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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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Given By 
U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS 



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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BBFORB THB 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ->, ^,,, ■., 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS "^ -^^f' ^ 

FIRST SESSION < ^ ^-^ 

PURSUANT TO « ,^ i • 



S. Con. Res. 27 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THB ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 






PART 34 
PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Inyestigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

i/tC'^ -^^ • BEFORE THE 

" JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 12^7^7 

FIRST SESSION • xZ 

PURSUANT TO • /j^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 p-a. ^<l 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN ' ' 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 34 

PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of tlie Pearl Harbor Attack 





UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 104G 



U. S. SUPtR»NTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS . 

SEP 231946 



JOINl COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JDLE M. Hannafobd, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LooAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



n 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



1 
2 
3 

4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 



rages Transcript Hearings 

paces 

1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 

983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 

1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, )R, 19, and 21, 1946. 

2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 2S and 29, 1946., 

3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 

4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 

5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Boerd, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



H 

H 
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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


1 1 1 1 ^ CD 05 1 1 1 1 1 (N 1 

1 iiiiiOi(M^iilii(Ni 

1 (M 1 00 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1—1 1 

11 iiiiOiCOCOiiiiiiOl 

•> 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

0, iiiiii03iTtiOiiiii051 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 ^ 10 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 

fti 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CJ 1 00 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 

iiiliiiiliiiiiOiOSCOilliikOl 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 1' 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 i 1 i i i i i i i i 1 i i i ;? 1 i 1 ! i i : 

^ ! ; ! : 1 ; : 1 : ; ; 1 1 ; : ;i: ; 1 ; 1 ; ! i 
1 till T^i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Paget 

64" 

194 
59-63 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1915) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iN 

2 M M M I ; I M 1 : M 1 1 I 1 I : 1 r 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Array Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


III II 1 i 1 1 1 III 

lO i-H it^CO 1 lOOOiO 1 1 1 iCO lOO 1 iN 1 

i(N i05 i(NOO 1 lOOCO— 1 1 1 1 IT}< iTt<(M 1 ITJ< 1 

5 1^ iTj< lO^ 1 iiCOJiO 1 1 1 ICC it^{M 1 iTjH 1 

S. iCO ilM 1-^ 1 1 IIMCOIM 1 1 1 1^ iCOi-i 1 ir-i 1 

.Oil 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III III 1 

a, 110 idi KNTfi 1 iI~-(N(N 1 1 1 110 lOCO 1 ICO 1 

lO it^ i(N— 1 1 iCOt^O 1 1 1 it^ iC^OO 1 ii-H 1 

1 I— 1 1 -"^ lO 1 1 10 CT> •* 1 1 1 lie 1 1^ i-H 1 ITf 1 

iCO i(M I'* 1 KNCOC^ 1 1 1 i,_i lec^ 1 I-H 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Paget 
"391-398" 

"'115-134" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721" 

1219-1224" 

"886^951" 
1382-1399 

""377-389" 
1224-1229 

""314-326' 


a 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstev , Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

BaUard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Franci.s 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berrv, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell, George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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I I 

IC o 



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O O (NCC O 
(M '^ COCO ^ 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Conjrressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5080-5089 
3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

""418-423" 
""451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

205 

"B223-224' 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 ; i ; ; ; ; i i i i i i i i 1 1 ! 1 1 


Joint 
ComTnittee 
E.xhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

Julv 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""179-184" 

""ios-iii" 

96-105 

74-85 

'"368^378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180" 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

"812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 
365-368 

1747-1753" 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenburv, Carlisle Clyde, Col 

Dver, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 






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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5555-5560 

4829-4909 
341-368 

""Y049-T439", 
1499-1541, 
6175-5200 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 

182-292 

""140^142' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

•° 1 ! ! 1 ! ! ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! ! 1 1 ! 1 
t-^ 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exliibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July '24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lOOiiiiiCOiiliOiiO 11 

l^lllllTt-IIIITflOO II 

»iiiiiiiC>iiiiiOiiiil>iCO II 

1 ! 1 : 1 1 ; ;4 ; : ! : ic^ : : ; 14 icJ, w 

^ C-l 1 1 1 1 CO lie II 

illllliCliiiiiOiiiit^iOO II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

Julv 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2r)05"2695' 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1604 
3226-3250 

2362-2374' 

2-54' 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. IS, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


1 1 1 —1 1 IM lO 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 > -t 1 1 1 kO 1 (M 1 

1 iio It- ifoci 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO iioobio 

p 1 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 C^ 1 1 1 1 kO 1 1 1 00 iCO-*CO 
0, 1 1 ^ ' — < irfH— 1 1 1 1 — 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , —. 1 1 O-^ 
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 d> 1 1 1 1 1 (6 —1 
Q, 1 10 lO 1 00 1 1 i(M 1 1 1 10 1 1 ICO iiM 
ii-^iiOi COii't-iiiiiOiiiCl ICO 
1 1 r-l 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 IM 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' t^ 1 


1 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Ivroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

LasweU, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adni 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Jo.'^eph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsdcii, George, Maj .. 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, C.eorge W., Lt. Coradr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L,, Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 






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XII 



COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTaCK 



Joint 

Concni.ssional 

Committco, 

Nov. 15, 194.5, 

to Mav 31, 

1940 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committco 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(FIcwitt 

Imiuiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 194,5) 


1 OC 1 

00 .1 111 1 1 1 1 

?: 1 'CO 1 

^111 III 1.1 1 III > 1 1 1 

a 1 1 1 111 1 it- 1 111 1111 

^i 100 1 III 1 1 1 1 

III 111 1 iCO 1 III 1 1 1 1 


i-g c|>^- 


Oil 111 iir- 1 (Nil it-ii 
Tj- iiOO 1 COii it-ii 

to 11 III I 17 1 11 lo 1 1 

(S^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1?^ 1 1 1 1*" ; 1 


go Se- • 
|Es^S.£f-5<S 


^ 1 I 1 i i i i i i 1 i i i i i i i 




1 iiO III III •■„-^-<N"t-"(N 1 :<0 1 1 00 00 
iiOi III 111 ^^-/OCCOOiiTT iiCO 

2 1 IT 111 III Tc^o2::z; 1 it 1 i^f;: 
1 i ij: ill III "i^i^a. 1 li 1 isa< 

1 l'^ 111 III c^^§!2!2 ; ;^ 1 ;^'^§ 




1 1 C"<N iC ofo lO CO LO 1 1 OC C5 1 1 1 

IICO «-0 IT CT. C:OCO—i 1 iXr- OOiii 

•= 1 i,-i(N 1 CC CO C; <— C: C; 1 lOC t- 1 1 1 

g, 1 ir-iT 1 CO (M CO CO (N CO 1 1^,-H (111 

e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i ' i 1 1:1 00 1 1 1 

t,iit-OiOLOCeocoio 1 lOOLO t-iii 

iiCJ'iCOt^CiL.^iNOO 1 lOCO t-iii 
1 IT-HM lOCOCi — C:CC 1 iC:0 1 1 1 
1 It-1,-1 1 CO (M CO CO IM CO 1 1 — — 1 1 1 


Joint 

Commiltpo 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inciuiry, 

Fcl). 12 to 
Juno 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 I 1 i ! i i 1 ! if 1 i i : 

-K 1 1 1 IT^ 1 1 1 1 

111 III III 1 1 1 1— 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committco 

Exliibit No. 

143 

(Kobcrts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 L-t--* 1 1 i,^-,»"00 1 1 iCO"^ 1111 
iii^XOii Oih:li;(Ni iiXOOiiii 

1 ; ;S=f:2 ; 1 2 ;^^^ ! ; i^T 1111 
(S 1 i^i^ I 1 i iSJg ! ! i«^s 1 : ! I 

1 1?^^S I : ^ :^:^ 1 1 :S°^ 1 1 1 1 


> 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, ICns 

Phillip.s, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col.' 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindcxtcr, J().sct)h B., Gov 

Powell, BollinK U., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prathcr, IiOni.se 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pyc, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsev, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XXXGCOQ 



XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

1948 


Pages 
""2921-3231 


?«S 1 :S^ 1 :?^^sg^ 1 loco 1 1 I 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
4-9 


lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 III ICO 1 

7 iiiiii i i i \y \ 

lO IIIIII III 1 T-l 1 

CO IIIIII III I.-I 1 
CO IIIIII III i'"*^ 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. Xi, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69' 
195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarice 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1045) 


I 1 1 1 1(M 

II 111 

:S 1 I III 


1 1 1 Im 1 1 111 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lo 1 1 1 1 

iN. 1 1 1 1 
2 IS' 1111 
,5 li 1111 
a, i(N 1 1 1 1 

iCl 1 1 1 1 


IM —1 1 1 1 1 r-'O 111 III 
t^ 00llll^I^^-^ 1 

ic o 1 1 1 iE:?S^ 1 

1 r-l 1 , 1 ,^<^ 1 III III 

S rl 1 1 1 1^^^ 111 1 1 I 
"^ ^ 1 1 1 1 ?^^ 111 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

32G5-32S6 


1539-1575 

4037-4094 

C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


•9 11 1 1 1 1 

t-» 1 1 1111 

^11 1111 
II 1 1 1 1 


32-65 
323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exliibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

"'37-169,' 
1617-1647 
452-455 


1738^1742' 

1186-1190 
1805-1808 


B 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., IT, Capt. USN.. 
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith Waltpr R T.t Gfn 


Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Is.«tftc, Prig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, Cn/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. P., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Renjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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03 ^ 
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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31. 

1946 . 


1 1 1 1 1 1.-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 lf^-Tt< 1 

-- > ' ' ' ' '^\s, ; 

. • i ; i i i^ i i i i i ! ; i iiii^m 

N i i i F N N N N 1 N i"" 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""389^416" 

376^386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 

165-166 

— c5--- 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


Vol. 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 11111 1 
11111 Cft 1 1 1 1 

g 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 i i i i i i i i i i iS i : i i i i i i ; 

1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 

1111 1 lO 1 

1 1 ,—1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

i98<>^2067" 
2456-2478 

1345^1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683" 

3750-3773 
3357-3586' 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15. 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 1 (Mill 1 

icc Ill 1 CO 1 1 1 1 

2 (Ni COiii 1 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' ' ' < 

^ (35 1 1 1 1 d> 1 1 1 1 

t^ t- t- 1 1 1 1 

<N CO 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1912) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334^1346" 

"247-259' 

1.52.5-1538 
1683-1705 


a 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

\\ithers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 147 



PART I OF PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION 

CONDUCTED BY 

COLONEL CARTER W. CLARKE, PURSUANT TO ORAL IN- 

STPy noNs OF the chief of staff, u. s. army 

testimony and findings concerning handling of 
certain top secret documents 

Top Secret 

MIS/DC/CWC/EWG/dc 74195 

* Memorandum for the Chief of Stuff 

20 September 1944 
Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top 

Secret communications were handled. 

The report of the investigation regarding the manner in which cer- 
tain Top Secret communications were handled is attached hereto as 
Tab. A. Briefly summarized, the findings disclose the following : 

a. That between 1 October 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor 
the Secretary of State, Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief 
of War Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G-2 each received identical 
copies of the daily Magic material that had been screened out by Col. 
Bratton, and each received a copy of all of the Top Secret documents 
that are exhibits in this investigation. 

h. During the same period the Navy Department was furnishing 
similar material to the President through the President's naval aide. 

c. On 28 November 1941 the so-called "Winds Code" was decoded. 
This code provided for the warning of Japanese embassies and con- 
sulates throughout the world in a voice broadcast that relations be- 
tween Japan and the United States, Japan and Russia or Japan and 
Great Britain, as the case might be, were to be severed and that when 
this word was received all code papers were to be destroyed. Arrange- 
ments were immediately made both by the Army Signal Corps and, 
through the Army Signal Corps, with Federal Communications Com- 
mission for listening for a message that would implement this code. 
However, prior to Pearl Harbor neither the F. C. C. nor the Army 
Signal Corps intercepted an implementing message. 

d. Thirteen of the fourteen parts of Tokyo's reply to the American 
counter proposals were received by the War Department in the eve- 
ning of 6 December and were delivered to the Department of State late 
that evening. The fourteenth section, which was the concluding sec- 
tion of the Japanese reply, and a message from Tokyo to the Japanese 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 147^ 2 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ambassadors in Washington instructing that this reply be presented 
to the Secretary of State at one p. m., Washington time, were re- 
ceived in the War Department before 0900 E. S. T., 7 December 1941. 
As soon as possible thereafter Gen. Marshall, Gen. Gerow, Gen. Miles, 
Col. Bratton and Col. Bundy met in Gen. Marshall's office at the War 
Department and at that time Gen. Marshall decided to send a further 
warning message to the commanders in the Pacific area. This infor- 
mation was conveyed by Gen. Marshall to Adm. Stark, who concurred 
therein and asked that the Navy commanders be informed of the Army 
message. This message was filed in the War Department Message 
Center at 1200 noon E. S. T., received R. C. A. Honolulu 33 minutes 
later but not delivered to the Hawaiian Department until 7 hours and 
25 minutes after its receipt by R. C. A. Honolulu. 

Clayton Bissell, 

Major General^ 
A. C. of S., G-2. 
Enclosures : 

Tab. A. 

MIS/DC/EWG/dc 74195 
20 September 1944 

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: 

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top 

Secret communications were handled. 

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to con- 
duct an investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top 
Secret communications were handled. Under authority of a letter of 
9 September 1944 (AGPO-M-B 333.5 (7 Sep 44)) from The Ad- 
jutant General, which read as follows : 

It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an in- 
vestigation and Interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions issued 
to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret 
communications were handled. 

The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to 
administer oaths for this purpose. 

the investigation was conducted on 14, 15 and 16 September, in Room 
2CG37 of the Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken 
of Major General Sherman Miles, Acting A. C. of S., G-2 during 
the year 1941 ; Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, Chief of the In- 
telligence' Branch of the Military Intelligence Division during the 
last half of 1941; Colonel Ruf us Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern 
Section of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter half 
of 1941; Colonel John T. Bissell, head of the Counter Intelligence 
Branch of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter part 
of 1941 ; Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications 
Service during the latt/er part of 1941; and Mr. William F. Fried- 
man, principal cryptanalyst of the Signal Intelligence Service dur- 
ing the latter part of 1941. Documentary evidence in the nature of 
copies of 38 Top Secret decoded Japanese messages passing between 
the Toyko Government and various Japanese embassies in many 
parts of the world in October, November and early December, 1941 
were also introduced into evidence. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 3 

[2] 2. There were also introduced into evidence memoranda 
for the Chief of Staff in the nature of Estimates of the Situation 
which were made by the then Acting A. C. of S., G-2 the latter part 
of November and early December, 1941, all of them immediately 
prior to Pearl Harbor day ; the findings of fact of the Roberts Report 
of January 1942; a telegram to the G-2, Hawaiian Department of 
5 December 1941, signed Miles; a telegram signed Brink received in 
the War Department 6 December 1941 at 1629 E, S. T. ; a memoran- 
dum of 6 December 1941 signed Perry regarding Jap Washington 
Embassy burning code books the night of 5 December; telegram 
from Melbourne, Australia from Merlesmith received in the War De- 
partment 7 December at 1950 E. S.. T. ; M, I. D. form containing infor- 
mation received from the Orient dated 3 November 1941 containing in- 
formation purporting to have come from a Mr. Hirota; report of 
Headquarters, Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941 entitled, 
"Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii" ; secret 
radiogram dated 7 July 1941 to the Commanding Generals, the 
Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine Department, Hawaiian 
Department and Fourth Army; radio message dated 27 October 
1941 from Manila, signed Brink; radiogram dated 29 October 1941 
from Manila signed Evans ; copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo 
to MHUD between 12 July and 27 July 1941; and the following 
messages flowing between Commanding General, Hawaii and the 
War Department: 27 November 1941 Chief of Staff to Command- 
ing General, Hawaii; 27 November 1941 G-2 War Department to 
G-2 Hawaii; 27 November 1941 Commanding General, Hawaii t© 
Chief of Staff; 28 November 1941 The Adjutant General to Com- 
manding General, Hawaii; 29 November 1941 Commanding Gen- 
eral, Hawaii to The Adjutant General; 7 December, Chief of Staff 
to Commanding General, Hawaii et al. 

3. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and 
transcribed. 

4. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered 
and as a i-esult of this consideration I find the following facts : 

a. That between 1 October and the afternoon of 7 December 1941 
there were at least 37 coded messages that were flowing between 
the Tokyo Government and their embassies in various parts of the 
world which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service 
and were decoded. In addition there was at least one copy of a 
telephone conversation between the Tokyo Government and the 
Japanese Embassy in Washington. These intercepted and decoded 
messages were Top Secret material that was designated as "Magic" 
in the latter part of 1941. (Ex. #1, Bratton, p. 10, Sadtler, p. 1.) 

b. At all times between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack 
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Top Secret material that 
is involved in this investigation was handled as follows (Bratton 
p. 24 ; Miles p. — ) : 

It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by hand of 
an officer to the office of Colonel Ruf us Bratton who was then Chief of 
the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of M. I. D. Col. 
Bratton then read all of the material, screening out that which had 
intelligence value. The other material he then burned. The screened 
material was then arranged by Col. Bratton in separate piles, one for 



4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one for the A. C. of 
S., G-2, one for the Chief, War Plans Division and one for the Secre- 
tary of State. Col. Bratton then bouild each pile in a carboard folder, 
inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked each 
dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at that 
time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were 
brought by Col. Bratton back to his office, opened and the material 
therein checked prior to destruction by burning. 

c. Between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of 
War, the Chief of War Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G-2 each 
received identical copies of the daily Magic material that had been 
screened out by Col. Bratton, and each received a copy of each of 
the 38 Top Secret documents that are exhibits in this investigation. 
In addition, for a short time immediately prior to Pearl Harbor 
and for a short time thereafter, Gen. McNair, Commanding General 
of the Army Ground Forces, also received daily copies of this Top 
Secret material. (Bratton p. 7, 24, 25 ; Miles p. — ) 

d. During this identical period the Navy Department was fur- 
nishing similar material to various officers in the Navy Department 
and to the President through the President's naval aide. (Bratton, 
p. 4 — Miles p. — ) 

e. From time to time during this period the Chief of Staff ques- 
tioned Col. Bratton as to his evaluation of certain of the Top Secret 
reports that are exhibits in this investigation. (Bratton p. 5 and 12) 

/. That on 28 November 1941 Top Secret Army message No. 25432 
was decoded. The decoding of this message read as follows (Ex. 
#2): 

From Tokyo 

To Washington 

19 November 1941 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and 
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave ncjws broad- 
cast: 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger : 
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN) 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: 

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY) 

(3) Japan-British relations: 

NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR) 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the e)nd as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all 
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

On 28 November 1941 Col. Bratton made arrangements for listen- 
ing for Japanese broadcasts that might include this code. These ar- 
rangements were made through Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the 
Chief Signal Officer, who put Col. Bratton in touch with a Mr. G. E. 
Sterling, then Chief of the National Defense Operations Section of 
the Federal Communications Commission. The F. C. C. did there- 
after monitor Japanese broadcasts for the purpose of determining if 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 5 

the Japanese sent a message using the "Winds" code. I am unable to 
find that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted 
by the F. C. C. or the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. 
(Bratton p. 10, 11; Miles p. — ; Sadtler, p. 2; Friedman, p. 7; 
Ex. #3) 

I find that on 5 December 1941, Col. Sadtler was informed by Adm. 
Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using 
the "Winds"' code had been intercepted the previous night, and that 
the message, decoded, meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations 
were to be broken ; that on 5 December 1941 Col. Sadtler so informed 
Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Gaily and Gen. Bedell 
Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, but that Gen. Miles or 
Col. Bratton never informed Gen. Marshall personally of the Sadtler 
information. I do find, however, that Col. Bratton prior to this time 
had been informed by the Navy that Commander Eochefort of the 
14th Naval [J] District knew all that our own Navy Depart- 
ment knew about the "Winds Code" message and that on 5 December 
he caused the following message to be sent the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department (Sadtler p. 2, 3, ; Bratton p. 17, 18 ; Miles p. — : 
Ex. #4) : 

CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDI- 
ATELY THRU COMMANDANT FOURTEEN NAVAL 
DISRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKIO 
REFERENCE WEATHER. 

I further find that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton were on 5 December 
1941, and had been for some time prior thereto, expecting a break in 
Jap-Great Britain relations. I further find that no officer of the Navy 
ever advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implement- 
ing the Winds Code had been received by the Navy. I find that if in 
fact such a message was intercepted, it was not intercepted by the 
Army Signal Corps or F. C. C. (Bratton p. 11, 12, 13, Roundtable; 
Miles p. — ). 

g. I find that 13 of the 14 sections of the Japanese reply. Top Secret 
Army No. 25843 were received by the evening of 6 December and one 
copy of that part of the Japanese reply was delivered by Col. Bratton 
to the watch officer on duty at the Department of State late in the 
evening of 6 December, with instructions to see that the document 
was delivered to the Secretary of State immediately. (Bratton p. 17; 
Miles p. — , Ex. #5) 

h. I find that between 0830 and 0900 E. S. T. 7 December 1941 Col. 
Bratton was at his office in the War Department and at that time 
received copies of section 14 of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army 
No. 25843, and also received copies of Tokyo's instructions to deliver 
the reply at 1 : 00 p. m. 7 December 1941. Top Secret Army No. 25850; 
that Col. Bratton then immediately attempted to contact the Chief 
of Staff and the Chief, War Plans Division at their offices in the War 
Department but these officers were not in their offices at that time; 
that Col. Bratton then telephoned Gen. Marshall's quarters and was 
informed that Gen. Marshall had gone horseback riding; that Col. 
Bratton requested Gen. Marshall's orderly to go out and find him at 
once and to ask Gen. Marshall to call Col. Bratton on the telephone 
as soon as practicable as Col. Bratton had an important message to 



6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

deliver to him; that Col. Bratton then called Gen. Miles, reporting 
what steps he, Col. Bratton, had taken and recommending that Geu. 
Miles come to the office at once ; that either Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton 
thereafter called Gen. Gerow, then Chief of War Plans Division ; that 
sometime between 1000 and 1100 E. S. T. Col. Bratton received a 
telephone call from Gen. Marshall and then informed Gen. Marshall 
that [^1 he, Col. Bratton, had a message of extreme importance 
which Gen. Marshall should see at once and advised Gen. Marshall that 
Col. Bratton would bring the message to Gen. Marshall's quarters if 
Gen. Marshall so desired; that Gen. Marshall instructed Col. Bratton 
to report to Gen. Marsliall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Depart- 
ment as the General Avas on his way there ; that Col. Bratton reported 
to Gen. Marshall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Department at 
about 1125 E. S. T., which was shortly after Gen. Marshall's arrival ; 
that shortly thereafter Gen. Miles arrived; that the message, Top 
Secret Army No. 25850, instructing the Japanese ambassadors to 
present Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, to the Department 
of State at 1300 E. S. T. that afternoon was laid before Gen. Marshall 
and discussed ; that the Chief of Staff then had on his desk the lengthy 
Japanese reply. Top Secret Army No. 25843, which he read aloud to 
those officers present ; that the Chief of Staff asked all officers present 
for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the 
message. Top Secret Army No. 25850 ; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton 
both stated that they believed there was important significance in the 
time of the delivery of the reply, namely 1 : 00 p. m., that this was an 
indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Jap- 
anese at that time, that they thought it probable that the Japanese 
line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any 
one or more of a number of other areas ; that Gen. Miles urged that the 
Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed im- 
mediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock 
that afternoon, Washington time, and that the commanders in the 
areas, indicated should be on the alert ; that Gen, Marshall then called 
Adm. Stark on the telephone and told Adm. Stark over the telephone 
that he thought the Army should send out a warning substantially 
as Gen. Miles urged; that after Adm. Stark replied Gen. Marshall 
put down the telephone and stated that Adm. Stark did not think any 
further warning necessary since all the forces had been several times 
alerted; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton nevertheless continued to 
urge Gen. Marshall to send the warning; that Gen. Marshall then 
wrote out in pencil the warning message and there was some discussion 
at this particular time as to whether or not the Philippines should be 
included ; that Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone 
and read to Adm. Stark the message he. Gen. Marshall, had just 
written; that Adm. Stark apparently concurred and asked that the 
naval forces be also informed and Gen. IMarshall added a request to 
that effect at the bottom of his penciled [7] warning; that 
about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived and Gen. Marshall 
again asked each officer present, in succession beginning with Gen. 
Miles, their opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message, 
Army Top Secret No. 25850 ; that Gen. Miles said he thought it prob- 
ably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some sig- 
nificance and that warning messages to our people should be sent ; that 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 7 

Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and Col. Bratton concurred; that Gen. 
Marshall then gave Col. Bratton the message in Gen. Marshall's hand- 
writing and instructed Col. Bratton to take it immediately to the 
Message Center for transmittal; that as Col. Bratton was about to 
leave there was some discussion as to whether the penciled message 
should go to Gen. Gerow's oflSce for typing first but it was decided that 
as time was an important factor Col. Bratton should take it in its draft 
form to the Message Center ; that as Col. Bratton left the room Gen. 
Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was any question 
of priority involved to give first priority to the Philippines; that 
Col. Bratton took the message to Col. French, a Signal Corps officer 
then in charge of the Message Center, explained to Col. French that 
it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the 
addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines 
first priority ; that Col. French then said he would give it his personal 
attention and that processing of the message would commence im- 
mediately; that Col. Bratton then returned to the office of the Chief 
of Staff and Gen. Marshall then directed Col. Bratton to find out how 
long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees ; 
that Col. Bratton returned to the Message Center, talked the matter 
over with Col. French, who informed Col. Bratton that the message 
would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight 
minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes; 
that it was then 1150 E. S. T. ; that Col. Bratton returned to the Chief 
of Staff's office and so reported to him. Bratton p. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 23 ; 
Miles p. — , Ex. #6, Ex. #7). 

i. I find that the log of the warning message sent by the Chief of 
Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is as 
follows {Ex. #8) : 

E. 8. T. Honolulu time 

Filed War Department Message Center 12 : 00 noon 6 : 30 AM 

Sent Western Union 12 : 17 PM 6 : 47 AM 

Received RCA, Honolulu 7:33 AM 

Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu 11 : 45 AM 

Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department 2 : 58 PM 

Carter W. Clarke, 

Colonel^ General Staff Corps^ 
Deputy Chiefs Military Intelligence Service. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN T. BISSELL 

[i] Place : Koom 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 14 September 1944. 
Time: 1310-1330. 
Present : 

Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Colonel John T. Bissell. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 
Colonel John T. Bissell, having been sworn arid warned of his 
fights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn 
testimony: 

Col. Clarke. State your name, rank, organization and station 
please. 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. BissELL. John T. Bissell, Colonel, Field Artillery, Headquar- 
ters 89th Division Artillery, Camp Butner, North Carolina. 

Col. Clarke. On what date did you become a member" of G-2 
Division, War Department General Staff? 

Col. Bissell. I believe it was on the 25th day of May 1940. 

Col. Clarke. What were your duties at that time? 

Col. Bissell. I was assigned to the Counter Intelligence Group of 
the Military Intelligence Division. 

Col. Clarke. In what position? 

Col. Bissell. I was Executive Officer of that Group. 

Col. Clarke. How long did you remain on those duties? 

Col. Bissell. I remained as Executive Officer until, I think July 1, 
1941, when I became the senior member of that Group. 

Col. Clarke. As Chief ,of the Counter Intelligence Group of 
M. I. D., what were your principal duties? 

Col. Bissell. The principal duties that I had were the collection, 
evaluation and dissemination of counter intelligence information. 

Col. Clarke. Would it be correct to state that your principal duties 
then dealt with what we might call domestic intelligence rather than 
any foreign intelligence? 

Col. Bissell. That is correct. 

[2] Col. Clarke. Did you focus your attention on any partic- 
ular enemy or potential enemy ? 

Col. Bissell. Yes, on the Germans and Japanese. 

Col. Clarke. By that I mean their agents in this country. 

Col. Bissell. Yes, and in our possessions. 

Col. Clarke. Were Honolulu and the Philippines included? 

Col. Bissell. They were. 

Col. Clarke. What was your chief source of information with re- 
gard to the Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. Bissell. At that time it was from reports we got from the 
Philippines and the F. B. I., principally. 

Col. Clarke. Did you have any knowledge of or access to any mate- 
rial which was known as Magic or Ultra during that period prior to 
Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Bissell. Prior to Pearl Harbor I did not. 

Col. Clarke. Did you know of its existence? 

Col. Bissell. I did. 

Col. Clarke. But you had no knowledge of the contents of any of 
the material produced? 

Col. Bissell. I never read any of it in the raw. I did receive sum- 
maries pertaining to Japanese agents in this country. 

Col. Clarke. Did vou ever discuss the contents of it with either the 
A. C. of S., G-2 or the Chief of the Intelligence Group? 

Col. Bissell. I don't recall that I ever did. 

Col. Clarke. Did j'ou ever discuss the Japanese situation with the 
Chief of the Far Eastern Branch of the Intelligence Group? 

Col. Bissell. Only on one or two occasions prior to Pearl Harbor. 

[-3] Col. Clarke. Did you receive any information from F. B. I. 
at any time which would indicate that they had knowledge of any of 
this material or access to it? 

Col. 15issELL. No. Of course I did receive reports on the activities 
of Japanese agents and attaches in the United States, but that was 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 9 

obtained by following those individuals, not from any translated 
codes. 

Col. Clarke. Did any of this information come from wire tapping 
sources, to your knowledge? 

Col. BissELL. I don't believe so. 

Col. Clarke. In what form did you make available to the A. C. of 
S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff such information that you did re- 
ceive ? 

Col. BissELL. As I recall it, we prepared in the Group daily a short 
memorandum if there was anything of any value. 

Col. Clarke. Was that sent to the Chief of Staff or just to the A. C. 
ofS.,G-2? 

Col. BissELL. It went to G-2. I am not absolutely certain in my 
own mind at that time whether I had that system in operation or not, 
but when I left here I had it going. 

Col. Clarke. Then you had no channels of contact with either the 
Chief of Staff or the Chief of the War Plans Division except through 
the person of the A. C. of S., G-2 ? 

Col. BissELL. That is correct. 

Col. Clarke. Did you ever receive from F. B. I. any information 
which would lead you to believe that there was a possibility of any 
attack by the Japanese on the U. S. or any of its possessions prior to 
Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. BiSSELL. No. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did it ever come to your knowledge that certain 
Japanese consulates were destroying codes and burning secret docu- 
ments early in December 1941 ? 

Col. BissELL. Yes I knew that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know it at the time ? 

[4] Col. BissELL. Yes I knew it at the time. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. That was before Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. BissELL. It was, I believe, the day of Pearl Harbor that the 
codes were destroyed. They were burned in the Japanese Embassy 
here in Washington. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of any other places they were burn- 
ing codes ? 

Col. BiSSELL, No. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever hear or know, prior to Pearl Har- 
bor, that the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on December 3, 1941 stating that it was 
believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and 
burning secret documents ? 

Col. BissELL. I did not know that. 

Col. Clarke. Did you ever initiate any warning message to the 
corps areas or department commanders with respect to sabotage prior 
to Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. BissELL. Yes I did. 

Col. Clarke. What did you base that on? 

Col. Bissell. I based that upon a directive that I got from the 
A. C. of S., G-2. 

Col. Clarke. In other words, you wrote the message at his direc- 
tion. 

Col. Bissell. I did, and took it to him for correction and editing. 

Col. Clarke. Then you did not initiate it ? 



10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. BissELL. I executed it and carried it out. It was initiated by 
the A. C. of S., G-2. 

Col. Clarke. Did you know of any message which was initiated 
by the Chief of the Army Air Forces to the same effect ? 

Col. BissELL. No I did not. 

Col. Clarke. Will you state briefly what your actions and activi- 
ties were on December 7. 

Col. Bissell. On that particular date I was at my house in Wash- 
ington [5] and happened to be listening to the radio in the 
afternoon. I heard the commentator discuss the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. I went to the office immediately and was there until some- 
time that evening. 

Col. Clarke. Did you have any knowledge of any warning mes- 
sage which was sent to the commanders on the morning of Decem- 
ber 7? 

Col. Bissell. At that time, no. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you ever alerted to be watching for a Jap 
message in code that might be given during a news broadcast ? 

Col. Bissell. No. I knew about it after December 7th but not at 
the time. 

TESTIMONY OP RUFUS S. BRATTON 

Part I 

[1] Place : Boom 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 14 September 1944. 

Time: 1045-1200. 

Present : 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, having been sworn and warned of his 
rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testi- 
mony : 

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank, organization and 
station please. 

Col. Bratton. Rufus S. Bratton, 0-3726. Headquarters, Com- 
mandant, Headquarters 3rd U. S. Army ETO. 

Col. Clarke. When were you first assigned to duty in the G-2 
section of the War Department General Staff? 

Col. Bratton. In the fall of 1936. 

Col. Clarke. And you continued in that duty until when? 

Col. Bratton. I continued on duty in one capacity or another in 
G-2 until the fall of 1943. 

Col. Clarke. From the time you arrived here until Pearl Harbor 
on December 7, 1941 what were your duties? 

Col. Bratton. I was at first assistant to the Chief of the Far East- 
ern Section of the Intelligence Branch and later succeeded him to 
that office. 

Col. Clarke. Who was that? Mason? 

Col. Bratton. Col. Homer Slaughter. I later succeeded him to 
that office as Chief of the Far Eastern Section. At that time my 
immediate superior was Col. Faye Brabson. He was later succeeded 
by Col. Charles Mason; he in turn by Col. Hayes Kroner. Upon 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 11 

the latter's designation as Chief of M. I. S. I became Chief of the 
Intelligence Branch. I think that is accurate. 

Col. Clarke. Was one of your duties both as the Assistant and as 
Chief of the Far Eastern Section, the handling of this so-called 
Magic or Ultra material ? 

[2} Col. Bratton. That is correct. When I first arrived in G-2 
a copy of the day's output was placed on my desk for such informa- 
tion and action as was necessary or advisable. At that time the pro- 
duction of Magic was on a very limited scale and it was a combined 
product of naval communications, I believe, and the Army SIS. As 
we progressed in solving various codes and ciphers the quantity and 
quality of this material naturally improved and it became quite vol- 
uminous, and its study and evaluation occupied a large part of my 
time as Chief of the Far Eastern Section. 

Col. Clarke. Will you state how this material was handled from 
the time it was received from the Signal Corps, who saw it besides 
yourself, and what selections were made to go to your immediate 
chief, also to the A. C. of S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff. 

Col. Bratton. Initially this material reached me through the Chief 
of the Operations & Training Branch of G-2. Later on this office 
was eliminated as a transmitter of this material and I dealt directly 
with the SIS and their counterpart in Navy communications. The 
material in later years was broken down as to source or type of code 
by the Army and Navy so that the Army worked on one type and the 
Navy on another. Normally the material was collected and coordi- 
nated by the Army SIS before it was presented to me. Occasionally, 
in matters of great interest or importance, an officer of the Navy 
would bring me a message direct, to save time. 

Col. Clarke. How many copies of this did you receive of each 
message ? 

Col. Bratton. Initially I received no copy of any message. I sim- 
ply received a statement showing that a message had been sent from 
one diplomatic post to another diplomatic post on such and such a 
date, followed by a brief summary of its contents. Later on, to 
further develop this very valuable source of intelligence, arrange- 
ments were made whereby I received exact copies of the decoded or 
deciphered message. 

Col. Clarke. Do you remember about what date that was, sir? 

Col. Bratton. We started this latter practice, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, early in 1941 or late in 1940. It then became 
my duty to see that the proper officials of the War Department had 
access to the intelligence contained in these decoded and deciphered 
messages. This entailed so much traveling around on my part from 
one office to another that it was a waste of time. So at the direction 
of the Chief [3] of Staff, transmitted to me through the 
A, C. of S., G-2. I started the system of having copies made — my 
office having a very limited number of officers — and instituted a check 
system whereby all copies were returned to me for destruction. This 
subsequently proved impracticable because of lack of clerical help and 
other assistance in the Far Eastern Section, and arrangements were 
made with the SIS and their counterpart in naval communications to 
have some six copies of each decoded or deciphered message delivered 
to me daily for study and evaluation. By this time the volume of 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

this work had increased tremendously. Many of the messages were 
purely administrative in character and were of no interest from an 
intelligence point of view. They were all gone over carefully, how- 
ever, to make sure that I missed no item which would be of in- 
telligence value. Those that had no intelligence value I destroyed 
by burning. The others were variously processed. 

Col. Clarke. Were you assigned the duty of selecting the mate- 
rial that went to the A. C. of S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff and 
Secretary of War? 

Col. Bratton. I was. 

Col. Clarke. By whom ? 

Col. Bratton. By the A. C. of S., G-2. 

Col. Clarke. Then you personally made the selection of what part 
of this material he saw and the Chief of Staff saw ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, they both saw the same material. 

Col. Clarke. In other words, if you decided that a message was 
of sufficient importance to be seen by the A. C. of S., G-2, it was also 
of sufficient importance to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary 
of War. Is that correct? 

Col. Bratton. Not always, but the reverse was always true. If 
the message was important enough to be seen by the Chief of Staff 
and Secretary of War, I of course saw to it that the A. C. of S., G-2 
saw the same message so that he could talk to the Chief of Staff intel- 
ligently about it. 

Col. Clarke. Did anyone else in G-2 see this material besides you 
andtheA. C. of S., G-2? 

[4>] Col. Bratton. Initially no, but as the volume increased it 
became necessary for me to have assistance in handling it, and with 
the knowledge and consent of the A. C. of S., G-2, certain trusted 
clerical help and certain of my officer assistants helped me in han- 
dling it. 

Col. Clarke. Who made the selection of the material that went to 
the State Department? 

Col. Bratton. Initially there was no agreement on this. Fre- 
quently the Navy Department would take the same message to the 
State Department that we thought would be of value to them. As it 
was a duplication of effort we finally came to an agreement that the 
Army would furnish the Secretary of State with material thought 
to be of interest to the State Department and that the Navy would 
serve the President likewise. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall about what date that arrangement be- 
came effective? 

Col. Bratton. Not exactly, but it was sometime early in 1941 when 
a written agreement was drawn up between the A. C. of S., G-2 and 
the Chief of Naval Intelligence, a copy of which was placed in the 
G-2 files. 

[5] Col. Clarke. Initially you made a selection of what was 
to go to the State Department or the President and the Navy made a 
similar selection. Is that correct? 

Col. Bratton. That is correct. 

Col. Clarke. When did you start giving all the material produced 
to the State Department and to the President ? 

Col. Bratton. I am quite positive that at no time was all of the 
material given to the President for the simple reason that the bulk 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 13 

of it would have been of no interest or value to him. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, the State Department was never given all 
of the material when I was responsible for its transmission. In other 
words, I made the selection of what was to go to the Secretary of State 
and it was left to my discretion to determine the material that would 
be of interest to him. 

Col. Clarke. In the period from July 1, 1941 up to and including 
Pearl Harbor, did you ever discuss any individual message or group 
of messages with either the A. C. of S., G-2 or the Chief of Staff? 

Col. Bratton. Oh yes, on innumerable occasions, with both. 

Col. Clarke. Was the Chief of Staff in(ilined to take your evalua- 
tion on this material or did he want to act on it and place his own 
interpretation on it? 

Col. Bratton. He almost invariably asked me for my interpre- 
tation and evaluation. 

Col. Clarke. What were your relationships with what was then 
known as War Plans Division? Did you ever discuss this material 
with the Chief of that Division ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, by direction of the Chief of Staff. They had 
access in the latter stages of this production and dissemination to 
exactly the same material that went to the A. C. of S., G-2, to the 
Chief of Staff and to the Secretary of War. 

Col. Clarke. Who in that Division had that besides the Chief, do 
you recall? 

Col. Bratton. Initially, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, I 
took the message that I wanted the Chief of the War Plans Division 
to read, directly to him, and when he had read it and after discussing 
it with him — if there was any discussion — removed the message from 
his desk, took it back to my oflice and destroyed it. Later on the 
Chief of the War Plans Division insisted that certain of his section 
chiefs should have access to the material also. This was approved by 
the Chief of Staff, and I then made it a practice to deliver this mate- 
rial in a padlocked leather case to the Executive Officer of WPD, ob- 
taining a receipt from him for certain numbered messages. After 
they had been read by the proper officers in WPD they were returned 
to me either the same day, in the locked bag, or on the following day 
when I delivered that day's messages. 

Col. Clarke. Was there ever prepared in the Far Eastern Section 
of G-2 any summary or evaluation which was based exclusively on the 
contents of this material ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall any particular one ? 

Col. Bratton. I don't recall any particular one but in the early 
stages of this work I very frequently submitted to the Chief of Staff, 
through the A. C. of S., G-2, a staff memorandum [6'\ based 
upon one or more messages that I had received, concealing the source 
by some agreed upon code word, so that the reader would know where 
I had secured the information which I was evaluating. Later on, as 
this material became of increasing value, the recipients, that is the 
Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the 
Chief of the War Plans Division, deemed it advisable to have access 
to the raw material themselves so that they could arrive at their own 
independent conclusions as to its meaning. This was how the prac- 
tice developed of delivering the raw material to certain officers desig- 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nated by the Chief of Staff. Frequently, even after this practice was 
instituted, I submitted memoranda to various officers in connection 
■with such and such a messa^ie, calling their attention to certain impli- 
cations or trends indicated therein. 

Col. Clarke. From the period November 1, 1941, when the tension 
increased between the United States and Japan, was there any special 
handling of this material ? 

Col. Bratton. As the tension between Japan and the United States 
grew we all took much greater precautions in processing and in other- 
wise handling the material. 

Col. Clarke. Did you h^ve conferences with your opposite numbers 
in the Navy and in the War Plans Division regarding the interpreta- 
tion and evaluation of this material ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. I had almost daily conferences with my op- 
posite number in ONI and with the Chief of the War Plans Division 
as to the true significance of the material under study. I may say at 
this point that there was complete cooperation and collaboration be- 
tween my opposite number in ONI, Commander McCuUem, and myself. 

Col. Clarke. Did you agree on the interpretation of this material? 
In other words, was your evaluation agreed upon? 

Col. Bratton. We were for the most part in complete agreement in 
our evaluations of the material. Wliere there were differences of 
opinion we always consulted and came to an understanding as to how 
we would present these opinions to our respective chiefs. In the event 
of any major difference of opinion as to interpretation I always gave 
the A. C. of S., G-2 a summary of the Navy's viewpoint along with 
my own, and I believe that my opposite number in ONI did likewise. 

Col. Clarke. In the handling of this material, both in evaluation 
and [7] safeguarding and what not, did you deal directly with 
the A. C. of S., G-2 or did you go through the Chief of the Intelligence 
Group ? 

Col. Bratton. Initially I went through the Chief of the Intelligence 
Group, but as tension grew and time became the important factor, at 
his direction I went straight to the A. C. of S., G-2 first and informed 
the Chief of Intelligence Branch afterward of my action and the na- 
ture of the information that I had transmitted. 

Col. Clarke. To the best of your knowledge and belief, the Chief 
of Staff was kept completely informed of all information and intel- 
ligence which was available to G-2 from this source. Is that correct? 

Col. Bratton. Completely. 

Col. Clark. I wish also to clear this one point up. I understood 
you to say that it was at the direction of the Chief of Staff that this 
raw material we served to him and to the Chief of the War Plans 
Division. 

Col. Bratton. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Colonel, you used the term "early stages" of this 
thing — I wish we could put an approximate date to "early stages" 
as you referred to early stages. 

Col. Bratton. Well, by early stages I mean during the years 1936 
and 1937 before the quantity and quality of the material materially 
increased. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. May I interrupt? Wouldn't you say that your 
early stages was from the time you came in, in 1936, up to the bomb- 
ing of the Panay ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 15 

Col. Bratton. Well I wouldn't extend the early stages to as late a 
date as the bombing of the Panay — earlier than that. 

Col. Clarke. In other words, you would say from the summer of 
1936 to the summer of 1937 would be the early stages ? 

Col. Bratton. Let me put it this way. By early stages I mean the 
period before our relations with Japan became strained. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Approximately when was it that the War Plans 
Division started getting this Top Secret material ? 

Col. Bratton. You mean copies of the raw material? 

[8] Lt. Col. Gibson. Yes. 

Col. Bratton. I am sorry, sir, I can't answer that definitely. My 
memory won't permit a definite answer. I would say not earlier than 
the summer of 1941. I would like to amplify that, however, with the 
statement that prior to the summer of 1941 various memoranda, writ- 
ten by me or by the A. C. of S., G-2, based upon this material were 
submitted to WPD. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. When these copies went to the State Department or 
War Plans they were not allowed to keep them on file? You went 
around and got them ? 

Col. Bratton. They were returned to me as soon as the proper offi- 
cials of the State Department and WPD had seen and initialed them. 
They did not remain in the files of either office. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were they allowed to make copies of this ? 

Col. Bratton. Not by me or any other officer of the War Depart- 
ment that I know of. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. You as Chief of the Intelligence Branch or your 
Chief of the Far Eastern Unit knew generally, did you not, that the 
United States policy in the Pacific in 1941 was in conflict with policies 
of the Japanese Government? 

Col. Bratton. Of course. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever have any knowledge of a letter from 
the Secretary of the Navy addressed to the Secretary of War on or 
about 24 January 1941 wherein the Secretary of War was warned that 
hostilities might be initiated at any time by the Japanese by an attack 
on Pearl Harbor, or that in substance ? Did you ever hear of any such 
letter at that time ? 

Col. Bratton. To the best of my knowledge and belief I have never 
seen or heard of any such letter. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. The Chief of Staff never advised you of the exist- 
ence of any such letter? 

Col. Bratton. I have no recollection of any such advice. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever attend any of the what were then 
termed War Council meetings ? 

Col Bratton. No, I did not. 

[9] Lt. Col. Gibson. In any of your conversations with the Chief 
of Staff did he ever discuss anything that went on at any conferences 
he had with his counterpart of the Navy or regarding the Japanese 
situation ? 

Col. Bratton. Not that I recall. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you ever told, or did you know, in the latter 
part of November, of a message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations 
to Admiral Kimmel, which was concurred in by General Marshall, to 
the effect that we might anticipate a surprise and an aggressive Japa- 



16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nese attack, or to be prepared for such a thing, or anything of that 
substance? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, I saw such a message. It was dispatched, to the 
best of my recollection, on or about the 24th of November. 

Lt. Col. Glbson. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral 
Kimmel ? 

Col. Bratton. That is right. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was that message brought to the attention of Gen- 
eral Miles at that time or General Kroner? 

Col. Bratton. I think so. I have no way of 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you recall how yau acquired your knowledge of 
the existence of such a message ? 

Col. Bratton. I believe that I first learned of the message through 
my opposite number in ONI, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division. I 
later saw and read a copy of the message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of General Marshall's message of 
the 27th of November to General Short and other commanders in that 
general area ? A warning message so-called ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you receive at any time during the first week of 
December 1941 any information either from the Navy or from our own 
military attaches to the effect that Jap consulates were burning docu- 
ments and codes on or about the third of December ? 

Col. Bratton. I can't recall receiving this information from any 
local source. I do remember, however, that in various Japanese mes- 
sages detailed instructions were issued from Tokyo to their consulate 
and diplomatic officials as to the methods to be used by the latter in 
destroying their [10] codes and ciphers when directed to do so. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. The Roberts report states that on December 3, 
1941 the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pacific Fleet that it was believed certain Japanese consulates 
were destroying their codes and burning secret documents. Did you 
at that time ever know of such a message being sent by the Navy ? 

Col. Bratton. No, to the best of my knowledge and belief this is 
the first time I have heard of it. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you aware of the bulletin of December 1, 
1941 dealing with the Japanese naval situation, issued by the Direc- 
tor of Naval Intelligence ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, this looks very familiar. I believe that I had 
access to this or a similar document and used it as the basis of a memo- 
randum for the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief of 
WPD to keep them informed as to where the Navy thought the bulk 
of the Japanese naval forces were located. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Colonel, I have here a whole series of these Top 
Secret messages, or copies of them rather, and I just want to get in 
the record whether you knew of these at the time. They are Army 
Nos. 23570, 23631, 23673, 23859, 24373, 24655, 24656, 24878, 25138, 25344, 
25390, 25392, 25432, 25435, 25441, 25445, 25446, 25496. 25497, 25548, 
25554, 25605, 25644, 25659, 25715, 25725, 25727, "25730, 25731, 25762, 
25773, 25783, 25785, 25807, 25817, 25823, 25843, 25850. Have you seen 
these communications? 

Col. Bratton. Yes I have seen all of these communications before. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 17 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Calling your attention to this No. 25432, after you 
received that did you make some arrangements for listening for 
broadcasts ? 

Col, Bratton. Yes, I did, through Col. Sadtler, then in the office 
of the Chief Signal Officer, who put me in touch with an official of 
the FCC, a Mr. Sterling, I believe. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever receive, prior to Pearl Harbor, word 
from the FCC that such a code message had been put out by the 
Japanese ? 

Col. Bratton. I did not, though I was in daily telephone com- 
munication with Mr. Sterling or his assistant in connection with this 
matter. Their understanding w\as that immediately upon [11~\ 
receipt of any such message I was to be informed by telephone, day or 
night. They had my office phone number and my house phone num- 
ber. I did get from them on one or two occasions messages resem- 
bling the Wind Code, but which upon examination proved to be not in 
that code. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did the Navy ever give you any information of any 
such code message being put out ? 

Col. Bratton. No, although I did discuss with them certain code 
messages that had been received which resembled the expected Wind 
Code messages. 

Col. Clarke. Did Col. Sadtler ever tell you that it was in ? 

Col. Bratton. I cannot rmember that he did. I have a vague recol- 
lection of a conversation with him about a code message indicating 
a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain. This, how- 
ever, was beside the point. Such a break had been expected by all 
of us for some time. The code message we were waiting for was one 
indicating a break between Japan and the U. S. It never came 
through that I know of. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of any message being sent by G-2 
to the 14th Naval District to check up on some such alleged message 
prior to Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. Bratton. No, I do know, however, that Gen. Miles sent a mes- 
sage to Gen. Short, or to Gen. Short's G-2 directing him to get in 
touch with Commander Rochefort of the Navy with respect to this 
type of message as the Navy was completely aware of all the facts 
in the case. ^ 

Col, Clarke. Well that message actually went to G-2 in Hawaii. 

Lt. CoL. Gibson. I show you No, 25138 and ask what your evalua- 
tion of that message was, if you remember. 

Col, Bratton. My evaluation of this message at the time I read it 
was that Japan intended taking military and/or naval action in the 
Pacific on or after the dates indicated. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. And was that evaluation given by you to Gen. 
Miles? 

Col. Bratton. I believe so. I remember that during this period 
Gen. Miles and I discussed at some length the meaning or implication 
of each and all of these messages. 

[i^] Lt. Col. Gibson. Was that true also of you and the Chief 
of Staff? 

Col. Bratton. Not in every case, 

79716—46 — Ex. 147 3 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you recollect whether it was true or not in this 
particular case, referring to No. 25138? 

Col. Bratton. I don't remember definitely. I am under the im- 
pression that I discussed this particular message both with Gen. 
Miles and Gen. Marshall, and Gen. Gerow. 

It. Col. Gibson. Would you say the same is true of message No. 
25644? 

Col. Bratton. No, but I can state that all three of the officers just 
mentioned were given copies of this in the present form. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Also on No. 25390. What interpretation or evalu- 
ation did you place on that particular message? 

Col. Bratton. I at this time do not recall the evaluation I gave that 
message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I call your attention also to No, 25554 and 25555. 
What was your interpretation of this message? Particularly I call 
your attention to the last sentence thereof. 

Col. Bratton. This message, as is indicated in the text thereof, is 
an effort on the part of the Japanese Government to inform their 
diplomatic representative in Germany as to Japanese inability to suc- 
cessfully negotiate a pact with the United States and is an expression 
of the opinion of the Japanese Government that the United States was 
and would be allied with England, Australia, the Netherlands and 
China against Japan. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you at this time. Colonel, consider it a capa- 
bility of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. Many of us considered and discussed the feasi- 
bility of such an attack — an attack on our West Coast, an attack on 
Alaska, an attack on the Canal Zone, an attack on Hawaii and other 
Pacific installations of ours, the Dutch or the British governments. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. From a reading of these messages at that time did 
you come to the conclusion that the Japs were about to undertake an 
attack on some of the United States installations? 

Col. Bratton. It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of 
some such attack. It was also apparent that the Japanese immediate 
major objective would be the British and Dutch [13] posses- 
sions in the west Pacific. I believed at that time that any attack on 
any American installation would be in the nature of a diversion or 
have for its purpose the prevention of our going to the assistance of 
the Dutch or British. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Had you talked that thought over with Gen. Miles ? 

Col. Bratton. I did. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. General Kroner? 

Col. Bratton. As to Gen. Kroner, my memory is faulty, but I dis- 
cussed this feature on many occasions with Gen. Miles, with Gen. 
Gerow and with the Chief of Staff when asked my opinion in the 
matter. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you inform the Chief of Staff that it was a 
capability of the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Bratton. In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of 
Staff over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always 
been listed as one of the Japanese capabilities against us. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I notice in the estimate dated 29 November 1941 
that the capability of the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't included. 
1 wonder how that happened, if you have any recollection of it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 19 

Col. Bratton. In reply to that I can only say that those of us in the 
Army who were studying this situation always listed, mentally at 
least, an attack on Hawaii as a capability, but in our discussions of 
the situation with our counterparts in the Navy it was always em- 
phasized by the latter that their forces in the Pacific were alert and so 
stationed as to make such a Japanese attack impracticable or suicidal, 
and we therefore relegated such an attack to the realm of remote possi- 
bility. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. At that time did you feel that there was a fairly 
reasonable probability that Japan was going to attack the United 
States in the reasonably near future, I mean at the last of November or 
the first of December 1941? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, and I had felt for some time — that is over a 
period of several years — that war between Japan and the United States 
was inevitable. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Had you so informed Gen. Miles and the Chief of 
Staff [14] that you, in the last of November or first of Decem- 
ber 1941, felt it was probable that the Japs were going to attack the 
United States in the near future? 

Col. Bration. Not in that form, but I repeatedly expressed the 
opinion to my superiors that Japan intended to take some form of 
aggressive action which would involve her in a war with us. 

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one question here before we get 
these people back. On the morning of December 7 when you got the 
famous message that they were going to deliver their note at one 
o'clocji, will you recount briefly the actions which you took with refer- 
ence to that message and also the actions of Gen. Miles and Gen. 
Marshall? 

Col. Bratton. Will you permit me to refer to a memorandum which 
I made at the time for the record ? 

Col. Clarke. Sure. 

Col. Bratton. The message in question, that is the deciphered mes- 
sage in question, was delivered to me from the Navy sometime between 
0830 and 9000 that morning. It was immediately apparent that it 
was of such importance that it had to be communicated to the Chief 
of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief , WPD with the least prac- 
ticable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time. 
I called Gen. Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that 
he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and 
find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as 
practicable as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then 
called Gen. Miles and reported the step that I had taken to him and 
recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remem- 
ber whether I called Gen. Gerow or whether Gen. Miles called him, but 
we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it and I don't 
remember now which of us did, but in any event Gen. Gerow was sum- 
moned to the office. I waited for the telephone call from Gen. Mar- 
shall, which I received some time between ten and eleven. I informed 
him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see 
at once and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so de- 
sired. He said to report to him in his office as he was on his way there. 
1 reported to him in his office at about 1125 immediately upon his 
arrival. Shortly thereafter Gen. Miles arrived. The message was 
laid before Gen. Marshall and discussed. We were all asked by the 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief of staff for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or sig- 
nificance of the message, in connection with [15] the lengthy 
Japanese ultimatum which the Chief of Staff had on his desk and read 
aloud to us at this time. Gen. Miles and I stated that we believed 
there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the 
reply, one p. m., an indication that some military action would be 
undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable 
that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it 
might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. Gen. Miles 
urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be 
informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be deliver"^ at 
one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the com- 
manders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert. 

Part II 

Place : Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 15 September 1944. 

Time: 1130-1200 and 1340-1455. 

Present : 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

[JS] Col. Bratton. General Marshall then called Adm. Stark 
on the telephone and told him over the phone that he thought we should 
send out a warning as indicated above. After Adm. Stark replied. 
Gen. Marshall put down the telephone and stated that the Admiral 
did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had 
already been several times alerted. Gen. Miles and I nevertheless 
urged Gen. Marshall to send the warnings. Gen. Marshall then wrote 
out in pencil the warning message. There was some discussion at this 
time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included. 
Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and read to him 
the message he had just written out. Adm. Stark apparently con- 
curred and asked that the naval forces be also informed. Gen. Mar- 
shall added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled warn- 
ing. At about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. Gen. 
Marshall again asked us, in succession beginning with Gen. Miles, our 
opinion as to the significance of the Japanase message. Gen. Miles 
said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the 
timing had some significance and that warning messages to our people 
should be sent. Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and I concurred. Gen. 
Marshall then gave me the message in his handwriting and instructed 
me to take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal. As 
I was about to go out of the door there was some discussion as to 
whether it should go to Gen. Gerow's office for typing first, but it was 
decided that as time was an important factor, I was to take it in its 
draft form to the Message Center. As I left the room Gen. Gerow 
made a statement to the effect that if there was any question of priority 
involved, to give first priority to the Philippines. I took the message 
to Col. French, the Signal Corps officer in charge of the Message 
Center, explained to him that it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the 
message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe 
means, giving the Philippines first priority. Col. French said that 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 21 

he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message 
would commence immediately. I then returned to the office of the 
Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would 
take for the delivery of the [17] message to the addressees. 
I returned to the Message Center and talked the matter over with Col. 
French who informed me that the messages would be encoded in about 
three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of 
the addressees in about 30 minutes. I looked at my watch at this time 
and saw that it was 1150 a. m. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office 
and reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had 
been given me by Col. French. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did this reply from Japan (No. 25843) start com- 
ing in on the 6th of December, do you have any recollection as to that ? 

Col. Bratton. I believe that the message started coming in to the 
Navy on the 6th. My recollection is that I transmitted a copy to the 
Secretary of State that night. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Had you conferred with Gen. Miles or the Chief of 
Staff previously as to when the Japanese reply might be expected? 

Col. Bratton. We knew that some such message was coming. We 
of course had no way of telling when it would be forthcoming ; it might 
have been a question of hours, it might be a question of days. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Calling your attention to message No. 25445, which 
apparently was received by you the 28th or 29th of November, you 
then had some knowledge that a reply might be expected within two or 
three days from that time. Is that correct ? 

Col. Bratton. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Anyway, the first thing you did when you got the 
message on December 7 was to phone Gen. Marshall? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, I called Gen. Marshall at his quarters. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I call your attention to the message sent to the G-2, 
Hawaiian Department on 5 December, signed Miles, requesting that 
Commander Rochefort, 14th Naval District, be contacted regarding 
broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. How was it that this tele- 
gram happened to be sent ? 

Col. Bratton. When we received the Japanese message concerning 
the code to be used in weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with 
my opposite number in the Navy, Commander McCullom, and his 
assistant, Lt. Kramer. They informed me that Commander Rochefort 
was their man in Hawaii, that he had [18] all the information 
that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he could explain 
in detail to the commanding general or his G-2 the significance of the 
code and suggested that I have oair G-2 in Hawaii get in touch with 
Commander Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In 
other words, we could get the desired information to the commanding 
general in Hawaii or his G-2 much faster and in much greater detail 
and with far greater security than by means of a long and involved ex- 
planatory message which we would have been forced to send through 
the Army communication system. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I want to refer to this so-called Winds message. 
Did Col. Otis K. Sadtler of the Signal Corps ever, prior to Pearl 
Harbor, notify you that the Japanese'had implemented the Wind Code 
by broadcasting a message in accordance with that code ? 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Bratton. As I have stated before, I cannot remember that he 
did, although I believe he did speak about one indicating a break be- 
tween Japan and Great Britain. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know a naval officer by the name of Kramer 
who at the tune of Early December 1941 was an assistant to Com- 
mander McCuUom of ONI particularly being interested in communica- 
tions work? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, I knew him well and was in constant communi- 
cation with him at this time both orally, in person and by telephone. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did Lt. Kramer at this time ever notify you that 
the Navy had been advised by the FCC that a so-called Winds message 
had been intercepted by the FCC monitoring station ? 

Col. Bratton. No. We discussed on one or two occasions messages 
resembling those in the Wind Code but as far as I know no actual Wind 
Code message ever came through prior to Pearl Harbor. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you a copy of a cable sent 27 November to 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept., containing instructions of how 
to act in case hostilities between Japan and the United States occur 
and notifying him that negotiations with Japan appear to be termi- 
nated. Did you know of such a cable being sent ? 

Col. Bratton. Not prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, I 
have seen a copy of the message since that date. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show yooi now paraphrase of a cable dated Novem- 
ber 27, [19] 1941 sent to the G-2's of corps areas, Caribbean 
Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, signed Miles. Did you 
know of that being sent ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, I did know of this message and was shown a 
copy of it on or about the date of dispatch. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you ever see any reply 
from Gen. Short to that message ? 

Col. Bratton. No, prior to Pearl Harbor I have never seen any reply 
from Gen. Short to any of these messages. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of the sending of this message to the 
Adjutant General of November 28 warning your corps area and over- 
seas department commanders? 

Col. Bratton. Yes I knew of this message. I am under the im- 
pression that I was shown a copy of it on or about the date of its dis- 
patch. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. You had nothing to do with the sending of either 
that message or the other message G-2 sent out of November 27 ? 

Col. Bratton. I did not. My recollection is that they were both 
drafted in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2 or that of his executive. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I now show you a copy of a telegram from Mel- 
bourne, Australia via Honolulu to the War Department and Command- 
ing General, Hawaiian Department, date of sending of the message 
the 6th, date received December 7, 7 : 50 p.m. Do you recall seeing 
such a message? 

Col. Bhatton. I can make no positive statement in reply to that ques- 
tion. The message, however, looks vaguely familiar. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you have any of the information contained in 
this particular message prior to one o'clock the afternoon of 7 Decem- 
ber 1941 ? 

Col. Bratton. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 23 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you an MID form, subject: Information 
received from the Orient, dated 3 November 1941, which is information 
purporting to come from a Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at a directors 
meeting of the Black Dragon Society. I ask if you remember receiving 
this information approximately at that time or shortly before. 

[20] Col. Bratton. I do not recall ever having seen this docu- 
ment, nor can I recall being advised as to its subject matter. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Information such as that, in the ordinary course 
of routine back in the summer and fall of 1941, would be routed through 
you as an ordinary matter, would it Col. Bratton ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, if this is a report from the Counter Intelligence 
Branch, which I believe it to be, I received information of this nature 
from the Chief of that Brance as a matter of routine. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I call your attention to a report of the headquarters, 
Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941, subject : Report of Rumors 
Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii. This report is signed by 
Philip L. Thurber, Colonel, GSC. First I ask if you have any Tecol- 
lection of this particular report. 

Col. Bratton. I have never seen this document before. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. The document last referred to of Headquarters, 
Third Corps Area, of December 18, 1941, on Rumors Concerning Jap- 
anese Attack on Hawaii, states in substance that Senator Gillette at 
Washington warned officials what was going to happen, stating to 
officials that Japan would declare war on the United States December 
19 and would attack Hawaii. This information was alleged to have 
been conveyed about 3 weeks prior to December 18. Did you ever re- 
ceive such information from Senator Gillette or from any other source ? 

Col. Bratton. I did not. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you copy of a secret radiogram dated 7 July 
1941 sent to Commanding Generals of the Caribbean Defense Com- 
mand, Philippine Department, Hawaiian Department, Fourth Army, 
which in substance was an estimate of the Jap probable course in the 
near future, and ask if you are familiar with that radiogram. 

Col. Bratton. I do not recall having seen this message prior to or 
on the date of its dispatch. However from its context I assume that 
it was based upon an estimate prepared either in my office or at my 
direction by one of my assistants as it expresses the views we enter- 
tained at that time. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you a copy of a radio message dated Oct. 
27, 1941 from Manila, P. I. to MILID, signed Brink, relative to move- 
ment of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific and ask if you saw that 
message at or about that time. 

Col. Bratton. I can make no positive statement in reply to that 
question, [21] but the message looks familiar to me. I have 
seen this or one like it containing similar information. 

Lt, Col. Gibson. I show you a copy of a radiogram dated October 
29, 1941 from Manila to MILID, signed Evans, relative to the move- 
ment of Jap aircraft carriers and other seacraft. I ask if you had 
knowledge of that message at or about that time. 

Col. Bratton. This message also looks familiar. I would like to 
say at this time that during this period messages of this type came over 
my desk in considerable volume as all of our military attaches, ob- 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

servers and agents were under instructions to assist us in following 
the movements of Japanese naval craft and land forces. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you a copy of a paraphrase of secret mes- 
sage dated November 29, 1941, No. 986, from Ft. Shafter to TAG, 
signed Short, which answers secret radiogram No. 4820 of November 
28, 1941, and gives other data relative to the sabotage situation in 
Hawaii. I ask if you had ever seen that message prior to December 
7, 1941. 

Col. Bratton. No. I have not seen this message before. As the 
subject matter deals largely with counter espionage and counter sab- 
otage measures the message would not, in the ordinary course of events, 
have come over my desk but rather over the desk of the Chief of the 
Counter Intelligence Branch. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you now copies of 5 radiograms sent from 
Tokyo to MILID, those of July 12, July 14, July 23, 11 : 32 p. m. and 
July 27 being signed Creswell, and the one of July 23, 3 : 21 p. m. 
being signed Orear. I ask if you have recollection of seeing those 
cablegrams at about that time. 

Col. Bratton. Yes, all of these messages passed over my desk on or 
about the date of their arrival in MID. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Earlier I asked you about a brief periodic estimate 
of the situation December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942, dated 29 Novem- 
ber 1941, for the Chief of Staff. I now call your attention to a mem- 
orandum for the Chief of Staff entitled : Supplementary Brief Period 
Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942, dated 
December 5, 1941. What occasioned issuing a supplementary report 
as soon after the November 29th report, if you recall. 

Col. Bratton. I do not recall what the occasion was which de- 
manded [22] the issuance of this supplementary estimate, but 
I believe that, as is stated in paragraph 1, the supplemental estimate 
is arranged in a form more suitable for the Operations Division for 
use in planning. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did this supplemental report of December 5 cor- 
rectly represent your evaluation of the Japanese situation at that 
time? 

Col. Bratton. It did. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you now copies of memorandums for the 
Chief of Staff of November 25, 26 and 27 dealing with the Far 
Eastern situation, Japanese Naval Task Force and Recent Develop- 
ments in the Far East, respectively. Those reports correctly repre- 
sent your evaluation of the various situations as outlined therein, did 
they? 

Col. Bratton. They did. I wrote them. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I also call your attention to an undated mem- 
orandum of November 1941 for the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, 
on the subject of G-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation (for 
situation and communication maps) with tabs b, c, and d. Did this 
at that time correctly represent your evaluation of the facts ? 

Col. Bratton. It did. I wrote it. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you actually have any knowledge yourself as 
of early December 1941 of exactly what of our naval forces were at 
Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Bratton. Only in a general way. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 25 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know at that time that the Navy, or a 
substantial part of it was tying up for weekends at Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Bratfon. I did not and had I been in possession of that 
knowledge I would have urged, through the A. C. of S., G-2, that im- 
mediate action be taken to prevent such an assemblage in the Harbor. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. At about this time, the first week of December 
1941, had you heard from any source that the Fleet was ordered to 
stay in Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Bratton. No. I was under the impression, gained from con- 
versations [2-3] with my opposite number in ONI that the 
Fleet in Hawaiian waters had been alerted and all components were 
at their battle stations. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I wish to say in asking this question that I don't 
have any knowledge that it had been ordered to stay in harbor; I 
had heard rumors of that, and that is the reason I asked the question. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. At that time, the first week of December 1941, 
were you under the impression that extensive air reconnaissance was 
being maintained from Hawaii ? 

Col. Bratton. I was under that impression. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. These estimates of the situation or summaries of 
the situation that I have referred to, do you know what their actual 
dissemination was? 

Col. Bratton. I believe that in each case you will find at the bottom 
or lower left hand corner of the last page a distribution list which 
indicates to whom the carbon copies were routed. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you have any recollection on the morning of 
December 7 at what time it was that you received the intercept mes- 
sage which in effect instructed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver 
Tokyo's reply to the Secretary of State if possible at one o'clock 
in the afternoon ? 

Col. Bratton. I received a copy of this intercept from the Navy 
at about 9 a. m. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Could you say you i-eceived it at about the same 
time as you received the reply itself ? 

Col. Bratton. No. The reply itself was received the day before. 
It was a very long one and took considerable time to decipher and 
typewrite. It came to me as fast as the various sections could be 
typed. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Col. Bratton, if on or about December 5, or at 
any time prior to an attack on Pearl Harbor you had been informed 
that the Japanese had broadcast a code message which implemented 
message No. 25432, which was the Winds Code message, and had 
been advised that such message, decoded, in substance meant U. S.- 
Japanese relations are in danger of being ruptured and their con- 
sulates were to burn their codes, what would have been your evalua- 
tion and action? 

[24] Col. Bratton. My evaluation would have been that Japan 
would immediately sever diplomatic relations with the United States 
and that hostilities against our country would ensue forthwith. Had 
I received such a report I would have taken immediate and vigorous 
action, through the. A. C. of S.. G-2, to see that the proper officials 
were alerted and warned to be on guard against any and all eventual- 
ities. 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Will you once more describe in detail how this Top 
Secret material was handled between 1 October 1941 and the time of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Bratton. It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence 
Service by hand of an officer to my office. I read all of the material, 
screening out that which had intelligence value. The other material 
I then burned. Indeed much that was daily brought in to me did not 
have intelligence value but was merely routine and administrative 
in nature. The screened material was then arranged by me in sep- 
arate piles, one for the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one 
for the A. C. of S., G-2, one for the Secretary of State, and one for the 
Chief of War Plans Division. I then bound each pile in a cardboard 
folder, inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked 
each dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at 
that time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags 
were brought back by me to my office, opened and the material therein 
checked prior to destruction by burning. 

Lt. Col. GiBSO^sr. It is also your recollection that it was shortly 
before Pearl Harbor that copies of this Top Secret material were to go 
also to Gen. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground 
Forces, and it was so delivered to him by officer messenger daily for a 
short time prior to Pearl Harbor and a short time after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Bratton. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you a memorandum dated 6 December 
signed by James F. Perry and ask if you ever had that called to your 
attention at that time. 

Col. Bratton. No I have never seen this paper before. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was any of the information contained in that 
paper ever relayed to you as you recollect at that time? 

[£5] Col. Br.\tton. Not that I recall. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you ever notified by anybody from the Navy 
that the Navy had intercepted a message which was an implementation 
of the Winds Code prior to Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. Bratton. No, and by Winds Code I mean that phrase which 
would indicate a rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and 
the United States. My recollection is that Lt. Kramer and Com- 
mander McCullom had received what appeared to be garbles of varia- 
tions of this Winds Codes message on one or two occasions, but to the 
best of my knowledge and belief no clear cut Winds Code message 
was received prior to Pearl Harbor indicating that relations between 
Japan and the United States or Japan and Great Britain or Japan 
and Russia had been or were about to be severed. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did Commander McCullom ever tell you of draft- 
ing a warning message of several hundred words long warning the 
commanders in the Pacific area that war was imminent and that such 
message was not sent out because his superiors deemed it unnecessary? 

Col. Bratton. No, this is the first I have heard of this matter. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Colonel, to make sure to tie in all loose ends, let 
me ask you this. All of the Top Secret material that you have here 
identified the carrying dates of translation between October 1 and in- 
stant of Pearl Harbor and which are in this case Exhibit 1, were 
delivered by you or an officer working for you to the Chief of Staff, 
Secretary of War, Chief of War Plans Division, A. C. of S., G-2 and 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 27 

the Department of State, were they not ? And delivered at times rela- 
tively close to the date of the translation thereof as shown on the 
bottom of each Top Secret document ? 
Col. Bratton. That is correct. 

[^6] Part III 

Place : Eoom 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 20 September 1944 

Time: 1500-1600 

Present : 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson 

Col. Bratton. I have a statement to make and I request that it be 
made a part of the record of this investigation. The allegation has 
been made, in the press and elsewhere in connection with the disaster 
at Pearl Harbor, that if G-2 had been "on the job" we would not have 
been caught so unprepared for our war with Japan. In point of fact, 
G-2 in general and the Far Eastern Section in particular were very 
much "on the job," as evidenced by the written record of Estimates, 
Staff Studies, Memoranda, etc. with which G-2 served the Chief of 
Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2, WPD, ONI, the State Department and other 
interested planning and policy making agencies of the Government, 
to warn them of the increasing menace of Japanese war potential and 
intentions. G-2 can stand on this record and needs no defense from 
me. I feel, however, that a part of this record, as presented in the 
documents I now lay before you, should be taken cognizance of by this 
investigating committee and made a part of its proceedings if for no 
other reason than that the documents include some Top Secret papers 
heretofore known as Magic and many references to others. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do I understand. Col. Bratton, that many of the 
documents contained in the summaries now being introduced into this 
investigation, most of which were in the nature of Estimates of the 
Situation, contain conclusions based upon your knowledge of the 
material contained in the so-called Magic material? 

Col. Bratton. That is correct. The principal document I show you 
I secured from the G-2 files. It is labeled, "Summary of Far Eastern 
Documents." It came into being as a result of a letter from the Presi- 
dent to the Chief of Staff, dated July 14, 1943, in which the former 
requested copies of the dispatches of our military attaches which esti- 
mate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbabil- 
ity of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way to the estimates 
of potential military strength of any of the countries involved. The 
countries which [^7] concerned the President were Germany, 
Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England 
and Russia. He indicated his interest in dispatches from January 1, 
1937 until such time as our military attaches left the first seven named 
countries ; his interest in similar dispatches from England dated from 
January 1, 1937 to the outbreak of the war in September 1939 ; and his 
interest in dispatches bearing on this subject from Russia from January 
1, 1937 until the present time (that is, the time of his letter of July 
14. 1943). This letter of the President was transmitted to me by the 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

then A. C. of S., G-2, General Strong:, who instructed me to start work 
on a compilation of the desired documents. I was at that time the 
Chief of the Intelligence Branch, MIS, G-2. I detailed Col. Maguire to 
exercise general supervision over the assembly of European documents 
and Col. Pettigrew over the Far Eastern documents. As stated in the 
explanatory note which you will find on page 1 of the Summary of 
Far Eastern Documents, the yearlj^ summaries which follow on succes- 
sive pages are based on information contained in intelligence docu- 
ments consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, etc. The summary 
itself was written in a chronologically arranged narrative form sup- 
ported by photostats of the original documents in the files of G-2. It 
was arranged in this way to facilitate the use of the document by his- 
torical researchers. The European summaries were similarly com- 
piled and supported by photostats of the original documents. All 
summaries were transmitted to the Chief of Staff by a covering memo- 
randum signed by the A. C. of S., G-2, General Strong, 20 August 
1943. With the covering memorandum was transmitted a memoran- 
dum for the President, subject : Axis War Potential, for the signature 
of the Chief of Staff, which read as follows : 

There are forwarded herewith, in accordance with the request of the President 
dated July 14, 1943, copies of numerous Military Attache dispatches, memoranda, 
estimates and handboolis dealing with the preparations foor war by Germany, 
Italy and Japan, and their aggressive intentions on the continents of Europe 
and Asia from January 1, 1937. Similar documents bearing on Bulgaria, Austria, 
Occupied France, Belgium, England, and Russia are also included. 

These photostatic, carbon, or "true" copies [28] of Gr-2 dispatches, mem- 
oranda, etc., have been arranged in chronological order for each of the above- 
named countries. To assist the White House Secretariat in studying this mate- 
rial, a brief summary of the contents of each tile has been prepared by G-2 and 
these summaries have also been arranged in chronological order in two volumes. 
Far Eastern and European, enclosed herewith as Tabs A and B respectively. 

It has not been thought advisable to submit all documents on the subject of 
Axis war preparations to the White House. There are thousands of miscella- 
neous dispatches and other documents which touch incidentally on German, Ital- 
ian and Japanese war preparations, but which are only slightly germane to an 
historical analysis of the information possessed by G-2 on Axis preparations and 
aggressive intentions. 

Furthermore, as the President is aware, during the summer and fall of 1941. 
G-2 secured from highly secret sources considerable information indicating 
Japan's determination to resort to armed force in the event that the negotiations 
between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, then being conducted, did not 
result in an agreement satisfactory to Japan. It is presumed that the President 
does not desire to have documents from this source included in this compilation 
because of the danger to security involved. 

Great care has been taken by G-2 to include in this compilation copies of mis- 
estimates by Military Attaches or other persons as regards strength and inten- 
tions. A few such mis-estimates actually occurred, but on the whole, false con- 
clusions were rare and pertained not so much to the strength and ultimate 
aggressive intentions of the Axis as they did to the timing of the aggression. 

In the case of the document collection pertaining to Germany, a few very im- 
portant dispatches have been included dealing with the period 1935-1936. inas- 
much as these were the years of the largest and most rapid military expansion. 

It is thought probable that, after the White House Secretariat commences to 
study these documents, it will feel the need for examining still further [29] 
dispatches on matters correlated to the Axis rearmament program. They can 
be promptly furnished by G-2 in case they are desired. 

Col. Bratton. On August 26, 1943, the A. C. of S., G-2 received a 
memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, which read as follows : 

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much 
material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised 
to contain only MA reports. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 29 

This memorandum and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Docu- 
ments, were given to me by Gen. Strong at approximately 2 : 00 p. m. 
26 August 1943, with instructions to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, 
the Summary of European Documents, although prepared in the same 
manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates by G-2, Staff Studies, 
memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence, was not re- 
turned to Gen. Strong. I inferred that it would be forwarded to the 
President as compiled and that Tab A was to contain only raw, un- 
evaluated military attache reports. I instructed the Chief, Far East- 
ern Unit, to revise Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sex- 
ton's memorandum. At about 2 : 45 p. m. 26 August 1943, Gen. Strong 
directed me to include military observer reports with military attache 
reports in Tab A. The revised Tab A, revised as directed in memoran- 
dum from the Secretary, General Staff, dated 26 August 1943, was 
forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 1 September 1943. The Summary 
as then written and its supporting file of 15 volumes were based only 
upon reports received from military attaches and military observers. 
The Summary of Far Eastern Documents which went forward to the 
President did not contain any references to Magic or any summaries, 
estimates or Staff Studies based thereon wholly or in part. It is to 
the first edition or unrevised Summary of Far Eastern Documents 
that I wish to call the attention of this committee. 

It will be noted that many of the documents have a "distribution 
list" written or printed on the document itself indicating the offices 
or officers to whom copies were given. Where no "distribution list" 
appears it may be assumed that the War Plans Division was given a 
copy, as was the Office of Naval Intelligence, as that was our standard 
operating procedure. The State Department was given copies when 
the subject matter would be of interest to that department. Occa- 
sionally, when considered of sufficient importance, copies went to the 
President. 

[30] TOP SECRET 

Part IV 

Place : Eoom 20637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 23 September 1944. 

Time : 0950-1005. 

Present : 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. CoL E. W. Gibson. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Colonel, while you were testifying about this meet- 
ing in the office of General Marshall on Sunday morning, 7 December 
1941, you were using a memorandum to refresh your recollection. 
When was that memorandum prepared and by whom ? 

Col. Bratton. On or about the 8th of December 1941, by General 
Miles with my help. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Is the above paper a true copy of that memoran- 
dum ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I want to get a few more details about this Sunday 
morning meeting. After your telephone conversation with General 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Marshall in which he tojcl you to meet him at his (General Marshall's) 
office and that he was on his way there, what did you do ? 

Col. Bratton. I called General Miles on the telephone and reported 
to him the gist of my conversation with General Marshall and recom- 
mended to General Miles that he come to the office too as General 
Marshall would no doubt want to see him also. Either General Miles 
or I, I have forgotten which, then called General Gerow and asked 
him to come to the office also as we felt General Marshall would wish 
to see him also. I then proceeded to General Marshall's office and 
waited for him either in the anteroom, that is, the office of the Secre- 
tary of the General Staff, or in the hallway where I could see the 
Chief of Staff immediately upon his arrival on that floor. My recol- 
lection is that General Marshall and General Miles arrived at about 
the same time and that I followed the two of them into the latter's 
office, carrying a copy of the message I wished him to see. 

[SI] Lt. Col. Gibson. Was that message the message of instruc- 
tions to the Japanese Ambassadors to deliver the Japanese reply to the 
Department of State at one p. m. Washington time ? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I want to ask another question to clear up another 
point. Wlien, to the best of your recollection, was the Japanese reply, 
Top. Secret Army No. 26843, delivered to General Marshall's office? 

Col. Bratton. Either on the night of 6 December or early in the 
morning of the 7th, prior to his arrival at his office. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. When you walked into General Marshall's office, 
following General Marshall and General Miles, on the morning of 
7 December, what did you do ? 

Col. Bratton. I handed him the message referring to the time of 
delivery to the Secretary of State of the Japanese long reply. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did he read it that time or did he read the long 
Japanese reply first, as far as you recollect? 

Col. Bratton. As far as I recollect, he read the message that I 
handed to him first, then read the long reply. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Colonel, is it possible that the second telephone 
conversation on that Sunday morning between General Marshall and 
Admiral Stark was as a result of Admiral Stark's calling General 
Marshall, rather than General Marshall calling Admiral Stark? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, it is quite possible. 

Lt. Col. Gibson, Did you make two or three trips to the message 
center with the message penciled by General Marshall on that fore- 
noon of 7 December ? 

Col. Bratton. I made only two trips to the message center, carrying 
General Marshall's penciled memorandum with me for delivery to the 
officer in charge of the message center on the first trip. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did Colonel Bundy go with you on either trip to 
the message center on that Sunday morning? 

Col. Bratton. He did not. 

[321 Lt. Col. Gibson. This 11 : 25 a. m. when you first saw Gen- 
eral Marshall on that Sunday morning, that time is the time as you and 
General Miles recalled it when you drew up this Memorandum for the 
Record, is it not? 

Col. Bratton. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 31 

TESTIMONY OF COL. EDWARD F. FRENCH 

[1] Place : Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 28 September 1944. 

Time: 1015-1045. 

Present : 

Colonel Carter W. Clarke. t 

Colonel Edward F. French. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Edward F. French, having been sworn and warned of his 
rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testi- 
mony : 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Will you state your name, rank and serial number 
and present position, please. 

Col. French. Colonel Edward F. French, 08935, officer in charge 
of Traffic Operation Branch, Army Communications Service, Office 
Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you on duty in the War Department in 
Washington in that position the first week of December 1941 ? 

Col. French. I was. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. As such, did you have immediate supervision over 
the War Department message center ? 

Col. French. I did. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you now telegram dated 5 December 1941 
signed Miles, addressed to Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters 
G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and ask 
if this telegram passed through your message center for delivery to 
the addressee on that particular day. 

Col. French. This message was received in the code section of the 
War Department message center at 11 : 47 a. m. on the 5th of December 
1941, as indicated by the stamp on the reverse side. This message 
was given a code serial number of 519 and its transmission evidenced 
by the "Sent No. 519 12-5," as typed on the face of the message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was that typed by the message center, that par- 
ticular typing ? 

[2] Col. French. No. This clear text message never left the 
code room but that numbeir and date was typed on there after the 
return of the coded copy of the coded text itself from the Signal 
Center. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Who actually did the typing of the words "Sent 
No. 519 12-5"? 

Col. French. That was typed on there by a clerk in the code room 
after the return of the message from the Signal Center. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. After the message had actually been sent? 

Col. French. After the message had actually been received by the 
Signal Center for transmission. Then this copy, as provided for 
under the routine, was returned to G-2. We do not keep any copies 
of the original texts in our office; they were returned to the writer 
within 24 hours. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Will you explain the routine that then existed 
between Hawaii and the War Department which was set up to insure 
that all messages sent were received ? 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. French. To assure that all messages were received, we had a 
separate set of serial numbers that was utilized to identify the classi- 
fied message. These numbers were assigned in sequence and were 
frequently checked to assure that the message assigned that number 
reached its destination. In some instances messages have been de- 
layed in transmission or in office routine so that a message would be 
received in a code room out of sequence. In such instances a service 
message would be instituted to check for the message not in sequence 
that was evidently delayed or possibly lost. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. In other words, Colonel, if message No. 519, being 
the telegram in question in this investigation, had not been received 
by Hawaii, what would have happened? 

Col. French. In checking their numbers off in Hawaii, when 
Hawaii would receive No. 520 and No. 419 did not appear in a reason- 
able time, they would query the War Department message center 
relative to No. 519, and the War Department message center would 
check the files, verify its transmission and repeat the message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you believe this message No. 519 on 5 December 
1941 went by cable or by radio? 

[3] Col. French. I believe that that message went via radio 
as it was a "routine" message and our normal transmitting would be 
via radio. In the event that our radio was out of service, due to 
atmospheric conditions, the message would have been transmitted 
via cable. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Your records of messages sent in December 1941 
were kept for how long ? 

Col. French. As I recall it, at the time it was 6 months. However, 
the regulations have since been changed and the messages are now 
retained for a period of 3 months. The War Department code room 
is not an office of records, under the provisions of Army regulations. 
All records pertaining to classified messages rest with the office of 
origin. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Then as far as you know the Signal Corps have 
no existing records in Washington that would show any more about 
the fate of message No. 519 of 5 December 1941 ? 

Col. French. The only actual record of this message is as indicated 
on the message itself. The files of the coded text have all been de- 
stroyed by burning, as provided for in Army regulations. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I want to go to the morning of 7 December 1941. 
Were you on duty in the message center on that morning ? 

Col. French. I placed myself on duty on Sunday morning, 7 
December. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you there when Colonel RuJ^s Bratton 
brought a penciled message to the message center ? 

Col. French. I was in my office across the hall from the code room 
when Colonel Bratton came to the code room with a message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Will you tell us noAv what took place at that time. 

Col. French. I heard some commotion over in the code room and 
I immediately left my desk and on arrival there I found Col. Bratton 
with a message that he was anxious to have processed for immediate 
transmission. I asked Colonel Bratton if I could be of any assistance 
to him and he said he was anxious to get this message processed 
[4] immediately. The message, as I recall, was written in pencil 
on a slip of paper. It was rather difficult to read so I told Colonel 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 33 

Bratton it would be necessary to type the message and have him 
verify. The message was typed and Colonel Bratton verified and 
authenticated the message. We immediately processed this message 
into a code system and after the work was under way I went into 
the Signal Center to check and determine the method of transmission. 
I found that our channel at Honolulu was out, due to atmospheric 
conditions, from about 10 : 30 that morning. I had the operator 
check the channel to Honolulu and at that time Honolulu could not 
be heard. It was determined that Honolulu was working San Fran- 
cisco but the atmospheric condition was so bad that to transmit the 
message to San Francisco in a relay to Honolulu would mean that it 
would have to be sent at slow speed and then copied and retransmitted 
at San Francisco to Honolulu. I made up my mind that the quickest 
method of dispatch would be via commercial service and avoid the 
risk of any garbling or error in relaying the message via Army 
facilities through San Francisco. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. What did you know about the means of com- 
munication between RCA and Honolulu and Ft. Shafter? 

Col. French. Our normal method of transmitting a message, when 
atmospheric conditions prevent handling via radio, is to utilize com- 
mercial facilities that are available in the Signal Center. As this 
message could be handled directly to San Francisco via the Western 
Union and on a tube relay of this message to the RCA office in San 
Francisco, with that excellent dispatch, this method had been chosen. 
I had learned on Saturday, the day previous, that the RCA was 
installing a teletype circuit to the Department headquarters at Ft. 
Shafter, so I assumed that this would be the most expeditious means 
of getting that message with the least practicable delay to the De- 
partment headquarters. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. You have no personal knowledge, I assume, of 
actually what happened to the message when it got to Hawaii? 

Col. French. No. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did Colonel Bratton return to the message center 
a second time after he had been there the first time as you have 
described? 

[6] Col. French. Yes, I believe Colonel Bratton was in my 
office several times during that Sunday morning. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was he there a second time with reference to 
this particular message ? 

Col. French. As I recall, on my return to the code room from the 
Signal Center, I met Colonel Bratton at the code room door and 
he asked me how long it would take to get that message transmitted 
to Hawaii. I informed him that I thought it would be there within 
a half hour to 45 minutes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did Colonel Bundy ever at any time come that 
morning to your office with Colonel Bratton ? 

Col. French. I don't recall that Colonel Bundy came to my office 
with Colonel Bratton but I very definitely recall Colonel Bundy 
coming to my office that morning and spending some time with me 
there. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was that before or after this episode ? 

Col. French. After this episode. In fact. Colonel Bundy and I 
reviewed the action taken on certain messages. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 147—4 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Which messages were they that you reviewed the 
action taken on ? 

Col. French. Whatever messages were at that time being trans- 
mitted through the office. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN 
[i] Part I 

Place : Room 20G37 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 16 September 1944.^ 

Time: 1045-1115. 

Present : 

Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 
Mr. William F. Friedman. 

Mr. William F. Friedman, having been sworn and warned of his 
rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testi- 
mony : 

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name and official position in the 
U. S. Government. 

Mr. Friedman. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications 
Research, Signal Security Agency, Office Chief Signal Officer. 

Col. Clarke. What were your duties in this position during the six 
months period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Friedman. I was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelli- 
gence Service. I had just been retired from active duty as lieutenant 
colonel. Signal Reserve, in about April, I think it was the early part 
of April 1941, and was given an honorable discharge for permanent 
disability. I had been in Walter Reed hospital for some three or four 
months and was recovering from a nervous breakdown. 

Col. Clarke. In your position you were familiar with and had access 
to and had read all of the production of the Signal Intelligence Service ? 

Mr. Friedman. I had access to it. I didn't read it all because at that 
time, in my condition I was not able to carry on a full day's duty and 
had been assigned to other work by Col. Minkler who was then the 
Chief of SIS. 

Col. Clarke. Were you familiar with a message which was received 
on or about November 28 which later became known as the Winds 
message '( 

Mr. Friedman. Yes. 

Col. Clarke. I gave you this document and ask you to identify it. 

Mr. Friedman. I believe that I was familiar with it at the time. 

[^] Col. Clarke. Will you state what, to the best of your recol- 
lection, is the history of this message, with any implementing message 
which may have been received in connection with it. 

Mr. Friedman. My recollection is so hazy at the moment and I really 
was not in on the details of cryptanalytic operations at the time, so I 
would hesitate to make any statement about that. 

Col. Clarke. Could you refresh your memory by getting a log of 
SIS? 

Mr. Friedman. I think that would be possible. 

Col, Clarke. Do you know whether any implementing message on 
that was ever received ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 35 

Mr. Friedman. Not to my direct knowledge at the time. I only 
learned of it comparatively recently in talking with Col. Sadtler and 
Capt. Safford of the Navy. If I did know it at the time I have for- 
gotten it. 

Col. Clarke. Would you care to make any statement with reference 
to the arrangement which was then in existence where the N<ivy pro- 
cessed messages one day and the Army the next. Would that have 
contributed to the disaster where you had no continuity of study? 

Mr. Friedman. I don't believe that arrangement had any particu- 
lar affect on the situation. It was an arrangement that was worked 
out between Achn. Noyes* and Gen. Mauborgne, to have as fair a dis- 
tribution of work and credit in the results achieved as possible. 

Col. Clarke. The point I am making there though is, would the 
translators who worked on the same thing day in and out not have had 
this continuity of thought in mind if the same people had been working 
on it? 

Mr. Friedman. Of course the translators in both the Army and the 
Navy cryptanalytic sections were constantly engaged on the same sort 
of material. There was a full exchange of material and results. A 
message might be done one day by the Navy people and another mes- 
sage the next day by the Army people, so that they kept their hands 
in it together and they were keeping abreast of each other in the 
work. That of course was one of the aims of that arrangement. I, as a 
technician, think that it was a poor arrangement from a cryptanoiytic 
standpoint but from a practical standpoint, in trying to share the work 
on an equal basis and share credit perhaps, that is as good an arrange- 
ment as could be worked out, with two separate but cooperating organi- 
zations. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Just one question. You received from the FCC a 
document with three attachments, a letter dated August 18, 1944 hav- 
ing to do with the so-called Winds Message and possible implementa- 
tion thereof. Is that correct ? I show you this telegram. 

Mr. Friedman. The documents were not received directly by me from 
the FCC. I was given a copy by Capt. Safford of the Navy. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. And this is the document that I now have in my 
possession ? 

Mr. Friedman. That is right. 

Part II 

Place : Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date : 19 September 1944. 
Time: 1030-1200. 
Present : 

Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 
Mr. William F. Friedman. 
[4] Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you now have access to the Signal In- 
telligence Service records of the United States Army for the dates 
October through Pearl Harbor 1941 ? 
Mr. Friedman. I do. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. And have you searched those records to see what, 
if anything, was done about having Army signal stations monitor for 
the Japanese Winds Code message ? 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Friedman. I have examined the files which are extant and find 
that certain messages were sent and I can present copies of those which 
were found. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did the Army ask its stations to monitor for imple- 
mentations of the so-called Winds messages? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not specific Winds messages so far as I know, but 
a general directive was sent to all its monitoring stations on December 
2 directing that monitoring stations were to copy all Japanese plain 
text in addition to code text and that traffic be forwarded with the 
regular traffic. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was any other message sent in this regard after 
that? 

Mr. Friedman. On December 7 a message was sent to Signal officers 
at Manila, Ft. Shafter and Presidio of San Francisco directing that 
they were to send to the War Department by priority enciphered radio 
Japanese clear language messages all ending with the English word 
"stop," copied since November 27 and thereafter. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Is there any record showing that the Army Signal 
Service received prior to Pearl Harbor any message that implemented 
either of these Winds Codes ? 

Mr. Friedman. Not that I have been able to find so far. 

\_5] Lt. Col. Gibson. Have you made a diligent search from all 
possible sources available to you to see if the Army Signal Service, 
through its monitoring stations, ever received any executing message 
to these Winds messages? 

Mr. Friedman. I have made a diligent search but I will not say that 
it is a completely exhaustive search because of the lack of time. Thus 
far I have not found a single bit of evidence to indicate that an Army 
station actually intercepted a Winds execute message. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. L. T. GEROW 

[1] Place : Koom 3E794 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 25 September 1944. 

Time : 1420-1530. 

Present : 

Major General L. T. Gerow. 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Major General L. T. Gerow, having been sworn and warned of his 
rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn 
testimony : 

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank, organization and 
station please. 

Gen. Gerow. L. T. Gerow, Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding 
V Corps, Luxembourg. 

Col. Ci^RK. What were your duties, sir, from the period October 1, 
1941 through December 7 ? 

Gen. Gerow. Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division. 

Col. Clarke. In this position, will you state whether or not you 
received from G-2 any material which was then known to you as Magic. 

Gen. Gerow. I did. 

Col. Clark. Are you familiar with that material ? Do you identify 
any of it as material which you have previously seen ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 37 

Gen. Gerow. I saw material of a similar nature three years ago. I 
cannot definitely state at this time whether or not I saw these particular 
documents. I imagine I did. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall having discussed with Colonel Bratton 
or General Miles a message which later became known as the "Winds" 
message ? In that message there was a statement that if certain words 
occurred in the weather broadcast that would indicate the severance 
of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan or Great 
Britain and Japan or Russia and Japan. The message is Top Secret 
Army No. 29432. 

Gen. Gerow. I believe I saw the message and discussed it with 

t^l Colonel Bratton. I cannot be sure, at this late date. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall whether on the morning of approxi- 
mately December 5 or at any other time that you discussed with Gen- 
eral Miles, or Colonel Bratton any message which implemented that 
which would indicate the severance of relations between the United 
States and Japan ? 

Gen. Gerow. I do not remember any such message. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall, as Chief of War Plans Division, any 
warning message being sent out on or about November 27, 28 or 29 to 
the overseas commanders ? 

Gen. Geeow. Yes, I remember the message sent out on 27 November. 

Col. Clarke. Do you have any recollection of any of this stuff that 
Sadtler says here in his testimony? 

Gen. Gerow. I have recollection of talking to Sadtler only once. I 
don't recall ever being informed by Colonel Sadtler of the fact that 
Japan had decided to declare war on Great Britain. 

Col. Clarke. Were you ever informed by Colonel Bratton or General 
Miles of that? 

Gen. Gerow. Not to the best of my recollection. 

Col. Clarke. When Colonel Bratton w^ould bring this material to 
you, would you just read it or did you discuss it with him ? 

Gen. Gerow. Ordinarily he would leave it for me to read. On some 
occasions he would remark that he had something very hot or refer 
to a particular paragraph which we would discuss. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall ever discussing the contents of any of 
this, prior to Pearl Harbor, with General Marshall ? 

Gen. Gerow. Yes, I do recall discussing Magic information with 
General Marshall on numerous occasions. 

Col. Clarke. Do you remember whether or not any of the warning 
messages which you sent out, as Chief of War Plans Division, were 
based on this material ? 

[3] Gen. Gerow. The warning messages were based on the gen- 
eral situation as we knew it and a part of that information came from 
these messages. 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall ever having gotten a warning from the 
Secretary of State to the effect that negotiations would very likely 
break down and that war would ensue ? 

Gen. Gerow. Of course I didn't get any information as a rule direct 
from the Secretary of State. On one occasion I recall there was a gen- 
eral discussion in the Secretary of War's office relative to the phrasing 
of a warning message to go to the overseas commanders. Prior to 
sending this message out the Secretary of War conferred over the 



38 CONGRESSIONiVL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

telephone with the Secretary of State. The result was that a message, 
dated November 27th, was sent out containing such a statement. 

Col. Clarke. General, will you state what you recollect about the 
instance of the morning of December 7, with particular reference to 
any message which may have been brought to your attention by Colonel 
Bratton or General Miles. 

Gen. Gerow. I have here a memorandum for record on that subject 
which I prepared on December 15, 1941. I would like to insert that 
memorandum in the record as my answer to your question. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you Top Secret Army No. 25850. Is that 
the message you refer to ? 

Gen. Gerow. I cannot definitely identify this message, but I think 
it is the same one that was under discussion. 

Lt. Gen. Gibson. Do you recall who, if anyone, there wrote a mes- 
sage to be sent to Honolulu ? 

Gen. Gerow. General Marshall personally wrote the message. 
Lt. Col. Gibson. Referring to your memorandum dated 15 December 
1941, do you remember whether General Marshall sent Colonel Bratton 
back to the message center a second time to check ? 
Gen. Gerow. I don't recall. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you recall whether there was any discussion or 
debate regarding the interpretation on either of [4] these mes- 
sages in General Marshall's office prior to the writing of this message ? 
Was it discussed freely ? 

Gen. Gerow. The message was discussed freely. The main point 
involved was the significance of the time — 1 : 00 p. m. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. And who was there exactly besides you, Bratton 
and General Marshall ? 

Gen. Gerow. General Miles and Colonel Bundy. 
Lt. Col. Gibson. The discussion, as you remember it, was about this 
one o'clock proposition ? 
Gen. Gerow. That is right. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you remember whether or not General Marshall 
asked your opinion, what it meant, or anything of this nature? 

Gen. Gerow. He asked all of us for an opinion as to the meaning 
of the message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. This Magic, was that delivered in a dispatch case 
at that time to your office everyday — a locked dispatch case? 

Gen Gerow. As I recall, Bratton used to bring it down himself 
personally in a locked dispatch case. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. During the day you would go over it and the next 
day he would come and get that and leave you some more ? 

Gen. Gerow. I don't think we kept it. I think I went over it as 
soon as I could and occasionally I would call Bundy, my war planning 
man, in and let him see parts of it, and then it would be returned 
immediately to Bratton. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you pretty close to G-2 at the time; did they 
give you estimates of the situation occasionally ? 
Gen. Gerow. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. And you conferred with them about the enemy 
situation generally? 

Gen. Gerow. That is correct. 

[5] Lt. Col. Gibson. It was your duty, as head of the War Plans 
Division, to direct the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 39 

ment as to dispositions, what state of alert to take, or anything of that 
nature ? 

Gen. Gerow. Not necessarily that way. If something important 
would come up it would be discussed with the Chief of Staff and might 
be discussed by the Joint Board. Messages would result from those 
discussions. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Generally such instructions sent out would be sent 
through your office ? 

Gen. Gerow. Yes, on matters involving WPD responsibilities. If 
it were purely a G-2 matter, the instructions would go out through 
the G-2 office. War Plans Division occupied a little different status 
at that time from what it occupies now. 

Lt. Col. G1P.SON. Did the Navy ever inform you exactly of what their 
naval schedule was, that is, when their ships would be in harbor and 
when they would be out to sea, or anything of this nature, particularly 
referring to the Hawaiian Islands ? 

Gen. Gerow. No. I don't believe they did specifically inform me. 
I could have gotten that information, however, from the Navy had I 
asked for it. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you aware that the Navy were coming in and 
tying up on definite weekends in Hawaii ? 

Gen. Gerow. No. I was not. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you a message dated 27 November 1941 and 
ask if that is the message that you have referred to in your testimony 
where the telephone conversation was had with the Secretary of State 
prior to the sending of that particular message? 

Gen. Gerow. Yes, this is the message I referred to. I presume that 
it is a true copy of the original message. 

Col. Clarke. Yes it is. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I also show you a copy of a secret radiogram dated 
July 7, 1941 which is in the nature of a warning to the Hawaiian 
commander and others and ask if you recollect that. 

16] Gen. Gerow. Yes. It carries my signature. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I just wondered if you had any recollection of it 
now. 

Gen. Gerow. Yes. I remember such a message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. In other words, even on July 7, 1941, you were 
giving some sort of warning to these various commanders? 

Gen. Gerow. That is right. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. When you sent this warning of November 27, did 
you consider that as a definite war warning, General ? 

Gen. Gerow. I considered it very definitely a message to put our 
forces on the alert in these various overseas garrisons against a pos- 
sible attack by Japan. 

I was called to the Deputy Chief of Staff's office (General Bryden) 
and there General Miles, Colonel Bundy, General Bryden and I dis- 
cussed the advisability of including in this message any reference to 
sabotage or subversiA^e activities. I objected to the inclusion of any 
reference to sabotage in this message that was being prepared by War 
Plans Division. As I recall, the decision was finally made by General 
Bryden that G-2 would sent a message to the G-2 of the Hawaiian 
Department telling them to be on the alert against sabotage. The orig- 
inal copy of the message that we had at that meeting shows that the 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

reference to subvei-sive activities and sabotage was stricken out and 
initialed by me, with the approval of General Bryden. 

Col. Clarke. In view, sir, of what you have just stated, in your 
opinion this message of November 27 constituted a definite war warn- 
ing to the overseas commanders and you did not want to confuse 
sabotage or subversion with an alert? 

Gen. Gerow, Yes, I did conceive it to be that, very definitely. 

Lt. Col. Gibson : General, this message of November 27, 1941 to the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and Commanding Gen- 
eral, Caribbean Defense Command, was considered by you to be a 
definite warning to be on the alert against a possible enemy offensive 
against those garrisons. 

[7] Gen. Gerow. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you now, (xeneral, a paraphrase of a 
radiogram from General Short received in the War Department 29 
November 1941 and ask if you recollect that message. 

Gen. Gerow. I don't recall having seen that message. If I did see 
it my initials probably appear on it in the permanent records. 

Lt. Gol. Gibson. Do you have any recollection of having an answer 
from General Short to your warning radiogram of 27 November 1941 ? 

Gen. Gerow. The War Department records show that such a mes- 
sage was received in the War Department. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. You mean an answer from General Short? 

Gen. Gerow. Correct. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you recollect what his answer was ? 

Gen. Gerow. I have refreshed my memory from War Department 
records. There was a reply received from General Short which in 
substance stated that he had taken all the necessary precautions against 
sabotage and that he had liaison with the Navy. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of the message of November 24, 
1941 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which 
message stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise 
aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an 
attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility ; that the doubt 
as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the 
Japanese government, and the movements of its army and naval forces, 
supported this opinion, and that the message stated that the Chief of 
Staff of the Army requested the local senior Army officers be advised 
that he concurred in the dispatch ? Did you know of the sending of 
that dispatch on or about 24 November 1941 ? 

Gen. Gerow. I knew^ that the Navy sent such a message and believe 
that I read it. As to the exact date and wording, I cannot recall at 
the moment. 

[S] Lt. Col. Gibson. But it was at about that time ? 

Gen. Gerow. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you also know that on the 27th of November, 
the date on which this warning message was sent through your office 
to the Commanding General of Hawaii, that the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions was sending a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
fleet which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered 
a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to 
stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected 
to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an am- 
phibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Pen- 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 41 

insula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment 
of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. 
The message further stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Dis- 
tricts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, 
that a similar warning was behig sent by the War Department. At 
about that time did you know such a message was being sent by the 
Navy Department ? 

Gen. Gerow. To the best of my recollection, at that meeting in the 
Secretary's office on the morning of November 27, it was agreed at that 
time that the Navy would send a similar warning message to the one 
that the War Department was sending out. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did j^ou know at the time that on December 3, 1941 
the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific fleet stating it was believed certain Japanese consulates were 
destroying their codes and burning secret documents; and that on De- 
cember 4 and again on December 6 they sent instructions to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet with regard to destroying cetrain 
confidential documents and means of confidential communication under 
conditions of emergency. Did you know of such messages being sent? 

Gen. Gerow. I have no recollection of having seen such a message 
although I may have seen it before dispatch. The War Plans Divisions 
of both the Army and Navy were in constant contact and kept each 
other advised of action taken. 

[9] Lt. Col. Gibson. At that time, was it your opinion that the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the other 
Commanding Generals of the Departments in the Pacific or of the 
Caribbean had had sufficient warning against any aggressive action by 
an enemy, particularly the Japanese? 

Gen. Gerow. I felt that they had been sufficiently warned as to the 
possibility of aggressive action on the part of Japan. 

December 15, 1941 
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11 : 30 A. M., E. S. T., General 
Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton 
were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese 
Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Depart- 
ment at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Gov- 
eriunent instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time 
might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message 
to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East ; CG Carib- 
bean Defense Command ; CG Hawaiian Department ; and CG Fourth 
Army were read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all 
present. Colonel Bratoon was directed to take the pencilled draft of 
the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the 
most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes 
and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over 
to the Message Center and would reach restinations in about thirty 
minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and 
formally made of record. 

/s/ L. T. Gerow 
L. T. Gerow 
Brigadier General^ 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OP BRIG. GEN. HAYES A. KRONER 

[i] Place : Koom 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 13 September 1944. 

Time: 1430-1510. 

Present : 

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner. 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, having been sworn and warned 
of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn 
testimony : 

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank and station. 

Gen. Kroner. Hayes A. Kroner, Brigadier General. Station : Rio 
de Janeiro, Millitary Attache. 

Col. Clarke. When did you first come on duty in G-2, War Depart- 
ment General Staff? 

Gen. Kroner. About the first of March 1941. 

Col. Clarke. What were your duties at that time ? 

Gen. Kroner, I was assigned to the British Empire Section of the 
Intelligence Branch, G-2 but before taking up those duties I was sent 
to England for a period of observation of the war. I returned from 
England early in June, about the middle of June 1941, and took up my 
duties of Chief of the British Empire Section, G-2 at that time. 

Col. Clarke. How long did you continue on that duty? 

Gen. Kroner. Approximately one month. 

Col. Clarke. And then what did you do ? 

Gen. Kroner. About the middle of July I was informed by the retir- 
ing Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Col. C. H. Mason, that he was 
leaving G-2 and that he had been instructed to turn the Branch over 
to me as the next senior officer. I immediately took over charge of the 
Branch and for the next several months was acting in charge and later 
on I was appointed Chief of the Branch. To the best of my memory 
it was about September 17 that an order was issued by the Executive 
Officer, G-2 appointing me as the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, 
which position I [2] held until sometime in the month of De- 
cember, when General Lee became Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 
and I was then verbally relieved from Chief of Intelligence Branch and 
made Deputy to General Lee. 

Col. Clark. What did the Intelligence Branch consist of princi- 
pally? 

Gen. Kroner. I found the Intelligence Branch, in July '41, to consist 
of a very small Administrative Section and of several geographic sec- 
tions and an Air Section. The Administrative Section was in process 
of transition. Because of the impact of the war and more information 
coming into G-2, there was a greater need for proper handling and 
dissemination of that information. The only geographic section of 
G-2 which appeared to be expanding at that time was the Latin Ameri- 
can Section. By the 10th of October — referring here to the official chart 
on record — the Intelligence Branch consisted of a headquarters or the 
Administrative Section, Contact Section, Situation Section, Dissemi- 
nation Section, and the Air and geographic sections composed of the 
following: Air Section, British Empire Section, Western European 
Section, Central European Section, Eastern European Section, South- 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 43 

ern European Section, Far East Section, and the Latin American Sec- 
tion. The several European sections had been set up to deal with the 
increased information coming in from the European war and, together 
with the British Empire Section, it was considered adequate to handle 
the war in Europe. The Latin American Section was expanding for 
obvious reasons of hemisphere defense. The Far Eastern Section at 
this time had not undergone any material change, so far as I remember, 
for several months. This organization, w4th a few changes, continued 
during my tenure of office as Chief of the Branch. The second exhibit 
of the organization chart of December 5, 1941 indicates that. 

Col. Clarke. I understand you to say then that you were Chief of 
the Intelligence Group from about July through Pearl Harbor, De- 
cember 7 ? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes. 

Col. Clarke. During that time was there any recommendation 
made — first let me ask you this — who was the Chief of the Far Eastern 
Section ? 

Gen. Kroner. Col. R. S. Bratton. 

Col. Clarke. During that time was there any recommendation made 
to you as Chief of the Group for any increase in personnel [3'] 
or expansion of its intelligence gathering activities ? 

Gen. Kroner. Not any to give me any trouble — there was some minor 
increase of a clerk or two and perhaps one officer, I don't remember, but 
nothing in the line of expansion as I have referred to in the European 
Section. I would say this further, that one of their Far East experts, 
Col. Pettigrew, was taken from the Far Eastern Section at that time to 
assist in the reorganization of the Headquarters dissemination, so that I 
had ven^ close to me at that time an experienced Far East officer on 
my staff. 

Col. Clarke. Who was that ? 

Gen. KjiONER. Pettigrew. It was, I think, worthy of note just here 
that Col. Belts, who was the Chief of the Situation subsection, whom 
I called my G-2-G-3 officer on my own staff, Col. Pettigrew being so- 
called G-l-G-4 officer, together with my own experience in the Far 
East, that with Col. Bratton it was a fairly good team of Far East 
trained officers at the head of the Intelligence Group. 

Col. Clarke. Was there any action taken by the Chief of the Far 
Eastern Group that would lead you to think that any difficulties or 
hostilities were expected in the Orient that would affect the United 
States? 

Gen. Kroner. None specifically as to direct threat in regard to time 
or date or place. Japanese possible lines of action were often dis- 
cussed, as you might expect among officers as closely allied as the ones 
I mentioned above with Far East training and influence. I left the 
evaluation of information pertaining to the Far East and its interpre- 
tation initially to Col. Bratton, and in that over-all sense to Col. 
Betts. 

Col. Clarke. What was your chief source of information with re- 
gard to the Far East? 

Gen. Kroner. Military Attache reports and translations of books 
and journals which were received from various sources, so far as I was 
aware. 

Col. Clarkje. You had no secret intelligence service ? 

Gen. Kroner. No. 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Clarke. Was any attempt made to create any during the time 
that you were in charge ? 

[4-] Gen. Kroner. Yes. I remember the time — ^I don't remember 
exactly — but I remember an instance which was partially fulfilled, I 
believe, that a former Far East trained officer, who I think was re- 
tired and living in California, Captain or Major W. C. Clear, was 
brought into G-2 and given secret briefing by Gen. Miles, to the best 
of my knowledge, and sent out to the Far East, I think to Singapore, 
in order to initiate some secret intelligence, of which I have no de- 
tailed knowledge. 

Col. Clarke. Did we have any liaison with the Chinese secret intel- 
ligence ? 

Gen. Kroner. Not that I know of. The Military Attache in China 
may have had such but it did not come to my attention. 

Col. Clarke. Did you have direct communication and contact or 
a direct reporting system with the G-2 of the Philippine Department? 

Gen. Kjioner. Yes, we exchanged reports and some telegrams. That 
I left largely in the hands of Col. Bratton who, as Chief of the Far 
Eastern Section, encompassed Japan, China and the Philippines and 
in general the whole Pacific area. In the Intelligence Section, as far 
as I know, prior to Pearl Harbor the exchange of information was 
routine; it was automatic. I recall toward the end of the summer 
of '41 that Col. Bratton got somewhat disturbed because our Military 
Attache in Tokyo was getting practically no information. The Jap- 
anese had practically closed up on him, and we took that as an in- 
dication of their general hardening of their relationship towards us. 

Col. Clarke. Did you receive any reports from the State Depart- 
ment agencies such as the Commercial Attache or the consular ser- 
vice? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes, all sections in the Intelligence Branch had at 
that time direct liaison with their appropriate opposite number in 
the State Department. This was an established standard procedure, 
and only when something out of the ordinary came to the front was 
the State Department paper given any special attention. In addi- 
tion to that I, Chief of the Branch, and Col. Betts talked and dis- 
cussed things concerning the Far East with various officers in the 
State Department and also in the Navy Department. 

Col, Clarke. I was going to ask, did you have the same relation 
with the Navy? 

[5] Gen. Kroner. And the same relation with the Navy. 

Col. Clarke. Did that give you, so far as you know, full and com- 
plete exchange of information and intelligence? 

Gen. Kroner. So far as I know. 

Col. Clarke. Wliat were your relations with the F. B. I.? Did 
you have any contact with them? 

Gen. Kroner. I had none whatever. I got no information — 

Col. Clarke. Did you from any other federal government agency? 

Gen. Kroner. The Commerce Department is the only one at that 
time, I remember. 

Col. Clarke. Did you have access to a source of information which 
we know as Top Secret or the British known as Most Secret? 

Gen. Kroner. Meaning communications information ? 

Col. Clarke. Signal intelligence. 

Gen. Kjioner. No, none whatever. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 45 

Col, Clarke. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't 
get it? 

Gen. Kroner. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. 
I was aware that something, which later I found out to be of this 
nature, existed, but I was given to understand, particularly by Col. 
Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who sometimes handled the matter for 
Col, Bratton, that he received information from Col. Minkler, whom 
I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do with 
Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by Gen- 
eral Miles special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gen. 
Miles. 

Col. Clarke. Then you don't know what Col. Bratton did with this 
stuff other than to give it to Gen. Miles ? 

Gen. Kroner. No official information. I frequently remember 
seeing him leave his office with several parcels under his arm and 
be gone for some hours, but I felt it was my duty to follow the es- 
tablished procedure which was apparently pleasing to my own chief, 
and I didn't question the procedure. 

[6] Col. Clarke. During the time that you were Chief of the 
Intelligence Group you never had access or never saw any of this 
material yourself? When did you first see it? 

Gen. Kroner. I only saw the material, which later I learned was 
called material, when I used to receive it from Minkler's hands when 
Bratton was absent, and lock it up in my safe and give it to Brat- 
ton without sorting it out. In other words, I understood, without 
any specific orders from Gen. Miles, that he wished it handled that 
way and therefore I did not violate that procedure. 

Col. Clarke. Do you know if any estimates were written in the 
Far Eastern Section based on this material or any prognostications, 
forecasts, or predictions? 

Gen. Kroner. I do not. 

Col. Clarke. If any had been made you would have seen them, 
wouldh't you, as the Chief? 

Gen. Kroner. I think so because estimates were accustomed to 
being made, not only at regular intervals, but also special estimates 
from time to time would be made, the Far Eastern part of which 
was always prepared initially in the Far East, held by Col. Bratton 
or under his direction brought in to Col. Betts, who revised it and 
fitted it in with information from other geographic sections. I 
assumed that the Chief of the Far Eastern Section used all the in- 
formation at his disposal to make a complete estimate and as ac- 
curate an estimate as possible. 

Col. Clarke. Did j^here exist anything like a central evaluating 
section where all information came in and was there melted into one 
estimate or report or summary? 

Gen. Kroner. No. There was a trend toward that at the end of 
the year but we didn't get anywhere with it. It was just iji 
the planning stage. 

Col. Clarke. Well then, you have no personal or official knowledge 
of who other than Col, Bratton and Gen, Miles saw this Top Sec- 
cret material? 

Gen, Kroner. That is correct. I have not. 

Col. Clarke. Are you familiar with any warning messages that 
may have been sent to the Hawaiian or other departments ? 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7] Gen. Kroner. Only now — not at the time of the sending;. 

Col. Clarke. At the time they were prepared and sent you had no 
knowledge ? 

Gen. Kroner. No, none whatever. 

Colonel Clarke. When did you first become aware of the existence 
of these warning messages which were sent out of the War Depart- 
ment? 

Gen. Kroner. I remember a few days after Pearl Harbor, when 
there was naturally a certain amount of excitement in the War De- 
partment, hearing it said by someone — I don't remember — either in 
Col. Ralph Smith or Gen. Miles' office, words to the effect, "I wonder 
if that message got through in time," and it was several days later 
that I learned that an official message from the War Department had 
gone out to the Commanding General at Honolulu either the night 
before or the day after Pearl Harbor, I am not certain. 

Col. Clarke. Did you know anything about an}^ warning messages 
that were sent out late in November? 

Gen. Kroner. No. 

Col. Clarke. Or early in December before the morning of Decem- 
ber 7? 

Gen. Kj?oner. I never heard about those until today. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I would like to ask, General, if you ever asked Gen. 
Miles yourself whether or not you were to see this Top Secret infor- 
mation or whether it was his desire that you not see it. 

Gen. KJRONER. No, I am very certain I did not ask him and I have a 
very good reason and that is because Col. Bratton impressed me so 
much with the secrecy and the importance of his relation with Gen. 
Miles, that it was Gen. Miles' wish. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. In other words, you received the information from 
Col. Bratton that that was Gen. Miles' wish. 

Gen. Kroner. Not so much the specific information as it was that 
I received the impression from Col. Bratton that Gen. Miles wished 
Bratton to handle this information with him. 

[8] Lt. Col. Gibson. I want to go back to the State Department 
liaison. Were you, as head of the Intelligence Division, kept informed 
of the conversations between the Secretary of State and Admiral 
Nomura and Kurusu prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. Kroner. No, except that Gen. Miles once in a while would 
make some remark on the subject. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. You personally never went over to the State De- 
partment or talked with anyone there about the situation? 

Gen. Kroner. In regard to communications? 

Lt. Col. Gibson. You never received any warning of any kind from 
anybody in the State Department? 

Gen. Kroner. No. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did your Intelligence Section, in receiving reports 
from the Navy receive any submarine reconnaissance reports or re- 
ports of that nature from the Navy ? 

Gen. Kroner. Not to the best of my knowledge. I don't remember 
any submarine reconnaissance reports until 1942. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you maintain any gathering of information, 
any contacts with religious societies or anything lo gather informa- 
tion about the Far East from missionaries or anything of that nature ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 47 

Gen. Kroner. Yes. There were some missionaries who, by habit 
and custom, maintained certain contact direct with the Far Eastern 
Section. 

Lt. Coh Gibson. I see. How about these big private corporations, 
banks and companies that deal with local ones throughout the Far 
East — Avere they contacted by your intelligence? 

Gen. Kroner. I think they were rather few and far between. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was there any contact with the British Secret 
Service at that time? 

Gen. Kroner. Not to my knowledge. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were inquiries made of the Maritime Commission 
on whether or not shipping was being obstructed out in that area? 

Gen. Kroner. There may have been, but I don't remember that. We 
[r9] were building up, you will notice from the chart, the Contact 
Section and they were beginning to explore the field you were refer- 
ring to. How far they got I don't remember. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you maintain close liaison with the War Plans 
Division — I believe that is what it was called at that time? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes. Every section in G-2 knew personally and 
talked to the Section in War Plans Division. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you personally, for instance, know of what the 
Fleet consisted of out in Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes, in a general way. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know the extent of our own anti-aircraft 
defenses and of our radar installations? 

Gen. Kroner. A very incomplete idea of that. 

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one more question. In any esti- 
mate from the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and 
including Pearl Harbor, was there ever any prediction or forecast 
made of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. Kroner. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last 
estimate that was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate 
covering a future period from December 1 to sometime in 1942. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to 
successfully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers ? 

Gen. Kroner. No. The matter was discussed 

Col. Clarke. Did you identify this document? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes. I identified it — this is the document to which I 
referred — IB 159, November 29, 1941. This particular estimate was 
considered by the whole division, not only the Intelligence Group but 
by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important we had ever 
gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that we 
saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly 
discussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wished to focus War 
Department though on the defeat that could be administered to the 
Nazi powers. In the [10] preparation of the estimate each 
geographic section in the Intelligence Branch prepared its part. Colo- 
nel — now Brigadier General — Thomas J. Betts put the several esti- 
mates together and did what we called "polish them up." He and I 
discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring powers 
and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them 
to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved. 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open 
to Japan, an attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so dis- 
tinctly because when the word came through the radio on that fateful 
Sunday, December 7, that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was 
sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper 
the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel 
that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left from 
this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information 
which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to 
do so. 

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one final question again just to 
reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. 
Bratton did with this most secret material or to whom he showed it. 

Gen. Kroxer. That is correct, except to Gen. Miles. 

Col. Clarke. And you don't know what Miles did with it. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES 

[1] Place : Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 

Date : 14 September 1944. 

Time: 0930-1030. 

Present : 

Major General Sherman Miles. Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson. 

Major General Sherman Miles, having been sworn and warned of 
his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn 
testimony : 

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank and station please. 

Gen. Miles. Sherman Miles, Major General, First Service Com- 
mand, Boston, Massachusetts. 

Col. Clarke. During what period were you A. C. of S., G-2? 

Gen. Miles. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 from the 
first of May 1940 until late in December 1941, when I was made 
Assistant Chief of Staff — that was a technicality — and relieved from 
the duty the end of January 1942. 

Col. Clarke. In the six months period preceding Pearl Harbor did 
you have presented to you all information and intelligence which was 
received in the War Department General Staff with reference to the 
war making potentialities of Japan ? 

Gen. Miles. I can't say that all came to me personally. A synopsis 
of all came to me through my organization. Certain dispatches and 
re])orts I never saw in toto. They were handled by the particular 
Section of the Military Intelligence Division, which I headed, and 
came to me in the original form if they were of very great importance, 
but otherwise in the form of summaries, estimates, etc. 

Col. Clarke. Who was the head of the Intelligence Group during 
the time that you were A. C. of S., G-2 ? 

Gen. Miles. General John Magruder was the Chief. He was suc- 
ceeded by Colonel Charles Mason, as I remember it, who was relieved 
in the summer of 1941 and succeeded by General Hayes Kroner. 

[^] Col. Clarke. During this entire period who was your Chief 
of the Far Eeastern Section ? 

Gen. Miles. Colonel Bratton. 

Col. Clarke. The entire period ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 49 

Gen. Miles, I think so although I wouldn't be positive. 

Col. Clarke. I am sure that is correct. 

During this period, information which was received with reference 
to Japan or the Far East, was that presented to you, when it was im- 
portant, direct by Col. Bratton or did you have that transmitted 
through the Chief of the Intelligence Group, Colonel Kroner or Colonel 
Mason ? 

Gen. Miles. Such information as came in Top Secret was habitually 
handed direct by Colonel Bratton to me. This was particularly so in 
the six months preceding Pearl Harbor. We were tightening up on 
secrecy to a great extent. Other information normally came to me 
through the Chief of the Intelligence Branch. 

Col. Clarke. How was this Ultra information presented to the 
Chief of Staff? 

Gen. Miles. It was presented in a loose-leaf folder in a locked 
dispatch case for which the Chief of Staff had the key. He took the 
folder out, read the Top Secret dispatches and returned it to its bag. 

Col. Clarke. Who made the selection of what was presented to the 
Chief of Staff? 

Gen. Miles. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section — Colonel Brat- 
ton. 

Col. Clarke. Did he present all of that or just what he. Colonel Brat- 
ton, considered were the important items ? 

Gen. Miles. Only what were considered the important items. There 
was, as I remember, an immense amount of what we called chitter- 
chatter which came in Top Secret, routine stuff and stuff of no par- 
ticular significance except to the people to whom it was addressed. 
This was not put in. 

Col. Clarke. Did Colonel Bratton present this direct to the Chief 
of Staff or did you present it ? 

[3] Gen. Miles. It was presented by Colonel Bratton direct to 
the Chief of Staff. We had a regular system by which it was taken 
around by an officer courier. 

Col. Clarke. Then Bratton himself didn't always take it to the 
Chief of Staff and discuss it with him, to the best of your knowledge? 

Gen. Miles, No. 

Col. Clarke. Did the Chief of Staff ever discuss with you or Colonel 
Bratton the contents of any of these messages and their significance ? 

Gen. Miles, Oh yes, he discussed it with me several times. 

Col, Clarke, Do you recall any particular messages of the Top 
Secret which he discussed with you ? 

Gen, Miles. No I don't. Strangely, I recall the lack of messages 
which he discussed with me. The one thing we couldn't understand 
was why they weren't talking more about our air reinforcements of 
the Philippines, I remember he discussed that point with me at length 
although we reached no conclusion. 

Col, Clarke. Were you familiar with what has later been referred 
to as the "Winds Message" at the time of its receipt ? 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I remember the receipt of the "Winds Message." 

Col. Clarke. Was that discussed with you by the Chief of Staff ? 

Gen, Miles, Not that I remember. 

Col. Clarke, Did you ever receive any information that the Winds 
Message had been implemented ? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 147 5 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Gen. Miles. I have been trying to remember and my memory is very 
hazy about it. I do not remember seeing any document on it, any 
written statement on it. I'm sorry but my memory is — 

Col. Clarke. Do you recall any oral discussion you may have had 
with any individual with reference to that message, with the imple- 
mentation of it ? 

Gen. Miles. No I do not, and yet I do know of course that we sent 
a dispatch to Hawaii early in December, to the G-2 in [^] 
Hawaii, directing him to contact a certain officer about the Winds 
Message. 

Col, Clarke. Do you recall what the occasion of the sending of 
that message was? 

Gen. Miles. Sending which message? 

Col. Clarke. The one to contact the officer in Hawaii who was 
familiar with the "Winds Message." 

Gen. Miles. It must have been information that the naval com- 
mand had in regard to the "Winds Message" but I don't remember 
the background. 

Col. Clarke. Were any of of the warning messages that were sent 
from November 25 through to include Pearl Harbor the result of this 
most secret source? 

Gen. Miles. Oh yes, very definitely. The first warning message, 
the main warning message, written by the War Plans Division, of 27 
November was the result not only of what we knew about our own 
note to the Japanese of the 26tli of November, but of the general 
build-up of Top Secret information, and that also applied to my 
message to the G-2's of the 27th of November. 

Col. Clarke. At that time did you have direct contact or author- 
ity to communicate directly with all of the corps area and department 
G-2's or did your traffic have to go through command channels ? 

Gen. Miles. That is somewhat a difficult question to answer be- 
cause it depended on the message. I realized that I should never 
put myself, the G-2, in a position of influencing the commanding gen- 
erals, particularly of overseas departments, on action which had not 
previously been approved by command channels. I kept in very 
close contact with War Plans Division, General Gerow, and I remem- 
ber particularly in my message to the G-2 of November 27 discussing 
that with Gerow, and I am pretty sure it was his suggestion that I 
put in the sentence to communicate this only to the Commanding 
General and Chief of Staff. The general proposition held that the 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the War Department had authority 
to communicate freely with his G-2's but always under the principal 
that he did not influence the commanding generals in lines of action 
not previously approved. 

[5\ Col. Clarice. During this period from July 1 through to 
Pearl Harbor, did the officers of G-2 in the various geographic 
branches have daily contact with their opposite numbers in the War 
Plans Division? 

Gen. Miles. I can't say that they had daily; they had very close 
contact I know but how frequent that contact was I think un- 
doubtedly depended on the situation. It might have been two or 
three times a day in some cases. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 51 

Col. CtARKE. In your opinion every piece of vital information that 
was available in Cj-2 was made known to the proper people in War 
Plans? A i i 1 

Gen. Miles. That was my policy and Gen. Gerow's policy— what 
we were trying to work to at all times. The same applied to ONI 

Col. Clarke. Then it was the responsibility of War Plans Division 
and not ot youreelt to inform these overseas department commanders « 

Gen. Miles To promulgate command decisions, yes. 

Col. Clarke. That is what I am trying to bring out. Do you know 
Whether or not tliere were discussions between the Chief of the War 
Plans Division and the Chief of Staff regarding this Top Secret 
material that you weren't a party to? -tup oecrec 

or?iot' ^^^^' "^ ^^^'''*' ^'^""'^ whether there were such conversations 

ri.Vr]" 9ff''w^''l.r" ^^?^. discuss any of this material with the 
Chiet of the War Plans Division and its significance? 

Gen. Miles. Oh yes, frequently, 
wov!^* Clarke. These warning messages that you spoke about, they 
weie sent to all overseas departments, Panama, Philippines and 

JL A d » A d J. J. S 

Gen. Miles. My recollection is that the first one drafted by War 

97ihl ZT n'V" ^" ^"^''^'''^^ departments. Mine, the one of the 
27th to the G-2's, was not sent to the Philippines 

Col Clarke. Do you know whether or not messages were received 
from the overseas commanders of the three overseas depart- 161 
ments at that time indicating that they had been warAed and had 
taken appropriate action? 

..l!!o" ^f.f • -^ ^'^ ''''\ ^* *^^^ ^^"^^ '^now because I never saw the 
o?the l7?h irrr' ^^P-^^^^^^^;^^- ^o the first or War Plans wamin| 
of the 27th I did, however, see General Short's reply to a subsequent 
telegram of November 28 about sabotage which of course clearlv inr?^ 
cat.d to me at that time that he had at^least receivrd tlfat trSnf ' 

the oVVt^^r* ? ^""1 ^IT "■ ^''^''^ ^""^ discussions with the Chief of 
G?n mTtI^ reference to the contents of the Top Secret material? 
Gen. Miles. Frequent discussions with him. 

thi; material ' ^'^ ^'''' ''''^ ^'' ^^^^ ^'^"^^^"^ ^'^^^^ ^'^^ reference to 
Gen. Miles In the sense of informing our Chiefs, yes. I don't re- 
member any difference of opinion on thil evaluation between Admiral 

Co Ct^S?4 "K'f '' ^^"^''^^ ^''^ ^"^ ^y^^lf «" Top Se^reT 
FRt!;^;k ? -L>id you ever receive any information in G-2 from 
i^^I with reference to this material 8 vj - nom 

Gen. Miles. Top Secret? 

Col. Clarke. Yes. 

Gen. Miles. No, not that I remember. 

Col. Clarke. Would the President and Secretarv of State have rP 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Clarke. Yes, sir. 

Gen. Miles. No. 

[7] Col. Clarke. Can you state definitely that the same material 
which was made available to the Chief of Staff here was made available 
to the President and the Secretary of State ? 

Gen. Miles. My recollection is that on Navy day the Navy put these 
things in the file and that the same file copies went to the Chief of 
Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, the two Secretaries, 
the President and Secretary of State. But I see your point — I don't 
know. 

Lt. Col. GiBsois^. General, I may ask some rather unintelligent ques- 
tions because I am somewhat foggy about this whole thing. Did you 
know of the letter that the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary 
of War on or about the 24th of January 1941, wherein the Secretary 
of the Navy warned the Secretary of War that hostilities might be 
initiated any time by an attack on Pearl Harbor, and did you have 
at that time any knowledge of such a letter being written ? 

Gen. Miles. I had at that time no knowledge of a letter containing 
a warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor other than this, that I remem- 
ber in the late winter of 1940-41 that the Navy was worried about our 
anti-aircraft defense and air defense of Pearl Harbor. I didn't know 
that it resulted, although I assume it resulted, from some communi- 
cation from the Navy Department. I never saw the letter, to my 
knowledge. However I remember that it was a matter under discus- 
sion at about that time. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did the Chief of Staff ever tell you of any such 
letter being received from the Navy? 

Gen. Miles. Not that I remember. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever attend any War Council meetings 
during that period of 1941 ? 

Gen, Miles. Those were the ones with Secretary Welles, Assistant 
Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff? 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Generally, I believe, provided for a meeting of the 
Secretaries of War, Navy f^nd State. 

Gen. Miles. No I did not attend any of them. 

Lt. Col, Gibson. Did the Chief of Staff ever talk with you of any 
matters that were discussed as these War Council meetings during 
the year 1941 ? 

[5] Gen. Miles. I don't remember. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you yourself ever have any conferences with 
the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State or any 
responsible official in the Department of State relative to their inter- 
pretation or understanding of these so-called Top Secret reports 
during the year 1941 ? 

Gen. Miles. No I did not. I remember, however, once — perhaps 
twice — going to the office of the Secretary of State, Secretary Hull, 
rather formally, together with the head of ONI and certain other 
State Department officials, for a general discussion of the military 
and naval situations throughout the world. I don't remember in any 
of these discussions that Top Secret was mentioned. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you ever informed by the Chief of Staff of 
any warning from the State Department that war might be expected 
any minute because of a breakdown of negotiations between the two 
countries that were then eoine: on in November 1941 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 53 

Gen. Miles. No, I don't remember ever having been told by the 
Chief of Staff that the State Department considered war might re- 
sult. I did know at the time the general trend, and I think very 
accurately, the actual substance of our note of November 26 which 
gave me certainly the impression that war might result. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was your knowledge of that note obtained from 
the newspapers or from State Department copies of the note? 

Gen. Miles. From our liaison with the State Department. We 
sent an officer to the State Department every day. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you, recall who the officer was at that time ? 

Gen. Miles. Colonel Betts, generally. I don't know whether he 
actually did it that particular day. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Were you ever advised or told by the Chief of 
Staif of the message of 24 November 1941 sent by the Chief of Naval 
Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which message said it was concurred 
in by Marshall, warning of a possible surprise aggressive Japanese 
attack ? 

Gen. Miles. I was never told by the Chief of Staff of any such 
message. 

[9] Lt. Col. Gibson. You of course knew from previous his- 
tory that the Japs were apt to make a surprise attack in starting any 
war? 

Gen. Miles. I knew that they had done that in the Russian war. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you have an}^ knowledge from our military 
attaches or any other information, possibly from the Navy Depart- 
ment, that certain Japanese consulates were burning their documents 
and codes on or about 3 December 1941 ? 

Gen. Miles. I have no recollection of any such knowledge as of 
that date. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of the bulletin issued by the Direc- 
tor of ONI on the Japanese situation, on the Japanese naval situa- 
tion, on December 1 of 1941 ? I show you a copy of it. 

Gen. Miles. I undoubtedly saw this document. I certainly remem- 
ber that ONI and the Navy Department were persuaded that there 
was a considerable movement of Japanese naval forces to the south 
and that there were rumors of forces in the mandates, which were, 
of course, Japanese waters. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you remember seeing document 23673, message 
from Berlin to Tokyo? 

Gen. Miles. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you recollect seeing Army 23570 ? 

Gen. Miles. Yes I do. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. With reference to this 23570, did you ever talk 
with the ONI about this conversation between Admiral Turner and 
Admiral Nomura? 

Gen. Miles. My recollection is that I did. Admiral Turner was 
rather a law unto himself and my recollection is that I discussed it 
in a friendly way with my colleague. We didn't reach any definite 
conclusion. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever visit with Admiral Turner about 
this? 

Gen. Miles. No. 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever get any information on how this 
meeting came about ? 

Gen. Miles. No. 

[10] Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever hear from the Navy Depart- 
ment of any other meeting between Admiral Turner and Admiral 
Nomura about one week prior to Pearl Harbor as a result of which 
Admiral Turner called a meeting of high naval officials as to what 
Nomura was alleged to have told Turner at this meeting ? 

Gen. Miles. No I don't remember having any knowledge of that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Army No. 23631. Had you seen that? 

Gen. Miles. Yes I remember seeing this one, which was to indicate 
that Germany and Italy might act of themselves against the United 
States. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I ask you now if you remember seeing 23859 at 
that time. 

Gen. Miles. Yes I do. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Would you say that, generally speaking, you saw 
these shortly after the date shown on the bottom, apparently trans- 
lated 10-23-41 ? 

Gen. Miles. In all probability the same day. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. That is undoubtedly true of all of these? 

Gen. Miles. Yes. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you 23860 and ask if you recollect seeing 
that. 

Gen. Miles. Yes I saw that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you 24373 and ask if you saw that. 

Gen. Miles. I am pretty sure that I saw that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you 24655 and 24656, which go together, 
and ask if you saw those. 

Gen. Miles. I saw that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you No. 25644 and ask if you saw that. 

Gen. Miles. I don't remember seeing that. 

Lt. Gen. Gibson. No. 25390. Did you see that ? 

Gen. Miles. I don't remember. I would like to say here that those 
I have said I have seen recall to my mind in each case [11] cer- 
tain things that make me say I have seen them. I don't recall that 
or the one preceding it. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. I show you No. 24878. 

Gen. Miles. I recall that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. No. 25773. 

Gen. Miles. I recall that because it was about Mamala. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. No. 25817. 

Gen. Miles. I don't recall that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. No. 25432, which is the Winds Code. 

Gen. Miles. I recall that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson, And did you have that in mind when this so-called 
Winds Message was reported to you ? 

Gen. Miles. You mean the implementation of that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you recall a message being intercepted on the 
evening of December 3 or 4 which apparently used this code as shown 
in Aj-my 25432 ? 

Gen. Miles. Well that question I have already answered. My mem- 
ory is very hazy about it. I don't remember seeing any document on 
the subject. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 55 

Lt. Col. Gibson. In other words, you yourself never got the inter- 
cepted message of December 3 or 4 ? 

Gen. Miles. Not that I remember. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. No. 25392. 

Gen. Miles. I don't recall this message, which is supplementary to 
the Winds Code. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. No. 25138. 

Gen. Miles. No. 25138 I do recall. You want this 25441 too? 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Yes. 

Gen. Miles. 25441. ves I do recall that. 

[i^] Lt. Col. Gibson. 25435 and 25436. 

Gen. Miles. Yes I remember 25435 and 436. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. No. 25442. 

Gen. Miles. That is a continuation of the summary of our note of 
November 26. I remember it. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25446. 

Gen. Miles. I do not recall that message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25548. 

Gen. Miles. I do recall that message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25823. 

Gen. Miles. I don't recall that message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25496. 

Gen. Miles. Yes I recall that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25497. 

Gen. Miles. I don't remember seeing that radio telephone message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25554. 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25344. 

Gen. Miles. I don't recall that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25762. 

Gen. Miles. I don't recall that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25605. 

Gen. Miles. I think I recall that, yes that was when they told us 
they were going to handle the note here, not in Tokyo. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25727. 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I remember that. 

[13] Lt. Col. Gibson. 25783. 

Gen Miles. I don't remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25715. 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25659 and 25660. 

Gen. Miles. Yes. This is the interview with Sumner Welles. I 
remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25730. 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25725, and 25721 goes with it. 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I think I remember both of those. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25731. 

Gen. Miles. I don't remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25785. 

Gen. Miles. I think I remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25807. 

Gen. Miles. I don't remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25838 and 25843. 



56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Gen. Miles. 25838, yes. 25843, this is an answer. Yes I certainly 
remember that. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. 25445. 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I remember that. Before we go any further I 
think I ought to make a statement. You have shown me a series of 
important dispatches. I believe, from my knowledge of the system 
then in effect, that I saw them all. I have identified certain ones as 
being those that I remembered because as I read them I find state- 
ments of fact or assumption that ring a bell in my mind. Others I 
have identified as not having seen, so far as I now remember, because 
[14-] I find no such statements or assumptions in them that ring a 
bell in mind. I am conscious of my oath and I want to make it plain 
that my memory, after two and a half years, is not of the best and I 
cannot even be sure of identifying those messages which I think I 
remember. 

Lt. Col. GiBSOx. I want to come back for just a moment to that 
so-called Winds Cods. I believe you said you did not remember seeing 
that. 

Gen. Miles. I remember seeing the Winds Code. Then there was 
another code that I don't remember seeing that was in the intelligence 
summary. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you make any arrangements with the Army or 
Federal Communications Commission or Navy or any listening agen- 
cies to listen — to pick up anything that might be broadcast ? 

Gen. Miles. We did. 

Lt. Col. GiBSOx. And what were those arrangements? 

Gen. Miles. These arrangements were that if certain words that we 
had from the Top Secret were intercepted in any of our monitoring 
stations we were to be immediately notified by telephone. As I remem- 
ber, the telephone number that we gave was that of Colonel Bratton — 
it was to come through that source. We did not, of course, tell FCC 
what the meaning of this intercepted message would be. They were 
simply to notify us if they heard it. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you have knowledge, General, along about the 
first of December 1941, that there was a Japanese fleet operating in the 
Marshalls area? 

Gen. Miles. I had knowledge that the Navy had received reports 
that there was a Japanese naval force in the mandated islands. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know of your own knowledge or did the 
Navy tell you as to our own fleet out there around Pearl Harbor, what 
we had out there, etc. ? 

Gen. Miles. I knew in general what part of our fleet was in Pearl 
Harbor. I don't remember that I particularly tried to find out exactly 
what ships were there but the [15] greater part of the battle 
fleet was there, I knew from general knowledge. Whether it was in 
Pearl Harbor or in that area I did not Iviiow on any particular day. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you have any general knowledge from anybody 
on the state of our anti-aircraft defenses of Hawaii at this time? 

Gen. Miles. Yes, I know from my jDrevious knowledge of the de- 
fenses of Hawaii pretty generally the number and strength of our 
anti-aircraft batteries on the island. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you know about the practice of the fleet coming 
in and tying up in the Harbor for the weekends? 

Gen. MiiJ2S. No, I did not know that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 57 

Lt. Col. Gibson. General, you, I believe, got out an estimate of the 
situation generally for the Chief of Staff as of 29 November 1941. I 
will show you a copy for your recollection. 

Gen. Miles. I did. 

Lt. Col. GiKSON. That did not disclose in it that you considered the 
Japs had a capability of attacking Pearl Harbor by air. I wonder, 
was that considered before you submitted the report, was that capa- 
bility considered by you? 

Gen. Miles. I presume so. Please note that this estimate starts 
out with this sentence : "This estimate is addressed to the objective of 
Nazi defeat." It was deliberately written that way. I was a little 
tired of certain defeatist attitudes among certain of my own people 
and I wanted to get out an estimate of the situation addressed to the 
objective of the defeat of the Nazis. Now an air attack on Pearl Har- 
bor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been, I knew very well, a 
source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Depart- 
ment. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation presumably 
because it was so obvious. We had spent several hundred million in 
defense of Hawaii, we had our greatest fleet out there. That Hawaii 
could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone. I re- 
read that estimate yesterday. I regret that in stating the possibilities 
we stated an attack on the Philippines and did not state an attack on 
Hawaii, Alaska, West Coast, Panama, etc. It was an omission, but I 
think a rather obvious omission. 

[16] Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever talk with the Chief of the 
War Plans Division as to the possibility of a Jap attack on Hawaii ? 

Gen. Miles. I don't remember specifically talking with him on that 
subject, no. We both were thoroughly familiar with the defense plans 
and I don't remember that the subject came up. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. These reports, these Top Secret reports, when you 
got them did you evaluate them yourself or did you have somebody 
else give you their evaluation of them? 

Gen, Miles. I evaluated them myself in my own mind. Colonel 
Bratton was evaluating them and putting his evaluation into the big 
estimate. 

Lt. Col, Gibson. The only dissemination that you made of the evalu- 
ation of these reports would be to Colonel Bratton or WPD or the 
Chief of Staff? 

Gen. Miles, As I say, I do not remember that the Chief of Staff ever 
discussed the effect of the Top Secret dispatches except their absence 
in not talking about our reinforcement of the Philippines, I don't 
remember any particular discussion that I had with General Gerow 
on evaluating them. These were highly important dispatches which 
all three of us saw and after all I assumed that the command channels 
could evaluate about as well as I could, in plain English, what the 
Japanese were saying and thinking, 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever take it upon yourself to go up to 
see the Chief of Staff and say you thought a very serious situation was 
being revealed by these things and jog him on it ? 

Gen. Miles. Not until the morning of December 7th, The serious- 
ness of the situation was, obviously, known to him, 

Lt. Col. Gibson. On what occasion on that particular morning did 
you go up and personally see him ? 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Gen. Miles. Well, upon the receipt of the long Japanese telegram 
reply. That, I notice, is dated December 6. I first knew that it was 
in that evening and of course we were watching for it very eagerly. 
We knew that that meant some very definite decision regarding the 
conference. It was being translated all night. [l?] I knew 
that the first part of it was translated on the evening of the 6th but 
that did not give away the whole business. I went to the office the 
morning of the 7th and got the whole thing, also was informed that 
it was to be delivered that afternoon, and arrangements were made to 
see Secretary Hull. That of course alone was enough to go to the 
Chief of Staff. 

Col. Clakke. These messages which you have identified here and 
which you say according to the system you are sure you had seen all 
of them, you are positive these were seen by the Chief of Staff, to 
the best of your knowledge ? 

Gen. Miles. They were all seen by the Chief of Staff and all seen 
by me to the best of my knowledge. Certain ones, as I say, ring a 
bell in my mind. I feel morally certain that I saw them all and 
the Chief of Staff saw them all. 

Col. Clarke. Were you ever told by the Assistant Secretary of 
State or the Under Secretary of State in July of 1941 that in their 
opinion war was inevitable and that the War Department should get 
a secret intelligence service started and get their agents planted 
around through the world while there was yet time? 

Gen. Miles. No, I have no recollection whatever of being told by 
the Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State. 

Col. Clarke. What was the occasion when you started censorship 
in the War Department ? 

Gen. Miles. It is rather a long story. A censorship plan had been 
drafted in the War Department, largely in MID, before I came in 
May 1940. My recollection is that that plan was approved by the 
Joint Board. It must have been because I distinctly remember it 
went to the President and was disapproved. From then on there were 
many attempts to revise some form of censorship plan. It was ob- 
viously a war necessity if war did occur between us and the Germans 
or Japanese or anyone and a necessity which could be filled only by 
pre-preparation and training, in other words, you had to train cen- 
sors. During 1941, or perhaps as early as late 1940, the Navy, without 
approval of the President, quietly began to train censors and my 
naval colleague at that time, Admiral Anderson, Chief of ONI, used 
to spur me on — "why don't you do this too?" I remember several 
conversations about that. We were trying, as usual, to play the 
game and do only what was approved, but as the thing warmed up 
all over the work!, our lendlease and other [18] approaches 
to war, it became obvious that the War Department had to do some- 
thing about it and I started the censorship school, as you remember, 
over here in Clarendon. 

Col. Clarke. That had nothing to do with any of this material, it 
was the general knowledge inherent within you that 

Gen. Miles. It was just the general trend. We knew we had to 
prepare for censorship immediately. 

Col. Clarke. You had close contact with ONI but not with the 
Naval Operations — is that true, at that time ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 59 

Gen. Miles. That was very true. Admiral Turner was practicallv 
Nava] Operations through a larcre part of that time Neither Ge?ow 
nor McNarney nor McCloy nor myself could g-et very far whhSnT 

Lt Col GiBsox. So the only real liaison you had was^^^^ h ONI 
winch really had the strategic iiitelligence data andTfot The .vctuai 
up-to-the-minute operations of the Na?y2 

Gen. Miles. Yes. I knew, for instance, through ONI of the naval 
telegTam that went out paralleling ours of November 27 I am nre^v 
sure that I knew other definite moves that were made' ^ *^ 

to^eSvy^T? """"' ''"^"^ "^^ "^ "^^^^ '''-' --* f-m here 
..^,-?if' A J^^'^'; ^''''f ^^ ''^^^^^'' ^""^ ^ore directly my own relationshin 

cons^'sf of S^fr* ^u^'^ IT''. ^'^'^'''' ""'^^ ^^^^ State Department merely 
Gen m£s f es """"' '"^"^^ ^^ '' '^'^ ^'^'^ Departmen{? 

fnl^L ^^^V?n?'''''' ^yi^ln't consist of contacting the Under Secre- 
taries [i5] or Secretary of State or the experts on the various 
country desks to ask for their judgment on what las pkkedVp 

Gen. ]\W In a sense it did. Our liaison officer partkularlv 
P.? hl'V^'^^'' ""^^ ^^f extremely successful as a llaS officer 
established very personal relations in order to carry out his iob w?th 
various people of the State Department, from wK he c^uld ^et 
thiu^ht oTif ''?'h?^^ factual Information but what tfey 

retai^^ Rprlp T ^h/^^^of relationship also with Assistant Sec- 

saw Mr Hun JCI U^^d^^Secretary Sumner Welles at times I 
saw Mr. Hull at least once and perhaps more, I don't remember. 

Gen. Miles. I did not. I don't know if Colonel Betts did or not. 
TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT O'DELI 

CWC: All right, now tell me your story. We ^ot the storv thit 

someZn^ to t^f'^T T ' '""'^ ^^" ^^^" ^^^ did^Pead llSr t' 
O'D Wpll ^''^'T ^^" ''''I ^^^^* t^""^g "« ^hat you know. 

OD. Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought 

might not have come out through other sources. There was a cable 

of'thrH.w'" '^^^£^,^^ ^^^^?jb^^ ^« th- Commanding Generals 
ot the Hawaiian and Phihppme Departments concerning the move- 
ment of a Japanese Task Force in the South China Sea. The infor- 
mation had come to the Military Attache through the Australian 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called 
Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office. 
CWC : You were then Merle Smith's assistant ? 
O'D : That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. 
That's the reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over 
on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Burnett, myself, and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander 
Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. 
The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, to the 
Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the movement 
of a Jap Task Force in the South China Sea. However, within an 
hour after we had gotten there some additional information came 
in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we 
went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he 
revised to send out and the principal part of that other than the 
movement of this convoy was that the Dutch had ordered the execu- 
tion of the Kainbow Plan, A-2. I remember, it's been almost three 
years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of 
the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the 
joint Abducan plan only to be taken in the event of war. It pro- 
vided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other 
action. In other words, A-1 would have been some other direction 
expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they or- 
dered the execution of this A-2. That was significant because the 
plan called for joint operations for the Australians and the Dutch 
and to the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That 
was to go into, effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had 
ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into 
effect. There was a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir 
Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle 
Smith, although impatient to send it. said that he would wait twelve 
hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request. In other words, they 
didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they 
probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it. 

[2] CWC : Let me ask you — now that was on December 5 ? 
O'D : Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it. 
CWC : In other words that's the 3rd our time. 
O'D : That's right, sir. 

CWC : And you didn't send it actually until the 5th? 
O'D : Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cab- 
inet Meeting at which Sir Charles Burnett was to report this informa- 
tion to the Australian War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne 
that evening, and he went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. 
We, on our part, held the cable twelve hours, and I coded it and had 
it ready for dispatch and held on to it. In the cable (it was extremely 
urgent) this convoy, they had it doped out. could get to somewhere, 
either the Philippines or^he Indies within, I believe it was, 60 hours, 
and that is the way that we had figured it. So we sent the cable one 
copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and another 
copy in a different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commancling 
General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it to Wasliing- 
ton. In other words, we sent none direct to MILID as we would have 
done if time hadn't been such a factor. But, we were extremely labor- 
ious in writing 



PROCEFDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 61 

CWC : In other Avords, you fellows instead of having a drop copy 
for Hawaii, you gave it to Hawaii and told them 

O'D : And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another 
copy to the Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this 
whatsoever. It wholly concerned itself with the Philippines and the 
Indies, and it looked like the Indies at that precise moment would be 
the first to get it. Now, we sent that cable, that would be the morning 
of the 5th their time, and I see in the papers where Dixon denied that 
his country had any information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it 
was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But they did have 
a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific Area. 
I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know — we never 
had any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Phil- 
ippines, and we never heard anything from MILID to let us know 
whether or not it had reached them. Of course, the subsequent events 
were such that it might have been overlooked. The file copy was de- 
stroyed — ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir, Netherlands Far East 
Command on Execution of Plan A-2. Naval moves in Mindanao — 
(interrupted) 

CWC : General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell. 

KAO: O'Dell. 

\o] O'D : How do you do, sir. 

KAO : Mighty glad to know you. 

O'D : Pleased to meet you, sir. 

CWC : He's giving us some information here in connection with this 
Pearl Harbor business. 

RAO : I've heard about it. 

CWC : You've heard about Pearl Harbor? 

RAO : Ha ! Ha ! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at 
Christmas we'll all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have 
met you. 

O'D : Thank you, sir. 

O'D : What made us particularly angry about this was that the next 
morning the newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain 
part of this information about the Indies. And, after we had held the 
cable up at their request. Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great 
deal of trouble over why we had had to hold our cable and the press 
had gotten an inkling of it ; they hadn't gotten the works, sir, but they 
had an inkling. That is the message in particular, sir. That is the one. 

CWC : Notice the footnote down there. 

O'D: "And relayed to War Department message center" (reading 
from message). 

(Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with Gen- 
eral Strong) 

O'D : We expected action to take place on Sunday our time, and we 
all went down to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, 
and nothing happened Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this 
was another of those scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had 
had several previous warnings of impending action in time to reflect 
that in the reports and cables that we had sent. One other positive 
action was that Kopang — two davs before this happened — received 
fifty (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to have in 
under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened 
by the Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship. 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I think that was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he 
could put it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete, 
well not radar because radar wasn't in the state that we now know it, 
but it was a sending and receiving radio set, and we had had informa- 
tion about that. Also, [4] of course, all the Japanese shipping 
had been pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty days be- 
fore. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, we sent that in 
the morning, the Japanese consul, in Melbourne, who was under sur- 
veillance, was seen to burn all of his codes in the backyard. Nobody, 
of course, was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that. 
CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was 
it sent from ? 

O'D. From Melbourne, sir. 
CWC. Melbourne on the fifth. 
O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir. 

EWC. According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by Sig- 
nals iSawaii, don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Depart- 
ment, arriving here at the night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, 
with a memo on it that this was addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed 
here with request for decipherment and repeat back to them. 
CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note. 
EWG. Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious why 
Signals Hawaii held that so long. They couldn't decipher it; maybe 
they thought they could, I don't know. 

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had. 
CWC. What did you use ? 

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used 
the secret book with the cipher table. 

CWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you re- 
member ? 

O'D. If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I remember it, 
it was gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential ancl 
a thin secret and then there were the cipher tables that were changed 
every thirty days, and we were very careful to pick one. That's why 
we had to code it twice, once in a code that we knew Hawaii had and 
once in one the Philippines had because the Philippines had diflPerent 
codes entirely from HaAvaii, and we had to — well, you can imagine, 
that is a rather laborious job, a message like that. 

CWC. The message we got in said it was held 17 hours. 
O'D. That was IT hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next 
morning. I see tliey have a question maik under what government. 
It was the Australian government. We put that in the message. 

[6] EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information 
indicating that there was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor? 
O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any informa- 
tion or anything in that direction. We knew of a task force in the 
South China Sea, and whether it was headed for the Philippines or 
whether it was headed for any part of the Indies, the reconnaisance 
information that was available to us did not specify. 

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in tlie 
Marshalls? 
O'D. Yes, sir. 
CWC. You did know about that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 63 

.1 ^3^; S^' ^i^,' ^^^ough the Australian Government again. Mostlv 

the -KAAl^ They were the ones rather than the Army or the Navv 

?.^f^S^^^^'^F ^^^^^ ^^""^ feeding us what information of vahie-— 

owe. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, 

do you recall ? *^ ' 

O'D. I shoiild say it was in that same week. Probably early in 
that week. That was toward the latter part of the week. I should 
say m the early part of that week, sir. We had been followinfr the 
Japanese disposition of troops and had sent a report, a regular M/A 
report on the disposition of all Japanese divisions about a month be- 
tore all this came up, which was used merely to confirm what other 
reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the disposi- 
tion ot the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirmina the other 
information here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japa- 
nese shipping had been moved back into its own territorial waters 
Most of our information led us to the definite and inescapable conclu- 
sion that war was going to break here, nothing about Pearl Harbor, 

fi ^^J-^-r.?^^^^' ^i ^°^^^^^' ^h.^t is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who is 
this Sir Charles Burnett again ? , y^^i^ ^^^ 

f.^'^'i ^^1 ^""^ ^^'i5^ ^^ ^^^SP^ ^^^ ^-^^F. He has been sent back 
to England now. He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was 
through him and Air Commodore Hewett, he was an intellio-ence 
officer that we had disposal of whatever information they had? and 
they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. But the message 
that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we sent it 
out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Colonel Merle Smith 
was exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmLt He 

ZSlt^Z'rSl^rjdy. ^ '-''' ^'^^ '^ '^'^'^ ^^^^ absolutely down 

?}7^' JS^ -^ ^'^^^'^ ^^^'^^ ^"^i^^- I knew him very well 

If- .1 . • ,^ y°" ^^^ s^^ ^^^^ that cable, sir, that he put 

A-Tlas?"^" ^^'''' ^'''''^ ''^^^*^'^'' '''' ''''^ ^^"^'^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^i« Pl'^n 
fi.^'i?' ^\believed that they did. That point came up because of 

andSh'nT'o H^' "^'f "^^'l'' ^^^?^? *^^ ^-^^ Headquarte?f 
and the Plan A-2 being for I). S. participation mostlv in a naval 

Hn'^r'-rfL^ '"''r^'^^r ^''''"^''^ '^^' i^ ^^ybody knew^ A-2 PeS 

Navv'^nd tl^nT ' " J^^' ''^''^'' '^' ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ow that toThe 
^avy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to them. But this 
Naval Plan, you see there was a Naval Attache in Melbourne Captain 
Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Cap an 
Pm noL VffS'f '^ ""''l ™^^^^-e like that. I do not belfeve hfdid 
I m not qualified to say for certain, but he was not in the same state 
tha we were about it. What I am trying to say is that whit we sent 
thfi' wf ""' ^'""^ seemed such a positive indication, to that every- 
thmg where we were definitely led to the assumption that war was 
going to break out. This was about the third or fourth imlTt had 
happened but this time it really seemed in a state where in 60 hours 
that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code burn- 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing and various other indications from all sorts that I knew about 
and no doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it 
was goinor to be the end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday 
and that Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we had 
a let down, and then of course it was Monday, our time, that it 
happened. He put nothing in that cable that wouldn't be 

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands Command at 8 A. M. 
on 7 December reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you 
have sent it before ? 

O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it 
was delayed. In other words we had to re-write it because the situa- 
tion was changing momentarily. 

EWG. Then you don't think that this was 

O'D. No, sir, that went out on Friday. 

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering? 

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing : the suggestion that 
the RAAF likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're 
going to live up to our obligation ". 

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all. 

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy that I 
know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present Mili- 
tary Attache with all old papers, about two years ago. 

[7] CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their peo- 
ple here ? Do you have any way of knowing that, or any opinion ? 

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situa- 
tion. You see, of course, the capitol, sir, is in Canberra, and we were 
stationed in Melbourne because that was the scene of activity. The 
War Cabinet met the previous night. That's when Sir Charles 
Burnett had told them this information. Whether the War Cabinet, 
who would be the body then who would have instructed them to let 

Washington know . Sir Owen Dixon wasn't here then. He was 

a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here. 

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then. 

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey. 

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out 
of here. 

O'D. Yes, sir, that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not 
they sent a cable to — I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I 
say, the Australian Government wasn't too happy about our sending 
this out even after the delay. I mean they realized that it was in- 
escapable, and we had to keep our government informed, but . 

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my own 
mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he 
gave it to you with the understanding that you not transmit it. 

O'D. No, sir, when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it 
out. It was only after we had the cable — you see, we were there over 
an hour, over two hours, that afternoon, and the information was 
dribbling in in spurts, and we had that and it was only when we were 
getting ready to go, which was around seven o'clock, that the War 
Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't say before six thirty, at 
the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They called this 
emergency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable 
and were' getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett requested 
very specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had 



• PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 65 

informed the War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't 
want the information to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't 
told his own government yet. 

CWC. In other words he wanted to spring it on his people first. 

O'D. I5efore there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir. 

CWC. That's logical. 

O'D. I might say, sir, that because there were only two of us and 
because everything was happening day and night then, that was one 
of the last messages that we sent out in our own code. From then on 
we used the Australian cipher section back and forth. 
[8] CWC: Why? 

O'D: Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the F'hilippines. 
We knew they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the secu- 
rity afforded by the cipher device. 

CWC : You mean the cylindrical ? 

O'D : That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir. 

CWC : But it was secure before the outbreak of war? 

O'D : Once the show broke and we were going back and forth be- 
tween General ]\fac Arthur's headquarters and Australia, we were 
given the use of the Australian code and it was mostly of a liaison 
nature, anyway, as to whether General MacArthur could send a plane 
here on reconnaissance or a plane there or what could be expected in 
one way or another. There were so many messages coming and 
going. General MacArthur w^ould send us messages. Sir Cliarles 
Burnett would ask us for certain information from the Philippines. 
You see Washington was pretty far removed from us at that time. 
We didn't know what delays would be encountered in the cables going 
through Hawaii to AVashington, which was the only means of sending 
any message here, and there were matters which would come up which 
we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we knew we'd never 
get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what 
General MacArthur would be able to tell us and which Washington 
would only have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of 
correspondence back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philip- 
pines to Australia as soon as the war broke out. We simply didn't 
have the means, I mean it would take at least three hours to do a job 
like that message there. By that time the information was not even 
wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office 
right into the RAAF Headquarters. 

CWC : They had the machines then, too, didn't they? 

O'D: No, sir, they did not. They had — I can assure you that 
Colonel Merle Smith went into it to the last detail, no violations of 
any security. 

CWC : Oh, no, I wasn't thinking about that. Mine was just a ques- 
tion of the time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. 
This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that 
convoy which was at sea when Pearl Harbor hit ? 

O'D : Yes, sir. 

CWC: Were you aware of the corresj^ondence when they sent it 
all over the whole damned South Pacific 1 

O'D: Then, sir, we started getting messages from General Marshall 
in a code that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the 
code. They repeated the message in a different code, and we had that 
code, and curiously went through that and got that, it was a 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 147 6 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9] double transposition, which, of course, didn't use the book. 
We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there again. We were 
having our troubles. We got that deciphered, and it was from 
General Marshall, and we called that the F'ensacola, sir, that was 
under escort by one cruiser, which was the Pensacola. We would do 
about ten of those in one message, sir. One little error in the first, 
and you go back and do the whole thing over again, and you can't tell 
until after you've finished that you've made an error, when you start 
to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several cables 
about the arrival of the Pensacola convoy, including what was on it. 
As I remember j^ there were A-24's and P-40's. There were, 'I think, 
26 P-40's and 18 A-24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted 
to know what was the A-24. Well, sir, frankly the means at our 
disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the A-24's were, we 
didn't get far, and that was a little annoving. 

CWC: That was that Mitchell dive bomber? 

O'D : That's right, sir, single engine and, of course, the A-20 was 
a twin engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's inind was, 
is it a single engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes 
and they had to make arrangements for staging areas for them and 
discharge and so forth, and it was rather difficult to do without that 
information. Still, by the time we wired to Washington to ask them 
(we didn't, of course, because, with everything happening all over) 
they were going to land. They were due on the 23rd of December, 
sir. They arrived in Brisbane and we went up to Brisbane to meet 
the convoy. 

CWC : Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. 
That interceptor outfit that came out with them. 

O'D : Yes, sir, they were destined, of course, for the Philippines 
and South Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. 
General MacArthur had sent General Brereton with a mission of about 
eight men, eight officers, from the Philippines in the latter part of 
November, and General Brereton had arrived at Darwin and Colonel 
Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul with them, 
and I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They 
were primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being 
flown out from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin and then up through the 
Indies to the Philippines. They were trying to arrange for petrol 
from the Shell Oil Company and airports, airports principally. That 
was where we got about a 60 day start, not quite that, about a 45 day 
start on building airports around Darwin which were later used when 
they evacuated the B-l7's, these strips through the jungle. General 
Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't 
have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had 
flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports 
where we could land them. Then, of course, this Pensacola convoy 
came in. 

CWC : Yes, I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there 
is anything else unless you have something you want to add to what 
you have said. 

O'D : No, sir, I just wanted you to have 

CWC: All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I ap- 
preciate your taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you. 

O'D : Thank you very much, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 67 

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER 

[i] I'lace : Room 2CG37 Pentagon Building, Washington. D. C. 

Date : 10 September 1944. 

Time: 0945-1030. 

Present : 

Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler. 
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, having been sworn and warned of his rights 
by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony : 

Col, Clarke. Will you state you name, rank, organization and 
station. 

Col. Sadtler. Otis K. Sadtler, 03577, Headquarters Army Ground 
Forces, War College, Washington, D. C. 

Col. Clarke. When did you become Chief of Army Communica- 
tions Service, approximately what date? 

Col. Sadtler. About the 7th of August 1941. 

Col. Clarke. You held that position at the time of Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Sadtler. I did. 

Col. Clarke. As such were you responsible for the production of 
what is known as Magic or Ultra intelligence ? 

Col. Sadtler. I was. 

Col. Clarke. Did you have access to this ? I 

Col. Sadtler. I did. 

Col. Clarke. Did you read the messages before they were sent to 
G-2? 

Col. Sadtler. In general yes, not always. 

Col. Clarke. Were you familiar with a message which was received 
in the SIS on or about November 28 which later became known as 
the Winds message ? 

Col. Sadtler. I am familiar with that message. 

Col. Clarke. I hand you that and ask if you can identify it — 
#25432. 

Col. Sadtler. That is the message, yes. 

[£] Col. Clarke. Will you state what, to the best of your knowl- 
edge, belief and recollection, you know of the history of this message 
and any implementing message which may have been received regard- 
ing it ? 

Col. Sadtler. It is my recollection that that message was inter- 
cepted by the Navy and we asked the Federal Communications Com- 
mission to monitor all press broadcasts from Japan as a result of that 
message. 

Col. Clarke. By "we" you mean Signal Corps? 

Col. Sadtler. Yes, and Col. Guest, as I recall, was the man who made 
the arrangements. The FCC put their Wharton station on these 
broadcasts from Japan and made arrangements with the telephone 
company to contact Col. Bratton, the G-2 liaison officer at that time, 
directly if they heard anything regarding the implementing of that 
message. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Meaning message #25432. 

Col. Sadtler. That Winds message. We contacted the FCC from 
time to time and asked them whether anything had been heard that 
would give us any clue as to when that was going to happen, etc. The 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

first information that I had regarding any new developments on that 
message was on the morning of December 5, when Adm. Noyes called 
me and said, "Sadtler, the message is in," or words to that effect. 
Adm. Noyes was the head of Navy commmiications service which in- 
cluded this code and cipher work. I went immediately to General 
Sherman Miles' office, who was G-2 of the Army at the time, and told 
him that the message was in and that it was to the effect that war would 
be declared between Japan and Great Britain. He said, "Wait a 
minute, I will get Col. Bratton." Bratton came in almost immedi- 
ately. I told him what Adm. Noyes had told me and he said, ''What 
was the word?" I told him I didn't know what the word was. He 
took out a little slip of paper he had in his pocket which had the Jap- 
anese words shown in this message and asked me if it was one of those. 
1 said, "I don't know but it is the one that means war with Japan and 
Great Britain." He said, "Do you think you can verify this?" and I 
said, "I will go back and call Adm. Noyes." The reason I had to go 
back to call Adm. Noyes was that the secret phone was in my office. I 
called Adm. Noyes and he said something to the effect that, "I don't 
know any more Japanese than you do ; it's the one of Japan and Great 
Britain." I said, "Do you think you can verify it?" He said, "I can't 
do it [3] now because I must report to the Chief of Naval 
Operations but I will do it later," I said it would be too late then. 

I then returned to Gen. Miles' office and told him that Adm, Noyes 
did not know the word but that it was the one that war was ffoing to 
be declared between Japan and Great Britain. They said, "Well un- 
less there is something definite as to the meaning of this word this 
may be a false alarm," There was some other conversation on the 
subject, and as I recall I was instructed by Gen, Miles to make sure 
that FCC and other agencies listened on that Japanese press broad- 
cast and to let him know of any future developments. I then returned 
to my office. 

Col. Clarke. Did you ever discuss this with anybody else ? Did you 
make any report of this to the Chief Signal Officer, for example, or 
to the Chief of Staff or Secretary of General Staff? 

Col. Sadtler. No, it wasn't told to anyone else in the Signal Corps 
because the Chief Signal Officer was in Panama at the time. That was 
discussed in War Plans Division and it was to some extent discussed 
with the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. Smith. 

Col. Clarke. Did they evidence any interest in this case? 

Col. Sadtler. Not a great deal. As I remember. Gen. Gerow made 
a statement that they had been adequately warned. 

Col. Clarke. By they you mean the department commanders? 

Col. Sadtler. HaAvaii, Panama and Philippines. Col. Smith de- 
cided that nothing further should be done because it had been dis- 
cussed with G-2 and War Plans. 

Col. Clarke. Will you state what you know about any action that 
may have been taken on the morning of December 7. 

Col. Sadtler. I did not go to the office on the morning of December 
7. Anything that I can say about December 7 is as a result of going 
down to the office afterwards. 

Lt, Col, Gibson, This Col, Smith is Col, Bedell Smith, now General ? 

Col. Sadtler. That's the one. 

[^] Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you talk to Col. Smith personally 
about the 5th of December? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 69 

Col. Sadtler. It was tlie morning of the 5th, Friday morning, after 
I talked to G-2. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. And he asked you if you li:id talked with G-2? 

Col. Sadtlek. He asked me what T had done as a result of this and 
I told him I had been to G-2 and that I had visited WPD and had 
seen Col. Gaily and Gen. Gerow. Gaily had nothing to say but Gen. 
Gerow^ said they had had plenty of warning. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, tell this to 
Gen. Marshall? 

Col. Sadtler. Personally, no. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Do you know of anybody who did? 

Col. Sadtler. I don't know if Gen. Marshall ever knew it. 

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 

[i] 

Place : Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, "Washington, D. C. 

Date : 14 September 1944. 

Time: 1330-1430. 

Present : 

Major General Sherman Miles. 
Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner. 
Colonel John T. Bissell. 
Colonel Rufus Bratton. 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson. 

Gen. Miles (to Col. Bissell) . Definitely you confirmed yesterday my 
impression that the information we got from F. B. I. through the trans- 
lations or intercepts of their messages at Hawaii was not given to us 
and was not available in fact to F. B. I. until after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Bissell. That is correct. 

Gen. Miles. I think you also said that we got nothing from the 
F. B. I. before Pearl Harbor indicating the possibilities of an open 
break of war with the United States. 

Col. Bissell. That is correct, too. 

Col. Clarble. Where did this message come from here on December 3 
that they were burning the codes? Where did that information come 
from — it is in the Roberts Report. It apparently was the Navy and it 
must have had something which McCullom didn't make available to 
you. Bissell says he knew about burning the codes on the morning of 
December 7. That was in the papers of course. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was there much interchange between the F. B. I. 
and G-2 prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Col. Bissell. Oh yes, there was a great deal but not of this nature. 

Col. Clarke. It was all on domestic intelligence. 

Gen. Miles. Oh, no, there was a lot on South American stuff and a lot 
on Japanese stuff. I had a personal meeting with Hoover and ONI 
once a week. 

[2'] Lt. Col. Gibson. Had you ever asked them if they had anything 
on Hawaii, any information of Japanese activities in Hawaii prior to 
Pearl Harbor ? 

Col. Bissell. Yes, to a great extent. The F. B. I. kept us informed 
as to the locations of these Japanese military attaches and then when 
they passed into Panama I in turn notified the G-2, with Gen. Miles' 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

consent, where they were going, and they in turn shadowed them in 
Panama, and if they turned up in Hawaii we got information both from 
the F. B. I. and our own people, 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Why was it that the F. B. I. suddenly started to turn 
over to you after Pearl Harbor information that might have been help- 
ful before Pearl Harbor ? 

Col BissELL. They didn't have it before. 

Gen, Miles. They were held down. 

Col. Bratton. I would like to clear this up. I understand that you 
(Col. Bissell) and Gen. Kroner have stated that this material (refer- 
ring to Top Secret) was not made available to you prior to Pearl Har- 
bor. I am of the distinct impression that, under orders from Gen. 
Miles, I did make it available to you before Pearl Harbor in the form 
of memorandums that had to do with certain subversive activities. I 
told you sometime before Pearl Harbor that I had a source of informa- 
tion which 

Col. BissELL. I don't remember the date. That may have been be- 
fore Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Bratton. I am of the distinct impression that that was initiated 
sometime before Pearl Harbor, and I am also of the distinct impression 
that these things were made available to you, at Gen. Miles' order, prior 
to Pearl Harbor and that you (Gen, Kroner) and Betts used to read 
them in the evening in the office. 

Gen. Kroner. That is not my impression. I am aware of such (Top 
Secret) existing but I remember very clearly 

Col. Bratton. Pursuant to instructions to you and an understanding 
with the General here, when anything was hot I used to run to General 
Miles first and I always acquainted you with what I had done after- 
wards at your convenience. 

[3] Gen, Kroner. I do not remember that procedure with regard 
to signal intelligence or what was known as Magic. I do not remember 
any specific instance. 

Col. Bratton. I cannot recall any specific instance, but I am under 
the impression you knew what had gone between General Miles and 
myself. 

Gen, Kroner. Well I have just the opposite impression, and that is 
that it was General Miles' wish, not expressed specifically but as I 
got it in working with you and his not talking about it to me spe- 
cifically, that he wished it to continue to be handled between you two 
and that would form the basis of information, with your general 
information, and you advised me about the Philippines or about the 
Far Eastern situation according to the information you had available 
to you. 

Gen. Miles. Your section, Bratton, was part of Kroner's Branch. 
Now it is true, I remember, that we were alwa3'^s closing in on Magic, 
making it more secure all the time — trying to — and that we had several 
jjeople outside of the Munitions Building to serve. It was my definite 
desire and direction, I think, that you would handle the mechanics of 
Magic direct with me and the Chief of Staff, and later WPD, ONI, 
etc., but that you were to inform your Chief of anything important 
and certainly use Magic in your estimate of the Far East that 3^011 
were giving to your Chief, Gen, Kroner. I am pretty sure that was 
the definite arrangement. 

Col. Bratton. That is my undei-standing too. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 71 

Gen. Kroner, My only comment on that is that I was never told or 
never received the impression that you wanted me to be specifically 
informed, but I assumed from our association that you expected 
Bratton to use the information in an all around appreciation of what 
was available to him when he gave me an opinion about the Far East. 

Gen. Miles. I would like to ask Gen. Kroner if you can remember 
what your general impression of the Far Eastern situation was, of 
the probabilities of Japanese action whether against us or foreign 
powers, late in November or early in December. 

Gen. I^oNER. That there were a number of lines of action open to 
Japan, mostly comiected with the Asiatic Continent, [4] which 
she would be more likely to take in case she decided to go to war against 
England or America, and that my attention was focused, after fre- 
quent discussions with Col. Bratton and Col. Betts, on the Asiatic 
Continent rather than toward the South Pacific. 

Gen. Miles. Then I would like to ask both of you this. I have just 
read today that excellent summary that you prepared last year on 
the information received in MID. From that I get the very distinct 
impression, and I can remember this was my impression at the time, 
that the bulk of our information, all of it including Magic, indicated 
the major proability of a Japanese move to the south, Indo China, 
Siam, Thailand, perhaps the Dutch West Indies, perhaps Malaya, 
that our general impression at that time was that that was the most 
probable Japanese move. We did not exclude war with the United 
States since we specifically mentioned the Philippines as being part 
of the Japanese southern push and in a war with the United States 
of course there was a possibility, particularly with the Japanese, that 
a surprise attack might be made anywhere, certainly including Hawaii 
which had been armed and prepared for such an attack for twenty 
years. 

Col. Bratton. But that initially, as I have testified this morning, 
any attack against an American installation in the middle or eastern 
Pacific would be in the nature of a diversion and having as its ob- 
jective the immobilizing of any force that we might call in to help the 
Dutch and British in west and southwest Pacific, but as you say their 
primary initial objective was the destruction of Great Britain's power 
in southeast Asia and the seizure of 

Gen. Miles. We don't very greatly differ there. I don't know that 
I would have said at the time that an attack on Hawaii or tlie Panama 
Canal, if made, would be a diversion. It would be a pretty serious 
attack to attain the objective, but not likely in view of the mass of in- 
formation that we had as to the southern push. Is that more what 
you remember, Kroner ? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes. 

Col. Clarke. In view of what you have just stated here with refer- 
ence to this great mass of information, didn't you consider it was 
equally the responsibility of the Chief of the War Plans Division to 
advise the Chief of Staff, as much [6] his responsibility as 
it was yours with reference to any potential attack which we might 
expect from Japan or any line of action that Japan might take ? 

Gen. Miles. It was the primary responsibility of Military Intelli- 
gence, always is and always will be, to advise the Command what 
the enemy may do and possibly do or more probably do. It is cer- 
tainly the responsibility of Operations to advise the Chief of Staff 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

wliat we should do as the result of information received in Military 
Intelligence from their sources. I certainly considered it then a part 
of my business to know, in general terms, the disposition of American 
forces and rather specifically our defense plans of vital installations 
such as the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines. I certainly 
knew the location of the major parts of the U. S. fleet. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. In other words, General, once you informed the 
Chief of Staff and the War Plans Division the possibility of an attack, 
it was then up to the WPD, through the Chief of Staff, to inform our 
forces what plan to put into effect ? 

Gen. Miles. Yes, a command responsibility. Now Bratton, in read- 
ing your testimony, it gave me the impression that the Magic that you 
selected for the Secretary of State might not be and was not in 
some cases perhaps quite the same as that presented to the Chief of 
Staff and to me. 

Col. Bratton. No, if you got that impression from anything I said 
I wish to correct it at this time. The Secretary of State never saw 
any document that was not presented to you, the Chief of Staff and 
WPD, as far as I am concerned. 

Gen. Miles. Vice versa, was any document presented to the Chief 
of Staff that was not also presented to the Secretary of State? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, very often. 

Gen. Miles. Keally ? 

Col. Bratton. Initially, but in our final breakdown of the thing 
it was the understanding that Mr. Hull w^as to see all [6] the 
communications that you and General Marshall saw. 

Gen. Miles. And that had been in effect for sometime previous to 
Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Bratton. Yes. When I first started handling this stuff the 
State Department didn't see any of it. It was not until our relations 
with Japan became rather strained that I was instructed to serve it 
to the State Department at all. 

Gen. Miles. I remember that, but for months preceding Pearl Har- 
bor exactly the same selections from Magic which you made went to 
the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2, WPD, 
and the Secretary of War. 

Col. Bratton. Identical. 

Col. Clarke. This meeting is primarily for the purpose of getting 
the four of you together here to iron out anj^ little differences. 

Col. BissiXL. After Bratton talked, I do recall now — I was thinking 
primarily of Japanese information at the time — Bratton did give me 
in the summer time various things which applied to domestic things 
as Communism and things of that nature. It was not primarily 
Japanese. 

Col. Clarke. One thing I want to bring out, you did not receive 
any raw material ? 

Col. Bissell. I never got any raw material until after Pearl Harbor. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Going back to this so-called Winds matter again. 
Gen. Kroner, do you have any recollection of how this telegram was 
sent to G-2, Hawaii — how it happened to he sent on December 5, 1941, 
asking them to contact Commander Rochefort immediately regarding 
a Tokyo weather reference? 

Gen. Kroner. No, I have no knowled^je of it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 73 

Col. Bratton. I wrote that, had General Miles' O.K. and had it 
dispatched. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Who initiated it? 

Col. Bratton. I did. The basis is in one of those messages there. 

Col. Clarke, That message is November 19 and this is December 5. 
[7] Col. Bratton. There were a number of these messages about 

this boogey-woogey they were going to send out on weather broadcast. 
They changed them a number of times and finally it became apparent 
this was what they were going to do. 

Col. Clarke. It has never been clear in my mind what brought this 
on. Sadtler said the message came in on the night of December 4 
and on the morning of December 5 is when he went to General Miles 
with reference to this. This message is dated December 5. I won- 
dei'ed if by any chance you could recall whether or not Gen, Miles 
talked to you about it and told you to have the message sent, or 
whether McCullom, or maybe Sadtler. 

Col. Bratton. I had discussed this weather announcement system 
with Commander McCullom of the Navy and was informed by him 
that the officer in Hawaii who had complete knowledge of all of these 
Magic messages and who could explain most readily to the Army 
officials the significance of the radio broadcast, was Commander 
Rochefort. 

Gen. Miles. So then this was a means of getting the information to 
Hawaii that the Winds message was out. Is that what you mean ? 

Col. Bratton. No, that this would be the most expeditious way of 
telling our people in Hawaii that relations between Japan and one or 
more countries would be broken off. 

Gen. Miles. If a certain message came through? 

Col. Bratton. They were monitoring them in Hawaii; they got 
them there before we got them. They were listening to the same 
stuff we were, so my idea here was that if our G-2 got in touch with 
Rochefort, he having already received this code by broadcast, could 
tell our G-2 at once what it meant. It was a means of saving time. 

Col. Clarke. Why did you wait two weeks ? You got it on Novem- 
ber 19 and told Hawaii on December 5. I am not clear on that. Cir- 
cumstantial evidence points to the fact that Sadtler is partly accurate 
in what he says. 

Gen. Miles. The message of November 19 gave us the word which 
they would use in three cases. Now what Bratton is saying, if I 
understand correctly, is that this message of December 5 was a means 
of letting our G-2 know thoroughly not only that this code had been 
arranged [S] but the implementing message was in, which 
would account for the date of December 5. My recollection about 
that is very vague. 

Col. Bratton. This accounts for some of the discrepancy in the 
timing. It wasn't translated until the 28th. 

Gen, Miles. The Winds Code message was not translated until 
November 28, 

Col. Bratton. And may not have been given to me until the 29th. 

Col. Clarke. What I am trying to prove is, was there any knowledge 
in G-2 of the implementing message ? 

Gen. Miles. I think that that is the correct explanation but, as I 
say, on that particular thing my memory is hazy, of the implementa- 
tion of the Winds Code. I can conceive, however, of no reason for 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Sending that message about Commander Rochefort except that Roche- 
fort was in position not only to know the code but to know the imple- 
mentation of the code. 

Col. Bratton. There were several nights when I sat up all night 
waiting for this thing to come through. 

Gen. Miles. I am not trying to excuse my poor memory, but I can 
say that certainly from the 5th to the 7th of December there was little 
doubt in my mind that war was going to ensue. I wouldn't have said 
it was inevitable, but on the 6th the President appealed direct to the 
Emperor of Japan and there wasn't much doubt in our minds here 
that we were in a very difficult crisis. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. It seems to me that if you had notice that the 
Japanese were ordered to burn their codes on the 5th of December you 
wouldn't have forgotten that anyway. 

Gen. Miles. This (Winds message) says that these words mean 
"east wind rain" which means, according to this code, that the Japa- 
nese-U. S. relations are in danger and also means that these code 
papers will be burned, but we knew damned well that the Japanese- 
U. S. relations were in danger. I cannot say that I did know of the 
implementing message. I can't explain why I knew and why Bratton 
didn't know if I knew. That is a blank in my memory. 

[5] Col. Bratton. It isn't conceivable that you would have 
known of this without saying something to me about it because we 
were both waiting for the thing. 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff 

17 August 1945 
Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. 
Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security 
Agency, War Department, regarding alleged destruction of certain 
War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor 

1. The report of the investigation regarding statements of fact 
made by William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. 
Hewitt of the U. S. Navy sometime prior to 5 July 1945 is attached 
hereto as TAB A. 

2. In view of the fact that the investigation being conducted by 
Admiral Hewitt is on the same level as that being conducted by Lt. 
Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, it would seem that the release of infor- 
mation to the Navy, as requested by Admiral Hewitt in his letter of 
5 July 1945, is a matter for determination by the Secretary of War. 
It is recommended, therefore, that the request of Admiral Hewitt 
and the results of this investigation be referred to Lt. Col. Clausen 
for preparation of such portion of the testimony in this case as the 
Secretary's office deems desirable to furnish Admiral Hewitt. 

Carter W. Clarke 
Brigadier General^ GSC 

Deputy Chiefs MIS 
1 Inch 
Tab A 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 75 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff 

13 August 1945 
Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. 
Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security 
Agency, War Department, regarding alleged destruction of cer- 
tain War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor 

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to 
conduct an investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top 
Secret communications were handled, under authority of a letter 
of 9 September 1944 which read as follows : 

It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an in- 
vestigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions issued 
to you by the Chief of Staff i-egarding the manner in which certain Top Secret 
communications were handled. 

The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to 
administer oaths for this purpose. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

/s/ J. A. Ulio 
J. A. Ulio 
Major Oeneral, 
The Adjutant Oeneral 

2. The investigation was completed in September 1944. 

3. On about 8 July 1945 the undersigned was instructed to re- 
open the investigation to investigate certain statements made by 
William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt 
of the Department of the Navy earlier in July 1945. 

4. The investigation was re-opened on 13 July 1945 in Room 
2E780, Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken of 
Mr. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, 
[2] Signal S)ecurity Agency, War Department; Col. Otis K. 
Sadtler, Signal Officer of the Army Ground Forces; Brig. Gen. 
Isaac Spalding, presently stationed at Ft. McPherson, Georgia; Maj. 
Gen. Ralph C. Smith, presently Military Attache to France and, 
during the days of Pearl Harbor, Executive Officer of the Military 
Intelligence Division ; and Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell, Headquarters 
89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York. At 
the time of Pearl Harbor, Gen. Bissell was Chief of the Counter- 
intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. There 
was also introduced into evidence the testimony of Mr. William F. 
Friedman as given before Admiral H. K. Hewitt. 

5. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and 
transcribed. 

6. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered 
and, as a result of this consideration, I find the following facts : 

a. That shortly before 5 July 1945 William F. Friedman, Director 
of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Depart- 
ment, testified before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of 
the Navy in an investigation pertaining to the Pearl Harbor dis- 
aster, in his testimony Mr. Friedman testified, along with other 
things, as follows : 

Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversation with Colonel 
Sadtler, who came to duty in Washington about then, and we talked about 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had been the head of our communica- 
tions service at the time, and he indicated that he had tried his best to urge 
that some specific warning message be sent out to the Department commander. 
He indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the — 
some time on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't thinlt that he was clear 
himself as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly, he 
was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, 
that the message was in — "It's in," as I recall it, was the expression used — or 
it may be that the Navy source called Army G-2 and indicated that they had 
had word that the message was in, and that Colonel Sadtler was then called to 
Gr-2 to corroborate the interception of the message. 

At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese word, 
that was used and when Colonel Sadtler couldn't indicate the word, because 
he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried — I thinli he said 
[5] that they tried to get a verification from whoever it was— Admiral 
Noyes — but they weren't successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply 
passed the matter over. There was apparently nothing to substantiate the 
existence of the message. 

Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a 
copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer teas, if 
I remetnher correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy, but that he had been 
told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed 
by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence 
and nothing more than that: highly inconceivable that such a thing u-ovld 
happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story tcith Captain Safford, 
7 probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started. 
I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it. 

b. I find that Mr. Friedman was not told by Col. Sadtler the facts 
as outlined in the last paragraph of Finding a, but was told by Col. 
Sadtler at some time in 1943 that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding had 
told Col. Sadtler that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen. 
Spalding that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being 
destroyed or had been destroyed. 

c. I find that Col. Sadtler was told by Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding 
sometime in August 1943 that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told 
Gen. Spalding that certain messages, pertaining to Pearl Harbor, 
had been received and were in the files of G-2 on 7 December 1941 
and that Bissell had deemed it most necessary to destroy them. 

d. I find that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding was not told by Brig. 
Gen. J. T. B. Bissell that certain messages had been received and 
were in the files of G-2 and that he (Bissell) deemed it most neces- 
sary to destroy them. 

e. I find that Col. Sadtler did not tell Mr. Friedman that Gen. 
Spalding had told Col. Sadtler that certain messages implementing 
the Winds Code message were destroyed as a result of an order or 
direction of Gen. Marshall. 

f. I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code 
message was ever received by G-2, and I find that no records per- 
taining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody 
connected with G-2. 

Carter W. Clarke, 
Brigadier General, GSC 

Deputy Chief, MIS 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 77 



PART II 
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION 

(On the oral directive of the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carter W. 
Clarke is now re-opening the investigation concerning Pearl 
Harbor) 

13 JULY 1945 

FINDINGS 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN 

[1] Place : Room 2E780, The Pentagon. 

Date : 13 July 1945, 1 : 00 p. m. 

Present : Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 
Colonel E. W. Gibson. 
Mr. William F. Friedman. 

Gen. Clakke. I have been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this 
investigation on the basis of the old order that we had here last Sep- 
tember 9 when we started this investigation. I would like to remind 
you that you are still under oath with reference to that and I would 
like to re-swear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do 
you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Friedman. I do. 

Gen. Clarki. State your name, rank, position and organization. 

Mr. Friedman. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications 
Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department. 

Gen. Clarke. I would like you to refresh your memory on this mat- 
ter by looking that letter and statement over before we ask you some 
questions about it. It is a statement sent by the Navy bearing date 
of 5 July 1945 enclosing your testimony before Adm. Hewitt, together 
with letter from Hewitt to Marshall. 

Gen. Clarke. Will you state, to the best of your knowledge and be- 
lief and recollection, just what conversations you have had with Capt. 
Safford on this whole subject of the Winds message from the very 
beginning. 

Mr. Friedman. Well that would go back to a period of about 18 
months ago when Capt. Safford apparently began to collect material, 
either on his own behalf or at the direction of some higher authorities, 
having a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack. In the course of his 
studies he prepared a list of the pertinent message or messages which 
he thought pertinent that came out of the Navy cryptanalytic bureau. 
Of course at that time we were working very closely with the Navy 
on the diplomatic side and we exchanged fully translations and tech- 
nical data. There were some cases in which he wanted to piece out 
some things which might have been missing from his list of messages. 
He asked the Signal Security Agency — well he asked me first — to 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

supply [^] certain of this material, which was supplied only 
after approval had been obtained to supply whatever was necessary. 
In the course of getting together these materials we compared notes 
of our recollections and of the dates because at that time he was the 
head of the Navy cryptanalytic unit and I was principal cryptanalyst 
in the Signal Intelligence Service, and naturally I had a deep interest 
in the whole affair. At about the same time as Capt. Safford began 
his studies, I thought it would be interesting to collect material of 
that nature too. And I had a good deal of such material collected 
in the form of messages and in the form of reports, for example, the 
Roberts published report, periodical literature that was pertinent, and 
of course the technical files at the Agency were available for gathering 
together such material as I was directed to gather together upon three 
or four instances — I don't remember now just how many times. Well 
Capt. Safford came over to see me at my office. 

Col. Gibson. When, about? 

Mr. Friedman. I wish I had brought my notes. I can't place the 
date accurately enough for this purpose, I am afraid. 

Col. Gibson. Do you have notes that could place it ? 

Mr. Friedman. I have some notes of dates of conversations, etc. 
I could place it fairly accurately that way. It is 18 months ago 
anyhow and possibly more. 

Gen. Clarke. Suppose you refresh your memory on that from your 
notes and 

Mr. Friedman. I will do that. Then I was a member of a special 
committee in connection with cryptographic security, and ad hoc com- 
mittee, and we had occasion to go over to the building where Capt. 
Safford had his office from time to time, and every time I passed by 
he would ask me in or I would stop in to exchange a pleasant word 
or two with him, because he is a long-standing friend of mine. We 
had not only official relations of a cordial nature but also in a per- 
sonal way we were fairly well acquainted. It was in that sort of 
way that we exchanged ideas about Pearl Harbor, and it was from 
him that I fii-st learned of the Winds execute message. I had a very 
good recollection of the Winds code setup — well I had a knowledge 
of the Winds code setup from the old days of pre-Pearl Harbor, but 
I hadn't had any recollection whatsoever, if I even had knowledge 
at the time, of the existence of a so-called [3] Winds execute 
message. It was in these conversations that Capt. Safford stated on 
several occasions that there had been such a Winds execute message, 
that he believed that a copy of it was still. in somebody's safe in the 
Navy Department, but that all of his attempts to local a copy of the 
Winds execute message in the official files of OP-20-G had been fruit- 
less. And he naturally wanted to know if we had anything of that 
nature, and I told him I didn't know and I didn't look for anything 
like that. But some time thereafer — months thereafter — an official 
request came through from somebody higher up in the War Depart- 
ment — I think it might have been Gen. Bissell — who directed that 
a search be made through our files at Signal Security Agency to see 
if we could locate such a Winds execute message, and that was fruitless. 

Capt. Safford was very firm in his conviction that there had been 
a Winds execute message and moreover that he himself had had it 
in his hands and that there was no question in his mind of the actual 
transmission of the Winds execute message, of its actual interception. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 79 

of its translation in accordance with the terms of the Winds code 
setup, of its having been handed over in the proper transhxted form 
to the Navy people in Naval Intelligence who had jurisdiction of 
dissemination. Also, he was apparently quite convinced that dis- 
semination had been made to the Army, if not to the Signal Intel- 
ligence Service then to somebody in G-2. And he felt that there 
was some very excellent reason why no copies of this message could 
be found, and of course it left a number of questions and inferences 
in his mind which he naturally transferred to my mind. Well he also 
had apparently definite knowledge that certain testimony before one 
of the several Boards investigating Pearl Harbor showed clearly that 
there had been a Winds execute transmission and he believed that the 
Koberts Board had some definite knowledge about its having been 
transmitted, etc. 

Well this mysterious disappearance, according to him, of all copies 
of the Winds execute message naturally w^as of extreme interest to 
me, and some time after my first, or possibly second, conversation 
with Capt. Safford, I learned of the return to Washington for duty 
of Colonel Sadtler. We were old friends. I have known him for 
certainly 20 years. And when he came to Washington — I don't know 
whether he called me or I called him — I can't recall that — but being 
old friends, naturally we w^anted to get together. Shortly after he 
came back he came over to my office one day — and I don't know whether 
he had specifically in mind to talk about Pearl Harbor [4-] he 
may have, but at any rate in the course of our reminiscences about 
those days, he told me some very startling things. I might say he was 
quite positive about what he said and left me more or less breathless at 
one part of his news. I don't know whether I should call it informa- 
tion or what, but at any rate, when I asked him about the Winds 
execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear, and he 
certainly was positive about his recollection of the fact that such a 
Winds execute mesage had been intercepted by a Navy source, be- 
cause he told me that he was called over to either Gen. Miles' office 
or Col. Bratton's office — I don't recall which one — but at any rate he 
was called over to — well we may have to go back — I recall now that 
he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning and my recollection 
is that it was on December 4 — might have been the 5th — 1941, saying — 
and this stands very bright in my memory — he actually quoted what 
Adm. Noyes said to him on the telephone : "It's in," meaning that the 
Winds execute message had been transmitted and had been intercepted 
and that it meant a break in relations between Japan, and he said, 
if I recall correctly, a break in relations between Japan and England, 
and that he had then gone over to either Gen. Miles' office or to Col. 
Bratton's office — or Adm. Noyes had telephoned the same message or 
the purport of the Winds execute message to Gen. Miles or to Col. 
Bratton. At any rate. Col. Sadtler was either summoned or pre- 
sented himself to G-2 and said that the Winds execute message had 
come in and that something should be done right away. Well Col. 
Bratton, who was the Japanese language expert, wanted Col. Sdatler 
to tell him what the Japanese word was that had been included in the 
Winds execute message. I don't think it is necessary for me to indi- 
cate the nature of the Winds code setup, but at any rate, Col. Bratton 
wanted to know what the Japanese word was. Well Sadtler said 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that he himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the informa- 
tion from the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore couldn't 
give the Japanese word. He was directed to go get the Japanese 
word. And here my recollection isn't very clear as to whether he 
actually went over personally to Adm. Noyes' office or whether he tried 
it on the telephone, but he apparently wasn't able to get the Japanese 
word, whatever it was. He want back to Col. Bratton or Gen Miles 
when he was unsuccessful in getting the Japanese word, or perhaps 
even a copy of the message — which is something I don't understand — 
at any rate when he was unable to produce the message or the Japanese 
word they said there was nothing they could do, that perhaps there 
was disbelief on their part in the allegation that [5] the mes- 
sage had been transmitted and intercepted. That of course was very 
interesting to me. And then I asked him whether he had a copy of 
the Winds execute message, and I am pretty sure in my recollection that 
he said that he never had had one and of course didn't have any now. 
He did have certain things put away in a safe deposit box, and I 
don't know what sort of documents he might have put away. But 
he did mention one document which was of very great interest to me. 
I have naturally not seen it^ — I didn't ask him to show me a copy of 
it, but this, to the best of my recollection is what he told me about that. 
He said that on Friday, possibly earlier than Friday, December 5th, 
he, being deeply concerned about the threat of negotiations with the 
Japanese Government and noting the tenor of the messages that we 
were turning out in translation, became extremely apprehensive that 
war might break out at almost any hour without any declaration on 
the part of the Japanese. And he felt that somebody high up in the 
War Department ought to send a message out to Gen. Short warning 
him that — well I remember the words in general of what he said was 
the type of message that he actually prepared in his own hand : "Break 
in relations between Japan and United States may be expected within 
the next 24 or 48 hours. Take all necessary steps to insure that there 
will be no repetition of Port Arthur." Now by that of course he 
meant that in the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese attacked at Port 
Arthur without warning, and the implication was quite clear what 
he had in his own mind. Well he tried to interest some of the people 
in the higher echelons in sending such a message, and I don't recall 
the various steps he took. He tried somebody in G-2 ; he tried some- 
body in Operations Division; the Secretary of the General Staff — 
I can't enumerate them all now — but at any rate he said that he got 
turned down all the way and nobody would pay any attention to him. 
He claims to have a copy of such a proposed message, or rather a draft 
of a message, still in his possession. 

Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, "What do you 
suppose happened to the Winds execute message which we believe 
so firmly was intercepted?" Well he said he was told that they were 
ordered destroyed. And tliat sort of took me aback, and I said, "By 
whom?" And he said, "By Gen. Marshall." It was something that 
I just couldn't believe, swallow, or give credence to, and I expressed 
my disbelief, but he was pretty firm in his statement and there was no 
checking him in that. Now where he got it from I don't remember. 
I do know that on a subsequent occasion or two — because we met 
each other once or twice thereafter — my disbelief of the story was 
discredited by [6] him apparently, because he still remained 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 81 

very fii'ni in his belief that all copies of the Winds execute message, 
both in the Army and in the Navy, had been destroyed and ordered to 
be destroyed. 

, Col. Gibson. Did he sa}' who told him this story that these messages 
had been burned — at Gen. Marshall's order? 

Mr. Freedman. He did. 

Col. Gibson. Who did he say told him that story? 

Mr. Friedman. The name is Ike Spalding, but I don't recall his 
grade or rank. It is possibly Col. Spalding — I don't recall whether 
or not he told me of the official position which Spalding occupied. 
Now, while I am at it, I recall that Col. Sadtler stated that there were 
two messages ordered destroyed. " 

Col. Gibson. Did he say that as of his own knowledge or that some- 
body had told him there were two? 

Mr. Friedm.an. I am quite sure that it was not of his own knowl- 
edge. He was passing on second-hand information. Now what cre- 
dence he gave to the story that was told to him I don't know — I don't 
recall — but the other message which was allegedly also one that was 
destroyed was a message which was supposed to have — well as I recall 
it — a message was sent by the War Department a day or two after 
Pearl Harbor, maybe INIonday, to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, ask- 
ing him whether the radar installation in the islands was in operative 
order at the time of the attack. And the answer came back in the 
affirmative. Now whether the question and answer were destroyed, or 
rather alleged to have been destroyed, or just the answer, I don't recall, 
but at least there were two different things involved. 

Gen. Clarke. In order words, they were on two different subjects? 

Mr. Friedman. Yes. 

Col. Gibson. This talk took place in your office ? 

Mr. Friedman. In my office. 

Col. Gibson. You don't know the exact day ? 

Mr. Fru^dman. I could place that because I made very, very rough 
notes of the substance of the conversation after 

[7] Col. Gibson. Will you supply us the approximate date? 
Was anybody else in your office when that took place ? 

Mr. Friedman. No. There were just the two of us. 

Col. Gibson. Was that the first talk you had with Col. Sadtler after 
he came back in the War Department ? 

]\Ir. Friedman. The very first. 

Col. Gibson. And after that you had two or three other talks with 
him ? 

Mr. Friedman. Yes. 

Col. Gibson. Those took place where ? 

Mr. Friedman. I think there was one more occasion when he came 
over to the office and the other time or two was when we were socially 
having dinner together or something like that. At my home I know 
there was one evening that we talked about it privately, just the two 
of us, in my own study. 

Col. Gibson. He never claimed to you to have seen the Winds exe- 
cute message himself ? 

Mr. Friedman. He never did. 

Col. Gibson. What did he say he had in his safe deposit box other 
than a copy of the draft of the message he tried to get sent out ? 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 147 7 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall that he said anything. I may have 
asked him, "What else do you have there," and he either passed it 
off with a remark, "Well never mind, I am not telling anybody." But 
I rather got the impression that he felt that as head of the Army com-^ 
munications at the time and the superior of the officer in charge of 
the Signal Intelligence Service, he might be called upon some day in 
connection with an investigation and that he had put certain things 
away. I might say that, to the best of my Imowledge and recollection, 
Col. Sadtler didn't inmpose any secrecy upon what he was telling me. 
Oh naturally he trusted to my discretion, but I don't know whether 
he had in mind that I might or might not communicate the informa- 
tion to others entitled to know about such things or not. I certainly 
wouldn't have said anything to Capt. Safford about it if he had im- 
posed some sort of secrecy upon what he was telling me, and of course 
you understand that, not giving any credence to it myself, I didn't feel 
that Safford would believe any of it. But to my astonishment. [8] 
Safford seemed to think there might be something to it, at least he 
thought there was a Winds execute message and now it can't be found. 

Col. Gibson. Did Safford come to your office for some of these con- 
ferences ? 

Mr. Friedman. Yes, he was over to my office two or three times in 
an official way — I mean getting together the data that he wanted. He 
supplied us with digests of his series of messages and I think he 

turned over a copy of everything he gave me to Gen. . I do 

have rough notes made of some of these conversations. If they are 
necessary I will put them at your disposal. 

Gen. Clarke. I think that would be highly advisable, because I hope 
this is the last round-up and I think that you ought to come back in 
the morning 

Mr. Friedman. General, I am going to take for the air tomorrow. 
I had better do it this afternoon. 

Col. Gibson. At the time of Pearl Harbor and before or somewhat 
prior, you were not working with Jap cryptography, were you ? 

Mr. Friedman. No, I was not directly engaged in it because, as you. 
know, I had been ill, had had a nervous breakdown. 

Col. Gibson. You were putting in part time at that time ? 

Mr. Friedman. Yes, when I came back to duty after I was dis- 
charged from Walter Reed, Gen. Mauborgne and Col. Minckler told 
me I was to take it easy and come and go as I pleased. I used to come 
in about a half hour or an hour late in the morning and leave a half 
hour before the end of the day so as to avoid heavy traffic. I was not 
in direct touch with the cryptanalytic work, although I did see, when- 
ever I wanted to, the messages that came out. 

Gen. Clarke. Who was in direct charge of the Japanese at that 
time, while you were ill ? 

Mr. Friedman. Well of course at the time of Pearl Harbor it was 
Col. Minckler, who was in charge of Signal Intelligence Service, and 
then I think he was ranked as Captain — Capt. Doucl, Capt. Svensson 
and then Rowlett was in technical charge of the Jap diplomatic op- 
eration. 

Gen. Clarke. Do you know whether or not Col. Sadtler saw the out- 
put of the institution ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 83 

[3] Mr. Friedman. I am certain that he saw the very important 
messages but I don't know that he saw everything that came out. 
Gen. Clarke. Did Gen. Mauborgne? 
Mr. Friedman. The same situation. He saw the important mes- 

sa^es. 
&en. Clarke. Of course Olmstead was in there— not Mauborgne. 
Mr. Friedman. Well Gen. Olmstead didn't take as much interest 
in that sort of thing as Gen. Mauborgne did. He may have seen 
occasional messages. As a matter of fact, I recall Sadtler said that 
four or five days before Pearl Harbor, Gen. Olmstead was planning 
on going to Panama on an inspection tour and that Col. Sadtler tried 
to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from taking this trip, saying that "condi- 
tions are extremely critical and I believe war is going to break out 
within the next 72 hours ; maybe you had better stay around." Well 
Gen. Olmstead didn't agree with him and decided to go ahead with 
the trip, and he did. I think he came back within a day or two after 
Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Gibson. How many were engaged in the cryptanalytic work on 
this Japanese traffic at the time of Pearl Harbor by the Signal Intelli- 
gence Service ? 

Mr. Friedman. You mean right in the Munitions Building — ex- 
clusively the intercept personnel? 
Col. Gibson. Yes. 

Mr. Friedman. I prefer to wait until I get my notes to answer. 
Col. Gibson. Was our section as big as the Navy section? 
Mr. Friedman. They were comparable in size. I think there were 
just as many on the diplomatic side as on our side. 

Col. Gibson. Did the Army process its material as speedily after 
receiving it as the Navy did ? 

Mr. Friedman. Oh yes. I believe that there is little to be said 
about comparative speeds. We were both most anxious to get these 
things out as expeditiously as possible, in fact there was a good deal 
of competition in getting out the translations and if, of course on 
isolatecl occasions, we found that they were a bit slow or we were a 
bit slow, we would inquire to see what had happened. Well it might 
have been a key had to be reconstructed or — I couldn't [10] say 
that we processed a certain message faster than they because there was 
no way of telling. 

Col. Gibson. Who set the priorities as to which code should be read 
first? 

Mr. Friedman. Those were set by the Chief Signal Officer and the 
Director of Naval Communications in conference with the technical 
peof)le, etc. As a general rule we processed the messages in the 
Purple system under a first priority because our experience had been 
that that was the system that carried the most important traffic. What 
came after that I don't recall exactly. It might have been the com- 
bined PA-K2, as I remember one designation. That was an en- 
ciphered code system. Then there was a J-19, also an enciphered code 
system, and the least of the codes in priority was what we called LA, 
and of course below that would come plain language. 

Col. Gibson. The Army and Navy agreed on this priority? 

Mr. Friedman. Oh yes, the priorities were set by mutual agreement. 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Gen. Clarke. That was done in conference from the Director of 
Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer. Do you mean 
by that those two individuals or their representatives ? 

' Mr. Friedman. At that time, Gen. Mauborgne, who was in office 
as Chief Signal Officer when the odd and even date was set up as 
the basis for operation, took a great interest in this work, much more 
so than the Chief Signal Officer. I can't say absolutely at the moment 
that he himself sat down with his opposite number — at that time 
Adm. Noyes — -and decided the priority scale, but I thing those two 
officers would certainly approve a schedule recommended by the tech- 
nical people. Naturally the technical people would have to have a 
hand in determining those priorities because of technical considera- 
tions, the difficulty of each system, etc. I should have said also that 
the A. C. of S., G-2 would have a very vital word to say in the process- 
ing of priorities. 

Gen. Clarke. You never got any guidance from the Chief Signal 
Officer or the A. C. of S., G-2 in your case, or the Office of Naval 
Intelligence in the Navy, on interception or anything of that kind? 
As you got this stuff you worked on it according to the classification 
of the code and its degree of security ? Is that what I understand ? 

Mr. Friedman. I don't understand your question. Are you asking 
did the technical people process these Ihessages in accordance with 
their own ideas? 

[11] Gen. Clarke. Their own ideas, or did they get guidance 
from on high ? 

Mr. Friedman. Guidance from on high. The decision to process 
l^urple messages, for example, would be one for the people of a higher 
echelon to say, "Yes, process those first." In fact, even in connection 
with the intercept operation and the forwarding operation, those things 
were all set up by priorities. The material that came from Honolulu, 
for example, had to be sent according to some priority system. 

Gen. Clarke. Is it correct in your opinion — something that I have 
heard — that the most important traffic came in a lower grade system 
and not in the high grade Purple ? 

Mr. Friedman. No, I wouldn't subscribe to that. We occasionally 
did encounter a case in which a message of considerable importance 
would be in a low or medium grade code, but largely because it came 
from a place which didn't have the higher level material, or there 
have been cases in which some sort of a condition of a breakdown 
of a machine at a station which was provided with a machine would 
cause a message to go in a code of a lower category. 

Gen. Clarke. In our discussions here we have referred a number 
of times, and so have you, to the so-called Japanese Purple system. 
Will you state approximately when that was solved and by whom it 
was solved ? 

Mr. Friedman. To the best of my recollection, the first complete 
translation was handed in some time in August, it might have been 
the early of August or the middle part of August. We had been 
working on the Japanese Purple system. This system liad super- 
seded a system known as the Red, which was also a machine cipher. 
But when the Purple system was first introduced it presented an 
extremely difficult problem on which the Chief Signal Officer asked 
us to direct our best efforts. After work by my associates when we 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 85 

were making very slow prog^ress, the Chief Signal Officer asked me 
personally to take han(^. I had been engaged largely in administra- 
tive duties up to that time, so at his request I dropped everything 
else that I could and began to work with the group. Naturally this 
was a collaborative, cooperative effort on the ])art of all the people 
concerned. No one person is responsible for the S(;lution, nor is there 
any single person to whom the major share of credit should go. As 
I say, it was a team, and it was only by very closely coordinated 
teamwork that we were able to solve it, which we did. It represents 
[12] an achievement of the Army cryptanalytic bureau that, so 
far as I know, has not been duplicated elsewhere, because we definitely 
know that the British cryptanalytic service and the German cryp- 
tanalytic service was baffled in its attempts and they never did solve 
it. After we solved the Purple system, the technical data necessary 
to operate the system and a machine constructed by ourselves were 
turned over to the British so that they were in position to process 
Purple messages also. We did the same so far as concerns the Navy. 
We ])rovided them with a Purple machine or two. 

Gen. Clarke. On approximately what date did we give the Purple 
machine to the British? 

Mr. Friedman. I recall that very clearly. A joint U. S. Navy- 
U. S. Army cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from 
each service, went, to London for the purpose of establishing tech- 
nicakcooperation with the British cryptanalytic service. It was at 
that time the Army furnished a Purple machine and the technical 
data to the British. 

Gen. Clarke. To the best' of your knowledge and belief then, was 
all of the traffic which has since become known as the Pearl Harbor 
traffic in these Pearl Harbor investigations available to the British 
at the same time as it was available to the American Army and Navy ? 

Mr. Friedman. I believe that to be a correct statement. The only 
thing that they might lack would be certain intercepts which they were 
not in a position to 

Gen. Clarke. You mean by that individual messages? 

Mr. Friedman. Yes. 

Gen. Clarke. Did you ever discuss or hear them discuss the Pearl 
Harbor traffic ? 

Mr. Friedman. No. 

Gen. Clarke. Or any of the traffic leading up to Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Friedman. No. The only thing that I do know is that there 
exists in the files one or two messages which came from British sources 
out in the Far East. If you remember, the British had some relations 
with the Dutch in the East Indies. 

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLEE 

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon. 
Date : 14 July 1945. 
Time : 10 : 00 a. m. 
Present : 

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 

Colonel E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler. 



86 dONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Gibson. Col. Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath and 
you are fully aware of what your rights are ? 

Col. Sadtler. Yes. 

Col. Gibson. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called 
Winds execute message ? 

Col. Sadtler. I did not. 

Col. Gibson. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the 
War Department? 

Col. Sadtler. It was not. 

Col. Gibson. And all that you know about that message and all 
contact that you had with it is in your former testimony ? 

Col. Sadtler. That is right. I might further add that the infor- 
mation came from Adm. Noyes. 

Col. Gibson. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Adm. 
Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then 
if I remember correctly, I asked Col. Sadtler whether he had a copy, 
had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if 
I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy but that 
he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or 
directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall." Did you tell Mr. Fried- 
man that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the Winds 
execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by 
Gen. Marshall? 

Col. Sadtler. I will make an absolute flat denial of that state- 
ment made by Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message 
was never in the War Department and I never made any statement 
that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that 
Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed. 

[2] Col. Gibson. When did you return to duty in Washington 
this last time ? 

"Col. Sadtler. About March 28, 1944. 

Col. Gibson. After your return during the following summer and 
fall on occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman? 

Col. Sadtler. Yes. 

Col. Gibson. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other 
things ? 

Col. Sadtler. Yes. We had discussed what had happened at that 
time. 

Col. Gibson. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Fried- 
man's office? 

Col. Sadtler. Well I assume they did because I have been in his office 
several times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had hap- 
pened, not only in his office but at his house. 

Col. Gibson. At some time did somebody tell yoii that messages per- 
taining to the Peai'l Harbor affair were being destroyed? 

Col. Sadtler. Yes. Some time during 1043 Gen. Isaac Spalding at 
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. 
Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was 
being destroyed or had been destroyed. 

Col. Gibson. Is it possible that you told that to Mr. Friedman in 
one of your conversations? 

Col. Sadtler. It is possible. 

Col. Gibson. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many 
yeai^ ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 87 

Col. Sadtler. I have known him for over 25 years. 

Col. Gibson. This Colonel, now Brigadier General J. T. B. Bissell, 
that you speak of, do you know him personally ? 

Col. Sadtler. I do not. 

Col. Gibson. To your knowledge have you ever met him? 

Col, Sadtler. Yes, I have met him casually but I doubt if I would 
recognize him today if I saw him. 

[3] Col. Gibson. During the period immediately prior to Pearl 
Harbor did you have any official business of any nature with the then 
Col. Bissell? 

Col. Sadtler. No. 

Col. Gibson. And your only business of an official nature that you 
did with G-2 at that particular time was done with Col. Rufus Bratton 
and Gen. Miles? 

Col. Sadtler. Yes, and Hayes Kroner. Mostly with Bratton and 
Miles. They were my normal contacts. 

Col. Gibson. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman also has testified that on or 
about the time Adm. Noyes advised you that the Winds execute mes- 
age was in that you prepared a draft of a message that you wanted to 
suggest be sent to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, 
Hawaii and 'Panama. Is that so? 

Col. Sadtler. That is correct. 

Col. Gibson. Will you relate now what happened about that ? 

Col. Sadtler. In substance the message was about as follows : "Re- 
liable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future. 
Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur. Notify 
the Navy. Signed Marshall." 

Col. Gibson. Did you type that message out yourself or who did 
the typing? 

Col. Sadtler. I am positive that I did it because Miss Robinson says 
she never saw it. 

Col. Gibson. Did you have that message with you when you went to 
discuss Adm. Noyes' message to you that the "Winds Execute" message 
was in, with Col. Bratton and Gen. Miles? 

Col. Sadtler. I did not. After leaving Gen. Miles' office where Gen. 
Miles and Col. Bratton more or less casually threw off this information 
about the execute of the Winds message, I went back to my office and 
thought that something ought to be done. That message was typed 
up and I went to see Gen. Gerow and talked this over for a few moments 
with him and suggested that he notify them. Gerow's reply to the 
effect was that they had been adequately notified, as I recall it. I 
then went to see Secretary of General Staff, Col. Bedel Smith, and told 
him what had been done and [4] suggested he send a message. 
His reply was to the effect that he refused to discuss it further. 

Col. Gibson. Did Gen. Gailey or Gen. Gerow see the message you 
had prepared — or Gen. Bedel Smith? 

Col. Sadtler. No, I don't think so. 

Col. Gibson. Col. Sadtler, I also want to ask you if it is true that 
early in December you tried to dissuade Gen. Ohnstead from making 
a trip to Panama because you felt sure that war was going to break 
out. 

Col. Sadtler. That is correct — on December 1. 

Col. Gibson. Tell us about that. 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Sadtler. On December 1, when Gen. Olmstead was making 
preparations to go to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his 
trip because I felt positive that war would be declared before he re- 
turned and I thought that it was his duty to be in Washington. 

Col. Gibson. What did he say ? 

Col. Sadtler. He said, "I am going anyhow and that's all there is 
to it." 

Col. Gibson. When did Olmstead return, do you know ? 

Col. Sadtler. About the 20th of December. 

Col. Gibson. Did he have any conversation with Marshall when he 
got back, do you know ? 

Col. Sadtler. He said that he had gone to Gen. Marshall or had 
visited Gen. Marshall and Gen. Marshall had told him that his men 
that he had left in charge while he was gone had not performed 100 
percent, or words to that effect. Olmstead said, "WTiy didn't you 
act on the information you already had ?" 

Col. Gibson. Col. Sadtler, have you ever talked anything pertain- 
ing to Pearl Harbor over with Capt. Satf ord of the Navy ? 

Col. Sadtler. No. 

Col. Gibson. Have you discussed it with any naval officer who had 
any direct contact with naval communications at the time of Pearl 
Harbor ? 

[5] Col. Sadtler. Only with Adm. Noves. 

Continued— 17 July 1945, 9 : 30 a. m. 

Place : Koom 2E780, The Pentagon. 

Present : 

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 
Col. E. W. Gibson. 
Col. O. K. Sadtler 

Col. Gibson. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you 
told him that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute 
message being ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall, there was a second 
message that was ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall. This second 
message was a message which was the result of a message sent by the 
War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor to the Signal Officer, 
Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the Islands 
was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the answer came 
back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had 
heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar 
installation in the Islands or the answer thereto had been destroyed? 

Col. Sadtler. I did not. The circumstances attending that mes- 
sage are about as follows : I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the 
General Staff, inquiring as to the operation of radar on December 7. 
Upon receipt of that message Col. Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, 
personally took a copy of it into Gen. Marshall's office. I gave a copy 
to Geo. Gerow. Col. Colton, upon his return from Gen. Marshall's 
office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected and held 
intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor 
secret at that time, the information was not to be disclosed. Gen. 
Gerow kept his message and I think that Col. Handy had it and he held 
it. 

Col. Gibson. To your knowledge, did Gen. Marshall ever order this 
radar mes3age, either the original inquiiy or the answer theiato, de- 
stroyed ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 89 

Col. Sadtler. No. To my knowledge, he did not. 
Col. Gibson. Did you ever hear from any source that he had ordered 
either of those destroyed ? 
Col. Sadtker. No. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ISAAC SPALDING 

[7] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon Building, Washington. 
D. C. 

Date: 17 July 1945. 

Time : 9 : 30 a. m. 

Present : 

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 
Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding. 
Col. E. W. Gibson. 
Col. O. K. Sadtler. 

Gen. Clarke. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give 
in this case will be the truth, so help you God ? 

Gen. Spalding. I do. 

Gen. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank, organization and 
present station ? 

Gen. Spalding. Isaac Spalding, serial number 03383. Brigadier 
General, USA, Station Ft. McPherson, Georgia. 

Gen. Clarke. What were your station and duties in the three months 
preceding Pearl Harbor ? 

Gen. Spalding. I was on duty as Chief of the Officers Branch of 
the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department up to 
the night of December 3, 1941, and on the morning of December 4, 
1941 I became Chief of the Army Exchange Service, which lasted for 
some time after the Pearl Harbor incident. 

Gen. Clarke. Had you previously been on duty in the old War 
Plans Division? 

Gen. Spalding. I had. I was on duty in the War Plans Division 
from the summer of 1932 to the summer of 1936. 

Gen. Clarke. But you were not in the War Plans Division on your 
return from that tour of duty you were then on just preceding Pearl 
Harbor? 

Gen. Spalding. No. I was placed on duty in G-1, War Depart- 
ment, on Januar}'' 11, 1941 on my return from overseas service in 
Hawaii. 

Gen. Clark. Were you on occasion called into conference by the 
War Plans Division with reference to Hawaiian war plans? 

Gen. Spalding. During my four year tour you mean? 

[2] Gen. Clarke. While you were with G-1. 

Gen. Spalding. I don't remember ever talking with anyone in WPD 
about any war plans. I had many friends there and would occa- 
sionally go over and see them on matters connected with personnel. 
I remember someone in the summer of '41 — I think it was Gen. 
Gerow — stating that a message had been sent to the Philippines mak- 
ing Gen. MacArthur the head of all our Army forces over there, 
but I think that is the nearest that I ever came to anything connected 
with the w^ar plans in any way. I don't remember talking about 
Hawaii with anyone in '41, nor do I remember who was in charge 
of the Hawaiian Defense Project. 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Gen, Clarke. Did you have knowledge of the intercepted traffic 
which was being produced by the Signal Corps at that time? 

Gen. Spalding. No. My friend Spencer Akin was in charge of 
some kind of a secret room which was right over G-1 in the same 
wing of the Munitions Building, and I had planned to go up and 
visit Akin and see what was going on but I never did go and Akin 
was transferred away. I knew they had some kind of a secret room 
up there and I thought it was something with breaking down codes 
but I don't know what they did. 

Col. Gibson. General, Mr. William F. Friedman, who is at present 
Dijector of Communications Research of Signal Security Agency of 
the War Department, has testified that sometime in 1944, in a con- 
versation with Col. O. K. Sadtler, that Col. Sadtler told him that 
he had been told that a certain message pertaining to a warning on 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which we called the Winds 
execute message, had been ordered destroj^ed by Gen. Marshall and 
that another message dealing with the question of whether or not 
the radar installation on the Hawaiian Islands was in operation on 
the date of Pearl Harbor, and the answer thereto, had been destroyed 
by Gen. Marshall's order. Mr. Friedman further testified that Col. 
Sadtler told him that he had been told this story by you. Thereafter 
Col. Sadtler testified that he had never told Mr. Friedman that he 
had heard that Gen. Marshall had ordered this so-called Winds execute 
message destroyed or the radar message destroyed, but that he had 
been told by you at Ft. Bragg sometime in 1943 that the then Col. 
J. T. B. Bissell, now Brigadier General Bissell, had been ordered 
to destroy all matters pertaining to Pearl Harbor, or that in sub- 
stance. I want to ask you, having given you tliis background, first, 
did you tell Col. Sadtler that in substance? 

[3] Gen. Spalding. I did not tell him that in substance, answer- 
ing specifically your question, but I did tell him certain things. But 
at no time was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the con- 
versation or discussion. 

Col. Gibson. What was it you did tell Col. Sadtler ? 

Gen. Spalding. I would like to make a rather full statement. By so 
doing maybe I can answer questions which you might specifically ask 
me later. I wish it to appear in my testimony that it is my full belief 
that the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. 
Marshall, are not involved in any way whatsoever with the testimony 
w^hich I am about to give, and it is my belief that neither one knew 
anything of it. 

I was around in the War Department for a year preceding Pearl 
Harbor and for six months thereafter, and of course there were various 
conversations about Pearl Harbor after that "blitz." It was all very 
vague to me as to why the A. C. of S., G-2, Gen. Sherman Miles, had 
not diagnosed this coming war, and it was rather queer to me that 
soon after the blitz he was transferred to other duty and Gen. Raymond 
Lee was brought back from England to be the War Department G-2. 
This transfer aroused my curiosity but I never did know wdiy it was 
done. 

In the summer of 1943 I was stationed at Ft. Bragg, and certain 
troops at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, came under my connnand. It 
was my custom to visit the troops at Ft. Jackson about once a week 
for from one to three or four days at a time. In July of 1943 I moved 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 91 

my whole headquarters and headquarters battery from Ft. Bragg 
down on to the reservation at Ft. Jackson for two weeks field training. 
Previous to that time and during July and for several weeks after, 
Col. John T. Bissell, Field Artillery, commanded one of my artillery 
groups at Ft. Jackson, and so I requested him to make the necessary 
reservations for camping space and maneuver ground on the Ft. Jack- 
son Reservation. Upon my arrival at this camp site I found that Col. 
Bissell and his staff had made arrangements preliminary to our enter- 
ing the camp and Col. Bissell himself had established his command 
post under canvas within a few hundred yards of my camp site. We 
were thus camped close together for several days and during that time 
we often sat under the trees and talked in the late afternoons and early 
evenings. Bissell had been on duty in the War Department and I 
believe part of his [4] duties w^ere connected with secret service 
operators. Naturally we talked about matters which were of inter- 
est to each other and I had some curiosity on our secret service, but I 
learned nothing from him except such generalities as that we had 
considerable such effort now that the war w^as under way. I remem- 
ber telling him that G-2 denied during peacetimes that they ever had 
any operators, but I didn't believe those statements. He made no 
remark as to whether they did or didn't. I remember telling him 
that I had always wanted to be a sleuth or a detective of some kind 
but I didn't think I would be a success at it. But I was always curious 
concerning detective stories, etc. It is my opinion and recollection 
that Bissell in no way whatsoever revealed any secrets connected with 
his duties concerning our secret operators. I remember that I would 
have liked to have him talk more but he didn't. 

We talked about the Pearl Harbor incident. I remember expressing 
to him my failure to understand how Sherman Miles and the Navy 
could fail to discover that those Japanese vessels had left home ports. 
I was under the impression from my experience in both the Army 
and Navy War Colleges and in the War Department General Staff 
and in my dealings with the Navy while on duty in the General Staff, 
from all these experiences I had thought or believed that our Navy 
kept track of every vessel carrying the Japanese flag, both commercial 
and war vessels, and I didn't see how those vessels in peacetime could 
get away from Japan and come down near Hawaii without our Navy 
knowing it. I was astounded at their ignorance or inability to detect 
that ! I remember shooting off my mouth about Sherman Miles, for 
whom I didn't have a very high regard professionally, and I think 
I remember telling him wdiat I told Walter Krueger when he asked 
me what I thought about Sherman Miles, I told him that I thought 
Miles was a "stuffed shirt," and Krueger was astonished that I should 
think that about him. And so by our talking we got into the subject 
of Pearl Harbor and the information which we must have had and 
wdiich the Navy must have had and our failure to give some kind of 
a better warning to Gen. Short. I remember expressuig my disgust 
at those airplanes up at Wheeler Field all lined up for Saturday 
morning inspection and were still there on Sunday morning, and I 
told him of my disgust that those radars weren't working, that I 
knew when I left Hawaii in 1940 they were being installed. And 
Bissell said that certain messages had been received and were in the 
files of G-2 and he deemed it most necessary [5] to destroy 
them. I got the impression that these messages were derogatory to 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility 
destroyed them. I had the impression that they were secret informa- 
tion which it was most desirable that the President, Congress, the 
public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall not know about. I had the 
feeling that Bissell destroyed them without even Gen. Raymond Lee, 
the G-2 at that time, knowing they were in existence. 

Now the question may come up as to sobriety on this occasion. We 
were out there under the trees and upon my arrival a bottle of Scotch 
and two or three bottles of soda water had been presented to me and 
when I broke camp 14 days later I returned the unopened bottle of 
Scotch and possibly the soda water to the officer who had given them 
to me upon my arrival at Ft. Jackson. I may have had some liquor 
of my own with me and Bissell and I may have had a drink or two 
of Bourbon which I provided — I don't remember — but it is customary 
for me to drink one or two highballs after the day's work is over. 
Sometimes the day's work is not over until late at night, midnight 
or later, and then of course I don't drink, but I am sure I was sober 
all the time I was down there in camp with my headquarters battery 
and headquarters staff. 

Gen. Clarke. Was Bissell sober? 

Gen. Spalding. Yes. Bissell and I, in the course of three or four 
months that he was in my command, we would have a bottle of beer 
together or over at his quarters before supper have a bottle of beer 
or a highball. I loafed with him considerable, was with him a lot 
during duty hours, and never knew him to take a drink during duty 
and after retreat we would have a drink or two, but I never remember 
taking more than two. Bissell carries liquor very well and did not 
drink to excess. 

Now about this occasion of my talking to Sadtler. It is natural that 
we talk about those things which worry us a little and Sadtler dropped 
into my house one evening at Ft. Bragg about August of 1943 and 
we talked for an hour or two there in my home. Col. Sadtler does 
not drink alcoholics, to my knowledge, and didn't there at my house. 
I knew that he was interested in Pearl Harbor and I told him of this 
incident of my talking with Bissell out there under the trees and 
[6] Bissell having told me that he had destroyed what I would 
call vital records which, if known, would be very unpleasant for the 
War Department. I don't remember that Bissell used those expres- 
sions but that is the impression which I goL 

Gen. Clarke. I got the impression from your statement that these 
messages were from secret operatives. Was that your impression? 

Gen. Spalding. No, they might have been either, but they were so 
hot that if Gen. Marshall had known about them it would have been 
very disagreeable for Gen. Marshall, but what the source of them was 
I don't remember that Bissell indicated it in any way whatever. 

Col. Gibson. You definitely understood, then, from him that this 
destruction was done on his own initiative and not at the suggestion 
of anyone else? 

Gen Spalding. That is absolutely the impression I have. 

Col. Gibson. Have you ever heard from any other source of any 
of these Pearl Harbor records, the claim that they were destroyed? 

Gen. Spalding. No. Bissell was the only man who ever told me 
anything, that I remember. I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn't 
want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson ov 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 93 

George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and 
they would hew to the line I know. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH 

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon. 
Date : 18 July 1945. 
Time : 10 : 05 a. m. 

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith. 
Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 
Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Gen. Clarke. Do you solemnly swear that the statements you make 
in this case will be the truth, so help you God ? 

Gen. Smith. I do. 

Gen. Clarke. Are you familiar with your rights as a witness, self- 
incrimination ? 

Gen. Smith. I am. 

Gen. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank, organization and 
station. 

Gen. Smith. Major General Ralph C. Smith. Presently Military 
Attache, Paris, France. 

Gen. Clarke. What w ere your duties in the three months preceding 
and approximately 3 months following the so-called Pearl Harbor 
incident ? 

Gen. Smith. During the period specified and for something more 
than a year previous, I was Executive Officer of the Military Intelli- 
gence Division. 

Gen. Clarke. Under General Miles ? 

Gen. Smith. Under General Sherman Miles, until his relief in 
December 1941. Thereafter I occupied the same position with respect 
to Brig. Gen. Raymond Lee. 
. Gen. Clarke. You never were Executive Office under Gen. Strong? 

Gen. Smith. My recollection is that Gen, Strong was actually desig- 
nated as G-2 after I left the G-2 Division. He was acting as G-2 
for a week or so prior to my departure. 

Gen. Clarke. Will you state in a general way what your duties as 
Executive Officer were? 

Gen. Smith. As Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence 
Division I was charged primarily with responsibility for all admin- 
istrative functions of the Division. As Executive Officer I was also 
head of the Administrative Branch. I conceived my mission to be 
to relieve the [21] G-2 from as much concern about the routine 
operation of his Division as possible. The Administrative Branch 
included matters such as finance, personnel, both military and civilian, 
allotment of office space (Wliich I may say parenthetically was a 
terrible headache at that time because we were being moved from 
one part of the Munitions Building to another). I also had charge 
of the filing system, the records room and the general procedure of 
handling records. The Translation Section was also included. Being 
charged primarily with administrative responsibilities, I did not 
have any direct responsibility in the intelligence chain. Because of 
my close relationship with the G-2, I was aware of a great deal that 
was going on in the intelligence and counter intelligence part of the 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Division's work, but I did not have any direct responsibility for op- 
erating that. The chain of responsibility passed directly from G-^ 
to the heads of the Intelligence Branch, Counter Intelligence Branch 
and Plans and Training Branch. 

Col. Gibson. Were yon aware of the existence at that time in 1941 
of the so-called Magic material? 

Gen. Smith. I was. Of course, as you know, every effort was made 
to limit to the very minimum, persons who had contact with or even 
knowledge of the existence of Magic material. However, because of 
my position, I knew of course, of our work in the Signal Intelligence 
Service of intercept and I was aware of our success in breaking the 
Japanese codes. I knew that this material was being handled in the 
raw in the Far Eastern Section by Japanese experts and that the 
product of the code-breaking work was being distributed in locked 
leather pouches to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, G-2 and 
later to the State Department and the Wliite House. 

Col. Gibson. Will you state your recollection as to how this Magic 
material was handled between the period of 1 July 1941 and Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Gen. Smith. The head of the Far Eastern Section, Col. Bratton, 
and his principal assistant. Col. Pettigrew, were the principal ones 
involved in handling this material. I knew that they had a great 
deal of contact with Gen. Miles, the head of G-2, on this material 
and I was generally cognizant of its nature and sometimes of its 
context, but I made no effort to pry into the exact nature of it because 
it did not concern my direct functions. 

[S] Col. Gibson. At some time did you read this material? 

Gen. Smith. Along in the late summer, as I recall it, Gen. Miles gave 
me a key to the Magic pouches. If I remember correctly, it was when 
he was absent on leave for a few days. For a period of several weeks 
or a month, approximately, I saw the pouches and read the contents of 
most of them. Later in the fall, it was about September, Gen. Miles 
told me that the Chief of Staff had expressed the desire to restrict to 
the absolute minimum persons having access to and knowledge of the 
Magic material. Therefore I returned to Gen. Miles the key to the 
pouches that I had and after that date I did not see any of the material, 
so far as I remember. 

Col. Gibson. Who delivered those pouches to Gen. Miles? 

Gen. Smith. As a matter of routine. Col. Bratton. Sometimes Col. 
Pettigrew. I do not recall their being handled by any other person. 

Col. Gibson. Was that delivery made daily? 

Gen. Smith. Yes. 

Col. Gibson. On occasions did you see Col. Bratton with several 
pouches in his possession ? 

Gen. Smith. Yes. Col. Bratton would have several pouches because 
similar ones were being given to the Chief of Staff, to the best of my 
recollection. I believe that the same copy went from the Secretary of 
War's office to the Chief of Staff, and I know that there was a separate 
copy for G-2. Whether there was a third copy I am not certain. 

Col. Gibson. Is it your recollection that WPD had a pouch? 

Gen. Smith. Yes. I am certain that Gen. Gerow had access to the 
material because I remember some incidents through the fall when I 
made contact with Gen. Gerow and arranged a meeting with him for 
Gen. Miles and vice versa. I also know that the Navy was handling 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 95 

the material because I remember there were conferences of Adm. Wil- 
kinson with Gen. Miles and Gen. Gerow in the G-2 office. 

Col. Gibson. Is it your recollection that the State Department re- 
ceived a pouch? 

[4-] Gen. Smith. Yes. A pouch went to the State Department, 
delivered there in person I believe by Col. Betts, who was the liaison 
officer with the State Department at that time. That I am a little hazy 
on, whether it was Col. Betts or Col. Bratton that took it over. And I 
know a pouch was taken to the White House on many days. 

Col. Gibson. Will you describe how the contents of the pouch looked 
when you saw them and about how many sheets might be in the pouch ? 

Gen. Smith. The Magic pouches were leather brief cases, I believe, 
with a zipper opening and susceptible of being locked with a padlock. 
On removing the padlock and opening the zipper the material inside 
was contained in a loose-leaf red board cover. In the ones that I 
recollect seeing there were always from three to a dozen or 15 pages. 
They were always carbon copies of other messages. 

Col. Gibson. Did Gen. Miles destroy the contents or what happened 
to them ? 

Gen. Smith. Gen. Miles would read the material, place it in the 
locked pouch and leave it on his desk and I would return it to Col. 
Bratton or Col. Pettigrew the next time they came up. 

Col. Gibson. Did you ever hear of a so-called Winds code message 
prior to Pearl Harbor ? 

Gen. Smith. Not that I can recall. 

Col. Gibson. Were you in any conferences of G-2 immediately prior 
to Pearl Harbor or the month prior to Pearl Harbor where the question 
of Japan and its capabilities and intentions were discussed ? 

Gen. Smith. I did not attend such conferences. I think I recall a 
meeting in Gen. Miles' office attended by Col. Kroner, Col. Bratton, 
Col. Pettigrew, Col. Betts and some of the other members of the Intelli- 
gence brain-trust. I did not participate in the conference but I knew 
it was being held. 

Col. Gibson. These estimates of the situation that were being pre- 
pared by the various intelligence branches during that period of time, 
did they come through your office ? 

Gen. Smith. They came through my desk. The volume of business 
in my office was increasing in geometric proportions at [5] 

about that time. I tried to read those estimates insofar as I could be- 
cause I wished to keep abreast of the general situation. However, 
many of them I was unable to touch ; they would go over my desk to 
G-2 and out again. 

Col. Gibson. The Military Attache reports and observer reports that 
came in from the field did not cross your desk ? 

Gen. Smith. They did not. They went directly from the mail room 
where they had a processing system that would get them with the 
minimum delay to the interested section in the Intelligence Branch. 
About the only thing that came to the front office would be the evalua- 
tions and estimates based on the Military Attaches' raw material. 
Sometimes I know, when a report would be of particular interest, it 
would be brought up and shown to Gen. Miles. I remember some 
particularly good reports by Gen. Lee's office in London and from the 
office in Germany. 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Gibson. Were you informed prior to Pearl Harbor of the con- 
tents of the message that our Government had sent to the Imperial 
Government of Japan along in the latter part of November 1941? 

Gen. Smith. I recall vaguely that such a message was in existence, 
but I do not remember that I saw it in the course of my official duties. 

Col, Gibson. In early December 1941 were you preparing to leave 
the War Department ? 

Gen. Smith. A list of senior colonels had been prepared by the G-1 
Division with an indication of possible dates when they might be 
called for active combat duty with the new divisions that were being 
contemplated. I remember that my name was on that list, as well as 
the names of Col. Bratton, Col. Compton, Col. Pettigrew and several 
other officers. From other divisions of the General Staff I knew Col. 
Huebner, Col. Ridgeway and others were likewise on this list. The 
Chief of Infantry had arranged a special two-weeks' refresher course 
at Ft. Benning for the benefit of colonels who might be relieved from 
staff duty and assigned to active command in the next few months. 
My name and that of Col. Bratton were submitted for this course. 
Bratton's name was later removed because of conversations going on 
at the White House with the Japanese special envoy and the general 
tense nature of the Japanese situation. The course was actually 
planned to begin on the 8th of December, I remember distinctly that 
I left Washington on the train from the Union [6] Station for 
Atlanta about 6 : 00 p. m. December Gth. Ralph Huebner, Mat Ridge- 
way and several others were on the same train with me. I remember 
distinctly that we reached Ft. Benning soon after noon of December 
7th. We were at the Officers' Club having luncheon when the an- 
nouncement by radio of the attack on Pearl Harbor was received. 
A few hours after this, perhaps about 5 : 00 p, m,, I received a telephone 
message from Gen. Omar Bradley, Commandant of the school, that 
Gen, Miles had called by phone and asked to have me return to Wash- 
ington by the quickest available means. Gen, Bradley loaned me a 
car to drive to Atlanta, where I got a plan and reached Washington 
Monday morning, I must admit that because of this course and my 
preparations to leave, that happenings in the office on the morning of 
December 6 are quite hazy in my mind. My ])hice during my absence 
was taken by the late Col. Roderick, my Assistant Executive Officer. 

Col. Gibson. In the immediate few days prior to Pearl Harbor, any 
messages that were sent out from G-2 to the Commahding Generals 
of the Philippines, Hawaii or Panama, would clear through your 
office? 

Gen. Smith. They would clear through my office. The volume of 
messages had reached a formidable proportion at this time and in 
order to clear them out in the evening, I had had an autograph rubber 
stamp prepared that was kept locked in my deck or in the desk of one 
of my assistants. Whenever a message came up properly authenti- 
cated with the initials of one of the Chiefs of Branches or Sections, 
this message would be cleared by one of my assistants without ever 
coming to my attention. 

Col. Gibson. As a matter of routine then, any message that came to 
your office at that time to be cabled to the field or sent to the field 
would be stamped by someone in your office and sent forward for dis- 
patch provided that the Chief of a Branch had initiated the same? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 97 

Gen. Smith. That is right. The functions of my office were to 
verify that the message had been properly coordinated within the G-2 
Division prior to being sent. I assumed no responsibility for the 
actual context of the message except that it made sense. I had in- 
structed my assistants to read through and see that the message was 
understandable to them and there were no obvious errors. 

[7] Col. GiHsoN. The wisdom or the propriety of sending such 
a message was not a duty of yours ? 

Gen. Smith. No. I had no function on that score. I accepted any 
message that had the approval, as indicated by initials, of any Branch 
or Section Chief, and I had delegated that responsibility for approval 
to my assistants. 

Col. Gibson. In fact in your administrative duties, you were kept 
so busy that you didn't know enough of the intelligence situation to 
really pass sound judgment on these messages. Is that correct? 

Gen. Smith. I am sorry to say that that is an understatement, if 
anything. The office was a beehive of activity about this time. 

Col. GiBSOx. Were you aware of certain warning messages that 
were being sent out by G-2 to the field during the first week in 
December ? 

Gen. Smith. As I have reflected on the events of that week in retro- 
spection, I have a vague awareness that such messages were going out 
and there was a tense atmosphere in the office. I of course knew about 
the presence of the Japanese Ambassador and knew that the confer- 
ences were not going satisfactorily, but that is about the limit of my 
detailed knowledge. 

Col. Gibson. Any answers to these messages that were sent out in 
either the latter part of November or the first week of December, the 
answers being from Department Commanders, did you see ? 

Gen. Smith. Not that I recollect. Our system of office procedure 
was such that the handling of such messages would be expedited to get 
them to the interested agency as quickly as possible. Outgoing mes- 
sages did pass through my office. Incoming messages were handled 
directly from the Record Section to the interested agency. 

Col. Gibson. Do you ever recall seeing or knowing about a message 
from Gen. Short, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to G-2 in 
answer to a warning message that G-2 had sent out either the latter 
part of November or the first week of December ? 

Gen. Smith. I have seen references to the message which I know 
you mean since, but I am certain that I had no knowledge of it prior 
to December 7. 

[<§] Col. Gibson. After you returned from Ft. Benning on the 
morning of 8 December, then what were your duties ? 

Gen. Smith, My duties continued unchanged as Executive Officer 
of the Division until approximately the end of March. 

Col. Gibson. Then from the 8th of December until the end of March 
you were in charge of the records of G-2 ? 

Gen, Smith. In a broad supervisory sense, yes. 

Col. Gibson. If any records were to be copied or destroyed or trans- 
ferred to any other source, would you in the ordinary course of your 
duties have had to pass on it? 

Gen. Smith. I am certain that my subordinates would not have 
accepted any orders to tamper with the records, either in changing 

79716—46 — Ex. 147 8 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

them, removing them or destroying them without having reported the 
fact to me. 

Col. Gibson. At any time during your service in the War Depart- 
ment in 1941 and until you left in March 1942, to your knowledge were 
any of the records of G-2 destroyed? 

Gen. Smith. Categorically, no. The only recollection of any de- 
struction of records that I have occurring during my administration 
was in the early part of my function as Executive Officer in 1941 when 
we were making an effort to collect out of the files and eliminate a lot 
of obsolete material dating back to World War I in order to conserve 
filing space. A considerable cleaning up of the Record Section was 
done in 1940 and 1941, as I recall it, in order to place with the National 
Archives material that should be kept of permanent record, and mate- 
rial of no permanent value was destroyed. 

Col. Gibson. After that time to your knowledge was any material of 
any type destroyed ? 

Gen. Smith. I am very certain that no permanent records after 
January 1941, perhaps, were removed or destroyed. 

Col. Gibson. At any time did you ever receive any order from any- 
one after Pearl Harbor while you were in the War Department to 
destroy or have any records destroyed ? 

Gen. Smith. I did not. 

[9] Col. Gibson. Or held? 

Gen. Smith. I did not. 

Col. Gibson. Or tampered with ? 

Gen. Smith. I did not. 

Col. Gibson. Or touched in any way, shape or manner ? 

Gen. Smith. I did not. 

Col. Gibson. As far as you know, are the records of G-2 that per- 
tain to Pearl Harbor for 1941 and up until March 1942 complete ? 

Gen. Smith. To the best of my knowledge they are. 

Col. Gibson. Until you arrived at the War Department yesterday, 
did you ever hear of any story to the effect that some of the Pearl 
Harbor records or reports bearing on Pearl Harbor had been de- 
stroyed ? 

Gen. Smith. I did not. 

Col. Gibson. Prior to yesterday had you ever heard any comments 
made that if certain records in G-2 became known or were made 
public that it would be very damning to the Secretary of War or the 
Chief of Staff? 

Gen. Smith. No I had never heard any such comment. 

Col. Gibson. Did you know Col. J. T. B. Bissell? 

Gen. Smith. I did. 

Col. Gibson. And was he on duty in the War Department in G-2 
at the same time you were? 

Gen. Smith. Col. Bissell was, first, assistant to Col. Lester and 
later became Chief of Counter Intelligence Branch. He occupied 
that position, as I recall it, in December 1941. 

Col. Gibson. Now let me ask you this question. Did Col. Bissell, 
to your knowledge, ever destroy any records in G-2 in the War 
Department ? 

Gen. Smith. He did not during my tenure of ofHce ; and I believe 
that if he had I would have known about it from my subordinates. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 99 

[10] Col. Gibson. Let me ask you this. Did Col. Bissell ever 
tell you that he had destroyed some records dealing with Pearl 
Harbor? 

Gen. Smith. He did not. 

Col. Gibson. Had you ever heard, until yesterday, any story alleg- 
ing that Col. Bissell had said he did destroy certain records? 

Gen. Smith. I had not. 

Gen. Clarke. Did you ever discuss any of the incidents leading up 
to Pearl Harbor with Col. Bissell ? 

Gen. Smith. I have no recollection. It is true that we were both 
members of the G-2 Division for the 3 months following Pearl Har- 
bor. It is possible that we may have discussed it in general terms 
but I have no specific recollection. 

Gen. Clarke. I would like to ask one question here. Do you know 
whether or not the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, Col. 
Bissell, had at his disposal all of the information and intelligence 
which was available to the Intelligence Group ? 

Gen. Smith. I have a vague recollection that some point was 
brought up either shortly before Pearl Harbor or possibly afterward 
that some sources of Counter Intelligence data were in existence but 
not being exploited to the maximum. I think I can state as a cer- 
tainty that the Counter Intelligence Branch did not receive the 
pouch containing the full Magic material. I do, however, have a 
vague recollection that the Far Eastern Branch had some contacts 
with the Counter Intelligence Branch on activities of Japanese agents 
in this country. 

Gen. Clarke. What about Japanese agents in Hawaii ? 

Gen. Smith. I have no recollection on that specific score. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN T. BISSELL 

[i] Place: Koom 2E780, The Pentagon. 

Date : 4 August 1945, 3 : 10 p. m. 

Present : Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell. 
Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Col. Gibson. Gen. Bissell, Gen. Clarke has been directed by Gen. 
Marshall to reopen this Pearl Harbor investigation on the basis of 
the old order that he had here last September 9 when this investigation 
was commenced. I would like to remind you that you are still under 
oath. With reference to that I would like to reswear you in, in con- 
nection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God ? 

Gen. Bissell. I do. 

Col. Gibson. You of course are aware of your rights ? 

Gen. Bissell, I am. 

Col. Gibson. Will you please state your name, rank, position and 
organization. 

Gen. Bissell. John T. B. Bissell, Brigadier General, 08624. Head- 
quarters 89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York. 

Col. Gibson. You are here as a result of receiving cable orders to 
return here for purposes of this interrogation ? 

Gen. Bissell. I am. 

Col. Gibson. Since your arrival here have you read the sworn testi- 
mony of Mr. Wm. F. Friedman of 13 July 45 before General Clarke 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. 
Isaac Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor 
matter ? 

Gen. BissELL. I have. 

Col. Gibson. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt 
sent to Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain 
testimony of this Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board ? 

Gen. BissELL. I did 

[2] Col. Gibson. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this 
matter in September 1944 ? 

Gen. Bissell. That is correct. 

Col. Gibson. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over 
that testimony ? 

Gen. Bissell. I have. 

Col. Gibson. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding? 

Gen. Bissell. I do. 

Col. Gibson How long have you known him ? 

Gen. Bissell. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. 
while he was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had 
just been ordered to take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group 
which was part of that Brigade. 

Col. Gibson. Had you known him before that? 

Gen. Bissell. I had not. 

Col. Gibson. How long did you serve under Gen. Spalding at Ft. 
Bragg ? 

Gen. Bissell. From about the 12th of June until some time in Octo- 
ber. I was stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C. 

Col. Gibson. During this period of time did you have many occasions 
to converse with Gen. Spalding? 

Gen. Bissell. I conversed with him frequently as he came down 
from Ft. Bragg about once a week. 

Col. Gibson. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg ? 

Gen. Bissell. Roughly, 70 miles. 

Col. Gibson So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were down 
at Jackson all of this time ? 

Gen. Bissell. Yes. 

Col. Gibson. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery 
did come down to Jackson for some training? 

Gen. Bissell. That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I 
remember. 

[3] Col. Gibson. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. 
Spalding during those months in 1943 did he ask you about what 
G-2 knew about tlie Pearl Harbor attack ? 

Gen. Bissell. Yes, he asked me several questions about it. 

Col. Gibson. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion? 

Gen. Bissell. I don't recall. I think he may have. 

Col. Gibson. Is there any particular occasion that you have in 
mind when he did talk with you at some length about it ? 

Gen. Bissell. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand 
why the airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields 
when conditions were as strained as they were. 

Col. Gibson. Where was that? 

Gen, Bissell. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might pos- 
sibly have been at Bragg, as I was up there several times. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 101 

Col. Gibson. Do you remember conversinj^ witli him about Pearl 
Harbor when you were sitting together under some trees on the train- 
ing grounds at Jackson? 

Gen. BissELL, I don't remember the incident. It may well have 
occurred there or somewhere else. I don't remember the details. 

Col. Gibson. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, 
3'ou told him that certain messages had been received, these messages 
pertaining to Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you 
deemed it most necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a 
statement ? 

Gen. BissELL. No, I did not. 

Col. Gibson. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and 
5 of his testimony of last: July, and ask if you will give your recol- 
lection of the talk you had with Gen. Spalding. 

Gen. BissELL. As I recall it. Gen. Spalding asked me a great many 
questions with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the 
Military Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was 
particularly interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, 
etc. I tried to avoid the issue as much as possible and give [4] 
no information that I thought should not be revealed. Following 
that, he discussed at some length the Pearl Harbor disaster and 
stated that he could not understand why G-2 had not been more 
alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been 
assembled together. He asked me what I know about the matter and 
I told him that G-2 had been afraid of sabotage and that a message 
had been sent out to the Hawaiian Department alerting them to be 
on their guard against possible sabotage. He endeavored to draw 
me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed, he asked 
me what I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had 
been directed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to draft a message to the G-2, 
Hawaiian Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other 
Defense Commands and Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage 
on account of the very strained relations with which everyone in 
G-2 was familiar. He asked me further details of the matter and 
I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office one evening until 
about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was then the 
A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian 
Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained rela- 
tions betAveen the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. 
Miles personally. He read the message and change it materially, 
stressing the sabotage angle more than I had. That message, as far 
as I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen. Miles destroyed 
as it was marked Secret. 

Col. Gibson. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adju- 
tant General, dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps 
Area and Overseas Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if 
that is a copy of the message that you refer to just now in your testi- 
mony as being the message which Gen. Miles drew and substituted 
for the message that you had prepared. 

Gen. BissELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution 
for the one which I drafted. 

Col. Gibson. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed 
to you his failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the 
Pearl Harbor attack had left their home ports ? 

Gen. BissELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I 
don't recall it. 

[5] Col. Gibson. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you 
that he believed that Mies was a stuffed shirt? 

Gen. BissELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state 
that he believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt ? 

Col. GiBSON". Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on 
Hawaii weren't working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 
1940 that they were being installed? 

Gen. BissELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention 
of radar. 

Col. Gibson". To your knowledge, while you were connected with 
G-2 were ever any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything 
else destroyed ? 

Gen. BissELL. Not as far as I know. 

Col. Gibson. And once a message was okeyed and sent it was kept? 

Gen. BissELL. It went to the file immediately. 

Col. Gibson. And no files were ever destroyed? 

Gen. BissELL. Not as far as I know. 

Col. Gibson. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed? 

Gen. BissELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World 
War I excess material that had no value. 

Col. Gibson. Again to clarify the record, your job in G-2 in 1941 
and 1942 was always connected with the Counter Intelligence work 
of G-2? 

Gen. BissELL. That is correct. 

Col. Gibson. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal 
intelligence ? 

Gen. BissELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. Gibson. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of 
what you later found to be information based on signal intelligence? 

Gen. BissELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got 
emanated from signal intelligence. They pertained principally to 
[6] suspected Japanese again in this country, in Panama, in 
Hawaii, and in Alaska. 

Col. Gibson. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such 
material in the raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined? 

Gen. BissELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more 
of the signal intelligence material. 

Col. Gibson. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, 
that you had destroyed what you would call vital records, records 
which if known to exist would be very unpleasant to the War De- 
partment ? 

Gen. BissELL. I did not. 

Col. Gibson. Did you ever tell him anything from which he might 
infer such? , 

Gen. BissELL. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 103 



EXHIBITS OF THE CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



ExHlIilTS 1 TO 8 

HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS 

Clarke Exhibit No. 1 

top secret 
From: Wasliiiigton (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 14, 1941 
Purple 
#943 (Part 1 of 2) ' (To be handled in Government Code) 

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told 
me, it is this : 

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. 
Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a 
definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be 
made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. 
Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters inde- 
pendently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her 
obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing 
or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would 
seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for 
a gradual withdrawal." 

He speculated on the various diflSculties which Japan had to face internally. 
It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State. 

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2) 

TOP SECRET 

From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To : Washington 
October 16, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#671 

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors 
in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotia- 
tions, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining 
to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American 
merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision 
of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Gov- 
ernment submit to the American Government a message to the effect tliat the 
Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues 
to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably 
arise between Gei'many and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the 
other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envi- 
sioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately 
the war in opposition to the United States. We -have not, as yet, submitted this 
message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it 
necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the 
message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request 
and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. 
While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of 
carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had 

" For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success 
of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no 
other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words 
as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American 
negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you. 

(Separate wire) 

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American 
Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the 
prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the 
recent tension in the German American relations suffer aggravation, there would 
arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over 
which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pace, naturally cannot help enter- 
tain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German- 
American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension 
will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now 
requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government. 

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET 



From ; Berlin. 
To : Tokyo. 
1 October 1941 
(Purple) 
#1198 

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters es- 
pecially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and 
the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of 
society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences 
and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this 
report to you. 

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the con- 
tent of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador 
Ott. America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Jap- 
anese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand 
Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude. 

2. That the Foreign Oflice staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in 
general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their 
attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels 
kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. 
Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in 
his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessi- 
mistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper 
correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant 
of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an 
alienation between Japan and Germany. 

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show 
great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain 
sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. 
However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is 
avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident 
and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war. 

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machina- 
tions of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pre- 
tence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the 
feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting 
bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan 
takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without 
consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without 
consulting Japan. 

Please convey this to the army and navy. 
Relayed to Rome. 

23673 JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 10-1&-41 (4) 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 105 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To : Tokyo 
October 22, 1941. 
Purple. (CA) 

I have already wired you something aliout my present psychology. I am 
sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some 
time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet 
how little influence I have in Japan. I ;im ashamed to say that it has come to 
my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this i)oor 
novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encourage- 
ment is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are 
also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As 
for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor 
do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the bones of 
a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving 
other people. No, don't think I am trying to tiee from the field of battle, 
but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please 
send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your 
forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in 
the depth of my rudeness. 

ARMY G017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7) 



From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
5 November 1941 
(Purple-CA) 
#736 

( Of utmost secrecy ) 

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I 
realize that this is a diflBcult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoid- 
able one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the 
Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great 
determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only. 

JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT) 



From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 

1. I sent MOORE " to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows : 

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States 
will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy 
is prepared and ready for action." 

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quib- 
bling, began by saying to me : 

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he 
continued : "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports 
th^t Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe 
that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have 
any effect on the general situation." 

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since 
the freezing ; how they are eager for a quick understanding ; how both the Govern- 
ment and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war ; and how we will hope 
for peace until the end. 

[2] He replied, however: 

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary 
of State." 

24655 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2) 

" Frederick Moore — Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Part 2 of 2) 

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the 
Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war 
with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the 
British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys 
have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been 
made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in 
the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this 
trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the 
United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be 
done since it is a question of the United States saving its face. 

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on 
the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best. 

24656 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2) 



From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
November 16, 1941 
Purple (Ca) (Urgent) 



#- 



For your Honor's own information. 

1. I have read your #1090," and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude 
for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the 
slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. 

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and 
I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you 
to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.'' Will you please try to 
realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn 
the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the 
situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution 
of these negotiations in my #736," and there will be no change. Please try 
to understand that. You see how short the time is ; therefore, do not allow the 
United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them 
for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an 
immediate solution. 

ARMY 24,878 JD-1 : 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S) 



From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
November 22, 1941 
Purple CA (Urgent) 

#812 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.' You 
should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed 
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution 
we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to 
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or 



» See JD- : 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 
not available. 

" S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japan- 
nese Empire will not permit any further delav in reaching a settlement with the United 
States. 

<= S. I. S. # 24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 

■ See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances 
it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be com- 
pleted by the 25th of this month. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



107 



four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing 
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you— twenty ninth) ; if 
the pertinent notes can be exchanged ; if we can get an understanding with Great 
Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have 
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso- 
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. 
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever 
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors 
alone, 

ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S) 



[i] From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
November 26. 1941 
Purple 

#836. To be handled in Government Code. 

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too 
long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations 
to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American 
Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will 
use the following code : 



Japanese 

Sangoku Joyaku Mondai 

(Three-Power Treaty question) 

Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai 

(The question of nondiscriminatory 

treatment) 
Shina Mondai 
(The China question) 
Soori 
(Premier) 
Gaimudaijin 
(Foreign Minister) 
Rikugun 
(The Army) 
Kaigun 
(The Navj^) 
Nichi-bei kooshoo 
(Japan-American negotiations) 
Daitooryoo 
(President) 
Haru 
(Hull) 

[2] Japanese 

Kokuaijoosei 

(Internal situation) 

Jooho Suru 

(To yield) 

jooho Sezu 

(Not to yield) 

Keisei Kyuuten Suru 

(Situation taking critical turn) 

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are 
as follows : 

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO : Setagaya 4617 
Section Chief KASE : Yotsuya 4793 
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614 
The Vice-Minister's residence Ginza 1022 

ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 



English 
Nyuu Yooku 
(New York) 
Shikago 
(Chicago) 

Sanfuranshisuko 
(San Francisco) 
Itoo Kun 
(Mr. Itoo) 
Date Kun 
(Mr. Date) 
Tokugawa Kun 
(Mr. Tokugawa 
Maeda Kun 
(Mr. Maeda) 
Endan 

(Marriage proposal) 
Kimiko San 
(Miss Kimiko) 
Fumeko San 
(Miss Fumeko) 

English 
Shoobai 

(Trade) 
Yama Wo Uru 

(To sell the mountain) 
Yama Wo Urenu 

(Not to sell the mountain) 
Kodomo Gaumareru 

(The child is born) 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

To: Nanking. 

15 November 1941 

From : Tokyo 

(Purple) 

#499 

Re your #818* 

To Naval authorities : 

We are now in tlie midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached 
an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for 
a vphile. 

25390 JD-1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR) 



"Not available. 



From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
19 Novmber 1941 
(J19) 
Circular #2354 

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following 
at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts : 

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations 

"HiGAsnr 

(2) Japan Russian relations 

"KITA" 

(3) Japan British relations ; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) 

"NISHI" 

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at the beginning 
and end. 

Relay to Ri/> de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco. 

SIS-25392 JD-1: 6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-26-41 



From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
19 November 1941 
(J19) 
Circular #2353 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added 
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast : 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME 
(EAST WIND RAIN) 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND 
CLOUDY) 

(3) Japan-British relations : NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR) 
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 

and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy 
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

See Supplementary Information File. 

(Voice broadcasts) 

SIS-25432 JD-1 : 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 109 

Fronl : Washington 

To: Tokyo 

November 26, 1941 

Purple. (Extremely urgent) 

#1180. (Part 1 of 2) 

From Nomura and Kurusu. 

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having 
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation 
remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably 
be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humilia- 
tion are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Al- 
though we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSE- 
VELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United 
States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as 
j'ou wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrange- 
ment with all we have in us) , and that you in return reply with a cordial message, 
thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Con- 
sidering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring 
the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in 
order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral 
nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Tliai. (As you 
know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French 
Indo-China and Thai.) 

(Part 2 of 2) 

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily 
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we 
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England 
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would 
be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty 
bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. 
Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait 
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled. 

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to 
express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the 
Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wire us back 
instantly. 

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



[Jf] From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 26, 1941 

Purple. (Extremely urgent) 

#1189. (Part 1 of 2) 

At 4 : 45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with 
Secretary Hull and we talked for about two hours. 

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been 
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the 
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 
20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At 
length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without 
commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st 
and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following 
two proposals: 

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles." 

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, 
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok. 

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, 
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of 
economic treatment in French Indo-China. 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all EYench 
Indo-China. 

[2] (4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no 
regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI SHEK. 

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China. 

25441 ARMY Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 

[Jf] ' (Part 2 of 2) 

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United 
States on the basis of most favored nation treatment. 

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders. 

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange. 

(9) No matter vrhat sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has 
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties 
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objective of this treaty or to the mainte- 
nance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the 
Three-Power Pact.) 

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumb-founded and said we 
could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued 
back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States 
have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and 
China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit 
helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have 
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there 
have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete [2] 
control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard pro- 
posals, or we think so. 

From : Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 28, 1941 
Purple. (CA) 

#844. 

Re your #1189 \ 

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of 
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented tliis humiliiiting proposal. 
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government 
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the 
views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send 
you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is 
inevitable.- However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotia- 
tions are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and 
that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your 
own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and 
has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have 
always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the 
other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan 
to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man 
you told me to in your #1180" and he said that under the present circumstances 
what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can. 

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S) 



• S. I. S. #25441, #25442. 

•» S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 111 

From : Tokyo 
To : Wasliiugton 
27 November 1941 
(Purple) 

#843 

Broadcast schedule as follows : 

6 p. m. To Pacific Coast 

6 : 30 p. m. To Western Hemisphere JUO 9430 and 

7 : 00 p. m To the Coast 

8 : 00 p. m. To the Coast 

9 : 00 p. m. To the Coast 

10 : 00 p. m. To the Coast 

10 : 30 p. m. To Europe 

(Note: All times Tokyo time) 

SIS 25446 JD-1: 6899 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-28^1 (S-TT) 



JVJ 


12275 


JUO 


9430 


JVJ 


12275 


JVJ 


12275 


JHL 


5160 


JHL 


5160 


JHL 


5160 


JHP 


11980 



From : Tokyo 
To: Washington 
29 November 1941 
(Purple-CA) 

#857 

Re my #844* 

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines : 

The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial posi- 
tion and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both 
sides. 

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now 
taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the 
basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual 
conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial 
Government. 

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what 
has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis 
of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would 
request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government. 

{In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to 
anything like a breaking off of negotiations.) 

SIS 25496 JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT) 



•JD-l : 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new 
U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days 
giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de factor" ruptured. However, do not 
give the impression that negotiations are broken off. 



From : Washington 

To: Tokyo 

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST) 

Telephone Code 

Transpacific 
Radio Telephone 

(Note: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between 
Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief 
yamamoto on Sunday night) 

Kurusu : "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a 
short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about 
the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to 
Mr. Hull's proposals.) 

Yamamoto : "Yes. I see." • 

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home." 

Y : "Is there any special significance to this?" 

K : "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having 
strong repercussions here." 

Y: "Is that so." 

K : "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large 
headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There 
no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving." 

( Pause ) 

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it 
puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about 
these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani." 

Y : "We are being careful." 

K : "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the cor- 
respondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, 
the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected 
to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. 
Premier's speech) 

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code) 

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan) 

Y : "No particular — (one or two words faded out) — ." 

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" 

Y: "Yes." 

K : "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you ; but now you want 
them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign 
Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you under- 
stand? Please, all use more discretion." 

Y : "When will you see them. The 2nd?" 

K : "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomox*row morning at ten. 
That will be Monday morning here." 

(Pause) 

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in 
the South. You understand don't you?" 

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it he before the President gets back?" 

K : "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4 :00 this 
afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime." 

Y: "Well then— Goodbye." 

JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497 



From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 28, 1941. 
Purple. 

#1214. To be handled in Government Code. 

Re my #1190 \ 

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United 
States ; hx)wever, now the results of our confeerenee of the 26th are out and head- 
lines like this are appearing in the papers : "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," 
and "America Scorns a Second Munich.'' The papers say that is up to Japan 
either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, 
in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan. 

This we must carefully note. 

ARMY 2.5548 Trans. 12-1-41 (2) 



« S. I. S. #2, 
biliity for the r 
sohoduled opei'a 




fJciuHuiiea ojteraTions nurinj: rne course or rne nefroTianons. jue suggests tnnt tne neeoria- 
tioiis be irrevocably concluderl either through an announcement to the American Emt)assy 
in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 113 

[/] From: Tokyo 
November 30, 1941 
To: Berlin 
Purple 

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2) (Se- 
cret outside the Department) 

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this 
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period 
the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the 
cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international 
situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the 
United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope 
of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from partici- 
pating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these 
negotiations. 

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of 
defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, 
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views 
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops upon which the negotiations 
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French 
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other. 

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first 
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional idea- 
logical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her funda- 
mental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on be- 
tween the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the 
United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establish- 
ment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far 
East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire 
of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance 
of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they 
took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand 
the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This 
was brought out; at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in 
the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and 
more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations 
with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations 
would inevitably be detrimental to our cause. 

[2] (Part 2 of 2) 

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude 
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that 
no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not 
be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely 
the maintenance of peace in the Pacitic. This means specifically the Three- 
Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war 
at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Ger- 
many and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes 
it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What 
is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with 
England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they do so repeatedly. There- 
fore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and 
has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy. 

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR) 



79716— 46— Ex. 147- 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
1 December 1941 
(Purple-CA) 

#865 

Re my #857.* 

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation 
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States 
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others 
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United 
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information) . 

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador 
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make 
the necessary representations at your end only. 

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital 
is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President 
did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please 
make investigations into this matter. 

SIS-25605 JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 



•JD-1 : 6921. 
*»JD-1 : 6710. 
•♦♦Not available. 

From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Honolulu (Riyoji) 
15 November 1941 
(J-19) 

#111 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although 
you already are not doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy. 

SIS-25644 JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S) 



[Completed Translation] 
From : Washington 
To : Tokyo 
December 2, 1941 
Purple 

#1232 

(Part 1 of 2) 

Re my #1231. 

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under- 
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying 
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he 
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.* Thereupon we said : 
"Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the 
troops in French Indo-Chiua, we will transmit the gist of your representations 
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered 
that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of 
November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the 
stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all 
parts of the world." Thereupon we replied : "The United States and other 
countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us 
Japanese. (I made that statement that economic warfai*e was even worse 
than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of 
this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with 
economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between 



» Not available. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 115 

submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want 
you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves 
as the result of the four-year incident in China ; the President recently expressed 
cognizance of the latter situation. 

25659-B Trans. 12/3/41 



♦Original translation incomplete from this point on. 

(Part 2 of 2) 

[1] Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent 
American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound 
consideration to this important question which has to do with our national 
destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said : "I am well aware of that." 
I continued : "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is 
concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American pro- 
posals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the 
proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on 
the previous proposal,, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement 
of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture 
to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make 
for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised 
to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement 
of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the 
Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions the question 
of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under- 
Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said : "The American proposals 
of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the 
United States because of the internal situation here." 

25660 ARMY 

[2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have ex- 
pressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary." 

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped 
Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much 
room. 

Judging' by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my 
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to 
peacefully conclude the current diflBcult situation. I am convinced that they 
would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well 
in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American pro- 
posals and to my separate wire #1233." 

ARMY 2.5660 Trans. 12-3-41 (7) 
» Not available. 



From : Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

1 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available). 

(Message having the indicator 20S03* is part one of three.) 

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatis- 
faction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President 
recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four 
years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense. 

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by success- 
fully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support 
and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction. 

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China the gov- 
ernment of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been 
receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. ofiicials stationed 
in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy ; the landing 

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message. 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of various types of arms ; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is 
felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was they they feared that 
they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern 
Pacific area). 

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are 
planning are not diflScult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese 
army and navy joins forces with the Germans ; even if, in actuality, that is not 
what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and 
all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area. 

25715 JD-1: 7042 <D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7) 



From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 

#875 

Chief of Office routing. 

Re your #1232* 

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines : 

There seems to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French 
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an 
unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French 
Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of 
northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops 
in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors 
is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no 
way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense 
agreement. 

25725 JD-1: 7057 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT) 



*JD-1 : 7021. (SIS #25659-60) 

From: Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

1 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1227 

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even 
if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. How- 
ever, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the 
middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further develop- 
ments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' 
meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between 
persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice Presi- 
dent Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, 
who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy 
Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as 
Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. 
Have tliem make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of 
their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each. 

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace. 

We realize of cour.se that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former 
Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, 
it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this possibility. 
Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives 
even if the meeting is held, cnreful consideration should first be given this matter. 

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, 
it is not wasting our efforts to puvstie every path open to us. It is our opinion 
that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding 
this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 117 

does not seem px'actical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would 
it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that 
manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government 
could make the oflBcial proposal. 

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter. 

25727 JD-1: 7055 S'ECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) Copy 



From : Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
December 2, 1941. 
Purple. (Urgent) 

#1234. 

Strictly Secret. 
Re your #862." 

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now 
stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd 
prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE 
at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE 
said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, 
the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a 
severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate 
and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was tlie American newspapers 
that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make 
any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present 
the newspaper of both countries ought hoth to be cool and calm, so will you 
please advise them hereafter concerning this point." 

25730 JD-7059 Trans. 12-4-41 (2) 

ARMY 



» Not available. 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 4, 1941. 
Purple (Urgent) 



#891. 

To be handled in Government Code. 
Re your #1256." 

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be 
a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my 
#875.'' I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so 
please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message. 

25731 JD-7105 Trans. 12-4-41 (S) 

ARMY 



« Not available. 
" S. I. S. #25725. 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 30, 1941 
Purple 

#1224 

Re your #857." 

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified 
of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's ex- 

« See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally 
to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United 
States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front 
•with regard to the China problem. 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity 
and so will you transmit your message af once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 
p. m.) 

25762 

ARMY JD 7089 Trans. 12/5/41 (2) 



From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To : Honolulu 
November 18, 1941 
J-19 

#113 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area ''N"» 
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay," and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your inves- 
tigation with great secrecy.) 

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S) 
» Probably means Mamala Bay. 



From: Tokyo 
To : Hsinking 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 

#893 

* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war • * • in 
view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate 
in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England 
and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. 

A summary follows : 

1. American and British consular oflBcials and offices will not be recognized as 
having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code tele- 
grams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired 
that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable 
to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident to 
Japan. 

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private 
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by 
Japan. 

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular 
offices and interests will not be recognized. 

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable 
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan. 

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform 
to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be 
exercised not to antagonize Russia. 

[Handwritten:] Codes Manchukuo, etc. 

JD-1:7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR) SIS 25783 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 119 



From: Washington. 

To : Tokyo. 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1223 



Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between 
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a 
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand. 



25785 

JD-1 : 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7) 



From : Berlin - 

To: Tokyo 
December 4, 1941. 
Purple. (CA) 

#1410 

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like 
to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE 
and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other offi- 
cials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end. 

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W) 



From: Honolulu (Kita) 
To: Tokyo 
November 18, 1941 
J-19 

#222 

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my 
#219 ' on that day. 

Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. 
Area C " — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or 
some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one 
of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at 
anchor in Arear D.* 

3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed enter- 
ing the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance of 1,000 
meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From 
the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they 
were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The 
elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after 
passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side. 

Relayed to . 

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2) 



* Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study. 
*> Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 

<^ East Loch. 

* Middle Loch. 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Tokyo 
To: Honolulu 
29 November 1941 
(J19) 

#122 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future 
will you also report even when there are no movements. 
SIS 25823 
JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 



From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 1 of 14) 

Separate telegram 
Memorandum 

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to conse to an 
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order 
that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific 
area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has con- 
tinued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Gov- 
ernment of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of 
Japanese-American relations and the stal)ilization of the Pacific area. 

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concern- 
ing the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as 
the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan 
during these eight months. 

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the sta- 
bility of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations 
to find each BOAMPTQBR place in the world. 

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of 
China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, tlie Japanese Government has 
striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best 
effort to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that 
end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with 
Germany and Italy. 

(Part 2 of 14) 

Ho'o'ever, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every 
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish- 
ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's 
constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pres- 
sure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they 
have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common 
prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in 
accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of 
French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinter- 
preted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands gov- 
ernment to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing 
economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile 
attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations per- 
fectitig an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which 
endangers the very existence of the empire. 

(Parts of 14) 

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, 
in August last, to n>eet the President of the United States for a discussion of 
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. 
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the 
meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 121 

fundamental — (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted a pro- 
posal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully 
into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. 
Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of 
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating 
still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of ditnculty in 
tho negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the 
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to 
display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no 
progress. 

(Part 4 of 14) 

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for 
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th 
still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more 
essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated 
the following points : 

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dis- 
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, In 
the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 

(2) Roth Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition 
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two 
countries are in need. 

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to 
those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. 

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity 
of oil. 

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures 
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace 
between Japan and China. 

(H) The Japanese Government imdertakes to withdraw troops now stationed 
in French Indo China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and 
China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is 
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo- 
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement. 

(Part 5 of 14) 

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness 
to accept the ofter of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" 
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an 
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the 
restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct 
negotiations. 

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, 
but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and in 
spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to 
act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that 
time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose 
upon the .Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the 
American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which 
is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government. 

(Part 6 of 14) 

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government 
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best 
to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite 
of great difficulties. 

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the 
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. 

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, ad- 
vocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its 
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that 
along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, 
and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic 
activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French 
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to 
carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China 
as a measure of easing the situation. 

(Part 7 of 14) 

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree 
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the 
American government. 

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories 
in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, 
caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude 
of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the 
attention of the American government especially to the following points : 

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those 
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance 
thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a 
mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation 
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores 
realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the 
purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations. 

(Part 8 of 14) 

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis 
of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese govern- 
ment is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, 
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt 
to force their immediate adoption. 

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between 
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether- 
lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective 
security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia. 

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both gov- 
ernments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any 
third powers, shall be intei-preted by it in such a way as to conflict with the 
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of 
peace throughout the Pacific area.*' It Is presumed that the above provision 
has been projwsed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations 
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in 
Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government. 

(Part 9 of 14) 

The American Governmjnt, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may 
be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one 
hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the 
other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of 
self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a 
new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many 
principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability 
of the I'acitic area through peaceful means. 

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, 
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising 
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. 
Recourse to such i)ressure as a means of dealing with international relations 
should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure. 

(Part 10 of 14) 

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the .Vmerican Government 
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other 
powers, its dominant p<isition it has hitherto occupied not only in China but 
in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr — (45 letters 
garbled or missing)— -been compelled to observe the status quo under the 

Anglo-American jjolicy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the es 

to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 123 

the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's 
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the 

world. 

(Part 11 of 14) 

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French 
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. 
That the six countries,— Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Nether- 
lands, China and Thailand,— excepting France, should undertake among them- 
selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China 
and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing 
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six coun- 
tries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position 
of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an 
arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China 
of a system similar to the n— (50 letters missed ) —sible for the present predica- 
ment of East Asia. 

(Part 12 of 14) 

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding 
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the 
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual 
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the 
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in 
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime 
other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of 
the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. 
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its 
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demon- 
strates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restor- 
ation of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to 
East Asia. 

(Part 13 of 14) 

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as 
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, 
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and 
Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the 
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the 
four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and dis- 
parages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese 
government regrets that it caiinot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation. 

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the 
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-, 
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other inter- 
ested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. 
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 
26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The 
Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of 
the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded 
that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's 
position. 

(Part 14 of 14) 

(Note: in the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, 
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT"). 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the estab- 
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and espe- 
cially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and 
China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of 
the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government 
to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace 
of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally 
been lost. 



♦Probably "and as" 
**Probably "China, can bii*-' 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov- 
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but 
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. 

JD-1:7143 SECRET, (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941. (S-TT) 
25843 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December 7, 1941 

I'urple (Urgent — Very Important) 

#907. To be handled in government code. 

Re my #902.* 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos- 
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on 
the 7th, your time. 

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 



» JD-l : 7143 — text of Japanese reply. 



Claeke Exhibit No. 2 
From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
19 November 1941 
(J19) 

Circular #2353 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added 
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave new^s broadcast : 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger : 

HIGASHI NO KAZEIAME (EAST WIND RAIN) 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: 

KITANOKAZB KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY) 

(3) Japan-British relations : 

NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR) 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and 
each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code 
papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

(Voice broadcasts) 

S/S 25432 

JD-l : 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41 



Claeke Exhibit No. 3 

SECRET 



United States of America, 
Federal Communications Commission, 

Washington, D. C, Auffust 18, Idlt). 
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as 
follows : 

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather message which Major Wesley 
T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Coips, requested the Commission's 
monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel 
Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such messages was intercepted. 
This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 125 

Document No. 2 is a true copy of ;i weatlun- message from Tokyo station 
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at ajiproximately 2200 GMT, 
' December 4, 1941, which at 9 : OH p. ni. EST, December 4, 1941, having been 
unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was teleplioned to Lieutenant 
Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Departnu'iit, who stated that he was 
authorized to accept messages of interost to Colonel Bratton's office. 

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station 
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, 
which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7 : 50 p.m. EST, 
December 5, 1941. 

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by 
Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 
0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. G. Dusenbury, 
U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approxi- 
mately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the 
Romaji version of these messages. 

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the 
Federal CoQimunications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 
1944. 

/s/ T. J. Slowie 
T. J. Slowie 

Secretary 
(SEAL of the F. C. C.) 

CiABKE Exhibit No. 4 
sECRErr 
Document No. 1 

Group One is EAST WIND RAIN 

Group Two is NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND 

Group Three is WEST WIND CLEAR STOP 

Groups repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast 
The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the 
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941. 



Document No. 2 

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow 
slightly cloudy and fine weather. 

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds. 

Ciiiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean 
surface calm. 

Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 
2200 GMT, December 4, 1941. 



DOCTTMENT No. 3 

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. To- 
morrow north wind and later from south (repeated 3 times). 

Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 
gmt December 5, 1941. 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Document No. 4 
English Romaji 

This is in the middle of the news Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga hon- 

but today, specially at this point I will jitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho wo 

give the weather forecast : inoshiage masu 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISm NO KAZE HARE 

This is in the middle of the news but Nyuso no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo 

today, at this point specially I will give wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo 

the weather forecast: moshiage masu 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans- 
mitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941. 



Sent No. 519, 12/5 

Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, 

Q2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii. 
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandment Fourteen 
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather 

Miles. 
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public 
service. 

/s/ Ralph C. Smith, 

Colonel, O. 8. C, 
Executive Officer, G-2. 
Secret Cablegram 
las 

Clarke Exhibit No. 5 

TOP SECRET 

From Tokyo 
To Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 1 of 14) 

Separate telegram 

MEMORANDUIVI 

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an 
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that 
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area 
and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued 
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of 
the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese- 
American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area. 

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning 
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the 
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during 
these eight months. 

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability 
of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to 
find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world. 

Ever since the China Affair broke our owing to the failure on the part of 
China to comprehend Japan's true Intentions, the Japanese Government has 
striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts 
to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that 
in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and 
Italy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 127 

TOP SECRET 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 2 of 14) 

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every 
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish- 
ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's 
constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure 
on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have 
attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity 
in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with 
its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, 
both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat 
to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow yuit, 
they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with 
Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries 
have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of 
Japan, and have bi"ought about a situation which endangers the very existence 
of the empire. 

TOP SECRET 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December G, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 3 of 14) 

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, 
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of 
important problems between the two countries covering the entire I'acific area. 
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the 
meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on funda- 
mental — (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted a pro- 
posal based on the fornmla proposed by the American government, taking fully 
into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. 
Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of 
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating 
still further the Japaneise claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in 
the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the 
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, railed to 
display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made 
no progress. 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 4 of 14) 

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for avert- 
ing a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still 
another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential 
and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the fol- 
lowing points : 

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dis- 
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the 
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition 
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two 
countries are in need. 

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commei-cial relations to 
those previously prior to the freezing of assets. 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity 
of oil. 

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures 
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for tlie i-estoration of general peace be- 
tween Japan and China. 

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in 
Frencli Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China 
or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is prepared 
to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the 
northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement. 

JD-1 : 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3) 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 5 of 14) 

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to 
accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of 
peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an under- 
taking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration 
of Sino-Japanese i)eace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiatoins. 

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, 
but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and in spite 
of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as 
the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time 
was not yet ripe for it Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon 
the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the 
American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which 
is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government. 

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-%-41 (3) 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 6 of 14) 

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has 
always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to 
reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of 
great diflScultles. 

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the nego- 
tiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. 

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advo- 
cated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire 
to see the said principal applied throughout the world, and declared that along 
with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government 
would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made 
it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities 
of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. 

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo- 
China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry 
out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a 
measure of easing the situation. 

JD-1 : 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-%-41 (3) ' 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 129 

Froui : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December 4, 1941 

#902 (Part 7 of 14) 

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by 
the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American 
government. 

On the otiier hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in 
disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, 
caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude 
of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the atten- 
tion of the American government especially to the follovs^ing points : 

1. The American government advocates in the name of vporld peace those 
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance 
thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a 
mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation 
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores 
realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose 
of facilitating the consummation of negotiations. 
JD : 1 7143 
25843 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 8 of 14) 

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of 
the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government 
is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it 
seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt 
to force their immediate adoption. 

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression past between 
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, 
and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is 
far removed from the realities of East Asia. 

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both govern- 
ments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third 
powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental 
purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout 
the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with 
a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact 
when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot 
be accepted by the Japanese Government. 

JD: 1 Navy Trans. 12-&-41 (S) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 9 of 14) 

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be 
said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, 
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, 
in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, 
Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in 
Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which 
the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area 
through peaceful means. 

79716— 46— Ex. 147 10 



130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, 
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising 
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. 
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations 
should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military in'essure. 
JD-1 : 7143 Navy Trans 12-6-41 (S) 
25843 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 10 of 14) 

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government 
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other 
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in 

other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr (45 letters 

garbled or missing been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo- 
American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the es to the 

prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the 
perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's funda- 
mental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world. 

JD-1 : 7143 Navy Trans. 12-&-41 ( S ) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 11 of 14) 

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo- 
China is a good exemplilication of the above-mentioned American policy. That 
the six countries, — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, 
China and Thailand, — excepting France, should undertake among themselves to 
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality 
of 1:reatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory 
under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from 
the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unaccept- 
able to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be con- 
sidered as an extension to Fi'ench Indo-China of a system similar to the n — (50 
letters missed) — sible for the present predicament of East Asia. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 12 of 14) 

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding 
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the 
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual 
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabiliz- 
ing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding 
Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than 
the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking gov- 
ernment, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 131 

the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned 
refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the 
intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal 
rehitions between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 
25843 

TOP SECRET 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 

#902 (Part 13 of 14) 

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as 
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual 
removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar 
exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other 
hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four 
years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages 
its honour and prestige. Tlierefore, viewed in all its entirety, the Japanese 
government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation. 

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the nego- 
tiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese- American 
negotiations, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested coun- 
tries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since 
the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result 
of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and 
Chungking. ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking 
regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all these 
countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-43^1 (S) 
25843 



♦Probably "and as" 
**Probably "China, can but" 

From: Tokyo 
To : Washington 
7 December 1941 
(Purple — Eng) 

#902 (Part 14 of 14) 

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this report, 
appeared the plain E-nglish phrase "VERY IMPORTANT") 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the estab- 
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially 
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at 
war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present 
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust 
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific 
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov- 
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but 
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT) 
25843 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Clarke Exhibit No. 6 

TOP SEXJBErr 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December 7, 1941 

Purple (Urgent — Very Important) 

#907. To be handled in government code. 

Re my #902*. 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government ( if possible 
to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on the 
7tli, your time. 

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 



» JD- 1 : 7143 — text of Japanese reply. 



Clarke Exhibit No. 7 

SECRET 

WPD 4544-30 WPD 

CKG 

Deceimbeb 7, 1941 
Memorandum for the Adjutant General {Through Secretary, General Staff) 
Subject : Far East Situation. 

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram 
be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East ; Command- 
ing General, Caribbean Defense Command ; Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department ; Commanding General, Fourth Army : 

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts 
to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine imme- 
diately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but 
be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication 

Marshall 
L. T. Gesow, 
Brigadier General, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 

OCSigO 311.23 (Gen) 1st Memo Ind. O Br. 

(12-8^1) 
War Department, OCSigO, Washington, December 10, 1941. To : A. C. of S. G-2. 

1. Following is the log of the message requested in basic memorandum : 

Honolulu Tinje E. S. T. 

Filed War Department Message Center 12 : (X) noon 6 : 30 AM 

Sent Western Union 12 : 17 PM 6 : 47 AM 

Received RCA, Honolulu 7:33 AM 

Delivered to Signal OflScer, Honolulu 11 : 45 AM 

Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department 2:58 PM 

2. Attached hereto is paraphrase copy of secret message received from Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department. 

For the Acting Chief Signal Officer : 

O. K. Sadtleib, 
1 Incl — Paraphrase of radiogram Colonel, Signal Corps. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 133 

Clarke Exhibit No. 8 

SECBET 

Paraphrase 

1087 Dbcembee Ninth 
Re your five four nine radio five tvpo nine RCA received this message at their 
Honolulu station at seven thirty three morning December seventh and this mes- 
sage was delivered Fort Shatter eleven forty five morning seventh the Adjutant 
General received the deciphered copy at two fifty eight pm 

Short 

Incl #1 December 8, 1941 

Memorandum for: The Chief Signal Officer. 

Subject : Warning order to Overseas Departments 

1. At about 11 : 30 a. m. Sunday, December 7, a secret radiogram, written by 
the Chief of Staff, was handed in to the Message Center by Colonel Bratton of 
this division. Colonel Bratton reported verbally to the Chief of Staff that the 
message would be in the air in about eight minutes as he was assured by the 
Message Center. This radio was a highly important warning to all overseas 
departments including Hawaii regarding the timing of the Japanese ultimatum 
on that afternoon. 

2. It is recommended that steps be taken to determine the exact time of arrival 
of this message at Honolulu, the time when the deciphered message was trans- 
mitted by the Signal Corps to the Staff, and by what office it was received in 
the Staff. Prompt action on this message might have averted disaster. 

Sherman Miij:s, 
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2. 

G2/WAH 
MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept. 

confidential 

War Department 
War Department General Staff 
Military Inteit.ligencb Division, G-2 
Washington, D. C, November 4, 1941. 
Subject : Letter of transmittal. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 

Headqiiarters, Hawaiian Department 
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such 
action as you consider advisable. 

Sherman Miles 
Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General. U. S. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 
1 Enclosures : 

336. (1103^1) — MID Sum. of Info, re Information received from the 
Orient ; dtd. FMH 
Mailed G/2 Nov 5, 1941 Reg. #910405. 

MID 336. 11-3-41 

G2/C1 
FMH 
War Deipartment 

M. I. D. 
November 3, 1941. 
Subject: Information Received from the (Date) 

Orient. 
Summary of Information : 

. The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is 
considered reliable : 

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon 
Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to com- 
plete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific. 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. 
The full preparation to be completed in November." 

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States 
would best begin in December or in February." 

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet 
would likely start war within sixty days." 

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who 
is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and 
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section. 

Distribution : Evaluation 

All Corps Areas —of source —of information 

All Departments X Reliable 

Alaska ^ ,.,, ^ 

YBI Credible tr. 

ONI Questionable 

STATE Undetermined 

File 

J. B. Cognizant 

Source : Dr. Cho. Date of original paper 10/28/41 p. m. 

Headquaeters Hawahan Department 

Office of the Assistant Chief for Miutary Inteijj:gence 

Fort Shaffer, T. H. 

6 September 1941. 
In reply refer to : 
350.05 (G-2) 

Subject : Summaries of Information. 
To: War Department General Staff, 

Military Intelligence Division G-2, 
Washington, D. C. 

REC'D-B-2 SEP 17, 1941 

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received 
from your office originate with OflSce Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District 
and have already been furnished this office by the Navy. 

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Depart- 
ment, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dis- 
patch of information to the respective Washington offices. 

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are 
other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your 
office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort. 

Kendall J. Fielder 
Kendall, J. Fieujer, 

Lieut. Colonel, Inf., 
Acting A. C. of 8., 0-2. 

FAR EASTERN 

G2/1 
RSB 
NO. 519 sent out December 5, 1941 
Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters 
G-2 Haxcaiian Department 

Honolulu. Territory Hawaii 
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has 
some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are men- 
tioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once. 

Miles 



TROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 135 

[Handwritten:] From Boogy Woogie. 

Date dispatched 

SIS No. 
Date translated From To Extract 

11/19/41 Tokyo Washington " — please present our B proposal of the Im- 

25040 perial Government, and no further con- 

n/20/41 cession can be made. If the U. S. consent 

to this cannot be secured the negotiations 
will have to be broken off." 

11/22/41 - Tokyo Washington There are reasons beyond yo'ur ability to 

25138 guess why we wanted to settle Japanese- 

11/22/41 American relations by the 25th but if 

within the next three or four days you can 
finish your conversations with the Ameri- 
cans, if the signing can be completed by the 
29th ... we have decided to wait until 
that date. This time we mean it, that the 
deadline absolutely cannot be changed. 
After that things are automatically going 
to happen." 

Warning Mess. No. 1. OPNAV. 24 Nov. 

"These are very doubtful chances—" 

11/14/41 Tokyo Hongkong "Should the negotiations collapse ... we 

25322 will completely destroy British and Ameri- 

11/27/41 can power in China." 

11/26/41 Tokyo Washington. "The situation is momentarily becoming 

25344 more tense and telegrams take too long. 

11/26/41 Therefore will you cut down the substance 

, of your reports of negotiations to the mini- 

mum and, on occasion, call up Chief 
Yamamoto of the American Bureau on the 
telephone and make your report to him. 
At that time we will use the following 
code . . ." 

11/19/41 Tokyo Washington "In case of an emergency (danger of cutting 

25432 off our diplomatic relations) and the cut- 

11/26/41 ting off of international communications, 

the following warning will be added in the 
middle of the [2] daily Japanese 
language short wave news broadcast. 
(1) In case Japan-U. S. relations in danger: 
Higashi no Kazeame (east wind rain). 
This signal will be given in the middle and 
at the end as a weather forcast and each 
sentence will be repeated twice. When 
this is heard please destroy all code papers 
etc." 

11/19/41 Tokyo Washington "When our diplomatic relations are becoming 

25392 dangerous, we will add the following at the 

11/26/41 beginning and end of our general intelli* 

gence broadcasts: 
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations "Higashi". 
. . . The above will be repeated five 
times and included at beginning and end." 

11/26/41 Washington Tokyo Kurusu to Yamamoto: "I have made all 

25349 efforts but they will not yield." 

11/26/41 

Trans Pacific tele- 
phone conversa- 
tion 

Warning Messages Nos. 2 & 3 

OPD "Negotiations with Japan appear G-2." Advise only the Commanding Ofl^cer. 27 Nov. 

11/28/41 Tokyo.. ..*.. Washington "Therefore with a report of the views of the 

25445 Imperial Government on this American 

11/28/41 proposal, which I will send you in two or 

three days, the negotiations will be de facto 
ruptured. . . . However, I do not wish 
you to give the impression that the negotia- 
tions are broken off, merely say to them 
that you are awaiting instructions." 

Warning Message No. 4 28 Nov. 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Lines immediately above and below the cross rule are handwritten] 

Date dispatched 

SIS No. From To Extract 

Date translated 

G-2 "Critical situation demands that all 

11/26/41 Washington Tokyo "Should we, daring the course of these 

25460 conversations, deliberately enter into our 

11/29/41 scheduled operations, there is great danger 

that the responsibility for the rupture of 
negotiations will be cast upon us." 
11/29/41 Tokyo Washington "We wish you would make one more attempt 

25496 verbally along the following lines: . . . 
11/30/41 [3] (in carrying out this instruction 

please be careful that this does not lead to 

anything like a breaking off of negotiations) . 

11/30/41 Washington Tokyo Kurusu: "Are the Japanese-American nego- 

25497 tiations to continue?" 
11/30/41 Yamamoto:"Yes." 
Telephone 

conversation 

12/1/41 Tokyo Washington "When you are faced with the necessity of de- 

25:545 stroying codes, get in touch with the Naval 

12/1/41 Attache's office there and make use of chem- 
icals they have on hand for this purpose." 

11/30/41 Tokyo Berlin "The conversations ... between Tokyo and 

25552 Washington. . . now stand ruptured, broken. 
12/1/41 . . . lately England and the United States 

have taken a provocative attitude . . . 
They are planning to move military forces 
into various places in East Asia . . .we will 
have to counter by also moving troops . . . 
war may suddenly break out between the 
Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan." 
11/30/41 Tokyo Berlin "Say that we have already clarified our atti- 

25553 tude toward the Russians. Say that by our 
12/1/41 present moves southward we "do not mean 

to relax our pressure against the Soviet . .. 
however, right now it is to our advantage to 
stress the south and for the time being we 
would prefer to refrain from any direct 
moves in the north." 

12/2/41 Tokyo Washington "Among the telegraphic codes with which 

25640 your office is equipped, burn those now 

12/3/41 being used in connection with the machine. 

Burnevery "0"code . . .st-op at once using 
the machine and destroy it completely . . . 
Burn all the codes Kosaka brought you." 

Warning message No. 5 Dec. 

[4] Q-2 "Contact Commander Rochefort 

12/1/41 Tokyo London "Please discontinue the use of your code 

25787 machine and dispose of it immediately." 

12/5/41 

12/5/41,. _ Washington Tokyo We have completed destruction of codes 

25836 but since the U. S, -Japanese negotiations 

12/6/41 are still continuing I re(iuest your approval 

of our desire to delay for a while yet the 
destruction of the one code machine." 

12/6/41 Tokyo - Washington "The Government has deliberated deeply on 

25838 the American proposal of the 2Gth of 

12/6/41 November and as a result we have drawn 

up a memorandum for the United States . . . 
when you receive it I want you to keep 
it Secret for the time being. Concerning 
the time of presenting this memorandum 
to the United States I will wire you in a 
separate messase." 

12/6/41 Tokyo Washington The memorandum referred to in 25838 above. 

25843 A 14 part telegram in reply to the .\merican 

12/6/41 proposalaiul concluding with thesentence — 

"The Japanese Government regrets to have 
to notify hereby the .\mericrtn Government 
that iti view of the attitude of the American 
Government it cannot but consider that it 
is impossible to reach an agreement through 
further negotiations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 137 

Date dispatched 

SIS No. From To Extract 

Date translated 

12/7/41 _ Tokyo ■Washington Re my #902 (see 25843 above) will the Am- 

25850 bassador please submit to the United 

12/7/41 ■ States Government, if possible to the 

Secretary of State, our reply to the United 
States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time. 

Final message 7 Dec. 

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m." 

Fab Eastern 
G2/1 
RSB 
No. 519 sent out December 5, 1941 

Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters 
G—2 Hawaiian Department, 

Honolulu, Territory Hawaii. 
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has 
some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned 
that you must obtain. Contact him at once. 

Miles 



ANUEX TO ORCANIZATOS CHART, GE^'ERAL STAFF (G-2) 



EXECUTIVE OFFICE 

Colonel H&lph C. Smith 

Lt« Colonel Thomas E. Roderlolc 

Aasistant Ex. Officer 

2d Lt. E. R. ff. KcCabe, Jr. 

2d Lt. Warren S. Richards 



ADi:iKISTKATIVE BRANCH 

Colonel Ralph C. Smith 

KILITAHY ATTACHE SECTIOM 

Lt* Colonel John S* Wlnslow 

Amerlo&n Uillt&r^' Attaches, l^laslons. 
Observere abroad^ and LajiguagA 
Officera. 

FOREIGN LIAISOK SECTION 

Lt> Colonel Lavrenee Higgins 



INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 
olonel Hayes A> Kroner 



AEKIKISTRATIVE SECTION 



Lt. Colonel U* W* Pettlgrew 



COORDINATING SECTION 

Lt. Colonel B. B* HcUahon 

Certain special contacts. 

FINANCE SECTION 

Lt. Colonel Robert B. Richards 

Finance and Property. 

FERSONt:EL SECTION 

Captain George F. Ashworth 

Acmini strati on of oommissioned 
officers in G-2, '.TOGS, and all 
MI-Reserve officers. 

RECORD SECTION 

1st Lt. Ualcolm Hay, Jr. 

Records and files* 

tra^sl^tiot: section 

Colonel Ralph C. Smith 
Translations ana Preparations of 



Ur* John S. Calvert 

Civilian Personnel, classification 
and employment of applicants for 
civilian positions, miscellaneous 
correspondence of Division. 



Cables and Uessages 
Drafting 
Stenographic Pool 

FIELD FEatSOKNEL SECTION 

Captain H. V. Rohrer 

Handles selection of plaeea {not 
personnel) for new observers and 
attaches. Training of Military 
Intelligence personnel. 

SITUATION SECTION 



Lt* Colonel Thomas J. Betts 

Charge of information bearing on 
the situation all parts of world. 
The heart of the Intelligence 
Branch. Uaintains situation maps 
both in G-2 ana for the Secretary 
of V(ar* All special studies, etc. 
' from here. 



CONTACT SECTION 

Colonel Harry F. Cunningham 

Contact with State, ONl, etc., for 
military information. 

DISSE:aNATION SECTION 

Colonel Fred J. d«iRohaji 

Boils down and reports into Tenta- 
tive LesaonB, Special Bulletins, 
etc, ano distributes to service* 



Lt. Colonel Walton W. Cox 
CEIO'RAL EUTOPEAJl SECTION 

Colonel Hamilton E. llagulro 
EASTEP-N E UROPEAN SECTION 

Lt. Colonel G. B. Guenther 



•ffESTERH EUROPEAN SECTION 
Lt. Colonel Louis J. Fortler 

LATIN Al^ERICAN SECTION 

Colonel R. Townsend Heard 

SUB-SECTION NO. 1 



Colonel E. U. Bsnltez 

SUB-SECTION NO. 2 

Lt. Colonel Harry M. Gwynn 
SUB-SECTION BD. 3 
Central American 



gale 



Special Sect: 
Captain Bob N. Mai 
All Latin America 

BRITISH EMPIRE SECTION 
Lt. Colonel L* J* Compto 



COOHrERIHTH-LIGENCE BRANCH 

Lt* Colonel John T* B* Blaeell 

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION 

Lt. Colonel IT* A* Holbroolc, Jr. 

General adminlatrative duties for 
this Branch. Supervision of all 
activities and policies of the 
Counterintelligence Branch. 

DOMESTIC INTaXIGENCE SECTION 

Major David G. Ersklne 



INVESTIGATING SECTION 



Lt. Colpcel Stuart R. Carswel 

SUP-SECTION HO. k 

Lt. Colonel Stuart R. Carewel 

SUP-SECTIOH NO. 3 

W est Cotist S. America 

let Lt* T. H. Harrell 

SUB-SECTIOi: HP. 6 

River Flats S. America 

Uajor Wilaon L* Townsend 

SU'':-SECTION ND. 7 

Lt. Colonel William Sackville 
SUf-SECTION ND. 8 



Uajor Nicholas S. Beckvtt 

Investigation, including personnel, 
disaffection, subversion and 
sabotage within the military 
es tabl i shment • 

P LANT lOTELLIGENCE SECTION 

Uajor 7f. E. Crist 

Securing, evaluating and disseminat- 
ing intelligence information 
covering industrial plants, conmuni- 
catioDs, transportation, power and 
other facilities vital to the 
national defense program, including 
labor situation and espionage. 

Sabotage, strikes, labor agitation. 



Re CO 
alie 



actio 



for 



Air Corps 



SAFtCUARDING laLITARY INFORMATION SECTION 



ffi, regulations, and 
es relative to S-L:. 
with Public Relati 



Clarke 

nd supervisory 



Lt. Colonel Cart 

Poll 

Lial 

on releases. 
Signal intelligence - Passport 

Supervision o:' Military Attache 
cryptographic security. 

SP ECIAL ASSIGNMENT SECTION 

Captain Frank S. Nosterman 



PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH 

Lt. Colonel Charles Y. Banfill 

PLANS AND TRAINING SECTION 

lUJor Walter A. Buck 

Coordination and supervision of 
E-11 military intelligence 
Eictivities in the Army. Coor- 
dination of G-2 contributions 
1» mobilisation and war plane. 
Review of tables of organ! ration, 
mobilisation plans, war plans, 
defense projects for G-2. 
Review of all regulations and 
manuals having a bearing on 
military intelligence. Prepa- 
ration of Ul manuals and MID 
Army Extension Courses not 
assigned to another agenoy. 
Allocation of Reserve intelligence 
training funds. 

GEOGRAPHIC SECTION a 

Lt. Colonel Patrick H, Timothy 

Formulation of plans and policies 
governing the collection and compi- 
lation of domestic and foreign maps 
and of geographic information* 
Procurement, reproduction, and 
distribution of maps. Preparation 
of Geographic Chapters of Intelli- 
gence Surveys by the research office 
of the Geographic Section. Guidance 
in the selection and preparation of 
maps and charts to accompany 
Intelligence Surveys. Coordination 
of Engineer and Air Corps mapping 
activities. Review of regulations 
and manuals pertaining to maps, 
map reading, and map malcing* Liaison 
with Federal mapping agencies. 
Representation on the Federal lioard 
of Surveys and Maps. 



SPECIAL STUDY GROUP 



Lt. Colonel Percy 0. Black 



INFOR^^ATIO:: CONTROL BRANCH 



Majo 



•A', p. Corde 



Plans and regulations for IJationa 
Information Control in collabora 
tion with the Navy Departnent. 
Tralnin.- of Information Control 
Personnel. Liaison v.ith forei?;n 
Information Central Organitatian 
Liaison vrith other Government 
Deparlanents on information 



FAR EASTERN SECTIO N 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton 

Japan Sub-section 

Lt. Colonel Carlisle C. Dusenbury 
L'^jor Wallace n. I'oore 
2d Lt. J. Bayard Schindel 

C^hin a Sub-sect i on 

'diajor "Prank N. Roberts 
1st Lt. Julean Arnold, Jr. 
2d Lt. Dwi^^ht Edwards 



CORPS OF INTELLIG E NCE P O UCE SECTION 

Captain Henry Gordon Sheen 

Procurement anc training CIP 
personnel and promulgation of 
regulations thereof. 



Pacific Islands and . 



AIR SECTIO?! 



Lt. Colonel J. C. lEodgson 



] 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 139 



INCIDENTAL EXHIBITS 
RE 

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION 

Index 

1. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Dec. 5, 1941. 

2. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Oct. 10, 1941. 

3. Newspaper article re Pearl Harbor. 

4. Two letters re testimony of Gen. Miles and testimony of Gen. Miles before 

Grunert Board. 

5. Copies of Messages. 

6. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Lt. Col. Fielder, Hawaii, 31 Dec. 1941. 

7. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General, Dec. 28, 1940. 

8. Letter to A. C; of S., G-2 from Col. Thurber, Dec. 18, 1941 re Report of 

Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii. 

9. Message, to Hawaii. 

10. Message, from Melbourne, Australia to War Dept. & CG Hawaii. 

11. Memo for Col. Holbrook from Lt. Perry, Evaluation Section, Dec. 6, 1941, re 

Japanese Embassy burning code book. 

12. Messages re weather broadcast. 

13. Estimate of the Situation Dec. 1, 1941— March 31, 1942. 

14. Message from Short, Ft. Shafter, Nov. 29, 1941. 

15. Memo for Adjutant General from Gen. Gerow, Nov. 27, 1941, sending messages 

to CG Hawaii and CG, Caribbean Defense Command, re negotiations termi- 
nated with Japan. 

16. Cable to all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command and Hawaii, by Miles, 

Nov. 27, 1941. 

17. Paraphrase of cable to all Corps Areas (same as No. 16.) . 

18. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General re Jap troops evacuating. 

19. Message to Gr-2, Hawaii from Miles, Nov. 12, 1941, re custodial detention list. 

20. Message from Manila, P. I. Oct. 28 re Jap aircraft. 

21. Information received from the Orient, Oct. 28, 1941. 

22. Copies of Messages. 

23. Index of Translations and Memoranda re Pearl Harbor. 

24. Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to Japan's War Potential and 

Intentions. 

Exhibit No. 1 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 : Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Acting) 
Executive Officer : 

Lt. Col. R. C. Smith 

Lt. Col. T. E. Roderick 
Administrative Branch : Lt. Col. R. C. Smith 
Intelligence Branch : Col. C. H. Mason 

Balkans and Near East Section : Lt. Col. W. W. Cox 

British Empire Section : Lt. Col. Homer Case 

Central European Section : Lt. Col. H. E. Maguire 

Eastern European Section : Lt. Col. G. B. Guenther 

Far Eastern Section : Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton 

Latin American Section : Lt. Col. R. T. Heard 

Western European Section : Lt. Col. H. F. Cunningham 

Aviation Section 

Editorial Section 

Collection Section 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Liaison Branch : Lt. Col. A. R. Harris 
Counterintelligence Branch : Lt. Col. J. A. Lester 

Safeguarding Military Information : Maj. W. P. Corderman 

Domestic Intelligence : Maj. W. A. Holbrook 

Plant and Utilities Section : Maj. W. E. Crist 

General 
Plans and Training Branch : Lt. Col. V. W. Cooper 

Plans and Training : Maj. H. V. Canan 

Geographic : Lt. Col. C. Y. BanfiU 
Approved March 10, 1941. 



Exhibit No. 2 — See facing folder 

Exhibit No. 3 

[From the Times-Herald, Washington, D. C, Thursday, September 28, 1944] 

The Truth of Peakl, Harbor 

(an editorial) 

By 3asil Brewer, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times 

Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America. 

Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet, chief weapon to re- 
strain Japan from war — chief weapon with which to win, if war came. 

Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American Army and Navy. 

Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, built for them 
by the criminal negligence of others. 

Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible relief of the 
Philippines, may have been responsible for that other great tragedy — Bataan and 
Corregidor. 

Pearl Ha,rbor marked the beginning of war with Japan. 

It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending of the Jap- 
anese war. 

Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure of devotion," 
were not to blame for the disaster. 

Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor? 

Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty. 

Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, con- 
victed and punished? 

WHY? 

The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor : 

"When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an 
act of war on our part. They, not we, will choose the time, the method and the 
place of their attack." 

Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor? 

Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact locations 
map-marked by the Japanese flyers to receive the torpedoes,, made especially for 
this attack? 

Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, unarmed, for the 
kill? 

Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7? 

And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders? 

INVESTIGATIONS 

Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been conducted — all secret. 

Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts Commission, re- 
leased a few weeks after Pearl Harbor. 

Of the 127 witnes.ses who testified in the Roberts investigation, the testimony 
of none has been made public. 

Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in the Roberts 
investigation, none has been made public. 



EXHIBIT NO. 2 




PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 141 

Why have not these documents been made public? 

The Roberts report blamed General Short, commanding general of the Army, 
and Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the tleet at Pearl Harbor, for the 
disaster. 

As a result of the findings of the Roberts Commission, both have been ordered 
tried by court-martial. 

Kimmel and Short, members of Congress and many others repeatedly have 
demanded the trials be held. 

Today, more than 2V2 years after the report of the Roberts Commission, neither 
Short nor Kimmel has been brought to trial. 

It was urged, shortly after Pearl Harbor, that trials would interfere with the 
war. 

Certainly now, almost three years after the disaster, no such claim validly 
can be made. 

More than a year ago the late Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote a letter saying 
public trials of Kimmel and Short could not affect the progress of the war. 

"Very recently a sub-conunittee of the House Military Affairs Committee stated 
public trials would not interfere with the war. 

Why, in justice, have not these trials been publicly held, that those charged may 
be punished, if guilty, and, if innocent, freed? 

Why have not the American people been told the truth about Pearl Harbor? 

Truth, which they need in order properly to appraise their military and 
political leaders — and their policies. 

Truth, which they need to appraise their own share, if any, in the guilt. 

Truth, which they need to better guide themselves, as citizens — in the interest 
of the country in war. 

The American people grew old overnight at Pearl Harbor. 

Why are they being treated as children, who must not be told? 

Pearl Harbor was the Gethsemane of the American people, as well as of the 
soldier dead. 

Why not the truth, no matter how hard to take to cleanse the soul — perhaps 
to bring temporal, as well as spiritual, salvation? 

Not even the truth, as to the Pearl Harbor dead, was known, until long after- 
wards. 

The facts as to the destruction of the battle fleet were withheld for a year — 
and then released with news of successful salvage operations. 



For a year or more prior to Pearl Harbor, it had been clear to ofllcial Wash- 
ington only a miracle or American surrender could keep the United States out of 
the European war and war with Japan. 

Japan had signed the Tripartite pact with Hitler, binding her to war with 
the U. S., if war with Hitler came. 

Japan had notified Ambassador Grew, in the Spring of 1941, the pact meant 
what it said. 

Grew had advised Washington. 

Concurrently, Japan's course of conquest clearly pointed to the Dutch East 
Indies, Singapore, Burma, possibly India, if not the Philippines. 

That Britain could successfully meet this attack, without help, was dubious 
indeed. 

Lend-lease, convoyed supplies, loaned destroyers, etc., would not suffice if Japan 
attacked Britain. 

Therefore, the President faced, early in '41. the two horns of dilemma. 

He must decide whether to join Britain in stopping Japan — which meant war. 

Or he must take the chance, which seemed a certainty, that without the U. S. 
actively fighting, the Triparite powers would defeat Britain, force Russia to 
peace — and attack the U. S. 

That the President had determined on war seems indisputable. 

On Jan. 21, 1941, he wrote Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that the maintenance 
of British supply lines from the Far East was vital. 

On Feb. 14, 1941, Dooman, Counsel of the American Embassy in Tokyo, told 
the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Okashi that, if the Japanese 
attacked Singapore, "the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the ques- 
tion" that this would mean war also with the U. S. 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On Feb. 26, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported Dooman's conference to Wash- 
ington, saying: 

"I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka (Japanese foreign minister), with whom I 
have an appointment this morning tliat the statements made by Mr. Dooman to 
Mr. Okashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval." 

Washington did not disapprove nor disavow Dooman's and Grew's statements. 

In April 1941, Naval authorities in Washington had written the commanders 
of the Asiatic and Pacific fleets that the question of U. S. entry into the war 
seemed a matter of — "not whether — but when." 

By the time of the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, 
early in August '41, events in Asia were moving with tremendous and ominous 
speed. 

Churchill, the Australians and the Dutch urged an immediate ultimatum — 
war — if Japan pursued her expected course. 

Responding to the argument for an immediate ultimatum, the President only 
asked if "we would not be better off in three months?" 

And then sarid, "Leave it to me. I think I can baby them (the Japs) along 
ior three months." 

There was no disagreement between the President and Churchill as to Japa- 
nese plans — nor that Jajran must be stopped. 

Probably there was no disagreement that an ultimatum meant war. 

It now is clear the President only was playing for time — time to be better 
prepared — 

And — time for the American people to "catch up," mentally and morally, with 
commitments, made and to be made. 

The Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt settled the policy 
of a united front between the U. S. and England toward Japan. 

That this was true seems implicit in the following from Churchill's address 
to Parliament on Jan. 28, 1942, about seven weeks after Pearl Harbor : 

"It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment 
with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be 
engaged. * * * 

"On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which 
I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, 
even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus 
make the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and 
that expectation has not been falsified by the events." 

July 24, the United States had "frozen" Japanese funds. 

Immediately after the Atlantic Conference, commercial embargoes, against 
oil, steel and gasoline were ordered which only could result In war. 

This writer believes the President, in all these matters, made the correct 
decision — in the country's interests — that history shall so record. 

With equal impartiality, history shall record that the President, out of his 
political genius, made one, perhaps two fatal errors, which may have brought on 
the Pearl Harbor disaster. 

Certainly these contributed greatly to the disastrous success of the attack. 



The working agreement with Churchill being what it was, the danger to the 
country being apprehended — the President failed to take the people into 
confidence. 

This was the President's political bent. 

A statesman long ago would have told the people the facts — and risen or fallen 
with the consequences. 

Democracy rises or falls, lives or dies, based on how well this thesis is under- 
stood and followed. 

But the President was not of that talent nor taste. 

Far more than he trusted the people, he trusted his own facility of expression, 
his abihty, not ne(:"essarily by the use of facts, to get the people to think as he 
wanted them to think. 

Concurrently, this formula had seemed to the President not to have worked 
badly in eight years of the Presidency and three elections for President. 

It was true, also, this was the only method the President knew. 

Secretary Hull had said, when questioned about apparent inaction in Wash- 
ington, "governments which get too far ahead of the people are apt to fall." 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 143 

The President, in the grave war situation in the Fall of '41, had gotten far 
ahead of the people — far too far for the people ever to catch up by anything 
which he, by that time, could say. 

Fortunately we can now depend on two of the President's friends and biog- 
raphers for the facts at this staye of the crisis. 

Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, friends of the President, had access, 
through the President, to confidential information, from which they produced 
early in 1942, "How War Came." 

This is from page 305 under the title, "The Sands Run Out — Pearl Harbor" : 

"Few, if any, high officials believed, however, that the United States would, 
or could, stand aside for long if the Japanese struck at the East Indies or 
Malaya, or even thrust into Siam. For at stake were not only immediate in- 
terests vital to us, but resources and strategical positions affecting our long-term 
security as a nation. 

"The question perplexing many high officials was how, in the absence of a 
direct Japanese attack on the American flag, to summon the nation, divided as 
at then loas on questions of foreign policy, to the strong action which th&y 
believed essential. 

"There had been considerable discussion of possible methods ... It was 
commonly supposed that the Japanese were too smart to solve this problem for 
the President by a direct assault on the American flag— especially at Hawaii, 
which even the extreme isolationists recognize as a bastion of our security." 

Surely this is plain enough. 

"As the Sands Ran Out at Pearl Harbor," the Japanese "solved the problem 
for the President by a direct assault on the American flag." 

The President, in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, required an "incident" 
that would enable the people to catch up with him. 

Pearl Harbor gave the President far more of an incident than he needed, 
expected — or wanted. 

Born optimist, the incident the President expected was to be a glancing blow — 
but the blow came full and head-on at the whole body of the country. 

Moreover, it was not the kind of an incident he had in mind, as shall be 
disclosed. 

THE FXEET 

Naval strategy opposed having the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. 

Three or more high admirals had opposed it, including Kimmel. 

Admiral Richardson, immediate predecessor of Kimmel, was removed from 
command by the President because," among other things, he opposed basing the 
fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

The fleet was at Pearl Harbor by orders of the President, though of course 
he ordered no such concentration as existed there on Dec. 7. 

Reasons of diplomacy, and war strategy, as judged by the President, required 
a powerful fleet based at Hawaii, a threat and a warning to Japan, the only kind 
the Japanese could understand. 

In no other way, the President judged, could the U. S. hope to keep open the 
British, and our own, supply lines from the Far East. 

These supply lines, the President had told Grew, were vital. 

These were the supply lines the President and Churchill had agreed to defend 
together at the Atlantic Conference. 

The admirals were opposed to basing the main fleet at Hawaii, because they 
believed the fleet there was too confined, too exposed to possible attack. 

Knowing the power of the Japanese fleet, high oflJcers of the Navy had for 
years questioned its ability to meet the Japanese successfully in Far Eastern 
waters. 

Defending the Philippines always had been considered difficult. 

Certainly this thesis had not been changed by large increases in the Japanese 
Navy and by the fact the U. S. fleet in '41 was divided between the Pacific 
and the Atlantic. 

Additionally, the admirals opposed using the fleet at Hawaii as a threat to 
Japan. 

Such an approach, they considered, was apt to result in "backing into the war," 
instead of the more forthright and direct method, which they favored. 

What the admirals didn't know was, we were, to all practical puri)oses, already 
in the war. 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We were watchfully waiting for the "incident" which would make the war, 
already a foregone conclusion, "politically possible." 

A plan of co-operation with the British Far Eastern fleet had been arranged, 
which required the U. S. fleet to be as near as practical to the Philippines. 

The Japanese knew the full meaning of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Every war plan of the Japanese, including the latest by Kinoaki Matsuo, "The 
Three Power Alliance," published in 1940, plainly stated in war with U. S. 
Japan; would be defeated — if the U. S. Paciflc fleet were permitted to get to 
the Philippines. 

We were, at the time of Pearl Harbor, waiting for an "incident" which would 
start war. 

The Japanese, having in mind basic Japanese strategy, that the battle fleet 
of the U. S. must not get to Manila — for a long time had been preparing the 
''incident.'" 

SABOTAGE 

Having overruled his admirals in basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, it 
would be expected that the President, of all persons, would make most certain 
no disaster came from the fleet's being there. 

Doubtless the President thought he had so arranged. 

It is a fact, however, the President, by his own acts, unwittingly of course, 
contrived to bring about the success of the Japanese attack. 

This was not in the manner that he has been commonly accused, running all the 
way from plotting the attack, to ordering the fleet unprotected to appease the 
Japanese — all of which are false. 

The President's responsibility is nevertheless direct and definite. 

Early in January, Secretary of Navy Knox had sent a warning to both Army 
and Navy chiefs at Pearl Harbor suggesting the danger of a surprise bombing 
attack by air against the fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

It had been a foregone conclusion, if war with Japan came, it would begin 
by surprise attack, the Japanese way, as the President himself had said Jan. 
6, 1941. 

But, as the months went by between the first of the year and Dec. 7, 1941, as the 
plans of the Japanese to attack became matured, for some strange reason there was 
less and less emphasis on surprise attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor by air, more 
and more on sabotage. 

Of seven warning messages from Washington to Short and Kimmel, recorded in 
the Roberts report, in addition to the one in January from Secretary Knox, four 
referred to sabotage. 

None, after, the Knox warning, referred to the possibility of surprise attack by 
air on the fleet. 

Twice, in acknowledging warnings and instructions from Washington, General 
Short reported to Washington he had taken all precautions against sabotage. 

On Nov. 27, 10 days before Pearl Harbor, General Short advised Washington he 
had ordered Hawaii "alert No. 1" against sabotage, and gave details of what 
measures he had taken. 

Washington knew of and did not disapprove these "defense steps," solely against 
sabotage. 

Sabotage, third in the list of attacks most expected by Knox in January, had 
become No. 1 of those expected in Washington and Pearl Harbor as Dec. 7 
approached. 

It is not sabotage which competent military leaders, in Washington or Pearl 
Harbor, would normally most fear, as war with Japan approached. 

As Dec. 7 approached, the "incident," which would bring war with Japan, was 
daily, almost hourly, expected in Washington. 

Historically, the sinking of the battleship Maine In Havana harbor on Feb. 15, 
1898 — an act of sabotage, had brought war with Spain. 

By some strange twist, the President, and to some extent the military leaders in 
Washington, were in a "Battleship Maine" state of mind, when the attack occurred, 
or at least were up to the last hours before the attack. 

This explains why the battle fleet was docked, each ship at its station, awnings 
up — why tlie planes were grounded wing to wing, unarmed, ammunition for guns 
and planes locked in magazines, when Japan struck Dec. 7. 

The Army at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, interpreting its instructions from Washing- 
ton, was "alerted" for sabotage only. 

Had Hawaii "alert No. 3" been ordered, by General Short, the Japs might never 
have struck, certainly the damage would have been far less. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 145 

In far-away Aleutian Islands, at Dutch Harbor, where military orders only had 
to be followed, U. S. bombers were cruising with live bombs in racks, U. S. tij,diters, 
with live ammunition in guns, when the attack came to Pearl Harbor Dec. 7. 



But it is not alone the "sabotage psychology" at Pearl Harbor for which the 
President must accept his share of responsibility. 

There were blunders there, both of omission and commission, which he must 
shoulder. 

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor had warnings of danger. 

But with every warning, save one, came a "precaution," which tied their hands 
psychologically, if not actually. 

As the danger became greater and Pearl Harbor closer, the "precautions" became 
more definite, more insistent, more urgent. 

These precautions came direct from the White House. 

The only warning message that Kimmel and Short received, which did not 
contain definite precautionary orders, was the one from Secretary of the Navy 
Knox in January '41. 

This was 11 months before Pearl Harbor and long before the expected "incident," 
which would kick off hostilities, was expected. 

Here are the precautions, which accompanied each "warning," as told in the 
Roberts report. 

Oct. 16, as Kimmel and Short were warned of danger by Washington, they were 
ordered to do nothing which would "constitute provocation as against Japan." 

Nov. 24, 13 days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was enjoined to strictest secrecy, 
in any defense moves he made "?o prevent complication of tense existing situation." 

Nov. 27, came the most serious warning yet, from the Chief of Staff to Short, but 
with it an order that under no circumstances was he to take any steps or make any 
moves that ivould make it appear the U. S. had committed "the first overt act." 

In the same message "reconnaissance" was ordered but only "in such a way as 
not to alarm the civil population or disclose iyitent." 

Here a military authority must have thought of the possibility such an order 
might tie the hands of the commander, for there was inserted : 

"He (General Short) was not to be restricted to any course, which would 
jeopardize his defense." 

Nov. 28, nine days before Pearl Hai'bor, Short was cautioned again that any 
protective measures he took, "must be confined to those essential to security" and 
Tie must avoid "unnecessary publicity and alarm." 

It was the next day, Nov. 29, Secretary Hull stated, "The diplomatic part of 
our relations with Japan is virtually over and the matter will now go to the 
officials of the Army and Navy." 

Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered to "take no 
offensive action until J(tpan had committed the first overt act." 

Nov. 30, seven days before Pearl Harl:)or, Kimmel received the last warning 
message to reach Pearl Harbor before the attack. 

It was a copy of a dispatch sent to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering certain 
scoutirg, but again witli the admonition, to "avoid the appearance of attacking." 

None of these precautionary orders came from military authorities in Wash- 
ington, though all came through military channels. 

None of these precautionary orders at Pearl Harbor ever was withdrawn. 

One of the last warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor was changed by the 
President, personally, to insert the usual precaution. 

The official explanation, of course, is that, if war came, the President wanted 
the record to show he had done all he could to prevent it. 

But on Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, as stated, the Secretary of 
State had said "the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy." 

The Roberts report, in No. 15 of its conclusions, quotes one of the ifiany pre- 
cautionary orders from Washington as a cause of the success of the Pearl Harbor 
attack tliough the report does not fix the responsibility. 

The last full fatal week before Dec. 7. 1941, the Roberts report does not show 
a single message from Washington to Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. 

It now is known Washington had. during this week, information of greatest 
imiwrtance, whicli Short and Kimmel didn't receive until after the attack. 

This is the real story of Pearl Harbor, seven warnings of danger to the com- 
manders there, six confusing and contradictory "precautions," which tied their 
hands. 

79716— 46— Ex. 147 11 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Word available the last fatal week — word most needed at Pearl Harbor — 
never was sent. 

Obviously the President, "as the sands ran out" at Pearl Harbor, was definitely 
expecting a Japanese attack. 

But the nearer it was expected the more careful he became that when the 
attack should come, it should be such as the isolationists could not tie onto him- 
self. 

The attack, which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which the "isola- 
tionists" could not tie onto the President. 

But the success of the attack can in part, in all fairness, and in such measure 
as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Colmmander-in-Chief 
as commander and personally. 

The President, and others, in Wasliington, first had lulled the commanders 
at Pearl Harbor into expecting only — sabotage. 

The President then had given them such restraining prrecautions and orders 
they did not know what they could or dare do — in measures of protection and 
defense. 

The Japanese, as Davis and Lindley had said, solved the problem of how to 
summon the nation against isolationism for the President at Pearl Harbor. 

But in trying to keep "the record clear," the President unknowingly and 
unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle fleet, 
had helped to bring about Bataan and Corregidor, had lengthened immeasurably 
the Japanese war. 

WHY? 

This of course explains many things. 

It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short and Admiral 
Kimmel. 

It explains why the President through members of Senate and House, stopped 
Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials. 

It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts Com- 
mission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public. 

It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral Hooper a year 
ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress. 

It explains why no information has been given out as to the investigation by 
Admiral Hart, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox. 

It explains investigation number 4, now being held behind closed doors. 

White House pressure succeeded in substituting secret hearing number 4, for 
a proposed resolution of Congress calling for immediate court-martial. 

[Editor's Note: This editorial is rcpitblished and paid for by The Nexc Bed- 
ford, Mass., Standard-Times, as a patriotic public service. No outside parties^ 
have contributed in any way toiikird the cost of publication. RepublicationJ 
pey'mitted.l 

Exhibit No. 4 

10 August 1944. 
Confidential 

Colonel Charles W. West, JAGD, 

Recorder, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Room Jfllfl, Munitions Building, 
Washington 25, D. C. 

• Deae Colonel: General Miles has asked me to write to you requesting a copy 
of the transcript of his evidence before the Board. The General desires this 
copy of the transcript because he is concerned with the possibility of his evidence 
showing an inaccurate statement of fact. 

General Miles would have written to you personally on this matter but he is 
now on an inspection trip and by long distance telephone he communicated with 
me today, asking me to make this request of you. The General will be at this 
headquarters on Tuesday, 15 August 1944, and I can assure you that he will 
examine and return the same immediately. 

I trust everything is going well with you and that you are enjoying your 
assignment. 

Sincerely, 

Daniel L. O'Donneix, 
Lt. Colonel, J. A. G. D., 
Service Command Judge Advocate. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 147 

War Department 

washington 

Hbadquartees Army Peiarl Harbor Board, 

Munitions Building, 12 August 1944- 
Lt. Col. Daniel L. O'Donnell, J. A. G. D. 
Hqs. First Service Command, 
Boston 15, Massachusetts. 

Dear Colonel O'Donnell : Tursuant to your request of 10 August 1944, I am 
enclosing herewith a copy of the transcript of General Miles' testimony. Cer- 
tain minor inaccuracies such as typographical errors, may appear therein which 
we haven't yet had an opportunity to correct but will do so at the earliest 
opportunity. May I suggest that the matter of any possibly "inaccurate state- 
ment of fact" be made the subject of a letter to General Grunert. 

Please return the transcript when it has served its purpose. With kindest 
regards, I am. 

Sincerely yours, 

Charles W. West,, 
Charles W. West, 
Colonel, J. A. G. D., 



Recorder. 



1 Incl : Transcript. 



[91] Testimony of Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles. Commanding 1st Service 
Command, Boston, Massachusetts 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article 
of War 24.) 

Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organiza- 
tion and station? 

General Miles. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st Service Com- 
mand, Boston, Massachusetts. 

General Grunert. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, 
is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and 
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assign- 
ment as A. C. of S. Gr-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. 
In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board 
members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, 
although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General 
Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the questions 
and the other members will assist in developing them. So I will turn you over 
to the mercies of General Russell. 

General Russeix. What was your assignment in the year 1941? 

General IMiles. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department. 

General Russexl. Can you remember approximately the date on which you 
entered upon that assignment? 

General Miles. May 1, 1940. 

General Russell. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment? 

[92] General Miles. The end of January 1942. 

General Russell. During that period of time you were actually the head of 
what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was 
that the name of it? 

General Miles. That was the official name — Military Intelligence Division, War 
Department General Staff. 

General Russell. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the 
Gr-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division? 

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. 
It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and 
Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations and 
Training Division, or the Per.sonnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. 
I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter- 
intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geographically to 
cover the world, or as much as we could cover. 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Russell. Definitely, General Miles, as to tlie operations of your de- 
partment related to the Japanese Government during your period of service tliere, 
what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government? 

General Miles. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the 
Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in tact, a great many yaers. It 
was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all 
possible information about. Our system was a running digest. 

General Grunebt. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you 
put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations now, 
I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in closed 
session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to see this 
recoi'd. Do you see what I am getting at? 
General Miles. Yes, sir ; I understand. 

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. 
Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every gov- 
ernment. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political side, ' 
the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that ever 
came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and sent 
out to the various military attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas 
departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form of cor- 
rected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been 
going on, to my knowledge, for thirt y twenty years. In addition to that, of 
course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries, 
which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or 
three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we 
kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of Com- 
merce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own military 
attaches and observers that we had throughout the world. 

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it. 
General Russell. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [9.'f] personnel 
available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941? 

General Miles. A limited personnel. General. We were building up. When 
I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 officers 
in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, with an equal 
proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as the war came 
nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, military attaches. 
Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or un- 
limited selection, ef effieefs? particularly of officers. That was a time when the 
Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to go with 
troops and remain with troops. The general officers, in the field of course wanted 
the best men, naturally, and should have had them. em4 We did not have a free 
field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could 
with the personnel and the funds we had available. 

General Russell. About when did this personnel reach its maximum develop- 
ment of 400? 

General MttES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not 
know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it did, I 
cannot place any date on any maximiun reached. 

General Russell. Can you approximate the number of people who were avail- 
able to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign 
fields, in October and November of 1941? 

[95] General Miles. General, I would not try to answer that question from 
my memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it. 

General RussEax. General, a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi- 
monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to 
the overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports? 
General Miles. Oh. yes. 

General Russeix. Are they in the files now? 

General Miles. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the 
Military Intelligence Division. 

General Russell. There would be no reason to destroy them at all? 
General Miles. Not that I know of. 

General Russeli>. I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search 
of the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover 
copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I am 
giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further search 
to locate, if possible, these documents. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 149 

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have 
divulged already and to limit it*to Japanese inforination, what sources of informa- 
tion were there in Jaiian in the fall of 11)41 on which you as G-2 could rely as to 
activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters? 

General Miles. Within the United States? 

General Russell. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan 
and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you 
could rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in 
Hawaii. 

General Miles. I would say that by far the most important source was our 
Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there 
a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than that. 
We had, of course, used the military attache and his assistants. The informa- 
tion which we could get on the militai-y side from our military attache and his 
assistants was of course very limited ; the Japanese being extremely close- 
mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the 
State Department — Mr. Grew, particularly— on the state of mind of the Japanese 
people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so forth. We 
also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the 
State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 
1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any impor- 
tant sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of informa- 
tion from what might be called the borders ; in other words, China, and even 
the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get out 
once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We exchanged 
information very freely with the British and, to a certain extent, with the Dutch. 
They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were 
getting some. 

General Russell. Did the British have any organization within the homeland 
of Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the 
fall of 1941? 

General Miles. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we 
had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, it was 
necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. 
You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not. 

General Russell. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State De- 
partment or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained 
related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward 
the war and their enmity toward the United States? 

General Miles. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir? 

General Russell. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case? 

General Miles. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I 
would not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Em- 
bassy, that that by any means covered the field. 

General Russell. Do you remember a message from oxu* Ambassador along 
in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State 
Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop 
movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth? 

General Miles. I do not recall that particular message. General. 

General Russell. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this 
as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the 
Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had 
ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of 
our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the 
Japanese situation? 

General Miles. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them. 

General Russell. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in 
the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report 
from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 
(handing a book to the witness). 

General Miles. What is the question, now, sir? 

General Russell. When did you first know about that message? 

General Miles. I don't remember, General ; I can't answer that question. 

General Frank. Did you know about it at all? 

General Miles. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had 
very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did; but, 
frankly, it is so obvious a mes.sage that the impression it gives me today is 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

probably the same impression it gave me then : "Yes, of course I know we 
can't count on i*T the Embassy. How can we be'sure that any group can tell 
us the movement of the Japanese fleet or army?" We knew we could not. 

General Russell. In other words, the information which you have testified 
that you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather gen- 
eral and indefinite in its nature? 

General Grunert. Unless we know about that message the record will not be 
intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record? 

General Russell. Yes. 

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] of 
1941 was very indefinite and general? 

General Miles. Necessarily so. 

General Russell. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secre- 
tary of State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a 
telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this 
White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941." 

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 
1941, is as follows : ) 

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 

"(Telegram: Paraphrase) 

"Tokyo, Noveinher 17, 19^1 — 1 p. m. 

"Received November 17 — 2 : 09 p. m. ) 

"1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 8 
p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese 
naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese 
theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese 
exploiting every possible tiacticiil advantage, such as surprise and initiative. 
Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving 
prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, 
since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and second- 
ary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information in 
advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press ; the obser- 
vation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans 
remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, 
Kobe) ; and with Ajnerican and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent 
waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observa- 
tion their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations 
were reported recently by American consuls in IManchuria and Formosa, while 
troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all 
other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out 
of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest 
or in Siberia or in both. 

"We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect 
any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned 
above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The 
Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to 
what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are 
advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likeli- 
hood of our ability to give substantial warning. 

"Greiw" 

General Russelj.. General Miles, referring to the statement which is con- 
tained in Ambassador Grew's message : "and with American and other foreign 
shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are as.sured of the [101] 
ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various 
directions." 

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was an 
absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters? 

General Miles. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence 
of American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had 
information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war 
plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called 
the "Vacant Sea" in which there are pi-actically no ships and In which large 
movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that part of 
the ocean between the great southern routes that go from Hawaii to the coast of 
Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near the Aleutians. 

General Russell. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you 
called it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 151 

General Miles. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea." 

General Rt?ssell. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the man- 
dated Islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" or 
not? 

General Miles. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii 
to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated 
islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding: the mandated islands 
were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any information 
on for other reasons. 

General Russeij.. Why? 

[102] General Miles. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. 
"You might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for 
many years. 

General Russell. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those 
islands that were mandated to the Japanese? 

General Miles. Absolutely, sir. 

General Russell. Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated 
islands? 

General Miles. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but Ameri- 
cans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship went 
in there. 

General Frank. Do you know of any American port or any point over which 
the United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap ve.ssels or Japanese 
nationals? 

General Miles. No, sir. 

General Russell. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of 
the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands? 

General Miles. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on 
documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of us 
in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid you 
in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times tried 
to get ships in there. 

General Grunesit. As far as the so-called mandated islands are concerned, they 
were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they? 

General Miles. Yes, sir. 

[103] General Russetx. That is exactly what I was trying to find out. 

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu? 

General Miles. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it. 

General Rus.sell. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense 
of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as 
to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2? 

General Miles. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian Department 
from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the general staff study and 
estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time and for some years. 
Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was particularly 
charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and their plans. So, 
up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was intimately acquainted with 
it. 

General Russell. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence just 
given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of an attack 
on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you were, of 
course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities? 

General Miles. Yes, sir. 

General Russei,l. Did it occur to you as G-2 from what port or ports these car- 
riers might depart on a mission of that sort? 

General Miles. They might have departed on a mission from a great many 
ports. We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands, 
and obviously they could have departed [i04] from almost any port in 
Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama. 

General Russell. Y'^ou stated that you did not know what bases they had 
in the mandated islands? 

General Miles. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands. 

General Russell. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had 
over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the other 
war in 1918? 

General Miles. That is correct. 

General Russell. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to 
develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there any information in G-2 in preparing ports and bases in any of the 
mandated islands? 

General Miles. Very little, and very general information. We knew that 
they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and 
we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information i« Hwiitfti^ aftd 
from Naval Intelligence. Taken together it could not have been called any 
detailed or complete infonuation of possible bases in the mandated islands. 

General Frank. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit? 

General Miles. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of 
the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that tliey were developing. 

General Russrax. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G-2 have 
sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate 
an intelligent opinion as to the [i05] possibilities of launching convoys 
from there which might have included aircraft carriers? 

General Miles. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an 
estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a probability ; that they 
had the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means 
to do it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very 
possible, if not probable, that they did have those means. 

General Ritssell. Do you know whether or not the data on these develop- 
ments on the mandated i.slands is a matter of record any place in the G-2 files? 

General Miles. Oh, yes ; we had tiles on them. We had maps and whatever 
we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more. 

General Rtjssell. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where 
the islands were? 

General Mii>es. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one 
source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and 
ours, where we thought they were devploping, from what information we could 
get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you. 

General Russfxl. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the 
inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions 
against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by the 
Japanese people whv"> were there? 

General Miles. That is what kept us away. General. 

General Rt'ssell. They just would not let you go in? 

[106] General Meles. They just would not let us go in. They had one 
excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they were ; but the net 
result was that mighty few people got into the mandated islands. 

General Russell. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated 
islands in 1941? 

General Mij.es. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 
for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out. 

General Russell. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher 
authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the 
mandated islands? 

General INIiles. Not specifically the mandated islands ; no. sir. 

General Russell. But you did regard the geographic location of these 
mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being 
rather material? 

General Miles. Yes, I did, General ; but. on the other hand, we knew perfectly 
well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the 
mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the 
other side, based on a surprise attack launched from tlie mainland of Japan, with 
fast crnisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked 
it up, just how they would take those liners off their routes for one reason or 
another — this one to be repaired, and so forth — and suddenly launch -this an 
attack from the "Vacant Sea." ft¥t4 suddenly arrive in Honolulu. . So the 
mandates were alwavs a black shadow, but they were not [J07] the only 
means of attacking Hawaii, and we it as far back as the early 1930's. 

General Rubseix. In those studies which were made by you, and others with 
which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to 
discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out that 
type of attack? 

General Miles. We considered it. General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in 
that fefifte»9 dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." i* wfts much 
Bftefe ftft we attacked the problem from the other side. 

General Frank. What do you mean by that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 153 

General Mir.ES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnais- 
sance and submarine reconnaissance [liandwritten : by our own people in 
Hawaii] to detect any force coming in before it could actually attack. I recall 
particularly during all of Genera] Drum's command out there in the middle 
193(ys that he was very nmch interested «ftd in it. He was constantly sending in 
papers to War Plans, and they were coming to my desk, involving tiie possibility 
of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous perimeter 
containe4ing the «* thtese five big Hawaiian islands. That was a current matter 
almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was 
constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 
1980's. 

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence 
officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force 
or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was 
beyond our -teffwe dreams of eflicienry. 

[108] General Russktx. Or even the mandated islands? 

General Miles. Rather less in the mandated islands. 

General Russexl. You had less chance there? 

General Miles. Yes. 

General Grunert. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands 
indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was 
bound for Hawaii or elsewhere? 

General Mii.es. It would be no indication at all where it was going. General. 

(There was informal discussion off the record.) 

General Russell. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and pur- 
poses eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese territory 
to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy? 

General Miles. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it 
was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval 
part of the Embassy. What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never 
dreamed that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been 
almost a military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in 
forming and have known before it sailed where it was going. 

General Russell. Now, general, if that be true, then the conclusion has been 
reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian 
Islands, that thg chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on recon- 
naissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions contigu- 
ous thereto? 

[109] General Miles. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air 
power. 

General Russell. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was 
sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2? 

General Frank. Prior to December 7? 

General Russell. Yes ; prior to December 7, 1941. 

General Miles. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if 
you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected 
sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the informa- 
tion, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is 
for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. Gl-2 is the 
Gt-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I had to be very 
careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be very careful. ¥fet 
the information you give your Chief is something which he must pass on from the 
command point of view. If that information is habitually sent out to the vari- 
ous overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling 
the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we will say, 
something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur in, and 
forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief of 
Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of the 
command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate 
of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through 
the command channels ; and G-2 is not in the command channels. 

[110] General Grunert. Insofar as action is concerned on the information 
that is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back 
through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains 
to information? 

General Miles. I do not know thaM have your question clearly. 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gkunert. You have gotten information from various sources which 
influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the 
Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that infoi-mation, if true, that certain 
command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that 
they get that information? 

General Miles. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all 
information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the 
Philippine Depai^ment that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that Depart- 
ment got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very broad 
sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce action. 
The latter, in other words, is a conmiand proposition. 

General Grunert. In other words, you give them the information, but you do 
not analyze it; or do you? 

General Miles. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for them. 

General Frank. You gave information and interpretation only through com- 
mand channels? 

General Miles. Interpretation would certainly go only through command 
channels. 

General Grunert. Any warning, then, should come from command channels 
rather than from G-2? 

[Ill] General Miles. If it is warning that probably would result in action, 
yes, most definitely. 

General Russell. Your Gr-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of 
the Hawaiian Department? 

General Miles. Yes ; to all departments, as I remember. 

General Russell. Now, a few specific questions. General Miles, and I will 
be through : 

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two air- 
craft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which 
Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators? 

General Miles. How is the name spelled? 

General Russell. B-r-i-n-k. 

General Grunert. Was there not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, 
and then he went to the Philippines? 

General Miles. Yes ; that was the man, I think. 

General Russell. This was sent from the Philippines? , 

General Miles. Yes. 

General Grunert. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2, 
Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore 
to be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man 
named Brink. 

General Russell. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese 
aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent 
recollection on that subject? 

General Miles. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the 
mandated islands, but I would not be able to [112] pin it down to any 
particular source. 

General Russbill. Would it be about that time? 

General Miles. It was about that time. 

General Russexl. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of 
a photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late 
November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection 
of that activity on our part? 

General Miles. No, sir ; I did not know we sent one. 

General Russell. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that 
time in obtaining information from them? 

General Miles. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

General Russell. What did you know from the Navy about the location and 
disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do 
you remember? 

General Miles. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers 
in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports, 
they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and 
Thailand. 

General Russell. What was your impi-ession as to the knowledge which the 
Navy had generally during the last six' months before the attack on Pearl 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 155 

Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in 
their Navy? 

General Miles. Their information was very general and incomplete. 

General Kussetx. General, when in your opinion did it [Jl'3] become 
apparent that war with Japan was inevitable? 

General MiLt:s. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had 
practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by 
them an ultimatum from then on I considered war as very probable if not 
ultimately inevitable. 

General Russell. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations be- 
tween the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State 
Department? 

General Miles. Primarily on that. It was a build-up. 

General Russell. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with 
you in any great detail, there was a statemnt that negotiations had practically 
ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that — although there was a 
bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further negotiations. 
Do you remember that? 

General Miles. That was in General Marshall's dispatch? 

General Russell. Yes. 

General Miles. I do not remember that ; no. * 

General Russell. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 
and continued negotiations : Would that have affected your conclusions about 
the inevitability of war? 

General Miles. Oh, yes. 

General Russell. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th 
of December, were they not? 

General Mitj:s. The Japanese reply was not back, sir. 

General Russell. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated. 

[114] General Miles. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but *feft% it 
all hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese Govern- 
ment as a result of evtf the U. S. paper on the 26th of November, I think it was, 
i^ which was considered practically an ultimatum. 

General Russell. I think that is all. 

General Grunebt. I have a few questions. 

General Miles. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure 
of my answer tfeei-eT i 4i4 regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the 
impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately in- 
evitable. I thought that, very definitely, &» some action by Japan, a pretty 
radical action, would be taken almost at once ; but that ^ need not necessarily 
would be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all 
sure that war with Japan was p ra c ti e aHy immediately inevitable any time. 
B«* There were a good many things Japan could have done, if she 4i4 bfeafetfeeee 
broke her negotiations in Washington short of open war with the United States, 
and we were considering all of those iftftttefs possibilities. 

General Russell. That suggests one other question : Did you know that there 
had been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines 
beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, 
Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war? 

General Miles. Yes. 

General Russell. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things occurred, we, 
in association with those powers, might attack? 

General Miles. Yes ; certainly. 

[115] General Feank. You said you were not prevented specifically by 
higher authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese 
mandated islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there 
a general attitude of "hands off"? 

General Miles. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply 
a question of whether you wanted to send a, man to his almost certain death or 
not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth 
that risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending 
a man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think 
I could get him in there and get him back alive, or get information from him 
while there. 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gbunert. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all con- 
cerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend the 
Japanese? 

General Miles. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow 
it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the 
game. 

General Frank. On November 27 there went out a message from G— 2 of the 
War Department, which was your organization, saying : 

"Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that 
conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of 
sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin." 

Do you remember that message? 

General Miles. Very well. 

[116] General Frank. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to 
Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure? 

General Miles. Yes ; in a general way. 

General Frank. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing 
Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage? 

General Miles. Yes ; it provided against all forms of attack, including sabotage. 

General Frank. Why, yien, was sabotage especially emphasized in that mes- 
sage? 

General Miles. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my 
answer must be somewhat long. 

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and 
offices of the Government to keep out of antisabatoge and antiespionage work, 
except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I. and M. I. D. After I took 
M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. 
I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O- N. I. delimiting our respon- 
sibilities under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the three 
Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-subversive system for 
the Army, and later a counter-Htt clligcncc fifth-column plan, the first one we 
ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other Assistant 
Chiefs of Staff and I am relating this only to point out that by the summer 
of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was definitely established that 
counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2's responsibility and solely G-2's 
responsibility. I shared the [117] responsibility for measures against an 
effort overt to attack by a possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, 
because I was supposed to give the information on which their orders were 
based. But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive 
measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that nothing was 
specifically said about sabotage in General Marshall's dispatch of that date, the 
war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's. not only of the over- 
seas departments etn^ i atcr but particularly those in this country. It was fe«4i 
sent it to all of the corps ai'ea G-2s, because we knew the build-iip in this 
country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people were very worried 
about what could be done in this country, particularly to the Air Force. Gen- 
eral Arnold was very much worried tmd -t^t He broke loose the next day and 
occasioned the further dispatch of November 28. 

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid 
down by General Marshall's telegram of the 27th. So I was simply backing up 
the policy of the Chief of Staft' and emphasizing the form of attack for which 
I was most directly responsible at as G-2, [handwritten:] and reiterating the 
possibility of open hostilities. 

General Frank. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an 
answer to the effect that as a result of your background and experience you had 
felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is that 
correct? 

General Miles. That was one of the methods of attack to which we were 
most vulnerable. 

General Frank. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your 
attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack? 

General Miles. If the Japs attack openly at all, and if their attack was made 
on Hawaii. I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack on 
the Pearl Harbor installations and the fleet (although I did not actually know 
the ships were there in Pearl Harbor) was one of the most probable movements 
that the Japs would take. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 157 

General Frank. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabo- 
tage, why did you uot likewise go out of your way to caution them about the 
probability of an air attack? 

General Miles. Because, General, all that had been covered in General Mar- 
shall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary reconnaissances — 
I remember the use of that word — to protect the Hawaiian Department against 
attack. And that was the only way — that, and of course radar — that such an 
attack could have been countered. My message also warned of possibile hos- 
tilities. 

General Fr-vnk. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a 
message with respect to sabotage? 

General Miles. Yes, indeed. 

General Frank. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing 
sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing 
something else? 

General Miij:s. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General 
Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to 
overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient 
message to cover the question of sabotage. 

General Frank. As hindsight, of course, and considering [il9] the fact 
that provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other 
documents, would not the following message have sufficed : 

"War inuninent. Act accordingly."? 

General Miles. For me to send? 

General Frank. No ; for the War Department to have sent. That would not 
have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it? 

General Miles. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording 
in his message of November 27. 

General Frank. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 
28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs ; three of them em- 
phasized sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: 
while we were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the 
attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking? 

General Miles. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the 
negotiations? 

General Frank. All over the world. Were tliey as particular about preventing 
any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any 
provocation on their part? 

General Miles. Oh, no. They liad been provocative for a great many years, 
particularly since they began their attack on China. 

General Frank. Will you develop that in just a few words? 

General Miles. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later 
in China, whicli, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic nego- 
tiations here in Washington in 1941 was the b:isie cause of it, was the beginning 
of a very provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese. 

General Frank. What I am after is this : There was little or no attempt 
on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, where as there was every 
effort on the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that 
correct ? 

General Miles. I should say as a general statement that tliat is very accurate, 
sir. 

General Frank. I asked that of you because you should have information on 
that as the War Department G-2 at that time. 

General Miles. Yes, sir ; but I think it was very general information that at 
Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, 
as we all knew ; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to 
take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with 
Japan. At least, so we read it. 

General Frank. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that 
attitude? 

General Miles. That is a very difficult question to answer. General. I simply 
say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action. 

[121] General Frank. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. 
To whom? 

General Miles. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General 
Seanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it. 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Feank. What were the circumstances under which your objection was 
finally overcome and the message sent ? 

General Miles. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden. 
General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, 
very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow. ae4 
Our objections were on this line : ( 1 ) *hie an antisabotage message had gone out ; 
(2) ^e^ a the proposed message should not go to the air forces alone, but if 
sent at all, should go to the Commanding Grenerals for their air forces and for 
everybody else; and (3) tharfe the message as originally drawn was very drastic. 
As you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in 
command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, 
particularly, to e arg o protect planes and so forth, might very well have resulted 
in somebody's being shot. 

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily 
addressed to the continental United States ; he was thinking' about that. What 
started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western 
fields — I think at Salt Lake — all with the same trouble, and from different 
depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. 
But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of 
Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided imtil 
[122] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air 
side, and I think. General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General 
and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in modified form ; that 
is, not directing such drastic action te fee taken against anybody who might 
climb over a fence ; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and 
that the Air Corps might also, if they desired, send it direct under General 
Arnold's name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned : +«d that 
was the final decision. 

General Frank. Now, another question that I am asking because G-2 might 
have drawn a conclusion on it : What was the attitude of the public toward the 
possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that? 

General Miles. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly 
as much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few 
months pa o t since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of Repre- 
sentatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote was 
taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time. 

General Frank. What do you mean, "saved the Army"? 

General Miles. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all 
the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something 
like that. 

General Russell. A bill to demobilize the National Guard. 

General Miles. To demobilize the National Guard and send the draftees back. 
The War Department was extremely worried about it. 

General Frank. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give 
me an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect 
to the possibility of war? 

General Miles. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, 
^»% November, p receding Novcmbcr r early preceding November, and I don't 
remember to have heard the matter discussed. The Army in those days, as 
you well remember, we all remember, was intensely busy in building itself and 
training and maneuvering and so forth. I would not say the Army as a whole 
were much concerned as to where war was going to break if they could get 
their troops ready before the break. 

General Frank. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon? 

General Miles. The Army? 

General Frank. Yes. 

General Miles. Y'es, sir. 

General FR-^nk. All right. 

General Miles. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon. 

General Frank. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force con 
sisting of .several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine force 
in the ^Marshall Lslands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of December? 

General Miles. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and 
about that time. 

General Frank. Was that information given to the Commanding General of 
thp Hawaiian Department? 

General Miles. I don't know, sir. I do not remember. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION . 159 

General Fkank. Have you any way of determining that? 

General Miles. 1'he records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubt- 
edly will disclose it. 

[12-^] General Fkank. If it were given? 

General Miles. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or 
another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because 
one foi in might very well have been through Navy and Fleet. 

General Fkank. Information on the' situation surrounding the Hawaiian 
Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile 
activity in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnais- 
sance and air reconnaissance? 

General Miles. That is correct — and radar. 

General Feank. And radar? Since the Navy is the only Department that has 
submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they 
were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was 
the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Hono- 
lulu advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as 
reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct? 

General Meces. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had 
the means of carrying it out. 

General Feank. That is all I have. 

General Gbunekt. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in 
mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War De- 
partment, so I will put it in various questions. You get information from the 
State Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might 
become available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges 
whether or not particular parts of that information 1125] are of value 
and should be transmitted, for instance, to the Commanding General of Hawaii? 

General Miles. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, 
the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that 
information — the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through 
the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel Brat- 
ton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. - That It would 
then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, 
dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter-intelligence, 
the negative side, and would then be sent out. 

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, 
would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about it, 
it would be brought up through normal channels to the executive officer, who, 
if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2 men aed him- 
self. That was the method. 

General Gbunekt. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various com- 
mands, or any particular command, would it then pass directly from Gf-2 to 
such Commander, and in what form? 

General Miles. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. 
i moan That would be the routine. •Tbeft asy Any particular information of 
particular importance would be telegraphed cut to those agencies concerned with 
that particular bit of information ; in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philip- 
pines, to Hawaii, to Panama, to the West Coast, possibly and so forth right to our 
military attache afc in China and to the 0-2 of the foriog ft dep artmcnt oj ef the 
corps ureas. 

[126] General Grunert. But when you make an estimate of the situation, 
that then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of 
Staff? 

General MiMS. Yes. 

General Grunekt. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that 
estimate, it then must be authorized for jou to pass it out, or for them to pass 
it out directly to those concerned, is that right? 

Genei-al Miles. Yes. It becomes more than information, then ; it becomes an 
opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff. 

General GRUNEaix. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which 
we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message 
of November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it 
necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did you send it out directly to the G-2? 

General Miles. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to pass 
on it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the previous 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

messages of the same date from General Marshall. I do remember, however, 
consulting, as I almost always did. War Plans, as they consulted me on messages] 
and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message 
that the G-2s were was to inform their Commanding Generals and the Chiefs of 
Staff only. 

General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various 
agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep sub- 
ordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission? 

General Miles. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative 
to the G-2. 

General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry 
out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, making 
estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent? 

General Miles. The answer to that is Yes. 

General Grunert. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record. 

General Miles. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got 
certain complaints — complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned 
out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could. 

General Grunert. Did so many things go out at one 'time that the "low side" 
might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation 
that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In 
other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"? 

General Miles. That could have been, sir. 

General Grunbxt. Do you think that the G-2 message — we call it "the G-2 
message," of November 27 — and the sabotage message — we call that the "Arnold 
message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signa- 
ture — did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command 
"down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of 
November 27? 

General Miles. No, sir ; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 
27 was a war- warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms 
of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the 
same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, 
who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas depart- 
ment, to that particular form of danger. 

General Grunert. There was no report from the recipients required? 

General Miles. There were no report required. 

General Grunert. That is, to your message. 

General Miles. No answer to my message, of the 27th. 

General Grunert. No an.swer? But there was a report required by the Chief 
of Staff's message of November 27? 

General Miles. That is true, sir. 

General GRUNiaiT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department 
made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's mes- 
sage of November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabo- 
tage. Did you see that report? 

General Miles. I did not see that message — that answer — until after Pearl 
Harbor. 

General Gkunert. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think 
of anything el.se? 

General Frank. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility 
of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view 
of the man at this end. Now. consider yourself for a moment as the man at 
the receiving end of those messages, not knowing who prepared them, nor any- 
thing about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the 
War Department, and considering that as a single source: under tliose con- 
ditions, might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing? 

General Miles. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed 
"Marshall." 

General Frank. That is right. 

General Miles. That would be my answer. 

General Frank. Now, the next questicm is : I asked you, in ray questions a few 
minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the 
Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communi- 
cations that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 161 

from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not 
in the vicinity of Jaluit until about tlie 25th. In view of the critical stage 
of the situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there 
is no record of its having been comniuiiicated. Is there any explanation of 
that? 

General Miles. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't 
communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that in- 
formation, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, to 
all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered that 
as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches. Army and Navy, were 
working in very close cooperation, we thought, everywhere — in Hawaii and 
the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth. 

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morn- 
ing, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, 
and they do not know where [130] these messages are. We hope you 
have them, but they do not know. 

General Russeu.. We didn't get them from G-2. 

General Miles. How? 

General Russell. We haven't gotten anything from G-2. 

General Fkank. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, 
who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department 

General Miles. Yes, G-2. 

General Frank. He discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this 
information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it. 

General Miles. He should have, of course. 

General Frank. That is all. 

General Grunert. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and 
as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message 
signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant 
General, or one signed by a Staff Officer? 

General Miles. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins 
with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message." 

General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 

General Russell. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General 
Miles? 

General Miles. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't 
it before me. 

General Grunert. There was one starting out that way, but it happened to be 
a Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start 
out that way, [131] according to the record. 

General Russell. Who was Creswell ? 

General Miles. Creswell ? He was Military Attache in Japan. 

General Russeix. I want to go back to my Mandated I.slands for a minute, 
General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some description 
of those islands. Referring to tlie Marshall Islands, where these carriers are 
supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on those islands 
except Japanese? 

General Miles. Some natives there, I believe — a few, there. 

General Russell. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there? 

General Miles. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there, 
and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very much, 
I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, particu- 
larly now 

General Russell. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am 
asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in arriving 
at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they sailed up 
and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn't know where they came from, 
or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far 
to get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, if there 
were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size of the attacking 
forces? 

General Miles. Prior to the attack? 

General Russell. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] informa- 
mation that led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, 
launching this attack? 

7!i71G— 4G— Ex. 147 12 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Miles. We have only general information, largely from Naval Intelli- 
gence. The ships supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very large 
carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older battleships of the 
KONGO class — their four old battle cruisers ; but I have ru> definite information. 

General Russell. I think that is all. 

General Grunert. Thank you, very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.) 



Exhibit No. 5 

confidential 

[Exact Copy Action Copy Radiogram] 

EHB/bjs-1712 
September 29, 1941. 
AG 383.4 (9-29-41) MC 
From : Ft. Shaffer, T. H. 
To : The Adjutant General. 

******* 

No. 420. September 29th. 

For G-2. Reurad 114 tenth September Nineteen Forty One Re Natzi agents 
aboard army transports. Investigation revealed that subject Wilhelm Braudeis 
was not a member of the crew of USAT President Coolidge nor was Joseph Ryan 
aboard USAT President Cleveland. 

Short. 



[Radiogram] 

Sept. 23, 1941. 

704 a. m. 
105 WTJ 
DJ 

FLD 1205P 22nd 
From : Ft. Shaffer T. H. 
To : G Two 
No. 379 September 22nd. 

Request authority to reproduce and distribute to certain G two and S two 
officers in this department confidential document subject protection electric 
utility property issued by the Federal Power Commission Washington January 
twentieth nineteen forty one received as inclosure to your letter G two dash ten 
three thirteen dash one six three March twentieth. Fielder 

Short. 



CI/G2 

cwc 

MID 350.05 Safeguarding 

September 23, 3941. 

memouandum for the adjutant genekal 
Subject: Security of information pertaining to movements of ships and aircraft. 

The Secretary of War Directs : 

1. That a Confidential radiogram substantially as follows be sent to the Com- 
manding Generals of all Departments and Defense Commands: 

Effective inmiedlately all radio or cable trattic pertaining to movement of 
vessels and aircraft to (u- from the overseas bases connna department or defense 
commands will be classified as confidential. 

2. That notification to this effect, for information and compliance, be given 
general distribution, including General Headquarters, the Chief of the Army Air 
Force, and the commanding officers of outlying bases. 

Sherman Miles. 
Memorandum for record: Certain overseas bases have made inquiries by radio 
of cable messages sent in the clear about personnel, material and docking time 
of transports, and the Navy has protested this. 



Secret 
X Confidential 
liestricted 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 163 

Drafting Section : C. I. P. 
Drafting Officer : Hugh D. Wise, Jr. 
G-2 File Number: 

Paraphrase of an outgoing 

X Radiogram 

Cablegram 



No. 128 Sent 9-13-41 LW 
Date : September 13, 1941. 

To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shaf ter, T. H. 

Present strength of Corps of Intelligence Police in your department is re- 
quested by radio. 

Mailed G/2 W. D. G. S. Sep. 13, 1941. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2) GENERAL STAFF 

9-13-41 
From : To : 

The A. C. of S., G-2 
Executive Officer, Gl-2 
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH 

Finance Section 

Personnel Section 

Chief Clerk 

Record Section 

Translation Section 
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 
LIAISON BRANCH 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH 

C. I. P. 
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH 
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-1 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-3 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G^ 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WPD 
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE 
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH, DCofS 
BUDGET & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
WAR DEPARTMENT JIESSAGE CENTER 
W. D. MAP COLLECTION 



For; 



Necessary action 

Preparation of reply 

Recommendation or remark 

As a matter of primary interest 

Previous correspondence 

Note and return 

Information 

Mail 

File 

Noted 



G2/CI 
WAT 

Sent #114, 9/10/41 

The Assistant Cliief of Staff, G-2, Hawauan Department, 
Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. 
Following men reported to be crew members of Army transports and Nazi 
agents Joseph Ryan present Cleveland due Honolulu September twenty first 
and Wilhelm Brandeis President Coolidge due Honolulu September thirteenth. 

Miles. 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Drafting Section : Administrative 

G2/I 
Drafting Officer : MWP 

1\IWP 
G-2 File number : 

Paraphrase of an outgoing 
Secret xx 

Radiogram xx 
Confidential 

Cablegram 
Restricted 

No. 75-Seut Aug. 29-41 
Date: August 29, 1941. 
To : Gr-2 Hawaiian Department, Fort Sliafter, Territory Hawaii. 

Colonel Field of the British Army will pass through Honolulu aboard the 
Klip Fontein about September fifth. Desire you meet him personally and hold 
full and free discussion on all intelligence matters. 
Record Section copy 

August 18, 1941. 
Memorandum for The Adjutant General : 
Sub.iect : Radiogram 

The Secretary of War directs that a radiogram, substantially as follows, be 
sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department : 

Reurad fifteenth requesting War Department Maps Eastern Europe comma 
these maps not produced and are sending you mail necessary sheets Inter- 
national Map of World together with other miscellaneous map coverage period 

Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, 
Acting Assista7it Chief of Staff, 0-2. 

Received Aug. 19, 1941. Miscl. Div. A. G. O. 

Action taken : Radio to CG Haw Dept. 8-19-41. GHB 



[Exact copy — action copy — radiogram] 

AG 336.3 Japan (7-9-41) MC Received at the War Department 
74 WTJ AE 124P 
July 10, 1941 7 : 84 A. M. 
From : Manila 
To: TAG 

No. 1337, July 9th. 

Further remarks for G-2 reference our radio one three zero one are that 
Mexico Maru small Philippine-Japan run freighter due Manila July 25th has 
been cancelled and commandeered. Kokkai Maru ten thousand ton on New 
York-Philippine run due Manila about August first has also been cancelled and 
commandeered. Ganges Maru now enroute to Manila not yet affected. 
Signed O'Rear 

Gkunebt. 



[Paraphrase] 
AG 600.12 (7-1-41) MC-D EHB/sm— 1712 

To : CG, Hawaiian Dept. 
From: TAG 
July 9, 1941 

Consideration being given projects for Wheeler Field, Hickam Field, and 
Hawaiian Air Depot from FY 1942 funds by Chief of Air Corps. The Quarter- 
master General has been directed to expend $104,202 from available funds 
for anti-sabotage protection. Correspondence now en route advising you of 
action. Above Reurad thirty one seventy three. 
-Copy For : Chief of the Air Corps 
The Quartermaster General 
A. C. of S., G-2 
Chief of Engineers 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 165 

[Radiogram] 
74WTJ AE 

July 30, 1941 
3 : 44 AM 
From : Hawaii 
To : War Department 
No. 3419, July 29th. 

For A C of S Gr-2 reliable information concerning Japanese forces in Man- 
churia as follows. Ten divisions of a total strength of two hundred forty two 
thousand men. These are the eight divisions which are given in latest British 
military intelligence order of battle; with the twelfth and twenty fifth repeat 
twelfth and twenty fifth in addition. Eight Frontier Garrison units of a total 
strength about twenty two thousand six hundred. Six independent garrisons 
units of total strength about thirty eight thousand. Total strength approxi- 
mately three hundred thousand repeat three hundred thousand. The weapon 
equipment of Four Regiment Divisions is given as seven thousand six hundred 
eighty six rifles, five hundred seventy six trench mortars and infantry support 
guns. Three hundred ninety six heavy and light machine guns. Ninety two 
field guns and howitzers. Same source reports that German accounts in South 
America steadily being transferred to Japanese custody. It is freely pi'edicted 
Germany will ask Japan to blockade Vladivostok to prevent essential supplies 
reaching Russia. 

Short. 



[Cablegram] 
LAS 
WUWA 3 

July 29, 1941. 
8 : 33AM 
From : Tokyo 
To: MILID 
No. 508, July 29th. 

After period during which no reservations from Japan in any direction pro- 
curable NY'K today confirmed reseiTation Nitta sailing August 7th arriving Hono- 
lulu about August 15th. Since restriction travel south and west may be unduly 
prolonged strongly recommend Pape avail himself this opportunity and that 
clipper reservation Honolulu Singapore be arranged. Request prompt reply as 
reservations in great demand. 

Creswell. 



[Exact copy — action copy — radiogram] 

AG 380.3 (6-26-41) MO 

159 WTJ 

AE 

616P 

Received at the War Department June 28, 1941, 2 : 00 PM. 
From : Manila. 
To: TAG. 
No. 1230, June 26th. 

Twenty five thousand Japanese Troops received parachute training in China 

and Japan of this number fifteen hundred in Canton Army according to British 

report evaluation questionable. Three Japanese convoys last reported headed 

' south believed to have gone to Pescazores and Formosa. Typhoon reported east 

Manila lends credibility to above. For G-2. Signed OREAR. 

Geuneet, 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exact copy — action copy— radiogram] 

AG 380.3 (6-2!>-41) MO 

21 WTJ 

AE 

620P 

Keceived at the War Department, June 26, 1941, 8: 00 AM. 
From : Manila 
To: TAG 
No. 1225, June 25th. 

Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th 
of June British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of 
Chinese Air F'orce (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event 
of Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese 
airfields as bases from which to attack .Japanese sea communications, land troops, 
and .Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the event of 
Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero minutes 
north 108 degrees 30 minutes east : Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 109 
degrees 20 minutes east : Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 10 
minutes east : Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes 
east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees SO minutes east, 
Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese 
suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to make 
direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland : Weuchow-Chuchowfu- 
Kienowhs. 

British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the 
following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu ;- Siagtanhs-Changsha- 
Yowchow; Nanchang-Haohcow-Kiukiang ; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton- 
Kongmoon-China Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be 
arranged the 1st week in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in 
Burma. Signed Orear. 

Geunebt, 



[Radiogram] 
2WVY 
519P 
BVC 

June 6, 1941. 
1030Z 
From : Tokyo. 
To: The Adjutant General. 
No. 482, June 6, 1941. 
Investigations among Japanese Russian and others nationals fails to reveal 
any information either positive or negative regarding your number 492. Efforts 
will be continued. 

CRESWEIXu 



[Radiogram] 
(JTP) 
152WTJ 

May 3, 1941. 
9:22AM 
From : Tokyo. 

To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
Tokyo No. 467, May 2, 1941. 

Under the provisions of Article 20 Tripartite pact military missions known 
to have left Japan for Germany and Italy though no first hand information this 
office relative arrival Japan similar missions from those countries. At present 
no move discernible which might be considered preparatory to military action 
as provided by Article three although frequent rumors refer Japanese strength 
Formosa Hainan Indo-China greater than normal under China war conditions and 
held in readiness move against Dutch East Indies Singapore. Increase of Japa- 
nese Naval and Air force Saigon likewise rumored. This office not in position 
to confirm or refute such reports. No unusual mission movements observed 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 167 

Japan distinguishable from normal movements connected operations China al- 
though such moves would be carefully hidden and difficult to follow after leav- 
ing Japan. Attention is invited to recent State Department dispatch concern- 
ing transit 

(Sheet Two Tokyo, No. 467, May 2, 1941) 

of German aircraft, artillery and other military supplies via Trans-Siberian 
railway to Japan. 

Instead of daily report required by your No. 505 suggest immediate report 
any information obtained since without change present international political 
and military situation many such reports will be negative. 

Ckesweix. 



[Radiogram] 
14 WTJ ae 

May 3, 1941. 
9 : 22 AM 
From : Manila. 
To : Asst. Chief of Staff. 
No. 915, May 3, 1941. 

Telegraphic summary of report of Singapore conference sent by radio to Brit- 
ish Ambassador Washington by conference chairman. If urgent suggest you 
consult that summary. Copy of report with my comments going forward by 
clipper naval courier to Washington scheduled to leave May eighth. 

Gkunert. 



[Radiogram] 
LW April 26, 1941. 

104 WTJ 7 : 11 AM 

From : Manila. 
To : The Adjutant General. 
jManila No. 8S1. April 26th, 

Reliably informed German Ambassador to Japan has requested that Japanese 
shipping lines facilitate the evacuation of German Nationals from Philippines. 
For G-2. And that Kokusai Kisen Kaisha office in Manila has been so advised. 
Signed O'Rear. 

Grunert. 



[Radiogram] 
(RRR) March 21, 1941. 

53-WVY 6 : 06 PM 

From : Manila, P. I. 
To : The Adjutant General. 

No. 662 March 21st. * 

For G-2 

Exaggerated account of visit of Japanese fishing boat to Itbayat Island on 
March 12 apparently has been given press distribution. Actually fishing boat 
Dichi Maru anchored at Mauyen Itbayat Island took on supplies of cocoanuts 
and fruit and some stores and departed. Carried Japanese flag engraved on 
both sides and was equipped with radio apparatus, fishing nets, and one life 
boat. This incident is normal and is without importance. Signed O'Rear. 

Grunert. 



[Radiogram] 
BFS March 18, 1941. 

22 WVY 3 : 42 PM 

From : Tokyo via Manila 
To : MILID 
Number 459. March 13th. 

Japanese in position to know definitely states parachute training of infantry 
and engineers taking place for the past year. No information as to number and 
location. 

Cresweix. 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Radiogram] 
(MWW) March 8, 1941. 

63-WTJ 10 : 07 PM 

From : Tokyo, Japan 
To : MILID, Washington, D. C. 
Number 457, INIarch 7th. Files 425 PM. 

Colonel Takeo Iwakuro who sailed on S. S. Tatsnta Maru for the United States 
March 6th is advisor to Admiral Nomura and liaison between Admiral Nomura 
and Army. As such will occupy important position Japanese Embassy. Sug- 
gest IMartin meet him San Francisco. See Embassy Number 330 February 27. 

Ceesweix. 



[Radiogram] 
BFS February 24, 1941. 

3WVY 9 : 59 AM 

From : Tokyo 
To : MILID 
Number 453, February 25th. 

Reference your 406 the three Japanese translators and one Formosan messen- 
ger employed by this cfBce are doing translation that can not be done adequately 
by American personnel. Although we known they report to police w\\enliostile 
affairs of office so organized that they can, report nothing of any consequence. 
Miss Ishigami an American citizen handles routine reports and correspondence 
only with Miss McMahon writing all confidential matters. 

Recommend that present setup remain unchanged. 

Creswell. 



[Radiogram] 
WE February 14, 1941. 

72 WTJ 6 : 04 AM 

338 

From : Manila. 
To : G-2. 
Number 512, February 13th. 

Netherlands Consul reports concerning two vessels Java China Japan line as 
follows : For G dash two signed Orear. The Tjitjalenka sailed from Manila zero 
seven zero zero February thirteen but was ordered to return to Manila shortly 
thereafter ; the Tjihesar now euroute from Japan has been ordered to put into 
Manila for further instructions. No explanation available as yet. 

Gkunebt. 



[Radiogram] 
WE 

89 WTJ * 

218 PH 

February 5, 1941. 

7 : 04 AM 
From Manila 
To: MILID 
Number 41, February 5th. 

British consular source reports Governor East Java intercepted telephone 
conversation between two important Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang dis- 
cussing news that Japanese attack is scheduled for February, tenth repeat 
tenth. Both Japanese arrested and both denied conversation. This message 
for G dash two signed Orear. Governor comments very few Japanese believed 
to be armed and no- difficulty is anticipated in taking all Japanese into custody 
when desired. Evaluation of data low. 

Geunert. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 169 

[Radiogram] 
(MWW) 
44-WT.T 

Januauy 5, 1941. 
8 : 00 PM 
From : Fort Shafler, T. H. 
To : The Adjutant General. 
Number 2041, January 4th. Filed 2 : 47 PM. 

Attention G-2. Following information was given out by official British 
sources and was obtained from Captain Thomas V. Hill, Master ARMS 
AORANGI. Description of three raiders operating in Pacific is as follows : 

TOKYO MARU EX KULINIERLAND, Japanese markings, 7300 tons, 20 pas- 
senger, one straight funnel amidships, two masts, three single Samson posts 
one between bridge and foremast one directly abaft passenger accommodation 
one abaft the mainmast, crows next extreme head foremast, slightly raked 
stem, cruiser stern, one seaplane carried. 

MANYO MARU, Japanese marking, 5000 tons, 20 passenger, one straight 
funnel amidships very close to bridge, two masts with foremast abaft well deck 
with seaplane derrick one set of Samson posts immediately before bridge,* 
Maier form bow, cruiser stern, one seaplane. 

Probably MARVIK, Norwegian MARKINGS, 6000 tons, one large funnel amid- 
ships close to bridge, narrow bridge to heavy mast, foremast well aft and single 
Samson post forward of foremast, one Samson post abaft mainmast, ))lack hull, 

(Sheet 2, No. 2041 from Ft. Shafter, T. H.) 

white band, straight stem, counter stern, raised forecastle, high after deck 
house, one seaplane. 

In almost every attack of U boats on shipping a night it has subsequently 
transpired that light were being shown, it is believed darkening of merchant 
ships is improving but it is reported that light torches are sometimes used on 
upper decks. 

Herkon. 



[Radiogram] 
(RRR) 
31-WTJ 

January 4th 1941. 
354 AM 
From : Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
To: G-2. 
No. 2039, Jany 3rd. 

Reurad 584 second January. Saganii Mam arrived Honolulu 21st December 
departed for Hilo 23rd December enroute to Lima Peru. 490 cases small arms 
ammunition, one pounder ammunition and fuses all destined for Peru. Now 
shown on manifest and discovered by U. S. customs. Next boat Nita Maru due 
fourth January. This steamer and future ships will be watched report being 
made any further shipments this nature. Signed Marston. 

Hereon. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 6 
confidential 
[i] Rec'd— G-2 Jan 29, 1942 

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence 

Fo7't Shatter, T. H., 31 Dec. 1941. 
In reply refer to: 350.05 (G-2) 
Subject: Report on Internal Subversive Activities for tlie Montti of December 

1941 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, War De- 

partment, Washington, D. C. 
1. Reference paragraph 6a, CONFIDENTIAL letter, AG 350.05 (8-5-40), 
M-B-M, dated 17 August 1940, the following items are submitted : 

HAWAIIAN DPa>ARTMENT, INCLUDING ALL POSTS, FIELDS, AND DISTRICTS 

Period : 15 November 1941 to 15 December 1941 
Individual and special cases 

The abnormal conditions which have prevailed in this Department since 
7 December 1941 have made inadvisable, for the time being, continuing investi- 
gation of minor routine cases, other more pressing matters having been given 
priority. Only cases of more active cliaracter, such as have been listed in previ- 
ous reports with an asterisk to denote their importance continue under active 
investigation at present. It is anticipated, however, that the summary for next 
month, January 1942, will be in its usual complete form. 

Situation summary 

Propaganda : Japanese radio broadcasts, presumably originating in Japan, 
give highly exaggerated accounts of Japanese success, together with violent 
anti-American propaganda. No local stations are permitted to broadcast in 
Japanese (or in any other foreign language). Except for these broadcasts 
there has been no attempt at enemy propaganda. Gossip and loose talk among 
local residents of all nationalities, both service personnel and civilian, were 
common immediately after the raid of 7 December, but have subsided to a reason- 
able volume and are decreasing. No instance has been verified of deliberate 
spreading of rumors as enemy propaganda. 

Suspicious Cases almost without number have been reported and investigated, 
with results largely negative. Among service personnel, the unanimous report 
of all S-2's has been that even those individuals in the past most suspected of 
subversive tendencies have proved intensely loyal when put to the test of actual 
war conditions. 

Estimate of the situation 

[2] No attmept can be made in this summary to cover other than the internal 
situation, as only preliminary investigations have been made of most of the 
aliens in detention, and tlie labor of checking reports of alle.ged subversive actions 
continues, with little positive result, on a 24 hour daily basis. In general it may 
be said, however, that the morale of the civilian populace is very high, and that 
labor disputes and other disturbing factors have disappeared in the general 
effort to effect a united front. 

Within the various Army establishments morale is at the highest level. How- 
ever, in anticipation of the probable "let-down" incident to tlie lessening of the 
initial excitement, the C. S. System is being completely reorganized and enlarged 
so as to cover effectively all of the newly arriving units as well as those already 
established in the Department. 

Kendall J. Fielder 
Kendall J. FiPXDHaj 
Lt. Colonel, O. S. C. 

A. C. of S., 0-2 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 171 

Exhibit No. 7 

confidential 

EXACT COPY 

ACTION COPY 

AG 380.3 (12-28-40) M 

Prom : Grunert, Manila, P. I. DECEMBm 28, 1940. 

To : TAG 

Prority For G-2 

Netheiiauds Consul sources: Japan attacks January 15 against Netherlands 
Indies with light Naval force and transports against New Guinea simultaneously 
with Naval force and transports against Java. Evaluation of plan high. Evalu- 
ation of date doubtful. 

United Press sources : Two German vessels have been outfitted Shanghai with 
Japan guns as raiders, three German vessels being outfitted at Tsingtao and 
two at Canton. All German vessels in Japan controlled ports are to be outfitted 
as raiders before January 15. Signed, O'Rear. 



Exhibit No. 8 

[1] RSU/tes 

Headquaeteks Third Corps Area 

United States Army 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G— 2 
Military Intelligence, Public Relations, Civil Defense 

Seventh Floor, Standard Oil Building 
Baltimore, Maryland, December 18, 1941 
In reply refer to File : III-7764 

secret 

Subject: Reports of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii. 

[Stamped:] Secret. Date 12/18/41. HQ. 3RD C. A. Initial, PLT. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 

War Department 
Washington, D. C. 
Attention Lt. Col. W. A. Holbrook, Jr. 

1. This office is in receipt of a report, information of undetermined reliability, 
source usually reliable, which is quoted as follows : 

"Three weeks ago Senator Gillett at Washington warned officials what was 
going to happen. Stated that Japan would declare war on United States Dec. 19. 
Also told of an attack on Hawaii. No attention paid to assertions and, Dec. 9 
held conference with some of the leading officials of New York City, State of 
New Jersey, Jersey City and two congressmen from Washington who flew 
back for this conference. Conference was for purpose of possibly setting up an 
individual Intelligence Unit because they are disgusted with the actions of G-2 
in some cases and as far as O. N. I. is concerned they are so disgusted against 
this group that they do not know what to do about it. At Washington Dec. 9, 
one of the highest officials of the British Government got in communication 
with the same country's officials at New York and in substance here is the story — 
the Japanese Business Group at Honolulu had invited practically all the officers 
at Pearl Harbor to a big celebration and dinner on Saturday evening. A vast 
number of the Naval officers were reported to have been so drunk that they had 
to be taken to their quarters. He also stated that the damages suffered by the 
United States Government at Honolulu and on the sea were far greater than the 
total damages that England suffered the first year of the war on the sea. Am 
positive that Senator Gillett has received a lot of his information from 
Wythe Williams, who has retired from the air and is now preparing several 
books. Remember that Williams is a pal and confident of Attorney General 
Biddle and still the F. B. I. is reported to be afraid of Williams and the material 
that he sends out. Williams is smart. He has a staff here in New York that 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

includes the ex-Chief of Police of Berlin (Note, G-2 III C. A. : Believed to be one 
Gkzysinski, who has lectured against Nazism in New York) and other good 
men." Destroyed by 84 Dec. 29, 1941. 

2. However much or little truth there may be in this report, the possibility 
is not overlooked by this office that there may be an attempt to make political 
capital at the expense of military and naval morale. 

3. No other distribution of this report whatsoever has been or will be made 
from this office. No action is contemplated except at the request of the War 
Department. 

4. The original report, quoted above, was dated December lOtli. The capitali- 
zation of names of persons was done by this office. The source was a Pittsburgh 
source which has been discussed with General Miles. 

Philip L. Thurber, 
Philip L. Thurber, 

Colo7iel G. 8. C. 

A. 0. of S., G-2. 



Exhibit No. 9 



This message was addressed to CG., Hawaii, and relayed to War Dept. by 
signals Hawaii with request for decipherment and repeat to them. This mes- 
sage also contained a request that Honolulu repeat it to War Dept. CS WDMC 
Will paraphrase and repeat back to Honolulu 

/S/ B. F. Smith 
Code Section WDMC 
12-&-41 



Exhibit No. 10 

SECBET 

0-4-0 

Exact copy of radiogram received at the War Department Message Center, Room 
344i Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C. 

December 7, L84L. 
7 : 5S P. M. 
P 23 WT J 

From : Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu, 

To : War Department & C. G. Hawaiian Department 

NUMBEB 24. December 6th. 

Based on Dutch intelligence report unconfirmed here of Naval movements 
from Pelau objective Manado and or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A-2 
and suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Keo- 
pang. So ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task recon- 
naissance Buka and northwest passage Australian army reinforcements Auiboa 
Keopang subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours 
by .... government eight am Dutch reported advancing planes to be on 
Keopang not now considered necessary. Eleven am chief of air corps desired 
proceed with all aircraft forward movements Manilla informed. 

Meklesmith. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 173 

Exhibit No. 11 

confidential 

War Department 
War Department General Staff 

MlLfTARY INTELMGENCE DiVL.SION G-2 

Washinqion, December 6, 19Jil. 

G-2/CI 
JFP 
Memorandum for Colonel HolbrooJc: 

Word has just been recei\ed from O. N. I. by telephone to the effect that the 
Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. 0., was reliably reported to have burned- 
its Code Book and Ciphers last night. 

James F. Perry, 
James F. Perry, 
1st Lt., Military Intelligence, 

Evaluation tsuhscelion^ 

Engineering Department 

field DH'ISION 

National Defense Operations Section 

Fr oni T To : G. E. Sterling, Chief. Date : 12/4 

[Hand written:] Major Guest foned 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to 
B«rt-t-e»Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054. Home Tel. Glebe 1129. 
D. C. & Laurel advised. 



D 

a 

a 
a 

a 



Route in Order Indieated: 






Cliief Engineer 


D 


Mr. Webster 


Mr. Terrell 


D 


Mr. Cruse 


Secretary 


D 


Mr. Turner 


Mr. Reynolds 


D 


Mr. Mason 


Mr. Cureton 


D 


Mr. Loucks 


Mr. Ring 


n 


Miss Wiltshire 


Remarks : 







[Hand written:] Until Saturday night. 



Give Bue eepy ef the fo ll o w ffig %e For Carter afi4 defffefey ftU papefe afid f orget 

Group one is east wi|nd rain group two is north wind "X" clou|dy and group 
three is west|wind. clear stop groups wiH fee rope|atled twice in middle and at 
end] of [broadcast. 

Exhibit No. 12 

Dec. 4, 1941. 
Mr. Sterling : Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m. : 
Remarks : Fii-st type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent 
monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports. 

About 2200GMT 12/4/41 JVW3 : 

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight 
tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather. 

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds. 
Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean 
surface calm. 
(End of program followed by music) 

DE 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Dec. 5, 1941. 

Mr. Sterling: At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the fol- 
lowins; Information : 

JVW3 2130G 

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. 
Tomorrow north wind and later from south. 

(The above was repeated three times) 

JWV3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then ; 

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no 
modulation — evidently cutoff in Tokyo) 

Remarks by Carter : 

They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is 
evident that at 213{)G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo 
weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and 
estimate eflSciency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five 
percent. 

FINI 

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m. 

Remarks by Col. Bratton: 

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means 
that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in 
the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. 
(Asked Col Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland — con- 
cerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. 
I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg in the morning and will contact 
Mr. Sterling in that regard. 

FINI 

DE 



[Exact copy — action copy — radiogram] 

AG 580.81 (12-1-41) MC EHB/sm— 1712 

15 WTJ 0-4-O 

1/1130P 

Received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions 
Bklg., Washington, D. C, December 4, 1941, 411 p. m. 

From: Manila, P. I. 

To : Adjutant General 

No. 1046 First 

Replying your radio of November twenty eight and j'our radio six four seven 
on same subject all practical steps within the limits of the facilities of this 
command are being taken to protect all air and ground installations. 

MacAbthur. 



[Copy] 



Secretary of State, Washington. 



Batavia 

Dated December 4, 1941 

Rec'd 9 : 19 a. m. 



220, December 4, 10 a. m. 

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from 
Ministry Foreign Affaii's Tokyo: 

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be oroadcast at end 
weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind 
cloudy war with Russia, thi'ee west wind clear war with Britain including attack 
on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If six)ken twice burn codes and 
secret papers." 

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General 
Batavia : 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 175 

"When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of 
general reports and radio broadcasts: one Iligashi east America, two Kita 
North Russia, three Nichi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack 
on Malaya and Dutch Indies." 

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little 
or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been com- 
mon since 1936. 

FOOTE. 

Oive e»e eepy ef tfee fellew-iftg t© For Carter ftftd d catrey ftii pftgee aad fefge 

Groups one is east rain group two is north wind wi|nd clou|dy and group x 
three is west|wind clear stop groups will fee repe| at |ed twice in' middle and at 
end of broadcast. 

Engineeking Department 

field division 

National Defense Operations Section 

To: G. E. Sterling, Chief. Date: 6/12/4 

[Hand written : J Major quest foned 12/4 that Msg from Carter should do tonight 
B«t4teft Lt Col. C. C. Dusenbury Phone War Dept 2054 Home Tel Glebe 1129 
DE & Laurel advised 

ated: 

n 
n 

D 

□ 

n 

n 

n 



Route in Order Indicated: 






Chief Engineer 


n 


Mr. Webster 


Mr. Terrell 


n 


Mr. Cruse 


Secretary 


n 


Mr. Turner 


Mr. Reynolds 


n 


Mr. Mason 


Mr. Cureton 


n 


Mr. Loucks 


Mr. Ring 


n 
____ n 


Miss Wiltshire 



Remarks : 

[Hand written:] Until Saturday night 



Deo. 4, 1941. 



Mr. Sterling: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m. 

Remarks : First type of program received since Nov. 2Sth, 4-5 hours spent 
monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports. 

About 21-OOGMT 12/4/41 JVW3 : 

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight 
tomo)-row slightly cloudy and fine weather. 

Kanaga'R'a prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds. 

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean 
surface calm. 

(End of program followed by music.) DE 

Dec. 5, 1941. 
Mr. Sterling: 

At 7.45 p. m. jMr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information : 

JVW3 2130G 

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. To- 
morrow north wind and later from south. 

(The above was repeated three times.) 

JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then : 

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no 
modulation — evidently cutoff in Tokyo) 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Remarks by Carter : 

They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is 
evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo 
weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and 
estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five 
percent. 

FINI 

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.&0 p. m. 
Remarks by Col. Bratton : 

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means 
that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the 
middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked 
Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland — concerning 
the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will 
have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg in the morning and will contact Mr. 
Sterling in that regard. 

FINI 

DB 



For action OPNAV RRRRR 



From ALUSNA Batavia 
Date : 5 DEC 1941 
Decoded by Kalaidjian 
Paraphrased by Purdy 



031030 CR0222 



From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept : Japan will notify her 
consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East 
wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England 
with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice 
or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introiluced five 
times in general text. 
Distribution : 

War Dept ACTION. FILES : CNO 20OP 20A 

Record Copy: 20G X Show OI'DO 



Exhibit No. 13 

confidential 

Military Inteixigencp: 

I. B. 159 

Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941 — March 31, 1942 

Record Section 

G2/1 
TJB 
[1] i: B. 159 November 29, 1941. 
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : 

Subject : Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941 — March 31, 
1942. 
I. Oeneral. 

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is 
to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of 
the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to presixit the military possibilities 
and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1042. 

2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, 
will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. 
Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion 
of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo- 
German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her Russian 
success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 177 

a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and 
redisposition of her major forces. Tlie German conduct of war, so far, has been 
characterized by a thoroughness and delib'.'ration in this regard. Between the 
end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable 
periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the theater 
of war, all inilications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time 
lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale 
German strategic olTensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the liussian 
theater within the period under consideration. It is much more pi-obable that 
Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and 
the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter 
and early spring. 

[2] I). Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited 
degree tlian is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has 
a multiplicity of strategic objectives ; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot 
concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with 
assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the 
contingency of a serious depletion of Kussian forces in eastern Siberia. But 
even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic otfensive against Siberia dur- 
ing the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico- 
military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region. 

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has 
taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily 
and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means. 

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered 
incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The 
United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germanj^, is an increasingly 
important element in the situation. Our intluence is exerted in naval and aerial 
participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and tech- 
nical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic *and 
political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not 
sum up to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a means of strate- 
gical maneuver — our ability to make available more or less material and tech- 
nical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most 
advantageously employed. 

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates 
any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the 
period in question. 

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question : 

(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision. 

(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which 
they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important thea> 
ters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject 
to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy 
for the defeat of the Nazis. 

[3] II. Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War. 

1. The British Isles. This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its 
security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The 
ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being mate- 
rially strengthened. 

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a 
position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. 
It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer 
of 1C42. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for 
the present, after a short delay of reorganization and transfer, Germany can 
launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is 
willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of im- 
proved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, how- 
ever, it is estimated tliat in the period in question such attacks cannot reach 
the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41. 

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is 
to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories 
will continue ; but that this action will be indecisive. 

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the 
resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still 
essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid. 
79716— 46— Ex. 147 13 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the 
sealanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending 
against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction 
in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable tliat replace- 
ments have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 
are as follows : 



January 1 to June 30 (6 months) - 
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4H months). 



Losses (British, Allied, and Neutral) 



Total 



Ships 



628 
285 



Tonnage 



2, 755, 242 
1, 000, 990 



Monthly Average 



Ships 



105 
63 



Tonnage 



459, 207 
222, 442 



[4] During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the 
United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approxi- 
mately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States 
Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy 
continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured. 

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and sub- 
marines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected cliat she will 
continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations 
elsewhere. 

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of 
the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continu- 
ance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany. 

S. '''Eastern Theater: By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied 
vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has 
inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great 
losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of 
destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. Wliile Germany could 
transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated 
that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. Specifically she 
will : 

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies. 
Continue tlie siege of Leningrad. 

Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk. 
Seek to seize the general line of the Volga. 

Attempt to overrun tlie Caucasus, tlms obtaining oil and securing a jump-off 
position for an eventual advance into the Middle East. 

The most serious German threat is soutlieastwards to the Caucasus, and her 
goal is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don. 
They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth 
at Astrakhan. Russian defense of tlie Nortli Caucasus will probably eventually 
fail, after suljstantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently doterniined 
and prompt allied aid] the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans- 
Caurasus and control of the Baku oil fields. 

[5] The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset ot 
hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while 
depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following : 
The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and 
technique in severe winter weather is considered better than that of the invaders. 
While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources 
is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately _ GO /o 
of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received ; 
increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required. 

The following considerations are unfavorable to the V. S. S. R. : The uncertainty 
of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along 
the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet 
" Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The 
shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms am- 
munition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the 
outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 179 

has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from 
Russia. 

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of 
action is to resist stubbornly in tlie hope that attrition, climate and lengthened 
communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the 
spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will 
stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also prob- 
able that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia. 

With her industry dislocated, Rus-sia is in extreme need of material assistance 
from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Un- 
fortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very 
awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total 
import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this 
figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States 
and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo- 
German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies 
to influence the struggle within this theater. 

4. Middle Eastern Theater. In this theater, extending from Libya to the 
Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged 
in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, 
Iraq and Iran are shielded from tlie war for the time being by neutral Turkey 
and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus. 

[6] Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, 
there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from 
the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan 
operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria 
and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya 
would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers 
and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to 
hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the 
Middle East Theater. 

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the 
British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay 
for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view 
this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several 
months available for the completion of its organization. 

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British 
are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area 
through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three 
Australian divisions with other troops, and Genei'al Wavell told our Military 
Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern 
Iraq by March of 1942. 

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the 
Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. 
Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important 
active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long,' are the least 
vulnerable. 

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. 
Further American commitments, including probably the eventual emiiloyment 
of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region. 

5. The Far Eastern Theater. Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite 
of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her : 

a. Attack Siberia. 

ft. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an eai-ly 
end to the war with China. 
[7] c. Occupy Thailand. 

d. Through Thailand, attack 

(1) Burma and the Burma Road, 

(2) Malaya. 

e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on 
Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. 

f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and 

(1) Attack Singapore 

(a) directly, by sea; 

(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand 

and Malaya. 

(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies. 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of tlie above 
lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor. 

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an under- 
standing with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic 
penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacflc. 

i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis. 

(/i) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing 
forces. 

Thei most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand. 

Tlie forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before 
Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United 
States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date 
this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to 
the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. 
The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her 
Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter 
Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort. 

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan 
and will containue to contain important [8] Japanese forces. Tlie effec- 
tive use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends en- 
tirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery 
and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. 
The stronger the Cliinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down 
in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler. 

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this 
country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period 
ending March 31, 1942. 

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely 
defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by addi- 
tional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in 
Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of 
these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese 
attack. 

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, 
affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, 
loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have re- 
organized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army 
equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system 
of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and 
United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) 
have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered 
to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941 — said delivery having 
been on an old contract still in force. 

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and 
also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth 
and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few mili- 
tary airplanes to Thailand. But this theater Avill be a secondary one from the 
point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able 
to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though 
somewhat precariously, tlirough the Burma Road. Siberia will become com- 
pletely cut off if Japan attacks Russia. 

Our influence in the Fast Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our naval 
power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents 
against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become 
involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against lier by 
Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic 
offensive because it could not be decisive within [.9] a reasonable time, 
and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather 
than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis. 
[10] III. Morale. 

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis 
and the decline in Axis morale. 

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the Failure of the German air 
attack on Bx-itain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued 
resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on (Germany of the 
Eussiau Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all, 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 181 

by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in 
the war. 

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan 
the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically 
distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation 
which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprece- 
dented success in war — and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, 
only the desire to see it all end. 

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three 
military situations. To each of these situations there should be a correspond- 
ing moral reaction. These situations and reactions are : 

Military Situation Moral Reaction 

1. Superiority of strength. 1. The elan of victory — fighting with 
Possession of intiative. confidence of success. 
Unbroken success. 

2. Approximate equality in strength, 2. The grim struggle — fighting to gain 
Initiative doubtful. success. 

Ultimate success still in balance. 

3. Inferiority in strength. 3. Their "back to the wall" — fighting 
Strategic initiative lost. prevent defeat. 

Ultimate success doubtful. 

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Ger- 
many is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the 
moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than 
number 2. 

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the out [11] come, 
probably within the next inouth, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by 
Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in 
German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced. in the period under 
discussion. 

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat. 

Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2. 
Distribution : 

The President 
Secretary of War 
Secretary of State 
Undersecretary of War 
Assistant Secretary of War 
Assistant Secretary of War for Air 
The Chief of Staff 
Chief of the Army Air Forces 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P, D. 
G. H. Q. 

Chief of the Air Corps 
Director of Naval Intelligence 
Coordinator of Information 
General Embick. 
Record Section 
I. B. File 
dya 
[Hand written:] Copies checked in red delivered by an oflficer — other copies 
sent out by Miss Finch & Mi.ss Carrick. 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 14 

SECEET 

[Paraphrase of a SECRET RADIOGRAM] 

G2/CI 
FMH 

Received at the War Department, November 29, 1941. 
From : Fort Shaffer, November 29, 1941. No. 9SG. 
To : TAG 

With reference to protection of vital installations outside of Military reserva- 
tions such as highway bridges, telephone exchanges, and power plants this head- 
quarters by conhdential letter of 19 June, 1941 asked the Governor of the terri- 
tory to use the authority given him by the Organic Act Section 67 which provides 
that tl»e Governor may call upon the Naval and Military Force Commanders of 
the United States in the Hawaiian Territory to suppress or prevent invasion, 
lawless violence, insurrection, etc. In accordance with tlie above stated Authority 
on 2D June 1941 the Governor made a confidential formal demand in writing 
on this headquarters to supply and to keep on furnishing such suitable protec- 
tion as may be required in order to prevent sabotage, and violence of a lawless 
nature in connection therewith, being done in the territory against vital struc- 
tures and installations. Suitable military protection in accordance with the 
above request is now being given important civilian installations and structures. 
Upon the suggestion of this headquarters, in connection with the above, the 
county and city of Honolulu enacted, an ordnance on 30 June 1941 permitting the 
Hawaiian Dept. Commanding General to restrict the use of and travel upon or 
to close within the county or city of Honolulu any road whenever such action is 
necessary in the interest of National Defense. No exercise of the authority thus 
given has yet been necessary. Cordial relations exist and have meen maintained 
and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters which involve 
the FBI and all other Federal and Territorial Officials. 

In regard to the secret radiogram of your office numbered 482 dated November 
28, 1941, within the scope of investigative responsibility of the War Department 
(Paragraph No. 3 MID SC 30-45) and Military establishments which include 
equipment and personnel, full precautions against activities of a subversive 
nature are being taken. 

Short. 



Exhibit No. 15 

SECRET 

(Copy) 

WPD 4544-13 November 27, 1941. 

Memorandum for The Adjutant General (through secretary, General Staff) : 
Subject : Far Eastern Situation. 

The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message 
be dispatched by cable, radio or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure 
from the viewpoint of secrecy) to eacli of the following: 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action uiq)redictable but hostile 
action iwssible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, lie avoided, 
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy 
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action thai 
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed 
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary 
but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil 
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur 
you will carry out the tasks assigned in Riilnbow Five so far as they pertain 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 183 

to Japan. Limit dissemination of this higlUy secret information to minimum 
essential officers. 

L. T. Gkbow, 
Brigadier General 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 



Exhibit No. 16 
PRIORITY— 

From : War Department, 
Bureau : G-2 .. sm/mis 

T. E. Roderick, 
T. E. Roderick, 
Lt. Colonel, O. 8. C. 
Asst. Executive Officer, 0-2 
Telegeam 

official business — government bates 

November 27, 1941, 
All Corps Areas 
Carribean Defense Command 
Havv'aiian Department 

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may 
ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform commanding 
general and chief of staff only end 

Miles. 
Sent no. 473 to Hawaii, 11/27 
Sent no. 562 to Panama, 11/27 
Sent no. 66 to 1st. CA, 11/27 

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public 
service. 

T, E. Roderick, 
T. E. Roderick, 
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C. 
Asst. Executive Officer, G-2. 
Sent no. 191 to 2nd CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 48 to 3rd CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 72 to 4th CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 49 to 5th CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 54 to 6th CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 45 to 7th CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 75 to 8th CA, 11/27 
Sent no. 367 to 9th CA, 11/27 

Ralph C. Smith, 
Colonel, General Staff, 

Executive Officer, G-2, 
Cable recorded in M. L. D. 
Exact Copy made for Gen. Miles 1-28-42. 380. 



Exhibit No. 17 

[Paraphrase] 

G-2 
SM/td 
November 27, 1941. 
G-2's All Corps Areas 

Caribbean Defense Command 
Hawaiian Department. 

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that 
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts 
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin 

Stop ' i'fiiS ftiC3Sft§^ tiO ■&© wB&i^K^f €€i Oftiy Oy \y~2s7 

Miles 



184 CONGKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[PRIORITY SECRET] 



Drafting Section : G-2 

Drafting Officer : SM 

G-2 File Number: 



[Paraphrase of an outgoing Secret Cablegram] 

#66 Sent out Nov. 27, 1941. 
Date: November 27, 1941. 

To: All Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department, 
First Corps Area 

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that 
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts 
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may- 
begin stop 

Miles. 
#66 to 1st CA 
191 to 2nd CA 

48 to 3rd CA 
72 to 4th CA 

49 to nth CA 
54 to 6th CA 
45 to 7th CA 
75 to 8th CA 
367 to 9th CA 

#473 to Hawaii 
5G2 to Panama 



EXHIRIT No. 18 



(RRR) 
56-WTJ 



[Radiogram] 



NOVEMDER 14. 1940. 

312 AM 



From : Manila, P. I. 

To: The Adjustment General. 

November 14th. 

For G-2 

Following received reliable sources "Reliably reported Japanese evactuating 
troops and air forces middle Yantze including Hangkow. Washington report 
states concentration transports Haiphong Taiiioiig and Formosa." Taiping re- 
feri-ed to probably on Pearl River. Informant believes this presages initiation 
new plans and not result Chinese pressure. Signed O'Rear. 

Grunert. 



Exhibit No. 19 



CONFIDENTIAL 

CIB 

Maj. David G. Erskin 
No. 381 sent Nov. 12. 1941. 
To : G-2, Hawaiian Department. 

Requests you be prepared to check with FBI and render tliem every assistance. 
FBI field office Honolulu is being advised to check with MID and ONI concerning 
custodial detention list in order to ascertain that all points are covered. 

Miles. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 185 

Exhibit No. 20 

SECRICT 

S3 WTJ 0-4-C 

61G-P 

[radiogram] 

October 29, 1041. 
731 AM 
From : Manila, P. I. 
To : MILID 
No. 700, October 28th. 

Three Japanese aircraft carriers including one latest type comma two armed 
merchant vessels of unknown size suitable for transjDorts and one aircraft tender 
are now at Takao Formosa. Commander in chief combined naval and air forces 
has been ordered to Takao G-2. Comment report concerning commander in chief 
may signify beginning of assembling of an expeditionary force. 

Evans. 



Exhibit No. 21 
confidential 



War Department, 
War Department General Staff, 
Military Intelligence Division G-2, 

Washington, Octohem28, 1941. 

Information Received From the Orient 

Dated August 26, 1941. 

1. "Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon 
Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TO.TO (now Premier) "to com- 
plete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific. 
All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. 
The full preparation to be completed in November." 

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States 
would best begin in December or in February." 

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet 
would likely start war within sixty days." 

S. C. 
[Handwritten:] 
Summary of Inf. 11/3/41 
Distribution : 

All C. A.'s F. B. I. 

All Dept.'s O. N. I. 

Alaska State 

File 

P. M. S. 

Exhibit No. 22 



[Radio] 
R. A. Oct. 27, 1941 
4 WTJ 
4 WTJ 

Oct. 27, 1941. 
1055 PM 
From : Manila, Philippine Islands. 
To: Milid, Washington. 
54 Twenty Seventh. 

General southward movement of Japanese shipping in western Pacific is re- 
ported by British sources two aircraft carriers have been operating .imoiig 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mandated islands, of which Kaga repeat Kaga still present following planes re- 
ported based there: Palau repeat Palau, eight flying boats, Saipan repeat Saipan, 
eight lighters, six heavy bombers; Truk repeat Truk, six lighters, six lieavy 
bombers ; Jalu repeat Jalu, eight flying boats, twelve flight planes ; Wot je repeat 
Wot.je, eight flying boats. 

Brink. 

confidentiai, 

[Radiogram] 
LAS 
3WTJ 
518P 

July 28, 1941. 
10 : 36 PM 
From: Manila 
To: Milid 
No. 1485, July 26th. 

British intelligence Singapore reports existence in Middle East of enemy con- 
nected organization there for supply of semiannual passports to so called refu- 
gees paren potential fifth columnists paren enroute from Middle East to South 
American stop One identified member of this organization Schwarzstein reported 
now enroute P'ar East stop Information suggests all passports for South and 
Central American countries issued nationals of occupied territories be regarded 
with suspicion stop Uncertain extent South and Central American governments 
may be involved. 

O'Reak. 



CONFIDENTIAL 

[Radiogram] 
LAS 

30WTJ 
715P 

July 27, 1^1. 
6 : 20 AM 
From: Tokyo 
To: Milid 
No. 505, July 26th. 

Mobilization mentioned in my radio 498 and 500 still going on iinder conditions 
ex/)reme secrecy involving restrictions all kinds on movements additional foreign- 
ers to the Continent also foreigners restricted as far south as Formosa and as 
far north as Korea and Manchukuo. Size of mobilization cannot be estimated 
but it is one of the largest single drafts since initial mobilization for China war. 
Some reports of troop movements away from Japan but nothing available to 
number preponderance moving in any single direction. 

Creswell. 



SECRET 

. [Radiognlm] 

LAS 
29WTJ 
8P 

July 27, 1&41. 
6 : 20 AM 
From : Tokyo 
To: Milid 
No. 507, July 26th. 

On basis of statements made by heretofore reliable contact, it is thought likely, 
should Japanese occupation French Indo China be extended, occupying forces 
will include one specially selected pursuit wing of approximately SO to 90 planes 
now being organized Formosa. 

Creswell. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 187 

[Radiogram] 
I.AS 
82 WTJ 
248P 

July 23, 1941. 
3 : 21 PM 
From: Manila. 
To: Milid. 
No. 14r)6 July 22nd. 

United Press states Lomei news Tokyo claims following from reliable French 
source quote as result of secret agreement between British, Chinese and De 
Gualliets the Chingkiug forces are massing for attack on northern Indo China 
stop Simultaneously the British will attack south Indo China using natives 
stop Whether Indo China govt will participate is not known unquote stop 
This office estimates above as build up for Japanese -movement into Indo 
China stop We are of opinion that new Japanese cabinet is war minded 
and capable of action. 

O'Rear. 



[Radiogram] 
LAS 

150 WTJ 
1210P 

JULT 23, 1941. 
11 : 32 PM 
From: Tokyo 
To: Milid 
No. 504, July 21st 

Recently imposed restrictions of indefinite duration on laud, water, and air 
travel in Japan reduces available services southward to NYK Transpacific 
liner. Application has been made for reservations through to Manila on first 
possibility namely Yawata sailing Yokohama August 14th Shanghai August 19 
arriving Manila August 21 without touching Hongkong. Company states that 
reservations cannot be confirmed for several days. If it is desired that Pape 
carry digest on Japanese vessel he requests specific "authority therefor. It not, 
suggest that assistant naval attache in Shanghai be requested to forward digest 
to Manila by first available safe hand and if it does not arrive before Pape 
leaves he be authorized to pick up Manila copy of digest. Only other alternative 
is for Pape to go to Shanghai first available transportation and to proceed 
thence by whatever combination of clippers and non Japanese shipping will 
put him soonest in Singapore. Schedule of British and Dutch lines are not 
available to their agents in Japan. Assist naval attache in Shanghai has been 
requested to secure and forward pertinent infoi'mation if possible. No detailed 
schedule can be reported until transportation to Shanghai is secured and 
possibly until after arrival there. 

Creswell. 



[Radiogram] 
AEL 
8 WVY 
743P 

Jui-Y 14, 1941. 
1 : 36 PM 
From : Tokyo 

To : Assis Chief of StafE G-2 
No 500, July 14. 

Now evident that mobilization mentioned our number 498 taking place on 
considerable scale and under unusual conditions as to secrecy. It has been de- 
termined that some of the newly mobilized men are being sent to Manchuria, 
but as yet unable to determine how many or whether any are being sent 
southern destination. Although Tokyo is alive with rumors as to purpose 
this mobilization there is no conclusive indication so far available. 

Creswell. 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Radiogram] 
67-WTJ 

July 12, 1941, 
1032AM 
From : Tokyo, 
To: MILID. 
No. 498, July 12th. 

Considerable talk and some evidence of unusual recruiting extent and pur- 
pose not clearly determined but thought to be precautionary as for the time being 
governments attitude not considered as one tending towards positive com- 
mitments. 

Cresweix. 



WPD 4544 ' July 7, 1941. 

Memorandum for the Adjutant General : 
Subject : Secret Radiogram 

I. The Secretary of War directs that a secret radiogram, as follows be sent 
to the : 

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command 

Commanding General, Philippine Department 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 

Commanding General, Fourth Army 
For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources 
is that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is sup- 
ported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This policy 
is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against 
the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been 
materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a 
decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in the 
south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma 
army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and 
Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The neutrality pact with Russia may be 
abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west 
of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan 
has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end 

II. That a copy of the above radiogram be furnished to the Chief of the Army 
Air Force. 

L. T. Gekow, 
Brigadier General, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 
ks 

COPY/ml 
(Original paper filed under Cnribb eftR DcfcHac Panama Command. 



[Radiogram] 
AEL 
85 WTJ 
451 

June 29, 1941. 
7 : 43 AM 
From : Tokyo. 

To : The Assis Chief of Staff G-2. 
No. 498, June 27 

War Office states that cannot grant attachment regiment Japan proper Dickey 
Verback present time but may be able to arrange in future. At same time men- 
tioned possibility arrange those officers Korea provided suitable exchange in one 
of our possessions no specific possession requested but Philippines mentioned as 
exan)ples. Request statement policy regarding arrange our possessions in general 
and reciprocity for Korea in particular. In my opinion under present conditions 
Korea is not adequate trade any of our possessions and arrange in any other 
Japanese possessions would be severely circumscribed. Suggest I continue efforts 
obtain arrange Japan proper. See my letter June 9 to Harris, Chief Liaison 
Section in June 13 pouch. 

Ceeswell. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



189 



G-2(WEC) 
Ralph G. Smith 

Sent to all listed destinatiion * * * s^^ 

IVIay 29, 1941 * * * May 28, 1941. 

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Kii-st Corps Area, Third Corps area. Fourth Corps 
Area, Fifth Corps area, Sixth Corps area, Seventh Corps Area, Eighth Corps 
area, Ninth Corps Area, Panama Canal Department, Puerto Rican Department, 
Hawaiian Department, Philippine Department and Alakan Department. 

Communist Party order recently issued directs all Communist Party members 
of National Maritime Union to remain on board ship until further notice period 
Highly reliable British source reports nation-wide sabotage may be expected 
comma especially on Pacific Coast comma over may thirtieth weekend on all 
defense projects including shipping facilities period 

IMlLES. 



AG 220.482 (4-3-41 )E 



Adjutant General's Office, 

April S, lOJfl. 



Commanding General 

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, TH. ^ 

Issue orders detailing on temporary duty the necessary number of armed non- 
commissioned officers of the Air Corps but not less than 6 for the purpose of 
providing adequate and continuous guard from Hawaiian Department to destina- 
tion for airplanes and parts being shipped on the Steel Mariner scheduled to sail 
to Philippine Department from Hawaiian Department April 5, 1941, and direct- 
ing that upon completion of such duty soldiers return to proper stations in 
Hawaiian Department on first available army transport payment of monetary 
allowances * * * authorized while traveling on SS Steel Mariner a chartered 
vessel * * * 

Adams. 

Copy for A. C. of S., G-2. In connection with your disposition form dated April 
3, 1941. 



AGO 004.5 ( 5-13^1 )MB-G 

The AGO 

AGMX-G 

EAH 

Commanding General, May 13, 1941. 

Schofield Barracks, TH. 

In reply city AGMX period. War Department authority granted you to per- 
mit representative of Pan Pacific Press Association to make photographs of un- 
restricted training activities and general views of post at your station for forth- 
coming articles Colliers Magazine period. All photographs to be made under your 
supervision and to be reviewed by War Department prior to publication. 



Copy for: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Major Corderman), 



Adams. 



G-2 
Lt. Col. 



R. C. Smith 



G-2/272-82 

No. 740 Sent April 18, 1941 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

Hanaiian Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Naval Intelligence on March 21 received from unknown source partially il- 
legible copy combat estimate of Fiji Islands dated December 1940 signed by 
Captain John W. Coulter present address University of Hawaii period. Investi- 
gate authenticity and why G-2 did not receive copy this valuable report. 

Miles. 



193 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[Radiogram] 



Maech 29, 1941. 
8 :32 AM 



(JTP) 
39WTJ 

From : Ft. Shatter. 

To : The Adjutant General. 

FoET Shafter, No. 2492, March 28, 1941. 

For G-2. Colonel Hideo Iwakuru, Ija passed through Honolulu 15th aboard 
Tatsuta Maru enroute Washington, D. C. Nippu Jiji of Honolulu reported, 

"Colonel Iwakuro was formerly head of military affairs section of Military 
Affairs Bureau which is probably the most important oflice in the army. He 
is so influential that there is no one in army circles who does not know him. 
We do not know what mission this colonel is on but in view of the times the 
visit of so important an army personage is worth our attention." 

Shoet. 



Exhibit No. 23 

[H^tnd written:] Copy cf Capt. Safford's digest, with missing numbers supplied: 
1 copy to Safford. 
1 copy to Corderman. 

[1] Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor 

MARCH 1941 



DATE 


JD# 


SIS# 


OTHER# 


BRIEF 


#Mar. 13 
#Mar. 13 


A 

N 1472 
A 1479 

A 

A 1540 

A 

A 1572 

A ...- 

A 


15306 
15351 
15330 

/ 15341 

1 15342 

15425 

15421 
15455 

f 15550 
\ to 
I 15555 


nsmkmg#58 

Tokvo 216 


Foreign Propaganda Conference. 
Japanese-Russian Cooperation. 


#Mar. 13 


Tokyo 222 


Get the Russians to accept the Ribbentrop pro 
posal. 

Propaganda towards the South Seas. 


Mar. 14 


JHsinking #59 


Mar. 18 


Tokyo 120 


Put Terazaki ia charge of information and propa- 
ganda. 
Southern Advance. 


#Mar. 18 


Tokyo 276 .-. 


#Mar. 19 


Moscow #5 -- 


German-Soviet Relations: change in. 


*Mar. 21 


>Tokyo #40 


Trade-agreement between Japan and USSR. 


**Mar. 22 




SIS Memorandum predicting German attack on 


#Mar. 22 


A 1654 
N 1662 
A 1748 


15621 
15656 
15749 


Tokvo #81 


Russia. (Memo not available.) Given to State 
Dept. 
Secure 'intelligences by bribe. 


#Mar. 25 


Tokyo 286 


Dinner with Admiral Racder. 


*Mar. 29 


Berlin 308 


Germanv plans to attack Russia. It is necessary for 






Japan to attack Singapore. 



APRIL 1941 



#Apr. 3 
#Apr. 4 
#Apr. 3 
Apr. 5 
♦Apr. 18 


A 1806 
A 1826 
N 1829 
N 1842 
N 2066 


15900 
15936 
15945 
15976 
16409 


#Apr. 19 
#Apr. 29 


N 2099 
A 2251 


16455 
16741 


♦Apr. 30 


N . 









[Berlin #56.... 

Batavia 142. . 
Honolulu #43 
Wash. 230... 

Tokyo 171.-.. 
Wash. 253... 

GZ-32 



German preparations for war with Russia. 

Military campaign in the lowlands. 

Typical Honolulu Spy Report. 

"As a result of tlie Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact^ 
Japan is at la'^t free to use force in this area (South- 
west Pacific)." 

"Our Southward Move would be halted." 

"It is truly a marvelous tiling that— our relations 
with Moscow have been adjusted." 

Early intentions of Germany to attack Russia. 



***Most important. 
♦♦Very important. 
♦Important. 
Unmarked— Normal. 
^Supplementary. 



[:?] 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 

l7i!ex of Iranslations and mciyioranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 

MAY 1941 



191 



DATE 


JD# 


SIS# 


OTnER# 


BRIEF 


#May 


9 
13 
13 

13 

15 

10 

21 
22 

26 


N 2452 
A 2509 

N 2513 

NQ2514 

N 2549 

N 2502 

N 2619 
N 2043 

A 2675 


17089 
17101 
17203 

17264 

17272 

17305 

17423 
17473 

17536 


Tokyo 202 


"I am most anxious to see the United States discon- 
tinue its policy of aiding Chiaus Kai-shek." 

"Advise the President to counsel Chiang Kai-shek 
to respond to Jajianese peace overtures." 

Transmit #217 to the Secretary of State without 
delay. (Precedent for Tokyo #901 & 902, Dec. 
1941.) 

The U. S. Govt, agree to advise Chiang Kai-shek 
to enter into direct negotiations with Japan. 

Japan has absolutely no aggressive ambitions in 
the southern area.(!). 

Our request that the United States stay out of the 
war. 

Japanese southward expansion. 

"Our dreams of southward expansion ..." 

"To further bolster the spirit of the Tripartite 
Pact." 

Wire real intentions of the German Govj;. 


#May 


Tokyo 39G 


#Mav 


Tokyo 216 ... 


#May 


Tokyo 217 . 


iCMay 


Wash. 299 


#May 


Tokyo 230 


#May 


Wash. 320 


*'May 


Berlui569 


May 


Tokyo 440 







JUNE 1941 



#June 3 


A 2791 

N .... 
N .... 

N .... 
N .... 

N .... 


17741 


Rome 


The German Govt, has recently completed all 
preparations for attacking Soviet Russia. 


#June 14 


GZ-1 


^Jime 10 


GZ-9 




#June 10 


GZ-10 . . 


Japanese-United States negotiations. 
German-Soviet crisis. Prediction of surprise Ger- 
man attack. 


#June 17 


GZ-15 


#June 27 


GZ-26 






"It will be well for the Imperial Govt, to assume 
a very prudent attitude in respect to this German- 
Soviet war." 



JULY 1941 



#July 7 A _. I. B. 1-155 



A 

N 3515 

A 

N 



19126 
19127 
19128 
19197 



I. B. 1-157- 
Wash. 463-. 
I. B. 1-158- 



"Tho Jap Govt.— do not at present feel compelled 
to modify their policy towards the USSR." (JD 
3461) 

J Plans for utilizing American negroes for espionage 
\ and sabotage. (JD 3490) 

"If we are definitely determined to make a military 
stroke southward." 

Comments and paraphrase of JD 3515. [Note: 
MID missed the point completely.] 

Memo to Naval Aide to the President re with- 
drawal of Jap merchant vessels from the Atlantic 
Ocean. 



AUGUST 1941 



N 




N 




N 




N 




N 4814 _ 


21575 



GZ-l 

GZ^ 

GZ-5 

GZ-9 

Berlin 1066 



Jap Decisions at Imperial Conference, July 2, 
1941— to break British-American encirclement 
and arm for all-out war. 

Preparations- for the southward advance shall be 
reenforced. 

The belief of Ambassador Oshima is discounted by 
the Tokyo Government belief that the war will 
continue into ne.xt year, with the Russians hold- 
ing in Siberia. 

Nomura's estimate of U. S. Policy. (U. S. is deter- 
mined to take drastic action to counter, further 
attempts at Japanese expansion.) 

The German-Soviet war as described by Marshal 
Keitel (Germany conquering Russia). 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



U] 



Index of translations Kind ynemoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
SEPTEMBER 1941 



DATE 


JD# 


SIS# 


OTHEPJ 


BRIEF 


#Scpt. 4 


A 4929 

A 4940 

A 4941 

N 5234 
A 5360 

A 5381 
N 5438 

A 5441 
A 5464 
A 5510 


/ 21784 

\ 21785 
21790 

f 21786 

i to 

1 21788 
22377 
22550 

22588 
22748 

22753 
22787 
22870 


JRome 556 


1 Essential to carry out boldly at this time our policy 

\ of southward advance. 
U. S. -Japan Negotiations— See JD; 4941. 

(.lapa/iese Draft Proposal of Sept. 6, 1941. (Japan 

< demands conditions that the U.S. cannot possibly 

( agree to.) 

"Japan's war preparations against the Soviet." 
Basic terms of peace between Japan and China. 
(Jap troops in China & Recognition of Man- 
chukuo.) 


#Scpt. 4 
♦Sept. 4 


Tokyo 528 

[Tokyo 529 


#Sept. 19 


Shanghai 808 - 


•Sept. 22 


Tokyo 590 


#Scpt. 23 


Berlin 1161. 


**Sept. 26 


Tokyo 595 - 


national policy. 
Japanese Proposal of Sept. 25, 1941 (submitted to 
State Dept. on Sept. 27, 194n. (Amplifies the 
Note of Sept. 6th (JD 4941) and attempts to force 
the U . S . to relin quish its position. It is apparent 
that the negotiations are getting nowhere and 
that the Japanese believe that the U. S. will back 
down or resort to appeasement if they put up a 
determined front.) 


#Sept. 26 


Tokyo 597 . 


iSept. 27 


Wash. 852_. . 




Sept. 30 


Tokyo 614 . 


This whole matter concerns the China Incident 






and the South Seas Question. 



[5] 



OCTOBER 1941 



•Oct. 


2 


A 5598 


22987 


#Oct. 


3 


N 5593 


23034 


#Oct. 


6 


A 5640 


23114 


#Oct. 


7 


N 5650 


23162 


#Oct. 


7 


N 5661 


2:3166 


#Oct. 


8 


A 5693 


23220 


Oct. 
Oct. 


9 
10 


A 5696 
N 5730 


23260 
2.3312 


#Oet. 
#Oct. 


10 
13 


N 5738 
N 5779 


23318 
23421 


#Oct. 
•Oct. 


13 
15 


N -__- 
N 5838 


""23513" 


•Oct. 


16 


N .... 




#Oct. 
#Oct. 
iCOct. 
Oct. 
#Oct. 
#Oct. 


16 
15 
16 
17 
17 
18 


A 5854 
A 5S54 
N 5888 
N 5898 
A 5901 
N 5919 


23570 
23510 
23622 
23629 
23631 
23677 


Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 


18 
20 
23 


N 6923 
A 5941 
A 6017 


23677 
23715 
23859 


Oct. 


27 


A 6084 


23996 


Oct. 
Oct. 


28 
26 


A 6116 
N 6118 


24046 
24070 


►Oct. 
Oct. 


28 
30 


N 6138 
6175 


24125 
24192 



Wash. 881 

Wash. 869 

Wash. 901 

Wash. 880 

Wash. 894 

Tokyo 647 

Tokvo #83 

Honolulu #41.. 

Harbin 129..-. 

Tokyo 658 

OZ-9 

Berlin 1237.... 

OZ-10- 

[wash. 943 

Berlin 1236.... 

R)me 661 

Tokyo 671 

Rome 664 

Tokyo 682 

Wash. 959 

Wash 

Wash. 989 

Shanghai 361.. 
Mex. City 422. 

Tokyo 674 

Wash. 1004.... 



Interview with Adm. Stark. "The Admiral 
stated that if the United States fights a two- 
ocean war she will have to defend herself in the 
Pacific." 

Relations of Terasaki (First Sec'y) and Schmitt 
(spy). 

Nomura sounds a warning against further aggres- 
sion. 

Nomura advises caution: "After Japan has had 
time to evaluate the results let her determine her 
course." 

Nomura submits his humble opinion: "The only 
remaining problem is that concerning the evac- 
uating of our troops (from China)." 

The internal situation here — would not permit fur- 
ther delay. 

Area designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports). 

Dock & Mooring designations in Pearl Harbor 
(for spy reports) . 

Promise of American aid to Russia. 

"The situation at home is fast approaching a 
crisis." 

Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779). 

Ambassador Oshima urges Japan attack Russia — 
"at the time of the fall of Moscow"— and adds 
"It is absolutely essential for us to make sure of 
the resources and markets of the south." 

Kramer's Memo to CNO with paraphrase of JD 
#5838. 

(■Interview with Adm. Turner. (Withdrawal of 
\ Jap troops from China. 

Protest on Domei editorial. 

Evacuation of Japanese merchants from Europe. 

German pressure on Japan. 

"My (Paulucci's) personal opinion is that Japan 
should strike at the Soviet Union immediately." 

Resignation of Jap cabinet. 

Conversation between Terazaki and Adm. Turner. 

Nomura submits his resignation. "I don't want to 

continue this hypocritical existence deceiving 

[6] other people ... As a man of honor 

this is the only way open to me." (This is why 

Kurusu was sent.) 

"The Chief of Stall has sent the Military Attache 
some secret advice. Is this the future policy)' 
the Government." 

"At the time of a Japanese advance to the North." 

Sec'y Knox's statement that there would be immi- 
nent action in the Far East. 

Japanese nationals evacuating the N. E. I. 

Talk with Adm. Pratt-^"Stark cannot be said to 
be a 'strong' individual, .\diniral Pratt said." 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



193 



Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
[7) NOVEMBER 1941 



DATE 



JD# 



SIS# 



OTHER# 



BRIEF 



Nov. 1 
Nov. 4 
♦Nov. 4 



•Nov. 4 



Nov. 4 
#Nov. 4 

"Nov. 5 



#Nov. 5 
iJlNov. 6 



Nov. 7 



Nov. 8 



18] 



•Nov. 12 



iKNov. 12 



Nov. 17 
•Nov. 17 



•Nov. 17 



••Nov. 17 
&22. 



[9] 



Nov. 17 



N 6204 
N 62:58 
A 6248 



A 6249 



A 6250 
A 6251 

N 6254 



N 6275 
A 6302 



24249 
24322 
24330 



24334 

to 
24337 



24338 
24339 

24373 



24386 
24439 



N 6320 24479 



N 6335 



N 6415 



N 6416 



A 6540 
A 6541 



A' 6542 



A 6553 



Hsinking 697, 
Tokyo .343... 
Tokyo 725... 



Tokyo 726. 



Tokyo 727. 
Tokyo 730. 

Tokyo 736. 



Tokyo 734. 
Tokyo 739. 



Wash. 1040. 



24533 Manila 722. 



24373 Tokyo 762. 



A 6638 



24853 
24854 



24856 



24877 
24857 

& 
25139 



24878 



Tokyo... 
79716 — 46— Ex. 147 14 



Tokyo 763. 



Hsinking #1 

HsinkitiR #2 (Append- 
ed to #1). 



Hsinking"#3 (Append- 
ed to #1). 



Wash. 1090. 



Border clash. "Let the matter be forgotten. 

.Japanese nationals evacuating the Philippine. 

Counter proposals will be given in #720 & 727. 
Conditions both within and without our Empire 
are so tense that no longer is procrastination pos- 
sible. This is our last ctTort. The success or 
failure of the pending discussions will have an 
immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of 
Japan. 

Proposal "A" — Submitted in Part to sSite Dept. 
on Nov. 7, 1941. "How hard have we fought in 
China for four years What tremendous sacri- 
fices have we made They must know this . . . 
In any case, our internal situation also makes it 
impossible for us to make any further compro- 
mise." 

Proposal "B"— Never submitted. "A last effort 
to prevent something happening." 

"Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by clipper on the 
the 7th. He is carrying no additional instruc- 
tions (!)" 

It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for 
the signing of this agreement be completed by the 
25th of this month. (Of utmost secrecy.) 

Ambassador Kurusu left the 5th for (Shanghai(?)). 

We are sending Ambassador Kurusu to show our 
Empire's sincerely. . . To make it sound good we 
are telling the public. . . Both the Army and 
the Navy are pleased. (Note: See JD #6017.) 

There is danger that America will see through our 
condition. If we have made up our minds to a 
final course of action it would be the part of 
wisdom to keep still about it. 

Spy report on U. S. aircraft in the Philippines and 
analysis. (Note: This is why we did not worry 
too much over Japanese espionage.) 



"Dissemination to White House." (This memo- 
randum in Kramer's handwriting records reasons 
for giving original translations to Pres. Roosevelt 
(& Sec'y Hull) after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to that 
time Memoranda forwarding Paraphrases of im- 
portant messages had been furnished.) 

The United States is still not full aware of the ex- 
ceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The 
date set in message #736 is a definite deadline. 
The situation is nearing a climax . . . time is in- 
deed becoming short. 

Germany putting pressure on Japan to get tough 
with the U.S. 

Umetsu to Kurusu (Nov. 6, 1941). 

Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It would be imposs 
sible for us to fight the Soviet Union unless some- 
thing unforeseen happens. The Kwantung mili- 
tary command is restraining the forces there from 
any rash action. The Soviet is also endeavoring 
not to antagonize our country. 

Estimate of the Russo-Oerman War. (The founda- 
tions of the Stalin regime are very firmly fixed. 
The outlook for any early close to hostilities in 
Europe is fading.) 

Nomura's swan song (Nov. 14, 1941). (The policy 
of the American Govt, in the Pacific is to stop any 
further moves on our part, either southward or 
northward. They are contriving by every possi- 
ble means to prepare for actual warfare. It is not 
their intention to repeat the Munich Conference. 
The apex of German victories has been passed. 
The United States would not favor us at the sac- 
rifice of China: This war will be long, and who- 
ever can hold out till the end will be the victors. 
I would like to caution patience for one or two 
months to get a clear view of the world situation. 
This would be the best plan. 

Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our Empire hangs 
by the slender thread of a few days. I set the 
deadline. There will be no change.) 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Index of iraiislaiions and memoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
NOVEMBER 1941— Continued 



DATE 


JD# 


SIS# 


OTHER# 


BRIEF 


•Nov. 22 
Nov. 24 


A 6710 

N 6731 

A 6737 
A 6744 

A 6801 

A 6841 

N 68.'^0 
N 6875 


25138 

25171 

25174 
25178 

25322 

25344 
25392 
25432 


Tokyo 812 

Tokyo 969 


There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why 
we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations 
by the 25th, but if the sis^ning can be completed 
by the S9th, we have decided to wait until that date. 
This time we mean it that the deadhne absolutely 
cannot be changed. After that things are auto- 
matically going to happen. 

We would welcome peace between Germany and 
the Soviet Union. 

Continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion. 

The time limit set in my #812 is in Tokyo time. 
(See JD #6710.) 

Should negotiations collapse . . . we will com- 


#Nov 2! 


Wash. 1148 


♦Nov. 24 


Tokyo 823... .. 


Nov. 26 


Tokyo 2319 


#Nov. 26 


Tokyo 836 


pletely destroy British and American power in 
China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of 
these decisions. (Circular to China Net— Nov. 
14, 1941.) 
Telephone Code (see JD 6890). 


Nov. 26 


Tokyo 2354.^ 


Winds Code— IMorse (Nov. 19, 1941-J19). 


♦Nov. 28 


Tokyo 2353. 


Winds Code— Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-J19). 




Appended to JD 6875.. 


(Singapore version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. 


Nov. 28 


N 6890 

A 6891 
6896 

A 6892 
A 6898 

N 6899 
N 6908 

N 6921 


25443 

25435 
25436 

25437 
25445 

25446 
25476 

25496 


(Thorpe) version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. 
(Foote) version of tlie Winds Code. Japan- 
U. S.=East Wind Rain. Japan-U. S. S. R.= 
North Wind Cloudy. Japan-British=West 
Wind Clear (including N. E. I.). 
Washington-Tokvo Telephone Conversation Nov. 


#Nov. 26 


jWash. 1180 


27, 1941 (2327-2334 E. S. T.)— The south, south- 
ward matter. A crisis does appear imminent. 
Regarding negotiations — do not break them ofl. 
We have a crisis on hand and the Army is champ- 
ing at the bit. [Note: This was the only tele- 
phone conversation of any importance.] (See 
JD 6841.) 

Our failure and humiliation are complete. 


[10] 
#Nov. 28 


Wash 1181. 


It is better to wire urgent news than to phone it. 


•Nov. 28 


Tokyo 844... 


The United States has gone ahead and presented 


Nov. 28 


Tokyo 843 


this humiliating proposal (of Nov. 26th). Ne- 
gotiations will be de facto ruptured. Do not 
give the impression that negotiations are broken 
off. 
Tokyo Broadcast Schedule. 


#Nov. 29 


Wash 1197-. 


Ref. Tokj'o 843, recommends change in Broadcast 


Nov. 30 


Tokvo 857 


Schedule— Nov. 27, 1941. (See JD 6899.) 
Make one more attempt. Please be careful that 






this does not lead to anything like a breaking oS 
of negotiations. 



Ui] 



DECEMBER 1941 



#Dec. 1 
♦Dec. 1 



♦♦Dec. 1 



N 6939 
N 6942 



A 6943 



25545 
26556 



25552 
25553 



Tokyo 2436, 
Berlin 1393. 



Tokyo 985. 



Destroying codes with chemicals. 

Ribbentrop said, "It is essential that Japan effect 
the Now Order in East Asia without losing this 
opportunity." "Should Japan become engaged 
in a war against tlic U. S. Germany, of course, 
would join the war immediately." Foreign Min- 
ister Ribbentrop requested tliat the contents of 
our talks be ke[)t a strict secret. 

The conversations between Tokyo and Washinston 
now stand ruptured— broken. Say very secretly 
to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme 
danger that war may suddenly break out between 
the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and this 
war may come quicker than anyone dreams. 
Will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for 
the time being we would prefer to refrain from any 
direct moves in the north. Impress on the Germans 
and Italians how important secrecy is. (Nov. 30, 
1941.) ]Note: Coded message forwarded by Com 
16 as GYROF 010001, 010014, or 011)027. Also 
forwarded from London as Admiralty #104 and 
#105. Admiralty 011530 advised "Tokyo to Ber- 
lin #985 of immediate interest to]. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 

Index of translations and 7nemoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
DECEMBER 1941— Continued 



195 



DATE 



OTHER# 




•Dec. 1 



Dec. 2 

#Dec. 2 

#Dec. 2 

•Dec. 1 

•♦D<?c. 1 

•Dec. 2 



Dec. 3 

••Dec. 4 

#Dec. 3 

•Dec. 3 



#Dec. 4 

#Dec. 5 

#Dec. 5 

[13] 

#Dec. 5 

•Dec. 5 

#Dec. 5 

••Dec. 4 



A 6974 

N 6981 
A 6982 
N 6983 

N 6984 

N 6985 



25572 

25604 
25571 
25605 

25606 

25609 



Hsinking 781. 



N 6991 
N 7001 
N 7012 

A 7017 



A 7029 

A 7063 
A 7064 

N 7080 

N 7086 
N 7091 

N 7092 



Rome 768. _ 

Rio 482 

Tokyo 865.. 

Tokyo 2444. 



Tokyo 2409. 



25644 

25656 
25640 



25694 Tokyo 114. 



25773 
25772 

25781 

25823 
25787 

25783 



111. 
Tokyo 113- 



Honolulu 224. 



Tokyo 842. 



Tokyo 122... 
Tokyo 2443. 

Tokyo 893... 



BRIEF 



Tokyo 111. 

Berlin 1396 
Tokyo 867. 



The Imperial Govt, can no longer continue nego- 
tiations with the U. S. The proposal presented 
by the U. S. on the 26th contains one insulting 
clause. It is clearly a trick. The (J. S. has de- 
cided to regard Japan as an enemy. (Nov 30 
1941.) [Forwarded by Com 16 as YROF 010001. 
010014, or 010029.] 

In the event that war breaks out with England 
and the U. S.— Persons to be interned: (a) 
British nationals, 339; (b) American citizens, 81; 
(d) Nationals of the Soviet observed to be ob- 
noxious characters with pro-British and Amer- 
ican leanings are to be suitably taken care of. 

Japanese language broadcasts to Europe. (Nov. 
29, 1941.) 

At present we can hear only the 6:30 p. m. JVJ 
transmission to the U. S. (Nov. 30, 1941.) 

To prevent the United States from becoming 
unduly suspicious we have been advising the 
press and others that the negotiations are con- 
tinuing. The above is for only your information. 
(QY Log #6428.) 

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, 
and Manila have been instructed to abandon the 
use of the code machines and to dispose of them. 
The machine in Batavia has been returned to 
Japan. (GY Log #6432.) 

Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941-J19). For 
later additions see: 



JD# 



7214 
7360 



SIS# 



25830 
25943 



OTHER# 



Tokyo 2432. 
Tokyo 2433. 
Tokyo 2450. 
Tokyo 2431. 



(?) 



Make your "ships in harbor" report irregular but 
twice a week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19.) 

JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to be the (missing) 
translation of the Winds Message. 

Note from German Ambassador concerning what 
is to be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese 
and an American-Japanese war. (Dec. 1, 1941.) 

Washington burn all codes except one copy of 
"Oite" (Pa-K2) and "L" (LA). Stop using the 
code machine and destroy it completely. When 
you have finished this, wire back "HARUNA." 
Destroy all messages files and other secret docu- 
ments. (Dec. 2, 1941.) 

Investigate fleet bases in Hawaii reservation. 
(Nov. 20, 1941— J19.) 

Report ships in Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, etc. 

(Nov. 18, 1941— J-19.) 
Unimportant spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941— I • 



The United States might make a protective occu- 
pation of the Dutch East Indies. (Nov. 27, 
1941.) 

In the future report even when there are no (ship; 
movements. (Nov. 29, 1941— J19.) 

London discontinue use of code machine and dis- 
pose of it immediately. Wire "SETUJU." 
(Dec. 1, 1941.) 

Manchuria will take the same steps toward Eng- 
land and America that this country will take in 
case war breaks out. American and British 
consular officials and offices will not be recog- 
nized as having special rights. Great care shall 
be exercised not to antagonize Russia. (Dec. 
1st.) [Note: Intercepted by Army at Fort Shaf- 
ter, T. H. Received by Navy in late afternoon 
of Dec. 3, 1941, LCT. (OY Log #6498.)] 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 147- 



-15 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
DECEMBER 1941 — Continued 



DATE 



#Dec. 6 
#Dec. 5 
Dec. 6 



Dec. 



Dec. 



#Dec. 6 



JD# 



A 7111 
N 7122 
A 7125 



N 7136 



A 7142 



[H] 

••Dec. 6 

••Dec. 6 

(1-13) 

••Dec. 7 

(14) 
♦Dec. 6 


••Dec. 


7 


#Dec. 


7 


•Dee. 


7 


••Dec. 


7 


"Dec. 


6 


#Dee. 


_ 


#Dec. 


7 


[15] 




Dec. 


9 


#Dec. 


8 


#Dec. 





•Dec. 


10 



SIS# 



25817 
25830 
25837 



25836 



A .__. 

N 7143 

N 7143 
A 7144 

A 7145 

A 7146 
A 7147 

N 7148 

A 7149 



A 7150 
A 7151 

A 7214 

A 7257 

N 

N 7280 



25843 
25843 
25844 

25850 

25853 
25854 

25856 

25838 



25857 
25858 

25943 
25998 



26029 



OTHER# 



Honolulu 222 

Rio 329 

Bern 



Wash. 1268. 



Tokyo 897. 



Tokyo 898_ 
Tokyo 899. 
Tokyo 900- 



Tokyo901_ 
Tokyo 902. 

Tokyo 902_ 

Tokyo 904. 



Tokyo 907. 

Tokyo 908. 
Tokyo 910. 



Tokyo 2494. 



Tokyo 901. 



Tokyo 905. 



Tokyo 909. 



Tokyo 2450. 



BRIEF 



Spy report on Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor. 
(Nov. 18, 1941— J19.) 

Tokyo Circular 2432— Additions to Hidden Word 
Code. (Dec. 2, 1941— J19.) (See JD #6985.) 

Tokyo Circular #2447. Orders have been issued to 
our diplomatic officials in North America and 
the South Seas, and to all our officials in British 
and Netherlands territory to burn all telegraphic 
codes except one copy of "Oite" and "L". (Dec. 
2— J19.) 

We have completed destruction of codes but since 
negotiations are still continuing I request to 
delay the destruction of one code machine. 
(Dec. 5th.) 

Destroy one "B" code machine and use the other 
for the time being. [Note: #897 was the first 
Tokyo to Washington serial sent on Dec. 6, 1941. 
We intercepted #897-912 solid.] 

See JD #7199. 

See JD #7170. 

Doemi praises KATO for good reporting. 



(Parts 1-13.) (See 
(Very 



Tokyo/Extra. 
Tokyo 912.... 

Honolulu 252 



See JD #7149. 

Japanese Declaration of War. 
GY Log #6619, 66 20, etc.) 

Japanese Declaration of War. (Part 14.) 
important.) (See G Y Log #6649.) 

Re my #902 — Be most cautious in preserving se- 
crecy. (Note: This was received before #902 — 
SeeGY Log #6618.] 

Re my #902— Submit our reply to the U. S. Govt, 
at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th your time. (Urgent — Very 
imjjortant.) (See G Y Log #6648.) 

Deepest thanks to both you ambassadors. 
(Urgent.) 

After deciiihering Part 14 of my 902 and also 907, 
908, and 909. destroy at once the remaining cipher 
machine. (E.xtremely Urgent) 

Relations between Japan and England are not in 
accordance with expectations. (In Hidden Word 
Code.) (See J D #6985.) 

Re my 844 (J D 6898) . The Govt, has deliberated on 
the American proposal of the 26th of November 
and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum 
for the U. S. contained in my separate message 
M902, in English. This message is very long — in 
14 parts. Keep it secret for the time being. I will 
wire you in a separate message the time of present- 
ing this memorandum to the U. S. Present it to 
the Americans ;'(/«/ a.' soon as you receive instruc- 
tions. [Note: #901 was intercepted before #904 and 
#902. See (iY Log #661 2.] 

According to AP <fc UP reports the President has 
wired a personal n:essage to His Majesty the 
Emperor. Please wire me the facts. (Urgent.) 

I heartily thank IGUCHl and YUKI. (Vrgejit.) 



Supplement to Hidden Word Code (Dec. 2— J19). 
[Note: Com 16's 051402 advised "Singapore at- 
taches great importance to Tokyo Circulars 2433 
and 2450." Circular 2450 was requested by Op- 
Nav 061605 and was forwarded by Com 16 GY- 
ROF 070330, 070415, & 071257 (?). See GY Log 
#6665-6669.] 

PAK2 message dated Dec. 6th. Of no importance, 
except to show solid interception of Tokyo- Wash- 
ington messages on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941. 

Same as #911 but in PAK2 (Dec. 7th) [Note: #912 
was the last Tokyo-Washington serial sent. Our 
file of Tokyo- Washington serials sent on Dec. 6 & 
7, 1941, is complete.] 

The following ships were in port on the afternoon of 
the fifth: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 de- 
stroyers. Four ships of the Honolulu class were 
in dock. (Dec. 5th— PAK2.) [Note: Army inter- 
cept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.] 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



197 



Indea of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
DECEMBER 1941 — Continued 



DATE 



•Dec. 10 

#Dpc. U 

#Dcc. 12 
Dec. 11 

[16] 



mec. 7 
#Dec. 8 
#Doe. 8.. 



#Dec. 7 
#Dec. 7 
#Dec. 7... 

#Dec. 7. 

•Dec. 8 



•Dec. 8. 



#Dec. 7.. 
••Dec. 7... 



#Dec. 8... A 7199 



#Dec. 8.. 
#Dec. 8- 
#Dec. 8- 

im 

#Dec. 11 
#Dec. 11 

#Dec. 12 
•Dec. 11 



#Dec. 11 
•Dec. 12 



JD# 



N 7294 

N 7299 

A 7330 
N 7335 



A 7157 
A 7158 
A 7164 



A 7170 

A 7171 

A 7175 

A 7176 

A 7178 



A'7179 



A'7183 
A" 7184 



SIS# 



N 7205 

A 

A 7212 



N 7338 
N 7360 

A 7369 
N 7370 



A 7377 
A 7381 



26053 

26047 

26103 
26108 



25859 
25880 
25879 

25868 
25851 
25845 

25846 

25877 

25874 

25852 
25866 

25896 
25923 
25928' 



26109 
26144 



26214 
27136 



26142 
26158 



OTHER* 



Honolulu 241. 



Wash. 1278 

Cant. 512 . 
Pek. 625__. 



903 

906. _ 

911 

912 
Tokyo iis" 



Tokyo 119-. 
Tokyo 2445. 



Tokyo 899... 

Tokyo/Extra. 
Wash/Extra.. 

Wash. 1272... 

Honolulu 253. 



Honolulu 254. 



Tokyo 906... 
Budapest 104 



Tokyo 898. 



Tokyo 911.... 
Tokyo 903..-. 
Honolulu 2.38. 



Wash. 1276. 
Rio. 328... _ 



>Hsinking.. 
Hono. 245. 

Tokyo 909. 
Tokyo 128. 



BRIEF 



The usual schedule for departure and return of the 
battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning 
on Friday and returning on Saturday of the fol- 
lowing week. (Dec. 1— Ji9.) [Note: Army inter- 
cept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.] 

Re your #910 we will commence the demolition (of 
the code machine) and destruction by fire. [Note: 
Last Purple message sent by Washington (Dec. 
7th).] 

The Army has completed all preparations to move 
immediately on Thai. (Dec. 2— J19.) [Note: 
Place of interception not known.] 

Coincident with the beginning of the war against 
Britain and America (Dec. 6th). [Note: Inter- 
cepted at Fort Shaffer, T. H. Received Dec. 
10, 1941-see GY Log #6749.] 

Sec cntrv after JD #7205. 

See JD #7183. 

See JD #7205. 

See Entry after JD #7257. 

Honolulu retain codes so long as the local situation 
permits. (Nov. 28— J19.) 

Report entrance and departure of capital ships. 
(Nov. 28— J19.) 

Burn all codes with exception of one copy of "Oite" 
and "L". Wire "HARUNA." Burn all secret 
documents. Be especially careful not to arouse 
suspicion. (To Habana.) (Dec. 2— J19.) 

Anti-U. S. Propaganda. 

Correction to #902. 

Requests correction to #902. [Note: This is why 
Nomura was late.] 

Japanese attempts to influence the American Govt. 
(Dec. 6th.) 

There is considerable opportunity left to take ad- 
vantage for a surprise attack against these places. 
(Dec. 6th— PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded 
by teletype from San Francisco.] 

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being con- 
ducted by tne fleet air arm. (Dec. fith- PAK2.) 
[Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San 
Francisco.] 

Minister SAKAMOTO return to his post at once. 
( Urgent.) 

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the 
Government of this country a British Govern- 
ment communique t'/ the effect that a state of war 
would break out on the 7th. (LA). 

Send Terasaki to his post immediately. (Urgent. 
(Dee. 6th.) 

Minor correction to #902. (Dec. 7th.) 

Washington send #1286 to Brazil. (LA) 

Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28— J19.) 



Please wire the December operating expenses for all 
offices today. (Dec. 7 — LA) 

Tokyo Circular #2431— Nov 29th. Additions to 
Hidden Word Code. (Dec. 2— J19) (See JD 
#6985) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va.] 

Prospective use of the Kwantung Army and recom- 
mendation against attacking Russia. (Dec. 4th) 
[Note: Intercepted at Fort Shatter, T. B.] 

Spy method of communication by signals: KQMB 
Want Ads. (Dec. 3— PAK2). [Note: Intercepted 
at Fort Hmit, Va. Translated in the rough by 
Mrs. Edgers, 1:00 p. m. on Dec. 6, 1941. Seen by 
Lt. Cdr. Kramer about 3:00 p. m. Typed smooth 
and distributed on Dec. 11 th.] 

When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities 
Manchukuo will not participate. (Dec. 4th) 
[Note: Intercepted at Fort Shaffer, TH] 

Honolulu wire immediately movements of the fleet 
subsequent to the 4th. (Dec. 6— PA K2) [Note; 
Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H.] 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor — Continued 
DECEMBER 1941— Continued 



DATE 



JD# 



SIS# 



OTHER* 



BRIEF 



"Dec. 15 



N 7469 



26308 



Tokyo 2556. 



#Dec. 


14 


#Dec. 


16 


[18] 




#Dec. 


19 



#Dec. 26 



•*Dec. 30 



A 7479 



A 7511 



A 7590 



N 7848 



A 8007 



26294 



26351 
26352 



26479 



26881 



Rio 379- 



•Hono. 234. 



Tokyo #4. 



Pek. 616. 



Tokyo 123. 



Explanation of circumstances attending Nomura's 
presentation of Japanese Declaration of War to 
the U. S. Govt: "We really supposed tiiat the 
negotiations had been broken ofT first, and the 
shooting had taken place after this. . . . The 
President's speech was trying to hide the fact 
that the United States had been taken by surprise 
and failed in the first step." (Dec. 11-J19) 
[Forwarded from Bainbridge Island bv teletype.] 

Tokyo Circular #2570:— The Imperial Naval Air 
Force damaged three battleships and sank three 
in the Battle of Hawaii. Those sunk were the 
Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arizona. (Dec. 
14— Plaa Language.) 

Spy report on maneuvers of U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
(Nov. 24— JI9) [Note: Intercepted by Army at 
San Francisco.] 



War News Circular #4. The following report 
based on what the attacking forces witnessed 
during the battle as well as photographic obser- 
vations after the battle, show that we had com- 
pletely destroyed the United States Pacific Fleet 
and the American Air Forces in the Hawaiian 
region. (Detailed losses reported were very 
accurate.) (Dec. 18— Plain Language) 

If this war does start, this will be a war which will 
decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. 
... It can be ims.gined that the next war is to 
be a longer one than the China Incident (Dated 
Dec. 3, 1941.) [Note: Intercepted at Corregidor, 
Dec. 7, 1941. Forwarded by Com 16 GYROF 
# -?- and received Dec. 8, 1941. GY Log #6707.] 

To Honolulu: In view of the present situation, 
the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, 
and cruisers is of utmost importance. Let me know 
day by day. Wire me in each case whether or 
not there are any observation balloons above 
Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not the war- 
ships are provided with anti-mine nets. (Dec. 
2-J19) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. 
H. Reason for long delay not known, but 
•apparently some one fumbled the ball. Note 
on translation says: "This mes.sage was received 
here Dec. 23."] 



14 S5$. 44 



Exhibit No. 24 



SECRET 



L-^] 



Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to 
Japan's War Potential and Intentions 



Explanatory Notes. 

The summaries which follow are based solely on information relating to 
Japan's war potential and intentions included in reports from U. S. Military 
Attaches and Military Observers during the period beginning 1 January 1937 and 
ending 7 December 1941. These intelligence documents, a descriptive catalogue 
of which follows the yearly summaries, are reproduced in Far Eastern Docu- 
ments, Volumes I-XV. In most cases marginal lines have been added to the 
documents to indicate sections pertinent to the subject. 

Marginal references in the yearly summaries indicate the documents from 
which the information is extracted. For instance, "FE 1" refers to the first 
Far Eastern document. Where several sources contain essentially the same 
information, they are indicated in the margins but not always referred to 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 199 

specifically in the text of the summaries. When the source of any statement is 
desired, the marginal references should be compared with the annexed table of 
contents of the documentary file. 

The following abbreviations have been used : 

MA Military Attach^ or Assistant Militai-y Attach^ 
MO Military Observer 

Expressions such as "Tolcyo reported" or "Singapore reported" refer to reports 
from War Department intelligence personnel stationed at those places. Reports 
are included from Military Attaches or Assistant Military Attaches on duty 
at embassies or legations in Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, Portugal, Great 
Britain, and Mexico, and from Military Observers in India, Malaya, and Nether- 
lands Indies, where no diplomatic representation was maintained. 

[21 Japan's War Potential and Intentions 

1937 

FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were 

building up a war psycliology. One of the most formidable instru- 

FE 3 ments used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reserv- 

sists Association, with a large and well disciplined membership scat- 
tered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year 

FE 4 expansion program providing for (a) increase of the Air Corps and 

antiaircraft defenses; (b) increase of the military force in Man- 
ehoukuo ; (c) improvement of military training facilities; (d) re- 
plenishment of war materials; and (e) organization of industry in 
the interest of national defense. 

FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet during the early months of the 

year, references were made to the so-called "Continentatl Policy" 
and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on 

FE 2 expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concur- 

rence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private 
gathering, said : "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our 
duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations fior overseag\ 
development." 

In early July the so-called China Incident began, and what at 
first appeared to be a local incident in Nortb China developed into 
a major conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic. 
Following the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the 
Army, and the movement eventually took on the proportions of a 
general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army 
by reconstituting similar units disbanded in 1925. 

The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members 
of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to 
the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged. 
Special volunteer officers and reservists of all I'anks and grades called 
into active service were to serve until relieved from active service. 
For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, including con- 
script reserve privates, where the term would normally expire in 
1938, the term was extended to 1939. 

FE 30 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there 

were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meet- 
ing physical requirements. The MA in Tokyo estimated Japan had 

FE 36 950,000 troops under arms as of 29 October. The Imperial Headquar- 

FE 40 ters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on 
two previous occasions had this headquarters been established : in 
1894, just prior to the Sino-Japanese War; and [3] in 1904, 
following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. 

FE 23 Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totalled Yen 2,464,078,- 

117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777, or 
45 per cent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted 
to Yen 5,483,3&i,279. 

FE 20 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but 

prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building 
program for 1937-38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favor- 



FE 


16 


FE 


18 


FE 


22 


FE 


24 


FE 


26 


FE 


29 


FE 


31 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 
500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Com- 
pared witli the previous year, squadron strength increased from 53 to 
59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400, with 288 trained during 
the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased, so that the number 
of available planes on 1 July (1223 of all types) represented an 
increase of only 34 planes. Several new airplane companies were 
formed, and plans were made for increasing production facilities. 

Legislation of a wartime character enacted at special sessions of tlie 
Diet included the "Military Secrets Protection Law," passed on 7 
August, and the "Munitions Industry Mobilization Law," passed on 
9 September. The Cabinet Planning Board was reorganized to plan 
for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with 
the need of the national defense progiram. 

An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on 
several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly 
stated on 17 September by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister that 
peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with, but if a 
situation like that in Spain should develop, Japan might change her 
policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British 
and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was 
decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as 
the immediate and potential enemy. 

The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5 
October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstra- 
tion of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat 
"Panay" brought an official expression of regret with offer of resti- 
tition. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States 
would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident. 

JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS 

1938 



FE 13 
FE 17 


FE 25 


FE 38 


FE 22 


FE 26 


FE 22 
FE 34 


FE 32 


FE 41 



U] 



FE 42 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settle- 

ment of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic 
groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling" 
toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs 
of the Far East." 
FE 56 The Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not 

FE 57 understand Japan" or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand," 
FE 58 and in so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan" 

really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia. 
FE 57 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires 

stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure," 
and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United 
States as long as they understand each other." 
FE 58 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese 

nationalistic group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed 
to the American people that the way for the United States to get 
"peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "respect the 
position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient ; . . . make abso- 
lutely no political activity or economic operations having political 
significance without the understanding of Japan ; . . . guide other 
Powers to take the same attitude." 
FB 62 The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March 

FE 65 laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete war- 
FE 66 time mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law, 
FE 68 which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it 
FE 69 would not be invoked for the "China Incident," virtually suspended 
FE 78 the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance 
FE 87 of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and 
material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Min- 
FE 62 ister of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in 
April that there must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese 
strength "because the end of the China incident was remote and 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 201 

the cliangos in the international situation were difficult to pre- 
dict." Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry 
FE 66 planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing 
a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that 
"only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the 
ambitions of a third power be restrained." On 15 November the 
FE 86 MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [5] General 
Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect through 
the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when 
propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable. 
FE 59 With the extension of military operations in China during 1938 

<he mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased. 
On 26 March the MA in China reported that a total "of 1,200,000 
Japanese troo])s were under arm's. Various measures to strengthen 
FE 44 the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of mili- 
FE 78 tary training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's 
FE 60 colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA 
in Tokyo i-eported on IS January that the new law to require two 
FE 44 years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry, 
regardless of preconscription training, was necessary because of the 
need for "further training of soldiers in tlie varied weapons now in 
FE 60 use." An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all 
Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South 
Sea Islanders, above the age of 17, might volunteer for the Army, 
subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new pro- 
gram 400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938. Under the 
FE 45 leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese 
FE 78 educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism 

and military training. 
FE 61 ■ In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home 
air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese 
were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese 
but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from 
any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency 
to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordina- 
tion with military preparations." On 14 May the MA in Tokyo 
FE 67 reported Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes 
near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing 
fields in Japanese villages. 
FE 63 Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army 

FE 64 during 1938-39 totalled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen 
FE 23 2,464,078,117 for the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000 
represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against sup- 
plemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38). 
FE 67 In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous 

"spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [6] 
front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in 
Tokyo reported on 14 May : 'The response of the people appears to 
be all that could be desired. . . . With stoic determination the people 
FE 75 have set to fight a serious war." Tokyo reported "as significant" 
that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2 
July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore 
had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized 
Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident 
in accordance with the "Imperial Principle." 
FB 74 Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was 

undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July 
the number of Army planes was estimated to be 1,455 with 305 addi- 
tional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first-line 
army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent planes 
from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to 
the tremendous Army production program which commenced during 
the spring of 1937 and continues at present." Japanese aircraft 
production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of 
the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers 
abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron 



FE 


67 


FE 


71 


FE 72 


FE 73 


FE 


76 


FE 


77 


FE 


84 


FE 85 


FE 76 


FE 


67 


PB 71 


FE 84 


FE 


67 


FE 71 


FE 


76 


[71 




FE 


72 


FE 


77 


FE 


78 


FE 81 


FE 


79 


FE 80 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots num- 
bered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months. 

Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the 
Chinese Government by foreign powders was reflected in numerous 
reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially 
singled out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways 
in transporting material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's 
apparent intention of occupying Hainan Island. 

The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that 
"foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime" 
and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures 
to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek." 

While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other 
pressure against French, English, and American interests in 
Japanese-occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid 
to China, Germany tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such 
acts as the recognition of Manchoukuo on 12 May, the ban on 
German exports of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of 
German military advisers from China in July. 



Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of con- 
tinued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and of recurrent 
border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July 
and August. 

During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September, 
the MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled news- 
paper in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman irt Shanghai 
indicated that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy 
even to the point of war. 

FE 84 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic 
sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to 
take action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 
October that such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are 
willing to go to war to back them up." Japan answered this action 

FE 85 of the League of Nations by severing all relations with that organiza- 
tion on 2 November, but the Japanese retained their Mandated 
Islands. 

FE 86 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating to 
the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments, 
probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was 
"out-moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference 
with Japan's aims." 

The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having 
overrun over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the 
end of 1938. Japan began to consolidate her military and economic 
gains in North and Central China. In order to strengthen the 
Japanese military machine, the semi-ofl3cial North China Develop- 
ment Company and Central China Development Company placed 
their main emphasis upon the expansion of communication and 
transportation facilities and the production of iron, steel, coal, and 
synthetic oil. 

1939 

Tlie occupation of Hainan Island early in 1939, Tokyo reported on 
13 February, gave Japan the following advantages: (1) it provided 
an air base close to Burma and French Indo-China ; (2) it made pos- 
sible a naval blockade of South China ; (3) it brought French and Brit- 
ish holdings in South China under Japanese guns; (4) it threatened 
Manila with encirclement; and (5) it added a second "Formosa" to 
Japan's island possessions. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted the 
FE 93 significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-China and 
related to this aggression the strategical implications involved : "The 
occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French 
that it is universally assigned a political motive of retaliation, in spite 



FE 59 


FE 76 


FE 85 


FE 58 


FE 71 


FE 75 


FE 72 


[8] 


FE91 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 203 

of ofl5cial denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a 
potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it also 
provides a close-in base for immediate air operations to cut the supply 
routes leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, the 
MA evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press lo ''recent manifes- 
tations of U. S. foreign policy" : "These developments [i. e., United 
States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification of 
Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United States, 
England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are 
widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. ad- 
ministration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and 
of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian 
states including Japan." Subsequently, on 7 March, the MA in China 

FE95 reported the Japanese occupati<on of Hainan as a strategic move di- 
rected! toward French Indo-China, Hongkong, Singapore, and the 
Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in 
China. 

FE 96 On 8 March Tokyo forwarded further evidence of Japanese legisla- 

tive measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war footing. 
Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the Pro- 
tection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing the 
provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1937. 

FB 99 On 23 March the MA in Tokyo reported that Japan was preparing 

a three-year plan for expansion of production of strategic materials 
and products in Japan, China and Manchoukuo in order to attain self- 
suflSciency. The MA stated that the government intended to spend 13 
billion yen on the project and that in his opinion the degree of de- 
pendence on foreign sources in wartime would as a result be con- 
siderably reduced. 

19] 

FE 102 On 1 April the MA in Tokyo commented on and forwarded to the 

War Department a tactical study made by" an Army oflBcer under his 
command. The study reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese 
Army, as modified by the new combat regulations of 1939 and by obser- 
vation of current military operations in China. The report stated 
that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army, 
were spending large sums on aviation, motorization, and mechaniza- 
tion, and were increasing the strength of the division artillery. They 
were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of their 
military organization and tactical operation. 

In the light of these improvements, the report concluded : 
"The division which started the China Incident will not be the divi- 
sion of a future war. Increased material means will facilitate the 
task of Japanese tactics. Tactics are without meaning unless studied 
in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This 
study has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psy- 
chology and national characteristics ; however, it should be read with 
a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these 
tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign 
officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress and 
unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accoutrements, 
there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics. But it 
is an army which excels in durability and i>erformance. In the same 
way that its infantry "straggles" thirty miles a day and arrives at 
the destination on time and with surprisingly few casualties, its com- 
mand and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, 
without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practical and work- 
able schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese 
soldier. Furthermore, the Japanese Army which fought with bows 
and arrows seventy years ago is thoroughly capable of learning from 
its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. 
While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in 
a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a 
narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its 
own choosing." 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

FE 103 The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the 

1939-40 budget passed by the Diet. On 10 April Tokyo reported that 
the sum for defense amounted to Yen 6,432,155.345, whicli was 68.35 
per cent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were 
being improved and modernized, and large sums were allocated to 
artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships. 

FE 104 Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to estab- 

lish the nation upon a more secure war footing. Articles 2 [10] 
and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to pro- 
vide (1) governmental limitation of dividends, and (2) governmental 
I'egulation of a maximum working day of 12 hours and of wages in 
factories employing more than 50 workers. 

FE 105 In April, the MA in Japan, reviewing the trend of military avia- 

FE 106 tion toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war 
in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps 
had increased 60 per cent, production had increased 125 per cent, and 
new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40 
per cent. 

FE 110 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law 

which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12 
years 4 months to 17 years 4 months and the training period of 
resenists to include the Second Conscript Reserve. 

FE 111 On 9 June the MA in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes 

occurring toward tlae end of May and early in June between the 
Japanese and British over control of the British and French Con- 
cessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai. 
Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as 
acute, particularly in Tientsin. 

FE 113 On 1 July, Tokyo reported that the Army Air Corps, during the 

FE 74 preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes to 
1961 from 1093 ; and pilot strength to 2900 from 1600. 

FE 115 The MA in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti- 

Britisli campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese 
credo is to drive out all western influence from China" ; that the time 
for an anti- American compaign would come; and that Japanese ex- 
tremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese 
dominance in Asia. 

FE 116 The MA in China, in a report dated 14 July, estimated the strength 

of the Japanese Army in China to be 840,000 men, and 240,000 ad- 
ditional men in Manchoukuo. 

FE 120 The MA in Tokyo reported on 15 August that as a result of changes 

in conscription regulations, the estimated strengtli of the standing 
array will be 800,000 men, with an annual enrollment of 400,000 men. 

FE 122 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken 

aback by the announcement on 26 July of the American abrogation 
of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The press claimed that 
the [11] United States Government was abandoning the iso- 
lationist tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment 
of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including 
Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being 
deterred, according to the MA. from exploiting an opportunity to 
push the hardpressed British only because of apprehension of Russia. 
On the same date the MA in Japan estimated the future course of 
Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak 
of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it 
can safely be said that Japanese foreign iwlicy will be directed toward 
a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and an 
avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a set- 
tlement of the China war shall have been realized." 

FE 124 Tokyo reported on 20 September that the Japanese government 

was concerned over possible loss of exports as a result of the China 
war and was taking steps toward reducing electric consumption on 
non-essential lines. The MA stated that the power shortage touched 
many points in the national economy and was a vital matter, although 
Japan, in his opinion, could fill the military need of manpower 
through the use of female labor or other devices to maintain electric 
power at a necessary level. 



PROCEEDII^GS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 205 

FE 129 The MA in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to the War Depart- 

ment a inemoranduni contMiiiiiis estimates of Japanese imperialistic 
designs in relation to the lAiropean war: "In the realm of foreign 
affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating 
the United States and toward taking advantage of the present Euro- 
pean embrogllo to secure as many plums as possible. . . . Japan is 
reported to be watching carefully . . . the Dutch East Indies. It is 
rumored that Japan Is waiting for the propitious moment to take 
advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in 
that direction. . . . Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and 
Singaiiore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to 
bear and easily lop off this rich prize." 

FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an im- 

pending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "[The] Japanese 
realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the 
attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' . . . Regardless of the final 
outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we 
may take against Japan." 

FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 November (subsequent to the speech of Ajo- 

, bassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American 
opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that 
[12] attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic 
pressure upon Japan would result in "a refu.sal to accept such pressure 
supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as 
may be available." The imminence of Japanese realignment incidental 
to such economic pressure was thus estimated : "Should the European 
struggle develop into a world war through participatioii by the 
United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia 
and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could 
be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world 
war." 

FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported 

on 20 November by the MA in Japan. Included among citations of 
threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's asser- 
tions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a success- 
ful conclusion ''without over-much regard for public opinion" and that, 
although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty 
would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this 
situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should 
be a strong one." 

FE 138 The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze 

River. With reference to this move, the MA in Japan, in his report 
of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might tem- 
porarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of 
the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which they 
were "not likely to be diverted except by force of arms or circum- 
stances." 

[13] 1940 

FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet 
was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty 
status with the United States, the MA in China .stated that Japanese 
political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until 
their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the 
road to accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard 
American opinion and pressure with impunity." 

FE 141 Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty 

FE142 on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United 
States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that 
Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be 
the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination 
of the Netherlands Indies. 

FE 144 The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American 

loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence 
of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program. 
The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wei 
regime in Occupied China. 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

FE 146 The American non-recognition i)olicy toward tlie Wang Ching-wei 

regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our 
determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo 
reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a 
deal with England and Fi-ance whereby those nations would not 
oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's neu- 
trality in the European war. 

FE 147 Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German 

attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese 
demand for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands 
Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was 
intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves." 

I'E 149 The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted 

for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and 
improve armaments, Tokyo reported on 16 May. A chart of continuing 
expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring 
the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible, 
but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget shx)wed that new 
large-scale campaigns were not expected in China. 

[U] 

FE 148 After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing 

Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies. Concen- 

FB 150 trations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan 

FE 151 were reported on 7 June from Tokyo, while a report dated 10 June 
stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine 
tools had created "quite a furore" in Japan and that agitation for 
"positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing. 

FE 152 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air 

force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently 
French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate 
objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard." 

FE 153 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July a minimum 

of 4040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1510 additional 
planes contracted for and not delivered ; a total of 4565 officers, 1350 
cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men in the Army Air Corps and Naval Air 
Service, including 5950 pilots ; and a total of 238 air combat squadrons, 
composed of 114 in the Army Air Corps and 124 in the Naval Air 

FE 156 Services. Further improvement in military aviation was expected with 
the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light 
bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army 
Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and 
would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy 
bombardment. 

FE 154 On 11 July Tokyo i-eported that within Japan "the situation is at 

present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with 
Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, 
and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action 
is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on ac- 
complishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the Japa- 
nese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hong- 
kong and the French Indo-China border. 

FE 155 Tok.vo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized, 

effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for 
national defense, training, and administration. 

FE 158 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shakeup in the Japanese 

foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were 
pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the 
number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin 
Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese 
Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of 
Indo-China." 
[15] 

FE 159 On 19 September Tokyo reporte<l that the Japanese Army continued 

to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 207 

if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture 
elsewhere. If the European war seemed to point to a long-drawn-out 
struggle, the Japanese would eventually decide to seize the desired 
teri-itories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for 
defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that 
the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely 
to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression 
with armed force. The Japanese believed that time would be on their 
side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval 
and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations 
in the Far East as long as the German menace still existed. The 
most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move 
across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the 
conclusion of the China War. 

FE 160 Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact had been signed 

after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed 
to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan had decided to change her tradi- 
tional policy of "at least quiet relations" with the United States and 
to pursue a course to satisfy her national ambitions. The statement 
of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace 
or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the United 
States respect and understand the stand of each other" expressed the 
determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present 

FE 161 ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan and 

FE 162 China during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American 

FE 163 relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression. 

FE 164 On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a nonaggression pact 

could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her south- 
ern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese- American relations. 

FE 165 Details of a new "Ten-Year-Plan" to weld Japan, China, and Man- 

choukuo into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted by the MA 
in Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength 
of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed. 

FE 166 The MA in London forwarded on 20 November a report on the Jap- 

anese Army which stated, among other things, that the Japanese were 
probably ahead of most Western nations in landing and [16] 

combined operations. Special mention was made of the emphasis 
which the Japanese put on outflanking and enveloping movements in 
attacking and on morale and endurance in training army personnel. 
Japan was estimated to have had 1,350,000 inen under arms, of whom 
1,000,000 had had active service experience, as of December, 1939. 
This report concluded that "the Japanese army is a formidable fighting 
machine but has not yet reached the standard of efficiency of Western 
armies. It is, however, trained for and will probably only required 
to fight in Eastern Asia where it will have inherent advantages over an 
opponent." 

FE 167. Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's 

FE 168 evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that 
Japan's next move might be into southern French Indo-China. 

FE 168 The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plane with regard to 
the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, 
observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via 
Lingayen Gulf." 

FE 169 Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's 

mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was 
probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government 
was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements" 
and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program 
for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion. 

[17] mi 

FE 170 In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty 

of Amity, the Tokyo . MA on 11 January called attention to the 
progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases 
for operations against Malaya and Singapore. 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

FE 174 In February Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the 

National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect 
would be closure of many sources of information. The MA in 
FE 172 China reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to 
profit as a mediator "preserving the peace"' between Thailand and 
French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the 
FE 1'73 United States that she would tolerate no interference in develop- 
ing the East Asia economic bloc, on her inclusion of the Netherlands 
Indies in this bloc, and on the reports that many Japanese divisions 
were being trained lOn Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated 
plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions 
Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies. 
FE 175 On 1 March Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed 

Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies de- 
pended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England. 
FE 177 The Military Observer at Singapore on 22 March reviewed the 
FE 178 disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but pre- 
dicted rfifRculties in meeting flank attacks and in maintain- 
ing signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese 
were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya. 
FE 179 On 18 April Tokyo pointed out that although the newly-concluded 

Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one 
front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed 
none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries. 
FE 180 Tokyo reported the establishment of an Army Mechanization Head- 

quarters charged with research into, and supervision of, training in 
the use of mechanized equipment. 
FE 181 Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported 

increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan, and French 
Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and 
that these forces "may be there in readiness for a move against 
Singapore or East Indies." A report on field operations from Tokyo, 
FE 184 21 May, warned that the Japanese would probably attempt [18] 
an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a 
free hand for southward expansion if the United States should be- 
FE 182 come involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese 
Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941-42, the Tokyo MA contrasted 
it with the budget for the preceding year and pointed out that the 
China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion. 
FE 185 On 29 May Cungking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had 

2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes. 
FE 186 On 3 June Tokyo wrote : "* * "' two new Inspectorates have 

been established, the Chemical Warfare Inspectorate and the Com- 
munications Inspectorate, thus considerably raising these two forms 
of military activity above the places which they have heretofore 
FE 187 occupied in the Japanese services." Tokyo also reported on the 
FE 188 yellow fever inoculations given in May to certain officers attached 
to northern units, on the training for transport of troops and sup- 
plies by air, and on parachute troop training. The Japanese Gov- 
FE 194 ernment at this time was said to be facing great difficulty in pre- 
serving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong, direct 
action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of the trade 
negotiations at Batavia. 
FE 189 The Singapore MO believed that the Japanese would not move 

without a 50-50 chance for success. He expressed the opinion on 
5 June that the Japanese were forcing economic penetration of 
Thailand and Indo-China, to be followed by military occupation 
in readiness for any advantage to be had from weakened British 
or American positions in that area. "With regards to defense of 
Malaya," he continued, "it is believed that the present forces of 
approximately 60,000 Army and 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel 
can contain for six months or more the force of six divisions and 
1,000 planes which it is estimated Japan can now send against them." 
FB 190 Hongkong reported that on 14 June 27 Japanese transports con- 

voyed by 21 destroyers were off the China coast travelling southward, 
FE 192 and were expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. On 25 June Hong- 
kong further reported that three convoj's, totalling about 50 trans- 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 209 

ports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were be- 
lieved tju have gone to the I'escadores or Formosa. The IVIA in 
FE 191 Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constrnctlng 
special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl 
Harbor, and that a training program then under way included tow- 
ing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where 
they practiced surfacing and submerging. 

U9] 

FE 193 Chungking believed that the sudden German offensive agiiinst Rus- 

sia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward 

FE 19.J the United States, and on 27 June cabled the opinion that the 
Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results 
of border incidents revealed the potential strength of the Russians. 

P'E 197 On 12 July Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization 

FE 196 and unusu;il secrecy attending it now beyond question." Tokyo 
believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive 

FE 199 conuuitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evi- 
dent that large scale mobilization under way covered by unusual 
secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but 
unable to determine number or whether any being sent south." 

FE 200 Hongkong reported that 19 Japanese transports were moving south- 
ward from Formosa on 12 July. 

FE 201 Chinese Military Intelligence was reported on 15 July to anticipate 

an early invasion of French Indo-China and to believe that areas 
newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases. 

FE 203 Oil 21 July Singapore reported that the Japanese had delivered a 

virtual ultimatum, with a 20 July deadline, in which they de- 
manded the use of naval bases in southern French Indo-China. "If 
the French refuse, regardless of British or United States inter- 
ference, the bases will be taken forcibly." 

FE 201 London on 22 July reported belief that the Japanese had com- 

pleted all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases. 

FE 206 On 20 July Tokyo cabled : "Largest single draft since initial mo- 

bilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme 
secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all direc- 

FE 207 tions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing 
of Japanese credits by the United States as the first step toward 
a final break with America. 

FE 208 Singapore on 29 July estimated that Japanese strength in French 

Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would 
be forcible seizure of additional bases. 

FE 209 Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases, 

and on 31 July Bangkok commented : "An immediate Nipponese 
move is anticipated due to Thai indecision." 

[20] 

FE 211 Estimates were forwarded from London on 3 August that more 

FE 220 than 500,000 Japanese were mobilizied during June and July, and 
further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, 20 August, 
placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the 
end of August when mobilization would be complete. 
FE 212 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July 3200 Army 

(FE 153) airplanes (1940 estimate was 2010) ; a total of 3600 officers, 1600 
cadets and 34,800 enlisted men (1940 estimate was 2900 officers, 1.350 
cadets and 28,700 enlisted men) in the Army Air corps, including 3900 
pilots (1940 — 3100 pilots) ; and 136 air combat squadrons in the Army 
Air Corps (1940 — 114 combat air squadrons). 
FE 213 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working 

at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent 
of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual produc- 
tion for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 
2,730 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 
the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half and 
capacity by about two-thirds, while completlion of construction then in 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of em- 
ployees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per 
cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in 
number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41. 

FE 218 Chungking reported 15 August Japanese plans to take over inter- 

national concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai 
by surprise. 

FE 219 Chungking on 19 August forwarded British estimates that Japanese 

tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars, 
was ten regiments, each consisting of 160 tanks, with an equal num- 
ber in reserve. 

FE 224 In addition the MA at Chungking on 27 August forwarded a Rus- 

sian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was 48 
divisions and 20 independent brigades (approximately 58 divisions), 
with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Un- 
called reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions 
could be organized from reserves already trained and 16 from those 
then in training. These figures include corps, army, and service 
troops. Artillery was believe to be insufficient. The total potential 
strength was estimated by the Russians to be 76 divisions. 

[21] 

FE 222 On 21 August Tokyo reported that drastic shipping control meas- 

FE 223 ures were about to be instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo also 
reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions), 
located overseas. 
FE 226 On 1 September the Tokyo MA reported on the organization and 

high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system, 
and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to 
our own in every respect." 

FE 229 On 11 September Tokyo made a full report on the National mobili- 

zation which had begun 3 June. In his opinion "in round numbers 
about 700,000 were called up during this mobilization." This number 
did not include the home defense "National Army," which was called 
up for five days' training. "The number of men mobilized was far 
too great for mere replacement purposes in existing divisions now irl 
Japan or on the Continent . . . While estimates of other foreign ob- 
servers place the total number of men mobilized as high as 1,250,000, 
it is believed that these estimates . . . [are too high]." About 90 
per cent of the total of 18,000 horses also mobilized at this time were 
known to have gone south rather than direct to Manchoukuo or Korea. 

FE 230 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters (reported 

by Tokyo on 16 September) in a move to improve arrangements for 
the defense of Japan Projjer. 

FE 231 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobil- 

ization Law (revised) and a tense political atmosphere indicated, 
according to Tokyo, that the day for a final decision on "immutable" 
policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for 
total war. 

FE 239 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports 

on the Pearl River. 

FE 240 The China MA cabled on 17 October: "Increased Nazi activity in 

Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and 
press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future." 

FE 242 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China, 

Tokyo concluded on 20 October : "If the rumored increase goes above 
the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt 
as to the intention behind it." 

[22] 

FE 243 Tokyo reported on 20 October that General Tojo, on becoming 

Premier, retained his status as an oflScer on the active list, an unusual 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 211 

procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because 
of inability to meet army criticism of its policy toward French Indo- 
China, the conversations in Washington, and its policy vis-a-vis a 
weakened Russia. 

FE 245 London cabled on 21 October: "Japanese troops in Indo-China will 

be strengthened as follows : 3G,000 there now ; an estimated 20,000 
enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." Chung- 

FB 246 king on 23 October reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to 
be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November. 

FE 247 A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western 

Pacific was reported on 27 October- from Singapore, together with 
intelligence that two aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and 
bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands. 

FE 249 Under pretext of surveying a new commercial air route the Japanese 

made a number of flights between Palau (Pelew) and Timor, violating 
at the same time certain provisions of the agreement granting them 
the privilege of flying over Dutch territory. Unusual passenger lists, 
the absence of commercial justification, the type of equipment, and 
the movement of guard vessels were reported on by the MO at 
Bandoeng on 30 October. 

FE 248 On 29 October the MA in Chungking radioed that Japanese strength 

in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and that it was steadily 
increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through 

FE 250 Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to 
capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the 
ravages of war. 

FE 262 The Japanese Consul General at Batavia was reported to have 

recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report 
promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus 

FE 253 avoiding violence. The Singapore BMritish, however, were reported 
by the MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April 
because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya. 

FE 254 The MA in London forwarded on 9 November a British opinion that 

Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with 
the United States and that Japan would find it too difficult to attack 
Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack 
Netherlands Indies . 

[23] 

PE 256 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 

planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry 
had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated 
that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military 
planes, including trainers. 

FE 258 The London MA on 21 November cabled a summary of British 

Intelligence as of 18 November, in which it was stated that failure 
of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese 
decision whether to risk probable war ; that Japan would probably not 
attack Siberia at that time ; that unless agreement was reached in 
Washington, the war in China would continue; that Japan probably 
did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time ; and that the 
occupation of Thailand, the best possibility for the moment, would 
pave the way for subsequent attack upon Malaya, yet minimize the 
risk of a general war. 

FE 264 The Singapore MO advised the War Department on 2 December 

that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from th*e third to the 
second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activ- 

FE 260 ities over Malaya were reported. 

FE 268 The MA in Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands 
Far East Command, upon learning of Japanese naval moves on Menado 
and/or Ambon out of Palau, had ordered the execution of Plan A-2. 
79716— 4G — Ex. 147 16 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS* 

Contents 

VOLUME I 



Source, Date 



Subject 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8601 
13 Jan 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8G31 

30 Jan 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8667 

25 Feb 37 

Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8670 

I Mar 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8681 

II Mar 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8707 

31 Mar 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8724 
9 Apr 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8738 
17 Apr 37 

China M/A.. 
No. 9540 
23 Apr 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8744 
23 Apr. 37 



Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8762 
5 May 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8767 
8 May 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8775 
11 May 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8794 

25 May 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8795 

26 May 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8893 
22 July 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8930 
10 Aug 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8941 
18 Aug 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8945 
25 Aug 37 



The Japanese Army during 1936 

Comment on Current Evcnt.s, January 21-30, 1937 

[Japanese] Militerized Societies — Imperial Reservists Associa- 
tion. 

Political Issues and Problems: 70th Session ot the [Japanese] 
Diet. 

Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan] Aircraft 
Industrial Activity. 

Air Budgets [Japan]. Appropriations for Civil and Military 
Aviation. 

General Headquarters Air Force [Japan]. Organization of 
GHQ Air Force. 

Comment on Current Events, April 1-15, 1937 

Situation Report, .\pril 10-23, 1937.. 

Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Proposed Air Regiments 



Military Aviation [Japan]. 5th Air Regiment 

Military Aviation [Japan]. Tokorozawa Army Air Technical 
School. 

Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan]. Expan- 
sion of Aviation Manufacturing Industry. 

Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan]. Naka- 
jima Aircraft Factory (Otamachi, Gumma Prefecture). 

Organization of the [Japanese] Cabinet Planning Board.. 

[Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident 



National Defense Laws [Japan]. Military Secrets Protection 
Law. 

[Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident 



Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Number and Classification 

of Air Units. 



VOLUME II 



Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8948 
26 Aug 37 



Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. July 1, 1937... 



Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



213 



[iii] 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 

VOLUME III 



Source, Date 



China M/A.. 
No. 9588 
1 Sept. 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 89C0 
1 Sept 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8978 
15 Sept 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8973 
17 Sept 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 8981 

17 Sept 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8980 

18 Sept 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 8989 
22 Sept 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9004 
30 Sept 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9001 
30 Sept 37 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9002 
30 Sept 37 

m 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9005 

30 Sept 37 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9035 

14 Oct 37 
China M/0 

(Colonel Ord) 

20 Oct 37 
Tokyo M/A.. 

No. 9059 

28 Oct 37 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9060 

28 Oct 37 

Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram No. 343 

29 Oct 37 

Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram No. 345 

1 Nov 37 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9071 

4 Nov 37 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9089 

16 Nov 37 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9099 

24 Nov 37 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9150 

22 Dec 37 



Subject 



Situation Report, August 21 — September 1, 1937. 
Area, North China, Order of Battle). 

Foreign Relations— North China Incident 



(Shanghai 



Government 
1937-1938. 



Budget— War Department Budget [Japan] 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



General Mobilization [Japan]. 



Mobilization of Industry — Munitions Industry Mobilization 
Law. 

Foreign Relations [Japan]. North China Incident 



Comments on Aviation Personnel [Japan]. 



Organization and Distribution of Troops [Japan], 
of Air Units. Expansion Program. 

Increase in Active Army Divisions [Japan] 



Movement 



Mobilization of Personnel [Japan]. Aviilable Man Power, _- 

Commissioned, Warrant and Enlisted Personnel [Japanese 
Army]. Terms of Service Extended. 

Foreign Relations [Japan]. The United States. 

Sino-Japanese Operations 

Foreign Relations [Japan]. U. S. S. R 

Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain 

Japanese Order of Battle in North China 

Estimate of Strength of Kwantung Army 

Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. Organization of the 
New Planning Board (Kikaku-in). 

National Defense Policy — General [Japan]. Military Secrets 
Protection Law Enforcement Regulations. 

[Japanese] Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei) 

Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking 



♦Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[ti 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 

VOLUME IV 



Source, Date 



Subject 



FE Docu- 
ment , 
Number 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9172 

6 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A (via Manila). 

Radiogram No. 363 

14 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9192 

18 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9193 

18 Jan 38 

Tokyo M/A -.. 

No. 9198 

19 Jan 38 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9201 

19 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram No. 365 

22 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9206 

26 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram No. 368 

31 Jan 38 
China M/A.... 

No. 9633 

1 Feb 38 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9219 

2 Feb 38 

[vi] 



Tokyo M/A... 

No. 9232 

12 Feb 38 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9239 

17 Feb 38 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9240 

18 Feb 38 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9256 

2 March 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9286 

17 March 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9288 

18 March 38 
Peiping M/A... __ 

Radiogram No. 893 

26 March 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9322 

5 April 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9326 

11 April 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9332 

13 April 38 

Tokyo M/A 

Memo to A. C.of S. 
18 April 38 



G-2 



Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9336 
19 April 38 



Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking (Continued 
from Report No. 9150, December 22, 1937). 

Japanese Warehouse and Factory Stocks, War Reserves 



Recruitment— Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Enrollment in the 
Active Army. 

Military Schools and Colleges [Japan]. Preconscriptional 
Training. 

Comment on Current Events, January 6-19, 1938 

Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain 

Reactivation of Divisions of Japanese .\rmy 



Armament and Equipment. Organizational, Standard [Japan] 
New Equipment for the Japanese Army Air Corps. 

Japanese Troop Concentrations in Formosa 

Comments on Current Events, January 13-February 1, 1938 

Foreign Relations |Japan]. U. S. S. R 



Recruitment — Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Age and Physical 
Standards for Enrollment in the Active Army. 

Comment on Current Events, February 3-16, 1938 



Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet (Continued 
from Report No. 9221, February 3, 1938). 

Comment on Current Events, February 18-March 2, 1938 

Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet 

Comment on Current Events, March 3-17, 1938 , 

Strength of Japanese Troops in China , 



Recruitment— Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Volunteer Enroll- 
ment of Japanese Subjects— Active Army. 

Air Defense System [Japan]. Strengthening of Japanese 
Home Air Defense. 

Comment on Current Events, April 1-13, 1938 

Expenditures for National Defense by Japan 



War Department Budget [Japan]. 1938-1939 Army Budget... 



•Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



215 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME IV— Continued 



Source, Date 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9339 

19 April 38 
Tokyo M/A.-- 

No. 9376 

12 May 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9380 

14 May 38 
Tokyo M/A 

Memo for A. C. of S., G-2 

16 May 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9397 

26 May 38 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram No. 385 

26 May 38 



Subject 



Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. General Mobilization Law. 

Political Issues and Problems (Japan]. The Effect of the Pro- 
tracted China Operations in Japan. 

Comment on Current Events, April 27-May 13, 1938 

Reply to Evaluation of Reports 

Comment on Current Events, May 14-May 26, 1938 

Cabinet Changes Relative to China Operations; Mobilization. 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



VOLUME V 



Tokyo M/A- 
No. 9422 
11 June 38 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9440 
22 June 38 

China M/A„ 
No. 9668 
25 June 38 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9381 
1 July 38 

[viii] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9462 
11 July 38 
China M/A 

No. 9676 

15 July 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9486 

22 Julv 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9639 

27 Aug 38 
Peiping M/A 

Radiogram (via Naval 
Communication Service) 

5 Sept 38 
Peiping M/A 

Radiogram (via Naval 
C ommunication Service) 

20 Sept 38 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9574 

21 Sept 38 

Peiping M/A 

Radiogram (via Naval 
Communication Service) 

30 Sept 38 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9583 

4 Oct 38 

[ix] 



China M/A 
No. 9687 
12 Oct 38 



Comment on Current Events, May 27- June 9, 1938-.- 

Comment on Current Events, June 10-20, 1938 

Comments on Current Events, May 22-June 25, 1938- 



Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Annual Avia- 
tion Intelligence Report as of July 1, 1938. 



Comment on Current Events, June 21-July 7, 19.38 .. 
Comments on Current Events, June 26-July 15, 1938- 

Comment on Current Events, July 8-21, 1938 

Comments on Current Events, August 10-27, 1938 

Japanese Military Operations in China 



Japanese Operations and Troop Dispositions in China- 



Comments on Current Events, August 28-September 21, 1938 
Japanese Policies toward Foreign Powers in China 



Government Policy Pertaining to Air [Japan], .\ircraft Manu- 
facturing Industry Law. 



Comments on Current Events, September 14-October 12, 1938. 
♦Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME V— Continued 



Source, Date 


Subject 


FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 


Tokyo M/A 


Comments on Current Political Events, October 19-Novem- 
ber 4, 1938. 

Comments on Current Political Events, November 5-15, 1938. 

Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocation of Article II of 
National Mobilization Bill. 

Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocations of Portions of 
Mobilization Law. 


85 


No. 9607 
4 Nov 38 
Tokyo M/A 


86 


No. 9619 
15 Nov 38 
Tokyo M/A 


87 


No. 9623 
21 Nov 38 
Tokyo M/A . 


88 


No. 9633 
30 Nov 38 





VOLUME VI 



Tokyo M/A. 
No- 9709 

6 Feb 39 
Tokyo M/A- 

No. 9711 

9 Feb. 39 

Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9713 

13 Feb 39 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9722 

27 Feb 39 
Tokyo M/A_ 

No. 9726 

28 Feb 39 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9734 

7 Mar 39 

W 

China M/A . 
No. 9744 

7 Mar 39 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9735 

8 Mar 39 
China M/A.. 

No. 974i 

9 Mar 39 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9739 

14 Mar 39 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 9744 
23 Mar 39 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9748 
25 Mar 39 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9749 
27 Mar 39 



Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units Overseas 

National and Government Income. Taxation to Meet 1939- 
1940 Budget. 

Field Operations in China, January 28-February 13, 1939 

Estimate of National Wealth [of Japan] 

Comments on Current Events, February 28, 1939 (No. 4) 



Adherence of Mancboukuo and Hungary to Anti-Comintern 
Pact. 



Situation Report, February 5th-March 6th, 1939. 



National Defense Policy— General [Japan]. Military Re- 
source Secrets Protection Law. 

Comment on Current Events, February 9-March 9, 1939 

Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1939 (No. 5) 

Plan for Expansion of Production [Japan]. 

Appropriation for 1939-1940 Budget [Japan] . . _ 



Aircraft Production [Japan]. Licensed Aircraft Manufac- 
turers. 



VOLUME VII 



Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9755 
1 Apr 39 



Tactical Doctrine of the Japanese Army. 



VOLUME VIII 



Tokyo M/A 
No. 9764 
10 Apr 39 



Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1939-1940 [Japan] . 
Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



103 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



217 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*- Continued 
VOLUME VIII— Continued 



Source, Date 



Tokyo M/X. 
No. 9764 
12 Apr 39 

[It] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9766 
13 Apr 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9768 

24 Apr 39 
Tokyo M/A- ..- 

No. 9772 

26 Apr 39 
Tokyo M/A - - 

Memo to A. C. of S., 0-2 

No. 9778 

4 May 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9796 

24 Mav 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9803 

7 June 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9807 

9 June 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9858 

1 July 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9850 

1 July 39 



Subject 



Comments on Current Events, April 12, 1939 (No. 7) 



Aviation School System — General [Japan]. Tokyo Army Air 
School. 

Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Supplemen- 
tary Air Force Strength Report as of February 28, 1939. 

Comments on Current Events, April 26, 1939 (No. 8) 

Expenditures for National Defense by Japan 

Comments on Current Events, May 24, 1939 (No. 10) 



Recruitment— Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Changes in Con- 
scription Regulations. 

Comments on Current Events, June 9, 1939 (No. 11) 



Annual Aviation Intelligence Report. Aimual Aviation 
Digest. [Japan] 

Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Aviation 
Statistics— MID— ONI Joint Forms. 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



VOLUME IX 



Comments on Current Events, July 4, 1939 (No. 13) . 
Comments on Current Events, June 15-July 13, 1939. 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9833 
4 July 39 
China M/A_ 

No. 9783 

13 July 39 

im 

China M/A 

No. 9784 

14 July 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9845 

19 July 39 
Tokyo M/A... 

No. 9859 
4 Aug 39 

Tokyo M/A.. 

No. 9868 

14 Aug 39 
Tokyo M/A.. 

No. 9873 

15 Aug 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9877 

25 Aug 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9893 

12 Sept 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9883 

12 Sept 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9899 

20 Sept 39 

*Bouifd in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents Pile. 



Situation Report, June 12-July 11, 1939 

Comments on Current Events, July 19, 1939 (No. 14). 

Comments on Current Events, August 4, 1939 (No. 15) 

Minor Military Operations, Outer Mongolian Border Incident 

Reply to Evaluation of Reports 

Comments on Current Events, August 25, 1939 (No. 17) 

[Japanese] Foreign Relations 



Minor Military Operations, Outer Mongolian Border Incident, 
August 13-September 10, 1939. 

Shortage of Electric Power [Japan] 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME IX— Continued 



Source, Date 



Subject 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9902 
21 Sept 39 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 9900 
21 Sept 39 

[xiii] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 9906 
22 Sept 39 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 9907 
22 Sept 39 

China M/A 

Memo to A. C. of S., Q-2 

1 Oct 39 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9915 

2 Oct 39 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9914 

5 Oct 39 

China M/A 

No. 9810 

1 Nov 39 
Tokyo M/A.. 

No. 9955 

6 Nov 39 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9964 

20 Nov 39 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9973 

15 Dee .39 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9986 

16 Dec 39 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 9995 

21 Dec 39 

[xiv] 



Tokyo M/A 
No. 9996 
22 Dec 39 



Comments on Current Events, September 21, 1939 (No. 18). 



Minor Military Operations, Mongolian-Manchoukuo Border 
Incident. 



Foreign Relations — Press Releases on American Relations 

Army Finance — Donations (Japan] 

Comments from the Field No. 3 

Aviation School System— General [.Japan]. Air Cadet System. 
Aviation School System— [Japan]. Mito Army Flying School 
Comments on Current Events, October 3-November 1, 1939.. 

Comment on Current Events, November 6, 1939 (No. 20) 

Comments on Current Events, November 20, 1939 (No. 21)... 



Recruitment— Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. MUltary Service 
Law. 

Government Budget [Japan]. Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1940-1941 

Major Military Operations Field Operations in China, Novem- 
ber 18-December 18, 1939. 



Comments on Current Events, December 21, 1939 (No. 22). 



VOLUME X 



Tokyo M/A 


Major Military Operations Distribution of Major Japanese 
Army Units Overseas, January 1, 1940. 

Comments on Current Events, January 11, 1940 (No. 1) - 

Comments on Current Events, February 16, 1940 (No. 24) 

Comments on Current Events, February 27, 1940 (No. 25) 

Recruitment— Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Conscription 
Statistics. 

Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1940 (No. 26) 


139 


No. 9998 
9 Jan 40 
China M/A . . 


140 


No. 9844 
11 Jan 40 
Tokyo M/A 


141 


No. 10,037 
17 Feb 40 
Tokyo M/A 


142 


No. 10,045 
27 Feb 40 
Tokyo M/A... 


143 


No. 10,053 
11 March 40 
Tokyo M/A 


144 


No. 10,060 
14 March 40 





VOLUME XI 



Tokyo M/A 
No. 10,074 
4 April 40 



Reciprocity in Inspections of Air Activities. 
•Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



219 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME XI — Continued 



Source, Date 


Subject 


FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 


Tokyo M/A - 


Comments on Current Events, April 9, 1940 (No. 27) 

Comments on Current Events, April 23, 1940 (No. 28) 

Comments on Current Events, May 14, 1940 (No. 29) 


146 


No. 10,076 
10 April 40 
Tokyo M/A .- 


147 


No. 10,091 
24 April 40 

[xv] 


148 


No. 10,112 

14 May 40 

Tokyo M/A 


War Department Budget 1940-1941 Army Budget 


149 


No. 10,113 
16 May 40 
Tokyo M/A 


Major Military Operations Field Operations in China, May 
14-June 6, 1940. 

Comments on Current Events, June 9, 1940 (No. 30) 


150 


No. 10,128 
7 June 40 
Tokyo M/A 


151 


No. 10,129 
10 June 40 
China M/A ... . 


Comments on Current Events, June 12, 1940 (No. 6) 


152 


No. 9903 
12 June 40 
Tokyo M/A 


Aimual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. July 1, 1940 — 
Field Operations in China, June 20- July 10, 1940 


153 


No. 10,166 
1 July 40 
Tokyo M/A 


154 


No. 10,146 
11 July 40 







VOLUME XII 



Tokyo M/A . 
No. 10,154 
24 July 40 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 10,167 
1 Aug 40 

Tokyo M/A- 
No. 10,169 
6 Aug 40 

Tokyo M/A. 
No. 10,190 
4 Sept 40 

Ixvi] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,203 

19 Sept 40 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,209 

5 Oct 40 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,215 

7 Oct 40 
Tokyo M/A. 

Radiogram 

29 Oct 40 
Tokyo M/A. , 

No. 10,225 

29 Oct 40 
China M/A. 

No. 9944 

31 Oct 40 
Tokyo M/A , 

No. 10,234 

18 Nov 40 
London M/A , 

No. 41,865 

20 Nov 40 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,241 

21 Nov 40 
•Bound in fifteen volu 



Newly Created Army Districts [Japan] 

Hokota Army Air School 

Comment on Current Events (No. 53) 

Comments on Current Events, September 4, 1940 (No. 34) . 



Field Operations in China, September 4-18, 1940 

Alignment with Rome-Berlin Axis 

Field Operations In China, September 19-October 5, 1940. 

Language Officers in Japan 

Comments on Current Events (No. 37) 

Comments on Current Events 

Ten-Year-Plan for Japan, China and Manchoukuo 

The Japanese Army, General.. 

Field Operations in China, November 1-20, 1940-. 

mes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME XII— Continued 



Source, Date 


Subject 


FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 


China M/A-_ 


Situation Report, November 1-December 4, 1940 

Comments on Current Events 


168 


No. 9956 
5 Dec 40 
Tokyo M/A.. 


169 


No. 10,257 
12 Dec 40 







VOLUME XIII 



[xvii] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,274 
11 Jan 41 
Peiping 

Assistant M/A Memo to 

A. C. of S., G-2 
31 Aug 41 

China M/A 

No. 9972 

4 Feb 41 

China M/A _ 

No. 9973 

5 Feb 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,317 

8 Feb 41 
China M/A 

Dispatch to A. C. of S., 
G-2 

1 March 41 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram No. 459 

13 March 41 
Singapore M/0 

Special Report dated 22 
March 41 
Singapore M/0 

Extracts of letter dated 29 
March 41 
Tokyo M/A. 

No. 10,382 

18 April 41 



[xviii] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,383 
• 19 April 41 
Tokyo M/A 

Tadiogram (Paraphrase) 
No. 467 

2 May 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,403 

5 May 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,414 

20 May 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,419 

21 May 41 
Chungking, China M/A ... 

Radiogram 
(No. 83) 
29 May 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,423 

3 June 41 



Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity 

Comments on Current Events (No. 13). 



Situation Report, December 31-February 4, 1941. 

Comments on Current Events No. 13 

[Japanese] National Defense Security Act 

Comments on Current Events No. 14 



Paratroops Training in Japan 

Defenses of Malaya ^ 

Comments, U. S. Military Observer, Singapore. 
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 



[Japanese] Army Mechanization Headquarters- 



Japanese Preparations for Military Action Toward Singapore 
and East Indies. 



Army Budget for Fiscal Year 1941-1942 

National Defense Budget-- 

Fiel.i Operations in China, May 7-21, 1941. 
Estimate of Japanese Air Strength 



New Inspectorates for Communications and Chemical War- 
fare [Japan]. 



VOLUME XIV 



Yellow Fever Inoculations . 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,434 
6 June 41 

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



187 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



221 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME XIV— Continued 



Source, Date 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,435 

5 June 41 
Singapore M/0 

Memo for A. C. of S.. Q-2, 

HPD 
5 June 41 

[xiT] 



Hongkong M/A 

Cablegram 

No. 135 

16 June 41 
Mexico City M/A 

No. 9899 

1" June 41 
Hongkong M/A 

Radiogram No. 145 

25 June 41 
China M/A 

No. 10,001 

25 June 41 

Tokyo M/A.. 

No. 10,447 

26 June 41 
Chungking M/A 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

27 June 41 

Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram 

No. 498 

12 July 41 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 

12 July 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,459 

12 July 41 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram 

No. 500 

14 July 41 



[XX] 



Hongkong M/A 

Radiogram 

No. 168 

15 July 41 
Chimgking M/A 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

15 July 41 
Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 

21 July 41 
Singapore M/0_. 

Radiogram 

No. 31 

21 July 41 

London M/A 

Cablegram 

22 July 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,472 

23 July 41 

Tokyo M/A 

Radiogram 

No. 605 

26 July 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,476 

28 July 41 

Singapore M/0 

Radiogram 
No. 37 

29 July 41 



Subject 



Transport of Troops and Supplies by Air— Parachute Training 
[Japan]. 

Summary of Situation, Malaya 



Japanese Convoy Movements. 



Activities of Foreigners in Country 

Japanese Convoy Movements. 

Comments on Current Events No. 16. 
Comments on Current Events No. 51. 

Russo-Japanese Border Incidents 

Japanese Government's Plans 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



Japanese Mobilization. ._ 

Transport of Troops and Supplies by Air— Parachute Training. 
Mobilization" of Japanese Army 



Japanese Convoy Movements. 



Probability of Japanese Invasion of Indo-Chiaa. 
Japanese Mobilization 

Japanese Ultimatum to French Indo-Chtna 



Japanese Designs on French Indo-China. 

Third Konoe Cabinet... 

Japanese Troop Movements 



Comments on Current Events No. 52 

Japanese Aggression in French Indo-China. 



♦Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME XIV— Continued 



Source, Date 



Bangkok M/A. 
Cablegram 
31 July 41 

[xxi\ 



China M/A 

No. 1 

I Aug 41 

London M/A 

Cablegram 

3 Aug 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,492 

5 Aug 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,493 

5 Aug 41 

China M/A 

No. 2 

6 Aug 41 

Chungking M/A 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

8 Aug 41 
London M/A 

Cablegram 

8 Aug 41 

Delhi M/0 

* No. 2 

II Aug 41 
Chungking M/A .'... 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 
15 Aug 41 

Chungking M/A__ __ 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

19 Aug 41 
Chungking M/A_ 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

20 Aug 41 



[xxii] 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,506 

20 Aug 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,505 

21 Aug 41 

Tokyo M/A: 

No. 10,511 

25 Aug 41 
Chungking M/A 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

27 Aug 41 
Chungking China M/A 

Radiogram No. 31 

27 Aug 41 
Tokyo M/A -. 

No. 10,515 

1 Sept 41 
Singapore M/0 

No. 48 

I Sept 41 

Singapore M/0 

No. 52 

8 Sept 41 
Tokyo M/A-. 

No. 10,530 

II Sept 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,543 
16 Sept 41 



Subject 



Japanese Demands on Thailand. 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



Comments on Current Events, Hongkong.. 

Japanese Mobilization. 

Annual Aviation Intelligence Report 

Estimates of Production [Japan] 

Situation Report, June 16-August 6, 1941 

Japanese Troop Movements in Indo-Chtna. 

Japanese Military Movements. 

Defenses of Singapore 



Probable Japanese Administration of International Settlement, 
Shanghai in Event of War. 



Japanese Tank Strength 

Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army. 



Field Operations in China, July 28-August 20, 1941.. 

Comments on Current Events No. 53 

Distribution of Major [Japanese] Units Overseas... 

Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army 

Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units 

[Japanese] Signal Communication 

Training in Defense Against Airborne Troops 

Air Defense in the Far East 

[Japanese] Mobilization Personnel — Actual 

[Japanese] National Defense General Headquarters. 



♦Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



223 



I rriii] 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME XV 



Source, Date 



Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,M4 

18 SeiH 41 
Singapore M/0. 

No. 60 

18 Sept 41 
Singapore M/0 

Cablegram 

No. 26 

23 Sept 41 
Singapore M/0 

Cablegram 

No. 30 

25 Sept 41 

Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,5,53 

26 Sept 41 

Lisbon M/A 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

6 Oct 41 
Tokvo M/A. 

No. 10,567 

11 Oct 41 
Tokyo M/A _ 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 

13 Oct 41 

Chungking M/A.. 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 

14 Oct 41 

Chungking M/A 

Cablegram (Paraphrase) 
17 Oct 41 

[xxii] 



Singapore M/0 

No. 87 

17 Oct 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,581 

20 Oct 41 
Tokyo M/A" 

No. 10,578 

20 Oct 41 
London M/A 

Radiogram 

No. 795 

20 Oct 41 

London M/A 

Cablegram 

21 Oct 41 

Chungking M/A.. ..•_. 

Radiogram 

No. 79 

23 Oct 41 
Singapore M/0 

Radiogram 

No. 54 

27 Oct 41 
Chungking M/A 

Radiogram 

(Paraphrase) 

(No. C-88) 

29 Oct 41 

Bandoeng M/0. 

Report No. 4 

30 Oct 41 

Bangkok M/A. 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 
(No. 38) 
30 Oct 41 



Subject 



FE Docu- 
ment 
Number 



Comments on Current Events No. 54. 



Estimates, Plans and Training— British Far East— for Octo- 
ber, November, December and January. 

Japanese Troops in French Indo-China.. 

Japanese Troop Movements... ^ .:._ 



Enlistment of Formosans 

Probability of War Between United States and Japan. 

Army Arsenals and Depots [Japan] 

Increase of Japanese Strength in Indo-China 

Japanese Troop Concentrations, Pearl River 

Japanese Cabinet Crisis and Press Attacks on U. S 



Analysis of Japanese Aviation Production 

Comments on Current Events, October 20, 1941 (No. 55). 

Resignation of Third Konoe Cabinet 

Estimate of Japan's Future Moves 



Japanese Military Plans 

Japanese Plans to Attack Thailand- 



Japanese Aircraft Carriers in Mandated Islands. 



Japanese Troop Strength in Indo-China. 



Japanese in Portuguese, Timdr.. 

Probable Reaction of Thailand to Japanese Attack. 



* Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*— Continued 
VOLUME XV— Continued 




[iiv]] 



Singapore M/0. 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 

(No. 57) 
31 Oct 41 

Singapore M/0 _ 

Radiogram 

5 Nov 41 

Singapore M/0 

Radiogram 

7 Nov 41 
London M/A 

Radiogram (paraphrase) 

9 Nov 41 
Peiping M/A 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 
(No. 9) 

11 Nov 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,593 

16 Nov 41 
Tokyo M/A 

No. 10,608 

19 Nov 41 
London M/A 

Radiogram (Paraphrase) 

21 Nov 41 
London M/A 

No. 45481 

21 Nov 41 
Singapore M/0 

Radiogram 

23 Nov 41 

Bandoeng M/0_ _.- 

No. 8 

24 Nov. 41 

Bandoeng M/0 

No. 10 

27 Nov 41 
Chungking M/A 

Secret Message 

No. 104 

29 Nov 41 
Singapore M/0 

No. 133 

2 Dec 41 
Singapore M/0 

Secret Message 

No. 96 

6 Dec 41 

Singapore M/0 ...j 

Secret Message 
No. 97 

7 Dec 41 

Singapore M/0 

Secret Message 

No. 103 

7 Dec 41 
Melbourne M/A 

Secret Message 

No. 24 

7 Dec 41 

Singapore M/0.. 

Secret Message 
No. 105 

8 Dec 41 



Probable Japanese Invasion of Thailand 

Japanese Air Strength in Indo-China 

Japanese Troop Concentrations in China and Indo-China 
Probable Japanese Attack in Netherlands East Indies 



Japanese Proposals for Settlement of Far Eastern Problems 
via Envoy to Washington. 



Aircraft Production [Japan] . 
Objective Material [Japan].. 



Probable Japanese Offensive and Possibility of War with 
ABD Powers. 



Japanese Intentions. __ 

British Air Activity over China 

Comments 

Japanese in the N. E. I. 

Probable Japanese Attack on Thailand. 



Alerting of Malayan Command.- 

Japanese Naval Operations 

British Defense of Singapore 

Japanese Air Operations and Troop Movements in Malaya- 



Execution of Plans Ordered by Netherlands Far East Com- 
mand. 



Japanese Landiiigs at Patani 



251 

25? 
253 
254 
255 

256 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
262 
263 

264 
265 

266 



26& 



♦Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION 



225 



MID 336. (11-3-41) Alaska 



CONFIDENTIAL 



War Department, 
War Department General Staff, 
Military Intelligence Division, G-2, 

Washington, D. C, November 5, 19.'fl. 
Subject : Letter of transmittal. 
To : Commanding General, Alaska Defense Force. 

Tlie attached communications are forwarded for your information and such 
action as you consider advisable. 

Sherman Miles, 
f Sherman Miles, 

Brigadier Q-eneral, U. 8. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2. 
1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41) — MID Summ. of Info, re Information Received 
from the Orient : 11/3/41. FMH 



MID 336. (11-3X41) Phil Dept. Dept. 

confidential 

War Department, 
War Department General Staff, 
Military Intelligence Division, Gr-2, 

Washington, D. C, November 5, 1941. 
Subject : Letter of transmittal. 
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Department, 

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such 
action as you consider advisable. 

Sherman Miles, 
Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)— MID Summ. of Info, re Information Received 
from the orient : dtd. FMH 



MID 336. (11-3-41) PR Dept. 



confidential 



War Department, 
War Department General Staff, 
Military Intelligence Division, G-2, 

Washington, D. C, November 5, 1941. 
Subject : Letter of transmittal. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

Headquarters, Puerto Rican Dept. 
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such 
action as you consider advisable. 

Sherman Miles, 
Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)— MID Summ. of Info, re Information Received 
from the Orient : dtd. FMH 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



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