 or 3 — either document?
A. No, sir.
42. Q. Had yooi ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 895
43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an officer in your Division
made any telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter
contained in this winds code, of document 15, that you have previously
been shown?
A No.
44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, havin<r been informed by some
officer in the Navy Department that there had been received in the
Navy Department certain information about winds, and that your
reply was, "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange direction," or
words to that effect ? Do you have any recollection of such a conversa-
tion ?
A. I do not.
45. Q. I would like to refer you to document 17 of Exhibit 63, which
you have before you, and ask you whether you ever saw or had been
informed of the contents of this document on or before 7 December
1941. This document is the Secretary of State's note of November 26,
1941.
A. I couldn't say whether I was familiar with this particular paper
or not.
46. Q. Can you state whether you knew, on or after November 26,
1941, whether or not Mr. Hull had delivered a note to the Japanese
diplomats in Washington with reference to the negotiations that were'
then in progress?
A. No, I couldn't answer that question. That is three years ago. I
can't say on what day. This traffic which has my initials, and things
that I prepared, I am glad to testify to, but I cannot say exactly when
I saw or if I did see many [1034-] of these hundreds of dis-
patches. No, I cannot state.
47. Q. Before 7 December 1941, had you been expecting to receive
any information in the Navy Department with reference to the nego-
tiations that had been in progress between the United States and
Japan ?
A. I don't understand that question.
At the direction of the court, the question was repeated.
A. During this period we were making every effort to obtain any
information possible in regard to the United States-Japanese relations.
48. Q. We have testimony before this court. Admiral, from sub-
ordinates who were in your office as of this period immediately pre-
ceding 7 December 1941, that all personnel were on the alert for the
receipt of some very important — or of a very important answer from
the Japanese Government. Do you have any knowledge of this situ-
ation ?
A. From the time of the 27 of November, gradually getting more
acute, we were making every effort to obtain any information possible.
I couldn't say that we expected any particular message.
49. Q. Or any particular information ?
A. Anything that had to do with the relations between ourselves
and Japan was of the highest priority.
50. Q. But were you expecting any information of importance
immediately preceding 7 December 1941, from the Japanese Govern-
ment?
896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I might say we were hoping. I couldn't say we were expecting.
[1035] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S.
Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
51. Q. I want to show you Document No. 39 of Exhibit 63 and re^er
you to Parts 1 to 13 of this document and ask you whether or not
prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 you had seen or been
informed of the subject matter contained therein?
A. Not before the 7th of December.
52. Q. Will you state when, if ever, you were made acquainted
with the contents of Parts 1 to 13 of this Document 39?
A. No, I couldn't say the day I saw it.
53. Q. Can you state where you were on the night of 6 December
1941, after working hours ?
A. I was at my office until about 8 : 00 o'clock.
64, Q. Can you state where you were between 8 : 00 o'clock and mid-
night on 6 December 1941 ?
A. I don't know whether I came back down to the office or whether
I stayed at home.
55. Q. But your present recollection is that you have no knowledge
of having seen that document, Parts 1 to 13, on the night of 6 De-
cember 1941 ?
A. That is my recollection.
56. Q. Nor at any time subsequent thereto?
A. No. As I I'emember it, the next morning, which was the 7th
of December, I was down at my office about 9 : 00 o'clock. The con-
ference was being held of Japanese representatives at the State De-
partment. I imagine the note was delivered before the translation
reached me.
57. Q. Were you present in Admiral Stark's office at or about 10 : 00
a. m., on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. I don't think so.
58. Q. I AYould like to show you Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit
63, and ask you to state whether or not this part of this document
ever came to your attention, and if so, when?
A. This message wasn't translated until the 7th of December.
59. Q. Had you ever been informed of it at any time, and if so,
when ?
A. I will have to say I don't remember.
60. Q. I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you
were ever made acquainted with the contents of this document?
A. Yes.
[1036] 61. Q. AVill you state when, and the circumstances sur-
rounding it?
A. I could not, except to make the statement that I did not see it
until after the 7th of December. It was handled by the Army, it was
an Army message, and I have heard from my colleague, General Mo-
brun, the chief signal officer of the Army, that that was the message
which they tried to forward to Pearl Harbor and it was not received
until after the attack. That is hearsay on my part.
62. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding from your answer
that you did not see this document 41 at any time on the date of 7
December 1941?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 897
A. Yes. I spent the forenoon of Sunday, the 7th of December, in
my office on various important communication matters, one of which
was caused by the reported sighting of a Japanese convoy in the Far
East, and I was sitting at my desk at 1 : 00 o'clock when the report of
tl>e air raid on Pearl Harbor was sent out from Pearl Harbor. It
was copied direct by the Navy Department and from then on the
rest of the afternoon there were very many important communication
matters going on. As to when I saw any one of these intelligence
messages, I couldn't say.
63. Q. Can you recall ever having informed the Chief of the War
Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the Navy organizations
in the Pearl Harbor area were decrypting this Japanese diplomatic
cipher about which you have testified in a number of instances this
morning, and which is before you now in the form of Exhibit 63 ?
A. These messages we have discussed came in many different ciphers.
1 would never have made the statement that all ciphers could be trans-
lated in Pearl Harbor.
64. Q. Did you ever inform the Chief of the War Plans Division,
Captain Turner, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that
which you were receiving in the Navy Department?
A. No.
65. Q. Did the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner,
ever ask you or discuss with you whether or not the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet was being kept informed on the latest intelli-
gence information that was being received through your division of
the Office of Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. I saw Turner almost daily and we continually discussed the status
of matters of interest to him. The work was broken up between
different stations which he should have understood.
[1037] 66. Q. But can you recall whether Captain Turner of
the War Plans Division had ever raised the question with you as to
whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in this
period preceding 7 December 1941 was receiving an adequate amount
of intelligence information from the Navy Department ?
A. So far as I know. Turner, Wilkinson and myself were in entire
agreement. This was a matter of continual discussion among the
three mentioned and so far as I know there was never any question
of this agreement. I can only say that we conferred almost daily
on the question of what was being done and I thought that Admiral
Turner had a clear understanding of what was being received in Pearl
Harbor, as far as we could tell, and what was not.
67. Q. From the testimony of Admiral Turner as he gave it on the
stand yesterday, the judge advocate understood that witness to state
that he had specifically asked you on one or more occasions whether
or not this decrypted information that was received immediately prior
to 7 December 1941 was being transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet. I ask you, Admiral, whether or not Captain
Turner did discuss this matter with you?
A. I said I discussed it.
68. Q. Did he ask you that question ?
898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. It is my remembrance that Admiral Turner asked what was our
set-up in regard to intercepted messages and it was fully explained
to him.
69. Q. Was your explanation to Captain Turner that the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was or was not getting this
intercepted traffic ?
A. The messages that are in this file and that we have discussed
were sent in many different enemy codes. Some of them we could
read; some of them we could not. Some days we could read them;
some days we could not. There is no such thing as a simple answer
as to what was or was not being received. There was an intercept
station fully staffed at Pearl Harbor. They specialized in certain
codes that were most easily intercepted by them. They forwarded
it to Washington, what they were able to make out of their particular
task, and the same was true of the Asiatic Station. But to say that
any individual message was received, it was also physically impossible
to exchange every message. Right here is about two days traffic
(indicating Exhibit 63).
70. QT Do you know how intelligence information was transmitted
in the purple code ? That is, by radio, cable, or what ?
A. Usually by cable.
71. Q. Did the Navy have any facilites in Pearl Harbor for inter-
cepting information sent in the purple code by cable ?
A. At the time there were no legal facilities for intercepting cable.
[1038] 72. Q. Can you state whether or not the naval organiza-
tion in Pearl Harbor was or was not receiving these purple code dis-
patches sent by cable prior to 7 December 1941 ?
A. No.
The court then, at 11 : 06 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 15 a. m., at
which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the
reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral
Harold R. Stark, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, interested party, whose counsel were present.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
Examination by the judge advocate (Continued) :
73. Q. Do I understand your answer to mean that they were not
receiving these cable dispatches transmitted in the purple code?
A. I should say they probably were not.
74. Q. Did you ever give Captain Turner, the Chief of the War
Plans, any impression that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet was getting information of the type contained in the purple code
intercepts?
A. Not intentionally.
75. Q. On 7 December 1941 what was the quickest means of com-
munication between the Navy Department, Washington, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. Direct radio circuit between the Navy Department and the Com-
mander-in-Chief, if we could raise him ; if not, through Coml4.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 899
76. Q. Was there telephonic communication between the Navy De-
partment, Washington, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Not direct.
77. Q. Will you state what circuits were involved in a telephonic cir-
cuit between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor ?
A. There is a regular commercial telephone circuit from the United
States to Oahu, but as I understood it, the nearest outlet was several
miles from the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters at Pearl Harbor.
[10S9] 78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor on 7 December 1941 was there brought to your attention a
dispatch that had been prepared by Commander McCoUum in the
Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far Eastern Division in which there
was a summary or resume of intelligence information to be trans-
mitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with
me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communi-
cation intelligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence.
I told him that in my opinion estimates of the situation should come
from the Chief of Naval Operations.
79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message
was ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. I do not.
80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department
with regard to releasing this dispatch ?
A. I cannot, I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except
to see that they were properly released.
The interested party, Admiral Harold K. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated
that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Hear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :
81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was
prepared and being considered for transmission to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, do you remember whether any reference
was made to the winds code system ?
A. I do not.
82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your
office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code sys-
tem if and when the execution signal was received ?
A. We had a special 24-hour watch for all communication intel-
ligence matters.
83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese
words that were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered
to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly inter-
ested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal ?
A. I couldn't say.
[IO4O] 84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there
has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of
the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and these
had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would
900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest
moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was
established ?
A. No, I couldn't say.
85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that
the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thor-
ough search in the Navy Department files had failed to reveal a copy
of the execution signal. Would the Director of Naval Communica-
tions files be the normal place in which that record would be kept?
A. If it was received by naval means, yes ; if not, no,
86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of
the Director of Naval Communications the normal repository of such
messages ?
A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been re-
ceived by naval intercepting means and therefore the record of this
message would naturally be kept in the files of the Director of Naval
Communications, would it not ?
A. Yes.
88. Q. Can you explan why this document is missing from the files
of the Director of Naval Communications?
A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think
that any such message was received by naval means.
89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution
of the winds message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone
of the execution in any form of the winds message? Is that the
way you want to leave your testimony on that subject ?
A. That is right; yes.
90. Q. In your testimony before this court at the time that you
were examining Exhibit 21, which was the dispatch from OpNav to
Guam, directing them to destroy confidential publications, you used
the expression in your testimony as being contained in tliis dispatch,
"In view of the imminence of war." Is there such an expression in
that dispatch ?
A. There is not.
91. Q. I show you Exhibit 22 that is before this court which is a
dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, information
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and ask you if you can identify this
dispatch, and if so, the approximate time that you saw it, and whether
or not you prepared the dispatch ?
A. I did.
l^lOJfl^ 92. Q. Did you prepare that dispatch at your own initia-
tive, or was it prepared by one of your subordinates at his initiative?
A. I would say that I discussed this with Captain Safford in 20-G ;
as to whether I suggested it to liim or he to me, I couldn't say. I
discussed it with Admiral Turner, definitely, and with Admiral Wilkin-
son, and sent it in to the Chief of Operations for release.
[76*4^] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
93. Q. Do you remember whether or not the wording in this dis-
patch was the same as proposed by Captain Safford ?
A. This is my writing here — that correction.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 901
94. Q. Do you remember whether Captain Safford in discussing this
dispatch with you desired to insert the words, "in view of the imminence
of war" ?
A. I have no such recollection. It might be.
95. Q. Will you please tell the court the Washington time of origin
of this dispatch.
A. It would be 12 : 43 on the Gth.
96. Q. Will you tell the court in what classification that dispatch waa
transmitted as to priority of sending i
A. It was sent secret in ECM.
97. Q. The preceding question was meant to cover the precedence
in forwarding the dispatch, that is, whether or not it was sent priority,
routine, or deferred ?
A. It doesn't show on the copy. As a matter of fact, messages are
transmitted direct to the Commander-in-Chief.
98. Q. But was it not a rule in Communications at that time, in indi-
cating the order in sending dispatches, that if there were "X" marks
or checks against ''priority" it would be sent in that category, that if
the checks were against "routine", it would be so sent, but that if
there were no checks against "routine", it would be sent deferred ?
A. That was the routine.
99. Q. That was the procedure or rule at that time, was it not?
A. Yes.
100. Q. Then, this dispatch which you have referred to as being sent
"in view of the imminence of war," was sent deferred as late as noon
of the 6th of December ; isn't that so ?
A. That is not so.
101. Q. Why not?
A. Because I handled the message personally. The routine was as
you say. I was Director of Naval Conmiunications, and I sent mes-
sages simply when they were to go specially.
102. Q. After you directed that this message be sent was not its
classification deferred, so that it could be delivered at nine o'clock the
following working day without violating the communications regula-
tions?
A, No,
[■104S] 103. Q. Will you point out in this dispatch where you
have directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy any
codes?
A, It did not direct the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy
his codes.
104. Q, Did it direct him to have any codes destroyed ?
A, The wording was, "You may authorize the destruction."
105. Q, Did you consider that that was an order to destroy?
A, The Chief of Naval Operations did not desire us to use language
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that was not necessary. I
drew this up for the release of the Chief of Naval Operations, and it
met with his approval. (Beading) "In view of the international situa-
tion and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may
authorize"
106. Q. Couldn't the Commander-in-Chief in his own discretion do
as much ?
A. In an emergency, yes.
107. Q, Then, what was the object of this dispatch?
902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I should say the Commander-in-Chief would have hesitated to do
it without some sort of directive from the Navy Department, and it
was an appropriate authority to give him.
The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) ,
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Examined by the court :
108. Q. Referring to the radio communications system in effect be-
tween Washington and Pearl Harbor: How long should it take to
uncode a 20-word, special priority dispatch and transmit it from Wash-
ington to Pearl Harbor, assuming no delay in reaching the addressee ?
A. In the case of any special message, such as this one, if I was given
the word in time by someone else who originated the message, in order
to let me know it was coming or, as in this case, when I knew it was
coming, the procedure was to have the message unciphered before its
release, clear the Commander-in-Chief, set up the radio circuit, and
just before the message was released it was transmitted. It took time
to transmit the message.
109. Q. I was also figuring on the time for uncoding.
A. I handled all these special messages myself. Whenever they had
to do with the war, that was the procedure we followed, and that was
the reason for no priority appearing on that particular message. It
was handled by hand. We also could not get the Commander-in-Chief
direct. That meant a [1044] relay through Coml4, but when
we did get the Commander-in-Chief direct, we cut the tape. We trans-
mitted by tape and the message would go through in about a minute.
When the Secretary landed at Pearl Harbor on a trip, Admiral Bloch
sent a message reporting his arrival, and it was received in the Navy
Department a minute and a half after he landed.
110. Q. Wouldn't an hour be ample allowance, under these special
circumstances, for getting the dispatch from the inception of sending
it to the uncoding stage, transmission and decoding, and receipt by
the addressee ?
A. In general, yes, if it was not stopped by something else. There
were peaks of traffic.
111. Q. Assuming that the Chief of Naval Operations had written
out a dispatch of not more than twenty words and sent it to you directly,
designating the special urgency of the circumstances, would not an
hour have been ample allowance to get it through either Coml4 or the
Commander-in-Chief ?
A. Get it as far as Coml-4 or the Commander-in-Chief himself.
112. Q. Admiral, do you know of any message, other than that with
respect to the destruction of codes, which was sent to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific from November 27 to December 7, giving him the
secret information you had received during that period!
A. Oh, yes, a great deal of this went. I could not tell from memory.
113. Q. Do you know whether any of these deciphered messages went
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. Certain messages were sent to the Commander-in-Chief with a
cipher on the original message, so that we deciphered there, but I
could not say which ones were from here.
114. Q. Do you have any knowledge of having sent any of these
decrypted messages, the purple code messages, or anv information con-
tained therein, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 903
A. I could give you a negative answer. I could say the note was
not sent. I could not say just which ones were sent, because when I
had finished my responsibility was the mechanics of the crypto-analysis.
The messages were turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Who saw them in the Navy Department or whether they went on was
primarily a matter for Naval Intelligence.
115. Q. If any one of these messages, or the contents of any of these
so-called decrypted messages, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, such message would have been sent through Naval Communi-
cations, would it not?
A. Well, it might have been sent by air mail or pouch.
[104s'] 116. Q. I am speaking of Naval Oommunications aa
such.
A. I would not necesarily have seen it, no.
117. Q. Was there any system in your office by which, generally
speaking, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept informed as to
the contents of these decrypted messages ? I am speaking now of the
purple code.
A. The purple code is just one method of communication. To handle
that long message, for instance, the 14-part message, to take an ex-
treme case, was a very difficult matter for us. Wherever it happened
to be picked up, and we got hold of it, it required first decrypting, for
which we often did not have the key.
The court directed that the reporter read the question.
A. The office of Coml4 was primarily set up to read naval matters.
This so-called purple code, which was quite new, was, as far as we
were concerned used primarily for diplomatic matters.
118. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the Com-
mander-in-Chief was kept informed of the contents of these purple
code messages ?
A. Of all these purple messages?
119. Q. You have heard the question.
A. Not all of these purple messages. It would have been a physical
impossibility to do it.
120. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the most
important of these purple messages, and the information contained
therein, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief for his information?
A. Whenever the Director of Naval Intelligence or War Plans
Division or the Chief of Naval Operations himself — Whenever any-
one directed or requested that a message be forwarded, it was done.
121. Q. But there was no system in your office by which the im-
portant messages were transmitted ?
A. Not the diplomatic messages.
122. Q. Or to get checks on them to see that they had been received by
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. Not the diplomatic mesages.
123. Q. When these important decrypted messages were received,
did you have anything to do with sending them in to the Chief of Naval
Operations, or did you insist on some initialing or something to show
that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen these particular messages?
A. It goes back to the question of Lieutenant Commander Kramer,
who said that he had a separate book, as I understood 1.1046'] it,
904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
for the Chief of Naval Operations. Originally, there was one book for
the people in the Navy Department, which was carried by hand, first
of all, by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Then it was directed to
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who carried the book himself to
the people concerned, first of all, the Chief of Naval Operations.
124. Q. As Director of Naval Communications did you try to keep
informed about the very important traffic flowing through?
A. I did.
125. Q. There has been referred to in this testimony the note of 26
November, which was really the beginning, probably, of the message
which you state Mr. Hull gave the Chief of Naval Operations with
respect to the breaking off of negotiations. Did you have any idea
about November 26 as to this note ? It is document 17 of Exhibit 63.
A. No.
126. Q. Did you know that the officers in your department were
standing by and were anticipating a reply to this note from 26 Novem-
ber to 7 December, 1941 ?
A. We had set up a continuous watch, established direct telephone
communication between the War Department and ourselves and had
taken every step to get immediate action on anything important
received.
127. Q. But you had no reference to this special note of Novem-
ber 26?
A. No. It was not done on account of that. It was done on account
of the general thing. There was no special step in regard to a particular
note.
128. Q. But due to the importance of this message, everybody was
on the alert awaiting its answer?
A. I gather from the question that somebody had said that they
were giving that particular message — In my own mind, it was all
important.
129. Q. When the reply of this note of 26 November came in and
was received, in accordance with the testimony heretofore given, on
the afternoon of December 6, and those thirteen parts were translated
and ready for delivery at 9 p. m. on December (>, did you hear at that
time anything at all regarding this reply? I am asking this question
in view of the fact that you stated in your testimony that if any im-
portant reply came in, night or day, the watch officer would imme-
diately inform you.
A. I was there. I was in my own office at 8 : 30 Sunday morning.
[1047] 130. Q. I am speaking of Saturday, December 6.
A. Not to the best of my recollection at that time.
131. Q. Did you see the reply consisting of those 13 parts on the
morning of December 7?
A. I could not say just when I first saw it.
132. Q. You stated that if any of these decrypted messages were
received in Honolulu, they were forwarded to Washington; is that
correct ?
A. No.
133. Q. I meant that anything decrypted was forwarded to Wash-
ington or the information contained therein?
A. You have here a very small part of the mass of material that
we had. The general plan was that the Commander-in-Chief pri-
marily tried to build up the naval codes.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 905
134. Q. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific ?
A. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. It was really Coml4. Coml4
was on shore. It was a long process — a group here and a group there.
From all that material they endeavored to get these naval codes in
Coml4's establishment in readable shape. From time to time they
sent their values to Washington, which was behind but kept up as
material came in. The same way, there was a return exchange from
Washington to Honolulu. A good deal of it was done by air mail
and special messenger on account of the bulk of the traffic and the
danger of what we were doing being discovered.
135. Q. Admiral, we are discussing these important messages which
have a bearing on information which was or was not sent to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific. We well realize that there were thousands
of messages coming in, but these messages had a particular bearing
on information which could have been used by the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific, and that is what we are discussing.
A. Those messages are picked out of many other messages.
136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of
the "Winds Message" : Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant
Commander Kramer came in with the execute to the "Winds Message"
and said, "Here it is" ?
A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which
afterwards turned out not to be correct. That information was taken
to mean that an execute of this "Winds Message" had been received.
It turned out not to be correct.
137. Q. You speak of a naval radio circuit. During your experi-
ence in Washington was this Naval radio circuit quicker than the
Army's means of communication between Washington and Honolulu?
A. Yes.
[J048] 138. Q. In other words, if you had had a very important
message which was to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, for
his information, even if originating by the Army, you would have
sent it immediately by naval radio circuit ; is that correct?
A. Yes.
139. Q. Do you think a considerable time would have been saved
thereby ?
A. By following the procedure I outlined, that is the fastest that
could be done.
140. Q. By naval radio rather than Army circuit ?
A. Faster than any means there was available, but that required
some preparation.
Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) : •
141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did
you learn from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any
form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form."
I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that
subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just
testified that you did receive some information. From where did this
information come ?
A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, there
was a false alarm about it.
906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was
it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did
not take it away from that particular subject, did it?
A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.
143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution
of the ''Winds Message" ; is that right ?
A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution
of the so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.
Reexamined by the court :
144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt
of it with the Chief of Naval Operations ?
A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it
more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only
said that relations were strained.
145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?
A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally ?
[1049] 146. Q. Yes.
A. No.
147. Q. Did you give him any information?
A. He got a copy of it.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message
from Alusna, Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether
or not you have seen that dispatch, or whether j^ou recognize it, and if
so, at what time did you see it?
A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.
149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court,
please?
A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."
150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.
A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls
of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."
151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?
A. It was his interj^retation apparently of the same message that
had already been received.
152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the
War Department of the Japanese code would have reached about
the same conclusion, in that they had the same words to work from?
A. This was not necessarily
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made
the following statement : I call the court's attention to the fact that
this was not a translation made in the War Department. This came
from Batavia that way.
The witness made the following statement : Somebody in Batavia
had gained that information.
153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same
code system which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the
"Winds Code" system?
A. Probably. We discussed it with the War Department. They
did not have mucli confidence, as I remember it, in the information
from there as against the rechecking that was done in Washington.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 907
154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds
Message" was received ; that is, who gave it to you ?
A. No.
[lOSO] 155. Q. But you do not recollect that you did hear
about the execution of this before 7 December 1941 ?
A. It has been stated and it lias been testified to that there were
six copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my recollec-
tion for three years back as against my assistants. These people who
handled the details were my subordinates, and their recollection of
details is probably better than mine.
Reexamined by the judge advocate:
156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it,
what this false report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was?
A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe
there must have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that
it was not finally found to be correct.
157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain. Admiral, is the wording
of the report which you received and which later you determined
to be false?
A. I don't know.
158. Q. Do vou know from whom it was received?
A. I don't. '
159. Q. Adverting again to document 3 of Exhibit 64, in which
counsel for an interested party pointed out to you the words, "Japan
will inform her consuls of war decision": His question seems to
infer that this was a translation of the Japanese weather code.
Might not the words, "war decision", have been an evaluation from
other information as well as the weather code, as set up ?
A. Except that the message states "code intercept." I don't
think that this is an exact translation. It is a paraphrase.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record
in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by
the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: I would merely like
to say that I am sorry not to have been able to answer the questions
more specifically. Three years ago I had all the communications
business of the De])artment to handle. This was one part of my
duties. I realize that the court considers some of these messages
of greater [lOol'] import than they were considered then.
We made every attempt at the time to cull what we could handle.
We had thousands of these messages. We had to get the best in-
formation we could from them. Messages such as that note we
could not have possibly transmitted in a secure means back to the
field. It was most important that there should be no inkling of
the fact to Japan that we could read any of her codes. There is no
better way to have that discovered than to re-cipher a message
which has been already sent by somebody. That is exactly what we
did do in the ones we considered sufficiently important, but we had
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 15
908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to keep down on the number of messages that were sent for those
reasons. Although it was not my decision, I do not think that the
details of the purely diplomatic matters were as important as some
of the others. There are many more messages which at the time
looked very important, but those particular ones were culled. We
handled all we could with the personnel and the system we had
available. It was very difficult for us to get Japanese translators.
There are very few reliable Japanese translators in this country. We
worked with the War Department. We split our work with them,
and we had a great deal of difficulty in working in a foreign lan-
guage, plus putting in an enemy secret code. It is not just an open
and shut proposition.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Eobert D. Powers,
Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (Relative to introduction of exhibit),
and Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U. S. Navy. Pages 1091-
1108, inclusive.
[10911 Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class,
U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
The counsel for the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Robert
D. Powers, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by
the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
1. Q. Have you in your possession a document requested by the
interested party, Admiral Stark?
A. I have. It is a document containing intercepted dispatches
prepared for the interested party, Admiral Stark, at the request of
the judge advocate, by the Director of Naval Communications. It
contains sixteen documents, duly authenticated under official seal.
The document referred to was submitted to the judge advocate, to
the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the
purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may
be considered pertinent to the inquiry.
There being no objection, it was so received and marked
"EXHIBIT 68" for reference, description appended.
The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate,
none of the parties to the inquiry desiring further to examine him.
A witness called by the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of
the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Com-
munications, attached to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Examined by the interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy:
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 909
2. Q. What duties were yt)ii performing during the latter half
of 1941?
A. Assistant Director of Naval Communications.
3. Q. Admiral, 1 show you Exliibit 68, whicli contains sixteen sep-
arate documents. Do yon recognize it ?
A. These are extracts from the files of the Communications-Intelli-
gence organization which relate to diplomatic traffic [1002]
which had been intercepted and translated by the organization under
the Director of Naval Communii-ations.
4. Q. Will you read Document 1 ?
A. (Reading:)
SECRET
From: Seattle (Sato).
To : Tokyo.
November 10, 1941.
J-19: (Priority.)
#165: (Message to Wasliington Circular #80.)
Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I
have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on succes-
sive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.
Relayed to and liOs Angeles.
ARMY 24990 SECRET Trans. 11/19/41 (2)
5. Q. Will you read Document 2 ?
A. (Reading:)
From: Manilo (Nihro).
To : Tokyo.
1 November 1941.
( Purple. )
#723. (Re your #318)*
Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is ex-
tremely difiicult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the
following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.
1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Ai-my is
progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the
incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the
various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis
is being placed on the concentration of military strength.
Localities are as follows :
Kabanatuan, San Marcelino (several groups missing).
Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers sta-
tioned in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneu-
vers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may he a tem-
porary measure.
[1093] 2. In the vinicity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being
used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more
than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.
On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry troops
left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above
place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are
being built there and the docks are being enlarged.
In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is iSaid that
even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.
3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?)
and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not
been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between
910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Worlt is being carried on
day and night and tlie progress is amazing.
4. In Iba tliere are 30 or 50 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several
score of altitude planes ( f ) it is said.
Details by mail.
JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1 : 5681 : "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along
the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress,
strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.
6. Q. Will you read Document 3 ?
A. (Reading:)
From : Tokyo.
To : Manila.
5 November 1941.
(Purple.)
#355. For Secretary Yuki.
The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the
follovping items. Please arrange as yoxx think best for the same :
[1094] These items in regard to each port of call:
(1) Conditions at air ports on land.
(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
(3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.
JD-1: 6424 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-13^1 (6-AR)
7. Q. Will you read Document 4 ?
A. (Reading:)
From: Manila (Nihro).
To : Tokyo.
1 November 1941.
(Purple.)
#722.
1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers
entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st,
destination unknown.
2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison
left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).
3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources
the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands
is as follows :
(a) Military Planes.
Large bombers, 29.
Scout planes, 324.
The same, B type, 62.
Fighters, 317.
The same, B type, 131.
Pursuit planes, 302.
The same, D type, 69.
Training planes, 49.
Total, 1283.
(b) Naval planes.
Large flying boats, 26.
[1095] 4. Ships in port on the 1st; MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*,
BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite :
RET*, PASU*, 2 Z.
5. According to a reiwrt from the De La Rama steamship company two of
their ships, the Dona E.staban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons),
had been renuisitioned by the local American Army.
JD-I: a335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (&-AR)
♦Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are TON (Houston) : MADDO (Marble-
head) ; HON (Heron) ; BUKKU (Black Hawk) ; PISU (Canopus) ; BERU (Isabel) ; REl
(Langley) ; PASU (Canopus).
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 911
Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington
In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2.
Secret November 27, 1941.
U. 8. Air Forces in the Philippines
NAVT
Tj/po strength
PBY-4 (Patrol) 14
PBY-4 (Patrol) 14
SOC-3 (Scout Observation) 4
SOC-1 (Scout Observation) 2
J2F^ (Utility) 3
SOC-1 (Scout Observation) 2
SOC-2 (Scout Observation) 2
052U-2 (Observation) 2
Total 43
2 squadrons of 0S2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the
Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be
shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.
army
B-18 (Heavy Bomber) 18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber) 35
P-35A ( VF) 52
P-40B ( VF) 30
P-40E ( VF) 117
[1096] 0^6A (VO) 7
0-49 (VO) 3
0-52 (VO) 10
A-27 (Dive bomber) 9
C-39 (Combat) 1
C-49 (Combat) 1
P-26A ( VF) 15
Total 298
111 addition to the al)ove 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been
shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive rein-
forcements have been approved for completed delivery by February,
1942.
SUMMARY
Bombers Fighters Combat Patrol Observation Utility Total
62 214 2 28 32 3 341
Japanese Estiruates of U. S. Air Forces in Philippines
MILITARY PLANES
Type Strength
Large bombers 29
Scout planes 324
The same, B type 62
Fighters 317
The same, B type : 131
Pursuit planes 302
The same, D type 69
Training planes 49
Total 1,283
912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
NAVAL PLANES
Large flying boats 26
8. Q. Will you read Document 5 ?
A. (Reading:)
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Manila.
5 November 1941.
(Purple.)
#349.
Re your #722*.
Please vpire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports
mentioned in paragraph 3.*
JD-1 : 6335. Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine
Islands.
JD-1: 6423 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (6-AR)
[1097] 9. Will you read Document 6?
A. (Reading:)
SECEEH"
From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 8, 1941.
Purple.
#742.
The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows : The Marble-
head, the Black Hawk, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the Heron, the Woho-
tosu," The Isabel, and the tanker Trinity (the latter arrived on the 8th).
ARMY 6478 24745 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)
" Kana spelling.
10. Will you read Document 7 ?
A. (Reading:)
SECBETT
From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 10, 1941.
Purple.
#745.
1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.
3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the
names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing, 2,300 soldiers.
ARMY 6487 24755 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)
11. Q. Will you read Document 8?
A. (Reading:)
SEcEE:r
From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 12, 1941.
Purple.
753.
On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered
port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on . It is thought
likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port.
This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.
ARMY 6573 24923 SECRET Trans. 11/18/41 (6)
J
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 913
[10,98] 12. Q. Will you read Document 9 ?
A. (Reading:)
SECBETT
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To : Manila.
November 20, 1941.
Purple.
#372. (Strictly Secret.)
Please advise immediately the results of your investigation as to tlie type of
draft — presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay ".
Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as
to Tokyo.
ARMY 6805 25314 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (6)
" Near Manila, P. I.
13. Q. Will you read Document 10?
A. (Reading:)
SECBETT
From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 22, 1941.
Purple.
#785.
1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having
8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of tlie 21st and anchored
at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.
On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison)
entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material.
2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were :
Manila- — Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black
Hawk ; Isabel ; Heron ; Wohotosu " ; Pisu " ; one mine layer ; 9 destroyed ;
20 submarines.
Cavite — Houston ( ?) ; Canopus.
ARMY 6902 25471 SECRET Trans. 11/29/41. (6)
* Kana spelling.
14. Q. Will you read Document 11?
A. (Reading:)
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Seattle.
25 November 1941.
(J19.)
#026.
[1099] Regarding War Spite, a British war ship now under repair at
Bremerton.
Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day
and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.
JD-1: 7034 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)
15. Q. Will you read Document 12?
A. (Reading:)
From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
25 November 1941.
(Purple.)
#790.
1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thou-
sand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.
2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.
3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left i)ort, destination unknown.
JD-1: 7035 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)
• Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND (of 8000 tons).
914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16. Q. Will you read Document 13?
A. (Reading:)
SECKET
From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#799.
Reecntly they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and
another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila
from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the
city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear
and windless, squalls come once a day.
ARMY 70S4 25764 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (fi)
[1100] 17. Q. Will you read Document 14?
A. (Reading:)
From: Tokyo.
To : San Francisco.
29 November 1941.
(J19.)
Circular #2431.
Make full report beginning December 1st on the following :
Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it
arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure.
etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian
Ocean, and South China Sea.
JD-1: 7037 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)
18. Q. Will you read Document 15 ?
A. (Reading:)
From: Tokyo.
To : Singapore.
5 December 1941.
(PA-K2.)
#377 (Alstract)
Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.
JD-1: 7446 SECRET (A) Navy Trans. 12-13^1 (AR)
19. Q. Will you read Document 16?
A. (Reading:)
SECEET
From : Seattle.
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
PA-K2.
#184. (Urgent intelligence.)
1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out
of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.
2. The Saratoga sailed the same dav.
ARMY 7177 25876 SECRET Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
[1101] 20. Q. Admiral, from what you remember, as you exam-
ined the class of information from -which these are extracts during the
last few months of the war, were there, in addition to those which you
have just read, a considerable number of other reports from Japanese
consuls or other agents giving our ship movements and dispositions,
which came to your notice ?
A. Why, the general tenor of the Japanese traffic was in a searching
expedition all over the world as to movements not only in United States
ports but also in those of foreign countries.
21. Q. Had that been going on for some time?
I
PROCEEDINGS OF XAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 915
A. During the several months preceding December, 1941, it was
intensified and had been going on for a considerable period.
22. Q. As you recall, was the physical volume of that traffic which
was translated considerable or not ?
A. In the early part of 1041 it wasn't so gi'eat, but towards Decem-
ber it built up month by month. I refreshed my memory yesterday.
There were about 700 of these diplomatic dispatches in our hands
during the month of November, 1041.
23. Q. Referring to all the translations made by the Army and
the Navy during the last two months of peace in 1041, can you give
a fair estimate of the nmnber of those translations which were aver-
aged per day?
A. Well, the diplomatic traffic during that month averaged about
2G messages a day.
24. Q. During the last month?
A. The last month.
25. Q. How was it during the preceding month ?
A, September and October were also heavy, but it increased in
November. I will say this. It was beyond the capacity of the staff
we had to handle all those translations expeditiously.
26. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before the court to the effect
that this class of information, which was recovered by the organza-
tion under you, was not transmitted to commanders at sea, particu-
larly the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you give the court
uny reasons why that should not have been transmitted to all com-
manders in the Pacific, including the coastal frontier commanders on
the Pacific Coast?
A. Well, first, I would like to indicate the method in which this
[comn intellig] information was handled. It was the function of the
Director of the Naval Communications organization to procure it.
It was then passed to the Office of Naval [1102] Intelligence,
whose function it was to evaluate and disseminate. In regard to our
part in it. Naval Communications had always objected, for security
reasons, to any of this traffic being passed other than in a secure
cryptographic sj'stem. Only the intercept traffic itself, which was
available to any intercepting agent, was allowed to go by air mail.
The rest of it would have to be put in the naval cryptographic sys-
tems. That volume was such, with the staff available, that it was not
all disseminated, and we would have objected seriously if it had been
loaded on the naval communications system. We would have objected
to its being passed by air mail, because had it been known and com-
promised, we would have lost our source of information.
27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your answer, the translations, if
passed by the quickest means, would have to be uncoded in one of our
own systems before transmission; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
28. Q. Do you mean that the personnel available was not sufficient
for that work?
A. Yes, we only had four watch officers to handle the naval traffic
coding here before the war without taking on a load of this intelli-
gence information.
29. Q. Well, would such uncoding have been a great increase pro-
portionately in the work of those officers?
A. Yes, I would say at least it would have doubled it.
916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30. Q. Will you further elaborate your reply, giving the reasons
which you mentioned, for not transmitting this information, at least,
to Pearl Harbor by air mail ?
A. Well, in accordance with the regulations, secret matter is not
sent out, even today, beyond the continental limits by air mail, and
this information was considered, at least, on a level above our own
naval administrative secret, and we would not permit any of this to
go by air mail. We do not today transmit any of it by air mail.
31. Q. Just why was the level of required secrecy so high?
A. You jeopardize your source of intelligence if the enemy knows
your degree of success.
32. Q. Has it developed that the maintenance of that secrecy has
been very important in carrying on the war since December 7, 1941 ?
A. I would say it has been vital to the war ejffort.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
[llOS] 33. Q. There has been testimony before the court, Ad>
miral, relative to what was known as the "Winds Message". Were
you Assistant Director of Naval Communications at the time of the
"Winds Message"?
A. If you will give me the date in relation to the "Winds Message",
I can answer.
34. Q. November and December, 1941.
A. I was the Assistant Director at that time.
35. Q. Do you recall the receipt of the execute of the "Winds Mes-
sage"? Would you like to see it?
A. Yes, I would. I never have.
36. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63.
A. Yes, I have seen this message. This is not the one I thought
you alluded to that set up the procedure. Yes, I have seen thati
message.
37. Q. Did you see what has been called the execute?
A. No, that is the one I referred to. I never did see it.
38. Q. Did you hear about it ?
A. Yes, I heard about it in discussion.
39. Q. At or about the time it was received?
A. That is right.
40. Q. Do you recall approximately when that was. Admiral?
A. Well, this is just a hazy recollection. It was about the 6th or
7th of December. I would say right in that period. I don't know
exactly when the message was sent, but I heard the discussions about
it. I never saw it.
41. Q. Can you fix it as being before or after the Pearl Harbor
attack ?
A. No, I can't. What impresses it upon my mind is that there was
some discussion as to the exact meaning of that message, whether it
actually applied to this one or not.
42. Q. With whom did you discuss it, Admiral?
A. I really wasn't in the discussion. I heard about it from the
Director, who was Admiral Noyes, and the officer who had charge of
the folder, who was Lieutenant Commander Kramer.
43. Q. In answer to one of Admiral Hart's questions you said tliat
there were several hundred of these intercepted diplomatic matters
during the month of November; is that right?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 917
A. That is right. I obtained that information from the file
yesterday.
[1104] 44. Q. That number included all the diplomatic inter-
cepts ?
A. All diplomatic that they had.
45. Q. It did not refer only to inquiries concerning ships or ship
movements ?
A. Oh, no, the diplomatic intercepts for the month.
46. Q. How many of the 700 during the month of November are of
the character of those contained in Exhibit 68?
A. I couldn't answer that. I would have to take the file and dig
the information out of it.
47. Q. Did you select all of the documents which were included
in Exhibit 68?
A. I had nothing to do with it.
48. Q. I note that 11 of the 16 were from here to Manila. Is that
a fair portion of the inquiries or answers to inquiries concerning
ships which emanated from here and were directed to Japanese rep-
resentatives in the Philippines ?
A. I couldn't answer that either without making a study of the file.
49. Q. Would you look at document 40 of Exhibit 63?
A. I have it here.
50. Q. Insofar as the information in that document purports to
place various ships in certain areas, is that an unusual document of
the character of which we have been talking ?
A. Well, it was more specific than any of the others I saw.
51. Q. It was most specific ?
A. Yes.
52. Q. There was nothing specific from any continental ports ?
A. No, the continental ones more or less referred to movements in
and out of port.
63. Q. It was even more specific than any answer from Manila ?
A. Yes, because this apparently referred to some particular chart
upon which he was reporting.
54. Q. Now, you told Admiral Hart that it was not feasible to un-
code and transmit by our system all the diplomatic intercepts to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor was it secure to do it by any
other means.
A. I did not say "any other means." I said by air mail.
55. Q. Were there any other means?
A. You could have put a courier on the job and sent him.
[1105] 56. Q. Was a courier used ?
A. No.
57. Q. Was any of the information obtained in this manner trans-
mitted directly or indirectly to those who were vitally interested in
acquiring the information?
A. In perusing this file recently, I noticed that there were messages
sent from Manila to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, into Wash-
ington with information copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
They related to the information which was gained out there in that
theatre.
58. Q. Was any of the information which was processed in Wash-
ington transmitted in any way to the Commander-in-Chief?
918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. You are asking me something which I would have to gain from
knowledge of the files, because, as I have previously testified, we did
not disseminate the information. It was disseminated by ONI, but
when it came to translating these exacts, as we call them, we did not
transmit them.
59, Q. So far as you know — and I appreciate that your knowledge
was limited — was any of it transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief ?
GO. Q. The exact messages, I don't believe, were transmitted.
There were other messages relating to the situation which were sent.
They were not, however, originated by the Director of Naval Com-
munications. The only traftic that the Director of Naval Communi-
cations originated had to do with the destruction of codes and ciphers
and information relating to the code and cipher system of the enemy.
61. Q. Was the reason why the messages could not be transmitted
applicable to a condensed digest of the information?
A. That goes back to the functions of ONI. I would say, yes, we
could have handled digests.
62. Q. The information would not be of much use unless either it
or some evaluation of it was made available to some of those in the
tield, would it?
A. That is correct, but, again, that was the function of ONI to
evaluate information.
The interested party. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the judge advocate:
63. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet or the Com-
mandant of the 14th Naval District, in his intelligence organization
or his intercept command, have the same facilities for receiving and
for translating messages of the type contained in Exhibits 63 and 68 ?
A. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific had any of [1106]
the intercepts, he could not have worked on them, because he did not
have the machines to do it. The problem was never assigned to
Honolulu, and all the translations were accomplished here in Wash-
ington.
Examined by the court :
64. Q. Admiral, in order to clear this question of transmitting in-
formation to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or other commanders
in the field, and having in mind these intercepts of a very secret
nature, aren't there means other than by air or courier of sending
a brief of such information by dispatch in code ?
A. Oh, yes, that is a brief of it, but I was referring to the exact
translation, that is, the total.
65. Q. But you could have sent a brief, giving full information ?
A. We could have handled that, yes.
66. Q. We have had testimony before this court that on or about
December 3 there was a dispatch made up and discussed with the
■Chief of Naval Communications, which was a summary of informa-
tion received in Washington. There was a suggestion that this dis-
patch be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Are you aware
of any such dispatch, or were you familiar with the conversation
among Admiral Wilkinson, Captain McCollum, and Rear Admiral
Noyes regarding the sending of such a dispatch ?
A. No, sir, I was not.
67. Q. You have no knowledge of such a dispatch?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 919
A. That is correct.
68. Q. Have you any knowledge of any dispatch reporting a sum-
mary of information, having in mind these very secret documents,
being sent to the Coniniander-iu-Chief, Pacific, or the Commander-
in-Chief, Asiatic?
A. I have not. There were one or two dispatches which originated
from the Chief of Naval Operations and which indicated what you
might call a situation out there, but they didn't allude to what we call
ultra information.
69. Q. Did those dispatches give any information included in the
intercepted messages ?
A. I think the best way is to let the dispatches speak for them-
selves. They are in the files.
70. Q. Were the dispatches you referred to based on that informa-
tion ?
A. Oh, partially, yes. I don't know what dispatches this court has
before it.
[1107] 71. Q. Do we understand that certain dispatches were
sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, which gave information
contained in these ultra secret dispatches?
A. No, they were based on that information. They were situa-
tion dispatches. It is a long time since I saw those dispatches.
One was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, which alerted
him as to the passage of a Japanese force into China and alerted him
as to a possible attack in Manila, and some of these dispatches did
include the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and some did not, and the
best way I know of is to get those dispatches from the files.
72. Q. Have you in mind any particular dispatch sent to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, along these lines ?
A. There was one, as I remember it, which told him to execute
War Plan 46 or 47.
73. Q. Execute it? When?
A. No, that came after it. It said to take measures in accordance
with that War Plan.
74. Q. Do you have reference to Exhibit 13 ?
A. (Referring to Exhibit 13.) It says.
By Japan for her present desperate tsiuation there is a possibility that Japan
may attack these two powers.
That is the background of ultra information.
75. Q. What date was that?
A. That is under the 16th of October. It states :
In view of these possibilities, you will talse due precautions, including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute
provocative actions against Japan.
and so forth.
76. Q. The question had particular reference to information being
transmitted from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, between the dates of 27 November and 7 December,
A. I could take the whole file and go through it. Here is one of
November 27 which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic. It states, "This despatch is to
be considered a war warning."
The question was repeated by the reporter.
920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Well, the only information I have is a recollection of these
dispatches which were sent and which were in the files of the office.
77. Q. You have no recollection of anything else ?
A. No.
[IIOS] Keexamined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R.
Stark, U. S. Navy :
78. Q. I show you Exhibits 15 and 17 before this court. You have
been asked several questions concerning the transmission of sum-
maries, briefs, etc., of the information in the super secret class. Would
that serve as a fair example of what you meant in your replies ?
A. It would, because it states here, "Chances of favorable outcome
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled
with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval
and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise, aggressive
movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam
is a possibility." Those statements in there came from ultra sources.
Reexamined by the court :
79. Q. In the Roberts Report it is stated that on December 1 the
Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the
caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated at considerable length the
elements of a situation existing at that time. Was that transmitted
by radio ?
A. That I could not answer. If I saw it, I could tell, I can say off
hand it was not transmitted by a dispatch.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this
witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any
further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter
of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in con-
nection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previ-
ous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret). Pages 1121-1123, inclusive.
[ii^i] 34. Q. Admiral, youi have stated that had you been
aware of this information which was not conveyed to you between
27 November and 7 December 1941, you would have had, in all proba-
bility, taken the Fleet to sea. Did any of this information to which
you refer, and which you state you did not receive, bear any indication
that there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. I think that the series of messages inquiring as to the disposition
of ships inside Pearl Harbor itself, wanting to know which ones were
in areas, the report of the Japanese Consul giving in detail the courses
taken by those in the harbor, would have indicated to me that they
were not only interested in the ships that were in the Pearl Harbor
area but that they were interested in exactly where they were in Pearl
Harbor proper. There are only two forms of attack that would be
effective against the ships inside Pearl Harbor. One is for submarines
to come into the harbor, and at that time I did not know that they had
any midget submarines, and I would have discounted largely the sub-
marine attack and would have considered that about the only thing
that could get in would be a bombing attack. I would also and did
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 921
discount the aircraft torpedo attack for reasons which have been pre-
sented to this court, and in view of that I would have said, "Well, they
probably are going to make an air bombing raid here." I do not see
any other conclusion you can draw from it unless you put it down to
Japanese stupidity in wanting all this information, and I do not
think they were so stupid.
35. Q. In view of the fact they were also making inquiries about the
disposition of ships at Pu^et Sound and Manila Bay, would that have
indicated, reading those dispatches collectively. Pearl Harbor particu-
larly or rather a desire for information as to what to do in case hostili-
ties were opened?
A. Well, the dispatches I have seen in regard to Puget Sound and
Manila Bay indicate an interest only in the ships that were there,
whether the ships were in port or whether they had left. Where they
are is something that is of interest always. Every ship located reduces
the number of those unknown, and if a carrier and a battleship are
located in the Navy Yard at Puget Sound, that is very definite infor-
mation that they are not in Hawaii. However, they did not ask in
Puget Sound nor in Manila, so far as I am informed, whether the
ships were tied up in a certain area, or where they were. They did
do that, I believe, in Pearl Harbor.
36. Q. What effect would the knowledge of the existence of the
Winds Message and so forth have had upon you?
A. Again I must say that I do not want to be so wise now that every-
thing has happened, but still I have a right to an opinion, and I will
give it for what it is worth. The definite fact that Japan, at least, was
going to break off diplomatic relations and, at most, was going to war
with us [1122] would have had a very great effect on me and
all my advisors. That would have been something definite. I think
that Commander Layton, who was my Fleet Intelligence Officer and
the Japanese language student, has already testified that had that come
through, he would have advised an all-out alert, to put it briefly.
37. Q. I am interested to know what good that would have done?
A. I don't know. That, I think, is open to question also.
Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter,
entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter, withdrew.
Cross-examined by the judge advocate:
38. Q. You have testified that had you had the information con-
tained in the "winds message", that you might have taken certain action
with regard to security or disposition of the United States Pacific
Fleet. What information was contained in the "winds message" as
regards the possible relations of the United States and Japan, as you
recall it?
A. In that Exhibit 63, there are several messages leading up to the
"winds message."
39. Q. I am asking only about the "winds message" at this time.
A. I am trying to answer about the "winds message." The "winds
message" contained a statement that at most they were going to declare
war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East
Indies; they were going to have peace with Russia; and that at the
least, they stated, that Japan was going to break off diplomatic
relations with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
East Indies, and maintain diplomatic relations with Russia — and a
922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
very strong belief by most of Japanese students that the translation in
fact meant that they were going to declare war, anda definite statement
such as that — would have lead me to know that the war was coming,
and coming almost immediately.
40. Q. Did not the dispatch. Exhibit 17, say in effect the same thing,
for the reason that it sets out that "negotiations have ceased, and an
aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few days,"
and it sets out territory of the United States as an objective ?
A. It doesn't convey the same thing to me at all, and I have testi-
fied at length as to my reactions when I received the message of No-
vember 27, and I can add nothing to that now.
Examined by the court :
41. Q. Referring to these Fleet planes. Admiral, if you [IISS}
had received the message which you did receive several hours sub-
sequent to the attack on 7 December, relative to the delivery of the
answer by the Japanese, what would have been you action regarding
these planes based on shore ?
A. I hate to make statements as to what I would have done under
theoretical circumstances. It is difficult for me to answer that. I
think I would have taken action. I would have gotten the planes, in
the air, at least, and taken all the steps possible, at least until a day or
two had elapsed, because that definite time for delivery must have
meant something. However, I do believe that the message sent by
General Marshall to General Short could have been a much clearer
message than the one that was sent.
Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, re-
porter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret). Page 1154.
[7-?5^] The court questioned the interested party, Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), as follows : To what document
did you refer in your preceding answer?
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested
party, made the following reply: I referred to the "execute" of the
Winds Message. I might further identify the first part of the Winds
Message as Documents 13 and 15, Exhibit 63, and Documents 2 and 3
in Exhibit 64.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 923
EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
Volume I
No. 1 to 29 (both inclusive)
Note. — Exhibits No. 11 and 29 contain privileged matter, which though not "Top-
Secret", do contain matter which is against the public interest to release for any
purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by under-
lining in "red", together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its
classification.
/S/ H. BlESEMEIEK,
Captain, U. 8. Navy,
Judge Advocate.
Exhibit No. 1
General Okdeb Navt Department,
No. 142 Washington, D. C, Jan. 10, 1941.
Status of Commandants Fifth, Tenth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Naval Districts
1. General Orders Nos. 109, 119, and 128 are hereby cancelled, and this order
substituted therefor effective February 1, 194J..
2. The Commandants of the Tenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Naval Districts,
the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United
States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Bermuda, and the
Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far as pertains to Alaska and
the Aleutian Islands are hereby assigned a dual status as follows :
(a) As Commandants of their respective Naval Districts, operating under
the orders of the Navy Department.
(b) As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of a
Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such, and
(2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and as directed
by its Commander-in-Chief.
3. As commandants of their respective districts, they will be governed by all
existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts.
The units under their command will be those prescribed in existing regulations
and instructions, and will include the Local Naval Defense Forces as well as the
usual shore activities.
4. Their exercise of duties as officers of a Fleet will be guided by such instruc-
tions as the Commander-in-Chief of that Fleet may consider desirable.
5. Upon assuming command of their respective districts, commandants will
further report to the officers indicated below in order that they may carry out
their Fleet duties as indicated above :
(a) The Commandants of the Fifth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts will
report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 16
924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) The commandants of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Districts will
report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Frank Knox.
A true copy. Attest :
H. Biesemeier,
H. BlESEMEIEK,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.
Exhibit No. 2
Genebai. Order Navy De^'Artment,
No. 143 Washington, D. C, February 3, 1941.
Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States
1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled.
2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this
order organized into:
The United States Fleet, comprising :
(a) The United States Atlantic Fleet,
(b) The United States Pacific Fleet,
(c) The United States Asiatic Fleet;
The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,
Special Task Forces,
Special Duty Ships,
The Naval Transportation Service,
Naval District Craft,
The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the fore-
going will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special orders
or in the "Assignment of Units in tbe Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the
U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."
3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the
United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and nor-
mally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is
under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief, United
States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits of com-
mand of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the
Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit
shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian
east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia,
Africa, and, sourth of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.
4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the
United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the United States Fleet, whose
commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the
component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for
training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets
are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.
5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet, will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of train-
ing for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will
be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing
Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as po.ssible, the type commander
will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
6. The Commander-in Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Com-
manders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating
in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible
to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations.
7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and
task organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders.
Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them.
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval Coastal Forces" and
"Naval Local Defen.se Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Com-
manders and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 925
Coastal Frontiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces consist only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Comiuandants of Naval Dis-
tricts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Fi'ontiers have administrative respon-
sibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval
Coastal Forces, respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have
task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations lor Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces.
8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief
of Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks.
9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey
duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under
orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or
under the Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are
performing.
10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be
assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly
under the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the
naval district or station to vphich assigned. They consist of such naval craft
and floating equipnient of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense
Forces."
F^NK Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.
A true copy. Attest:
11. Biesemeier,
H. Bdeskmeiek,
Captain, U. 8. Navy,
Judge Advocate.
Exhibit No. 3
General Ordeb
No. 170
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, March 23, 1942.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet
1. Pursuant to Executive Order of the President the duties of the Commander
in Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations
have been combined and placed under one officer who has the title "Commander
in Cliief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations", with the rank and
title of Admiral. This officer is the principal naval adviser to the President
on the conduct of the war, and the principal naval adviser and executive to the
Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment.
2. As Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, the officer holding tthe com-
bined offices has supreme command of the operating forces comprising the sev-
eral fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the Navy and is directly
responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the
President therefor.
3. The staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, is composed of —
(a) A Chief of Staff, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who, in the temporary
absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations", shall act as Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet ;
(b) Such deputy and assistant chiefs of staff as may be necessary ; and
(c) Such other officers as may be appropriate and necessary to enable the
"Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" to
perform tlie duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
4. As Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding the combined offices is
charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the preparation,
readiness and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several
fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the Navy, and with the coordi-
926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nation and direction of effort to this end of tlie bureaus and offices of the Navy
Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the
Navy may specifically exempt. Duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be
contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet.
5. The staff of the Chief of Naval Operations is composed of —
(a) A "Vice Chief of Naval Operations, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who
has all necessary authority for executing the plans and policies of the "Com-
mander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" so far
as pertains to the duties herein prescribed for the Chief of Naval Operations.
In the temporary absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" he shall act as Chief of Naval
Operations ;
(b) An Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, with the title of Sub Chief
of Naval Operations and the rank of Rear Admiral, and such additional assistant
Chiefs of Naval Operations as may be required ; and
(c) Such other officers as may be considered to be appropriate and necessary
for the performance of the duties at present prescribed for the Chief of Naval
Operations.
6. During the temporary absence of the Secretary of the Navy, the Under
Secretary of the Navy, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the "Com-
mander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" shall be
next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy. In the temporary absence of
all of these officers the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff,
United States Fleet, respectively, shall be next in succession to act as Secretary
of the Navy.
Frank Knox.
Secretary of the Navy.
A true copy. Attest:
H. Biesemeier,
H. BlESEMEIEai,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.
[i] SECRET
Exhibit No, 4
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, May 26, 1941.
Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 060512
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List for WPL^46.
Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).
Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 92, including List of EflFective Pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.
1. Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans
required by WPI/-46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accom-
plished with the least possible delav. To this end, all planning based upon the
directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL^44 will be discontinued
until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Trans-
portation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed
prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for
the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
927
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited
to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning," and in the
"Registered Publication Manual".
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of
vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix
II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of
WPI^S.
[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A"
stowage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual".
9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR-
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDI-
NATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION.
H. R. Stark.
[iii]
Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Subject Matter
Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC)Al6(R-5)
of May 26, 1941.
List of Effective Pages
Table of Corrections ■_
Distribution List - - - --
Title Page
Table of Contents
Introduction v.
Parti
Chart
Part I (Cont'd)
Part II -
Part III --
Part IV
Party
Appendix I„; -
Appendix II;
Title Page
Chapter I,
Chapter II
Table ATF-1
Chapter III
Table PAF-1
Table PAF-2
Chapter IV;
Table SEP-1
Chapter V:
Table ASF-1
Chapter VI .- - -.
Table NE-1
Table NE-2
Chapter VII:
Table CNO-1...
Chapter VIII....
Table NACF
Table SCF
Table CACF
Table PACF
Table PSCF
Table PNCF
Table HCF
Table PhCF
Chapter IX
Page or Sheet No.
1, u
iii
iv
V, vi
1
2 to 4 inc..
5 to 8 inc..
9, 10
11.
12
13, 14
15 to 60 inc
61 to 80 inc
81,82
1 to 51 inc..
1
2,3
4,5
1 to 3 inc...
6
1 to 3 inc...
1
1
1,2
7
1..
1...
1
8 to 10 inc..
1 to 5 inc...
1 to 4 inc..
1
1
1 to 3 inc...
1
1
1-
11
Change
in Effect
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
Original
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m
TABLE OP CORRECTIONS
R. P. M. or Change No.
Date of
entry
Signature and rank of officer entering change.!
1
26-7-44
Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R.
928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, June 3, 1941-
Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 064112
Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: Change No. 1, WPI^46.
1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46:
(a) On Page 45
Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line— Change 13,400 to 6,400.
Paragraph 3511.a.2(g), first line— Change 23,600 to 12,600.
Paragraph 3511.a.2.(i), first line— Change 44,000 to 23,000.
(b) On Page 80
Paragraph 4601, first line, — after "will be" insert "prepared as".
(c) On Page 30 of Appendix I
Paragraph 51. a. (13), first line— Change 13,400 to 6,400.
Paragraph 51. a. (14), first line— Change 23,600 to 12,600.
(d) On Page 31 of Appendix I
Paragraph 51.a.(16), first line— Change 44,000 to 23,000.
2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46.
3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the
continental limits of the United States.
R. E. Ingersoll, Acting.
DISTRIBUTION LIST
[V]
Official to whom issued Registered Nos.
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.. - - 1
Commander, Battle Force - - - 2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force 3
Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld) 4
Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld) - 5
Commander, Battleship Division Three 6
Commander, Battleship Division Five 7
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force - --- - - 8
Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force - 9
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force -.- -.- 10
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force 11
Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force 12
Commander, Scouting Force - - 13
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force 14
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force _ 15
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force.. ..- 16
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet. ..- -.. 17
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet -.. 18
Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet 19
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, .Vtlantic Fleet 20
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet -.. 21
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet 22
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet - 23
Commander, Support F'orce, Atlantic Fleet 24
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet 25
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ..- 26
Commanding Oeneral, Fleet Marine Division 27
Commanding General, Second Marine Division -.. 28
Operations — Director, War Plans Division 29,30,31
— Director, Xaval Intelligence Division 32
— Director, Naval Communications Division.- 33
— Director, Fleet Maintenance Division 34
— Director, Ship Movements Division 35
— Director, Naval Districts Division 36
—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements
Division). 37
Chief of Bureau of Navigation 38,39
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.. 40
Chief of Bureau of Ships 41
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks. 42
Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics. 43
Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 44,45
Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 46
[VI] Judge Advocate General, U. S. K'avy 47
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 48
Director, Shore Establishment Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy) 49
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 929
DISTRIBUTION LIST— Continued
Official to whom issued Registered Nos.
War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department 50
President, Naval War College -. 61
Commandant, First Naval District 62,53
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland 64
Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H 55
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I 66
Commandant, Third Naval District- 67, 58
Commandant, Fourth Naval District - ..- ..- 59,60
Commandant, Fifth Naval District 61,62
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda 63
Commandant, Sixth Naval District— - 64,65
Commandant, Seventh Naval District - 66
Commandant, Eighth Naval District - 67,68
Commandant, Ninth Naval District.. 69
Commandant, Tenth Naval District 70
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba 71
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad 72
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District 73,74
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 75,76
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District 77,78
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 79
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 80
Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District 81
Commanding General, Department of Pacific, U. S. Marine Corps, San Francisco, California 82
Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va 83
Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif 84
Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa 85
United States Military Mission in London 86,87
United States Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada _ 88
British Military Mission in Washington 89
U. S. Naval Attache, Melbourne, Australia 90
Registered Publication Section, — Working Copy 91
Registered Publication Section, —Library Copy.. 92
Registered Publication Section, —Reserve Copies 93,
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107
Op-12B-McC Navy Department,
(SC)A16(R-5) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Serial 071912 Washington, July 1, 1941.
Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.
lleference :
(a) GO No. 142.
(b) GO No. 143.
(c) WPI^46.
1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312
of WPL-46 are hereby established.
2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I,
Appendix I, WPI^46.
3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and
Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in
accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of
General Order No. 142 are suspended.
4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General
Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval
Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assign-
ments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense
Forces.
5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional
duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated:
Commandant, 3rd Naval District — Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 6th Naval District — Commander, Southern Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 10th Naval District — Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 15th Naval District — Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fron-
tier;
930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Southern Naval
13th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Northern Naval
14th Naval District — Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Commandant,
Frontier;
Commandant,
Frontier;
Commandant,
Frontier;
Commandant, 16th Naval District — Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal
Frontier.
6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the
commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of
the Naval Coastal Frontiers remain in a SECRET classification. Correspond-
ence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature.
7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental
limits of the United States is authorized.
/s/ H. R. Stark.
[1] W. P. L.— 46
NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES
NAVY
[S] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject
Introduction: rage'
Chapter I. Origin, Basis, and Scope of this Plan 5
Chapter II. Execution of this Plan 6
Section 1. Execution of the Entire Plan 6
Section 2. Execution of a part of this Plan 7
Chapter III. Agreements with Associated Powers other than the British Commonwealth 8
Part I. Task Organization, Information and Assumptions:
Chapter I. Task Organization 9
Chart Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers 11
Chapter II. Information and Assumptions 12
Part II. Outline of Tasks:
Chapter I. Concept of the War 13
Chapter II. The General Task 14
Part III. Assignment of Tasks:
Chapter I. Forces in the Western Atlantic Area 15
Section 1. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet 15
Section 2. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 21
Sections. Command Relations 25
Chapter II. Forces in the Pacific Area 27
Section 1. The U. S. Pacific Fleet 27
Section 2. The Southeast Pacific Force 31
Section 3. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 33
Section 4. Command Relations 36
Chapter III. Forces in the Far East Area 38
Section 1. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier 38
Chapter IV. Forces in the United Kmgdom and British Home Waters Area 42
Section 1. The U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe 42
Chapter V. The Services '.. 44
Section 1. The Naval Transportation Service 44
Section 2. The Naval Communication Service 47
Section 3. The Naval Intelligence Service 48
Chapter VI. The Shore Establishment 49
Chapter VII. Instructions Jointly Applicable to Task Forces 60
Section 1. Forming the Task Forces SO
Section 2. Mobilization 51
[S] Sections. The Routing and Protection of Shipping 53
Section 4. Rules of Warfare _ 68
Section 5. Intelligence Liaison between Commanders of Associated Forces in the Field 60
Part IV. Logistics:
Chapter I. The Shore Establishment 61
Chapter II. General Directives 62
Section 1. Personnel 62
Section 2. Material 63
Sections. Transportation 64
Section 4. Legal Services 66
Section 5. Augmentation and Maintenance of the Shore Establishment 67
Section 6. Priorities 68
Chapter III. The Operating Forces and Services 69
Section 1. Preparation for War Service.. .. 69
Section 2. Maintenance 73
Section 3. Augmentation 77
Chapter IV. Advanced Bases 78
Chapter V. Salvage 79
Chapter VI. Plans to be prepared by the Shore Establishment- 80
Part V. Special Prorisions:
Chapter I. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure 81
Chapter II. Joint Plans Covering Intelligence Service, Censorship and Publicity, and Mobiliza*
tion of Resources 82
* Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 931
APPENDICES
Subject Page «
Appendix I. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow No. 5-.. 1-36
Annex I. Coastal Frontiers --- 37-51
[4] Appendix II. The Composition of Forces
Title Page 1
Chapter I. Introduction - 2
Chapter II. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet _ 4
Table ATF-1 _. Sheets 1 to
Chapter III. The U. S. Pacific Fleet 6
Table PAF-1 Sheets 1 to 3
Table PAF-2— Sheet 1
Chapter IV. The Southeast Pacific Force
Table SEP-1, Sheet 1
Chapter V. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet
Table ASF-1 Sheets 1,2
Chapter VI. U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe 7
Table NE-1 -- Sheet 1
Table NE-2- Sheet 1
Chapter VII. Vessels Operating under the Chief of Naval Operations
Table CNO-1 Sheet 1
Chapter VIII. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces --- 8
Table NACF. ---. Sheets 1 to 5
Table SCF --.- Sheets 1 to 4
Table CACF --- — - Sheet 1
Table PACE .'. Sheet 1
Table PSCF Sheets 1 to 3
Table PNCE Sheet 1
Table HCF... Sheet 1
Table PhCF Sheet 1
Chapter IX. Naval Transportation Service _ 11
[5] Introduction
chapter i. origin, basis, and scope of this plan
0101. This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the
direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.
0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conver-
sations (Short Title ABO-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan
(Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow .
No. 5.
0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint
Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited dis-
tribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan
by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations,
are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5,
which is included in this plan as Appendix I.
0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and
tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War.
0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be
made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in
the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization
of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to
Naval Districts and Naval Stations."
[6] CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN
Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN
0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval
Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, includ-
ing acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5".
b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise
designated.
[?] Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN
0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is antici-
pated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may
be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan
or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.
1 Pages referred to are represented by Italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original exhibit.
932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations
to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary
measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or addi-
tional tasks thereof.
[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
030 L The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than
those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate
to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan,
as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction.
0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has
agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and
BAHIA.
a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports.
b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and
delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited
capacities of the ports.
c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port.
d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be
given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States
Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard
to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance
are not required.
e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local
arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port,
through the United States Naval Observer.
[9] Part I. Task Organization. Information and Assumptions
CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow
No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is
prescribed below:
a. THE OPERATING FORCES, under command of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
1. THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET, under command of
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
2. THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, under command of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
3. THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, under
command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.
4. THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, under command of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
5. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE,
under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES,
NORTH EUROPE.
6 THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, under the command
of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of:
(a) THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES:
(b) THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES.
b. THE SERVICES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.
1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.
2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE.
3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.
c. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, under the direction of the appropriate
Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department.
[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsi-
bility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix
I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea,
designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Ap-
pendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 933
1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas'^for which the
United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations
will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in
paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in
Appendix I, "Section V."
(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the world
showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers." This
map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBIT-ILLUS-
TRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound
together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)
[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III."
[IS] Part II. Outline of Tasks
CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR
2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV."
14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK
2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of
Appendix I.
2202. The Navy General Task is as' follows:
a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of
the other Associated Powers, will:
1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC
AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY
BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;
2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR
EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN
MEDITERRANEAN;
3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United
States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED
KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR|EAST
AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA;
4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or
Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Asso-
ciated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and
5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and
CAROLINE ISLANDS.
[16] Part III. Assignment of Tasks
CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially
be organized into task forces as follows:
a. OCEAN ESCORT;
b. STRIKING FORCE;
c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE;
d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE;
e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO;
f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE;
g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;
h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA;
i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COM-
MANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within
the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA:
934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET— Continued
a. TASK
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);
b. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR
DESTROYING VESSELS^TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
[16] c. TASK
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS
AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER
INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND
AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND
POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
d. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S.
ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C";
6. TASK
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER FORCES;
f. TASK
PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE
ISLANDS.
3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC
AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface
forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from
bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC.
b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH
HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH
ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC
AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, wiU remain under the strategic direc-
tion of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the
naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable.
3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO wiU operate under the strategic direc-
tion of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.
[17] h. This force will be assigned the following task bv the Commander in
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:
1. TASK
PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO
GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS.
c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC
AREA this force will execute the following task:
1 TA ^K
RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING
THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFI-
CER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC.
d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC
FLEE T for administrative purposes.
3115. a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE Sind SUBMARINE FORCE
THREE will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 935
b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander
in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:
L TASK
PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO
BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRinSH HOME
WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS.
[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME
WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE
FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be
assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter
are to be foimd in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.
3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange
for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter
III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources
designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and
outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from
United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For
this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC
FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Trans-
portation Service.
b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States
forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated
herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.
1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supple-
mented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH
ATLANTIC AREA.
2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States
sources.
3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and tem-
porary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented bj^ use of
available British facilities.
4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States
sources.
[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of
the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the
NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in
that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately
obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic
deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.
d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander,
TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect
to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including per-
sonnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUB-
MARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES,
NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.
3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the
preparation of the following plans:
1. U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No.
5 (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5) ;
2. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of
this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOT-
LAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b)) ;
3. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of
this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS
AREA;
936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the
movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH
ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared.
b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of
Naval Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[31] Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is
prescribed in General Order No. 143.
b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.
3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA
are:
a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR.
3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appen-
dix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES
INDICATED BELOW:
CATEGORY B— THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER.
—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
CATEGORY D— THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRON-
TIER.
—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
[22] b. TASK
PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SEC-
TION 3;
c. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC. FLEET;
SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE
COASTAL FRONTIER.
e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PAN-
AMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task:
1. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.
3124. a. The following plans will be prepared:
1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this
plan;
2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL
FRONtlER,'and SOUTHERN NAVAL'COASTAL FRONTIER:
(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 5, including
an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval
Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);
3. Bv Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL ^COASTAL FRONTIER,
and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER," and by Commandants,
FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH
NAVAL DISTRICTS:
[23] (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW
No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);
(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;
4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Com-
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.
b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of
Naval Operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 937
2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts^will
be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respec-
tive Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval
Districts.
4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH
ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and
Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and
PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their
review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination
with the' Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operation Plans and
Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchor-
ages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for com-
ment, if he so requests.
5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[25] Sections. COMMAND RELATIONS
313L In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S.
ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in
the execution of tasks requiring mutual support; the following provisions shall
apply :
a. On M-dav, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are
assigned a dual status as follows :
1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations;
2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of
task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief
thereof.
b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require
the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, tempo-
rarilv and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking
temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned
in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
L The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require
task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their
respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations.
[26] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while
the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.
3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is as-
signed as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and
task purposes.
3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval
Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern
the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval
Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of
the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to
the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft as-
signed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.
b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the
938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.
3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Flan — Rainbow No. 5, Appen-
dix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.
[27] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organ-
ized into task forces as follows:
a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;
c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.
3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the
PACIFIC AREA:
a. TASK
SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE
FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM
THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE
OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON
ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;
b. TASK
PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER
THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ES-
TABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;
c. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR
DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
d. TASK
SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF
THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST;
[28] e. TASK
DEFEND SAMOA IN CATAGORY "D";
f. TASK
DEFEND GUAM IN CATAGORY "F";
g. TASK
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) ;
h. TASK
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS
IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF
ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING
LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE
OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
i. TASK
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
FORCES;
j. TASK
ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS
FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;
k. TASK
ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE
FLEET CONTROL ZONES.
[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in
Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET,
to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be
established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations,
when so directed by that officer.
c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT
and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 939
by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent
to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the
CANAL ZONF] twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their
transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.
3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for
the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental
United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by
the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources.
(See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the
transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supple-
mented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service.
b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service
will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including
personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU.
c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the
Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRON-
TIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and trans-
portation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the
Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may,
at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders
of other Naval Coastal Frontiers.
[SO] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will
re(iuire the folloVing plans to be prepared:
1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 6 (Navy Plan 0-1, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the
availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on
180M;
3. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval Station Samoa Plan 0-5
RAINBOW No. 5);
4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct.
b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating
Plan — RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be
prepared.
NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the
distribution of this Naw Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5.
[31] Section 2. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will
be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations
upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE.
3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in
SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC
AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between
the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.
3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY:
b. TASK
PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE .ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES;
c. TASK
SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR:
d. TASK
PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS
IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 17
940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S^] s ., 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC! FORCE, will
arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from
Shore Establishment sources hi the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from
foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). Transporta-
tion will be provided by the Naval Transjjortation Service.
b. In circumstances where transportation facihties provided by the NAVAL
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTH-
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels
immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent
logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if
available.
3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require
the preparation of the following plans:
1. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN-
RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander,
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct.
b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
is prescribed in General Order No. 143.
b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frt)ntiers, Coastal
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the
Navv, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.
3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are:
a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Ap-
pendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES
INDICATED BELOW:
CATEGORY fi— THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER.
—THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR.
CATEGORY C— THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER,
EXCEPT UNALASKA.
CATEGORY i)— UNALASKA.— THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COAST-
AL FRONTIERi
[34] b. TASK
PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SEC-
TION 3;
c. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
d. TASK
SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN
THE COASTAL FRONTIERS.
3234. a. The following plans will be prepared:
1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix T, paragraph 48;
2. Bv the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
frontip:r:
(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan — RAINBOW No. 5,
including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal
Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);
3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by
the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:
(a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 5
(Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);
(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph
48;
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 941
[S5] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed
by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval
Districts,
b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Com-
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be
reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local
Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief,
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief
of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operat-
ing Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and
Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet
anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for
comment, if he so requests.
4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[36] Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS
3241. In order to provide for unitv of command of task groups of the U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTH-
ERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring
mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242) :
a. On M-day, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will bfe
assigned a dual status as follows:
1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the
orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in com-
mand of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Com-
mander in Chief thereof.
b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafte-
require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his comr
mand, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval
Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET,
when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard
for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers
by the Chief of Naval Operations.
1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, wiU not
require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the
limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon
authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.
c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while
the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.
[37] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command
relations of the Commander in Chief. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Com-
mander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circum-
stances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execu-
tion of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.
3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTH-
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force
and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Opera-
tions will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if
this situation arises.
3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Com-
mandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in
942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence
Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given
to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily,
to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.
b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph. Commanders of
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, Appendix
I, after ABC-22 has been approved.
[S8] CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER
3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.:
"Far East Area
"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military
forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East
Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA wiU, subject to the approval of the Dutch
authorities, be effected as follows:
"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers
will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in
that area.
"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be
the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces
concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual
support as may be practicable and appropriate.
"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces
of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting
the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval
Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of
naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES."
3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate
superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II).
b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order
No. 143.
[39] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER.
and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are
defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I
of Appendix I.
d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER Mill
employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned bv the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its 'joint
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, under the
direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the
following tasks:
a. TASK
RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY
AXIS FORCES;
b. TASK
SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF
THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF
THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE
CONTINUES.);
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 943
c TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
d. TASK
PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES;
[40] e. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIP-
PINE COASTAL FRONTIER— CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E";
f. TASK
ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED
POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA.
3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to
BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion.
3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for
the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIX-
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from com-
mercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch
governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.).
b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical
materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources
in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS.
c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources
in the United States.
d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be
employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval
Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United
States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be
retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that
.\rea.
through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance
with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine
registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the
transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC
FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate,
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a
time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States
registry will be employed if available.
3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the
following plans to be prepared:
1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-2, RAINBOW No. 5) ;
2. Local Joint Plans required bv Appendix I, Paragraph 48;
3. SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE
FORCE OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5. (Sixteenth Naval
District Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5) ;
4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in
Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct.
b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS
AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE
3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH
EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United^States Military Mission in
London.
b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the
administrative command of the Commander in Chief, L^. S. NAVAL FORCES,
NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.
3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI,
Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:
1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;
2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE.
b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.
3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME
WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH
EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks:
a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE
1. TASK
ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROAQHES,
ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE
BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN AP-
PROACHES;
b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE
1. TASK
RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED,
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE
ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES.
US] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH
EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Sec-
tion 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service
or from vessels assigned to the task forces.
a. Fuel from United States and British sources.
b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from
United States sources.
c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facili-
ties assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities.
d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources.
e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided bv the NAVAL TRANS-
PORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis,
or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States
registry will be employed, if available.
3415. a. Outline operating plans for the emplovment of the U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared bv the prospective Commander
of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective
Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review
by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After
review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval
Operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 945
[44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES
Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix
II) is assigned the following task:
a. TASK
PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVE-
MENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY
FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE
TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND
OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.
1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels
of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require.
2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as
indicated in this paragraj^h. Larger movements may be made eventually,
as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans
for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First
contingent — 10,500 troops embark on 24 M. Second contingent —
16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by
British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan
contemplates use of United States transports.
(b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on lOM.
NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on lOM.
(1) These two forces will move in one convoy.
(c) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark
on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45]
transported. Part of this force mav be moved before M-day.
(d) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on
15M.
(e) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M.
(f) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark
on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
(g) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000
embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
(h) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark
on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before
M-day.
(i) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000
embark on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressivelj^ as
ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before
M-day.
3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be
transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indi-
cated in Appendix I, paragraph 57.
3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Com-
manders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in
Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.
[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the
Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and
will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans — Rain-
bow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval
Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Com-
mandants of Naval Districts.
[47] Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following
tasks:
a. TASK
INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE
NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION
OF THIS PLAN;
946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. TASK
IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOV-
ERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION,
PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR
THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVI
SIGN, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION
STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL.
3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations
(Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following:
a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department;
b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants
of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of command-
ers of forces afloat, including aircraft.
3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, viill prepare the Principal
Naval Communication Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe
therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5
which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and
Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of
Naval Districts.
U8] Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.
3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following
tasks:
a. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED
POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH
INFORMATION. PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY,
ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND
FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN-
RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT;
b. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPART-
MENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF
MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY.
3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations
(Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following:
a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navj- Department, including
naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under tlie Director
of Naval Intelligence;
b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Comman-
dants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C, and Outlying Naval
Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities.
3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal
Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe
therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5, whicli
are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activi-
ties or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval
Districts.
49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV,
[50] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES
Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES
3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and
U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief
of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to
which assigned.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 947
b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143),
designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed
by tlie Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of
task organizations to which assigned.
c. Vessels to be mobilized, uj)on completion of mobilization, and when directed
by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the
commanders of task organizations to which assigned.
3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels
of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the
Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require.
3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establish-
ments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President,
will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set
forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940."
b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units
coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organiza-
tions as indicated in Appendix II of this plan.
[51] Section^. MOBILIZATION
3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:
1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be
mobilized preparatory to 2;
2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establish-
ment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is
provided for in Part IV of this plan.
b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating
Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment
does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and
facilities as required to perform its assigned task.
c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of
the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized.
During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through
the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.
3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan
have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed,
even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for
immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Cliief of
Naval Operations.
3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan
applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to
the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be
taken over from private sources or other government departments.
[5S] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of
vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief
of Naval Operations.
3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned
to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.
[53] Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING
3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V";
a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protec-
tion of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British author-
ities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United
States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping
of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.
"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and pro-
tected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British
Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North
Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.
"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange
for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter
948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service
Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas
will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations."
b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes
all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas,
except protection.
Definitions
3732. a. ROUTING. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this
plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure
from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meet-
ing points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions
for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the
scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a
part of routing.
b. INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers
proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District.
c. INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the ,% Associated
Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval
Coastal Frontier.
d. INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers,
not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to,
or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier.
e. FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING. All shipping of the Associated
Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone.
f. OVERSEAS SHIPPING is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose
route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier;
except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada
is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.
Instructions for routing shipping
3733. INTRA-DISTRICT, INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER
SHIPPING.
a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval
Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier,
and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and
Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and
interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by
them.
[56] b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier
and Inter-Frontier Shipping.
c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval
District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier.
3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING.
a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as
Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping:
1. CLASS A. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of
strategic responsibility of the United States;
2. CLASS B. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic
responsibility of the LInited States, and one point in the areas of strategic
responsibility of the United Kingdom.
b. WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA.
1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom
Cbief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas
Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and
UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south.
2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Over-
seas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In
the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing
instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Dis-
tricts in which are the ports of assembly of the convovs, with copies to the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, apprbpriate Naval Coastal
Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected.
In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of
Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal
Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN-
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 949
TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the
general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com-
mandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders
of vessels.
c. PACIFIC AREA.
1. Under the general direction of the Cliief of Naval Operations, the
Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by
the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA,
with the following exceptions:
(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route
shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES;
(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER,
will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA;
(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged
directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff.
The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United
Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer.
Instructions for the "protection of shipping
3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the
Operating Forces.
[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by
covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combina-
tion of these methods.
c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic
responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Com-
manders in Chief, Commanders of Sub- Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and
by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing
situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers
will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval
forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping.
d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be
viewed as having an especial importance,
[58] Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE
3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by
the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime
Warfare".
3742. Except under extroardinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are
available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing
ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the
jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States
prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously
been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United
States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents
itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department
shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United
States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly
notified.
3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy,
3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the
WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategi-
cal Areas" as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the
exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the
Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used,
means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant
aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or
aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would
be detrimental to our own forces.
[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET,
or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside
the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated
Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom-
950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to
be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval
Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify
shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid,
before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases
appropriate local notification should be made by th'e Commander in Chief con-
cerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed.
\60] Section B. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS
OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD
3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task
force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task
force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating mat-
ters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.)
[61] Pakt IV. Logistics
CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT
THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES;
b. TASK
PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ES-
TABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES;
c. TASK
PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC
OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA,
WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED
STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING
UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.
4102. Each Chief of Bureavi or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and
each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute
such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his
cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV.
[6^] CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES
Section 1. PERSONNEL
4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for:
a. Preparing for war servcie, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating
Forces and the Services;
b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.
4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54.
"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met
by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940".
4213. a. Personnel will be suppUcd in accordance with the Basic Priorities
established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).
b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the
Services cannot be suppHed from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval
District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel
for such period of time as found to be necessary.
[63] Section .?. MATERIAL
4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for:
a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces
and the Services;
b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.
4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the
Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial
Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurenient Plans, The procurement of material
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 951
will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive
Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and
Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58).
4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the
Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such
material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means.
4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities estab-
lished in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).
[64] Section 3. TRANSPORTATION
4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by:
1. THE OPERATING FORCES;
2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.
b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and
material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable.
4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading.
b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and
the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding
material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transporta-
tion may be provided.
c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels
designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.
4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Dis-
trict Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities
of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57).
b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation,
and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the
Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regard-
ing the safety of vessels.
c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army peronnel
while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered
vessels) ; the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals
embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel
embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army
personnel.
(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will
establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander,
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison
duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by
fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.
[66] Section 4- LEGAL SERVICES
4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, neces-
sary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment.
4242. These services will include:
a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Estab-
lishment;
b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such
Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the
Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan;
c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legisla-
tion and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive
Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the
execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5
(Appendix I, paragraph 59).
[67] Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE
SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by
providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned
tasks.
4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in
excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met
locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking
over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners
for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both govern-
ment and private requirements.
952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[68] Section 6. PRIORITIES
4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance
with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERV-
ICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the pri-
orities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several
items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance.
a. PRIORITY ONE
1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial move-
ments to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA,
TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII.
2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S.
NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE
THREE, U. S. NAVAU FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.
3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
b. PRIORITY TWO
1. Initial movements to ICELAND.
2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET.
3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
not specified under PRIORITY ONE.
c. PRIORITY THREE
1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.
2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under
PRIORITIES ONE and TWO.
d. PRIORITY FOUR
1. New Construction.
[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES
Section 1. PREPARATION FOR \f AR SERVICE
4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTAB-
LISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPER-
ATING FORCES and SERVICES Usted in Appendix II, which are not then in
condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and
providing personnel to perform their war tasks.
- 4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel,
repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION pre-
scribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.
4313. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the
current Operating Force Plan.
a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the
current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most
of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan.
Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for imme-
diate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. The.y will complete
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed l)y their
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
4314. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in
the current Operating Force Plan.
a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in
Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobiliza-
tion Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are
responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for
mobilization.
b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization
District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will
employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service.
[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day
Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far
in advance as practicable.
c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day
Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the
mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established
and other related instructions.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 953
d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with
navy personnel before being considered ready for war service.
e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STAND-
ARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing
them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits.
f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in
STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except
as follows:
1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for
war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sani-
tary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled
voyage;
2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered
ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary,
medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled
voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication
group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;
[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for
voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready
for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for
which scheduled;
4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered
ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service
for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a com-
munication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as
may be required;
5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for
the installation of batteries and magazines.
g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to
be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION
after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits.
h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal
Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.
4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled
to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent
stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or
by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies
to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels.
b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable
number of officers and men as follows:
1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 6
[7S] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 8
3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 8
4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 6
[73] Sections. MAINTENANCE
4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the
Services in condition of readiness for war by:
a. Replacement of personnel and material;
b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities;
c. Hospitalization of personnel ;
d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and
welfare of personnel.
Replacements
4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the
Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Depart-
ment concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon
estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These
rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel
and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and
the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each
type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub- Areas listed in para-
graph 1102 of this plan.
954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to
time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the
Services, as determined by war experience.
c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement
rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied.
A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained
available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation
to destination.
d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate
to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material alloted to low
priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until defi-
ciencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates.
e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replace-
ments of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Estab-
lishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transporta-
tion Service will submit their requests for replacements.
f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission
of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery.
g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows:
1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S.
ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers
designated by them;
2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Com-
mandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based;
3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the
commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where
delivery is desired;
4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants
of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these
units are established.
h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the
Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material
replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replace-
ments obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements
made to Shore Establishment activities.
[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the Services
will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested.
Repairs
4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating
Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment
activities.
b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore
Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following:
1. The geographic disposition of the various forces;
2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work
required;
3. The degree of urgency of the work required;
4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities;
5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers.
4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which
a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates.
Hospitalization and evacuation
4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for .sick and wounded
personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships,
in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units.
[76] h. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or
wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore
Establishment activities.
4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activ-
ities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other
available vessels having adequate medical facilities.
4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will
be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 955
b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by
the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army
hospitals or field medical units.
Recreation and welfare
4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and
welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps
personnel.
b. Provisions for these activities will include:
1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Estab-
lishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are
concentrated, and at Training Stations;
2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the
above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies
and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel.
\77] Sections. AUGMENTATION
4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the
Services by:
a. New construction of vessels and aircraft;
b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of
vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply
and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service;
c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy
from other Government Departments;
d. Acquisition of material.
4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of
Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local
representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.
[78] CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES
4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required
for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with in-
structions issued in separate directives.
[79] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE
4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render sal-
vage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas
prescribed in paragraph 4101. c.
b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available
by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own
forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United
States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced
Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.C.
4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or
other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within
the waters of the United States.
4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will
acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels:
1. From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY
PIONEER,
GUIDE.
DISCOVER;
2. From the COAST GUARD
REDWING,
b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of
Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and
two on the Pacific Coast of the United States.
[80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in
Part V, WPI^S, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128.
4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the
estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies.
79716—46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 IS
956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\81] Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE
5101, The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60:
"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy-
Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic
pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, trans-
portation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means."
5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint
plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.
[8S] CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CEN-
SORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES
5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61:
"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government.
"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the
Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following
subjects:
a. Intelligence Service;
b. Censorship and Publicity;
c. Mobilization of Resources."
5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will
act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for
the Intelligence Service.
(^ b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act
for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censor-
ship and Publicity.
c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the
Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in
the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources.
[1] Appendix I. To WPL-46, The Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan — Rainbow No. 5
[2] SECTION I. directive
1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5,
contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October
14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in
paragraph 2 of this paper.
2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint
Army and Navv Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of
United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and
upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), now in process of
drafting.
[3] section II. DEFINITIONS
3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British
Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of
either Power.
4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and
other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as
including all such Powers.
5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settle-
ments, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes
the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an
easterlv direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia,
6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as
including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed
as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 957
\4] SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugo-
slavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war
against the Axis Powers, comprising either:
a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
h. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1
and ABC-22.
9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account.
10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical
materials, from sources in that general region.
11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be
available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.
[5] SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR
12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of
ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by
the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412
of April 5, 1941.
"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the
defeat of Germany and her Allies.
"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic de-
fense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must
take account are:
(a) United States
The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western
Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such
dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of
European or Asiatic political or Military power.
(6) British Commonwealth
The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circum-
stances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must
maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate
security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of
British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as
will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the
maintenance of its war effort,
(c) Sea Communications
The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential
to the continuance of their war effort.
[6\ "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal
offensive policies against the Axis Powers:
(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all
other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplo-
matic and financial measures.
(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supple-
mented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which
contribute to that power.
(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.
(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated
Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis
Military strength.
(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Asso-
ciates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in
resistance to the Axis Powers.
(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against
Germany.
(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.
"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will
likewise be governed by the following:
958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers,
the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre.
The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre,
and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted
in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.
(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom,
the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be
the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of
the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches
to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval
effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary im-
portance.
(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and
Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to
prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.
(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy
their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan
does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive.
The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength
in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively
in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to
support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength
away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth
will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.
[S] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated
Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation
in all theatres.
(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated
Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the
Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands
of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.
(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air
forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in
the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained
and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule,
provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used pri-
marily by United States forces.
(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the
British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated
Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward
providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplish-
ment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent
air operations against the sources of Axis military power.
(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land
and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or
operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availabilitj'
of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense
of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States
forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may
be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against
German Military power at its source.
(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic
support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles.
Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and
supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the
other as required for the successful prosecution of the war."
13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will
be governed by the following:
(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the
Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and
submarine forces.
(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations
against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States
Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to
such operations as will not materially delay this effort.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 959
[W] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM
RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS
14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United
Kingdom relating to war operations.
In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and
ABC-22).
15. Principles of Coturnand of the Forces of the United States and the United
Kingdom.- a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the
United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of
responsibility of their own Power.
h. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their
type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific
strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own
commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces
of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the
temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.
d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of
time in grade.
e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate
under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United
States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.
/. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth
in paragraph 16.
[11] 16. Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces, a.
United States Areas. Upon entering the war, the United States will assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces
in the following areas:
(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con-
tinental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30°
West, except:
(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which
lies east of Longitude 40° West.
(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility
for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United
States-Canada Joint Agreements.
(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con-
tinental land areas, as follows:
(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;
(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;
(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South Ameri-
can coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in
which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military
forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada .Joint Agreements. The
United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south
of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.
[12] b. The Far East Area. Coordination in the planning and execution of
operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and
Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the
Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:
(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will
collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.
(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the
responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned.
These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may
be practicable and appropriate.
(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the
Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense
of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief,
China. The Commander-in-Chief," United States Asiatic Fleet, will be
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defensa
pf the Philippines,
960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from
the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East,
thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence
south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence
westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Lati-
tude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude
20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.
[IS] c. Joint Land Offensives. Responsibility for the strategic direction of
the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance
with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circum-
stances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.
d. British CommonweaUh Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other
areas not described in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c next above. These areas as
initiallv delimited are:
■(1) The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA comprises the
Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180°
and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China,
is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated
Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area.
(2) The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA
comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the
Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the
islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United
States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be
exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain.
This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization
and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation)
and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.
(3) The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.
(a) Northern boundary. Latitude 43° North,
(b) Southern boundary. Latitude 20° North,
[14] (c) Western boundary. Longitude 40° West,
(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and
Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous
thereto.
(e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar
will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when
he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:
To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations
in the Western Mediterranean.
To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations
in the Central Atlantic.
(/) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will
be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United
States Atlantic Fleet.
(4) The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA comprises:
(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the
west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast.
(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between
Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas
contiguous thereto.
(5) The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS comprise
the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the
islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of opera-
tions in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also
included in this area.
[15] (6) The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA comprises:
(a) India.
(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the
West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by
the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station.
(c) The islands in the above ocean area.
17. Collaboration in Planning, a. The High Commands of the United States
and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execu-
tion of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war.
They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 961
nSfS collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be
undertaken jouitly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will
apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately the
extent of co laboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed
mutually when the general policy has been decided ^ agreea
To effect the conal)oration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph and to
IT.Zt f'Vn-rTlf-]\''^ administrative action and command between the United
States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will
exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer
^+/^ n?"/''?^?^'^"^, jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff
of rhipf!fnf°^f^ff?f .?^' p''^'°''! being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group
of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of
collaboration in the [16] formulation of Militarv policies and plans
govermng the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes
responsibility for strategic direction. ^66-umes>
(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Militarv
Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which
they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that
Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction
or.^' J, , ^/u''^'^''K''I^ '''''^'*''' Mission shall not become members of any regularly
constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accrldited
Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches
and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are IccredSed ^'^'''^^'
a. the United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with
Canada Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between
United States and Dominion forces. ucLween
e To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military trans-
portation service will be established between England and the Un ted States
Ships and airplanes wiU be assigned to this service by the United States and the
United Kingdom as may be found necessary.
/. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate
as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison wi-iSi each
other in order to ensure the fuU and prompt exchange of pertinent information
ihr^uT.f. ""A^rfP'^^^f""- ^Intelligence liaison will be establlhed iToronly
through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the
field with respect to matters which affect their operations.
'■■''^J Communications
" A^Jr^^h^ Fn^'''^ ^^^^""^ .^"d the United Kingdom will establish in London the
Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows
TW.H ^tP^e«e^,*ati^e of the United States Army and a representative ofThe
Kion in LondJ7' ^'' n^embers of the staff of the Unitea States Military
KingdJ.m'"^^^''*^*'''^^ °^ *^^ ■^"^'"^ Combined Signals Board in the United
hniv Jf^lf iw-"''*.^'^-S°°'"'"''^'^*-^°''^ Committee wUl be the supreme controlling
body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire visual and sound
affectmg the armed services and the merchant marines of t™wo nations
Control and Protection of Shipping .
«f !S-,,J^^ British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection
of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Militarv forces. Unfted States
authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of th|
respons bmtv^rfh'''''^"^'^' ^h'^' I" which the United States authoi'^tiesls ume
responsibihty for the strategic direction of Military forces
tn on. plit w ^ ^"""^ ^"^^'^ shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and
5dS? by agreement between the respective naval authorities The British
botSo'^anitTtr sr^^^^^ ^°"^^°^ ^' ^^^PP^"^ - ^^^ ^-^^ ^*^-^^«
^vfio"^^? -^^^^^^ ^^""^^ Control Service Organization will continue in the
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment
962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange
for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or
charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control
Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States
areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.
23. Special Relationship between Canada and the United States. Joint Agree-
ments are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United
States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United
States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction.
When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will
be incorporated in this plan.
[19] SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS
24. Joint General Task. In cooperation with the other Associated Powers,
defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by:
a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a
sustained air offensive;
b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and
air offensive;
c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;
d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic
military power; and by
e. Protecting outlying Militarj- base areas and islands of strategic importance
against land, air, or sea-borne attack.
[20] ' SECTION VII. TASKS
25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those
listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III.
26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which ma}- be furnished
by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce
the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations.
The Western Atlantic Area
27. Definition . The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous
continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West
except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of
Longitude 40° West.
28. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into
the W^estern Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that
Hemisphere.
b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.
c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of
the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating
radius of occupied ^^r bases.
d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba.
e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad,
St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana.
[21] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense
Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in
paragraph 47.
g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against
Germany.
h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if
such garrisons have been established.
29. Army Forces, a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detach-
ments.
b. Local defense forces.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 963
c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces
maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons
and Latin American Republics.
Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.
30. Navy Tasks, a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers
bj' escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
h. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy.
c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of
enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expe-
ditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the
use of land positions in that hemisphere.
d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified
localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
\23] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones.
/. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.
31. Navy Forces, a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments.
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
The Pacific Area.
32. Definition. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous
continental land areas, is as follows:
a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast
and Longitude 74° West.
33. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into
the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in
that Hemisphere.
b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin Ajnerican Republics against
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.
[23] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications
of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating
radius of occupied air bases.
d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command
Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
34. Army Forces, a. Local defense forces.
b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the
United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the
West Coast of South America.
Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.
35. Navy Tasks, a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far
East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the
denial and capture of positions in the Alarshalls, and through raids on enemj'
sea communications and positions.
b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy.
c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific
Area.
d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as
Longitude 155° East.
e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by
destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces
in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.
/. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area.
g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam.
h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal frontiers and specified locali-
ties in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
7. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.
36. Navy Forces, a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Far East Area
37. Army Tasks. In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal
Frontier — Category of Defense "E".
38. Army Forces. Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel
and facilities as are available locally.
39. Navy Tasks, a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis
forces.
b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Asso-
ciated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that
defense continues.)
[25] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering,
and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier —
Category of Defense "E".
40. Navy Forces, a. The Asiatic Fleet.
United Kingdom and British Home Waters
41. Definition, a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the
Northward of Latitude 43° North.
6. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area.
42. Army Tasks, a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offen-
sive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted
invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation.
b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those
general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States
Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed
upon.
c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles.
[36] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and
in cooperation with the Navy defend that island — Category of Defense "D".
43. Army Forces. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces:
a. British Isles.
3 Heavy Bombardment Groups
2 Medium Bombardment Groups
3 Pursuit Groups
Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments
Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases)
One reinforced Regiment (Token Force)
b. Iceland,.
One reinforced Division.
Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51.
44. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Northwest Escort Force.
Task. Escort Convoj^s in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic
direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches.
b. Submarine Force Three.
Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the
strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.
North Atlantic Area.
[27] 45. Definition. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:
a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North.
b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North.
c. Western boundary. Longitude 40° West.
d. Eastern boundarv, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude
5° West.
46. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Submarine Force Two.
Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction
of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer
Commanding North Atlantic.
Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the
Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this
area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different
decision.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 965
b. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting,
covering, and patrollhig, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directlv or indirectly with the enemy.
d. Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Medi-
terranean.
[28] 47. Categories of Defense. The Categories of Defense listed in this
paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval
Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions.
Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier,
except United States Bases in Newfoundland Category B
United States Bases in Newfoundland Category C
Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier Category B
Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal
Frontiers Category D
Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except
Alaska Category B
Alaska, Less Unalaska Category C
Unalaska Category D
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier Category E
Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine
Coastal Frontier.
Bermuda Category C
Iceland Category D
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra - Category D
Guam Category F
48. Joint Plans lo be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action
of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will
be disregarded.
a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.
b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as
required by ABC-22.
c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed
bj' the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.
d. Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified
in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of
Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports
are located.
[29] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS
49. Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required.
50. Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the
continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the
Army Transport Service.
51. Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is
based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941.
Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless
M-day has occurred before such date.
a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop
movements specified in this subparagraph a.
(1) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft.
First contingent— 10,500 troops embark on 24-M.
Second contingent — 16,000 troops embark on 57-M.
These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements
can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States trans-
ports.
(2) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M.
(3) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M.
These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy.
The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy.
(4) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on
18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported.
Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[SO] (5) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark
September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to
destination.
(6) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October
1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.
(7) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October
1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported.
These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy.
(8) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark
November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.
(9) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January
1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported.
(10) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on
February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be
(11) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on
15-M.
(12) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M.
(13) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on
20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become
available. Part of this force mav be moved before M-day.
(14) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000
embark 20-M. The remainder ■vd'ill be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-dav.
[31] (15) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark
on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become
available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.
(16) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000
embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.
b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon
unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make
specific plans for these movements in advance of M-dav.
(1) GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA, 24,000
troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the
Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco.
(2) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN
AMERICA, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The
56 aircraft may be flown to destination.
(3) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINA-
TIONS, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum
I ate of movement 60,000 troops per month.
(4) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions,
will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M.
SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES
[3S] 52. Theaters of Operation. The designation and delimitation of addi-
tional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation
covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect.
53. Time of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this
Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile
acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate
or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.
54. Personnel. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will
be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
55. Ports of Embarkation. The Army will establish, when required, additional
ports of embarkation at:
New Orleans, La.
Galveston, Texas
Boston, Mass.
Charleston, S. C.
56. Material. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the
United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain
material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate
United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 967
o the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under
this plan will come from existinsi reserves of the respective services and from pro-
duction sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all
cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet
requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible
for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their
respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other
with the material involved.
57. Supply Levels. Sui)ply levels will be maintained for forces operating in
the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this para-
graph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established
after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved.
a. Supplies other than ammunition.
(1) Iceland 30 days, build up to 60 days within six
months.
(2) British Isles Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to
60 days within six months.
Pursuit Aircraft
60 days, build up to 120 days within six
months.
(3) Panama and Caribbean 30 days, build up to 45 days within six
Coastal Frontiers. months.
(4) Newfoundland and Alaska 30 days, build up to 60 days within six
(Less Unalaska). months.
(5) Unalaska 60 days, build up to 90 days within six
months.
(6) Bermuda Maintain at 30 days.
(7) Hawaii Maintain at 70 days.
[34] (8) Philippines As the situation may permit, the desirable
standard being the maintenance of stocks
at 90 days' supply.
b. Ammunition for places listed under 57 a:
(1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then
maintain at that level.
(2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then main-
tain five times the mobilization allowance.
(3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation
in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days
within six months.
(4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' opera-
tions; build up to 120 days within six months.
58. Industrial Planning. For Industrial planning purposes, and with due
regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to^other Associated
Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with
the following general policy:
a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial
needs.
b. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the
requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as neces-
sary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board
and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with
national policy.
[35] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver
material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such
material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made.
Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and
the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army
may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole.
59. Supporting Legislative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly
shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential
Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as
are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan,
60. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export
Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and
programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained
968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial rela-
tionships and all related means.
61. Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government. The War and Navy
Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government,
shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:
a. Intelligence Service.
h. Censorship and Publicity.
c. Mobilization of Resources.
SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES
[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should
be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United
States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemi-
sphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land
bases.
63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the
defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications
may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and
commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the
African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal
zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the
Island of Ferando do Noronha.
64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing
the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when
necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa.
65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile,
to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage
opposition to the Axis Powers.
66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective
occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government.
37] ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS
Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.
1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic
War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a),
as indicated herein.
2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:
"33. Joint organization and command.
"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which
an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces
and the Navy forces; respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have
been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective
coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense.
These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The
system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas,
as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together
with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and
after M-day and the necessary peacetime i)lanning therefor, are as stated below.
NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies
Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a).
"h. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is
responsible for the coordination or prepnration, and for the execution of all plans
for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command
boimdarles ; where pertinent, a Defense Command Includes one or more coastal
frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached siiowing defense
commands in continental United States.)
"c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to
the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be in-
cluded in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier Includes
waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.
[38] "d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the
North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of
the territory and coastal waters of Canada.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 969
t
"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations
shall be bv the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of para-
graph 9 b."
3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows:
"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States, but including United
States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22.
Southern. — Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C), Albemarle Sound, Chowan
River, Virginia — North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an
officer, designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Third Naval District, whojis designa.ted as
the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also
commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal
force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the
commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will
arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of
the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
[39] "c. Sectors. — The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the
following defense sectors:
(1) Newfoundland sector.
(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22.
The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland.
(b) Commanders.
Army.^ — 'As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — -Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.
(2) New England sector.
(a) Boundaries.
Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States.
Southern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island,
inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designatsd by Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, First Naval District.
(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport
subsectors, with boundaries as follows:
[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors:
Northern boundary of Massachusetts.
2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip
Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit
Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to
Boston subsector.
(3) New York sector.
(a) Boundaries.
Northern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island,
exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.
Southern. — Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton,
inclusive.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — Commandant, Third Naval District.
(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey
subsectors with boundary as follows:
Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York
Bay to the Long Island subsector.
970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Dola\varc-('hosai)eake sootcir.
(a) Boundaries.
Northern. ^ — -Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton
exclusive.
[41] Southern.- — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet,
inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C),
Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina bound-
ary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into
the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as
Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern
and western boundary of Delaware.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — There is no naval commander of this sector. The
Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local
defense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant,
Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in
the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval Dis-
trict, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local
defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts."
4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows:
"35. Southern coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries,
Northern. — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C); Albemarle Sound, Chowan
River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.
[43] Southern. — The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends south-
eastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean
naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of
Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that
boundary.
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an
officer designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the
Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command
over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force
under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command
of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named
will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army,
of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
"c. Sectors.-^-This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina,
Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Naval Districts, respectively."
5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:
"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
All United States territories and possessions, and Laiited States military
and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded
as follows:
[43] Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32'
West thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude,
thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude,
thence by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence
by a line direct to the place of beginning. The coastal zone includes all
of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal
points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary.
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or
an officer designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated
as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also
commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 971
"c. Sectors. — The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following
defense sectors:
(1) Guantanamo sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying
westward of a line passing through Cape Isabcla and Beata Point, His-
paniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal
frontier boundaries.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
[44] Navy. — C'onimander, Naval Operating Base, Guan-
tanamo, Cuba.
(2) Puerto Rico sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The . area within the Caribbean coastal frontier
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and
northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.
(6) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
(3) Trinidad sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and
southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad."
6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:
"35B. Panama coastal frontier.
[4'5] "a. Boundaries.
All United States territories and possessions, and United States
military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within
the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land
areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal
frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas
betvi^een the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn
from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South,
longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal
zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea
lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries.
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command,
or an officer designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is desig-
nated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer
also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its
joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army,
"c. Sectors.
The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense
sectors :
(1) Atlantic sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Panama coastal fron-
tier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continen-
tal divide.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
(2) Pacific sector.
(a) Boundaries.— The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying
between the continental divide and the western and southern boundaries.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy." — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District."
79716— 46— Ex. 146, vol. 2 19
972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:
"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas
lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama
coastal frontier."
8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read:
"36. Pacific coastal frontier.
"o. Boundaries.
Northern.- — Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part
of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required
by ABC-22.
[47] Southern. — Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal
zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico.
(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers. — The Pacific coastal frontier is
divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval
coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The
boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern
boundary of California,
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an
officer designated bj' him.
Navy. —
(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also desig-
nated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier.
(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also
commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed
of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval
local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under
the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned.
(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands
the naval local defense force assigned to his district.
(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and
the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange
for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the
naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
[48] "c. Sectors. — This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California,
Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows:
(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California
sectors, Santa Maria River.
(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern
sector is the northern boundary of California.
(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern bound-
ary of Washington.
(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector.
"d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with bound-
aries as follows:
(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.
(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria
River, exclusive.
(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point,
inclusive.
(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern bound-
ary of California.
(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to
Moclips, Wash., inclusive.
(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary
of Washington.
[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West.
(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West.
9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea
areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a dis-
tance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 973
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated
as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also
commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its
joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.
"36B. Philippine coastal frontier,
"a. Boundaries.
The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and
sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of
the sea approaches to the coastal frontier.
[50] "b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Philippine Department.
Navy. — The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as
the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also com-
mands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the United
States showing the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex
I. Coastal Frontiers". This map ^vi]l be found reproduced as Item
No. 2, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry.
These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits
of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)
[1] Appendix II to WPL-46, Composition of Forces
[2] chapter I. INTRODUCTION
2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating
Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service.
2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number,
b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name.
c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken
over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning pur-
poses, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the
system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.).
2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard
vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names.
b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control,
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign
to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature
(AP 60, AK 90, PY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of
the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the
Bureau of Ships.
2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned
to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized
at the time of issue of this plan.
2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the
heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and
aircraft belong, as follows:
A — Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day;
B — Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under
construction;
C — Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government
to be commissioned in the Navy;
[SI D — Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either
Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis;
E — Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis;
CG — Coast Guard vessels.
[4] CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC
FLEET as of July 1, 1941.
2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, sub-
marine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE
974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TWO. Not. less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE
BASE, COCO SOLO.
b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.
2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT,
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the
Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as
may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation.
2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations,
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty,
patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task
Forces indicated herein:
1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE.
18 VPB and necessary tenders;
2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders;
3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders.
b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph
will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of
the Commander in Chief.
[6] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to
the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations,
for the transportation of Army troops.
2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and sub-
marines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in
these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional
circumstances.
TABLE ATF-1
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
BATTLESHIPS
Batdiv 3 --- ---
BB
BB
CA
CA
CL
CL
AD
ODD
ODD
DD
DD
DD
DD
DD
CV
CV
VPB
VPB
AVD
AVP
VPB
VPB
AVD
AVP
PG
ASR
OSS
OSS
AG
OSS
SS
3
3
1
4
4
4
2
3
4
4
9
9
8
8
2
1
12
12
2
2
12
12
1
2
1
1
8
7
1
2
1
Batdiv 5
CRUISERS
CA 31 - -
Cradiv7 . --
Cmdiv 8
Crudiv 2 -
DESTROYERS
AD 2, 12 --- -
DD 141 187 343 -
Desdiv 54 . - - --
Desdiv 22 -
1,850 tons.
AIRCRAFT
Cardiv 3
OV 5 -
Patwing S
VP 31 --
VP 32
AVD 4, 9 --
AVP 1,9 - --
PntwinQ 5
VP 51
VP 52 - -
AVD 13 - ---
AVP 3, 8
SUBMARINES
PG 53 .
Subron /
S/M Base, New I-ondon
ASR 2 - -
Subdiv 11
Subdiv 12
Exdiv 1
AG 24 ---
SS 20, 48
SS204
\)iO
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY ^i"-^
TABLE ATF-1— Continued
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
SUBMARINE— Continued.
SubTon 3
S/M Base, Coco Solo
ASR4 .
ASR
OSS
OSS
AS
OSS
OSS
AF
AG
AKS
AO
AT
AE
DMS
AM
AP
APD
PC
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
AG
IX
1
6
6
2
3
7
2
1
1
8
2
i
4
7
4
2
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Subdiv 31 -
Subdiv32
SuhTon 7
ASS, 21 _
Subdiv 71 ....
Subdiv 72
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2
SIM Base. St. Thomas
TRAIN VESSELS
AF 1, 9
AFl to be assigned in August, 1941.
AO 17 -
AKS 3
AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941.
AO 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26
AT 37, 66
AE 2
To be assigned in August, 1941.
MINECRAFT
Minron 7
Mindiv 13
Mindiv 14
TRANSPORTS
Transdiv 1 .
Transdivll
PATROL CRAFT
Siibchasordiv 31 .. .
DUANE (CG)
INGHAM (CO)
CAMPBELL (CG)
SPENCER (CG)
HAMILTON (CG)
BIBB (CG)
NORTH STAR (CG)
NORTHLAND (CG)
AG 21)
UNCLASSIFIED
IX 20
NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA
MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL NO. 1
MARINE CORPS FORCES
First Marine Division
First Marine Aircraft Group
Fifth Defense Battalion
[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. 8. PACIFIC FLEET
2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET as of July 1, 1941.
b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REEN-
FORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
2-3C2. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations,
the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty,
patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task
Forces indicated herein:
1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders,
2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR) ;
2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders.
b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain
under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Rotation of units may be made periodicallj at the discretion of the Commander
in Chief.
2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally
continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under
exceptional circumstances.
976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE PAF-l
Unit— Vessel
BATTLESHIPS
Batdiv 1.. .
Batdiv 2
Batdiv4 .
CRUISERS
Crudiv 4
Crudiv 6
Cradiv9
DESTROYERS
Desflot 1
CL 7
ADS, 4
Desron 1 dess one Desdiv)
Desron 3, 5 _
Desflot S
CL8
AD 11, 14
Desron 4, 6
Desdiv 50
MINECRAFT
CM 4
Mindiv 1, 2 ._
AIRCRAFT
Cardiv 1
Cardiv 2 (less CV 5)._
Patwing 1
VPll
VP 12
VP13
VP14
AVI
AVD6, 10
AVP4
Patwing 2
VP21
VP22 .
VP 23.
VP24
AV4
AVD 11, 14
AVP7 -
Patwing 4
VP41
VP42
VP43
VP44
AVD 2, 12...
AVP 5,6
SUBMARINES
CL9
Subron S
AS3
ASR 5....
Subdiv 21
Subdiv 22
Sithron i
S/M Base, Pearl Harbor
DD336
AM 30
ASRl.
Subdiv 41...
Subdiv 42
Subdiv 43...
Subron ff'
Subdiv 61
Subdiv 62
BASE FORCE
TRAIN VESSELS
AE 1
AF 7,8, 11
AG 16,31.
AH 1
AKS 1,2
AM 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43, 52... ....
AO 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29
AR 1, 4
ARbl
ARD 1
AT 12,23.33,34,64,65
TRANSPORTS
Transdiv 2
Transdiv 4
Transdiv 12
Sym-
bol
No.
BB
3
BB
3
BB
3
CA
4
CA
4
CL
5
CL
1
AD
2
DD
5
DD
18
CL
1
AD
2
DD
18
ODD
4
CM
DM
1
8
CV
2
CV
VPB
1
12
VPB
6
VPB
5
VPB
12
AV
AVD
1
2
AVP
1
VPB
12
VPB
12
VPB
12
VPB
12
AV
1
AVD
2
AVP
1
VPB
6
VPB
6
VPB
6
VPB
6
AVD
2
AVP
2
CL
1
AS
1
ASR
1
ss
6
ss
6
ODD
1
AM
1
ASR
1
OSS
6
ss
4
ss
5
ss
3
ss
3
AE
1
AF
3
AO
2
AH
1
AKS
2
AM
10
AO
14
AR
2
ARb
1
ARD
1
AT
6
AP
f)
AP
2
APD
4
Notes
To be formed about October 1, 1941.
Includes SM 1.
To be assigned in Aupust, 1941.
EX AD 13.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
TABLE PAF-1— Continued
977
Unit— Vessel
Sym-
bol
No.
Notes
BASE FORCE— Continued
MINE SQUADRON S
DMS 13
DMS
DMS
DMS
DMS
1
4
4
4
Mindiv 4
Mindiv 5
Mindiv 6
NAVAL STATION. GUAM _.__
NAVAL STATION. SAMOA
Seventh Defense Battalion _
MARINE CORPS FORCES
Second Marine Division .
Second Marine Aircraft Group
Second Defense Battalion
Sixth Defense Battalion.
TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
CRUISERS
Crudiv 5
CA
4
CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST
PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941.
TABLE SEP-1
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
CRUISERS
Crudiv 3
DESTROYERS
Desdiv 1 or 2
CL
DD
2
4
As assigned by CinCpac.
CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET
2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANS-
PORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be re-
tained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
TABLE ASF-1
Unit— Vessel
CRUISERS
CA 30. __
CL 12 ._
DESTROYERS
AD 9
Desron 29
AIRCRAFT
Patwing 10
VP 101
VP 102
AV 3
AVD 1, 7...
AVP 2
SUBMARINES
Subron SO
AS 9, 20
ASR 6
Subdiv 201-
Subdiv202._
Subdiv 203- .
PATROL CRAFT
PG 21, 22
PR3. 4, 6, 7, 8._
PYIO
Symbol
No.
CA
CL
1
1
AD
ODD
1
13
VPB
VPB
AV
AVD
AVP
12
12
1
2
1
AS
ASR
OSS
SS
ss
2
1
6
4
7
PG
PR
PY
2
5
1
Notes
978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE ASF— Continued
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
TRAIN
AO 6, 13
AT 32
AO
AT
AM
AM
2
1
2
4
Mindiv 3
MindivO
MARINE CORPS FORCES
Marine Detachments
Fourth Marines (Shanghai)... .. ..
Marine Detachments
(North China)
Marine Detachments
(Philippines)
[7]
CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE
2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE,
show the initial composition as of Julv 1, 1941.
a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE— TABLE NE-1.
1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service wili be temporarily
assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material prep-
aration.
b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE— TABLE NE^2.
TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
DESTROYERS
AD 15
AD
DD
ODD
ODD
DD
VPB
VPB
VPB
VPB
AV
AVD
VPB
VPB
VPB
VPB
AVD
VPB
VPB
VPB
VPB
AM
AMr
1
9
18
5
4
12
12
9
9
1
2
12
12
12
12
1
12
12
12
12
4
H
Desron 7 --.
Desrons 30, 31
DD .341, Desdiv 53
Desdiv 2L.
Mobile Destoyer Repair Units 1, 2
AIRCRAFT
Patwing 7
VP 71...
VP 72 .
VP73
VP 74
AV5
AVD 3,8..-
Patwing 8
VP 81 ..
VP82
VP83
VP84
AVD 5..
Patwing 9
VP91
]
VP92
1 This wing will be formed following
VP93
1 completion of Patwing 8.
VP94
J
Mnt)i!e Aircraft Repair Units l,t... .
TRAIN VESSELS
AM 73, 74, 75, 77
AMc36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50
MARINE CORPS FORCES
Eleventh Provisional Marine Company
TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE
THREE
Unit— Vessel
Sym-
bol
No.
Notes
SUBMARINES
Subron 5
AS 13
AS
ASR
OSS
OSS
OSS
1
1
7
4
6
ASR3
Subdiv 51 .
Subdiv 52
Subdiv 53
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
979
CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the
Chief of Naval Operations.
TABLE CNO-1.
t'nlt— Vessel
AO k
A(i 23.
AO 2.'i, 26
AO 30, 32
AM 40
P0 52
MTB Squadron 1
MTB Squadron 2
Subchaser Squaiiron 1
COATANCHE (CO).
ALOONQUIN (CO)
MODOC (CG)
RARITAN (CG)
1X50...
SS 206 to 211 incl
Sym-
. bol
No.
AG
1
AO
1
AG
2
AG
2
AM
1
PG
1
PT
6
PT
7
PTC
4
XPY
1
XPY
1
XPG
1
XYT
1
IX
1
SS
6
Notes
ReoNav Yacht.
Presideut's Yacht and tender.
Survey vessels.
BuOrd duty.
Tender for PT's and PTC's.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
In commission or to be commis-
sioned and to operate either un-
der the CNO or CinClant for
temporary duty. To be a.ssigned
to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
[8]
2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.
2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval
Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such
commands. Commandants of 'Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will
assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to
Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following
general rules:
a. TO THE NAVAL WCAL DEFENSE FORCES
1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships'
Data, U. S. Naval Vessels").
2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval
Local Defense Forces.
3. District Craft (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval
Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and
boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant.
b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT
1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force.
c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft
will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or in the status "in
commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in
accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in
commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of
the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are oper-
ating.
[9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding
paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix IT, will be employed in the Naval Local
Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the
Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United
States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts
will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also
assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior
to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast
Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard.
b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as
modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy,
980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces in tabular form.
1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) Column (1),
2. Sub-group Column (2) .
3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be
detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to
be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the
Chief of Naval Operations) Column (3) .
4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which
the vessel is to be mobilized) Column (4).
b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship.
2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval
Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of
the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in
Column (4) , where mobilization will take place.
[10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to
convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units
are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration
of the following:
a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the
Mobilization;
b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion;
c. Equipment available;
d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion;
e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no
conversion.
2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal
Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal
Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval
Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts.
TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
Sub-
group
From
Mob.
Dist.
Notes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE
Navy Vessels
PE 19, 27, 48, 55, 56. 5 PE
A
PY 12, 13, 15, 16 4 PY
A
PO 17, 18, 54. 3 PG
A
VPB 18VPB
A
USAF
(Administration in
AV or AVD or AVP number as required..
A
USAF
\ U. S. ATLAN-
I TIC FLEET.
ZNP 6 ZNP
A
IV ND
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, Salem, Mass .._
Air Station, New York, N. Y
Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C
Vessels from Other Sources
XPG 1. 1 XPG
D
CNO
I
XPG 2,3 2 XPG
1)
CNO
III
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FIRST
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, North At-
lantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XYPltoSOincl 30XYP
D
D
I ND
I ND
XAGs 1, 2 2XAGS
XAM 1 to4incl 4XA1M
D
I ND
XAMb 1 to 9 incl 9 XAMb
1)
I)
I ND
I ND
XAMc 1, 2 2XAMC
Units Ashore
As indicated in I ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 981
TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit— Vessel
Sub-
group
From
Mob.
Dist.
Notes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
NA^'AL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— THIRD
NA VAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
he assigned by the Commander, North Atlan-
tic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Ouard ^'essels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
1 'essels from Other Sources
XYP 31 1 XYP
D
III ND
III
XAM 5 to 13 incl 9 XAM
D
IND
I
XAMb 10 to 14 incl 5 XAMb
D
D
IND
IND
I
I
XAMcS to 16 incl 14 XAMc
Units Ashore
As indicated in III ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2. RAINBOW No. 5.
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FOURTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMcl 1 XCMc
D
IND
I
XPYcl, 2 2XPYC
D
HIND
III
XPYcS, 4 2XPYc
D
IV ND
IV
XAGs3 _ 1 XAOs
D
IV ND
IV
XAM 14 to 21 incl 8 XAM
D
D
D
IND
IND
IV ND
I
I
IV
XAMb 15 to 24 incl 10 XAMb
XAMc 17 to 19 incl... 3 XAMc
XAMc20 IXAMc
D
IND
I
Units Ashore
As indicated in IV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FIFTH
NAIAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMc2 1 XCMc
D
VND
V
XYP 32 to 38 incl 7 XYP
D
D
VND
VND
V
V
XAGs4__. 1 XAGs
XAM 22,23 2 XAM
D
I ND
I
XAMc 21 to 31 incl... 11 XAMc
D
VND
V
Units Ashore
As indicated in V ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
4
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE SCF— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
(1)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE
Navy Vessels
None
Coast Guard Vessels
MOJAVE, TAMPA 240' 2XPO
TALLAPOOSA Misc. 1 XPY
MOHAWK 16£' IXPY
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, Charleston, S. C
Air Station, Miami, Fla _
Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla
Air Station, Biloxi, Miss. -.. -.
Vessels from Other Sources
XPG 4 IXPO
XPYl to4inel 4 XPY
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— SIXTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander. Southern Naval
Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMc3- IXCMc
XPYc5. 6-- 2XPYC
XYP 39 to 44 incL 6 XYP
XAGs5, 6 2XAGS
XAM 24 to 27 incl - 4 XAM
XAMb 25 to 31 incl 7 XAMb
XAMb 32 to 34 incl __._ 3 XAMb
Units Ashore
As indicated in VI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned In Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SEVENTK
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard "^'essels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
\''essels from Other Sources
XPYc7, 8 2XPYC
XPYc9, 10 2XPYC
XAGS7, 8 2XAGs
XAM 28, 29 2 XAM
XAMb 35, 36 2 XAMb
XAMc 32 to 35 incl 4 XAMc
As indicated in VII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
N^avy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard ^''essels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMe4 1 XCMc
XPYc 11 to 18 incl - 8 XPYc
XYP 45 to 50 incl- 6 XYP
XYP 51 to 55 incl 5 XYP
XAGs9 to 11 incl 3 XAGs
XAMb 37 to 40 incl 4 XAMb
XAMc 36 to 40 inch. 5 XAMc
XAMc 41 to 43 incl 3»XAMc
CO
CQ
CO
VI ND
VI ND
IV ND
CNO
III ND
III ND
ni ND
VI ND
VI ND
I ND
I ND
VI ND
IND
HIND
VII ND
IND
IND
IND
VI
VI
VI
VI
III
Notes
(5)
III
III
VI
VI
I
I
VI
I
III
VII
I
I
I
III ND
III
IX ND
VIII
VIII ND
VIII
V ND
V
VIII ND
VIII
VIII ND
VIII
I ND
I
VI ND
VI
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 983
TABLE SCF.— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit— Vessel
(1)
Sub-
group
(2)
From
(3)
Mob.
Dist.
(4)
Notes
(5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— EIGHTH
NAVAL DISTRICT— Continu3d
Units Ashore
As indicated in VIII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
TABLE CACF— CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67 5 ODD
PY 18 1 PY
VPB.- 12 VPB
AV or AVP or AVD number as required
Coast Guard 'l^essels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803. Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XPO 6,7 2 XPG
XPC 2,3,4 3 XPC
XPY 8 1 XPY
XPY 9, 10 2 XPY
XPYc 24 to 27 incl 4 XPYe
XPYc 28 to 31 incl 4 XPYc
XYP 128 to 131 incl 4 XYP
XAM 42 to 47 incl 6 XAM
XAMbei to 66 incl 6XAMb
XAMb67to 70 incl 4XAMb
_XAMc93 to 102 incl 10 XAMc
As indicated in X ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating
Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.
USAF
USAF
CNO
III ND
V ND
III ND
III ND
I ND
IV ND
I ND
V ND
I ND
I ND
X
III
V
III
III
I
IV
I
V
I
I
(Administration in
\ U. S. ATLAN-
[ TIC FLEET.
TABLE PACF.— PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
ODD Desdiv 67.. __ 4 ODD
PG 50 1 PG
VPB 12 VPB
AV or AVP or AVD number as required
Coast Guard Vessels:
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources.
XCMc6 1 XCMc
XPC 6, 6 2XPC
XPY 11 to Hincl 4 XPY
XPYc 32 to 43 incl 12 XPYc
XPYc 44 to 46 incl 3 XPYc
XPYc47 1 XPYc
XYP 132 to 141 10 XYP
XAGsl6, 17 2XAGs
XAM 48 to 50 incl- 3 XAM
XAMb 71, 72 2 XAMb
XAMc 103 to 116 incl 14 XAMc
As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5,RAINBO W
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
USAF
USAF
V ND
V
III ND
III
IX ND
VIII
III ND
III
V ND
V
VI ND
VI
IV ND
IV
VIII ND
VIII
I ND
I
V ND
V
V ND
V
{Administration in
U. S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET.
984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE PSCF— PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
Sub-
group
From
Mob.
Dist.
Notes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE
Navy Vessels
ODD Desdiv 70, 83 8 ODD
A
PE32.38 2 PE
A
PY14 1 PY
A
A
USPF
VPB 12 VPB
(Administration in
AV or AVD or AVP number as required
A
USPF
I U. S. PACIFIC
I FLEET.
Coast Guard Vessels
TANEY 327' 1 XPG
CG
CG
IXVND
XII ND
XI
XII
SHAWNEE Misc. 1 XPY
1
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, San Francisco, Calif
Air Station, San Diego, Calif
Vessels from Other Sources
XPG 5 1 XPG
D
CNO
XII
XPY5, 6, 7 3 XPY
D
XI ND
XI
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— ELEV-
ENTH NAVAL DISTRICT:
Navy Vessels:
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, Pacific South-
ern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels:
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources:
XCMc5 1 XCMc
D
HIND
III
XPC 1 _ 1 XPC
D
XI ND
XI
XYP 93 to 97 incl 5 XYP
D
D
D
D
D
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XI
XI
XI
XI
XI
XAGs 14 1 XAGs
XAM 39 to 41 incl 3 X.VM
XA Mb 51 to 60 incl 10 XAMb
XAMc65 to 86 incl 22 XAMc
Units Ashore:
As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces:
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— TWELFTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, Pacific
Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XYP 98 to 127 incl 30 XYP
D
XII ND
XII
XAGs 15 1 XAGs
D
XII ND
XII
XAMc 87 to 92 incl 6 XAMc
D
XII ND
XII
Units Ashore
As indicated in XII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2. RAINBOW No. 5.
TABLE PNCF.— PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— ThIR-
TEENTE NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
ODD Desdiv 82 5 ODD
PG51 1 PO
PE57 1 PE
SS 2SS
ASR 1 ASR
VPB 12 VPB
AV or AVD or AVP number as required
I'SPF
USPF
USPF
USPF
I Administration in
I U. S. PACIFIC
f FLEET.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 985
TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit— Vessel
(1)
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
AURORA 165' B 1 XPC
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash.
Vessels from Other Sources
XPVc 19 to 23 incl 5 XPYc
XYP 56 to 92 incl - 37 XYP
XAGsl2, 13 2XAGs
XAM 30 to 38 incl 9 XAM
XAMb 41 to 50 incl 10 XAMb
XAMc 44 to 64 incl 21 XAMc
XAOb 1, 2 _ 2XA0b
Units Ashore
As indicated in XIII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marirte Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
From
Mob.
Dist.
(3)
(4)
XI ND
XIII
XI ND
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
XI ND
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
CNO
XIII
Notes
(5)
TABLE HCF.— HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
(1)
Sub-
group
(2)
From
(3)
Mob.
Dist.
(4)
Notes
(5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragrapii
2-802, Appendix II.
ODDDesdivSO 4 ODD
PQ 19 1 PG
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
DAPHNE - . .. 165'B 1 XPC
A
A
CG
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
XII ND
V ND
XIV ND
I ND
XII ND
XIV ND
CNO
XIV ND
XII
V
XIV
I
XII
XIV
XIV
XIV
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMc7 1 XCMc
XYP 142 to 167 incl 26 XYP
XAM 51 to 55 incl- 5 XAM
XAM 56 1 XAM
XAMcll7 to 119incL- 3 XAMc
XAOb 3, 4 2 XAOb
XYFlto5incl 5 XYF
Units Ashore
As indicated in XIV ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. .. .
First Defense Battalion.. .. . .
Third Defense Battalion..
TABLE PhCF.— PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIX-
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Such suitable vessels as are locally available and
additional vessels and aircraft as assigned
by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC
FLEET.
As indicated in XVI ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
[11] CHAPTER XI. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the
Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.
986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit No. 5
My
SECRET
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063 W
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 25, 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46.
1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in efi'ect
prior to the receipt of such approval.
2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the
Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders.
At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for
approval by the Commander-in-Chief:
Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander
Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the
Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)
The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for
the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this 0-1 Plan by
including suitable measures in their 0-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare
separate siipporting plans for this 0-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific
Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for
operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval
Operations for approval.
3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the
Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be
incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-
in-Chief.
4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations
to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed
and approved.
5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this
command.
H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. Kimmel.
[i] SECRET
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 21, 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.
Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of eflfective pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.
1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and
the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning
and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief
of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).
3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the
instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and
the Registered Publication Manual.
4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be
kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
987
5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR-
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION
MANUAL.
6. SPECIAL WARNING — the contents of this publication shall be given
the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the sub-
ordinate plans.
P. C. Crosley, H. E. Kimmel.
P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five)
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES— WPPac-i6
Subiect Matter
Page Number
Change
in Effect
Promulgating letter: CincPac file A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W
of July 21, 1941.
List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46.
Table of Corrections
Distribution List -
Title Page
Table of Contents
Parts I to V (incl.) _
Annex I ^ . _
Annex II
Annex III,_
Annex IV
1
2, 2a. 2b
3-52 incl
52a-52h incl
53-56 incl
56a-56dincl
57-74 incl
I-l tol-llincl...
II-l toII-9incl._
III-l to III-5 incl
IV-1 toIV-3incl.
Original
[iii] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS
Change No.
Date of
entry
Signature and rank of ofEcer entering change
[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST
Regis'
tered
Official to Whom Issued Nos.
C hief of Naval Operations __ 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet : '7]8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 10, 11
Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor) 12,13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor) 14, 15
Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor) 16,17
Commander, Battleships Battle Force 18
Commander, Battleship Division One 19
Commander, Battleship Division Two 20
Commander, Cruisers Battle Force 22
Commander. Cruiser Division Three 23
Commander, Carrier Division One ^ 25
Commander, Destroyers Battle Force 26
Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One 27
Commander, Minocraft Battle Force 28
Commander, Cruisers Scouting Force 29
Commander, Cruiser Division Five .30
Commander, Cruiser Division Six 31
Commander, -\ircraft Scouting Force 32
Commander, Patrol Wing Two 33
Commander, Submarines Scouting Force 34
Commander, Base Force 35,36
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.. 37
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa 38
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District 39
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 40
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval D istrict 41
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 42
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 43
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 2], 24, and 44 to 60 in
reserve.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 146, vol. 2 20
988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
WPPac-46
[«] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject Page Nos.
Introduction:
Chapter I. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) 3
Ciiapter II. Format of Fleet Plans 4
Chapter III. Subordinate Plans 6
Chapter IV. Mobilization 8
Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information:
Chapter I. Task Orcanization .._ _ 9
Chapter II. Assumptions 15
Section 1. General Assumptions 15
Section 2. Special Assumption _ 16
Chapter III. Information.. _ 17
Section 1. General Information 17
Section 2. Enemy Information 20
Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 21
Part II. Outline of Tasks:
Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan,— Mission 24
Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions 25
Part III. Task Assignment:
Chapter I. Phase I 28
Section 1. Task Force One 28
Section 2. Task Force Two _ 29
Section 3. Task Force Three _ 30
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 32
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 33
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 34
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 35
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 36
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 38
[Sa] Chapter II. Phase lA 39
Section 1. Task Force One 39
Section 2. Task Force Two 40
Section 3. Task Force Three 41
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 42
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 45
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 48
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 49
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 50
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 51
Chapter III. Phases Succeeding Phase lA 52
Section 1. Task Force One 52
Section 2. Task Force Two. , 52a
Section 3. Task Force Three 52b
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 52c
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 52d
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 52e
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). _ ._. 52f
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 52g
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 52h
Chapter IV. Execution of the Plan S3
Chapter V. Initial Transfer of Units 54
Part IV. Logistics:
Chapter 1. General. 56
Chapter II. Transportation 56a
Chapter III. Hospitalization and Evacuation 56b
Chapter IV. Prize Crews 56c
Chapter V. Salvage 56d
Part V. Special Provisions:
Chapter I. Time to be Used 57
Chapter II. Communications 58
Chapter III. Location of Commander-in-Chief 59
Chapter IV. Tentative Operations Plans— Phase I and lA 60
Section l. Phase I 61
Section 2. Phase lA 68
[Sb] Annex I. Patrol and Sweeping Plan I-l to I-ll
Annex II. Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan II-l to II-9
Annex III. Communication Plan.. III-l to III-5
Annex IV. Command Relationship and (Coordination of Activities at Outlying Bases IV-1 to IV-3
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 989
[3\ SECRET
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
iNAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
Introduction
chapter i. navy basic war plan (rainbow five)
0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in
so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the
Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only
particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do
chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.
[^] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS
0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small
variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemi-
nation on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:
a. In Part I the order of presentation is:
Chapter I — Task Organization.
Chapter II — Assumptions.
Chapter III — Information.
b. In Part II are incorporated:
Chapter I — Task assigned by Basic Plan.
Chapter II — Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accom-
plishing the assigned mission together with (in a few in-
stances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried
out.
c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of
those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate
section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped togetlier. Perti-
nent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given
therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this 0-1 Plan. Where a
task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made
to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.
d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans
which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time,
and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized
in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five), are
considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect tlie measures
of Phase I and Phase lA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could
be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes
[5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to
have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional
form with which all concerned are familiar.
e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-
Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occa-
sion requires. The fortes affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of
the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order
by despatch or letter.
f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the
next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.
[6\ CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS
0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared
as follows:
a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in
Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned
task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.
b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard
form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operat-
ing Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan
for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is
not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-
Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.
990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed
below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-!", the
second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task as-
signed at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a
commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.
Task Force One A-1, etc.
Task Force Two B-1, "
Task Force Three .._. C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force ^ F-1, "
Base Force G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier K-1, "
d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task
organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than
by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.
e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations
which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a
brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendum to
his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be ap-
pended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.
f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further
preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group com-
manders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in
the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but
will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to
the task force commander for acceptance.
g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic
requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such
addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case,
copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.
h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum
possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary,
plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably
attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available,
is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this
shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take
immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence
through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Com-
mander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they
occur.
i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal
system of numbering subdivisions.
j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan,
lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above
will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One
will be "a-1".
[8] CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION
0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can
be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization.
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout
the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.
[9] Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information
CHAPTER I. TASK 0RGANIZ.\TI0N
1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix
II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern,
Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 991
of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject
to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the
current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to
become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.
1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their
broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:
Task Force One. — for covering operations — Commander Battle Force in
command.
Task Force Two. — for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations — Com-
mander Aircraft Battle Force in command.
Task Force Three. — for landing attack operations — Commander Scouting
Force in command.
1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is
designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn
the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time.
It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred
between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons,
and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of
the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in
this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases
the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to
accomplish the assigned task.
[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be
effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up
particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required.
It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show
the task organizations at that time.
1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organiza-
tion that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will
thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned
until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will
release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the
period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassign-
ment is made by competent authority.
[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:
1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force
Batdivs 2, 4 6 BB
SARATOGA 1 CV
Crudivs 3, 9 5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9 ._ . _ 4 OCL#
2 DL
16 DD#
2 AD
(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)
2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force
Batdiv 1 3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN 1 CV
Crudiv 5 4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50 _.--._ 1 OCL
8 DD
2 AD
(llncludes Atlantic Reenforcement of 4 CA.)
3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force
Crudivs 4, 6 _ . . . 8 CA
Cardiv Hess SARATOGA 1 CV
Desrons 4, 5 2 DL
16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6 5 DM
Available Transports Base Force — AP
— APD
2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.
2d Marine Air Group.
992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[12] 4. TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft
Scouting Force
AH units of Aircraft Scouting Force 107 VP
2 AV
2 AVP
4 AVD
Utility Squadron from Base Force 10 VJR
5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines Scouting
Force
All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School.- 30 SS
2 OSS
1 SM
1 ODD
3 AS
2 ASR
1 AM
6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force) Commander Minecraft Battle
Force
All units of Minecraft Battle Force 1 CM
8 DM
7. TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force) Commander Base Force
All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less 8 DMS
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ. 4 AF
6 AT
1 AH
13 AO
2 AR
1 ARD
2 AK
2 AE
1 AKS
10 AM
4 AG
Utility
Wing
[13] 8. TASK FORCE FOUR (Ilaivaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
9. TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Coastal and local defense forces.
10. TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement,
composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, T'. S.
Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They
will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent
their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.
[16] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS
Section 1. General Assumptioris
1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern-
ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers,
comprising either:
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia,
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.
b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 993
c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.
d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the
Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so con-
ducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional
transfers may become necessary.
6. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that
eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reenforcements will be made
in the Far East.
[16] Section 2. Special Assumption
1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor,
but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces
immediately available by about one-fifth.
[17] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
Section 1. General Information
1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:
1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American
Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military
forces.
b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces
in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.
c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the
Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West
Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.
d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone
extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of
Mexico.
e. The Pacific Northern Naval Co?,stal Frontier includes the coastal zone of
the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California,
and, in addition, Alaska.
f . The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal
zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala
boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the
Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the sruthern and western
borders of that zone.
[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the
land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to
a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.
h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude
30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east
to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on
the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East,
thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence
north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.
i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval
forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the
defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-
Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of
the Philippines.
j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New
Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator.
The British Naval Commande'r-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic
direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powders operating in this Area.
1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to
cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con-
994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-I).
Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of
preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being
made,
[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:
a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United
Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsi-
bility of their own Power.
b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operation.s
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their
type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic
tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will
not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power.
Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension
of the normal strategic tasks.
d. "VVlien units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of
time in grade.
e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate
under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United
States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.
1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen- [20]
sive. The ITnited States does not intend to add to its present military
strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet
offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power,
and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese
strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its
forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth
will be in a jjosition to release the necessary forces for the Far East.
Section 2. Enemy Information
1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the exe-
cution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.
1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task
is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.
[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action
1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.
1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced
bases.
3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action
will be toward:
a. Capture of Guam.
b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced
bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and
naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 995
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
(1. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
o. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparative!}' weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main
base in Halmahera).
d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack imits as can be supported there.
f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian Area.
[33] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas
of lines of communication.
h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of
usual routes.
[24] Part II. Outline of Tasks
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN MISSION
2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions;
b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy;
d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as
longitude 155° east;
e. Defend Samoa in category "D";
f. Defend Guam in category "F";
g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy
raiding forces:
h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent
the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying
liostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as
circumstances require;
k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.
[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSION
2201. It wuU be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based
upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks
the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and divides the
tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:
a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE lA — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks.
2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:
996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter main-
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a
similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups
as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator
as far west as Longitude 155° East.
h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
(26) 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the
possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the
Navy Department.
j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii
for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Phase I A
2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows:
a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been com-
pleted.
c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and
tenders in the northern Pacific.
d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the asso-
ciated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering opera-
tions.
e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids
against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and
outlying bases.
[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, be-
tween the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.
i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
as necessary.
k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the
Second Marine Division.
1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.
Phase II and subsequent phases
2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at
this time are:
a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island
Area.
b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary
for further advance to the westward.
c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase lA.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 997
[28] Part III. Tm^k Assignment
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3111. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division
to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy basic plan.
3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).
[S9] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3121. Task Force Two will:
Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
[30] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE
3131. Task Force Three will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3133. a. Move from San Uiego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of
the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.
b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan
for capture of Eniwetok.
c. 1. Special Information.
As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are
as follows:
MIDWAY —34 ofl^cers
750 men
6 5' 751 caliber guns
12 3"/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.
JOHNSTON— 18 men
2 5"/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns
PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5'751 caliber guns
4 3'750 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns
[31] OAHU —32 oflicers
620 men
4 5'751 caliber guns
8 3' 750 caliber A A guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns
Note: The above personnel are defense battalion person-
nel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard
duty, barracks duty, etc.
WAKE —None.
2. Task
Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the
Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-
in-Chief.
[32] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)]
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue admin-
istration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[33] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE)
3151. Ta.sA: Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3152. a. Special Information.
1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall
area.
2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deploy-
ment suitable for this eventuality.
3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of
aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.
b. Task.
Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
c. Special Logistics.
Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.
3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for land-
ing attack training.
3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan
sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.
[34] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)
3161. Task Force Eight will:
Continue operations and training under commanders Task Forces One and Two
[35] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)
3171. Task Force Six wiU perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.
3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.
3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the
loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of V. S.
and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander Ta.^k Force Nine.
[36] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)
3181. Special Information.
The Basic Plan assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier:
a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in C'ategory "D". (Category
"D" — Mav be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Crnunaiider-in-Chicf,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase L)
b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier.
3182. By this Fleet Plan, Task Force Four is assigned the tasks below.
a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier, in coop.>ration with the Army and the units concerned.
(As of the date of issue of this plan, the security i)lan of tlu^ Commander, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).
b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the
development of Samoa and (!uam.
c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in
the vicinit}'; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate
with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military
activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COXTRT OF INQUIRY 999
11. S. PACIFIC FLEHT OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 01. RAINBOW FIVE)
PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for
the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized,
Wake and Canton.
Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier)
3183. Commanders Task Forces Five and Ten perform tasks assigned by the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
[38] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal
Frontiers will perform the following tasks:
a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the
end of four W-day: units designated for early operations complete mobilization
prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the
Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.
b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating
with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.
d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief
may direct.
e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera-
tions as directed by the commander-in-chief.
[39] CHAPTER II. PHASE lA
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3211. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
3213. Reenforce and support operations of Task Force two as required in the
Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).
[40] Section f. TASK FORCE TWO
3221. Task Force Two will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graph.
3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as
required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).
[41] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE
3231. Task Force Three will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required
in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3233. Peenforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance
and Raiding Plan (Annex II).
3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of
the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.
3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.
[42] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3241. Task Force Nine will perform tasks as required in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3242. a. Special Information.
1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and
Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the
1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence.
Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of Julv 1, 1941,
tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities
may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the
improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has
been approved.
2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier.
3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will
habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.
4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c,
1. Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged
with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol
plane operations.
5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane searc
will comprise:
(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along
our lines of communication.
[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of commimications.
(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra and Canton. -
(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.
b. Tasks.
1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol
planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest
possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only
when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of
damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on
the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.
3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.
4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan
(Annex II).
5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same
general area.
6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid dis-
proportionate losses.
[\j,.] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be V. J.
Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of
major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at dis-
cretion, mav be temporarily transferred to commander Task Force Four (Hawai-
ian Naval Coastal Frontier).
c. Special Logistics.
Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Fontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways
facilities.
[45] Sections. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)
3251. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.
3252. a. 1. Special Information
1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and
Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the cap-
ture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas
and the Japanese Homeland.
2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and
Johnston Islands.
3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands.
Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been
reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-
lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft
usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami
Oshima.
4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is be-
leved that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol
planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 1001
5. The main units of the Jai.anese Fleet will probably be operating from the
Inland Sea.
6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines
and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be
expected.
[46] 32ri2. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications
from Japan may bo considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are
very important.
8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be
operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack.
Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.
9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to
extend the Pacific Area sufficientlv for submarines to pass through the Nansei
Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.
10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The
specific authority for such mining will be issued later.
b. Tasks
1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.
2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and
thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating condi-
tions, giving Stations the following priority.
YOKOHAMA
BUNCO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU
3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing
torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.
[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of
attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.
c. Special Logistics.
Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.
[48] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE)
3261. Task Force Eight will:
Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the
local defense forces during this phase.
[49] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)
3271. Task Force Six will:
Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding
plan (annex II).
[50] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
3281. Task Force Five (Pacific Northern; and Task Force Ten (Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier; will:
Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).
3282. Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:
Continue tasks assigned for phase I.
[61] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3291. All task forces concerned:
a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.
b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).
[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3311. Task Force One \\\\\:
Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex — ),
and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[52a] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3321. Task Force Two will:
Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans
and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.
[52b] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE
3331. Task Force Three wUl:
a. Continue training for landing attacks.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other operations
involving landing attacks.
c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.
[52c] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3341. Task Force Nine will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for
the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
[52d] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)
3351. Task Force Seven will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for
the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA
[52e] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)
3361. Task Force Eight will:
Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — )
and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.
[52f] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL
FORCE)
3371. Task Force Six will:
a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and
a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.
[52g] Section S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
3381. Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten will:
Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.
[52h] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3391. All task forces concerned:
Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.
[58] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on
Avhether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.
a. If action against European Axis Powers onlv is to be taken the despatch will
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE
PHASE ONE".
b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE
PHASE ONE AFIRM".
3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against theUnited
States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the seniorcommander
on the spot to take such action in the defense of his conunand and thenational
interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior
authority at once.
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
1003
[64] CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS
3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers
to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organ-
ization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made
upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be
made when the execution of Phase lA is ordered. Units concerned will report by
despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.
From
To
Unit transferred
Transfer effected
Remarks
Taskfor 1
Southeastern Pa-
cific For.
Taskfor 3 .
/2 OCL
jwhen directed. -
W-Day . . .
11 Desdiv
1 CL
For rotation on patrol
until J-Day.
For rotation on patrol
Taskfor 2
Taskfor 3
1 CA
W-Day.-
When directed. .
When directed..
[w-Day
Atlantic Reen
Taskfor 2 _-..
PSNCF
4 CA - .
until J-Day.
If Atlantic Reen. is de-
Taskfor 3
2CA
tached.
If Atlantic Reen. is de-
fl2 VPB
tached.
fAdministration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
h AVD
PNNCF
PNNCF..
Taskfor 3
h AVP.
I W-Day
fl2VPB
(■Administration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol
h AVD
[1 AVP
Plane Force).
}w-Day
f2SS
(■Administration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
U ASR .
W-Day
|j-Day
NARWHAL or
NAUTILUS.
fl CM
166]
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).
Hawaiian NCF...
Taskfor 3
on J-Day.
Until further orders.
\8 DM.
W-Day
Taskfor 6 (Logistic
1 AO
Base Samoa, released on
and Control For).
Taskfor 2
1 AO .
J-Day .
J-Day.
For fueling at sea ships
2 AO
J-Day
in initial sweep. To
revert when released.
For fueling at sea ships
Taskfor 9
Hawaiian NCF...
Task for fi (Logistic
and Control
Force).
lOVJR
J-Day
in initial reconnais-
sance of MARSH ALLS
To revert when re-
leased.
Until further orders.
All Forces
As directed
Any ship passing
between West
Coast and Ha-
waii.
When directed..
Prior to sched-
uled date of
departure.
For escort duty. To re-
vert on completion.
[56]
Part IV. Logistics
CHAPTER I. GENERAL
4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged
with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task
Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present out-
lying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required
by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer
in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal
Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of
material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a
reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor.
After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of
supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transporta-
tion facilities available.
4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left
the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.
4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included
in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.
4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other
task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic require-
ments as far as they can be foreseen.
4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest
priority classification by paragraph 42G1 of the Navy Basic Plan.
79716 — 46— Ex. 146, voL 2-
-21
1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[56a] CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION
4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his
liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and per-
sonnel by Fleet transporta 
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