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Given By
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BBFORB THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OE THE PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK .
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con, Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 35
PROCEEDINGS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
^-^-5 JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 35
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946
^
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gau FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
/I ''■
(Through January 14, 1946)
W^iLLiAM D. Mitchell, General Counsel < // ^
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel f-~ r /
JULE M. HAXXAFORD, Assistant Counsel / / S^ (^
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel ^ j- —
(After January 14, 1946) ^-^O'^ . '^ O
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel ^ >->
Samdel H. Kadfman. Associate General Counsel — '^X*''^ '^'^
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel /
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19. 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946,
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-IHustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commi.ssion Proceedmgs.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5080-5089
""3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
"418-423"
"451-464'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
'sY-'b"
205
"B22S-224"
B65-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
S 1 Iiiiii i 1 1 1 1 i M 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3190-3201"
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
179-184
"" 105-1 14"
96-105
74-85
"'368-378"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
coo 1 iCO lOCOOO 1 1 ICO—'OI 1 1 1 i(N 100 1 1 1 ICO
00-^ 1 it^ lOC'CDOS 1 1 ITJ<1>0 1 1 1 ifO ICO 1 1 1 iiO
E-^CO 1 1^ ,,-H«£)'-i 1 1 lOOiOiO 1 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 If-
^.11 |,,-H,^,.HlllllrH| lllllMil ,11,^
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11.— Ill— ICO III kO IIII 1 iiiit^
II,— 11,-lrH III ^H IIII 1 ||||,_1
1
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
DiUon, James P
Dillon, John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold," Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, Carhsle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
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K>K>*Vtv'':i*'_<!!^tid
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
oiiiiiiocoiiiiii ^~_ro 1 1
CO! OcOiiii Sn^oii
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Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
COKNiii iiMii II
iiiiiiOiCSiiiiiiiiii'tiii II
•» iOi(Niiii iT-iii II
1 J^ ic!, ;:::;.;;;: ;i 1 : : i
BlIIIIITjtiOO Tjlli II
lOli-H Illll-Hll 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
III 111 1 1
1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 C5 1 1 1 CO (N (N 1
iitOiii—i ii0O(M Oi
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tX, Oiiiiiiiiiii^ i
111 1 1 ,,-1 1 1 1 1 (M 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
, 1 rH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
>^ ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904^918
028-643
""734^746"
""852-885"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-269.5"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802'
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214-225
363-307
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1146-1156"
1156-1171"
4^32"
1068-1095
1272-1285"
"500^504"
1793-1805"
'"320-352,"
1648-
1659
0
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Mai
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committoe
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"'387-388'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investiration,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
45-46
"179-181"
232
76^77"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Chirko
Investifjation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ i i i i i i ill i ill i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 lO 1 --,-^(M"t-'(M 1 1 CO 1 1 00 00
1 lO 111 III ^I^ ^: ?2 00 CO iO 1 1-* 1 lOO
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11 III 111 1— 1,— ii— III 111— 1
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to ■
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 L-t^rtH 1 1 CO i,--,-,-00 1 1 ICO"^ 1 1 1 1
1 itroool 1 1 »o ij5z:'>« • " loooo i i i i
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1 i^^g 1 ; g i^s 1 i ig i i i i
a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, WiUard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Maj
PoweU, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, WiUiam S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
1 i§ i i i 1 lis 1 i§ i iilSli i 'M i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
dlewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
4-9
"335-375"
411-413
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
69"
195-197
203-204
185'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
11 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 Ic^ 1 1 III 111
t \\ . I j 1 j 1 1 i I i i I i j
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
lO (N ^ilil ^-^-0 III 111
il^ llllit^ OOilii^^rt III 111
117 1 1 I I 17 2 1 ! ! iSc^^f 11! Ill
^ \^ I 1 I 1 1?^ ti. 1 1 I lcI.o^ II! Ill
1^ 1 1 1 1 ;"= 5 1 1 1 1 ^^ 111 II!
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3644-3650
27S-54I,
441 1-4445
3265-3286"
1539^1575"
4037-4094
C
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
32-65"
323-334
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18. 1941.
to Jan. 23, 1942)
lOl^iOlilii ilNiiOOO 111 III
ICONIC ■>*<iiOO
" 1 r-4 CD -<* lllll 1 1> 1 1 T-H 00 111 III
S,l|'-l| lllll 11-HIIT-Ht-H 111 111
0 il^ 1 IM A 1 ' i 1 11' '11
Dh iC0t>O lllll lOO 1 iCDiO 1
i'-<'^illll iCOiiCOO
ICO lllll il>iiT-(00 111 III
1
Short, Arthur T.
Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen
Shortt, Creed, Pvt
Sisson, George A
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN_.
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen
Smith, William W., Rear Adm
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN
Smoot, Perry M., Col
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr
Spalding, Is.iao, Brig. Gen
Staff, W. F, CH/CM
Stark, Harold R., Adm
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR
StUphen, Benjamin L
Stimson, Henry L
Stone, John F
Street, George
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XV
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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
ConRressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945.
to May 31,
194G
Pages
'""1723-1911
"'"3"2"3"3"-3"25"9",
3303-3354
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""38^410"
376^386
541-553
597-602
442-450
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
O) 1 1 1 1 1 CD 1
00 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 ! i ! i '7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
„o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t^ lO 1 1
t, 1 1 1 1 1 1 .00 O 1
1 <—i 1 1 1 1 1 1—1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
CommittPO
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ ! i ; i i i i i : i i i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1083-1090
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Uarhor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
134.5-1381"
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683"
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379^382
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commi.s.'ion,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334^1340"
""247-259"
152.5-1538"
1683-1705
3
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichi.ser, Rea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wil.son, Erie M., Col
Wirrxer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
n
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148
[TOP SECRET]
Keport of Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD,
FOR the Secretary of War, Sitpplementary to Proceedings of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board
contents
Page '
ReiJort to Secretary of War by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, of investigation
supplementary to Army I'earl Harbor Board 2
Tab "A" — Copies of statements of Secretary of War, dated 1 December 1944 and 29
August 1945, of Colonel Clausen's orders and of related documents 4
Tab "B" — Copies of affidavits and statements obtained in Colonel Clausen's investiga-
tion 38
Tab "C" — List of additional documentary evidence comprising Exhibits "1" through
"8" obtained in Colonel Clausen's investigation 233
Tab "D" — Written periodic reports by Colonel Clausen 246
Tab "E" — Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon
Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in light of Colonel Clausen's
investigation 279
Tab "F" — Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and comment-
ing upon certain asi)ects of his previous memoraniluni to the Secretary of War,
dated 25 November 1944, in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation 296
Tab "G" — Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War
dated 25 November 1944 313
top secret
[2] Wae Department,
Washington, H September 1945.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War :
Subject : Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel H^nry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board.
Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the investigation
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, mentioned in
the public statements of the Secretary of War on 1 December 1944 and 29 August
1945. Copies of these statements and of my orders and some related documents
are attached as Exhibit "A".
In the course of this investigation, I travelled over 55,000 miles by air and
interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian i^ersonnel at the following places :
Berlin, Germany London, England
Blenchley Park, England Luzon, P. I.
Boston, Massachusetts Manila, P. I.
Cannes, France Neuenahr, Germany
Casserta, Italy New York, New York
Frankfurt on Main, Germany Paris, France
Guam Potsdam, Germany
Honolulu, T. H. Saipan
Langley Field, Virginia Versaille, France
Leyte, P. I. Washington, D. C.
Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat in
active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his public state-
ment of 1 December 1044 would be necessary.
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
79716— 46— Ex. 148-
2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded
their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit
General George C. Marshall
General Douglas MacArthur
[S] Lt. General Richard K. Suther-
land
Major General John R. Deane
Major General Charles D. Herron
Major General Sherman Miles
Major General C. A. Willoughby
Major General Ralph C. Smith
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts
Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder
Brig. General Morrill W. Marston
Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop
Brig. General Charles K. Gailey
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft
Colonel George W. Bicknell
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen
Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury
Colonel Moses W, Pettigrew
Colonel Joseph K. Evans
Colonel Edward F. French
Colonel Edward W. Raley
The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records of
my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B" :
Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow
Lt. General Walter B. Smith
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler
Colonel Rex W. Minkler
Colonel Harold Doud
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN
Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN
Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
Major Edward B. Anderson
Captain Howard W. Martin
Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel,
USN
Miss Mary J. Dunning
Miss Margaret McKenney
Miss Louise Prather
Miss Mary L. Ross
Mr. George W. Renchard
Rr. Robert L. Shivers
Mr. John F. Stone
Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USN
Mr. Harry L. Dawson
Mr. John E. Russell
Brigadier General C. A. Powell
Colonel O. H. Thompson
Lt. Colonel Byron M. Muerlott
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN
I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list of this
is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented herewith.
Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written reports
are attached as Exhibit "D".
There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge Advocate
General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous
memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my
investigation.
6 Incls Henry C. Clausen,
1. Ex. "A" Henry C. Clausen,
2. Ex. "B" Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
3. Ex. "C"
4. Ex. "D"
5. Ex. "E"
6. Ex. "F"
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
[/,] EXHIBIT A
Investigation bt Lt. Colonet. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of
War; Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Peart. Harbor Board
1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of
Pearl Harbor.
2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1
December 1944.
3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation.
4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning
unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel
concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945,
concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945,
in reply to letter 6 February 1945.
8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March
1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen.
9. Movement Orders for Major C. Clausen, 14 March 1945.
10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific
Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major
Henry C. Clausen.
11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, South-
west Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made
by Major Henry C. Clausen.
12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting change
in movement orders.
13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding OflScer,
1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders
of Major Henry C. Clausen.
[5] 14. Memorandum, of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May
1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.
15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945.
16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945,
concerning investigation.
17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August
1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen.
18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11 August
1945.
19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29
August 1945.
[6] [Public Law 339 — 78th Congress]
[Chapter 247 — 2d Session]
[S. J. Res. 133]
JOINT RESOLUTION
To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.
Resolved ty the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assemUed, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all
statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prose-
cution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor
4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
catastrophe of Dwoniber 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent
dereliction- of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate
to prevent the court ni.-irtial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or
persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the
Pearl Harboi- catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible
or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States,
are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the exten-
sion provided for in Public Law 20S, Seventy-eighth Congress.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally
directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into' the facts surrounding
the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings
against such persons as the facts may justify.
Approved June 13, 1944.
[7] War Department
bureau of public relations
press branch
Tel. —RE 6700, Brs. 342.5 and 4SG0
December 1, 1914.
Immediate Release
Statement by the Secretary of War
The following i5 the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War :
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an
investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of Decem-
ber 7. 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts
might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this
resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to
this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1941, a I4t>ard of three
general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating
to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on
7 December 1&41 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."
This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking
investigation._ It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington
It has examined a total of l.jl witnesses and received many exhibits. I have
read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General
of the Army, at my direction, has al.so examined the reiDort and the record and
has given me fully the benefit of liis views.
I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision
taken as to what, if any, action is to lie instituted against him and, after weigh-
ing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and
fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far
as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclu-
sions are as follows :
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or
other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the
War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or
exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the
recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.
So far as the Conunanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I
am of the opinion that his error.s of judgment were of such a nature as to demand
his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11. 1942, and in
itself is a serious result for any ofiicer with a long record of excellent service, and
conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence
now recorded, it is sufficient action.
P^irtherniore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such
inadequacies of cither personnel or organization as were shown to exist either
in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does
not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the
Army.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 5
In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided
that my own investigation should he further continued until all the facts are made
as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of
material facts can he obtained, and I have given the necessary [8] direc-
tions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may he much delayed
where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My
present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally
completed.
Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would he highly prejudicial to the success-
ful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during
the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is
based.
STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS
I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the
evidence now recorded not to institute further pi'oceedings against any officer of
the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of
June 14. 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl
to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore
Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to
the I'earl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report
bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further in-
vestigation, '
I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review
that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any
alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyiUty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Con-
structors, the organization with which he was connected. Colonel Wyman, or
others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not tind that there is
any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any in-
formation to the enemy.
As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and
others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing
of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate
General.
Distribution : Aa, Af, B, Da. Dd, Dm. N.
5 : 00 P. M.
SECRET
[9] Wait Department,
Washington, 23 Noveinhcr 191flf.
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Subject : Pearl Harbor Investigation.
In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a num-
ber of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation.
I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD.
You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and
information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to ad-
vise all ofticers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible
cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and
the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have
knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.
In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret
or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary not-
withstanding.
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of A¥ar.
A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
U. Colonel, JAGD.
6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
top shxjket
110] Headquarters, Army Service Forces
office op the judge advocate general
Washington 25, D. C.
Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
Subject : Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am sug-
gesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advanta-
geously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter.
The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed
as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.
2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can
be investigated :
a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department
notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the
order.
b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.
c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington.
d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part
of the fleet to remain in harbor.
e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired
back for its meaning.
f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy
Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies
thereof.
g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative
of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were
believed required by the situation.
h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, author-
ized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of
the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department.
i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February 1941.
[11] j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their
training and the possibility of continuing training luider Alert 2 or 3.
k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britian
and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised pf this agreement
or discovered its existence.
1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of
the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan (Rep.
41).
3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain :
a. The exact date and time of first translation.
b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some
of the most vital messages.
c. Who got each message, when and in what form.
d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed
thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.
e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.
4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored:
a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now
probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning
of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed
of it.
b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army.
(Tr., SafEord C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery,
as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether
the transmission was received.
[12] c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain
Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which
case they would have known that a "War with Britian" message would neces-
sarily have involved the United States in war.
d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britian" was brought to
Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 7
of Naval Operations and the Chief of StafC did know of the Joint Action Policy.
e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefiort
of the implementation intercept?
f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating
"Winds" message?
g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board
failed to examine?
h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message
directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether
there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the
warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds"
message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.
Myron C. Cramer,
Myron C. Cramee,
Major General, USA,
The Judge Advocate General.
SECRET
[i3] WAR Department
Washington, 6 February 1945.
Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned :
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1
December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investi-
gation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and
information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the
fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen
should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer
any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any
papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him.
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
SECBET
[i^] 6 Feibeuaby 1945.
Deae Mr. Secretary: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my
public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is con-
ducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board.
Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be
available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major
Clasen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part
that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.
I will apprecitae it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all perti-
nent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing
such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply
strictly with the instructions I have stated above.
Sincerely yours,
HeNry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy.
MO'B.
Hon. James V. Forkestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.
hhb/mob
A True Copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
[15] The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, 10 Feb. 19.',5.
Dear Mr. Secret-ary : I liave .voiir letter of 6 February 1945 advising tliat Major
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary
to the i>roceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be
given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the
opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood
that you have instructed him to'limit his inqtiiry strictly to matters which have
a bearing on that part that Army iDcrsonnel, organization, or action may have had
in the disaster.
I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that
we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,
authorize us to make available (o each other information in our respective Depart-
ments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to coui
ply with your request, and suggest that Ma.ior Clausen commxmicate with Lt. Com-
mander John F. Sonuett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to fur-
nish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy
Department.
Sincerely yours,
James Fobrestal.
Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.
[i6] 3 March 1945.
Memorandum for The Adjutant General.
Subject : Request for Orders.
1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War,
dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation
by' Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of
War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about
12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and
(c) then return to Washington, D. C, and (d) authority to make such successive
trips from Washington, D. C, and to travel to such othei" place or places, and to
make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said
mission.
3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft.
Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircaft, commercial steamship, rail
or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accom-
plishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75
pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft.
4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of $7.00
be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Wash-
ington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference is made to the de-
termination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day
limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 200, 1944, is not applicable
in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith.
/s/ H. C. Clausen.
H. C. Clausen,
Approved :
/s/ Harvey H. Bundy,
Harvey H. Bundy, for the Secretary of War.
/s/ Myron C. Cramer,
Myron C. Cramer.
The Judge Advocate General.
A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen.
Major, JAGD.
Major, JAGD.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 9
[17]
RESTRICTED
AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Honry C. EAD/bls/2231 Mu
(12 Mar 45) Br. 76520
War Department,
The Adjutant General's OFFitE,
Washinfft07i 25, D. C, IJ, March 19.',5.
Subject : Movement Orders.
To : Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
4731 Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.
1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March
1945 from Washington, D. C, to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of
approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Fair-
field, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Connnanding
Officer, 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shatter, T. H. Upon
arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army
Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months
for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty
he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.
2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02, 03,
212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes no. 9), and
is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR-2-331156-
ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal ef-
fects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents),
is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the
provisions of War Department Circular 260, 1944 apply ; outside continental
United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply.
3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as
may be necessary for the iierformance of this mission.
4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamplilet No. 38-6,
"Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of
aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions.
5. Special instructions : Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to
Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will
be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as
special official courier.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR :
E. A. Davis, Adjutant General.
[18^ 3 Incls.
AG Ltr 4 July 1944
AG Form 43
Travel Book
Distribution :
Officer (10)
Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu.
Lt. Stump, lC-931, The Pentagon.
APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2)
Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort IMason, Calif.
Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD. WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon
Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The Pentagon
P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va.
CG, T^SAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California
Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.
CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (8)
10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SEOBEX
119] 24 Makch 1945.
Memorandum for the Commanding General, I'acific Ocean Areas.
Subject : Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1
December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen,, JAGD, is conducting for me the
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Com-
mand within the next thirty days.
It Is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him,
and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist
in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtain-
ing statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information
in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of Navy.
Henby L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
hcc/es
A true copy.
Henry C. Ciausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
SEC3KET
[20] 24 Maeoh 1945.
Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater.
Subject : Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1
December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Com-
mand within the next thirty days.
It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him,
and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist
in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtain-
ing statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information
in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of Navy.
Henky L. Stimson.
Secretary of War.
hcc/es
A true copy.
Henry C. Ciausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[21] Wab Depaetment
aemy service forces
office of the judge advocate generrvl
24 March 1945.
Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett)
1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached)
as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to
report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended
to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26
Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4
April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank.
2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await
certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henby C. Clausen,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.
Rm. 4741 Munitions
Ex. 78922
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION H
[22] EAD/ED/ ed/2331 Mu
27 Mabch 1945.
AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C 77723
(27 Mar 45)
AGO Personnel Officers Assignment SPXPO-A
Room 2323 Munitions
CO
1504 AAFBU PP
FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF
FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907613
JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 26 March 45
from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN
AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG.
Official :
, Adjutant General.
SECRET
[23] 24 May 1945.
Memorandum for The Adjutant General.
Subject : Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1945, to Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945.
2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen direct-
ing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1945 to Headquarters, SHAEF, and to such
other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and
frequency as may be necessary for the purpose of conducting investigation in
accordance with Secret instructions of the Secretary of War.
3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders, dated
3 March 1945, be considered applicable hereto and that a one priority be assigned
for air travel.
Haevey H. Bundy,
For the Secretary of War.
A true copy.
Hknry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
BESTEICTED
EAD/laf/fcs/2323 Mun
Br. 76520
Wab Depabtment,
The Adjutant General's Office,
[24] Washington 25, D. C, 25 May 19^5
AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C
(24 May 45)
Subject: Movement Orders
To : #Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or
about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. C. to Headquarters, SHAEF, European
Theater of Operations, Versailes, France, and to such other points in the theater,
and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be neces-
sary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of
conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions ol the Secretary of
War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base
Unit, Air Annex #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for process-
ing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Wash-
ington, D. C. to "Versailles, France, reporting upon arrivel to the Commandirig
General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this
temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.
2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03
212/50425. Travel by air (APR-l-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2)
AK 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg-
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eiicy war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all
personal effects, and an execess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is author-
ized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United
States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35—1820, 19 April 1945 apply: outside the conti-
nental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 35-4820, 19 April
1945. apply.
3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to
proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of
this mission.
4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD
Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will
be issued at the aerial port of embarkation.
5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, % Postmaster, New
York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to
Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately
upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier.
By Order of the Secretary of War :
Capt. E. a. Davis. AGO,
Adjutant General.
Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec
[25] 3 Incls :
AG Ltr 4 Jul 44 - •
AG Form #43
Travel Book
Distribution :
Officer (10)
Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun
APS, 4A-514. Pentagon
OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)
Lt. Stumn, lC-931, Pentagon
CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746. Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3)
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun
Destination Commander :
SECRET
[26]
Dear Mk. Sbxretary: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to
thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain
Navy personnel.
I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Naty
representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your
investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited
to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization
or action may have had in the disaster.
Sincerely yours,
, Secretary of War.
Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.
A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
hhb/mob
[27] 7 August 1945.
Memorandum for the Adjutant General :
Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD,
dated 25 May 1945.
It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of
temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read "four months."
Harvey H. Bundy',
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.
A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 13
RT.STRICTED
[2S] RHO/laf/inm/2323 Mun
Br. 76520
. War Department
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C, 11 August 19Jf5.
AGPO-A 201— Clausen, Henry C.
(7 Aug. 45.)
Subject : Amendment of I\Iovement Orders,
To : Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD.
So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May
45. Subject : Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, O-907G13, JAfJD as reads : ''Temporary r)uty of approximately
two (2) months" be amended to read: "Tempcjrary Duty of approximately four
(4) months".
By order of the Secretary of War :
E. A. Davis, Adjutant General.
Distribution :
Officer (10)
Offs" Br Rec Sec AGO, Rm 1528 Mun
APS, Rm 4-A 514, Pentagon
OIC, Einb APO 464 Lexington Ave, NY, NY (2)
Lt. Stump, IC 931, Pentagon
CO. 503D AAFBU, WPAE, Rm 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Ptd, DC (3)
Judge Advocate General, Rm 2734, Mun.
Destination Commander :
[29] Official Report of the Secretary of War Regarding the Pearl Harbor
Disaster
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with
an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of
December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as
the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed
in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me
to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three
general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to
the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7
December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."
On December 1, 1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter
as follows :
"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking
investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington.
It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have
read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record
and has given me fully the benefit of his views.
"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision
taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing
all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and
fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as
they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions
are as follows :
"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary
or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in
the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill
or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the
recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.
"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is con-
cerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature
as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on Januai'y 11,
1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent
service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment,
or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such
inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either
in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded
does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer
in the Army.
"In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have de-
cided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts
are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [50] every wit-
ness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the neces-
sary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much
delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation.
My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally
completed.
"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public
during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which
it is based."
Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction,
Lieutenant Colonel Henry G. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General
has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was
Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate
knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and
I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the
action to be taken was correct.
Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to
disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and espe-
cially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the
Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and. others. From
these same sources there came to the Government additional information which
resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.
The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more
fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious
danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication.
It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have
directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public
except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The con-
clusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public.
The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress
the full reports and the record of the testimony.
My conclusions are as follows :
The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island
of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the
Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C.
Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General
Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers
of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabili-
ties for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the per-
formance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army
authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsi-
bility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed
successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various
theaters of oi)eration. Thus each theater commander is charged with the prep-
aration of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense
operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the
appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are siibject to any
changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary
responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the com-
manding officer familiar with the local [31} situation and conditions.
Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian De-
partment had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint
Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an
emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary respon-
sibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 15
demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese
attack.
I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until
the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical
events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November
27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic
relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that
an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were
possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his
command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that
he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he
deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Wash-
ington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous
reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness
of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the
policy for a responsible commanding oflicer to anticipate and to be prepared
for the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military
estimates from his own stafP as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that
a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.
I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War
Department and which was not made available to General Short vshich would
have modified the essence of the above information which was s ent to him
or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance af id alertness
thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given
him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later
pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties
more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but
I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of
being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.
I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received
adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situa-
tion demanded ; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of
the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the
attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for
reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime
necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its recon-
naissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnais-
sance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiarcraft defenses
sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.
This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience
of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz : the failure to comprehend the
necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he
had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than
be actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was
carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming
the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such consider-
ations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station
against Japan was his paramount duty.
[32] The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's
confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him
it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone con-
cerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He
was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology
which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and par-
ticularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short
also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better
informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their
operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely.
The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to
operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.
Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the
large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the Wnr
Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning
also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the
fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27,
1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
should be roguvded as a tacit approval of liis failure to alert against other dangers.
I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Dei^art-
nient warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian popu-
lation, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27,
confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and
might disregard all others.
But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do
not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against
an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improb-
able, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for
use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility
of such an attack was his own definite responsibility.
To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warne<I by Washington that
there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an
attack from within liy sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against
both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense
against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from
without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as
not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require
several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.
To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from
another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed
than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible
defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his
duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack
on that outpost to the opinion of another service.
Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Depart-
ment of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such
a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from
his independent responsibility as a theater commander.
I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my
statement of December 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation
does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any
action beyond that which has ali'eady been taken.
II
[33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the super-
vision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known
as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the
General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and mes-
sages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved
by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and
under him various officers had specially assigned duties.
The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of col-
lecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections
of the War Department and to the theater commanders.
I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him
adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and
the development of the situation ; that he was warned that Japanese future
action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and
that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also
expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures — the all-important measure
to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that
any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered
by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible
enemy action was not also his duty.
There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to
General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's
attention or emphasized further the invminence of war. Some part of this
information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the ride that all
such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl
Harl)or, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information
coinnmnicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While
Adjniral Kimmel and (ieneral Siioi-t were on very friendly terms and in frequent
communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other
respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 17
The information available to the War Department on or Ijefore December 7,
I?F41, which was not passed on to General Short included the following : informa-
tion available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government
insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by Novem-
ber 25, 1941, later extended to November 20, 1941 ; information available De-
cember 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United
States that Japan would yield no further ; and information available the morn-
ing of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster
that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States
at 1 : CO P. M., December 7, 1941. and that the remaining cipher and code machines
in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had
earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war wtih Japan
was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to
General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however,
was that the War Department had information through secret sources of infor-
mation that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London. Washington
and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The addi-
tional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this
information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be
borne in mind also that General Short had been [3//] fully advised by the
War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at
anr time.
The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not
forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu
was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other
somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates
in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Depart-
ment as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the
American Navy as far as possible.
Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to
what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be
and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations.
There is no dispute, however, that General Mar.shall did not get this infcnination
until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War
Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6
he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the
Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Divi-
sion, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the
additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified
that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty
officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investiga-
tion showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message o,n
December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9 : 00
A. M. on the morning of December 7.
When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the
morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the
effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Govern-
ment at 1 : 00 P. M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher
and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a mes-
sage giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that
this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was
the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after the
attack.
Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which
General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo
about November '^o. 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect
that in case of severance of diplomatic relatit)ns or war with the United States,
Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report
would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be
destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Shoit or his
command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed
signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subse-
quently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contra-
dictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event,
information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as
above discussed.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 3
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe
the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short
more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation od
the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the signifi-
cance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack
specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War
Department [35] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all
times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals
in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation
and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the
event.
Again, as I have pointed out. General Short in response to a message which
had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for
a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was
susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only
and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this
interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message,
nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the
messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Di-
vision of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well
have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates
knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for.
General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division.
A clear and satisfactoi'y reply should have been required. This was not done
and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a
careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no
room for ambiguity permitted.
It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the
responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many the-
aters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, suf-h
as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be
pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the svibsequent disaster, but
it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they
were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct
must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander,
such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and
vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been
chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by
consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible.
Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which
warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the
War Plans Division.
Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized
and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received
other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the
performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps
were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as
were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time
of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
Ill
The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General
Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the
Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pear]
Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Stalf as being responsible
for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have
just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It
arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff
and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It
is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally
supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the
General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secre-
tary of War, and to make plans for [86] and supervise the organization,
equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and
himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the
many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental
and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 19
lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a
Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by
which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.
It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties
efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the re-
sponsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective or-
ganization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered
and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor dis-
aster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff
which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent
results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war.
The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to
the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he
acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.
IV
The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors
of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts
Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor
Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans
Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the con-
clusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go
into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the respon-
sibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the
conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with
the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion
in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.
In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with
responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be con-
strued as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of
the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have pro-
longed the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better pre-
pared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts
at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect
was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.
VI
There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investiga-
tion of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wynian, as
expressed on December 1, 1944, were as follows :
[37] "I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from
this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or
caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the
Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected. Colonel
Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find
that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction
gave any information to the enemy."
The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no
further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.
I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and
neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred
the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of
War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report,
I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman.
♦This Commission consisted of Mr. .Justice Roberts ; Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired ;
Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired ; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired ; and Major General
Joseph T. McNarney.
20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[38] EXHIBIT B
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, For The Secretary
OF War
SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEaCDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24 January 1945,
at "Washington, D. C.
2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses AV. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washing-
ton, D. C.
4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washing-
ton, D. C.
6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
7. Affidavit of Margaret ]\IcKenney, GSC, G-2. 22 February 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945,
at Washington, D. C.
10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
n. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at Wash-
ington, D. C.
13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February 1945, at.
W^Lshington, D. C.
14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2. 1 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley Field,
Vii'ginia.
16. Affidavit of General Charles K. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at Wash-
ington, D. C.
17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, 8C, 22 March 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
[39] 18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at Wash-
ington, D. C.
19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.,
Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also statement of
Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Hono-
lulu, T. H.
22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J.
Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945, at
Himolulu, T. H.
25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
26. Statenjent of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam.
28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Hono-
lulu, T. H.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 21
30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emauual, USN, 27 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas,
6 May 194.'). at Manila, P. I.
32. Affidavit of General of the Army Dougla.s MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at
Manila, P. I.
33. Affidavit of Ma.ior General C. A. Willoughbv, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas,
8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
34. Affidavit .of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Hono-
lulu, T. H.
35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at
Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, (yS, SHAEF, 15 June 1945, at
Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
U,0] 37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CO, 15th Army, 20
June 1945, at Cannes, France.
38. Affidavit of Colenel Roliert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy.
39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
40. Affidavit .of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam,
Germany.
42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France.
43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston,
INIassachusetts.
46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC. 21 August 1943, at Washington, D. C.
47. Affidavit ,of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945,
at Washington, D. C.
48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington,
D. C.
49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Wash-
ington, D. C.
50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Wash-
ington, D. C.
51. Affidavit of Miss INIary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washing-
ton, D. C.
52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washing-
ton, D. C.
[^1] Heauquarteks, Army Seevice Forces,
Office of the Judge Advocate Genebal,
Washington 25, D. C, 2^ January IDJfS.
Memorandum for the files.
Subject : Intervievp of General Fielder.
Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell
on 8 January 1945, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4DS52. Pentagon,
on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clear-
ances with General Bissell which permitted General P^ielder to answer all my
questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a
witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with
respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would
be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail
considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the
specific points indicated.
1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington
since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely
to counterintelligence matters and that had "nothing to do with combat."
2. He stated he was not very well aqnainted with Commander Joseph J. Roche-
fort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know
of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward
Railey. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U" (called Rl."
3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October
1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief
of Staff and General Short.
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Wash-
ington Gr-2, 27 November 1941, warning. ,
5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December
1941.
G. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton
D. 289-291 ) and that it was "circulated" as something he "used to get."
7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache mes-
sage of 5-6 December 1941.
142] 8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conduct-
ing long distance reconnaissance.
9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington Gr-2 message to the Hawaiian
Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message,
he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it "might have come in as
routine."
10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew
that the Navy was intercepting such information, he stated at first that he knew
of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he
knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes.
Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were
asked.
General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without
recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to
obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information.
Henry C. Clausen,
H. C. C,
ifajor, JAOD,
Assistant Recorder. APHB.
TOP SECRET
[JfS] Affihavit of Captain Joseph J. Eochefort, United States Navy
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn,
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy
personnel and records, does depose and state:
During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat
Intelligence Oflicer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor,
which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio
intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Peai-1
Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence
OflScer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder sta-
tion, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor.
My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J.
Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were
made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelli-
gence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discus-
sions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T.
Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including
the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations,
meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements.
My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941
did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese
political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done
mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions
I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have
read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret
Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December
1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and
SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's
date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I re-
ceived concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 23
was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in
which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and 144] and which
came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that
Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our
common interests.
[Written:] Note. — This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accord-
ance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort.
Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard
is distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items
of intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and
SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an
implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the
latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing
message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning
those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the
substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert
L. Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December,
1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the de-
struction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honlulu, which information
I gave to my head office in Washington.
Joseph J. Rochefort,
Captain, V8N.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
top secret
145] War Department
washington
Affidavit of Colonei. Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the
nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secre-
tary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was
required, deposes and says :
From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence
Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington ; that from November 1939 to August
1941 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2,
War Department ;
That while performing said duties in Gr-2, he read various intercepts of diplo-
matic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies ; that these inter-
cepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19 ;
That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941,
while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and
SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been
identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly re-
ferred to as the "Winds Code" ;
That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 De-
cember 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the
Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger; that
in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the imple-
mentation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had
prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Ha-
waiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now
recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached.
That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in pos-
session of the same information he had received in Washington ; that he reached,
this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does
not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information
that Washington had ; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii
under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these inter-
cepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent ex-
change of intercept translations as a check one against the another.
[.'/()] That on "• December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii
would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret tele-
gram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have
been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information ; that
affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he
prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that
the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written tliereon by affiant on 5 December 1941
and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner ; that affiant
believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel
Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed by Lt. Colonel
C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch;
That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was
dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number
which was given only in the ordinai'y course of procedure when a message was
dispatched ;
Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said
message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department ;
That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from
May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department ; that while in the
performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed
that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time ; that the Army had
a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining inter-
cepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in
the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to
obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Mor-
rill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was
succeeded by Colonel Fielder ;
Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with
Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2DS41, Pentagon, Extension 5851, questioning
of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and check-
ing records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel
Powell. Also, interviews with Colonel C. C. Duisenbury, MID, former assistant
to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston.
Moses W. Pettigrew,
Moses W. Pettigrew,
Colonel, MIS.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Wash-
ington, D. C.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
SECRET
[47] Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926
Texegram
OFFICIAL business — GOVERNMENT RATES
Sent No. 519, 12/5
December 5, 1941.
AS.SISTANT Chief of Staff Headquartfjss,
G2, Haivaiian Department,
Hotiolulu, Territory Hawaii:
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
Miles.
I certify that this njessage is on official business and necessary for the public
service.
Ralph C. Smith,
Colonel, O. S. C,
Executive Officer, 0-2.
Secret Cablegram
las
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 25
TOP SECRET
[JfO] Wak Depaktment,
Washimjton.
Affidavit of Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbuky, GSC
Colonel Carlise Clyde Dnsenlmry, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence,
Southeast Asia Cctnnnand. Kandy. Ceylon, on temporary duty in Weshington,
being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scoiie of the investiga-
tion by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his right
to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says ;
To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5 December
1941 secret cablegram reading:
"Sent No. 519, 12/5
December 5, 1941.
Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters,
G2 Haicaiiaii Department,
Hotwtiilu, Tcnitonj Hawaii:
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
Miles."
I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse
side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or following consultation
with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS. For
several months prior to and following 7 December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was
on duty as Executive Officer, Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active
member of the Far Eastern Section when the message of 5 December originated.
His duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving
outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret cable-
gram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by G-2,
especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the United States and also,
because there was believed to be lack of confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy
Intelligence Officer as to Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department.
It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts, includ-
ing the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii, which had
been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in WashingtoiL I
understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval personnel in Hawaii
doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the Japanese diplomatic codes.
[50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having
reported to him in August 1940, and continued as bis assistant until and after 7
December 1941. Far the four or five months immediately following August 1940,
Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the translated intercepts of Japa-
nese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide
of the Secretary of War ; John Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull ; Colonel
Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. and Colonel
Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Cohniel Bundy in OPD. The pro-
cedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all
copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed,
and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who
receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby
were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and
the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the inter-
cepts which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months
period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in
assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about
7 December 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting
and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my
knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was
kept because of the top secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically
each message which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained
elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department may
have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about
fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five
for distribution.
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS
No. 25S43, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on
duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in
and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and
went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for
the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was
received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the
next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen
parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept
about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State
Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State.
When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel
Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to
that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the
morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel
Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night ;
furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish
to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see
the implications of immediate hostilities.
It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the
Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to
the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.
[51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850,
being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States
at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December
1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he
arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m.
Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury,
Carlisle Clyde Dusenbtjby,
Colonel, O. 8. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washing-
ton, D. C.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clattsen,
Major, JAGD.
Top Secret
[52] Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefobt, Unitei> States Navy
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn,
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel
and records, does depose and state :
During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat
Intelligence OflScer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor,
which was a field unit to the home oflSce at Washington. I was attached to the
Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties in-
volved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in
Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a
District Intelligence Officer.
My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to
December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior
to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the
purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of
mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose
I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor.
During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained
more cordial and close relations, meeting informally.
My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did
not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political
or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments
relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me
by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B"'. I did not know the substance
of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS
25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 27
written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave
him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents
and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the Informa-
tion of importance in which the Ai*my and Navy were jointly interested and which
came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel
Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common
interests.
[53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with
respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the
substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn
so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during
the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing
message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning
those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the
substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L.
Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941.
This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of
secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to
my head office in Washington.
Joseph J. Rochefort,
Joseph J. Rochefort,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, J A GD.
at Washington, D. C.
[54] Affidavit of Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Am Corps, AUS
Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (0475864), presently assigned to the
Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by
Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required,
deposes and says :
That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instruc-
tions, I made diligent seai'ch of all War Department pertinent files, and especially
those in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General
Staff, and its predecessor. War Plans Division, War Department General Staff,
covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941, to ascertain whether a
Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General
Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received
in the War Department before 7 December, 1941 ; that among other things I per-
sonally searched or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the
War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to
have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure,
including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H.
Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge
of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS ; that
this search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received
by the War Department at Washington, D. C, until March of 1942 ; that I ques-
tioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing
Operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the
Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941,
and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject ; that I also questioned
General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with
respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months
immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to rememlier,
whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not ; that the net result of
my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Proce-
dure was first received at Washington, D. C, in March, 1942, at the time it was
receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy of receipt ; that
the reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume. Register No. 45,
Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat-
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies
said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating
Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941 ; tliat a letter dated
r> November 1941, attacbed to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November,
1941, directs tbe collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative
Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5
November, 1941. provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16
of Section II. as follows :
[55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3)
Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a De-
partment order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f
(8) below.
"14. ALERT NO. 1. — a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and
uprising within the islands, with no threat from without.
* * * * * * *
"15. ALERT NO. 2. — o. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious tlian
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-
craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
*******
16. ALERT NO. 3. — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations
on outlying islands.
****** *"
Signed : Claeence G. Jensen.
Suljscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henky C. Clausen.
Alajor, JAGD.
Secret
[56] . Headquarteks Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January l9Ji2.
In reply refer to : WPD-.381— Haw Dept (1-29-42)
AG 311.5— OHD-41. Auth : CG, Haw Dept
Initials OMM A. G.
Date : 29 Jan 1942
Subject: Operation Oi'ders Hawaiian Department, 1941.
To: War Plans Division, War pepartment General Staff,
Washington, D. C.
Herewith Register Nos 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.
Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below.
By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS :
O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDoLE,
Major, A. G .D.,
A.ssistant Adjutant General.
Incls : Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41.
March 10, 1942.
TOP SECRET
[57] ArFinAviT of Margaret McKenney
J. L. McKee,
J. L. McKee,
Col, G. S. C.
Mai-gai-et McKenney, civilian clerk in charge. Cable Section, Office of the As-
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C, being first
duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen,
J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army
I'earl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
That during the month of Decembei-, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian
clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 29
G-2, War Departnieiif, Washington, D. C., which section collects and delivers
incominji and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the af-
fidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best in-
formation and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge
of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the f) Decendier 1941
secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff. Head-
quarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy
of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of
Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy oidy if the
message was sent, (2) the notations of the number Hig thereon indicates that
the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it
was received from G-2; that the message was then incoded and sent and that
then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, CA) that the stamp
(m the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel
Moses W. I'ettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the
Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in
the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth
message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables
receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. RosS;
(5) that the said G^-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable
messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question thei cu.s-
tomary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the
daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the
designation, classification, time received in the Cable Section, nund)er 82 being
Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer
and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the
receipt liook shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps
cqde room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the pagei of
the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by
the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and
received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519
tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Departm»*jnt
in receiving messages nmst account for the sequence by numbers and if a number
were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing mes-
sage; that since no check backs were received with respect to luimber 519, the
system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and
(7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [.58] of which
is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the
handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew ; that I assisted in the collection
of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor
and at subsequent interviils and for that reason nay memory is clear on the
points in which I herein state I have knowledge.
Signed : Maegabet McKennett.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen.
Major,,!. A. G. D.
at Washington, D. C.
top secret
[59] War Department
Washbiffton, 25 February lOJ/S.
Afyiuavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I.
Colonel George AV. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS. Washington,
D. C, having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Maj(u- Henry
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes
and says :
I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelli-
gence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel
Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this
connection had served under General Nolan.
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources
of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose
offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J.
Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence
Unit, Pearl Harbor ; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th
Naval District ; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific
Fleet ; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army.
Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI.
I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that
Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept
radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in
Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such
as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the
public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.
Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned
that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from
Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false
weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war
or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United
states, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their
secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B"
shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have
initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part
of November, 1941, I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio
station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain
intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which
I was looking.
[60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code informa-
tion when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5
December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War De-
partment, Washington, D. C, in substance as follows:
"December 5, 1941.
Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters,
G2, Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
Miles."
On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to
ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was moni-
toring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was
also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu.
The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which
had been given me.
Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy
sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic repre-
sentatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and else-
where. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C,
in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain
L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed
with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that
the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and
destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at
the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told
those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned con-
cerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and
stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved
reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent
and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had
previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed
and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G-2, Hawaiian Department; G-2,
Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G-3, Hawaiian Department;
FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 31
between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly
estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I
have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying
the pertinent information to interested parties.
In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI
had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then
living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected
with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been
recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was
alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message con-
cerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversa-
tion as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of dis-
cussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the
party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions,
and references to "hibisqus" and "poinsettias." My Gr-2 sense told me that
there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy
and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt
very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind
the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I
reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu
was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted
elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the informa-
tion I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes
and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in
execution of the "Winds" code.
I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5 : 15 p. m., 6 December
1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and
General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of
utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going
to dinner at Schofleld Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter
had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I though it was too important
to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could
get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make
it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who
read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated
that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message
seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My
conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and
seemed to last only for about five minutes.
Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify
before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to
me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever hap-
pens you were right and I was wrong."
On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused
all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for
which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to
be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did
not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort
for our joint investigatory action.
As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and
custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack
Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning
the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December
1941 by the British SIS, Manila ; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel
Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.
George W. Bicknell,
George W. Bicknell.
Colonel, M. I.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. G.
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[63] Amendment to Affidavit of Colonel George \V. Bicknell
Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amondment to his affidavit of 25 February
1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation:
I wish to state further that prior to 7 December l'.)41, namely about October
1941, I made and practised, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elab-
orate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of
war witli Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called "A",
"B" and "C". They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which
should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan "C" was put into execution immediately
on the proclamation of martial law.
In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates
given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October
1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October,
1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a
teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the
Hawaiian Islands with the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.
Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which
Gerald Wilkinson of the Britisli Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry
Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this tile which are marked for me, were received
by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group
are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November
and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 No-
vember and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received
by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of
each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides.
The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including
that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941,
as well as any pertinent information I received in coimection with my G-2 activ-
ities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in one form or another. Reference is
made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available
in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on
the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December
1941.
George W. Bicknell.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen.
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C.
[64] War Department
washington
Affidavit of Major Edward B. ANDEassoN, T. C.
Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C, presently on duty with the OHice of the
Transportation Conis, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of
the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen. JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementai-y to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that
top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
My attention has lieen called to a photostatic copy of a secret teleguam dated
5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. On
the (late of this message I was assigned to the OflSice of The Adjutant (ieneral,
Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the then Major McDole.
The customary and usual practice with respect to such messages was for
them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, to the oflSce in
which I was assigned, Ofiice of The Adjurant General, Hawaiian Department,
and r)y our office to the addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies
to our ofiice. One of these was .sent by our office to the action addressee, and
if it was returne<l it was filed in a sul)ject file. The other copy was retained
in our ofiice and u.sed for the imri)ose of checking against the sequence of luim-
bers whidi was a system in use at the time for assuring that we received all
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 33
messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal
Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having seen
the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall either having
occasion at the time to have indications of a missing number.
As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief Warrant
Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapi). and personnel of the Signal Office, Hawaiian
Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Office,
Hawaiian Department, .should indicate whether the message was received.
Edward B. Anderson,
Edward B. Ander.son,
Major, T. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Mujoi\JAGD. ^
At Washington, D. C.
\65] War DtJ'ARTMENT
washington
Affidavit of Brigadier Genp^ial Robert H. Dunlop
Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of The
Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that
top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and
including December 1941 and thereafter.
I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940. So
far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance thereof
did not materially alarm the civilian population.
My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the
Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen
has shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations Orders,
Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter dated 5
November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of sending any copy
of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November
1941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, to Washington,
D. C, or having these sent to Washington, D. C, before 7 December 1941.
On 27 November 1941. I was in the office of Lt. General Short, Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of
the Hawaiian Department, at about 2 : 30 p. in. entered the room, excused him-
.self for the interruption, and said that he had come in to show the Commanding
General a very important message from General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the
Army, Washington, D. C, which he had just received. General Short read this
message and said in effect that it certainly was a very important me.ssage, and,
it is my impression that, directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to
put into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5
November 1941. At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 Novem-
ber 1941 was in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or
later that the message from Washington read in general as follows:
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest iwssibilities that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile
action ix)ssible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be
avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This
policy should not, repeat not, be constructed as restricting you to a course of
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other
measures as you deem necessary, but the.se measures should be carried out
so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report
measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned
in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this
highly secret information to minimum essential officers."
79716— 46— Ex. 148 4
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff meeting
to which I had been called. The message was read to us and Colonel Phillips
stated that the Commanding General had ordered into operation Alert No. 1 of
the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for questions and as I recollect
there was only one question put. It concerned the message from General Mar-
shall, but the details of which I cannot now recall. There was no further dis-
cussion. There was no mention then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7
December 1941, as to what had been the effect upon the civilian population of the
alert ordered by General Herron the preceding year to wliich I have referred.
The staff meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes.
I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941, the
one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the
affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest that a search of the records
of The Adjutant General and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made
since the receipt or non-receipt should have been recorded and the record thereof
preserved.
Kobert H. Dunlop,
RoBEET H. Dunlop,
Brigadier General.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[67] War Department,
Washington, 28 February 1945.
Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief, Signal
Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of
the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to the proceedings of the Ai'my Pearl Hai'bor Board, and that top
secrecy is required, deposes and says :
On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a civil-
ian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytical Unit Signal
Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department, Washington, D. C. My immedi-
ate superior was Major Harold S. Doud who was assistant to Colonel Rex W.
Minckler, Chief of tlie Signal Intelligence Service, who in turn was under Colonel
Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and whose superior
was the Chief Signal Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese
Diplomatic Solution Activities.
I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic intercepts which
had been deciphered and translated, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown
me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of Major Clausen I have attempted
to compile from original records presently in the possession of the Signal Corps
information concerning the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of
interception; (2) dates of the messages ; (3) dates of interception ; (4) dates of
translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the activating mes-
sage in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available in places to which I
now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I prepared which refers to vari-
ous of the intercepts by the Signal Intelligence Service number and gives some
of the requested information which I have been able to obtain. My search has not
disclosed any "Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was
supposed to have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall com-
ments to the effect that it had been intercepted.
As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel Minckler,
Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr. Friedman, among others.
Frank B. Rowlett,
Frank B. Rowlett,
Lt. Col., S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
35
[68] SIS No.
Sources*
Date Msg
Date Int
Date translated
Honolulu
23260
S
24 Sept—
24 Sept
9 Oct
No
23570
7
14 Oct
15 Oct
16 Oct
No
23616
2, S, 7, M, 3 . -
14 Oct
14 Oct -
15 Oct
No
23631
1
16 Oct
16 Oct
17 Oct.
No
23859
2,7, 1 -
22 Oct
22/23 Oct-..
6Nov
? . . .
23 Oct
No
24373
S (teletype)
5 Nov
14 Nov
5 Nov
No
25322
Navy Radio
S
26 Nov..
No
25644
16 Nov.
?
3 Dec. -.-.
No
24878
S
16 Nov
18 Nov
17 Nov
17 Nov
No
25773
S - .
18 Nov
6 Dec
No
25817 . - .
1,2
18 Nov
18/19 Nov
?-.-
?
6 Dec
No
25392
s .
19 Nov . . .
26 Nov
No
26823 .
S 2
s'(tefetype)""]""]
S (teletype)
29 Nov
6 Dec
No
25040
19 Nov
? . .
20 Nov
No
26432
19NoV-.._
22NOV
7
22Nov.
28 Nov
No
26138
S.-
22NOV
28 Nov.. -
No
26135
1, 6. .
26 Nov. .
26 Nov
26 Nov
No
25344
S -.
26 Nov
26 Nov
No
26349
? .
26 Nov
26 Nov
26 Nov
No
25444
1,2
26 Nov
27 Nov
28 Nov
No
26480
1,2
26 Nov
26/27 Nov
26 Nov
29 Nov
No
25436
1
26 Nov
28 Nov
No
S,6
S (teletype)
28 Nov
28 Nov
28NOV
No
26496
29 Nov
29 Nov
30 Nov...
No
26554
Navy Radio
J, Navy Rad
J, Navy Rad
?
Navy Radio..
British
30 Nov
30 Nov
1 Dec
No
25553
30 Nov
1 Dec
1 Dec.
No
25552 .
30 Nov
1 Dec
1 Dec
No
25497
30 Nov -
30 Nov
30 Nov
No
25565
30 Nov.
30 Nov.
1 Dec
No
26787
1 Dec
1 Dec
?
5Dec
No
26605
S (teletype)
1 Dec
1 Dec
No
25545 ..
S (teletype)
1 Dec
1 Dec
1 Dec
No
25727
S, 1
1 Dec
?
4 Dec
No
25783
S, Navy Radio
1,2,7
1 Dec
?—
2 Dec
4 Dec ---
No
25659-B...;
2 Dee
3 Dec
No
26660
7
2 Dec
2 Dec
3 Dec -.
No
26640
X, 2 „ .
2 Dec
2Dec
3 Dec
No
25785
7
3 Dec
9
5 i)ec ........
5 Dec
No
25807
W .
4 Dec
6 Dec
No
27065
S, 5
2 Dec
2 Dec
30 Dec
Yes
26843
S (teletype)
4 Dec
?
7 Dec
No
25836
S (teletype) .
6 Dec
?
6 Dec
No
25838
S
6 Dec
6Dec
6 Dec
No
26843 . . .
S
6 Dec
6 Dec
6 Dec
No
26168
1, 5
6 Dec
?
12 Dec
Yes
26846
2 (teletype)
6Dec
6 Dec
7 Dec
No
25864
s
7 Dec
7 Dec
7 Dec
No
25850
S
S (teletype)
7 Dec
7 Dec
7 Dec
No
25856 .
7 Dec
7 Dec
7 Dec
No
25866
2, Navy Rad
7 Dec
7 Dec
7 Dec
No
*Navy: J=Jupiter, Fla. S=Bainbridge Island. Wash. "W= Winter Harbor, Me. Navy Radio-Navy
Overseas Intercept or British, X-photographs of original messages
Army: l=Ft. Hancock, 2=San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama, 5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7=
Fort Hunt, Va.
[69}
Wab Department
washington
AFFIDAVIT OF Major Genekal Railph C. Smith
Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the Assistant
Chief of StafE, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was
Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington,
D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941, Colonel Carlise Clyde
Dusenbury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern
Branch, G-2. Up to a few weelvs before 7 December 1941, it was customary for
either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury to bring to me, for the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted,
deciphered, and translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this
time I would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to
the Assistant Chief of Staif, G-2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941, pursuant
to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to the Assistant Chief
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury
would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the intercepts and gave
the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During the period when I was
reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch to General Miles, as stated,
the pouches containing the intercepts were almost always delivered to me by
Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recollect specifically
whether Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the
pouches, I do recall clearly that as a customary practice it was either one,
or the other.
I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6 Decem-
ber 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entrained at about 6 p. m.,
for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the Infantry School which
I then commenced. I recall as being on the train with me en route to Fort Ben-
ning, the evening of 6 December 1941, Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore,
following the time stated, namely about noon on (3 December 1941, receive any
pouch containing intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, or any other person.
Ralph C. Smith.
Ralph C. Smith,
Major General.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
Washington, D. C.
[70] Affidavit of Mary L. Ross
Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2. War Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn, and informed
of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., for the Secertary of
War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that
top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in the •
Cable Branch in the Ofiice of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department,
Washington ; that in said month of December, 1941, in connection with my duties
I was assigned the number "32" and said number was used in said office to
designate me.
That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December
1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Head-
quarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of which is hereto
annexed ; that I recall the circumstances and my actions with respect to said
cablegram ; that the yellow copy of said cablegram, of which the attached exhibit
is a photostatic copy, was brought to me with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of
which is attached, and on which at the bottom is written a message in the hand-
writing of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew ; that I recall that the person who brought
me the cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its
immediate dispatch was urgent ; that on receiving the yellow copy and said
buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables receipt book,
a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also attached hereto ; that
the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed therein by myself as indicated
by my number 32 in the colunni for the clerk; that I put a red priority tag on
the copy of the cablegram and took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed
it to the clerk who receipted for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of
said receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that there-
after, pi-oI)ably the next day, the yellow copy was returned wth the notation
thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5"; that the said number 519 was as-
signed the message by the Signal Corps and was then \yritten on a page of our
receipt book as is indicated on the attached photostatic copy ; that the procedure
in the Signal Corps code room was to assign a number and then after the message
was sent to write on the yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow
copy of the message in question as heretofore indicated.
That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paraphrase kept in the
G-2 olfice and which has thoreon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941 32";
that this latter notation ,on said photostatic copy was placed thereon by me to
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 37
indicate that it had been transmitted by tlie Signal Corps; that the initials in
the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the handwriting of
Colonel Pettigrew. .
That my memory with respect to the foregoing is clear because soon [il\
after Pearl Harbor and at intervals thereafter I was questoned concerning the
foregoing and the Ofiice of (i-2 assembled pertinent papers among wliich were
the documents, pliotostatic copies of wliicli there are attached ; that I assisted
in the assembly of these papers.
Signed : Mary L. Ross.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 1st day of March 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C. "
[72]
Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
Marclil0,1926
SECEET
Telegram
official business — government rates
Sent No. 519, 12/5
December 5, 1941.
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Headquarters 02 naicaUan Department,
Hoiwluln, Territory Hawaii
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather
MILES
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public
service.
Ralph C. Smith,
Colonel, G.S.G.
Executive Officer, 0-2.
Secret Cablegram
[731 Intelligence Branch— IMISV—WDGS
FROM : TO ;
The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
Chief, Intelligence Branch
Executive, Intelligence Branch
Administrative
Field Personnel
Drafting and Reproduction
Stenographic Pool
Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch
Situation
Contact
Dissemination
Air Section
British Empire Section
Central European Section
Eastern European Section
Southern European Section
Western European Section
Far Eastern Section
Latin American Section
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Military Attache Section
Foreign Liaison Section
Coordinating Section
Finance Section
Personnel Section
Record Section
Translation Section
Mimeograph Room
Chief Clerk
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH
W. D. MAP COLLECTION
FOR Necessary Action
Preparation of reply
Recommendation or remark
Information and guidance
Note and return
Number and return
[Written :] Important— Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD
(The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables men-
tioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, supra^ will be found repro-
duced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen In-
vestigation. These illustrations will be found bound together follow-
ing the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)
SECRET
[75] Paraphrase of an outgoing. Drafting Section : Far Eastern G2/I.
Secret XX Drafting Officer : RSB.
Cablegram XX No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941
DEOEMBEm 5, 1941.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu,
Territory of Hawaii.
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some
information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that
you must obtain. Contact him at once.
MlI.ES.
[76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va., being
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, deposes and says :
On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceoding I was G2, Hawaiian Air
Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the
Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Comdr.
Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian
Air Force. During this jwriod of about one year I had not more than six con-
versations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These
conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the
last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton before 7 Dec 1941 was about October
1941.
The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He
stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge,
and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only
specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible
Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates.
I believe this was at least two months before 7 Dec. 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 39
[77] Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to
my Commanding General, General Martin.
On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was
then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached that hos-
tilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They ap-
parently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin. Attached are portions
of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct 1941, concerning this conference.
I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the
civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian
population.
Edward W. Raley, Col. AC.
Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Va.
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
[7S] Thursdiay Afternoon, 2 October, 1941.
Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had
Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who is on
intelligence duty down town ; and Major Meehan from the post — and their wives,
of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at the club. We assem-
bled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a few and then we adjourned
to the club where we had dinner and danced a bit. We thought a good time was
had by all and in your immortal phrase, it "was a good party."
The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was anxious
to get Bicknell's and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation. You
might gather from the public prints that United States — Japanese relations had
been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't think so. It seems to me that Japa-
nese— U. S. relations never were in a more critical state than they are at this
moment. I don't say [79] there necessarily will be a war between the
two countries right now, but I do say that never in the past has there been a time
when it would be easier to have one.
I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and he made
me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion and then, in
the fewest number of words possible, he summed up the situation in a fashion
that was just about perfect. I would have been very proud of myself if I had
had the situation as well ordered in my mind and was capable of expressing it as
well as he did. I've never heard anything so concisely and comprehensively ex-
pressed.
Daddy.
[Hand written :] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942.
EWR.
[80] War Department
washington, d. c.
Atfidavtt of General Charles K. Gailey
General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the Operations
Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C, being
duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was
Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of Japanese diplo-
matic messages which had been deciphered and translated it was the customary
practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these
to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Gerow. They would be
given me and I would get them to General Gerow as soon as practicable. I
recall that these intercepts were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or
Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing
them I do remember that it was either one or the other as a customary practice.
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not recall
having i-eceived any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusen-
bury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow did not receive
any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December 1941, I am certain that
they were not delivered to me as, if they had been, I would have given them to
him.
Chas. K. Gailey,
Charles K. Gailey,
Brigadier General.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C.
[81] War Department-
Washington
Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French
Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief
Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of the investi-
gation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supple-
mentary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top
secrecy is required, deposes and says :
During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was
Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington, D. C.
I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5
December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses
W. Pettlgrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my opinion
that the message was sent to the addressee for the following reasons : The
notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" indicate that the message
was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was assigned the "#519" and
that the message was then encoded with the code room sequence number as
the first word in the text of message. The coded text message, original and
carbon copy, was then sent to the message center. The carbon copy bearing the
time stamp of the message center acknowledging receipt was then returned to
the code room and checked with the original clear text message. The Signal
Center time stamp date -was then placed on the original clear text message,
which was returned the following morning to the office of origin.
In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time stamped,
was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and then the
message was word counted and placed at the operating position, where it re-
ceived a channel sequence number at tlie time of transmission which was
checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of the message
the operator put his initials and time of transmission on the face of the
message, which was later collected by a clerk who verified the "black number"
by a check off sheet before sending the message to file. This was a further
guard to assure the transmission of the message. At midnight these sequence
channel numbers were and still are verified with the distant end of the circuit
to assure that all messages as transmitted were received. This sequence
check was and is known as a "good night service."
Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have been
made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break in the
sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of checking
sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure and guard
againt lost messages.
[82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In
fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal Center, and
from my own experience prior to 7 "December 1941, the loss of a coded message
could not be recalled.
I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in possession
of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy is attached to the
affidavit of Colonel Pettlgrew.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 41
I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable receipts
book page for 5 December 1041 attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. The
entry shown thereon bearing serml No. 4 indicates that the clerk in the Signal
Corps code room receipted for the message by the initials "DG", which I recognize
as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves who was employed as a clerk in the Signal
Corps code room on r> December 1941, and whose duties included receipting for
such messages.
Edward F. Frencli,
Edward F. Fkench,
Colonel, S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of IVlarch 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C.
[83] War Department
washington
ArriDAvrr of Colonel Joseph K. Evans
Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as the
Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Ma.ior Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, sup-
plementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top
secrecy is required, deposes and says :
For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2,
Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was
Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.
There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between
the Army and the Navy at INIanila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities
for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each
Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were
encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted
at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and desig-
nated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at
Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese
information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to par-
ticular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence,
Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Eosie" Mason,
USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For
example, see Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Eoom
3501, 630 Fifth Avenue. Rockefeller Center.
I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States
by Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received in-
formation, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret
Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United
States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were
concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the
convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct
route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through
the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival
in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2
matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr.
Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these discussions I told
Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information [S.^] I had received
and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received tliis infoi'-
mation and at the same time.
Joseph K. Evans,
Joseph K. Evans,
Colonel, OSC.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen.
Major, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C.
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
185] Memorandum to : Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen.
From : Mr. Jolin E. Russell, President
Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H.
You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential
information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble
in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment
to that Territory.
My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. O. V. Bennett,
Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all
outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands and to endeavor to stop
sliipments that were en route there.
I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw
a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson ( then working secretly for
the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested
the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question,
is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorangum, and states that after show-
ing this message to me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield
and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records
of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.
On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows :
"Tliank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders.
It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps
on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precau-
tions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why
I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one
gets at times."
I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but
believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating
in the light of diplomatic exchanges than taking place. I do not believe that the
message said that trouble would begin on December 7th ; but as I told you today
the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in
the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a con-
siderable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.
I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw [86] light on
this subject ; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr.
Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject ; but I can say
that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I
have given you herein,
jer-m.
John E. Russeu,,
President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
April 10, 1945.
At Honolulu.
CONFIDBNTIAI,
[81A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941
We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments
in Indo-China :
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and
considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Wash-
ington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia
at present but will act in South.
You may infoi-m Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.
CO. Col. Bicknell
. Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
[87^] On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message re-
ferred to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945,
which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons
indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.
Honolulu, T. H. Harry L. Dawson.
April 16, 1945. John E. Russeli,.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 43
[88} Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers
Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, being
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says :
On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu,
T. H.
During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr. Joseph
J. Rocht'fort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet.
Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Capt.
Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District.
Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell,
MID, Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt.
Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the fore-
going persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings
with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes
be present.
I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr.
Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted [89] of an
intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical
units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss witli me his opera-
tions, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations,
until after 7 Dec. 1941.
Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was aware
of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements
and break in diplomatic relations ; and said to me if I suddenly call you and
say I am moving to the East side of the Island (Oahu) or north, south, or west
sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in
those directions from Japan. J passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell,
on that date. At no time did Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such
movement.
On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his informa-
tion that the Japanese Consul [90] General at Honolulu was burning his
codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveilance of the Consulate had
disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he was referring to information
intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and
London. This latter information was given me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7
Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec
1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese
Consulate & a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this
person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers.
This was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to
Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt. Mayfield
what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this
information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff meeting on 6 Dec. 1941.
On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the US & Japan
were breaking down & to be on the alert at all [91] times as anything
could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt. Mayfield Sr
Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information
from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C.
About the period 8 Dec to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a paraphrase
copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec 1941, of a radiogram
sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office
at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul
General, through which the movement of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could
be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui.
Robert L. Shivers.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at Honolulu
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[02] Amendment to Affidavit of Robert L. Siiivebs
CoiicerJiiiii,' the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., sijiiu-d Marshall,
(lilted 12 Dec. 1J;41, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding
that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this in-
formation from Col. Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in
Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to
which it relates. Comdr. Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given
him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on
7 Dec. 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on
7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message,
we got the original from the Mackay Radio Co.
Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian i)opulation
of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way.
because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give
the impression it created.
Concerning the AflSdavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945, I
talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans arrived in
Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the details of our con-
versation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the
information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit.
Robert L. Shivers.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[9.{] Amendment to Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, Who States Further:
Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P. I.,
called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific
area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British government, reporting
direct to the British Foreign Office at London ; that he had established Mr. Harry
Dawson, an English citizt^n and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as
the operative representative of the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr.
Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands,
but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertain-
ing to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to
Hawaii from Japan ; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2
at Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other
SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affect-
ing Japan ; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were
made for the receipt of such information [95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2
at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as propo.sed during the period
from July to and including December, 1941 ; that the files of the information so
furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon
which appear my initial ;
Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascer-
tained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several
years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate,
did not in fact cover one line to the cook's quarters ; I therefore covered this line,
which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his
important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified ; that
I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December
1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was
stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December, 1941, at the order of the
District [96] Intelligence Officer ; that had I known such ONI coverage
had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement.
Robert L. Shivers.
Robert L. Shivers.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945.
Henry C. Claitsen,
JA. Colonel, JAGD.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 45
[97] Telegram
Gov Jus
Hoover
FBI Justice
Washington, D. C.
RLS:PB
Honolulu, T. H., Deceml)er 5, 19ff5.
Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage confile J. Japanese consul
general Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.
Shivers.
Official Business.
[98] Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command
office of the assistant chief op staff for military intelligence
counter intelligence division
Box 3, APO 456
In reply refer to :
16 April 1945.
Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
Subject : Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible hostilities with
Japan.
1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C. W.
Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force,
and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area, on 29
November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with
information contained in a Secret Radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department,
from the War Department, dated 27 November 1941, which advised that negoti-
ations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that
subversive activities might be expected.
2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430,
29 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the
context of the above-referred to radio message, and it was suggested to them that
all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage
of Air Force installations and equipment.
Byron M. Meurlott,
Byron M. Meurlott,
Lt. Colonel, M. /.,
Assist. A. C. of 8., G-2 (CID).
At Honolulu
[99] Headquarters United States Army Forrces, Pacific Areas
office of the commanding general
APO 958
In reply refer to: 17 April 1945.
Memorandum :
Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 519, 5 Dec 1941.
On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General's Office
requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or record of receipt,
of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5 December 1941. The under-
signed instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in charge of the AG Classified Records
Division, to make the search and assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible.
The following is a brief account of the search made :
a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were in.spected and it was determined
that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on or about 25 January
1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who was on duty in the division
at that time.
b. A search was made of the AG decimal files and no record was found of the
subject radio.
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, oflScer in charge of the Signal
Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record was kept
of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept.
d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was assumed
that distribution in this headquarters would be made to Gr-2. Capt. Bosworth,
accompanied by Col. Clausen, went to G-2 and contacted Major Maresh of that
section. A thorough search was made of tlie Gr-2 Files by Major Maresh, in the
presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record was found of the radio.
e. Col. Clansen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on
duty in the AG CRD at the time.
As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of this head-
quarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl Harbor Investigation
Board's visit and no record was found at that time.
O. N. Thompson,
O. N. Thompson,
at Honolulu.
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant Oeneral.
[100] Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfeed
J. Holmes, USN.
Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl
Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (ret.) presently on duty with
JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of the investiga-
tion by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the Secretary of War, supple-
mentary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority
of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Naval personnel and records, and
that top secrecy is required, do depose as follows :
Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several
months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit,
Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT, and was in charge of the
radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHEFORT, ; that his duties included the
daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for distribution by Captain
ROCHEFORT ; that copies of the said radio traffic analysis summaries covering
the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941, taken from the
file of FRUPAC entitled "Communication Intelligence Daily Summary", are
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; that he did not maintain
or conduct any liaison with any Army officer, or exchange any information per-
taining to his functions or duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this
regard, he did not maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information
with Kendell J. FIELDER, G-2, Hawaiian Department.
Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for several
weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit,
Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the scope and extent
of his duties during said period included only the preparation of plots of posi-
tions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels, flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes
and positions of Japanese ships based on call analysis ; that these plots were dis-
seminated only to CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on
7 December 1941, and several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to
the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain
HOLMES and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows :
That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months
immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room, was
assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to
Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT ; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor
concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, referred to in the affi-
davit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT given Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN
and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch dated 28 November 1941 from
CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by British and ComSixteen for a
certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 29 November 1941 from OpNav [101]
to CinCPac concerning .Japanese broadcast schedules and, dispatch 1 December
1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPac concerning certain important Japanese
news broadcasts which dispatches have been microfilmed and are contained in In-
coming Code Book No. 1 ; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concern-
ing the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 47
of Captain ROCHEFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to
CinCPac concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Wash-
ington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and
by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple machines, which dis-
patch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1 ; that
the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in
Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from Com-
FOURTEEN to OpNav of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 No-
vember 1941, from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information
that Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6
December 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese con-
sulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system ; that the Communica-
tion Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and
including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit "A" herewith attached and
made a part hereof, and consist of a resume or evaluation showing the results
of traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications
only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHEFORT with copies thereof dis-
seminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A",
only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer ; that on 7
December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by
Captain ROCHEFORT did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese
diplomatic radip messages which required the use of a machine and the USN
decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the
on'y machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and cov-
ert d a Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.
Thomas A. Huckins,
Thomas A. Huckins,
Captain, USN.
Wilfred J. Holmes,
Wilfred J. Holmes,
Captain, USN.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Col, J/A/O/D.
at Honolulu, T. H.
Read and approved.
J. S. Holtwick.
J. S. Holtwick,
Cdr. U. 8. N.
[102] Morrill W. Marston, 07626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being first
duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen for
the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that
top secrecy is required, reposes and says :
My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated
15 Feb. 45 ; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2,
Hawaiian Department ; and had information, that the Navy had a cryptoanalytic
unit ; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison
with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts
of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the
local (MWM) development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occa-
sions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by
the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to
the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings ;
Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observa-
tions there was no alarm of the civilian population.
Morrill W. Marston,
Brig. Oen. U. 8. A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Col. JAGD.
at Honolulu.
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[103] Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed Soutli Pa-
cific Base Conimand, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed of the in-
vestigation by Lt. Col. Henry G. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and that top secrecy
is required, deposes and says :
Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record of this
message by looking carefully through the classified files and journals of incoming
messages covering said date; said files and journals being available this date at
Hq., POA, Ft. Shaffer and consisting, among others, of tlie following:
Classified, A. G. Binder 1 ; 370.2 Battles & Ileports of;
Classified, A G Binder 1 ; 091 Japan ;
Classified, A G Binder 1 ; 2S3.4 Espionage ;
Classified, A G Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information ;
Classified, A G Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298;
no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message could be
found, although it was the practice to [lOJf] set forth in said journals the
War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent number in this case,
519, could not be found as having been entered, but the preceding numbers 517
and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers 520 and 521, pertaining to mes-
sages dated during the time in question.
I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the file copy
shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial.
LoTJis R. Lane,
CWO USA.
Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at Honolulu.
[105] Fourteenth Nav^l District,
District Intelligence Office,
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel.
Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 19^5.
Sefret
Statement for Proceedings Supplementary to the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor
Board
This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is
based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago,
and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my
knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement.
The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around,
the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintainecl by the District Intelligence
Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received
almost daily transcripts and tran.slations of conversations monitored.
About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a
telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge
of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself
in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some em-
ployees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported
their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casu-
ally passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone
company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance
had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On
receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly
to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence
had been breeched by the DIO's having been given information concerning an
FBI tap.
When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI
protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to
consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be
a serious breech of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of
Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and
thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 49
ducted, Captain Mayflield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all tele-
phone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not
resumed until the [106] morning of 7 December. 1941, following the
Japanese attack.
It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District
Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such surveillances were being
conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from
gaining any currency in the organization.
Donald Woodnim, Jr.,
Donald Woodrum, Jr.,
Lieutenant, USNR.
[107] Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN
25 April 1945.
[lOS] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, being first duly sworn and informed
of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence
Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive,
correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to desig-
nated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet ; to provide Plan.s
and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of
current estimates ; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within
the U. S. Pacific Fleet ; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy
Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of
Fleets of potential Allies ; to supervise projects concerning aerial ph(?tographic
reconnaissance.
Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally
lie effected through established channels, i. e.. the Naval shore liaison or repre-
sentative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify
the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the
Combat Intelligence Officer. Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Roche-
fort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Cap-
tain Mayfield) : Captain Mayfleld was the District Intelligence Officer and
responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director
of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage
and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct
liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth
Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of
Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communica-
tions Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces
of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander
in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example,
I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District,
there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies
through that officer.
About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called
at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an
Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia,
Netherlands East Indies, Australian Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific
Ocean airports and airways information. I furnished him with 1109] all
the information was possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Air-
ways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he,
or his assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence
material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers
and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency.
By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources,
including Dutch. British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that
Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular
Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from
other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of
79716— 46— Ex. 148 5
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along
the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South
China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Haley and
we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance
thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my
recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every
other day.
During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941,
without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I im-
parted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had
previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previ-
ously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the
true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath
by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized
to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would
make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his
Cotomanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General Hawai-
ian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement,
I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as
follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-
Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese
landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that
Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North
Mayana, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand,
the pro-Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call
upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand
and an invasion of Malaya.
To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" informa-
tion that' we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included
in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic rela-
tions or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely,
America or Britian or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or re-
ceived at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him
of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic
Officials were destroying their Purple Machines.
[110] In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious
equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to in-
forming Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable
information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a
considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battle-
ships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. 1 distinctly
recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in
late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China
coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had
sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh
Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very
strict secret.
Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by
the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise.
I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a
telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He
said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I
should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied : "We cannot do
anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until
toinorrow morning."
In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands :
Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently,
,1 made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in
the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Jap-
anese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very ap-
parent. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins
concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Sur-
face and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High
Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.
When the U. S. Army projiosed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain
of the Japanese Mandates in late Noveniber 1941, I held a series of conferences
with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 51
(#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso
that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the
reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed
on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not
carried in aircraft. Colonel Kaley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on
all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots
on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This recon-
naissance did no materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him
of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the
Mandated Islands. Exhibit "B" is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulle-
tin #45-41.
[Ill] I do not specifically recall the term "A, B, C Block" or discussions
with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations
concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could
not permit Jap penetration.
My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel
Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of
us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far
East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct
liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the
Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters per-
taining to shore-side business.
From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders
returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's oflSce to
give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question.
I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I
believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference
with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them.
During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location
and activity of the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was
known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also
discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated
Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with par-
ticular emphasis on the Marshalls.
I had no oflBcial liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel
Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison
that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a sub-
ordinate Command of the Commanding General, HaWaiian Department. His
statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers
of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the War
Plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian
Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other
liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance
with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew
there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Oflicer Lt. Burr USN from Head-
quarters, Fourteenth Naval District, x)ermanently attached to the Headquarters,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct
liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of the information that
I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any
intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941.
I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to
at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission in
December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in 1944) , I am unable
to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with
the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.
[J12] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen,
marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of
these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787
on which I have written my initials and today's date.
E. T. Layton,
E. T. Layton, Captain, USN,
Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander U. 8. Pacific Fleet.
Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, J/A/G/D.
At Guam.
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[113] United States Pacific Fi^et,
Secret U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Pearl Har'bor, T. H., November 28, 19.',!.
Memorandum for: Atlmiral.
Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight lOver Mandates Islands.
1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air
Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this after-
noon at 1430.
2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet
Intelligence Bulletin No. 45^1, giving the general summary of the installations
and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised
me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circula-
tion except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders
of the Army squadrons tO' be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document
will not be carried in any aircraft.
3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the IVIARSHALLS, TRUK
and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK,
KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP.
4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference
and is working up meteorological data in Gonjunction with the proposed recon-
naissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of
medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and
fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that
hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.
5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive
armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day, depar-
tures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be
practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installa-
tions in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective
of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The JALUIT plane returning
via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and POKAAKKU. The
TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These return objec-
tives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective,
and existing conditions at the time.
6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to
Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI
(Greenwich Island).
7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences
after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots
on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff.
/s/ E. T. Layton.
ExhiUt "A"
[llJf] United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Cincpac File No. HRK
AA/FFl/(25)
Serial 01954
Peael Hakboe.
November 21, lOJfl.
Confidential
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.
2 BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE
AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IM-
PORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CARE-
FULLY PRESERVED.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 53
3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been repro-
duced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request
for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief
and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.
4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bullettin should be retained for
study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the
present National Emergency.
' P. C. Crosley
P. C. Ceosley,
By direction.
DItiTRIBUTlON: (7CM-41)
List I, Case 3 ; P., X.
Atlantic Fleet Al ;
Asiatic Fleet Al ;
One copy each to :
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11^ND14,
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.
Exhibit "B"
[U5\ TOP SECRET
Confiderttidl
Intelligence Bulletin No. ■l.'j-41
CONTENTS
(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS I'ages 1 to lli inclusive.
Major Fleet Commands Page 1.
Combined Fleet and First Fleet '" 2.
Combined Fleet and Second Fleet " 3.
Third Fleet " 4.
Fourth Fleet " 5 and 6.
Fifth Fleet " 7.
Sixth Fleet — (Submarine Fleet) " 7.
Carrier Fleet : " 8.
Combined Air Force . " 9.
Train for Combined Fleet " 10.
Japanese Naval Forces in China " 11 and 12.
(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS, Pages
13 and 14.
General Situation.
Air Distribution.
Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in Mandates
(2 pages to be pasted together).
Sketch of PALAO (PELEW).
Sketch of MALAKAL Harbor, etc.
Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc.
[116] TOP secret
(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941.
(10574)
The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and
replaces the former report on this subject.
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet
commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and
seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of siiecial task
forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regroup-
ing has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as
shown below.
54
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I. Combined Fleet
1. First Fleet
2. Second Fleet
3. Third Fleet
4. Fourth Fleet
5. Fifth Fleet
6. Sixth Fleet
7. Carrier Fleet
MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS
(Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2
Desrons
(Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc.
(Blockade & Transport Small craft.
Force)
(Mandate -Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and
many small units.
? ?
(Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons
(Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air (Seaplane tenders, etc.) 4 Airi-ons, & shore based
Force
II. Japanese Naval Forces ( Staff Headquarters)
in China.
1. First China Exi)ed, (Central China)
Fleet.
2. Second China (South China)
Exped. Fleet.
3. Third China (North China)
Exped. Fleet.
4. Southern Exped. (Saigon)
Fleet
planes.
1 PG and 3 DD's
Gunboats
1 CA, 1 CL and small
craft.
Torpedo Boats, etc,
1 CL, transports and mine
craft.
[117] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service
than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and
the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time.
The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly
increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing.
COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET
YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)
MAGATO, Flagship
FIRST FLEET
Batdiv One
NAGATO (F)
MUTSU
YAMASHIRO
Batdiv Two
FUSO (F)
ISE
HYUGA
Batdiv Three
HIYEI (F)
KONGO
KIRISHOIA
*HARUNA
Crudiv Six
KAKO (F)
FURUTAKA
AOBA
KINUGASA
Desron One
ABUKUMA (F)
Desdiv 6
IKAZUCHI (F)
INAZUMA
SAZANAMI
HIBIKI
Desdiv 21
NENOHI (F)
HATSUHARU
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA
Desron One (Cont'd)
Desdiv 21
SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SHIGURE
Desron Three
SENDAI (F)
Desdiv 11
FUBUKI (F)
SHIRAYUKI
HATSUYUKI
Desdiv 12
SHIRAKUMO (F)
SHINONOME
USUGOMO
MURAKUMO
Desdiv 19
ISONAMI (F)
SHIKINAMI
AYANAMI
• URANAMI
Desdiv 2o
AMAGIRI (F)
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI
Total : 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD.
•Note ; The HAKDNA b^s been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major
repairs.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
55
urn
COMBINED FLEET
SECOND FLEET
TAKAO, Flagship
Crudiv Four Desron Two (Cont'd)
TAKAO (F) Desdiv 16
ATAGO HATSUKAZE
CHOKAI • YUKIKAZE
MAYA AMATSUKAZE
Crudiv Five* TOKITSUKAZE
MYOKO (F) Desdiv 18
NACHI KASUMI
HAGURO ARARE
Cnidiv Seven KAGERO
KUMANO (F) SHIRANUHI
MOGAMI Desron Four
MIKUMA NAKA (F)
SUZUYA Desdiv 2
Crudiv Eight YUDACHI (F)
TONE (F) MURASAME
CHIKUMA HARUSAME
Desron Tioo SAMIDARE
JINTSU (F) Desdiv 9
Desdiv 8 ' ASAGUMO
ASASHIO (F) YAMAGUMO
ARASHIO MINEGUMO
OSHIO NATSUGUMO
MICHISHIO Desdiv 2-'t
Desdiv 15 KAWAKAZE (F)
KUROSHIO YAMAKAZE
OYASHIO SUZUKAZE
NATSUSHIO UMIKAZE
HAYASHIO Total : 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.
♦Note : There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.
[119] THIRD FLEET
TAKAHASHI Ibo— Vice Admiral
NAGARA, Flagship
NORTHERN BLOCADE FORCE 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE— Con.
CHOGEI (F) Desron Five
Subdiv Desdiv 34
HAKAZE
AKIKAZE
YUKAZE
Subdiv TACHIKAZE
1st BASE FORCE
Maru (F)
Minelayer Divisron
2nd BLOCKADE FORCE ITSUKUSHIMA
Desron Five AOTAKA
NATORI (I') HATSUTAKA
Desdiv 5 Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21
ASAKAZE AM-1 AM-7
HARU0AZE AM-2 AM-8
MATSUKAZE AM-3 AM-9
HATAKAZE AM-4 AM-10
Desdiv 12 AM-5 AM-11
SATSUKI AM-6 AM-12
FUMITSUKI Ounboat Division 1
MINATSUKI 6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing
NAGATSUKI Vessels)
56
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THIRD FLEET— Continued
2nd BLOCKADE FORCE— Con.
SUBCHASER SQUADRON
(F)
Subchaser Division 1 and 11
PC-1 PC-7
PC-2 PC-8
PC-3 PC-9
Subchaser Division 21 and 31
PC-4 PC-10
PC~5 PC-11
PC-6 PC-12
27 AP-Naincs Unknown
2nd BASE FORCE
Maru, (F)
Minelai/er Division 17
SHIRTAKA
YAEYAMA
KUNAJIRI
At least 5 other men of war, and 17
merchant ships.
•Total : 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS. 6SS, GCM,
12 AM, G XPG 12 PC, 46, AP.
\I20]
FOURTH FLEET
HiRATA — Vice Admiral
KASHIMA, Flagship
Cnidiv Eighteen
TENRYU (F)
TATSUTA
KASHIMA
Desron Six
YUBARI (F)
Desdiv 29
OITE
HAYATE
ASANAGI
YUNAGI
Desdiv 36
MUTSUKI (F)
KISARAGI
YAYOI
MOCHITSUKI
Subron Seve)i,
JINGEI
Snbdiv 26
R0-6(1
RO-61
R0-«2
Siibdiv 27
RO-Gf)
R0-6(;
RO-67
Subdir 33
RO-63
R0-(i4
RO-68
Siibdiv
S XPG
[121] 4th BASE FORCE
Truk, Headquarters
IMaru (F)
Guard ^Division Jf
Maru (F)
4AP()rAK
FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-
TRUK
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding Air Group #17 and
Ponape Detachment of 4th Def.
Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th
Def. Force, Olol Detachment of
4th Def. Force, Greenwich De-
tachment 4th Def. Force, Mort-
lock Detachment 4th Def. Force,
Pingelap Detachment 4th Def.
Force, Puluwat Detachment 4th
Def. Force, Lamortek Detach-
ment (Hall ?) of 4th Def.
Force.
5th BASE FORCE
Saipan, Headquarters
SHOE I MARU (F)
Giiard Division 5
Composition unknown
Minelayer Division 19
OKINOSHIMA (F)
TOKIWA
Subchapter Division 56
KASHI (F)
XPG 561 (?)
XPG 562 (?)
XPG 563 (?)
Gunboat Division 8
Composition unknown
9 AP or AK
FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-SAI-
PAN )
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding Air Group #18.
Tenian Detachment, 5tli Defense
Force
PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense
Force
Snrveif and Patrol Division
KOSHU
KATSURIKI (CM)
KOMABASHI (AS)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
57
FOURTH FLEET— Continued
FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE— Con.
Repair and Salvage Division
MATSUEI MARU
NAGAURA (MARU)
Srd BASE FORCE
Palao, Headquarters
Maru (F)
Guard Division 3
Maru
Subdiv 6
RO-56
RO-57
RO-58
RO-59
Subchaser Division 55
Maru (F)
XPG 551 (?)
XPG 552 (?)
XPG 553 (?)
XPG 554 (?)
THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ
PALO A)
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding Air Group #16 and TOBI
detachment of 4th Defence Force
Detach. 4th Def. Force -
Estimate these unknown loca-
tions to be SOROI, HELEN
REEF, ULITHI, YAP and AN-
GUAR).
6th BASE FORCE
Jaluit, Headquarters
TAKUHAN MARU (F)
6th BASE FORCE— Continued
Mine Siccepcr Division J(J
NAGATA IMARU ( F )
CHOKAI MARU
DAIDO MARU
IKUTA MARU
Maru
Maru
Maru
(This may
be the
SALVAGE
Unit known
to be in
6th Base
Force)
Subchaser Division 5
PC-51
PC-52
PC-53
SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-
Jv^LUIT)
KAIKEI Maru
#5 FUKU Maru
Maru
Miscellaneous Forces ashore in-
cluding AIR GROUP #19 at
IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and prob-
able Air Groups at WOTJE and
KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is.
( Kwajalein Atoll ) . Detach-
ment 6th Defence Force KWA-
JALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll),
TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll),
ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok
Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENY-
BOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI
Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE
Atoll— Detach, of 6th Def. Force,
UTIRIK Atoll— Detach, of 6th
Def. Force.
Total : 4 CL 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS. 1 Sur-
vey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM,
41 AP or AK.
[122]
FIFTH FLEET
CL (F)
The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.
The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.
SIXTH FLEET
(Submarine Fleet)
KATORI, Flagship
Subron One
TAIGEI (F)
Subdiv 1
1-9
1-15
1-16
1-17
Subdiv 2
1-18
1-19
1-20
Subron Two
KITAGANI (F)
Subdiv 7
I-l
1-2
1-3
1-7
Subdiv 8
1-4
1-5
1-6
58
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FIFTH FLEET— Continued
Subron Three
NAGOYA MARU (F)
Subdiv It
1-74
1-75
SiiMiv 12
1-8
1-63
1-69
1-70
SiiMiv 20
1-71
1-72
1-73
Supbron Five
YURA (F)
Subdiv 28
1-59
1-60
Sttbdiv 29
1-61 (Sank 10-2-41)
1-62
1-64
Subdiv 30
1-65
1-66
•Note : The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.
Subron Six
KINU (F)
Subdiv 9
1-123
1-124
Subdiv IS
1-121
1-122
Subron Ten
KARASAKI (F)*
Subdiv IS
1-53
1-54
1-55
Subdiv 19
1-56
1-57
1-58
Subdiv 21
RO-33
RO-34
Total : 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.
[123]
CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)
CV KAGA Flagship
Cardiv 1
Cardi/v Jf
AKAGI
ZUIKAKU
KAGA (F)
SHOKANU
Desdiv 7
Desdiv 3
OBORO (F)
HOKAZE
USHIO
SHIOKAZE
AKEBONO
NAMIKAZE
AKATSUKI
NUMAKAZE
Cardiv 2
Cardiv
SORYU (F)
CV KORYU
HIRYU
CV KASUGA (MARU)
Desdiv 23
Total : 10 CV, 16 DD.
UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
YUZUKI
Cardiv _
RYU JO (F)
HOSHO
Desdiv 11
ISOKAZE
URAKAZE
HAMAKAZE
um
COMBINED AIR FORCE
Kanoya 'Naval Air Station, Edqtrs.
Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The oi-ganization provides for great
mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the
Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups
(e. g the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely
wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air
groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
59
Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accord-
ingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings
into which the various units may be combined.
Ship-Based Squadkons
Shoke-Based Aib Groups
Air Ron 6
8th Air Group
KAMIKAWA MARU (F)
10th Air Group
FUJIKAWA MARU
11th Air Group
KENJO MARU
12th Air Group
(Has been working with the
3rd
14th Air Group
Fleet)
16th Air Group
Air Ron 7
17th Air Group
CHITOSB (F)
18th Air Group
CHIYODA
19th Air Group
MIZUHO
23rd Air Group
(Has been working with the
1st
Chichijima
Fleet)
Chinkai
Air Ron 2-i
Genzan
KAMOI (F)
Hyakurihara (or
Moribara)
1 XAV
Iwakuni
Yokohama Air Graup
Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Chitose Air Group
Kashima
(Has been working with the
4th
Kasumigaura
Sasebo
Fleet)
Kisarazu
Suzuka
Patrol Squadron 2
Kure
Takao
NOTORO
Maizuru
Tateyama
(Formerly with Air Ron 6)
Oita
Tsukuba
Ominato
Usa
Omura
Yatabe
Saeki
Yokosuka
TOTAL : 5 AV, 3XAV, 35 Air Groups.
U25]
SHIRETOKO
SATA
TSURUMI
SHIRTYA
IRQ
TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET
ONDO
HAYATOMO
NARUTO
MAMIYA
ASAHI
AKASHI
MUROTO
OTOMARU
SETTSU
Total : 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.
[126]
JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA
KOGA, Mineichi — Vice Admiral
IZUMO, Flagship
Shanghai Base Fokce
ASUGA
TSUGA
KURI
HASU
Shanghai Harior Affairs Section
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai
Nanking Base Force
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking
Central China Fleet, or First
Expeditionary Fleet
KOMATSU, Teruhisa-
UJI, Flagship
Patrol Division 11
ATAKA
SETA
KATADA
-Vice Admiral
Patrol Division 11 — Continued
HIRA
HOZU
TOBA
ATAMI
FUTAMI
FUSHIMI
SUMIDA
HASHIDATE
Air Oroup 10
Hankow Base Force
Kiukiang Base Force
Gunboat Division ? ?
SHINFUKU MARU
HITONOSE
CHIKUBU
Total : 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.
(F)
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA— Continued
South China Fleet, or Second [127] North China Fleet, or
Expeditionary Fleet Third Expeditionary Fleet
SUGIYAWA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral
NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral IWATE, Flagship
ISUZU, Flagship Patrol Dwision 12
Crndiv 15 IWATE (F)
ISUZU (F) MANRI MARU
ASHIGARA Torpedo Boat Division 11
Patrol Division I4 HATO
SAGA SAGI
AM-17 KARI
AM-18 KIJI
Torpedo Boat Division 1 Torpedo Boat Division 21
OTORI CHIDORI
HAYASUSA MANAZURI
HIYOBORI . TOMOZURU
KASASAGI HATSUKARI
G^itard Divisio7i 15 KARUKAYA
Guard Division 16 Gtinboat Division 1
Canton Base Force Gunboat Division 2
Ammj Base Force Gunboat Division 13
Haitian Is. Base Force Gunboat Division IJf
13 Special Service Ships Tsinqtao Base Force
Total : 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM, Southern Expeditionary Fleet
13 INIisc. KASHII (F) (CL)
SHIMBUSHU (CM)
AP
Total : 1 OCA, 1 DD, S TB, 1 AP.
[128] (B) Japanese Forces and Installations in the Mandated Islands.
1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently
administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons
units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative
jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly re-
sponsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the head-
quarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating
base.
2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned,
the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense Forces ("special Landing
Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed
to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison
force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil
Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working
in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists,
navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of
naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high
frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities in-
creased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries eraplaced on strategic
islands of key Atolls.
3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of
facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940,
probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of
naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-
merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased
in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traftic,
the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some
forty odd vessels.
4." The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the
Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil
Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered
at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka
as the Mandates are in the First (HQ— YOKOSUKA) Naval District.
5. The Conunanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate
commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet ; they iiave a designated Flag-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 61
ship ;uul M Hea(l(iu;ir(ers oi- Adniiiiistraf ive Section, the latter remaining ashore
at the home base regardless of the movements of the connnand or the Flagship.
Piach Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of which are sta-
tioned on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have
been reported to be attaclied to the PAIiAO BASE FORCE.
\ t'29] a. Consideralile air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN,
PALAO-PELELIU, TRIIK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close
cooperation has l)een noted between the Defence Forces and tiie Aircraft activi-
ties at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been
subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes. Bombers and
Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE,
have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI-
TARI, and BERU).
7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in tlie Mandated
Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may
be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this
subject. In addition to those listed in Table A. there are a number of potential
bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, v^'hich may be
used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for ''priority two" development.
8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present
distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical dispo.sition
rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is :
Identiflcatioti Location Includes
Airron 24 Marshall Area (AV) KAMOI
(AV?) Maru
ex-CHITOSE Air Group
ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group PALAO Area
16th Air Group PALAO Area
17tb Air Group TRUK
18th Air Group • SAIPAN
10th Air Group IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit
Atoll)
Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE
Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN
? AIR GROUP TRUK
The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of
total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely : 62-268 planes.
Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
(Pages 130, 131, 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A show-
ing tlie distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the
Mandates, a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These
pages will be found reproduced as Items Nos, 2, 3, 4, and 5, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Chuisen Investigation. These ilhis-
ti-ations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits
of tlie Clausen investigation.)
[loJf] Notes to Accompany Sketch of Jalu;t
1. Aviation Facilities. — Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of
housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated
between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel
fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air
fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940). Eighty planes reported based here
(November, 1940).
On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp
and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as
present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.
2. Headquarters — Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of
Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post
Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores.
Good bituman and powdered coral roads.
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Radio towers. — Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet
high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).
4. Shore Batteries — Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile water-
front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940
but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Bar-
racks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).
Mobile Batteries — Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed
trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).
5. Oovemment Pier — 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped
with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end
of pier (1940).
6. Mole — 150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW. cor-
ner of J ABOR (1933).
7. Co»spfc?/OMs red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936).
8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY
Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).
9. Two tuildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from
one of them (beaching gear? — small marine railway?). A gasoline storage lo-
cated near the two buildings. (1936.)
(Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be
found reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound to-
gether following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)
[iS6] Exhibit "A"
U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit
Box 103— Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, % Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
18 APRIL 1945.
Received from Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages
covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1 November
1941 through 6 December 1941.
[i37] Communication intelligence summary, 1 November W^l
General. — Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but
traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls
only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed
that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so
state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change
amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but
it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve.
All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls
were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the
major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this sum-
mary will deal only with general impressions.
Combined Fleet. — The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic.
The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to
addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement
of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little
tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.
Carriers. — The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from
Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.
Submarines. — Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined
up yet.
Third Fleet.— This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST
BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy
with Tokyo.
China.— The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several
messages from Saigon.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 63
[138] Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 19^1
Qeneral. — Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair
but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call
system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system
not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls.
The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system.
So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.
Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic
is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating
many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and
BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus
are originating periodic despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI.
There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet
commanders as addressees.
[iS9] Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941
Qeneral. — Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Re-
ceiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to
emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and
the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities
of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports
to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent
on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI
messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).
Combined Fleet.— Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelli-
gence Tokyo ,the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Pei'sonnel. Com-
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the
mandates, principally RNO PAliAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined con-
tinues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.
Third Fleet. — Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement re-
port by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third
Fleet for information.
Air.— A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The lit-
eral reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new
organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate
that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7)- while never identified seemed
to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon
movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3
with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a
command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occured before but
under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air
Force continues at a high level.
[140] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941
Oeneral. — Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical
traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tac-
tical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Com-
manders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one
other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.
Air. — High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air
despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO in-
cluded for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addi'essed to SANCHOW
Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an
addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to
SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two
unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Comman-
der in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO and others. The Com-
mander Combined Air Force addressed a messaged to Commander in Chief Third
Fleet.
Mandates. — The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander
in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA.
The PALOA weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the
islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change
in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.
Submarines. — No activity noted.
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[/.}/] Commnnication Intelligence Summary, 5 Novemher lOJfl
General. — Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving
conditions were fair to good. TOKYO vxey active as an originator, sending
out many messages of general address. Two WIAVI messages in Kana Code
sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified) respectively.
The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many
despatches passing between the two.
Third Fleet. — T\vo units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area.
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and Y0A2) it is not known
how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander
in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected
that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from
him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the
Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.
A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CAKDIV 4 appeared today at
BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd
Section ?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The
Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several
dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND,
TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAI-
HOKU originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China
Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Em-
bassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo
China Forces.
BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet
Commanders.
The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from
TOKYO.
Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there
is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which
will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and
will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown
extent.
[l-'i2'\ Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 Novemhcr, 19.'il
General. — Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered* somewhat.
Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly
Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a
member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are
addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message.
The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance
in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be
the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo
addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and
Submarine Force.
Takao-Bako Area. — It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concen-
tration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force
including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an
unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet
were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now en route
BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second
Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South
China «Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.
Comhined Fleet. — A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing
with secret (tactical) calls in use.
Mandates. — The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth De-
fense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active
units.
[i^.?] Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 Noi-cmher, lO'/l
General. — ^Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use
of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all
Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which at-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 65
tached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet
forces, many of wliich have not yet been definitely identified or associated with
known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix
"JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that
a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are
participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill."
Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to
congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentra-
tions in that area.
Air. — Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly cen-
tered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates in-
cluded in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Com-
mand included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate
activities in long headings.
Fleet. — Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifica-
tions are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.
^ireatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to
facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet
traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.
[144^ Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 19^1
General. — Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing
on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff
Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a
despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air
Force, unidentified fleet unit. Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This
may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the ludo-
China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were
used vei-y little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were
heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air
Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits
were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate
addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end
and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included
in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base
Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air
movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified.
Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with
the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him
as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth
Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or
will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth
Fleet in the lower island areas.
Fleet. — Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio.
Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main
force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha
area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC
Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander
and to movement oflices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic
from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese i-adio station
at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore
at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.
Air. — Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area
between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly
concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of
a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be
nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval
Minister, Commanders of CarDivs, Combined Air Force, First [14^] Fleet
and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes.
This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a
number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly .some
units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force
highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much
traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at pres-
ent most traffic includes Palao.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 6
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[/ 'i(l\ Couimnnication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, J9.'fl
(l(')iir(il.~-Tviiffie volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but
lieavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Min-
ister'sent several messages of general address including one to all First and
Second class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general messages carried
SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and
there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from
Takao. The P^lagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area.
Some tactical tratJic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The
association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may in-
dicate operations of that unit in the Mariaunas. The JINGEI was communi-
cating with SAMA, HAilNAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China
Force is in Tokyo.
One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAI-
ZURU for delivery but this is believed a comumnication error. The Third Fleet
appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic
passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth
Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The
Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.
[///7] Commnnication Intelligence Summary, 10 'November, lO'/l
General. — Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer
general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence
still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Man-
dates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progress-
ing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.
Combined Fleet. — Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of Bat-
Div Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this wliole division is
there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two
cruiser divisions.
Third Fleet.— The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several
movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted
other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC
Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.
Fourth Fleet. — Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk
with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Sub-
marine Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit.
Fifth Fleet. — One imit of this fleet located at Chichijima.
Air. — The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Car-
rier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier
Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still
in Takao.
[IJfS] Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition
about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with
most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net
was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators
have conunented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of
the major naval activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over
this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite
lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still
sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic
has been mostly from the technical bureaus.
Combined lleet. — The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area.
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates
stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which
places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their
position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No
subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV
are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of
this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet
remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 67
^ir.— CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE.
Most of .air activity confined to dispatclios between carrier and shore establisli-
inents.
Fifth fleet. — Nothing to report.
Fourth fleet. — The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volnnio
of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Connnander Submarine Force
is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addres.sed a message there.
AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Com-
munication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area.
YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.
China. — The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo Cliina Forces and
bases continues.
[1^/9] Communication Intelligence Summary J3 Noremher IDJ/L
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several mes-
sages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are :
1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief
of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval
Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Stafl: Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet,
INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet
and SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA,
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Com-
bined Fleet.
This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelli-
gence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet In-
telligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.
The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near
CHINKAI) , JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.
Combined Fleet. — The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is oper-
ating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BAT-
DIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is com-
municating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division
remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they
are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser
Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that
area.
Third Fleet. — Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been
active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief
Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several mes-
sages but no indication of change of location.
Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with
the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He appears
to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUB-
RON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement
r^wrt, but no indication of direction.
[150] Air. — Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with
them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined
AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level be-
tween its component Air Corps still exists.
China. — The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO
TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.
[,1511 Communication Intelligence Summary, IJf November 1941
General. — Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving
conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav
dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.
1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet,
information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet,
Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified
unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Com-
bined Air Force.
Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in
addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount
of activity.
Conihined Fleet. — Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still
operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet
units appear active in the traflBc. They are DesRon Three (normally in First
Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second
Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traflJc with the South China
Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China
area in near future.
Third Fleet. — Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic
It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the
Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air
units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?
Fourth Fleet. — No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were
addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.
Siihmarines. — No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and
S-ubmarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo
and Yokosuka originators.
Air. — One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN,
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation
of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in
port.
1152] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 Nove^nier 1941
Oeneral. — Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages
originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato,
U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and
Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Com-
munication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore
addi'esses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to
D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication
Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were
detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements
for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one
Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel
and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and
shore. Significance is not determined though it is belieA'ed possible that a fur-
ther partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air
station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet
originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication
Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv
Three flagship.
Combined, Fleet. — ^Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC
Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging
operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.
Third Fleet. — Inactive.
Fourth Fleet. — Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or
underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth
traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi)
and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement,
direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified
Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.
Suhmnrine Force. — Little activity detected. It is believed that some sub-
marine activity is operating or preparing to opei'ate in the Marshall area, from
communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 69
Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has
been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure
associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have
been made.
[153] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 19^1
Air. — Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron
(formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees
in traflic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed
to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.
The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of
traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of
alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes avail-
able for research.
[15^] Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 Novemler 1941
GENERAL. — Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A
new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted
on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch
appeared ; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried
in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all
in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading
fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.
A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets
and general addresses to this effect :
"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a
decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows :
1. Resolution of House of Peers — (Expressed deepest thanks and
emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period
to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives — Expressed thanks, etc.,
to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4%
years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the estab-
lishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of
all hands, etc. ."
First and Second Fleets. — Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain
in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most
active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be :
Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven.
It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role
in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some
*of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-
China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have
thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other
dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Di-
visions and the Mandates. [155] It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron
One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division
Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been
operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch fo the ATAGO,
Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises
in that area.
Third Fleet. — Believed inactive in Sasebo — Kure area.
Fourth Fleet. — FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an
unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinG. Combined Fleet, Com-
munication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer,
CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEC 66, believed to be a shore based
air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.
Fifth Fleet. — Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of
the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval aux-
iliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the com,-
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
posit(in of tliis mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating
in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Mai'cus.
Suhmarincs. — Little activity. Communication Oflicer. Submarine Force orig-
inated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined
Fleet Communication Oflicer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet
Commands continues.
[156] Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 November, 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal \iith receiving conditions good. More trafiic
with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches
numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the
call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour
and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages.
It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading.
Since none of this traflic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated
in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted.
Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan
controlling.
Combined Fleet. — No movement from the Kure area of any major jwrtion of
the First or Second Fleets. The CinC, Second Fleet very active as an originator
today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his com-
mand. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Paloa Forces, and the Chief
of Staff Fourth Fleet.
Third Fleet. — Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third
Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Paloa.
Fourth Fleet. — The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered
about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both
these activities originated traflic.
Air. — The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by
the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the
exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.
China. — Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku ad-
dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC. South China,
and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.
[151] Communications intelligence summary, 18 November 194I
General. — Traflic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions
fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address
emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL
and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet flor
information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an
urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff
South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator,
believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet,
Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet.
MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Com-
bined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and
for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent
three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active
today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent
one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China
Force.
Combined Fleet. — CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator
and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every
important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he
is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and
the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was
addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dis-
patch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dis-
patches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two
destroyer squadrons have been associated in traflic. Several dispatches occurred
today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in
several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 71
to liini. Theso form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be iu command
of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some
carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home
waters has been noted.
Third Fleet. — The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears
to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, informa-
tion to CiuC. Third Fleet. There wore other units tentatively placed in Third
Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an
addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area
in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic
with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transi)orting air units or
equipment.
Fourth Fleet. — Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between
this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.
[158] Communicatimi Intelligence Sutnnianj, 19 'November 19^1
Qrnei'al. — Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates
w^as noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light.
Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There was been a
noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen.
Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both
within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently
addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has
subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the
past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Sec-
ond Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy
Minister .sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with
all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to
major commanders.
Combined Fleet. — The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today
at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer
Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second
Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force,
French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three.
• Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago
and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed
the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The
Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CiuC. French Indo
China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.
Third Fleet. — Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and
of the Ba.se Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction.
CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.
Fourth Fleet. — Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base De-
fense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet
was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has
been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it
appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is
not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at
Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.
Fifth jF?ee?.— Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared
in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.
[159] Communieation Intelligence Summary. 20-21 November WJfl
General. — Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal.
Tokyo originators active with haessages addressed to all major commanders.
N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of
Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become
very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The
activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his i-ecent high
volume of messages vdth a long four part message addressed to all major com-
manders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net,
indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The
traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that
the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Combined Fleet. — Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area
and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three
still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues
abnormally high. A list of units addres.'^ed by him or who sent traffic to him
and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows :
MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) ENO 7 (Unidentified)
TAE 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit)
KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified)
TAWI (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified)
KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified)
RESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified)
AKI 0 (Desron 4) KONA 0 (Unidentified)
TIYA 7 (Co'mdr. 1st Base For) NOTU 6 (Unidentified)
SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified)
YOMO 9 (Desron 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified)
REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified)
KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentified)
MIMO 3 (Air Unit?) MARE 5 (Unidentified)
TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus.
This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but
only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with
the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now
in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made
up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second
Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will
either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it
will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out — so far there
has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets
in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has
not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Man-
dates traffic.
[160] Commnnication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 'Novem'ber 191fl
Mandates and Fourth Fleet. — ^The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have
remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken'
to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the
Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the
R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it
may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just
which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is
no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force
which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed
there and the IMaru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area.
With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday repjorted as either a carrier unit or sub-
marine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine
Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than
that existing at Palao.
[ifii] Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941
General. — Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now
completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other
messages, one to CinC, Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Sub-
marine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to
CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed
Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka.
Another ilnidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority" message to all major flags
and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed
one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second
Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Com-
mander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three.
Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon?
While the Drection Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more
bearings than usual for that station,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 73
Combined Fleet. — ClnC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidenti-
fied calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet
was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined
Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders
was very great. One message addressed many units as follows :
CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE5 (Crudiv?), K002 (SubronsS) TIYU 66
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3),
RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and
unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo),
Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1( ?) (at Kure), SATU 8 ( ?) (at Kure), META 0
(AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU2 (?), NARI 33
CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC.
Comb. Fleet).
Third Fleet.— CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN-
BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief
of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces
with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association with Com-
bined Air Forces.
Fourth Fleet. — CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at
Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka.
He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.
China. — The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC.
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secre-
tary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions,
Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.
[162'[ Comnmnication Intelligence Simimary, 23 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has. increased. Some
of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed :
1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore
Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Southern Expedi-
tionary Force.
Precedence
NIKA-WIWI
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information
Combined and Southern Expeditionary
Force Chief of Staff.
NIK A
3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern
Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-
KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.
WIWI
4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship
NWA 2, Information Tadio Tokyo and
Second Fleet flagship,
NIKA
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure,
Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.
KIU
Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet,
Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio
in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI."
An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio
circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following :
KENU 3— CruDiv 7 Flagship?
. HOWI 2 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
EKE 8 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
MUSE 5 — Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.
The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by
CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the
forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.
Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of
fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter-
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in sum-
maries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most
active unit in today's traflfic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway
[163] in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force
and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp.
For.) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air
Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence mes-
sages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that
area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic.
Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other.
With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more sub-
marines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to defi
nitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange
between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet
with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and
that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to
relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various
frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while
the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.
Air. — Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate
area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three
definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.
China. — CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air
Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from
Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed
questionable.
Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days
and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or
actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces oper-
ating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gather-
ing in the Palao area.
[164] Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 'Noveniber, 1941
General. — Ti-affic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal.
Traffic analysis impresses are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficul-
ties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and
fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area.
If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the
assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic,
the following impressions are worth something :
(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage
of what appears to be movement reports.
(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat
addresses.
The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary
Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch
traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force
Commander with the latter.
Fir.it find Second Fleet.s. — Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call
believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch
to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Connnander South-
ern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The
CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a
large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three
.-i.nd Combined Air Force imits.
Third Fleet. — Largo number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some
of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet ap-
pears as information addresse on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet
units indicates that these two fl(>ots will be closely associated in any future
operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division
Three with Cine. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet nnd Mandates.— Yom-ih Fleet appears to be concentrated in
Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have
''Otue from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of
subTiiarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 75
Subinarines. — Comparatively little activity.
China. — Comparatively quiet.
CarriGrs. — No definite indications of location.
Combined Air Force. — Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area.
Otherwise no change.
\_165] Commtmication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 19Jfl
General. — Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units.
Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet,
CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus
Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. A
Direction Finder Not, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being
sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to
the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet
complete.
Combined Fleet. — Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet
remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and
South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron
arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously
arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates
the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchang-
ing messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and tlie
Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.
Air. — Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has
been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined
Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this
is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the
Mandates. '
Fourth Fleet. — CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications
with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Car-
riers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base
Forces.
[166'i Communication Intelligence Su/mmary, 26 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-
Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past
week. Intra-fieet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching
AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed
a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second
and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was
first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today
than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet
and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the
ISUZU (fiagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations
directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).
Combined Fleet. — Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indica-
tions were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this
unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present) alt
Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the
traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker
HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well
as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the
newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the
Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.
Fourth Fleet. — No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communi-
cation with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Sub-
marine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.
Fifth Fleet. — The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of
the Second Fleet and is as.sociated with the new Task Force.
Submarines. — As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima
area. The Submarine Squadron NETES's location is somewhat uncertain today
due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is
doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her
previous association with Cruiser Division Seven,
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
China. — Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.
Third Fleet. — Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from
the Sasebo area.
[167] Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the
frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch.
Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active
as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of
Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of
Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief
of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence
activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction
Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including
the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.
COMBINED FLEET. — No further information as to whether or not Destroyer
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division
Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several
messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator
lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined
Air Force, and Bako.
THIRD FLEET. — Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama,
South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses
is increasing, those occurring today were :
"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)
"KOROKUKITISIKI"
"KIZUKEYAMASTTABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)
"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"
There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.
FOURTH FLEET.— CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to
the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Com-
mander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps
held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering
Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks.
Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating
in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division
Five in the Mandates.
AIR. — An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU
and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of
further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.
SUBBIARINES. — Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.
[168] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 19-^1
General. — Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has
been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and
is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages
to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the
Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to • NRE0 (the TOKYO
D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This
Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Com-
manders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating
at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS.
TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the
Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force.
The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent
one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet,
Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The
BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air
Corps at SAIPAN.
Conihined Fleet. — ^No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units.
Commander in Chief Second Fleet oi-iginated his usual number of despatches to
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to
by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 77
DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO
(CA).
Third Fleet. — Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander
in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present
wth the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere.
The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the
Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and
are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.
Fovrth Fleet.— Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief
Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth
Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held
communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.
South China. — SAMA sent several me.ssages to shore addresses in the Empire.
SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went
for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the
Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China P'orce and
Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and
YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON
originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The
Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed
his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Com-
mander in Chief Third Fleets.
Submarines. — Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two des-
patches there was no submarine activity today.
[169] Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 19Jfl
General. — Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very
high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Hokyo-Takao circuit but
was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up
of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages
during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio in-
telligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders.
In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in
reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direc-
tion Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much
activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Com-
mander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual
two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet,
Third Fleets Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has
been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose
address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has
no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR
FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI
is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is un-
known.
Combined Fleet. — The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is con-
firmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor
denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the
immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet :
CARDIV THREE DESRON TWO
SUBRON FIVE DESRON FOUR
SUBRON SIX THIRD FLEET
CRUDIV FIVE FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE
GRUDIV SEVEN
Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet
definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and
South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Com-
mander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above.
Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was
addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF.
The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.
Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron
Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One
and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Com-
mander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made
movement reports.
78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fourth Fleet. — Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in
Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force.
He is still in TRUK area.
[170] Submarines. — Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed
through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.
South China. — CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed
several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander
in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and
the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.
[171] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 19^1
General. — Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic con-
sisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November.
No reason can be given for tlxe retransmission of these messages unless the
high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of des-
patches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The
only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several IVIARUs.
The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major
Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff,
Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force ;
Submarine Force and China Fleets.
Combined Fleet.— The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet
are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not
at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander
in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and
Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them
as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no
longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two davs. The RNO
PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN
Army Headquarters).
Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to
COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second
Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief
Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander
in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.
Fmirth Fleet. — Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Mar-
shalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Sub-
marine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of
JALUIT and Commander SiAmarine Force plus his known progress from the
Empire to CHICHIJUMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the
Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls
some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a sub-
marine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration
of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of
the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA
AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations
from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers
indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this
has not been confirmed.
South China.— BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets,
Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming
more and more active as an originator witli despatches to the Ta.sk Force.
He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information
addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was
addressed at Shanghai today.
[172] Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December lO'jl
General. — ^All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1
December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or
more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service
calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing
for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior
to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from
one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 79
more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December
indicates tliat an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that
promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dis-
patches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large
number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make
it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.
First Fleet. — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside
of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet
is operating with the Second Fleet Task I'orce that this fleet has ceased to
operate in a prominent role.
Second Fleet. — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in
the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play
an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that
this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force
are definitely in the Indo-China arua (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer
Squadron Three most prominent).
Third Fleet. — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second,
Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces
continues.
Fourth Fleet. — No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.
Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report.
Suhmarines. — Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the
area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere
in this general area.
Carriers. — No change.
Combined Air Force. — No change,
[i75] Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941
General. — The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent con-
fusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet.
There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after
it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the
same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and
Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these
fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports,
there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In
several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Sum-
ming up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of
Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close
enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to
Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from
making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area.
To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable
amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the
Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in
Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh
Bay. This gi'oup is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six,
which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included re-
peatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.
There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by
major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao
and Third Ba.se Force is holding the same relative importance.
First Fleet. — Despite the lack of positive identification, the First Fleet appears
relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have
been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may
be two supreme commanders with stales. As an example, traffic routing indicates
one Combined F'leet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and appar-
ently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with
the Second and Third Fleets.
Second Fleet. — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days.
This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the
belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three ai'e unlocated and unobserved
since change of calls.
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[174] Third Fleet. — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect
way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.
Mandates. — Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some
traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through TrulJ.
Carriers. — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today.
Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. How-
ever, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is
evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.
Combined Air Force. — This force continues to be associated closely with Second,
Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have
undoubtedly left the Takao area.
[175] Communication Intelligence Stimmary, 3 December 1941
General.— Traf&c volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state
of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The
extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification
of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The
Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC
COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Toyko Intelligence originated
nine despatches to the same addresses.
The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is
indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo
he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both
SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio
Intelligence means.
There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including
some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known.
The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC
FOURTH.
Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the
RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.
No information on submarines or Carriers.
[176] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 Decem'ber 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio
today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so
that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few mes-
sages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of
urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major co&manders.
Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of
Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South Cliina Fleet, French Indo-
China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major
commanders.
Combined Fleet. — The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes-
sages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously
very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not
yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed
to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now
believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the
apparently conflicting evidence is due ,to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU
broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet
sent one message to an unidentified imit for information to Third Base Force
Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet.— The CinC. Fourt Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Com-
bined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron
Twenty-four, Tliird Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No
further clieck could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the
Marslialls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed
to be an oil tanker).
South ChiHa.—Bi\\io continues as an active originator addressing many mes-
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Com-
manders, all units in that area quiet.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 81
[177] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941
General. — Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broad-
cast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation.
There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working
SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traflic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic
to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic
for these units also. It is noted that some traflic being broadcast is several
days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio or-
ganization.
There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused
by the jammed condition of all circuits.
A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to
Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Po-
litical Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what
you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are
doing, specific orders will be issued soon."
Comhined Fleet. — Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have origi-
nated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving
their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther
south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic
from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.
Third Fleet. — In one WE address a "Chief of Stall:" sent a message to "Com-
mander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYON-
GUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been address-
ing the CINC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet. — The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer
of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression
that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South
China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the
Commander Second Fleet.
South China. — SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO
continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third
Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the move-
ment of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are
moving, probably to Indo-China.
[178] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941
General. — TraflSc volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being
transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This
is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of
confusion In traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now
holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts),
SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.
Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with
the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of
TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes of high priority.
Combined Fleet. — Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders.
These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers,
Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.
Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK
area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that
some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite
close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in
South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff
of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being
almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose
command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO
weather observer.
Fifth Fleet. — This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO
broadcasting traffic for this unit.
Submarines. — The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to
his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is
definitely in the MARSHALLS.
South China. — Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAQ still sending
many messages to the Task Force.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 7
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[/7.9] top secret
Hk.\i)(;uarters United States Army Forces
pacific ocean areas
APO 958
In reply to :
POSIG-483 27 April 1945
Memorandum : To Lt. Col Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you
handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief tliere are no copies
of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal Center,
Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in Ihe Signal
Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear
traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are
no records, including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any
information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter.
Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as to whether this
message had been received and they have been negative.
2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept num-
bered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to
said intercept at the time stated was as follows :
Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the
Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they
were intercepted, I have this to report:
There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show
whetlier or not these intercepts w^ere made by MS-5. The fact that Wash-
ingtoii gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept
was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an
indication to the contrary.
As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report :
Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via
airmail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of intercept
each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an index sheet.
The entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular date was then fastened
together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper. Upon
notification of the impending departure of the Clipper all accumulated
air-mail trafiic together with a letter of transmittal and a classified docu-
ment receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department
Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files
section of the Department AGO.
[180] The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing
Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately c^nce each
week, but this schedule was frequently internipted because of weather con-
ditions. It is known that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship because
of the long delayed departure of a Clipper. The only messages transmitted
to Washington by radio were those specially selected in accordance with
instructions from the Chief Signal Officer. The message in question was not
within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been
included in the special instructions.
My search in this regard included:
A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication Service,
Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such records as
have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station #5
at the time in question show that this station was intercepting traffic
between Japan, Asia and Euroi>e.
In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning the
originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington,
and received this information.
"Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign
does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 014037 appears on
traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Inter-
cept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941".
A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic
forwarded are available previous to 1943.
3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to
the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 83
not monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters
were used on the Trans-Pacific radiopliones circuit between Honolulu and the
mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between
Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and
design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December
1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using
a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this
installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu
terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much
more complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old in-
verters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the
A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.
Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the
Tokyo teclinical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a
new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able
to understand the conversation.
[181] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had .lust
been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell
Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that
Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone
circut.
C. A. Powell,
C. A Powell,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Signal Officer.
At Honolulu
top secret
[182] United States Pacific Flekt
Radio Unit
commandant, navy 128
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.
JSH/rec
EF37/A6(1)
Serial Z-4225
Top Secret
27 April 1945.
Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. Clausen.
Subject: Information.
1. I regret that results of search 'for amplifying information on the subject we
discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.
2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given)
Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A. Cole, USN. and
Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieu-
tenant Lankf ord
8. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for question-
ing. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan
Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and
used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in prac-
tically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broad-
casts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs
of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases,
split-phone watches were used.
4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government
Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to
those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which usually contained weather in-
formation.
5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at any
time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was naturally
secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.
J. S. Holtwick, Jr.,
J. S. Holtwick, Jr.,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
By Direction.
At Honolulu
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[183] Affida\t:t of Theodore Emanuel, USN
Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C.
Calusen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says :
Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I vras assigned to the District Intelli-
gence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with
Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was called to active duty, about
1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of
mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my
understanding that [ISJf] Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and
activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originat-
ing in and going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at
Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from
January 1941 to dnd including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some 5 or 6
lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and
reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This
traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The trans-
lator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr, USNR.
Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAOD.
Theodore Emanuex
Chief Ships Clerk, V. 8. N.
top secbet
[JSo] Affidavit of Lieutenant General
Richard K. Sutherland
Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ,
Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the investi-
gation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of
War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor, and that
top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE.
I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit
"B", consisting of a file^ of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To
the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of
the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those
relating to the negotiations at Washington, D. C, of Kurusu. I did not see
the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or imple-
menting message, I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the head-
quarters.
I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November
1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelli-
gence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald
Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and,
as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, ACofS,
G-2.
The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept
station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic
messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence
Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted
and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were
delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the
Hq. USAFFE.
Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were re-
ports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures
of ships in Manila Harbor.
Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination
was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.
R. K. SUTHFJJLAND.
Subscribed and sworn to befoi-e me this 6th day of May 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAOD
at Manila, P. I.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 85
top secret
1186] Affida\t:t of Genekal of the Akmy Douglas MacAkthub
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander,
Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation
by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supple-
mentary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy
is required,, deposes and says :
Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding Greneral, USAFFB.
I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Ex-
hibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages.
I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see thei
messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing
message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq.
USAFFE.
I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941
and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this
intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being trans-
mitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.
The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept
station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic
messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at
Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these
messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS' oflScer who delivered
them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages
was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned
the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had
facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this
intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army
I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the
hands of the Navy.
Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information
and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on
a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.
Douglas MacAkthur.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen.
Lieutenmit Colonel, JAGD.
at Manila, P. I.
[1S7] Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby
t, Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ,
Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation
by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the.Secretary of War, supple-
mentary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy
is required, deposes and says :
Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE.
I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designed as Top Secret Ex-
hibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages.
I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before,
except isolated fragments of the Kurusu diplomat message series. Concerning
those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone
else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any acti-
vating or implementing' message, nor any notice that such a message had been
transmitted or received.
Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December
1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the
basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appeal's to have been
disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British
Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq.
USAFFE, and as such had contact with me an<i my predecessors, in 1941. (See
Appendix A).
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army
in the I'hilippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting,
translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The
Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for
decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code
messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple"
machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the
Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the
Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq.
USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and
source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army.
(Siee Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were
handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C, now deceased, who was the Army liaison
with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries
from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States
military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the
Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on
which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this
intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was
exclusively a Navy function.
C. A. WlLLOUGHBY.
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henky C. Clausen,
Lieut. Colonel, J. A. O. D.
at Manila, P. I.
2 Ends :
Appendix "A" — Re Col G. Wilkinson.
Appendix "B" — Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service.
TOP SECEET
[188] Appendix "A"
affidavit
8 May 1945.
The British SIA messages, their purjwrt and evolution and the curious role
played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this
investigation, in my opinion.
The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of infor-
mation and a sort of E. Phillipps Oppenheim international intrisue.
Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law,
in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years ; hence, the casual reference to a
"Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson,
suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson
combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a
secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information ; contrary to U. S.
Lavs', he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding,
in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine
Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over,
he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed ; the intelligence ma-
terial he desired to file with me ; they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap mili-
tary data and some sprinkling of China-based i-eports. It became apparent to
me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he
possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became con-
vinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-
Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition
but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and
executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide ; it is still
in operation ; I employ botli STA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one
but themselves and the Empire.
My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high — a horse-
trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents
not all of the messages sent ; the commercial deductions are obvious : Davies can-
celled sugar shipments in the nick of time.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 87
Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a mili-
tary status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the
outbreak of the AVar, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the
Japanese-occupied city ; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for tlie
duration.
We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to
Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report "home" though his stuff was
severely edited by me ; the General hnally sent him to Wavell's Headquarters,
as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system ; he then made his way deviously
to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his "status" with
GHQ, USAFFE; he was "promoted" to Colonel and attempted to return to our
Headquarters, as a "liai.son" ; he even had the support of the Prime Minister ;
with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side,
except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly de-
moted and attached to duty with the British Ofiice of Information at Washington-
New York.
C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. Willoughby,
Major General, O. S. C,
Asst. Cfiief of Staff, 0-2,
General Headquarters. 8WPA.
top secret
Affidavit
1189] Appendix "B"
8 May 1945.
In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly eflficient cryto-analytical
service, specializing in Japanese material ; though the Army had notably parti-
cipated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained
a lead ; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed on almost monopolistic -
privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though evei-y modern
nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole
enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the
whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue :
as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, for-
warded via 7th Fleet D. N. I. ; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of
Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select,
and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection
is as evident now as it was in 1941. Tlie only excuse the Navy has is that its
field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other
incidental traffic. This collateral traflSc is not always understood or correctly
interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.
The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, inter-
locking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the
freest interchange of messages and interpretation.
The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent
intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with
November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl
Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or
November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was
involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.
C. A. Willoughby,
G. A. Willoughby,
Major General, G. S. C,
Assst. Chief of Staff, G-2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.
[190] Statement
Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly sworn
and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says :
1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months
prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organiza-
tion of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows : a
small administrative section of one officer, two clerks ; a public relations section
of two officers and three clerks ; a combat intelligence section of two oflBcers and
several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency ; a counter-intelli-
gence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that
time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt Col George Bicknell and located
in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 Section
was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the
section was small and the duties varied.
2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest
of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and on
interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British
SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese
communications.
3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard against
internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication
certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was cus-
tomary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office
where summaries and estimates were prepared.^ Prior to December 7, 1941,
the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with sub-
versive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the
Territory of Hawaii of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to
me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing
should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the
public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week
of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military
establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by
other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall
of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications
should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about
friction between local Filipinos and Japanese.
[1911 4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned
somewhat as a special staff section : the Contact Officer, Lt. Col Bicknell, had
direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this sub-
section of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was
known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section". I refer to attempting to ob-
tain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the
Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat.
5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings,
usually on Saturday morning : at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief
summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented
the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of in-
formation to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7
December 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my
attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at
headquarters and were in contact many times each day.
6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their com-
bat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of in-
formation between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do
primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me
by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Jap-
anese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that
relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent,
but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for
Hawaii.
7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by G-2
in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander
Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broad-
cast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The Winds" message. J
have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it
come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col Bicknell
for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 89
Captain Mayfleld, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer ; particularly since
the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly
important. The contents and details of "The Winds" message were never made
known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferi-ed with Com-
mander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not
tell me if he did.
8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific
Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and
assumed that if any information which [192] I needed to know was pos-
sessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now -that had I
asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not
have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned
any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have
given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt Col Bicknell.
The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified princi-
pally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-
aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons.
The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the
Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that
prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt Col Raley, was in
liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific
Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Com-
manding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until
after the war started.
9. I have been shown by Lt Col Clausen a file containing information received
by Lt Col Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a re.sponsive chord
in my memory but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention
prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my
attention.
10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence
Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given
to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who
according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any
of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming
from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was getting
the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Roche-
fort did not give it to me direct.
11. Col Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit
"B" which are intercepted Japanese despatches. I had never seen any of them
before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to
December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and
papers which was related by Col Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6,
1941. I gave this latter information to General Short the same day. With re-
spect to Top Secret Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior
to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that
he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General
Short had seen these messages prior to December 7. 1941, he would have ordered
Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Com-
manding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff.
Kendall J. Fielder.
[193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henky C. Clausen,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.
At Honolulu, T. H.
[194] TOP SECBEH^
Affidavit of Beigadieu General Thomas J. Betts
Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Asssistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first duly sworn
and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive
Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence
Division, War Department General StalT, Washington, D. C.
In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the nsajor
intelligence problems confronting the Militai'y Intelligence Division and with
a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of
the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentalized the handling of all Ultra
messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton
was assisted by Major Duseiibury. GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel
Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both
from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed
Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the
War Depatment.
In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages,
from whomi they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of
my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form
or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during
the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question
Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the
Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed
me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I
further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message im-
plementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been i-eceived. I do not recall
that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further
believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would
have remember it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person in-
formed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an imiplementing message had been
received.
Thomas J. Beits.
Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945.
Heni-y C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen.
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Frankfort on Main, Germany.
[195] supreme headquarters
Allied Expeditionaey Force
office of the chief of staff
15 June 1945
Affidavit of Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith
Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF, being
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Wash-
ington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that
capacity and during the iieriod mentioned, I received from representatives of
Gr-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret in-
formation which I later learned included various Intercepts of Japanese radio
diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then
called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose
to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the
Chief of Staff. I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what
messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribu-
tion or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always
given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would
always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If
received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as
he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered
to him at his liome when the A. C. of S.. G-2, considered the contents lu'gent.
The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected with these
intercepts, but T do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall
specific details.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 91
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:
1. On ") Dec l!J41, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information
from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese
"Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic [196]
relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over
with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the
information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the
Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have
had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me,
and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division
had acted I did not want to. discuss the matter further ;
2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always
in person to the officers concerned ; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there,
lie delivered the pouches to me for delivery to The Chief of Staff ;
3. During November and December 1U41, Colonel Bratton reminded me that
the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown
the Chief of Staff without delay ;
4. On Dec 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the
Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese
Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States.
(I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the
effect that instead of giving these to me it "'may have been one of others.")
My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows :
1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However,
since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the
A. C. of S.. G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct
access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or
authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to
intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an
"Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any informa-
tion to support his contention that I should step out of [197] my rather
minor province.
2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other otficer of G-2 delivered the
pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever As-
sistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence.
When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was
to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office,
or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the
contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were
so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat
would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he hap-
pened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally
sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in
the absence of a Duty Officer.
3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches
contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown
to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division
who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of
Staff's office as indicated above.
4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time on the eve-
ning of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I
am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted
radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to
the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which
I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so in-
formed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its con-
tents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra".
If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have
been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either
by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.
W. B. Smith,
W. B. Smith,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Heney C. Clausen,
Lt. Col., JAGD.
at Frankfort on Main, Germany.
92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[19S] Affidavit of Lieut. Genekai. Leonard T. Gebow
Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and
says :
During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief,
War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington,
D. C, some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which
had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered
in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representa-
tives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I
received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts
were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no
evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form
of intelligence.
Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, desig-
nated Top Secret Exhibit "B". I recall the general substance of some of these
messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate
dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and
23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to
reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and
coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to the Navy, I
assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this informa-
tion in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with
other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection
is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and
disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and
Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places.
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect :
1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's
attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy
their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and
then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas com-
manders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following
this. Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion
he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to
confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds
Code."
2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, informed General
Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal
breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow
replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.
3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered
to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843.
[199] My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:
1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that
if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite prop-
erly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, wlio had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a
matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and
if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief
of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.
2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mis-
taken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal
Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or in-
terpreation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information
of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the atten-
tion of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by
a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 93
prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing
message to tlie Japanese "Winds Code." If I Iiad received such a message or
notice tliereof, I believe I would now recall* tlie fact, in view of its importance.
It is possible tligit Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or
that he had received some tentative information which was subject to cpn-
firmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in
either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be
more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so
many major events have intervened.
3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until
the morning of 7 December 1041, when a conference was held with the Chief
of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December
1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and in-
formed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was *
always open to me.
In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any
written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl
Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan
or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions
receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent
events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis
powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United
States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my
staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involv-
ing possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by
the Axis powers.
I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warn-
ings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respec-
tive commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice
to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared
for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him.
The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in
efl'ect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in
the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates
[200] with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to
writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great
deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for tha<r
purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military
opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department.
Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully
cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary
threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his
thinking, and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice
ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit
pr^arations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the
War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department esti-
mates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these
estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that
he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established
military practise. I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy
was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the
Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments
to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at
Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that
information sent by either Department which would be of use -to the other
service would be exchanged between tlie two commanders at Hawaii.
So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 37 November
1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and
Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well
as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my under-
standing that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities,
was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports
and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, Gr-2 had
available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not
included in Top Secret Exhibit "B."
Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully
against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how
it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the policy of the
War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom
of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed infor-
mation, or if the actual intercepts, bad been sent to Hawaii, then the same
procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas com-
manders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii.
This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this
highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us
for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's
intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolonga-
tion of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible
defeats.
L. T. Geeow,
Lieut. Gen. V. 8. Army.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
at Cannes, France.
TOP SECRET
[201] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONE2r. ROBEET E. SCHUKRAFT, SC
Colonel Robert E. Schukraf t, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence
Service, Signal Section, MTOUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy, being first duly sworn,
and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for
the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Wash-
ington, D. C, in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War
Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio inter-
cept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties
I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and
decoded and translated.
Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the
time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", numbered
25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Fi'ancisco intercept station
to intercept all plain test Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from
Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and reports in to me. To the
best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up.
I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and
a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts
in Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25349 and 25497, but in which the person
at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said
something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I
refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept
or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941.
I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy."
I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was
i-eceived from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2.
As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of
my former superior Colonel Minckler ; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and
Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel
Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams.
Robert E. Schukraft.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at Caserta,
Italy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 95
[202] George W. Reucliard, presently on duty at the American Embassy
to the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and in-
formed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for
the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June
13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July
7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and incorporate
herein the allegations thereof as my statement in response to similar questioning.
Geobgd W. Rexjohard.
Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1945.
Henry C. Clausen, _.
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[2031 John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London,
England, being first duly swoi-n and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolu-
tion of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required,
DEPOSES AND SAYS :
During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time there-
tofore, I was a Foreign Service OflBcer and a personal assistant to the Secretary
of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during this period from two
United States Army officers named Bratton and Dusenbury, who were then I
believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels, allegedly representing the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C, various intercepts of official
Japanese messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were
handed to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also
handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr. George W.
Renchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of State, and were
at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representa-
tive of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of my recollection, complete trans-
lations of the deciphered code texts. I do not recollect that except for possibly
a few instances receipts were required when they were of course always given.
If, however, delivery was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged
representative of [20 Jf] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary
of State was normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that
any copies were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned
while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the time
of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery of and the
volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my recollection of any specific
details regarding any one or several deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact
time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept
indicating the possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and
the United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my
attention.
Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in question
by the alleged representatives of G— 2 as mentioned, the function was performed
period icallv by officers of the United States Navy, presumably of the Office of
Naval Intelligence, and it is my recollection that on one or more occasions
information of this type was brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by
a Naval officer subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army
officers undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I recollect
no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer prior to the attack
on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I interpreted as indicating the
possibility of said attack.
John F. Stone.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAOD.
at London, England.
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
top secret
[203] Affidavit of Major Genebal John R. Deane
John R. Deane, Major General, USA, being first duly sworn and informed of
the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of
War, supplementary to proceedinjis of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that
top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the
War Department, Washington, D. C, as Assistant Secretary, General Staff;
On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other
l>erson, any pouch for the Chief of Staff ;
On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the
same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was between
9 and 9 : 30 a. m.
John R. Deane,
Major General, USA,
Commanding General, U. S. Mil Mission mith U. 8. S. R.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at Potsdam, Germany.
TOP secret
[206] Affidavit or Coi.onei, Rufus S. Bratton
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, 0-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S. HQ.,
BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation
by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint
Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is
required, deposes and says :
Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testi-
mony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements and
afladavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W. Pettigrew,
Colonel ; Ralph C. Smith, Major General ; Charles K. Gailey, Brig. General ;
Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General ; Walter B. Smith, Lieut. General ; Leonard T.
Gerow, Lieut. General ; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel ; John F. Stone and George
W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the yarned persons to
Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.
During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto,
as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2, I
received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of Japanese
diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and distributing to au-
thorized officials such of these intercepts as were matters of military intelligence
value. In the period of about October to December, 1941, the volume of these
intercepts increased to such an extent that with the permission of General
Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major
or Lieut. Colonel Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in
processing, assembling and distributing tliis material. These were distributed
in the raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation
to the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed by
the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December, 1941, au-
thorized by the Chief of Statf, were, so far as G-2 distribution was concerned,
the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief,
War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By agreement between
the Assistant Chief of Staff, (j-2, and representatives of the Office of Naval In-
telligence, the President was served by representatives of the Navy. The normal
procedure was to secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Aide to the
Secretary of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the
Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed and
thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by the repre-
sentatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then burned with the
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 97
corresponding receipts^ which wero given to assure the ultimate destruction
of the material. During the period October to November, 1941, the G-2 received
daily about fifty to seventy five of these intercepts which were sorted to about
twenty per cent for distribution, and which twenty per cent represented sucli
of the documents as had intelligence value.
It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so that the
various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I am unable to
recall at this time except as may be hereinafter [207] mentioned, and there
are no records to show, who delivered what to whom during this period, with any
degree of accuracy.
Concerning the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall a meeting about 5
December 11)41 with General Miles and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, at which
Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a
possible implementation. There had been several "false alarm" reports to this
same effect. In view of an intercept which had already been received and trans-
lated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy of Japan at Washington to
destroy their codes, in my opinion an implementation message to the "Winds
Code" was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose would be
to effect a destruction of the codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I
verified that the Japanese Embassy at Washington wei'e burning what appeared to
be important papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting men-
tioned, to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation
message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese. Colonel Sadtler
never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any additional information
on the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether Colonel Sadtler. after getting
the purporte<l implementation message mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then
Secretary of the General Staff, or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War
Plans Division, and in effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more
warning. I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's
report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by rea-
son of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc,
were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any imijlementing
message to the "Winds <_'ode" indicating Japanese aggression against Great
Britain.
At no time prior to 7 December 1041, although a thorough alert in this regard
was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the
"Winds Code". In connection with testimony of Captain Safford on this subject
to the effect that two copies of such a message was sent by the Navy to the Army,
it was the customary practice for the Navy when sending the Army material of
this character, to send six copies. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the
Navy had discussed with me several "false alarms", but no one in the Navy had
discussed with me, nor to my knowledge with any one else in Gr-2, the message
supposed to have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford.
The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington,
to destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for distribution to the authorized
recipients.
The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No.
25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when
I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the oflBce. We assembled and studied
the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock p. m. After re-
ceipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe
was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likeli-
hood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was' not, as
there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then as-
sembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients.
[208] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff
to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home
in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock p. m. The sets of these thirteen parts
for the ACofS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of War were not de-
livered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7
December 1941, with the fourteenth part. They were not given to General
Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General Galley or General Ralph
C. Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were they given that night to General
Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of StaflC the morning of 7 December
1941, he then had the fourteen part message, which I had not given him. About
ten o'clock p. m. on 6 December 1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 8
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to the night
duty oflScer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the night duty oflScer
was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest importance that the papers
be placed in the hand of the Secretary of State at once. He assured me that
this would be done. This was the only delivery I made that night. I then
went home to bed and returned to the office the following morning between
7 : 30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteenth part of the message came to
my desk about the time I reached my office. It was processed at once and
about 8 : 30 a. m. it was sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I
did not deliver any material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Wash-
ington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at
1 p. m,/1941, Japan's reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave to
the Chief of StafE between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning. The
last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for delivery by
either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my opinion the fourteen
part message mentioned was relatively unimportant, in view of the other mes-
sages which preceded it, especially the one ordering the destruction of the
Japanese codes and ciphers and the one ordering the delivery of the fourteen
part message at one p. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteen part message was
merely the formal announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break
which, from the evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed
the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles
the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the fourteen
parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff the morning of 7
December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came into his possession.
Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my
statements here, including among other things as to the processing and de-
livery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and considered
changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now repre-
sents my best recollection of the matters and events set forth, and a better
recollection than when I previously testified before the Army Pearl Har-
bor Board, and is made after having my memory refreshed in several ways and
respects.
RtJTUS S. Beatton,
Col., G. 8. O.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris, France.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieut. Colonel, JAOD.
{2091 Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtleb
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on duty
at Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation
by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board pursuant to Joint Resolution of
Congress, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :
Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given me
on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that following my
second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth on
page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, I did nothing further to ascertain from /Vdmii-al Noyes or any
other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which he had
conveyed to me, and as far as I know nothing further was done to get further
information from Admiral Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information
before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned me was an intercept which would,
according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the
Army.
I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 De-
cember 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 2.")4 of the ti-anscript mentioned, without
getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and
without informing any reijresentativos of G-2. I was alarmed by the series of
Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a
considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 99
Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with
General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified hefore the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building,
and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be
sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows
and quoted herewith from memory :
"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii — Panama. Reliable information indicates war with
Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repeti-
tion of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."
I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recol-
lection of the drafting of this pi'oposed warning message. I did not show it to
anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no copy at the
time. After I had typed this message I conferred with General Gerow and Gen-
eral Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did
not [210] show them the warning message I had typed.
I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in aflidavits
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, re-
ferring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my con-
ference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the
comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits
mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows
concerning this subject :
General Gerow. — "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel
Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely
a Signal Corps oflBcer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or
interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of
such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of
the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps
oflScer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December
1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese
"Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I
would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel
Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative
information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be
written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the
fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this
time, especially so since so many major events have intervened."
General Smith. — "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has
stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of
opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division,
both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I
had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler
would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since
I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for
him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step
out of my rather minor province."
I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention whii'h
pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941. The
actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that the Panama
Canal would be the surprise attack target.
[Hand written : Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col.
Bratton, Genl. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whoever may have been in Gen. Miles' office
at the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7, 1941 I did not give any
other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.]
[211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending
such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", and
so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War
Department.
I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative
of Gr-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders, and I deny
the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman given to General Carter W.
Clarke on 13 July 1945.
I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the
effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiter-
ate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute ujessage
mentioned by Admiral Noyes.
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the
effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deiwsit box concerning
the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have imt collected any such material in k safe-
deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do have possession of the
testimony given by me before General Carter W. Clarke on two occasions, 16
September 1944 and 14 July 1&45, which was given to me by General Clarke,
and is now in a private box in my home.
Otis K. Sadtler,
Otis K. Sadtleb,
Colonel, S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clatjsen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[212] Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herkon
Major General Charles D. Heri'on. presently assigned to the Office Chief of
Stafif, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation
by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplemen-
tary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolu-
tion of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, desposes and says :
Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August
1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General
Short to relieve me as Conunanding General, Hawaiian Department, which com-
mand I had held since October 1937. I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could
with my experience and knowledge of affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was
to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time
in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days.
Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I
sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material
relating to the connnand, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of
five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits.
Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether
he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers
and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco
but that he had not given them much time while en route.
I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining
to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This
included my giving him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my
estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that
Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified,
efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him
my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the
Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my
experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on
receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated 17 June 1940,
reading as follows :
"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible
trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public
hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest
maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret
communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnish you shortly.
Acknowledge."
[213^ I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed
with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the
assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government.
I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations and gave
him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island.
Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii,
he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the
subject of command and related problems.
Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in
1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise a
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 101
War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting
to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take
whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the
War Depai-tment at the earliest possible moment.
Charles D. Herron,
Charles D. Herkon,
Major General, U. S. A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HE^^RY C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[214] Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles
MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First
Service Command, being tirst duly sworn and informed of the investigation by
Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of
the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August
1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any
statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived
from Top Secret sources then called "Magic", or any intimation that such sources
existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my api)ear-
ance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter
W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the
Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any
facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form
of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accord-
ingly, I obeyed that instruction.
My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light, therefore.
In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available to the War and
Navy Departments in Washington, D. C, intercepts of Japanese radio messages to
their diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world. These were
inteix-epted, decrypted, decoded and translated by the two services in Washington,
D. C, under arrangements for mutual assistance in this regard and for their
dissemination. So far as the Army was concerned. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who
was the head of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was
G-2, War Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from
this source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieuten-
ant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which contained information
valuable from a military intelligence standpoint. The latter was then distrib-
uted by these officers to various officers and persons who had theretofore been au-
thorized to receive them. Those on this authorized list, in the several months
immediately preceding 7 December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by
the officers mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the
Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant Chief of Staff,
WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases. The brief cases con-
tained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate destruction of the material
thus delivered. The cases were returned to Colonel Bratton's office when they had
been read, the receipts they contained having been initialed by the authorized
officers. The material and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This in-
telligence was distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are
any records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the
dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I do not
think that any such records were made at the time.
Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top Secret Ex-
hibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date I am unable to
recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any particular messages translated
prior to that date, except those bearing Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373,
25322, 24878, 25432, 25138, 25435, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727,
25545, 25640, 25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages
contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The remainder
of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Ajmy serial numbers 25874
and 25877, summaries of which were shown me by Colonel Clausen, nor do I know
how these two happened to be omitted from the Top Secret Exhibit "B", in the
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
preparation of which I was not iii any way concerned. I must add, however, that
I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 19il, all the messages contained
in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated prior to that date except number
25843. ily belief is based on the fact that they were of such importance that my
oflacers would have assured themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do
not recall simply do not register in my mind after nearly four years.
Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the Jap-
anese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship move-
ments in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into districts for such
reporting, I would like to point out that such messages were primarily of Naval
interest and what might have been expected. Of course the Japanese were fol-
lowing the movements of our major ships, as best they could, as we were doing
with regard to their ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages
mentioned also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured
four years.
Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit
"B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc, or members
thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.
The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in the Top
Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts, were known to
me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about because I was dining at
the home of my opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral
Bearsdall the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson,
who transmitted it to me.
Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief in the
period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting, decrypting,
decoding and translating this material, consisting of Japanese diplomatic and
consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in connection with the fleet. I was given
so to understand by Naval sources, but I do not recall who told me.
Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with Colonel
Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning information re-
ceived by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible "Winds Code" execute
message, I cannot specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the
information stated. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute
message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hos-
tilities. In the event of the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit
it immediately to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of
G-2 was especially alerted to watch for this message since receiving information
of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of vital
cotncern. I have some recollection that there were several messages intercepted
which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not
to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It is my
belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred,
concerned such a message. It may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about
Commander Rochefort, on that date.
As to the meeting the morning of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of Staff,
according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made shortly thereafter,
I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at the Munitions Building at about
II a. m.
On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible surprise
attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my service in the Hawaiian
Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3. It was while so assigned
that I [216] prepared and disseminated a General Staff study, afterwards
disseminated further by General Wells, on the defense of Oahu. This study em-
phasized the advantages which an attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might
give Japan. The usual assumption in war planning during my assignment was
that of a surprise attack made with little warning in the nature of strained re-
lations internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one situ-
ation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday morning.
During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J. Clear
to be sent to the Far East for undercover work for G-2. He made reports to
G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through Colonel Brink at Sing-
apore.
My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman, given
to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the Navy the
type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War by Colonel Clau-
sen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 103
Hai'bor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person.
Specifically, to my knowledge. General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any
copies of a possible "Winds Code" execute message. Nor, to my knowledge, were
any records of Gr-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor and derogatory to the "War De-
partment, destroyed. While serving as Gr-2, I would have known of any de-
struction of records ordered by any competent authority.
Concerning the question as to whether correct military practise, current in
1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas command, such
as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War Department estimates of
the situation, such as were contained in War Department messages prior to 7
December 1941, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department,
my answer is that the Commanding General v;as responsible for the successful
execution of his mission ; he could act contrary to War Department estimates of
the situation, but at his own risk ; and that custom and doctrine of command
would require him to report his action and the x'easons therefore promptly to
bis superiors.
In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short,
prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941, were
definitive directives that a war alert was required by the situation, and that there
was an immediate threat from without as well as danger from sabotage.
Sherman Miles.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at Boston,
Mass.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
[217] Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Mincklee, SC
Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training. Camp Crowder,
Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceed-
ings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to joint resolution of the Con-
gress, and that TOP SECRECY is required, deposes and says :
On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at
Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel
Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the
Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my
superior. My dilties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dis-
semination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I
saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which
had been decrypted and translated.
Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and
at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top
Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action
which was taken under my supervision to moniter for the execute message
contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic
execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It
is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were
one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives
of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message
had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My
opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily
contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for
such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message
had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.
The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and
Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.
Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial num-
bers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December
1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypt-
ing and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting
and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code
indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the
intercepts [218] were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they
were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and addi-
tional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination.
Rex W. Minckler,
Rex W. Mincklee.
Colonel, HC.
Subscribed and sworn to before nie this 21st day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henky C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[219] \ffidavit op General George C. Marshall
GENERAL GEORGE C. ]\L\RSHALL. presently Chief of Staff, War Depart
ment, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretai-y of War, supplementary to proceed-
ings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the
Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add
that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript lot Proceedings before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising- the voting
members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grunert, Major General Henry D.
Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session
with me from 11 : 10 A. M. to 12 : 07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indlicated
on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this
closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of infor-
mation which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources
then called "Magic". I told them, among other things, that the source of this
information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which
were decrypted, decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal
Coi'ps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source
thereof should be made public because it would result in at least tempo-
rarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would
have meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their
systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital
source of information which has continued to be available up tx) the present
hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would
have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been
so compromised.
I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2
and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", prior
to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I
personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence
and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the
"Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the
Army officers concerned were authorize<l to go into all the details regarding
"Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at
length the general problem concerning the method of including "Magic" in the
report of the Board and also the availabilit.v to the Board of any officers concerned
for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the
investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and
37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in
Washington for that purpose.
[221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my under-
standing in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this infor-
mation from facilities available in his command.
Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7 Decem-
ber 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at the time for
General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was shown, about 3
December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, to the Navy at
Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C" Transcript
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 105
of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of Captain
L. F. SafCord, USN, which reads as follows :
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent
instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular
posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other
important confidential and secret documents."
It is customary and expected that information of this character would be
exchanged between tlie respective Services at Hawaii.
Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and
myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to him
dated 7 Februaryl941 and 5 March 1941 as follows :
[222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no
serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, there-
after the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard
of an att'ack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid
by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly,
I do not see any lauding threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have
air superiority."
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian
Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of
a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a
matter of first priority."
Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the War
Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7 December 1941
with replies and sent communications to the War Department which indicated
that he was then alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against
Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility.
At no time did General Short inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the
War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department
estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to
expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with
Japan.
The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of
an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act contrary
to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless he believed such
action to be dictated by necessity and unless he immediately reported and gave
full details and reasons to the AVar Department.
» George C. Marshall
Geoege C. Maeshaix.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this i:8th day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
top secret
Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doxjd
COLONEL HAROLD DQUD, presently with the Allied Translator and Intel-
ligence Service, GHQ, AFPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of the inves-
tigation by Lt. Colonel Heiu-y C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, sup-
plementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint
Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Wash-
ington, D. C, in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was
the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the
solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of
these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese
messages which had been intercepted.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Regarding the so-called Japanese ''Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time
of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432. I recall that
when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the
execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute
message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such exe-
cute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called
to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Stafford, USN, to the effect that I may have
some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis
for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an
execute message.
[22^] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of
13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and
evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen
the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solu-
tion. I went on duty on the aftternoon of 6 December and came off duty some-
time on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.
Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the Japanese
radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average
time required was at least two days.
I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates of receipt.
Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to
show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and
diseminations.
Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any
current Japanese military codes.
Harold Doud,
Haeold Doud,
Colonel.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAQD.
At Washington, D. C.
[225} Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security
Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, ,JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress,
and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese
system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1
November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which
were actually published were included in the data on which the average was
calculated.
No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military At-
taches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts
were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military
system.
a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the
exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco
by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building. My recollection is
that the first call to initiate the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed
sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from
Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air
mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them
to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by
teletype. [226] This preparation required some time because tapes had to
be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it
was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the
Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco.
b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward
traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped
to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the prelimi-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 107
uary discussions in wliich traffic was requested and also in receipting for the
traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present
and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we
operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and
this also tended to impress the matter on my memory.
Frank B. Rowlett,
Frank B. Rowlett,
Lt. Colonel, 8C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[227] Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin
CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and
that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are true :
At approximately 8 : 00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at
Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on
duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype
machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted
traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other per-
sonnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station
immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained
copy, as the original traffic had been air-mailed to Washington at approximately
4 : 00 p. m. on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed
Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am
certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and
the hours as given are approximately correct.
[228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.
Howard W. Martin
Howard W. Martin
Captain, SC
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington. D. C.
TOP SECRET
[229] Affidavit of Mary J. Dunning
MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly
sworn and informed of the investigaton by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD,
for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top
Secrecy is required, deposes and says :
On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1 : 00 p. m., the
regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45
tliat afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office, re-
questing me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the hour by the length
of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by
3 : 00 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the
hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time
on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5 : 00 p. m. instead, since
I had made plans to spend the day out of town.
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I can't recall' being told why we were called hack to work, but the general
assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japan-
ese Ambassador was in conference with the President.
I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was proc-
essed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance)
where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think that as I entered
the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been in-
stalled, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few
hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly
visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that
representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation
of the machine. After that we spent some time practicing.
It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always
seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco
at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the
room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minck-
ler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just
long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because
we joked about my teaching him to operate the teletype. To the best of my
knowledge, we were in communicat-ion with our intercept station in S. F. not
later than 7 : 00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had
any traffic for us at that time.
I believe I went home around midnight or 1 : 00 a. m. and I recall processing
some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, how-
ever, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had
been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was
traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.
I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.
Mary J. Dunning
Mary J. Dunning.
Subscribed and sworn to before me ths 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[2S2] Affidavit of Louise Prather
Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly
sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD,
for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Array Pearl
Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy
is required, deposes and says :
To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit
traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.
This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circum-
stances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit
was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for
work at 7 : 00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at th<;
office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and
the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as
rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given
Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, tlie transmission
of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This
further served to impress the event on my memory.
Louise Prather.
Louise Prathkr.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAC'D.
At Washington, D. C.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 109
[233]
TOP SECRET
EXHIBIT C
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secketaky of
War, Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
The documents referred to in the Report are listed on the inclosed cover
sheets to Exhibits "1" through "8".
1234] Exhibit "1"
a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on
7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 December'',
which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time.
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters
and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted.
b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General,
. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.
c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941.
d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japanese
War Policy".
e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is
initialed by General Short.
f. Memorandum re ''Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August
1941.
g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report
of Sir George Paisn.
h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General
Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C, dated 6 September 1941.
i. Photostated copy of reixtrted talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel
in Honohdu SUir-BuUetin dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo.
H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
J. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941,
initialed by General Short.
k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo,
dated 17 October 1941.
1. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of Tdiriku, Japanese magazine,
for May 1941.
m. Inter-statt" routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941.
re "Estimate of Japanese Situation",
n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreii:n Dolicy.
[236] o. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25
October 1941, initialed by General Short. .
I). Letter from Brig General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs.
Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum
containing information received from Orient,
q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941,
initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain
information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable.
s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander
(L C), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British,
t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November
1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from
Navy.
V. Transcript of telephone conversation. 1 December 1941, obtained from
Navy.
110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from
Navy.
X. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian department,
27 November 1941.
z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C,
29 November 1941.
aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington,
D. C., Hawaiian Department, 27 December 1911.
dd. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December
1941.
ce. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department,
7 December 1941.
dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941.
ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C,
7 December 1941.
ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H, 8
December 1941.
gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 Decem-
ber 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter
aircraft by Carrier".
[236] hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
ii Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941.
jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8
December 1941.
kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C,
8 December 1941.
11. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter,
T. H., 9 December 1941.
mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, 9 December
1941.
nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Department,
Washington, D. C, 9 December 1941.
00. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11
December 1941.
pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio — Merle Smith".
qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11
December 1941.
ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and
destruction of their code machine",
tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian
Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air
Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers.
[237] ExliiUt "2"
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Ha-
waiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.
a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Con-
tact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial
detention of persons connected with shrines.
c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum), 7 September
1944, to C. G.. POA, re Documentary Evidence.
d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Do-
mestic Conditions, 1 December 1941 (2 copies).
e. Exhibit I — A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands
Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
f. Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through
the Eyes of the Press.
g. Hawaiian Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a. m., 7 December 1941,
dated 22 December 1941.
h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori,
i. Radio froiD War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese
negotiations, 27 November 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 111
.i. Informal report re Thailand.
k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asma Maru and con-
ditions in Japan.
1. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13
November 1941.
m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.
n. Army Contact Office memorandum), 2 May 1941, re Comments on observa-
tions of a missionary,
o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situ-
ation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.
p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.
q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip x-e Information re Japanese Situation.
[238] r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache
Shanghai,
s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population
to unite and serve empire,
t. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department trans-
mitting letter from F. B. I. re info rasa tion on Japan's entry into war
dated 28 July 1941.
u. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report
No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.
v. G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New
Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo.
w. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Deten-
tion Plan (Japanese).
X. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Ac-
tivities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and M. A.
report attached.)
y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of
T. H.— Loyalty of— ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached).
z. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George
Parish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies),
aa. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 I'e
French Indo-China.
bb. MID. War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941
re Formosa.
cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents.
dd. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft
(Continued),
ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan,
ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1941 re Fornsosa.
gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan,
hh. M. A. Report dated 2.5 September 1941 re French Indo-China.
ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand.
jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations,
kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Aus-
tralasia.
11. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 August
1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
[239] mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries
In Pacific Area,
nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 Feb-
ruary 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, T. H.
00. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Jap-
anese Spy Activities.
pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate
Activities.
rr. Copy of radio "638 12th."
ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND Report dated 9 Feb-
ruary 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at.
tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo,
uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities,
Maui, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.).
w. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
WW. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and Kalaraa to observe
unusual activities.
XX. Memorandum date 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John Water-
house house at Kailua.
yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939 — "The Spy Game".
aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji.
[240] Exhibit "3"
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office,
Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.
a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 7 October 1941
re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.
b. M. I. D., Washington, Letter of transmittal dated 28 August 1941, w/letter
dated 3 August 1941 from George Paisn to President Roosevelt re Japanese
in Hawaii ; summary of information dated 30 September 1&41 re letter, and
H. H. D. letter dated 30 September 1941 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply
thereto attached).
c. M. I. D., Washingtou, letter of transmittal dated 16 September 1941, w/letter
from M. I. D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to
General Short dated 25 July 1941.
-e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled
"Three-Power Alliance and American- Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo,
w/note attached.
f Inter-staff routing slip dated July 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines re-
ported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Molokai, w/G-2, H. H. D.
letter of transmittal dated 25 July 1941 re Activities of Foreigners in
Country— Mexico.
g. F. B. I. report dated 6 November 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
h. F. B. I. report dated 9 October 1940 re Rev. I'n ji Hirayama.
i. 14ND report dated 15 February 1943 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu-
Espionage Activities.
.1. 14ND report dated 15 June 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage
Activities.
k. 14ND report dated 14 February 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Es-
pionage Activities.
1. F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Washington, 28 March 1942, re notes found on desk
pad at Japanese Consulate.
m. F. B. I. letter, 19 March 1942, re translations made of coded and confidential
material from Japanese Consulate.
n. luter-stafC routing slip dated 14 March 1942 re Translation of a Register of
Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter of transmittal
dated 13 March 1942 and report same subject attached.
[241] Exhibit "4"
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Ha-
waiian Department, as noted on the cover sheet L and M.
a. G-2 H. H. D., letter of transmittal to G-2, Washington, dated 7 March 1942
re translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Intcr-staff
routing slip dated 7 March 1942 and F. B. I. report dated 2 March 1942
re same subject.
b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Register
of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject.
[242] Exhibit "5"
The following documents were obtained froni the District Intelligence Office,
14th Naval District, Honolulu.
a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cable-
grams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and
numbers of cablegrams in date order : 3G3, 3 December 1941 ; 364, 4 De-
cember 1941 ; 365, 4 December 1941 ; 221, 5 December 1941 ; 368, 6 December
1941 ; and 369,6 December 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 113
b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941
to the following addresses : Shagro, San Francisco ; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young
Hotel, Honolulu ; Growsumida, Honolulu ; and Sliokin, Honolulu.
c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941
to the following addresses : Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church,
Waipau, Oahu, T. H. ; American Consul, Papeete ; Y. Watanabe, Box 511,
Wailuku, Maul, T. H. ; and Shokin, Honolulu.
d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 Novem-
ber 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.
e. Four confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the Japanese Consulate, Honolu-
lu— Espionage Activities, dated : 9 February 1942, 14 February 1942, 15 June
1942, and 15 February 1943.
f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy
of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941, Japanese
time.
g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands pre-
pared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND,
dated 20 April 1943.
h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg) T.
W. Joyce.
hl-h35. Various evaluations and related papers from 14ND, Honolulu.
[243] Exhibit "6"
The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165,
from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at
Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained
from their respective files.
They comprise reports diuing the period from June to December 1941.
[2U] ExMUt "7"
a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941
of radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and
which were not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl
Harbor Board.
b. The documents following those mentioned in a above are the intercepts which
comprise Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred
to in their affidavits.
[245] "Exhibit "8"
The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources.
They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to
22 December 1941.
797]()— 46— E.X. 148-
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TOP SECBEnr
EXHIBIT D
Investig-ation by Lt. Colonel Henry C Clausen, JAGD for the Secretary of
War
SuPPIJiMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE AkMY PeARL HARBOR BoARD
1. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 17 February 1945, concerning investigation of
Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
2. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 3 March 1945, concerning investigation of Major
Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
3. Receipt from the District Intelligence Office 14ND of designated material,
19 April 1945.
4. List of Photostated copies of C. I. D. files furnished to Lt. Colonel Clausen,
19 April 194C>.
5. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 23 May 1945, concerning investigation of Lt.
Colonel Clausen supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
6. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 1 August 1945, fourth progress report of Colonel
Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
7. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 12 September 1945, fifth progress report of Colo-
nel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
top secret
[247] War Department,
Washington, 12 September 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.
Subject: Fifth progress report of Lt. Colonel Clausen's investigations supple-
mentary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. Since 1 August 1945 I have concluded the investigations of the following : :
a. Army Personnel interviewed:
General George C. Marshall
Major General Charles D. Herron
Major General Sherman Miles
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler
Colonel George W. Bicknell
Colonel Rex W. Minckler
Colonel Harold Doud
Colonel Harold G. Hayes
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
b. British Army personnel interviewed:
Colonel Gerald Wilkinson
c. Civilians interviewed:
Miss Mary J. Dunning
Miss Louise Prather
d. Related conferences:
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Major General Myron C. Cramer
Commodore Inglis, ONI
Brig. General Carter W. Clarke
Brig. General Thomas North
Colonel Ernest W. Gibson
[248] Colonel William J. Hughes
Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USN
Mr. John F. Sonnett
Mr. A. T. Klotz
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 115
e. Affidavit evidence obtained:
General George C. Marshall
Major General Sherman Miles
Major General Charles D. Herron
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler
Colonel Rex W. Minckler
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
Captain Howard W. Martin
Miss Mary J. Dunning
Miss Louise Prather
Henry Q. Clausen,
Henky C. Ci-AtrsEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
top seceet
1249] Wae Depabtment,
Washington, 1 August 19^5.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.
Subject : Fourth Progress Report of Colonel Clausen's Investigation Supple-
mentary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. Activities Reported: Investigations at Blandford, Blenchley Park, London,
England; Cannes, Marseille, Paris, "Versaille, France; Casserta, Italy; Berlin,
Frankfurt on Main, Potsdam, Germany ; and Washington, D. C, were conducted
during 15 May to 1 August 1945.
a. Army Personnel Interviewed:
Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow^
Lt. General W. B. Smith
Maj. General John R. Deane
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts
Colonel George W. Bicknell
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
Colonel Warren J. Clear
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft
Major Louis Stone
b. British Navy Personnel Interviewed:
Captain Edward Hastings
c. Civilians Interviewed:
Dr. Stanley Hornbeck
George W. Renchard
John F. Stone
d. Related Conferences:
Harvey H. Bundy
General Thomas T. Handy
Maj. General Myron C. Cramer
Maj. General Otto Nelson
Brig. General Carter Clarke
[250] Bi'ig. General Thomas North
Brig. General G. Bryan Conrad
Brig. General Marion Van Voorst
Colonel C. W. Christenberry
Colonel R. W. Hauenstein
Colonel F. W. Hilles
Captain Wm. T. Carnahan
Captain Edmund H. Kellogg
John F. Sonnett
Admiral Henry K. Hewitt
e. Affidavit Evidence Obtained:
Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow
Lt. General W. B. Smith
Maj. General John R. Deane
Colonel George W. Bicknell
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft
George W. Renchard
John F. Stone
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f. Dwinncntanj Evidence Obtained:
British radio intelligence material
2. Siiinificant Features of Additiomil Evidence Developed:
(a) Cohmcl Bratton's Testimony Before APHB: Colonel Brattou admitted to
me that his testimony given to the APHB was incorrect on some very important
subjects, and should be revised accordingly. These changes include the following
points :
1. He previously testified that the top secret radio intelligence material, con-
tained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", had been delivered to the President, the Secre-
tary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of
Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
But, in his affidavit to me made when his memory was more refreshed, he
admitted that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy, and that there
were no records to show who delivered what to whom during the period in
question.
[251'\ 2. He previously testified that he personally delivered the top secret
radio intelligence material to the officers concerned.
In his affidavit to me, however, he admitted that in addition to himself, de-
liveries were made by Major or Lt. Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieu-
tenant Schindel.
3. He previously testified that on the evening of 6 December 1941 he delivered
to the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the office of the Secretary of State, the thirteen;
parts of the fourteen part Japanese rejily to the settlement conditions which the
Secretary of State had given the Japs on 26 November 1941. He had also testi-
fied that he put the thirteen parts of this message on the desk of the Chief of
Staff. He had further testified that on 6 December 1941 he had given sets of
the thirteen parts to Lt. General W. B. Smith for the Chief of Staff, to Brig.
General Galley for Lt. General Gerow, and to Maj. General Miles as G-2, and
that it was his recollection that these officers received these sets that night.
He had also testified that on 6 December 1941 he discussed the thirteen part
message with General Miles.
But in his affidavit to me he admitted that the only set of the thirteen parts
message he delivered on 6 December 1941 was to the duty officer of the Secretary
of State ; that the sets for the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., were not delivered the night of (5
December 1941 ; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December 1941 to
General Smith, General Gerow or General Miles; that Jie could not recall having
discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December 1941 ; that he did not
know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession, although he
claimed that he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver it on 6 December 1941
to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury admitted in his affidavit
to me that he received the messages on 6 December 1941, but that he did not
deliver any until after 9 : 00 A. M. on the morning of 7 December 1941.
[252^ 4. He previously testified that on the morning of 7 December 1941 he
arrived at his office about 7 : 00 or 8 : 00 A. M. and telephoned the home of the
Chief of Staff at about 9 : 00 A. M., and that the Chief of Staff arrived at his office
at 11 : 25 A. M.
In his affidavit to me, he fixed the time at which the Chief of Staff was in his
office on 7 December 1941 as being between 10 : 30 and 11 : 30 A. M.
The affidavit of Maj. General Deane fixed the time at which Colonel Bratton
arrived at his office on 7 December 1941 as between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 A. M., which
also agrees more nearly with the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury.
Affidavits mentioned in previous reports, as well as the new affidavits of Generals
Gerow, Smith, Deane, and Messrs. Stone and Renchard, tend to support the revised
testimony of Colonel Bratton.
(b) "ivinds Code'' Message: Investigation at British sources failed to reveal
that the British ever intercepted an implementation message. Apparently, the
evidence to date of the existence of such an implementation depends primarily
on the recollection of certain Navy witnesses, and among whom there is a conflict.
Colonel Schukraft claimed to have seen an implementation in a form different
from that testified to by the Navy witnesses. On this subject it should be recalled
that the action to be taken by the Jap Consular and diplomatic agents on receipt
of an implementing message, namely, destruction of codes, actually was ordered
by Tokyo in a radio which was intercepted about 4 December 1941. As I pre-
viously reported, this information was given to Short prior to 7 December 1941,
according to his G-2 and Assistant G-2. Short testified before the Navy Court of
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 117
Inquiry, however, that he did not get this information, and that to him it would
have been the only important part of the message which the Chief of Staff sent
him by radio on 7 December 1941. Assuming that the recollections of Short's
two members of his Staff are correct, then Short had received prior to 7 December
1941 the ultimate in available information according to his own statement of what
should have been given him for a different alert than that which he had ordered
on 27 November 1941.
[253] (c) Sufflciencii of War Department Warnings to Short: General
Gerow in his affidavit to me sets forth detailed reasons why in his opinion the
overseas commanders were given adequate information of impending events.
Also why the radio intelligence messages were not sent to the couunanders.
In this regard, testimony should be recalled to the effect that, for security
reasons, the Army was restricted by the Navy from sending these messages, and
that representatives of the Navy had stated that the Navy unit at Honolulu
w\ns getting the messages from their own facilities.
(d) Conflicts in Testimony: Many of the points heretofore in doubt and
hereinbefore mentioned have been sufficiently developed to I'each appropriate
conclusions. A number of conflicts I'emain, however, which it is planned to
resolve by completion of the investigation.
3. Progress and Objectives: The investigation will be concluded by explora-
tion of the remaining leads and. the making of a final and comprehensive report.
This will involve :
(a) Intei'views with Generals Marshall, Herron and Miles, Colonels Bicknell,
Doud, Minkler and Sadtler, INIajor Bash, Messrs. Roberts, Hoover, Friedman,
and Wilkinson, and Misses Adams, Cave, and Prather.
(b) Examinations of the testimony given Admiral Hewitt by Admiral May-
field Captain McCoUum, Commandei'S Kramer and Mason, and other Navy
witnesses if necessary ; the engagement book of former Secretary of State
Hull : the statement by General Smith ; and the recent Gt-2 examination involv-
ing Mr. Friedman, resulting from Navy disclosures.
(c) It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War
direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give
me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, any copies of
affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes or papers
which may be in their possession or under their control, they to advise me in
writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, and that
they be advised that these records will be available in the War Department
in the event access thereto is ever required.
Henry C. Clausen.
Henry C. Clausen.
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[254] TOP SECRET
War Department,
Washington, 23 May 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy :
Subject : Investigation of Colonel Clausen
Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. Activities Reported: Investigations at Honolulu, Guam, Saipan, Leyte, and
Luzon were conducted during the period 26 March to 12 May, 1945.
a. Army Personnel Interviewed:
General Douglas INIacArthur
Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland
Major Gen. C. A. Willoughby
Major Gen. Spencer B. Aiken
Major Gen. C. L. Ruffner
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder
Brig. Gen. C. A. Powell
Brig. Gen. J. J. Twitty
Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston
Colonel O. N. Thompson
Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott
Major H. H. Henderson
Major Maresh
Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. 2favy Personnel Interviewed:
Captain E. T. Layton
Captain Harper
Captain W. J. Holmes
Captain T. A. Huckins
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.
Commander Burr
Commander Carr
Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.
Cnief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel
[255] c. Civilians Interviewed:
D. K. Dawson
Robert L. Shivers
Harry L. Dawson
John E. Russell
d. Related Conferences:
General Richardson
Admiral Nimitz
Admiral McMorris
Admiral Towers
Mr. H. H. Bundy
Gen. Carter W. Clarke
Gen. Myron C. Cramer
Commander John F. Sonnett
e. Affidavits and Statements Obtained:
General Douglas MacArthur
Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland
Ma.1. Gen. C. A. Willoughby
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder
Brig. C. A. Powell
Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston
Colonel O. N. Thompson
Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott
Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane
Captain E. T. Layton
Captain W. J. Holmes
Captain T. A. Huckins
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.
Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel
Mr. John E. Russell
Mr. Robert L. Shivers
f. Documentary Evidence Obtained:
1. British intelligence material (SIS) consisting of more than 200 reports
from Gerald Wilkinson at Manila to Honolulu, from July 1941 to and including
December 1941.
2. Files of the Hawaiian Department, G-2, Army Contact Office. These are
set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945.
[256] 3. Nflvy District Intelligence Office files, set forth on the attached re-
ceipt dated 19 April 1945.
4. Files of the Hawaiian Department, AG. These include photostats of file
copies of pertinent communications received before 7 December 1941.
5. FBI records of telephone intercepts and British SIS reports.
2. Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:
a. Short's Defenses: Assumption that Navy knew the whereabouts of the
Jap fleet : Actually, as could have been ascertained from plots prepared by Cap-
tain Holmes, USN, and daily Communication Intelligence Summaries prepared by
Captain Rochefort (see affidavit of Captain Huckins), the Navy did not have such
information.
Claim that War Department acquiesced in reply of Short to radio of 27 No-
vember 1941 signed "Mar.shall", and thereafter did not give him additional informa-
tion : The reply of Short also stated "liaison with Navy." Attention is invited
to new evidence of items of intelligence possessed or available to Short.
Claim that a more effective alert would have interfered with training and
would have alarmed the civilian population : Evidence shows there was no civilian
alarm when the Herron all-out alert of 1940 was ordered and Short did not order
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 119
the radar into 24 hours operation and did uot order any visual lookouts or sound
detectors against a possible air attacli ( See notes on Navy court testimony) .
b. Intelligence and Information available to Short: Short and his G-2 testified
in effect that they were almost v?holly dependent on the War Department for
information and that they actually received very little. New evidence indicates
that the Hawaiian Department received a great deal more military and diplomatic
information than has been previously developed. For example, the British SIS
reports (See Russell & Shivers affidavits), the intercepts of telephone conversa-
tions in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Emanuel, Shivers and Woodrum affi-
davits), some commercial radio traffic in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Mars-
ton and Shivers affidavits), information from the Navy District Intelligence Office
and the Fleet Intelligence Officer (See fijes and affidavit of Captain Layton).
Much material was gathered from observers, travellers, and Washington sources,
and evaluated and disseminated by the Army contact office.
[257] Various papers dealing with this intelligence were initialed by Short.
For example, see the Inter-Staff Routing Slip, 11 September 1941, concerning infor-
mation from the Tokyo Naval Attache as to Japan's intentions ; the Slip, 6 No-
vember 1941 ; the War Department Military Attache Report, 3 November 1941 ;
the Special Intelligence Report, 17 October 1941 ; the memo of Colonel Bicknell, 21
November 1941 ; the War Department G-2 Rejwrt, June 1941, regarding the lurk-
ing of small submarines in Hawaiian waters preparatory to attacks on Pearl Har-
bor ; the War Department G-2 Report, 28 August 1941, of a warning by one George
Paisn ; the Contact Office Report and Estimate, 25 October 1941 ; the report 19
June 1941 of Japanese books.
A detailed study of the foregoing and other items of intelligence, in relation to
testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, will be made on com-
pletion of the investigation.
Incidentally, a special investigation by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, 9 July 1941,
reported to General Short many deficiencies of his Command. Amohg other things,
the report set forth that the attitude of mind in the Hawaiian Department, the
Hawaiian Air Force and Hickman Field was deficient as to "the immediate need
for jwsitive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and
ordered sabotage," and further "it is found that a considerable portion of the
Command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing
between inter-continental theaters of war and our local sphere of action." The
report further stated that the Command was not alert to :
"(a) The i)Ossibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to
an overt hostile act either near or far away. * * *
"(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia."
The report found the cause for this attitude of mind was, among other things,
traceable :
" ( 1 ) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.
"(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical
island garrisoned by large forces. * * *
"(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions
as compared to that given to operations and supply functions. * * *
[25S] "(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of
the above first needs. * * *
"(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive wait-
ing attitude.
"(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which
to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern
for the future."
The report concluded :
"(a) That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of
instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of
subversive activities within the command ; although such a condition naturally
provides a move fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities."
Under Appreciations, the report stated :
"(a) Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell,
Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of
Investigation."
c. Imminence of War with Japan: Short testified that if this had been known
to him he would have ordered a different alert. The affidavit of Fielder and the
documentary evidence mentioned shows that Short was so informed. For in-
stance, see the estimates dates 17 October 1941 and 25 October 1941 by Colonel
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Bicknell, initialed by Short ; the memo of Bicknell, dated 21 November 1941 ; and
tlie speeches of Short and Kimmel, reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
18 September 1941, a copy of which is attached.
d. '-Winds Code" Message: Contrary to Short's testimony and the findings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, this information was given the Army at Honolulu.
See the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell. It should be
noted that in the documentary evidence is a translation of the Jap Consul's desk
pad. He had written thereon several wave lengths of Jap broadcasts on the date
the Winds Code was broadcast. No evidence was found however, that the code
was implemented (see statement of Holtwick), other than the 3 December 1941
British SIS report to Honolulu, copy of which went to Colonel Bicknell, read-
ing in part :
[2J.9] "(C) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early
hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack
Russia at present but will act in South."
Significantly, the date 3 December 1941 agrees with the testimony of Captain
SafEord as to when he saw an implementing message to the code in similar
terms.
e. 5 December 1941, War Department 0-2 Message: See affidavits of Fielder,
Powell, Thompson and Lane. In view of previous statements recently obtained
from Colonel Bicknell and personnel of G-2, it is a reasonable certainty that the
message was received by the Army in Hawaii on 5 December 1941.
. f. Destruction by Japs of Codes: Short denied receiving this information and
claimed that he would have considered it most important, calling for a different
alert order. But Fielder states in his affidavit that he gave his information to
Short on 6 December 1941. See also the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of
Colonel Bicknell.
g. Pearl Harbor as attack target: If the Jap Consul commercial radio traffic,
which was available at Hawaii to the Navy especially from the latter part of
November 1941, included the reports as to ships in the harbor, then it was similar
to that received at Washington. Several messages are contained in the docu-.
mentary evidence above which are indicative that some such traffic was available
at Hawaii before 7 December 1941. Further details are being explored in con-
junction with the Navy. The availability of these messages is confirmed by the
affidavits of Shivers, Marston, and testimony of Captain Rochefort.
It should be noted that the Jap inquiries as to ships movements included re-
ports at many other places, such as Manila, Seattle, etc. Also, so far as Hawaii
specifically was concerned, intercepts of telephone conversations at the Jap Con-
sulate revealed that in 1940 a Jap agent was collecting information om ship
movements.
Another item of intelligence which pointed to Pearl Harbor was the 3 Decem-
ber 1941 message from the Jap Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, giving the visual
signals devised by Otto Kuhn to report ship movements. This message falls into
the category stated as requiring further exploration as to its availability before
7 December 1941.
[260'] As to the Army Signal Intelligence Service activities at Hawaii, see
the Powell affidavit. Two of the most vital messages, intercepted before 7
December 1941, were sent in to Washington by Hawaii. General Powell, how-
ever, states he was not aware of the contents.
In the documentary evidence mentioned there is correspondence from War
Department to Hawaii in June 1941 concerning a report of the Military Attache
at Mexico City as to the Jap intentions to strike Pearl Harbor with midget sub-
marines at the outbreak of hostilities.
h. Jap Navy Task Force in Marshalls: Short testified that he did not have
this information. But, the contrary might well be true in view of the affidavits
of Layton, Huckins and Shivers, in addition to the proof previously reported.
i. Sufficiency of War Department warnings: General MacArthur, who received
information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after re-
viewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and
complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war.
Colonel Bicknell told Shivers the Army had been alerted when Shivers men-
tioned the alert he received from Hoover on 28 November 1941. (Shivers affi-
davit) .
j. Possible alarm to civilian population: The affidavits of Marston and Shivers
confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the ex-
perience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 121
3. Miscellaveous: Many rumors relating to Pearl Harbor had been circulated
concerning information available to General MacArthur, reports by him to
Hawaii, and the War Department warnings to him. These are set at rest by the
aflSdavits of MacArthur, Sutherland and Willoughby.
4. Wymflin-Rohl investigation: Concurrent with the foregoing, evidence was
obtained at Hawaii and Leyte in exploration of certain leads.
5. Progress and objectives: I propose to complete the interviews of overseas
witnesses by going to the ETO to develop some very important and promising
leads. Those to be questioned on the Pearl Harbor phases include, among others,
General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General T. J. Betts, Colonel Rufus Bratton,
Colonel Harold S. Doud. Colonel R. E. Schnkraft and Colonel W. H. Tetley. This
would include an investigation of new matters as well as of [261] those
items previously discussed. It is felt desirable to leave as soon as possible in
order that interrogation be done before the witnesses are further scattered or
are perhaps unavailable later.
Certain overseas witnesses pertinent to the Wyman-Rohl investigation would
also be interviewed, thus completing the overseas phase of that investigation
also.
I am keeping in touch and cooperating in a reciprocal manner with the Navy
on additional investigation.
When my investigation is completed I shall make a comprehensive critique
and report of all the new evidence then developed in relation to the Army Pearl
Harbor Board Secret and Top Secret Reports.
Henry C. Clausen.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAG.
[262] confidental
Headquarters Centrai, Pacific Base Command
office of the assistant chief of staff for military intelligence
counter inteixigence division
Box 3, APO 456 '
In reply I'efer. to:
19 April 1945.
Memorandum :
Subject : Photostated copies of C. I. D. files.
1. The following photostated copies of C. I. D. files were furnished to Col.
Claussen as directed bv the Secretary of War and the Commanding General,
CPBC :
G-2, Hawn Dept. list Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Hono-
lulu, T. H.
G-2, CID memo dtd 9/12/44 re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of
persons connected with shrines.
War Dept., Hq Army Pearl Harbor Board memo dtd 9/7/44 to CG, POA re
Documentary Evidence.
G-2, Hawn Dept report re Japan, Foreign Relations & Domestic Conditions.
(2 copies) (1 Dec 41)
Exhibit I — A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands
Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through
the Eyes of the Press.
Hawn Dept. Summary of the Situation As of 7 : 30 A. M., 7 December 1941,
dtd 12/22/41.
Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.
*Radio from War Dept to G-2, Hawn Dept re .Japanese negotiations,
11/27/41.
Informal report re Thailand.
Army Contact Office memo dtd 8/1/41 re Asama Maru and Conditions in
Japan.
Radio from Short to AG, Wash, dtd 11/13/41.
Brief re Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army Contact Office ineino dtd 5/2/41 re Comments on observations of a
missionary.
Memo for Col. Bicknell dated 8/1/41 re Local Japanese Situation During the
Period 26-31 July 1941.
Copy of radio received 11/27/41.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asst N:iva] Attache Shanghai.
[26.^] Ritdio re speeches made by Militny Naval Oflicials urging popula-
tion to unite and serve empire.
War Dopt Itr (ltd 8/5/41 to G-2, Hawn Dept ti-:insmitting Itr from F. B. I. re
Info on Japan's entry into war dtd 7/28/41.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Nov. 1941 re JMililarv Attatlie Report No. 23 dtd
11/3/41.
G-2; H. H. D. Six>cial Intelligence Report (ltd 10/17/41 re New Japanese
Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo.
Ai-my Contact Office memo dtd 11/21/4] re Seizure and Detention Plan
(Japanese).
luter-Statf Routing Slip dtd Jan. 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities
of Foreigners in Conntry. Mexico." (Distribution list and M. A. report
attached).
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.—
Loyalty of— ONI report dtd 1/26/42 (attached).
Ltr from Hq. Second Corps Area dtd 11/28/41 re George Paish (Paisn).
w/FBI report same Subject attached. (2 copies.)
M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re French Indo-
China.
M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re Formosa.
M. A. Report dtd 8/14/41 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re General
Report, Japan and China.
M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australia.
M. A. Report dtd 9/10/41 re Japan and Japanese Relations.
M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re Thailand.
M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re French Indo-China.
M. A. Report dtd 10/2/41 re Japan.
M. A. Report dtd 10/23/41 re Formosa.
M. A. Report dtd 10/28/41 re Japan.
M. A. Report dtd 11/3/41 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).
M. A. Report dtd 11/18/41 re Japan, IVIilitary Agents.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 w/14MD report dtd 2/9/42 re Fifth
Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Cable re movements of fleet and return to Japan of members of diplomatic
staff.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio #628, 12/12/41 re Japanese Spy
Activities.
Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
14ND report dtd 2/9/42 re Espionage Activities at Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu.
FBI memo to ONI dtd 1/4/42 re Japanese Consulate Activities.
Ltr dtd 12/3/41 from Kita to Foreign Minister. Tokyo.
Extract from ONI report dtd 12/9/41 re Activities on Maui, Uanai i&; Molokai,
since 7 December 1941.
[264] Report dtd 12/12/41 by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.
Memo re ON'I and FBI agents to Lanikai & Kalama to observe unusual ac-
tivities.
Memo dtd 12/17/41 from R. A. Cooke Jr. re John Waterhouse House at
Kailua.
Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
Extract from Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39 — The Spy Game.
Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji.
Army Contact Office memo for Col. Bicknell dtd 10/7/41 re Japanese Arrival
In and Departure From Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.
M.I.D., Wash, ltr of transmittal dtd 8/28/41, w/ltr dtd 8/3/41 from George
Paisn to Pres. Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii, Summary of Information
dtd 9/30/41 re ltr, and H. H. D. ltr dtd 9/30/41 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area
(reply thereto attached).
M. I. D., Wash, ltr of transmittal dtd 9/16/41, w/M. I. D. Summary of In-
formation re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 123
luter-Staflf Routing Slip (ltd Aug. 1941, w/ltr from Admiral Bloch to Gen.
Short dtd 7/25/41.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book Entitled
"Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo,
w/note attached.
Inter-Staft' Routing Slip dtd Jul 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines re-
ported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Malokai, w/Gr-2, H. H. D.
Itr of transmittal dtd 7/25/41 re Activities of Foreigners in Country-Mex-
ico.
F. B. I. report dtd 10/9/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
F. B. I. report dtd 11/6/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
F. B. J. Itr dtd 3/19/42 re translations made of coded & confideutial material
from Japanese Consulate.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/14/42 re Translation of a Register of Radio-
grams sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. Itr of transmittal dtd 3/13/42
and report same subject attached.
F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Wash. 3/28/42 re notes found on desk pad at Jap-
anese Consulate.
14ND report dtd 2/14/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Ac-
tivities.
14ND report dtd 6/15/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Ac-
tivities.
14ND report dtd 2/15/43 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Ac-
tivities.
G-2, H. H. D. Itr of transmittal to G-2, Wash, dtd 3/7/42 re Translation of
Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-Stafl: Routing Slip dtd
3/7/42 and F. B. I. report dtd 3/2/42 re same subject.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 4/2/42 re Photographs of Message Register of
Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. Itr dtd 4/2/42 same subject.
[265] The aforementioned files were furnished to
on the th day of 1945.
M. H. Sheward
M. H. Shewaed
2nd Lt., M. I.
Receipt acknowledged.
SECEET
\_266] Fourteenth Naval Distbict, ,
District Intelligence Office, Sixth Floor, Young Hotel,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 April 19Jf5.
Receipt From the District Intexligence Office 14nd Is Hereby Acknowledgeu
Fob the Following Materia^:
1. Five (5) Secret Photostats (one positive and one negative of decoded cable-
grams, from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo.
Listed are the dates and numbers of the above cablegrams in date order.
Date of Cablegram Number of Cablegram
(a) 12/3/41 #363
(b) 12/4/41 #365
(c) 12/4/41 #364
(d) 12/5/41 #221
(e) 12/6/41 #368
(f) 12/6/41 #369
2. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated
11/27/41, to the following addressees :
(a) SHAGRO, San Francisco
(b) Dr. HOLMES, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu
(c) GROWSUMIDA, Honolulu
(d) SHOKIN, Honolulu
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated
11/25/41, to the following addressees.
(a) Rev. Hiro HIGUCHI, Waipahu Conimiuiity Church, Waipahu,
Oahu, T. H.
(b) AMERICAN CONSUL, Papeete
(c) Y. WATANABE, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.
(d) SHOKIN, Honolulu
4. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated
11/19/41, addressed to Inosuke HACHIYAE.
5. Four (4) Confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the JAPANESE CON-
SULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities, dated as follows :
(a) 9 February 1942
(b) 14 February 1942
(c) 15 June 1942
(d) 15 February 1943
6. One PHOTOSTAT (positive and negative) of each of the following
SECRET intercepts:
(a) 1-540; 11/30/41 & 12/1/41
(b) NYK-38; 12/2/41
(c) 6-1 ; 10/11/41
7. One Photostat (Positive and Negative) of the following: (Page
indicate DIO file page.)
Wilkinson report dated IS October 1941 — (No. DIO file page number.)
Wilkinson report dated 10/6/41, pg. 174.
Wilkinson report dated 9/16/41, pg. 173.
Wilkinson report dated 10/22/41, pg. 172.
Wilkinson report dated 10/17/41, pg. 171.
Cable received from Wellington, 11/25/41, regard Pacific Raider Intel-
ligence, pg. 168A.
Memo for the files, dated 12/3/41, in reference to Wilkinson report
dated 10/6/41, pg. 168.
Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 166.
Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 162.
Confidential letter to DNI from Coml4, dated 10/14/41, Ser. #0965916,
Subj. : "Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence
Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence
Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Agent in Manila — Information
received from), pgs. 160-159.
Wilkinson report dated 9/3/41, pg. 158.
Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 157.
Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 156.
Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 155.
Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 154.
Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 153.
Wilkinson report dated 10/11/41, pg. 152.
Wilkinson report dated 10/2/41, pg. 151.
Wilkinson report dated 9/29/41, pg. 150.
Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 149.
Wilkinson report dated 9/26/41, pgs. 148-147.
Wilkinson report dated 9/24/41, pg. 145.
Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 144.
Wilkinson report dated 9/23/41, pgs. 143-142.
Wilkinson report dated 9/14/41, pg. 140.
Wilkinson report dated 9/10/41, pg. 139.
Wilkinson report dated 8/28/41, jig. 134.
Wilkinson report dated 8/25/41, pg. 133.
Wilkinson report dated 8/23/41, pg. 132.
Wilkinson report dated 8/21/41, pg. 131.
Memo by T. W. Joyce, dated 11/5/41. (Notes & Connnents), pg. 130.
Wilkinson report dated 10/4/41, pg. 129.
14ND card #1536, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French Conces-
.sion — Japanese Designs on", pg. 121.
14ND card #1534, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Thai— Japanese Activities
in", pg. 120.
[267]
numbers
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11
(12
(13
(14
(15
(16
(17
(18
(19
(20
(21
(22
(23
(24
(25
(26
(27
(28
(29
(30
(31
(32
(33
(34)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 125
[268] (35) 14ND card #ir..'ir., dated 9/23/41, Sul)j. : "Fdrmosa— Heito
Airdrome", pg. 120.
(36) 14ND card #1533, dated -0/31/41, Subj. : 'Japan— General Intelli-
gence", pg. 119.
(37) 14ND card #1531, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Fleet Organiza-
tion", pg. 118.
(38) 14ND card #1532. dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Indo-Cluna— Japanese
Moves in", pg. 118.
(39) 14ND card #1528, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japan— Ordnance Produc-
tion", pg. 117.
(40) 14ND card #1530, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Far East Exports to Ger-
man.v", pg. 117.
(41) 14ND card #1526. dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "China Blockade— Smug-
gling", pg. 116.
(42) 14ND card #1527, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa— Coastal De-
fenses", pg. 116.
(43) 14ND card #1525, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa (Takao)— Gen-
eral Military Intelligence", pg. 115.
(44) 14ND card #1523, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Formosa— Conscription",
pg. 114.
(45) 14ND card #1524, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa— Troop Move-
ments", pg. 114.
(46) 14ND card #1520, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Japanese— Troop Move-
ments", pg. 113.
(47) 14ND card #1521, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Japanese Troop Move-
ments", pg. 113.
(48) 14ND card #1522. dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa— Supplies", pg.
113.
(49) 14ND card #1518, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria— Travel Re-
strictions", pg. 112.
(50) 14ND card #1519, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Mancdiuria— Censorship",
pg. 112.
(51) 14ND card #1516, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Mobilization",
pg. 111.
(52) 14ND card #1517, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Construction",
pg. 111.
(53) 14ND card #1482, dated 9/12/41, Subj.: "Hongkong— Prospective
Disorders", pg. 97.
(54) 14 ND card #1468, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy",
pg. 95.
(55) 14ND card #1470, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese— Siamese Rela-
tions", pg. 95.
(56) 14ND card #1466, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Manchuria— Japanese Troop
Movements", pg. 94.
(.57) 14ND card #1467, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: ".Japanese Foreign Policy",
pg. 94.
(58) 14ND card #1465, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria— Railways,
Buildings, etc.", pg. 93.
[269] (59) 14ND card #1463, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French
Concession — Japanese Designs On", pg. 92.
(60) 14ND card #14.56, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Formosa-Japanese Airplane
Movements", pg. 90.
(61) 14ND card #1457, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa-Japanese Troop
Movements", pg. 90.
(62) 14NR card #1453, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japane,se Naval Ordnance",
pg. 89.
(63) 14ND card #1454, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Factory", pg. 89.
(64) 14ND card #1455, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troops in Indo
China", pg. 89.
(65) 14ND card #1450, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : ".Japanese Troop Movement",
pg. 88.
(66) 14ND card #1451, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Naval Construc-
tion", pg. 88.
(67) 14ND card #1452, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Naval Construc-
tion", pg. 88.
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(68) 14ND card #(?), dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Aircraft Factory",
pg. 87.
(69) 14ND card #1448, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Spratley Island— Japanese
Construction", pg. 87.
(70) 14ND card #1449, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "German Raiders in Pacific",
pg. 87.
(71) 14ND card #1444, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan— Kobe Navy Yard",
pg. 86.
(72) 14ND card #1445, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Submarine Con-
struction", pg. 86.
(73) 14ND card #1446, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Aerial Bomb Fac-
tory", pg. 86.
(74) 14ND card #1442, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy",
pg. 85.
(75) 14ND card #1443, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japan— Airdrome at Kama-
kura", pg. 85.
(76) 14ND card #1440, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japan— General Military and
Naval Information", pg. 84.
(77) 14ND card #1441, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan— Underground Air-
drome at Takarazuka", pg. 84.
(78) 14ND card #1438, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy",
pg. 83.
(79) 14ND card #1439, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Philippine— Japanese Propa-
ganda In", pg. 83.
(80) 14ND card #1435, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Dutch East Indies— Japanese
Propaganda In", pg. 82.
(81) 14ND card #1436, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Saigon", pg. 82.
[270] (82) 14ND card #1437, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Philippine-Japanese
Business In", pg. 82.
(83) 14ND card #1434, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese National Policy",
pg. 81.
(84) 14ND card #1433, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Anti-American Measures by
Japanese in Occupied China", pg. 80.
(85) 14ND card #1431, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Indo-China", pg. 79.
(86) 14ND card #1432, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Formosa", pg. 79.
(87) Conf. Ltr. to DNI from DIO, 14ND, dated 9/20/41, Subj. : "British
Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with", pg. 78.
(88) Extract #61 for Honolulu, dated 8/8/41, pg. 71.
(89) Extract #59 for Honolulu, dated 8/10/41, pg. 69.
(90) Extract #57 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 67.
(91) Extract #54 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 64.
(92) Extract #52 for Honolulu, dated 8/21/41, pg. 61.
(93) Extract #35 for Honolulu, dated 8/18/41, pg. 42.
(94) Extract #33 for Honolulu, dated 8/16/41, pg. 40.
(95) Extract #27 for Honolulu, dated 8/12/41, pg. 34.
(96) 14ND card #1420, dated 9/2/41, Subj. : "Japanese Repatriation", pg.
30.
(97) 14ND card #1421, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr.",
pg. 30.
(98) 14ND card #1417, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "DAKAR— Military Exer-
cises", pg. 29.
(99) 14ND card #1418, dated 9/2/41, Subj. : "DAKAR— Attitude of Na-
tives", pg. 29.
(100) 14ND card #1419, dated 9/2/41, Subj. : "MOROCCO— Outgoing visas
from", pg. 29.
(101) Conf. Ltr. to Hd. of Domestic In tell. Branch, ONI, from DIO, 14ND,
dated 8/22/41, Subj. : "British Secret Agent in Manila ; information
received from", pg. 27-26.
(102) Extract #24, Subj. : "HULL, Amos Tyler", pg. 21.
(103) Extract #20, dated 8/1/41, Subj. : "German S/S RAMSES", pg. 19.
(104) 14ND card #13.S3, dated 8/15/41, Subj.: "JAPANESE MILITARY
ARMOR", pg. 14.
(105) Japan Military Body Armour, pg. 13.
(106) 14ND card #1334, dated (?), Subj.: "Japanese Industrial Manage-
ment", pg. 12.
(107) Extract from letter from Manila, dated 7/12/41, pg. 10,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 127
(108) Factual Information regarding Japanese Professions, pgs. 9-7.
(109) Extract #9 for Honolulu, dated 7/3/41, pg. 6.
(110) Extract #10 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 5.
(111) Extract #11 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 4.
[271] ( 112 ) Extract # 12 for Honolulu, dated (?) , pg. 3.
(113) Extract #13 for Honolulu, dated ( ?) , pg. 2.
(114) Extract #14 for Honolulu, dated ( ?), pg. 1.
B. One (1) Photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a
copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 12/8/41 (Japanese time).
Henby C. Clausen
Lt. Col., JAQD, V. S. Army
For Armv Pearl Harbor Board.
top seceet
[272] War De^pabtment,
Washington, 3 March 19^5.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy :
Subject : Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor
Board.
1. Activities reported: Report is made of my investigation for the Secretary of
War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, during the
period 17 February-3 March 1945, as follows:
a. Army personnel interviewed as leads:
Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C. «^
Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I.
General Robert H. Dunlop, A. G.
Colonel Edward F. French, S. C.
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C.
Lt. Ann Long, S. C.
Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2.
General Thomas North, OPD
Miss Mary L. Ross, G-2
Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.
Mr. Smith, S. C.
General Ralph C. Smith, G-2
b. Navy personnel intervieiced as leads:
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort
c. Affidavits obtained:
Major Anderson
Colonel Bicknell
General Dunlop
Colonel Jensen
Miss McKenney
Captain Rochefort
Miss Ross
Lt Colonel Rowlett
General Smith
[273] d. Conferences additional to foregoing:
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
General Carter W. Clarke, G-2
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD
Mrs. Foley, OPD
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN
2. Significant features of additional evidence developed:
a. "Winds" code message: General Short contended and the Army Pearl Harbor
Board concluded that no information concerning this intelligence was available
to General Short in the Hawaiian Department. For example. General Short
stated in a letter to the Secretary of War : "Such information was not made avail-
able to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islan(ds." But it now
appears probable that before 7 December 1941, both his (j-2. Colonel Fielder,
and his Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, received information of the "Winds"
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
code, and that his Assistant G-2 took action for the purpose of intercepting an
execution message. If it is a fact that General Short did have available in his
Hawaiian Department the information from the Navy as to intercepts of the
' Winds" code message, this confirms the impression of General Marshall and
Admiral Turner.
b. Destruction by Japanese of codes: General Short also contended that this
information was not available to him. He attached more importance to this than
almost any other intelligence. He testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry
that had he received this information he would not have been led to attach much
importance to not alarming the civilian xwpulation. In response to a question
as to whether he would have gone into a different alert if he had received by
telephone the 7 December 1941 message from General Marshall, he testified :
"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made
■much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code ma-
chines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this
advantage also : I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving
that out, the code machine would have been very significant, the destruction
of the code machine tvould have been very significant to me. I would have
been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * *
I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously."
It now appears probable that both General Short's G-2 and his Assistant G-2
were informed before 7 December 1V>41 of the destruction by the Japanese of
their secret codes and papers at Washington, London, [27//] Hongkong,
Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, and his Assistant G-2 saw the Navy Depart-
ment message which so informed the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It will be re-
called that this Assistant G-2 reported to Short's staff on the morning of 6
December 1941 'that the Japanese Consuls were destroying their secret papers.
He, also, in the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, brought to the attention
of General Short and his G-2 the fact that the FBI had intercepted a telephone
message between a Japanese agent in Honolulu and a purported newspaper
correspondent in Tokyo referring to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft,
weather conditions, "hibiscus" and "poinsettias" in the Hawaiian Islands. This
information was not given to the War Department. It should be observed that
the "'Winds'' code was to be implemented by a false weather broadcast as a
signal for the Japanese Consuls and diplomatic agents to destroy codes and
papers. Hence, knowledge of the "Winds" code ariTingement, coupled with later
information that the Japanese were destroying their codes and papers, would
indicate that the "Winds" code had been implemented. Colonel l^ratton sent
the 5 December 1941 warning wire to the Hawaiian Department because he had
received information ot the destruction by the Japanese of their codes. This
was an inferential notice of implementation of the "Winds" code. Since it now
appears probable, subject to additional investigation, that Short's G-2 and his
A.ssistant G-2 knew of the "Winds" message and of the destruction by the
Japanese of their codes, it follows that there may have been available in the
Hawaiian Department the same information possessed by the War Department.
c. Inquiries and Reports on Ships in Pearl Harbor: These were jjerhaps the
most telling indications of the Japanese intentions. Two, which were very sus-
picious, dated 2 and 6 December 1941, were intercepted or received by the Army
Signal Corps at Honolulu and mailed to Washington. The message dated 2
December 1941 was not received at Washington until 23 December 1941. Trans-
lations of these were therefore not available in time to be of any use as fore-
warning to Washington. Inquiry will be made at Honolulu as to all the cir-
cumstances, and whether anyone in the Hawaiian Department had prior knowl-
edge of the tenor of these or similar messages. In this connection, I have
discovered evidence that more than a week before 7 Decend»er 1941 the Navy
arranged to receive and did receive copies of some conmiercial cables from the
Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, which tied into the radio intercepts.
Some were decrypted and translated before 7 December. Others, supposed to
be the more suspicious ones, were not decrypted and translated until later.
(Copies of these are supposed to be at Honolulu. Short's Assistant G-2 was
aware befoi-e 7 December 1941 that the Navy had made arrangements for receiv-
ing these copies.
d. 5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department: Colonel Fielder de-
nied receiving this message. But it now appears probable that it was sent by
Washington and received in Honolulu on 5 December 1941. The importance of
this fact is that it was the War Department method of informing the Hawaiian
Department of the "Magic" messages.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 129
[275] e. Alarm to civilian population: General Short contended that this
caution had been urged upon him by the War Department and was one of his
reasons for his No. 1 alert. It now appears that General Short did not inquire
of his staff, and ascertain in the experience of those on duty in 1940, as to what
effect the Herron alert of 1940 had on the civilian population. Had he done so,
he would have learned that the Herron all-out alert did not materially alarm
the civilian population.
f. Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November 1941: General Short testified
that the War Department had this in Washington when he sent his reply
to the 27 November 1941 message from General Marshall. It now appears that
the Standing Operating Procedure was not received in Washington until March
1942, and hence the War Department cannot be charged with prior knowledge
thereof.
3. Miscellaneous items: Several administrative matters pertaining to the Army
Pearl Harbor Board have been coordinated.
4. Wyman-RoM activities: Exploration of further leads has been held in abey-
ance pending completion of Washington matters.
5. Progress and objectives: I shall develop some very important and promising
leads in Hawaii and elsewhere when the studies in Washington have been com-
pleted, which is expected to be within the next two weeks.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
top secret
[276] Headquabtees, Army Sebvice Foeces,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington 25, D. C, 11 February 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy :
Subject : Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary
to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. Activities reported: During the period 3-17 February 1945, in pursuance of
directives, I conducted for the Secretary of War investigations at Washington,
D. C, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as
follows :
a. Army personnel interviewed as leads :
General Carter W. Clarke, G-2
Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, G-2
General Charles K. Galley, Jr., OPD
General Thomas T. Handy, D. C. S.
General Thomas North, OPD
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, G-2
Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.
Colonel Eric H. F. Svensson, G-2
Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2
b. Navy personnel interviewed as leads :
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort
c. AflSdavits obtained:
Colonel Dusenbury
Colonel Pettigrew
Captain Rochefort (being completed)
d. Conferences:
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Major Henry A. Correa, lADB
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD
Colonel William J. Hughes, Jr., JAGD
General H. I. Hodges, G. S. C.
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN
[277] e. Studies of Navy Court of Inquiry and Army Pearl Harbor Board
records, reports, and exhibits.
2. Significant features of additional evidence developed:
a. Colonel Bratton had testified that he delivered decrypted and translated
Intercepts to various distributees immediately preceding 7 December 1941.
Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit that it was he who, almost exclusively,
delivered the intercepts immediately preceding 7 December 1941.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 10
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. Colonel Bratton had testified that he wrote the 5 December 1941 message
from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, requesting that
Commander Rochefort be contacted regarding a "Winds" broadcast. Colonel
Dusenbury and Colonel Pettigrew stated in affidavits that this message was
written by them.
e. Colonel Bratton testified that the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to
Hull, called by some witnesses a Japanese declaration of war, intercepted 6
December 1941, were delivered by him to the usual distributees on the evening
of 6 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in an affidavit that he was on
duty and waited that night for the receipt of the parts of this message and that
when about half of it had come in, Colonel Bratton left for his home. Colonel
Dusenbury further stated that none of the parts were delivered that night and
that he, Colonel Dusenbury, delivered them the following morning, 7 December
1941.
d. Colonel Bratton testified that the Japanese message to deliver the Japanese
reply to Hull at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by him between 8 : 30
and 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941, and that he then called the home of the Chief of
Staff. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit his impression that this mes-
sage was received by Colonel Bratton between 9 and 10 a. m., 7 December 1941.
This confirms the recollection of the Chief of Staff as to when Colonel Bratton
made the telephone call to his quarters. This latter time element is also sup-
ported by testimony of Navy witnesses.
e. Colonel Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, stated he had no recollection
of receiving the 5 December 1941 message from Washington asking him to com-
municate with Commander Rochefort regarding the "Winds" message. He
stated he did not have any knowledge of the "Winds" message. Commander
Rochefort stated to me, and an affidavit to this effect has been prepared and
submitted to him for execution, that since the Fall of 1941 he had very close
liaison with his opposite number, Colonel Fielder ; that he. Commander Roche-
fort, was monitoring at Hawaii for the implementation of the "Winds" message
before 7 December 1941 ; that since this was of interest to the Army he did,
before 7 December 1941, discuss with Colonel Fielder the "Winds" message as
well as the destruction by the Japanese of their code and cipher machines in
London and in Washington, and of secret papers in Honolulu, and any other
important information of that character.
1278] 3. Miscellaneous items:
I have coordinated several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl
Harbor Board
Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 6 February 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy
requested a copy of the record of the Navy Court of Inquiry and an examination
of the record of the Army Board of Investigation. The Secretary of the Navy
replied by letter dated 12 February 1945 that the request so far as the Navy Court
of Inquiry is concerned should be denied because courts of inquiry and other
investigative bodies are convened for the purpose of informing the convening
authority or higher authority of facts attending the matter inquired into, and
furthermore, that the investigation has not been completed. So far as the Army
Board of Investigation is concerned, the Secretary stated that this is a matter
over which the Navy Department has no authority.
4 Wymnn-Rohl activities:
In conjunction with the foregoing, investigations and conferences have been
conducted and held by me on phases involving Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.
These do not pertain to responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but some of
the persons to be interrogated are in the same locations as those to be questioned
in connection with the foregoing unexplored leads. The Under Secretary of War
and The Judge Advocate Genei-al have directed that I conduct the appropriate
additional investigation, including the development of leads suggested by the
Army Pearl Harbor Board.
5. Progress and objectives:
It is intended to complete the examination of the Navy Board of Inquiry pro-
ceedings, to interview and confer with such other persons as are available locally,
and then to gather such information elsewhere as is essential. When concluded, I
shall correlate, digest, and, interpret the additional facts in relation to the Army
Pearl Harbor Secret and Top Secret Reports.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 131
TOP SECRET
[2791 EXHIBIT E
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secbetary
OF War
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the
Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of my investiga-
tion.
[280] TOP SECREH'
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington 25, D. C, 14 September 19I[5.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject : Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
This vpill confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified
as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as top secret
and consisted of one volume.
I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained
by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel
that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret
Report require modification.
In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and one page 16 :
"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our
potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United
States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments
in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete
disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know
what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against
the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts
as to the enemy's intentions.
"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in Novem-
ber absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to
every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to
give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.
"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only
a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian
Department based upon this information except the 'Do-Don't' message of No-
vember 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information,
ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive direc'
tives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.
"This was not done.
"Under the' circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions
to be taken by field commanders, and [281] this information cannot be
disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon
the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to
the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the
War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the com-
petent field commanders.
"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster
of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were
available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting
those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this
information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War
Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself
having selected the right alert.
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either
to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it." (Pp 1 & 2)
"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6,
1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and
Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of
the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack." (P 16)
The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I
have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in the light of Colonel
Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with
the new and additional evidence. These revisions inclulde the following:
As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on
page 2 :
"Story of the Information as to tlie Japanese Actions and Intentions from Sep-
tember to December 19^1. The record shows almost daily information as to the
Japanese plans and intentions during this period.
"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been
fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese oflfensive military op-
erations. (R. 86)"
The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the
proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes
A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its
report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows:
TOP SECRET
[2821 "On the 24th day of November we learned that November 29, 1941,
Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations
of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for
the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that
date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."
The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the
Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944,
for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an
excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examina-
tion of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain
Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November
1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington.
This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing
an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it
stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things
are automatically going to happen."
The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian
Department.
It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony
of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our minds."
The Board further found :
"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' inten-
tions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States.
(R. 87)" (P2)
"* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indi-
cated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. R.
123-124) • * *" (P 5)
This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell
to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123-124)" is to the
testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was
asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which
he mentioned in his testimony to Admiral Hart. He stated he could not then
recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had in-
formation that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the
United States and probably against Russia. He gave ns a basis for this informa-
tion his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was a circular
message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony
of Captain Snfford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was
the so-called .Japanese "Winds Code" message.
[28S1 Colonel Clau.sen's investigation shows that this Information reached
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 133
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified
before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that
the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese "Winds Code." He took
immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further
testified that his attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on
the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated
5 December 1941, asking that the G-2 Hawaiian Department, communicate with
Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo.
This obviously refers to the "Winds Code." Colonel Bicknell further testified
that he also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert
L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and iufoi-mation that Commander
Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also
monitoring for the execute message.
Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General
Kendall J. Fielder, G— 2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained
liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General Fielder
such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplo-
matic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the
Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the
course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the
latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code"
intercept.
The Board found :
'<« * ♦ War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26
that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the
Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action." (PP 2 & 3)
The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as
he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents" which
he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows :
"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a con-
centration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from
Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine
activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands." (P 87)
This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 Decem-
ber 1941.
[28//] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Lay ton. Captain
Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Commander Holtwick, of the
Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short
was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The
Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2,
Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the
increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelli-
gence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercept-
ing, decrypting and analyzing radio tratfic of the Japanese navy. The Daily
Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer,
during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable
Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval
forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Col. Clausen's
Report. )
The Board found :
"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources
that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would
maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)" (P 3)
This, again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart
Examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Colonel Bratton,
as follows :
"General Russell. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December
1st message, Colonel.
"Colonel Bratton. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. * * *"
(P 88)
Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of
Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e.,
the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code" message and a message from
Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and
stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at
Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated : "I attached little or
no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming
since 1936."
As shown above, the "AVinds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian
Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that
Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States.
[285] The Board stated :
"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to
war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were
destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as
meaning immediate war. (R. 280) * * *" (P 3)
Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy
sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in
Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been
instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from
the Navy Department, dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows :
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent
instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts
at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy
most of their codes and cipliers at once and burn all other important confidential
and secret documents."
Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel
Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J.
Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that
Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in HonoluliT had intercepted a telephone mes-
sage from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese
Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also
shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference
conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this
information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was pres-
ent at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General
Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his
codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staif, and gave this
information to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General
Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.
The Board further stated :
"As Colonel Bratton summed it up :
'The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials,
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War
Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was
being painted over a period of weeks if not months.' (R. 243-244)" (P 3)
[286] "* * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had
was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agen-
cies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary
of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances,
copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the
Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R.
297)" (P 3)
The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel
Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, however. Colonel Bratton
corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified
in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testi-
mony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he pi'e-
viously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the char-
acter mentioned and wliich were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" be-
fore the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the
Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he
stated that he could not x-ecall with any degree of accuracy what material was
delivered to whom during the peripd in question, and that there were no records
to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously
testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned.
But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries
as were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then
Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.
The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 135
revised in accordance with ttie corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Sim-
ilarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4 :
"All of this important infoi-mation which was supplied to higher authority
in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go
out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occa-
sional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups
in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"
The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence
must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel
Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Claii-
sen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian
Department before 7 December.
The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the
effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under
instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he aslied [287]
General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that
General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following this, according to
the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose
suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department,
to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."
General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the inci-
dent, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could
quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to
General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance.
The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general t.vpe of information which,
according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November
and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that
Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the
deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to
29 November ; and also information available at Washington on 28 November
In the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advis-
ing that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the
"proposal" in toto, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was,
negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be
called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and suggesting
that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between
the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation
of the Netherland's Indies by the United States and the English which would
make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese
envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further
referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as
related by Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the
"Winds Code."
None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December.
However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945,
analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War
Department sent to General Short.
Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional
information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the
tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings
of war.
The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and
Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel
Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [288] which is men-
tioned in his report to the Secretary of War. Once such dispatch from Manila,
given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth
prophetically :
"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with
Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present
but will act in South."
The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplo-
matic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute
message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.
In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period
of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Con-
136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in
the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report.
Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic
out of the Japanese Consulate.
Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment G-2 contained much material gathered from observers, travelers, and
Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and informa-
tion mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the
Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report
to the Secretary of War. Some are initialed by General Short.
Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and
25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable
moves of Japan.
General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department
cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they
were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his
cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most com-
plete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6)
General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation,
"it was well known that relations witli Japan were severely strained and that
war seemed imminent."
Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific
intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command simi-
lar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual
intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel [289] Clausen that
this type of information and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most care-
fully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have in-
cluded not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders and that
this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would
spread the information into too many hands. There has been considerable evi-
dence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before
Colonel Clausen,
". . . Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would
have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so
compromised."
The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Doug-
las MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department informa-
tion as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen,
"Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information
and advice for the purpose of alerting: the Armv Command in the Philippines on a
war basis, which was done prior to 7 Decem1)pr 1941."
The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information
that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however,
that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department, which are con-
tained in Top Secret Exhibit "P>" before the Board, there were others which, in
retrospect and with tlie benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl
Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and
the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements
in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The re-
quests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more
frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. T^vo intercepts, which
were not decrypted and translated until S December, were part of the series
mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board.
They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, Japa-
nese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached
to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel
Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and
transmitted to Washington by telet.vpe on fi or 7 December. They were not in the
code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype
between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of
6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between re-
ceipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was
less than the normal time required of 3.5 days.
There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he
could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attack target in the event
of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [290] that the
Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 137
shoi'tly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the
Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traflic of the Japanese Consulate at
Honolulu. Some of this traflic included the same types of reports as were inter-
cepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor.
It is not entirely clear just what commercial traliic was decrypted and translated
by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being
made, to Toliyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner,
attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu
were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Jap-
anese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached,
and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.
The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at
pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sadtler
that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called him
and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then con-
ferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investi-
gation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt,
who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Col-
onel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall
having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel
Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5
December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time.
He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercepts which
was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.
Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a
Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese "Winds
Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen's investiga-
tion discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I
understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by
testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.
Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the
Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or some equiva-
lent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence Service
and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila and, in turn, from
Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the
British Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete
file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the
Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's
query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the docu-
mentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.
[291] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and Gen-
eral Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based
on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and General
Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also
testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows :
"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in afiidavits
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, refer-
ring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my con-
ference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the
comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the aflfidavits
mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows
concerning this subject :
''General Gerow: — 'I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel
Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely
a Signal Corps ofiicer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination
or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy informa-
tion of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the atten-
tion of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a
Signal Corps oflScer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to
7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to
the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof,
I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible
that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received
some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event,
there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Depart-
ments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
meiuoi-y at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.'
'•General Smith: — 'I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has
stated. However, since the matter in question was ohviously a difference of
opinion between the A. C of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division,
both of whom liad direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I
had any nvsponsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadt-
ler would have asked' me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly
since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impos-
sible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I
should step out of my rather minor province.' " (P 2 - Affidavit of Colonel
O. K. Sadtler)
From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board
meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort mes-
sage of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [292] of receipt
of an execute message to the '"Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified
that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information
derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their
codes and important pai^ers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the C-2
warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2,
Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony Colonel
Clausen, however, General Fielder stated :
»* * * I jjave no recollection of having received the War Department radio,
but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col.
Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close
liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer : particu-
larly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or
particularly important. * * *"
Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on or about 5 December
he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he
then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent infor-
mation and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the
execute message of the "Winds Code."
It shoidil be l)orne in mind tliat the execute message to the "Winds Code" was
to notify the .Tapanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the
United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representa-
tives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same
information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more
direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investi-
gation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.
On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings con-
cerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo
to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes :
"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9 : 00 and 10 : 30
p. m., December 6, as follows :
"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a
locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General
Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and
General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see
the contents. (R. 307)
"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the
message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R.
239-241.) He stated that [293] General Miles did nothing about it as
far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles.
'Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow's executives in
the War Plans Division. (R. 238)
"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Depart-
ment for the Secretary of State and did so between 10 : 00 and 10 : 30 p. m.
(R. 234, 239) ~
"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had
urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General
Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading
the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none
by General IMiles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation
until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12)
"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to
see that the contents of the 18 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 139
known in detail to the Wax- Department, completely translated and available in
plain English, by not later tlian between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December
6 or approximately Honolulu time. Tliis information was taken by the Oflicer
in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally
in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff
to General Eisenhowei-, who was then Secretary to tlie General Staff, and he M'as
told that tlie message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It
Was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to
the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the Wai- Plans Division, each of whom was
advised of the vital importance of this information tliat showed that the hour had
struck, and tliat war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock tliat night, this same
oflBcer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty
officer.
"General ISIarshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as
vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either
Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows." (P 16)
These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The
basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying
before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony;
that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 0 December was to
the duty oflicer for the Secretary of State ; that the sets for the Secretary of War,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Divi-
sion, were not delivered the night of 6 December ; that these sets were not given
the night of G December to General Gerow, General Smith or [29.',] General
Miles ; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles
on 6 December ; and that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came
into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on
the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliv^er the set to the
home to the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen
that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any
until after 9 : 00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury stated
Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received.
On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the
testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General
Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and
General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 Decem-
ber. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general
contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home
of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall,
the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who trans-
mitted it to General Miles.
The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton tele-
phoned General Marshall's quarters at 9 : 00 a. m. the morning of 7 December
to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages
directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 Decem-
ber, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General
Marshall did not come into his office until 11 : 25 a. m.
These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of addi-
tional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before Colonel
Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which would be
in the office of the Chief of Staff "between 10 : 30 and 11 : 30 that morning."
Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morn-
ing of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Build-
ing until between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel
Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December
in his ofl[ice at about 11 : 00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel
Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the
United States at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton
until "after he arrived that morning, between 9 : 00 and 10 : 00 a. m."
The Board further found :
"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4
and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday,
December 6 and 7, was \295] clear-cut and definite." (P. 15)
The evidence does not seem to justify any suQh conclusion. There was not
received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information
which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department
received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the
Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most
suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near
future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other
information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in ad-
dition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was informa-
tion received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular
posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed
out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources
in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be
delivered at 1 : 00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore
pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not
a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time.
The Board further found :
"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were
planning to do was known to the United States except the final message in-
structing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the pre-
ceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very
hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor." (P 18)
This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japa-
nese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the
fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement.
This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top
Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has
since testified was information he should have received. General Short testi-
fied before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General
Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by
the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different
alert if General Marshall had given him this message by telephone. General
Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone
on a different alert :
"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about
the destruction of the code machines. The other ^natter wouldn't have made
much of an impression on me." (Underscoring supplied)
As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from
his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the Japa-
nese Government held sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to
destroy certain of its codes and important papers. -
The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Mar-
shall included in his message which read as follows :
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code ma-
chine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not
know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this com-
munication."
My Conclusion:
The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based
upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its
reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed
herein.
Mybon C. Ceamee,
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 141
TOP SECRET
EXHIBIT F
Investigation by Lt. Colonex Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, fob the Secbejtary
OF War
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Peakl Harbor Board
Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and commenting
upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War,
dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation.
The previous memorandum mentioned is attached at the end of Exhibit "F."
top secret
[297] Headquarters, Army Service Forces,
Officb; of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington 25, 14 September 19^5
Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation.
This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.
Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to
your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl
Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course
of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to
whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing
the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires
m.odification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of
fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In
my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional
data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact,
however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as
a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require
clarification in some respects.
The "Winds" Message:
On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the
War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so-
called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese
diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that
" 'In case of emei'gency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)',
a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the
Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows :
'(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND BAIN)
'(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KIITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
'(3) Japan-British relations :
NISHINO KAZB HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)' "
When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.
It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal
to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941.
However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [298] Harbor Board left
in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever
received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army
codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" message indi-
cating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was
not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of the testimony of Captain Saf-
ford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. p. 25).
142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that
an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese
relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United_ States was ever received
by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section,
Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in
November and December 1941, stated:
"I did not see any ext>cute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know
there was no shch execute message received in the War Department." (Affid.,
Col. Harold Doud)
.Captain Edwin T. Lay ton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testi-
fied no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (Affid., Capt. Edwin T.
Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Roche-
fort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of
Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)
Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Signal CoTps, in charge of Signal Intelligence
Service at the time, stated:
"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either
before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent."
(Affid., Col. Kex W. Minckler)
He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with repre-
sentatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in the Navy was Captain
L. P. SafEord.
Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time, did not recall
meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which
meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes'
telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24)
General Miles stated : "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic
execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak
of hostilities." (Affld., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated
that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the
activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated
there were several [299] messages intercepted which were thought at
first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He
thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December
1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles,
p. 2)
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers
in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 1941, stated that when
he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D., Top
Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral
Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that
according to standard practice, it would be transmitted withoiit delay to G— 2
(Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel
Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and Colonel Bratton about
Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning
as follows :
"C. G-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with
Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repeti-
tion of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."
However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and
he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According to
his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell
Smitli about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted
draft but stated he did suggest that a' warning message be sent the overseas
connnanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top
Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen
(Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith
had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such
recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that
Colonel Sadtler was " purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not con-
cerned with the dissemination and interpretation of 'INIagic' " messages (Affid.,
Gen. Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise had no recollection of Colonel
Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was
not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the
"Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible for
Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W.
Bedell Smith)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 143
[300] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that
other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a "false
alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the "Winds Code" and, so far
as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He
at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative^ of G-2 to send
a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 3)
I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before
Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter, denied the
receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.
Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941,
recalled a meeting 5 December 19 11 with General Miles and Colonel Sadtler at
which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had received from Admiral
Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes,
as there had been several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as
he knew, Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional
information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of
Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith. Colonel Bratton
never brought Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff.
(Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)
Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever
see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code." As to the
testimony of Captain Safford of tlie Navy to the effect that two copies of such a
message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but
six copies of any such message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army,
the inference being that no copies at ali were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941,
representatives of the Navy liad discussed with him several "false alarms" relative
to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with
him the message supposed to have been sent to the Array according to Captain
Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton)
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for
the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testi-
fied that on receipt of the original "Winds" message, [301] he directed
the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating
message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message
was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)
General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testi-
mony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from Admiral
Noyes has already been discussed (See affidavits. Gen. Gerow, p. 2 ; Gen. W. Bedell
Smith, p. 3).
Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief,
Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the
source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic") messages concerning Japan
was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He in-
quired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message
had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall receiving any such in-
formation from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would
have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds"
message prior to 7 December 1941 (Alfid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he
had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit
B (see my first memorandum of 2.5 November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the
"Winds Code" nor any activating or implementing message. He believed he had
seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas
MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testi-
fied to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland) Major General
C. A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had
never seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments
of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to his knowledge
were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute message. (Affid., Maj. Gen.
C. A. Willoughby)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that imme-
diately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to
the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War
Department, Washington, D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency,
Signal Corps, War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
activating "Winds" message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank
B. Rowlett.)
[302] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the
testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the "Winds" message, discussed by
me in my memorandum dated 25 November 1944, is that the most diligent search
fails to reveal that any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received
by the War Department. In this connection. General Marshall's testimony will
be recalled, "I find that no ollicer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton
that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received by the Navy."
(Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, p. 38)
The Rochefort Message:
In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony
that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo
to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines,
he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after
discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas command-
ers. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given and Gen-
eral Miles stated he was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, how-
ever, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed
it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCoUum stated that as
Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth
Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listen-
ing for the second or implementing message, a radiogram be sent to General
Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton
thereupon drafted a radiogram, signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941,
reading as follows :
"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth
Naval Di-strict regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather"
No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or
in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message.
However, realizing its importance. Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investiga-
tion examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant
Gf-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken.
General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radio-
gram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2)
As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy,
independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified :
[303] "My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of
their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage
of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had
to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given
to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the
Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known
that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed Imminent,
but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for
Hawaii." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2)
General Fielder further said :
"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific
Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and
assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy
agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for infor-
mation obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been
given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to
me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some
different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian
Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft bat-
teries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter
being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy
constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to
December 7, 1941. the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Haley, was in liaison
with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Com-
bat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding
General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the
war started." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8, p. 2)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 145
General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese
messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included the "Winds" mes-
sage (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Aflad., Brig. Gen.
Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact
Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close [SOJf]
liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the
latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During
the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the
Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to
have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the
execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1).
His attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941
he saw on General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General
Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General
Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel
Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the
pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring
for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L.
Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.
The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelli-
gence Branch, Gr-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort
message, contains heresay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything
in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds" mes-
sage), the source of which was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall.
His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Com-
mander Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for inter-
cepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would
receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 Decem-
ber merely as a precautionary, measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)
Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not
mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the
Navy had guardedly advised him of this message or its equivalent prior to 7
December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the
Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a
break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would
inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this informa-
tion on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal. (Affid.,
Robert L. Shivers)
Mr. Shivers testified:
"Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he
disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after
7 December." (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)
There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell.
[305] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affi-
davit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied
that he received it. General Fielder stated :
"I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who
according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any
of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming
from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting
the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Roche-
fort did not give it to me direct." (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 8)
General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the
"Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the
receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.
In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that
the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either
through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence
Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short re-
ceived equivalent information will now be considered.
Other Information Possessed by General Short:
I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board,
testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to
the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to
Whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said :
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 11
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made much
of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines,
you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also :
I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the de-
strtictian of the code machine icould have been very significant to me. I would
have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * *
I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." (Italics
supplied)
It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equiva-
lent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum
of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel
Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was [306] "destroying its codes and burn-
ing its papers," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war.
This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's
staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by
General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p.
10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short
(Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19) .
The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the
FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December
1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him,
asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in
Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI
intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and
a Japanese in Honolulu, durin.g which the cook stated that the Consul Genez*al
was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave
this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise tele-
graphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
"Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important
papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November
1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotia-
tions between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the
alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this informa-
tion to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already re-
ceived similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid.,
Robert L. Shivers)
General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by
the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by
Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder
testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affid.,
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)
Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy
sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representa-
tives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This
apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850. dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval
District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows :
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confiden-
tial and secret documents." (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183)
rS07] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell,
p. 2)
About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and
told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their
important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)
He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent informa-
tion which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of such papers had a
very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen
somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to
the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. .30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tran-
script, p. 8084-3685) Colonel Bicknell also fpstified further relative to giving
General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 147
on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11). Their
reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell :
"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too
'intelligence conscious' and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order,
and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short
and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about
five minutes.
"Following 7 December 1941, 1 met General Short while waiting to testify before
the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me
words to the effect, 'Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens
you were right and I was wrong.' " (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3)
It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl
Harbor Day by General, Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three,
of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate
in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however,
I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memo-
randum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and
Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying
its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not
mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burn-
ing and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean
codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form.
Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his sttaement that he
evaluated tihe Dr. Mori message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the
light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Con-
suls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testi-
mony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the
Jap Consul was [308] burning his "codes and papers." (Affid., Brig. Gen.
Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)
Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the
information that the Japanese Consul Genera] in Honolulu was destroying his
codes, as distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his
secret papers and not some but all such papers at that .iuncture of world af-
fairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had
adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-American situation. While it may
be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers,"
of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are
quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact
remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the
destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by
the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme sig-
nificance.
The Manila Warning Message:
This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H.
Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies & Co., Honolulu,
one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Com-
pany, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member
by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British
Government as a secret agent in INIanila. The cablegram received by the Davies
Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows :
"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following develop-
ments in Indo-China:
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and
considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Wash-
ington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hos-
tilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack
Russia at present but will act in South.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence
Honolulu."
[309] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of
Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable volume of orders for
delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and
Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of
Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)
Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover
activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul
in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson
arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson.
Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December
1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2-
of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cable-
gram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained
in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell)
In addition to the cablegram above referred to. Colonel Bicknell stated he
obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson,
which he brought to the attention of General Short, in one form or another.
(Amend, affid.. Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this information is attached
to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items
struck a responsive chard in his memory, but he could not remember if they were
brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information
was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen.
Fielder, p. 3)
It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly
important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila.
The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel
Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated :
"Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, with-
out any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting betweeni
Bangkok and Singapore."
A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain
Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short
"in one form or another." (Amend, affid.. Col. George W. Bicknell)
[310] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:
These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel
Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson,
to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain
Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be
discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing
of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports
found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which
he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. Geoi-ge W. Bick-
nell)
Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor
disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel
Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W.
Haley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten
days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel
Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin,
which included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show a
general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army pro-
posed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands
in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about
the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with
Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to them.
(Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USN) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts
with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him over the
entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. Pie told Captain Layton and Colonel
Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. This was in
October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He also reported this to
General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 149
Comment on Information Which Beached Oeneral Short:
In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as
to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional informa-
tion possessed by the War Department whicli was not sent him, I said:
"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had,
Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that
there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations."
(P. 30)
Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortiiied me in my conclusions above
stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject
''Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on
this subject.
[311] Short's SOP Against Attack:
In my memorandum of 2.5 November 1944, I stated :
"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General
Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert
No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No.
2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation
of field positions as in Alert No. 1 ; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against
sabotage and uprisings within the Islands 'with no particular threat from with-
out.' It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts
of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in para-
graph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative
draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, SJiort expressly recognized the necessity
for preparation for 'a surprise hostile attack.' " (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics
supplied)
As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the
radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour
ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with
no threat from without." Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much
of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he
sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with
the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of
5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that
time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against
sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the
War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabo-
tage, be brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his
SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)
Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short
transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around
that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War
Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C, was
specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of
receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files
of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces,
and made specific inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter.
His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department
until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to
the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clar-
ence G. Jensen)
Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the Hth Part of the Japanese
Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:
[312] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you
of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the
above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place.
Conclusion:
My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative
to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, General Gerow
and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
investigation I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's investigation which leads me
to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum
of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with
the present memorandum.
Myron C. Cramer,
Mybon C. Cramer,
Major General
The Judge Advocate Oeneral.
1 IncI
Copy memo from TJAG
to S/W, "Top Secret
Report, Army Pearl
Harbor Board."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 151
ISm EXHIBIT G
Investigation bt Lt. Colonel Henky C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secbetaky
OF War
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War dated 25
November 1944
top secret
[314] Memorandum for the Secretary of War :
Subject : Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.
You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have
examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The
pi-esent memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to
the conduct of Colonel Tlieodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in
the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.
Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:
No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented.
As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of
War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as
amended and supplemented, in order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed
in Public Law 389, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed
judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in
their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were like-
wise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and
submit information.
Board's Conclusions in Oeneral:
The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise
to all concerned : the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, which caught tlie defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and
to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due,
the Board states, (a) to the failure of General Short adequately to alert his
command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of
the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert ; and
(c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United
States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the
inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these gen-
eral conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief
of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-
300). The Board makes no recommendations.
It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report is to take
up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions
later.
[3^5] Board's Conclusion As to General Short:
Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed
in his duties in the following particulars :
"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a
war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information
which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was suflBcient to warn him
of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and
that hostilities might be momentarily exi)ected. This required that he guard
against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it
might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst foiin of
attack that the enemy might launch.
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreemeut with the Admiral command-
ing the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Nayal District for
implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in exist-
ence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods
by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement
of the responsible commanders.
"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnais-
sance being conducted by the Navy.
"(d) To replace inefficient staff oflacers." (Rep. 300)
Short's Defences:
General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the po-
sition of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked : it is a question of the
validity of his defenses.
Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed
"Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which
his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from with-
out." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) He did this without con-
sulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the
Navy. (Tr., Short 262, 395)
He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only
from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297, 4442)
[316] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 No-
vember wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr.,
Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) His failure to provide for an outside threat
was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the
attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the
ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and
military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he
did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this
regard "I was wrong." (Tr., Short 4440)
Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an
outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin
2618, 2655 ; Farthing 838-839 ; Gerow 4274 ; Hayes 268 ; Herron 238 ; King 2700 ;
Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throck-
morton 1395-1396; Wells 2731 ; Wilson 13S0-1381)
Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the
Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample
time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55 ; Tr., 299, 300, 451,
452; cf. Kimmel 1769) ; (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of
27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage
and the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him addi-
tional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 306) ; (3)
that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with
training (Ex. 1, p. 10), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the
civilian population (Ex. 1, p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions,
and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522;
Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57)
These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the where-
abouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him
for his failure to take precautions again.st an outside threat. In the same
way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt tlie necessary alert against
an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or disclosure of possible intent, or
possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his train-
ing program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadow-
ing danger of a possible air attack.
Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient informa-
tion as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what informa-
tion he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278-
281, 291, 4427)
The Board in its conclusion stated :
"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the
Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected." (Rep.
300)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 153
[317] General Short took command 7 Febi-uary 1941. That very day the
Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the
Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated :
"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl
Harbor." (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied)
Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster"
warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to
withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *." The letter proceeded :
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage,
(4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire." (Roberts
Report, p. 5)
The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satis-
factory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army
consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy
defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts
Report, p. 5) Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing
Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369)
On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter
containing the following statement:
"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six Jiours of knoitm hostilities, thereafter the existing
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine,
constitute the real perils of the situation, frankly, I do not see any landing
threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority." (Tr., Marshall
17) (Italics supplied)
On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian De-
partment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satis-
factory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of
first priority." (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied)
[S18] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation
at length and stating :
"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability
of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack." (Tr., Marshall 21) (Italics
supplied)
Short further stated :
"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning
that would exist on the mainland." (Tr., Marshall 24)
On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent
General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark :
"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air
force and the anti-aircraft defense." (Tr., Marshall 27) (Italics supplied)
General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job."
(Tr., Marshall 27)
On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of
the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had deter-
mined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against
Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely
ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan
to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese
shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being
requisitioned. (Tr., Marsliall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055)
Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack. Short sent General
Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts. Alert No.
1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions ; Alert No. 2 being
applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field
positions as in Alert No. 1 ; and Alert No. 8 being a defense against sabotage
and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without."
It will be noted that these alerts are in inver.se order to the actual alerts of the
final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13
of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of
the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for prep-
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
aration for "a surprise hostile attack.'' (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics
supplied)
[319] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War De-
pai'tment that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War
Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District,
and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation be-
tween his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete,
that all such data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington
and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to
avoid duplication of effort. (Tr.. Bratton D. 292-293)
On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese
Cabinet resignation created a grave situation, that the new cabinet would probably
be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly pos-
sible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the
present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack those two
powers. The radio concluded :
"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute
provocative action against Japan." (Tr., Short 279)
Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278)
Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to
Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055)
On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the
Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan
would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which
might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an
unparalled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that
probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the
Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a
simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise
her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated
that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers
<<* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan con-
siders war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against
Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval
program is completed." (Tr. 3688)
[320] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short :
"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese. situation for your
information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained
but no. repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems im&inent."
(Tr., Short 412^13, Main 3307, Gerow 42.56, 4264)
Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25
October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation
since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of
the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by tlie fall of the Japanese Cabinet,
that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the
United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It
predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her
potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter
part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur
before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694)
On 5 November, the War Department Gr-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head
of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that
"* * * "War with the United States would best begin in December or in
February. * * * rpj^g ^^^^ cabinet would likely start war within sixty
days. * * *" (Tr., Bratton D. 289-291)
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his
Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that
"* * * from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii '
it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November
or, if not, then not until spring." (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440)
Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, testified he
believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force
and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, ves-
sels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came
from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 155
Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the
Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had
been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Lay ton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041)
[321] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacitic Fleet, that.
"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with
Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and
movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a sur-
prise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philip-
pines of Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and con-
curs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14)
inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action.
Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch." (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch
1503-C)
This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his
estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with
Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059) Short said, "I do not think I ever got the
message. * * * j might have seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten
about it." (Tr., Short 414)
On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short :
"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while simultane-
ously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and
number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and navals vessels including
submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are
fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (Tr., Gerow 4259)
The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which
arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows :
"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be ^terminated to all practical pur-
poses with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hos-
tile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be
avoided. United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are di-
rected to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem neces-
sary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to
Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum es-
sential officers." (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281)
[322] This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed
Short's G-2 as follows :
■ "Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock.
Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may
begin." (Tr., Gerow 4260) (Italics supplied)
The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy
Department, reading as follows :
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates
an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula
or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory
to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 40X. Inform District and Army
authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spanavo
infoi-m|ed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take ap-
propriate measures against sabotage." (Tr., Gerow 4262)
Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469)
The following day, 28 ISiovember, The Adjutant General sent Short a long
radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken
immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short
293, Scanlon 4176) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against
sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
November. (Tr., Short 422) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the
various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage
(Tr., Short 294-296)
[323] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations,
dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra
Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fort-
nightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941,
which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly
that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval
and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769^1770) An FBI or War
Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes
and secret papers was given to Short's Gr-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr.,
Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that
Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning
secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) There were two Navy messages on
4 December 1941, the first an information copy to Kimmel of aklvice to certain
naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1614), the
second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event
of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safiord C. 187)
Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation
naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy
confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C 189, Bloch 1514)
In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's Gr-2
on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval crypto
graphic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broacasts from Toky<
"that you must obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This
had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully
later. (Tr., Bratton B. 62, D. 283) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff
advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning
papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413)
Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported.
(Tr., Fielder 2986)
On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military
Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Ha-
waiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had
ordered the execution of Plan A-2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese
naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507) Lieutenant
Robert H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Lega-
tion, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rain-
bow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512) The message in question was supposed to be
relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509) The record does not show
whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code
had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510) Colonel Merle-Smith,
had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order
that there should be no delay.
[32^] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell,
informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversa-
tion between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo
who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and
"poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military
significance" as Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell
testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416)
Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would
be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises
against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the
Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of
which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability
of "air surprise." (Tr., Short 387-388) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agree-
ment (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:
"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of at-
tack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be deliv-
ered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that
it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow
to start * * *."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 157
General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise
air attack. (Tr., Short 388)
General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff np to the middle of October 1941, (Tr.,
Hayes 242) testified that he. General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral
Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable
enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in
Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes
267-268) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan
1929), testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed
"many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1061-1963) Short had at least one air
defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he
conducted an air raid drill as late as 20 November 1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727)
General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him
to imdertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote
that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full
responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance "* * *." (Tr., Short
4442)
[325] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington
did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in
mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these
messages.
Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and
that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against
Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr. 279-281) and that when the 27 November
message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that
differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 261) He likewise interpreted the 27
November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm
the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio
to him of 28 November. ( Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54 ; Tr., 293-294) As Short testified :
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that
there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *." (Tr., Short 437)
Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War
Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for
defense. The planes arrived in this condition during the attack. (Short, Ex. 1,
p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471)
Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Wash-
ington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on
his part. Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr.,
Short 453)
Tlie Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General
Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300)
Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as
confiicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared
for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This
precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was
adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between
the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary
outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility
of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and
where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set
forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction,
namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruc-
tion to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows :
[326] "* * * This policy should not, repeat not be construed as restrict-
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defenses. * * *"
(Tr., Short 280^281)
Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have
been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert
against threats both from within and from without. .
Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall."
This reads:
"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Short,
Ex. 1, p. 16;Tr. 286)
As previously pointed out. Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes
after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting
the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed
to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities
might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962)
Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that
he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report
contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."
He testified :
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there
was going to be anything more than sabotage ; and, as I have explained, we had
a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went
into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the re-
quirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me
to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I re-
ported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or
too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it." (Tr.,
Short 437)
When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison
with the Navy" meant, he replied :
"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the
Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.
"General Gruneet. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to
carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?
[327] "General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent
that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agree-
ment which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." (Tr., Short
380)
Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency
and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated :
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. . . . Execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X.
Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the
War Department. . . ." (Tr., Gerow 4262)
The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)
On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message.
(Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message.
(Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department
was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile
action jwssible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbi'eak of hostilities
the tajiks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain
to Japan. The Implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of recon-
naissance refers to paragraph 18 (i) of the Plan which provides that the Navy
shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr., Kimmel 1745)
Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy
responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380, 383, 393-394,
4443-4444) because it only becomes a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint
Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put
it into effect even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676. Short 4437, 4441)
General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified :
"... A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message
of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division
to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat
as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint
Coastal Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval
District." (Tr., Gerow, 4283-4284)
[328] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with
the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that
"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures
in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic
Plan. . . ." (Tr., Gerow 4289)
Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only
that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures
were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the
Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the
Plan provides :
"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to
M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon
by local commanders." (Tr., Bellinger 1584)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 159
It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Di-
vision should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief
report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that
he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military
commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that re-
sponsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on
27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which
intervened fi'om 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore
quoted, which called for his re-examination of his decision.
Reconnaissance ; Means Available:
Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his
action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiving the message in
question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only
from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis.
(Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the
most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service.
The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for
twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian De-
partment did not have sufficient aircraft for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is
clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour
operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack.
(Tr.. Short 470)
[329] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance recon-
naissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 2S4, 385), but
he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr.,
Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like
way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report,
p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to
the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for train-
ing purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 3.o9-
360, 384; Bloch 1527; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 1725; Kimmel 1773, 1794r-1796;
1802; McMorris 2885 ; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)
According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and
could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted
to Washington, * * * jt ^^s clearly stated that we had to know the time
of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an
effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few
days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * • *."
(Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for
naval reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel stated :
"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against
aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from
Oahu, around a 360 degi-ee arc, if you want a full coverage, and this mil take
about 84 planes, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * *" (Tr.,
Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)
How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears
that the Navy had 81 patrol planes :
"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as
might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army
could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in
the fleet was 81, all told. Of these approximately between 50 and 60 were in the
Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * and
they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific
Fleet * * *." (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)
Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion,
Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such recon-
naissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)
[S30] According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were
needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees." (Tr.,
Martin 1872)
"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission,
with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought
the total of heavy bombardment to 180." (Tr., Martin 1873)
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required
180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short testified that he
believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting
reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385 ; cf. Roberts
Report, p. 16), and that the ta.sk force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles
wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses
would have been needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324,
374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel
1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in Oahu (Tr., Bellinger
1598, 1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of those could have been used for re-
connaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the
then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-20's, and 54
B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane,
but as General Martin says,
"* * * They could be used for reconnaissance, but * * * were always
recognized as not being a. combat ship." (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)
General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance
a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress.
Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes
in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes
were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing
repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that
a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could
have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel
and Short that the number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for re-
connaissance must be taken with some qualifications.
I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV,
D. 12) :
[331] "Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan be-
came effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating
from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no
distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers.
The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the
island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes
conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however,
constituted but small areas of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a
radius of 700 miles.
"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded
a measure of security against a surprise air attack.
"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance,
but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War
and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnais-
sance, if any, being conducted by the Navy."
Information Not Received By Short; In General:
Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important informa-
tion prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him
and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under
these circumstances, where vital infoi'mation cannot be disclosed by the War
Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department
to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to those commanders. (Top
Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present
case.
It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the
Roberts Report shows, the Vv^ar Department possessed no information definitely
pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date
of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper
stories. Indeed, aside from the Top Secret information which will now be con-
sidered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short
said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable,
(Tr., Short 499^50), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board,
there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not
transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with
having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short
received important information from his Gr-2 of which the War Department was
not informed.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 161
[S32] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that
it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis refer-
ences to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate
that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions
or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses
is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus
received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out
of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from
day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts
are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian
Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the
War Department was that it had possession of information which indicated war
at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclu-
sively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top
Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that
the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and
elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and
confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder,
and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning
its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant
war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel
Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War
Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed
of his own G-2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told
Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr.,
Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was
given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii
had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents
in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according
to Short's Gr-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton
D. 292-293)
The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top
Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally
between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order
to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary
briefly to recite the contents of thes.e various messages :
24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting re^
ports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various
subdivisions for that purjwse.
14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to
Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner ; Turner suggesting
Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradu-
ally withdraw Jap troops from China.
[333] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October, Toyoda, Foreign
Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S.
might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-Power
agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the
Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the
above.
22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo.
Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved.
5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost
secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging
renewed effort.
14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating
that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and
American power in China.
15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Hono-
lulu stating:
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."
16 November, translated 17 November, Tokyo to Washington. Referring
to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations
with the U. S.
79716— 46— Ex. 148-^12
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bring-
ing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of
eight destroyers entering harbor.
19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises
to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be
secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."
19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving
three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-
U. S. -Russian-British relations should become dangerous.
22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends
time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is
absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."
[3341 26 November, translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura
and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering
"the proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations
will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so.
"Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of
present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and U. S.
but would be followed by U. S. and English military occupations of Nether-
lands Indies, which would make war inevitable.
26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating
"the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too
long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.
26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and
Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no
progress.
26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great
danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon Japan
and suggesting plan to avoid this.
28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating
that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a
humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations" ;
.therefore answer will will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after
which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to
give impression negotiations are broken off.
29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have
been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will
you also report even when there are no movements."
29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instruct-
ing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.
30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's
adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting
proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and
Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for nego-
tiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has
decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
[335] 30 November, translated 1 December, Tokyo to Berlin.
Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured — broken" and
to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments ; that England
and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to
move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by Japan,
that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that
"the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone
dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the
most absolute secrecy."
30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between
Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out
negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.
1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing de-
struction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in
deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly sus-
picious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note
will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested, but in
Washington only.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 163
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising
when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for
that purpose.
1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising
continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders then
those lower down.
1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that
it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British
and American Consular rights would not be recognized.
2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting
conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein
Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and
expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of
26th. Japs convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement
which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American
proposals.
2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly
Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and
destroy all secret documents.
[336] 8 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo.
Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great
Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.
4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain
members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.
5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruc-
tion of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request
delay in destruction of one code machine.
6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance
notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare
to present it when directed.
6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating
that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet
Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-
American war.
7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent.
Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan
to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes,
also all secret documents.
7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the
6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a
British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break
out on the 7th."
The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail
later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States
Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts,
thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth
part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B" ; Tr., Safford C. 154) The
Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and
the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the
negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same
day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this
note to the United States at 1 :00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B")
[337] The Winds Message:
The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, inter-
cepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the
effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)"
a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily
short-wave news broadcasts as follows :
"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
"(3) Japan-British relations :
NISHINO KAZE KARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Ex-
hibit "B", 19 Nov., S. I. S. 25432 ; Tr., Marshall A. 35 ; Sadtler D. 250 ; Safford C.
125-126)
A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26
November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25432) The Army,
Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced
a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December,
Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge
of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was,
Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan
and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General
Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing
Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was. General Miles stated :
"Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel
Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no
time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time
but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to
keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253) Colonel Sadtler then advised
General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations
including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have
had pletty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed
Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff,
of the message and that be had talked to G--2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith
did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254)
It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message
apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel
Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes
was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations.
(Tr., Sadtler D. 252) According to [53S] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2
ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see
also Marshall A. 36-38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel
Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertainted the exact meaning of the Navy
activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry
of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On
this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated :
"I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that
any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations
would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39)
It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted
by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall
A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel
Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great
Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252) Apparently, therefore, the source of the
activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy.
The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford,
head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December
the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieu-
tenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of
it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message
was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain
Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes.
(Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to
the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department
Gr-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army
Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr.,
Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found
in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford.
The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department
and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr., Saffdrd
C. 133, 13&-138, 172) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that
this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford O. 136-138) ; the same is true as to its
getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)
Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty inter-
cepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession
of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr., Safford C. 139-140, 152) Whether these
include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 165
Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present r^ord.
Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he
suhmitted S. I. S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the(
Japanese reply at 1 : OO p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it
saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly
a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)
[339] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating mes-
sage with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he
became worried and teleplioned Commander McCollum and asked him whether
Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet.
McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having
sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been
instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated
he also arranged for four additional messages to be sent out to various naval
attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr.,
Saft'ord C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same
effect was also sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information
copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford
C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford O. 188-190)
One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a
statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval
authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department."
(Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by
Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of vari-
ous witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944,
in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford
C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document.
General Russell stated :
"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:
'On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warn-
ing message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,
summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Mes-
sage", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.'
"Now, this is on the 4th day of December :
'Admiral Wilkinson approved this message' —
which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely,
— 'and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the
message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p. m.,
Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What
do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult
to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated,
"I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man."
and so forth." (Tr., Russel A. 33-34)
[340] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral
Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr.,
Gibson D. 276-277)
Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message trans-
lated 4 December, ffom Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes
and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and Gen-
eral Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated
sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General
Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt
that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, con-
tinued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department
where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that
further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Roche-
fort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for
the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their diflSculty
a wire be sent to the Army Gr-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr.,
Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK
this message which was sent 5 December to Short's Gr-2 and read as follows:
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District,
has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are men-
tioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283)
In addition to the "Winds" message, the slieaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top
Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated
19 November 1941, reading as follows :
"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the follow-
ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
"(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations
'HJGASHr
"(2) Japan Russia relations
'KIT A'
"(3) Japan British relations; (including Tliai, Malaya, and NEI) 'NISHF "
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)
There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to
whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations.
(Tr., mil Bratton B. 60-71; Salford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See
also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This
conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan
might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized
this. (Tr., Short 456-457 ; see also Stimson 4061)
There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher oflScers in the War
Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or
the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single
code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic rela-
tions became dangerous, (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)
Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit "B", a sheaf
of forty-seven messages, stated :
"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to
the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. . . . The oflBcials
to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division." (Tr., Brat-
ton D. 297)
Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any
one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when.
Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any
showing of the form in which they received them. Sucli general testimony as
that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted — relying, as it apparently does, entirely
on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions — cannot be re-
garded as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge
of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a
specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of
having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211)
Discussion of Foregoing Information:
It is obvious that those Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration
in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was
specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time
and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, how-
ever, are very pointed ; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9
October, from Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor
and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose ; the radio of 15
November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, requesting that the
"ships in harbor" [3^2] report be made twice a week in view of the
critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December,
from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in "Pearl
Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering tlie harbor; the radio
of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a
"ships in harbor" report even whene there were no movements. The above
appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this
inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an imimag-
inative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves
advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on
ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, tlie radio of 5
November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting of 25
November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 167
translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline;
the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from
25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically
going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which
was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early
attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Mar- ,
shall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Mar-
shall A, 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department wit-
nesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United
States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated
the same day ; 2 December, translated 3 December ; 5 December, translated 6
December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, and secret papers.
There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These
messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been
warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment.
Whether, had General Short received these mesages, he would have altered his
view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message
clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely, the radio of 2 December
from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there
were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there
were provided with anti-mine nets. But this message was not received until 23
December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ey "B", S. I. S.
27065)
It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of
the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there
is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943
that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25350 instructing the Jap Ambas-
sadors to present the Japanese reply at 1 : 00 p. m., he sent along a [3^3]
note stating "This means a sunrise attack at Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford
of C. 167). Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy respon-
sibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department.
The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available
in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence
sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts,
along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might
have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl
Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to
make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the
light of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance which
was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that sub-
stantially all the definite information received as to Jap naval movements
pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia.
As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred
to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in
operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjectui'e. The fact that
Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that
the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers
(which meant war to Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what
Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he
did not get.
As'I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington
than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible
commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make
preparations. To the same effect was the testimony of General Marshall (Tr.,
Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton
D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 2.53), General Miles (Tr., Miles
127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-2.54; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr.,
Marshall A. 7-8, 14 ; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277 ;
Rus.sell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep.
pp. 18-21)
Comment on Short's Defenses:
The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no
escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with
the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were
threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form
of attack which he could expect was a surprise air attack, he cannot now
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S-}4] be heard to say that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the
exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is
obvious that General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change
the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and
stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into
the fall of 1941, that a surprise air attack was a primary threat. It is equally
obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not
amount to a communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived
at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which excluded a surprise
air attack as a then present basic threat.
As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held
by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing"
(though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short
continually stressed the possible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a
threat from without. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the
idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have in-
terpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor,
an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this
would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind
the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and
Short's claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample
time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would
have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent
and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General
Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt
act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might
jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2,
at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population.
It should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard
against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the
civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an ex-
perienced commander.
I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that
Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for
war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the
information which Short had was incomplete and confusing.
I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his
duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for
joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record.
I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not
informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being
conducted by the Navy.
[345] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these
Various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under mili-
tary law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's various failures were
not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of sei*ious errors of judgment. His
first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he
made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack
Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was
his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly
improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the
result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not
constitute a criminal neglect of duty.
Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:
The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff offi-
cers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of
the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far
too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep. 74)
A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for
Its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain witnesses were asked as to
their opinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied from complete
reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel
was unqualified. (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered
Phillips "one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to
confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise — the average,
run-of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 169
of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not
"feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time
of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that
he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-
1978)
These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips'
training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket
conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The Board adds, however, that
Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception of his duty and what he did and
failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is suf-
ficient evidence of the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to
support this finding is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interfer-
ence with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases
of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an air attack,
[346] what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short
ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips,
and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November.
(Tr., Phillips 1134-1144)
It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as a Chief of Staff,
as he had not been appointed until 5 November 1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and
that Short did not treat Phillips as a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having
him present at important Navy Conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no sub-
stantial evidence that Phillips was ineflBcient to a degree that would require his
removal by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way
a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that
can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully
qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigateiJ by the
Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the
disaster on 7 December 1941.
Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record
as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3, or G-4. Short's G-2,
Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either
from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold
Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst that can be said against Fielder is that
he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that
Japanese Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However,
this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about
these matters.
The Board also stated that
"While the varous assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the
results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of
requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their
testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short." (Rep. 74)
The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton,
Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony
when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed
under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what
happened on December 7." (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no
substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.
It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short
failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified.
[3^7] Board's Conclusions as to General MarshaV
The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations vnth the
Hawaiian Department in the following particulars :
"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully ad-
vised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an in-
creasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an
abundance and Short had little.
"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize
the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly
that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of Novem-
ber 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.
"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early
morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate
break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITTACK
"(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Com-
mand between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat
of war." (Rep. 298-299)
Adequacy of Oeneral MarshalVs 27 November Warning Message:
The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall"
should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese
and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission.
(Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197)
The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of
the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) overlooks the fact that the 27 November
message signed "Marshall" pictured the Japanese-United States situation ac-
curately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department
at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese
representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued
up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggests the possibility that they may
have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and witli evident hope of a
peaceful settlement.
[348] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washing-
ton to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in carrying
out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a
breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B")
Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic state-
ment, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, the Japanese negotia-
tors would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they were doing their
best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B")
On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington, suggesting
a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret
Ex. "B")
On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated :
"Judging from my interview witli Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my
considei'ations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peace-
fully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would
like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this
fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my
separate wire #1233." (Top Secret Ex. "B")
On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruc-
tion of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top
Secret Ex. "B")
Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability
of war :
"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would
have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when
I beUeved the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the
reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be
the result of war. * * « jsjo-^y ^j^g question at that time was whether they
would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that
question definitely and linally prior to the outbreak of war." (Tr., Grew
4213-4214)
When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr.
Grew replied :
[3^9] "I could not put my finger on any particular date. General. My own
position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to
prevent war ; and I did everything in my power to prevent it ; and, not being a
•defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to
the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December
7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable." (Tr., Grew 4199)
With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were
"two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and reported
directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.
"I think it is perfectly possible that the cabinet was not informed of the plans
for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is — well, I won't say confirmed, but it is
increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister
at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about
three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the
nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 171
Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces
me personally that he didn't know. * * *" (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)
When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by
Japan, Mr. Grew stated :
"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it,
that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides
war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our
views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could
readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have
relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think
that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it
didn't happen." (Tr., Grew 4218)
As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, General
Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War Department
was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It was first thought
that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. When the
time was extended to 29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall
A. 4) "November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December without
anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which
we' could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed
quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5)
[S50] In the light of all information possessed by the War Department at
that time the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note breaking ofE negotia-
tions, and the direction to the Japanese representatives to present the fourteen
parts at 1 : 00 p. m. (Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that
day, it is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall"! was an
accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was
sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in
the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.
General Marshall's Views on Warning:
The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred
not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that "very remarkable
things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading
an actual act of war." (Tr. Marshall A. 45-46) W^ith respect to other informa-
tion of the Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and influ-
enced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that
while it may have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to
Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what has hap-
pened, * * * the situation might well have been helped by translating that
information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of his decision at the
time, however, he stated :
"In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the
two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army Alert,
(messages to Short from War Department and Navy Department) were sufficient
for any Commander with a great responsibility ; and in addition to that you must
remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines,
convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme.
Nobody could look at that without realizing that something very critical was in
the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way
we were — the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, par-
ticularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii — without giv-
ing such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our
stalling off this affair.
"Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their
decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a certain period
of time, it would be too late: we would have gained the necessary strength to
make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act.
TOP SECRET
[351] "All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only
the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commer-
cial shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Every-
thing was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how — I never have quite
understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know
what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it." (Tr.,
Marshall A. 46-47)
As already indicated. General Marshall had no information of any kind which
Indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)
The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had atlequate weapons, ammunition,
and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 27) He also was under the belief in late November and early Decem-
ber of 1941 that Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the
desired reconnaissance. In this regard, he testified :
"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of
other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry
out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in
the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel." (Tr., Mar-
shall A. 27)
The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance
by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A. 26)
The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places
on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best prepared that we had."
(Tr., Marshall A. 25) He stated :
>i4: * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100,
Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska
and the Aleutians completely negligible." (Tr., Marshall A. 23)
The Chief of Staff continued :
"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * *" (Tr., Marshall
A. 26)
To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the over-all
supervision which was required of him from a global perspective, the Chief of
Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal Department:
[352] "* * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course
they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable
way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii." (Tr., Marshall A 13-14)
General MarsMlVs 7 December Message:
Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff
should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning
of 7 December of an almost immediate break with Japan, the Chief of Staff
testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated such a break until
about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6) He then immediately con-
ferred with appropriate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a message to
be transmitted to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when
completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense
Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine
command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required
for coding was "a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as
the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to
the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to
the procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could be
expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of Staff did not
understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he with Colonel Bundy was
sent back for additional information. (Tr., Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy
was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff in charge of matters
pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr., Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and
Colonel Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the
message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that
moment. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff
as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy
back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply confirmed
that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)
The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients
before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall A. 14)
Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message
to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to Hawaii via Radio
Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio was not able to get
through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further delay, which was also
unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the nonoperation of a teletype at
Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 173
it was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bomb-
ing and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)
[353] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because,
In the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr., Marshall
A. 13) The Chief of Staff testified :
"• * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have
called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience, my
own experience, even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * * * ^e
now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone." (Tr.,
Marshall A. 13-14)
Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message
for delivery to the Message Center :
"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the
message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the
message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means,
* * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed
me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the
addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with
Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about
three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the ad-
dressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw
that it was 11: 50 a. m." (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (This would be 6:20 a. m.
Honolulu time)
Colonel French testified that :
"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would
take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to
4.5 minutes to transmit the message to its destination." (Tr., French 196)
Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than
the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a warning without waiting
for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the morning of 7 December, the following
testimony by the Chief of Staff is pertinent :
"General Russell. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than your-
self with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders
a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and in-
cluding the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly
as to the substance of this message of December [35^] 7th relative to the
delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?
"General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer con-
cerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal
affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment
of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff was here, if the head of the War
Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff Gr-2 were aware
of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to
answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a great
catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way." (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212)
Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:
As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in
his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short fully advised
of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of which information he had
an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as already indicated, that General
Marshall's radio to Short of 27 November, considered along with the other mes-
sages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then
existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military com-
mander was required to take the information contained in this radio from his
Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further informa-
tion or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in the position of
carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a sub-
ordinate what the situation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces
itself to a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length and
in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that
there was only a bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and
that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at
any moment.
So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is
concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's Con-
clusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately pictured
-174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity that Short be on
the alert against threats from within and from without. The most that can
be said is tliat the War Department did not transmit to'Short the Top Secret
messages, but these were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the
messages actually sent Short over a period of months, hereinbefore referred to.
While the War Department was possessed of more information than Short
received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the qui vive. That
Hawaii had already been sutliciently alerted was [355] the opinion of
Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 27&-277),
of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler
D. 253. Bratton D. 283), of General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General
Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253)
Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Mar-
shall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages. (Tr., Mar-
shall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772) The Navy messages of 24 and .27 November spe-
cifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 30, D. 306; Short 358, 363) Captain
Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed with General Short in per-
son the message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941.
(Tr., Layton 3058-3059)
Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of
the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear instructions from the
Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from within and from without, and
for eventualities which could be momentarily expected.
As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Mai'^hall failed in his relations
with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional instructions to
Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of Short's 27 November
reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short had misunderstood General
Marshall's radio and had not alerted his command for .war, (Rep. 298) this
statement is a non sequitur. But, in addition, there was no testimony before
the Board that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified
that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the presumption
would be that I had seen it." (Tr., Marshall 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall
C. 201) It is significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though
initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not initialed
by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the corresponding radio from
General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39) The reply itself was indicative that
Short had taken precautions against sabotage and in stating "liaison with the
Navy" was susceptible of the interpretation that Short had also ordered defense
measures in accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that dis-
tant reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to
General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply, was en-
titled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his
reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered
that Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 Novem-
ber to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled to believe that
his order would be obeyed.
Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch
with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing."
(Tr., Short 380) He also stated that this phrase indicated he expected the
Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long distance reconnaissance.
(Tr., Short 380) General Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief
of Staff, testified that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy"
led to the reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out recon-
naissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This
would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * *". (Tr., Gerow 4289)
In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely advised by this reply of
Short that Short had made no preparations against an outside threat.
[356] -In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that
while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications calling
his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no time, so far as the
record shows, questioned this estimate by a communication to the Chief of Staff. ,
The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Depart-
ment that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would be a most
anomolous situation if a theater commander could be heard to say that because
he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had replied with a fragmentary
report that ipso facto he was relieved of his responsibilities and that these respon-
sibilities were then fastened upon the Chief of Staff.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 175
Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 Novem-
ber, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff testified it was SOP
to exchange (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772), the silence of Short after the
message of 28 November would indicate to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready
to meet all threats, both those from within and those from without.
It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the
Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in-Chief and, in point of truth,
personally warned the Hawaiian Department, with prophetic accuracy, against
the very type of attack which occurred.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did
not include the duty of personally directing and siipervising the detailed ad-
ministration of the various sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff. His pri-
mary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and the President, to plan and su-
pervise the organization, equipment, and training of the Army, to make decisions
and give advice concerning the over-all and vital problems of military strategy
from the perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then
confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the
War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent vic-
tories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose records justi-
fied the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the prime responsibility is
on the theater commander. No duty could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff
to check personally on the Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to
the stated fundamental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department
for any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy
and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in
preparation for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced
from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid
his responsibility in the event his organization is ineffective. There is a dis-
tinction, however, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the
performance of duties by members of his staff.
[3o7] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep. 298) that
General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt
of Short's reply, is not justified.
As to Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short
on the evening of 6 December or tlie early morning of 7 December the critical in-
formation indicating an almost immediate break with Japan "though there was
ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes entirely clear that Genera]
Marshall personally did not receive this information until late in the morning of
7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately but failed
because of circumstances beyond his control.
As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate
and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between 27
November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether this was the personal
duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already indicated that General Marshall
was entitled to rely upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that
elaborate preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formu-
lated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander in
accordance with the traditional American military policy. General Marshall had
seen General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate
plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29)
To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to Genera]
Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report (Roberts
Report, p. 19-20).
Board's Conclusions as to General Geroiv:
As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows :
"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately
informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the sub-
stance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2.
"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on
November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive ; on the contrary he approved the
message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements.
"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the
November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to
take corrective action.
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and
agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two
services in the manner contemplated." (Rep. 299)
[55S] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding
General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy beach-
head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities as Chief or Act-
ing Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in
question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of the General Staff was charged
with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and super-
vision of the Chief of Staff.
From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was
given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the
situation with the Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese future action,
the imminence of hostilities, and that under no circumstances should any limita-
tions or qualifications expressed in the messages jeopardize his defense. He was
also ordered to establish reconnaissance.
But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to
an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received sub-
stantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that
had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might have convinced
him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a
surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any sub-
stantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alterna-
tive, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General
Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination
in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it
could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed
lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese
intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu
requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into
various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to
Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further message
of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship
movements. (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imagina-
tive person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the
significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and
preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at
the head of the War Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illus-
trates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret informa-
tion to Short.
The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending
Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear and
concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers to this
radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In my opinion
this is an erroneous characterization of the message. I fails to take into account
the very essence of the situation which then presented [359] itself. Those
in authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted at that
moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations
which had been taking place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese
emissaries had practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the
Japanese might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew
that the United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month
of delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very iday —
27 November 1941 — the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations of
the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United States,
urging him to postpone any action that might precipitate war as long as possible
because we were not ready. Confronted with this situation, those in authority
in the War Department, including the Secretary of War, participateid in the
preparation of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which
were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express as ac-
curately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of
the possibility of an attack at any moment and that nothing must be omitted to
Jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance
of not doing anything that would precipitate war on our part. This naturally
presented a delicate problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of
the facts and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into
the language. There was no other course except to present this problem just as
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 177
It was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate situation conflicting
factors are bound to exist. It is because it requires wisdom and judgment to
deal with them that only men supposedly qualified are given posts of such re-
sponsibility. In any event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November,
beginning "This is a war warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent.
(Tr., Gerow 4261-5262)
As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's
reply arid to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer ground, General Gerow
admitted that while it was physically impossible for him to check every message
(Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered the War Department gave Short
adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by assuming
that the reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant Gen-
eral of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he
failed also to follow up on the demand in the radiogram of 27 November signed
"Marshall", for a report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified :
"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval
of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important
problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through."
(Tr., Gerow 4290)
[360] In fairness to General Gerow Is should also be mentioned that
Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge of
the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific matters.
(Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291)
General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the
failure of his Division to function with the eflSciency that would have made
impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans Division
is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although its functions are
not comparable to those of a commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on
post, is charged with specific responsibilities.
As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required
.«iteps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant to
their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these agreements for joint
defensive action could be put into effect by the two commanders in Hawaii
when they deemed It advisable. (Tr., Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short
4440) General Gerow assumed and had the right to assume that, warned by
the threat of hostile attack contained in the 27 November message, the two
commanders would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
(Tr., Gerow 4289) or at least such portions thereof as would assure adequate
reconnaissance.
On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing
to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by 0-2 is, in the
light of after-events, to a degree justified. (Rep. 299) At least it was a pre-
cautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too
with the Board's conclusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was
culpable in failing to check on Short's reply to the November 27 message signed
"Marshall." I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General
Gerow in approving the 27 November message to Short failed to send a clear,
concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately
and adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite instructions.
I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to
take the required steps to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War
Plan. General Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two
commanders would themselves put these plans into effect.
Miscellaneous Statements of Board:
Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull,
are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure to discuss
such matters should not be regarded as indicating my agreement with these
conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider such irrelevant matters in
arriving at my conclusions.
[361] Unexplored Leads:
In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further in-
quiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advan-
tageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probabil-
ity, in my opinion, affect the result ; at the same time in order to complete the
picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 13
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose ;
the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.
In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in
detail with the officer selected by you.
Recommendations :
As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclu-
sions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.
As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the
Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did,
and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November message signed
"Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against
General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not check-
ing Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors
and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field
command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.
As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that
Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war
in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) in
failing to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in
Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation ; and
(c) to inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance
being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in the above
respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by
court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) above that Short in failing to
put into operation the proper alert was not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as
of a serious error of judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form
of a neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered the various
alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert.
The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into consideration
certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the primary threat, or that
he failed to subordinate certain other factors such as possible alarm of the civil
population does not remove the case from the category of a mistake of judgment.
Those mistakes simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong
alert. The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision
to establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the
concept of a neglect of duty.
[362] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an
agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and
Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of being
a terrible offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now of record,
this question is answered by what has been said above. Short's failure stemmed
from a mistake of .iudgment on his part.
As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing
to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being
conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as he indicated in the present
proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a Navy function. Whether he was
entitled to rely upon the fact that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its
ability, such reconnaissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do
not feel that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I
believe the timer picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly
what was apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally
no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.
Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial
at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are still using some
of the code systems in which various intercepted messages were sent and that
information of great military value continues to be obtained from present day
intercepts sent in these code systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result
in disclosing these facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary
court of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous wit-
nesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the
world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is out of
the question.
As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be
considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would adjudge.
As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 179
various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he re-
sponded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, in-
complete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as
to the suflBciency of the action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads
me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence
in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim
that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 16, p. 21)
There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's re-
fusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment.
(Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore
forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in
his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sen-
tence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.
[36S] As, on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if
it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am inclined
to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by a trial should be made
rather than to permit the case to linger on as a recurrent public irritation.
I suggest therefore that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review
of the Board's proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of
errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that
this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event
fijrther investigation should disclose a dilTerent situation the matter could later
be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.
Myron O. Ceamee,
Majoi' General, The Judge Advocate Qeneral.
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
CONTENTS
Page
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 1 181
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 2 253
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 3 341
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 4 428
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 5 480
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 6 592
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 7 645
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 8 668
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 181
EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 1
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of
War Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbob Board
a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of slieets 2 and 55, showing that
on 7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States,
Great Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 Decem-
ber", which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time.
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters
and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise
noted.
b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.
c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy
Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941.
d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japa-
nese War Policy".
e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is in-
itiated by General Short.
f. Memorandum re "Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August
1941.
g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report
of Sir George Paisn.
h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General
Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C, dated 6 September 1941.
i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kim-
mel in Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 September 1941, obtained from
Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October
1941, initialed by General Short.
k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki
To jo, dated 17 October 1941.
1. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of Tairliku, Japanese maga-
zine, for May 1941.
m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October
1941, re "Estimate of Japanese Situation".
n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy.
0. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25 October
1941, initialed by General Short.
p. Letter from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2,
Hqs. Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding mem-
orandum containing information received from Orient.
q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December
1941, Initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of
certain information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable.
s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Com-
mander (I. C), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from
British.
t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November
1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from
Navy.
V. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from
Navy.
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from
Navy.
X. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, 27 November 1941.
z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 29
November 1941.
aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washing-
ton, D. C, 27 November 1941.
bb. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 Decem-
ber 1941.
cc. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, 7 December 1941.
dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941,
ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington,
D. C, 7 December 1941.
ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.,
8 December 1941.
gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 De-
cember 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch
fighter aircraft by Carrier".
hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
ii. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb. JAGD, 10 December 1941.
jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8
December 1941.
kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C,
8 December 1941.
11. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter,
T. H., 9 December 1941.
mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, 9 December
1941.
nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Depart-
ment, Washington, D. C, 9 December 1941.
00. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11
December 1941.
pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio — Merle Smith."
qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11
December 1941.
ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and
destruction of their code machine".
tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian
Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air
Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers.
SECRET
278/242/10/des/13/j
Affixed to 2/1 :
Caution on Handling
1. This book will be handled by staff officers, the commanding officers eoncerned
and higher officers.
2. For the benefit of persons directly responsible for communications, supply
and related matters, these subjects have been treated.
rS. As in the case of code books, care must be taken that the publication does not
fall into enemy hands should the ship sink or be damaged.
5 Nov 41
Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet
Page 2/1 : Combined Fleet Ultbasecret Operation Order 1
Flagship NAGATO (*1),SAEKI (*2) WAN (TNBay.)
5 Nov 41
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku (*3)
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet
145 of 700 copies
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 183
Combined Fleet Order
Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT
BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the
Separate Volume.
SECRET
278/242/mab
Page 2/120-124 :
Editor's Note: Document pages 2/120-124 inclusive comprise the errata indicated
throughout the text in translator's notes. Document pages 2/125-150 duplicate
2/64-94 (G, Supply) and are omitted. Document page 2/151 (Appended Table 5,
Organization of Supply Forces of Combined Fleet) follows 2/94.
Combined Fleet Ulteasecket Operation Order 2
rage 2/152 :
Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI V7AN 7 Nov 41
145 of 600 copies
Combined Fleet Order
7 Nov 41
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet
First preparations for war
Y Day 8 December
Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 7
Page 2/154 2/155 :
Flagship NAGATO, off HASHIRA SHIMA (*1)
22 Dec 41
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet
confidential
Hawaiian Department Service Command,
Kauai District,
lAhue, T. H., 29 March 1941.
Subject : Japanese attitude on Kauai.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. Enclosed is a copy of the English translation of a speech delivered by the
Rev. Hiseki Miyasaki, Buddhist Priest of Lihue, Kauai during a send-off recep-
tion for selectees of the Lihue district on March 27, 1941.
2. The sentence inclosed in red brackets has been expurgated in press reports,
since it was felt that reactionary Japanese groups would attack Mr. Miyasaki for
such a statement.
3. The speech was given first in Japanese and then the English translation was
read.
4. The words of Mr. Miyasaki express very well the attitude taken now by the
majority of first and second generation Japanese on this Island.
5. It is becoming more and more apparent that as long as the local Japanese
population is not antagonized by fools of other races, it will as a whole be loyal and
peaceful.
6. The peace in the community and the loyalty of the Japanese are only en-
dangered by persons like Mr. Cedric Baldwin, Manager of McBryde plantation — to
mention only the worst offender — who delight in insulting the Japanese people
without the slightest provocation.
1. Incl. : Copy of speech
Eugene J. Fitzgerald,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
D. 8. C.
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
10 July 1941.
G-2: •?. 2 Exec.
Assistant G-2: ?.
Subject : Japanese War Policy.
]*^ile : To be filed in #2 safe and noted in "Current Estimate" Japan — in Record
Room.
confidential,
29 May 1941.
Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. N.,
'Savy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
My dear Admiral : In order that you may be acquainted with the steps taken
by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with Colonel
Throckmorton this morning I desire to inform you that during the holiday and
week-end I have increased the guard over important installations, and have
arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard during this period. Every
attempt will be made not to bring this action into the limelight so that the
community as a whole will not be aware of the increased surveillance.
I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is
concerned.
With kindest personal regards,
Very sincerely yours,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
SECRET
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B & LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception
that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General
unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip
will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the respon-
sible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered
in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign
for him.
AG 091/2
Statement A. — World tank-ship fleet, Dec. 31, 1945, versus Sept. 1, 1930
No. of Ind.
From and Date
To
Subject: W. D. Radio #924, 8 July 41
"Japanese War Policy"
1st Ind. AQ9 July 41...
C/S.
1 Incl. File — Dept. Comdr. informed.
Paraphrased copy furnished Dist.
Intell. B. 14 N.D. Mura 10 July 41.
1989 R. H. D.
1941. A. G.
9 July
Signal Corps, United States Abmy
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ In CODE.
Washington DC 152A July 8 1941
Secret
94 WAR BC 207 WD
CG Hawn Dept Fort Shaffer TH :
Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information
from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
185
policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups
Period. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable
aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian
garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that
Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period Opinion is
that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and
development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance
against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period Neutrality
pact with Russia may be abrogated Period They have ordered all Jap vessels
in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period Move-
ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant
vessels are being requisitioned.
Adams.
334P/720P/8
Received as a secret communication.
(Strilfe out two)
Decoded by :
Capt C J Habbison SC
818A Jtoy 9, 1941
Headquabtebs Hawaiian Depabtment
intes-staff bouting slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be
sent to subordinate commanders.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General
Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The
Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the
1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subse-
quently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement.
Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer
In charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and
Date
To
Subject: Traffic on Burma Road
1st Ind. Contact Office,
7-18-41.
2nd G-2, 7-18-41
3rd Ind. C/S, 7-21-41....
G-2
CS
G-2
To note and return. Subject matter
will be included in next foreign intelli-
gence report.
Please note. The increase in traffic and
the high freight rates are of consider-
able interest.
Noted . Incls ; n/c. Contact office
By G. W.B.
Mum.
W.D.T.
H. E.
Philip Hayes,
Colonel, a. S. C, Chief of Staff.
1740 FoET Stbeet, Victobia, B. C.
Deae Me. Andeew: Herewith a few notes on the arrival of Burma Road
trucks. The salt trucks arriving at Kunming originate in China a short distance
down the Burma Road, but tlie figures for the trucks exclusive of salt represent
imports from Burma & the steady increase in the average daily arrivals is
interesting. Tonnage arriving at Chunking is negligible.
I also enclose a few figures on freight rates which I hope you will be able
to follow.
Yours sincerely,
J. K. GOBESFIELD.
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
BuBKATT Road Taxes
1) Central Oovemment Yunnan MgMcays tax (payaUe each trip):
N$0.12 per tonAm. based on 960 kms. Wanting/Kunming i. e. :
1 ton truck outwards N$115. 20 return 230. 40
li/a " " " 172.80 " 345.60
2 " " " 230.40 " 460.80
2V2 " " " 288.00 " 576.00
3 " " " 345.60 " 691.00
2) Yunnan Provincial Oovemment Highways tax:
N$0.10 per tonAm based on 975 kms. Wanting/Kunming
Up to 2 tons Outwards N$195. 00 return 390. 00
21/2 to 3 " " 292. 50 " 585. 00
31/2 to 4 " " 390. 00 " T80. 00
(N. B. Fractions of a ton are regarded as 1 ton)
3) CM. Customs duty — 5% ad valorem — plus 5% Consular fee
4) Number plates and seasonal tax (quarterly):
2 Plates N50.00 and N$28.00 per quarter
5) Yunnan consumption tax (payable once only) :
N$802.50 per truck
1 & 2 for Shippers account — if trucks overloaded weight of cargo is used
as basis for calculating tax.
Weight rates Lashio/ Wanting /Kunming /Chungking
Distance
Rate
Approx.
exchange
US $ per
ton
Lashio/Wanting
Wanting/Kunming
Kunming/Chungking.
Chungking/Kweiyang
K weiyang/Kiinming . .
119 miles
959 Km-
1150 Km.
488 Km.
662 Km.
$39 per ton, $2 fee to Truck Control
NC$2.92pcr ton/Km
NC$2.4? per ton/Km
NC$2.06 per ton/Km
NC$0.87 per ton/Km
334
25
25
25
25
12.28
112. 01
111.32
40.21
23.04
Note: 1) Rate Wanting/Kmiming recently increased from NC$2.12 to NC$2.92
2) Rate Kunming/Chungking recently increased from N C$2. 12 to NC.$2.42
3) Where no return cargo Kunming/Wanting Government rate for "empty despatch" allowance
NC$1.62 per ton/Km @ Exchange 25 = US$62.14 per ton.
4) Above rates include Highway Taxes shown on separate list.
5) No recent information regarding rates from Chungking available and rates vary with different
types of cargo.
6) Rates shown from Lashio onwards are now paid for 1st class cargo e. g., gasoline.
HONO Kong, IMh June 1941. ■
Burma Road
Period
9/10/40-17/11/40-
8/11/40-17/12/40.
8/12/40-17/1/41..
8/1/41-17/2/41...
8/2/41-17/3/41...
8/3/41-17/4/41...
8/4/41-17/5/41...
8/5/41-12/6/41...
8/5/41-7/6/41....
Total.
Truck arrivals at Kunming
Including salt
No. of trucks
Total
3360
3112
3815
4226
3958
6802
5858
5074
35205
Aver-
age per
day
112
104
123
136
141
187
195
195
148
Total
tons
carried
9756
9529
11762
12843
12130
18189
18172
15604
107985
Excluding salt
No. of trucks
Total
1740
1720
2448
2914
2855
4519
4794
4207
25197
Aver-
age per
day
58
57
79
94
102
146
160
162
106
Total
tons
carried
5220
5677
7849
9100
8981
14195
15065
13071
Arrivals at Chungking
No. of trucks
Total
456
464
439
459
438
505
421
344S
Aver-
age per
day
Total
tons
carried
1368
1392
1317
1377
1314
1515
1263
798
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
NUMBEE OF TRUCKS PASSING FRONTIER AT WANTING
187
From
China
December
January. -
February,
March
April
Hongkong, 19th June, 1941.
Army Contact Office,
fedeb^^l buiujing,
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.
Memorandum : Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.
The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2: 00 P. M., and docked at Pier
#8 at 3 : 30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles
at 9 : 00 A. M., 1 August 1941.
Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route
were as follows : From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to
receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them ; they were also prevented
by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23
July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west
until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the
180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog
banks ; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during
which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on
the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu ;
then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been
ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours.
In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that
the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued
on into this port.
It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was
taken freezing credits.
Rcliablo buaincag ffteft fepei^l- tfesrfe Japan is very short ea carbon fela:efe7 aftd
uIIiIt ^n^y' 'iIttVC SOmO S uO O IC Ot i^lxGi' DC tlPifigS Oil ilclll(J.y OU u riGl TjiIGF uIlC IIilXLCi llXiy II Ol
faeilitica fof pfeducing them, ftftd -tliftt aay ohortagc e# tfeis item would eerioualy
hamper their airplane production, ^hoy a#e Gollccting «4i eefftp H^ft m citica,
even including ifee fcncco Oftd ornamental irons ea buildings.- Other items
reported %e fee short fti=e high stable cotton; rubber supplies,- high test aviation
gaooiinc, sugar, flour, icathcr, wool, Oftd anasthctics.
it is reported there a#e many ^crmofts m ali public efficcs ift Japan, even ie-
ciLiuift^ police QopftrtJinC'fitSj pos^ orfiCGSy ftnci iiriRncc oiiiooS'j uiicsc moR ftrC bhiq t^o
WftftP civil] flfi ClOullifi^j ■OtJrxf Wit) 11 ft liXF^C "JcVftSi OIllDiGfft ift ■trrtCi^' COfto iftpClr "ri-C^Ulil'"^
•f 1 /"mn f^.T*^^ nn i r1 ^,r\ r^^ Ty\ t^inr^ 4-tye\r^n\c\ 4--i.^*-»t-i f y/^yii TT^frnln i'loyin n n o rl i x\ \ -tf^'v I'W fl Tl Vi ■ 4-)yt ^
J«ly 1011 ttffee German raiders p«t ift at Yokohama, which were [sic]
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
201 (Paisn, George)
CI
WAH
CONFIDENTIAL
Wab Department,
War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington, D. C, August 28, 19.'fl.
Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such
action as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assista7it Chief of Staff, 0-2.
1 Enclosures;
201 — Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in
Hawaii : dtd 8/3/41.
CONFIDENTIAL
MID 201 (Paisn, George)
Strictly private and
confidential.
The Boreas,
Blue Ridge,
New York State.
Aug 3 1941.
Dear Mb. President, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter
on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance
that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.
As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii
and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that
inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of
some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live
in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give
the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to
anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger
of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be
overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the
American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan
destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would
be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might
arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers
and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly
trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes
would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken
American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to en-
able the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money.
Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would
be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that
the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution
against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth
columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can
be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the
disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precau-
tions.
Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with
renewed health.
Very sincerely yours,
/s/ George Paisn,
The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.
8/21/41.
Copies to:
G-3
Haw.
VSR/lge
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 189
CONFIDENTIAI,
EHG/td
Headquabtebs Second Cobps Abea,
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G}-2,
Governors Island, New York, NovemJ)er 28, 1941.
Subject: George Paish (Paisn).
To : Assistant Chief of Staflf, G-2,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H,
1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941,
there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.
2. This is transmitted for your information and records.
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :
F. J. Pearson,
F. J. Peabson,
Lt. Col., Q. 8. C,
Executive Officer, 0-2.
1 Incl.— (dupl.)
cpy FBI rept.
OONFIDENTIAI,
Copy op FBI Repobt
An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact Mr. PAISN at the
address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned
from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD G. PAISH, that his true name is SIR
GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Moun-
tain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that
address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was inter-
viewed, at which time he furnished the following information :
SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture
tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay,
he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to
world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world
trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace
to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the
United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken
in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name
at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations
which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people
at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced
and otherwise entertained the gathering.
SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and
during the course of the evening he turined the trend of conversation to any spirit
of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the
Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possibility
exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United
States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a
Japanese promise of "liberation".
SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be
Inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon
the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or
otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on
the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind
but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that
the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it
incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard
and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened
due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department.
SIR GEXDRGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of
Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's
Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining
his publications and ability as a lecturer.
It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming
conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference
to pre-World War associations, characters aud historical events.
I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.
confidential
Headquaktees Hawaiian Depaetment,
Office of the Assistant Chiei' of Staff
Fob Militaey Inteij.igence,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 30 September 1941.
In reply refer to :
336.8— (Japanese).
Subject: Letter from George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors
Island, New York.
1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your identification, with the request that
Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concern-
ing the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese
Government, and the native Hawaiians.
Kendall J. Fieldeb,
J Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of 8., G-2.
confidential
War Department
M. L D.
Intelligence Section, Contact Office,
215 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu, T. H., 30 September 194t.
Subject : Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.
Summary of Information :
Dear Mb. President, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on
your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I
feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.
As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii
and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that
inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some
kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii,
the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of
this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be
trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these
reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and de-
mand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval
and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and
these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the
Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of
supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard
these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of
these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any
risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard
might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his
purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be pre-
pared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may
be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials
have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the
Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy,
but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves
should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from
failure to take the necessary precautions.
Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with
renewed health.
Very sincerely yours, /s/ Geokge Paisn.
The Honorable E'. D. Roosevelt.
Evaluation
- of source ~ of information
X Undetermined X
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 191
CONTIDENTIAL
WCG/cjo
Headquai;tp;rs Second Corps Area,
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Oovernors Island, New York, October 15, 19^1.
Subject : Letter From George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.
To: Assistant Cliief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Fort
Shafter, Territory of Hawaii,
1. Reference is made to your communication of SOtli, September, with above
subject title.
2. Before tliis office can comply with request contained therein to interview the
subject, it is requested that this office be supply with Mr. PAISN'S address, inas-
much as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indi-
cate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.
For the A. C. of S., G-2 :
F. J. Peabson,
Lt. Col., G. 8. C,
Executive Otficer, 0-2.
1st Ind.
336.8 (ACQ).
Intelligence Section, Contact Officer,
214 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu, T. H., 5 November 1941.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, N. Y.
1. Mr. Paisn's address as shown on his letter to the President was "The Boreas,
Blue Ridge, New York State". This address was inadvertedly omitted in S/I of
30 September 1941.
Geobge W. Biokneu:.,
Lieut. Colonel, O. S. C,
Asst. A. C. of 8., G-2,
Contact OJficer.
confidential
Headquartees Hawaiian Depabtment,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff foe Military Intelligence,
Fort 8hafter, T. H., 6 September IdJfl.
In reply refer to :
350.05 (G-2).
Subject: Summaries of Information.
To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Wash-
ington, D. C.
1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Infox-mation received from
your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have
already been furnished this office by the Navy.
2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Depart-
ment, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dis-
patch of information to the respective Washington offices.
3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are
other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your
office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of 8., G-2.
(Item I of Exhibit 1 being pages 28E and 29E is a photostatic copy
of a portion of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 September 1941,
relating to reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel.
This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 7 and 8, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illus-
trations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits
of the Clausen Investigation.)
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAI-
Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D.
Army Contact Office
Honolulu, T.H.
Date: 17 October 1941.— 1200
G-2 Estimate OF International (Japanese) Situation
1. Summary of Situation
a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the
Pacific reached a, new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due
to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiation between America and Japan,
and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result
of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of
Japan by the ABCD group.
8. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still
necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has
not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is avail-
able as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the atti-
tude of the cabinet as a whole will be.
c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is
fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will
remain unchanged ; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her de-
cision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might
oppose the execution of said policies — irrespective of what means she may choose
to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.
2. Conclusions
According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the
near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary
reasons for such a, move or moves are believed to be as follows :
d. Capabilities
1. Desperate economic conditions internally — making it perhaps preferable
to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.
2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any
appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the
Axis — for the time being.
3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse
of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with
chances of minimum resistance — that is, when the strength of the Axis is at
it maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized.
If. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block.
6. Probable Moves. — The most likely moves which Japan may make in the
near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows :
1. Attack Russia from the east.
2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way
of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation.
5. Attack British possessions in the Far East.
-J. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.
5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might prom-
ise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages.
0. Reasons Justifying These Moves. — The basis for each of the above possible
moves are considered to be as follows :
1. Attack on Russia. — (a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense
as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential
aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.
(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that
Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control east-
ward to the Pacific).
(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known
to be in Siberia.
(d) To secure effective control over, or i)erhaps stamp out, communism
in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 103
(e) A possibility that an attaclv on Russia at this time can be undertaken
with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States ;
and that even the British might not resort to active military action in sup-
port of Russia in the Pacific, due to the tact that both the Americans and
British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither povi'er has any genuine
desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again
plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.
(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coor-
dination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against
other Pacific powers.
(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive
the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the sojith.
2. Pressure French Indo-China mid Thailand. — Pressure on French Indo-
Chiua and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guar-
antees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may
either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia,
in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the
north is being achieved ; and to afford her moi'e and better strategic bases
from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communication,
and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes
necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also,
to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.
3. Attack on British Possessions in the Far East. — Following the principle
of defeating one opjwnent at a time — famous with her Axis partner, Hitler —
it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance
to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a
simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding
agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action
against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to
support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in
ease of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to
fight the United States within a relatively short time.
4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers. — While a simultaneous at-
tack on the AJBCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it
cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers
war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against
Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our
naval program is completed.
An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost
certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the pos-
sibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever
points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advan-
tages over her opponents.
5. In Conclusion
Barring unforseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any
quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is be-
lieved that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take
and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will
be, as generally predicted, "strongly military" and will support the present
demands of the "rightists" elements which were largely responsible for the fall of
the Third Konoye cabinet.
George W. Bicknes^l,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C,
Asst. A. C. of S., 0-2,
Contact Offlcer.
Distrihution
C/S H. H. D.
G-2, H. H. D.
G-2, H. A. F.
G-2, Scofield Barracks (3 copies)
G-3, H. H. D.
F. B. I., Honolulu (2 copies)
O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies)
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 14
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D.
Army Contact Office
Honolulu, T. H.
Date: 17 October 1941.
Special Inti-xugence Report
Subjects : New Japanese Premier
Hideki or Eiki Tojo
Lieutenant General; Director General of Militai-y Aviation. Born December
18§4, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919;
instructor Military Staff College, 1922 ; Chief of Mobilization Section ; Commander
Infantry 1st Regiment ; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer ; Commander 24th
Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Chief
Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, May
1988-December 1938 ; JNIinister of War since December 1938,
Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-time
cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.
An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss
Kasuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who
returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conserv-
ative among the members of the army clique".
Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated
that he is a conservative.
George W. Bicknell,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.
Distribution
C/S H. H. D.
G-2, H. H. D.
G-2, H. A. F.
G-2, Schofield Barracks (3 copies)
G-1, H. H. D.
F. B. I., Honolulu
O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies)
JAPANESE POLICY FOR EAST ASIA
An enlightening statement of Japanese policy is contained in an article entitled
"The present stage of our great continental policy," written by Takehiko Okuhira,
an instructor in Keijo Imperial University and published in Tairiku ("Great
Continent") Magazine for May, 1941. A summary of the English translation of
this article is as follows :
1. The great continental policy of Japan originated with the Korean problem
of 1868. It has been consistent fr.om beginning to end and has been guided by a
spirit of universal concord. But it is based on the defensive point of view of wiping
out any menace from the outside to our national defense.
The continental debouchment of Japan's economic power was first started in
Korea. Then it was extended into China. But it was after the Russo-German
war that it made its great progress and came to hold an important position in
our great continential policy. It has taken a natural course, differing essentially
from the agressions of the Western European countries.
It was necessary for Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy,
countries which are facing similar critical situations, due to the political upheaval
in the world, and both of whom possess a common world view.
Our great continental policy in the present stage is also our world policy,
and is based on the v.orld view harbored by us. For not only does it aim at the
expansion and development of our national power, but also signifies our proposal
for a world administi'ation.
2. Japan's policy aims at the creation of a new world order and the establish-
ment of a gi-eater East Asia mutual prosperity sphere. It has entered a new stage
through the conclusion of the tripartite alliance. These three nations, which
occupied opposite seats at the Paris Peace conference, have come to harbor the
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 195
same historical mission, the same economic circumstances, and the same political
aim. They have banded together against the serious opposition of the nations
advocating the maintenance of the status quo. The creation of new orders in
Europe and Asia are not only their war aims, but also the guiding principle of
the creation of a new world.
The principle acting as the support for the creation of a new world order has
been provided by the words, "to regard the acquisition of appropriate territories
by each of the nations as the sine qua non (necessity) for lasting peace." This
principle is the correct basis for world partition, rather than the recognition
of possession as legal from the fact that a nation got there first. The principle
advocates the acquisition of appropriate territories by every nation of the world
to enable it to exist on earth and not be shut off from space. It sets forth an
idea of systematized order in place of the anarchical world order and world
partition of today.
Another fundamental support for the creation of a new world order is the
mutual i-ecognition of the right of leadership for nations. Leadership as an
ideology of order has definitely taken the place of the old idea of balance of power.
In Europe, Germany and Italy are carrying on a war to wipe away the influence
of Great Britain and put an end to her traditional policy of balance of power.
Japan, who is the stabilizing power in East Asia, is showing a resolute determina-
. tion and power to wipe away America's interference in the changing of the
political situation. Their aims are the same.
3. The great continental policy and the Pacific policy are inseparable. It was
hoped that America would understand this ; but America gradually took over the
receeding British interests, and after the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance,
America denounced the Axis as aggressors and strengthened her aid to Britain.
She has been rushing headlong toward war. An agreement has been concluded
between Great Britain and America for America to oppose Japan's navy, with
quotations from Prof. Fieldhouse of Canada and Prof. Whitney Griswold to prove
it. This has brought Japan's sea supremacy to the front. Japan's great con-
tinental policy aims to wipe away the intervention of third powers aiming to
encircle Japan, dominate the China Seas, and also to terminate the clashes
between the races of East Asia and their conquest by Europeans.
4. The Sino-Japanese treaty of Oct. 30, 1940, concluded at Nanking, for the
readjustment of relations, failed to bring aboiit complete peace despite the efforts
of Wang Ching-Wei. But, as the manifestation of the pro-Japanese centralized
government's collaboration toward the establishment of a new order in China,
it unfolded a new phase in East Asia. The treaty does not discriminate between
the winner and the loser and is based upon equality between Japan and China.
It has furthered the formation of the East Asia bloc and strengthened the axis
connecting Japan, Manchukuo and China, expanding their defense industries,
building up their economy by acquiring and developing natural resources, and
formed a union between Japan and China just short of military alliance. During
the past half year the Chinese government has made progress by solving her finan-
cial problems, monetary system, peace, and order problem, cultural problem
(establishment of Nanking Central University), and is making great strides
toward the resurection of a new China. There are many obstacles in the path
of the Chinese government : to overcome the feeling of dependence upon Britain
and America. But the penetration of the great Asiatic principle, proclaimed by
Wang Ching-Wei, and the withdrawal of British and American influences, which
actually can be seen, will make the people of China realize that they are the
descendents of a great and free i)eopIe.
Chungking has been continuing her resistance, hoping for America's support.
But President Roosevelt's special envoy, Carey, must have detected that conditions
in Chungking are very different from propaganda sent to America. Her economic
power is exhausted, transportation routes are deficient, is in conflict with Chinese
Red Army, and estranged from her emigrants abroad. She is being made to
dance to the tune of the dying embers of the mistaken nationalism of the intellec-
tual class and America's political expediency of regarding her as a stone of the
anti-Japanese cordon.
5. In August of last autumn, the landing of our troops in French Indo-China
wrote a new page in the annals of the history of Asia. Loss of French influence
led to demands by Thailand for the return of Laos and Cambodia territory. Be-
hind the scene of Thailand and French Indo-China were Britain and America, with
threats and warnings, siding with French Indo-China. Their attempts at recon-
ciliation were rejected and America stopped the shipment of airplanes ordered by
Thailand. A friendly neutrality agreement was signed between Japan and
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thailand, since which relations have drawn closer, with the opening up of an
airway, trade agreements, and use of Japanese technicians. Our country, which
is determined to maintain the peace and tranquility of the greater East Asia
sphere at all cost, proposed to arbitrate and mediate the clash between Thailand
and French Indo-China, and when this was accepted, held the peace conference
at Tokyo. After about a month, this resulted in the acceptance of an impartial
peace on March 11. This had profound significance, strengthening the tie among
the three nations and making Japan's position of leadership in greater East Asia
firmer and unshakable. Moreover, it enhanced the racial consciousness of the
oppressed races of Southern Asia and installed in them hope. Thailand was able
to push aside Britain's influence. Thailand is the spear to stab at Malaya and
the Dutch East Indies, which are embraced within Japan's greater East Asia
policy, and to the north of Thailand lies Burma, which is the gateway of India,
while to the east lies Indo-China, which is an undeveloped treasurehouse and
embraces Camranh Bay. All of the races of southern Asia have been robbed
of their real eyes by the propaganda of Britain and America. But since they
commonly entertain a righteous indignation against the conquerors and oppres-
sors, it is exi)ected that a time will come when they eventually will revolt.
6. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and mediation of the
Thailand-French Indo-China border clash, which occurred during the past
half year, after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement, have made a great
stride toward the creation of a new world order. Our relations with the Dutch
East Indies are still being negotiated. Our country has decided to break
with the status quo of Britain and America and fight resolutely against their
antagonistic interference. The most urgent matter for us is to pay strictest
attention to changing phases of the International situation and not take our
eyes away from the political, economic, and military attacks against the Axis
nations. America's anti-Japanese policy is of an unprecidented positive nature,
and is changing from economic oppression to military coercion. Our conti-
nental policy should be made the core of our national defense. So long as the
execution of our peaceful southward expansion is not threatened, our country
will leave their military bases (such as Singapore )i alone. More important
than anything else is making the western Pacific and the South China sea
"our waters", impi-egnable to the enemies. We should be aware of the fact
that not only does the supremacy of the seas depend upon the actual strength
of our fleet, but upon the number of naval bases and their position, our mer-
chant fleet, our production power, and our strategic raw materials. Since that
which would likely happen in the event of an emergency is protracted blockade
warfare, it is an urgent matter to include the south in the generalized economy
plan of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. The first work should be to awaken
within the races of East Asia, who are suffering from the exploitation and
oppression of the American and Englishman, their racial consciousness as
Asiatics and encourage them to combine and unite.
The consummation of the Sino-Japanese treaty is to Wang Ching-wei like
the discovery of a lighthouse. He is advancing along these brilliant rays
toward lasting peace. But there are several hundred million people of Asia
still wandering about in darkness. But their eyes are fixed on our moves to
bring about the creation of a new order in East Asia, even through the smoke
screen spread by the Englishman and the American. If a light to which
th^ can really turn is not hung out today, our mission of resurrection of
East Asia will become exceedingly diflicult. Foreign Minister Komura's
diplomatic plan embraced the resurrection of the races of East Asia. I think
the arousing into action of a leader burning with the spirit of an adventurer
from the races under bonds! is not far away, and I cannot help but look for-
ward to the glorious day of welcoming him.
SECRET
Headquarters Hawahan Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-J?taf£ Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the
Department C/A, the B & LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Ofl5ce
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, witli the
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 197
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement (list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
To
Subject: WD Radio, 20 October 1941,
of Japanese Situation".
"Estimate
1st Ind. AG 20 Oct 41
C/S
AG
1 Incl -
R. H. D.
3rd Ind G-2 21 Oct. 41
Noted. Unci. N/C
K. J. F.
Signal Corps, United States Army
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.
Secret
8 WVY EC 47 WD WASHN DC 1234P OCT 20 1941
20th Following War Dept estimate of Japanese situation for your informa-
tion stop tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no!
repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent
Adams.
1937A
Keceived as a secret communication.
Decoded by : LT G E HAVEN 1150A OCT 20 1941
• Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 20th."
To : Contact office noted by General Short & Col Phillips, new Acting C of S.
C/S HHD
CONFIDENTIAL
Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.
Army Contact Office,
Honolulu, T. H.
Time and date : 1200 25 Oct. 1941.
G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation
1. Sunmiary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the Inter-
national (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no funda-
mental changes in the iuteruatioual situation, centering on Japan, since the
time mentioned ; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with con-
temporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known _
to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation.
However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this
time:
a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the
Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly
precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapproachement negotiations be-
tween America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightest" elements
who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful
opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.
ft. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together
with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate
the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye
cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost imme-
diately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.
198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared
their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — which automatically underscores
Japan's policies with "intensified aggression" ; definitely places Japan in a camp
hostile to the United States and other democracies ; makes all protestations of
peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into
a state of constant vigilance — but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent
that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.
2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941.
However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to
take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course
of events in question in the near future. These are :
a. The formation of a new Japanese ''War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Min-
ister, General Tojo.
b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three
Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded
Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.
c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations
with the United States.
d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic
ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.
e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladi-
vostok as a part of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of
Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.
/. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation
with the new cabinet.
3. Justifications for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evalua-
tion of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as con-
clusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situa-
tion as subsequent events and special situations are preented :
a. New Calinet. Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other
noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that
General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man
considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave
olf any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become
definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rap-
prochement negotiations with tlie United States.
b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to per-
mit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded
nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as
a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and
military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove
Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military
operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Jap-
anese nationals from America and American territories.
c. Rapprochement Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has
openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — definitely our
enemy — we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations
as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential
enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be
preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously con-
sidered.
d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. This action on
the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also
appears fully justified — realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an
exponent and ally of Hitler.
e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two
issues are here involved-:
(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue
to face Hitler across the English channel, across the Atlantic, or on American
shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to
hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific.
Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on
incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts
for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
199
would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet
in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been
entirely ruled out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be
not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.
(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivos-
tok lias been one of the major issues' between America and Japan recently, the
abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a
longer period ; and, in case of an unforseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe,
might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan
desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis were useless,
and that a compromise with the democrocies has become inevitable.
Confidential
f. Nomura's report to 'New CaMnet. This is considered a very noi'mal pro-
cedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a
review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American
attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he
may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not
even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a
subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity
of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.
Remarks. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question. When will
Japan move? — a question which no one dares predict with certaifity. However,
the following points are considered to be wortlj^' of mentioning :
a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for
approximately another month are: .
(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded
nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.
(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the
new cabinet.
(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue
.rapprochement negotiations.
(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against
Russia very risky before spring.
(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did
immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the
"rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again
hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a
tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow
(?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a
rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.
(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito
to coavoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at
which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on
international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's
message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.
6. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made
before the latter part of November — in any direction — with a chance that the
great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.
George W. Bicknell,
George W. Bicknexl,
Lt. Col., G. 8. O.,
Asst.A.C.ofS.,G-2,
Contact Officer.
Distribution :
C/S H. H. D.
G-2 H. H. D.
G-3 H. H. D.
G-2 Schofield Barracks
G-2 24th Div.
G-2 25th Div.
F. B. I. (2)
O. N. I. (2)
Capt. Bryan, Trans. Sect.
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27 Oct. 1941.
Subject G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation
G-2 IJL
Assistant G-2
C/I DBL
Public Relations HGU
Contact Officer Bofile
File C/S & G-3 Dept. direct
Remarks Nothing re Hawaii.
G-2, HHD
CONFIDENTIAIi
Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D.,
Army Contact Office,
Honolulu, T. H.
Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941.
- Gr-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation
1. Summary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the Inter-
national (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no funda-
mental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the
time mentioned ; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with con-
temporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are knovni
to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation.
However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this
time :
a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the
Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly
precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations be-
tween America and Japan, and by exti'eme pressure from "rightist" elements
who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful
opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.
&. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, to-
gether with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to ac-
centuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the
Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost
immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General
Tojo.
c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared
their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — which automatically under-
scores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression" ; definitely places Japan
in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies ; makes all pro-
testations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion ; and forces
America into a state of constant vigilance — but at least clarifies the situation
to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what
should be done.
2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941.
However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take
place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of
events in question in the near f utui'e. These are :
a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minis-
ter, General Tojo.
&. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three
Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded
Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.
c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with
the United States.
d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic
ports in the north Pacific, including Shangliai.
e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivos-
tok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Arch-
angel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.
/. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return' to Japan for consultation
with the new cabinet.
3. J ustift cations for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evalu-
ation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as con-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 201
elusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusion on the general situa-
tion as subsequent events and special situations are presented :
a. New Cabinet. Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other
noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that
General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the 07ily man
considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave
off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become
definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapproche-
ment negotiations with the United States.
&. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to permit
three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of
both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure
to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves.
It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals
from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that
section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from
America and American territories.
c. Rapprocliement 'Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has
openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — definitely our
enemy — we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as
her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies.
From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by
concrete evidence of sincerity before the can be seriously considered.
d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. -This action on
the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also ap-
pears fully justified — realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an ex-
ponent and ally of Hitler.
e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two
issues are here involved :
(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to
face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores,
centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold
the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys
to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental
to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the
remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would be re-
quired over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific,
any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled
out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake
a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.
(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok
has been one of the major issues between American and Japan recently, the aban-
donment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer
period ; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might
provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to
change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a
compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.
f. Nomura's report to Neiv Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure
with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review
of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word in the American attitude.
If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return
to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assvmiption that he may not even be re-
placed. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate
to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situ-
ation. This is not, however, a prediction.
Remarks. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question. When will
Japan move? — a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However,
the following points ai*e considered to be worthy of mentioning :
a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for
approximately another month are :
(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of
stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands. ■
(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the
new cabinet.
(3J. Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue
rapprochement negotiations.
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against
Russia very risky before spring.
(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did
immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the
"rightists" 'who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again
hesitate to take the final plimge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus
a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow
(?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a
rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.
^6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to
convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at
which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on
international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's
message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.
6. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made
before the latter part of November — in any direction — with a chance that the great
break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.
Distribution : George W. Bicknell
C/S H. H. D. George W. Bicknell,
G-2 H. H. D. Lt. Col., G. S. C,
G-3 H. H. D. ■ AssT. A. C. of S., G-2,
G-2 Schofield Barracks Contact Officer.
G-2 24th Div.
G-2 25th Div.
F. B. I. (2)
O. N. I. (2)
Capt. Bryan. Trans. Sect.
JVIID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.
Confidential
War Department,
War Department General Staff,
MlUTABY INTEXLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C, November 5, 1941.
Subject : Letter of transmittal.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such
action as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, V. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
1 Enclosures :
336. 1903-41) — MID Summ. of info, re Information received from the
Orient : dtd. FMH
16
FMH
Confidential
WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.
November 3, 1941.
Subject : Information Received from the Orient.
Summary of Information :
The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941,
is considered reliable :
1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon
Society, told of an onder issued by War Minister TO JO (now Premier) "to
complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 203
All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The
full preparation to be completed in November."
2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States
would best begin in December or in February."
3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet
would likely start war within sixty days."
G2 Note : Full name of iridividual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is
reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.
Distribution : Evaluation —
All Corps Areas of source : X Reliable
All Departments . of information : Credible X
Alaska
FBI
ONI
STATE
File
Source: Dr. Cho
Date of original paper 10/28/41
p. m. s.
I. B. Cognizant
Urgent Cable Received From Manila Night of Deo. 3, 1941
We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments
in Indo-China :
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and con-
siderable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washing-
ton Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at
present but will act in South.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu,
cc. Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfleld
TOP SBKREJT ULTRA
From London, 31st August 1945
ULTRA IMPORTANT
GOR 682 from GCCS 11279
Following from C. S. S. for Jones.
A. Colonel Wilkinson who was stationed at Manila and is now with 48000 and
temporarily in U. K., was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C.
Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department U. S. Army, in connection with
investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbour disaster.
He carried credentials from Secretary of War.
B. He brought copies of 2 telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November
26th and December 2nd, which were as follows :
1. "November 26th, 1941. Most Immediate. Secret Source (usually relia-
ble) reports:
( a ) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st with-
out any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bang-
kok and Singapore.
(b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa.
Main landing point to be in Songkhla area valuation for above is number 3
repeat 3 (i. e., only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy). American
military and naval intelligence Manila informed."
2. "December 3rd, 1941. Most Immediate.
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) We have received considerable intelligence confirming following devel-
opments in Indo-China:
(I) Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.
( II ) Arrival since November 10th of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops
and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 mm) .
(b) Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed to
Washington November 21st by American Military Intelligence here.
(c) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities
with Britain and United States. Japan does not repeat not intend attack
Russia at present but will act in south. You may inform Chiefs of American
Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."
C. Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para. C. of telegram of December
2nd, and in particular, whether this was in "fepecial" category. In point of fact,
para C. loas based on a B. J. Wilkinson was unaware of source and passed informa-
tion to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications.
D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agent's re-
ports, but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C.
E. You should consult with G-2, as security Ultra at stake if this evidence
made public.
Wt 55959/7940 30m 3/45 Wa & Co 51/3
Reference Sheett
Personal
Admiralty
TOP SECRET
From: Commander (I. C), Admiralty, Dated: 16th July, 1945.
S. W. I. To : Captain Hastings.
A/2277
Herewith copies of both messages referred to on the telephone this morning,
Monday.
Commander (I. C.)
Secret message IN
From : C. O. I. S. Singapore. Date 8.12.41.
Received: 0113
Naval Cypher (D) by W/T
Addressed Admiralty (for D. of N. I.) Navy Board Melbourne. Navy Boiard
Wellington, S. O. (I) Hong Kong. N. S. H. Q. Ottawa.
AID AC
Information received at 2010Z 7th by Hong Kong that severence of Japanese
relations ? admitted imminent.
2312Z/7
D. N. I. (4)
O. I. C. (3)
D. S. D. 9
File X
Most Secret message IN
1746Z/7th December.
From : C. O. I. S. Singapore Date 7.12.41.
Reed. 2112
Naval Cypher O. T. T. by W/T
Addressed Admiralty (D. N. I.)
Immediate
Personal from Consular Special Intelligence dated 7th December. Tokyo
inform all Consulates that relations between Japan and Great Britain and United
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 205
States are critical. Comment. Message from codeword from table for warning
telegram. '
1746Z/7
Advance copy sent O. I. C.
D. N. I. (4) Personal
O. I. C. (3)
D. S. D. 9
Copy of Cable Received Nov. 27, 1941
Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,
A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1,
without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between
Bangkok and Singapore.
B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main land-
ing point to be in Songkhla area.
Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 percent probable
accuracy).
AMerican Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila, informed.
Copies to : Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell.
6-1
Saturday, 11 October 1941
23251 /To KIMURA at P. Hotel, on private line:/ K. and girl, /reception
poor/ They are apparently very good friends. Their conversation is
about the dispatch of ships to the U. S. K says that X has rSceived
a cable re these ships. The Sumitomo Bank and certain other firms
will send staff members back. Perhaps TAKAGISHI will go, too. K.
goes on to say in English that it may happen "at any moment". /She
says goodbye and hangs up. He waits quite some time before hanging
up. It is apparent that K. is drunk and not in full possession of whatever
faculties he possesses. There was no lovey-dovey talk, however, as in
the case of TAKAGISHI. K. is convinced that he may be recalled at
any moment and is very sad about it./
END
l-5.',0
SECRET
Sunday, November 30
No activity
• Monday, December 1, 1941
1000 0 to RCA, for messenger
1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be
sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. $45.82.
They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but
SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not
being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation
is. (Doubt if S does either !)
1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi de-
spatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent.
First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not
had any information from Tokyo to prepare for possible closing (he
says). He saw "a few lines" in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks
the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.
1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday.
This morning /it was set ?/ at 9:30 — no 10. At X? Yes. /This con-
versation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling.
1326 o YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the
ofBce. /Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/
1330 0 for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.
1352 o to a girl. NI
1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out When back? 8 or 4. Well then please
/have him call me? First part was missing/.
NYK-S
SECRET
TXJESDAY, Decembee 2, 1941
0830 ? Discussion of the diflJcult situation i-esulting from the suspension /of
trade?/ Seems to shift to boats or planes. One says something about
"doing it on the 14th" and the other says the Matson sailings of the 5th
and the 19th are out. Also the airways present a financial problem. The
next Matson sailing after is in January. There are no $110 rooms. Some
more talk, most of which I can't get, but I think they are talking about
what to do with special reference to getting away. Part with the admo-
nition by one "not to talk too much about war."
0950 i His girl to YOSHIOKA. Stolen sweets are the best, but the boss came
back in the midst !
1052 i YOSHI. Gives girl number 98471 and name Shizuto NISHI /Mrs. Nishi's
husband).
1119 i YOSHI from pal /to play something or do something/ "Not today."
Tomorrow? OK/
1155 o to girl. This is NYK. Can you come to the ofBce.
1158 0 ordering oyako dombun and other food.
1435 0 to FUKUDA from YOSHIOKA. Not in /He was !/
1436 i to YOSHIOKA from FUKUDA about insurance. Personal.
1457 i Mr. Lee calling for Mr. Nishi.
At 4 p.m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December 2nd
inst. I bade my adieu to you my friend of 22 months standing. Darn if
I won't miss you ! !
Requiescat in Peace.
Y-1 J-1
20 Apr 45
FBI files
6.5-414 phone intercepts 19 Aug-2 Dec. 41.
65-414 " " 18 Aug-1 May 41.
65-414 " " 30 Apr 41-2 Dec 40.
2-291—
Monday, November 17, 1941
0945 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse re-
actions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K./ K. says /I think/
that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas px'opa-
ganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have.
Not in Japanese either.
1117 i FPM. Fragment
1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. $10,000, $12,000 /the amount they
have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they
figure the taxes, the bond, and all.
1817 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very
brief,
— WND —
NYK-S
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 207
Monday, November 24, 1941-
0847 o YOSHIOKA for ? NYK has received a confidential dispatch. Dictates.
Translation of the dispatch was made with further details eked out
from the NJ for 11-24-41 as follows.
As soon as preparations are completed, the government has de-
cided to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to Los Angeles, Balboa and
the southern regions, the exact time of departure and other
details to be announced later, but the Jiji story says she will sail
from Yokohama by the end of the month. The Jiji story men-
tions the 380 Japanese of Panama who are the "victims" of the
shut out policy of the government. Anyway, it is clear that a
boat will be sent.
0902 o To RCA from YOSHIOKA— NYK. Mrs. NISHI has left, so if there is
any wire after hours, please call Mr. T. YOSHIOKA, 75055. If not
home, call T. TAKEI, Makiki Hotel 67692 (private line).
0908 o To Commercial Pacific Cable Co. from YOSHIOKA explaining same
thing as above.
0933 o YOSHIOKA to girl in Togawa's office. Mostly friendly chatter, but he
tells her that a boat is going to L. A. and BalbOa. She says she can-
not talk too much /probably the boss is around!/ What's he going
to do? Oh he'll work around. Y. thinks things are going to be all
right now since the Tatsuta is coming.
KNO
Signal Cokps, United States Army
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.
Secret
PI WAR PRTY WASHN DC 611PM NOV 27 1941
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH
472 27th Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictible but
hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat
cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first
overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnais-
sance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be
carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or dis-
close intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will
carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers.
Marshall.
116P/27
Decoded by : Lt. J. H. Babcock, SC, 222P Nov 27, 1941.
Received as Secret communication.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 472 27TH."
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 Novemher 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General :
Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.
Thomas H. Green,
Thomas H. Green,
Lt. Col., J. A. G. D.,
Department Judge Advocate.
Sent as Radiogram No. 986— 29th.
Approved for Transmission :
O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDoLE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT '
WASHINGTON D C
Re your secret radio four eight two AG 383.4/13 twenty eighth comma full
precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of
investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid so
thirty dash forty-five end paren and military establishments including personnel
and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of mili-
tary reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway
bridges comma this lieadquarters by confidential letter dated June Nineteen Nine-
teen Forty One requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers
vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in
effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military
and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to pre-
vent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc
stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June Twentieth
confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to fur-
nish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary
to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith
comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the
Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military pro-
tection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this con-
nection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of
Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which per-
mits the Commanding Genei'al Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or
restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and
county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action
necessary in the interest of national defense stop The authority thus given has
not yet been exercised stop Relations with FBI and all other federal and terri-
torial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given
on all pertinent matters.
Shoet.
ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
2 : 45P 29 NOV 41
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 209
Headquahtebs Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 21 November 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General :
Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.
Walter C. Phillips,
Walter C. Phillips,
Colonel G. 8. C,
Chief of Staff.
Sent as Radiogram, No. 959— 27th.
CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON DC
Reurad four seven two to C/S 27 Nov 41 twentyseventh report department
alerted to prevent sabotage Period Liaison with Navy
Short.
ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBBRTZ SC
5 : 40P 27 NOV 41
Secret Routing 4 December 1941.
#1033^th
CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
Following report in compliance with instructions contained in Agwar four
eight four dash twenty eighth colon instructions contained in subject radiogram
issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on
twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received
comma and continues to receive detailed and comprehensive attention as result
of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July forty one
Stop Para
Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram sub-
stantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions
of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of
stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December stop In-
crease in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite
overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress
Stop This entire departmeni is now operating and will continue to operate
Under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para
Secrecy discipline being given all emphases practicable through official and
quasi official agencies Stop Wort? has actually begun on essential protec-
tive fencing and flood lighting projects Stop Para
With reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather
than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squad-
ron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possible in
form of development and expansion of foreword to soldier's handbook comma FM
twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of
relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citi-
zen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government
comma structure of Government comma place of military establishment in the
structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international
comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to Demo-
cratic form Stop Signed Martin End
Short.
Signal Cokps, United States Army
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.
Secret
1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today
what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code
79716— 46— Ex. 158 15
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we
do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of
this communication
Marshall.
Decoded by : Lt J H Babcock, 251P, Dec. 7, 1941.
Received as a secret communication.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th."
Heim>quarters Hawaiian Db^'Artment,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 7 December 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General :
Request that the following secret ofBcial radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.
C. A. FowEix, *
Lt. Coh,
Dcpt. 8ig. Off.
Sent as Radiogram No. 1057 — 7th.
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C
Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field
Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least
three hangars Wheeler Field three hangers Hickam Field and to planes caught on
ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over one hour Stop
Unconfirmed report that three ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Stop
Marine airfield EWA also badly damaged Stop More details later. End
Short.
ENO SECRET URGENT BY
LT G LENNOX SO
950A 7 DEC 1941
Headquarters Hawail^n Department,
Foi-t Shafter, T. E., 7 December 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:
Request that the following secret oflScial radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.
Earnest Moore,
3Iajor, A. C,
Actng., Chief of Staff.
Sent as Radiogram No. 1068— 7th. , "
CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON DC
Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor attacked simultaneously by Japa-
nese dive bombers for one hour beginning eight oclock seventh December damage
severe Stop Have left seven repeat seven B dash seventeen comma six repeat
six B dash eighteen comma eight repeat eight A dash twenty comma forty repeat
forty pursuit Stop Main part dpot destroyed but limited repair and supply
facilities remaining Stop Runways Hickam not damaged Stop Request all
possible reinforcement heavy bombardment fully equipped Stop Planes to ar-
rive here during hours of darkness Stop Additional ground personnel will be
needed as large part of Air Corps troops are being used in close in defense and
anti sabotage guards Stop Additional fighters should be immediately dis-
patched by carrier together with such dive bombers as can be made available
Stop Spare parts should be furnished for all types as there are no stocks on
hand Stop Signed Martin.
Short.
ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
6:50P7DBC41
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
211
Signal Corps, United States Akmy
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.
Secret
P 10 WAR HS 70 WD PRIORITY WASHINGTON DC llOp SEC 8 1941.
COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FT SHAFTER T H
543 8th TO SHORT PROM ARNOLD ALL REPORTS SHOW THIAT IN
JAPANESE ATTACKS NUMBERS OF OUR PLANES HAVE BEEN DE-
STROYED ON THE GROUND STOP TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS AT
ONCE TO AVOID SUCH LOSSES IN YOUR AREA INCLUDING PROMPT
TAKEOFF ON WARNING COMMA DISPERSION TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE
EXTENT COMMA AND CONSTRUCTION OF PARAPETS
Adams.
930P/8/3
[Written:] Ans to the radio delivered to M/C CP 11:55 am Dec 10th. for
dispatch.
Rie
Decoded by : LT. G. E. Haven, 1005P Dec 8 1941.
Received as a secret communication.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 543 8th"
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel wiU be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will
be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From
and Date
1st Ind.: AQ, 9 Dec 41..
2d Ind.:
C/S, 12/9/41.
A/0, 12/9/41.
To
C/S..
AirO
CS...
Subject: WD Radio #541, 8 Dec 41
"Ground Personnel needed & re
impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft
by Carrier"
Radio referred to attached. 2 Incl.:
WD Radio #541-8, HHD Radio
#1068-7.
Information.
Noted
4773, R. H. D. R. H. D.
6 Dec 1941. A. a.
W. C. P.
J. A. M.
Radio WD529 Received Filed at Wash D C 12 : 18 P M Washington tiime
(or 6: 48A Haw time) (ac RCA 1549WS)
Received by RCA at Honolulu 7 : 33 A M
Delivered to Signal Office at 11 : 45 A M not marked priority. Other priority
mesages handled first
Delivered to decoding officer 2 : 40 P M decoded and delivered to Col Dunlop
2 : 50 P M
Delivered to Capt Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P M
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Re your five four nine.
Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning
seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh
paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered
message received by adjutant general HqHawDept two fifty eight, afternoon
seventh (received by Chief of Staff HqHawDept three o'clock afternoon seventh
all Hawaiian)
Shoet.
10 Dec 1941.
Statement of Wm. B. Cobb, Capt. J. A. G. D.
On the evening of Sat. Dec. 6th, 1941, Mrs. Cobb and I had returned from
Schofield Bks., about midnight, and were invited to spend the night at Hickam
Field, with some friends, Lt. F. O. Brown, and his sister, at their quarters in
that post. We were awakened at 7 : 55 the following morning by the attack
by enemy planes on Pearl Harbor and Hickman Field. The attacks Gontinued
intermittently thruout the morning, and we assisted in such ways as we could,
to care for fhe dead and wounded, until about noon. At that time, I left Hickam
Field and proceeded to Ft. Shafter, reporting upon arrival, to my superior, Col.
T. H. Green, Dept. Judge Advocate. Volunteer nurses were needed at Tripler
General Hospital, and Col. Green made the arrangements for Mrs. Cobb to help
there in that work. After taking her to the hospital, I was directed to report
to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., at Ft Shafter, for duty, which I did
at 1 : 20 P. M., Dec. 7th, 1941.
Upon assuming my duties in the office of the Chief of Staff, I immediately
began to keep a personal record of the activities in the office, pursuant to rosy
instructions, and as a matter of ordinary oflice routine, which record I now
have. The telephone system was explained to me, and I was occupied for some
time, becoming familiar with the office. The situation was of course, very
intense, and numerous officers were calling on the Chief of Staff throughout
the afternoon. Col. Green, accompanied by Maj. Hanley, of the Judge Advocate's
office were in about 2 P M, and shortly thereafter, left to go to the Crater, t^
confer with Gen. Short. Col. Phillips was busy with long distance phone calls
to Washington, at least one of which I understood to be completed. Some
officer, whose name I do not know, called in person to report to the Chief of
Staff on the situation at Hickam Field. At about 3 P. M., a secret radio message
was received by the Chief of Staff, which was shown to me, and which referred
to the fact that the Japanese were serving what amounted to an ultimatum,
at one o'clock P. M. that day. We were unable to understand the mesasge,
inasmuch as the Japanese had made and concluded their assault on Pes^rl
Harbor and Hickam Field, approximately seven hours previously. In discussing
the message with Col. Phillips, he remarked that this "must be the message to
which Gen. Marshall was referring, and which he asked me if I had received."
As I recall, the message was dated and stamped as having been sent from Wash-
ington at 12 : 18 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941. I am positive that the message was not
received by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department before 2 : 55 P. M. Dec.
7th, 1941, at the earliest. Shortly thereafter, I heard the Chief of Staff phone
the contents of the message to Gen. Short at the Crater, near Ft. Shafter.
An additional message was prepared by Col. Phillips, the contents of which
I do not know, and I was directed to proceed to Pearl Harbor with the secret
message and the second message, and deliver both to Admiral Kimmel. I left
Ft. Shafter in an official car atj 5 : 42 P. M. and rushed to Admiral Kimmel's
headquarters, where I delivered both messages to his Chief of Staff, Capt. Davis,
with whom I conversed for some time. There was more discussion about the
time of the secret message and we attempted to account for the delay in trans-
mittal. Thereafter. Admiral Kimmel wrote, in longhand, a message to Gen.
Short, consisting of three pages of notepaper about 5 by 7 inches in size, the
last of the three being about one half filled with the writing. This message he
showed to two other Admirals who were conferring with him, sealed the same,
and delivered to me with instructions to deliver it to Gen. Short at once. Before
I left Pearl Harbor, an officer whose name is Delaney, but whose rank I do not
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 213
know, as he was in civilian clothes, gave me a message concerning the naval
vessels which were to enter the harbor that night, so that our coastal batteries
would not fire on them. I then returned, with the three messages — the pink
secret message, the Admiral's note, and Delaney's advice, to Ft. Shatter, where
I arrived at 4 : 16 P. M. I delivered the messages to CoJ. Phillips, who opened the
Admiral's note, and after reading it, again sealed it with sealing wax, with the
assistance of Mr. Emmons in the office, and directed me to take it to the General
in the Crater at once, which I did. After reading the message. Gen. Short called
Col. I'hillips and told him in substance, "I've read the Admiral's note, and will
keep it in my personal possession." He then asked me my name, which I gave
him, and he directed me to return to Ft. Shafter. The time of my arrival there
was 4 : 40 P. M., after which my attention was occupied by other matters.
Wm. M. Cobb,
Capt. JAGD., Ft. Shafter.
Signal Corps, United Statks Army
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE
Secret
103 WAR HS 144 WD WASHIN DC 112SP DEC 8 1941
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH
541 Sth Attention General Fred Martin Stop Clarify ground personnel needed
as requested in secret radio one zero six eight dated December seven Stop
The Commanding General Hawaiian Department has been informed of status
of ground reinforcements Stop Close in defense and antisabotage guard
should be supplied by Commanding General Hawaiian Department Stop State
whether personnel I'equested is Air Corps or ground personnel Stop It is im-
possible to dispatch fighter aircraft by carrier Stop Additional P dash forty
and P dash thirty nine types of aircraft are crated for shipment Stop Final
decision reference heavy bombardment for Hawaii is being made this date Stop
Notification later.
Adams.
955P/8/8
Received as a secret communication.
Decoded by: S Sgt D L Smith, S CI 115A 9 December 1941.
Answer should me marked "Answer to Code Message No. 541 Sth."
Headqttaiitees Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 19U-
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.
Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.
E. Moore,
E. Moore,
E. Moore,
' Major, Air Corps,
Chief of Staff.
Sent as Radiogram No. 1078 — Sth.
Chief op the Army Aib Fobices,
Washington, D. C:
More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold semicolon
command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dis-
persion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers comma bombers
can not be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint
agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for
help when thought necessary Stop Of planes in ferry flight all landed Oahu
two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gun
fire and one badly damaged Stop Attack was a perfectly executed surprise
attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bombing was highly
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
accurate Stop Every effort made with few bombers left to locate carriers without
success Stop Casualties dead six officers two hundred seven enlisted comma
wounded some seriously three sixty seven enlisted Stop Morale high End
Martin.
8HOBT.
Enc Sec by
Lt J H Babcock. (Handwritten :) J. B.
526P Dec 8 1941.
Note :
(Handwritten :) RCA-1549 WS. Delivered to Sig Office 11 : 45 not marked Pri-
ority to decoding Officer 240P.
Signal Cokps, United States Akmy
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code:
Secret Confidential Restricted
P 3 WAR L 54 WD 1 EXTRA URGENT WASHINGTON DC 219P DEC 9 1941
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER T H
Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our
number five two nine Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact
time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by what staff
office received.
CoLTON, Acting.
(Handwritten:) 529 delivered to C/S 300 PM 7 Dec— receipted for by capt
Trueman delivered by Mr Hough ; 2.58 PM Col Dunlop) 733A Honolulu, T. H.
Received as a secret communication.
Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910 AM Dec 9 1941. (Handwritten:) LGF
(Handwritten:) Filed 12:18 PM Wash or 6:48 Hon time. Received RCA
Honolulu 7 : 33 A.
Hel&dquakteks Hawaiian Depaetment,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 9 December 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.
Request that the following Secret — Extra Urgent official radiogram be sent.
This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either
in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is priority.
Walter C. Phillips,
Walter C. Phillips,
2:00 P.
Sent as Radiogram No. 1087 — 9th.
Approved for transmission :
U. M. McDole,
U. M. MoDoLE,
Major, A. G. D.
Assistant Adjutant Oeneral.
Chief Signal Officer, "
Washington, D. C:
Re your five four niiie radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA seven
thirty three morning seventh Stop. This message delivered signal office Fort
Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but
within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant
general Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh.
Short.
Enc. Sec. Extra Urgent by
(Handwritten:) LGF
Lt L G Forbes SC
315P Dec. 9 1941
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 215
HJEIADQUAKTEES HawAHAN DePAETMENT,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 9 Decemlter I941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.
Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is priority.
Walter C. Phillips,
Walter C. Phillips, Col., GSC.
Chief of Staff.
Sent as radiogram No. 1094 — ^9th.
Major General H. H. Abnoid,
War Department, Washington, D. C:
Re telephone conversation today with Phillips am satisfied.
Shoet.
Enc Sec by
Lt G Lennox, S O,
730 p 9 Dec. 1941
Headquabteks Hawahan Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.
Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is priority.
Walter C. Phillips,
Walter C. Philups, Col., GSC.
Chief of Staff.
Sent as radiogram No. 1112 — 11th.
The Adjutant General,
War Department, Washington, D. C. :
Reference is made to employment of troops at Christmas comma Canton
comma Fiji and New Caledonia Stop. Is the prohibition in Public Resolution
number ninety six forbiding the use of units and individuals outside the limits
of the United States and possessions thereof rescinded by the declaration of
war End.
Short.
Enc Sec by D. E. G.
(Handwritten:) Lt De George SO '
1930 11 Dec 41
secket
Headquarters Hawaiian Depabtment
intek-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including
the Department C/A and B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental
Staff inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From
and Date
To
Subject: Radio — Merle Smith
1st Ind., AO, 12/11/41...
2d Ind., C/S, 12/11/41...
C/S.
AG.
1. The attached radio reed thru HAF
facilities. ■
File ,
R. L. M., W. G.
W. C. P.
SECRET
Signal Cokps, United States Aemy
A-64
11 Dec. 1941.
1 F8U2 PY IMPORTANT GR231
To : Commanding General Honolulu.
From : Merle Smith 18 11th December.
Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy loss
and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the
Kota Baru. Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Baru,
Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak by
order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF
bombed Tobi Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact lost Kure (Ocean
Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air force
at Saigon comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon same of
combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama same of South China Fleet near Hong
Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop
Slightly garbled
One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor
130 miles South Sama one battleship 8 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya
Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat
MILID as my 31 Merle Smith (garble).
0845 Z / 11
130A
Slightly garbled.
Decoded by AB. Time 815A.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 11 December 1941.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.
Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the
clear or having a different security classification.
This message is priority.
Walter G. Phillips,
Walter G. Phillips,
Colonel, G. S. C,
Chief of Staff.
Sent as radiogram No. 1110 — 11th.
Message center No. 21.
Time filed 1110.
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C:
Following is Paraphrase of Paper #23 this file radio eleven December Forty
one received Quote
A-64
1F8U PY IMPORTANT GR231
To: Commanding General Honolulu.
From : Merle Smith 18 11th December.
Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy
loss and indication of enemy trooi) reinforcements and British reinforcements
to the Kota Baru, Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south
Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri
Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruc-
tion Stop RAAF bombed Tobi Helen Reef Stop Naru bombed again contact
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
217
lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief
combined air force at Saigon Comma same of southern expedition force prob-
ably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama Same of South
China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop
Slightly garbled
One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor
130 miles south Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya
Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat
MILID as my 31 Merle Smith (Garble)
0845 Z/11
130A
Slightly garbled
Unquote end of message.
Short. .
Enc sec by
Lt. J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.
150P Dec 11 1951
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
INTER- STAFF ROUTING SMP
SECRET
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, Including the
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist, Engr. It will be
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Ad-
jutant General unless a policy has been established. The staff section origi-
nating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorse-
ment list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently
will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorse-
ments hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in
charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. Form and
Date
To
Subject: WD SEC Kadio 529 7th re
Ultimatun by Japanese and destruc-
tion of their code machine.
1st Ind. C/S14Dec41....
AG.
Forlflle.TilncirSubject radio-
Walter Phillips, Colo,
nel G. S. C, Chief of
Staff.
confidential
hb3adquaeteks hawaiian ale foecb,
Office of the Air Force Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H. 9 July ISJ,!.
In reply refer to :
Subject: Special Report.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shaf ter, T. H.
1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted
pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War De-
partment, Washington, D C., to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, dated March 26, 1941, subject : "Provisions for Security of Installation",
and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the De-
partment and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Depart-
ment Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently
declared unlimited emergency.
2. Estimate of the Situation:
a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and in-
stallations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding
Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field,
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive
preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered
sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsi-
ble oflBcers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.
b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs,
consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate
Hickman Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that
the controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for
the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal de-
terrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been
operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted
sabotage has as yet ieen ordered, or contrawise, that orders, without doubt
are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the
growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should
be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action
for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan
may not have been discovered.
[2] c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent
to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confront-
ing Germany in her war With Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of
the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now
existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.
(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick
movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy
reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all
heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases
are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such
incipient events as ;
(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our
part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.
(b) Or, of a final break with the German-Italian Axis.
(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting inter-
ests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.
(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to
Russia.
(e) Or a repercussion in consequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.
(f ) Or an occupation of the Galipagos Islands as a result of the conflict
between Peru and Ecuador.
(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from
which to reenforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the main-
land or from which to reenforce Manila with B-19"s and the belief that
Hickam will be fully spot-lighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully
comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.
(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn
up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents
acting jointly in support of her tri-parte pact.
(4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution
of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.
[3] (5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile
powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reenforcing our far-
flung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the
the narrow seas that can be employed en mass within tactical times over
strategical theatres of 2500 miles extent. (As an illusti-ation of the precept
in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 9, 1941.)
d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect
all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be
preconceived now and receive first consideration over all other types of military
field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, air-borne infantry trans-
ports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next
highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become
the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army
or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national
defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize
an immediate state of air readiness and seek first, by any and all means, to destroy
the opposing state of air-readiness.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 219
3. General Findings:
a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly
acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to suc-
cessful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently
assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and
Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having
inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, or-
ganization and management which are now required to master the present border-
line war situation.
6. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is
faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly
unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training
to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without dis-
rupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city as
Hickam Field.
c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due :
(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.
(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropi-
cal island garrisoned by large forces.
(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time
occupancy instead of war-time security.
[^] (4) To the relative inattention accorded in peacetime to intelli-
gence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.
(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on
sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for
information.
(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily in-
creased routine administration.
(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air
Force.
(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the
quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland
to construct buildings and grounds.
(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning
reserve officers to activate new units.
(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting
new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.
(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the
above first needs.
(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new
projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily
post duties.
(18) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now
existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for
reliability of all civil service employees.
(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive
waiting attitude.
(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from
which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical
concern for the future.
(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of
labor and materials required to meet the needs of all arms and services.
[5] d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control
has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons,
departments, and daily mass details, due in turn :
(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodi-
cally to the mainland.
(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve
officers within the past year.
(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained
men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead
growth of higher echelons.
(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.
~ (5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical
school courses at Wheeler and Hickam Fields.
(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill
and ground security missions.
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of sev-
eral thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.
(8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying is-
lands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments
in the Department.
(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.
(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a
proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary re-
cruit and technical school training.
(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained special-
ists from the Service Departments and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police,
drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a com-
mand that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate
specialized divisions, departments, and sections.
(12) To tlie culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth
over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and
an over-complicated administration of it.
[6] 4 Special Findings:
a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to
the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must possess a practical
working knowledge of each and every man under its immediate legal jurisdic-
tion— this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience, and
"trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each
man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the
present set-up:
(1) Five or more different applications of the War Department's pre-
scribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration
centers exist in the Department.
1st — At Schofield, one regiment centralizes separate company per-
sonnel units in regimental headquarters.
2nd — Another regiment centralizes composite battalion units in regi-
mental headquarters.
3rd — Another regiiDent centralizes the separate specialized functions
that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.
4th — Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the
Wing Headquarters.
5th — Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three
Group Headquarters (i. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th
Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the
Wing are attached.
(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, pay-
rolls, reports of changes, etc.
(3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and
sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.
(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.
(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is imprac-
tical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron
roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.
[7] (6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts
during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly
upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of
numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and
who report to Squadron Headquarters v/hen and if absences in attendance
occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such
changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes
required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Head-
quarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to
the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters — but in the interim of two, three or
more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the
Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air
Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special
ordei's which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing
calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the
Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for
the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily
emergency dictates.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 221
(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive
varying details from various squadrons, vphile one of numerous squadrons
may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control
obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is
physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily
management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.
(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all
intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further
complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Com-
manders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2
intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel
functions.
(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not
relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that
the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be
coordinated regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to
insure daily security.
(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3
and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and the
front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the
separate variation in the timing of Jhe mass of personnel, operations, mate-
riel, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Depart-
ment to the Squadron and the Squadron to the [8] Department, the
undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination
throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a
necessity.
(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simpli-
fied by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uni-
formly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all
echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rear-
range existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural
operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "op-
erations control oflSce" and "grand security troops" as a basis.
(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and
important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the
Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in
the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which
the lower echelons have no direct control.
5. Detailed Findings:
a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part
were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding
General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and
with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conunction with the
Inspector General's report.
6. Command Division:
(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of
the (I!ommanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the i)ersonal attention
of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to
required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the
guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.
(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one
necessitating a formal 'regard for the serious legal consequences involved.
(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions
of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence,
(3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelli-
gence.
[9] (4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished
a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection
and report.
(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized
as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department,
under the direct control of the Wing Commander.
(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and
separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in per-
sonnel, operations, and materiel divisions.
(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed
to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered
morale of the junior officer and private soldier ; this in order to separate the
effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive
agents.
c. Personnel Division:
(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the
Hawaiian Air Force.
(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam
Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detach-
ment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian
Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.
(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a
semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men,
grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.
(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by
the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the re-
currence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.
(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated
with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trait" analysis and report to
S— 2
(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swim-
ming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program
with estimated dates of completion.
[10] (7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale,
Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian
Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition
of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now
in use, etc.
(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical
location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.
(9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school
courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function
as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Head-
quarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purjwse to the Hawaiian
Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.
(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, -be set up
for each service division, department and section of the Base which con-
stitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether
or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.
(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all
men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command,
service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency
report and the recommendation of the operating departments.
(12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours
of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in
the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the
station.
(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and
security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably
of infantrymen.
(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison-Officer,
Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the
type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered ;
also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side-arms.
(15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories
necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check
the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.
[11] (16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on
extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people
of either sex when on duty.
(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be
furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of
controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 223
(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and
patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that
no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to
remain over-night on the station.
(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of prin-
cipal departments be issued pistols.
(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may
be taking civilian flying instruction.
(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge care-
fully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush,
cane or small fires at a distance beyond quick recall.
(22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young ofiicers for
autos and uniforms be re-checked.
(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Ex-
change and Non-commissioned Oflicers' Club be re-checked.
(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records
be returned to the mainland.
(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive in-
creasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be re-
checked.
(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for
dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the
distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.
(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal dis-
tribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades
and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made
the subject of a special study and repoit with the view of creating a more
uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital
specialties [12] such as squadron mess, communications, armament,
maintenance, without adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for
first priority of flying pay.
(28) That S-1 oflices, officers and functions be separated organically
from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.
(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice
of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married non-commissioned officers
and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.
d. Operations Division:
(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of
Oahu be re-checked and numbered.
(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked
and numbered.
(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to recheck the proposed
use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and
defense plans to prevent conflict.
(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be
re-checked in connection with Plans for Ground Security, Alert Plans and
Plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the
successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.
(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training
be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the
Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights
and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally re-
sponsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety
and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted
higher commanders.
(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting
of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft
be expedited.
(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio
operators be reduced to writing.
(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ord-
nance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at
outlying fields and for the safe-guarding [13] of bombsights on over-
night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(9) That the storage and shortage of water, and exposed pipelines at out-
liying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a
ground security viewpoint.
(10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced
to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and
vaults.
(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires be-
tween Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and fre-
quent practice.
(12) That the question of developing ^n auxiliary mobile message cen-
ter in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set,
wire and repair men, be considered.
(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal OflScer
in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-
submitted and receive favorable action.
( 14) That additional measures, such as voice code, be prescribed and tested
to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and
that private soldiers be excluded from duty of transmitting imortant
verbal orders of serious purport.
e. Materiel Division:
(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system, to include periodic
chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in writing as
a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards
against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of
lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooper-
ation and technical advise, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Ha-
waiian Air Depot, be solicited.
(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickman Field dock at
the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that
will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under
the dock.
(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-
holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and com-
munications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.
[14] (4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and
prepared by Wing S-4, of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are con-
sidered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures
under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main
control cables, the connection ot control cables with the servo drums of
the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuse-
lage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.
(5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps
Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include
such a selected list of "critical" items.
(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required
of the Engineer Corps in the Wing Plan for screening, lighting and fencing
of Hickam Field be prescribed, particularly, by special order.
(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be
rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of mainte-
nance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when
the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the
Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been
available to the Engineers,' for several months, be put on a prescribed
priority list by the Department.
(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply
reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop
management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.
(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective con-
sideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.
(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were
stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the
Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unob-
structed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be
smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as
well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of
the Depot. , ^ ,
(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and
gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 225
[15] (12) That copies of the detailed findings of the Hawaiian Air
Depot at Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise
be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with
request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.
(13) That additional measures for night-time security be prescribed
to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or
military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to
spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the
shops, hangars and dead-line.
(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster,
Supply, Fire Department, etc. who control nearly all utilities that can
tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving
them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance
social morale.
(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length
of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.
/. Flight Division:
(1) That fight and; airplane commanders, especially of B-17 type of
bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility* of a
commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in
Army Regulations.
(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally respon-
sible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in fiight.
(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally
responsible for the related functions of his fiight plan, the coordination of
flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading,
dress, discipline, and tactical reports.
6. Conclusions:
a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of in-
stability, bias, or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects
of subversive activities within the command ; although such a condition
naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.
6. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is
required for the Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organiza-
tion for the Air Base Group.
[16] c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects for Hickam
Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Depart-
ment Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to
insure compliance within prescribed time limits.
7. Recommendations:
That the Department Commander authorize a board of general ofl5cers of the
Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and
standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing
emergency.
8. Appreciations:
a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell,
Assistant Gr-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
6. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of
Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and
Major A. W. Meehan, Gr-3, is acknowledged.
c. The spirit of open honesty and helpfulness displayed by Brigadier General
J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the neces-
sary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition,
is considered worthy of commendation.
d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above^ it is appreciated that the pres-
ent status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense
of responsibility is at issue.
e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding
General, 18th "Wing, with a x-equest that he register any dilference of facts or opin-
ion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already
been initiated by his headquarters.
H. S. Burwell,
H. S. BUBWELL,
79716— 46— Ex, 148 16
Colonel, A. C,
Special Inspector.
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Headquaeters Hawauan Department,
Office of the DEyABTMENT Commandeb,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 1 May 1941.
In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions tor Security of Installations.
To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Fort
Shafter, T. H.
1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941
on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect to see if air-
planes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as
to the result of your inspection.
By courier, 1 May 1941.
Cabl Geosse,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General
confidential
Headquaetees Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Depaetment Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 19^1
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To : Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.
With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941,
request information as to when a reply may be expected.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT :
O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDoLE,
Major, A. O. D.
Assistant Adjutant General,
let. Ind.
AG 383.4 (7-15-41)
24
HQ. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., July 17, 1941.— To : Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a
verbal reply.
For the Commanding General:
Edward Jenkins,
Edwaed Jenkins,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Adjutant General.
confidential
Headquaetees Hawauan Department,
Ojfice of the Depaetment Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 August 1914.
In reply refer to : AG 3S3.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam
Field, T. H.
With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941,
and follow-up letter 15 July 1941, request that reply be expedited.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT :
Robeet H. Dunlop,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
227
SECRET
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department of Staff, including the
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communications.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff OflSce to
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the excep-
tion that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant Gen-
eral unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing
slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the respon-
sible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be num-
bered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized
to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and
To
Subject: Provisions for Security of
Date
Installations
1st Ind. AG 18 Nov
C/S
Herewith reports from major echelon
R. U. D.
41.
Commanders in compliance with 3rd
R/S Indorsement C/S to AG, 29 April
41, in file marked "HERE".
6 Incls:
#1— Report General Murray.
#2— " Colonel Walsh.
#3— " Colonel Capron.
#4— " General Gardner.
#5 — " General Martin.
#6— AG file 383.4 (Secret).
2d Ind. C/S. 11/18/41,
0-2
Study & Report
W. D.
#117.
3d Ind. G-2 16 Jn
AG
For file. No report made
42.
confidential
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
intee-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its endorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind.
To
Subject: Provisions for Security of
4259
From and Date
Installations
1st Ind. Air 0. 11/17/41..
C/S
There is attached special report on
Hickam Field together with comments
thereon by the Hawaiian Air Force StaS
and General Martin.
M.
1 Incl.: Chart showing Burwell Re-
J. A. M.
02792
port, General Martin's Comments and
Stafl Comments. For the Air Officer:
2nd Ind. C/S 11/18/41,
#118.
3Ind. Q-2016Jn42....
Q-2
Study and report.
N. CO.
A. G.I....
For file— no report made.
KJF.
228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
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240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(AG-1)
Headquaeters Hawaiian Ant Foeoe,
Office of the Air Force Commandek,
Hickam Field, T. H., 11 November 19U.
In reply refer to :
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter AG 383.4/6, Headquarters
Hawaiian Department, 1 May 1941, subject : "Provisions for Security of Installa-
tions", there are inclosed special reports on Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and
the Hawaiian Air Depot.
2. These reports have been carefully studied by this headquarters and those
deficiencies susceptible of correction have been corrected. Many of the opinions
expressed by the inspecting officer are in conflict with established policies and
Army organization and as such cannot receive remedial action by local commanders.
3. The vital installations on all Air Force stations are believed to be adequately
guarded and all commanders are fully cognizant of their responsibilities.
F. L. Martin,
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. 8. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incls.
#1 — [Report on Hickam Field
#2 — Report on Wheeler Field
#3 — Report on Hawaiian Air Depot
Headquarters 14th Pursuit Wing,
Office of the Commanding Genesial,
Wheeler Field, T. H., 29 Jtilij 1941.
Refer to :
Subject : Special Report On Wheeler Field, T. H.
To : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.
1. Authority:
a. See paragraph 1, attached copy of Special Report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian
Air Force, 9 July 1941.
2. Estimate of the Situation:
a. See attached report, paragraph 2 a, 6, c, and d.
(Due to the recent^ freezing of Japanese credits, it is estimated that security
measures for pursuit aviation have increased in importance to the extent that
Wheeler Field, as an Advanced Depot, should now be prepared to take up the
shock in case the Hawaiian Air Depot is incapacitated.)
3. General Findings:
a. See attached report, paragraph 3 a, b, c, also copy of memorandum to Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Air Force, 10 July 1941.
(Reference the verbal authority of the Department Commander to create
and test an experimental maintenance command in the Hawaiian Air Force,
it is believed that the uniform and common grouping of responsibilities now in
eifect at Wheeler Field may be used as a guide in stabilizing the control of
personnel.)
4. Special Findings:
a. See attached report, paragraph 4 a (1).
(Wheeler Field has centralized all squadron units in a Wing Headquarters
Personnel Administration Center. Investigation indicates that this set-up may
be well employed as a standard.)
5. Detailed Findings:
a. The following detailed findings contained in attached report apply construc-
tively to the 14th Wing: Paragraph 5 a, paragraph 5 b (1), (2), and (3), para-
graph 5 c (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17),
(18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29); paragraph 5 d (1),
(2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 e (1), (3),
(4) (reP-40s), (5), (12), (13), (14) ; paragraph 5/ (1), (2), and (3).
(In order to instill an adequate attitude of mind throughout the lower echelons
of the command on the subject of intelligence, the undersigned finds that all squad-
ron intelligence officers need an intelligence manual composed of specific details
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 241
such as those contained in paragraph 5, attached report. The Commanding
General and Staff of the 14th Pursuit Wing fully appreciate the desire of the
Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Hawaiian Air Force to
effect, quickly, a change from the previous peace-time status to the present
borderline war-time status, and have fully coopeiated by preparing a detailed
plan of action.)
(Special attention is invited to the need for continued and increasing daily
coordination between the Corps of Engineers at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler
Field.)
(It is believed that there is an urgent security need for "satellite" fields adja-
cent to or in the near vicinity of Wheeler Field. )
6. Conclusions:
a. See attached report, paragraph 6 6, c.
(Special attention is invited to the need for an organic maintenance command.)
(Special attention is invited to the needs of Wheeler Field for priority con-
sideration and early action on the recommendations of the Commanding Gen-
eral, 14th Wing, in reference to fencing, lighting, facilities at Wright Gate,
further military control of the public highway through Wheeler Field, and to
required safeguarding of all paint, oil, and gas dumps.
7. Recommendations :
a. See attached report, paragraph 7 o.
8. Appreciation:
a. See attached report, paragraph 8 a, 6, d, e.
(The spirit of helpfulness extended by the Commanding General and Staff,
14th Wing, to the undersigned, in the preparation of the required changes from
a peace-time status to a critical borderline condition, is considered worthy of
commendation.)
&. A copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 14th
Wing, with a request that he register his concurrence or his difference of opinion,
and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been
initiated by his headquarters.
H. S. Burwell,
H. S. Btjkwbll,
Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector.
confidential
Headqttarthjbs Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 15 July 1941.
In reply refer to :
AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To : Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam
Field, T. H.
With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941,
request information as to when a reply may be expected.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT :
O. M. McDolh,
Major, A. O. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
confidential
Headquarters Hawauan Air Force,
Office of the Air Force Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 2 June 19^1.
In reply refer to :
Subject : Special Report.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Pursuant to instructions contained in attached War Department letter the
following special report on the Hawaiian Air Depot is submitted:
1. General Comments:
a. Officers of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force and
of the F. B. I. were previously interviewed reference general policy.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 17
242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
&; All commissioned officers and foremen of the Depot were personally inter-
viewed reference their knowledge and familiarity with the names, faces, and
reputation of all employees.
c. Headquarters personnel records are inspected for upkeep and statistical
data. All warehouses, storerooms, shops and jrrounds were inspected personally.
d. Critical locations were examined carefully.
2. Judged by standards required in peace time, conditions were found as follows :
a. Airplanes:
(1) Officers, superior.
(2) Crews, competent and trustworthy.
(3) Planes, excellent condition, locked at night, spot lighted.
(4) Guards, trustworthy.
(5) History of aircraft evidenced in Form #41 reveals no evidence of
previous untoward instances.
(6) Technical inspections, complete.
(7) No cases of carelessness noted.
6. Buildings and Grounds:
(1) Offices, superior.
(2) Chief clerk and superintendent, especially intelligent.
(3) Foremen, competent and trustworthy.
(4) Technicians, skilled and conscientious.
(5) Workers, industrious.
(6) Shop inspection, thorough.
(7) Equipment, good condition.
(8) Buildings, carefully locked at night.
(9) Guards, trustworthy.
(10) Machinery, clean.
(11) Supplies, stored orderly.
(12) Fire apparatus, good condition.
(13) No cases of carelessness noted.
c. Related Factors:
Badges are being worn. Action being initiated on photo badges. Employees
are being check in and out at the main gate. Foremen and workers wear sepa-
rate, distinctive unifoi-ms. The Depot -Commander, the Supply Officer and Chief
Engineer, Lieutenant Colonels Hurd, Montgomery and Lewis, respectively, are
giving intelligent and commendable attention to local responsibilities concerned
on the subject of this survey.
2. Conclusions:
Based on standards required in time of an unlimited emergency:
a. That the general opinion of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment and the Hawaiian Air Force, to the effect that the requirements prescribed
for guards at the gate, the interior watchman system and the inspection of iden-
tification badges, should be progressively increased during the present unlimited
emergency and that this conclusion is appreciated by subordinate officers in the
Depot who are initiating a plan of action to effect a compliance.
&. That progressive and increasing attention be given by every foreman to
insure a more intimate knowledge of every employee's name, face and character-
istics and to this end that his intelligence test, physical test, trade test, experience
test and, most importantly, his "trait" test data be systematically compiled and
maintained.
c. That the vital G-2 aspects of the above test-data be increasingly coordinated
with the S-1 office.
d. That the present degree of cooperation between the Depot and the Civil
Service, also between the Depot and the F. B. I. are considered to be excellent.
e. That existing conflicts between the communications plan of organization and
operation as contained in the Hawaiian Air Force Feld Orders and prescribed
degrees of readiness in the security, alert and local defense plans be made the sub-
ject of a special survey by a Signal specialist or a technical communications ex-
pert, in order to insure a coordinated execution of the plan.
f. That all anti-sabotage plans carefully separate requirements that are actu-
ally on hand and issued, from plans which deal with future or projected needs ;
or, in other words, that anti-sabotage plans emphasize the need for an organiza-
tion "in being" with material "on hand" for instant utility at any time.
g. That increasingly systematic inspection of the aqua system throughout, to
include a chemical analysis of both gas and oil, be further intensified.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 243
h. That, during the period of the present unlimited emergency, all employees be
further indoctrinated with a semi-military spirit of morale and discipline and to
this end that further stress upon social gatherings, restaurant facilities, personal
medical attention, and picnics be encouraged. Also that periodical and orderly
assemblies such as roll calls, fire calls, etc., be further encouraged.
i. That critical attention be given to selecting critical items.
(1) The electrical fuel pumps on the B-17's may be considered as a critical
item.
(2) The aqua system and the fire hazard incident to the storage or leak-
age of gas and oil in the warehouses and storerooms may be considered as
critical items in the supply department.
(3) The power, compressed air, water, and sewage lines or connections
may be considered as critical items in the engineering shops ; also the pollu-
tion of lubricating machine oil be considered as critical.
(4) The main highway through the Depot, the isolated engine test stands,
the engineer lumber dumps adjacent to the runway and food in the I'estau-
rant be considei'ed as critical items in general.
6. Recommendations:
a. That a regularly assigned Depot S-2 and Intelligence Plans Officer be
appointed.
" 6. That a Depot Inspector and an Intelligence Plans OflQcer be appointed and
directed to prepare a combined inspection, security, alert and defense plan for
the Depot and that two administrative reserve officers be assigned to the Depot.
c. That a travelling nurse, qualified as a psychologist, be assigned to the Depot
and be authorized to attend employees' families.
d. That the lumber stacked at the end of the main runway be removed on the
grounds that it constitutes a flying hazard and furnishes a close-up screen to the
edge of the Depot as well as a concealed position from which a saboteur without
detection could easily shoot up and hit a plane during its glide, especially at night.
e. That the interior watchman and guard system be increased progressively
from the present strength of 21 men to a strength of 42 men and that patrols be
instructed to w^ork in units of two men or to keep in regular and frequent con-
tact with each other.
f. That employees in the various shops and warehouses of the new buildings,
when completed, be furnished distinctive arm bands, or colored shoulder straps,
or caps, to aid in controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel between
separate buildings and between separate sections within buildings.
g. That priority of screening, as recommended by the Depot, be approved and
that this priority be considered as urgent, especially as it refers to the screening
of the motor test stand and a high man-proof screen required between the main
depot road and the depot warehouse that contains highly inflammable stores
such as gas, oil and chemicals.
h. That written instructions be issued to the guard verifying the present park-
ing plan and verbal orders reference the daily inspection of all cars entering
and leaving the Depot, this to insure that no unauthorized personnel or material
is hidden in the back of cars, and also to insure that no unauthorized personnel
remain hidden overnight in the shops.
i. That the subject of locks and keys which may have been in use for a long
time be made the subject of a special survey with the purpose of requiring all
locks and keys to be changed periodically, and that all men possessing keys to
vital installations be listed and systematically checked.
/. That, in the absence of daytime guards, the civilian chief clerks, superin-
tendents and foremen be issued pistols.
k. That all plats or diagrams of water, electrical, sewage and gasoline systems
be checked and numbered.
I. That the Depot Commander maintain a list of all employees who may be tak-
ing civilian flying instruction.
m. That a confidential general directive be issued by the Hawaiian Air Force
to subordinate commanders to the effect Ihat higher authority reposes special
trust and confidence in their employees ; that the present "unlimited emergency"
requires a quick appreciation of the difference between "peace" and "emer-
gency" conditions; that hostile saboteurs prepare most ingenious plans of ti7e
and destruction and effect them with bold and ruthless determination ; tbat our
previous habitual sense of peace and security must be realistically tempered;
that local commanders are directly responsible for the preparation and super-
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vision of internal security plans which now should be based on the premise that
at least a hundred saboteurs might act by criminal intention and stealth at any
time, at any hour, even today or tonight ; that no matter how far-fetched such a
basic premise may seem in peace time or how much it may stretch peace-time
credulity, that nevertheless the command responsibility for intelligence requires
such a day by day sense of prevention.
H. S. Burwell,
H. Si. BUBWELL,
Colonel, A. C, Special Inspector.
1 Incl.
Ltr. TAG, 3/26/41
"Provisions for Security
of Installations"
Istlnd. (A-1)
Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 June 1941.
To : Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H.
1. For careful consideration and recommendation on putting into being each
item of paragraph 6 of this report.
2. Paragraph 6 7i. to be interpreted that parked cars of employees be main-
tained under constant surveillance that nothing detrimental to security be re-
moved therefrom or placed therein while these cars are in their parking areaS.
By command of Major General MABTIN :
Cheney L. Bertholf,
Chenet L. BebthoiJ',
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. n/c
confidential
Headquaktees Hawaiian Department,
Office op the Department Commandee,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 JVIay 1941. ^
In reply refer to :
AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To: Major General Fulton Q. C. Gardner, U. S. A., Hawaiian Separate Coast
Artillery Brigade, Fort De Eussy, T. H.
1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March
1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect your instal-
lations to see if they are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as
to the result of your inspection.
Carl Grt)sse,
Carl Gbosse,
Major, A. O. D.,
Assista7it Adjutant Oenerah
confidential
Wae Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, March 26, 1941.
AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M.
Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.
To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments,
Corps Areas, and Air Forces; Chief of the Air Corps; Chief of Ordnance;
and The Quartermaster General.
1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spas-
modic, attemps at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing
daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the gi-owing number of airplanes
and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such
dangers more acute.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 245
2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all cortsmanders to provide ade-
quate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.
3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and
lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must
be maintained. The effective functioning of counter-subversive measures pur-
suant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will mate-
rially aid in the accomplishment of security.
4. Necessary counter-subversive measures are a responsibility of command
and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders.
Department and Corps Area Commanders are responsible for the coordination
of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including
activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.
By order of the Secretary of War :
S/ E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
confident! ai,
Headquarters Hawaiian De2'artment,
Office of the Department Commandeb,
Fort Shaffer, T. H. 1 May 1941.
In reply refer to :
AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To : Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March
1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you nsake a personal inspection to
see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him
as to the result of your inspection.
Carl Gbosse,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
(Basic: Ltr., HHD, AG 383.4/6, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security
of Installations.")
383.4 1st Ind.
HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Ft. DeRussy, T. H., June 28, 1941.
To OG Haw. Dept.
1. As the result of a personal inspection of the installations of this command,
the following comments are submitted :
a. In general the nature and the extent of these installations are such as tp
preclude the practicability of maintaining continuously sufficient guards to assure
the protection of all such installations against determined and well organized
saboteurs.
b. In my inspection special attention was devoted to the matter of the storage
of directors and height finders for antiaircraft artillery batteries. Where fixed
seacoast battery emplacements with protected magazines are available (at Fort
Kamehameha, Fort DeRussy and Fort Ruger) these instruments are kept stored
in the magazines. At Fort Weaver they are stored in one of the concrete maga-
zines. At Fort Barrette they are stored in the protected plotting room. In the
case of the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) they are stored in one of the concrete
storehouses at the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. At Camp Malakole and at Sand
Island, where no protected or fireproof storage is available, they are stored in
the barracks.
2. Plans recently submitted in connection with the construction required for
the augmentation of the antiaircraft artillery garrison include provision for con-
crete storehouses for the storage of directors and height finders at Schofieldi
Barracks, Fort Weaver, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Fort
DeRussy, Ulupau, Fort Barrette and at Camp Malakole. Recommendations will
be submitted in the near future for the construction of a similar storehouse at
Sand Island,
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. In general all fixed batteries and all vital installations are guarded either
by sentinels or by local guards quartered at these installations.
4. It is believed that, upon the completion of the concrete store houses referred
to in paragraph 2 above reasonably effective security will be provided for all
important installations of this command.
Fulton Q. C. Gardner,
Fulton Q. C Gardner,
Major General, U. 8. Army,
Commanding.
confidej^tial
Headqttarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 1 May 1941.
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort
Armstrong, T. H.
1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March
1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse
area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are
adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him
as to the result of your inspection.
Carl Grosse,
Major, A. O. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
1st Ind.
QM 383.4/6-A
Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.,
8 August 1941.
To : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaf ter, T. H.
1. I have personally inspected the warehouse area of this depot and in order
to provide a greater degree of protection I have fenced the entire area with a
9 ft. cyclone fence and increased the lights in this area.
2. Return of this paper has been delayed pending a thorough study of the
requirements of the guard detachment of this depot. Recommendations for an
adequate guard detachment were submitted August 7, 1941. Favorable action
on this request is considered imperative for the proper protection of this
installation.
Roland Walsh,
Colonel, Q. M. C,
Commanding.
confidential
He^adquarters Hawaiian Dbipartment
intee-stafp kouting slip
The Inter-Stafe Routing Slip is for use of, the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the excep-
tion that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant Gen-
eral unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing
slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the respon-
sible oflSce at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered
in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign
for him.
DOO 600.96/13
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
247
No. of Ind.
Froru and
Date
To
Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.
1st Ind.
DOO
5 Jul '41
AG
1. A report was presented in person by the undersigned to tlie Com-
manding General, 2 May 1941. As a result an Infantry Company has
been detailed as a permanent guard for the Ammunition Storage Area.
This question was reviewed by the Inspector General who concurred in
my recommendations, and the actual change was effected May 9.
2. A project has been submitted to the Chief of Ordnance and approved,
covering an interior lighting installation. Funds for the consummation
of this work have been promised us shortly after the beginning of the
present new fiscal year.
3. A detailed estimate is under preparation covering the lighting of the
peripheral fence around the Crater. This project will be submitted to
the proper authorities when it has been drawn up in complete detail.
4. It is regretted that nu formal written report was submitted on this
matter but it was felt that havmg presented the report in person to the
Department Commander, and having taken prompt Radio action where
indicated, no such written report was necessary.
W. A. C.
confidential
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 1 May 1941.
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To : Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March
19411941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to
see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him
as to the result of your inspection.
Carl Grosse
Carl Grosse,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
2nd Ind.
Headquarters Hawaiian Air Depot,
Hickam Field, T. H., 13 June 11941.
To : Commanding General, Haw^aiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. Judged by the new situation and standards required in consequence of the
recently declared unlimited national emergency, it is considered that the con-
clusions and recommendations of the Special Inspector are necessary and cover
the question constructively. In this respect and in concurrence with the Com-
manding General's desires, every effort was made by this Headquarters to assist
the Inspector by suggestions and cooperation.
2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of basic communication
are concurred in.
Re para, a and h: Priority action is requested on the assignment of two admin-
istrative oflacers to the Depot for assignment as Intelligence Plans OflBcer and
Depot Inspector, as recommended in paragraph 6 ft, basic report. These admin-
istrative and supervisory duties are being handled at the present time by Depot
ofl5cers in addition to a large number of other executive type of duties.
Re para c: The Depot First Aid Station has been expanded with the employ-
ment of an additional Nurse in order to allow the former Nurse to act as a
Traveling Nurse and thus keep in more intimate and helpful contact with
employees and their families.
Re para, d: The lumber stacked at the end of the main run-way #4 has been
removed by the District Engineer, which action has removed one of the more
serious flying and sabotage hazards.
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Re para, e: Due to the lack of available civilian guards and consequent diffi-
culty in employing additional civilian guards of trustworthy character, the
Depot has called upon Hickam Field for enlisted guards. It is believed that the
Guard Roster may have to be materially increased, even beyond 42 men.
Re para, f: Full compliance with this recommendation will, of necessity, be
progressive and will be completed when the Depot is moved into its new buildings.
In the meantime, this Headquarters has initiated action on making badges and
distinctive colors, which are in the process of procurement and issue.
Re para, g: Prepared plans include the screen fences mentioned in the Inspec-
tor's recommendation.
Re para, h: Detailed guard duties governing the parking plan have been pre-
scribed in writing to insure that no unauthorized material is brought into or
removed from the shops, also to insure that all personnel, other than the au-
thorized guards, are required to leave the shops and parking area promptly after
working hour^. This special problem will be simplified upon completion of the
proposed fence. Then all personnel en route to and from the parking lot, which
will be located outside the fence, will be checked in and out of the new gate,
recommended hereinafter in paragraph 3 &.
Re para, i: Survey has been initiated.
Re para, j: Pistols have been issued to Section offices for use in case of internal
riot or disorder.
Re para, k: Action has been initiated.
Re para. I: Action has been initiated.
Re para, m: Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous
peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters
is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of
planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of build-
ings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of addi-
tional administrative oflicers and the priority requested for protective fence and
lights is recommended.
3. Conclusions: a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated
and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report.
Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance
with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-
Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and
man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional
safeguards in this respect.
&. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for
the separate entrance and exit of Depot -personnel.
c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombard-
ment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical
items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection
of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small
electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian
of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.
d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel
traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to
effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference
to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-
employed common laborer.s.
e. Reference the selection of other critical items, sjiecial attention to any leak-
age of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating
machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the insi)ector
and additional safeguards provided with the conciirrence of the inspector.
f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facili-
ties, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic
association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.
Leland C. Hurd
Lei-and C. Hurd,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Commanding.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 249
1st Ind.
AG 383.4 (7-15-41)
24 Hq. Schofiexd Baeracks, T. H.,
July n, 1941.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaf ter, T. H.
General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a
verbal reply.
For the Commanding General : Edward Jenkins,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Adjutant General.
CONFIDENTIAI,
Commanding General Hawaiian Department.
War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, March 26, 19^1.
AG 383.4 (3-21-41 )M-B-M
Subject: Provisions for security of Installations.
To : The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps
Areas, and Air Forces ;
Chief of the Air Corps ;
Chief of Ordnance ; and
The Quartermaster General.
1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic,
attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The
multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces
of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more
acute.
2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide ade-
quate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.
3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted,
but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be main-
tained. The effective functioning of countersubversive measures pursuant to
instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in
the accomplisliment of , security.
4. Necessary countersubversive measures are a responsibility of command and
are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Depart-
ment and Corp Areas Commanders are responsible for the coordination of secur-
ity measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities
at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.
By order of the Secretary of War :
E. S. Adams,
Major General
The Adjutant General.
confidential
Headquaetees Hawaiian 'Depaetment,
Office of the Depabtment Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 15 J^ly 1941.
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort
Armstrong, T. H. ,
With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941,
request information as to when a reply may be expected.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT :
O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDole,
Major, A. Q. D., Assistant Adjutant Oeneral.
250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1st Ind.
AG 383.4/6
Headquaeters, Hawahan Quakteemasteb Depot,
Fort Armstrong, T. H., 16 July 1941.
To : Major O. M. McDole, Asst. Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Depart-
ment, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Information pertaining to the above subject may be expected on 25 July 1941,
For the Commanding OflScer :
B. F. Modisett,
B. F. Modisett,
Major, Infantry, Executive Officer.
CX)NFIDENTIAL
Headquakters Hawahan Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 19^1.
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations.
To : Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.
1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941
on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse
area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him
as to the result of your inspection.
Carl Grosse,
Major, A. O. D., Assistant Adjutant Qeneral.
By Courier 1 May 1941 CG
confidential
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be
sefit to subordinate commanders.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one' Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff
section may route papei's to another General Staff section direct. The Staff sec-
tion originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st
Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subse-
quently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. In-
dorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in
charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.
AG 383.4/6
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
251
No. ef Ind.
From and
Date
To
Subject: Ltr WD TAG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, 26 March 1941, "Pro-
visions for securityjof installations."
971
1st Ind.
AG
26 April 41
G-2
Two (2) copies received, one copy retained in AG files,
llncl.
C. Q.
W-76
2d Ind.
0-2
22 APR 41
C/S
1. For your information.
2. I propose to send ditto copies of this communication to all G-2 and 8-2
oflJcers, Hawaiian Department, for information and necessary action,
and to check with Commanding Officers of Posts especially with regard
to paragraph 4, and report to this office.
Incl. No change.
M. W. M.
3d Ind
C/S
4/29/41
AG
The Department Commander desires that copies of this letter be fur-
nished to General Martin, General Murray, Lt. Colonel Walsh, Q. M. C,
General Gardner, and Colonel Capron, 0. D.; a wrapper letter to Gen-
eral Martin, directing him to personally inspect to see if airplanes, sup-
plies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded; a wrapper
letter to General Murray, directing him to personally inspect the
warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately
guarded; a wrapper letter to Lt. Colonel Walsh directing him to person-
ally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the
warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to
General Gardner directing him to personally inspect his installations to
see if they are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Colonel Capron,
directing him to make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and
Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded— all to make a report to Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department as to the results of their
inspections.
Incl: N/C
4th Ind
AG
1 May 41
G-2
For notation of action taken and return.
W-80
5th Ind.
G-2
2 May 41
A.G.
Noted.
Incl: N/C.
M. W. M.
CONFIDENTIAL
AGW/amh
AG 383.4 ( 3-15-41 )M-B
March 19, IMl.
Subject : Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation
Corps.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Attention is invited to tbe inclosed copy of an agreement between the
War Department and the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps relative
to the responsibility for investigations dealing with espionage, counter-
espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the CCC.
2. The Counter-Subversive system, including the selection and designation
of informants within the ranks of the CCC, is being made the subject of further
study and will not be placed into effect at this time.
3. Correspondence and reports relative to CCC investigations will be accom-
plished and distributed in the same manner as currently prescribed for military
activities.
By order of the Secretary of War :
, Adjutant General.
1 Incl.
Cy., CCC agreement,
2-26-41.
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAI,
1st Ind. AG 3 April 41 G-2
AG 383.4/5
Ltr. WD AGO 383.4 (3-15-41) M-B, 19 March 1941, "Investigation of Sub-
versive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps."
Basic communication received in duplicate, inclosure in single copy, one
copy of basic retained in AG files.
C. G.
1 Inch
Re para m:
Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status
and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further
opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and
directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and
grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional ad-
ministrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is
recommended.
3. Conclusions:
a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in
by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent
to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the
Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam
Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes
with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in
this respect.
6. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for
the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.
c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type
bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination
of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly,
connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against
hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check
on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.
d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel
traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to
effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference
to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-
employed common laborers.
2nd Ind. to CG HAF 6/13/41
e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any
leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of
lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to
the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the
inspector.
f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social
facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant,
athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.
Leland C. Hurd
Leland C. Hued,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Commanding
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 253
Clausen Investigation' Exhibit No. 2
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Heney C. Clausen, JAGD — Fof the Secretary of
War — Stjpplbmentahy to Proceedings of the Abmy Pearl Harbor Board
The foUovping papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawai-
ian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.
a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Con-
tact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
b. Gr-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial
detention of persons connected with shrines.
c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 Sep-
tember 1944, to C. G., POA, re Documentary Evidence.
d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Do-
mestic Conditions, 1 December 1942 (2 copies).
e. Exhibit I — A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands
Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
f. Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands
Through the Eyes of the Press.
g. Hawaiian Department Summary of the Situation as of 7 : 30 a. m., 7
December 1941, dated 22 December 1941.
h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori,
i. -Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese
negotiations, 27 November 1941.
j. Informal report re Thailand,
k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asama Maru and
conditions in Japan.
1. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C,
13 November 1941.
m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.
n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observa-
tions of a missionary.
~ o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Sit-
uation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.
p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.
q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asistant Naval Attache Shanghai.
s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to
unite and serve empire,
bb. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department trans-
mitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war
dated 28 July 1941.
t. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Re-
port No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.
u. C}-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New
Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo.
V. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and
Detention Plan (Japanese),
w. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled
"Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and
M. A. report attached. )
y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of
T. H.— Loyalty of— ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached). .
aa. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George
Palsh (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies).
z. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941
re French Indo-China.
dd. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941
re Formosa,
cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents.
X. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft
(Continued),
ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan,
ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1041 re Formosa,
gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan,
hh. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re French Indo-China.
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand.
jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations.
kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Austra-
liasia.
11. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19
August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area,
mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific
Area.
nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 Feb-
ruary 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Hai"bor, T. H.
CO. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w,/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Jap-
anese Spy Activities.
pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate
Activities.
rr. Copy of radio "638 12th".
ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/l4ND Report dated 9 Feb-
ruary 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at.
tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities,
Mauri, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.).
w. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.
WW. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and-Kalama to observe
unusual activities.
XX. Memorandum dated 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John
Waterhouse house at Kailua.
yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939— "The Spy Game",
aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji.
CONFIDENTIAL
A
Headquarters CPBC
G-2 [CID]
Box S, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
Private File — Lieutenant Col. B. M. Meurlott — No File Number
Cf-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports
Prepared at Army Contact Office, Honolulu
No. Date
General Nature of Contents
I 24 June 1941.
2 14 August 1941.
3 19 August 1941
4 19 August 1941
5 26 August 1941
6 5 September 1941 . .
7 10 September 1941 .
8 25 September 1941.
9 25 September 1941.
10 25 September 1941.
11 25 September 1941.
General for Pacific area: Burma Road, New Caledonia mining, New Zealand
troop training, Thailand Japanese merchants, Australia propaganda, eco-
nomic and troop training, Japanese economic pressure in N. E. I., petro-
leum, agriculture, banking in N. E. I., Japan propaganda, economic war-
fare, petroleum, agriculture, banking, harbor defense, airways.
General for Pacific area: Japan propaganda, general economic, harbors, man-
dated islands; Australia petroleum; N. E. I., petroleum, airports; Burma
Road.
China, general economic; Formosa harbor defense.
Airports in S. W. Pacific: Canton I., Fiji, New Caledonia, Australia, New
Guinea, N.E.I.
Spratly and Adjacent Islands and reefs.
Burma Road.
Japan and Japanese relations.
Thailand: Japan attempting to dominate Thai thought, business and govern-
ment.
French Indo-China: Gloomy picture of present conditions.
China: Shanghai economic conditions, Burma Road, Suggling, casualties, air
alarm system, raids.
Japan: foreign relations, economic conditions coal, iron, ironworks, foreign
advisors, mobilization, conscription in Formosa, Palau, Yap, Manchurian
frontier, troop movement, naval organization, construction, movement,
mine laying, airways, air movement.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
0-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports — Continued
255
No.
Date
General Nature of Contents
12
25 September 1941 . .
Dakar.
13
29 September 1941,.
Japan: aerodromes.
14
29 September 1941..
Japan: movement northward, profits at Shanghai, intelligence services, war
policies.
Japan: treatment of foreigners, petroleum, troop movements, troops in French
15
2 October 1941
''
Indo-China.
16
3 October 1941
Fiji: summary from South Seas Weekly re RAF selectees, military training,
military hospital.
17
3 October 1941
New Guinea Mandate: capital removed from Rabaul to Lae. (Summary
from P. I. M.)
18
9 October 1941
China: oil fields near Suchow, transportation, airways, inhabitants.
19
11 October 1941
Dutch East Indies: political conditions.
20
23 October 1941
Formosa: foreign relations, volunteers to army, loyalty to Japan, fortifica-
tions, war planes, air raid precautions.
21
28 October 1941
Japan: foreign relations, raw materials and manufacture, oil, gasoline, iron,
tungsten, rice, rubber, lampblack, steel, motor cars, rubber products,
motorcycles, concrete, war morale of civil population, troop mobilization,
embarcation points, airports, anti-aircraft, para-troops.
22
1 November 1941...
French Oceania: political situation.
23
3 November 1941...
Japan: aerodromes and aircraft factories, types of aircraft.
24
6 November 1941
French Indo-China: airfields.
25
18 November 1941..
Japan: Japanese agents and military activities abroad; German agents and
advisers in Japan; German raiders.
26
19 November 1941..
Japan: aerodromes, aircraft factories, types and movements of aircraft, para-
troop training.
27
26 November 1941..
Australian air force and repair facilities.
28
1 December 1941
Japan: foreign relations and domestic conditions.
29
9 January 1942
Japan: vital points in Nagasaki city.
30
14 January 1942
Japan: Island of Kyushu, vital points in communication system.
31
23 February 1942...
Trans-Pacific air route suggested.
32
1 June 1942
Korea: large factory at Honan.
33
26 June 1942...
Japan: Aluminium plant at Shimizu.
3 January 1942
Memorandum on the Loo Choo Islands as a possible point of allied attack.,
(Spencer.)
Reports produced by Army Contact Office, Hq. Haw. Dept., Honolulu
Digest of Contemporary opinions on current topics in the Japanese Press.
(Biweelily up to Nov. 5, 1941; final issue, Nov. 29, 1941, covered period Nov.
6-25,1941.)
Distribution :
G-2 WD, 3.
S-2 Scho. Bks. 1.
G-2 24tli Div. 1.
G-2 25th Div. 1.
F. B. I. (Hon.) 2.
O. N. I. (Hon.) 2.
File.
G~2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation.
Last estimates produced were : 17 October 1941, 25 October 1941.
Distribution : same as for Digest, above.
(Extracts from the above are given in Exhibit herewith.)
Military Intelligence Reports (periodic).
(See list and sample copy herewith.)
Counter-intelligence Estimates. 350.05 at Shafter 1941 to 1942.
No. 7 was issued for period 16 to 30 November 1941.
Distributed to all M. I. Sections of Hawaiian Dept., 10 copies to ONI and
5 to FBI.
256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
confidential
Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence
Counter Intelligence Division
Box 3, APO 456
In reply refer to :
12 September 1&44.
Memorandum for Major Meurlott:
Total Shinto Shrines — 55 (about 12 of these are independent shrines)
OK per Capt. Iwai.
Total Shinto Priests 49 (about 15 of these individ-
" " Priestesses , 9 uals were connected with
" " Asst. Priests 24 the independent shrines)
OK per Capt. Iwai.
82
Total in Custodial Detention 38
Priests
CD on mainland 20
Paroled on mainland 3
Paroled in T. H 2
CD and then repatriated to Japan 4
29
Priestesses
CD on mainland 3
Paroled in T. H 1
CD and then repatriated to Japan 1
Released 2
7
Assistant Priests
CD on mainland 1
Paroled in T. H 1
Total deceased \ -n^- 4. rr t^ „i,„ inyii
> Prior to 7 December 1941
War Departme^^t,
Headquarters Akmy Pearl Harbor Board,
7 September 1944.
Memorandum : ,
To: Commanding General, USAFPOA.
Subject: Documentary Evidence.
1. It is requested that you make available to the Board, named by War Depart-
ment, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese
armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following
documents, to wit :
a. All data in whatever form, relating to the Japanese-American relations
received by the Hawaiian Department from the War Department during the
period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941 ; including movements of the Japanese
armed forces and probable Japanese actions.
b. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same i)eriod
from and through the Navy.
c. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
d. All reports relating to Japanese activities, both military and civil, made
by G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, or others for said period, including Gr-2 summaries.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 257
e. All messages take from the Japanese Consulate on December 7, 1941, or
subsequent to said date.
f. Documents captured from Japanese invading forces on or about December 7,
1941.
g. All correspondence or other writings relative to the alert of June 17, 1940.
h. All orders for close-in reconnaissance by aircraft or other agencies for the
period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941.
i. Secret report of Colonel Capron describing damage to structures in Honolulu
on December 7, 1941.
j. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941.
k. Report of Colonel Berquist upon his return from school in 1941 in w^hich
he discussed air warning service, stations and information centers, and generally
the employment of Radar.
1. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii,
m. Pattern of bombings by Japanese.
n. Copy of record of trial against Kuhn in Hawaii,
o. Herron's Field Order #1.
p. Complete file of O. N. I. of message taken by F. B. I. from Hawaii R. C. A.
file.
q. Army's A — B lists in 1941.
r. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in the Marshalls.
2. It has come to the attention of the Board that an exchange of information
by the O. N. I. and G-2, Hawaiian Department was made during said period by
means of teletype. Are there any records of these exchanges?
3. Procedure for obtaining the described documents desired to be used as
evidence by the Board can be agreed upon.
/s/ George Grunert,
George Grunert,
Lieutenant General,
President.
Classification : Confidential
Enclosures: No.
Military Intelligence Division
War Department General Staff
Military Attach^ Report
reported by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : JAPAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS & DOMESTIC CONDITIONS.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Business men, journalists, and missionaries returning fronCi Far East.
Reliability believed good except as indicated.
Summarization of Report
When required :
1. Japan's relationship with Dutch East Indies, China, U. S. S. R., and
New Caledonia.
2. Japan's internal conditions : Tojo cabinet, conditions in Korea, con-
ditions in Japan.
1. foreign RELATIONS
A. With Dutch East Indies. A. D. E. I. officials, en route from Singapore to
Dutch West Indies, stated on 26 November that there is a strong feeling against
Japanese in D. E. I. and that the attitude on the part of the Japanese has been to
"clear out" as quickly as possible. Source is certain that there were about 7,000
Japanese in D. E. I. in October 1941. Early in November 2,000 Japanese were
evacuated, principally from Java. In mid-November 1,500 more were preparing to
leave. Practically all of the Japanese were "business men", no laborers.
B. With China. American journalist, returning from Far East, reports that
there are many military leaders of the Japanese army in China who do not want
the "China incident" to end. They are making big money, and this war in China
has developed into "the biggest racket the world has ever seen". On the other
hand, the navy resents the army's opportunity for graft and is attempting to
plug the smuggling holes.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 18
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C. With V. 8. 8. R. Vladivostok is a more important base than Singapore or
Manila from which to launch an attack on Japan, according to an American
journalist. The Soviets have 110 submarines there. Estimates made in Tokyo
gave the Ruissian forces east of Lake Baikal as about 600,000 men before the
start of the Russo-German vpar. Since then this eastern front steadily has been
reinforced until novp the number is estimated to exceed one million. Some of these
may be recruits replacing vpithdravpn veterans. But it was believed in Japan
that an actual withdrawal of men and planes would have to be made before a
Japanese invasion would be practicable. Source believed that the establishment of
an American expeditionary force at Vladivostok could change the whole situation.
D. Witli, New Caledonia. Evidence is accumulating to indicate an offer on the
part of Japanese to gain a "peaceful" footing in New Caledonia. A Japanese
line of freighters is said to be carrying unmelted nickle ore to Japan in spite of a
Franco-British agreement that the entire output be sold to Britain. The Japanese
consulate in Noumea is believed to be primarily a "listening post". TOKITARC
KUROKI in Consul. He is said to have asked the N.Y.N, agent in Honolulu
to interest Vuric in Hawaii to move to New Caledonia. In July, 1941, Georges
Peloea, chief engineer of a new Calendonia nickle mine, stated that there were
about 2,000 Japanese "businessmen" in New Caledonia. Most of them had come
as contract laborers, but now were small merchants, etc. "Le Bulletin de Com-
. merce", Noumea, 7 August 1941, estimated the Japanese in New Caledonia to
number 1074 men and 52 women. Of these 316 men and 31 women lived in
Noumea. It is believe that Free French authorities in New Caledonia dare not
make reprisals or economic discrimination against Japan because lack of mili-
tary or naval protection leaves the island open to Japanese attack and occupation.
2. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
A. The Tojo Cabinet. An American journalist from Japan states that the fact
that General TOJO did not resign from the army before accepting the premiership
is noteworthy. It tends to bring the army out into the open as the real rulers of
the government. Now the army itself must be responsible to the people for
governmental activities. The problem now is what can TOJO do with the army
group. Only a ranking army oflicer would be able to keep the extremists in hand.
TOJO is believed to be more anti-Russian than anti-British and American.
Premier Konoye's admission of "blame" for the China incident was thought to
be a well understood hypocritical statement, pointing the finger of blame directly
at the army group. Hence,' the "tears in the eyes" of the War and Navy ministers.
B. Conditions in Korea. An American missionary, resident of Secul since 1917,
gives the following information :
The attitude of Koreans toward the Japanese is one of hopeless acquiescence.
They are afraid to talk, even among themselves, as they do not know who may
be spies. Japanese surveillance of the schools is very rigid. Once or twice
a day an under^cover official would come to the schools to inquire about various
matters. Japanese language was stressed as a cultural subject. Teachers were
made to reprimand children talking Korean, even on the athletic field. In August
1940, all school children had to have Japanese names. Any meeting that is held
must be reported to the police and a permit obtained for even the smallest gather-
ing in a private home. Police representatives always are present.
The position of missionaries has been harder and harder. The pressure is not
direct, but upon anyone associating with them. This has made the missionaries
realize that they were doing more harm than good to the people they are trying
to help. In November, 1941, there were only 12 missionaries left out of several
hvuidred. Permits to missionaries are for one year only, and are not subject to
renewal if they do not "play ball" with the Japanese. At times direct pressure
has been brought to bear on missionaries. In one instance a woman missionary
was "detained" for questioning for about a month in a dark cell. Physical pun-
ishment has been occasional, but it is uncommon for Japanese to give punishments
which leave marks of any kind.
Confidential
Strict censorship with the outside world prevents word of true conditions from
getting through. Source states that it takes mail about three months to get out.
Present conscription by Japan of Korean youths Is called "voluntai-y", but is
far from it. In the summer of 1940 the Japanese called for a volunteer regiment,
but obtained a bare 200 enlistments.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 259
Source stated that many of the poorer class of Koreans were selling everything
they had and were moving north into Manchukuo where they hoped to enjoy a
better status as Japanese subjects. From this group the Japanese have been
enlisting men to do their "dirty work", such as smuggling, spying, dope peddling,
etc
Source recommended that organization engaged in collecting money in the
United States for Korean nationalist programs should be watched carefully, as
he believed that the funds fell into private hands and were not being used for
purposes for which intended.
O. CONDITIONS IN JAPAN
(1) An American missionary who lived many years in Japan up to last August,
reports as follows :
The government does not like to have Japanese soldiers return from Chma,
being afraid they will talk. The few who come back do not talk about the war.
None of the seriously wounded soldiers are sent back to Japan. They are sent to
Formosa. No casualty lists are posted in Japan. Parents are informed after
about three months of the death of a son. Source believes that only about one-
third of the parents are so informed. Source stated that many returning soldiers
are intolerable and are unable to settle down to normal life. Many of them are
CliSGclSGCl.
All telephone calls from city to city have to be carried on in Japanese. One
English word would cause the operator to cut in on the line and remind you of
the" regulations. Even on the streets, if a Japanese person speaks to you in
English it is likely that some other person will tell your friend that his language
is good enough. Source believed that Germans are handling the censorship,
especially of mails.
The average Japanese is said to feel more friendly toward Americans than
toward any other foreigners. They dislike the British very much. Germans also
are much disliked, especially as they make no pretense of covering up their con-
tempt for the Japanese.
Source believes that food restrictions are handled very well by the government.
At such times as New Years, restrictions are eased, so that people forget their
hardships and praise the Government. Such relaxing of restrictions builds up
morale in the people when it is most needed. Last July no food could be taken
from one province to another.
Travel was restricted the latter part of last July. Special permits had to be
obtained to get railroad tickets to go from one province to another on business.
The government first gave advice in regard to limiting amusements. When
this was not taken seriously, the government issued bans on various amusements,
such as dancing, and curtailed the movies. Students at high schools and universi-
ties were made to wear their school uniforms at all times. They could attend
movies only on Saturdays and Sundays. They were forbidden to go into certain
parts of the city, principally armament areas.
In Osaka (residence of source) blackouts were staged about twice a year
and lasted about two weeks. The city was divided into about ten zones, each
further subdivided into smaller units, the smallest being a group of ten houses.
Meetings were held frequently amongst the members of this smallest group, the
chairman being chosen by representatives of the ten houses. Each house had
a bucket of water and box of sand on hand at all times. Each house paid dues,
•according to their means, to buy fire-fighting equipment. The next larger divi-
sion, about one or two city blocks, purchased the equipment. Each house has
three fiags to be hung out in front: a red flag warns that enemy raiders are
overhead, red and white that the raid is lessening, and yellow, all clear. This
— (copy illegible) — word from house to house if communications break down.
(2) A returning American business man states that Indo-China rice is dis-
tasteful to the people of Japan ; but the supply is adequate to meet all their
needs. The people are willing to let the army have the best food and other
supplies, because the army has the popular reputation of being made up of
patriots. The people of Japan have little knowledge as to the graft and cor-
ruption which exists among Japanese army officers in China.
There have been no new motor cars in Japan since the start of the China
incident. Gasoline is so closely guarded that sampan owners are unable to get
enough to go fishing, hence, a shortage of fish.
(3) Shortage of gasoline indicated. Master of a tanker reports the con-
spicuous absence of Japanese fishing vessels, in October, from waters near the
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Jlarshall Islands where on previous voyages he had seen numerous fishing
sampans. He believed that it was caused by lack of fuel.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, O. S. C,
A. C. of S., 0-2.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to
ONI
FBI
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Report No. 28.
Page —
Date: 1 December 1941.
[1], Exhibit I. — A Study of the StrevEKSivE Activities in the Hawaiian
Islands Beioke, On, and After Decembeb 7, 1941
1. espionage
a. Agents and Agencies. — In an examination of documents and confidential
publications of various government departments, there appears the common
declaration that Japanese espionage activities have largely been centralized
in the Consular Ofiices, in addition to the more specialized Army and Navy
intelligence functions. There were more than two hundred Japanese Consular
Agents strategically located throughout the islands. Potential assistants, agen-
cies, etc., are discussed hereafter in detail.
6. Sources of Infonnation. — Obtaining of information was done mainly through
multitudes of observations, reports and studies of thousands of commercial
travelers, students, tourists, purchasing commissions, as well as agents in the
guise of "priests", hundreds of thousands of photographs, a most comprehen-
sive and minute analysis of practically any subject, and by Japanese Language
School principals.
c. Transmission of Information. — Apparently all information of an urgent
character was handled through the local Consulate, and transmitted by coded
radio to Japan up to and including the evening of December 6, 1941; and it
somewhat significant that local Japanese who might have had desirable infor-
mation were apparently contacted at their homes or places of business by
members of the Consulate staff.
[2] d. Analysis of principal sources and type of information. — An analysis
of the infojination available to agents of Japan and which was largely used in the
December 7th attack, was obtained through casual observation, publications
and periodicals, as well as from various Territorial and Federal published
reports. Maps and circulars issued by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, the Chamber
of Commerce, Territorial Planning Commission and other similar bodies, fur-
nished accurate and complete details as to roads, public utilities such as water
mains, electric power networks, telephone cables, and other such vital data.
High level vantage points on the surrounding hills offered ideal spots for
photography which would show, in completed detail, the layout of Pearl Harbor,
in complete detail, with the complete berthing arrangements of vessels when
the Fleet was in port. Layouts of the principal airfields were equally accessible
to photography and sketching operations.
A drive around the island of Oahu afforded full details of beaches, possible
landing points, some of the coast defense installations, and landmarks such as
prominent buildings, churches and chimneys and other such data.
In summation — other than for details as to technical description of equip-
ment, war plans, and other classified data — an espionage system, as such, was
not required to fulfill their needs under existing local conditions.
\_3\ From all of the foregoing, it can be assumed that any trained espionage
group, other than that made up of various members of the consulate staff and
visiting Japanese officials need not have been organized because of its non-
necessity. There was the usual chain of Consular Agents, Shinto priests, language
school principals and outstanding alien business leaders upon whom the Consulate
could call for such meager details required to fill any gaps in each analysis of
geographic, economic, political, or strategic subjects.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 261
The seizure and holding in custody of the group outlined in the foregoing
paragraph, in addition to other individuals who were suspected of subversive
activities would logically appear to include the majority of possible leaders for
such an espionage system. This action has been taken.
2. SABOTAGE AND FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES
As regards the question of planned sabotage or Fifth Column activities, it is
significant to note that no local investigational agency has been able to determine
any single fact which would definitely indicate that such activities have been
planned or existed.
While we see definite, long-term activities and plans in such localities as the
Dutch East Indies, which date back to 1915, none of these can be found in
similar form here in Honolulu.
There have been but few purely Japanese businesses solely dependent upon
the Japanese Government for support here in Honolulu as was the case in the
Dutch East Indies. The N. Y. K. [Jf] had a most legitimate reason to
exist here from a commercial transportation angle, the Sumitomo Bank and the
Yokohama Specie Bank were also maintained on a somewhat logical economic
reason due to the large Japanese population and the heavy trade with Japan.
While other alien companies did exist, with some degree of Japanese control
through stock ownership, they were relatively unimportant and did not involve
large spheres of influence.
Small merchants, businesses and professions were largely of Japanese nature
but purely economic in their endeavor. Due to local patronage and the mainten-
ance of large stocks of Japanese foodstuffs and supplies, these did a profitable
business.
It is quite true that the Japanese aliens held a large portion of the economic
control of such endeavors, but this was largely due to local conditions, their
liberties under American ideas of free trade and not through any exercise of
control or endeavor on the part of the Japanese government. There was a certain
amount of resentment and jealousy directed toward these successful aliens by
certain white elements of the business community, but largely because they were
successful, knew their rights under American laws and customs and insisted
upon exercising them. It is but natural that a white distributor would resent
being taken to task by an Oriental retailor, but usually the retailer was right
and could force the distributor to acquiesce to his demand. This has resulted in
the building up of a certain amount of anti-Japanese feeling [5] but this
should not be interpreted as being caused by any disloyal or subversive acts on
the part of the Japanese individuals concerned.
There are also certain distasteful businesses which did not attract the local
white population but which were profitable and lucrative. To the objectionable
features the Japanese took no exception inasmuch as their sense of thrift could
see the advantage. An example of this is the hog raising industry. The Japanese
saw all of the possibilities and went in to the venture encouraged by the white
population. As an adjunct the garbage collection system, to feed the hogs, was
built up. The citizens were glad to receive small monthly payments for this
waste material, and the City and County was greatly relieved in not having to
maintain a large garbage collection department. In a comparatively short time
these endeavors became a Japanese monopoly including collection of garbage
from Army Posts and Camps. This was a most profitable business but it was not
motivated by a Japanese nationalistic plot to obtain military information, as
some would have it believed ; and because these individuals amassed money and
property is no indication of Imperial Government subsidy to cover espionage
activities carried on by ignorant, non-English speaking aliens. The possibilities
of such, however, is not to be overlooked. It is x'ecognized that the very nature
of tlieir work provided potentially good fields for gaining military information.
[6] These presumably law abiding and legitimate business structures may
be sharply contrasted to the activities of the Japanese Oceanic Bonito and Tunny
Fishing Company and other similar Japanese government controlled and oper-
ated organizations which arrogantly and openly defied the authorities of the
Dutch East Indies. (Attached hereto as Appendix — are copies of reports made
by several organizations to the local Japanese Consulate. )
There has been abundant evidence that visiting Japanese vessels have brought
individual oflacials who openly did all possible to maintain nationalistic and
cultural ties between the local Japanese and their homeland. Japanese Language
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Schools were allowed to flourish with their constant endeavor to impress on the
second and third generation their fealty to the Fatherland. Many societies have
been expected to aid in Japanese national endeavors, furnish comfort kits
to the Army and offer financial aid to the Imperial Government in specific projects.
While it is true that all of these activities have had their very objectionable
features there appears no likelihood that any such endeavors have been di-
rected toward the organization of Fifth Column elements or sabotage organiza-
tions. '
[7] a. Japanese Press. — So far as this oflBce has been able to determine, no
attempt has ever been made by the Japanese Government to control, financially
or througli any channels, the publication of local newspapers. No campaigns have
been initiated in the local Japanese language papers which would tend to unit
the Japanese population against any other portion of the citizenry.
There have been expressions of pro-Japanese sentiments and pro-Axis senti-
ments, as well as some destructive criticisms and anti-American comments, but
not in a manner or degree which could be termed a general anti-American
attitude.
In specific local cases when it appeared that Japanese nationals or descendants
wei'e being discriminated against by proposed laws, regulations or rules these
same papers did carry editorials and other comments in protest in much the same
manner as would be true with any of the American press organizations.
Speaking generally the attitude of the local Japanese press has been normal,
with a considerable amount of pro-Japanese expression as regards the war with
China, but this may have been largely due to economic reasons such as the
maintaining of a high level of circulation and the sale of advertising space to
alien individuals and firms. Their has been no indication however that their
policy was controlled financially or otherwise by the Japanese government.
[8] b. Political Control. — There is no substantial evidence of any Japanese
attempts to control the local political situation other than such activities which
were directed by white politicians and their Japanese or Japanese-descendent
henchmen. It is true that legislators, supervisors and other officials in office
have been elected by the Japanese-descendent citizen vote but the actual control
of any legislation or selection of officials solely by a Japanese bloc has not
been observed during the past years. Election of Japanese candidates solely by
their own nationals vote has never occurred and no such candidate running on
purely racial lines has ever been elected. In fact the contrary seems the case
when Dr. Kurisaki ran for the position of supervisor and solicited the Japanese
vote, even to the extent of having the priests speak in Japanese over the radio.
He was defeated by a hugh vote, losing his own district.
So far, the Japanese citizens have usually preferred to elect a white candidate
as they apparently considered him to be "more suitable" as a political leader.
Legislators claim that no single Japanese leader or member of the Legislature
can obtain enough control to sway legislation even should they make an attempt
(which they have never done).
In recent sessions of the legislature, the Japanese opposed the Wages and
Hours Act. This was for economic reasons due to its effect through the estab-
lishment of a minimum wage which would greatly affect the small merchant,
restaurant keeper, etc. They were unable to swing this opposition successfully,
[9] hence traded their opposition to the Pier 15 Bill to the Dillingham inter-
ests who in return supported their bloc of the Wages and Hours Act.
It is regrettable to state, in connection with this phase of the discussion, that
the Japanese vote has in the past greatly influenced the statements, actions and
practices of many of the white politicians. While such an undesirable feature,
as the continuation of the Japanese language schools, has been a subject of
much investigation and proposed legislation, the matter has always been handled
most gingerly and with a view toward the effect upon the individual's political
future. It is believed that both protective and advisable precautionary measures
have been, in the past, fogged and tabled because of such considerations.
In conclusion, it might be pointed out, that despite the fact that so far there
has been no evidence of establishment of Japan's political bloc control, and no
indications of any political influence having been wielded by the Japanese people
or officials which was motivated or dictated by the Japanese government, there
is a distinct possibility that such may eventuate should Japanese cultural efforts
be permitted to thrive without proper American supervision. The economic,
political, and social subjugation of these islands could eventually be achieved by
first providing an appropriate cultural foundation ; and is certainly within the
realm of possible long-ranged Japanese planning.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 263
[10] At present we must reeed reckon with the fact that there is a certain
amount of leadership exercised by the Japanese-descendent political leader over
his particular group or supporters, hence they are potential "leaders". Whether
such leadership would be subversive or detrimental to the defense of these islands
in the event of an invasion is problematic, but a list of these individuals is pre-
pared and they can all be seized immediately if such action would appear desirable
to the Department Commander.
c. Japanese Propaganda and Local Japanese. — This office is of the opinion that
it is highly significant to note that Japanese official radio propaganda programs,
which have been directed solely toward the Japanese in Hawaii, have been free
from any actively dangerous propaganda both prior to and since December 7, 1941.
We have observed the "softening" processes effected by this means of propa-
ganda directed toward French Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, Dutch East
Indies, Burma, India and even Australia. "In these instances there has been a
definite attempt to drive wedges between the governments of those countries, the
Japanese and tbe local inhabitants. Propaganda directed toward Australia has
been designed to create dissention between the Australians and the British by
showing how tlie Australian soldiers were victimized by the Home Government.
[11] Programs directed toward Hawaii have not contained such propa-
ganda. There have been the constant reminders, to the cliildren, of their loyalty
to parents and the Emperor, the recitations of Japanese customs and culture, but
no attempt to bring any anti-American feeling or active support to Japan. Appre-
ciation of the Japanese soldiers for the comfort kits and letters from the Japanese
children of Hawaii has been frequently expressed.
It would seem that no one in Tokyo has thought of the amount of trouble which
could be caused by calling the attention of the local-born Japanese to the lack of
confidence which his adopted home (Hawaii) has toward him. There is every
reason to believe that the war measures which have been put in effect and directed
against these local people could form the subject of a radio program which would
bring doubt, discord and mistrust more prominently into their minds. The
reasons for such an ineffective policy are obsecure and may be the result of several
logical deductions :
(a) Distrust of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese elements by the Japanese
government itself.
(b) Hawaii considered to be outside of the present sphere of the "Greater East
Asia" control plans.
(c) That other more effective means for the accomplisliment of their objectives
have been completed.
(d) The assumption that any such prograros would be useless due to restrictions
imposed on local short-wave reception.
[12] (e) The knowledge or belief on the part of the Japanese government
that the inciting of any dissention, sabotage or subversive activity would imme-
diately result in the seizure and internment of Japanese and Japanese descend-
ant residents of Hawaii.
It seems that the first-mentioned deduction, (distrust of the local Japanese)
should be given first consideration. It is most noteworthy to learn that the
Japanese government has shown a marked suspicious attitude toward second-
generation Japanese who have gone to Japan for a visit. Many of these have
returned to Hawaii with stories of surveillance ; and their inability to properly
speak the homeland tongue, unfamiliarity with customs and irksome practices,
have resulted in a loss of any desire to ever again return to Japan.
It must also be realized, by the Japanese government as well as it is by us,
that many of the old aliens have no further interests in their land of birth, other
than spiritually. Their children have been brought up under American ideals,
culture and in association with white children, having only a small portion of
their time spent in the language schools and under home influence. Their daily
routine has brought them closer to American ways of life, freedom of thought,
exposure to the American press and motion pictures, while their sports and
reci'eations have been shared with other Ajnerican children, hence the prepon-
derence of influence is contrary to the Japanese scheme of life. They have also
intermingled freely [13] with young people of the various races common
to Hawaii, and thus become far more cosmopolitan and democratic than their
parents could ever become.
There is much evidence to show that these old aliens have, in many cases, a
genuine desire to provide for the safety and future welfare of their children
here in Hawaii and hence have lost all idea of returning to Japan. For many
years they have lived under American freedom, they liave prospered, their rela-
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tivos in Japan have died and the only future remaining for them is to see their
children secure, and then pass out of the picture themselves. Any subversive
action or act of sabotage on their part would bring discredit and disgrace, not
to themselves necessarily, but to their children who have the interest of the
United States more keenly at heart.
All of the foregoing factors and considerations are quite contrary to those
found in French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Burma, whei'e they
consider themselves a superior race rather than inferior.
It is therefore quite possible that the Japanese government could, with all
propriety, question the 100% loyalty of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese. In
other words, perhaps both governments find themselves in the same quandary
when attempting to establish probability and degree of loyalty of these subjects.
[IJf] It can therefore be easily assumed that Japan has little use for Hawaii,
at present, in her "Asia for the Asiatics" policy other than that dictated by a
purely military or naval point of view.
There is nothing to be found here as compared to the oil and minerals of the
Dutch East Indies, or the rubber plantations of Malaya and Burma. Hence, her
ideas of domination of Hawaii could be discai-ded for the present save for its
strategic value, which in the military control of the Pacific, is high. Whether
this value is rated high enough, at this stage of affairs, to warrant another very
costly attack is a question to be decided by the strategists but, from the propa-
ganda point of view, this has not made any strong appearance-
Considering the third reason for the lack of attention to the radio (that other
more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been com-
pleted), no evidence has been found which conclusively indicates any such plan;
and to evaluate the possible existence of any such plans, we must first consider
what their objective might be.
Since the start of the war, the Japanese Government has fully realized that
no large, alien radio audience would be allowed to listen to language programs
enamating in Japan, [15] hence a great portion of the propaganda value
of such programs would be wasted. Restrictions as to radio reception, which
have been placed upon residents of Japan, have been reported as being severe and
rigidly enforced ; and it is presumed that the Japanese would anticipate equally
stringent regulations to be instituted by the government of the United States.
Current programs from Japan indicate that the Japanese have anticipated a
large proportion of their expected audience would be American, as they have been
rendered in English with special emphasis on spreading confusion, doubt and
misinformation in regard to the efforts made which are in contradiction to the
policies of the United States government. The inclusion of personal messages
from prisoners of war has been interspersed in an attempt to keep Americans
listening to the entire program in order to be sure of hearing a message from
a member of the family. There has not been any similar or substitute method
for attracting the attention of the alien Japanese, or the American citizens of
Japanese ancestry.
[16] It is known that the radio broadcasting channels were to be used
to transmit definite indications of decisive actions to come, prior to December 7,
but this information was to be picked up only by the Consular staff and there
is no reason to believe that any other persons, aliens or citizen, were aware of
this secret code arrangement. This would tend to strengthen the supposition
that the espionage system was built along lines to cover the situation up to the
time when the attack was made but that no elaborate plans had been worked out
for the continuation of such acts after the war had definitely begun.
From the point of jwssible espionage, sabotage or subversive organization, there
is no reason to believe that the Japanese government could anticipate the pro-
tective action which we might initiate. There has been an abundance of open
talk in that respect for many years past of which the entire Japanese population
was well aware. Those rumored plans ranged from incai'cerating all such citizens
on one of the outside islands to evacuation camps located in various valleys of
the island of Oahu.
In other words, there always has been great apprehension as to the drastic
steps which would be taken against the Japanese in case of war. On this trend
of thought we must be sure that the Japanese government was fully informed
and therefore would be somewhat in doubt as to the effectiveness of any sub-
versive organization after the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, there are
the racial characteristics [17] involved, and no Japanese agent could
carry on extensive secret, undercover, activities. With the entire population
aroused as to potential sabotage and fifth column activities, the use of Japanese
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 265
nationals or descendents would appear to be quite a hazardous undertaking.
Because of this line of reasoning we have asumed, at all times, that any great
amount of continuing sabotage or espionage activities would involve the use
of low-class unprincipled, or traitorous individuals of either American or
European antecedents. It is for this reason that especial attention has been
directed toward the German, Italian and communistic elements of the local
population. Concrete results have been obtained in the case of Otto Kuhn who
definitely contacted the Japanese Consulate with subversive intent.
These endeavors are subject to present and future close examination and
investigation with a view to ascertaining any connection between the Japanese
government and local paid agents.
With regard to the tifth reason for the non-existence of any direct, dangerous
radio propaganda, we may safely assume that the Japanese government believes
that swift retribution would follow should any revolutionary or concerted sub-
versive action be undertaken by the local Japanese population. This could
quite possibly be contrary to the plan of Japanese strategy, as it. would seejn
entirely preferable from the military point of view, especially the Japanese
version, to have as many potential assistants, tifth columnists and guerillas
available to assist in a lauding operation rather than have them inaccessible in
concentration or detention camps.
[18] d. Furthermore, the confusion of moving large numbers of Japanese
citizens, the inability of troops to differentiate between local Japanese and
landed Japanese troops not uniformed would be momentous. Aid and assistance
granted to the invaders would be of enormous value and far greater than any .
organized sabotage efforts made prior to such an invasion. We therefore do
not discount this very possible angle and believe it may be one of the principal
reasons why the radio propaganda has not been more actively dangerous up to
the present time.
Some effects of Japanese Radio Propaganda. — The effect to date of the radio
propaganda which has dealt with the Japanese war effort as directed against
the Hawaiian Islands has resulted in greatly nullifying its value on local resi-
dents of Japanese origin. For example, the Japanese story of the great damage
done by the submarine attack on Hilo, Hawaii, was clearly false and the Jap-
anese residents of that city knew this to be a fact. In a comparatively
short time these facts also became known to all the residents of other islands
of the Hawaiian group. This was also true in the case of the sihgle plane night
raid against the island of Oahu, March 4, 1942, when the Tokyo Broadcast
falsely claimed extensive damage done at Pearl Harbor. Instances of this type
have resulted in causing the local Japanese to greatly discredit propaganda
emanating from that source. Hence, it is quite possible that they would seri-
ously consider the authenticity of any effort put forth to initiate a program of
subversion in these islands.
[19] e. Japanese Families Divided in Thought. — A further argument
against the possible existence of any subversive or sabotage ring among the
Japanese, consideration must be turned again toward the second and third
generation.
It has been outlined heretofore that these younger members of the race are
subjected to strong American influences. There have been large numbers of
cases where it is known that open conflict exists within the families due to the
fact that the younger members refused to see eye to eye with their parents on
matters of Japanese loyalty. A great number of cases are recorded where the
second-generation youth refused to file his claim for deferment of military serv-
ice with the Japanese Consul and the father, or head of the family, has executed
this act without the knowledge of the subject. We have also found numerous
cases where the parents, or head of the family, have protested when the second-
generation son has filed request for expiration of Japanese citizenship.
In other words, we do know of many instances where the second-generation
son has thrown his loyalty to the side of the United States, and even tried to
sway the older member of the family to invest in American securities, follow
American customs and disregard the established Japanese customs and ways of
life. It would therefore be necessary that any plots or plans on the part of the
older aliens be kept entirely secret from the younger generation which would be
relatively quite a problem.
;[,20] f. Miseellaneotis Reasons — Why no Sabotage? — Much argument has
been indulged in as to the significance of there having been no single authenticated
report of sabotage or subversive, activity on the part of the local Japanese on
December 7, 1941, or since that time.
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
While rumors ran rampant and stories of such actions were sidely circulated,
nothing has ever been substantiated by any investigative agency. To analyse
this particular problem, it is necessary to scan the record of known facts, to piece
this out with logical assumptions and apply the positive resillts of recent investi-
gations.
First of all, we can safely state that the objective of the attack was to cripple
the naval and air arms in such manner as to prevent United States interference
with Japan's program of attack in the Orient. The success of such a mission
depended solely upon the element of surprise which enjoined absolute secrecy on
the part of the enemy. Any one individual, Japanese or of any other nation-
ality, who was made cognizant of these plans introduced a serious chance of
exposure. Assuming such a case, it would first be necessary to convey the in-
formation to such a hypothetical person. Radio, telephone, mail, or cable com-
munication could never be trusted for such an important message (again assum-
ing the fact that the Japanese government would never believe that we were naive
enough to allow these channels of communications to continue without sur-
veillance during a period of extremely strained relations). [21] It is most
probable that such a message would have to be divulged only by veiled insinuation,
special courier or coded data in commercial radio broadcasts emanating in
Japan.
We do know that there were messages received in the Japanese consulate
which carried thinly veiled warnings that the situation was fast approaching the
breaking point but no definite dates were mentioned. It was also apparent
that the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu, on November 12, 1941, enroute to Wash-
ington held possibilities of personal instructions being conveyed. His progressive
engagements, held on the night of his presence in Honolulu, at various locations
such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the Japanese Consulate, the Sunchoro Tea
House, indicate that there was ample opportunity for important matters to
be discussed with the Consul ; and his constant moving about gave rise to the
thought that these matters were being carefully guarded.
The only concrete evidence to the effect that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu
had any idea as to when hostilities would begin was to be found in a notation
on his private desk calendar under date of December 1, 1941, when he had written
in Japanese "within the predictable future". We believe that it is thus safe to
assume that he did not know exactly when operations would begin. It was
quite possible that he was verbally informed of the general plan of the govern-
ment but we seriously doubt that he had specific information that the attack
on Pearl Harbor would be made at 7 : 55 a. m. on December 7, 1941. If such
were the case, with the highest ranking and [22] most confidential agent
of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small
merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk
and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew
nothing of all the facts involved.
Many of the above-mentioned facts are a result of investigations made since
December 7, 1941. We know from examination of records that the Consulate was
fully informed of fleet movements, names of ships, berthing positions and such
similar data, and that this information was forwarded promptly by radio to
Tokyo. This data was obtained, personally, by a member of the Japanese Con-
sulate staff who visited vantage points on Pearl City peninsula to make the nec-
essary observations.
There is also the Mori case where vital military information was exchanged
with Tokyo on December 5, 1941, under the guise of a press interview. It is
particularly significant that this was via radio telephone. Both radio telephone
telegraph and radio telephone traffic could logically have been intercepted by
ships of the Japanese fleet between Hawaii and Japan.
The fact that the Japanese Consulate was interested in getting information
to ships laying off the Hawaiian Islands by I'adio, commercial broadcast adver-
tisements, visual signals such as sheets, lights and fires has been made a matter
of record through the evidence developed in the Kuhn case. Here we find our
suspect German involved with the Consulate espionage system bearing out our
previous suspicion of the use of some [23] of these means.
g. Investigation of captured maps and other data bears out the contention
that no extensive e.spionage system, other than that definitely centered in the
Consulate staff and Consular agents, as heretofore outlined, was needed to obtain
the material required for their compilation.
Thus far we can see that the tactical plan was complete with no necessity for
use of the weapon of sabotage to carry out the objective of the mission. Further-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 267
more, the attack was such a complete surprise, to the Japanese residents them-
selves, that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days to follow. Casual-
ties included a number of Japanese, property destroyed was not exclusive of
that of Japanese ownership. There was no individual act, even fanatical, to
indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of con-
fusion or sabotage.
The absence of sabotage on December 7, 1941, is not proof that plans for such
could not exist but it is evident that there was neither necessity or intention
to use this weapon for the objective in view by that particular operation.
Japanese Leadership — Individual initiative Lacking. — In the consideration of
any organizations with subversive policy, we invariably come back to the point
of leadership. It has been found that the local Japanese inherently look for lead-
ership to some single individual before any marked success is achieved even in
peaceful pursuits. Japanese business partnerships hardly ever are successful
when the corporations [23] stand much better chance of survival. Here
again we find that leadership is required as it is practically impossible for the
partners to agree long enough to produce any practicable results.
These fundamentals go back still further in the demonstrated regimentation
and control of the lives, fortunes and existence of the millions of poorly educated
people in Japan. A fundamental respect for law and authority exists in the
minds of every individual Japanese alien. An order issued by the appropriate
authority finds more complete and blind acceptance among the alien Japanese
than is the case with the other elements of the population of Hawaii. For this
reason alone it is necessary to properly explain, translate and interpret any
regulations published or issued by the Military Governoi*.
T^is characteristic has been exemplified in their choice of white political
leaders as mentioned heretofore, where the many Japanese feel that they are
better qualified, more experienced and more able to successfully carry on politi-
cal issues.
An interesting consideration of this element of obedience in the mind of the
alien Japanese can be found in the Hirada case on the island of Niihau, where a
Japanese officer pilot, who was forced down, armed and equipped, informed
Harada, a U. S. citizen Japanese, that he had taken that island, as Japan and
the United States were at war. Harada knew nothing of the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the final outcome of the engagement [25] and had nothing to
indicate to his simple mind any other fact than that the Japanese had landed
on Niihau. There was probably no mental reaction, in his mind, of being loyal
or disloyal to the United States because of his blind acceptance of the aviator's
story and his complete obedience to his commands. There was no fighting, no
conflict between forces of the United States and Japan, as far as he could
see, hence it can only be said that he was immediately bound to obey Japanese
leadership and domination in the form of the Japanese officer, but perhaps no
question of loyalty to the United States entered his thoughts.
h. Local Japanese 'between two fires. — The Japanese, in general, here in the
Hawaiian Islands, cannot be said to desire Japanese domination and control of
the territory. They have been free in their businesses, life and customs and
many have prospered far beyond their expectations. Most of them are fully
aware that should the control of the islands pass to the Japanese, all of those
freedoms, successes and customs would disappear and they would be as fully
controlled and regimented as are the Japanese in Japan. Their fear of personal
safety, the safety of their families and children is the predominant feature at
present. Some feeling exists that they are between two fires and will suffer
either one way or the other in case of an invasion. If they are not harmed by
the United States forces, in such an action, they feel very [26] uncertain
as to the treatment which they may i-eceive in the hands of the Japanese in-*
vading forces. It is also very apparent that such apprehension is rapidly spread-
ing through the Japanese population, hence it is greatly doubted that any
organized sabotage system could thrive in such an atmosphere.
3. SOME OF THE MEASUKES WE HAVE TAKEN
The daily drive and steady pressure being applied on the local Japanese com-
munity, since the war began, also lessens any possible organization of subversive
elements. None know exactly when they will be picked up for questioning, their
premises seai'ched and careful examination made of the entire family background.
Many are questioned and released who are required to return at stated intervals
for check and recitation of their experiences, contacts and employment. Others
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
are placed in custodial detention on the results of these examinations. As a
result of this relentless activity there is a wave of doubt growing up among the
Japanese as to the loyalty of their neighbors and associates.
When one Japanese is placed in custodial detention, the neighbors remark
that the army has caught up with another man whom they did not know was
at all dangerous. With this thought in mind they wonder as to the reliability
of the man next door, and the one living further down the street. In this manner
there is an ever increasing apprehension, among the loyal Japanese citizens, as
to how many and where the disloyal ones are located.
[1] Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawahan Islands
THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PRESS
a. Prior to December 7, IBJ/l. — For several months prior to the treacherous
Japanese attack on the Island of Oahu, there was an almost continuous fluxa-
tion in both public opinion and official circles on the gravity of the interna-
tional situation, with specific reference to Pacific relations.
While public opinion varied from a fair state of optimism to a low degree of
pessimism, as reflected in the local press, official observers seem to have defi-
nitely looked upon the rapidly changing situation as growing extremely grave
for a very considerable period, as may now be revealed from official files.
As early as June 24, 1941, an understanding had been reached by the local
intelligencies, agencies, the M. I. D., O. N. I., and F. B. I., to accept the Digest
of Opinion, prepared by the Military Intelligence Office in Honolulu, as the
official digest for the three services. This was designed to avoid duplication
of efforts.
There isn't anything that can now be said which will throw more light on
the situation in question and at the same time illustrate the accuracy with
which the trend of events were being viewed than by the following extracts taken
from the "Digest of Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics in the Japanese
Press", and other documents, prepared by this office:
[2] Extracts from Digest of Japanese Press
June 9, IdJfl.
"There has been a pronounced pessimism as to the international outlook,
during the period 15-31 May. . . . The feeling is general that' Japanese-Ameri-
can relations are precarious and that they may ev.en become worse; that the
leaders of both countries/ are fully aware of the futility of war. . . . and
that important leaders on both sides are working feverishly to avoid an open
break — with slight hope of success.
"The course of action being* adopted by the local Japanese seems to be
strictly dictated by expediency ; and that of the Japanese government, by
opportunity."
June 16, 19Jfl.
"The period, June 1 to 10, has been marked by a rapidly worsening of rela-
tions between the United States and the Axis elements of Europe. . . . On
the other hand, during the same period, there was an ironical complex to local
opinion which offered a faint hope for improved understanding between the
United States and Japan. That is, despite the increase tension between the
two countries, there developed a conviction that diplomatic efforts would
triumph and head off any immediate crisis.
"The local situation, which may be affected by tlie above-mentioned trend,
has been distinguished by patriotic declarations and movements by second-
generation Japanese for the support of American policies ; and, ostensibly, a
better attitude shown by other Japanese elements.
"However, these many, and perhaps mostly, sincere patriotic utterances
were largely offset by other statements which were definitely destructive
criticism of our leaders and policies, and obviously inimical to national inter-
ests under present emergency conditions."
June 2.'i, WJil.
"Pro-American, loyalty, and patriotic expressions continue strong from
second-generation Japanese in particular, and a favorable attitude of other
elements in general. . . .
"Tlie idea of the Japanese remaining here 'irrespective of what might happen
between Japan and America', seems to be growing into a fixed policy. There
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 269
appears to be a movement to instill in the minds of the Japanese that 'this
is their country' as against the idea that they are merely 'hangers-on'."
July 2, 19.',1.
"Best opinion as expressed in the local press seems to indicate that Japan
will continue a watchful-waiting policy until a definite decision has been
reached on the outcome of the Russo-German war. . . . The Local Japanese
press was obviously bewildered for several days following the outbreak of
hostilities between Germany and Russia. . . . According to some . . ., it is
believed that Japan is now confronted with new and serious problems, and that
she must soon make decisions of far-reaching importance, possibly involving
fundamental changes in her foreign policy. It is further thought by many
that these changes will be at least temporarily and perhaps permanently to
the advantage of the United States.
[3] July 21, 1941.
"The international situation during the last twenty days has grown gradually
more tense, with a deep undercurrent of uneasiness. This is due principally to a
feeling in many quarters that a decisive phase in the Russo-German war is
about to be reached, and that the immediate results will be a deciding factor
as to whether or not — and in what direction — the Japanese will move in the
Orient.
"The Local Japanese press, in general, is still decidedly pro-German.
"The movement to encourage Japanese loyalty and cooperation with America
in case of an emergency, of whatsoever nature, is being given outward support
by most all elements of the Japanese community. The situation is such, how-
ever, that a show of anything but loyalty at this time would hardly be logical."
August 7, 19U.
"As reflected in the local Japanese press, the international situation in the
Pacific area is extremely tense, delicate, and highly inflammable . . . Only a
spark is required to cause an explosion that would set off the long-dreaded War
in the Pacific.
"The local Japanese are still being encouraged to be loyal to America, no matter
what may happen, and to cooperate in every way in support of the national policy
of the United States." •
August 21, 1941.
"International relations in the Pacific area have now reached their most critical
point in history — where an explosion may be easily set off either by a false
diplomatic step or by the rash act of an individual. Major interests, policies,
and ideals have now been brought near to the point of physical confiict, gravely
threatening the peace of the Pacific. Feeling is growing more bitter day by day
as economic and other forms of pressure are being exerted by both sides. An
open clash appears inevitable unless pressure is immediately relieved, or one
of the opposing forces make some major concessions, or institute major changes
in their basic national policies. Little hope is being entertained anywhere for
better relations between Japan and other Pacific powers. Local Japanese, both
alien and Hawaiian-born, in general, are determined to remain here, and throw
themselves on the mercy of the American government and people, and do nothing
that might prejudice their standing in the community as desirable residents and
good citizens.
"In case of war. between Japan and America, trouble with the local Japanese
may be either little or great, depending lai-gely on which country is able to
dominate the local situation in the course of events, and in what degree; and,
while United States domination remains unquestionable, a continuous cam-
paign for tolerance and restraint on the part of all elements, civil and military,
seems the best guarantee against local disorders so long as the Japanese are in
the present state of mind."
[4} September 5, 1941.
"International relations in the Pacific area, which have continued extremely
acute, have now reached the 'turning point' — in which direction, depending
upon momentous decisions now in the making. Both Japan and America appear
adamant in their determilnation to pursue their respective basic national policies
to a successful conclusion ; and each nation feels that it could not turn away
from its set course or goal without catastrophic results in the end.
"There is a flury of opinion in the Japanese press supporting the idea that
Japan and America are about to reach an amicable settlement .... but, while
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
this is not beyond the realm of possibility, as yet there is very little tangible
evidence to justify such an assumption.
"The local press and influential elements of the Japanese community continue
outwardly to encourage and advise both alien and non-alien Japanese to be
loyal and give their fullest support to the American government and its national
policies, and to strive for racial harmony and unity of purpose in dealing with
the present emergency. Local American military and civil officials are also
giving very active support to the foregoing with a view to minimizing racial
and other disturbances here in case of actual war.
"While the local press shows little evidence of definite propaganda, the tempo
of such Japanese radio programs from Tokyo, has been stepped up noticably.
The most flagrant statement recently being 'the reminder to all Japanese that
children born to Japanese parents are to be considered as children of the
Emperor entrusted to their care'."
September 20, 1941.
"Japan's basic policy of establishing complete hegemony over the greater part
of East Asia and adjacent areas of the South Pacific, remains immutable and
her course, irrevocable. . . . Japan still continues toward 'total mobilization',
and the combined forces which she may ultimately muster will constitute a con-
tinual menace to the United States and other democracies so long as said forces
are not actively committed against our enemies. Japan has been and still is
staunchly sticking to the role of an 'aggressive opportunist.' The future em-
ployment of her forces will be governed by the tide of the internecine struggle
now being waged among people of the white race.
"Another Japanese cabinet crisis was apparently avoided as a result of the
Emperor making the military directly responsible to His Highness. . . . Ten-
sion among local Japanese has been greatly relieved, and there is considerable
optimism for some form of adjustment of differences between Japan and
America.
"Protestations of loyalty by local Japanese cannot, from the military stand-
point, be accepted as being actuated by 'sentiment' because of too many extenu-
ating and compelling circumstances which might be forcing miost of them along
g course of 'expediency.' Only an acid test will reveal the truth."
[J] October 5, 1941.
"During the last two weeks, the Japanese government has been doing a superb
job of fence-sitting and ring-side betting in the arena of international diplomacy —
keeping contemporary observers in the dark, confused, and nervously speculative
as to which way she might eventually be forced to fall, or choose to jump, in
order to safeguard her present winnings or, perhaps, undertake to achieve new
prodigious gains She has been assuming the unique role of 'serving two
masters' while 'designing their mutual destruction.' She may be expected
to continue to exercise her present balance of power in the Far East to the
disadvantage of the democracies, with no good intention toward the Axis, just
as long as possible.
October 23, 1941.
"A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the
Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. . . . Ministers of the new cabinet, as
well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with
the Axis — which automatically underscores Japan's policies wjth 'further, inten-
sified aggression' ; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States
and other democratic states ; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a
sham ; and forces us into a state of constant vigilance . . .
"The local Japanese continue to outwardly display a determination to support
American policies by the purchase of defense bonds and saving stamps, by
organizing units to support the major disaster council, -and by assisting the
drive to collect scrap aluminum."
November 12, 1941-
"Most veteran observers who are in close contact with the situation seem to
agree that :
"a. In view of the fact that all diplomatic efforts toward a settlement of
outstanding vital issues on the Far East, between America and Japan, now
appear to be doomed to failure, both countries have been rushing military and
naval preparations to completion to meet what is considered to be an imminent
showdown.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 271
"6. Japan's special envoy, Saburo Kurusn, is going to Washington for the
purpose of submitting the least and final terms upon which Japan is willing to
remain at peace with the American government, and that our government will
be expected to accept those terms witli no more than nominal modifications. The
United States government likewise is presumed to have a set of counter proposals,
representing the minimum conditions under whicla it is ready to reestablish
normal relations witli Japan, and the Japanese government will be expected to
harmonize its policies therewith Each country .... is manifesting a
most favorable disposition for war unless the other country is prepared to sacri-
fice some major, fundamental policies affecting matters in the Far East. Each
state appears SO ADAMANT with regard to its own establislied basic policies,
wliich are diametrically opposite to, and irreconcilable with, the policies of the
other state, that very few observers now dare to venture an opinion that a.
successful compromise of differences is at all feasible.
[6] "The local Japanese in general continue to cooperate in the furtherance
of tlie American national policies, and declare their loyalty to the Stars and
Stripes. However, there has been recent evidence developed by the questioning
of evacuees returning to Japan wliich plainly shows that the true sentiment of
many Japanese here still definitely He with the mother country. Accordingly,
it is safe to assume that unfavorable reactions are likely to flare up occasionally
under circumstances attending an American-Japanese conflict."
Novemher 29, 19J,1. (The last issue of the Digest.)
"While the international situation centering in the Pacific and directly af-
fecting the United States has been somewhat stabilized near the point of ex-
plosion during this period (Nov. 6-25), the sitifation in several other continguous
areas — Thailand, Indo-China, and Eastern Siberia — of strong indirect concern
to the United States, has continued to deteriorate.
"The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the appointment of Saburo
Kurusu as Special Envoy to Washington for the avowed purpose of making a
final diplomatic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese problems and
effect an easement of tension in the Pacific. While a certain amount of optimism
was expressed in local quarters for the success of the Kurusu mission, the general
opinion was indeed pessimistic.
"The consensus of veteran observers seem to be that Japan had taken such a
strong aggressive stand that she could not back down without incurring serious
internal trouble ; and that the United States, on the other hand, had even less
reason to compromise its well-known demands which were diametrically oppo-
site to those of Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks wei'e doomed to
failure before they started. This opinion moreover appears to have been well-
founded as subsequent events began to unfold.
"Concurrent with the conversations in Washington came reports of extensive
Japanese military movements in Indo-China, toward Thailand, and elsewhere.
The Japanese home press intensified its anti-American attitude. The Japanese
Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extraordinary military budget of almost
four billion yen with unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to
evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii). Total mobiliza-
tion in Japan proceeded unabated and with an ever increasing tempo — involving
even boys and girls down to 14 years of age.
"The foregoing together with many other reported actions immediately aroused
grave doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government, and led many to
believe that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler's favorite strategem of
utilizing peaceful gestures to confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy
efi'ective opposition to an early contemplated military move.
[7] "There is no marked change m the local situation. The very nature of
the plight of the local Japanese dictates an extreme desire for peace. And while
local Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism, their state-
ments are frequently spiked with a note of despair. They appear to feel that
an acid test of their attitude is near at hand.
"It may- be well again to emphasize that extreme and eternal vigilance is the
only and safest course here in Hawaii."
Let us now turn to a few statements in oflBcial documents which represent
definite action of this office, taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed
by certain other information at hand.
From the G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, H. H. D.,
Army Contact Office, Honolulu, 17 Oct. 1941—1200 :
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"1. a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in
the Pacific reached a new high. . . .
'•ft. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, anifl is
still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet
has not been completed . . .
"c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is
fairly cei'tain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will
remain unchanged ; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her
decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might
oppose the execution of said policies — Irrespective of what means she may choose
to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.
"2. CONCLUSIONS.
"c. 4- Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers. — While a simultaneous at-
tack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioii(%l above (the
principle of defeating one opponent at a time — famous with her Axis partner,
Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan con-
siders war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions
against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before
our naval program is completed. An attack on the United States could not be
undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence
there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time,
and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or eco-
nomical advantages over her opponents."
From a 0-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, this oflSce, 1200
25 Oct. 1941 :
"1. a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of
the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th Instant. &.• Ministers of the new cabinet, as
well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with
the Axis — which automatically underscores Japan's [S] policies with 'in-
tensified aggression' ; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United
States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a
sham or object of suspicion ; and forces America into a state of constant vigi-
lance— but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know
where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.
"2. CONCLUSIONS
"c. Rapprochement 'Negotiations. — Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has
openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — definitely our
enemy — we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations
as her partner. Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential
enemies.
"f. . . . Remarks. 6. ... It seems logical to believe that no major
move will be made before the latter part of November — in any direction — with
a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring."
As it too well know, the great break did come on Dec. 7, 1941, but as clearly
shown in the above quotations from the Digest dated Nov. 29, that this office
was thoroughly alive to the possibility, but only lacked the tangible evidence
which might have been easily obtained by intelligence personnel had they not
been handicapped by existing legal restrictions. Had those restrictions not been
in existence, it is reasonable to assume that, "tangible" evidence would almost
certainly have been obtained that would in all probability changed, if not entirely
prevented, the great tragedy of Pearl Harbor.
[i] 6. Decemhcr 7, 19Ii2. — In brief. Army Alert No. 1 was in effect, which
provided "a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands,
with no threat from without.''
The Navy had made certain disposition of fleet units, in accordance with
warning Instructions previously received from the secretary of navy, .which was
considered appropriate to meet a threat no greater than could normally be
expected from a power with which avowed friendly diplomatic relations were
being maintained.
Neither of the armed forces were, however, prepared for a murderous, treach-
erous attack from a country whose high diplomats were making xjrofound
protestations of peace to the heads of our government.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 273
There are many confirmed instances where both service personnel and civil-
ians stood for minutes and even hours, watching the attack without being con-
vinced of its reality— such was the deed which led President to state in bitter
scorn :
"There is the record for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror
and disgust." ^ _
So much for the immediate military, diplomatic, and political aspects. How-
ever, the local situation as regard the state of civil preparations for war should
be mentioned.
As previously stated under paragraph 1 a, the civilians in general had been
thoroughly alive to the tensity of the situation for some time ; and several groups
of civilians were preparing for actual war. Some of the more important were :
[2] The nursing Association ; a group of business men who had volunteered
for police duty; another group who had been working on air raid warning
plans ; the Hawaiian Medical Society ; and the Hawaiian Chapter of the Ameri-
can Red Cross.
All of the foregoing played an important part in rendering prompt and
courageous assistance on the dav of the attack.
The combined forces of the M. I. D., O. N. I., and the G. B. I., although
woefully inadequate in numbers and equipment, pooled their efforts and endeav-
ored to meet the situation with all possible means and energy.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 22 December 19^1.
1. Summary of the Situation as of 7 : 30 A. M. 7 December 1941
a. naval operations
No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther East than the China
sea, although it was known that tliey had bases in the Mandate Islands and in
all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from
the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and December 7th, to indicate any
movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.
B. AIR operations
No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the
Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based
Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the ]\Iandate Islands (approxi-
mately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which
could operate from that distance and return to its base.
C. LOCAL situation
Instructions from the War Department announced that the international situa-
tion was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage
and subversive acts.
(1) DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES.— On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned
through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate were
being destroyed by burning.
(2) CONCENTRATION d MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS.— None. The
entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.
(3) SABOTAGE. — Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were im-
pending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated that
subversive acts would be committed.
On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6 : GO P. M., a transcription and
translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an
unknown party in Tokyo v/as received. This conversation had taken place on
December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were
suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts
were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to
reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 19
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
D. PKECATTTIONS TAKEN
Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the
counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a fully alerted condition. In
addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours
before dawn until one hour after dawn each daj'.
CONCXUSION
A. CAPABILITIES
1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result
at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the
Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.
2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters
the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lieutenant Colonel, O. S. C,
A. C.ofS.,G-2.
[1] CONFIDENTIAL
#69512 Copy
Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Db. Motokazu Mori
(J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I
would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at
present. Are, airplanes flying daily?
(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes.
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this
year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few
sailors here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US- Japanese
negotiations being conducted presently?
(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer
than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This
fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and
we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the
people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are
some who say odd things, but these are limited to [2] newcomers from
the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to
think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That's fine.
(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.
(J) Has there been any increase in ? of late. That is, as a result of
the current tense situation.
(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war build-
ing boom.
(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?
(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry
here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army
personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 275
sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students
at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs,
regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.
(J) Are there many big factories there?
(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds
are being constructed.
(J) Is that so?
(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.
(J) How large is the population?
(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy
personnel and workers from the mainland.
(J) What is the population?
(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.
(J) What about night time?
(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.
(J) What about searchlights?
(H) Well, not much to talk about.
[3] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?
(H) No.
(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?
(H) The comments by tlie papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the
atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed
to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily.
The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.
(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?
(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and be
was very adept at answering queries of the press.
(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate
Hawaii?
(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.
(J) What is the climate there now?
(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a
phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a
very unusual climate.
(J) Is that so?
(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the
United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland
today. He made no statements on any problems.
( J)Did he make any statemeents concerning the US- Japan question?
(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US- Japan question,
he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It
appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.
(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.
(H) Yes.
(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?
(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet
and a gentleman.
[//] (J) .Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?
(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned
for the mainland.
(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?
(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking
about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the
fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that
the fleet has left here.
(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?
(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. How-
ever, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.
t ( J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.
(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importa-
tion of Japanese goods?
(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy,
and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough
foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any
rate it is a big inconvenience.
(J) What do you lack most?
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the
freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods
are having a hard time.
(J) Thanks very much.
(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells
very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago
went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors
are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a stand-
still due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor
manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake
here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.
t(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Tak-
ara-Masamune" ; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert
in charge of the brewing ; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand
Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter ; and that
said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that
Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that
Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no
herringroe for this year's New Year celebration.
[5] (J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according
to last surveys made?
(H) About fifty thousand.
(J) How about the second generation Japanese?
( H ) About 120,000 or 130,000.
(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the
United States Army?
(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the
Army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are
Japanese.
(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?
(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.
(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?
(H) Yes, tliat is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be
inducted in January.
( J ) Thank you very much.
( H ) Not at all. I'm soi-ry I couldn't be of much use.
(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.
(H) Wait a moment please?
(J) off phone.
Signal Corps, United States Akmy
2834
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE
P 2 WAR WD PRTY
Washington, D. C, November 27, 1941.
G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Ft Shatter, T. H.:
473—27TH
Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate Stop Hostilities may
ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform Commanding
General and Chief of Staff only
Mixes
144 PM
Received as a SECRET communication.
Decoded by LT. JOS ENGELBERTZ, SC. 4:00 PM 27 Nov 41.
Answer should be marked ANSWER to Code Message No. 473-27th.
Note : See AR 330-5 and and 330-G for handling messages of this classification.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 277
21 April 1945.
The War Department secret radio reproduced on the reverse side hereof is that
referred to in my memorandum of 16 April 19^5, to Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, subject : Action taken on WD information concerning possible hostilities
with Japan.
Byron M. Meurlott,
Bykon M. SIeuklott,
Lt. Colonel, M. I.
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2 {CID)
CONFIDENTIAL
Headquaetees CPBC
G-2 [CID]
Box 3, APO ise — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
File 336 — Foreign & International Affairs & Relations— G-2 Estimate of Inter-
nation (Japan) Situation
SONGKHLA is another name for SINGORA, Sri Tamarat district, southern
Thailand, Latitude 7° 12' N., 100° 36' W. longitude. It has a seaplane anchorage,
Government aerodrome, radio station. It is located at the mouth of the "Inland
Sea" Dhale Sap. It is connected by a short branch railway with the main,
railway which runs from Singapore to Bangkok. It is also the seat of govern-
ment for the Viceroy of that district.
[Penned notation: 336— Foreign & International Affairs. X336.31— Foreign
Vessels.
Aemy Contact Office,
Federal Building,
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.
MEMORANDUM : Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.
The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2 : GO P. M., and docked at
Pier #8 at 3 : 30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los
Angeles at 9 : 00 A. M., 1 August 1941.
.Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en
route were as follows : From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed
to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them ; they were also pre-
vented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the
second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about
and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north
in the vicinity of the ISOth meridian, proceeding far enough north that the
ship was laying in cold fog banks ; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening
of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted
out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26tli July the
ship headed toward Honolulu ; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was
posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship
again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted
that the^ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down,
and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.
It is interesting to note that the ship began it's actions before the action
was taken freezing credits.
Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and
that they have some stock of i-oller bearings on hand, but neither the materials
nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item woidd
seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron
in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
itefiis reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test
aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anasthetics.
It is reported there are many Germans in all public oflices in Japan, even includ-
ing police departments, post offices, aad finance offices ; these men are said to vpear
civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations
are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July
1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from
South America ; the business men who saw these vessels could not give a descrip-
tion of them, but stated that the Captain of the "Frederick Lykes" could give a
full and accurate description.
The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of
the United Strifes, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public ^
has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Gov- *
ernment, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying
warnings against spies.
During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have
had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men work-
ing in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part
time military training.
For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead
of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of
bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from
other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse moun-
tain about six miles due west of Kobe.
On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army
officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet ; at *:he time of the incident no
one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended,
including local telephone service.
All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese
only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls
to Germany may be made in German, but no other language is allowed in com-
munications within Japan.
13 novembee 1941.
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C:
(Attention G-2.)
Information furnished by W G Keswick formerly Singapore British courier
now en route San Francisco comma Washington comma and London in same plane
■with Saburo Kurusu indicates mission of Ambassador is primarily to confirm
Nomura reports that United States Government is not blufllng stop If he sees
any indication of weakness in attitude of the United States then Japan may move
toward other hostilities Stop Should he observe only attitude of strength and
determination great possibility no such hostile acts would take place Stop Kes-
wick information and opinions hitherto fairly accurate End
Short.
[Penned notation: 336 — Foreign & International AfEairs X 201 — Kurusu,
Saburo]
Subject : Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July, 1941.
Advocating the Creation of a Go^'ERNMENT General of the South Seas
(By Tetsu Nakamura)
BRIEF
Japan's ove)-seas development policy has been stressed as the Great Continental
Development Policy. Involved in said policy, was a North Advance Theory,
considered a content thereof; and a South Advance Theory, often thought of
as an opposite theory to that of the North Advance Theory.
However, the South Advance Theory is now considered as inseparable to the
Great Continental Development Policy.
'J'he South Advance Tlicory was also often checked as an Oceanic Theory
(on account of encompassing mostly islands; and being principally a Naval
job).
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 279
The reason why the South Advance Theory and the North Advance Theory were
not taken up simultaneously as related policies heretofore is said to be due to
limited national power.
Now it seems that, as a result of circumstances and developments of the
" China incident, it has now become necessary to combine the heretofore separate
theories as to direction of expansion, into a single theory or plan.
Mr. Takegoshi Sansa, advocating the southward development of the Japanese
race, stated in part as follows :
"Besides those receiving the culture of England and France, many among
the 100,000,000 Malayans are looking forward to our country, for although
the Europeans have been exploring the waters of Malaya for several hundred
years, there has been no change. Consequently, it is waiting to be developed.
If the Japanese race is capable of developing this great treasure house, it can
be said that the noble project of a great nation has been accomplished. Our
future does not lie in the north, but in the south ; not on the continent, but in
the sea. The Pacific should be made our country's lake."
Mr. Sansa gave us our first European conception of colonial settlement.
The new slogan "East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere", adopted by the 2nd
Konoye Cabinet, is merely a progressive conception of the New Order in East
Asia, adopted by Konoye's 1st Cabinet, and due to its expansive nature^ requires
the fusion of the New Order in East Asia with the Southward Policy.
It is a great mistake to immediately consider that the New Order in East
Asia has been realized and that the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere has
been accomplished. This is because the political and economic reality of East
Asia must be reconstructed and revived for this ideal aim.
The East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere is being stressed as the ideal aim.
This new aim or idea is considered more realistic — it is more economical and
material (in the sense of natural resources). While the New Order in East
Asia conception was more political and less realistic — hence the new aim or
ideal.
It is needless to mention that the problems of East Asia Mutual Prosperity
Sphere, which now includes a southern political sphere, must be taken up.
Herein lies the reason why the plan of a Southern Government-General System
as a political pivot of the Southern Political Sphere must be considei'ed, al-
though it may be a very idealistic plan.
The southern political sphere, which can be considered a part of the East
Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, must be said to include a very complex political
structure and cannot be thought of as a single political block.
Within the Southern Political Sphere of East Asia are to be found our
country's possessions — namely, Formosa, the Mandate South Sea Islands and
the Spratley Islands and the Philippines, the Republic of China in South
China, the French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and the Hainan Island.
Their political control relations are multifarious ; their racial structure, cul-
ture and customs are diversified ; and the only thing in common are the blood-
relations of the natives as races of East Asia. Nevertheless, in view of the
fact that the conceptions of New Order in East Asia and East Asia Mutual
Prosperity Sphere have as their guiding idea the autonomy and independence
of the races of East Asia, this blood-relation element of the races must be most
seriously considered.
Now, the task assigned to the races of East Asia is that the southern
political sphere must be formed as a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity
Sphere based on the blood-relation characteristics of the races of East Asia
in the south.
Speaking of the Southern Political Sphere, althougli the relations between
our country and such countries as the Dutch East Indies, the French Indo-
China and the Philippines are not only not similar, but also do not appear
to have the hopeful possibility of creating the East Asia Mutual Prosperity
Sphere today. It is therefore necessary to have some sort of close connection
as races of East Asia, and is only proper for our country to have some sort
of powerful southern political system as a local organ of the south for the
consummation of such friendly relations. This is why the southern govern-
ment-general system is being considered as one of the methods. Hence the
necessity of a southern political system to control the southern policy is being
keenly felt, in contrast to the northern political system of Manchoukuo and
North China.
The Southern Government-General Theory is a contention stressing the
strengthening of a local organ as its political pivot to correspond to the south-
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ern new order of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere. It is wholly con-
nected with requests of outside territories advocating the strengthening of the
Formosau Government-General. However, if the ideal condition of the south-
ern political sphere is realized, it is doubtful that Formosa would be the pivot.
(Note: the center would probably move farther south)
There is at present conflict between the Formosan Government-General with
the East Asia Bureau. There must be a close connection among the East
Asia Bureau, the Foreign Ministry, the Formosan Government-General and
the South Seas Office, and a powerful political system to unify the southern
administration must be considered. Whether the southern government-general
should be an expansion of the Formosan Government-General or separate, is a
question.
Now, if Formosa, which presently has only man power and economic strength,
were to be made the center of the southern political sphere and a southern gov-
ernment-general were to be created there, the question as to whether Formosa has
the administrative and economic ability to discharge such a great task should be
considered.
Firstly, if Formosa is not able to become the industrial and economic center
of the southern political sphere, the independence of the southern political sphere
cannot be expected.
For example, even if the South Seas Government were to be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Formosan Government-General under the present economic
condition due to its geographical relations, it would still be impossible to manufac-
ture the raw materials of the South Seas into finished goods in Formosa. Hence,
considering the fact that the raw materials must be sent to Japan pi'oper to be
made into finished goods, it would be more significant for the South Seas to be
directly connected to Japan proper.
This is applicable to the products of Hainan Islands as well as those of French
Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, but if the products of these places could
be manufactured into finished goods in Formosa, Formosa probably would be able
to perform her role as the pivot of the Southern Political Sphere.
In this respect, the industrialization of Formosa is being regarded as the urgent
matter of the present. However, the industrialization of Formosa cannot neces-
sarily be regarded optimistically, for in as much as all products are being sent
through Formosa to Japan proper, today, no material value, probably, can be
seen even in the purpose of creating a southern government-general.
After all, it must be said that the possibility of the Southern Government-Gen-
eral System depends upon the possibility of the industrialization of Formosa.
An administrative center, which is not an economic center as well, is meaningless.
If Formosa, as the center of the new order of the Mutual Prosperity Sphere in the
south, cannot be industrialized and be made into the industrial center, then it
should not be the administrative center, except for possibly the reason of adminis-
trative necessity.
Judging from the problem of the quantity of electric power possessed and labor
power of the natives, not only can the industrialization of Formosa not be regarded
optimistically, but, also, is a very difficult matter.
However, instead of stressing the meaninglessness of the southern government-
general system from such economic aspects, the significance of the system should
be recognized from the point of view of administrative necessity for the estab-
lishment of the southern political sphere and our southern policy should, prefer-
ably, be turned toward the industrialization of Formosa and the development of
the natural resources of the south.
( Note — I think the above covers all the things of immediate interest contained
in the article.)
GMV
[Penned Notation: 336. Foreign & International Affairs & Relations.]
Army Contact Office,
Federal Building,
Honolulu, T. H., 2 May 1941.
MEMORANDUM : G-2.
Subject : Comments on observations of a missionary.
1. The observations set forth in the attached memorandum reflect the viewpoint
of most Christian missionaries in Japan. Being religious teachers, they are by
nature idealistic and their feelings toward the Japanese are often influenced by
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 281
wishful thinking. During many years contact with them in the Far Bast, I found
most of them pro-Japanese and often critical of our own people and actions of
our officials stationed there. In. this they wei'e sincere, bnt in evaluating their
statements regai'ding Japanese, these factors should be considered.
2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 — The transition from feudalism to a more or less modern
industrial nation, of necessity, made the Japanese imitators. They have con-
tributed little in the liekl of modern inventions and research. Almost everything
has been taken "as is" from western nations. Since they had not gone through
the trial and error period of tlie western nations, they employed foreign advisors
and sent investigators abroad to copy — to the letter — things other nations were
doing. The Osaka Street Railway is outstanding in Japan but not superior to
similar ones in western countries.
The Japanese merchant marine is very good. The white glove incident is typical
of the people who are thoroughly disciplined by the Shinto system. However,
this high standard of cleanliness is not standard throughout Japan.
3. Paragraph 4 — I was present when the Emperor reviewed the entire fleet, on
the occasion of his enthronement, and it presented a splendid appearance. Most
of our naval officers I have talked to think the Japanese navy very good.
4. Paragraph 5 — The Ministers of War and Navy are not accountable to the
Premier, but have direct access to the throne ; therefore it is not necessary to
refuse to name these ministers. The usual method is to name the ministers and
force the others to resign if they do not support the policies of War and Navy.
The Emperor undoubtedly approves many things after they have been accom-
plished, although he is all powerful (in theory).
5. Paragraph 6 — Shinto is not a religion in the western sense, but is usually
referred to as such. It is a form of ancestor worship and its control extends to
every Japanese during every motnent of his life. A person is [76] born
into Shintoism if he is born a Japanese. When the Buddhists went to Japan they
found that they could not change Shintoism, and altered their teachings so that
they would not conflict. The consequence is that the Japanese are both Shintos
and Buddhists and, in my opinion, Shintoism has far more influence over the
lives and actions of the Japanese people than Buddhism. A Japanese may believe
in Buddhism or not, just as he pleases, but is born into the Shinto system. The
Japanese "conscience" is motivated by moral teachings of Shinto just as the
Christian conscience is motivated by the Ten Commandments. A Shinto is con-
stantly striving to make face for his ancestors' spirits and the elaborate code
of conduct which has been built up controls every member of every family
during his every breathing moment.
I have talked to Japanese who professed Christianity after attending mission
schools. Some atlmitted that they could not throw off Shinto, as it is a national
system of life. Most Japanese admire the idealism of the Christian religions
and no doubt the second and third generations in Hawaii are turning more and
more to Christianity as the old home ties are broken.
Few educated Japanese, even in Japan, will contend that the Emperor is de-
scended from the Sun Goddess — they know it comes from their mythology, but
one must also remember that there is a difference of opinion among Christians
regarding the origin of man. Many good Christians contend that Adam and Eve
were mythological persons.
6. Paragraph 7 — I visited Japan three times before going there for a 4-year
detail at the U. S. Embassy, and found that being followed by secret police is
the rule, not the exception, in peace or war.
7. Paragraph 8 — The "black-out" drill in Tokyo was described in an illustrated
article in one of the Japanese publications during the past year, probably the
Japan-America Review published in New York. Undoubtedly the drill was car-
ried out efficiently. The rules and regulations were probably copied from the
British and the people ordered to comply— they do not ask people to cooperate
in Japan. In my opinion, it has never occurred to the Japanese people to delib-
erately evade or cut corners in regulations due to Shinto "Conscience." He is
probably right about the neutrality pact, as each will honor it only so long as
they profit thereby.
8. Paragraph 9 — Probably true.
9. Paragraph 10 — I am inclined to believe that very little information of value
can be obtained from the women. They are as a rule more clever than the men,
although they hold an inferior position in the family. They would not willingly
jeopardize the safety of any relative in Japan by telling anything of importance
that slipped through the censors. They are also reluctant to do anything that
might displease the husband or his family, and any disloyalty reflects discredit
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on her own parents and their ancestors for failure to give her proper moral
training. However, in Hawaii, this strong Shinto influence is weakening
gradually.
10. Paragraph 11 — I concur in general with these statements, but I am not quite
so optimistic. They do want to be Americans but reserve the right to define that
status. However, I believe that the citizens will remain loyal and the aliens will
be quiet and law-abiding through any emergency if they are kept informed as to
what is expected of them at all times and if they clearly understand that their
treatment will depend upon their behavior.
11. Paragraph 12 — No responsible person could doubt this. It is most impor-
tant that this be done.
12. Paragraph 13 — The language schools retard the progress of Americanization,
not because Japanese is taught, but because the children are kept in an alien
atmosphere all afternoon when other American children are mixing on the play-
ground learning to speak and think American. It is true that the students learn
a very poor grade of Japanese, if any, but due to the fact that they come into
contact with other American children only during public school hours, they also
learn a very poor grade of English. The "culture" taught in the language schools
seems to be stressed more than language, judging from the results I have seen.
This "culture" extols the superiority and virtues of the Yamato Race. It includes
moral lessons based on the Shinto system and an alien philosophy opposed to our
own way of life. They are told that in order to become good Americans they must
retain the virtues of the Japanese and combine them with the virtues of the
Americans, thereby making a superior citizen. Incidentally, all Japanese charac-
teristics are virtues to be retained.
The Consular Agents constitute an excellent semi-oflBcial network of communi-
cation and control for all who desire to do business with Japan or to aid its
government.
13. Paragraph 14 — These statements confirm my opinions on the same subjects.
However, it must be kept in mind that "good Japanese contacts" are rare. Japa-
nese are sensitive people, and family and racial ties are strong. It is almost
impossible to find one who will say anything reflecting discredit on the race or any
member thereof, and a contact will not bring discredit on his race by his disloyalty
to it.
Richard "W. Cooksbtt,
Lieut. Col. G. 8. C,
Contact Officer.
1 August 1941.
Memorandum For : Col. Bicknell.
Subject : Local Japanese Situation During The Period 26-31 July 1941.
Local Japanese situation changed momentarily during this period, becoming
more critical than ever before. Tliis change was due to the proclamation by
President Rossevelt freezing all Japanese assets in the United States on July
25th. Up to that time, in spite of the tense America-Japan relations, the
Japanese here manifested very slight excitement and apprehension and remained
practically unmoved because they have been imbued by local Japanese press with
the idea that the international situation between these two powers wasi getting
better and that it it certain to become better and hostility between them will
never come and because they have been given assurances frequently that they will
be treated fairly by the constituted authorities if they act properly. However,
they lost this optimistic view when the freeze order was announced and started
to harbor the feeling that a clash between America and Japan is imminent.
Consequently, excitement and apprehension became strikingly evident among
them. But, their apprehension was of financial nature more than anything else.
The fact that about $300,000 from the Sumitomo Bank, and about $40,000 from
both the Pacific Bank and the Yokohama Bank was withdrawn on the 2Gth and
the fact that many Japanese have tried to transfer land titles and bank deposits
to their children ably support this view. Spiritual apprehension also prevailed
to a slight extent. That is, some Japanese were reported to have worried as to
their future status regardless of their strong trust they have built in themselves
that the American government will accord them fair treatment at all times.
Local Japanese newspapers persistently maintained a calm and advising policy,
cautioning local Japanese to remain calm and cooperate with the United States
government and have confidence in the government of their residence at all times,
both in their editorials and columnists' columns. They also refrained from
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 283
publishing articles that might excite or cause controversy in the community and
gave big publicity on items that might calm the people.
The Japanese shipping situation vs^as acute here during this period. The NYK
ship Asama Maru which was scheduled to arrive here on the liGth failed to come
until the afternoon of the 31st. This delay caused local Japanese merchants and
Japanese people whose relatives were aboard the vessel considerable worry.
Local Japanese radio stations carried on as usual during this trying period,
excepting a noticeable decrease in the store advertisements on Monday, the 28th,
having been decreased to about half their normal number.
Practically all local Japanese importing firms have been closed by the freeze
order and the Japanese retailers stopped selling freely, some even going as far
as to hide their stocks. Shortages of Japanese goods became more and more
acute and prices soared. Many people were reported as having rushed to the
stores to purchase all available goods, but were unsuccessful in many instances.
Local Japanese educational institutions remained quiet. Authorities and
people connected with them made no statement and held no known meetings.
The religious groups remained practically quiet, excepting that a convention
of the delegates of various temples of West Buddhist sect was held in Honolulu
on the 28th and at which time Bishop Kuchiba asked the gathering to build good
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, cooperate with the United States national
policy, comply with the American principles, repay gratitude, and remain calm.
The American Legion held a conference at Hilo on the 26th and passed a reso-
lution calling for abolishment of Japanese language schools here. Local Japanese
newspapers have given considerable publicity on this matter and aroused con-
siderable interest among the Japanese.
More Japanese are now buying or advocating purchase of United States national
defense bonds. For instance, Honolulu Japanese Contractors' Ass'n. cancelled
its picnic and members have agreed to buy the bonds at a meeting held on the 27th.
Conclusion : Excitement and apprehension ran high at the beginning of this
period, but gradually subsided and was practically normal at the end.
President Roosevelt has proclaimed an embargo against oil and gasoline export
to Japan and it is expected the Japanese situation here will change.
SECEET
Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 19.'/1
Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,
A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1.
without ^ny ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting be-
tween Bangkok and Singapore.
B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main
landing point to be in Songkhla area.
Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 per cent probable
accuracy)
American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.
Copies to :
Mr. Shivers.
Capt. Mayfield.
Col. Bicknell.
[Hand written : distributed by me to those names shown on Nov. 27, 1941.]
confide.ntiai.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be
sent to subordinate commanders.
This slip and accompanying paper.s when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff
section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section
originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorse-
ment list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements
hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an
officer authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
#249— To
Subject: Information re Japanese Situation
1st Ind. Cont. 0 9 Sept. 41.
2d Ind. G-2 11 Sept. 41
3d C/S
G-2 C/S_
C/S
C/S
C/S
Cont
Attached hereto for information is a report
received 8 Sept. 1941 relative to the Japa-
nese Situation.
For information. My personal belief is that
conditions are- better since this report
from H. B. Incl; Data from Naval At-
tache—Tokyo. (Undated).
Noted.. -
G. W. B.
R.J. F.
V. S.
Office
G. S. C.
4th Ind. G-20 1 Sept. 41
MMM
INFO; CINCPAC, CINCAF, NAV ATTACHE CHUNGKING, C0M16, NAVAT-
TACHE PEIPING. Z MOTH 080730 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q OPE PLUG
WIFE D
From : NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO.
To: OPNAV.
Info : ASST NAVATTACHE SHANGHAI.
Influential semi official East Asia Development League headed by Expremier
General Seujuro Hayashi has issued following advise to Government X Adhere
to Axis Pact X Carry out Greater East Asia policy X Repudiate aid to Chung-
kingX invoke right of self defense in seas near Japan X Stated reasons for (50)
advice are that Japan desires speedy restoration peace to enable nations find
proper place in world X Keynotes Japans policy are early settlement China inci-
dent establishment co-prosperity sphere X Japan cannot tolerate American policy
of assisting China opposing Japans peaceful southern policy exerting economic
pressure on Japan and aiding nations (100) Hostile to Japans Allies X Japan
cannot understand American policy of shamelessly illegally occupying Greenland
Iceland violating laws governing neutral nations at same time remaining silent
toward outrageous invasion Iran by Britain USSR X Japan must break encir-
cling ring of hostile powers
TOD 0959
COPY
Z MOTH 030735 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q L0PE PLUG WIFE D GR 129
In recent speeches military naval officials urge entire population to unite
and serve Empire faithfully to meet greater crisis in history X War Minister
desires closest contact between Army which is driving force of national and
civilan population X Army trying carry out greatest mission must have na-
tions support X (50) Colonel Mabuchi, Chief Army Press Section, in speech
bitterly criticizing America states Japan must establish strong internal defense
structure to break encirclement by ABCD powers X If favorable settlement
Japans problems cannot be reached through diplomatic negotiations Japan
must use force X All Japanese must be prepared sacrafice themselves for (100)
state X Lt. Comdr. Tominaga of Navy Press Section states Japan must be
vigilant since anti Japanese nations under American leadership have greatly
increased military forces in Far East.
[Penned Notation: 336 — Foreign and international Affairs and Relations
X091— Japan.]
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 285
CONFIDENTIAL
MID-2801-510
C-I
WAR
War Department,
War Department General Staff,
Military Inteixigence Division, (5-2,
Washington, D. C, August 5, 19/fl.
Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. Hawaiian Department.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such
action as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G~2.
2. Enclosures:
MID/2023-1026/1— Cpy of Ltr. Fr. F. B. I. re Info, on Japan's entry into
war : atd 7/28/41.
OR/10524-4032 — Cpy of MID Setm. re Subversion statistics— War Depart-
ment personnel : dtd 8/4/41.
[Penned Notation : 336 — Foreign and International Affairs.]
confidential
Copy G-2
MID/2023-1026/1 DGE
Federal Bxjreau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D. G., July 28, 19J,1.
Personal and Confidential By Special Messenger
Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Assistant Scci-etary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Berle : As of possible interest to you, information has been re-
ceived from a. confidential source, the reliability of which has not been deter-
mined, to the effect that if Great Britain were to suffer a major military setback,
the Japanese military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in which
case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately occupied by the Japanese
Army and would be completely blockaded by them.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ J. E. Hoover.
cc — Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
cc — Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Further Distribution :
9th C. A.
Haw. Dept.
Phil. Dept.
File
Source : Reliable.
Info : Undetermined,
fm 8-4-41.
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL,
c
Headquabteks CPBG USAFICPA
G-2 [CID]
Box 3, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
350.05 — Inforpiation on Foreign Countries — Binder #1 Through 1941
(Headquarters Hawaiian Department)
CONFIDENTIAL
Inter-Staff Routing Slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception
that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General
unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip
will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible
office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in
sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for
him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
To
Subject: Military attache report
St Ind. G-2 6 Nov 41..
Jndlnd. Of G-2 11/6/.
Chief of
Staff.
For information. This report pertains
wholly to aviation and a copy has been
furnished H. A. F. 1 Inch: Military At-
tache Report No. 23. Dated 3 Nov 1941.
Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft.
Noted
K.J.F. E.J.E.
A.C.J.
CONFIDENTIAL
Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D.
Army Contact Office
Honolulu, T. H.
Date : 17 October 1941.
Special Intelligence Report
Subject : New Japanese Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo.
Lieutenant General ; Director General of Military Aviation. Born December
1884, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919;
instructor Military Staff College, 1922 ; Chief of Mobilization Section ; Com-
mander Infantry 1st Regiment; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer; Com-
mander 24th Infantry Brigade, 1934-35 ; Commander Gendarmerie Headquar-
ters and Chief Police Affairs Department of Kvv'antung Army, 1937; War Vice-
Minister, May 1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.
Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-
time cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.
An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by
Miss Kazuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs
who returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a
conservative among the members of the army cliaue."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 287
Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article
stated that he is a conservative.
George W. Bicknell,
Geokge W. Bickneix,
Lt. Colonel, C. S. C.
Asst. A. C. of 8., G-2,
Contact Officer.
Distribution G-2, Schofield Barracks (3 copies).
C/S H. H. D. G-1, H. H. D.
G-2, H. H. D. F. B. I., Honolulu.
G-2, H. A. F. O. N. I., Honululu (2 copies).
CONFIDENTIAL
D
Headquaktees CrBC
G-2 [CID]
Box 3, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
Private File — Lt. Col. B. M. Meurlott— No File Number
Akmy Contact Office,
Old Dillingham Bldg.,
Honolulu, T. H., 21 November 1941.
MEMORANDUM: Seisure and Detention Plan (Japanese).
1. It is quite possible that vpar may develop with Japan with or without a
formal declaration, in the near future. Advice of such action to the Hawaiian
Department, may be a single notification of the breaking off of relations between
Japan and the United States ; a declaration that the safety of the nation is
imperiled ; or definite instructions as to detailed action to be taken prior to such
formal declarations. It may take place before the promulgation of the Presi-
dential Proclamation, or it may not happen until such a final document has been
prepared and a copy furnished tins Headquarters.
2. In any event this question does involve the matter of policy to be adopted by
the Department Commander, and this outline of procedure is suggested to meet
these possible future requirements. They cannot be considered as either absolute
or final but simply as a guide to actions, any of which may be changed by the
then existing- conditions and factors.
3. The total number of alien Japanese and Japanese Nationals in the Terri-
tory of Hawaii registered in compliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940
is 41,346. American citizens, of Japanese ancestry, in the Territory on the same
date are estimated to be 123,410. It is obvious that it would be both impracticable
and ill advised to consider the question of seizure, detention, and possible intern-
ment of 37.3% of the total population of those islands, or even any sizeable pro-
portion thereof. For this reason the situation has been studied and broken down
into tlu-ee major plans ; known hereafter as Plan I, Plan II, and Plan III.
4. Plan I envisions the action necessary under conditions which would prevail
if war with Japan existed, or was indicated to be imminent, and which would
involve military action in the vicinity of Singapore, the Philippine Islands or
the Southwest Pacific area alone with no immediate threat toward the Hawaiian
Area.
5. Plan II considers the situation which would exist in a general Pacific war
with the United States fleet (or a considerable portion thereof) in Hawaiian
waters but with threats of surprise raids (by air or surface craft) against the
Hawaiian Islands.
6. Plan III considers a general Pacific war with the United States fleet absent
from the Hawaiian area land with the immediate threat of a large scale attack
upon the Hawaiian Islands.
288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. It is assumed, in the consideration of all these plans, that the exercise of
power of arrest, detention, and internment of alien enemies in the Hawaiian
Islands shall be under the jurisdiction of the Military Commander acting under
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. It is further
assumed that the Secretary of War, in carrying out such regulations, is author-
ized to use such agents, agencies, oflScers and departments of the United States
and of the territory and municipalities thereof as he may select for the purpose
and that they all are granted full authority for all acts done by them in carrying
out these regulations when acting by direction of the Secretary of War.
8. Full consideration has also been given to the established policy that all
enemy aliens will be enjoined to preserve the peace, to refrain from crimes
against the public safety, from violating the laws of the United States and the
Territory and to refi-ain from actual hostility or giving information, aid, or
comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply with regulations pro-
mulgated by the President ; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in
accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their
lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all law-abiding
persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection
and for the safety of the United States.
9. It must be understood that all lists of individuals which are mentioned
and referred to in these plans will be in a constant state of revision and review.
There may be additions made, names removed or transferred to lists of varying
priority as future investigations are made and further information received.
The lists quoted, at the time of the preparation of those plans, are based on
current information and the reports of subsequent investigations will cause
changes to be made at frequent intervals.
George W. Bicknell,"
Lt .Colonel, O. S. C,
Asst. A. C. of 8., G-2,
Contact OJficer.
CONFIDENTIAL
E
Headquaetees CPBC
G-2 [CID]
Box 3, APO ^56 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
File 336.8 — Activities of Foreigners in U. S. — Japanese — Bindei- #3: From
1 November 1941 to 31 January 1942
confidential
Headquaetees Hawaiian Depaetment
inteb-staff routing slip
The Inter-StafE Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Department Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff OflSce
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
289
No. of Ind. From and
Date
1st Ind. Contact O,
30 Jan. 42.
2d Ind.
ECH
G-2 FWD
1 Feb. 42.
To
G-2 F. E.
Contact officer.
Subject: M. A. Report entitled "Activ-
ities of Foreigners in Country, Mexico"
1. Tlie appended report is forwarded
for re-evaluation in the light of de-
velopments since December 6, 1941.
This matter formed the basis for
requests to Commanding Officers of
the outlying districts for close surveil-
lance of near oif-shore waters soon
after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
This is like a Rube Goldburg cartoon,
hence, is of interest to read. No par-
ticular significance. Believe informer
got a tip on pigmy submarine and let his
imagination run wUd. Navy does not
attach importance to theory. Search-
ing could have been continued to extent
of personnel available anyway. Return
for file after anyone interested has read it.
Noted— THD "
G. \V. B.
T. H. D.
(Page 92 of Exhibit 2 is a routing slip of Latin American Section,
Military Intelligence Division, War Department dated June 30, 1941,
which will be found reproduced as Item No. 9, EXHIBITS-ILLUS-
TEATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found
bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investi-
gation.)
79716
Classification : Confidential.
Enclosures : 1
Copy No. &-5G
Military Intelligence Division
Wae Department General Staff
Military Attach^ Report — Mexico
Source and Degree of Reliability : As stated : I. G. No. 5940.
Source and Degree of Reliability : As stated :
1. The following information was received from the same source who has, from
time to time, submitted information of a startling and fantastic nature, and
which has seldom been proved to be reliable :
"Gentlemen : Related with my recent report on activities at Honolulu
Pearl Hai'bor Hawaii Naval Base and the use of the word Molokai I have
run across the following vital information bearing on that subject and re-
lated features. From different contacts and two especially one being the
Naval I. S. agent Wagner Schioferle, who has recently been here from
Managua Nicaragua, I am glad to be able to hand you two rough pencil
drawings with inserted explanatory data of a new type of light draft short
radius submarine that is now being built in quantities at the Japanese Navy
shipyards at Japan.
"This submarine has a surface displacement of only 350 tons, carries
four torpedo tubes has a maximum radius of action of 600 miles and carries
a crew of ten men. This submarine is fitted with German N. A. M. engines
made in Augsberg, Germany and shipped direct to Siberia on the Trans-
siberian Railroad and from there to Japan.
"Actual time of construction to build one of these small submarines is 5
months and their mission is what I find is as follows :
"These subs are so fitted with remote control electric magnetically actua-
ated diving valves and air valves that they are susceptible of being operated
from small 3 centimeter lead covered under water cables attached to the
deck of said submarine and extended in the water along the floor of the
beach to the shore line at which point you will observe from my rough
79716— 46— Ex. 148-
-20
290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
drawings as near as I can remember all the details of the different attach-
ments tliat the submarine can be made to rise and sink simply by operating
magnetic electric valves in the inside of the submarine by the mere opening
and closing of the electric control circuits, the vpires of which run to the
shore and are concealed under the surface of the water.
"The only object of being outfitted with this remote control system of
diving and elevating mechanism without requiring any man being on board
is to slowly bring into the region of this Molokai Island in the Hawaiis at
which point the American government have established a large Leper
Colony for people afflicted with Leprosy. These small subs it is planned to
bring on to the number of about 12. Then they will be conveniently sunk
in the shallow waters surrounding this Island in depths not to exceed 40
feet of water. Procedure so far followed in test experiments show that
these subs can be sunk and will remain under water for perhaps of as long
as 30 days without being compelled to raise them for charging of batteries.
"Plan consists in arriving at point of submergence where the exact depth
of water is tested with a depth indicator on board. All men ai*e removed
from the interior of the ship the conning tower door is clamped down tight
to prevent the entrance of water then the Three outer control cables are
unwound and attached to the connection on deck after which a small boat
carried on board leaves for the shore carefully unreeling these three cables
until the Low Tide water level at shore is reached at which point the cables
are tied down to the shore or else buried under the sand.
"All crew members of the submarine are then removed to shore in this
rubber boat the submarine having been anchored fore and aft with light
weight anchors to prevent it from drifting. Crew which is Japanese goes
ashore and ai'e met there or along side the craft by Japanese sampan Fishing
vessels that take them to the other Islands where there are large colonies
of Japanese working in the sugar fields and pine apple plantations and there
are definitely absorbed with no chance of possible detection.
"Before crew is taken on board other vessels or given refuge in the other
islands the control cable running ashore that controls the magnetic diving
valve is made to charged using the direct current from the submarines stored
batteries the circuit is closed stored valves inside the submarine respond to
the flow of current coming from the Control Cable ashore the sinking tank
start to fill with water and the submarines sink in a very few minutes.
[Handwritten : "If and when war comes between Germany and the U — S —
or Japan and the U — S — the plan is to at once use this small fleet of sub-
marines for lightning attacks on the U — S — Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl
Harbor." !
"After once sinking this submarine can remain sunken on the ocean floor
for 30 days. In the meantime, another cable shown on my drawing con-
taining six wires and also anchored at the shore has a very ingenious air
pressure gauge for indicating the air pressure of the air contained in the
submarine tanks \vith a scale of I think five pressures so that if, for any rea-
son this air pressure in the sub tanks leaks out or suffers any drop in pres-
sure which would render the next raising of the submarine impossible the
Japanese spies who are charged with the supervision of this submerged
submarine fleet and working unobtrusively in their sampan vessels makes
trips from time to time to check the air pressure in these tanks by simply
uncovering this electric air pressure gauge and taking note of tLie reading.
"I also invite your attention to the existence of a special flve Centimeter
steel reinforced rubber hose all coiled and tied down to the deck of the
submarine with its corresponding wooden float or buoy. This hose is at-
tached to the main air tanks through the medium of the pipe attachment on
deck. In case then if the gauge on shore indicates that the Submarine is
losing pressure the word is given to bring in at night one of the aforesaid
fishing craft run by the Japanese and which you will find is provided with a
modern High Pressure Air Compressor specially provided to recharge these
tanks in case of exhaustion. On board this simple fishing craft there is
equipment for a deep sea diver who can descend at once to the deck of the
submarine, untie rubber hose and its wooden float and the hose rises at once
to the .surface due to the action of this float. After the hose is on the surface
of the water the small fishing vessel at once makes attachment to it and the
air in the submarine tank is immediately recharged. It takes 35 minutes
to recharge these tanks using this fishing vessel.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 291
"After tanks are fully charged the air compressor still continues to charge
the tanks inside ; however, the use of a Safety Valve Inside the suhmarine
to pi'event excess air pressure from bursting the tanks starts to function and
this excess air is accordingly blown out inside the interior of the submarine.
This continues until the air pressure inside the submarine is slightly in
excess of the pressure of the water surrounding the submarine at which time
it starts to purge and finds its escape through the XiOW Pressure Purge Valve
that I have indicated on my pencil drawing.
"This performs the function of driving out the foul air in the sub and
prevents corrosion due to the foul gas that comes from the submarine's
electric storage batteries. At the time of wishing to cause this sub to rise
the operation is very simple consisting simply in training one man to close
the shore cable circuit this causing the air to be admitted to the diving tanks,
the water is immediately expelled and the sub comes to the surface without
any other manipulation.
"Going back to the primary function of this submarine fleet I find that
about 10 of these small craft will be brought in to the vicinity of these
Hawaiian Islands sunken and the crew members secreted ashore. If and
when war comes between Germany and the United States or Japan and the
United States the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for
lightning attack on the United States Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor.
"Both high commands feel that a surprise attack of this kind would cause
the loss of all United States Airplane Carriers which is the principal objec-
tive of the Japanese High Command.
"Due to the fact that these small subs have such small cruising radius
it has been necessary for them to be towed and I find that the Japanese
tanker called Ken wo Maru conducted an experiment recently on her way
to Los Angeles, California, by taking one of those small subs from the
Marshall Islands to a base where a base has been established to the vicinity
of the Hawaiian Islands at which point those subs were again taken back
to the Marshall Islands in tow by another Japanese tanker for the object
of giving the members of the sub crew experience in' the deep sea towing of
these vessels; also the tanker accompanying these sub supplies them with
fuel for the expenditure of the fuel that they have to take for battery charg-
ing and the operations of their propulsions, appears during the day when
practically all navigation is done under water to prevent any detection by
other vessels of the fact that these subs are being towed by this tanker.
"I repeat a base is now established at the Marshall Islands and this sub-
marine fleet will slowly be increased until such time as at least 11 or more
of these small crafts are safely sunk near Pearl Harbor.
"I will have more this next week on further use of these small units. I
beg to remain,
"Sincerely,
"Yours truly,
2. On June 15, the following further information was received by the same
source.
"Gentlemen:
"Confirmatory to telephonic advices given to Sr. D M at his residence at
1 : 25 a. m., yesterday morning I wish to inform that I secured data just a
short time before to the effect that 3 under sea boats dealth with in my last
letter have been brought in and sunk either with the object of making tests
or for the purpose of starting a definite establishment of a group of these boats
off the coast of Molokai Island.
"Information here indicated in a vague way that these subs were suc-
cessfully sunk and that definite locations have been found on shore line for
these boats but information is not entirely clear as to whether ships have
been submerged permanently or just by way of experimental test. More data
will be prepared.
"Respectfully,
"Yours truly.
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Handwritten: "From:]M. A. Mexico City Report No. 9899 June 17, 1941."]
3. The military att:\cli4 is unable to place an evaluation on this information.
It was obtained by Mr. Lockett, commercial attache of this Embassy, by Senor
Villaseuor, President of the Banic of Mexico, who during the Cardenas regime
was sub-Secretary of Recferio. It was given Senor Villasenor by one of his
agents. Numerous requests have been made for information regarding the identity
of the agent and circumstances connected with his reports, but Sr. Villaseiior
refuses to divulge with it. For this reason no evaluation is attempted.
The agent is believed sincere and he reports what he gathers from subversive
individuals. Tlrese individuals may or may not be telling the truth. Their pur-
pose may be propaganda or a form of war of nerves, or it may contain an element
of fact.
On account of the serious nature of the information, it is submitted without
other comment. The Navy Department may be able to determine the practi-
cality of this scheme, and if it warrants investigation. If it can be used in
Hawaii, it can be used in Santiago, Panama, and other Naval bases. A copy
of the information quoted above has been given the oflice of the Naval Attach^ in
this Embassy.
Gordon R. •
G-2 Distribution : 4, ONI.
Classification : Confidential.
From : M. W. Mexico City.
Report No. 2899.
June 17, 1941.
Colonel Q. S. G.
Military attache.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP
The Inter-StafE Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental
Staff Inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the ex-
ception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st indirsement list
accompany papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsemicnt. Indorsements hereon will
be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer author-
ized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. from and Date
To
Subject: Japanese Residents of T. H.—
Loyalty of— ONI Report
Istlnd. Cont. 0. 3Feb.42_.
2nd Ind. G-2 RE 4 Feb. 42_
G-2
CO
Forwarded for your information. (1 Ind:
ONI Report dated 1/26/42, above Subject).
Noted
B. G. W. B.
K.J. F.
Form NNl-119 745-C— S/M Base. PH.— 11-16-41— 6M.
United States Naval Intelligence Service
investigation report
€on1idential
Date : 26 Jan. 1942
Subject: JAPANESE RESIDENTS OF T. H.— LOYALTY OF
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H.
Report made by: C. B. Baldwin, Lt., I-V (S), USNR; R. W. Breed, End., I-V
(S), USNR.
USNR.
Period covered : 16 Dec, 1941 ; 26 Jan., 1942.
Status of Case : Closed.
Origin of Case : Fourteenth Naval District.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 293
Character of Investigation : Report on specific incident as illustrative of Subject.
Enclosures : None.
Copy to:
ONI (2) 13ND (2)
CincPac (2) 14ND (2) -
Coml4 (2) MID-HD (2)
IIND (2) BIO-Kauai (1)
12ND (2) FBI-Hon (2)
Source File No. : 14ND #1798.
ONI File No. :
SYNOPSIS : Report predicated upon Japanese plane crash on 7 December,
1941, and events subsequent thereto, on Island of Niihau, T. H. Niihau is one
of smallest Hawaiian Islands, its meager population consisting mostly of
Hawaiians and a few Japanese engaged in cattle raising, and communications
with other islands are nil except by boat. Thus the residents of Niihau had no
cognizance of the Japanese attack, or its extent and elTect, until several days
after it took place. Pilot of this plane survived and was taken prisoner by local
Hawiians, who confiscated his sidearm and flight papers. Among guards of the
aviator were an American-born Japanese named Harada and an alien Japanese
named Shintani, neither of whom had ever been considered disloyal to the United
States. Shintani attempted unsuccessfully to secure possession of the pilot's
papers by bribery, stating it was a matter of life and death, and that Japan had
forced him to take this action. Shintani, however, later repented and re-joined
the Hawaiians. With the aid of Harada, the pilot recovered his pistol and a
shotgun, set up two machine guns from his plane, and dominated the island.
Pilot was finally killed by an audacios Hawiian couple, and Harada committed
suicide. Shintani is now in custodial detention.
DEDUCTIONS : The fact tliat the two Niihau Japanese who had previously
shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of pilot when Japanese
domination of the island seemed possible, indicates likelihood that Japanese
residents previously believed loyal to the United States, may aid Japan if further
Japanese attacks appear successful.
CLOSED.
RWB/zw
Approved :
Mayfield,
Captain, U. 8. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.
Confidential
26 January, 1942.
Subject : Japanese residents of T. H.^ — Loyalty of.
On Sunday, 7 December, 1941, a Japanese fighter plane crashed on the island
of Niihau, T. H. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was seized by the local
Hawaiians and his pistol and papers were taken from him. He surrendered and
at first was peacable and friendly, speaking English fluently. At the time ot
the landing, SHINTANI, a Japanese alien resident on Niihau, held a brief con-
versation in Japanese with the pilot, the subject of which was not understood
by the Hawaiians. SHINTANI had at this time no record of any subversive
activities or tendencies.
Niihau is one of the smaller islands, being seventh in size in the Hawaiian
group, and its meager population consists mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japa-
nese. The people of Niihau have very few weapons, and had no means of com-
munication, by radio or otherwise, with the Mainland or the other islands during
the week from 7 December, 1941, to 14 December, 1941, which is the period to
which this report pertains. Thus it is conceivable that the presence of the
Japanese plane gave the inhabitants the impression that the other islands of
the Hawaiian group had been invaded and captured by the Japanese ; and the
actions of the inhabitants with respect to the enemy pilot may be noted in the
light of such possible belief, which ahso may have been fostered I\v the pilot.
The aviator was kept under guard pending his dispatch to Kauai, nearest of
the more important islands. When, on Wednesday, 10 December, the islanders
found themselves unable to send the pilot to Kauai, due to the failure of a
motor launch to arrive at Niihau, the aviator was quartered at the home of
YOSHI HARADA, American of Japanese descent. Several Hawaiians remained
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to keep guard at the house of HARADA, who up to this time had shown no sign
of disloyalty and took his regular turn at guarding the pilot.
On Thursday, 11 December, HARADA sent a messenger to SHINTANI to come
and assist him in guarding the pilot, stating that he, HARADA, did not desire
the responsibility of being the only Japanese in charge of the pilot. SHINTANI
replied that he would join HARADA on the following day, Friday. He did so,
and a conversation in Japanese was held between HARADA, SHINTANI, and
the pilot. The nature of the conversation is unknown.
On the afternoon of this same day, Friday, 12 December, SHINTANI at-
tempted to secure the pilot's papers and pistol from the Hawaiian who had
possession of them, by offering the Hawaiian a bribe of two hundred dollars.
SHINTANI said excitedly, in the course of the attempted bribery, that it was
a matter of life and death and that Japan had forced him to take this action.
The attempt at bribery failed, and SHINTANI took no further action on the
pilot's behalf. SHINTANI has since been placed in custody, however.
On the same afternoon, HARADA and the pilot succeeded in obtaining
HARADA's shotgun from a building near HARADA's house. With the shotgun,
the pilot captured the Hawaiian guard and locked him in a warehouse. About
1730 that afternoon HARADA and the pilot broke into the house of the Hawaiian
v^ho had custody of the pilot's papers and pistol. HARADA was carrying the
shotgun and covering a Hawaiian prisoner at the time. The pilot recovered
only his pistol at this time. The owner of the house had been in hiding during
the burglary ; and, after the Japanese left, he removed the papers and secreted
them elsewhere, after which he warned the community of the pilot's escape.
The pilot and HARADA then secured two machine guns from the plane and
set them up in the village. HARADA, brandishing a gun, seized a wagon and
horses from some Hawaiians and forced a captive to load machine-gun cart-
ridges from the plane into the wagon. HARADA told a Hawaiian that the
cartridges were enough to kill off every man, woman, and child on the island.
That night HARADA and the pilot broke into SHINTANI's house in search
of the flight papers. They failed to find tliem and became furious; and later,
when they saw SHINTANI in the village, they pursued him, but he escaped and
joined the Hawaiians, who had scattered to the maintains and beaches. There-
upon the pilot and HARADA took as prisoners the few Hawaiians who happened
to be in the village at the time, and bound them.
About midnight the pilot attempted to send a radio message from his plane in
Japane.se. A few Hawaiians heard him, although they did not understand the
message; and the residents, now assuming that a war must be going on, were
alarmed at the thought that the pilot had sent for aid from the enemy. While
the pilot and HARADA were absent from the wagon containing ammunition, the
Hawaiians recovered the machine-gun bullets and secreted them. At 3 : 00 a. m.
on 13 December, the aviator burned his plane and the House of the Hawaiian
who had custody of the papers. However, the Hawaiians had already sent the
pilot's papers to Kauai, via a small boat, under cover of darkness. The pilot
and HARADA told the Hawaiian prisoners that they would be released if they
disclosed the location of the papers.
On 13 December an audacious Hawaiian couple succeeded in killing the pilot,
whereupon HARADA committed suicide. Both men were buried at Niihau. An
expedition squad of twelve armed soldiers arrived from Kauaii at 13.50 that day.
having been apprised of he situation by the Hawaiians arriving in the small boat
which had left Niihau with the pilot's papers the night before.
CONCLUSIONS : It is worthy of note that neither SHINTANI nor HARADA
had previously exhibited un-American tendencies, livmg docilely so long as the
Amei'ican Government was the established one. Attention is also invited to the
fact that the Island of Niihau was isolated as to communication, so it is conceivable
that the presence of the Japanese plane induced a belief among the residents that
the Hawaiian Islands were under Japanese domination ; and the residents were in
fact alarmed about the possibility of further Japanese aid for the pilot. These
facts indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory
of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent, who previously have shown no anti-
American tendencies and are apparently loyal to the United States, may give valu-
able aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of
Japan and where it appears to the residents that control of the district may shift
from the United States to Japan.
CLOSED.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 295
CONFIDENTIAL
EHG/td
Headquarters Second Corps Area
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.,
Governors Island, New York, November 28, JD'/l.
Subject: GEORGE PAISH (PAISN).
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarter Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5,
1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this oflBce by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.
2. This is transmitted for your information and records.
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2 :
F. J. Pearson,
F. J. Pearson.
Lt. Col, O. 8. C,
Executive Officer, 0-2.
1 Tncl — (dupli) cpy FBI rept.
[Penned notation: 336.8 — Japanese.]
confidential
Copy of FBI Report
An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact MR. PAISN at the
address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned
from his dau?hter-in-law, MRS. DONALD C. PAISN, that his true name is
SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road,
Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that
address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was inter-
viewed, at which time he furnished the following information :
SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture
tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks'
stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining
to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world
trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world
peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and
the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was
taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank,
whose name at this time he could not recall. Lie attributed great significance to
the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and
a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire
Goddess" danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.
SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and
during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any
spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that
the Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possi-
bility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the
United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all
pray to a Japanese promise of "liberation".
SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be
inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing
upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a
bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garri-
sons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular indi-
viduals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President
it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had
arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to
America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now
considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States
State Department.
SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of
Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's Un-
limited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his
publications and ability as a lecturer.
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK '
It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a cliarmlng
conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that
he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to
pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.
I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.
CONFIDENTIAI.
F
Headquaetees CPBC
G-2 [CID]
Box 3, APO J/oG — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
336. 2 — Foreign Armies
confidentiai,
War Depabtment,
M. I. D.,
18 August Wffl.
Subject : FRENCH INDOCHINA.
Summary of Information :
Following information received:
" reports July 25th.
A. July ISth 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.
B. July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK ITA) commander-in
chief Formosan army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived
Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers.
V. On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st air reconnaissance car-
ried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft.
D. July 20th (me cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and
four repeat four transports packed with troops arrived CAMRANH BAY.
Message ends."
Distribution :
Evaluation
-of source -of information
X Reliable X
confidential
Wab Department,*
M. I. D.,
18 August 19^1
Subject : FORMOSA.
Summary of Information :
Following information received:
*'A. June Ki 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for para-
chute training and on June ISth 200 paratroops were transferred from KOGO
to ROKKO.
B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.
C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained."
[Penned notation: 33G.2 — Foreign Armies.]
Distribution :
Evaluation
-of source -of information
X Eel i able X
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 297
CONFIDENTIAI.
G
Headquaetees CPBC
GX2 [CID]
Box 3, AI'O JfiiG — c/o ro.stmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
350.05 — Foreign Intelligence — General Reports No's 1 to 34
Classification : Confidential.
MiOTARY Intelligence Division
Wae Dhpaktment Genekal Staff
MiLiTAKY Attach^ Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : JAPAN, MILITARY AGENTS.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
Source : B. F. See separate communication.
Believed reliable, except as indicated.
Summarization of Report
When required :
1. Japane.se agents and military activities abroad. (5935)
2. German agents and advisers in Japan. (5940)
3. German raiders. (7020)
1. (G935) JAPANESE AGENTS AND ACTIVITIES ABUOAD
a. Military attache to Rio de Janeiro. On 12 September it was reported that
Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of the Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai
had been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro, in wliich capacity he
will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.
6. Suspected arjent in Netherlands East Indies. In October the Japanese po-
litical agent OKANO TETSUO returned to N. E. I. on the KT ANO MARU.
Having lived in N. E. I. since 1915, OKANO possessed a settlement permit and
did not need a visa. According to a police report OKANO was employed by a
high .lapanese official during his stay in Japan. During his former stay in
N. E. I. OKANO was in close contact with many suspected Japanese.
c. Code expert to N. E. I. Reported in September that Japanese courier,
NOMOTO TATSUO, would be attached to Consulate at Batavia for two months
after his return from Singapore. Consul General ISHIZAWA said he was
a cipher expert attached to give instructions on use of new complicated Japanese
code. NOMOTO toJd immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at
various Japanese consulates. KAWASAKI YOSHIAKI aLso a code expert in
service of Japanese Navy. He is registered as a secretary to Consulate General ;
sailed from Japan 11 September. (Reliability excellent.)
d. Japanese and German inteUigence in H. E. Asia. On 12th September it
was reported that German and Japanese S. I. S. reached an agreement whereby
the Germans will operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Jap-
anese except Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, N. E. I., and the Philippines, which are
operated by the Japanese. In spite rif this agreement, Gprmans intend to
operate in all far eastern countries under cover of the D. N. B. In Indo-China
the D. N. B. and Domei will operate private W. T. stations ! In Shanghai the
Germans are operating Gestapo type of organization for political information.
(Fairly reliable.)
c. Japanese Recruit ing Chinese Agents. In September, the head of a depart-
ment in the Nanking War Ministry reported having been approached secretly by
General Ochita HATA, who requested his cooperation in enlisting Chinese agents
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
for work in Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates
should be either pure Fukinese or Chinese speaking the dialect of that province.
Source stated that a certain number of men were recruited and dispatched over-
seas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated Cliinese. Those
chosen in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained through service
with Chinese troops. CHEN KUANG was said to be responsible directly to
Japanese Military H. Q. at Nanking. (Reliability fair.)
2. (5940) GERMAN AGENTS AND ADVISEES IN JAPAN
a German advisers. (Dated 7 October 1941)
(1) KURE, 5 working in shell factory and 4 in shipbuilding yard.
(2) yOKOSUKA, 18 working in munitions factory, 26 in shipyard, 6 at
aerodrome.
(3) MAIZURU, 5 working on A. R. P. (air raid protection).
(4) TOTSUKA, 18 aviation and parachute instructors, 2 constructiona)
engineers.
(5) SHIPUAKA, 8 working on aerodrome.
(6) NAKAMITA, 10 working at aerodrome.
(7) NAGOYA, 4 working at Aichi aircraft factory.
(8) HIMEJI, 5 working at chemical warfare factory.
(9) Thi-ee Germans, living at OSAKA, pay periodic visits to Nankai Heavy
Industries Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.
(10) Source was told that 125 Germans, en route for Japan, were detained
by U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
(11) Soui'ce also told that 11 German aviation and parachute instructors
were stationed at Nanking, and a total of 84 were attached to
Japanese forces at Shanghai, Hankow, and Nanchang. (Numbers
given with reserve.)
(12) Movement of 30 German personnel from Japan to Indo-China was
previously noted.
6. Actknties of Oerman agents. Information from a German source, reported
to have good connections in Japan, states : —
(1) German ambassador in Tokyo is concentrating (a) on breaking down
democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the
heads of the Japanese Fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America ;
(b) on destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented
the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis, and Right army groups into a united
front; and (c) encouraging higher ofiicers in the KWANTUNG and KOREAN
armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern
Soviet Army.
(2) German ambassador has considerable influence over General SENJURO
HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA, Colonel HA-
SHIMOTO, and among such civilians as SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU TOYAMA,
and KENSO ADACHI. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General
SUGIYAMA.
(3) In KOREAN and KWANTUNG forces, the following are known to be in-
fluenced by the German ambassador : Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI,
Major-General MITSUNAMI, and Lt.-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated
to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in the Far
East on the basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America
or U. S. S. R. government resulting in a guarantee of the inviolability of Soviet
Far Eastern frontiers and, in consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby
the Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from
the East. (Moderately reliable.)
c. Agent obtaining raw materials for Germany. Head of OTTO WOLFF
informed source that, acting under instructions from Hamburg headquarters, he
was buying up materials of which Germany is or will be in great need, such as
wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular they are interested in the purchase of
supplies of these in Slam, where it is proposed that they shall be stored under
innocuous names until such time as they can be delivered to Germany. (Re-
liability believed good ; dated 6 October 1941).
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 299
3. (702 0) GERMAN KAIDEKS
It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North
China to proceed to Japan under Japanese flag. They will he armed to operate
against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok. (Reliability uncertain;
dated 10 October 1941.)
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to
ONI
FBI
Classification : Confidential.
Report No. 25.
Date : 18 November 1941.
[Penned notation: 350.05. Info on foreign countries.]
Ofissification : Confidential.
Enclosures: No.
Military Intelligence Division
Wae Department General Staff
Military Attach^ Report
EEPOETED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject: JAPAN, Aerodi-omes and Aircraft (Continued).
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Source : Various observers.
Reliability : Good unless otherwise indicated.
Summarization of Report When Required :
Continuation of G-2, Haw'n. Dept. Report No. 13, 29 Sept. 1941.
1. (9185) Aerodromes.
2. (9505) Aircraft factories.
3. (9570) Types of aircraft.
1. (9185) AERODROMES IN JAPAN
a. KASUMIGAURA aerodrome, located on shore close to western corner of
LAKE KASUMIGAURA, east of and adjacent to AMI village. Lat. 36° 02' N,
Long. 140° 14' E. Roughly rectangular, total area, inclusive of buildings, about
1200 X 2000 yards. Source informed that south edge of landing field has been
extended about 300 yards. Surface sanTl and grass. On east side 26 buildings
provide accommodation for headquarters, oflSces, barracks. These are two story
buildings painted in camouflage patches of brown and green. Two steel hangars
with workshops, about 200 by 90 feet high, on north edge. Source told that air-
craft were stored in three layers in these hangars. New, large, circular hangar,
about 250 yards in diameter was completed at end of 1939, in southeast corner.
This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above ground at its highest point and
is believed to extend some distance below ground level. It is built of reinforced
concrete, covered with earth and grass. There are 8 doors to this hangar. The
W/T station is situafed on the south edge. Seaplane and flying boat facilities
are believed provided by two hangars on north edge. A number of mooring
buoys were seen off shore. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on
water's edge, north of aerodi'ome. Source was informed that there is an aviation
school here with 600 students. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed
here. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge.
Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but it A^-^as
believed that this large number was being tested out as to suitability and only a
small proportion would be retained for training. Ten Germans were attached to
this aerodrome and to the neighboring UDA aircraft factory. Source saw about
20 aircraft along south edge, including 6 or 7 Messerschmitts Me 110.
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. SUNOSAKI (IGD EAB) naval aerodrome and seaplane base, 45° 58' N.,
139° 4!)' E., (j km. east of promontory of same name and 4 km. west of town
of .lOJE (VHA HAL). Area about 100 acres. Possibly identical with TATE-
YAMA aerodrome.
c. FUNAHASHI (OJL HOP) Military aerodrome, 35° 42' N., 139° 5G' E.,
west of and adjacent to railway station of same name. Area about 1C6 acres.
Four hangars, also barracks. 300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army head-
quarters uudergoing training here under German supervision. Source states
"there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians attached."
Perhaps identical with SHINOSAKI aerodrome.
d. AKITSU (LTA IPX) military aerodrome, 35° 49' N., 139° 29' E., one and
a half km. north of railway station of same name. Area about 170 acres. Total
of 3,000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion are believed
to be paratroops being trained by German instructors. Perhaps identical with
SAYAMA aerodrome.
e. SHINAGAWA (RGU ECB) aerodrome and scaplne base, approx. 35° 38' N.,
139° 44' 30" E., one and a half km. southeast of railway station of same name.
Area about 80 acres. Possibly identical with SHIBATA aerodrome.
f. YOKAIDO (BYO, PON, SIR) military aerodrome, 35° 40' N., 140° '09' E.,
one km. northwest of railway station of same name. Area 75 acres.
g. MIO (AAF AHU) military aerodrome, 35° 00' N., 38° 31' E. ; small number
of paratroops from SHIDZUOKA military formations are under training here.
h. SUMA (UHN LIL) naval aerodrome, still under construction, about 5 km.
west of KOBE. Area about 325 acres.
i. KANOYA (UZH DUW) military aerodrome, 31° 25' N, 130° 51' E., locally
known as KASANOHARA (MEN TAK AYO) aerodrome; area about 325 acres.
Parachute unit being trained by German insti'uctors. Aircraft factory in vi-
cinity employing several thousand workmen. Possibly identical with KANOYA
naval aerodrome.
j. TSUDANUMA (IFX, JYS, lEC) military aerodrome, area 75 acres; para-
troops of first division under training here.
k. YOKAICHI (BYO, GAZ, ECK) military aerodrome, locally known as
KAWAI (ECB, BAG) aerodrome, area 125 acres.
1. OKAYAMA aerodrome has underground hangars similar in construction to
that of KASUMIGAURA aerodrome (a, above), with capacity for 50 aircraft.
m. New aerodrome has been constructed at TOKO. This is said to be the
largest in Japan.
2. (95 05) AIECEAFT FACTORIES
a. UDA (NYI JYS) aircraft factory, located 3 km. south of KASUMIGAURA
aerodrome (see 1. a.), 35°59' N., 140°14' E. (Note: this disagrees with another
report which states that it is in TOKYO, but KASUMIGAURA might loosely
be called "near Tokyo".) This factory has been producing aircraft for the past
3 years, Labor force, 3,500. Production: 45 aircraft a month. (It is believed
that this factory is used only for assembling aircraft.) The German INIesser-
schmidt Me 110 is under production her$. On 20 May, source saiv 6 or 7 Messer-
schmidts on the adjacent KASUMIGAURA aerodrome.
b. HANEDA (NYI, JYS) aircraft factory, Tokyo, recently has produced 100
Italian 3-engine midwing monoplane bombers. These aircraft have been delivered
to army and have been seen in the air over Tokyo. (Note: Source gave above
characters for name of factory, but gave romanization as UDA, characters for
this are (UCO, JYS) which resemble those given by him.)
3. (9570) AIRCRAFT ^
a. On 28 May, at a naval air demonstration at MTSAKI near YOKOHAMA,
source saw two 3-engine monoplanes and 18 twin-engine monoplanes. The three-
engine aircraft were Italian "Piaggio P. XI. RC 40" bombers, manufactured in
Japan. Engines are 14 cylinder, 1000 horsepower. Load capacity : 4,200 kilo-
grammes. Camouflage on under wings was light blue, gray and pale green in
large irregular patches. It has been suggested that these aircraft were so-named
because they are fitted with Italian engines. The twin-engine aircraft were
German Messerschmidt Me 110 fighters, manufactured in the UDA factory.
These aircraft gave a demontration of low level dive bombing. Source noted
that both these types of aircraft had single rudders, and stuck to this statement
even when shown pictures in Jane's. Both these types of aircraft are based on
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 301
the SUNOSAKI naval aerodi'ome, near tlie promontory of the same name on the
southwest tip of CHIBA peninsula.
b. Under the supervision of German engineers, the SHIBATA aircraft factory
has produced a 2-engine monoplane fighter. Armament : 2 fixed machine guns
(cannon guns?) and 4 movable machine guns. Tests have proved very satis-
factory. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as the
"16th Year of Showa" (1941) type. (Casual observation, without definite
reliability.)
c. A new type of high altitude bomber, built in Germany, has been reported in
South China area. Described as Heinkel-land (IHA OMR GYH OYK) type 98.
Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.
4. (9905) AIECEAFT MOVEMENT
On 25 August, 22 twin-engine bombers, commanded by Colonel MORIYAMA
(HDU DYA) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome (HAINAN ISLAND) from
Formosa. They are stated to be dive bombers, but this is to be accepted with
reserve. According to air force gossip, it has been decided that with the advent
of foggy season at CHUNGKING aircraft at HANKOW will be transferred to
the southern area and that after September 500 bombers are to be based in
Indo China.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, G. 8. C,
A. C. of 8., G-2.
Report No. 23.
Date: 3 November 1941.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to :
HAF
ONI
FBI
Classification : Confidential.
L-^enned notation: 350.05 — Info, on foreign countries.]
Classification : Confidential.
Military Intelligence Division
War Department General Staff
Military Attache Report
reported by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject: JAPAN.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Source : Businessman, resident of Japan.
Reliability : Believed good.
Summarization of Report, When Required :
Foreign relations ; raw materials and manufacture ; war morale of civil
population ; troop mobilization ; troop embarkation points ; airports ;
anti-aircraft ; para-troops.
1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS. The Italian influence in Japan is negli-
gible; the German very strong. There are several thousand German citizens in
Japan and many are giving their technical services to the army and bringing
strong political pressure to bear on the government. German successes or defeats
in Russia have a marked effect upon political negotiations now going on between
America and Japan. A Russian collapse may precipitate a Japanese move against
Siberia. The Japanese desire not only to remove the threat of Vladivostock, but
to occupy all of the Maritime Provinces. There seems to be doubt in Japanese
minds as to whether or not the U. S. fleet would oppose them in the Pacific if
they move against the Soviets. Their aggression will continue unless the U. S.
makes up its mind to fight. Meantime, while the Japanese people are going
through many hardships with unquestioning loyalty, the war machine is not
breaking down, their war industries are becoming adjusted to the blockade, and
their navy being augmented. Apart from Japan's determination to liquidate
the China affair, they are prepared to take advantage of any weakness that may
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
encourage them to move either north or south. The fact that their plans for
expansion are boundless is a realitj' and not an idle dream. The uiililary still
believe that the Germans can win, and that between them they can cause the
collapse of the Soviets. A lining up of their armies, supplies, etc. will prove fatal
to the cause of the democracies.
2. (4000) ECONOMIC.
a. (4020) NutionuL Mobilization is at its maximum and fully supported by the
entire nation. Children from the age of 14 up to old men and women of sixty
are engaged in munitions in defense industries. The war program has the full
support of the people despite their many sacrifices.
b. (4115) Oil and Gasoline. There is an extensive storage of gasoline, under
rows of temporay wooden buildings," at YOKOHAMA, at the west end of the
harbor, near the Yokohama Yacht Club. At TSURUMI, across the harbor from
Yokohama, there are Japanese oil installations, next to those of the Rising Sun
and Standard Oil Company. •
c. (4120) Iron Ore. Large, high grade deposits of iron ore have been uncovered
in Manchukuo, making possible delivery to army and navy of important supplies
of special high grade steel (see 4310, below. ) . The ore itself runs to 54 '/o pure iron,
producing 99.47fi sponge steel. It is claimed that 100,000,000 tons of ore are near
the surface, with at least 200,000,000 tons lying below the surface. The mine is
located a short distance east of MUKDEN, with a broad guage railroad leading
to the main line between MUKDEN and DAIREN. Large stocks of crushed ore
already have been stored at the steel workrs and they are being augmented
steadily.
d. (4120) Tungsten. Japan is said to be obtaining tungsten and other special
metals required in the manufacture of high test steel, from North China and
Korea. Source believes that it would be a great mistake to underestimate Japa-
nese capacity to mobilize in the future vast stocks of such raw materials for
war purposes.
e. (4200) Rice. The domestic Japanese rice crop this year is estimated to
be 10% below normal. However, this shortage will be made up and excessed by
supplies from Indo-(jhina. Only the shortage of shipping bottoms can possibly
interfere with adequate rice supplied for the Japanese populace and army.
f. (4240) Rubber. Up until recent months there has been a severe shortage
of rubber, but this gradually is being relieved since Japan's occupation of Indo-
Cbina. Now sufficient supplies are being received to care for military requirements.
g. (4240> Lamp black. There is a severe shortage of lamp black. Japan
urgently requires 9,000 tons for their tire industry. This Is being partially met
by a very limited domestic production.
h. (4300) Manufactures, yenernl. S. K. ¥. have for some years supplied Japan
with major ball bearing requirements. These supplies have been stopped com-
pletely since the Soviet-German war interrupted rail shipments across Siberia.
Despite the production of high grade steel in Manchukuo, Japan does not have
facilities for manufacturing ball bearings, and unquestionably they are facing a
serious shortage. Japan has been dependent on foreign equipment for their heavy
industries, but they are working on a comprehensive plan to switch over from
light to heavy industries. Sufficient time will enable them to realize this pro-
gram. They are also concentrating on the tool industry to become independent
of foreign countries. At TOTSUKA station, near YAKOSUKA naval base, there
are several large, three-storied, wooden military establishments for manufactur-
ing light military equipment, such as clothes, belts, etc. There are two plants ad-
joining the Bridgestone tire plant at KURUME, Kyushu (see 4360) and a large
one on the rail line at FUKUOKA, all supplying various military supplies to the
army, such as shoes, clothing, helmets, etc.
i. (4310) Manufacture, iron and steel.
(1) In JAPAN proper, the great iron and steel foundries are located at
KOHUKA on the railway rumiing between JOJI and FUKUOKA. They cover a
narrow area nine miles long, riming parallel to the railroad. This is the heart
of Jajian's iron and steel industi-y, and if destroyed would gravely cripple the
army and navy.
(2) Manchukuo sponge steel. Large quantities of steel, said to be equal to high
grade Swedish steel for tools and armor, are being produced in IMaiichukuo. The
plant is located just outside of the port of DAIREN, on a railroad spur leading
directly to the DAIREN-MUKDEN railroad. The grounds cover about 80,000
tsubo (06% acres). In March, 1!)40, two furnaces were in operation, producing
40,000 tons, and a new 30,000 ton plant was just being put in operation. A plant
of similar type, capacity 100,000 tons, was being constructed. It was hoped that
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION ' 303
this would be completed before the end of 1940, but construction was held up by
shortage of building materials. It is believed that priority rights have been
granted by army authorities so that it will be completed before the end of 1941.
The combined production, upon completion of this, will be over 180.000 tons of this
special steel, with twelve sets of electric furnaces in operation. Continuous ad-
ditions to the plant are being contemplated with a final goal of 1,000,000 tons. It
is stated reliably that they are using an entirely new and secret process, requir-
ing neither water, charcoal, coke, nor high grade coal. Only a low grade of ash
coal is required, and ample supplies of this are available from their own coal
mines in I\Ianchukuo. (Regarding the iron ore, see 4120, above.)
(3) Extensive "heavy industries" operate at FUSHAN, near MUKDEN, in-
dependent of Japan, but supported to a large extent by the Japanese armies in
Manchukuo.
j. (4830) Motor car manufacture. For years, Ford at TSURUMI, near
YOKOHAMA, and General Motors, outside of OSAKA, have dominated the
passenger and truck markets of Japan! Today they have shut down entirely.
They refuse to bring in parts for assembly, as no dollar exchange is available.
Also, the Japanese Government passed the National Automobile Industry law
some five years ago to protect and enable them to develop their own industries.
During these last five years, they have made considerable progress, especially
with trucks, military six-wheelers, and tanks.
The four most prominent factories are as follows :
Nissan Auto Co Near TSURRUMI
T. E. G " TOKYO
Nakajima Iron Foundry " "
Toyoda Auto Co " NAGOYA
All of these plants easily may be detected from the air. Production figures
are unknown, but source estimates that total number of trucks produced monthly
exceed 1000 units. They are copied after old American models, inferior in
quality. They are 4th class compared to American army units, requiring much
service, and with very short life, say six months to one year in the field.
Tlie Nissan Automobile Company, leading Japanese auto company, is located
at TSURRUMI, east of the Ford Motor Company's assembly plant. They turn
out several hundred trucks monthly, modeled after the old 1934 Paige. This
plant easily covers two acres of ground, and is the backbone of the army's
truck production. Its destruction would seriously cripple the army. It can
be located readily from its size and the fact that it lies between the YOKO-
HAMA-TOKYO highway and the bay. Originally commercial, it has been taken
over by the army.
The T. E. G. and Nakajima factories, located in the suberbs of Tokyo, turn
out special military trucks (and presumably light tanks), such as large 6
wheelers and scout cars. These are slow, lumbering jobs, but stand up better in
the field then the Nisson-Toyoda units Capacity of the plants unknown, but
these two companies and the Nisson-Toyoda supply virtually all requii-ements.
Toyoda is located on the main railroad between TOKYO and KOBE, near the
city of NAGOYA or just east of the city. Covers perhaps 200 acres and also is
just east of five high aerial towers. Its trucks are copied after old Chevrolet
models, and are considered inferior to the Nissan units. Production about 300
units monthly. Financially bankrupt, but now financed by the army.
k. (4330) Motorcycle manufatnre. Within recent years many new military
establishments have been erected along the water front between HIROSHIMA
and KURE at UJINA, a small village on a short spur railroad out of HIRO-
SHIMA. Here a large military establishment makes motorcycles and important
naval equipment. Motorcycle capacity, 400 monthly. Another motorcycle fac-
tory is located near SHIMAGAWA (Tokyo). Formerly controlled by Harley
Davidson, it now is 100% Japanese. Capacity of factory, 200 motorcycles
monthly.
1. (4360) Rubber products. The Yokohama Rubber Co. is located at
TSURUMI, east of the Missan factory. It produces 800 truck tires daily, and
manufactures miscellaneous military equipment for the army and navy, such as
hose, etc. Goodrich formerly owned controlling interest, but have withdrawn,
except possibly holding a royalty interest. This company, along with Dunlop,
KOBE, and Bridgestone, KURUME, supply all military tires to the army and
navy. •
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Dunlop is on the main railway line as you approach KOBE from OSAKA. It
now is controlled by a Japanese Board of Directors, and thus the army. Source,
however, believes that Dunlop, England, still controls a large share of the com-
pany. They endeavored to sell out, but Japanese were unable to pay in Sterling.
They can supply 1200 truck tires daily.
Bridgestone is located at KURUME, KYUSHU, on the river front and also the
main railway between FUKUOKA and KUMAMOTO. They can produce 1500
truck tires daily.
Bridgestone also has a factory at TSUIGTAO, China, producing 300 truck tires
daily. They also have a new factory at LIAYANG, Manchukuo, about a half hour
train journey south of MUKDEN on the main line to DAIREN. This is mainly
a synthetic rubber plant, but also makes miscellaneous rubber equipment for the
army.
ro. (4380) Concrete. All concrete and structural steel building in Japan has
ceased, unless they are for specific military projects. In some cases military
plants are built of wood, owing to shortage of construction steel.
3. (5970) WAR MORALE OF CIVIL POPULATION. The masses in Japan
are well informed by press and radio, which are filled with highly colored propa-
ganda. Despite restrictions and hardships of all kinds, their unity and their
remarkable national spirit drives them forward. No sacrifice is too great, and
there is not a chance of revolution in Japan, so long as they continue forward as
they are doing. Their blackouts are highly successful, but their ground defenses
against bombing are very weak. Source believes that mass bombing attacks
would have a devastating effect on the morale of the people.
4. (6545) A TANK PROVING GROUND is located at CHIBA, across the bay
from TOKYO.
5. (6610) TROOP MOBILIZATION has continued throughout Japan (up to
time of source's departure, Oct. 15, 1941), reportedly to reinforce central China
units and to augment forces in Manchuria. Many reserve officers, known to have
been held for any special Siberian developments, for which they have been
trained for cold climate work in Manchukuo, In recent weeks have been called
to the colors. Large forces are available on the Manchukuo border for a possible
offensive against Russia should they collapse before the German offensive. Con-
scription is at its highest peak since the beginning of the China "incident".
A very large number of horses were mobilized all over Japan in June- July
period, and reportedly sent to Manchuria for cavalry and horse-drawn units.
Source observed many horse concentrations in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA dis-
tricts as trainloads passed through these cities.
6. (6905) TROOP EIMBARKATION POINTS. The principal troop embarka-
tion points observed by cource were :
a. SHINAGAWA, by train. This is the south Tokyo railway station.
b. M'AGOYA, by sea.
c. KOBE, by sea.
d. MIABORA, by rail. This is an important rail junction on LAKE BIWA,
between NAGOYA and KYOTO. Troops from north and central Japan destined
for Manchukuo pass through this junction enroute to TSURUGU, one of the prin-
cipal embarkation points on the Japan Sea for Manchukuo, SEI SHIN, and
VLADIVOSTOK.
e. The other principal port on the Japan Sea is NIIGATA, with fast steamer
service to SEI SHIN. A railway connects with Manchukuo and to the Soviet
border. NIIGATA is only eight hours by rail from TOKYO.
f. Troops from the south embark at SHIMONOSEKI (opposite MOJI) for
Eusan garrison enroute to Manchukuo via Korea.
g. Troops and supplies from KYUSHU island pass through MOJI to SHIMONO-
SEKI by ferry. A tunnel now is being built between MOJI and SHIIMONOSEKI.
The pilot tunnel has been completed and the main tunnel should be ready within
two years.
h. There is some troop movement from KYUSHU out of the ports of NAGA-
SAKI and SASEKO, the latter being an important naval base. There are mili-
tarv establishments in KYUSHU at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, and
FUKUAHA.
7. (9185) AIRPORTS. There is a large naval aerodrome and seaplane base
connected with the YAKOSUK\ naval base. At this point, back of the hills
and in the YAKOSUKA-YOKOHAMA highway large aeroplane machine shops
are located. There are naval or rnilitary aerodromes reported at KAGASHIMA,
KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, FUKU.*HA, SASEKO, HIROSHIMA, and YOKO-
HAMA. The large aerodrome behind HIROSHIMA is shut off from view from
the railroad by a high plateau.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 305
8. (9840) ANTI-AIRCRAFT. Gradually all principal cities are being pro-
tected by anti-aircraft batteries as well as military and munition establish-
ments. These batteries are reported to be limited and defenses relatively weak.
Source believes that Japanese have manufacturing facilities for the Swiss gun,
but not of the most recent design. Searchlights and listening devices also are
being utilized.
9. (9960) PARA-TROOPS were used for the first time during the last of Sep-
tember and early October this year (1941) in the central China area. They
particularly were used in the assault against CHANOSHA when plain clothes
men were dropped from three different points over the city. The attack was not
successful — the Chinese mopped up the para-troops. Hence the report, "Jap-
anese evacuated Changsha".
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to—
HAF
OMI
FBX
Classification : Confidential.
Report No. 21.
Date 28 ; October 1941.
[Penned notation : 350.05— Information on Foreign Countries.]
Classification : Confidential.
Enclosures : No.
Military Intelligence Division
War Department General Staff
Military Attach^ Report
reported by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject: FORMOSA
Sources and Degree of Reliability :
Diplomatic resident. Reliability good.
Summarization of Report When Required :
Foreign relations ; volunteer recruiting of Formosans and their loyalty
to Japan ; fortifications ; war planes ; air raid precautions.
1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS.
A. South For7nosa closed to foreigners. Since April, 1941, the Province of
TAKAO ( South Formosa ) has been closed to foreigners. Even resident Spanish
missionaries have been required to leave. An Italian freighter, which had been
at refuge in TAKAO since June, 1940, was ordered by Japanese naval authori-
ties to move to KOBE.
B. Japan's anti-white attitude. The Japanese as a nation are not anti-British
or anti-American — they are anti-whit-e. They have no love racially for the
Germans, but cannot help themselves. Their intention quite definitely is to try
to throw the white man out of the Far East. Germans and Italians are in-
cluded. Any temporary modification of their program is purely a matter of
expedience — a marking time until the moment is ripe. The military will not
and cannot give up the program upon which they have embarked.
C. American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Source believes that Canadian
and American citizens of Japanese ancestry cannot he trusted. He has definite
knowledge of their having betrayed the countries of their citizenship. When
caught their excuse is that they were forced by Japanese authorities against
their own desires — highly debatable !
2. 6240 VOLUNTEER RECRUITING FOR FORMOSANS. In (?) May, 1941,
the Governor General introduced a volunteer system for Formosans. A similar
system had been introduced into Korea in 1938 and had met with some success,
the young Koreans having become saturated witth the fervent nationalism taught
in the Japanese army. The nebulous mysticism which is the core of this spirit
is essentially Oriental in character and it is a mistake to suppose that a gov-
erned people like the Koreans and Formosans, in spite of the subordinate posi-
tion in which they deliberately are held, regard it as alien and compulsory. In
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 21
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the hands of the Japanese educationalists, as they have been for a quarter and
a half a century i-espectively, their minds have been conditioned methodically to
this doctrine, and the young generation now rising will be a tremendously pow-
erful instrument in the hands of Japanese nationalists unless steps are taken
now or very soon to break the Japanese military power and discredit their doc-
trines In the minds of the young. The jubilation and martial air of the For-
mosan children, when marching in procession to celebrate the opening of the
army ranks to Formosan volunteers, was not assumed to order, although the
processions themselves were, of course, organized. It cannot be emphasized
too strongly that the conditioning of the young for national expansion is older
and more fanatical than anything Germany has known, as shown by their school
text books and popular literature.
3. (6800) FORTIFICATIONS. The whole of the south half of Formosa has
become a military garrison (strength of effectives not ascertainable). The
beaches are fortified against possible attack. The harbor of TAKAO steadily
has been improved for troop embarkations. The, transports themselves are
based at the PESCADORES, since TAKAO is open to heavy seas throughout the
summer months and is not suitable for basing large numbers of transports.
4. (9000) MILITARY AVIATION. Up until the end of July Japanese war
planes seen in the sky over North Formosa were of not very modern design
and their speed seemed very moderate. From the end of July plane.s of more
modern design and higher speed were seen. Planes based on the northern aero-
drome at TAIHQKU were used for bombing the China coast of FUKIEN and
CHEKIANG provinces. The main air defense and striking force are concen-
trated in the south of Formosa, opposite Hongkong. It is presumed that the
authorities consider that any hostile air attack would come from the south
and that it could be broken up before getting further north.
5. (9840) AIR DEFENSE. Throughout the island there has been almost con-
tinuous air raid drill. This consists largely of training the Formosan public
to cooperate in extinguishing fires and controlling lights. Anti-aircraft guns
have not been visible or audible on any of these occasions, and it is impossible
to say if and where they exist. Searchlights have been of antique pattern.
There are few air raid shelters in the principal towns, and much publicity has
been given to the need for building more. Japanese householders in many cases
have been canvassed and ordered to construct one for each group of houses, but
these facilities (up to the end of July) were quite inadequate. Experiments
were going on for the conversion of drain water to drinking water in case of
emergency. "Emergency" and "preparedness" were the constant cries of the
newspapers and the armies.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel G. S. C,
A. C. of S., 0-2.
Report No. 20.
Date : 23 October 1941.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished
ONI
HAF
Classification : Confidential.
Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures: No.
MiLiTAEY Intelligence Division
Wae Department Genekal Staff
Military Attach^ Report
reported BT g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : JAPAN.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
American shipping agent from Kobe enroute to San Francisco. Believed
reliable.
1. (3500. Treatment of foreigners.) There is intense anti-American and anti-
British feeling in both Kobe and Yokohama. Every obstacle Is put in the way
of these nationals trying to complete formalities to leave Japan. They have to
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 307
stand in line in the streets for hours awaiting their turn for examination by local
police or prefecture oflScials, only to be told to come again next day. Detailed
and annoying personal search is made, particularly of British, before they leave.
2. (4115. Petroleum pjoducts.) Supplies of lubrication oil and gasoline are
stored in valleys at ITOZAKI, near the Naval base, oif the Inland Sea. These
valleys are dammed at either end with concrete blocks and the whole area covered
with soil and planted with grass. A stevedore's superintendent told source that
the Japanese navy had oil reserve for 2 years. The Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai,
is reported to be still importing gasoline and oil from the United States, which
is then transshipped to Japan.
3. (6905. Troop movements.) Source reports that about 10 September, 800
trucks assembled in Sports ground and loaded soldiers. He could not state
regiments since no civilians allowed near, but he had opportunity to count the
trucks. Their destination was supposedly Dairen.
4. (G905. Troops in French Indo-China.) In early September a Frenchman
from Saigon told source that the Japanese were bluffing regarding the number
of troops in French Indo-China, to divert public attention from the huge numbers
being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The Frenchman estimated Japanese
troops in French Indo-China were only 35,000. Another source gives 40,000.
Kendall J. Fieldek,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., 0-2.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copy furnished to
ONI
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 15.
Date : 2 October 1941.
Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures : No.
Military Intelligence Division
Wab Depaetment General Staff *
Military Attach^ Report
reported by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHlkA.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Saigon business man, believed reliable.
Summarization of Report When Required :
Gloomy picture of present conditions in French Indo-China.
1. The Japanese advance party arrived at Saigon the latter part of July.
They picked out and requisitioned both public buildings and private residences,
giving occupants but 24 hours notice to vacate. The main body of Japanese
troops ariived about August 8. They have continued to arrive, in numbers
far in excess of what should be necessary to garrison and "protect" a country
like Indo-China. This leads one to believe that invasion of Thailand is con-
templated.
2. Business in Indo-China is at a standstill. Imports and exports, other than
those controlled by Japanese, practically have ceased. Food materials are being
requisitioned by the Japanese, so that it is very difficult for white residents
to live. Even the rice and fish of the natives are being curtailed. Payment
is made by the Japanese in paper yen, which have very little buying power in
circulation.
3. With war supplies greatly diminished as a result of the trouble with Thai-
land, it was impossible for the government of French Indo-China to resist this
invasion by Japan. Prior to the arrival of Japanese forces the sympathy of
many Indo-Chinese had been with Japan. As a result of this taste of Japanese
aggression, sentiment very largely has swung against Japan. The natives desire
a return of previous conditions under the French. The sympathy of the majority
of the French is with Britain. They believe that the only solution of their
difficulties is the defeat of the Axis.
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. A report from Manila states that steps are being taken by Japanese :
A. Completely to suppress all pro-Chungking elements in Indo-China.
B. To encourage Annamite independence movement, which definitely would
be pro-Japanese and anti-French. Results would create internal domestic
trouble throughout Indo-China, providing further excuse for expansion of
Japanese control.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., Q-2.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished:
ONI
HAF
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 9.
Date: 25 September 1941.
Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures : No.
MiLiT^VRY Intelligence Division
War Depaetment General Staff
Military Attache Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : THAILAND.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
News correspondflnt returning by clipper to U. S., fairly reliable; and
other sources as indicated.
Summarization of Report When Required :
Japan attempting to dominate Thailand thought, business, and govern-
ment.
1. (2900. Propaganda). Thailand is being overrun by Japanese and their propa-
ganda. They control 3 of 16 newspapers, includine the influential Bangkok Times.
Domei news is furnished free of charge to all Thai papers, and its volume far ex-
ceeds Reuters and D. N. B. combined. Control of Thai thought is being attempted
by the announcement in Tokio of Thai events and decisions, regardless of facts.
For example, a trade agreement is under discussion. -At a critical moment it is
announced to the world from Tokio that Thailand has accepted, although such
may not be the case. This has great nuisance value in embarrassing the Thailand
government. Reading rooms in Thailand clubs are being flooded with Japanese
publications. Italian journals of recent date also are available. But British and
American publications are old or unavailable. Source recommended that "waver-
ing countries", such as Thailand, should be copiously supplied with well-illustrated
journals displaying the might and power of the United States. Persons in the
Orient listen to Rome, Berlin, and Tokio broadcasts, he said. What he thought
is needed is strong American propaganda "bursting out of Manila", instead of
"'canned music and innocuities." American news reels are accepted in Thailand,
but British propaganda films are not accepted in northern Thailand. (This last
from represenative of M. G. M.)
2. (3850. Foreign relatio7is). It is reported from Manila that on August 18 the
Japanese Minister to Thailand handed the Prime Minister the following pro-
posals :
A. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
B. Six aerodromes in norih, south, and west to be leased to Japan, who
would undertake to improve them.
C. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
D. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
E. Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces.
3. (4000. Economic). Japanese penetration, begun five years ago, is seeking
economic domination of Thailand. Source estimated that there are 3,000 Japa-
nese in Thailand, some well supplied with funds and entertaining extensively.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 309
Thai shops were full of Japanese, who were willing even to pay "upped prices."
In 1939 Thailand's foreign trade was 4.7% with U. S., 23% with Hong Kong, and
15.4% with Singapore. Much of remaining trade is with Japan. If Thailand is
unable to obtain machinery, electrical, and other equipment from America or
Britain, the trade will be forced into Japanese hands. The only raw material
exported by Thailand which Japan does not control is tin. Most of this comes
from southern Thailand, which is pro-British.
4. (7500. Navy auxiliary.) Investigations were being carried out during
August by Japanese Special Service Department agents, as to the number of
lighters and their tonnage in the Gulf of Siam. (From Mjinila, believed reliable.)
5. (8220. Airways.) Dutch air lines continue to operate into Thailand, and
there is a line operated by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. There is
daily Japanese plane service out of Bangkok. Passengers carried by this last
are said to be Japanese, Germans, and others friendly to the Axis.
6. (9000. Airy. Japanese troops dominate the Thailand-French Indo-China
frontier, with extensive air bases near the border and within 250 miles of the
Burma Road. Danger of penetration of Thailand by Japanese parachute troops
was stressed.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., 0-2.
G-2, HAWN DEPT.
Copies furnished :
ONI
HAF
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 8.
Date: 25 September 1941.
[Penned notation : 350.05 — Foreign Intelligence. X336.2 — Foreign Armies.
X091— Japan.]
[i] Classification: Restricted.
Enclosures : No.
Military Intelligence Division
Wak Department General Staff
Military Attach^ Report
EEPOFvTED by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : JAPAN AND JAPANESE RELATIONS.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Various, reliability as indicated.
1. JAPANESE EXPANSION NORTHWARDS
Responsible British source reported that Itagaki favors expansion northwards,
and that his appointment as C-in-C in Korea might be interpreted as a precaution
against the need for big operations in Manchuria, for which Korea would be
the first reserve pool. A technically competent observer in Hong Kong, 21 August,
confirmed this view and added that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C in South China,
now Chief of Staff at Nanking of Japanese forces in China, is of same persuasion.
He may be counted on not to neglect the north, however tempting easy gains in
the south may be at the moment.
Renewed repo'rts from Shanghai that observers there expect something to
happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc. by a certain date, such as
September 15, bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war
of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners.
The Japanese in the past often have revealed their long term objectives, very
seldom have talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that
respect being a habit with them.
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. JAPANESE TEOOP MOVEMENTS NORTHWARD
Between July 10 and 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden,
proceeding north. They carried full war kit. (No means of checking numbers,
which should be accepted with reserve.) During this period a total of 75 troop
"specials" passed through I\Iukden. Flat cars carried [2] artillery and
tanks. Japanese station master of South IManchurian railway, Mukden, on July
21 stated that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but
over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of
cars, these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan, and Peking-
Hankow lines.
On July 20, troops from Jehol area arrived in filukden. They travelled in
special troop trains via KOUPAUTEE on Peking-Mukden line. Source saw great
activity at TANGKU TUN junction.
It was reported August 5 that mobilization and reequipment of troops in Korea,
Kwantung, and Manchuria was quietly progressing in preparation for eventual
movement against the Soviet.
There has been a "tug of war" between high ranking military officials as to
when northward move should be launched, and that question was still unsettled,
August 5. It was thought that the only event which would stop the move would
be a decisive German defeat at hands of Soviet.
High Japanese official expressed some concern over Japanese anti-aircraft
defense and lack of air raid protection, but no further details were mentioned.
3. MANCHURIAN MH^ITARY BAIL WAYS
It was reported, August 8, that the following railways in Manchuria now are
regarded as military lines on which the number of passenger trains has been
reduced to a minimum :
a. Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara, and to Korea via Tumen.
b. Harbin-Peian-Heiho.
c. Hsingehiang-Taouan.
d. Taonan-Doekk-Arshan.
e. Tsitsihar-Peian.
f. Tsitsihar-Bukhedu-Mailar and Manchouli.
g. Tumen-Mudadzian.
h. Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi.
i. All raiways in Jehol.
Since end of June. 1941, steps have been taken to increase capacity of single
track Hsingchiang-Harbin by constructing sidings and numerous shall stations
for storage.
In Kwangtung leased territories, since 1940, sand bag emplacements guarding
bridges, stations, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement
structures.
Japanese War Office has acquired by pui'chase several large buildings in
Harbin, and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over
if necessity demands.
4. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND HAINAN
On June 8, 12,000 men left French Indo-Chitia. It was rumored that they
were bound for Manchuria, but this is given with great reserve. On June 14
the following units of the 11th Division, totalling 3,300 men, left Hainan for
unknown destination :
HIROSE (EGZ IRX) Infantry regiment
NAKAMURA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery battalion
HIRAOKA (EED DYJ) Transport Companv
YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadrons.
[S] 5. JAPANESE M0\T:MENTS SOUTHWARD
A. To SPRATLY ISLANDS. On April 19. two armed merchantmen arrived
Kobe and unloaded scrap metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes. They were loaded
with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The cases
measure 8x0 foot. 400 men of a naval landing party and IHO coolies who had
been segregated until going on board, embarked on April 21. The ships left
for Spratly Island on April 21.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 311
B. FORCES IN SANCIIO AND KUKOK ISLANDS. Out August 2, 500 naval
landing party left SANCHO ISLAND. Total remaining garrison strength, 400
naval landing party and 200 puppets. Stock on hand: 2,000 cases small arms
ammunition, 'JUO cases shells.
At KUKOK ISLAND are 200 KATSIMURA (AUE GPA) naval landing party.
100 having left on July 22.
O. IN FORMOSA AND VICINITY. Between July 7 and 15, about 25 air-
craft arrived at OKAYAMA aerodrome nightly from Japan. Aircraft based
there July 19 were : 40 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers, 40 twin-engine
monoplane medium bombers, 40 single-engine monoplane light bombers, 60 mono-
plane fighters, 20 reconnaissance, 4 four-engine transports. This is the largest
aerodrome in Formosa, being about one mile square.
July 14, 6 fighters arrived at TAIHOKU from QUEMOY ISLAND.
July 10 to 11, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan.
July 15, 15 monaplane fighters arrived at HEITO from KWANGTUNG.
Aircraft reported at Quemoy Island, 12 fighters.
June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores Islands.
July 11, 200 mines and 120 torpedoes landed at TAKAO from Japan.
July 25 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for HAINAN:
24 twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers.
15 monoplane fighters.
3 reconnaissance bombers.
July 28 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for Indo-China:
6 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers.
9 single-engine monoplane light bombers.
July 26, 27 aircraft, composed mainly of twin-engine monoplane heavy
bombers, arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.
August 1, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HBITO for Indo-China.
D. TO AND IN INDO-CHINA. July 20, the following Japanese troops left
KARENKO for Indo-China :
U] 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry,
1,200 ISE (AES AUI) artillery
600KONDO (SOY MRU) and FUKASE (IIU IRX) A.F.V. units, with:
16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, 32 field guns.
Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome, 8 aircraft used.
Japanese strength in TONKIN area, August 1, approximately 25,000.
Japanese strength in southern Indo-China, Aug. 12, approx. 36,000.
Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and it
is believed that French troops are to be sent to the YUNAN and KWANGSI
borders.
Quantities of railway equipment are being sent to PNOM TENH for the
construction of a railway to the THAI border.
July 28 a transport left TOSHIYKN for Indo-China after loading 20 launches,
120 mines, and a quantity of naval ammunition.
August 21, strength in southern Indo-China was about 80,000, composed of
units of Guards, 28th Division, 38th Division, Formosan army corps, and naval
landing party. (This is given with reserve pending confirmation.) High com-
mands are:
Lt. General IIDA, Array
Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH), air
Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS), navy.
6. TROOP MOVEMENT IN JAPAN. There are naval bases or depots at
KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI, and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMAKURA and
TOYOHASHI.
Sources state that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese
sailors from TOKIO to KOSHIRO and TAKAHACHI. and that between June 26
and 28 numerous trainloads of ytmng men arrived at ZUSI. At NUMAZU source
observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders and also several howitzers
with camouflaged gun platforms, pushed by heavv trucks. At HAMAMOTQ
he observed 97th, 72d, and 8th Divisions. At WUSHIZU, 22d Division. At
OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA, 2d and 4th Divisions. New oil tanks were in
this district, which is very heavily industrialized.
All these obsei'vations made at end of June. Agent has had military training,
but is newly recruited, and no opportunity to cross examine him.
7. JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS. A. Aerodromes In Japan.— K large aero-
drome is under construction near KAMAKURA, (This is believed identical
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with TOTSUKA aerodrome.) Overall dimensions: 3,500 by 3,500 yards. Labor
force of 8.000, under supervision of 18 German engineers. Aerodrome expected
to be completed in August. 3,000 parachute troops are under training there.
Polish refugee journalist in Japan, at end of June, said he had seen great earth-
works, indicating underground aerodrome, with planes landing, at TAKARU-
ZUKA. (Observation not considered very reliable.)
[5] Area between KOBE, AWAJI, and SAKAI is heavily fortified.
(Creditable)
B. Oil Tanks iti Pescudores Islands. — ^Ansan Naval Base has large surface tank,
capacity 600 tons; small surface tank, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank
at TAISHOKU FORT, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at Keimo-U
aerodrome, capacity 300 tons. Comment: Fairly reliable; reported August 20,
1941. It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between types of
oil fuel.
8. JAPANESE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR.
A. Naval. — Floating dock at KOBE, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000
tons, is expected to be transferred to HAINAN. At end of May an "aircraft
tender" was under repair in this dock. Total of 2,000 workmen, working day
and night shifts, were engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock.
(Casual observation).
In collaboration with German advisers, the construction of 75 submarines is
projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 of these jobs,
of which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4. (Casual).
Twenty vessels are under construction at Harima shipyard, OSAKA, with
24-hour day work being done on the jobs in May. Vessels expected to be com-
pleted at end of July. Specifications: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200
feet X 28 feet x 5 feet (note that these dimensions give a displacement well over
that reported, and therefore are given with utmost reservation) ; speed 30 knots;
armament, 6 machine guns. Said that these ships are to be used as troop land-
ing craft in southern expansion.
Hearsay information, given with utmost reserve, states that some old hulks
have been emptied of machinery and equipment, and "pocket destroyers" are
being consti'ucted within them. As a further aid to secrecy, the position of these
hulks are changed by towing from one place to another. This may be an ex-
aggerated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but there may be something
in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.
B. Ordnance Construction. — Naval guns are being made a OSAKA arsenal
under German supervision. May 8, warships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted
with guns from this arsenal. (Casual observation.)
C. Aircraft Construction. — Beginning of April, three German engineers arrived
at Aichi Aircraft Factory, NAGOYA, from the Dornier Works. Name of one
is given as Andernich (DJI IZU DUN). They are supervising construction of
u new type of fighter. This is described at K-22 type, twin-engine, two-seater.
It is still in the experimental stage. Production aimed at is 50 a month. (Note,
this production figure coincides with that given for dive bomber reported as
being manufactured in this factory in January.) Labor force 2,600, working
day and night.
[6] A shadow factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in Osaka in mid May
started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the
Aichi Factory, NAGOYA. Labor force: 2,GO0, working 10 hours a day. Esti-
mated production: wings, etc. for about 100 fighters a month. Three Gennan
advisers are attached to this KAWAGUSHI factory.
Aerial bomb factory in HIMEJI, names Nakabe (AAW7SRY) Heavy Indus-
trial Works. Labor force in mid May, 000. Monthly production : 3,000 aerial
bombs and 2,.')00 flares. Four German engineers are attached.
9. JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS. A. With Great Britain and the
United States. — Admiral NOMURA has been instructed to work for a modifica-
tion of American embargo policy and to offer readjustment of American-Japanese
relations on basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined
and recognized as spheres of influence of U. S. A. and British. (Reliability un-
known, dated August 5, 1941.)
At a meeting held by High Command at CANTON on July 27 to discuss re-
taliatory measures on British and American freezing, the following steps were
decided upon and forwarded to TOKIO for approval :
1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South
China.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION L^l^
2! Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and
possibility of their expulsion.
3. Banning of exports to HONG KONG and tightening of blockades.
The government to be forced to cooperate in tliis measure.
4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese per-
sonnel in British forces.
5. Unifying of new territories of HONG KONG and KULANGSU to the
Puppet Government.
It was reported (August 15, 1941) that as a retaliatory measure for British
and American action against Japan, Japanese military authorities discussed
with Nanking Government the desirability of blockading International Settle-
ment on lines of TIENTSIN blockade of British concession. Japanese "Busi-
ness" Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation of four representatives
to interview General KAGESA at NANKING. Latter assured delegation that
if any steps were taken along lines suggested at any time, every effort would
be made to safeguard Japanese interests operating in International Settlement.
He further stated that they were not contemplated in the near future as there
was no complete accord between Japanese naval and military authorities on
these matters.
B. JAPANESE SPONSORED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AT HONG KONG.
(1) Incitement of Disturbances and Riots. — Plans are prepared for the creation
of strikes, disturbances, and riots at Hong Kong, when and if Japan breaks
with Britain. One of the principal agents for this is JOHN LUI, senior member
of Shanghai Tai Fing Insurance Co. One of Lui's close associates is the son
of Chief Detective of Amoy, CHENG SAI HOI. Lui also is believed to have
been the founder of Tung Man Alumni Association.
[7] Japanese hope to recruit about 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take
part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hong Kong on outbreak of hostilities
between Japan and Britain. A large number of these already are receiving
financial assistance from the Japanese.
It is believed that puppet officials of Chungshan area and Japanese agents are
being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that this is the channel through
which large quantities of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hong Kong.
(2) Japanese Agents. — LAM FEI, representative of Wang Ching Wei in Hong
Kong, with 45 senior agents, is mainly interested in collecting military intelligence
and recruiting questionable characters for subversive activities.
TAKEDA, of Special Service Section, is now attached to Japanese Consulate,
Hong Kong, to control the intelligence section there.
TAM k6wK-WA, acts as liaison between Special Service Sections in Macao
and Hong Kong.
C. RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES. Japanese business men, includ-
ing Manila heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank, appeared genuinely to
believe, August 18, that present Japanese threats of further southward expansion
were merely a "war of nerve.s" and that, under present conditions, Japan does
not intend to fight Great Britain or America. (Reasonably reliable.)
A recently selected Sakdal candidate for next political elections states that
local (Manila) Japanese agents have been cultivating him closely and volunteer-
ing the following information :
1. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on FORMOSA.
2. Attack on PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE simultaneously will take
place about end of August.
3. Campaign in Philippines to begin with uprising in MINDANAO and
bombing of MANILA.
4. Attack on SINGAPORE to be overland through SIAM, where at least
3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.
4. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in HAINAN and SAIPAN.
(Source doubtfully reliable: this looks like a whispering campaign.)
August 9, Manila agents of N. Y. K. received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio
office, stating that all "overseas" service is now suspended. "Overseas" means
all sailings except Japan-China ports. (Reliable.)
Manila agents, Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company, instructed by
telegram, August 15, from Tokio Office :
1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel Manila reinsured treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if
possible.
314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This conipnny's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded
200.000 pesos (2."i,000 pounds). (Reliable.)
[8] D. JAPANESE— THAILAND RELATIONS. Japanese Government
reported "considerably perturbed by the insincerity" of the Siamese Government.
Japanese Government stated that in spite of military "representations" by Japa-
nese Minister to BANGKOK, there has been little if any improvement in the un-
compromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan, and that it is
clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence.
Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further
immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter.
FBI WEN CHUAN stated Japanese Government, in carrying out its programme
in French Indo-Cbina, is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clari-
fied and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan and her co-prosperity
programme, Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into
line.
Between July 25 and 29, 12,000 troops left BANGKOK for Indo-China frontier.
This is partially confirmed by official Siamese communique which states that in-
fantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary, and special mission units left
for frontier at end of July.
An order has been placed by Thailand with Japanese for delivery in July, 1&42,
of two warships, probably torpedoboats, to replace three vessels sunk by French.
500,000 ticals have been paid on account of this order.
13 August, 1941. (Casual observation.)
E. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IN NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. It was
reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I., the following
was being said : —
1. In MENADO : Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be
taken off in vessels from PALAU.
2. Japan will send her invading foi'ces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from east-
wards of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives.
3. Japanese will not be evacuated, as evacution would give N. E. I. indication of
pending attack.
F. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. Blockade of Vladivostok.— Two separate
Chinese sources reported before July 7, that they understood Japan promised
Germany, in return for recognition of WANG CHING WEI, to blockade Vladi-
vostok, and that action was likely at an early date.
G. MADAGASCAR. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations, Japanese delegates
expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic-Indian Ocean com-
munications. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company of a million
3'en to start operations around island.
H. JAPANESE CONTROL OF NON-AXIS INTERESTS. It was reported
that following the completion of Japanese military occupation in Indo-China,
military have been considering possibilities of securing control of [9]
TIENTSIN FRENCH CONCESSION through puppet North China administra-
tion.
Local (Manila) military circles consider that, if Tientsin venture is accom-
plished, similar action might be taken through WANG CHiNG WEI government
at other points in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full
control of all non-Axis interests. (Aug. 10).
It is reported that pajjer plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai
have been completed and, provided futui'e developments in the general situation
in the Far East do not necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government is
expected to assume control in concession before October 10. Committee study-
ing this matter, under chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and
General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to Tokio for consid-
eration.
I. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY. Admiral TOTODA has already informed
German Ambassador that Japan is ready to readjust its political relations with
Reich as prerequisite for closer economic jiccord upon which will be founded
future economic relations between Asia and Europe, according to a report of
unknown reliability, dated August 5.
On April 20, 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for KURE. Guns were
to be fitted, and the ships will be ready for sea again about the beginning of
August.
On July 31, 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in PO ON area
for "the German expeditionary engineer corps", and as soon as possible are being
sent to Germany.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 315
According to a high puppet official, further recruiting is being carried out.
10. FRENCH INDO-CHINA. Tlie following is from Free French sailors who
left SAIGON about August 8 :
a. S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DRAYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo
of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo". Rest of cargo, nature not known,
mai'ked "San Francisco."
b. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel ADMIRAL CHARNER and the
submarine PEGASE.
c. S. S. SAGITAIRE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have
gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.
ICendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
.Acting A. C. of C, 0-2.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished :
HAF
ONI
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 7.
Date : 10 Septemler 1941
. Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures : No.
MiLiTAEY Intelligence Division
War Department General Staff
Military Attache Report
reported by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Unusually reliable expert.
Land planes flying from Hawaii to the Dutch East Indies might make use of
the following airfields : —
1. CANTON ISLyAND, north rim, undeveloped, but already a possible emergency
landing, 1630 sea miles or 1878 lands miles from Honolulu. Might be developed at
comparatively small expense. Alternate.
ROWLAND ISLAND, a partly developed airfield, 1650 sea miles or 1900 land
miles from Honolulu.
(Note : Ulm planned to land on south rim of BANNING ISLAND, at Peao.
Conditions of this landing place not known.)
2. FIJI. There are two airports on VITI LEVU Island. One along the Rewa
River, northeast of Suva, present condition not known. Another on the Nandi
Plain, near Lautoka, N. W. side, present condition unknown. There is a flight of
British patrol planes operating in Fiji at present. Definite information about
present airfield conditions 'doubtless could be had from them through High Com-
missioner for Western Pacific, Suva. An emergency landing might be made at
low water 'on Nasali Beach, near Suva, where a two mile stretch of compact sand
over 100 yards wide is capable of holding up aircraft of medium weight.
3. NEW CALEDONIA. Within 9 months an airdrome will be completed about
30 miles northwest of Noumea. When completed it will have two metalled run-
ways, each 2,000 meters long. It is believed that already work has progressed so
that a landing could be made. Low clouds and rain in this vicinity might make
lauding difiicult at times. No other landing place is known on this island.
4. AUSTRALIA. Either Sydney or Brisbane airports could be used for the
next hop. At both cities good airfields are available, with adequate, repair facili-
ties. Sydney is considered better, because in wet weather the grassy runway at
Brisbane might bog large, heavy planes.
5. TRANS-AUSTRALIA. There are several usable airfields on routes across
Australia :
a. The shortest route is via Charleville (620 miles from Sydney) and Clon-
curry (1200 miles from Sydney) to Darwin (2200 miles from Sydney) . At Charle-
ville, in wet weather, the ground is soft off the runways, which are about 50
316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
feet ^vide. At Cloncurry there are long, well-surfaced runways, 1200-1500 yards
in all directions. Fuel may be had at these two airfields, but no repair. In
summer, flying conditions may be bad in this region; conditions to be expected
at 5,000 feet being found on the ground, at 1000 feet. Darwin has an airfield,
with facilities for repair.
b. A southern, drier route is via Broken Hill, N. S. W., Oodnadatta, S. Austr.,
(with good field), Alice Springs and Daly Waters, N. Terr., at all of which air-
fields are availai)le. There also are good fields at Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide,
and at cities in Western Australia. Wyndham, on Joseph Bonaparte Gulf, north-
ern W. Austr., has airfield which can be used for heavy planes in dry weather.
6. DUT(^H EAST INDIES. The best of several airports are at: Koepang,
Timor, with good field, fuel, but no repair facilities ; Bali, on south coast, west
of Denpasar (not the smaller abandoned airfield inland from Denpasar) ; Soera-
baja, N. E. Java, with a modern, first class airport, with repair facilities; Batavia
Java, with excellent, new airport ; Palembaug, Sumatra, good field, but no repair
facilities; Makassar, Celebes; Kalikpapan, Borneo ; and Tarakan, Borneo.
7. NEW GUINEA. There is a good airport at Port Moresby; and smaller
ones at Salamanna and Lae. While these perhaps are too small for large bomb-
ers, they are being used by Lockheed "14's". There is an airport at Rabaul, New
Britain.
Kendall J. Fieldek,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., 0-2.
G-2, HAWN. DEBT.
Copies furnished
G-2 HAP
ONI, 14th Nav. Dist.
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 4.
Date : 19 August 1941.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
INTER-STAPF ROUTING SLIP
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the ex-
ception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the ofiicer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No.oflnd. From and date
To
Subject: General report, Japan and China
Istlnd. G-2 19Aug41_
2d Ind. G-2 8/27/41..
Chief of Staff.
For information. This report was for-
warded to G-2, War Department, this
morning via air mail. 1 Incl. Mil.
Attache Report.
K. J. F.
G. S. C. Chief of
Staff.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 317
Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures. No.
MrUTAKT iNTEaXIGENCE DIVISION
Wab Depaetment General Staff
Military Attache Report — Japan and China
KEPOKTED BY G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : General Report, Japan and China. I. G. No. : See below.
Source and Degree of Reliability :
Various sources, all considered reliable.
1. CHINA 4000 Following is text of order issued 28 July 1941 by K. Oyamada
for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs :
"Shipments of exportation and interport export for America and England and
their colonies, Burma, Frencli Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied area of
China of followhig goods are temporarily to be referred to me before release:
"Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton
piece goods and yarn :
"Except for Japan and North China :
(Signed) K. Oyamada."
2. JAPAN 6810 (Formosa) on 16 June 1941 150 infantry transferred from
Taiohu to Kogo for parachute training, and on 18 June 1941 200 parati'oops were
transferred from Kogo to Rokko. Kogo area now under martial law and entry
nearly impossible. Recruiting for army and labor corps still being maintained.
(End Formosa).
On 8 June 1941 following units of 12th division total strengtn 6,000 left Hainan
for Manchuria :
46th infantry regiment
48th infantry regiment ^ '
24th artillery regiment.
On 14 June 1941 "Hirose" infantry regiment of 11th division left Hainan ;
on 30 June 1941 this unit arrived Dairen and went on to Scheungkiang in Man-
churia. On 24 June 1941 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division arrived Wham-
poa from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.
18 July 1941 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon. 21 July 1941 Lieut.
General Homma, commander-in-chief Formosan army, and Major General Sumida
arrived Saigon with 30 Germon and Italian advisers. On mornings of 20 and 21
July 1941 air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft. 20 July 1941
1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 unidentified auxiliary, and 4 transports packed with
troops arrived Camranh Bay,
G-2, HAWN DEPT.
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 8.
Date : 19 August 1941.
Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures: No.
Military Intelligence Division
War Department General Staff
Military Attache Report — Various
RETOBTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Subject : General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
Business men of experience in the country regarding which they were inter-
viewed. All believed to be fully reliable.
1. JAPAN 2900 The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly
toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all
Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of con-
tinuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on
matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army
officers, in order to force u change in the cabinet ; at the time of the incident
no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were sus-
pended, including local telephone service.
All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only.
Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to
Germany may be made in German, but no language other than Japanese is
allowed in communications within Japan.
4000 Japan is reported to be very short on carbon black; and that they have
some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials no facilities for
producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper
their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even
including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other items reported
to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline,
sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anaesthetics.
Japanese Military Doctors have complained to American Doctors of being
short on quinine, atebran, and plasmochin ; all of which are used in combating
malaria. Malignant malaria and blackwater fever are prevalent in Hainan, in
the marshes along the Burma Road in Yunnan Province, and on the Kwangsi
Tonkin border. It was reported that 300,000 Japanese troops went from Hainan
to Kwangsi, and that only 50,000 returned, the others being lost account malig-
nant malaria on the Tonkin border.
6810 50,000 Troops were reported to have left Hainan in June 1941, leaving
only 3,000 troops, in addition to Navy, at that point. Also reported that large
numbers of Chinese guerillas are still active in Hainan.
During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have
had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working
in factories in Japan, regardless of a'ge, have lately been required to take part
time military training.
For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead of
through Kol)e, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers
have been flown to China and Manclmkuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts
of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about
six miles due west of Kobe.
It is reported there are many <Jermans in all public offices in Japan, even in-
cluding police departments, post offices, and finance offices ; these men are said
to wear civilian clothing, but wear a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Many
regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany.
On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored
to be from South America ; the businessmen who saw these vessels could not give
a description of them, but stated Captain Solberg of the S. S. "Frederick Lykes"
could give a full and accurate description.
91S5 An airport capable of basing 200 planes is located at Hoihow (Haiko),
concrete roads to the airport and a large barracks have recently been constructed
at this point, and that approximately 1,000 new trucks arrived at this point during
June 1941. It is also reported that there is an airport at Sama slightly larger
than the one at Hoihow. Large amounts of food and ordnance supplies are re-
ported coming into Hoihow and Sama. A large emergency airport has recently
been built at Haulang Plain about 20 miles northeast of Nodoa, and inland about
25 miles from the north coast of Hainan.
2. AUSTRALIA 4115 Australia uses about fourteen million barrels of oil
per year, with none produced there ; at the present time gasoline is being rationed
at two gallons per month per car. A new oil field has been located recently at
"Lakes Entrance", about 200 miles east of Melbourne "^ the field covers about five
square miles, with the pool of oil at 1200 feet from the surface ; a shaft will be
sunk at a 30 degree slope, and it is believed production of 500 barrels per day
can be realized within six months; this crude will be good for 70% lubricating
oil only.
It is reported that there is a large gassy coal mine under Sydney, from which
vapor gas (methene) of an octane rating of 115 can be extracted, with production
equivalent of 20.C0O gallons of gasoline per day possible. 140 cubic feet of this
gas equals 1 gallon of gasoline, and it can be compressed in drums to equal 10
gallons of gasoline which can be carried on an automobile. There is a total
of 10 mines in Australia which can be made to produce this gas within two months,
and they are also locating additional mines in New Zealand.
S'everal large deposits of bauxite have been discovered in Australia, and are
now being developed, but development is slow due to shortage of power.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 319
3. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Ulo 40,000 Barrel Refinery at Balek-
papen, which is only refinery in area producing lubricating oil, mostly of crude
from adjacent areas with small amount from Java, good harbor, 5,000 population,
everything owned by Shell Petroleum Company. 45,000 Barrel Ketinery at
Pladjoe about 20 miles from Palembang, producing 100 octane aviation gasoline
and all oil products except lubricating oil, sand bar across harbor limits draft
of ships calling there to 18 feet. 45,000 Barrel Refinery operated by Sacony
across Moesi river from Pladjoe. 15,000 Barrel Refinery named Pangkalan
Branden in North Sumatra near Medan, limited to straight run distilling, no
cracking, all crude from nearby areas by pipeline, export by sea. 7,000 Barrel
Refinery in Tjepoe, Java, about 60 miles west of Sourabaya, only low quality gaso-
line produced, only Java supplied, crude from nearby areas by pipeline, delivery
by tank car.
9185 Complete arrangements have been made for destruction of refineries,
pipelines, and wells, with all wiring, switches, etc., in place ; lacking only the plac-
ing of necessary explosives, which are kept near the points they would be placed.
Arrangements have been made to evacuate Balekpapen, with place already built
in interior to care for all personnel. Plenty of underground protection for all
persons at all other places.
It is reported that the N. E. I. Army is composed mostly of natives, and that
these natives do not see any need for loyalty to the Dutch. Also reported that
half castes in the Army are a possible source of trouble.
4. BURMA. .'{610 Number of trucks arriving at Kunming, exclusive of those
carrying salt, increasing from an everage of 58 per day carrying 5,220 tons freight
in October 1940, to 162 per day carrying 13,071 tons in June 1941. Arrivals at
Chungking during the period October 1940 to June 1&41 remained about con-
stant, with arrivals averaging 15 per day carrying 1377 tons. Numbers of trucks
passing frontier at WantLng are as follows :
To China From China
December 1940 4, 203 3, 619
January 1941 5, 090 4, 629
February 1941 5, 052 5, 009
March 1941 6, 282 6, 207
April 1941 6, 194 5, 658
Freight rates are as follows :
Lashio-Wauting $12.28 per ton U. S. Dollars
Wanting-Kunming 112.01 " " "
Kunming-Chungking 111.32 " " " "
Chungking-Kweiyang 40.21 " " " "
Kweiyang-Kunming 23.04 " " " "
Date : 14 August 1941.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Classification : Restricted.
Report No. 2.
CONFIDENTIAL
H
Headquarters CPBC
G-2 [CID]
Box S, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
File 383.4 — Spies, Espionage, Agents, Suspects, etc.
United States Naval Inteixigence Service
investigation report
Date : 9 Feb., 1942.
Confidential
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District.
Report made by : Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. ( jg) W. B. Stephenson,
USNR.
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941 to 9 Feb., 1942.
Status of Case : Pending in 14ND.
Origin of Case: Receipt by DI0-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign OfRce, Tokyo, and Japanese
Ambassador, Washington.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures and References : (See first page of details.)
Copy to :
ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Coml4 (1) .
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)
14ND (3)
Source File No. : 14ND #54A.
ONI File No. :
SYNOPSIS: On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu,
transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights,
cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japmaese ships at sea,
near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the de-
parture of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and
submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUBHN, a German subject and ex-officer
of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship
dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or
contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).
Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at
night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has
been found that KUEHN's signal system ever was employed.
The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as
FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Ef-
forts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.
KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be
charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.
DEDUCTIONS : Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December,
1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was
Otto KUEHN, a German subject.
APPROVED :
I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.
WBS/zw
[i] 9 Februart, 1942.
Confidential
Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
References :
(a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
(b) Coml4 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
(c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
(d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
UN, 5-1^1.
(e) DI0-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (Copy to ONI),
5-31^1.
(f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
I.IN, 7-17-41.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-A2.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-
SHIRODO, 2-8-42.
Enclosures :
(A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers,
Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels
in Pearl Harbor, at OS(X) and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 321
(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at
Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.
1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential
informant furnislied the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain com-
mercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao
KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1&41. These messages were
despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and W^ashington and Honolulu,
that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMUKA,
in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.
2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible
to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the
tirst of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason
deemed very important.
[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced
immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December.
When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence
Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. G. Bloch, USN, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George
W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of
the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in
charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard
thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radio-
grams and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were
effected.)
4. The following message, despatclied by Consul General KITA to Foreign
Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive
investigation by the three intelligence agencies :
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo
( Secret Military Message No. )
(By Chief of Consulate's Code)
To : Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.
From : Fujii
Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows :
(1) Code (Following 3 section 8 line table)
Battle Force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea —
1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
[3] 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
8.
(2) Signal
1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night — one light from 8 pm to 9 pm
indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until mid-
night, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time,
indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".
— When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight
and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5",
"6", 7", "8".
2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until Noon every hour
one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen
^ cloth indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".
3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat
with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates
"5", "6", "7", "8".
4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 pm to 1 am every
hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".
5. "KGMB want ads advertisements 9:45 am — (a) a Chinese rug, etc.,
for sale — apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6". (b) A complete chicken
farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7". (c) Beauty operator wanted
— same — indicates "5" or "8".
In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from
Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located
79716 — 46— Ex. 148—22
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala Road
which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southjeast of Maui, until
the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated, for several
days : A small fire on the high peak — 7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6" ; 8 pm to
9 pm indicates "4" or "7" ; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".
[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three
Intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of
3 December was made :
1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consu-
late, Honolulu ; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed
by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person report-
ing to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.
2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifi-
able, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.
3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a
window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German
suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 Decem-
ber, 1941.
4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have
been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and there-
after still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet
units from Pearl Harbor.
In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch
of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of
such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks :
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or
more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible perti-
nent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama
house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending
investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of his family.)
2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama
and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the
indicated markings.
[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents
to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regard-
ing signalling from a "Lanikai beach House" ; and, in addition, to conduct
an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and
Haleakala, island of Maui.
6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this oflSce sent Agents Joseph 'p.
McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of
11 December. On the following morning, an oflScer messenger flew to Wailuku,
Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch
Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to Investigate the case
there.
7. At Lanikai, the agents of this oflBce early determined that of the more than
seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines
on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that
one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN,
whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned.
Under a pretext. Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and .Kai interviewed all available
residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was
determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai
beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai
area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered
the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.
8. Upon the return of the agents of this oflSee from Lanikai on 19 December,
the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer
by Agent McCarthy :
"In compliance with instructions. Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer pro-
ceeded to Lanikai on December 13, 1941, and remained until the evening of
December 19.
"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of
all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that
might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of
signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a
house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 323
of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by
Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman
and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.
"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's
house for a month and- left there to talie another house in Laniliai on De-
cember 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not
have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this
family put in the! reappearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.
"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation re-
ported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be
suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with
the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose
house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6 :45
A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole,
was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a
red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the
Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the
Japanese referred to or to furnish any additional information concerning his
identity.
"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over
the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity
on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The in-
quiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at
night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time.
Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters
off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the i)er-
sons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or
other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period.
[7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that had a sail boat of
any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being inter-
ested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off
shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of
this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.
"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been
used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked
concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information.
However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all
residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to deter-
mine from what residence the other 'day time signals might have been given.
The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except
for the signalling with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occu-
pied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach
about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which
to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward
R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in
the information that they are a very reputable family and should be held
above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg)
G. P. Kimball of this office.
"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and
the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff
extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all
of Lanikai.
"During the period of time consumed by tlys investigation, a watch was
kept for signals and for other .suspicious activity from this vantage point
without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons inter-
viewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert
for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any informa-
tion considered worthy of further attention to this office."
[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 De-
cember, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of
war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the
following pertinent incident:
"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspiected
espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident
"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 204.'i, while
he was spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he
was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in
progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon
his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the
approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes
of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium
occupied hy Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential
investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA
and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently nt Kula <DIO-Z/3-#3),
have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and
Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident
and have also been given all information available here, in regard to
FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action.
Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subse-
quently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount
of Listerine. AVhile FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his
attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in
custody, as an enemy alien."
This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an in-
vestigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the
outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant
Commander Sadatomo OKADA, UN, among whose el^ects was found, in the
summer of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).
10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer re-
ceived from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regard-
ing investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region :
"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance
from nightfall to past midnight — actual observation of the area being con-
ducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hanson, H. E. Anderson (Fish
and Game WaMen), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert
AVong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.
"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the desig-
nated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and
are keeping this office advised.
"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with
Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire
which were interpreted as signals:
"At 8 : 25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds
in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and
off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire
signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes.
At 8 : 40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light
at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.
"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed
the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoo-
lawe.
"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and pai'ticular stress laid on the
Kahoolawe fire signal seen.
"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once
a week a sampan — "Maisie C, owned by one of the Baldwins and captained
by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the
island — where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan,
Mr. B'lldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C"
to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the
trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle. Col.
Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and
we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search .
of the island.
"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island
have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This
has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found
to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.
However, there is one such report of interest : On the night of 11 December,
1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District
Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson
to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula-
area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 325
the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by
Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to
scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police
had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There
is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the
information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared
away or else using another point."
11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further
report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in
part :
"... Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was
interviewed.
[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 De-
cember, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The
subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also
observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the
Kula Sanitorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in
line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's
room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont
about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time
was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject
light any matches."
12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the
activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula
Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's tindings will be set forth in a separate report
being prepared on FURUKAWA.
13. On 30 December, this office receivedlnformation that Morima MARUYAMA,
who lives at Kailua, Qahu,.T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but
very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house
high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After
advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on
30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MA-
RUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his
house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous
to Lanikai.
14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as
to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and
could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an obser-
vation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity
on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities."
Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other
person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling
to ships at sea.
15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the
sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is
Ichio FUJII.
[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most
of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that
the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi
FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from
Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former
clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three in-
telligence agencies confirmed this fact.
17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu,
were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu,
from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of
inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at
Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to
Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated
that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found
in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been
discovered.
18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference
to the surname FUJII (or HUZII and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was
made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case
is continuing.
326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed
at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investi-
gative agencies : Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation ;
Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division ; and, Lieutenant George P.
Kimball, District Intelligence Office,
20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry,
all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employ-
ment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and di not report for work on Mon-
day, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resigna-
tion or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.
US] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:
Miss Kimie DOUB
Takaichi SAKAI
Katsukichi MURAOKA
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
Kanaye SAHARA
Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI
22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate,
was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal
history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her
position as receptionist. Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors
to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be
slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and
impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering
questions.
23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that
Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived
from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible pui-pose of taking charge of the
expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that
work after the first few days following his arrival at Honolulu. Instead, MORI-
MURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA,
where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUB. The expatriation
work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the super-
vision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of
this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.
24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100,
two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the
afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not
come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in
a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the
same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal
Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and
it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions. Miss
DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [IJf] business hours
with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks.
Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times
they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them
came back for the rest of the day.
25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he
used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE
stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She
had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.
26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also
was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said
about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his fre-
quent departures from the Consulate during business hours.
27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth
in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third,
cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand
it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning
MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business houi'S, accom-
panied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these
occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he
suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he
meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they
were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained rela-
tions between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION ^ 327
KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where
they had^ been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937
Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.
^28. SAHARA further stated that lie did not know much about MORIMURA's
background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication
containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials.
He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a I'egular mem-
ber of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just
recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three
secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Ko-
kichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.
[^5] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTO-
SHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together
as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange,
in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the
Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by tjie fact that both were about the
same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.
30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on
9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details
of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In
substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTO-
SHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of
reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTO-
SHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of
military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with
MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose,
by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and
addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from
KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered
by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained
from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.
31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names
of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul
General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese
business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since
7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama
Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line).
According to Miss DOUE, these men would go directly into the office of the Consul
General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None
of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men
and the consular officials.
32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above,
visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss
DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went
several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described
as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat
Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul
General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office.
The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of
November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and some-
times Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.
33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former
consular clerks was commenced. Otto KUEHN was brought from detention
quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Ster-
ling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having
been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss
DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under inter-
rogation in a nearby room.
34. W^hen Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning
the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of
November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been
KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe
a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before.
Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN
was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper
over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.
35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being ques-
tioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was
being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the per-
son who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with as-
surance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having
come to the Consulate several times during November, Asked how she knew
it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and
by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen, this man leave
the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she
stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was
seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his
visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".
[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written state-
ments obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and
Alien, is submitted for information:
37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April,
1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until
captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war
until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close
of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In
1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came
to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the
secret i)olice of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN,
who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but
KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was
considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but
which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was
twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his
wife.
38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language,
and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan.
In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established
permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three
months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September,
1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he
engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN oper-
ated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at
Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his
wife's beauty shop brought in only about $80.00 a month, and they were forced to
sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which
usually was rented.
39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from
European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his
father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned.
Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany.
According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money
out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through
a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel
firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the
[18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for $40,000.00. Part of this con-
sideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu
in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was $6,000.00, but his wife, who
was questioned later, said it was $9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of
$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI,
purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.
40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and
is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942 :
41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul
OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr.
HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims pre-
viously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message
to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was
a request to send the balance of the $40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as
possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN in-
formed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an im-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 329
portant message for KYOGOKU. a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told
OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October,
1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he
intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from
KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government.
OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.
42. In his statement of 1 January, 1912, KUEHN had said that he first con-
tacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending
money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice
Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, In
his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the
message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted
having made sejveral visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and
stated that he called in the mornings.
43. It was developed that on his second or thir^ visit, either KUEHiN or
Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtain-
ing information concex'ning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to
do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity
of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor.
Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven
battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-
seven submarines, "or some similar fligure in Hawaiian waters." The infoi*ma-
tion which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can
be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were
prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data
furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the
figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely
fictitious, as far as I knew."
44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet move-
ments was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in EIUEHN's
statement of 1 January, 1942 :
"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave
transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also
outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish in-
formation relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that
had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These
signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama
which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One
. light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor ; one light between 7 and
8 meant scouting force in harbor ; one light between 8 and 9 meant air-
craft carriers in harbor ; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet
prepared to leave ; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared
to leave ; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to
leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and
two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one
to two days ago ; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers
left one to two days ago ; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle
fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant
scouting force left three to four days ago ; two lights between 9 and 10
p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago ; two lights between
10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago ; two lights be-
tween 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago ; two
lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to
six days ago.
[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen
on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in
daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor ; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. mean-
ing scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning
aircraft carriers in harbor ; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle
fleet prepared to leave ; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting
force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning
aircraft carriers prepared to leave ; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m.
meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago ; one sheet between 1 p. m. and
2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago ; two sheets on line
between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days
ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet
left three to four days ago ; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m.
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
meaning scouting force left tliree to four days ago ; two slieets on line be-
tween 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriei-s left three to four days
ago ; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet
left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon
meaning scouting force left five to six days ago ; two sheets on line between
12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aii'craft carriers left five to six days ago.
"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too com-
plicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One
or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had rid-
den by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that
time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified
system of signalling, on what I thinlt was December 2, 1941. This set of sig-
nals contained only eight combinations, as follows : No. 1 meaning battle
fleet prepared to leave ; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave ; No.
3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago ; No. 4 meaning scouting force
left one to three days ago; No. 5, [21] meaning aircraft carriers left
one to three days ago ; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago ;
No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning air-
craft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as
follows from my Lanikai home : One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No.
1 ; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2 ; one light between 9 and 10 p. m.
'tueaning No. 3 ; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4 ; two lights
between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5 ; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. mean-
ing No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile
lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung
on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9
and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3 ; one
between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4 ; two pieces between 8 and 9
a. m. meaning No. 5 ; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and
so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama
home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1 ; one between 8 and 9 p. m.
would mean No. 2 ; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6 ; one
between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12
p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.
"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been
used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain
hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corre-
sponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was
in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have
been used to indicate each signal.
"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morn-
ing the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug
was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was adver-
tised for ; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would
indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible
to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a cer-
tain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals,
such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6,
and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previ-
ously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of
vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by
reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which
border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended
plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.
"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short
wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to
contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to
my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.
"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope
by me about 8 : 30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I
was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car
I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals
and another envelope containing $500.00, which was to be sent to my son
LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall.
I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and
drove on into Honolulu.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 331
"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted
to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with
those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the
same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear In connection
with the hours stated for the signals to be given,
"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have
had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date,
neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such
represent tives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Con-
sulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.
"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island
nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter,
and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that
CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese
Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they
departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no
correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER
about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941,
to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee
with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred
from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these
individuals at the present time."
45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the
TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel
called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing
$14,000.00 in $100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN
that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of
3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows :
"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did L receive any post card
until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese
boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama
and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working
in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went
around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said
"Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I
took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and
a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he
said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper
written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would
be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was
on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was
typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and
an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make
the test. I was auite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to
him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no.
I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he
then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were
$14,000 in the package, mostly in new $100 bills, some $20 bills. I think that
this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this
letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make
this radio test and burned it up."
46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941,
he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself
to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua, KOTO-
SHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and
there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Maluniu
Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive
several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and
Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA
reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from the direction in which he had
disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later
rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximatelv one-half mile from
the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO
directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above
mentioned, and identified the places.
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by
Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Jap-
anese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon,
on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person
is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORI-
MURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very familiar to
the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that
it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same
[25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was
quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is
positive he has seen the person represented in the photograph before, and be-
lieved it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However,
KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to
see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in
port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only
Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU,
which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed
for San Francisco the following day.)
8. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other
then himself and the Japanese who delivered the $14,000.00 to him, in any of the
activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that any-
one, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction
with KUEHN.
49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Con-
sulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth
in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on
3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB
are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated
by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated
the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale
of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investiga-
tion by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record
of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between
24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office
Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box
at the Honolulu postoffice.
50. Of the original $14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, $5,000.00 in new
$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of
Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also
was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given $2,000.00, in similar denominations,
to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money
also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they
were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through,
Honolulu banks.
51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named
therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and
his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District
Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly
suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.
52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July,
1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following informa-
tion appeared on the suspect card :
(Occupation)
"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu None at present
Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among
officers in U. S. Navy ; at one time received considerable sums of money from
European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May,
1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable
sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real
estate."
53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District
Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e),
the pertinent portion of which reads as follows :
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 333
"KUEHN, Friedel— Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of
being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and
Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are re-
ported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."
54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District
Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated
that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the
request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy.
The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general
requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels,
and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed,
but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with
an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that
the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information
they furnished according to its value.
55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning
"Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed
to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager descrip-
tion furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and
Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained
prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs had
contacted the Japanese Consulate.
56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance
in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus
M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has pre-
pared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections
34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be
preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General,
Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of
the case before the Military Commission.
57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN
conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about
20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, infor-
mation to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of
the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN,
and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed
by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about
28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and
furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to
the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals
previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to
the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.
[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title
50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose
of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and
reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury
of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan,
unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States
naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.
59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and
specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted
the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese
Government, through the Consulate.
60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative
agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would
establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December
1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN
for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts
still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what
other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.
61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period,
1_4 December, 194], and at other times, as the same have been received by this
office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report
supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PtJARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pending — ^14nd
6 February, 1942.
Enclosure {A) : Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers,
aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels
in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.
Date
Time
Type of ships
BBS CAs CLs CVs SSs DDs DMs AVDs (i)
11/22
11/23
11/24
11/25
11/26
11/27
11/28
11/29
11/30
0800
1800
0800
laoo
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
Key: BB — battleship; CA — heavy cruiser; CL — light cruiser; CV— aircraft carrier; SS — submarine;
DD — destroyer; DM — light mine layer (destroyer type); A VD— seaplane tender (destroyer type).
#Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present
use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.
SECRET
Headquabtees Hawaiian Department
intee-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its endorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
istlnd. AG 12 Dec 41.
2 Ind. G2RE Cont., #362 19
Feb 42.
To
0-2.
Subject: WD Radio #628, 12 December 1941
"Japanese Spy Activities"
1 Incl.: Reply sent in Gen. Short's name.
For information
4837
R. H. N. 12
Dee 1941.
KJF EM.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 335
Signal Corps, United States Abmy
secrerr — confidential — restricted
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE
SB 0HU6 USG CDE WASHINGTON DC (VIA COMMERCIAL PACIFIC CAJBLE)
211/210
COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPT.
628 12th For your information and necessary action Colon One Ichiro Fuji
on December third arranged following signal system for Japanese fleet upon clo-
sure normal means communication Stop Lanikai beach house to show lights be-
tween eight PM and midnight and between midnight and four AM with various
meanings as to our naval dispositions depending on the hour of display Stop
Similarly a star and a roman numeral three at the head of the sail of the quote
star boat unquote In Lanikai Bay during daylight Stop Also lights in the attic
window of Kalama house parenthesis beach village one mile north west of
Lanikai close parenthesis Stop Also advertisements broadcast on KGMB re
Chinese rug for sale comma Chic space space Co paren two letters missing end
paren farm comma beauty operator and apply PO box One Four Seven Six
Stop If above unworkable a signal boniire to be located on Maui six miles
north of Kula Sanitorium at point halfway between lower Kula road and
Haleakala road.
( Signed ) Mabshall.
Received as a SECRET communication.
Decoded by : Lt. G. Lennox SC 850A 12 Dec 1941 Lx.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 628."
Note. See A. R. 330-5 and 335-5 for handling messages of this classification.
December 12, 1941.
Memorandum to SAC :
Re : Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
In accordance with your instructions the district of Kalama was checked as
thoroly as possible for houses with dormer windows. Three were found. These
are the homes of Otto KUEHN, now in CD, John Waterhouse, and Ensign
Bradley, USN, who has living with him a Lieutenant from Bellows Field.
A driving check was made in the district between Kalaheo Drive and the
pine grove and none other than the KUEHN place were found here.
On the beach side of Kalaheo Drive we found the John Waterhouse home,
which is the first residence encountered on the beach coming from Mokapu.
This house has not been occupied, except on Sunday nite, 12-7-41, when John
Waterhouse slept there. This was the first occupancy since the first of December.
However, there are Japanese living there. These on interview I found to be
Waichi Fukui, about 34; his wife, Hatsuko, 29, and their three children, the
eldest 9. Also living with them are Miss Chiyoko TAO, 21, and Jotaro ONISHI,
32. The latter is a brother of Mrs. Fukui. W. Fukui was born in Japan and has
lived in Hawaii most of his life. His wife is Hawaii born but did not regain
citizenship. Miss TAO and ONISHI are Hawaii born. Also living there since
the bombing are Isuke KIMURA, 49, his wife and 24 year old son who were
machine-gunned on Sunday while on their farm at Mokapu. I learned from W.
FUKUI that quite a few persons come about the place to fish and he complained
that persons broke into the place frequently by means of the dormer windows.
I was also informed by Norman Godbold Jr., Territorial Treasurer that while
he lived there in that district, directly behind the quarters occupied by FUKUI
that there were a number of persons visiting there at all times.
The house formerly occupied by Godbold is now occupied by Ensign BRADLEY,
USN, camera party, and the Lieutenant from Bellows Field and is in the next lot
to the WATERHOUSE property. The dormer windows of both places provide
quite a good view of the ocean.
A walk along the beach from the Waterhouse property to the Kailua end of
the beach failed to show any other houses with dormer windows.
Respectfully submitted.
J. A. Burns.
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Honolulu, T. H., January 4, 1942.
MEMORANDUM TO OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Attention : Captain I. H. Mayfield :
Re : Japanese Consulate activities — Confile ; Espionage — J.
During investigations whicli have been conducted by ONI, G-2 and tlie FBI,
Special Agent F. G. TILLMAN and Lt. GEORGE KIMBALL of ONI have de-
veloped the following information which it appears may be of immediate interest
to you in defense of these islands.
During the course of an interview with RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHI-
RODA, a former clerk employed by the Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu,
it was developed that TADASI MORIMURA, who is registered with the Secre-
tary of State as the Chancellor of that Japanese Consulate, is without doubt
the person charged by the Japanese Government with the collection of military
information in the Territory of Hawaii. This is substantiated by the state-
ments of other members of the clerical staff of the Consulate, and by MORI-
MURA's apparent activity.
KOTOSHIRODA is the only American-born Japanese employed at the Con-
sulate in whom the Consulate staff placed any confidence in connection with
other than routine matters. It has been learned from KOTOSHIRODA that
he accompanied MORIMURA on numerous occasions to jwints on the islands of
Hawaii, Maui and particularly in the vicinity of naval establishments on the
island of Oahu. These trips were usually made in a Ford sedan owned by
KOTOSHIRODA and a taxi owned and driven by an alien Japanese.
It was ascertained that MORIMURA showed unusual interest in the following
points on the island of Oahu :
(1) Kailua Beach in the vicinity of the public park which was visited in
May, 1941.
(2) Waimanalo Beach in the vicinity of the old sugar wharf which was
visited on the same day as the above.
MEMO FOE ONI
1-4-1942
(3) Haleiwa Bay in the vicinity of the public park which was visited three
or four times, the last visit being in about the end of October, 1941.
In addition, the entire Consulate staff had picnics at the SAM WOODS' place,
Lanikai, the first in January or February, 1941, and the second in March or April
of the same year. These picnics appear to have been held in the absence of the
owners of the property and by arrangements with the Japanese yardman who is
presently being investigated. This place is less than two miles from the Kailua
Beach park previously mentioned.
It has also been learned that MORIMURA has contacts at Pearl City ; these
individuals are now under investigation. He has also visited a point below the
home of CHESTER CLARKE at Aiea Heights where an excellent view of Pearl
Harbor may be obtained.
The above information is being submitted in the event that it may serve
some immediate purpose. The results of this investigation will be outlined fully
in a subsequent report.
Very truly yours,
RLS : mma
cc : Lt. Col. Bickneix
R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.
signals
638 12th Contents messages as follows quote one twenty five please turn over
immediately both items which I requested one twenty eight please wire imme-
diately re the latter part of my one twenty three the movements of the flpet
subsequent to the fourth circular two four siqq one please keep the code list
until the last moment and if by any chance you have already destroyed them
they will have to be resent to you so please notify us of this fact immediately
this message is a precaution circular two four siqq siqq we are giving a great
deal of thought to the question of the return to .Japan of your staff and their
families therefore wait where you are until I wire you at a later date unquote.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
337
Headquaetebs Hawaiian DEyABTMENT
INTEB-STAFF BOTJTING SLIP
The Intei'-Staff Routing Slip is foi- use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO, It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff OflSce
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adju-
tant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating
a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
1st Ind. Contact Office 2/12/42
2 G-2 2/12/42
Subject: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column
Activities at
1. For information and return. End.— (14ND report
re subject dated 2/9/42).
1. Noted. 2. Tiiis is a good report and coincides
with our beliefs.
[1]
Fourteenth Naval Disteict
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, T. H.
14ND AS-5/P&-2/EF37
Confidential
From:
AJL/ab
February 9, 1942.
The District Intelligence Officer
Fourteenth Naval District
To : The District Intelligence Officer
Third Naval District
Subject : Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column Activities at
Reference: (a) Letter dated 3 January, 1942 from Commandant 3ND to Chief
of Naval Operations, above Subject.
1. Reference (a) suggests that "there be conveyed to all District Intelligence
Offices, such information of Fifth Column activities at Pearl Harbor, as may be
useful in connection with the operations of all District Intelligence Office
activities".
2. For the pui-pose of this letter, methods of fifth column activities will be con-
sidered to consist of the following :
(a) To conduct accurate espionage work and transmit the results to the enemy.
(b) To demoralize public opinion; to cause panic or confusion; to promote
discord and dissatisfaction.
(c) To carry on actual physical sabotage.
(d) To render assistance to invading forces.
3. Referring to Paragraph 2 (a) above, there is no question but that the espio-
nage work of our enemies was carried out in an extremely efficient, thorough and
accurate manner. There is also no doubt but that this information was very suc-
cessfully conveyed to our enemies. The collection of the information was very
simple. The geography and topography of the area around Pearl Harbor are such
that any one with good eyes (perhaps aided with a pair of field glasses) can ob-
serve accurately movements in and out of Pearl Harbor from several highways
and roads near Pearl Harbor and also from a great many houses on the heights
79716 — 46— Ex, 148-
-23
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
back of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. There is no question but that the enemy did
this in a very thorough and efficient manner. It is also true that they were able
to transmit [2] this information very effectively and quickly to their
forces at sea. This again is easily explained by the fact that there was no censor-
ship of mail, cables or radio ; sampans were operating regularly off shore ; there
may have been (and probable was) communication by private radio; and there
may have been other signalling. Unfortunately, under a democratic form of
government, it does not seem possible to take necessary action ahead of time to
prevent this sort of thing.
4. Referring to Paragraph 2 (b) above, there were numerous rumors of cars
zigzagging along highways to slow up trafBc, of cars being parked across roads to
tie up or block traffic, of shots being fired from ambush or from automobiles, etc.
etc., etc. None of these reports were substantiated.
5. Referring to Paragraph 2 (c) above, there were no real cases of actual
physical sabotage. This is somewhat hard to understand as the utilities such
as the Hawaiian Electric Company, the Honolulu Gas Company, the Honolulu
Rapid Transit Company, the plants and storage tanks of the privately owned oil
companies all of which are concentrated in a limited area, the City and Navy
Yard water supply systems, etc., etc., were not adequately protected. As a matter
of fact, a comparatively small group of well trained saboteurs could easily have
put them all out of operation in a very short time. This leads to the query as to
whether there were no well organized plans to wreck these utilities and services,
or whether such plans were and are so well organized that one might assume
that instructions had been passed that no action was to be taken at the time
as there were no plans to follow up the attack of December 7 with attempts to land
and invade the island. This latter assumption may seem to be far fetched, but
is being carefully considered and studied. The only real basis for considering it
seriously is that there was not a single attempt made to sabotage any of these
essential utilities on the morning of December 7.
6. Referring to Paragraph 2 (d) above, there were many reports such as the
one about swaths being cut in cane and pineapple fields pointing to important
objectives ; people signalling enemy planes ; etc., etc. All such rumors and reports
were checked as expeditiously as possible. None of the cases investigated proved
to be authentic.
7. This Subject has been checked thoroughly with the local office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and with Military Intelligence Division, H^awaiian De-
partment, whose findings coincide with the above.
I. H. Mayfield,
A. J. Lowrey,
A. J. LOWKBTT,
By direction.
CO: ONI (2)
C0M14 (1)
DIOs in all NDs (1) (except 16ND)
FBI-Hon (1)
MID-HD (1)
Plan (1) "B."
From
3 Decembeb, 1941.
To : , Tokyo
(Secret military message No. ) (Chief of Consulate's Code).
To : Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff
From: FUJII
Re : Signals : I wish to simplify communications as follows :
1. Code (following 3 section 8 line table) battle force, including scouting
force, are about to put to sea —
1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle force has sailed lst-3rd dates Inc.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
4. All aircraft carj^ers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
5. All battle force have sailed, 4th-6th dates Inc.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)
2. Signal
— light in Lanikai beach house at night .
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 339
One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1". From 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2".
The below signals until midnight, in order to indicate 3 and 4. Two lights,
according to the time, indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.
When not in accordance with (lights) above 1 full automobile headlight and
one half light indicate 1, 2, 3, 4. Two full lights indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.
2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour 1 piece
linen cloth (sheet) indicates 1, 2, 3, 4. Two pieces linen cloth indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.
3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (Offing) a star boat with
one star on sail indicates 1, 2. 3, 4 ; a star and "I^" indicates 5, 6, 7, 8.
4. Light in dormer window of house from 7pm to 1 am every hour
indicates 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
5. "KGMB Want Ads" advertisements 9.45 am
(A) A Chinese rug etc., for sale — apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 3 or 6.
(B) A complete chicken farm etc., apply as above indicates 4 or 7.
(C) Beauty operator wanted — same — indicates 5 or 8.
In the event that in accordance with one of 3 items written above from Oahu
a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between
the lower road six miles north of KULA Sanatorium and Haleskala road which
can be watch from the sea to the south west and south east of Maui, until the
receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several
days : A small fire on the high peak.
7 pm — 8 pm indicates 3 or 6 ; 8 pm — 9 pm indicates 4 or 7.
9 pm — 10 pm indicates 5 or 8.
Extract from O. N. I. report dated 9 December 1941 ; Subject, Report of activi-
ties, Maui, Lanai and Molokai, since 7 December 1941.
"Mr. Earl Kraft reix)rted that on 8 December 1941, at about 2045, while he was
spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was tele-
phoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light
in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr.
Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person
flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took
place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in
the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by SHIGEO FURUKAWA, who is
subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will
be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at
Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens.
Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised
of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard
to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action.
Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently
has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine.
While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide,
no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."
From Katsuro MIHO, attoruey-at-Law, it was learned that the subject is a
respected surgeon and considered one of the best physicians in town even among
the white doctors. He is also alleged to be a cancer specialist and radium expert.
The subject, MIHO stated has lived in the mainland and London and has
been in the Territory for the past 20 years.
Subject has a son ISHIRO, an alien and an aviation engineer, who is now here.
A daughter MARIKO, a student at the University of Hawaii is married to Daino
SUMIDA'S adopted son and heir.
Dr. SAKAMAKI states that Sumida's son got married to avoid the draft.
Subject's wife is now alleged to be in Japan.
RiCHABD Mhjler.
12-12-41.
ONI and FBI to send agents to Lanikei and Kalama to stay there and find out
all possible information. Each to send two or more agents. No communication
by phone, only by one man coming in by automobile. These groups to communi-
cate with each other — How? How communicate with Army?
MID watch for (1) display of lights, (2) display of cloths (3) Star sail boat.
Army to send plane to Maui with the information. Get Adelson and Hansen on
job with Army about house on Haleakala.
340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MUMO TO SAC
11 : 30 a. m., December 17, 1941
Re : John Waterhouse House at Kailua
Ml-. George Moody, of Grossman-Moody, reports that on returning from horse-
back rides almost any Wednesday, Saturday, or Sunday afternoon he would
notice as many as sixty or seventy Japanese in the Waterhouse house. The
servants at this house very seldom, had the owners come down and they are also
said to have been raising pigeons. Mr. Moody was certain that this house had
dormer windows.
R. A. Cooke, Jr.
HONOLITLU, T. H.
Dec. 12, il941.
Memorandum to the sac :
Dr. Tokue TAKAHASHI
1385 Alewa Drive
95 N. Vineyard St.
Louis KAHANAMOKU, Sheriff's Office came in two nights ago and furnished
information on the subject.
He stated that about a year ago he rented a house from the subject on Liholiho
St. Soon after he rented the house, the subject asked him to take a group of
Japanese Naval Personnel out on a canoe ride. He also told KAHANAMOKU
that he had to entertain the Navy men at his home that evening.
KAHANAMOKU stated that this incident took place about a year ago upon the
visit here of a Japanese Training ship.
The subject's home on Alewa Heights commands a full view of Pearl Harbor.
KAHANAMOKU further stated that the subject is interested in sailing and owns
a sailing boat.
Upon checking at the Ala Moana Basin, William NELSON, in charge of the
Basin informed that the subject bought a second-hand 38 foot yacht, a very
sea-worthy craft about three years ago. This boat was sold to Dr. Louis GAS-
PAR by the subject about three months ago.
According to NELSON, the subject was a poor sailor and had a couple of
Japanese boys to help him operate the boat whenever he went out.
Extract, Army & Navy Register, 7/S/39.
THE SPY GAME
In the military and naval intelligence service spies are classified as: (1)
Stationary agents ; (2) mobile agents ; and (3) special agents.
The stationary agent has a mission assigned to him to secure information on a
specified subject. He established himself in a place conveniently located and
generally engages in a small business enterprise to serve as a cloak for his opera-
tions. A cafe or restaurant has been found to be one of the best screens, for by
serving better food at lower prices he can eventually attract and make friends
with people who may unwittingly, or wittingly, for a price, provide him with the
information which he seeks. This information he pieces together to attain his
final ends. Again these stationary agents may find employment in hotels and clubs,
where they come in contacts with guests and members in a casual way and pick up
bits of information. Here they also have access to baggage in the absence of its
owners and may examine into it. They may also find employment in Governmental
or industrial plants which are engaged in the manufacture of war material and
thus gain information which they are charged to obtain. Many of these station-
ary agents are women and they are characterized as the most dangerous of all.
This is evidenced by the reappearance in our own Navy Department of a war time
warning against them — a sign which reads :
"Beware of female spies. Women are being employed by the enemy to secure
information from Navy men, on the theory that they are less liable to be suspected
than male spies. Beware of inquisitive women, as well as prying men."
Stationary agents are also employed as "letter boxes." These maintain a per-
manent address where mail to the other spies operating in the district may be ad-
dressed, be received and cleared to them.
The mobile agents operate under the guise of tourists, travelers, students or
traveling salesmen. There are thousands of them all over the world. They as-
sume the status which is best likely to permit them to accomplish their mission.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 341
The reports of this gentry are pieced together by experts and an accurate picture
of certain situations reported upon may be gained.
Special agents are employed on special missions, where more or less skill is re-
quired. They are used principally in times of international tension and political
crises. Hundreds of them were used in Austria before that country was taken
over and in Czechoslovakia during the Sudeten crises, as well as later when that
republic was broken up and dismembered. They have been used in the Polish
Corridor for months and are now paving the way for a Danzig coup.
All of the great democratic nations are today passing on to their nationals who
are employed in activities connected with the national defense, directly or remotely,
the warning which France impressed upon her whole body x^litic during the
World War: "Keep your mouths shut. Be on your guard. The ears of the
enemy are listening to you."
HU181SN SCDE TOKYO 24 JG 4 816P
RIYOJI HONOLULU
01260 KOKOK UVUBA WWAYY lUIQO PETJJ UMNVH lAHOO GAUEY
VYTIN DYKIE SVSFG BAUGL lEFRAU ALDAI DHIYO MEYHE ATLIE
LBUOL EIELI AWBUB
TOGO
HU187SN SCDE TOKYO 30 JG 4 905PM
RIYOJI
HONOLULU
SIKYU 92466 GOGOG PJVEU VUUIY UDFJG OUEAI JYPGB SUUPX SEEVF
lOCAA ATTHA OTYVA GUUOO GWWDZ AUAUH SUIYD LLAHI ARRLO
HEOIA QVEDE TLFRG YATAM EUEXA XWDEI PIDCO TGOOX
TOGO
HU301 CB SCDE TOKIO 18 JG 6 648P
RIYOJI
HONOLULU
SIKYU 01280 KEKEK OQUCQ SNAII UOIUB DDJIY HRBJI EEUGO
CHVWO DAANJ OJJKV UUAKH UYDSU QSORO
TOGO
HU131SN SCDE TOKYO 29 JG 6 925PM
RIYOJI HONOLULU
KINQU 92461 GOGOG RAWOU UEIYF ZZOFB SAUQY SSEVJ IIQYK SOSAB
OUIER OESIO OJHUO JLREL OLAYS OOEYB IBOFJ HAETC YDSYU
OOMDR DIKAM WGVOZ OIYFE NUVBD DUIZO JOCQI
TOGO
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 3
Investigation By Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of
War Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pe:arl Harbor Board
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact OflSce,
Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.
a. Army Contact OflSce memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 7 October 1941
re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.
b. M.I.D., Washington, Letter of transmittal dated 28 August 1941, w/letter dated
3 August 1941 from George Paisn to President Roosevelt re Japanese in
Hawaii ; summary of information dated 30 September 1941 re letter, and
H.H.D. letter dated 30 September 1941 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply
thereto attached).
c. M.I.D., Washington, letter of transmittal dated 16 September 1941, w/letter
from M.I.D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to
General Short dated 25 July 1941.
e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled
"Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo,
w/note attached.
f. Inter-staff routing slip dated July 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines reported
to be concealed in Shallow Water near Molokai, w/G-2, H.H.D. letter of
transmittal dated 25 July 1941 're Activities of Foreigners in Country —
Mexico.
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
g. F.B.I, report dated 6 November 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
h. F.B.I, i-eport dated 9 October 1940 re Rev. Unji Hii'ayama.
i. 14ND report dated 15 February 1943 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu —
Espionage Activities.
j. 14ND report dated 15 June 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage
Activities,
k. 14ND report dated 14 February 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu —
Espionage Activities.
1. F.B.I, report to F.B.I., Washington, 28 March 1942, re notes found on desk
pad at Japanese Consulate.
m. F.B.I, letter, 1^ March 1942, re translations made of coded and confidential
material from Japanese Consulate,
n. Inter-stafE routing slip dated 14 March 1942 re Translation of a Register of
Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F.B.I. letter of transmittal dated
13 March 1942 and report same subject attached.
CONFIDENTIAL
File 336.8 — ^Activities of Foreigners in U. S. — Japanese — ^Binder #2: From
1 April 1941 to 13 November 1941
Headquarteks CPBO
G-2 [CID]
Box 3, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, Sa/n Francisco, Calif.
Army Contactt Office, 7 October 1941.
Subject : Japanese Arrival In And Departure From Honolulu On Taiyo Maru.
Memo, for: Col. Bicknell.
The Taiyo Maru, a NYK ship, under .Japanese government requisition arrived
here from Japan wit,h 326 Japanese (145 aliens and 181 dual citizens) and 14
others (Americans and Britishers) on the morning of November 1st, docking at
Pier 8 at about 9 : 00 A. M. This was the second NYK vessel to come here from
Japan since the suspension of Japanese shipping to the United States ; the first
one having been the Tatuta Maru of Oct. 24th. The Taiyo Maru was especially
assigned to make a round trip from Japan to Hawaii so that the people who have
been stranded in Japan and Hawaii may return to their desired homes.
Majority of the passengers that arrived on the Taiyo were local people and
few of them were people going to America and Europe. The greater portion of
the returning local people went to Japan either in spring or summer of this year
for a short visit and they would have returned here earlier if transportation
was available; the others have been either studying or working in Japan and
would have remained in Japan longer under normal conditions, but the tense
situation between United States and Japan more or less forced them to catch
the first available ship on hand and come back to Hawaii.
It seemed, judging from interviews with the passengers and from reports by
other contacts, every single one of the returning people was very glad to come
back here and they were all determined to live here permanently. Moreover,
they unanimously seemed to have fell very inconvenient and uncomfortable
to live in Japan due to economic. pressure although they have not experienced
serious shortages in every daj'^ necessities. Many people have expressed their
feeling that the people in Japan are united solidly and are well controlled by the
government and are prepared to meet any eventuality. Many American citizens
of Japanese encestry seemed extremely vexed and expressed hatred toward the
Japanese government for a discriminatory action against them ; that is, American
citizens were given only 10 yen as spending money on the ship while the alien
Japanese were allowed to board the ship with 200 yen or more per person.
The baggages of the returning passengers on the Taiyo were carefully in-
spected by the Customs oflBcials, but nothing of importance from the military or
naval or national defense standpoints was discovered. However, it was inter-
esting to note that these people brought back very little baggages, practically
nothing compared to the number of baggages that usually were brought here
before during the normal times. The contents of these baggages consisted
mainly of old personal effects and there were very small amount of new things ;
indicating that either these people were out of funds or Japanese government
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 343
was carryiug out strict control of outlet of goods from Japan. As far as I could
gather, it was mainly due to strict government control of commodities, and lack
of fund was secondary.
The inspection of the baggages of the people leaving here for Japan aboard
the Taiyo Maru by the Customs Office started at 7 : 00 A. M., Monday, Nov. 3rd.,
and lasted till about 7 : 00 P. M., that night. It was resumed at 7 : 00 A. M., on
the next day and was completed at around 6 : 30 P. M. About 125 families were
inspected on the first day and about 225 families were inspected on the second
day. The types of baggages consisted of trunks, suit cases, sacks, boxes, sewing
machines, ice boxes, packages, etc. In them were found kitchen utensils, plates,
tools, clothes, hats, shoes, books, magazines, and many other household goods
and personal effects and some canned goods. One interesting feature of the
baggages was that everyone of the families was taking a sewing machine and in
one particular instance two sewing machines and that all these machines appeared
to have been crated by the Singer Sewing Machine Co. It seemed all the leaving
people were well aware of the government regulations concerning money or mone-
tary certificates and commodities, for outside of a few cases, all complied studi-
ously with the prescribed regulations.
Wednesday, Nov. 5th, was devoted primarily in checking the leaving people's
money and certificates with the licenses that were issued by the local Freeze
Order authorities and their passports and searching them and questioning them
on matters that might be of interest to some authorities concerned. However,
some hand baggages were also inspected on this day. The work for tl;is day
started at 7 : 00 A. M. and was over by 6 : 30 P. M.
Following information was gathered during the 3 day inspection, search, and
questioning :
1. Practically all were going to Japan to visit their sick parents, brothers or
sisters, or other relatives and they hope to retui'n sometime later.
2. Some were going back to Japan to remain there permanently. These people
did not even take the trouble of obtaining necessary immigration papers for
re-entry here. I feel there were about 20 of these families. They seemed to
have amassed enough money here to enable them to live comfortably in Japan"
the rest of their lives.
3. There were few others who were undecided. That is, they may come back
to Hawaii if it will be possible, but otherwise they would be satisfied to remain
in Japan forever. I guessed perhaps there were from 25 to 50 of these people.
4. There were about 25 Japanese business men and professional men returning
to Japan. They were going back because of lack of business or were going back
because they have finished their work here.
5. The amount of money carried by these people ranged from about 2,000 yen to
65,000 yen, which were either in the form of bank deposit certificate or drafts
or bonds. Amount of American money carried by an individual ranged from about
$100 to $200.
A great many of these people originally had intended to go to Japan a few
months ago, but were forced to wait till now due to no shipping.
It is understood that 238 alien Japanese and 210 American citizens of Japanese
ancestry have left for Japan on the Taiyo Maru. Three persons, I have been
told, have cancelled their reservation since the baggage inspection started on
Monday. Also, I imderstand that about 50 people have cancelled their reserva-
tions before they sent their baggages to the pier.
As soon as the final inspection was finished, the people were taken aboard
the ship and were not allowed to come ashore. Hence, customary goodbyes
were exchanged out in the street and in the park in front of the pier hours
before the actual sailing of the ship. The Royal Hawaiian Band played "Aloha"
at least 3 hours before the ship sailed. In other words, all the color and gaiety
of the past was missing when the ship actually slid away from Pier 8 at 7: 80
P. M., Wednesday, Nov. 5th.
Following are some interesting things noted during the 3 days of inspection :
1. Shoyei Kamiya declared that he is going to join the Japanese army. He
even wrote it in the diary he carried. His brother is working at 711 S. King St.
and his name is Shozen Kamiya.
2. Takumyo, Katsuto, a Buddhist Reverend, was found carrying obscene pic-
tures in his baggage.
3. Uzo Shishido had many maps of East Asia which were published in con-
junction with the recent China incident by Japanese magazines as supplements.
4. Several old Japanese were seen holding letter of appreciation from both
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Japanese Army and Navy offices for their contributions toward soldiers relief,
defense funds, and comfort bags, and other donations.
5. Kenpei luchi was the only man whose family record showed that he had been
an ex-Japanese navy man.
6. Rev. Tatsuo Sawai took many old Japanese books and magazines back to
Japan. He possessed a scratch paper on which appeared various data concerning
the Japanese people in Mt. View, Hawaii, which he claimed he collected for the.
Japanese consulate in Honolulu while acting as a consular agent.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such
action as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
Sheeman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G^2.
1 Enclosures:
201 — Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in Hawaii:
dtd 8/3/41.
CONFIDENTIAL
MID 201 (Paisn, George)
Strictly private and confidential.
The Bobeas,
Blue Ridge,
New York State.
Aug 3 1941
Dear Mb. President, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on
your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I
feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.
A^ I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii
and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that
island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some
kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii,
the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source
of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be
trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these
reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand
the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of
the military authorities in Hawaii. Should Japan destroy these stores and
these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the
Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of
supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard
these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of
these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk
and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might
possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose.
Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay
any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my
anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken
every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians
themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible
precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left
untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take
the neecssary precautions.
Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with re-
newed health.
Very sincerely yours,
/s/ George Paisn.
The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.
8/21/41
Copies to:
G-3
Haw.
VSR/ege
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 345
confidential
War Department
M. I. D.
Intelligence Section, Contact Officei,
21S Dillingham Building, Honolulu, T. H., SO September 1941.
Subject : Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.
Summary of Information :
Dear Mr. I'resident: I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter
on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance
that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.
As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii
and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that
island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some
kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii,
the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source
of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can
be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of
these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and
demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval
and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores
and these reserves by sabotage, the American lleet would be at the mercy of the
Japanese fleet and an almost desepate situation might arise. Further, it is of
supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard
these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of
these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any
risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard
might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his
purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be pre-
pared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It
may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval
officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii,
the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy,
but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves
should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from
failure to take the necessary precautions.
Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with
renewed health,
Very sincerely yours,
/s/ George Paisn.
The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.
•
Evaluation
• — of source — of information
Reliable
Credible
Questionable
X Undetermined X
confidential
Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
Office of the Assistant Chief of SI'aff for Military Intelligence.
Fort Shatter, T. H., 30 September 19^1.
In reply refer to: 336.8 — (Japanese)
Subject : Letter from George Paisn relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.
To Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island,
New York.
1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your information, with the request
that Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess
concerning the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the
Japanese Government, and the native Hawaiians.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.
346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
confidential
Headquaetees Second Corps Area,
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Oovernors Island, New York, Optober 15, 1941.
Subject: LETTER FROM GEORGE PAISN RELATIVE TO JAPANESE
ACTIVITIES IN HA WAIL
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.
1. Reference is made to your communication of 30th, September, with above
subject title.
2. Before this office can comply with request contained therein to interview
the subject, it is requested that this office be supplied with Mr. Paisn's address,
inasmuch as there is nothing contained in your communication which would
indicate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.
For the A. C. of 8., Ch-2.
Lt. Col, G. S. C,
Executive Officer, G-2.
336.8 (AGO) 1st Ind.
Intelligence Section, Contact Officer, 214 Dillingham Building, Honolulu, T. H.
5 November 1941 — To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs, 2d Corps Area,
Governors Island, N. Y.
1. Mr. Paisn's address as shown off his letter to the President was "The
Boreas, Blue Ridge, New York State". This address was inadvertently omitted
in S/I of 30 September 1941.
George W. Bicknei^l,
Lieut. Colonel, G. 8. C,
Asst. A. C. of 8., G-2, Contact Officer.
confidential
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Wae Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington, D. C, September 16, 19^1.
Subject : Letter of transmittal.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such
action as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
• Brigadier General, V. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
1 Enclosures: 336.8 San Francisco S-25 — ^MID Summ. of Info, re Alleged
exodus of Japanese.
confidential
MID 336.8 San Francisco G2/CI
8-26-41 DGE
War Department
M. I. D.
G-2, Ninth Corps Abea, August 26, 1941.
7399.42
Subject : Alleged exodus of Japanese.
Summary of Information :
A confidential informant reported to this office that he received information
through one SILVER that all Japanese officials of Japanese concerns in San
Francisco have received instructions to liquidate their affairs as soon as possible
and to leave for Japan. Only three (3) key individuals in each concern are
not affected by this.
SILVER is said to be a buyer for a Japanese firm.
/s/ J. H. W.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
347
Evaluation
— of source — of information
X Credible X
Reliable
Questionable
Undetermined
Distribution :
G-2, WD
DIO, 12 ND
Further Dist:
G-1
G-4
FBI
Haw.
Intell.
G-3
WPD
State
Phil.
File
confidential
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
inter-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
To
Subject: L/fr Adm Bloeh to Gen Short dated
25 July 1941
1st Ind. AQ 4 Aug 41-
2dlnd. G-2 4 Aug 41.
G-2.
C/S.
3d C/S H9 8/5/41
4th Ind. AQ 6 Aug 41.
G-2.
This is apparently a G-2 communication.
1 Incl.
Reference attached note from Chief of Staff:
The letter of Admiral Bloch herewith
acknowledges receipt of the letter of the
Commanding General, 25 July 1941, trans-
mitting a copy of correspondence from the
War Department, MID, to A. C. of S.,
G-2, Hawaiian Department, on the sub-
ject of small Japanese Submarines lurking
in Hawaiian waters, etc., the communica-
tion having originated in Mexico and
transmitted to the War Department by
Military Attache. 2 Incls: Ltr. Admiral
Bloch and Note C/S.
File
For your file. 1 Incl L/14ND
O. M. M.
K. J. F.
L.
O. M. M.
Office of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,
AND Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawah, U. S. A.,
August 1, I94I'
Lieutenant General W. C. Short, U. S. A.,
Commanding Oeneral, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H.
Dear General Short : This is to acknowledge receipt of your confidential letter
336.81 (C-2) J dated 25 July 1941. Upon the completion of study of the letter
by interested members of my staff, in the absence of any instimctions from you,
we shall file it in our confidential files.
Very truly yours,
C. C. Bloch,
Bear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
COB :kt
348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
confidentiai.
Headquarters Hawahan Department
inter- staff boxttinq slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and the B.&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded to the interested staff section direct, with the
exeception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant
General unless policy has been established. The Staff section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will
be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer au-
thorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date
1st Ind. Q-2 19 June 41.
C/S.
To
W-36 C/S.
G-2_
Subject: Unknown subjects, book entitled
"Three-Power Alliance and American-
Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo
Please note the attached report on the Japa-
nese book "Three-Power Alliance and
American-Japan War" not on sale locally,
but others of similar nature are adver-
tised and sold here.
Review of "A Thesis on the Final Battle of
the World"— by Lt. Gen. Kanji Ishihawa:
Ultimate conflict between Japan and
United States predicted as inevitable,
with prophecies of Buddhism indicating
final battle will be fifty years hence. 1
Incl: FBI File No. 97-254— Dated 6/9/41.*
6/13/41.
16 located.
M. W. M.
♦ Returned to Contact OfTicer, 26 Jun 1941. VSW.
RS to CS : F. B. I. Report.
Please note the attached report on the Japanese book. "Three-power alliance
and American-Japanese War" not on sale locally, but others of similar nature
are advertised and sold here.
Review of "A Thesis on the Final Battle of the World" by Lt. Gen. Kanji
Ishihawa : — Ultimate conflict between Japan and United States predicted as in-
evitable, with prophecies of Buddhism indicating final battle will be fifty years
hence.
M. W. M.
confidb^ntiai-
He:adqtjaetees Hawaiian Department
inteb-staff routing slip
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the
Department C/A and B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff
inter-communication.
This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the ex-
ception that matters concerning personnel will be routed thi'ough the Adjutant
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff Section originating a
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st indorsement list
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will
be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer
authorized to sign for him.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
349
No. of Ind. From and Date
To
Subject: Small Japanese Submarines re-
ported to be concealed in Shallow Water
near MOLOKAI.
1st Ind. G~2 24Jul-41.
C/S.
3d Ind. G-2 25-Jul-41.
C/S.
1. Information furnished in MEXICO by
source which has seldom proved to be re-
liable.
2. Alleged that about 12 special type small
subs, will besubmerged near MOLOKAI,
kept in serviceable condition by Japanese
fishing sampans, their crews secreted
ashore among plantation workers. Three
of these craft are reported to be here now.
3. Objective: The destruction of naval ves-
sels, particularly plane carriers, at
PEARL HARBOR.
1 Incl: Mil. Intel. Div. WD, June 17/41, lO
No. 5940. subj: ACTIVITIES OF FOR-
EIGNERS IN COUNTRY.
1. Herewith draft of letter to Admiral Bloch,
as directed in 2d R/S ind. hereon.
2. If letter is approved and signed, please
return to this office, for mailing and fur-
ther action.
2 Incl. 1 incl. added: Draft of letter to Ad-
miral Bloch, dated 25 July 1941, File 336.
1 (G2)-J.
KJF.
KJF.
confidentiai,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Saff for Military Intelligence,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 25 July, 1941.
In reply refer to :
(G-2)336.81-J
Subject : Letter of transmittal.
To : A. C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff,
Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.
Reference attached report, the following action has been taken by this office :
Since the subject matter of this report concerns the Navy Department, a copy
thereof has been furnished the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii.
Robert T. Aitken,
1st Lt. MI,
ASST. A. C. OF S., 0-2.
1 Incl.
Copy of letter, Comdg. Genl. Hawn. Dept. No. 336.81(G2)-J, dated 25 July
1941, together with inclosure forming a part thei'eof, subject : ACTIVI-
TIES OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY— MEXICO (I. G. #5940, dated
17 July 1941.
confidential
Headquarters CPBC
G-2 [CID]
BOX 3, APO 456~% Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
File 201 — C. D. Section — Hirayama, Unji
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Form No. 1. This case originated at Honolulu, T. H. File No. 65-492.
Report made at Honolulu, T. H. Date when made : 11-6-40. Period for which
made : 10-23, 29, 31-40. Report made by : F. G. Tillman, jwh
Title : REV. Unji Hirayama
Character of case : Espionage
Synopsis of facts : REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA, Hompa Hongwanji Mission, La-
haina, Maui, T. H., is in charge of that mission and principle of the Language
School. He has not been observed engaged in suspicious activities but is said
350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to be fearful of his iwsition as a Japanese Priest, believing that this group
would be the first to be deported or interned in event of war. Names of as-
socicitcs set out.
Reference: Report of Special Agent N. J. ALAGA, Honolulu, T. H., dated
10-9-40.
Details : Confidential Informant M-2 was questioned generally concerning the
Japanese organizations and religious groups in the vicinity of Lahaina, Maui,
without any particular reference to the Subject UNJI HIRAYAMA on October
23, 1940, at which time he was to obtain statistical information relating to these
groups. On October 29, 1940, this Informant advised the writer that he had
just come from the home of REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA, from whom he had secured
the names of the directors of the LAHAINA HOMPA HONGWANJI MISSION pur-
portedly in connection with his, the Informant's, usual work.
At this time the Informant stated that UNJI HIRAYAMA was concerned over
the present Japanese situation and its reaction upon the [2] alien Japa-
nese and citizens of Japanese ancestry and the plight of the Japanese in Hawaii
should there be war between the United States and Japan. HIRAYAMA was
said to have expressed the opinion that, should such an event happen, the Japanese
priests in Hawaii would be the first group to suffer, that is, be interned or
deported. The Subject was said to have had the opinion that preparations or
plans had been made to intern such Japanese on the islands of Lanai, Molokai,
or Kahoolawe, T. H.
In this connection HIRAYAMA was said to have stated that the various Japa-
nese Priests and School teachers were instructed, probably by the Japanese
Consulate, not to express any pro-Japanese sympathies or to do anything which
would impair their position in the communities in which they are employed.
The Confidential Informant M-2 stated that it is now the policy of the Japanese
Government to replace the older Japanese Priests and School Principals, whom .
they are calling back to Japan, with younger and more active men who would not
be antagonistic to the second-generation Japanese and who would be more able
to run the affairs of the Japanese communities. HIRAYAMA was said to be a
good mixer and able to drink with, as well as teach and compete in sports with
the younger citizens of Japanese ancestry.
REVEREND HIRAYAMA was said to have related to the Informant that a
group of American sailors thumbed a ride from him to Lahaina but when they
observed his religious robes, refused to ride with him. Although two sailors,
in another group, rode with the Subject on the same day, HIRAYAMA used this
incident to illustrate to the Informant the precarious position of the Priests and
the suspicions in which they are held by this Government. Following the above
statement, HIRAYAMA was said to have again stated that he was afraid of
future developments and what would happen to him.
There is set out the officers of the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission and the Lahaina
Hongwanji Mission Japanese Language School, both groups being identical, as
these individuals are probably the Subject's closest contacts in the community:
Title
Name
Citizenship
Occupation
Jutaro Ito
Citizen
Alien
Now in Japan; Vice Chairman SHINTO
Vice-Chairman
Mrs. Seiichi Shota
Yasuto Shibao
Zeictii Fukunaga
Okujyu Sasaki
Ishiro Wada
DAI JINGU TEMPLE, Lahaina.
Wife of Asst. Consular Agent Zeichi
Secretary
Citizen
Alien
Fulmnaga.
Student; now in Japan.
Treasurer.
Active Consular Agent; NIPPU JIJI
Alien
representative: Vice-Chairman Shinto
Dai Jingu, Lahaina.
Pioneer Mill Company, laborer.
Auditor
Alien
Pioneer Mill Company, laborer.
Auditor. .
Shozo Tabata
Alien
Owner, S. Tabata Store.
[3] The following individuals are the teachers in the Japanese language
school of which HIRAYAMA is principal :
MRS. FUMIE HIRAYAMA, wife of Subject
REV. RINIKO KAMI
MRS. ISUMI KAMI
TADAYASHI KUBOTA
MISS NISAN SHUTA (Citizen)
MISS TOMING KANEISHI
MRS. KOU TAMURA
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 351
MRS. FUMIE HIRAYAMA, above mentioned, is also the head of the Lahaina
Japanese Women's Club (FUJINKAI). KOOCHI MASUDA, son of GOSAKU
MASUDA, a consular agent at Lahaina, is the chairman of the Judo Club of
the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission.
Inquiry was made of R. H. WATT, Factory Superintendent, TODD WILLETT,
Overseer and former American Legion Commander, and HARRY TAYLOR,
Assistant Superintendent, Pioneer Mill Company, Lahaina, who advised that
there have been no rumors of an espionage nature concerning REVEREND UNJI
HIRAYAMA, to their knowledge. In this connection, IMr. WILLETT has pre-
viously assisted the Army Intelligence and has exhibited an interest in these
matters over a period of years.
The Confidential Information advised that REVEREND HIRAYAMA has
not acted as a "consular agent," TURI-TSUGI-NIN, and has not the reputation
of being such. He is known to the Confidential Informant as having been a
priest at Paia Maui, as set forth in the reference report and in the Informant's
opinion, does not live any better or appear to have a greater income than that
usually enjoyed by men in a similar position. It is his opinion that HIRARA-
MA is timid, and will return to Japan as soon as he has earned sufficient money
for his purposes.
unde\te:loped lead
THE HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION at Honolulu, T. H., will keep in touch
with Confidential Informant J-1 with reference to the contact of REV. UNJI
HIRAYAMA with the Japanese Consulate.
Pending.
Federal Buiibl4.u of Investigation
Form No. 1. This case originated at Honolulu, T. H. File No. 65-492
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H. Date when made : 10-9-40. Period for which
made : 9-23- 27-40. Report made by : N. J. Alaga. jwh
Title : Rev. Unji Hirayama. Character of case : Espionage.
Synopsis of facts: Confidential Inforant J-1 stated that the local Japanese
Consulate, in June of 1940, requested Subject to keep the Consulate informed
as to any movement of the U. S. Fleet in the vicinity of Maui, T. H. Investigation
reflects Subject to be the Buddhist Priest in charge of the Nishi Hongwanji
Temple at Lahaina, Maui, having ari-ived in the Territory of Hawaii on May 3,
1936 from' Japan. Subject is also the director of the Judo Section of the Maui
Branch of the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai.
Details: At Honolulu, T. H. Instant investigation is predicated upon infor-
mation received from Confidential Informant J-1, whose identity is known to the
Bureau, that it had come to his attention in June, 1940, that Rev. HIRAYAMA
of Lahaina, Maui, had been requested by a member of the local Japanese Con-
sulate, identity unknown, to keep him informed as to the movements of the U. S.
Fleet in the vicinity of Maui.
A check of the records of Confidential Inforant N concerning Subject resulted
negatively. The records of Confidential Informant A reflected that Subject is an
alien, born in 1901 in Fukuoka-ken, Japan. He arrived on Maui on May 3, 1936,
his occupation being that of Buddhist Priest. He immediately took charge of the
Nishi Hongwanji Mission at Paia, Maui. He also became director of the Judo
Section of the Maui Branch of the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai, a Japanese organiza-
tion which apparently is organized merely for [2] the purpose of develop-
ing athletic skill in Judo and fencing, but which is believed to be a strictly nation-
alistic and militaristic organization, the main purpose of which is to instil in
young men of Japanese ancestry militaristic and pro-Japanese ideals and
principles, as well as to develop their bodies for military service.
Confidential Informant A's records further reflected that on August 7 1939,
Subject was transferred to the Hongwanji Buddhist Temple at Lahaina, Maui,
where he succeeded RENJO HIROZAWA. Confidential Informant A's report
reflected that HIROZAWA had also been Consular Agent and Japanese language
school principal at Lahaina and indicated a belief that Subject would take over
352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
these duties. A Confidential Informant of Confidential Informant A, in com-
menting on Subject, stated that he was "doing strictly religious work."
F. C. BRYANT, Retail Credit Company, checked his records and ascertained
that they reflected that Subject had recently applied for automobile insurance
on a 1940 Plymouth sedan. The report indicated Subject's occupation as being
a Buddhist Priest in the Hongwanji Mission and a teacher in the Hongwanji
Japanese language school, both in Lahaina, Maui. His net worth was ascertained
at $5,000 and his annual income as $1,000. He was reported as possessing a
good reputation and as having good associates.
Inspector JAMES SLOAN, U. S. Immigration Service, checked that Depart-
ment's records and ascertained that Subject, whose full name was reflected as
being UNJI HIRAYAMA, had entered the Territory of Hawaii from Kobe, Japan
on May 3, 1936, at Honolulu, on the SS "Bokuyo Maru" as a non-quota immigrant.
He possessed passport #297184 issued by the Japanese Foreign Minister through
the Kyoto Prefectural Oflice and bore non-quota immigration visa #1597 issued
on April 10, 1936, by WALTER P. McCONAUGHY, U. S. Vice Consul at Kobe,
Japan. The visa reflected that Subject was born oh September 14, 1900 in
Fukuoka-ken, Japan. It further reflected that Subject is married to one FUMIE
HIRAYAMA and has two children, YASUKO, born in 1932, and KOSHI. born
in 1934. Subject's wife and children arrived in Honolulu with him. Subject
indicated his occupation was that of Buddhist Priest and that he was entering
the Territory of Hawaii as a non-quota immigrant who has been a minister
continuously for at least two years prior to the time of application for admission
to the U. S. ; and that he enters the U. S. solely for the purpose of taking on
his vocation as a minister of the Hompa Honganji Temple. Subject's visa
further indicated that his final destination was Paia, Maui, T. H., where he would
be connected with the Hompa Honganji Mission. His passage from Japan was
paid for by the Hompa Honganji Temple, Hyoto, Japan. He indicated he intended
to remain in the U. S. for a period of 5 years.
A photograph of Subject appears attached to the immigration visa. Copies
of this photograph have been made and are being retained in the files of the
Honolulu Field Division.
Undeveloped lead: The HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION at Lahaina, Maui,
will make a general [3] investigation for the purpose of ascertaining Sub-
ject's reputation in the community, the nature of his activities, his contacts, his
income, etc. Will attempt to develop a confidential informant in a position to
furnish accurate information as to Subject's activities.
Pending.
[confidential]
Headqttaeteks CPBC
G-2 [CID]
BOX 3, APO 456, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
File 336.92 — Japanese Consulate and Consular Agents
United States Navai, Intelligence Service
INVESTIGATION EEPORT
Fourteenth Naval District
(Confidential)
Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
Report made at : 14ND— Honolulu, T. H. Date : Feb. 15, 1943.
Report made by : Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR ; Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.
Period covered : June 15, 1942-Feb. 10, 1943. Status of Case : PENDING — 14ND
Origin of Case : Investigation of espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu,
■•haracter of Investigation : Espionage
Enclosures : (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO,
dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kauai". (Photostat to ONI ; copies to
others.)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 353
Copy to: ONI (5) Zone III (1)
14ND (3) Zone IV (1)
FBI-Hon (2) CinCPac (1)
[Agts. have copy] MID-HD (2) Coml4 (1)
2/27/43
ZONE II (1)
Source File No : 14ND/54 (c). ONI File No. :
Synopsis: Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were re-
interviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.
Review of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate
was concerned only in "legal" espionage ; that is, that which could be discovered
by observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted area. Interest
was displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and
any new construction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power
plant on Kauai. Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July,
1941, to collect information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken
by Secretary Tadasi MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made
for general survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these indi-
viduals established contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evi-
dence that Vice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui.
Other information indicates that the consulate was granted an allowance for
"Korean Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close
contact with Korean nationalist movements.
[Stamped:] Feb 23 1943.
Deductions :
Approved
L. H. Matfield,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.
By direction
WBS/cop
U]
Confidential Febritaey 15, 1943.
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
References :
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard
Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1&43, subject Takaichi
SAKAI.
(f ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi
MURAOKA.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye
SAHARA,
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject John Yoshiye
MIKAML
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro
MATSUO.
(j) FBI-Honolulu report, file 97-274, dated November 12, 1942, subject
Noah Kwang Won CHO (available at Washington and Honolulu),
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Insuke HORI-
KAWA.
(1) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji Hirayama.
(m) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi
KAWAZOE.
(n) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 3, 1942, subject Kenneth
Kilsoo HAAN.
(o) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject
Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles,
and Honolulu),
(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
(q) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford
KONDO.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 24
354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO,
(s) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OHTOMO.
(t) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE
POSTAL EMPLOYEES,
(u) FBI-Honolulu Confidential Report, file 65-414, dated April 25, 1942, sub-
ject JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H. (CONFILE).
(v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF
JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.
(w) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimie
DOUE.
[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set
forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1942,
all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still avail-
able were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by the
Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Honolulu ; and the District Intelligence Office. In addition, a number of other
individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the espionage
activities of the Consulate were interviewed.
2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the
interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu :
Military Intelligence Division :
Captain Frank O. Blake
Special Agent William T. Hiraoka
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu
Special Agent J. Harold Hughes
Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa
District Intelligence Office
Lieutenant G. P. Kimball
Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson
Ensign Don Woodrum
3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office by
representatives of the three agencies :
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO — Formerly employed as a clerk at the
Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).
Joan Kimie KOTOSHIRODO— Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
Takaichi SAKAI — Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate,
subject of reference (e).
Katsukichi MURAOKA — Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Con-
sulate, subject of reference (f).
[3] Kanaye SAHARA — Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Con-
sulate, subject of reference (g).
Yasumasa MURATA — A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.
Miss Kimie DOUE — Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese
Consulate; subject of reference (w).
John Yoshiye MIKAMI — Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of
reference (h).
Albert Shuichi HAYASHI— Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
Koreshige KUDO — Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
Shotaro NIIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO — Regular taxi driver for Kenzi
KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y. K. line. He is the subject
of reference (i).
ICHITARO OZAKI— Consulate chauffeur.
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA— Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasi MORI-
MURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of
Maui.
4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intel-
ligence Division alone:
U] Shingo NARIKAWA.— Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and MORI-
MURA on the occasion of their trip to the Island of Hawaii.
George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO.— Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was vis-
ited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.
Toshimasa MINATOYA.— Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on
the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kauai.
Namiko FUKUSHIMA. — Recipient of a present from Consul General KITA
which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke
SONE, a toritsuginin at Puunene, Maui.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 355
Mrs. Tetsunosiike SONE. — Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of
her husband, wlio is now interned on the mainland.
5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation :
Noah Kwang Won CHO. — A Korean Christian minister who rendered various
services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of
reference (j).
6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intel-
ligence Office:
Lawrence NAKATSUKA. — Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin
who covered the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.
TKIPS MADE TO VAEIOUS PARTS OF OAHU
Pearl Harbor Area
[5] 7. The information set forth in this report concerning the various trips
made by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the
information thereon ah-eady set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO ampli-
fied certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story except
on a few minor points.
8. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice
Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kohichi SEKI, one of the Consulate secretaries,
to Pearl City and Aiea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose of these trips
was to determine the number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, and to keep the
Consul General informed of the movements of United States Naval vessels.
KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge, the personnel
of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December, 1940, or in
January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence that any agent
of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, except upon official
invitation.)
9. To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was earlv in 1941, probably
January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and SEKI)
should start "motoring around". KOTOSHIRODO also remembered having heard
Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time, that all Con-
sulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to the "public places"
such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the like.
KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to .January, 1941, he had never seen any
evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and
SEKI and MORIMURA subsequently did.
10. For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO re-
membered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan at
one time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation liecause of his
health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of,
naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of
trips to Pearl Harbor together.
11. When Tadasi MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORI-
MURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTO-
SHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to
identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifving
characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.
12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate went out
to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEKI
appears to have been of the opinion that observations should be made more often.
[6] 13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe
the ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped any
place on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see while
driving at 2.5 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the Navy
Yard boundries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or with
MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHIRODO always was asked to state how many
ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the number
of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types of ships.
14, KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and anchor-
ages of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, correctly,
that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island; that carriers
356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing; that de-
strovers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waiau. He further stated that
MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway be-
tween Aiea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could be
obtained. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo net
was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.
15. KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which
the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Aiea and Pearl City
regions for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a
girl friend in Aiea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked
KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Aiea or Pearl City "who could be
trusted", KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had suc-
ceeded in this plan.
16. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a
jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor.
He would get off at Aiea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according
to his story, MORIMURA got off the jitney at Aiea and walked back along the
Kamehameha Highway, finally coming a to Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO
was unable to state whether this was the Submarine Base gate or the main
gate ; however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA in-
quired about getting employment in the Navy Yard. The sentry referred him
to an office downtown. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed
around" Aiea.
17. KOTOSHIRODO' stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl
Harbor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Con-
sulate taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having
driven SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTO-
SHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.
Kaneohe Bay Area
18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO
drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence around the
Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the
Kaneohe Naval [7] Air Station. At the Kailua Beach Pavilion, they
parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving
Kailua, they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along
the highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach,
near the old pier. This time they got out of the car and walked out on the pier.
However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he
could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five
or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They made
no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORIMURA
make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wailupe.
19. Shortly after their trip to Maui (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and
KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu Pali.
As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road, and
drove to the Kalama Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had MIKAMI
drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field glasses with
him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORIMURA had
used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing that all the
hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORIMURA had
no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing MORIMURA
with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kalama Road, they stopped at a water-
melon stand on the side of the road away from the beach. Then they proceeded
to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and KOTOSHIRODO and
MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to no one but the waitress
at the tavern. From there they returned to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali
highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half hours. KOTOSHIRODO
believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe Kaneohe Naval Air Station.
20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate
at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Oahu, about the middle of April,
1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled
two such picnics, an eai'lier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA was
Acting Consul General, On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended.
They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordei*ed OZAKI to drive
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 357
to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour). They parked at Kaneohe
and everyone in tlie party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe
Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occa-
sion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour,
but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.
21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which was
detailed in paragraph 46 of i-eference (a). This trip was made in the latter
part of October, 1941. (KOTOSH/IRODO was unable to remember, however, if
this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the de-
partux'e of, the TATUTA MARU, Japanese evacuation ship which was in port
October 23-24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO
in the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the
other two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was
given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go
when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely in- [S] structed him to
"just keep on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went di-
rectly to Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed
KOTOSHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to
the first or second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop
the car, and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove
down the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told
KOTOSIHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be back
in about 15 minutes.
22. KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced
in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in
such a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it. When
MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport) shirt. He
wore no coat, and his shirt was hanging outside his trousers. He had nothing
in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went. When
the latter filed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIRODO suggested that they
return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After an
absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the
same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him.
When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or some-
thing similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.
23. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven
MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO
came along on some of these occasions ; at other times, MORIMURA was alone.
On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which
commands an excellent view of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station.
24. According to the statements made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the
Consulate, the Consul General's official car was never used for exploring the
island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used
by the Consulate. It was used primarily by the Consul General himself, or by
OZAKI when he drove around town on errands. The only time it was used for
a trip to Windward Oahu was on those occasions when the Consul General es-
corted some visiting dignitary on a sighteeing tour of the island. The itinex'ary
for these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waiman-
alo, then return to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali.
Other Parts of Oahu
25. The reinterrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little infor-
mation concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition
of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some
miscellaneous items are of interest.
26. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had
made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrival (March 27, 1941).
KOTOSHIRODO believed that MIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this oc-
casion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the
island with MORIMURA.
[9] 27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of
staying overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details,
and the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were
unknown to KOTOSHIRODO.
358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
28. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a "nice girl" at Wa-
hiawa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORIMURA
did not reveal her name.
29. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one trip
to the Haleiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Haleiwa Park,
by the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not get
out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned that
it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other
kindred subject of possible military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO had
no idea why MORIMURA made this trip to Haleiwa.
30. KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion, they
were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave. On the
second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former's car,
and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.
31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between Waia-
lua and Kaena Point.
32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORI-
MURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Beaches as potential landing
spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the
Kaneohe Naval Air Station were discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other air-
fields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air
strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly
accurate is refiected in the Navy Department communique of December 5, 1942,
which revealed that there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the morn-
ing of December 7, 1941.)
TRIPS TO OTHEE ISLANDS
Kauai
33. During the course of the reinterrogation, KOTOSHIRODO adihitted that
he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941.
KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation. He
and his wife made this trip together; they were not accompanied by any other
representative of the Consulate.
34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai
with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about
10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagreement
arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had
made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself,
and because of this, friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To
settle the argument, OKUDA decreed that neither should go. Instead, he told
KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a "front".
35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with
OKUDA in the latter's ofiiee, and received the following instructions :
(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands
Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed
KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there ;
(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawiliwili port,
taken about 1939, and instructed the latter to note any changes ;
(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not
remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some
use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if
any, of Naval activity there ;
(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the
airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity
there ;
(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Wainiha
Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed
KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the
power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this
map was a United States Geological Survey map, edition of 1912.)
OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed
was caution. He was to tell no one that he was from the Consulate. He was
to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact
no friends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could see
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 359
with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him to treat
the trip as a vacation and have some fun.
36. KOTOSHIRODO and his wife departed for Kauai by airplane on Saturday
morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records
of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their
home at 0715 and were driven to the airport in MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers
Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu
on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th, as he had planned, so he decided to
return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday
morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived
at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.
37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when
KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver,
so KOTOSHIRODO approached him. This driver has been identified as
Toshimasa MINATOTA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should
use only Japanese drivers when "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO told MINA-
TOYA that he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both
sides of the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he
agreed to and paid $25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price
was $35.00. Records of the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's
employer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)
38. From the airport, they drove directly to Waimea Canyon, getting out at the
tourists' observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up the
road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA's suggestion, they turned back
here. They returned to the Waimea Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTO-
SHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and lunched together. How-
ever, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.
39. They left the Waimea Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands.
They had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA's infor-
mation that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA
mentioned that there was a new airport at Barking Sands. They drove as far as
a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and
walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and Iceawe (algaroba)
trees. They remained at Barking Sands for about 15 minutes, and then departed
in the direction of Lihue about 1530. Enroute to Lihue they stopped at the
Spouting Horn for five or ten minutes, and the Ancient Hawaiian Battleground.
Both these spots are well known points of tourist interest. They arrived at Lihue
about 1730. They registered at the Lihue Hotel under their proper names, and
dismissed MINATOYA with instructions to pick them up again the following
morning. However, after KOTOSHIRODO and his wife had eaten dinner at the
Lihue Hotel, they decided to go to a movie, so they called MINATOYA to drive
them. All three went to the Lihue Theater, KOTOSHIRODO paying for the
tickets.
40. One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew
to Kauai was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (k). HORIKAWA,
who was taken into custody in April. 1942, was suspect because he was the
owner of the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage
center prior to the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel.
and was one of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identi-
fied with a number of pro-.Tapanese activities on that island prior to the war.
KOTOSHIRODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA's presence
on the same plane, but KOTOSHIRODO "main- \12} tained that this
■was pure coincidence. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the
Lihue Hotel, they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers
earlier that day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having
seen him at the Japanese Consulate on two occasions.
41. On Sunday morning, July 13th, KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate break-
fast at the hotel. At the suggestion of MINATOYA, they had the hotel pack
them a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the
east coast of Kauai. They went first to Wailua Falls, then to a grass shack
at a heian (ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist
spots, and finally arrived at Hanalei about noon. They ate th^^ir picnic lunch
at the Hanalei Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He
noted only that the water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very calm, and that
there was no sign of any construction work going on. About '1245, they d'"nve
to Haena where they visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist
attractions.
360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
42. From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a iwint near the power
plant. They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below
the power plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted
that the power plant was small, and had two lead-in water pipes, each about
three feet in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside
the road, and that the plant was unfenced.
43. On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is off
the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTO-
SHIRODO believed that he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.
44. From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the
wharf where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He
saw at once that there had been no new construction since the picture in
OKUDA's possession had been taken (1939), so they left immediately. He did
note, however, the Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks there.
45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They
dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater
and saw a movie.
46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport
twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were
some Army tents pitched in camp.
47. The following morning, July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about
0800. The KOTOSHIRODOS checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINA-
TOYA drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu
about 0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for
them, and drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her
dressmaking shop, and he went back to the Consulate.
[13] 48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour con-
ference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk.
KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA
finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not
present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had
had a good time, but also commented that it was "waste time" just to "look from
the road for things that were meant to be hidden",
49. On Ocober 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a state-
ment regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith
forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed
facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other disseminees.
50. Toshimasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a repre-
sentative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his
story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel
and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear
this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO
and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a
camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were
examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either in-
nocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO
stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary tourist
cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory. He
made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his ob-
servations.
51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about $100.00 for his
expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about $7.00 or $9.00. How-
ever, he stated that his expenses were : $50.00 for the air fare, $20.00 for the hotel
bill, and $25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure actually was
$35.00.)
Maui
52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA
made to the Island of Maui in May, 1&41. These details were substantially the
same as those set forth in paragraphs 15-18 of reference (c). The only change is
that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA
visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui ; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on
re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not
visited either.
53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map
of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 361
is, what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTO-
SHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were :
[I4] (a) Puunene Air Field (Navy) ;
(b) Kahului Harbor;
(c) Lahaina Bay;
(d) National Guard Camp.
54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off
Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later
that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea
Airport, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului.
MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was
told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit.
MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough com-
pared to that of Lahaina.
5.5. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making
a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and neces-
sitates traveling over bad roads.) MORIMURA also asked if there were an air
field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that the road
was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the limited time
MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.
56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then to Kula
Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTOSHIRODO
took a picture; MORIMURA commented on being able to see the ocean both on
the Wailuku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley. They stayed at
Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they drove to the National
Guard Camp at Waihee, about 10 minutes out of Wailuku; however, they saw
no troops. They drove along the coast a little farther, and then turned back and
drove to the Puunene Airport where they boarded a plane for Honolulu about
1500.
57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born nisei, 26 years old, who was expatriated
from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that
being when he was 5 years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKAMIYA,
when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO's description of the
trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would indicate
that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two men from the
Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui were with Itsuo
HAMADA, as set forth in paragraph 15-16 in reference (c), and with Tetsunosuke
SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).
58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious,
nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was
anything more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representa-
tives of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details
concerning the contact made with Tetsonosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated
that they had visited SONE, who was a toritsuginin and principal of the Japanese
language \15] school at Spreckelsville, and had delivered to him a package
sent by Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be;
given to a Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall)
who lived at Spreckelsville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question
was Miss Namiko FUKUSHIMA. Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated
that she had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1988, and during
that period she had become very well acquainted with a Yosuko ISHII, daughter
of a Consul General ISHII, said to be a prominent member of the Japanese
consular corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA main-
tained a personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had
requested KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA's coming
to Honolulu as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKU-
SHIMA produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battle-
dore. She stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONE.
59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA,
failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO's story.
60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their
trip to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the
only mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the
coastline just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indi-
cate that the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, un-
362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
suitable for landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any
written notes. OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about the trip. Later
MORIMURA observed to KOTOSHIRODO that "there wasn't much going on"
on Maui. KOTOSHIRODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photo-
graph the places they regarded as "important". The camera was used merely to
add to their pose as tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had
cost between $115.00 and $130.00.
61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the
confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent
collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed
this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him.
SEKI said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not
have the funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate
treasurer, and presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA
had a secret personal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA
expected him to tell OKUDA every secret, but the Vice Consul was not so "open-
hearted" with MORIMURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since
OKUDA and MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that
OKUDA would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that confirmed
MORIMURA's suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their
return from that island: Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he
had seen any mooring bnoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he
had seen none, but OKUDA contradicted him and said that there were some
buoys there. MORIMURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same
question of the clerk, but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there
either. MORIMURA concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the
contrary information.
[16] 62. Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts con-
cerning the Maui trip : MORIMURA conducted that mission very laxly. He did
not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He
traveled no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the
windward coast, he omitted more than half the road running north from Wailuku.
He did nothing to observe the Puunene Naval Air Station tield other than pass it
going to and coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot
of highway along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's
contact on Muai may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Hompa Hong-
wanji who resided at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7,
1941. It is known that HIRAYAMA, who is the subject of reference (1), was
requested on at least one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed
of any movements of the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed
that he complied with this request.
Hawaii
63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA
made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the
facts of the trip substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19(-24 of
reference (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version prin-
cipally concei'ned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on
Hawaii.
64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTO-
SHIRODO that he wanted to see:
(a) Hilo harbor;
(b) Kilauea. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilauea,
it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there
prior to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airport
in the lava flats) ;
(c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of
construction ;
(d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at
Upolu.
65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilauea Volcano, and
MORIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road
toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu — Military Reservation".
They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around
and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from
outside the gate.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 363
66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver.
The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only [17]
paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in
the Kohala district they also inspected Kawaihae, the landing from which
cattle are swum out to the intex'-Island steamers.
67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo,
seeing Rainbow Falls, the Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club,
and Puumaile Home (for the tubercular).
68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact
anyone on the Island of Hawaii ; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined
not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a
personal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her
candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her
that he was staying at the Naniloa Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes.
However, after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with
MORIMURA, George KAWAIMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been
told by his wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him
to MORIMURA. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited
them to the Hilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went
home.
69. A representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTO-
SHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's
wife, and be gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO
and his wife in 1940. Apparently this trip was merely a vacation. However,
there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that
KAWAMOTO was interrogated "concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO
and MORIMURA to Hawaii.
70. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also
interviewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and
KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length,
NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the storj
given by KOTOSHIRODO.
Tadasi Morimura
71. From the information that has been collected from the Consular clerks
and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that INIORIIMURA was
something of a mystery man. All f^greed that he had special privileges. He
was frequently drunk, often had women in his quartei's overnight, came to work
late or not at all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and
generally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused
much comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.
72. Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an officer
in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however, SEKI
denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved, and
that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.
[18] 73. It was publicly announced on MORIMURA's arrival that he had
been sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takaichi SAKAI, senior
clerk at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation mat-
ters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of
helping with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was here, but
had done none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work.
74. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, who, although uneducated, has given himself an
amazing self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA,
and emphatically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart
gait of a Japanese military or naval officer.
75. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in
the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary
being the hig'hest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and
Samon TSUKIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, re-
mark that eighth rank secretaries wei-e usually sent to the least desirable p-^sts
in the consular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according
to climate. Most of the less desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the
other hand, was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular serv-
ice. It was usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was
unusual for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hawaii. They believed this to be MORIMURA's first assignment abroad, since
liis name, at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular
roster of the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he
was recently admitted to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrina-
tion period in Tokyo before coming to Honolulu.
76. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA never talked about his past life
except of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORI-
MURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He
called the coolies the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO
to believe that MIRMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.
77. Ichitaro OZAKI, chautfeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of
MORIMURA's background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard
a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had
remarked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Ehime-
ken on Shikoku, in Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving his
mother in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable
land. Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the
Foreign Oflice in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although it
was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion he
had been discharged from the Foreign Office for excessive drinking, but his
mother had written to a prominent oflScial about the matter, and through this
connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.
78. Whatever his background, MORIMURA was not popular with the rest of
the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position,
[19] and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted
that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gather-
ing data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had
been relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited professional jealousy,
often telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was
doing. The change in plans for the Kauai trip was cited as an example of this
dissention. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI
and MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering
work. Further information about MORIMURA'S background is to be found
on pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).
79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new
secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO
stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese news-
papers, particularly the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORI-
MURA had many friends at the Nippu Jiji, but until questioned at length showed
no great willingness to "I'emember" who they were. Finally he admitted that
of all the men at the Nippu Jiji, Shigeo FURUKAWA, the advertising manager,
was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by
the information contained in paragraphs 9-11 of reference (a). Paragraph 16
of reference (c) should also be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated
that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corrobo-
rates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain
the common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed
out that FURCILAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a
business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and
preferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the geishas. KOTO-
SHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played go (Japanese check-
ers) together at the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also
knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate
"beat" for the Nippu Jiji. Other Nippu Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew
were Shoichi ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsuichi KAWAMOTO, the business
manager. All these men have been interned.
80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very
rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought Nippu
Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the Consul
General.
81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MOROMURA was
Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery.
TAKAGISHI was the subject of an intensive investigation by this office prior
to his departure for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on November 5, 1941.
TAKAGISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial
Japanese Navy. (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japa-
nese Navy ; this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 365
of TAKAGISH's wife.) TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese
Consulate, and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul
OKUDA, and Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where
TAKAGISHI resided. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the
friendship of MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funnj'", because TAKA-
GISHI loved gold so much and MORIMURA did [20] not play the game.
However, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used
to "chase women" together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actu-
ally was engaged in espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial
evidence points to the conclusion that he was so engaged.
Seki and Morimura Discuss Espionage
82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between
MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with
him individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as
SEKI's assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's
assistant in collecting information outside the office. Because of this situation,
KOTOSHIRODO was in close contact with both men.
83. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over
the world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing
"illegal things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORI-
MURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate
and part from' the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo,
collected such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This
would include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA ob-
served that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor
would the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate
would know nothing of this outside system, he said.
84. MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents
(meaning those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied
that he did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what the
facts were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know the
manner in which such an outside system would operate.
85. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage
on one occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a
"good man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this
requirement would be difficult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Terri-
tory of Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORI-
MURA and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the
local population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to carry on espionage.
However, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese
were too poorly educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on
this point, claiming that the toritsuginin (the so-called local consular agents)
were no good for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii were "just trash"
and insufficiently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii
as laborers and were therefore uneducated, whereas the Japanese on the mainland
of the United States were much better educated.
86. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then
(1941), all nations "use other kind of people" (i. e., non-nationals of the country
employing [21] them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that
Japan sometimes used non- Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO
never heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORI-
MURA once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo"
that Japan had long had a British nava'l officer acting as an espionage agent in
China. (Whether this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or
against both China and Britain, or only against Britain, Avas not stated). MORI-
MURA had said that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he
commented on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. He said that
the first time such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but
after that the law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the
employer would pay the same price for mere driblets. He also stated that it was
safer and less costly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more
valuable information could be obtained by non-Japanese, although at a greater
cost to Japan.
87. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate es-
pionage system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii
366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
at the present time, and sending inforniatien fri)m Hawaii to Japan. KOTO-
SHIRODO expressed surprise that sufli an operation was considered possible,
saying, "How cau?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection
was that MORIMURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-
wave radio for getting information out of Hawaii after war started because of
"a device" the Americans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location
of a radio transmitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and
knew of Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur
radio stations. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk
about the subject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town
who operated an amateur short-wave radio station.
88. KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked
to SEKI that Hawaii would be a tine place from which to watch a Japanese-
American war. Either SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no
way for a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to the
risk of discovery by radio detection equipment.
89. Apparently one of the "legal" methods of collecting information indulged
in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily newspaiiers. Yasumasa
MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers
were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this
work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as he desired and pass
them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two — occa-
sionally three — clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to
Japan, and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used
to receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his
home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Con-
sulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO's home, two blocks away, was near enough
to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep
close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (re-
viewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.
Security Measures
[22] 90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the
first rule in "information c(sllecting" was "no get cauglit". He was told never
to go out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired
objective from the hii^hway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the
highway to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities
and questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely "sight-
seeing". KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORI-
MURA's poor command of English.
91. He was told never to take pictures of "important places". Although he
took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a "prop" to carry out their
pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures
of air fields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His
snapshots were only of the usual scenic places, he said.
92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts
of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was
extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941
at SEKI's insistence. Prior to that time, there had been no field glasses at the
Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by
Toro NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji Ji. (NISH-
IICAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.!
93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made
written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate
after "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes
himself. Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had
seen to MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of
KOTOSHIRODO's reported observations.
94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps
which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, they
carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only occa-
sion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui : see
paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as rei)orted in paragraph 42
of reference (c), KOTOSHIRODO stated that on trips he made alone to the
Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the jiositions of various warships on rough
maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO's
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 367
extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which hap-
pened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise known
to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO's statements and admissions gen-
erally reliable.)
95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate
(1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk sfbout
Consulate business to' strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make
trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.
Christmus Presents Given hy the Consulate
[23] 96. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christ-
m'as presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that
he personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs inspectors Carl E. EIFLER,
George W. SPENCE, Anrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually
consisted of merchandise orders of $20.00 to $30.00 drawn on M. Mclnerny, Ltd.,
or the Liberty House, botli large Honolulu retail stores.
97. The Honolulu harbormaster, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank
J. UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.
98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA, an alien Japanese, foreman
of the registry section of the United States Post Oflice, Honolulu. Comment has
been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t.)
99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact
that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was
unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did re-
member that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHIRODO
also rmembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of persons.
Mikami's Naval Knowledge
100. The interrogating oflicers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye
MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that
he speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver
for the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since
that time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.
101. During the course of the interrogation (September 28, 1942), it became
apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with
current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor.
MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never seen
before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA, had
arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA actually
had arrived.)
102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left
Pearl Harbor — ^for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had
recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer move-
ments.
103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing "the same old battleships" return to
Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen
before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the WASP,
on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, was
seasonably [2//] informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI, an internee,
was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the itermeut camp on
Sand Island.)
104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He
mentioned "anti-torpedo nets", knew their purpose, and stated he had never seen
them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also mentioned "anti-
airplane balloons" which he thought were impractical for use around Pearl Har-
bor because they would give away the exact location of the objective. MIKAMI
also discussed, the "balance of naval power" theory, and expressed the opinion
that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a naval race
between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion that the
United States would beat Japan only when the had beaten the Japanese Navy.
105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval
subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about three
years, naming Our Navy. Life, and the Naval Institute Proceedings. He said
he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old copies
368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because "they
tell big lies". However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent (though
perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines in a lan-
guage in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains a mat-
ter of conjecture.
KOREAN CONTACrrS
106. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made a
point of keeping stationed in Hawaii one secretary who could speak Korean.
There were two reasons for this practice : First, to handle various Korean mat-
ters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate ; second, to use the Hono-
lulu Consulate as a "listening post" regarding various Korean nationalist move-
ments. The Japanese apparently regarded Honolulu as an excellent place for
keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.
107. Takaichi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was em-
ployed there from 1927 until the outbreak of war, recalled that during his time
secretaries Takeo KASHIMURA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyo-
nosuke YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs at the Con-
sulate. (For some reason SAKAI "forgot" to mention YUGE, the most recent
of these secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent inter-
view. All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties they having
been instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine. )
lOS. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having
seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the
subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of w^hich is reference
(n). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1938,
stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at
the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.
[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu field office
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the originals, in
Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate
General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set
forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925. the Consulate was
allowed $100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1931.
the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this field.
Following that time, thei Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations
from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that
the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate :
Kwang Won Cho
110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent visitor
of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the name.
Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment of
$37.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of $20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the
subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of which
follows :
"Subject [CHO] born October 21, 1897 in Korea ; came to Hawaii in 1923 as
Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean Mis-
sion, Honolulu. He became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931 ; however, his
entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently residing
in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source reveals
Subject paid ,$37.00 in May, 1934, and $20.00 in August, 1934, by Japanese Con-
sulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained in which
Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and beginning about
September, 1939, and extending to April, 1941. He admits having performed
work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities ; further, that during the
latter period approximately $200 was paid him by the Consulate for his services
which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers. Subject
claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate under threat to
bring harm to his family in Korea ; however, his acceptance of remiuneration
makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any payments
in 1934."
111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that
the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 369
on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance tliat a fellow passenger aboard
the ASAMU MARU was Sanji ABE, subject of reference (p), former Territorial
senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during which
he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, and also made an
overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan's war effort in China.
Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujiro KONDO, subject
of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuzo SATO, subject of reference (r),
now in custody; and Kenju OHTOMO, subject [26] of reference (s).
OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, Hono-
lulu, and whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese government,
has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to internal
security. Ten other of Reverend CHO's feillow passengers are now in custody,
and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous by,
this oflice. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons traveled
on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may be worth.
Doo Ok Chung
112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received $80.00 on
May 22, 1933. A revieiw of the files of this oflSce indicates that he is a 54-year-
old alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army
and Navv Y.M.C.A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilsoo HAAN's
SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly
chairman of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN. dated June 22, 1942, describes
CHUNG as one of "the cornerstones of our League".
113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that
CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three
sons serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his
wife, and his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in
Korean political circles since 1915, when he joined the KOREAN NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION. He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN
INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter or-
ganization. The KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE has been comparatively
inactive since 1929, and eventually he joined the SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S
LEAGUE. He denied, with seeming sincertiy, his ever having had contact with,
or accepting money from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be
no other individual in Hawaii of a similar name.
Won Sam Kim
114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following pay-
ments :
September 10, 1935 $20.00
May 28, 1934 15.00
July 24, 1934 25. 00
September 10, 1934 30.00
May 31, 1936 20. 00
April 13, 1936 10. 00
May 2, 1936 10.00
June 6, 1936 10. 00
March 29, 1937 18. 00
Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was
born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter
by trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDE-
PENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1939, in Honolulu, and his widow
denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese Con-
sulate.
Sang Ho Lee (Yee)
115. LEE was paid $100.00 on March 31, 1982, and $20.00 on August 19, 1933.
Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the
Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339i North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later
directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs.
Sang Ho LEE, 1355 Miller Street, Honolulu.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 25
370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE
was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States
on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from
July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on
February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.
Ok Nam Shin
117. The translation indicates that this individual received $50.00 on March
31, 1932, and $3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation revealed that SHIN, a groceryman, was born in Korea in ICOl,
came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to Hono-
lulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never returned.
Kylsoo Haan
118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, who is
usually referred to as Kilsoo HAAN :
May 25, 1936 $60.00
August 15, 1936 40. 00
August 25, 1936 10, 00
Chin Ho Tough
119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of $80.00 from the Consulate.
TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has
been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory
in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession.
He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as
a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Molokai. He
has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When interro-
gated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occasion, that
being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his passport stamped.
OTHEE CONSULATE CONTACTS
Ensei (Enjo) KotayasM
120. On March 15, 1932, KOBAYASHI received $8.00 from the Consulate. An
alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese language
school principal, and a toritsuginin at Hawi, Kohala, Hawaii, T. H. He was
taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned. He is
reported to be at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning for
repatriation to Japan.
Katsuichi Miho
121. MIHO received the sum of $27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March
15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the
MIHO HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H, and was a toritsuginin for that district.
He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned
at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
Minoru Murakami
122. MURAKAMI received the sum of $10.00 from the Consulate on March 15,
1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative
for the Nippu Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-
Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7,
1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Ap-
parently he desires to repatriate to Japan.
Masao Sogawa
123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of $50,000. He was editor
and publisher of the Hawaii Shimpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published in
Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-
Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 14,
1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 371
Wade Warren Thayer
124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of $40.00 from
the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese
Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known
why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence
Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some perma-
nent financial arrangement with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.
THE CONSXJLATE PEEPABES FOB WAB
[29] 125. Takaichi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 tiie Consulate
began to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about
the same time, the clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told
not to talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the
back yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers
shortly before the war started, although he did observe that the number of
visitors to the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie
Bank increased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors some-
times carried handbags with them.
126. Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist at the Consulate, remembered
that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials
came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA's room, where they
stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihei MIYAMOTO, sub-
manager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in
the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO
and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the
Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She
added that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had
never done this.
127. Ichitaro 02JAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1941,
the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appear-
ing books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his
departure for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI
explained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10
years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that
he helped carry these books from the Vice Consul's office to the yardmen, who
would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus
burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and
Rokuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate
staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeza order
against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned
a considerable amount of material at that time.
128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan
were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He
stated that in the code room of the Consulate was a small brazier, and when
papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming out
of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of this
room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941)
than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was
burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo
SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAW^A, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was
always present during this operation.
129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding
room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other
[30] material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that
he put out this fire about 19O0,just before darkness fell. He noted that every-
thing had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all
the time, so he was unable to state how often code room material was burned.
The incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove
the material from the code room.
130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to
play golf with Tsunetaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He
remembered that MIKAMI's taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the
two officials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate.
MIKAMI requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did.
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
However, OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because
he, OKUDA, probably would be unable to play golf that day.
13L OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to
and subsequent to December 7, 1&41, that Consul General KITA had no fore-
knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul
General had received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of
December 7th. (This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-
American and Japanese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon
its receipt, KITA had called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel,
two blocks from the Consulate gi-ouuds, and insisted that the latter come to the
Consulate immediately to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of
this incident from SEKI about a week or two after the attack. 021AKI stated
that TSUKIKAWA was at the Consulate at the time of the attack.
132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when
the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing
smoke come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatri-
ated (February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a
big tub filled with ashes.
133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about 0900
on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find out
what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKIKAWA
were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a little
later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTO-
SHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA
wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not
allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about 1000.
CMDNSITIATE DOMESTICS
134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the
domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA,
a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with
the [31] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops
to which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one
Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers. He
secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Consulate
chauffeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate. FUJITA
first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On one occa-
sion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like to cook
at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA. (Results
of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52-54 of refer-
ence (c).) Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic, OZAKI
asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJITA was
able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set forth in
paragraphs 55-56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs 47-51 of
reference (c).
JAPANESE NAVT TANKEES
135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at
Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more
with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would leave
the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One Ishichi
MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old Aala INIarket,
often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occasions by representa-
tives of this oflSce to have carried a mail bag onto the boat. SAKAI explained
that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post office pending the
arrival of the tankers and carry it aboard. Presumably this was a labor of love.
SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes left the tankers
here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honoh;lu at a future date. However,
SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further disclaimed all
knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where they lived while
here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), paragraphs 42-43.)
TOBITSUGININ
136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term soryojikan toritsuginin was not
accurately translated as "consular agents". He believed the more correct transla-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 373
tion to be "Consulate General 'go-between' men". He remembered Vice Consul
OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the toritsuginin were not agents of
the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute requir-
ing such agents to register with the State Department.
137. It should be remembered that the status of the toriisuginm ^as never
clarified by judicial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only' in a very
loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Consulate,
and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military espionage on
the part of a toritsuginin has been proven to the satisfaction of this office only
in one case, that of Unji HIRAYAMA, subject of reference (1). Economic
[321 espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases. However, the
basic motive in placing all toritsuginin in custody immediately after the attack of
December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were extremely pro-Japanese,
and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen to be toritsuginin on the
basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one who was not engaged in a
number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his duties as toritsuginin.
Pending— 14ND.
[copy]
[i] TRIP TO KAUAI
One (lay in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will
be sent on a trip to Kauai in the near future. Sometime after that Seki told
me that he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that
both of them wanted so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the
situation was between them. After several days (few days before we left)
Morimura suddenly told me that he is not going and said that I will be sent.
After hearing that from Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki
said that they (Morimui-a and Seki) had some kind of misunderstandings. I
told Seki why he (Seki) himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go
so much. But Seki said he is not going and told me to take my wife with
me. He told me to go and have a good vacation. And then Okuda called
me to his desk and told me to go to Kauai with my wife and also told me to
see Seki about the money. Seki gave me about $100, and the following day I went
down to the airway company office to buy our tickets. The day before we left
Okuda called me at his desk and gave me the following instructions. (1) See
the things that could be seen from the highways: (2) Not to talk to anyone:
(3) He said that he knew the air field project at the Barking Sand is going on.
He told me to see that if it could be seen from outside: (4) See the Lihue air
port if there is any improvements: (5) See the Hanalei bay if anything is being
done. He said he saw in a newspaper that the U. S. Navy is planning to use
the bay for small boat base: (5) He showed me the geological survey map of
Kauai and told me to see the Wainiha power plant. [2] He said that it is
the source of power used on Kauai: (6) He showed me a photograph of Port
Allen and Nawiliwili harbors. Te told me to see any change has been added.
He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I can see. I
called up Mikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport next morning.
Next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife
and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a. m.
and reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a. m. I noticed Horikawa was one of
the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I
happened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show
us around the island. He said the auto fare will be $25. Then we started out
immediately for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking Sand. He
said we cannot go there in the morning because the Army usually practice
bombing there. We went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon.
We got out of the car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued
our drive to Kokee and we went as far as the place where there were some
residences. Since Minatoya said there isn't anything more to see further up
we turned back and came back to Waimea. Minatoya suggested to have our
lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we went in and all three of us sat at one table.
He then introduced himself and said he is working for some transportation com-
pany. He talked about his having brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We,
ray wife and I, introduced ourselves too, but I didn't say I was from the con-
sulate. Soon after lunch we left the hotel and started for the Barking Sand.
We didn't stopped at anywhere on the way and [3] reached the Barking
Sand. We got off the car then walked up the sand hill and tried if the sand
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
really barks. I took a picture of my wife tliere, I looked from the sand hill if
there was any work going on for the air field, but I couldn't see anything at
all. Only things I saw were sandy beach and keawe trees. After staying there
about 20 minutes and started back the same road to Lihue. On the way back
to Lihue, we passed through Kukuiolono park and stopped at the Lawai beach
to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to Koloa beach where we got off the
car and walked around the sandy beach seeing many human skeletons. After
staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue without stopping anywhere.
It was about 5 p. m. when we reached the Lihue hotel. We registered there
and shown to our room. We had our dinner at the dining hall. After dinner
my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so we caljed up Minatoya on
the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon after and we went to
the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the title of the picture
was "Strawberry Blonde". After show Minatoya took us back to the hotel.
We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some kind of party at the
hotel that nite. The following morning Minatoya came to the hotel at about
8 a. m. After breakfast I happend to see Horikawa in the kitchen so I went in
just to say hello. I introduced myself and my wife. All he said to us was that
"You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sightseeing
trip?" Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9 a. m.
We went to see the Wailua fall. We didn't go near to the fall but just saw it
far from the hill. Then we went to see U] the Grass shack where we
got off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drum and sandals. From
there we went to see the Slipery faU. We got off the car and walked down
to the fall. After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direc-
tion. We didn't stopped anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our
lunch. We ate our lunch in the pavilion. I didn't see anything been done at
the bay. After staying there about 4.5 minutes we started to Haena. On the
way I asked the driver if we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing
it on the way back. We went in the dry cave in the car and got off the car at
the wet cave to see it. On the way back we went up the Waiuiha valley and
went as far as the power plant was. I expected to see something large but
All I saw were two pipes running down and one small power house building.
Without stopping the car ye just turned back from there and stopped about Yz
mile down on the same road and picked some mountain apples. After staying
there about 15 minutes we started back and didn't stopped anywhere before
we reached Kilauea lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of seeing the lighthouse
since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of the lighthouse came
and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climed the stairs and saw the large
lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors' signature book. From
there started back and didn't stopped anywhere before reaching Lihue. On
the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn't got off the
car. Minatoya said pointing one oflBce building that was his company office.
We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p. m. After dinner at the hotel my wife
and I thought of going to see [5] Japanese movie and walked to the
theatre. (I don't remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the
hotel) It happened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing
the show we Avent back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning
Minatoya came at about 8 a. m. we checked out the hotel at about 8 : 30 a. m.
I remember I paid $20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe air-
port. We left the Hanapepe airport at about 9 : 30 a. m. and i-eached Rogers
airport at about 10 a. m. Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my
wife to her shop and went to the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked
me how was the trip. They asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I
couldn't see much. Seki said it's natural that I didn't see much. He said many
things couldn't be seen from the highways. Then Okuda called me at his desk
and asked me to tell him what I have seen. I told him I didn't see anything
at the barking sand. I told him it was so quiet and I even never seen a plane
flying. I told him there wasn't anything at the Hanalei bay. All I noticed
was the sea was calm and it was a large bay. He asked me how was the reef of
the bay but I said I couldn't see any reefs. I told him there were two pipes
running down the mountain at the power plant at Wainiha and one building.
He asked me anything more so I said none. I told him there wasn't anything
new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Alien harbor. I told him at the Lihue
airport I didn't see anything but some army tents. I didn't tell him that I
talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about the trip. [6]
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 375
When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. Morimura just said
"There isn't anything big going on it seems".
On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn't bring any letter or
notes to anybody and I didn't bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.
/s/ richakd m. kotoshikodo.
Oct. 1, 1942.
United States Naval Intelligence Service
investigation report
Confidential
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
Report made at : 14ND— Honolulu, T. H. Date : June 15, 1942.
Report made by : Lieut. ( jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Woodrum,
USNR.
Period covered : February 15-June 15, 1942. Status of Case : PENDING — ^14ND.
Origin of Case : General investigation of espionage activities of Japanese Consulate
General, Honolulu — see reference (a).
Reference : See first page of details.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures : None.
Copy to :
ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Coml4 (1)
MID-HD (2) Zone II (1)
FBI-Hon (2) Zone III (1)
14ND (3)
Source File No. : 14ND/#64-A. ONI File No. :
Synopsis. — Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu,
indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu
in March, 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the
movements of U. S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.
MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he would
attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do. His
work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office,
involving poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not
known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much
time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City
peninsula and Aiea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa
beach (a potential landing place), Kaneohe Bay (across from the Naval Air
Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives
around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and
MIKAMI, a regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHI-
RODO alone to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5,
1941. IMORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned.
Deductions. — Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in
reference (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA.
Approved :
I. H. Matfield,
Captain, V. S. Uavy
District Intelligence Officer.
WBS/cop
[Z] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, Honolulu — Espionage Activities.
References :
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9, 1942.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14, 1942.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated February
3, 1942.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated Feb-
ruary 3, 1942.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated Feb-
ruary 3, 1942.
376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Richard Masayuki KOTO-
SHIRODO, dated February 8, 1942.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated January
29, 1942.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated June 15, 1942.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI, dated
February 6, 1942.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kenzo MAEHARA, dated May
11, 1942.
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ryuichi MORIBE, dated- March
6, 1942.
(1) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ilvuzo SATO, dated May 16, 1942.
This report has been prepared to supplement references (a) and (b), and
to demonstrate, insofar as is known to this office, the means by which the
Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, gathered information relative to ship
movements.
1. In paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of reference (a), it was stated that when
interrogated, Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist and typist at the Consulate,
and subject of reference (c), stated that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secre-
taries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the ostensi-
ble purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, but did
little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following
his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURDA was assigned to a desk in
the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work
there was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about
1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk
in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October
or November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE
often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100,
and she would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate
usually called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South
Vineyard Street, Honolulu, (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORI-
MURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshie
MIKAMI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions, Miss
DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Richard
Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Consulate
clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and other
times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither
of them came back for the rest of the day.
[2] 2. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island
of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time.
Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters wrtten in pencil on the
map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his
desk.
3. Takaichi SAKAI, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (d), when interi'o-
gated corroborated Miss DOUE's statements about MORIMURA's failure to con-
cern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the
Consulate during business hours.
4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e) , also was
interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle
or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand was
without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said con-
cerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours with
KOTOSHIRODO, adding that KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport)
shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.
5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to "important places",
and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said "military places." On being
asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said it was because
of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and because neither
MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention of where they had
gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added that KOTOSHIRODO
had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.
6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know nmch about IMORIMURA's
background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication
containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular officials.
He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if he is a regular member
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 377
of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not at his
age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told Sakae
TANAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedai University. )
7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO
were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they
entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not
strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks
at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about the same
age and seemed to enjoy one another's company.
8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHlRODO was interviewed, and his
personal history is set forth in reference (f ) . (It should be noted that none of the
Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections
with the Japanese Government.)
[3] 9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to
receive and open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He
usually logged in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were
actually opened by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO
stated that he wrote down the date of receipt and the number of each item
from the Foreign Office, which was addressed to the Consul-Geueral, but he did
not see the actual letters, as these usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI
would take this mail in to Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there it would go into
the Consul's office. Each letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was
signed and returned to the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to
SEKI from the Vice Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter
the subject of each letter and its date in a record book.
10. SEKI's predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to
Japan late in 1940. (It was recently learned that while he was in Hawaii,
IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)
11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two
types — that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and
letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive
numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths,
marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the
circular letters addressed to all CJonsulates, would arrive by post, and would be
picked up at the Consulate's post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered
by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. This
would be opened in the telegraph (or, coding) room by Samon TSUKIKAWA,
another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail in a suitcase,
and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accompanied by the
Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remember the same
courier ever coming twice, and he added that one would not necessarily arrive
every time an N.Y.K. liner called at Honolulu.
12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not
logged in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign Office, other
Japanese Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of
the local mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine
reports.
13. Office supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted
as treasurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar
with the purchasing. IMost office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu
Paper Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTO-
SHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK
STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minora FUJUWARA, the manager.
NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Condential In-
formant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA
was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was
no evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was
noted that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down,
with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual — one might
say, unique — coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKA-
MURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of
business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information
of any nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned.
U] 14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of
his activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not
altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived
378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new
secretary over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Hon-
olulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Waipahu,
a planation town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the Middle
Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious to visit a
tea house called the SHIOYU, which was off the highway to the left below the
high school, and which was noted for its baloon fish soup. KOTOSHIRODO had
been there before. The Consulate chaufEuer, Ichitaro OZAKI, advised that it
was impossible to get service there without prior reservation, but MORIMURA
insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said, "Let's not go," and
MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following this admission, KOTO-
SHIRODO displayed a reluctance to remember any further trips with MORI-
MURA outside of town, but was finally persuaded to recall trips to the islands of
Maui and Hawaii.
15. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul
OKUDA. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Hono-
lulu, at 8 :00 a. m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui airport
an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The driver was a
second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with MORIMURA.
MORIMURA spoke little English and had diflaculty understanding the local Nisei
brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this driver for the
two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded to the TOMOEDA
HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast port of Maui.
KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with a "funny eye"
(elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). MORIMURA talked to the
owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced himself. (The
HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nippu Jiji, a Hono-
HonoUilu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 10, 1&41,
described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either injured or made of glass.
HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nijju Jiji, a Hono-
lulu bilingual (Japanese-English) daily newspaper. HAMADA is now in
custody. )
16. It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo
FURUKAWA, the activities of whom were reported in pai-agraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12
of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sanatarium,
Maui, WPi-e found in FURUKAWA's possession, and it is known that HAMADA
visited FURUKAWA, at Kula, a number of times. It was also reported that the
two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA'S letters was a force-
ful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide from his mind. FURU-
KAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two attempts at suicide following
the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked of Japanese poetry, FURU-
KAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before entering Kula Sanatarium,
FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the Nippu Jiji, of which HAMADA
was the Kahulni representative.
[51 17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at
HAMADA's hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not
stay because the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove
to the Grand Hotel in Wailuku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They registered
here, and then drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the
United States Fleet, when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They
stopped at a fountain shop for a while, then drove back to Wailuku. From
here they drove to Sprecklesville, a few miles from Wailuku. There KOTO-
SHIRODO went to a Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul
General KITA had requested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the person
to whom it was addressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package
contained a gift of some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the wo-
man to whom it was addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils.
A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
dated April 11, 1942, states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language
school at Spreckelsville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years,
and had served as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was
taken into custody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee
Hearing Board at Wailuku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While
KOTOSHIRODO was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in
the car. After leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then re-
turned to the hotel in Wailuku about 4 : 00 p. m. After dinner they took a walk.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 379
saw a swimming meet, and about 9 : 00 p. m. dropped down to the fairgrounds
hall where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did
not dance. They returned to the hotel about 11 : 00 p. m.
18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited lao Valley,
located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they
drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10,000 feet
above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained
at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Kula
Sanatarium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the saua-
tarium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO admitted
taking a photograph of the building which be still has in his album. He insisted
that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to anyone else
at the Consulate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao district, in central
Maui, and arrived at the airport about 2 : 30 p. m. The plane took off at 4 : 00
p. m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5 : 00 p. m. (The fact of MORIMURA's
interest in the Kula region should be read in connection with the information
reported in paragraphs 4, 9, 10, and 11 of reference (a).)
[6] 19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was made October
13-17, 1941. Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO ac-
company MORIMURA. They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving
in Hilo about 10 : 00 a. m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during
their entire visit. His name was NARIKAWA, employed by the ABC TAXI
COMPANY (probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo).
MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated by
the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned Room 8.
After limch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilausea Volcano, and spent the
entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO PHOTO
STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and of the lehua
flower. (The [7] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO was then
Kenzo MAEHARA, subject of reference (j), who has been placed in custodial
detention, principally for his association with ofiicers of Japanese naval and other
public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On October 14th, MORIMURA and
KOTOSHIRODO drove to the Kona district (west side of Hawaii), via Kilauea
Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of
Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the hotel bearing his sur-
name, this oflice has no derogatory information.) At Kona, they stayed at the
KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa, but according to KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk
to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the KONA
HOTEL, has no adverse record in the files of this office.) On the evening of the
14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO went to a motion picture show at
Kainaliu, about seven miles from Holualoa.
20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are
a number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO preferred
to stay at the Naniloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is the
most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in three
and one half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must have
been made, inasmuch as Waiohinu is only a little more than half way between
Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Naniloa, the Kona
Inn, also operated by Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and
catering to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese
hotel.
21. On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to see
cattle shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the immense Parker Ranch, and other
smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaau, in
the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked to
an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man
told them about the birth and childhood of Kamehameha (probably Kamehameha
I, (1758-1819), first king of Hawaii). Directories show the pi-oprietor of this
hotel to be one Yoshio HORI. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only
to view Akaka Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night,
after dinner, they went to the Hananoya Tea House where they met two Japanese
girl^. The chauffeur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about
4:00 a. m.
22. The following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the
High School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow Falls,
the Country Club golf course, Puumaile Home (county hospital for tubercular
petients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the TOkiwatei. They returned
380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to Hilo about 2 : 00 p. m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya Tea
House, but left at 11 : GO p. m.
[8] 23. On October 17th, they checked out of tlie hotel and went directly
to the airport, taking the 10 : 00 a. m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in
Honolulu at 11 : 45 a. m.
24. KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver, and the
old man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaau were the only persons they contacted
on the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled
money which was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui
trip he was given $110.00, and on the Hawaii trip, $300.00. On the latter trip
they spent $65.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them $55.00.
25. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points on
Oahu with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks after
MORIMURA's arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him motoring
to the Kaneohe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned into the
Kokokahi road which runs along Kaneohe Bay (across from Kaneohe Naval
Air Station). They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach
pavilion. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the park on the ocean
side of the pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the
Kailua Theater, and then turned left on the road running to the Weimanalo
district. Here they stopped near the old wharf on Waimanalo beach. They
walked over to the wharf where several people were fishing. After about ten
minutes, they got back in the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the
Consulate about 4:00 p. m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and
MORIMURA again made a trip to the Kaneohe district. This time they went in
MiKAMI's taxi. Again they followed the Kokokahi road along Kaneohe Bay,
and at one point MORIMURA told MIKAMI to slow down. Further along the
road they stopped at a roadside stand and purchased two watermelons. This
stand was near a pine grove (KOTOSHIRODO evidently mistook ironwcod
trees for pines), on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the road. They
drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI had breakfast, while MORIMURA
and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer. They were served by a waitress
of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty minutes they returned to the
Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.
26. On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary
Ceremony, when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO
and MORIMURA to AVaianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out
beyond Waianae to Makua Cave, wliere the road ends. They departed from
town about ten in the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a
Chinese store in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to
Haleiwa, on the northwest coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first
trip was made in the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near
a ballground, for about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both
the trip to, and [9] the trip from, Haleiwa were made via Wahiawa.
The second trip occurred some time in May ; the third in July. On neither trip
did they get out of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the
mauka-eica (towards the mountain-towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl
City intersection for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA
talked with anyone on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae
and Haleiwa beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy
troops might first attempt landings.)
27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTO-
SHIRODO up on Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out
of the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used
binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November
they again drove to Aiea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO'S
car, and they were there about ten o'clock in the morning. MORIMURA directed
them to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom he was
visiting was a Mrs. MATSUO. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the house,
too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to her, and
asked her about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese people
in that district. Mrs. MATSUO hesitated, and refused to give a definite answer,
stating that there were other people in the district who knew more about such
matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORIMURA said
that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about 20 minutes.
Afterwards they drove directly to the Consulate.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 381
28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hono-
lulu, and Lieutenant G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO
concerning MORIMURA's visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a nisei whose husband, now
deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered
the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember
their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate.
She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated.
She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolulu Plantation) were
being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if they weren't "suspected." Mrs.
MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were
not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO
wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agents
concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs.
MATSUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO's house an
excellent view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.
29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIIMURA drove to the
top of Punchbowl about 8 : 30 a. m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which
overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely
looked at the view and drove down again.
[10] 30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely as
KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO only
after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to various
areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with MORI-
MURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of all he
had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been rearranged
in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.
31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to
the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they went
in MIKAMI's taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car. On the peninsula proper
they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water stand
belonging to Teisaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However, they
did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old. His
soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this spot
one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.
32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a taxi
and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his arrival,
SEKI acompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clipper landing
at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from SEKI.) About
a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive him to the
peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO's car. They got out of the car and bought soft
drinks at ETO's stand. MORIMURA talked to the ETOs, both the old man
and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had been situ-
ated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORIMURA had a
previous introduction to the ETOs, or had merely struck up an acquaintance,
KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA speak of ETO.
They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amusing that an alien
Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a naval base.
33. Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese
who worked at a store on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the
highway at the junction of Kamehameha Highway and Pearl City Road. MORI-
MURA would talk to this Japanese while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball
machines. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six
times a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last
time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in Septem-
ber, 1941. Whpn KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl Citv junction, he
identified the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken
to the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify
any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat
as the person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was owned
and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.
[11] 34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April. 1941, all the
Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a picnic
at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went to their
destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way to the
WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalanianaole Highway around Koko
Head. They started out about 9 : 30 a. m. and arrived about 10 : 30 a. m. They
382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served coconut
juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a middle-
aged Hawaiian couple. At about 3:00 p. m. they left for home, returning to
Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali. They reached the Consulate shortly before
4 : 00 p. m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam
WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKU-
RADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently
arransPd the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on occasions,
and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is lo-
cated, through a Mrs. BECKLEY, who arranged luaus (Hawaiian feasts). MIK-
KAMI sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its
destination. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, house-
keeper for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAIMI
arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.
35. KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps at
the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of the
Island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice Consul
study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on this
map! or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a new
Geological Survey map of Oahu (1928 edition), and he believed that this was
identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO
also stated that he had seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific
Ocean with a compass and protractor.
36. In lisrht of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the
KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on Janu-
ary 6, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake of
the Military intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated that
he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shopping,
to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. He added that
while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. He had
been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely reluc-
tant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was obtained.
He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where views were
obtained of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. He said that several times MORI-
MURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view could be obtained.
At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes. MIKAMI believed
that \12] MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but was unable to say
whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO went along with
them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion he had driven
MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island. They stopped
at "Sato's restaurant" in Haleiwa. ("Sato's restaurant" has been identified as
the SEA VIEW INN, owned by Ikuzo SATO, subject of reference (1). It is known
that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting Japanese naval
officers, a stop was made at the SEAVIEW INN, usually to eat lunch. While
such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW INN is the
logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it should be
noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach, which is
considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt a land-
ing.) INIIKAMI went on to state that he had driven MORIMURA to Wahiawa
OR two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Schofield Bar-
rack<, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because
MIKAMI's taxi did not have proper identification plates. He also stated that
on one occasion, he drove Tomoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK
STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consulate, to Waipahu.
Tliey saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was. (When
questioned separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such
a trip.) IMIKAMI also confirmed the trip to Waianae mentioned by
KOTOSHIRODO.
37. MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and
also admitted having stopped at ETO's stand at the end of the Pearl City
peninsula. However, he claimed that he did not know ETO's name. He stated
that sometimes he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He
remembered hearing the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet
had just gone out, and that his business prospered when the fleet was in, but
fared otherwise when the fleet was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball
machines while MORIMURA conversed with ETO. When taken out to ETO's
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 383
stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large pile of lumber on the east side of the boat
landing. He stated that this occupied a spot to which he and MORIMURA once
walked in order to obtain a better view of the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.
38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimano
Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles
to a point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At
this particular point, and in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The
view of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which prob-
ably accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once. '
39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honouliuli. Here MIKAMI indicated
a Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated
MORIMURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA
[IS] to Honouliuli only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil
installation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main high-
way, which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted
that this same highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort
Weaver and the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI
denied that he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.
40. At Aiea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Aiea Heights to a
point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of
Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot to which the agents had
previously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIELAMI stated that he had
taken MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least
one occasion, MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes
observing Pearl Harbor.
41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA
to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort
Shafter and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway.
MIKAMI stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030.
Other ships, led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but
he could not say how many battleships were in the line. However, he remem-
bered that the ship behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large,
and the other ships were strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl
Harbor that afternoon. (In paragraphs 6 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted
that prior to the arrival of the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl
Harbor on December 5, 1941, there were five battleships already moored. The
ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys
of Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)
42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORI-
. MURA to ETO's stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and
MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO
to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked
if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about
his mission. MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about
ships. When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would
say only that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to
see the Naval base.
43. In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again inter-
rogated. He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about
four times without MORIMURA, the last time in the latter part of November,
1941. He usually received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA,
who would direct him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any
[i4] change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTO-
SHIRODO stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission.
On this last trip, as well as on certain other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO
had gone to Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the
latter made a rough sketch of the hai-bor showing the approximate locations
of the usual battleship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. Not much emphasis was
placed on the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip
KOTOSHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking
to anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the
Pearl City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford
Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the moor-
ing on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of the peninsula
pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."
384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his
own car, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor.
This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he
made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July
to November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November
27 or 28, 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same
week. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time
during December. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that
MORIMURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending
a good deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate
paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and
repair bills he paid himself.
44. On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO 'Jane's Fight-
ing Ships. One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was
that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and that
MORIMURA had used the word "yagura" /literally, "turrett"/ to describe the
cage masts on certain battleships.
45. KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Con-
sulate, he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as
he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kailua, as described
in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone
outside of the Consulate.
46. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGE-
NAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. MORIMURA took KOTO-
SHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to
Washington and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that
MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and
seemed to know them. (The [15] VENICE CAFE drew the largest part
of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an
alien, about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of Jap-
anese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photographs
of high Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as a photo-
graph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips to Japan.
In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the Shore Patrol,
to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE, flagship of a
Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Comuiaiider Dix ac-
cepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the Japanese Con-
sulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHIGENAGA ar-
ranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the Japanese
officers present, from the Admiral on down, as equals, SHIGENAGA has been
interned for the duration of the war. )
47. On February 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of
the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant Eimball
interrogated Kimika ASAKURA, who was employed as a maid at the Consul
General's residence from June 16, 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA
is a dual citizen who was born at Aiea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA
stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home
on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate.
She had never seen FTJJITA before, but she delivered that he knew her father.
She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Pauca Valley, Hono-
lulu. He drove her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to Ichi-
taro OZAKI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokichi SEKI, who engaged
her services. Miss ASAKURA's duties at the Consulate were to clean the Consul
General's living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The Consul General
lived upstairs in a building which is on the makai (towards the sea) side of
the office building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a room with
Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which MORIMURA
lived.
48. Miss ASAKURA's predecessor at the Consul General's residence was a
girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had
been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from
Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul's
employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.
49. Consul General KITA's most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA.
MORIMURA would drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a
month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 385
treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had
never heard MOKIMUKA discuss business matters with KITA.
[16] 50. The mauka (towards the mountains) residence in the Consulate
residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and
his family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one
of the residences facing on Kuakini Stree, while Kyouosuke YUGB, another
secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur,
and his wife, lived above the garage.
51. Miss ASAKUKA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul
General about 8 :30 a. m. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA
was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast.
Miss ASAKURA did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual way of serving
that meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help
himself. She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the
office building to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the
morning, reportei-s came to the residence and asked for KITA. When the maid
could not find him at the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might
be at his oltice. Thereafter, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and
assisted in serving members of the staff, who were all living in the office building.
She stated that her services as an interpreter were frequently used by the
detectives who were placed on guai'd duty at the Consulate from and after the
morning of December 7th.
52. On February 11, 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshie KIKKAWA.
Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her position at the Consulate
through Toyoki FUJITA, who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised
flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA.
Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate
grounds facing Kuakini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters
in the Consul Gt^neral's house with Miss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated
that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o'clock in the morning, had breakfast
at nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o'clock.
He lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office
about three. After that, MORIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds
with other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened
to the radio, or went out with friends.
53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would
get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about
three in the afternoon with KOIOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several
hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions,
KOTOSHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She
stated that Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to
see MORIMURA after dinner. Sakae TANAKA, a former maid at the Con-
sulate, came to see MORIMURA several [17] times in the evening after
she had left the Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to
MORIMURA"s house several times in the evenings, and remained two or three
hours. On eight or nine occasions, after attending tea house parties, MORI-
MURA slept until noon. Each morning, MORIMURA had to be wakened. In
September, 1941, MORIMURA went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about
noon, he was still drunk, and he made considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA
went to the Consulate office building and informed SEKI, who came over and
induced MORIMURA to go back to bed and sleep off his drunken condition.
Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study, and in this was a wooden desk which he
kept locked. On several occasions. Miss KIKKAWA saw letters written by
MORIMURA, but the characters were too difficult for her to read, she said.
She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA to a girl at a tea house. This
letter she could read ; it was a love letter written to a girl named Tomoyoko.
(Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball later interviewed "Tomoyoko",
a geisha. She admitted her association with MORIMURA, and told of a golf
game she and another geisha once played with MORLMURA and Katsuichiro
TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left Honolulu for Japan on the Taiyo
Maru, November 5, 1941.)
54. On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the
agents, left the Consulate about 11 : 30 a. m. She had set breakfast on the
table for MORIMURA about 8 : 30 a. m. There was a slip of paper on the
table directing her to put breakfast on the table .and then go home. MORI-
MURA usually left such messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing
noticeably different about his activities just prior to December 7th, she said.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 26
386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Miss KIKKAWA emphatically stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that
he was "awful" and said "nasty things." MORIMURA told Miss KIKKAWA
that he had lost the tip of his linger "on account of love". (It had been noted
from several sources that one of MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or
third finger, was cut off at the first kunckle. However, the various observers
have been uncertain which hand was mutilated.) Miss KIKKAWA stated that
MORIMURA was quite friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter
for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone
MORIMURA, and on one occasion that she knew of, they went to a tea house
together.
55. Also on February 11, 1942, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the
agents. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her
father, Yokichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on
March 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941.
She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she
had obtained her job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words,
"he put me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with
the cook, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open.
Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA. She
[18] stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he i*efused to
tell her anything about it. She often went to the house where MORIMURA lived,
to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there. MORIMURA told her that he could
not, and would not, let her go into his study room.
56. One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA
over to Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while
Miss TANAKA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with
MIKAMI in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. After
the boat trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to Hono-
lulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA aslved MIKAMI questions
about Coconut Islajid, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not remember
any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While at Kaneohe
they drove by Dr. Iga MORI'S country place and stopped and looked at it. How-
ever, Dr. MORI was not there, so they did not go into the house. (Dr. MORI
is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu, and was an
advisor to the Consulate. He was taken into custody following the outbreak
of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition, subsequently
was released.) Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going to the Kaneohe
district, they had driven up Aiea Heights in MIKAMI's taxi.
57. Robert Orion Glover, Cy (AA), USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio
Censor, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORI-
MURA, having met him through his membership in tiie DAI NIPPON BUTOKU
KAI. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction
of Dr. Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATARIUM, Hono-
lulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A kendo (fencing)
group, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941.
One George HAMA]\IOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared
that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAIMAMOTO
introduced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORI-
MURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the
Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before,
and that he was an accomplished kendo man. In his kendo matches and instruct-
ing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described
by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA
stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had
proved best in the China "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak
English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to under-
stand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in tiie haoles
(whites) in the kejido class, and asked them many questions as to who they
were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions. Be-
sides Glover, there were two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c, USNR,
and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman. Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of his wild
parties, but the invitation was not accepted.
58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around
Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he
was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 387
MORIIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with
a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep
sea fishing on sampans.
59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose
professional name is "Sadako," also was interviewed by the investigators. She
stated that MORIMURA and Rynichi INIORIBE, subject of reference (k), once
held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is
not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been
interned, is a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Hono-
lulu. He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General
KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close
to the Consulate.)
60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who
had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agen-
cies, and new leads are from time to time uncovered in the investigation of
seemingly unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The
same will be developed in further reports under the general title of this case, or
under individual ease titles, as may be appropriate.
Pending— 14ND
United States Naval Intelligence Service
investigation report
Confidential
Subject : Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Activities.
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date : IJf Feb., 19Jf2.
Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending.
Origin of Case : Receipt by DI0-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese
Ambassador, Washington.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul
General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and
naval subjects.
ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Coml4 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MIDHD (2)
14ND (3)
Source File No. : 14ND #54A. ONI File No. :
8i/nopsis. During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General,
Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval
vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no- evidence at hand to show reporting of
such facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found
which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.
Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in
Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the
number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and
very inaccurate as to destroyers.
Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on
data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the
Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard
was engaged in this espionage activity.
The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets
were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.
Deductions. Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate
in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor,
absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non use of anti-torpedo nets to
protect battleships in the harbor.
Approved :
I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. S. Naini.
District Intelligence Officer.
WBS/zw
388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[i] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
References :
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASATUKI KOTO-
SHIRODO, 2-&-42.
(c) 14XD Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.
1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a).
It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence
transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo,
and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.
2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese
Consulate, Honolulu, dating bacli to March, 1941, were made available to the
District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those com-
munications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this
report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter dis-
cussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential
source, on 5 December, 1941, but wei-e in code or cipher and could not be evalu-
ated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until
11 December, 1941.
3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to
date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor,
and their entry and departure tlierefrom, was gained by the simple expedient
of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard.
From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either
by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the
Consulate ; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of
Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk,
subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver,
subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORI-
MURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and
contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, promi-
nently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for
the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off
the shores of the Hawaiian islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor
[2] area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and re-
porting his findings to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA
and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a
report to follow.
4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following
despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo :
WYOMING AND TWO SEAPLANE
TENDERS DEPARTED THIRD.
(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where
obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941
(hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above despatch to
have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at
1208 and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane tenders CURTISS
and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and
1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at
1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battle-
ships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel
that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane
tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.
5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister
TOGO by the local Consulate :
USS HONOLULU ARRIVED 1300/4th
From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS
HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300,
on 2S November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese
attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no ci'uisers of the HONOLULU type either
entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. Tlie only cruiser movements at
Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 389
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, be-
tween 0718, 5 December, and the arrical of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.
6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request
has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was
sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December :
The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth,
entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the
LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships
were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers;
16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the HONOLULU type and 2
destroyers.
The firts sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One
(ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between
0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed
by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled
to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to
Tokyo.
7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts.
The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with
the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735,
the same morning.
8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December,
and up until tJie time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were
eigiit battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA,
MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and
OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard
was, therefore, correct.
9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light
cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the
vessels of that tvpe in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA,
ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALIOIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light
cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in
the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.
10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were
twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed,
before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway
in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared
the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the after-
noon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.
11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have
been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers
now used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts
as to all destroyer-type ships are presented : At 0800, on 5 December, 1941,
there were twenty-eisht destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl
Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two
DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty
the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the hai'bor at 1200. Subsequent
departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the
harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.
12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that
four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that
afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the
four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had
been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or
were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival
of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals
of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four
destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431,
and at 1612.
13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following
despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a
matter of interest :
Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships
after the fourth.
390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when
the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet
movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch
was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.
14. At 1801 on 6 December, 11)41, the Consulate [5] placed the following
message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington :
On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper
entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3
light cruisers ; 17 destroyers ; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock : 4 light
cruisers ; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV all ) PS— CV cannot be found in
the fleet.
The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts :
The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl
Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.
15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the fol-
lowing are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should
be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYO-
MING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.
16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW
ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU,
HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.
17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels
in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of
destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of
OSOO, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor.
Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300,
and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total
of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 Decem-
ber, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above.
In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that
day — four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three
seaplane tenders (AVDs) — which to the untrained observer might have appeared
also to be destroyers.
18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in
Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered
at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at
1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.
19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms
"moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at
moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in
dr.vdock and those not in drydock.) From Navy Yard operational data, it was
determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at
moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was
in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored,
as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy
cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen
at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.
20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there
were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion
of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the. fact,
the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.
21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at
1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet
been found in the Consulate traffic) :
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123 :
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp
Davis, N. C, on the American mainland. They considered (at that time)
the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama.
Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected
for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence
of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their
installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they
would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and
Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail (he investigation of the non-use of nets for
torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 391
[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch
is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is
not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment
thereon is offered.
22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts
which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Con-
sulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used
to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the sub-
ject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch
was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found
in the Consulate traffic), or both.
23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the move-
ments of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen
and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.
24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following
message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco :
Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for
the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.
The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LURLINE
is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having
left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.
25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the fol-
lowing message for transmission to Tokyo :
On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and
departed early on the fourth. About 1100 tons ; one stack ; and had a four-
inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went
ashore and were receiving mail at the Briti-sh consulate.
[S] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian
merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and
departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE
ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6.892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, A' ice Consul
for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could
give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the
Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks.
That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT'S crew went
ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.
26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December,
1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:
A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure
of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. ( See paragraph 4, above. )
B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. Paragraphs 4,
14.)
C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONO-
LULU. (Paragraph 5.)
D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and re-
porting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9.)
E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in
on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)
F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Para-
graphs 6. 10, 11, 14, 17.)
G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at
moorings. (Paragraph 14.)
27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it
is concluded that :
A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship
movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTO-
SHIR* )D0 and MTKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by
other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.
B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception
of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails
[9] to show which observers made the accui-ate reports, and which made
the erroneous reports.)
C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded
chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the
WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily
available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her
392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tuiTets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battle-
ships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the
PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.
D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This
is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo
was surprisingly inaccurate.
28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature
have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages,
reporting (from newspaper sources, in^raost instances) such facts as the arrival
of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral
H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through
Honolulu of i)ersonnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been
collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).
Pending.
[-/] Encix)sube (A) : Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul
Oeneral, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consuls, concerning military and naval
subjects
21 MARCH 1941
(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)
According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn
and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland
on the 17th; and the'heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Chirk.
Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney — both groups on a friendly
visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to
Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane.
Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and
that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th,
that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The
maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.
29 APRIL 1941
(To Tokyo)
The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons
of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the
morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading
2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embai-ked and
she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting
troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.
14 MAT 1941
(To Tokyo)
With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing
the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Em-
mons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived
Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.
7 JUNE, 1941
(To Tokyo ; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)
1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started
conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance
seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kim-
mel brought plans for sending units [3] of the fleet back to the mainland
for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels
to return were not announced.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 393
13 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)
Reference ; San Francisco nisg #92 :
SS President Pierce with about 900 Array men embarked (includes some
hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed
the 12th.
26 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo)
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.
27 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo)
Chungking-Burma Road — Trucks.
28 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)
Daniel Arustein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4]
managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th
via Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from
the standpoint of speeding help (to China).
8 JULY, 1941
(To Tokyo and Washington)
A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin pact of May that
American pilots are joining the China Air Force: the local Chinese Consul
General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air
groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in
Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (lan-
guage) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (V).
The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.
lo JULY 1941
(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)
On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect
that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west coast
and [5] loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test
gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.
20 JULY 1941
(To Washington and Tokyo)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ferrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral
Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in
a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspect-
ing the U. S. fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six
officials coimected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of
handling affairs concerning the fretz.ng of Japanese and Chinese assets here.
2 SEPTEMBER 1941
(To Washington and Tokyo)
On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship
(called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked
by German planes, but the name and nationality was not [6] announced)
394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and
mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are
an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma
Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.
23 SEPTEMBER, 1941
(To Tokyo)
Magruder to Chungking via Manila.
IS NOVEMBER 14 91
(To Tokyo)
Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000 2 ton trucks.
The attached copy (of report sent to P.B.I., Washington by Mr. Shivers on
3/2S/42 re notes found on desk pad at Japanese Consulate) was furnished Col.
Bicknell.
[i] . 19 ja
1/6 (J) Greek ship New year 23 3
Ambassador Nomura, New Year greetings 71. (70)
1/13 (E) Mr. Heraenway. 10:30 A. M. Hawaiian Trust.
Mr. Thayer.
1/15 (E) Lecture on "Chinese Drama" by Reverent Stephen Mark of the Com-
munity Church of Honolulu.
7: 30 P. M. .Jan. 13, at Mrs. John Marks. ( ?)
1/16 (J) Tsuncda, Memorial pamphlet.
1/16 (E) Annual meeting and election of officers of Chamber of C. of Honolulu.
12 Noon. Jan. 19 at Young Hotel roof. Midkiff child, Bowen Smith
1/17 (E) Ordinary meeting of Japan Chamber of Commerce. 12: Noon.
Mr. Stevenson T. 6303 a lawyer taking care of Greek steamer "Madours
Pateras".
1 : P. M. Judo opening ceremony. Army & Navy Y. M. C. A.
6 : 30 P. M.— Dr. Takahashi.
? Wakayama. Ishizaki, Yamamoto.
Kinoshita. Japanese School
Hilo, Toyonaka city, Umabayashi,
To Japan Kunizukuri.
Grade wind. Trads wind.
Mr. Kamio, head of the purchasing dept. of House of Mitsukoshi.
Standard Trading Co. National Merchandise Commerce.
Indoor ball. Ceremony time will be fixetl later.
6:30 Ishii Garage. In front the Consulate.
? association (party) Miyoshiuo (teahouse) 6:30P.M.
Lt. Comr. Edwin Lavton.
Hanahauoli PTA meeting. 7 : 30 P. M.
Speaker: Mrs. Sam Reisbord,
Mrs. A. E. Steadman,
Mrs. Robert Judd.
2/3 (E) Wrote to Consul T. Kuroki ( ?) about "Snail" (Sooil) or (Siroil).
Lt. Commander Edwin T. Layton intelligent officer.
\2] 2/4 (J) From Japan.
2/5 (E) Major General Walter C. Short is to arrive aboard Matsonia.
2/6 (E) Mr. & Mrs. Okudu
5-7 Waialae Golf Clnl). Reception in honour of Lt. General & Mrs.
Herron and Major G. & Mrs. Short.
2/7 (E) By way of comparison.
2/11 (J) Golf, during morning, 9:30
6 : 30 A. M.
Dr. Mori, Kimura, attend Okumura, Katsuki, Sumida.
2/14 (J) Yokohama Specie 14/2
Consul. Mnto. Tpk^z-iki. f! : 00 p. m. Mochlzuki (tea house)
Shunchoro (tea house) $6.00
Dinner
2/15 (E) 8.93
1/19
(E)
1/22
(E)
1/24
(J)
1/24
(J)
1/24
(E)
1/25
(J)
1/25
(E)
1/26
(E)
1/26
(J)
1/27
(J)
1/29
(E)
1/29
(E)
2/19
2/20
2/20
(E)
(J)
(E)
2/21
(J)
2/21
(E)
2/25
2/27
(E)
(J)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 395
2/18 (E) Kamakura. Mr. Shirai Specie Bank depart for Japan
Successor Ninei Miyamoto.
Noon Mr. Midkiff.
To telegram concerning Trade wind (boat).
Maiden voyage Katheleen Norris
A Jew in Love Ben Heclit
For Men Only Beth Proun
Wife For Sale Katheleen Norris
Pacific Bank, 6 : 30 Mochizuki (tea house)
Tokyo, wind. Ozaki
Manhattan Love Song Kathleen Norris
Angel in the Home Kathleen Norris
O We Too Are Drifting Gale Wilhelm
Second Hand Wife Kathleen Norris
Museum Mr. Brian.
Mochizuki (cancelled) Royal Hawaiian 6:30
Mr. & Mrs. lida Mr. & Mrs. Mori.
2/27 (E) Oriental Literature Society 7 : 30
Jiot aUe to attend.
Mochizuki.
2/28 (J) Asnma Maru Washington Suzuki, wife Miyoko
677182
3/3 (J) fS] Sa— ? 6 : 00 Mochizuki Teahouse.
8/4 (E) Midkiff 6: 30 Cigar N. D. Edmunds (Edwards?)
3/6 (E) Academy Art. March 4, March 16. Mr. and Mrs. Okuda.
3/7 (E) Pan-Pacific Union Noon luncheon Y. W. C. A. J. N. Midkiff.
(J) Chamber of Commei'ce.
3/9 (J) McCully, dress-maker, 9th— 1 : 00 p. m.
3/10 (J) Invitation to the members of the Consulate. 6:30 p. m. Kyushuya
(hotel) ?
3/11 (E) Mr. Sumida.
(J) Soto-ahu (Soto Sect) Pacific branch
Kogan Yoshizumi
The Nissei Club Research meeting. 3 persons
Watanabe excursion party. Son five years. ?
3/14 (E) ? 92262 68 904
(J) March 6th, reached Yokohama.
Army Colonel. Head of the Bureau of the Personnel Affairs.
? ? (two names of places ? ) attached to embassy.
Arrival of the Consul General.
3/15 (J) Departure of the Astoria. Salt Lake and other six vessels.
Heavy cruiser Louisville, Light cruiser St. Louis and so forth, docked.
3/16 (J) Nichibei Chuzo Kabushiki Kai sha (Brewery company in Hilo).
Fujimoto Manager Hayashi Place, 3 persons Teuada, Takehara,
Imai.
3/17 (J) Secretary Morimura, leaving on 20th on Tatsuta Maru from Yoko-
hama.
(E) Dr. Franco Montanari, Italian Consul; Wade C. Hiberly, Asst. Col.
Customs.
3/21 (J) Welcome reception for the Consul General, under the allspices of the
United Japanese Society. Friday the 21st. Natsunoya, 6 : 00 p. m.
3/22 (J) Welcome reception for the Consul General, United Society (crossed
out). Army Commander in Chief, General Short.
(E) Return call— Short.
3/24 (E) 7 : 30 P. T. A., Hanahauoli School.
3/26 (J) Place : Shunchoro teahouse 6 : 30.
3/27 (J) Meeting: Thursday luncheon. Concerning the indictment of the
owner of the Japanese fishing boat.
(E) Saturday (crossed out) meeting.
3/28 (J) Buddhist. Mochizuki.
(E) 4-10 to Ft. Shafter.
[4] 3/29 (J) Meeting to discuss the name lists of the Japanese side.
3/30 (E) Murata dug (drug?) 1819 Homerule St., Kalihi. (The word "Makiki"
underlined in ink, written on same page).
3/31 (J) 7 Commerce.
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4/1 (J) Morimura
Stopover of Ambassador Kurusu when returning.
4/3 (E) Miss Loraine B. Kuck at home, 1951 Vancouver Dr., April 3rd
3—30 ; 6 p. m.
4/4 (J) Kagawa and his party.
Banquet. Y. W. C. A. dinner
Luncheon Japanese Christian Association, Nuuanu Y. M. C. A.
Tea Party, home of Dr. Iga Mori
Consul General
(E) Reception party at Dr. Iga Mori's home from 3 to 8.
4/6 (J) Only Consul General to University Graduates' Club.
4/10 (J) Consul General Reception for the Japanese side. 6 p. m.
(E) Panamean ship "Loidn" (?) "Loida").
4/12 (J) General meeting of the Fujin-kai. Use of the Consulate Building.
Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce.
Newly appointed Wo Fat (chop sui restaurant)
United Japanese Society, rural representatives.
Councillors — about 60 members invited
Consulate member.
4/14 (J) Auspices: The Oahu Branch of the Hawaii Japanese Christian Asso-
ciation ; Time : Noon luncheon ; Place : Pleasanton Hotel.
Oahu Branch head ; Chiyokichi Fiu'uta.
4/15 (J) Consul General Rotary Club Guest.
(E) Rotary Club guest. Luncheon, Young Hotel.
4/16 (J) Nitta-maru docks from mainland.
Obata— 1 N. Y. K.
Consul Fukushima 3 A. M.
Japanese Society. Luncheon.
4/17 (J) Yamamoto (to) Yamashiro Hotel.
Japanese food.
(E) Mr. Charles Bishop
Kinney
c/o Bernard Farden, 711 Pi-ospect St., Tel. 4451
6:30 IMr. and Mrs. Kinney
(In brackets) : Mr. Kita — Mr. and Mrs. Okuda.
[5] 4/18 (J) tYawata-maru
Lunch Fukuda. a clerk
Evening lent to United Japanese Society.
4/20 (E) Captain Charles (?) Hinfharoon.
4/22 (J) Consul General. Reception for the foreign people.
(E) Telephone number : 67907
Policeman, res. parking place
Norman Gay. Tel. 98542 - 2629 ]\Ianoa Rd.
4/23. (J) N. Y. K. invitation, evening. 6: 30 Shunchoro (tea house).
(Phone No.) 65985.
4/24 (E) 10: 30 (crossed out). Luncheon - Norman Gay.
4/24 (E) Wade Warren Thayer is to leave for mainland by Lurline to attend
the National Boy Scout meeting in Washington.
4/27 (J) Fukuuchi $25 00 contribution.
$10.00 contribution.
(E) Member (with arrow pointing to $25 00 contribution). 5:00 p. m.
4/28 (E) The number: 3-6-0-9 written thus, and boxed.
4/29 (E) Dr. Arthur L. Dean.
Director of the Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.
(Sato ? Mr. Wallis, M. Alexander)
Walter F. Dillingham (in Jap. characters: "Pres., Oahu Railway
Co."?
WnUp'- F Frpnr (spell'^d "Frier").
Frank Tremane? (this is written on separnte sh^et — reverse side?)
4/30 (E) Party at C. G. Residence for members of the Consulate.
(J) Frank Tremaine, Honolulu United Press correspondent, left on Lur-
line
R'-pr-^sontatives Tasaburo Shimizu and Riichi (?) Yamamichi left on
Lurline
5/1 (E) Invited to luncheon, Mr. S. Abe, Senator.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 397
5/2 (J) Mochuzuki (teahouse) 6 : 00 informal
(E) Call on Mr. Strench (?)
5/3 (E) Evening. Hanauoya ; wedding party of Mr. Hadada. (Hananoya:
tea-house).
5/4 (E) Expected — M. S. Asama Maru in port.
5/6 (J) Entertainer — a good talker.
Kokusai Theater - Gunnison - Young man's eye glasses.
(E) F. A. Conteur
Mr. Baker, photographer
Dr. Robinson, University of New York
Ml'. R. A. Gunnison.
[6] 5/7 (J) iSogawa, Toyama, Tsuchiya — not yet.
(E) Afternoon 2: 00 P. T. A. meeting, Hanahauoli School
Evening 6:30 — C. G. Residence; newspapermen
Sears Roebuck & Co, 8-10.
5/8 (E) 4 : 15 Doyle's services at Elks' Club, Waikiki.
(Word "tidbits" written in lower left-hand corner).
5/9 (E) Luncheon 12 : 00 Junior Chamber of Commerce.'
5/10 (E) Mothers' Day.
5/11 (J) 11 : 30 a. m., where to : Haloiwa.
Evening 6:30, Dr. Faus. Port Lock Rd.
5/13 (E) Telephdne call to Lt. Comdr. Layton.
5/15 (E) Mo uhly Study meeting 7 : -iS p. m. at Dr. Mori's. Speaker Cons. Gen.
Kita.
Kalama ? ?
5/16 (E) Meeting 6 : 30 p. m. Official Res'dence. Prominent Japanese.
P. P. U. (Pan-Pacitic Union?) Wade.
5/18 (J) Okazaki (judo) arena.
(E) 10 : 00 am. losen ( ?) first ball, finish 12 : 00
Midkife.
5/19 (E) May 19. 4 : 30 p. m. Assembly Room, Hanahauoli School.
5/23 (J) Fujii Hayakawa
(E) Tuesday lecture, Richard Lane.
5/24 (E) Kazukuehn 149 Sei 1476 Wrong 1568 no visit? 1896
Punahou School 8 : 00 a. m.
5/25 (J) Uluma— Ryukyu (Okinawa) word). "Ulu" mearis SAND; "ma"
means ISLAND.
(E) 7:00 p. m. Bartlett & Robertson.
5/26 (J) Hawaii Shogyo Sha (Hawaii Commercial Press).
(E) Mrs. Peck ; Mr. and Mrs. Jones ; Mr. Robertson.
(Following numbers— phone? 4327-9251.
5/29 (J) Kimura ? Matsuda Shunchoro (teahouse).
(E) Shunchoro (teahouse) — Moribe6:30
5/27 (J) Y. M. C. A.— 6 : 00 a m.
[7] 5/30 (J) 9:00 a. m. Moiliili
Standing Committee : Serizawa, Sasaki, Ogata
President.
6/3 (J) Invitation to Meiji University. .
6/4 (E) Mr. F. Midkiff— 2739
3609 Mr. Frazier
6/6 (E) 8: 00 p. m. Central Court of the Honolulu Academy of Arts.
6/10 (E) Ironwood.
6/11 (J) Yokohama Specie, Matsuda, night
Time: 6:30
Place: Halekulani
Mr. and Mrs. Matsuda ; Mr. and Mrs. Mori (Jr.) ; Takahashi ; Mr. and
Mrs. Soga (Jr.) Kita: Mr. and Mrs. Okuda ; Mr. and Mrs. Yuge
6/12 (E) Mr. Yugen (Eugene?) Turner speaks on China Affairs at Y. M. C. A.,
noon.
If there is any problem that you like to have explained, please feel
free to call upon us.
6/13 (E) Resterick. Academy of Arts.
Friel— 5439 (tel. no.?)
(J) Road — land — will estimate.
6/21
6/23
(E)
(E)
6/26
6/28
6/29
(E)
(E)
(J)
6/30
7/4
(E)
(E)
7/7
7/S
(J)
(E)
(J)
[8]
7/:
7/22
(J)
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6/16 (E) Mr. Jndd speaks on "Hawaii as the Pivot on the Pacific" at P. P. U.
luncheon. (Lawrence M. JuddV)
Mr. Arthur E. Goodwin, Tel. 66220—1704 Keesumoku St.
3 Masao Moriyu
237 Takashi Yoshida.
Alfred C. Young, Pnnahou, speaker. President of tlie Alumni Ass'n.
Luau at Punahou S<;liool, 6 : 30 p. m^
Conctn-niny heikau? fishing boat. Freeze of Foreign Assets. Penn-
sylvania.
Italian Consulate— 3948
Arriving July 9th, Kamakura — Diplomatic courier, Kajuwo Taki to
Customs.
Italian Consul meets at the C( cktail party.
Cai-1 Armfelt, 2235 Kalia Rd., Tel. 99865— Cocktail party.
Tour inspection committee to South America, representatives : head —
Kohei Hara ; Misliimnra, ?; Shiiiohada, Takhaki ; Tehara, Kiyoshi;
Toda, V ; Secretary. NYK Hirasaki Maru.
(J) The opening of the meeting. All Islands Commercial Meeting.
Mochizuki. Mr. & Mrs. 4 : 30-6 : 30.
First 3 months $21.00
From the 4th month $30.00
First Private $36.00
Senior Private $54.00
Corporal $60.00
Special Sergent $150.00
(food, clothing, board)
7/23 (J) United Society, Shunchoro teahouse 0 : 00 p. m.
7/27 (J) Contractors Organization, Ishii Garden, 6 : 00 p. m.
7/29 (E) P. P. U.
8/4 (J) Ukishima, Halekulani.
8/6 (J) Matsuda, invitation 6': 30
Kimura, Onoda, Mr. and Mrs. Matsui
8/10 E) "M' Day— Mobilization day
(J) Jews residing in America 477 ten thousand (4,770,000)
Negroes 1189 ten thousand (11,890,000)
S/11 (J) Ukisliima came from the island.
(E) The word "Monday" is written six times and underlined. The figures :
$3,200.00 and $2,000.00 are written all over page, and boxed in some
cases.
8/14 (J) Honolulu Geisha (girls) organization.
Memorial day, 30 years anniversary ; Congratulatory entertainment,
Kokusai theater, from the 14th to the 20th.
8/20 (J) French Consul — money?
(E) I see no necessity for denying the statement since it is entirely base-
less on the face of it.
8/21 (J) Douye.
(E) Thursday, Pratt.
8/29 (J) Miyoshino (teahouse) Hanafuji (Teahouse girl's name?) 6:00 p.m.
(E) Manual — handbook.
8/30 (J) Ikezawa— 79588 (phone no?)
(E) Vice Consul and Mrs. Otojiro Okuda
JZK 15160 (radio station?)
[9] 8/31 (J) Aug. 31, 1939, at present there are SI nations in Europe.
According to President Roosevelt, 70 millions of dollars.
L. L. B. loaned three million two thousand four hundred dollars.
9/2 (E) 93870 Hanahauoli School.
9/3 (J) 1. Japanese of Shanghai, 88,000 assets (assents) 8,000,000 yen.
2. The Americans say that manufacturing ability of the Japan Army
and Navy airplanes are average 250 plans monthly ; together with
the people-owned planes and Army and Navy, it is 5000 planes.
(70% are attack planes. Year ? Airplane School 7 ?
9/4 (E) full-fledged American.
Tenement house. (Japanese character meaning same).
9/6 (J) Tanabe— 944172 (James T. Tanabe, 1920 Bingham St.)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 399
9/7 (J) From July 1st, 1941 to the end of the year, 1943, there will be : Large
ships 1,153 (12,014,000 tons) on the high seas.
Battleships and warships. From Jan l'J41 to August there will be :
Completed ships — 213
Installed ships — 436
.Ships launched last year :
1 Battleship
1 Cruiser
8 Submarines
8 Destroyers
Installation :
2 Battleships
13 Cruisers
18 Submarines
57 Destroyers
1 Plane carrier
9/9 J) Candy. (Tea and cake to be served?)
9 : 30 a. m. 11 : 00 a. m.
9/10 (E) 10:00 a. m. Installation of Bishop Sweeney, D. D., at Cathedral of
Our Lady of the Peace.
9/13 (E) President Coolidge for Manila and Shanghai.,
9/16 (J) Stop-over: Kuniichi Kiyohara, Department of Justice Secretary
Haniada, I'rofessor of Imperial University
Nishina, Technician
Kuga, Courier
? Watanabe, Representative Nagatani
(E) President Tailor.
9/16 (E) Shaigeta ? up the can (case?).
[10] 9/18 (J) San Francisco departure: bounded for the east.
Penant ? (name of the ship). Two Japanese.
9/20 (J) Foliage plant. Like the chx-ysanthemum, tulip. A plant which the
leaves are to be considered.
(E) Single adultery; double adultery; foliage plant
9/23 (E) Miss Caroline Curtis, 6th grade teacher, anahauoli School.
9/24 (J) Ship bounded for the east, Penant. Expected to dock.
Fujiwara, Asayoshi or Yoritoshi.
9/28 (J) 1. Tennis -soft ball 8:30 — 12:30
2. 12: 30 Fair golf with Harada, list purse ? (Fair Golf: Terr. Golf
Course, Ala Wai) ?
9/30 (J) Sumida family marriage party, at Natsu-no-ya (teahouse) 6: 30 p. m.
(E) ? fairway, 1 : 00 p. m.
10/2 (E) Jitney sale - high jinks. ,
(J) Boisterous merrymaking.
10/4 (E) Both my feet had gone to sleep - I got to my feet.
(J) Got numb - got numb.
10/6 (E) Dr. Bowels who was Mrs. Carry in Osaka met at P. P. U.
Mr. Harbin, Hiroshima Higher Normal School met at P. P. U.
P. P. JJ. Straddles, Panama Zone, suave, polite, haggling and bicker-
ing
(J) 2. pm. Yama no Sakaya (name of brewery in town) . Note : on reverse
side of calendar sheet, up in corner next to the number 6 is the wor^
"coincident" written in English.
10/7 (J) One gallon is: "nisho ichigo" (in Japanese measurement.)
One pint is equal to "nigo hassavaku" (in Japanese measurement).
(E) Midkiff at home 6 : 00 p.m. (pencil)
Dr. Gulike (Gulick) 4 : 00 p.m. "
1. Dr. Bowels from Japan spoke at P. P. U. (written in pen).
Muffed the fly? (pencil)
10/8 (J) Natsumoya (teahouse). Baseball social gathering.
(E) Miss ? whf> was in Hiroshima p]lm at K'ng?
Murray CIO leader was at odds with Lewis.
[11] 10/9 (J) Kilchi or Nobuyuki. Tokyo city.
(A person's name, not clear) Yodobashi-ku, Nishi-Ochiai 1-134.
400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(E) I know how to get up a bridge game.
That's would be from frying pan into fire.
Volcanic Isle, by Wilfrid Fleisher. (book?)
10/10 (J) San Francisco departure. Ship bound for the east; Berdia (name of
ship). Two Japanese.
(E) Addition, as follows:
1.79
5. 27
7.06
10/11 (E) 1.00 Unialae Pu?
10/12 (E) Soft ball, Wahiawa
(J) Athletic Association.
10/13 (J) Shunchoro. Invitation : Matsuda, in place of ?
Ncda
Consul General Okuda
Yokohama Specie
10/14 (J) Form (in the circle).
Japanese returning?
From the beginning -
President Pierce from Shanghai docked. Chinese aviation, 100
persons on board.
10/15 (E) Marriage reception of Takabashi's daughters at Royal Hawaiian
Hotel, 4-6 p. m.
(J) Resignation bf the Kanoe Cabinet.
For once, only once, only this.
Waimanalo air field, or planes I suppose.
10/16 (J) Sakamoto. (Takdiro Sakamoto, 1518-F Hiram Lane, is listed in
phone book under the number given, viz. — 8429.)
<E) $7.00 for nothing
Tel. numbers as lollows : 684292 (crossed out) 8429 (underlined).
10/17 (J) Marine Inspector, Tatsuta-Maru
Department of Communication
Tsiichiya, a clerk
Also, Foreign Department, Maeda, a clerk.
(E) OflScial c]U irteis discounted to overlook (in Jap) this possibiliti'
[12] 10/16 (J) Fujita, Sasaki, Hiramitsu.
Ceremonial Rites of the Yasukuni Shrine (in Japan). Miyamoto.
(E) Ploliday.
It's the stove that's getting me down.
10/19 (J) Taiyo Maru. Consul Kaoru Iwanaga.
Tomoki Doi, Department of Communication clerk.
Marine Inspector.
10/20 (E) 7:30
10/23 (J) Tatsuta-Maru docked.
10/24 (J) Departure, Tatsuta-Maru.
10/27 (J) Disposition of the income from the freight by the special computation
of the consulate.
Get permission from the Freeze Order officer.
11/1 (J) Taiyo-Maru docked. Consul Iwanaga, Inspector Doi.
First— 9. Second— 50. Third— 271.
Three o'clock, regular staff— 403 Portable— 88 Extra— 200.
Kikuchi (may be the name).
(E) Pier. 2458 (teL no.?)
11/2 (J) Immigration official
(E) Customs 2
Harbor Master.
11/5 (J) Taiyo-Maru left port. 7:40 p.m.
Mori, Matsuda, Muramoto, Onoda, Soga, Makino, Sato, Ohya.
11/8 (E) 1. Fairway,
pufiferfish
with his back to the piano
(J) Ishii Garden
Baloon fish.
11/10 (J) Ambassador Kurusu's arrival, extended, (delayed?)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 401
11/11 (E) 1. Armistic Day. Holiday
(J) 2. Ambassador Kurusu's arrival extended one day.
11/12 (E) Ambassador Kurusu arrived by China Clipper, 4 : 35 p. m. at Pearl
Harbor.
11/13 (J) Ambassador Kurusn left for California by Clipper, 3 : 00 p. ra.
[13] 11/13 (E) Invited Mr. Morris and Mr. P. Tremaine at Ishii Garden
(UP).
11/14 (J) Expect Argentina Japan Ambassador "Gandei Ottei' .
(B) (Addition as follows:) 4.49
5.30
1.93
11.72
11/15 (J) The flying power :
2,500 fighting planes, or over
17,000 members Officers (41,000)
180,000 members Flying Soldiers (600,000)
10,000 members Flying cadets (600,000) (this latter figure is
crossed out).
11/19 (J) Foreign radio program.
( E ) TZ I— 9.535 kc. 10 : 30 p. m.
15105 News 1 : 30 p. m.
" 6 : 00 p. m.
9535 9535 (this latter is crossed out) .
11/23 (E) The word OBSERVE written four different times and underlined in
each case. The word LOT also appears several times, same way.
(J) The words SEA and SAILOR appear several times.
12/1 (E) Within the predictable future.
2609900 19, 463. 14
236 6, 635, 86
2,499,00 26, 0r^9, 00
12/2 (E) (Onlv following figures appear)
23600 24
26, 099. 00
24, 478. 25
1, 620. 75
3.38
1,624.13
Federal Bxteeau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice,
HONOLULU, T. H., March 19, 19J,2.
Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Army Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Sir : There are being forwarded herewith copies of translations made
of coded and confidential material obtained from the Japanese Consulate in Hono-
lulu. It may be observed that Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" are not included
inasmuch as they are messages which were not decoded.
Photographic copies of the originals of all of the foregoing will be furnished
you at an early date.
Very truly yours,
R. L. Shivers,
R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.
Enclosures.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 27
402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Translation of a Register of Radiograms
1. Two copies of the translation of radiograms received by the Japanese Con-
sulate at Honolulu during 1941 is forwarded to you for your information.
G. W. B.
.End. (2).
Honolulu, T. H., March 13, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Wa.shington, D. C.
Re : JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H., CONFILE— ESPIONAGE (J)
Dear Sir : Reference is made to a letter to the Bureau dated March 2, 1942,
transmitting a translation of a register of radiograms sent by the Japanese Con-
sulate at Honolulu during the year of 1941. This letter indicated that a register
of messages received by the Consulate would be translated and forwarded to the
Bureau.
In accoi-dance therewith, there are being forwarded copies of a translation
of a register of radiograms received by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu
during 1941. The synopses of the messages recorded in the enclosures herewith
are believed to represent all of the incoming radio activity on the part of the
Japanese Consulate.
This register should be considered with the register of radiograms transmitted,
which was forwarded to the Bureau by letter dated March 2, 1942, and with the
photorecord negatives of this register and other coded material which were
forwarded to the Bureau.
Very truly yours,
R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.
FGT : LT
65-414.
' Enclosures — 5.
cc: G-2 Honolulu (3 enclosures), ONI Honolulu (3 enlosures).
Translation of Form in Which We:ie Recorded the Incoming Tbxegrams to
THE Consulate
INCOMING TELEGRAMS
TELEGRAMS, OFFICIAL MESSAGES
SECRET ORDINARY
NO
FILE NO.
DATED month day
RECEIVED month day
FROM
TO
ATTACHED TO :
RECEIVED month day
SUBJECT: (gist of contents)
CHANNEL OF DISPOSITION :
TO month day
FROM month day
TO month - day
FROM month day
TO month day
FROM month day
TO month day
FROM month day
TO month day
FROM month day
TO : THE ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION
TELEGRAM SECTION (X)
PERSON IN CHARGE:
REMARKS :
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
403
EXPLANATIONS
TYPES OF CODES :
A AN (GO)
B RYAKU (GO)
C HEX (ordinary)
ABBREVIATIONS :
CG CONSUL GENERAL
ADS ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION
TS TELEGRAM SECTION
1. The letter GO is very similar to another letter, namely, REI, which may
mean ORDER (in the sense of issued order), but since the letter — GO or REI —
may also be a designation of a certain type of code, this explanation is being
attached for reference. This letter appears under columns entitled TELEGRAM
^'0. & CODE TYPE and CONTENTS.
2. The word GOGAI is presumably a designation to the effect that the radiogram
does not belong to any one type of code for the word literally means "outside of
number." However, the word may also be a designation of a certain type of code.
3. The word MU literally means nil or none, but this may also be a designation
of a certain type of code.
TOP SECRET
[3] FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)
Telegram No. & Code
Type
1-B
2-(A)
3-B
4-B
5-B
6-B
7-B
177-B
8-A
9-B
10-B
U] 11-B
12-B
13-B
14-B
584-A
15-B
16-A
619-A
17-A
18-C
7-YUGO..
File
No.
Date
Ree'd
19
1/17
20
1/17
26
1/24
27
1/24
28
1/26
31
1/27
32
1/27
33
1/27
69
2/15
78
2/25
80
2/26
82
2/27
83
3/1
91
3/8
90
94
3/10
111
3/18
116
3/20
117
3/22
119
3/25
120
3/25
127
3/27
Contents
Re granting of social allowances
Re Greek ship heading towards Japan..
Re remittance of development (of in-
telligence) expenses.
Re crew members connected with
Japan-Russian (?) fishing industry,
(to the Ambassador #37)
Ditto.... _
(to the Ambassador #38)
Re invitation of Ambassador Nomura
and his party.
Re delivery of telegram to Ambassador
Nomura.
Re expression of views by the Minister
on the speech by Secretary "Hull"
against Japan.
(to the Ambassador #39)
Re collecting of information
Re crew members connected with
Russo-Japanese (?) fishing.
Re date when Consul General Kita
will start for his new post.
Re invitation to participate in tne
special festival of the Yasukuni
Shrine to MASA NAKAMURA.
Re Consul General Kita's companion.
Re recrossing by CHINEI KANE-
SHIRO.
Re aopointment of Secretary (TA-
DASHI) MORIMURA to service
in this Consulate.
Re disposition of secret documents
(dated 3/10)-
Re starting for new post of Secretary
Morimura.
Re granting of visa for transit to
"WILLIAM PINRY HOL-
COMBE".
Re Greek vessel heading towards
Japan.
Re radiograms and secret documents
to this Consulate carried by courier
Mori.
Re inquiry on boarding of ship by the
Consul General's "cook."
Re distribution of code type TSU and
AN.
(type GO #1 type 9)
(dated 3/12)
Disposition
To the CG 1/17, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 1/17, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CO 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 2/15, to
the TS 2/14.
To the CG 2/25, to
the TS 2/25.
To the CO 2/26, to
the TS 2'26.
To the CO 2/27, to
the TS 2/27.
To the CO 3/1, to
the TS 3/1.
To the CG 3/8, to
the TS 3/8.
To the CO 3/8, to
the TS 3/8.
To the CG 3/10, to
the TS 3/11.
To the CG 3/18, to
the TS 3/18.
To the CO 3/20, to
the TS 3/21.
To the CO 3/22, to
the TS 3/22.
To the CO 3/25, to
the TS 3/25.
To the CG 3/25, to
the TS 3/25.
To the CG 3/31, to
the TS 4/1.
404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM : THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
19-B
2fr-B
[5] 21-B
814-ANGO
819-RYAKUaO
22-A
23-B.
24-C
U-B-YUGO....
25-B
26-B
963-ANGO...:__
-C
[6] 28-C
29-C .--
307-A
(17)-AN-YUG0.
1058-ANGO
31-C
32-B
33-C
34-B
35-C
36-A
37-C
38-C
39-C
40-C
[7] 41-A
12n-ANG0
42-C
43-C
44-B
45-(C)
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
139
4/5
145
4/7
144
4/7
148
4/10
152
4/11
151 (12)
4/11
162
4/18
163
9/18
164
4/18
179
180
dated
4/28
4/30
181
dated
4/30
19
5/3
194
5/7
199
5/12
200
5/12
198
5/10
201
5/14
208
5/21
211
5/22
213
5/24
226
5/29
225
5/29
227
5/30
228
5/31
230
6/2
238
6/5
243
6/7
246
6/9
247
6/9
250
6/11
254
6/13
266
6/21
282
6/25
Contents
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat
owners.
Re verification expense of crewmen's
registration.
Re request for contribution of article
from Premier Konoye and Foreign
Minister Matsuoka to the magazine
commemorating the completion of
the Memorial Hall of the Japanese
Hospital of Honolulu.
Re departure of Panamanian vessel
towards Japan,
(to Britain #123)
Re stopping in port of courier Secre-
tary FUKUDA and his party.
Re simplifying procedure for expatria-
tion from Japanese nationality.
Re remittance of allowances for rent...
Re expatriation notices in official
gazette.
Re supplementary addition of
RYAKUGO (code?) to transferred
telegram no. E.
Re notice of expatriation of HISAO
NAKAZAWA in the official gazette.
Re crew members connected with
Russo-Japanese (?) fishing,
(to the Ambassador #186)
(dated 4/30)
Re change of indicator words in request
telegram.
(Secret)
Re notice of expatriation of
in the official gazette.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Ditto..
Re purchase of OKUMA's house (or
purchase of hou.se by OKUMA).
Re method for use of telegraphic code
type TSU.
(dated 4/12)
Re abstinence from speeches disadvan-
tageous to the Axis.
Re expatriation notice in the official
gazette.
Re transmission of lodging expenses for
TSUKIKAWA by wire.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Re trip to Hawaii by the Meiji Univer-
sity baseball team.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Re transmission by wire of this Con-
sulate's expenses for the develop-
ment of intelligence for this year.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Ditto
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Ditto
Re subsidy to the "Pan-Pacific
Union",
(dated 6/9)
Re establishment of propaganda organ
of the League of Nations
(from Hankow #186)
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette
Ditto
Ditto
Re expatriation
Disposition
To the CO 4/5, to
the TS 4/5.
To the CG 4/7, to
the TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/7, to
the TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/10, to
the TS 4/10.
To the CG 4/11, to
the TS 4/12.
To the CG 4/11, to
the TS 4/12.
To the CO 4/28, to
the TS 4/19.
To the CG 4/18, to
the TS 4/19.
To the CO 4/18, to
the TS 4/19.
To the CG 4/28, to
the TS 4/28.
To the CG 4/30, to
the TS 5/1.
To the CG 4/30, to
the TS 5/1.
To the CO 5,3, to
the TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/7, to the
TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/13, to
the TS 5/13.
To the CG 5/12, to
the TS 5/13.
To the CG 5/13, to
theTS
To the CG 5/14, to
the TS 5/14.
To the CO 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/22, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CO 5/24 to
the TS 5/24.
To the CG 5/29, to
the TS 5/29.
To the CG 5/29, to
the TS 5/29.
To the CG 5/30, to
the TS 5/31.
To the CG 5/31, to
the TS 5/31.
To the CG 6/2, to the
TS 6/2.
To the CO 6/5, to the
TS 6/5.
To the CG 6/7, to the
TS 6/7.
To the CG 6/9, to
the TS 7/9.
To the CG 6/9, to
the TS 6/10.
To the CO 6/12, to
the TS 6/12.
To the CO 6/13, to
the TS 6/13.
To the CG 6/21, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CO 6/25, to
th« TS 6/26.
Clausen investigation
405
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN) — Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
46- A.
47-B ,
139fr-ANOO.
48-C...
49-A
SO-B
Sl-C
62-C
[8] 53-B...
S4-C
55-A
S&-A
S7-B
58-C...
59-C...
1631-ANaO.
60-A
61-A
62-C
63-A.'
64-C
65
[9] 66-A..
67-C
68-A
69-C.:
-A
70-C..
71-A
1836-ANGO.
72-B
73-A
74-C
75-A
76-A
1906-ANGO-
77-A
[10] 78-A.
79-A
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
284
6/27
289
6/28
300
7/3
301
7/4
302
7/4
312
7/10
313
7/10
321
7/12
322
7/12
325
7/15
329
7/16
331-330
7/16
336
7/17
344
7/21
352
7/24
395
7/28
394
7/28
404
7/29
409
7/30
419
7/31
420
7/31
432
8/2
450
8/6
451
8/6
457
8/8
459
8/9
460
8/9
469
8/13
470
8/13
477
8/16
486
8/22
492
8/26
496
8/28
498
8/29
497
8/29
499
502
8/30
507
9/1
516
9/5
Contents
Re investigation of the true facts sur-
rounding discovery of the mutiny
plot of the crew on the battleship
"Pennsylvania."
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Re putting into force the telegraphic
code type "TA".
Notice of expatriation
Message from the NYK
Re resending of radiogram.
Notice of expatriation
Ditto
Re transmission by wire of salaries(?)
for foreign diplomatic establish-
ments.
Re expatriation notice
Re return of the Imperial portrait
Re report of gathering of local informa-
tion.
Re arrival in port of courier OSHIO...
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Ditto
Re issuing of instructions on entry
into port of .Japanese vessels.
Re returning of the portraits of the
three Imperial Majesties.
Re the secret #2 type UNNUN.
Notice of expatriation
Re courier OSHIO
Expatriation notice in official gazette.
Re calling at "Honolulu" of Tatuta
Mani.
Re sailing of the Tatuta Maru directly
to Japan.
Re expatriation notice
Re visa for passing through to the
Britisher, McBain.
Expatriation notice
Request telegram from the Yokohama
Specie Bank dated Aug. 9.
Expatriation notice
Re loan from the Specie Bank
Re movements of foreign warships
Re request for permission for inspec-
tion tour within the jurisdiction.
Request telegram from Specie Bank...
Re expatriation notice
Re telegraphic code
(Special telegram type GO, no. 1907)
Re loans from Specie Bank to this
Consulate.
Re survey pertaining to Domei broad-
casts.
Re telegraphic code
Re movements and whereabouts of
the U. S. Fleet.
Request telegram from Specie Bank
Disposition
To the CO 6/27, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CO 6/28
the TS 6/30.
To the CO 7/3,
the TS 7/3.
To the CO 7/4
the TS 7/6.
To the CO 7/5
the TS 7/5.
To the CO 7/10
the TS 7/10.
To the CO 7/10
the TS 7/10.
To the CO 7/12,
the TS 7/14.
To the CO 7/12
the TS 7/14.
To the CO 7/15,
the TS 7/15.
To the CO 7/16
the TS 7/16.
To the CO 7/17
the TS 7/17.
To the CO 7/18
the TS 7/18.
To the CO 7/21
theTS 7/21.
To the CO 7/24
the TS 7/26.
To the CO 7/28
the TS 7/26 (28?)
To the CO 7/28
the TS 7/29.
To the CO 7/29
the TS 7/29.
To the CO 7/30
the TS 7/30.
To the CO 7/31
the TS 8/2.
To the CO 7/31
the TS 8/2.
To the CO
the TR 8/4.
To the CO 8/6
the TS 8/8.
To the CO 8/6
the TS 8/8.
To the CO 8/8,
the TS 8/8.
To the CO 8/9
the TS 8/9.
To the CO 8/9
the TS 8/9.
To the CO 8/13
the TS 8/13.
To the CO 8/13
the TS 8/13.
To the CO 8/16
the TS 8/19.
To the CO 8/22
the TS 8/22.
To the- CO 8/26
the TS 8/27.
To the CO 8/28
the TS 8/28.
To the CO 8/29
the TS 9/5.
To the CO 8/29,
the TS 8/29.
To the CO 8/29
the TS 8/29.
To the CO 8/30
the TS 8/30.
To the CO 9/1
the TS 9/2.
To the CO 9/5
theTS 9/5.
8/2
to
to
to
406
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN) — Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
m-c -
81-A ----
82-A - -
83-A
84-(C)
85-(C)
86-A
87-B
88-C --
89-C
90-C
91-B.
92-C - —
2179-RYAKUGO
[11] 93-C
94-B
95-A
96-A
97-A
98-B...
99-B
100-B
101-B
102-B
103-? ...
2231-RYAKUGO
104-AN-RYO
105-AN-RYO
106-C
[IB] 107-C
018-A -
2264-RYAKUQO
109-C ^.
2318-A
110-B
111-A
112-A.._
113-A
114-A
115-C
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
524
9/10
534
9/12
558
9/24
559
9/24
561
9/25
578
9/30
579
10/1
582
10/2
586
10/3
600
10/9
604
10/11
612
10/14
613
10/14
622
10/15
625
10/16
654
10/20
656
10/20
660
10/21
661
10/21
671
10/22
672
10/22
673
10/22
680
10/24
690
10/15
691
10/25
693
10/27
694
10/27
698
10/28
702
10/29
708
10/31
707
10/31
724
11/5
761
11/12
762
11/12
705
11/14
771
11/15
778
11/17
783
11/18
789
11/20
800
11/22
Contents
Expatriation notice in the official
gazette.
From OGAWA
Re YORITOSni FUJIWARA
Re report of movements of U. S. Fleet..
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Ditto
Re financial report
Re contents of baggage directed to this
Consulate.
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Ditto
Re return to Japan of TSUYOKO
AYUZAWA.
Expatriation notice.
Re advance of expenses for sojourn to
Secretary MAEDA.
Expatriation notice in official gazette.
Re landing of Secretary MAEDA
Re relaying (of message) to Secretary
MAEDA.
Re surveillance of movements of
"NEWMAN".
Re reports of forcible detention of
"LEO SIROTA".
Re reservation of stateroom for Secre-
tary TOKUNAGA.
Re number of passengers on the Taiyo
Maru. *
Re departure of Taiyo Maru from
Yokohama.
Re clearance of baggage entrusted in
care of Consul Iwanaga.
Re expatriation notice
Re investigation of whether the air-
craft carrier "Yorktown" is there or
not.
Re delay in arrival of Taiyo Maru
Re issuing of entry visa to "NEW-
MAN".
Re issuing of visa to the American
"CRICHTON COLVIN".
Expatriation notice
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Re transmission of (message?) to
REISAN (REI#3).
Re accord in e of conveniences to Am-
bassador KURUSU.
Expatriation notice
Re according of conveniences to the
"Argentine" Ambassador.
Re easing of the Freeze Order —
Re reports pertaining to warships and
ships.
Re letter(s) sent through Consul
IWANAGA.
Re reports on movements of U. S.
warships and ships.
Re location of Fleet Training Base
Expatriation notice in official gazette-
Disposition
To the CG 9/10, to
the TS 9/11.
To the CG 9/12, to
the TS 9/13.
To the CG 9/24, to
the TS 9/25.
To the CG 9/25, to
the TS 9/26.
To the CG 9/25, to
the TS 9/26.
To the CG 9/30 to,
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 10/1, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/2, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/4, to
the TS 10/6.
To the CG 10/9, to
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/11, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/14, to
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/14, to
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/15, to
the TS 10/15.
To the CG 10/16, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/20, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22:
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/24, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/28, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CO 10/29, to
the TS 10/29.
To the CG 10/31, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CG 10/31, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/5.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/14.
To the CO 11/12, to
the TS 11/14.
To the 11/14, to the
TS 11/14.
To the 11/15, to the
TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/17, to
theTS 11/17.
To the CG 11/19, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CO 11/21, to
theTS 11/21.
To the CG 11/22, to
the TS 11/24.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
407
FROM : THE MINISTER (FOREIGN) — Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
2378-ANGO
116-C
117-(C)
US'-A
119-A.-.- - --
[1S\ 2420-1-ANGO..
120-C - --
2422-ANGO
121-A
122-C
2422-OOAN.
2437-ANOO-
2445-ANGO.
123-A
2461-ANGO.
124-B
125-B
126-A
2466-ANGO-
128-A
127-C
File
No.
Date
Ree'd
801
804
11/24
807
11/26
827
11/28
828
11/28
434
11/29
835
11/29
836
11/29
843
844
12/1
845
12/1
846-
12/1
848
12/2
849
12/2
851
12/3
852
12/3
858
12/4
857
12/4
856
12/4
863
12/7
862
Contents
Re reports on matters pertaining to
finance.
Expatriation notice in official gazette..
Ditto.:
Re disposal of ANGO (code)-
Re reports of movements of U. S. war-
sliips and .ships.
Re reply telegram as to names of em-
ployes and number in their families.
E.\patriation notice
Re reports of entrance and exit and
other movements of warships and
ships.
Re representation of interests
Expatriation notice-
Re entrance and exit and movement of
warships and ships.
Re personal affairs of Consular staff
Re destruction by fire of code books. .-
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
Re ANGO FUGO (Ango code or
cryptographic code).
Re sending of families' travelling ex-
penses.
Re payment of year-end bonuses to
employes.
Request telegram
Re return to .Tapan of families (of Con-
sulate staff'') •
Re reports of movements, etc., of war-
ships and ships.
Expatriation .
Disposition , ''
To the CG 11/22, to
theTS 11/24.
To the CG 11/24, to
theTS 11/24.
To the CG 11/23, to
theTS 11/26.
To the CG 11/28, to
theTS 11/28.
To the CG 11/28, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/29, to
theTS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
theTS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/30, to
theTS 12/1.
To the CG 12/1, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 12/1, to
theTS 12/1.
To the CO 12/1, to
the TS 12/2.
To the CG 12/2, to
the TS 12/2.
To the CG 12/2, to
the TS 12/3.
To the CG 12/3, to
the TS 12/3.
To the CO 12/3, to
the TS 12/3.
To the CG 12/4, to
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/4, to
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/4, to
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/6, to
the TS 12/6.
To the CG 12/6, to
the TS 12/6.
Ui]
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR
315-YUANGO.
2-ANGO
1-B _
2-B
6-RYAKUGO.
7-RYAKUGO.
22-RYAKUGO.
3-A
C-ANYUGO....
8-ANYUGO.
[16]
25-HEIGO.
1
1/6
27
1/18
38
1/29
46
2/1
51
1/4
52
2/4
70
2/14
79
2/25
95
3/10
06
3/10
102
3/11
Re exchange visas between Japanese
and Russians,
(dated 12/20")
Re method of exit (from Japan?) of
American citizens fo Japanese de-
scent.
(from the Minister #25)
Re entry of nationality of dual citizens
Re inquiry of names of Ambassador
NOMURA'S party.
Newspaper reports concerning forcible
detention ol Greek vessel.
(from Los Angeles to the Mihisfcr
#18)
Re denial of rumors of forcible deten-
tion of G-reek vessel,
(from the Minister #53)
Re arrival at post of Ambassador
NOMURA.
Re bill for freezing foreign credits in
the United States.
Re gathering of military information
in U. S. and Canada,
(from the Minister #73)
(dated 2/18)
Re handling of visas for foreigners
coming to Japan,
fto tne Minister #109)
(dated 2/25)
Re visit of Minister MATSUOKA to
Germanv and Italy,
(from the Minister GO-#599)
To the CG 1/7, to
the TS 1/7.
To the CG 1/18, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 129, to
the TS 1/30.
To the CG 2/1, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/15, to
theTS 2/17.
To the CG 2/26, to
the TS 2/26.
To the CG 3/11, to
the TS 3/13. '
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/11, to
the TS 3/12.
408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR — Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
26-RYAKUQO-
104
3/12
Re official tour of Europe by Minister
MATSUOKA and the assumption
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
of superintending of foreign Min-
ister's duties by KONOYE.
(from the Minister GO-#629)
27-ANGO
105
3/13
Re telegraphic cnde --.
To the CG 3/1.3, to
(from the Minister QO-#633)
the TS 3/13.
28-ANQO
106
3/13
Re visas of Netherlander(s)
To the CG 3/13, to
(from the Minister OOHSf643)
the TS 3/13.
29-ANGO
109
3/14
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
To the CG 3/14, to
(to the Minister #34)
the TS 3/17.
20-YU-GO-RYAKU
108
3/14
Tenor of arguments concerning the
Far Eastern problem,
(to the Minister #29)
(dated 3/6)
To the CG 3/14, to
the TS 3/17.
4_B
110
3/15
Re transmission by wire of advances-.
To the CO 3/15, to
the TS 3/17
30-RYAKU-YUOO
114
3/19
Tenor of press comments on Minister
Matsuosa's visit to Europe,
(to the Minister #36)
(dated .3/14)
To the CG 3/19, to
the TS 3/19.
31-RYAKU-YUGO
118
3/24
Re regulations for survey of Japanese
assets abroad,
(from the Minister GO-#702)
To the CG 3/24, to
the TS 3/24.
33-RYAKU-YU
121
3/26
Comments on the President's speech,
(to the Minister #39)
To the CG 3/26, to
the TS 3/27.
(dated 3/19)
24-YUGO
129
4/2
Re text of report of "LOWREY"
(to the Minister #41)
To the CQ 4/2, to
the TS 4/3.
(dated 3/24)
[16] 33-ANGO
130
4/2
Re movements of the U. S. Fleet
(to the Minister #46)
To the CG 4/2, to the
TS 4/3.
25-ANGO-YU
133
4/3
Re reporting of limits of aid to Britain. -
To the 00 4/3, to the
(dated 3/28)
TS 4/4.
^I-TJ V A TCTIOO
136
4/4
Re change of Minister
To the CG 4/4, to the
TS 4/5.
Otj^xv X .rt.x\. \jvJvy-_- — ._. —
(from the Minister #786)
qo_ ATJOO
137
4/4
Re informative telegrams
To the CG 4/4, to the
O^ ./1L1>^JV
(from the Minister #758)
TS 4/5.
36-ANGO
138
4/4
Re method of new use of TSUGO
(HAGI).
To the CG 4/5, to the
TS 4/5.
(from the Minister aO-#779)
(*TSUGO means code type TSU)
37-ANGO
140, 141
4/5
Greater East Asia reports
TotheCG4/7, to the
(from the Minister GO-#759)
TS 4/8.
38- AN GO--
142, 143
4/5
Information on Europe and America. .
(from the Minister GO-#760)
To the CG 4/7, to the
TS 4/8.
GOGAI-A (outside of
146
4/7
. Re indicator veords and number of
To the CG 4/8, to the
code-A) .
words of telegram (s).
TS 4/8.
41/RYAKUGO
155
4/14
Re signing of the neutrality pact be-
To the CG 4/14, to
tween Russia and Japan.
the TS 4/15.
(from the Minister QO-#833)
42-ANGO -
161
4/16
Re continuation of voyage of Panama-
To the CQ 4/17, to
nian vessel to Japan.
the TS 4/19.
(to the Minister #60)
52(5?)-B — -
165
4/18
Re granting of holiday on Grand Fes-
To the CG 4/18, to
•
tival of Yasukuni Shrine.
- (from the Ambassador GO-#72).
the TS 4/19.
42-A
166
4/9
Movements of U. S. Fleet
To the CG 4/19, to
(to the Minister #61)
the TS 4/21.
44-RYAKUGO-
171
4/22
Re return to Japan ol Foreign Minister
To the CG 4/22, to
Matsuoka, etc.
the TS 4/22.
(fromlhe Minister GO-#927)
r/71 30-RYAKU-YU-
GO.
169
4/21
Tenorofthe press
To the CG 4/22, to
(to the Minister #55)
the TS 4/23.
(dated 4/12)
KETSU-
170
4/21
Tenor of press concerning conclusion
To the CG 4/22, to
RYAKU-
of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.
the TS 4/23.
YUOO
(to the Minister #57)
(dated 4/15)
46-RYAKUGO
176
4/26
Re completion of rarification of Russo-
To the CG 4/26, to
Japanese neutrality pact.
the TS 4/26.
45-ANGO
177
4/26
Re intelligence strategy versus the
To the CO 4/26, to
U.S.
the TS 4/28.
(from the Ambassador GO-#82)
(from the Minister #180)
37-RYAKU-YU-GO
178
4/27
Tenor of press in regard to conclusion
of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact,
(dated 4/21)
To the CG 4/27, to
the TS 4/28.
48-ANGO -
183, 184
4/30
Greater East Asia reports
To the CG 5/1, to
(215)
NI-(l); NI-(2)
(irom the Minister GO-#960)
the TS 5/2.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
409
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
49-ANQO.
52-ANaO.
59-RYAKU-YU-QO. ..
[18] 42-RYAKU-YU-
GO.
56-RYAKUaO
43-AN-YU-GO
61-ANGO
60-ANGO
2-ANGO
67-ANGO..
44-RYAKU-YU-GO....
68-ANaO
51-RYAKU-YU-GO....
[19] 69-ANQO.
70-ANGO
S3-R YAKU-YU-GO... .
72-ANGO
74-ANGO
79-RYAKUGO
77-ANQO
81-ANGO
83-RYAKUGO
76-RYAKUGO
[20] 78-ANGO
84-ANGO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
185, 186
187, 188
4/30
193
5/5
202
5/19
204
5/19
205
5/19
203
5/19
215,217
221,216
5/27
218,219
220.
5/27
222
5/27
239, 240
6/4
236
6/4
241
6/4
237
6/4
248
6/10
251, 252.
253
6/11
255
6/12
257(8)
6/16
260
6/17
268
6/23
269
6/23
271
6/23
274
6/23
275
6/23
273
6/21
281
6/25
Contents
Second reports from Europe and
America,
(from the Minister GO-#959)
Re seizure of German (s) on board
American ship by British warship,
(to the Minister #69)
(dated ,5/2)
Tenor of press concerning U. S. aid to
Britain and American-Japanese
relations,
(to the Minister #70)
(dated 5/6)
Re strikes in munitions factories.
(dated .5/13).
Re enforcement of trade control regu-
lations,
(from the Ambassador— Minis-
ter?—GO-#1064).
Re introduction of bill to control for-
eign language schools,
(to the Minister #74)
(dated 5/14)
Third reports from Europe
(from the Minister GO-#1125)
(dated 5/26)
Greater East Asia reports
(from the Minister #1124)
(dated 5/26)
Movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister #84)
Re introduction of bill to regulate for-
eign language schools,
(to the Minister #90)
Re function of the export control
bureau,
(to the Minister #78)
(dated 5/20)
Re receipt transit, degree of reliability
of intelligence telegrams,
(from the Ambassador Q0-#116)
(from the Minister #1480)
Tenor of the press in regard to the
President's speech,
(to the Minister #88)
(dated 5/29)
Re mutual exemption of passport visa
fees between Japan and Italy,
(from the Minister GO-#1302)
Re suspension of use of temporary
terms in naval code book S, and
formulation of temporary termi-
nology #6.
(from the Minister GO-#1217)
Re requisitioning of U. S. ships.-
(to the Minister #92)
(dated 6/5)
Re enrollment of class #2 of the HEI-
SHIKAN (a school?)
(from the Minister #65)
Re prohibition of Germans from
leaving the country,
(to the Ambas-sador #24)
Re outbreak of war between Germany
and ilussia.
(from the Minister GO-#1293)
Re transmitted telegram #28
(freezing of foreign capital)
(Ambassador #29)
Re press guidance policy in regard to
the Russo-German War.
(from the Minister GO-#1293)
Re regulations relative to the applica-
tion of the foreign capital freeze order,
(to the Ambassador #30)
Ditto
(to the Ambassador #28)
Re inspection of mail matter..
(to the Minister #104)
Re form of coded radiogram of direc-
tor(?).
(from the Minister GO-#1308)
Disposition
To the CG 5/2, to
the TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/6, to
the TS 5/7.
To the CG 5/19, to
the TS 5/19.
To the CG 5/19, to
the TS 5/19.
To the CG 5/19, to
the TS 9/20.
To the CO 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/27, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 5/27, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CO 5/28, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 6/5, to the
TS 6/7.
To the CG 6/5, to the
TS 6/6.
To the CG 6/6, to the
TS 6/6.
TotheCG6/6, to the
TS 6/6.
To the CG 6/10, to
the TS 6/10.
To the CG 6/11, to
the TS 6/13.
To the CG 6/13, to
the TS 6/13.
To the CG 6/16, to
the TS 6/17.
To the CG 6/17, to
the TS 6/18.
To the CO 6/23, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CO 6/23, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 6/23, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 6/24, to
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/24, to
the TS 6/24.
To the CO 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CO 6/25. to
the TS 6/26.
410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
80-ANGO
82-ANQO.
55-RYAKU-YU-QO
88-RYAKUQO
79-RYAKUGO
80-RYAKUGO
66-ANGO
91-ANGO
86-ryak;u-yu-go.
[ei] 94- AN GO...
6-C
7-B
95-ANGO
8-A
9-A
97-ANGO
100-ANGO
96-ANQO
99-ANGO...
101-ANGO
102-HEIQO
[22\ 103-HEIGO.-
104-ANGO
107-HEIGO
108-HEIGO..
109-ANGO
110-ANGO
57-YUGO
111-RYAKUGO
113-ANGO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
276
6/23
272
6/23
283
6/26
285
286
6/27
287
6/27
291
6/28
292,293
294
295
6/28
6/30
303
7/3
304
7/5
308
7/9
307
7/8
310
7/9
316
7/10
317
7/10
323
7/12
318
7/11
319
7/11
328
7/14
333
7/16
337
7/18
338
7/18
340
7/19
341
7/19
342
7/19
243
7/19
339
7/19
345
7/21
354
7/24
Contents
Re change of ANGO code
(cryptic code)
(from the Minister GO-#1295)
Ditto __
(from the Minister CP-#1305)
Re tenor of press in regard to the inci-
dent of the "ROBIN MOOR".
(to the Minister #100)
Re strikes of machinists in ship-
building industries in San Fran-
cisco,
(to the Minister #108)
Re reply telegram concerning total
amount of uncollected loans,
(from the Minister GO-#1329)
Re according of conveniences to
HARUJI TAHARA, director of
the Overseas Japanese Central
Society,
(from the Minister #71)
Re handling of visa for the British
(from the Minister Q0-#1161)
(date-i 6/22)
Re ANGO code (cryptic code)
rfrom the Minister #1166)
Outbreak of the Rus.'^o-German war
and the tenor of the press,
(to the Minister #105)
Re survey of number of visa granted
for transit through Japan,
(from the Minister GO-#1381)
Re arrival in port of Ambassador
SHIGEMITSU.
Re giving a message to courier TAKI
(orTAOI).
Greater East Asia reports (re visit to
Japan by Wang Chin-wei and
party) .
(from the Minister GO-#1406)
Re survey of assets of Japanese residing
in U. P.
Re transferring of telegram pertaining
to movements of U S. Fleet.
U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #122)
Re freezing of Japane.>5e credits in the
U. S.
Re steps for preparation for emergency
situation.
(from the Minister GO-#1366)
Re before and after measures on finan-
cial matters to be taken in case of
cmergencv.
(from the Minister 00-#1367)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet..
(to the minister #123)
Re resienation en bloc of the KO-
NOYE Cabinet,
(from the Minister 00-#1526)
Re issuance of Imperial command to
Premier KONOYE to form another
cabinet,
(from the Minister GO-#1539)
Re rigidifying of supervision of tele-
graph ^d telephone,
(from the Minister GO-#1525)
Re appointment of Foreign Minister
TOYOTA.
(from the Minister OO-#1550)
Re installation of new cabinet with
ceremony.
(from the Minister GO-#1551)
Re Cabinet shift and Japanese foreign
policy.
(from the Minister GO-#1560)
Re correction in telegram
(from the Minister GOGAI)
Tenor of press
(to the Minister #119)
Political change in Japan and the tenor
of the press.
Re Tatuta Maru.
^ (to the Minister #133)
Disposition
To the CG 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CO 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/26, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CG 6/27, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CO 6/27, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CG 6/27, to
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/3C, to
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/30, to
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/30, to
the TS 7/2.
To the CG 7/4, to the
TS 7/3.
To the CG 7/5, to the
TS 7/7.
To the CG 7/9, to the
TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/9, to the
TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/14.
To the CG 7/12, to
the TS 7/14.
To the CG 7/12, to
the TS 7/15.
To the CO 7/12, to
the TS 7/15.
To the CG 7/14, to
the TS 7/16.
To the CO 7/17, to
the TS 7/17.
To the CO 7/18, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/18, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CO 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CO 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CO 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/21, to
the TS 7/22.
To the CG 7/24, to
the TS 7/25.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
FROM : THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
411
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Ree'd
361
7/25
365
7/25
362
7/24
370
7/25
390
7/29
375
7/26
397
7/26
407, 408
7/29
412
7/30
413
7/30
433
8/1
434
8/2
441
8/3
^442
8/4
443
8/4
439
8/4
445
8/4
447
8/4
452
8/5
453,454
8/6
458
8/8
464
8/9
465
8/9
472
8/15
473
8/11
478
8/15
479, 480
8/18
489
8/23
493
8/25
511
9/2
Contents
Disposition
nS-ANGO
118-ANaO_._ --
114-ANQO... -
116-ANGO,..- ---
[25] 121-ANGO
120-ANGO
122-ANGO
124-ANbO
128-HEIGO
127-HEIGO._
131-ANGO .-
135-RYAKUGO
136-ANGO
138-RYAKUGO
137-HEIQO- -
lU] 132-GO-RYAKU
140-ANGO
143-ANaO-..
146-ANGO
144-ANGO
148-ANGO
153-ANGO
154-ANGO
158-HEIGO.....
159-ANGO
69-RYAKU-YU-aO....
[26] 164-ANaO
60-YU-GO-RYAKU
174-RYAKUGO-
10-A
Re controlling of Japanese shipping...
(from the Minister #93)
Re wiring instructions to Japanese
vessel (s).
(to the Minister?-#138)
Re TAKIZO MATSUMOTO
■ (from the Minister?-#92)
Re situation of entrance into and de-
parture from port of Japanese ships,
(to the Minister #135)
Re entrance of Japanese vessels into
American ports,
(to the Minister #140)
Re arrival in Hawaii of Undersecretary
of the Navy "FORRESTAL."
(to the Minister #139)
Re developments up to conclusion of
arrangements for mutual defense of
French Indo-China.
(from the Minister GO-#1598)
Re war situation
(from the Minister GO-#1642)
Summary of the regulations control-
ling trade with foreigners.
(Minister QO-#1657)
Re enactment of regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1656)
Re pustponement of arrival in port of
Asama Maru.
(to the Minister #148)
Re seizure of goods on TATUTA MA-
RU.
Re the third KOKURA MARU
(to the Minister #152)
Re departure from San Francisco of
the TATUTA MARU.
(to the Minister #153)
Re enactment of regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1732)
Re manner of enforcement of the freeze
order,
(to the Minister #151)
Re TATUTA MARU
(to the Minister #154)
Re method of investigation of bank
examiner,
(to the Minister #157)
Re movements of U. S. warships.
(to the Minister #159)
Re naval code book
(from the Minister GO-#1738)
Re decrease of telegraphic matter and
shortening of the contents.
(from the Minister GO-#1767)
Re British battleship "WARSPITE".
(from the Minister #108)
Re cash held in this Consulate
(from the Minister GO-#1781)
Re enactment o^regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1818)
Re amendment of regulations pertain-
ing to entry into and sojourn in
country by foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1819)
Drift of argument regarding Japan-
U. S. relations,
(to the Minister #164)
(dated 8/12)
Re condition of the Japanese residents
in San Francisco.
Tenor of jiress in regard to joint decla-
ration by Britain and the U. S.
(to the Minister #168)
(dated 8/15)
Re revision of passport visas and pas-
sage certification regulations,
(from the Minister GO-#1820)
Re arrival at post of newly-appointed
"Bishop SWEENEY" of the
"Catholic" parish.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CO 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/29, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CO 7/29, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CO 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/4, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/4, to
the TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to
the TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CO 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the C J 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/5, to the
TS 8/8
To the CO 8/7, to the
TS 8/8
To the CO 8/8, to the
TS 8/9.
To the CO 8/9, to the
TS 8/11.
To the CG 8/9, to the
TS 8/11.
To the CG 8/15, to:
the TS 8/20.
To the CG 8/16, to
the TS 8/18.
To the CG 8/16, to
the TS 8/20.
To the CG 8/18.
To the CG 8/23, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CG 8
the TS 8/27.
5, to
To the CO 9/2, to
the TS 9/5. ,
412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM : THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
61-AN-YU-GO -
514
515
517
518
522
523
525
527
537
538
545
549
550
555, 556
566
570
577
581
584
585
589
590
592
593, 594
595, 596
003
614, 620
621
623
9/4
9/4
9/5
9/6
9/8
9/8
9/10
9/13
9/15
9/17
9/20
y/20
9/22
9/26
9/26
9/29
10/1
10/2
10/9
10/4
10/7
10/7
10/8
10/10
10/13
10/14
10/15
Re method of enforcement of the freeze
order,
(to the Minister #181)
(dated 8/25)
Re treatment of Japanese residing m
U. S. by America,
(to the Minister #182)
(dated 8/25)
Movements of U. S. warships
To the CO 9/4, to
62-AN-YU-GO
the TS 9/5.
To the CG 9/4, to
KETSU-A
the TS 9/5.
To the CO 9/5, to
191-ANGO
(to the Minister #195)
Re applicants for class #2 of the
HEISHIKAN (a school?)
Re enactment of regulations control-
line trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1656)
Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHI-
KAN (a school?)
(to the Minister #200)
Re stopping in port of courier KUGA..
Re forwarding of mail matter between
Japan and U.S.
(to the Minister #205)
Movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister #211)
Tenor of press in regard to the "mes-
sage" to the President from Premier
■ Konoye.
(to the Minister #190)
(dated 8/30)
Re transmission of letters (documents,
records, or notes),
(to the Minister #214)
Japan-U. S. ship communication
problem,
(from the Minister #126) '
Re revision in handling of urgent tele-
grams,
(from the Minister GO-#2040)
Japan-U. S. ship communication
problem,
(to the Minister #220)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #127)
Re carrying out of diplomatic policy
(from the Minister GO-#2077)
Re expansion of Far Eastern aerial
^^ route by Pan-AmericanAirways.
(to the Minister #224)
Re inspection of baggage, etc., when
leaving country,
(from the Minister #406)
Re movements rf U. S. warships
(to the Minister #230)
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #231)
Re official announcement of tempo-
rary postal control order,
(from the Minister GO-#2121)
* Re special festival of the Yasukuni
Shrine,
(from the Minister GO-#2129)
Re distribution of propaganda "pam-
phlets" with aim to alienate Japan
from Germany.
(to the Minister #234)
Greater East Asia reports
(from the Minister GO-#2130)
Presidential message regarding amend-
ment of the neutrality act, and
tenor of press regarding Japan-U.
A. negotiations,
(to the Minister #235)
Re problem of Japan-America ship
communication,
(from the Minister #136)
Ditto
the TS 9/8.
To the CG 9/6, to
10-C (11)
the TS 9/8.
To the CG 9/8, to
194-ANGO
the TS 9/9.
To the CO 9/9, to
12-B .
the TS 9/9.
To the CG 9/10, to
[SB] 195-ANGO
200-ANGO
the TS 9/10.
To the CG'9/12, to
the TS 9/15.
To the CG 9/13, to
63-YU-GO-RYAKU
202-ANGO
the TS 9/15.
To the CG 9/15, to
the TS 9/16.
To the CG 9/18, to
218-ANGO
the TS 9/18.
To the CG 9/21, to
209-ANGO
the TS 9/23.
To the CG 9/22, to
211-ANGO
the TS 9/24.
To the CG 9/23, to
295-ANGO_
the TS 9/24.
To the CG 9/26, to
216-ANGO
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/28, to
66-RYAKU-YU-GO
[S7l 220-AN-TOKU-
GO.
222-ANGO
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/29, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/1, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/2, to
214-GO-AN...
the TS 10/4.
To the CG 10/3, to
225-RYAJCUGO .
the TS 10/4.
To the CG 10/6, to
226-HEIGO
the TS 10/6.
To the CG 10/7, to
228-ANGO
the TS 10/8.
To the CG 10/8, to
230-ANQO
the TS 10/8.
To the CG 10/8, to
232-RYAKUGO . .
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/11, to
234-ANOO...
the TS 10/13.
To the CO 10/14, to
237-ANGO...
the TS 10/15.
To the CG 10/15, to
238-ANGO
(to the Minister #237)
Re ailing of the TATUTA MARU....
(from the Minister #139)
the TS 10/15.
To the CG 10/15, to
the TS 10/15.
- CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
413
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
239-ANaO
624
627, 626
633
634
637
638
639
646
647
651
652
649-650
658
663,664
665
668
670
666
669
676
677
678
684
687
695
697
701
716
717, 718
719
729
732
738
10/15
10/16
10/16
10/16
10/16
10/17
10/17
10/18
10/17
10/17
10/17
10/20
10/21
10/21
10/21
10/22
10/21
10/22
10/23
10/24
10/24
10/26
10/27
10/29
11/2
11/2
11/2
11/5
11/7
11/8
Re problem of Japan-American ship
eomrrunication.
Problem of Japan-America ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister, to various
Consulates, GO-#237)
Re resignation en masse of KONOYE
Cabinet,
(from the Minister GO-#2190)
Ditto
To the CO 10/16, to
theTS 10/17.
To the CO 10/16, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/16.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/19.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.'
to the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21
[2S] (7)-A 12
241-HEiaO
242-HEIOO-
243-RYAKUOO
245-HEIOO..
(from the Minister O0-#2191)
Re number of passengers on T ATUTA
MARU.
(from the Minister #142)
Re issuance of Imperial command (for
formation of Cabinet?) to War Min-
ister TOJO.
(from the Minister (GO-#2195)
Re withdrawal of Ambassador(s) to
the Soviet Union from Moscow,
(from the Minister GO-#2149)
Re installation of Minister TOGO-..
(from the Minister 00-#2196)
Re completed selection of members of
the TOJO Cabinet.
(from the Minister GO-#2197)
Japan-America ship communication
problem.
Ditto
(to the Minister #245)
Japan-America ship communication
problem,
(from the Minister #145)
Ditto
246-RYAKUGO
252-HEIGO
253-HEIGO -*-..
249-ANGO-
245-ANQO
247-ANGO -.
[29] 255-ANGO
(from the Minister #146)
258-ANOO
Ditto
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
theTS 10/21.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/24.
To the CG 10/23, to
the TS 10/24.
To the CG 10/23, to
the TS 10/24.
To the CO 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CO 10/27, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CO 10/29, to
the TS 10/30.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5. to
the TS 11/7.
To the CO 11/7, to
the TS 11/10.
To the CO 11/8, to
the TS 11/11.
259-ANGO
(from the Minister #150)
Ditto
261-ANGO.-
(to the Minister #252)
Re method of interpreting telegrams..
(to the Ambassador #335)
Japan-America ship communication
problem,
(to the Ambassador #72)
Re carrying of American dollar bills_.
(from the Ambassador GO-#310)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #254)
Re passengers boarding TAIYO
MARU.
Japan-America ship communication
problem,
(to the Minister #255)
Re going to the U. S. of members of
the Chungking air force,
(to the Minister #258)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(from the Minister #154)
Re progress of warship construction,
etc.
(to the Minister #260)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(from the Minister #159)
Tenor of press on change of Cabinet . _
(to the Minister #249)
Re departure of TATUTA MARU..
(to the Minister #2P9)
Re mail matter to be loaded on
TATUTA MARU.
(to the Minister #201)
Problem of ship communication be-
tween Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #200)
Re departure of British cruiser
(to the Minister #278)
Re simplifying of expatriation . _ _
(to the Minister #280)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #282)
257-ANGO
260-ANGO
262-ANOO
13-B
264-ANOO
265-ANGO
266-ANGO..
267-ANOO
[SO] 268-AN-(D-00_.
68-RYAKU-YU-GO
273-RYAKUGO
275-ANGO
274-ANOO
278-ANGO....
280-ANGO
281-ANaO.
414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM : THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
(jg-RYAKU-YU-QO
283-ANGO
14-A
284-ANGO
[SI] 285-ANGO...
287-ANOO
292-ANQO
290-ANaO
291-ANGO.
GOGAI-A
297-ANGO..
298-ANGO.
302-RYAK:UQO
305-HEIQO
[SS] 303-ANGO...
71-RYAKU-YU-GO
307-ANGO
31&-ANO0
315-ANGO
313-ANGO
318-ANQO
321-RYAKUGO
TO-RYAKU-YU-GO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
7'13
11/10
740
11/10
752
11/12
755
11/12
767, 768
11/12
769, 766
11/12
773
11/14
774, 775
11/13
772
11/13
780
11/17
791
11/19
794
11/19
805
11/25
811
11/26
812
11/25
813
11/26
818-821
11/27
829
11/28
837
11/29
833
11/28
847
12/1
855
12/3
860
12/5
Tenor of press on trip to U. S. by
Ambassador KURUSU.
(to the Minister #280)
Problem of ship communication be-
tween Japan andU. S.
(to the Minister #287)
Re transmission or message to Am-
bassador KURUSU.
(from the Minister #168)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(from the Minister #169)
Greater East Asia report #5
(from the Minister GO-#2292)
European and American reports #5
(from the Minister GO-#2291)
Problem of ship communication be-
tween Japan and U.S.
(to the Minister #292)
Condition of progress of warship con-
struction and national defense plans,
(to the Minister #289)
Re decision on basic plans for adjust-
ment of relations between Japan and
U. S.
(from the Minister GO-#2313)
Re interpretation of telegram(s)
Re overseas broadcast in case of crisis
in Japan's foreign policy,
(from the Minister GO-#2353)
Re movements of British warships
(to the Minister #300)
Re extension of time of anti-Comintern
pact,
(from the Minister GO-#2389)
Re demise of Princess YOSHIKO,
wife of the deceased Prince KA YA.
(from the Minister QO-#2406)
Re Japanese employed locally and
second generation employes not on
regular staff.
(to the Minister #304)
Re severance of diplomatic relations
with Japan by "IRAQ."
(from the Ambassador #1181)
(dated 11/24)
Re method of telegraphing in connec-
tion with the situation,
(from the Minister GO-#2409)
Re Japan- Am erica negotiations
(•from the Mhiister GO-#2416)
Re reply telegram in regard to foreign
merchantmen and warships,
(from the Minister GO-#2431)
Re vessels requisitioned by the U. S.
Army and the Navy,
(to the Minister #317)
Re arrival and departure and move-
ments of warships,
(to the Minister #316)
Re number of attendants of families of
members of the Consulate wishing
to board the TATUTA MARU.
Tenor of press
(dated 11/19)
Disposition
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/10.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/14, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/15, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/15, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/13, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/17, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/20, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/20, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/25, to
the TS 11/25.
To the CO 11/26, to
the TS 11/26.
To the CG 11/25, to
the TS 11/25
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/27, o
the TS 11/28
To the CG 11/28, to
the TS 11/28
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/28, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 12/2, to
the TS 12/2.
To the CG 12/3, to
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/5, to
the TS 12/6.
[53]
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO
218-yu-go-ryaku.
2-yu-go-ryak:u...
1-B
2
1/6
11
1/13
14
1/14
Tenor of American press
(to the Minister #312)
(dated 12/20)
Re alien registration.
(to the Ambassador #1)
(dated 1/7)
Re toiir of the country by the "Subaru
Show" troupe,
(dated 1/16)
To the CG 1/8, to the
TS 1/9.
To tho CG 1/13, to
the TS 1/14.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
415
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
4-RYAKUGO
5-AN-YU-GO
2-A
2-RYAKU-YU-GO
3-C.
4-RYAKU-YU-OO
[3i\ 7-ANGO ..
-HEI-YU-GC.
-RYAKU-YU.
10-ANGO
9-ANGO.
10-AN-YU-GO.
U-AN-YU-OO.
13-ANGO.
[35] 14-RYAKU-YU-
GO
14-ANGO
16-ANGO
17-A..
15-RYAKU-YU-G0_._.
18-ANGO
19-RYAKUGO
19-RYAKU-YU-GO... .
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
15
1/15
16
1/16
22
1/22
43
1/30
44
1/31
47
2/1
53
2/4
55
2/5
54
2/5
57
2/5
58
2/5
61
2/6
62
2/6
63
. 2/7
64
2/10
65
2/10
71
2/15
72
2/17
74
2/20
75,76
2/21
77
2/21
81
2/26
Contents
Re settling on wearing of every day
clothes for various functions,
(from the Ambassador 00-#l)
(from the Minister GO-#68)
Re U. S. warships
(to the Minister #3)
(dated 1/6)
Re method of leaving country of Amer-
ican citizens of Japanese parentage,
(to the Minister #11)
Re refusal of American freighters to be
chartered by Russia,
(to the Minister #10)
(dated 1/21)
Re holding of reception for Ambassa-
dor NOMURA in San Francisco.
Tenor of i^ress in regard to the Minis-
ter's speech in the Diet,
(to the Minister #13)
(dated 1/24)
Re request for expenses for develop-
ment of intelligence,
(from the Ambassador G0-#15)
(from the Minister #45)
Re mediation in border controversy
between Thailand and French Indo-
china,
(from the Minister GO-#155)
(dated 1/25)
Ditto
(from the Minister GO-#154)
(dated 1/25)
Re policy of intelligence work against
the U. S.
(from the Ambassador Q0-#13)
(from the Minister #43)
Main points concerning establishment
of intelligence organ against the
U. S.
(from the Ambassador G0-#14)
(from the Minister #44)
Re careful selection of matters to be
telegraphed and making concise the
wording of the telegrams.
(from the Ambassador KETSU)
(from the Minister G0-#185)
(dated 1/30)
Re sending by wire of expenses for the
development of intelligence,
(from the Minister G0-#138)
(dated 1/23)
Re alteration of method for using
temporary terminology in naval
code book S.
(from the Minister G0-#242)
Tenor of press in regard to Minister's
speech in the Diet,
(to the Minister #16)
Re guiding of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #19)
Press accounts regarding the Far
Eastern situation,
(from the Minister GO-#310)
Re handling of visa for foreigners visit-
ing Japan,
(from the Minister OO-#300)
Tenor of press on arrival of Ambassa-
dor NOMURA at his post,
(to the Minister #22)
fdated 2/10)
Re telegraphic code
(from the Minister G0-#3fi7)
Re refraining from making official tours
within the year. •
(from the Ambassador KET-
SUGO)
(from the Minister Ci0-#365)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
(to the Minister #24)
(dated 2/15)
Disposition
To the CG 1/15, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CO 1/16, to
the TS 1/17.
To the CG 1/22, to
the TS 1/23.
To the CG 1/30, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 1/31, to
the TS 2/4
To the CG 2/3, to the
TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CO 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CG 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CG 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CG 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CG 2/6, to
the TS 2/7.
To the CG 2/6, to
the TS 2/7.
To the CG 2/7, to
the TS 2/10.
To the CG 2/10, to
the TS 2/12.
To the CG 2/10, to
the TS 2/12.
To the CG 2/15, to
the TS 2/17.
To the CG 2/17, to
the TS 2/18.
To the CG 2/20 to
the TS 2/24.
To the CG 2/21, to
the TS 2/24.
To the CG 2/21, to
the TS 2/24.
To the CG 2/26, to
the TS 2/27.
416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
20-RYAKU-YU-GO
21 RYAKU-YU-GO
88
87
97
98
103
115
126
128
147
157
175
207, 206
209
212
214
224
229
3/6
3/6
3/10
3/10
3/12
3/19
3/27
3/29
4/9
4/16
4/24
5/20
5/20
5/22
5/26
5/28
5/31
Tenor -of press in regard to Japan's
southward move question.
(to the Minister #27)
(dated 2/21)
Re the "embargo" problem -
To the CO 3/6, to
the TS 3/7.
To the CO 3/6, to
23-A -
(dated 2/24)
Re disposition of secret documents
(from the Minister 00-#584)
Re passport visa fees
(from the Ambassador GO-#30)
(from the Minister GO-#555)
Re returning of advances . .
the TS 3/7.
To the CO 3/10, to
[36] 24 .
the TS 3/11.
To the CG 3/10, to
4-B -
the TS 3/11.
To the CO 3/12, to
11-AN-YU-GO
(to San Francisco #4)
Re investigation of the trend of the
U. S.
(from the Minister #112)
(dated 3/8)
Re reporting of bounds of aid to
Britain,
(from the Minister #111)
Re telegraphic code kept in the Con-
sulate General in "Chicago."
(from Chicaeo 00-#3)
(to the Minister #8)
Re easy clearance of courier MORI
Re number of Japanese registered and
number enlisted.
(to the Minister #195)
(dated 4/1)
Re easy clearance of courier MORI
Re issuing of visa for direct transit to
Russian(s).
(from the Minister GO-#2337)
(to Vladivostok and New York
GO-#1086)
Re enforcement of system of sanction-
ing transit export (?) via America,
(to the Minister #275)
(dated 5/7)
Re issuing of visa for direct transit to
Russian(s)
(from the Minister #246)
(to New York and Vladivostock,
GO-#1103)
Re situation in the U. S. as regards the
European war.
(GO-#88)
(dated 5/12)
Re movements of the U. S. Fleet
(to Panama #15)
Re notification of Japanese shipping
in regard to suspension of use of tem-
porary terminology #S.
(dated 5/31)
Re reference to date official messages
were dispatched.
Re enforcement of system of sanction-
ing transit export (?) via U. S.
(to the Minister #288)
(dated 5/20)
Re method of seizure of foreign mer-
chantmen,
(to the Minister #373)
(dated 6/7)
Ditto.. ~
the TS 3/13.
To the CO 3/19, to
55-ANGO - -
the TS 3/21.
To the CG 3/27, to
5-A
the TS 3/28.
To the CG 3/29,
6-A
To the CG 4/9, to
15-AN-YU-GO
the TS 4/10.
To the CO 4/16, to
7-A
the TS 4/18.
To the CG 4/24, to
96-ANGO
the TS 4/26.
To the CO 5/20, to
21-RYAKU-YU-GO
[37] lOS-ANGO
22-RYAKU-YU-GO
106-.ANGO
the TS 5/20.
To the CG 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/22, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CO 5/26, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CO 5/28, to
114-ANGO
the TS 5/29.
To the CO 6/2, to
the TS 6/6.
8-A
234
235
6/3
6/4
To the CO 6/3, to the
21-RYAKU-YU-GO
TS 6/4.
TotheCG6/4, toth
TS 6/5.
117-RYAKUGO
244
245
256
261
262
265
6/7
6/7
6/13
6/18
6/19
6/20
To the CO 6/7, to the
118-RYAKUGO
TS 6/7.
To the CO 6/7, to the
125-ANGO
128-ANGO
(to the Minister #374)
(special telegram)
Re arrival in Japan of Wang Chin- Wei.
(from the Minister #1251)
Re giving strict warning for observance
of secrecy of this Consulate and re-
lated agencies.
Re promulgation of detailed regula-
tions, item 402, pertaining to expa-
triation,
(to the Minister #411)
Re refusal of visa for Meiji University
baseball team.
(to the Minister #413)
TS 6/9.
To the CG 6/13, to
TS 6/16.
To the CG 6/18, to
13S] 132-RYAKUGO.
2-B
the TS 6/18.
To the CG 6/19, to
the TS 6/20.
To the CG 6/20, to
the TS 6/21.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
417
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
lO-(A) .
280
277
278, 279
288
290
297
298
299
311
314
309
324
326
335
346
347-349
350
351
355 (359)
356
357, 358
360
363
369
371
372
373
364
376
6/23
6/23
6/23
6/27
6/28
6/30
7/2
7/1
7/9
7/9
7/9
7/14
7/15
7/17
7/22
7/22
7/23
7/24
7/24
7/24
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/26
Re delivering of message to Com-
mander TATIBANA on Nitta
Maru.
Re Commander TATIBANA
To the CO 6/23, to
11-A
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/24, to
12- A
Ditto.-
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/24, to
114-ANOO .
Re regular publications for use in de-
velopment (of intelligence?) and
propaganda.
Re question of closing Japanese Con-
sulates in the U. S.
(to the Minister #437)
Re concentration of sale of British
goods and British-controlled cui--
rency.
(from the Minister GO- #1198)
(dated 6/26)
Re stopping in port of Lt. Commander
(or Major) OKADA and Engineer
First Lieutenant YAMADA.
Re gathering of telephone directories
and name directories.
Re returning the Imperial portrait
(from the Minister #481)
Re report of assets of Japanese na-
tionals and commercial firms in the
U. S.
(to the Minister #487)
Re concentration of sale of foreign
goods,
(from the INIinister GO-#1276)
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/27, to
148-ANGO --
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/28, to
149-RYAKUGO
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/30, to
142-RYAKUGO-(l)
r53-RYAKUGO-a)
156-ANGO _..
the TS 7/2.
To the CG 7/2, to
the TS 7/3.
To the CG 7/2, to
the TS 7/3.
To the CG 7/10, to
[39] 158-ANOO
26-RYAKU-YU-GO
165-ANGO
the TS 7/10.
To the CO 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/15, to
168-RYAKUGO
Re extension of time limit for report-
ing foreign assets.
Re resending of telegram (s)
the TS 7/15.
To the CG 7/15, to
13-A
the TS 7/16.
To the CG 7/18, to
177-HEIGO
Re registration of foreign government
officials and employees.
U. S. attitude towards Japan
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/23, to
178-ANGO
the TS 7/22.
To the CG 7/23, to
179- AN GO
(to the Minister #548)
Re Consulates on West Coast
the TS 7/23.
To the CG 7/23, to
180-OO-RYAKU
183-ANGO
(to the Minister #549)
Steps to be taken by U. S. government
in case of occupation of French
Indo-China by Japanese troops,
(to the Minister #551)
Re problem of closure of Consulates. ..
(1) (2)
(to the Minister KETSUGO)
Tenor of press in regard to the French
Indo-China problem,
(to the Minister #561)
Re official announcement of procedure
for overruling assumption(?) of ex-
patriation,
(to the Minister #562)
...?... in regard to public an-
nouncement of retaliatory measures
against Japan by the President,
(to the Minister #568)
Re date of announcement of freeze
order against japan,
(to the Minister #573)
Re announcement of freeze order
against Japan.
(Minister #576)
Amendment to regulations
(Minister #579)
Writ.
Re freeze order
(Minister #577)
Ditto. Revised Presidential order
(Minister #578)
Re surveillance of U. S. warships pass-
ing throush the Panama Canal.
(to Panama #22)
Re exemption provisions of the freeze
order,
(to the Minister #586)
the TS 7/24.
To the CG 7/23, to
the TS 7/23.
To the CG 7/24, to
182-RYAK:UQ0
the TS 7/24.
To the CG 7/24, to
HO] 183-HEIGO
*
184-HEIGO...-iV
187-ANGO
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7; 25, to
189-HEIGO
the TS 7/25.
To the CO 7/26, to
192-(HEI)-GO
the TS 7,26.
To the CO 7/25, to
190-rHEI)-aO
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
191-(HEI)-G0
the TS 7/26.
To the CG 7/25, to
185-ANOO
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
196-RYAKUaO-_
the TS 7/26 (29?).
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148-
-28
418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
188-ANGO.
193-ANOO
lil] 186-GO
195-RYAKUGO
186-ANaO (2)
-HEIGO
194-ANGO
198-ANGO
197-ANGO
201-ANGO.
200-ANGO
202-ANGO.
[42] 205-ANGO..
206-RYAK:UQO---
204-ANGO
207-ANQO
KETSU-B
201-ANGO
209-ANGO
208-ANGO....
214-ANGO
218-ANGO
219-ANOO
KETSU-ANGO
US] 220-ANGO--
212-ANGO
215-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO
224-ANGO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
368
7/25
376
7/26
366
7/26
377
7/26
367
7/25
378-389
391, 392
7/26
393, 388
7/26
399, 400
7/26
402
7/28
401, 403
405, 406
7/28
410
7/30
411
7/30
416
7/30
418
421
7/31
423
7/31
424
7/31
425
426, 427
428
7/31
431
8/1
44?
8/?
437
8/2
430
8/2
436
8/2
435
8/2
438
8/4
444, 446
8/4
448
8/4
Contents
Re holding of assets of the various
Consulates (and other Japanese
governmental agencise?) in the Em-
bassy,
(to the Minister #575)
Re telegraphic code
Re application of the Freeze Order to
Germany and German nationals,
(to the Minister #569)
Gist of the Presidential "statement"
on promulgation of the Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #585)
Re application of the Freeze Order to
German citizens in general,
(to the Minister #569)
Generallicense No. 11
(to the Minister #588)
(Special telegram #11?)
Home policy of Finance Commissioner
NISHIYAMA in regard to freezing
of Japanese credit,
(to the Minister #583)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(to the Minister #587)
Re moving into French Indo-China
and propagandizing Japan's foreign
policy.
(from the Minister #1587)
Re exit from and entry into port of
shipping.
(to the Minister #593)
Re public opinion in the U. S. asso-
ciated with the Freeze Order.
(to the Minister #590)
Re reply concerning "balance" in
bank of government funds.
Re entry into port of Japanese vessel- -
(to the Minister #613)
Re shipment
(to the Minister #616)«
Re shipment on Japanese vessels.
(to the Minister #661)
Ditto
(to the Minister #619)
Re specification of main licensed list
of articles,
(from the Minister #431)
Re counter-measure against the Freeze
Order,
(to the Minister #621)
Re American currency bonds held by
Japanese residing in U. S. -
(to the Minister #619)
Re counter-move towards U. S.-Japan
relations.
(to the Minister #618)
Re baggage on TATUTA MARU
(to the Minister #630)
Re shipment on Japanese vessels
(to the Minister #637)
Re oil embargo act
(to the Minister #638)
Re exit from and entry into port of
Japanese shipping,
(to the Minister #632)
ReASAMA MARU
(to the Minister #639)
Re problem of shipment on TATUTA
MARU and HEIAN MARU.
(to the Minister #636)
Re effect of the Freeze Order on
finances of foreign diplomatic estab-
lishments.
(to the Minister #631)
Re problem of shipment on TATUTA
MARU.
(from the Minister #442)
Re oil embaruo act.
(to the Minister #647)
Disposition
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/26.
To the CG 7/26, to
the T6 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CO 7/26, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CG 7/29, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CG 7/29, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CO 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CO //SI, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 7/31.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 7/31, to
the T^/4.
To the CG 8/1, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to the
TS 8/4.
To the CG 82, to the
TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
TotheCG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
419
Telegram No. & Code
Type
233-ANGO.
14-A
KETSU-A
-ANGO.
15-C
245-ANGO
Ui\ 16-A..--
250-ANGO
255-ANGO.
254-ANGO
256-ANGO -...
29-B
257-RYAKUQO..--
-A
258-ANGO
QOGAI-A
18-A
262-ANGO
UB] KETSU-B..
KETSU-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO
272-ANGO
KETSU-A
19-A
KETSU-B
KETSU-A
278-RYAKUGO._..
277-ANQO
279-ANGO... _
KETSU-ANGO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
461
8/8
462
463
8/9
471
8/13
475, 476
8/16
481
8/18
483
8/18
484
8/19
487,488
8/22
490
8/25
491, 494
8/26
495
8/26
500
8/29
501
8/29
504, 505
8/30
506, 508
8/30
509
9/1
510
9/2
519
9/6
520
9/6
521
528
9/11
529-533
9/10
535
9/13
536
9/13
543
9/16
542
9/16
544
9/17
546
9/17
547
9/17
548
9/19
Contents
Re application of the Freeze Order to
diplomatic and consular ofTicials.
(to the Minister #670)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #453)
Re reply telegram in regard "balance"
in bank of government funds.
Tallfs (') of "MOORE" concerning
observations on the U. S.-Japan
situation.
Re counter-measures towards U. S.-
Japan relations,
(from the Minister #475)
Re forwarding of exequatur from U. S.
President to Consul-General KIT A.
Re allotment of ' 'running expenses' '
(to the Minister #712)
Re movements of U. S. warships
Re U. S. treatment of Japanese nation-
als residing in the U. S.
(from the Minister #489)
Re problem of evacuation of resident
Japanese.
(to the Minister #742)
Re enforcement of the Freeze Order_..
(to the Minister #741)
Re drawing on allowances
(to the Minister #743)
Re KIYOSni MAYAKAWA, Japa-
nese government official.
Re method of disposal of mail matter
to U. S. in Japan,
(to the Minister #775)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #516)
Re writing of Representative KASAI
concerning U. S.-Japan relations,
(to the Minister #760)
Re correction of telegram
(to the Minister #GOOAI)
(re writing of articles by Repre-
sentative KASAI)
Re stopping in port of coiu-ier.
Re registration of wealth by Japanese
nationals and commercial firms in
the U. S.
(to the Minister #787)
Re mail matter to Japan
(from Mexico O0-#86)
Re method of forwarding mail matter
to the U. S. followed in Japan,
(from the Minister #541)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #555)
Re mutual cancellation of frozen credit
towards computation of government
funds.
Re transmission of radiograms ad-
dressed to this Consulate,
(from the Minister #552)
Re delivery of documents . _
(to San Francisco #41)
Re arrangement for alleviation of
Freeze Order between Japan and
the U.S.
(from the Minister #566)
Ditto -.
(from the Minister #567)
Re drawing up of name-list based on
arrangement for alleviation of the
Freeze Order.
Re arrangement for alleviation of the
Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #820)
Re President Roosevelt's speech
(to the Minister #816, gist (?))
Re method for replenishment govern-
ment funds (estimate?) following
arrangement for alleviation of the
freezing of credit,
(from the Minister #575)
Disposition
To the CG 8/8, to the
TS 8/9.
To the 8/8 to the TS
8/11.
To the CG 8/9, to the
TS 8/11.
To the CO 8/13, to
the TS 8/14.
To the CO 6/16, to
the TS 8/18.
/18, to
To the CO 8/18
the TS 8/20.
To the CO 8/19, to
the TS 8/20.
To the CO 8/19, to
the TS 8/21.
To the CG 8/22, to
the TS 8/28.
To the CG 8/26, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CG 8/26, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CG 8/27, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CG 8/29, to
the TS 8/29.
To the CG 8/30, to
the TS 8/.30.
To the CG 8/30, to
the TS 9/2.
To the CG 8/30, to
the TS 9/2.
To the CG 9/1, to
the TS 9/2.
To the CG 9/3, to
the TS 9/5.
To the CG 9/6, to
the TS 9/9.
To the CG 9/8, to the
TS 9/9.
To the CG 9/8, to the
TS 9/9.
To the CG 9/12, to
the TS 9/13.
To the CO 9/12, to
the TS 9/15.
To the CG 9/13, to
the TS 9/15.
To the CO 9/13, to
the TS 9/19.
To the CG 9/16, to
the TS 9/18.
To the CG 9/16, to
the TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/17, to
the TS 9/18.
To the Cg 9/17, to the
TS 9/18.
To the CG 9/18, to
the TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/19 to
the TS 9/23.
420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
U6] 283-(AN)-GO
METSU-A..
552
553
557
560
562, 563
564, 567,
568
565
571
569, 572
573, 574
575
580
583
587, 588
591
599
597, 598
601
602
605
606
607
608, 609
617
615,616
618, 619
629
631
628
635
636
640
641
9/19
9/23
9/22
9/24
9/25
9/26
9/26
9/27
9/26
9/27
9/30
10/2
10/3
10/7
10/8
10/8
10/9
10/10
10/11
10/11
10/11
10/14
10/14
10/13
10/16
10/16
10/16
10/17
10/17
10/17
10/17
Re extension of time limit for reporting
foreign assets,
(to the Minister #833)
Re arrangement for easing of the
credit freeze,
(from the Minister #578)
Re alleviation of the credit freeze
(to the Minister #840)
Ditto
To the CG 9/22, to
the TS 9/23.
To the CG 9/23, to
285-ANGO
the TS 9/23.
To the CG 9/23, to
287-ANGO
the TS 9/25.
To the CO 9/25, to
2S8-ANGO
(to the Minister #?)
Ditto
the TS 9/26.
To the CO y/25, to
KETSU-ANGO
291-ANGO
(to the Minister #848;
Re evacuation of the resident Japanese.
(from the Minister #596)
Ditto
the TS 9/26.
To the CO 9/26, to
the TS 9/27.
To the CG 9/26, to
(20)-A
(to the Minister #854)
Re inquiry in regard to receipt of tele-
gram.
Re arrangement for alleviation of the
credit freeze,
(to the Minister #855)
Japan-U. S. ship communication
problem,
(to the Minister #864)
Ditto .
the TS 9/27.
To the CG 9/27, to
292-ANGO
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/27, to
293-ANGO
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/27, to
-ANGO
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/30. to
296-ANGO
(from the Minister #610)
Ditto .
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/30, to
297-RYAKUGO
(to the Minister #875)
Re fees of freeze-afTected nationals to
banks of deposits,
(to the Minister #883)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #a31).
Re amendment of nationality laws
with object of nullifying dual citi-
zenship,
(to the Minister #905).
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #910).
Ditto
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/2, to
U7] KETSU-ANGO-.
300-RYAKUGO .
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/4, to
the TS 10/6.
To the CG 10/8, to
KETSU-ANGO
KETSU-HEIGO
the TS 10/8.
To the CG 10/9, to
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/9, to
303-HEIGO
(to the Minister #911).
Re amendment of nationality laws
with object of nullifying dual citi-
zenship.
(to the Minister #913).
Re entry permit . ..
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/10, to
309-ANGO
the TS 10/10.
To the CG 10/10, t«
KETSU-HEIGO....
KETSU-B..
(to the Minister #922).
Problem of Japan U. S. ship communi-
cation.
(from the Minister #653) .
Ditto
the TS 10/11.
To the CG 10/11, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/11, to
KETSU-ANGO ...
(from the M inister #652) .
Ditto .
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/11, to
30.5-ANGO
(from the Minister #651).
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Minister #926).
Ditto
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/13, to
KETSU-RYAKUGO.
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/14, to
KETSU
(from the Minister #660?) .
Ditto
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/14, to
148] ANGO..
(from the Minister #661) .
Ditto --
the TS 10/14.
To the CO 10/14, to
ANGO
(to the Minister #938)
Ditto . . -
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/17, to
323-RYAKUGO._
(to the Minister #951)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
Re carrying of American dollar hills..
(from the Minister #670)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication,
(to the Minister #953)
Ditto
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
310-ANGO
the TS 10/17.
To the CO 10/17, to
322-A
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17. to
325-fHEI)-GO
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/17, to
326-GO
(to the Minister #956)
(separate telegram)
Ditto .
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/17, to
328RYAKUGO
(to the Minister #963)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication,
(from the Minister #684)
the TS 10/20.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
421
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
462, 643
10/18
644
10/17
645
10/18
653
10/18
657
10/20
655
10/20
667
10/21
674, 675
10/22
679
10/23
681
10/24
683
10/24
689
10/24
686
10/24
696
10/27
698
10/27
703
10/30
704, 705
10/29
706
10/30
709
10/31
710
712
11/1
714,713
11/2
720
11/4
727
11/5
721
U
11/4
722
11/4
728
11/5
730
11/6
737
11/8
744
11/10
745
11/10
753
11/12
754
11/12
756
11/12
758
11/12
759
11/12
Contents
Disposition
327-ANGO
325-ANGO
331-ANGO
330-ANGO. -..
332-ANGO_
KETSU-ANGC.
Ue] KETSU-ANGO
336-ANGO
21-A
340-ANGO
341-ANGO
342-ANGO.—
KETSU-A_
22-A
(23)-B
(24)-A
347-ANGO
348-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO..
[60] 349-ANOO
355-ANGO
(25)-A
(26)-A_
(27)-B...
352-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO..
328-ANGO
(28)-B...
KETSU-ANGO..
356-RYAKUGO
355-ANGO
358-ANGO
[51] GOGAI-A.
359-ANGO
KETSU-(C)
KETSU-A.
Ditto
(from the Minister #683)
Ditto
(from tlie Minister #685)
Ditto
(to the Minister #969)
Ditto
(from the Minister #687)
Problem of Janan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
(to the Minister #971)
Ditto
(from the Minister #688)
Ditto _._-
(from the Minister #695)
Ditto..
(to the Minister #982)
Ditto...
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #705)
Ditto.
Ditto
(to the Minister #990)
Re results of the Japanese overseas
broadcasts,
(from the Minister GO-#2222)
Re inquiry concerning receipt of tele-
gram.
Re credit report of this Consulate
and Consulate stafl.
Re inquiry as to whether articles were
entrusted to courier KUQA or not.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1011)
Re report of foreign assets
(to the Minister #1015)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
(from the Minister #715)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication,
(to the Minister #1018)
Re alleviation of freeze affecting our
governmental agencies in the U. S.
Re mail matter to be loaded on TAI-
YO MARU, and Consul IWAN-
AGA.
Ditto
Re tax exemption and clearance of
souvenir gifts presented to former
honorary Consul.
Re disapproval of loading of mail
matter,
(to the Minister #1033)
Ditto
(from the Minister #728)
Rereportof foreign assets
Re allowance for members of this Con-
sulate.
Re alleviation of freeze affecting our
governmental agencies in the U. S.
(Minister #749)
Re "camera interview" of Ambassa-
dor KURUSU.
Re alleviation of credit freeze
(to the Minister #1067)
Re delivery of message to Ambassa-
dor KURUSU.
Re interpretation of telegrams
Re easing of the Freeze Order
Ditto...
(from the Minister #761)
Ditto
(to the Minister #1081)
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/18, to
theTS 10/21.
To the CG 10/20, to
theTS 10/21.
To the CG 10/20, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To tlie CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/23.
To the CG 10/23, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/24, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/24, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/23, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CG 10/30, to
the TS 10/29.
To the CG 10/30, to
the TS 10/30.
To the CG 10/30, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CG 10/31, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CG 10/31, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CT 11/1, to
theTS 11/4.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/2.
To the CG 11/4, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/0.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/6.
To the TS 11/6.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CG 11/6, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CG 11/10, to
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
(28J-A..
757
746-749
763
764
776
777
779
781
782
784
785
786, 787
790
792, 793
795
802
803
797, 798
799
806
809
810
808
815
814
817
822, 823
824, 825
826
830
831, 832
839
840, 841
11/12
11/11
11/13
11/13
11/15
11/15
11/17
11/17
11/17
11/18
11/18
11/19
11/19
11/21
11/23
11/23
11/25
11/25
11/25
11/25
11/26
11/26
11/26
11/27
11/27
8/4
11/28
11/26
11/28
11/29
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
(from the Minister #744)
Re present situation in the U. S
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
Ditto -
To the CG 11/12, to
357-ANQO
theTS 11/15.
To the CG 11/14, to
362-ANQO
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/14, to
KETSU-B
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/14, to
29-B .._
Re resume of contents of bill for de-
fense of Hawaii and "PUERTO
RICO."
(to the'Minister #1101)
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
Re registration of real property be-
longing to Consulates in the U. S.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1120)
Ditto -
theTS 11/15.
To the CG 11/15, to
364-ANGO
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/17, to
367-RYAEUGO
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/17, to
368-ANGO
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/18, to
KETSU-ANQO
theTS 11/19.
To the CG 11/18, to
[62] 369-HEIGO
KETSU-A
(from the Minister #786)
Telesram of thanks from Ambassador
KURUSU.
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communi-
cation.
(from the Minister #791)
Re enforcement of regulations pertain-
ing to restriction and ban of leaving
and entering country,
(to the Minister #1127)
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
Ditto
theTS 11/19.
To the CG 11/19, to
theTS 11/19.
To the CG 11/19, to
370-RYAK:UGO_
372-17-ANGO
theTS 11/19.
To the CG 11/19, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CO 11/19, to
371-17-ANGO
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/21, to
KETSU-ANQO. ._._
375-ANGO .
(to the Minister #1151)
Re reporting of developments of Japan-
U. S. negotiations,
(to the Minister #1145)
Re reply on names and competence of
members of Consulate, etc.
Re personal affairs of members of the
Consulate,
(to the Minister #1162)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1152)
Ditto. _ .
theTS 11/21.
To the CG 11/21, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/24, to
376-ANGO .-
theTS 11/24.
To the CG 11/24, to
374-ANGO
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/24, to
399-ANGO
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/26, to
380-ANQO
(to San Francisco #66)
Ditto .
theTS 11/26.
To the CO 11/26, to
388-ANQO
(to the Minister #1168)
Re application for permit to leave
country,
(to the Minister #1182)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #819, #820)
Re TATUTA MARU's schedule
(from the Minister #838)
Separate telegram.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1181)
Re boarding of TATUTA MARU....
(from the Minister #837)
Re U. S. regulations permitting leav-
ing and entering of country,
(to the Minister? #1201)
Present condition of Japan-U. S. nego-
tiations,
(from the Minister GO-#2416)
Re investigation and reporting of
movements of warships.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(Minister #1211)
Ditto...
the TS 11/26.
To the CG 11/26, to
[53] 377-ANGO
KETSU-RYA-
KUOO.
383-RYAKUGO...
the TS 11/26.
To the CO 11/26. to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/27, to
KETSU-A._ _.
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/27, to
384-ANGO
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/27, to
KETSU-ANGO
223-GO-AN .
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CO 11/28, to
387-ANGO .
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/29, to
KETSU-A .
the TS 12/1.
To the 11/29, to the
KETSU-A
(from the Minister #839)
Ditto
TS12/1.
To the 11/29, to the
KETSU-A
(from the Minister #846)
Re disposition of American currency
bonds,
(from the Minister #850)
TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
423
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
KETSU-A..
842
11/26
Re entrusting of rights and interests in
the U. S.
(from the Minister GO-#2403)
To the CQ 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
[54] KETSU-A
850
12/2
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #870)
To the CG 12/2, to
the TS 12/3.
KETSU-B
854
12/3
Re transmission by wire of secret ex-
penses for third period and tem-
porarily increased amount.
To the CO 12/3, to
the TS 12/4.
FROM: SEATTLE
[55] 161-AN-YU-GO
1-AN-YU-QO...
2-AN-YU-O0..._
3-AN-YU-GO..
4-AN-YU-GO
5-AN-YU-G0_.
7-AN-YU-GO
9-AN-YU-aO
12-AN-YU-aO
13-AN-YU-GO
[Se] 14-AN-YU-CO..
1-A....
15-AN-YU-GO
16-AN-YU-GO
19-AN-YU-GO...
18-AN-YU-GO
21-AN-YU-GO
22-RYAKU-YU-GO....
23-AN-YU-GO
24-AN-YU-GO
2-A
[57] :3-A
37-AN-YU-GO
4
1/8
10
1/13
12
1/14
17
1/16
25
1/23
41
1/31
49
2/7
56
2/5
68
2/12
73
2/19
84
3/5
89
3/6
92
3/8
100
3/10
122
3/20
124
3/27
149
4/10
150
4/10
172
4/23
174
4/23
182
4/30
231
6/2
249
6/30
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #198)
(dated 12/24)
Ditto
(to the Minister #1)
(dated 1/3)
Ditto
(to the Minister #2)
(dated 1/6)
Ditto _.
(to the Minister #3)
(dated 1/8)
Ditto
(to the Minister #4)
(dated 1/16)
Ditto
(to the Minister #5)
(dated 1/21)
Ditto
(to the Minister #7)
(dated 1/24)
Ditto.
(to the Minister #9)
(dated 1/25)
Ditto
(to the Minister #11)
(dated 1/25)
Ditto
(to the Minister #13)
(dated 2/10)
Ditto
(to the Minister #14)
(dated 2/24)
Ditto :
Ditto
(to the Minister #15)
(dated 2/26)
Ditto
(to the Minister #16)
(dated 3/4)
Ditto
(to the Minister #20)
(dated ?/20)
Ditto
(to the Minister #18)
(dated 3/17)
Ditto
(to the Minister #23)
(dated 4/1)
Re calling attention to enforcement of
Nationality Laws.
(to the Minister #24)
(dated 4/2)
Re movement of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #26)
(dated 4/10)
Ditto.
(to the Minister #29)
(dated 4/16)
Re U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #36)
Re U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #.36)
Ditto
(to the Minister #51)
(dated 5/28?) ^
To the CG 1/8, to
the TS 1/9.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 1/17, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CQ 2/3, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/6, to
the TS 2/7.
To the CG 2/13, to
the TS 2/13.
To the CO 2/19, to
the TS 2/19.
To the CG 3/5, to
the TS 3/6.
To the CG 3/6, to
the TS .3/6.
To the CG 3/8, to
the TS 3/8.
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/26, to
the TS 3/27.
To the CG 3/28, to
the TS 3/28.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/15.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/15.
To the CG 4/23, to
the TS 4/24.
To the CG 4/23, to
the TS 4/24.
To the CG 5/1, to
the TS 5/1.
To the CG 6/2, to
the TS 6/3.
To the CG 6/10, to
the TS 6/12.
424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM : SEATTLE — Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
296
6/30
662
10/28
692
10/24
715
11/2
725
11/5
738
11/8
739
11/8
750
11/10
770
11/14
796
11/20
Contents
Disposition
42-AN-YU-OO.
66-RYAKUGO
70-ANGO
73-ANGO
75-ANGO
78-ANGO
79-ANGO
81-ANGO
83-ANGO
85-ANGO.
Ditto..
(to the Minister #56)
(dated 6/23)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(from the Minister GO #2205)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Ambassador #34)
Re registration of property
(to the Ambassador #39)
Re sailing of the HIKAWA MARU..
(to the Minister #158)
Re Japan shipping communication
(to the Minister #162)
Ditto _
(to the Minister #166)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #166)
Re adoption of the message associated
with the situation by the Council of
the League of Organizations of
"Seattle."
Re problem of Japan-U. S. shipping
communication,
(to the Minister #175)
To the CO 7/2, to
the TS 7/3.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/5.
To the CG 11/8, to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/14.
To the CO 11/14, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/20, to
the TS 11/24.
m
FROM: NEW YORK
2-RAKUGO
3-RAKUGO
1-A
52-ANGO...
54-ANGO._.
57-ANGO._.
60-ANGO...
67-ANOO...
18-ANGO...
83-ANGO.. -
95-ANGO..-
[59] 2-B..
88-ANGO...
89-ANGO...
90-ANGO..
Ol-ANGO...
94-ANGO_..
96-ANGO--
35
1/27
40
1/30
154
4/12
414,415
417
7/30
449
8/5
455, 456
8/8
466, 467
468
8/13
485
8/20
512, 513
9/4
685
10/24
711
10/31
726
11/5
733
11/8
734, 735
11/8
816
11/26
838
853
12/3
861
12/5
Re restrictions of parcel post to Japan-
Ditto
Re verbal message to Secretary FU-
KUSHIMA.
Re counter-measures against the
Freeze Order.
(to the Minister #372)
Re withholding of the cryptograph of
the Yokohama Specie Bank branch.
Re manner of evacuation of the resi-
dent Japanese.
(to the Minister #391)
Re manner of evacuation of the resi-
dent Japanese.
(to the Minister #401)
Re counter-measures against the
Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #414)
Re cryptographic code
(from the Minister GO-#1907)
Re steps for payment of boat fare for
passengers on requisitioned ships in
Japan,
(to the Minister #487)
Re report of foreign assets
(to the Minister #88)
Re resending of telegram advising of
dates of arrival and departure of
Secretary TOKUNAGA and wife.
Re procedure for foreigners to depart
from Japan.
(to the Minister #496)
Ditto
(from the Minister #234)
Re evacuation of Japanese commercial
firms and employes of branch banks
in the U. S.
(from the Minister #242)
Re cancellation of portion of Freeze
Order.
Ditto
(from the Minister #271)
Ditto...
(to the Minister #535)
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 1/30, to
the TS 1/30.
To the CG 4/12, to
the TS 4/15.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 8/5, to
the TS 8/6.
To the 8/8, to
the TS 8/8.
To the CG 8/13, to
the TS 8/13.
To the 8/20, to
the TS 8/20.
To the 9/4, to
the TS 9/5.
To the CO 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/5.
To the CG 11/10, to
theTS 11/11.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/27.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 12/3, to
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/5, to
the TS 12/6.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
425
[60]
FROM: FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
29-AN-YU-GO -.-
6
8
9
50
66
101
112
113
isS
156
107
168
195
305
306
474
482
539
731
1/7
1/10
1/10
2/1
2/12
3/10
3/19
3/19
4/11
4/15
4/19
4/20
5/8
7/7
7/7
8/15
8/15
9/15
11/7
Re movements of U. S. warships.
(to the Minister #474)
(dated 12/23)
(from Manila)
Re naval planes of the U. S
To the CG 1/8, to
48 AN-YU-GO
the TS 1/9.
To the CO 1/14, to
28 AN-YU-GO
(to the Minister #466)
(dated 12/14)
Ditto_-
the TS 1/15.
To the CO 1/14, to
1-B ---
(to the Minister #470)
(dated 12/16)
Re Greek ship, "ELENE S. EN-
BILICOS".
Re method of leaving country for
American citizens of Japanese
parentage,
(to the Minister #2)
(dated 1/31)
(from New Orleans)
Re telegraphic code in possession of
the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."
(to the Minister #4)
(dated 3/4)
(from New Orleans)
Re opening of the sub-Consulate at
"HOUSTON."
(to the Minister #1)
(dated 3/7)
(from Houston)
Re di.strict under jurisdiction of the
sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."
(from the Minister #1)
(dated 3/8)
(from Houston)
Re senaing of hard "tennis balls"
(from PeKing)
Re departure of the Panamanian ship
to Japan,
(from Britain)
Re stopping in port of the American,
"BOB COOK."
(to the Minister #222)
(from Manila)
Re resending of telegram
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 2/3, to
2-ANGO
the TS 2/4.
To the CO 2/12, to
4-AN-YU-GO
the TS 2/12.
To the CG 3/12, to
1-HEI-YU-GO . ...
the TS 3/13.
To the CO 3/19, to
2-HEI-YU-GO
the TS 3/19.
To the CG 3/19, to
[61] 1
the TS 3/19.
To the CG 4/12, to
MU-B _
the TS 4/12.
To the CO 4/15, to
11 ANGO-
the TS 4/17.
To the CG 4/19, to
1-ANGO
the TS 4/21.
To the CG 4/21, to
4-HEI-YU-GO-
(from Manila)
Renew "Address" of the sub-Consu-
late at "HOUSTON."
(dated 4/25)
(from Houston)
Re interpretation of telegram(s)
(from Ambassador to Britain)
Delivervine message to Ambassador
SHIOEMITSU.
(separate telegram)
Symbol for the Consulate head
(from Canton)
Symbol for the Consulate head
(from Canton)
Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHI-
KAN (a school?).
(to the Minister #36)
(dated 9/10)
(from Vancouver)
Re departure of Ambassador
KURUSU.
(to the Minister GOGAI)
(from Manila)
the TS 4/21.
To the CG 5/8, to
1-B
the TS 5/9.
To the CG 7/8, to
No number-A .
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/9, to
-A
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 8/15.
-A-
To the CG 8/19.
9-AN-YU-GO.
To the CG 9/15, to
OOGAI-C
the TS 9/16.
To the CG 11/7, to
the TS 11/8.
FROM: LOS ANGELES
105-AN-YU-GO
106-AN-YU-GO
107-RYAKU-YU-QO.
1-AN-YU-GO
3
1/6
5
1/6
7
1/7
13
1/14
Re movements of U. S. warships.
(to the Minister #220)
(dated 12/23)
Ditto
(to the Minister #221)
(dated 12/27)
Re sending of representatives of the
Patriotic Women's Society.
(to the Minister #222)
Movements of U. S. warships...
(dated 1/6)
To the CO l/8,toth§
TS 1/9.
To the CG 1/8, to the
TS 1/9.
To the CG 1/9, to the
TS 1/10.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM : LOS ANGELES— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
1-(C) ----- ----
4-AN-YU-GO
5-AN-YU-GO
10-RYAKU-YU-GO....
U-AN-YU-GO -...
2-AN-YU-GO
13-AN-YU-GO.
2-A
15-AN-YU-GO.
16-AN-YU-GO.
17-RYAKU-YU-G0-...
18-AN-YU-GO.-
20-AN-YU-GO
9-A .
23-AN-YU-GO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
1?
1/16
24
1/23
42
/1/30
59
2/0
60
2/6
23
1/23
67
2/12
85
3/5
125
3/27
132
4/3
133
4/3
159
4/15
173
4/23
190
5/1
196
5/8
Contents
Re vMt to the U. S. by the "Subaru
Show" troupe.
Re movements of the U. S. warships.
(to the Minister #7)
(dated 1/13)
Ditto
(to the Minister #9)
(dated 1/21)
Re parcel post to Japan
(to the Ji'inister #14)
(dated 1/26)
Re movements of the U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #15)
(dated 1/27)
Re problem of evacuation of the Jap-
anese residents in the U. S.
(to the Minister #4)
(dated 1/10)
Movements of U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #17)
(dated 2/1)
Ditto
Ditto ..-
(to the Minister #33)
Re visit to the U. S. by the Represent-
atives, YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.
(from the Minister #25)
(dated 3/26)
Re visit to the U. S. by delegates of
the Japan Christian Federation.
(to the Minister #34)
(dated 3/26)
Movements of the U. S.Tlavy
(to the Minister #38)
(dated 4/5)
Ditto
(to the Minister #44)
(dated 4/12)
Ditto
(to the Minister #59)
(dated 5/1)
Re participation of delegates of the
Japan Christian Federation at the
special conference of the American
Christian Federation.
(to the Minister #53)
(dated 4/26)
Disposition
To the CG 1/16, to
the TS 1/17.
To the CG 1/23. to
the TS 1/24.
To the CG 2/3, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/6, to the
TS 2/7.
To the CG 2/6, to the
TS 2/7.
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/25.
To the CG 2/12,
the TS 2/13.
To the CG 3/5, to the
TS 3/6.
To the CG 3/28, to
the TS 3/28.
To the CG 4/3, to the
TS 4/4.
To the CG 4/3 to the
TS 4/4.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/18.
To the CG 4/23, to
the TS 4/24.
To the CG 5/1, to the
TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/8, to the
TS 5/9.
m
FROM: PORTLAND
2-ANGO
4-A...-
7-ANGO
5-B
32-RYAKU-YU-GO.
33-RYAKU-YU-GO.
34-RYAKU-YU-GO
6-A
11-ANGO -..
7-A
Se-ANGO
197
5/28
232
6/2
233
6/2
259
6/17
263
6/19
264
6/15
270
6/23
315
7/9
327
7/15
334
7/17
529
9/10
Re movements of the U.S. Navy
(to the Minister #66)
Ditto -
Ditto
(to the Minister #83)
Re greeting courier YAMAZAKI at
pier.
Re strDce by the employees of the
"NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane
Company."
(to the Minister #87)
(dated 6/6)
Re strike by the employees of the
"NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane
Company,
(to the Minister #92)
(dated 6/9)
Ditto
(to the Minister #95)
(dated 6/11)
Re survey of assets of Japanese people
living on the mainland U. S.
Re movements of U. S. Warships
(to the Minister #112)
Re resending of telegram (s)
Re movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister #176)
To the CG 5/8, to
the TS 5/9.
To the CG 6/3, to
the TS 6/3.
To the CG 6/3, to
the TS 6/3.
To the CG 6/17, to
the TS 6/17.
To the CG 6/20, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CG 6/19, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CG 6/23, to
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/15, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/17, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 9/10, to
the TS 9/10.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
427
FROM : PORTLAND— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
554
9/20
610
10/13
630
10/16
632
10/17
659
10/20
684
10/24
700
10/28
723
11/4
833
11/29
859
12/4
Contents
Disposition
[65] 44-ANQO
47-ANaO
49-RVAKUGO...
50-ANGO
62-ANGO.
65-ANaO
67-ANQO...
60-ANOO
313-ANGO
7i-ryak:ugo...
Ditto
(to the Minister #190)
Problem of Japan-U. S. .ship communi-
cation,
(to the Minister #201)
Re notices of attainment of military
ape for year 1942.
(to the Minister #200)
Ditto
(Minister #94)
Movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister #205)
Re investigation of Japanese associa-
tions by the F. B. I.
(to the Minister #207)
Ditto
(to the Minister #209)
Re simplifying of procedure for e.xpa-
triation.
(to the Minister #214)
Re .ships requisitioned by the U. S.
Army and the Navy,
(to the Minister #317)
Re procedure for expatriation,
(from the MinisterJllO)
To the CO 9/22, to
the TS 9/24.
To the CG 10/13, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the BQ 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/28, to
the TS 10/29.
To the CG 11/4, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CG 11/29.
To the CG 12/4, to
the TS 12/5.
[66]
FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES
-(C)....
-C
-C
-(C)....
-c
-c
-c
-(C)....
-(C)....
167] -(C)
-(C)...
-c
-C
29
1/26
30
1/27
36
1/28
27
1/29
39
1/29
45
2/1
86
3/6
93
3/8
107
3/13
123
3/26
131
4/3
135
4/3
160
4/17
Re reception dinner for Ambassador
NOMURA,
(from Ambassador NOMURA,
KAMAKURA MARU)
Re delivery of message from Ambas-
sador NOMURA,
(from Ambassador NOMUR.A. on
Kamakura Maru)
Ditto.
(from Ambassador NOMURA on
Kamakura Maru)
Re inquiry on functions for Ambas-
sador NOMURA,
(from Secretary OKUMURA)
Re reply as to functions for Ambas-
sador NOMURA.
Telegram of thanks from Ambassador
NOMURA,
(from Ambassador NOMURA on
Kamakura Maru)
Telegram of thanks
(from Secretary MIYAZAKI on
Yawata Maru)
Re printing of Enclish name-cards for
Consul General KITA.
(from Consul General KITA on
TATUTA MARU)
(dated 3/9)
Re stopping in port of Ambassador
TOMII.
(from Consul General KITA on
Tatuta Maru)
Re reporting on time of arrival at post
of Secretary MORIMURA.
(from Secretary MORIMURA
on Nitta Maru)
Reply telegram from Ambassador
KURUSU.
(from Ambassador KURUSU on
Tatuta Maru)
Re arrival in port of MASABUMI
NAKAMURA.
(from MASABUMI NAKAMU-
RA on Kamakin-a Maru)
Re arrival in port of SHIMIZU and
YAMAGI.
(from SHIMIZU and YAMAGI
on Yawata_Maru)
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CO 1/28, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CO 1/29, to
the TS 1/30.
To the CO 1/29, to
the TS 1/30.
To the 2/1, to the TS
2/4.
To the 3/6, to the T
3/6.
To the CO 3/10, to
the TS 3/10.
To the CG 3/13, to
the TS 3/14.
To the CG 3/26, to
the TS 3/27.
To the CO 4/3, to the
TS 4/3.
To the 00 4/3, to the
TS 4/3.
To the CG 4/17, to
the TS 4/18.
428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
189
5/1
210
5/20
223
5/27
242
6/6
267
6/21
320
7/12
332
7/17
422
7/31
503
8/30
576
9/29
611
10/12
648
10/19
688
10/25
731
11/7
741
11/9
742
11/10
751
11/12
Contents
Disposition
-(C),
-(C)
-c
-c
-c
[68] -C
-A
-C
-(C)
-(C).....
-X
GOQAI
-C
-C
-(C).....
Re boarding of ship by HANA KU-
SANOBU.
(from the Kamakura Mam)
Re calling at port of Representative
SHIMIZU.
(from Representative SHIMIZU
on Asama Maru)
Telegram of greeting
(from Minister YAMAQATA on
TatutaMaru)
Re inquiry on completion of draft
deferment procedure.
Re stoppi;ig in port of Representative
TAKAMI.
(from Representative TAKAMI
on Kamakura Maru)
Telegram of thanks from Ambassador
SHIOEMITSU.
(from Am.hassador SHIGEMIT-
SU on Kamakura Maru)
Re stopping in port of Major (or Lt.
Commander) YANG.
(from Major YANG on Tatuta
Maru)
Re purchase of superior grade seed and
shoots of "pineapple."
(from Ilead of the Foreign AfTairs
Section, Formosa)
Re changing of broadcasting wave
length to Hawaii,
(from Japan Broadcasting Com-
pany)
Re request in regard to departure of
Professor Lee Sireta.
(from Professor NGRMSUGI of
the Tokyo Music Academy)
Re sending of divorce papers
(from YASUKO K.\NDA, Tokyo)
Re replenishment of fuel oU of
TATUTA MARU.
Re changing of broadcasting cycle
(from Tokyo Japanese Broadcast-
ing)
Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU
(from Manila)
Re stopping in port of Ambassador
KURUSU.
(from Secretary YUKI at Midway)
Re stopping in port of Ambassador
KURUSU.-
(from Ambassador KURUSU at
Midway)
Ditto
(dated 11/11)
To the CO 5/1, to the
TS 5/1.
To the CO 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CO 5/27, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CO 6/6, to the
TS 6/7.
To the CG 6/21, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 7/11, to
the TS 7/14.
To the CO 7/17, to
the TS 7/17.
To the CO 7/31, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 8/30, to
the TS 8/30.
To the CG 9/30, to
the TS 9/30.
To the CO 10/12, to
the TS 10/18.
To the CO 10/19, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/25,
To the CG 11/7.
To the CO 11/10, to
the TS 11/10.
To the CO 11/10, to
the TS 11/10.
to the TS 11/12.
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 4
INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, fAOD, FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawai-
ian Department, as noted on the cover sheets L and M.
a. G-2, H. H. D., letter of transmittal to G-2, Washington, dated 7 March 1942
re translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-stalf routing
slip dated 7 March 1942 and F. B. I. report dated 2 March 1942 re same subject.
b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Regis-
ter of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 429
CONFIDENTIAL
File 336.92
Headquartebs CPBC
G-2 [CID]
BOX S, APO ^i56 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
JAPANESE CONSULATE & CONSULAR AGENTS— Translation of Japanese
Consulate Radio Log Book
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence,
FORT SHAFTS R, T. H., 7 March 19-i2.
Subject : Translation of Japanese Consulate Massage Log Book
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, Washington,
D. C.
1. Attached hereto is the translation of a message log book, as maintained by
the staff of the Honolulu Japanese Consulate, which shows the file number, code,
date and subject matter of radio messages sent from the Consulate to various
points for the year 1941.
2. This information is forwarded for such use as it may serve to your office.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Colonel, G. S. C,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
GWB : mkc
1 encl.-Translation as noted.
CC '
' Dept. Signal Office, H. H. D. (2)
O. N. I., Honolulu, T. H. (1)
[Handwritten:]
336.92 — Consular Representative
333.4 — Espionage.
7 March 42.
Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log
1st Ind.
CO DSO
1. Attachced hereto is the translation of a log book, as maintained by the
staff of the Honolulu Japanese Consulate, which shows the file number, code,
date and subject matter of radio messages sent from the Consulate to various
points for the year 1941.
2. This information is forwarded for such use as it may serve to your office.
Enclosure: (2) G. W. B.
Fedebal Bureau of Ina'EStigation.
United States Department of Justice,
Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.
The following is a translation of *a form, printed in Japanese, on which radio
messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H.,
were recorded :
Outgoing Messages
Telegrams, official :
Secret Ordinary
No ,
File No
Dispatched Month Day
From
To ,
Attached to
430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Outgoing Messages — Continued
Subject : (gist of contents)
Disposal and development :
From
To Month.
-Day
The Archives and Document Section
The Telegram Section
Month Day
Person in charge:
Remarks :
Entries were not made in all of the spaces provided on the above form. The
symbols, A N (cryptogram ?), R Y A K U (code), and HEX (ordinary message),
were written over the printed characters for "Official Dispatches" and are repre-
sented in the translation by A, B and C, respectively. There were also used in
this manner the Japanese characters Y U (pertaining to postal?) and M U (a
negative term).
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER
(Code ? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
1-B
1
4
5.
6
7
9
10
11.
12..
13
14
16
17 ._
18
19
20
22
24
27
28
32
34
36
37
38
39
40
42
43.
44
45.
46
48.
49
50
51
52
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
62
64
1-4
1-6
1-7
1-9..
1-9
1-11
1-11
1-13
1-13
1-15
1-16
1-18
1-20
1-21
1-22
1-23.
1-24
1-28
1-29
1-29
1-30
2-1-.
2-1
2-3
2-6
2-7
2-15 -
2-20
2-21
2-21
2-24
2-25
2-26
2-27
3-1
3-1
3-3
3-4
3-4..
3-5
3-6
5-6*
3-10
3-10
3-14
3-18*
Matter re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's
Society.
Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
2-A
3-A .
4-B
Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.
5-A
Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
6-B_
7-B
8-A . .
Report of gist of conversation with "ABEND".
Conversation on meeting with newly appointed Commander
KIMMEL.
Movements of U. S. Fleet.
9-B
Matter re social expenses for third period.
10-B
11-A
12-A
13-B
14-A
15-A
16-A ...
Matter re invitation to luncheon for Ambassador NOMURA.
Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan. (LACONICUS)
Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
Matter re visit to Japan by American citizens of Japanese an-
cestry without passports.
Matter re movement of U. S. warships.
Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
Matter re simplifying clearance of documents carried by
\2] 17-B
18-A
19-A
20-B
Consul General NAKAMURA.
21-B
Ambassador NOMURA.
22-B
23-B.. -
Matter re reporting to Rear Admiral KIMMEL abou
24-B
appointment (NOMURA's).
Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
25-A
26-A
Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
27-A.
28-B
29-A...
30-B
Command.
Re designation of naval defense area in "Kaneohe" Bay.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
31-A
32-B.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Re explanation of Minister (Foreign?) in the Diet.
33-B - .
Re report of names of persons accompanying Consul-Oeneral
34- A.
KITA.
Re movements of U. S Fleet.
[3] 35-B._.
36-B
Re Consul-General KITA'S cook accompanying him.
37-B
Re recrossing (of ocean) by CHINEI KANESHIRO.
38-A
Movement of U. S. Fleet.
39-A
40-B . .
Re granting of passport to KENJO KOHARA (or OBARA)
41-B .
missionary of the Hongwanji Sect.
Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.
42-B
Re correction of telegram.
43-A-..
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
44-A .-
45-B
Re report of arrival in office of Consul-Oeneral KITA.
46-B .
Re issuing of pa.ssports for traveling to Hawaii to GIEN
MITANI and TAIYU OKAMOTO, missionaries of the
Hongwanji Sect.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
DISI'*^TCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER— Continued
431
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
47-A...
65
66
67
69
70.
71
72
73
75
76
77.
78
81
82
84.
85.
86
90
92
93
96
97
98
99
102
103
104
105
107
108
109
110
111
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120_
122
123
124.
126
129
130
132
1.33
134.
136.
137
138
139
140
141
143
144
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154_......
155
156
3-21
3-21*
3-24
3-24
3-25.
3-26
3-27*
3-27
3-28
3-29*
3-29*
4-1*.
4-3*.
4-5*
4-7* (?) . .
4-8
4-9
4-14
4-15
4-17
4-21
4-21
4-23
4-23
4-28
4-28
4-29*
4-30*
4-30
5-1*
5-1.
5-6
5-8-
5-12
5-14*
5-14*
5-16
5-20
5-21
.5-22
5-23*
5-26
5-27*
5-27
5-29*
6-3*
6-3.
6-6
6-6*
6-7*
6-9
6-12
6-13.
6-13
*
6-14
6-16*
6-17*
6-20.
6-23*
6-23
♦
6-27
6-28
6-28*
6-28
6-30
6-30*
7-1
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
48-B
Visit to New Zealand of U. S. warships.
Re information on Consul-General's coolc going on board ship
49-C. _.
50-A
U] 51--A. .
Re wireless messages and secret documents carried by Courier
52- A -
MORI.
Re expenses for development of intelligence for year 1941.
53-B
Re report of arrival in office of secretary MORIMURA.
S4-A ._
Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
55-A
Re visit to U. S. by Representatives YAM AJI and SHIMIZU.
56-A
Re passport visa for WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE.
67-B...
58-B
Re request to Prince KONOYE and Minister MATSUOKA
59 B...
for articles to be printed in publication commemorating the
completion of the extension to the Japanese Hospital.
Re arrival in port of Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
60-B
61-A
Re arrival in port of Japan Christian Federation.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
62-B
63-A
64-A
[5] 65-A. _
66-A. .
Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
67-B
68-A ._
(MU) B... .
Re receipt of decoding booli for use on request telegrams.
(MU)-B
69 A.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Re arrival in port of British warship.
70-A..
71-B
Re transport "WASHINGTON."
72-B-
Re trip of "HENRY LUCE" to Chunglcing.
Re seizure of crew members of the "COLUMBIA" by British
73-A
74 B . .
warship.
Re taking of office by Ambassador GAUSS
75-A-..
Re seizure of German subjects by British warship.
Re movements of U. S. Warships and ships.
The local general emergency situation.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
76-A-..
77-A...
78-A
79-B
[6] 80-B
KUSUDA, priest of the Higashi Hongwanji Sect.
Re arrival of B-17 Bombers.
81-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
82- A.. .
83-A
84-B..
Re indictment of .Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re arrival in port of Labor Minister and party of New Zealand.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Re departure of "TRADEWIND".
85 B
86--A.
87-B ..
88-B
Arrival in port of Foreign Minister KLEFFENS of Holland.
Re passing through of MANUEL FOX.
89-B
90-B...
91-A
tennial celebration of "PUNAHOU SCHOOL".
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Re boarding of German subject on TATUTA MARU (Dis-
patch #15 to San Francisco).
Re deportation of Japanese and Koreans.
92-A
93-B
94-B
[7] 9.5-A ...
Fleet's visit to the mainland.
Re request of German subject MEHNERT KLAUS to board
Japanese liner.
Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
96-A
97-A
98-A
99-B
Re arrival in port of U. S. transport "PRESIDENT
PIERCE".
Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.
Re arrival in port of British cruiser.
Re closing of German Consulate General in the U. S.
Re visit here by the baseball team of MEIJI UNIVERSITY
(to the Minister #25).
100-A
102-B
103-B
104-A
105-B
Re arrival in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Re return of Admiral KIMMEL
106-A...
107-B
108-A....
Re arrival in port of Commander TACIIIBANA (to the
Minister #27).
Re money loaned out by this Consulate.
Re arrival in port of Americans on inspection tour of Burma
Road.
Re plot for disorder (riot) on "PENNSYLVANIA".
Re correction in usage of code type TSU.
109-B
[8] 110-B
lU-A
-C
112 B
113-A...
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DISrATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER— Continued
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Sjmopsis of message
114-B...
159
161.
162
163
164
165
166
169
170
171
173_
174
176
177
179
180
181
182
185
186.
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
196
197
200
201
202
203
204
206
207
209
211
212
213
214.
216
217
220
221
225
226
227
228
229
230
234
235.
236
237
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
249
250
251
252
253
254
256
257
258
259
260
261
7-3*
7-7
7-8
7-8*
7-8..
7-10*
7-11
7-11*
7-14
7-14
7-15*
7-15*
7-17
7-18
7-19
7-21
7-22*
7-22
7-26
7-26
7-26*
7-28
7-28*
7-29
7-29
7-30*
7-30*
7-30
8-1
8-1
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-4
8-5*
8-7..
8 8
8-11 _
8-13
8-12*
8-13
8-15
8-18
8-19
8-27
8-28*
8-30
9-2
9-2*
9-2..
9-4
9-5
9-5..
9-6
9-9
9-13
9-13
9-13
9-15
9-15
9-17*
9-19
9-22
9-22
9-23*
8-24
9-25
9-29*
9-29
9-29
9-30*
10-1
10-2
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re movement of U. S. warsiiips
115-A. .. ..
116-B
Re re-telegraphing of telegrams.
117-B
118- A
Telegram by request of Nippon Yusen Kaisha
119-A
Re number of foreigners with visas to pass through Japan.
120-B
121-B
Re report of speech by LATTIMORE, advisor to CHIANQ
122-A
KAI SHEK.
Re request for instructions regarding returning of the Imperial
123-A
Portrait.
Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
124-B
Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc.
[9] 125-B
Re commencing of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet
Union.
Re status of employees, (to the minister #38).
126-A
127-A
128-A
129-A-.. _...
130-A - - .
Re wavelength of KGMB
Re return of Imperial Portrait.
Movement of U. S. Fleet.
Re issuing of visa for passing through to McBAIN.
131-A
Re investigation of passengers on board YAWATA MARU.
132-A
133-A . .
Re arrivil in port of ASAMA MARU.
Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.
134-B....
135- A
Re aiTival of the Under-Secretary of the Navy and Freeze
Administrators.
Re arrival of Japanese liner.
136-A -
Re visa for Mr. and Mrs. McDAIN (McBAIN 7).
137-B
138-B
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Re entry into American ports bv Japanese liners.
139
140-B
Effect on residence here of enforcement of the Freeze order.
Re broadcast to Hawaii.
141-B . .
Re exception of application of Freeze order to Chinese diplo-
mats and Consulate, (to the Minister #44).
Re itinery of Courier OSHIO (to San Francisco #19).
Ro departure and arrival of ASAMA MARU.
[10] 142 A
143-A.
-C
Re receipt of Naval Code Book type S-HE and related charts.
-C
Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type YA, etc.
-c
Re receipt of Common Code Boik for the three Ministries,
-C.
the Foreign, the War. and the Foreign (Navy ?).
Re receipt of Telegraphic Code tvpe HEI.
144-A
Telegram bv request of Yokohama Specie Bank.
145-A.
Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
146-A
Re placing of the Coast Guard under the Navy.
147-A
Re visa for passing through to the Britisher McBAIN.
148-A -
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
149-A. .- .
Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.
150-A
Re bank "balance" of official funds, (to the Minister #47.)
151-A
Re cash in hand of this Consulate.
[11\ 152-A
-A
153-A
Re employees of this Consulate.
Telegram by request of Branch OfiBce of the Yokohama Specie
Bank dated August 15.
Movements of U. S. warships.
154-A
Condition of Japanese people here.
155-A
Re treatment of Japanese Subjects in the U. S. by the Ameri-
156-B
cans.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
157-A
Re survey regarding DOMEI broadcast.
158-B
Re unreceived telegram.
159-B
Re passing through of American pilots.
160-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
161-A
To OGAWA.
162-A
Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago.
-A
Telegram by request of the Yokohama Specie Bank.
163-A
Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
164-A.-.
165-A
166-A i
Re arrival in port of French warship.
[n] 167-A
168-A
Re propaganda "pamphlets" of 5th columnists against Japan.
Re transfer of ofTicial telegrams to this Consulate.
169-A.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
170-A
Re arrival in ix)rt of Courier (to Shanghai #1).
171-A
Information concerning the military.
172- A -
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
173-A
Re departure of French warship.
174-B
Re arrival in port of military mission to Chungking.
175-A.
Re problem of U. S. and Japanese ship transportation.
176-A
Re questions pertaining to financial report.
177-B
Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats.
178-A
Movement of U. S. Fleet.
179-A
180-B
Re contents of baggages sent to this Consulate.
181-A
Re question of the Japanese I/anguage Schools.
[IS] 182-A.
Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
433
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER — Continued
(Code 7 No.)
File No.
Date. 1941
Synopsis of message
183-B
184-A._..
262
263
264
265_
266
267
268
269
271_
273
278
283
284
285
286_
287
289
291_
292
295
299
301
303
305
306-
307
308
310
311
312
313_
314
315
316*
10-2*
10-2
10-4.
10-6.
10-10*--.-
10-13
10-15
10-16
10-17
10-20
10-23
10-24
10-2.';*-...
10-25*....
10-25
10-25'....
10-28
10-28
10-29
10-29
11-1*
11-4 -
11-4
11-6*
11-6
11-6
11-7
11-7*
11-8
11-8
11-8
11-8
11-10....-
Re problem of Japanese owned fishing boats.
Re transportation of British soldiers by American ships.
185-B..
186-A
Re measures for time of war.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
187-B.
Re talks by Delegate KING.
188-A.
189-A
190-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ship.s.
Re going to the U. S. of Chinese airmen.
Re training of Chinese airmen bv the United States.
191-A_
192-A
Re payment of boat fare (shipping charges) in Japan.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
193-A
194-A
Re LEO SIROTA.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
195-A
196-A
Re granting of visa to the .American, CRICHTON COLVIN.
Re report of assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff (to
Ui] 197-A
198-A
199-A
the Ambassador #65).
Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance for members of
this Consulate (to the Ambassador #66).
Re granting of visa for entry into country to NEWMAN.
Re movements of U. S. warships.
200-A._
201-A
202-Al..
?
Retransmission (of message) to ?
Re LEO SIROTA.
203-B
204-A
Re arrival of TAIYO MARU.
Re delay in departure of TAIYO MARU.
205-
Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU.
206-B
207-A._..
208-A
Re departure of TAIYO MARU.
Re transmission (of message) to ?
Survev of passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.
209-A
Re request for easv clearance for Consul IWANAGA.
2ia-A
Re cancellation of trip to Japan of NEWMAN.
MU-C _
Re distribution of JIGO telegraphic code and attached decod-
MU-C
ing book.
Re sending of TAGO telegraphic code and attached decoding
[15] MU-C
211-A
212-A
book.
Re second receipt of common indicator words and key book.
Re according of convenience for clearance to passengers on
TAIYO MARU and two other ships.
Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
213-B
Re bounds of application of martial law in Hawaii.
214-A
215-A . ..
317
318
320*
322_
324
325
326
327
329
330_
331*
332»
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
240(340).
341*
342
343
344
347
348
350
352
3.=;3
355
356
357
358
359
11-11
11-11
11-12
11-13
11-13
11-14
11-14
11-15
11-18
11-18
11-18
11-18
11-19
11-19
11-22
11-22
11-22
11-22
11-23
11-23
11-24
11-24
11-25
11-25
11-26
11-26
11-28
11-29
11-29
12-1
12-1
12-3.
12-2
Re number of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.
Re easing of freeze applying to Japanese governmental agencies
216-C
in the United States.
Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU.
217
From Ambassador KURUSU.
218-A
From Ambassador KURUSU.
219-A
Re movements of U. S. warships.
220
Re conversation between Ambassador KURUSU and NEW-
221-A
MAN.
Telegram by request of Vice-Coiwul OKUDA.
Revenues in connection with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA
222-A
MARU.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
223-B
Re suspension of announcement of ship sailings.
224-B
Re stopping in port of technicians being sent to the Burma
[16] 225-A
22&-A . .
Road.
To
Re movements of U. S. warships.
227-A
To..
228-A
Departure of American convoy for Singapore.
229-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
230-A
231-A
Re movements of warships and ships.
232- A
Re disposition of telegraphic code.
233-A-..
Re demand of return of advances to courier KUG A.
234-A
Re Fleet training base.
235-A
Re representation of interests.
236-A
To
-A . . .
Telegram by request of the Specie Bank.
237-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
238-A
Miscellaneous military information.
239-A
BK(?) (In Roman letters).
240-A
BK(?) "
241-A.
BK(?) "
[/7] 242-A
243-A
Re report of number of Consular staff and their families.
Movements of warships and ships.
244-A
Re personnel of Consulate.
C
Re burning of codes.
245-A
360
361
362*
363*
362*
12-3
12-3
12-3
12-3
12-4.
To ? ..
246-A
Re remittance of traveling expenses of families.
247-A..
B. S. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
248-A
B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
249-A
Re entry in port of foreign warships and ships.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148-
-29
434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER— Continued
(Code ? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
250-A .--
365*
366*?... -
367
368*
369*
12-4
12-5
12-5
12-6
12-6
B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
251-A
Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU
252-A
and TATUTA MARU.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
253-A --.
B. K. (?)
254-A
Ditto.
TO SEATTLE
[18] 1-B.
Re investieation of date of crossing to United States by
ICHISAKU ICniNUKIDA (request Telegram).
TO LOS ANGELES
1-B .
15-
18
20
101*
175
1-17
1-21
1-23
4-26
7-16
Retrip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI and troupe, (request
telegram)
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #14)
Re movements of U. R. warships, (to the Minister #16)
2-A
3-A
4-B
5-A_-
Departure of Representatives SIIIMIZU and YAMAJI. (to
San Francisco #11)
Re re-sending of telegram.
TO SAN FRANCISCO
1-B-
2
3
1
9
19
35
63*
83
84*?
89
94*
101*
107
109-
121*
132
137
168
182
195*
196
199*
224
272*
274*
288
293-
309*
321*
323
328
362*
21-
27
26
29
30
1-6
1-6-
1-4 (dup-
lication)
1-11
1-22
2-1
3-15
4-7
4-7
'~4-\9V.'.V.\
4-26
4-30
5-1
5-24
6-6
6-12
7-11
7-22
7-31
8-1
•8-2
8-25-
10-20
10-22
10-27
10-29
11-7
11-12
11-13
11-17
12-3
1-24
1-26
1-28
1-29-
1-29
Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship, (to New York #1)
2-B
Re date of arrival in and departure from San Frencisco of
(1)-B -
Minister SUMA.
Re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's
3-B..
Society, (to the Minister #1)
Report of gist of conversation with ABEND, (to the Minister
4-A -
■#6)
Re trip to Japan without passports by American citizens o
[19] 5-B
Japanese parentage, (to the Minister #15)
Re names of Ambassador NOMURA'S party, (to the Minis-
6-B
ter #5).
Re journey of Ambassador TOMII.
7-A
Re resending of telegram.
8-A-. -.-
9-(A)
■ Re stopping in port of the Japan Christian Federation, (to the
Minister #61).
Re shifting of telegrams.
10-B
Re departure of courier FUKUDA.
11-B
12-A
Re departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI.
Re the seizure of crew members of the COLUMBIA by
13-A
British warship, (to the Minister #73).
Re seizure of German (s) by British warship, (to the Minister
14-B
1.5-A
#75).
Re request for easy clearance of courier TAOI (or TANOGI or
TAKI).
Re German boarding the TATUTA MARU.
(l)-A-YU
Re entry into port of British converted cruiser, (to the Minis-
16-C
ter #96).
Telesram of thanks of Ambassador SHIG EM ITSU.
17-A
Re investigation of passengers of the YAW ATA MARU.
18-B
Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU.
19-A
Re journey of courier OSHIO.
[20] 20-B
21-A
Re SLoppii g ii. port (f Hoi<olulu of the TATUTA MARU"
(re transfer of telegram #55 received from the Minister).
Re non-receipt of telegram.
22-B
Be landing of Secretary MAEDA.
23-B
24-A . .
Re p.isser.gers on board the TAIYO MARU.
Re delivery to Secretarv MAEDA.
25-A . .
Re physical examination of the passengers on board the
26-B .
TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #68)
Re departure cf Secretarv and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.
27-B
Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU? (to the
28-C
Minister #78).
29-A
Re resending of telegram.
30-A
B. S. (to the Minister #247)
[m -(C)-
-(C)
Re reception proeram for Ambassador NOMURA, (to Am-
bassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU). ^_
-(C)
Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA'S sojourn, (to
-c
Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA'S sojourn, (to
-c
Secretary OKUMURA).
Re sending of aide-de-camp by Commander-in-Chief RICH-
ARDSON, (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA
^ LMARU).
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
TO SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
435
(Code 7 No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
-C
31
68
1-30
Rg programme for Ambassador NOMURA'S sojourn, (to
-c
Secretary OKUMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
Re meetins the boat by Vice-Consul OKUDA. (to Secretary
MORIMURA on NITTA MARU1.
Private telesratn of Consul General, (to FUMIKO TAKAO
-(C) . .
74_
80
91. _
127
128
135
145_
198
219
1
270
294
3-27
4-2
4-15
6-2_
6-2.
6-7._
6-20
8-2.
8-16
9-8
10-17
10-29
-(C)
from OSAKA).
To Ambassador KURUSU. (from TATUTA MARU).
-(C)
Private request telegram of Consul General, (to HARUNO
-c
YOSISE, Tokyo).
Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General
to the GAKUYODO in Canton).
Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General
to Mrs. MAKI, Tokyo).
Re declaration of residence of MASAO KADOFUJI. (to
-c...
Villagemaster ENBUCHI, Otomari branch ofHce, Kara-
futo).
Condolatory telegram, (to wife of Councillor AKAQI in
-c
Shanghai).
Re son of Consul NAKAUCHI. (to Consul Nakaochi, Los
-(C) . -
Angeles).
Request telegram of Consul General, (to translator M AZ AKI
1-A..._
from Shanghai).
Re export of pineapple seedlings, (to Head of Section of For-
-c
eign AiYairs, Formosa).
Re inquiry on condition of fuel oil supply, (to Secretary
MAEDA on TATUTA MARU).
Re connection of Secretary • naga to American liner, etc.
(to Consul IWANAGA on TAIYO MARU).
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS
[SS] (l)-A-YU.
(2)-A-YU
1-B
(3)-YU-A.
(4)-B-YU.
(5)-A-YU.
2-B
3-B.
lU] 4-B..
(6)-A-YU..
(7)-A-YU..
(8)-A-YU..
(9)-A-YU..
(lO)-B-YU.
6-A
&-A.
(ll)-A-YU.
1-6..
1-9..
1-10-
1-16.
1-17.
1-28-
1-29.
1-30.
7-1..
2-6..
2-21.
2-24.
3-3.
3-4.
Re movement of U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #2)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
Re movement of U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #5)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.
Re enquiry on advisability of trip to United States by the
SUBARU SHOW.
Dispatched to: San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Re movement of U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #11)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI'S troupe, (to Los
Angeles #1)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #18)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re proposal of Commander-in-chief RICHARDSON for
reception of Ambassador NOMURA, (to the Minister
#20)
Dispatched to: Ambassador in U. S., and San Francisco.
Re offer of Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON to send
aide-de-camp to meet the Ambassador (NOMURA?), (to
the Minister #21).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco.
Conditions of Ambassador NOM URA's stopping in port here.
(to the Minister #22).
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re movement of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #25).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #29)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #31).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #34)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the Min-
ister #36)
Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #38)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #39)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS— Continued
(Code 7 No.)
File No. Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
[25] (12)-B-YU
{13)-A-YU
(14)-A-YU --.
a6)-A-YU
(16)-A-YU
(17)-A-YU
7-A ._
(18)-B-YU
S6] (19)-A-YU.
(20)-A-YU
(21)-A-YU
(22)-A-YU
8-B
(23)-A-YU
9-A
(24)-A-YU
(25)-B-YU
1^7] (26)-A-YU,
(27)-A-YU
(28)-A-YU
(29)-B-YU
(30)-A-YU
(31)-B-YU
(32)-A-YU
10-A
(33)-YU-A
(34)-B-YU
(35)-A-YU
IS8] (36)-B-YU
(37)-A-YU
11-A
12-A
58. .
59.-.
60...
65...
69...
73...
75...
85...
63*?.
90- -.
92...
93..
96*..
97..
100-
180.
104*
109.
110-
113.
115*
116-
119.
122-
125.
130.
M4*
138.
140*
148.
157.
160.
3-6-.
3-10.
3-10
3-21
3-24
3-27-
3-28.
4-8-.
4-9..
4-14.
4-15
4-17.
4-21.
4-21.
4-24.
4-28
4-29.
5-1- .
5-6..
5-12
5-14
5-16
5-22
.5-26
5-29
6-3..
6-7..
6-13
6-13
6-23
7-1.
7-5.
Re correction of tele?ram. (to the Minister #42)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #43).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #44).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #47)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle and
Los Angeles.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #50).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #53).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re trip to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.
Dispatched to: -Embassador and San Francisco.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #63)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #64).
Dispatched to: Amba.ssador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #65).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #65).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francigco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re stopping in port of eldest son of President ROOSEVELT.
(to the Mmister #67).
Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #68).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los jVngeles and
Seattle.
Re transferring of telegram regarding movements of U. S. Fleet.
Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #69).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re transport WASHINGTON.
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re seizure of German (s) by British warship, (to the Minister
#75).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#76).
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#78).
Re arrival of B-17 bombers, (to the Minister #80).
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#81).
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the Minis-
ter #84).
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#86).
Re check-up and reporting of names of U. S. warships.
Di.spatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#91).
Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle.
Re trip to Washington by Admiral KIMMEL and visit to the
mainland by the Fleet, (to the Minister #94).
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#97).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle.
Re arrival in port of U. S. Army transport PRESIDENT
PIERCE, (to the Minister #99)
Dispatched to: San Francisco and Manila.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#106)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, San Francisco and
Seattle.
Re stoppage of sending of code(s).
Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
Re survey of assets of Japanese residing within the United
States.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS — Continued
437
(Code 7 No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
13-A
14-B
15-A
16-A
17-A .—
18-C.
[g9] 19-C.._
20-A
21-A
22-A.
23-A
24-A....
25-A
2&-A
27-5
28-A
[SO] 29- A...
30-B
31-A
32-A
33-A
34-A
35-A...
36-A
37-A
[31] 38-A....
39-A
40-B
41-A
42-A
43-A-.
44-B
45-A
46-A
171.
174*
180.
188.
190.
191.
195*
197.
206.
211.
220.
221.
222.
226*
231 _
232*
237_
239.
241.
242.
243-
244.
250.
251.
253.
256*
257.
258.
260.
262*
263.
265.
7-14
7-15
7-21
7-28
7-29
7-29
7-31.
8-1-.
8-4..
8-6..
8-8 .
8-18.
8-19.
8-21.
8-28.
9-2..
9-3 .
9-3 .
9-6-
9-9..
9-13.
9-13.
9-15.
9-15.
9-22.
9-22.
9-24.
9-29.
9-29.
9-26.
10-1.
10-2.
10-2.
10-6.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#123)
Disptached to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re commencement of export to Vladivostok by'ships of the
Soviet Union, (to the Minister #125)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #129)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re entry into port of Japanese vessel, (to the Minister #135)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #137)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco.
Re entry into U. S. port of Japanese vessel(s). (to the Min-
ister #138)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU. (to San
Francisco #18)
Re entry into and embarkation from port of the ASAMA
MARU. (to the Minister #143)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#145)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re transferring of telegram (s). (telegram from the Minister
#66)
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#148)
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #153)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Local Japanese situation, (to the Minister #154)
Dispatched to; Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Ambassador #48)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the
Minister #156)
Dispatched to; Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#160)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re HAYAKAWA. (to the Ambassador #51)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re HAYAKAWA. (from the Ambassador #29)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#163)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Fransico.
Re mail matter to Japan, (to the Minister #164)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re stopping in port of French warship, (to the Minister
#166)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re propaganda pamphlets of fifth columnists against Japan.
(to the Minister #167)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re transfer of official telegrams sent to this Consulate, (to the
Minister #168)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#169)
Dispatched to Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#172)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re departure of French vessel, (to the Minister #173)
Dispatched to; Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re problem of shipping commmiication. Japan-United
States, (to the Minister #175)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re question of fishing boats owned by Japanese, (to the
Minister #177)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #178)
Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #179)
Re problem of Japanese Language Schools, (to the Minister
#181)
Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats, (to the Min-
ister #183)
Dispatched to; Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re transportation of British soldiers by American vessels.
(to the 'Minister #184)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Vancouver.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#186)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS— Continued
(Code ? No.)
FUe No. Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
47-A.
[Se] 48-A_
49-A.
50-A
51-B
52
53
fi4-A ---
55-A
56-A
57-A
[,?S] 58- A.
59-A
60-B
61-Al
62-A
63-(C)
64-C
6&-A
66-A
67-A
68-A
[Si] 69- A.
70-A
71-A
72-A
73-A
268
10-15.... _
271
10-17
273
274*
10-20
10-22
275*
10-22
276'
10-22
283
10-24
289
10-28
298
11-1
300
11-1
301
303
11-4
11-4
305*
11-6
314
11-8
315
11-10
320*
11-12
323
11-13
324
325
11-13
11-14
329
11-18
330
11-18
331*
11-18
334
11-19
353
361
11-29
12-3
366*
12-5
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#188)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re soing to the United States of Chinese airmen, (to the
Mmister#l89)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re payment of boat fare in Japan, (to the Minister #191)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San FranciFCO.
Re Japan-U. S. ship communication, (to the Minister #192)
Re passengers of the TAIYO MARU. (to San Francisco #23)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and Minister.
Re number of passenger? on TAIYO MARU. Telegram
transferred, (from the Minister #99)
Transfer telegram re departure from Yokohamaof the TAIYO
MARU. (from the Minister #100)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication, (to the
Mmister #194)
Re movem.ent of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #199)
Dispatched to: Am.bassador and San Francisco.
Re suspension of loading of mail matter on TAIYO MARU.
(to the Ambassador #71)
Dispatclied to: l\Tini?ter, Pan Francisco and Seattle.
Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier, (to th
Ambassador #73)
Dispatched to: Minister, Pan Francisco and Peattle.
Re delay in sailing of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #204)
Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU (to the Min-
ister #£05)
Re departure of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #206)
Dispatched to: San Francisco and Seattle.
Re according of convenience in clearance to TAIYO MARU
and two other ships, (to the Minister #211)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #212)
Dispatched to: U. S., and Pan Francisco.
Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #216)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and Pan Francisco.
Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to San Francisco #28)
Dispatched to: Minister and Ambassador.
From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #218)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#219)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Revenues comiected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA
MARU. (to the Minister #221)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#222)
Re suspension of announcement of arrival and departure of
ships, (to the Minister #223)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#226)
Blv. (?) (to the Minister #240)
Re sending of traveling expenses of family (families), (to the
Minister #246)
Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU
and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #251)
End of matching of telegrams.
TO NEW YORK
Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship.
Re telegram to the Specie Bank.
Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs.
TOKUNAGA.
Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs.
TOKUNAGA.
TO THE AMBASSADOR
[Se] (1)-YU-B._.
1-B
(2)-YU-B_
2-B
3-B
5
10
11
22
25-
33
35 -
1-7
1-11
1-13
1-24
1-28
2-1 -
2-1
Movements of the U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #3)
Interview with Rear Admiral KIMMEL, newly-appointed
Commander-in-Chief, (to the Minister #7)
Movements of the U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #8)
? (To Minister #17)
Re registration of families and servants of officials of foreign
government with the State Department.
Re expected time (date) of arrival in office of Ambassadoi;
NOMURA.
Re names of Ambassador NOMURA'S staff.
4-B ' .
5-B
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
TO THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
439
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
6-B.
7-B
(3)-B-YU.
('4)-YU-B.
8-B
[57] 9-B .
10-B.
11-B.
12-B.
(5)-B-YU.
13-A..
14-B
15-A
16-A
17-A
(6)-A-YU.
18-B
7-B-YU.
19-A
[SS]
21-B.
20- A.
(8)-A-YU.
22-A
23-A.
24-B.
25-B.
26-A
(9)-B-YU..
(lO)-B-YU.
27-A
28-B
29-A...
[39] 30- A.
(31)-B
32-A.
33-B.
34-C.
35-A.
36-A...
37-B...
38-A...
39-(A).
40-C...
41-A.
42-B.
43-B.
m
45-A.
46-A
47- A.
48- A.
49- A.
44-B.
51-A.
52- A.
63-A.
103.
111-
118.
120*
123*
1.30.
131.
134*
1.39.
141.
143*
146.
147*
149*
150.
155*
156.
159*.
161..
163*.
167. .
170.-
172- .
173..
176..
178- .
183..
184 -.
187*.
192*.
205-..
207*?.
213.
222-
225-
229*
230.
233-
235.
2-18-
2-20-
2-26-
2-26-
3-6--
3-11.
3-14.
3-21-
4-2--
4-10.
4-10-
4-28.
5-7--
5-21-
5-23-
,5-27-
6-3..
6-4-
6-7.
6-13.
6-14.
6-16.
6-16.
6-17.
6-20-
6-23.
6-26-
6-27.
6-30-
7-1..
7-2-
7-7-
7-8-
7-11.
7-14-
7-15.
7-15.
7-17.
7-18-
7-24.
7-24-
7-26-
7-30-
8-2-
8-5.
8-12-
8-21-
8-27-
9-2--
9-3.
9-3.
9-5.
Re reporting to Commander-in-Chief KIMMEL of new ap-
pointment.
Re measure for freezing of foreign assets in the United States.
Re designation of naval defense area in Kaneohe Bay. (to the
Minister #28)
Re explanations of the Minister in the Diet.
Re date when Consul-General KITA will start for his new
post, (from the Minister #10— telegram relayed).
Re indictmpnt of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the
Minister #36)
Re correction of telegram, (to the Minister #42)
Re request for refundment of advances.
Re report of arrival at post of Consul-Oeneral KITA. (to tho
Minister #45)
Re visit to New Zealand of U. S. warship(s)
Re Inquiry of name of Consulate to which telegraphic code
was transferred.
Re investigation of code type KETSU telegram(s).
Re easy clearance of courier MORI.
Re entry into port of British warship, (to the Minister #70)
Local general situation, (to the Minister #77)
General situation, (to the Minister #83)
Re stopping in port of Minister o'f Land of New Zealand.
(to the Minister #85)
Re departure of the TRADE WIND, (to the Minister #87)
Re movements of the U. S. warships and ships, (to the
Minister #91)
Re reply to date of sending of official message (s).
Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the visit
of the Fleet to the Mainland, (to the Minister #94)
Local general situation, (to the Minister #98)
Re entry into port of British converted cruiser, (to the
Minister #100)
Re entry into port of British converted cruiser, (to the
Minister #101)
Re closure of German Consulates in the United States, (to
the Minister #102)
Re coming here of the MEIJI University baseball team, (on
request of N. Y. K.)
Talks with Italian Consul, (to the Minister #104)
Re stopping in port of D-A.NIEL F. MEYERS, (to the
Minister #105)
Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.
Re arrival in port of Commander T.\TIBANA.
Re closui-e of German Consulate (s). (to the Minister #112)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#113)
Re regular foreign text publications for oversea propaganda
use.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the
Minister #114)
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #115)
Re participation of American flyers in the Chinese Air Force.
(to the Minister #117)
Telegram of thanks for Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.
Re instructions for returning the Imperial Portrait, (to the
Minister #122)
Re request for transfer of telegram (s).
Re closure of Itahan Consulate, etc. (to the Minister #124)
Re status of employees.
Re request for transfer of telegrams.
Re registration of officials and employees of foreign govern-
ments.
Re returning of the Imperial Portrait.
Re arrival of Under-secretary of the Navy and Freeze Ad-
ministrator, (to the Minister #134)
Effect of the enforcement of the Freeze Order on the resident
Japanese, (to the Minister #139)
Re exemption of Chinese diplomats and Consulates from
application of Freeze Order.
Re re-sending of telegram.
Re incorporation of the Coast Guard within the Navy, (to
the Minister #146).
Re bank "balance" of official funds, etc.
Re movements of U. S. warships.
Re treatment of the Japanese residents in the U. S. by Ameri-
cans, (to the Minister #155).
Re passing through of American airplane "pilots", (to the
Minister #159).
Re HAYAKAWA.
ReHAYAKAWA.
Plan (or construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago, (to the Mini-
ster #162).
440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TO THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
(Code ? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
•
54-A
247
248*?- —
249
255
264*
266*
277
279*
280
281
282-
285*
286
290
293
296.
2^
298
299*
300-
307
316*
317
9-17
9-18.
9-19
9-27
10-^
10-10
10-22
10-24
10-24
10-24
10-24
10-25
10-25
10-28
10-29
10-30
11-1
11-1
11-1
11-1
ll-<
11-10
Be reporting of names of Consulate staff members in reg<jrd to
65-B --
the Freeze Order.
Ee drawing up a name-list under arrangement for the easing
B6-A
of the credit freeze order.
Military informRtion. (to the ATinister #171).
U/1 57-A
Re correction of telegram numbers.
68-B
Re measure for time of war. (to Minister #185)
69-B
Re conversation of Delegate KING, (to the Minister #187).
60-A .
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
61-B
Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.
62-A
(from the Minister #101— telegram relayed.)
Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.
63-A -
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
65-A
Re report on assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff.
66-Al --.
Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance of Consulate
members.
Re correction of telegram numbers.
68-A
Re physical examination of passengers boarding the TAIYO
69-A
MARU.
Re notification of receipt of telegram, (in connection with
70-A -
courier KUGA.)
Re allowance for this Consulate members.
lis] 71-A
Re suspension of loading of mail matter on board the TAIYO
MARU.
Re arrival of the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #203)
73-A
Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier.
74-A
Re investigation of people boarding the TAIYO MARU.
75-B -
(to the Minister #208)
Re bounds of application of the Martial Law in Hawaii.
(to the Minister #213)
Re number of passengers on the TAIYO MARU. (to the
77-A
319
321*
322
326
343
345*
354-
369*
11-11
11-12
11-13
11-14
11-25
11-25
12-1
12-6
Minister #214)
Re easing of the freeze in Japanese governmental agencies in
78-B .
the U. S.
Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.
7&-A
From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #217)
Ambassador KURUSU's talk with NEWMAN.
81-A .
Re representation of interests, (to the Minister #235.)
Re report of names of families of this Consula'te's members.
83-A..
Re representation of interests.
84-A
BK (to the Minister #254)
TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
U3\ 1-A
76
Re passport visa of WILLIAM INRY HOLCOMBE. (to
l-B
81
95
104
105
112
126
152
215 -
218 -
223
245
246
4-3--
4-19
4-29
4-30 -
5-12
5-29
6-28
8-13
8-16
8-22
9-17
9-17
the Minister #56)
Dispatched to: New Orleans.
Re stopping in port of the Foreign Minister of the Nether-
2-A
lands, fto the Minister #69).
Dispatched to: Manila.
Re re-sending of telegram.
3-B
Dispatched to: Manila.
Re transport WASHINGTON, (to the Minister #71).
4-B
Dispatched to: Manila.
Re going to Chungking of HENRY LUCE, (to the Minister
2-C -
#72).
Dispatched to: Manila.
Re mourning on death of Representative YAMAJI.
l-B
Dispatched to: New Orleans.
Re passing through of MANUEL FOX. (to the Minister
2-B
#89).
Dispatched to: Hongkong.
Re stopping in port of American on inspection tour to the
MU-(C)
Burma Road, (to the Minister #110).
Dispatched to: Hongkong.
Re expressing of condolence for death of Mrs. KA (or SO and
MU-A . .
SO).
Dispatched to: Canton.
Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate.
MU-A
Dispatched to: Canton.
Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate.
lU] l-B . . -.
Dispatched to: Canion.
Re stopping in port of courier.
2-B
Dispatched to: Shanghai.
From Secretary KIYOHARA.
Dispatched to: Shanghai.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 441
Exhibit "A"
NR 63 15 March 1941
Mackay Radio
From : Kita.
To : Consul, San Fran.
The following from Ambassador Tomii : I and Ikeoawa, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, secre-
tary to Embassy, expect to arrive your place (San Francisco) on the December
Tatuta Maru X Will depart (San Francisco) the same day at 2300 by Santa Fe
"Chief" #24 Request that you reserve one double bedroom compartment and
one lower berth X Also please reserve same accommodations on the Liberty
Limited departing Chicago on the 23rd for Washington.
Mackay Radio
NR 64 18 March 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
When the two Honganji Missionaries: Azakawato Mitaniglin (?) Home ad-
dress: Shimane Kin, Oti Gun, Kawatomuna (correction Kawatomura) and
Okamoto iTaiyu, home address: Tokio, Suginami Ku, Kamiogikubo (?) #730
request passports from there Tohawaii (from Washington ?) if there is no
objection after an examination of their records, please expedite the forwarding
of the passports. Both men are coming to fill vacancies.
NR 66 21 March 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
(by code in mail to Washington).
* * * According to despatches from Aukland and Sydney the light cruisers
Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummins, Tucker, arrived
at Aukland on the 17th ; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and the de-
troyer Clark, Cassin, Cunnyngham, DoaVus, Reid arrived at Sydney — both
groups on a friendly visit x The first group departed from Aukland on the
20th and may return to Pearl Harbor x It is reported that the second group
will also go to Brisbane x Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed
under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and de-
parted there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders"
(gaihu) until they arrived. The maintainance of secrecy on this trip was a
great success it was reported.
Mackay Radio
NR 72 27 March 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
* * * Monimura reported for duty on the 27th (Correction Morimura).
Mackay Radio
No. 76 29 March 1941.
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Holcomb has not arrived in the past ten days. Furthermore as the Harrison
(steamship) will not return to our country the subject person is the one who
is going direct to Manila.
Mackay Radio
NR 77 29 March 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Re passports for sailors on Japanese ships calling at the port of Honolulu and
other US ports . . .
R. C. A.
NR 78 1 April 1941
From : Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Ref #29 of 7 March
With respect to the request of the client (Irainin) although I realize that . . .
is unreasonable, please forward by mail on the Yawata Maru which departs from
Yokohama on the 10th of April X I appreciate your special efforts.
442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R. C. A.
81 3 Apeil 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tolvio, Manila Consulate.
Holland's foreign minister, his wife, and the colonial minister (Takumu
Gainuiken Daijin) arrived here from San Francisco on the 2nd via Clipper and
departed for Batavia via Manila on the 3rd X Local newspapers stated that this
inspection of the Nei at this time is noteworthy.
R. C. A.
NR 82 » 5 Apeil 1941
From : Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Re charges against the owner of the confiscated fishing boats . . .
NR 84 April ? 1941
From : Kita.
To: Foreign Minister.
Later seizure proceeding have been instituted against the other eighteen of
the nineteen ships mentioned in my previous dispatch X After considerable
deliberation a court judgment was obtained under which the 1st of the ships was
confiscated by the US Government X Even tho it was to be put up at auction,
judging from examples on the mainland, by the time the price is so reduced by
sale at auction, the owner gets nothing X Furthermore the parties concerned
get quite a blow from the customs as a result of this seizure X Already steps
are being taken to claim loss from a standpoint of damage to the boats, and in
one case authority has been granted for a release from bond X Later on such
steps will be taken in all cases.
R. C. A.
NR 94 19 April 1941
From : Kita.
To : Consul, San Fran.
Radio industry employee ( ?) Fukuda departed here the 18th for your city X
Because of his position please use your influence in getting him through customs.
NR 96 21 April 1941
From : Kita.
To : Gaimudaijin, Tokio.
President Roosevelt's eldest son. Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt together
with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed
for Manila on the 21st X The local newspapers said that both men said that
any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington X
Perhaps is Chungking.
R. C. A.
101 26 April 1941
From : Kita.
To: Consul General, San Fran.
For your information Shimizu and Tamazi, members of the Diet, departed here
the 25th on the Lurline for Los Angeles X From Los Angeles they plan to pro-
ceed to your city.
R. C. A.
105 30 April 1941
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Inf: Manila.
Mr. Henry Buse (correction Luce) managing editor and publisher of Time,
Fortune, and Life and Claire Booth (pen name) took the Clipper for Manila
on the 30th x They plan to go to Chungking by way of Hongkong x After a trip
of about two months they plan, upon returning to the States, to conduct a series
of lectures at various places x This information from the newspapers.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 443
Mackay Radio
108 1 May 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Gauss, the newly appointed American Ambassador to Cliina, enroute to his new
station put iu here on the 30tli on the President Garfield. He plans going direct
to Chungking.
Mackay Radio
NR 114 14 May 1941
From : Kita.
To : Gaimudaijin, Tokio.
When there is a request for a passport to Hawaii from Kusuda Kakushin
missionary bishop ?? of the Higushii (correction Higashi) Honganji ( a temple)
(Home address: Niigata, Nishibori Dori 7 Bango ??) If tliere is no objection
from the investigation of his record please forward passport at once x He has
applied as a successor to Okiji who returned home early November (request
message).
NR 115 ' 14 May 1941
From : Kita.
To : Gaimudaijin, Tokio.
With respect to message No 10 of January Sth for the pui'pose of reenforcing the
local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General Emmons
departed San Fran, at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickman
Field at 0558 the 14th.
Mackay Radio
NR 120 23 May 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Inf : Washington, D. C.
The New Zealand's Minister of Lands Frank Langstone, former Premier J.
Gordon Coates and part of eight put in hei'e on the 21st by Clipper enroute to
Washington x They plan to discuss problems concerning the protection of British
and US territory.
Mackay Radio
NR 121 24 May 1941
From : Kita.
To : Minister, San Francisco.
Code Clerk Taki is heading for your office via the Tatuta Maru your good
offices are requested in helping him through customs.
Mackay Radio
NR 128 27 May 1941
From : Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.
The Trade Wind left port on the 26th and should arrive Yokohama the end
of June.
Mackay Radio
NR 126 29 May 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Inf: Hongkong.
Cravens of the foreign office after visiting Nei, Australia, and New Zealand
put in here on the Clipper enroute to Washington, D. C.
R. C. A.
NR 129 3 June 1941
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokio
The Punahou School is extending an invitation to Mr. Tadamichi Taketi,
Director of the Taiwan Pottery Company to attend the One Hundred Year Cele-
bration x I have no objections to his attending and request you issue necessary
passport.
444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R. C. A.
NR 133 6 June 1941
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister Tokio
8 Jap nationals sailed the tenth on the Tatsuta (2 stowaways and 6 deportees)
having been deported by tlie immigration authorities bound for Kobe and Yoko-
hama X Yokaliama three Japs Kobe three Japs two Koreans.
7 June 1941
NR 134
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio
INF: Ambassador Wasliington (by mail to San Francisco and Los Angeles and
Seattle)
1. On the fourth received work (correction word) from Washington that Ad-
miral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy no extra-
ordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an announcement by Navy Dopt officials Admiral Kimmel
brought plans for sending units on the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation
of personnel for short periods X the periods and names of vessels to return were
not announced.
13 June 1941.
NR 140
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio
INF : (have forwarded by mail to San Francisco and Manila)
Ref San Francisco MSG #92
SS Pres Pierce with about nine hundred Army men embarked (includes some
hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the eleventh and
sailed the twelfth.
R. C. A.
16 June 1941.
NR143
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio
Inf : Minister Washington
Because of return ( resignation (?) — recall was probably the word used, though
it was a resignation in fact) of honorary German consul I have been requested
by Germany Embassy in Washington to handle German affairs here.
R. C. A.
17 June 1941
N. 144
From : Kita
To: (Action) Minister Washington
(Info) Foreign Minister, Tokio
Group visas were refused for a Meiji U. Baseball Team Kita is requested that
Jap Ambassador use his influence to get the visas authorized.
R. C. A.
27 June 1941
(June 23?)
No. 147
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokio
Chungking Burma Road — Trucks
R. C. A.
26 June 1941
No. 149
From : Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 445
R. O. A.
28 June 1941
No. 152
From : Kita
To : Ryoji Hongkong
Foreign Minister, Tokyo
Daniel Armstein Harold Davis Manco Hellman transportation managers of
prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper
for Hongkong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the stand-
point of speeding help (to China).
R. C. A.
30 June 1941
No. 155
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Memo from German Consul he closes shop on the 30th.
Mackay Radio
3 July 1941
No. 159
From: Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Koshi Washington
Continued it has been decided to confiscate 7 ships (total ships 8) (no Kori
(?) yu 1 selu no uti (?) 3 vessels have been released under hand and 2 have al-
ready gone fishing.
This matter of seizing fishing vessels is of a difficult nature : It is fishing season
(?) and as it has a large influence on local food supplies, the authorities con-
cerned are observing it. (Part not clear — seems to be something about outrage
against Japanese) there is a movement to buy the confiscated ships (by US.
Government) and to release them underhand. At the same time delegate King is
making endeavors and those in Washington should make representations.
Mackay Radio
8 July 1941
No. 163
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo — Minister Washington
A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin pact of May that
American pilots are joining the China Air Force the local Chinese Consul General
on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local air
groups) newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attach^ in Wash-
ington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language)
newspapers or the 5th 200 men have already (toppa senn) gone (?). The Chin-
ese Consol (correction Consul) General avoids a statement regarding his orders.
Mackay Radio
10 July 1941
No. 165
From : Kita #119 of 10th, 20th or 30th (No month shown).
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Ref : Your Circular 1381 ....
Strictly secret : 9th one American and one German should have departed by
now.
Mackay Radio
11 July 1941
No. 169
From : Kita
To : Foreign Jlinister Tokyo
Movements and opinions of Chiang Kai Shek new adviser Latimore.
446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mackay Radio
15 July 1941
No. 173
From : Kita
To: Koshi Washington
* Foreign Minister Tokyo
The Italian Consulate was closed on the 10th, the Consul has at last obtained
permission to withdraw a portion of the government funds and all of the private
funds of the staffmembers. The Consul and one secretary have ordered the resi-
dent civil official to take over the post, and after the Consul has visited his mother
who I'esides in New York he will proceed to his new post on the Tatsuta Maru
sailing from San Francisco the 31st (the secretary will proceed on the Yawata
Maru sailing here the 18th) no request was made to entrust official or other
documents to that oflBce.
Mackay Radio
15 July 1941
No. 174
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect
that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West
coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gaso-
line, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.
Makay Radio
No. 187 26 July 1941
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral
Towers, Chief of the Bui'eau of Aeronautics, and his aide, will leave Alameda
in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of
inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same
plane 6 officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the
purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese
assets here.
Mackay Radio
No. 181 22 July 1941
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
This office has a request from a Mr. W. R. B. McBain, Manager of the Shanghai
firm of George-McBrain, and his wife Mrs. V. W. K. McBrain for a visa to visit
Japan. These people spend a good deal of their time in Shanghai, and have
been residing here for the past six weeks. They wish to stop over between ships
in Japan. And state that they have visited there many times before. They
both Lave on two previous occasions (19 July 1939 and 25 August 1939) obtained
visas in Shanghai. They returned to their home country in 1940. Have you
any objections to these visas. Answer to that question requested.
Mackay Radio
No. 189 28 July 1941.
From: Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Some sort of answer requested.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 447
Mackay Radio
No. 192 July 30 1941
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Since the enforcemeut of the law freezing Japanese credits in America has
been anticipated for a long, at this office and through the Japanese language
newspapers all the residents were warned of the effects upon them in case it
was put into force, and even jvitli the enforcement of the law on the 26th the
residents did not show any particular disquietude. The methods of application
of the law were announced and since the actual restrictions on the residents
businesses, remittance to Japan, and importation of Japanese goods were con-
sidered quite lenient, they were accepted calmly. The remittances to Japan
in anticipation of the freezing order and also the hoarding of U. S. currency has
amounted to a considerable sum. Furthermore the United States authorities
here have emjihasized that although in the midsts of the worst anti-American
circumstances the residents have nothing to fear so long as they obey U. S. laws.
Mackay Radio
No. 193 30 July 1941.
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
To Japan Broadcasting Company your new frequencies are lousy for Hawaii
Please go back to 19^25-31 meters
Mackay Radio
No. 194 30 July 1941.
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Foreign Office Tokyo
According to a report in an English language paper on the 30th a telegram
has been received by the local Chinese Consul General from a Central American
ambassador to the fact that steps are being considered to exempt Chinese diplo-
matic and consular officials from the application of the freezing order.
31 July 1941.
No. 195
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Since the Tatsuta Maru will sail directly from San Francisco to Japan, the
arrival and departure of the Abama Maru entering this 31st will be difference
from usual. Moreover when the Tatsuta Maru enters this port there will be
no loading problem, two hundred and some i)ei'sons will board, and it has been
announced that the local customs authorities will not obstruct the arrival and
departure of this ship.
R. C. A.
2 Auo. 1941.
No. 199
From : Kita
To : Riyoji San Francisco
The Tatsuta Maru will arrive in Honolulu August 1, loaded according to in-
structions from the N. Y. K.
i?. C. A.
7 Aug. 1941.
No. 207
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Visas were refused in both cases your indulgence is requested.
448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R. C. A.
12 August 1941.
No. 214
From : Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
$483 for defense fund.
28 Aug. 1941.
No. 226
From : Kita ,
To : Kosbi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Subequently, still another boat was adjudged confiscated (total 9 boats) and
one other boat was released, as in my earlier telegrams, and after the effective
intervention of the Territorial Governor and others, according to information
from Washington on the 26th, the Justice Department has decided that seven
of the aforementioned boats be sold to United States citizens to satisfy the stipu-
lations of the Department, and that the former owners should pay back 20%
of the apprised value plus court costs together with the indebtedness on the boats
themselves.
MacJcay Radio
2 Sept. 1941.
No. 229
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
On the 2d an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship
(called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by
German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) entered port
here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics.
Although the group declined to reveal their destination they are an advance party
already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have
obtained permission to resign from their military duties.
Mackay Radio
15 Sept. 1941.
No. 232
From : Kita
To : Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Hayakawa Kiyoshi, a Government official of this country, intended to enter
your port in April of this year, if he is still in your city, pleace register him
with the State Department as a foreign Government official. If he has already
left your city please investigate and reply by cable giving the year, month, and
day of departure and as many other details as possible.
Mackay Radio
17 Sept. 1941.
No. 245
From : Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Riyoji Shanghai
Kugami Watawabe Tajima sailing on Tyler for Shanghai welcome
Mackay Radio
17 Sept. 1941.
No. 246
From: Kita
To : Riyoji Shanghai
Arrival of Katuyama here from Shanghai Oct 1 via Pres. Tyler
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 449
Mackay Radio
18 Sept. 1941.
No. 248
From : Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Finance.
Mackay Radio
23 Sept. 1941.
No. 252
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Magruder to Cliuugking via Manila
29 Sept. 194il.
No. 256
From : Kita
To : Kostii Washington
Ryoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Two of the seven fishing boats reported released according to stipulations
were sold on the 26th at prices comparable to their appraised values to the
Hawaii Canning Company which has a very close connection with the boats,
and court proceedings were dispensed with.
In "connection with the above, the former owners, at the beginning as in my
telegrams, must pay to the court out of the selling price 20% of the appraised
value ($2,110 for one boat and $1,017 for the other) and also court costs
($178.86 for one and $185.80 for the other).
It is expected that the same procedure will be followed in the cases of the
other five boats. However, the above being a civil case, a decision is expected,
but criminal procedr still remains, but this also is expected to be disposed of
with leniency.
Mackay Radio
30 Sept. 1941.
No. 259
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Trace baggage.
2 Oct. 1941.
No. 262
Prom : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Ryoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Once more on September 30 two other boats were sold, in the same way as
explained in my previous telegram, to the Hawaii Canning Company court pro-
cedure being followed.
B. C. A.
4 Oct. 1941.
No. 264
From : Kita
Ao : Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
The special session of the Legislature of Hawaii which open from September
15th for the purpose of considering legislation for war time action (M-Ray Bill)
passed the aforesaid bill and the Territorial Governor affixed his signature to it
on the 3rd. This bill invests far-reaching authority in the Territorial Governor
in case of war, chief provisions of which are : the organization of special police
and fire fighting forces and medical squads, etc., anti-air preparations, the utili-
zation of community installations and highways, the regulation of food supplies
and commodity prices, the control of rumors etc., in order to put the above
measures into effect a budget of $500,000 is being appropriated. Details by mail.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 80
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R. C. A.
1941 Oct. 10.
No. 266
From : Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
According to information in the newspapers delegate King who is here at
present says that as for the plan for a revision of the Territorial Nationality
Law, the United States wants to settle the problem of dual citizenship, but a
complete settlement without negotiating with the interested countries cannot
be expected. Consequently after the delegate returns to Washington and has
conferred with the War Department, it is his intention to introduce into Con-
gress a resolution requesting provisions for the breaking-off of nationality from
the countries concerned.
R. C. A.
20 Oct. 1941.
No. 272
From : Kita
To : Ryoji San Francisco
The State Department has no objection to the landing of Maeda (Jimushokan)
at either Honolulu to San Francisco and will omit formalities, according to
information received from the American Embassy in Tokyo on the 20th Please
transmit the above information to Maeda upon the arrival of the Tatuta Maru.
22 Oct. 1941.
No. 274
From : Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Ryoji San Francisco
Since there is room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the
Taiyo Maru, it is suggested that the Tatsuta Maru allotment be made use of
and transferred to the Taiyo Maru here. Please reply by telegraph.
R. C. A.
No. 275
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Ryoji San Francisco
The passengers on the Taiyo Maru are as follows:
and 6 rows)
22 Oct. 1941
(Table below of 5 columns
Nationality
1st class
2nd class
3rd class
Total
Japanese
American of Jap extraction
Americans (.') -,
English
Total
20
28
11
None
59
124
150
None
None
274
149
179
13
1
342
No. 276
je. C. A.
22 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Ryoji San Francisco
The Taiyo Maru, requisitioned by the Imperial Government, sailed from Yoko-
hama today the 22nd
Consul Iwanaga Hiraku ( )
and Doi Tomoyoshi ( )
an oflJcial in the communications department were given passage by the kantoku
(Doi is qualified as a shipping kantoku).
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 451
B. C. A.
No. 279 24 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To : Koshi Washington
The Foreign Minister is presenting a commemorating gift to tlie recently
resigned honorary consuls at Philadelphia and San Juan (one cloisonne flower
vase each). These are being sent in two wooden boxes addressed to the embassy
(Washington) in the care of Consul Iwanaga, who is a passenger on the Taiyo
Maru sailing from here on the 22nd. It is requested that arrangements be
made for their clearance through customs and ultimate delivery.
R. C. A.
No. 284 25 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Mr. Crichton Colvin an American of the International News Service has re-
quested a visa for a stopover in Japan. He expects to leave here on the Tatuta
Maru sailing November 4th. Instructions requested.
R. G. A.
No. 285 25 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Since the time limit for reporting is near, shall this office and its staff report?
Please telegraph immediately instructions and items of the report.
R. C. A.
No. 287 25 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Re your No. 96 Newman wishes to return to Japan on the Taiyo Maru leaving
here Nov. 4th. After conferring with the head of the department, please let me
know if you have any objections.
Mackay Radio
No. 299 1 Nov. 1941
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
The Taiyo Maru arrived safely on the first it is being handled by the Americans
in the same manner as was the Tatsuta Maru the above information was receitved
from both Doi, an official in the office and from the Chief of the Shipping Bureau.
Mackay Radio
No. 302 4 Nov. 1941
From : Kita
To : Riyoji New York City
Consul Clerk Tokunaga Honolulu to Lisbon via New York extend courtesies.
6 November 1941
From: Kita
To: Ryoji Seattle Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
The Taiyo Maru departed safely at 7:40 p m on the fifth carrying 23 bags
of 3rd class mail.
The above information has been received from both Manager Doi and the
Chief of the Marine Bureau (harbor master?).
Mackay Radio
7 November 1941
No. 309
From : Kita
To : Riyoji San Francisco
Consul Clerk Tokunaga arrives San Francisco twelfth on Lurline.
452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mackay Radio
7 November 1941
No. 310
From : Kita
To : Tokio Foreign Minister
After srantins Newman's visa, he informs us that he has cancelled his passage
on the Taiyo Maru and will remain here for the preesnt.
Mackay Radio
11 NOVEMBEK 1941
No. 316
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Secretary of War Stimson on the third pointed out to Congress that the
aliens in Hawaii amount to one-tenth of the total population and emphasizing
the danger of strikes and sabotage he demanded that in case of the existence
of an emergency on an attack, the President should be granted the right to declare
martial law in Hawaii and also Porto Rico. According to information from
Washington on the 4th, Delegate King issued a protesting statement to the effect
that the above was an insult to the loyalty and patriotism of the (local) Govern-
ment and people. The territorial Governor also reported that since the power
to declare martial law was already vested in the Governor of the Territory
there was no necessity for such legislation. In short, the recent Army proposal
was to permit the President to directly order the local military commander to
put martial law into effect.
R. G. A.
12 November 1941
No. 321
From : Kita
To : Koshi Washington
Ryoji San Francisco
Following from Ambassador Kurusu : Although I have no objections for various
reasons I would like you to take care of Washington's decision in this affair.
Wants some thing forwarded immediately to San Francisco (may be the
results of above).
18 NOA'EMBER 1941
No. 331
From : Kita
To: Yuoji San Francisco
Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Local postal inspections (Yumuvensakan) announced on the 17th that from
now on arrivals and departures of clippers and ships (except for Hawaiian
(local) mail ships?) will not be published.
Mackay Radio
18 November 1941
No. 332
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc. Burma Road trucks 3,000 2-ton trucks.
Mackay Radio
24 Nov 1941
No. 341
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Spend $200 ??????
Mackay Radio
No. 345 25 Nov. 1941.
From: Kita
To : Koshi, Washington.
Consulate personneL
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 453
R. C. A.
No. 362 3 Dec. 1941
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
Consul San Francisco
TJEGENT REPORT
1. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on 2nd.
2. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on 3rd.
B. C. A.
No. ' 3 Deo. 1941
From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo #363
Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third
R. G. A.
^o. 364 4 Dec. 1941
From : Kita
To: FM Tokyo
PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning
fourth X Approximately 100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X
fueled?
Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British
Consulate
R. C. A.
No. 365. 4 Dec. 1941.
From : Kita.
To: FM Tokyo.
USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th.
Radiogram R. C. A.
No. 368. 6 Dec. 1941.
From: Kita.
To: F. M. Tokyo.
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC
on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of
their employment in the defense or Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any prepa-
rations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel prepara-
tions were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even
if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby
Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been
dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo
defense of battleships and will report further.
R. G. A.
No. 369. 6 Dbcembeb 1941.
From : Kita.
To: Washington-Tokyo.
On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and one sweeper entered
port.
Ships moored on the sixti are as follows : BB-9, CL-3, DD-17, am-3.
Ships in dock: CLr-4, DD-2.
(CA (cruiser) and CV (carrier) all ).
P. S.— CV cannot be found in the fleet (?).
454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit "E"
Mackay Radio
No. 67. 24 Maech 1941.
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
00490 (Please convey the following) to Sato, non official staff of the Bureau of
American Affairs Please let me know whether the above kokku person has
boarded the Nitta Maru or not( let me know also) the above name.
Qlohe Wireless, Ltd.
No. 68. 24 Makch 1941.
From : Consul General Kita.
To: Tadashi Morimura, Nitta Maru.
As you (your ship) reach the wharf please wait at your cabin for Vice Consul
Okuda is to meet you.
Mackay Radio
No. 74. 27 March 1941.
From: Nagao Kita.
To : Takao, Fumiko, Comino, Minami-Kanachi-Gun, Osaka, Japan.
Received notice of your uncle's death. I extend my consolation.
Olobe Wireless, Ltd.
No. 80. 2 APKiiL 1941.
From : Consul General Kita.
To: Ambassador Kurusu, Tatsuta Maru.
Wish you bon voyage. Please let me know where to send the doll.
RCA
No. 91. 15 April 1941.
From:
To : Haruno Yoshise, 19 Kasumicho, Azabu-Ku, Tokyo.
Received your vvire I am glad I am healthy sky is clear and gay the morning
of the 15th.
Note : Message asked by the Consul General.
Globe Wireless, Ltd.
No. 106. 30 Ap^il 1941.
From : Consul General Kita.
To : Captain Asama Maru.
Please advise me if Hana Kusanobu is on board your ship.
Mackay Radio
No. 112. 12 May 1941.
From : Kita.
To: Consul, New Orleans, La.
(Please convey) the following to Representative Shimizu. I extend my con-
dolence to the death of Representative Yamaji.
RCA
No. 127 2 June 1941.
From : Consul General Kita.
To: Gaku-Yoo-Do, Canton (is the name of a book store or hotel).
Having seen the death of Mr. Seitaro Mori in the papers. I extend my deep
consolation.
Note in handwriting on face of message : "Message asked by Consul General."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 455
RCA
No. 128. 2 June 1941.
From : Nagao Kita.
To : Lady Maki, 167 Kagomaclii, Koishikawa-Ku, Tokyo.
Having seen the news of the death of your husband in the papers I really
don't know how to extend my consolation.
Note in handwriting on face of message : "Message asked by Consul General."
RCA
No. 135. 7 June 1941.
From : Kita, Consul General.
To: Karafuto Village Head, Tofuchi, Otomari City (Sanchlin).
Your letter dated the seventh concerning Masao Mato (you have cited as Asao,
but we have no such person with that name) his statement of residence dated
February 1 has already been sent to the mayor of Ootoraari City.
RCA Radiogram
20 June 1941.
No. 145.
From: Kita.
To : Consul Shanghai.
I extend my consolation to Mrs. Councillor Akagi for her husband's death.
Note in handwriting on message : "Message asked by Consul General Kita."
Mackay Radio
11 July 1941.
No. 167.
From : Kita.
To : Minister, Washington, D. C.
00340 From Ambassador Shigemitsu to Minister Wakasugi. I thank you very
much for your kindness during my stay also convey my thanks to Councilor
Iguchi and to Ikashokei (May be Mr. Ikasho) Further convey my best wishes
to Obata and Kawakami.
Mackay Radio
11 July 1941.
No. 168.
From: Kita.
To : Consul, San Francisco.
00160 From Ambassador Shigemitsu. Received yours. I thank you very
much for your hospitality during my stay at your place. Please convey the same
thought to your wife,
Mackay Radio
24 July 1941.
No. 183.
From: Kita.
To: Koshi (Minister), Washington, D. C.
00400 40177 Concerning the debt of your honor and employee Kusanobu it
has been sent by me as dated July ninth number nine.
RO A
2 Aug. 1941.
No. 198.
From: Kita.
To : Consul, Los Angeles, Cal.
Kiyoshi is on Asama Maru He is well Busy in various things Take care.
Handwritten note on message : "Consul General private message."
456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R. C. A. Radiogram
13 Aug. 1941.
No. 215
From : Kita.
To : Consul Canton.
I am taking your trouble to convey my words of condolence to the President
Chin (may be Chan or Chen) and also to Mrs. Chin Heki (also Chinese name)
concerning the death of Mrs. K (name).
22. C. A.
16 Aug. 1941.
No. 219.
From : Kita.
To : Masaki, interpreter
c/o Japanese Consulate General Shanghai.
Please cancel the thing which I asked your favor a few days ago for it has
been arranged. Will let you know the details by mail. Give my best regards
to your colleagues and to my friends.
Olohe Wireless, Ltd.
17 Oct. 1941.
No. 270.
From : Kita.
To : Maeda, purser Tatsuta Maru.
Please let me know sure whether the ship is planning to refuel with oil here
or not.
Olohe Wireless, Ltd.
29 Oct. 1941.
No. 296.
From : Kita.
To : Consul Iwanaga Taiyomaru
Is the ticket in the possession of Secretary and Mrs. Tokumaga a straight
ticket to San Francisco or just until Honolulu. Further please let me know
whether you have reserved (hotel reservation) and also the number of members.
Mackay Radio
15 Nov. 1941.
No. 327.
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister. Tokyo.
GOOOGAI (t.ype of telegi-am) Please deliver the inclosed letter from Okuda whicli
should have been entrusted to clerk Mori of the personal affairs section by ciilling
out whomsoever is living at Okuda's home (request telegram).
HU 303 CB Tokio 42 JG 6 1001PM
1941 Dec 6 AM 7 07
Riyoji Honolulu
01270 Nanatiiki hatihizuke kogosangoo noloriwa nanatuki nijuuhatihi hatituki
rokuhizuke nihatiiticoo nireihatigoo nimeiwa kyuctuki juugohizuke sanitinigoo
minisanmeiwa juutkihatihi juutuki sanhizuke saaninigoo itiyonreinei jnutuki
nirzuke sanninanagoo sawkyuumei oyobl doojituzuke sanniihatigoo juumeira
juuitituki juuhatihi juuitituki itihizuke sangooyongoo sanreigoomeiwa juunituki
yonhuizukenite kokuseki ridatuseri
Togo
[Translation]
Riyoji (Consul) Honolulu
The remainder of #53 dated (gazetted) July S. July 28, August 6. #281,
#208 of 2 persons are dated (gazetted) as September 15. #312 of 223 persons
are dated (gazetted) as October 8, October 3. #322 of 140 persons are dated
(gazetted) as October 2. #3277 of 39 persons are also dated (gazetted) as
same date. #326 of 10 persons are dated (gazetted) as November 18, November
1- #3, #4, #30 persons are dated (gazetted) as December 4. And thus were
expatriated.
Togo.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 457
Exhibit "F"
#320
Riyoji San Francisco
1941 Nov 12 PM 8 40
90063 dalate 02160 kurusutaisi cliiiper engine lioshoouiyori Midway sliuppatu
nihitien juunihi gogogoji bujitootini toocliakuseri
KiTA
Translation :
Riyoji (Consul) San Francisco
90063 Diate (?) 02160
Because of engine trouble of the Clipper, Ambasador Kurusu departure from
Midway delayed. He arrived here safely on the 10th, 5 p. m.
KiTA (Consul General Kita)
The same telegram was sent to the following :
Koshi (Minister) Washington, D. C.
Gaimu-Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo.
1941 Nov 13 PM 5 52
#323
Gaimuda Jin Tokio
90064 Sookooate
0U280 kurusutaisi judsanri gogosanji California Clipper nite kitimuke shuppa-
tuseri nao United Aii-lines tootisishayori kiti dooshaye juuyonhi gogorokuji
yonzyuugofun kitihatu zyuugohigogo nijigojuppun kufutyaku nohikooki arrange
katadaden serutikoro kikanyorimo nenotaue mioiotanikame okinsgaitasi
gaimudaijin zaibeitaisie tendenseri
Kita
[Translation]
Gaimu Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo
Ambassador Kurusu left for your place by the California Clipper at 3 : 00 p. m.
on the 13th. Further, (we asked) the United Airlines Company of Honolulu
to wire the same company of San Francisco to arrange for reservation of plane
leaving San Francisco at 6 : 45 p. m. on the 14th reaching Washington at 2 : 50
on the 15th. To make sure, I wish you to ascertain the above. (We also) tele-
gramed to Foreign Miinister and to the Ambassador to the U. S.
KiTA (Consul General Kita)
The above telegram also sent to the following :
Ryoji, San Francisco (Consul)
Koshi, Washington, D. C. (Minister)
1941 Nov 15 AM 10 12
GAIMUDAI.JIN TOKYO
GOOGAI ZINZIKA MORIZOKUTE OKUDAYORI GOIRAISUBEKI FUUSHO-
RUSUTAKU YOBIDASINOUYE OWATASIKOU KAKKO IRAIHOO KAKKO
KITA
[Translation]
Gaimu-Dajin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo
PLEASE HAND OVER THE SEALED LETTER WHICH OKUDA WISHES
TO BE FORWARDED TO MORI CLERK OF THE PERSONNEL AFFAIRS
BUREAU BY CALLING SOMEONE LIVING AT OKUDA'S RESIDENCE. (RE-
QUEST)
Kita (Consul General Kita)
Exhibit "G"
The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining the message number
861.
Re : Cancellation of portion of freeze order (?)
(?)
Ditto to the Minister #535
The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 854 :
Re: Transmission by wire of secret expenses for third period and tem-
porarily increased amount.
458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at
Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 851:
Ke : Augo Fugo (Ango code or cryptograph)
The "register of messages received" maintained by tlie Japanese Consulate at
Honolulu reflects the follovs'ing information pertaining to message number 863 :
Ke : Reports of movements, etc., of warships and ships.
The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 852 :
Re : Sending of families traveling expenses.
The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at
Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 857:
"Request Telegram"
The following message was decoded at the Honolulu Office as being encoded
In Code Type GO-307 (4-1) being that described in enclosure "C" :
1941 Dec 7 AM 3 20
No. 864
ZL MRHU68 Tokio JG 19 9PM 6TH
Japanese Consul Honolulu
Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain.
Togo
The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 367 :
Re : Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 366 :
"Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA
MARU"
The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 360 :
To: (?)
Exhibit B
These are work sheets for use in decoding messages based on the Japanese
"Telegraphic Code Type 'O'."
There are three groups of coding on page one, the last group continuing on
page two. The decode of the last group when translated into English is as
follows :
{Strictly Confidential)
Of late in Japan the demand for American dollar currency has increased.
In view of this, when meijin (the English equivalent of this is master or expert)
return to Japan, please arrange so that they will, as far as possible, not bring
back money orders but bring with them paper currency in as large amounts as
possible.
There are also two radiogram blanks containing 16 and 12 vertical groups
respectively of 19 letters which resemble the above-described work sheets.
These work sheets are also similar to the photostatic copies of work sheets
found at the Consulate and forwarded to the Bureau by letter dated February
27, 1942.
Exhibit 4
The following is the special method for using "WA" and "O" (or "WO")
code:
1. Special method for using the "WA" code.
This method is to be used for strictly secret telegrams and, similar to the
method of use in the past, is an instrument for transposing letters. The fol-
lowing five ways are the methods for using this instrument :
(a) Based on two separate key words such as kanda, kudan with five letters
as a unit, we transpose letters alternately. The words shall be composed of
five letters of the "alphabet" with one index taken from c, g, and o and placed
as the second and the fourth letters with the same vowel (including v) picked
at i*andom placed as the first, third, and the fifth letters. For instance, icici,
cgaga, uouou. (Thereonafter where the index is made up of five letters (?) of
the "alphabet" is the same in all of the special methods for using "WA" and
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 459
"O" (or "WO") codes. Furthermore, since in tlie index of tlie special metliod
for using tlie "WA" code where one vowel picked at random is repeated in the
first, third, and the fifth letters is common to all, this will not be indicated
severally.
*(kanda, kudan are crossed out with red pencil and in the margin directly overhead is
written "revised 6-1, (a) AKASAKA
(b) As in (a), we transpose letters alternately based on two separate key
words such as sanso, suiso having five letters as a unit. As index, we place
either z, j, or a? as the second and the fourth letters. For instance, isisi, ejeje,
0X0X0.
* (sanso, suiso are crossed out with red pencil and in the margin directly overhead is
written "SEKITAN") 6243715
(c) Based on three separate key words such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka with
five letters as a unit, we transpose letters alternately. As index we place t and
d as second and fourth letters. For instance, atata, ududu.
♦Toljyo, Kyoto, Osaka crossed out. Inserted in margin is "FUKUOKA." 2637541
(d) We base the transposition of the key word, Otohime with seven letters
as a unit. As index we use either &, v, or p.
*Otohimo crossed out and AKISAME 1547243 inserted in margin.
(e) We transpose letters alternately based on two separate key words such
as Kumugai, Naozane with seven letters as a unit. As index we use either m or n
as the second and fourth letters. For instance, imimi, enene.
2. Special method for using "O" (or "WA") code. This method of use is being
established to supplement the SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "WA" CODE,
and is the same as (1) when it comes to being based on transposition of letters.
However, (c) shall be limited to usage only when communicating in regard to
telegraphic code.
(a) Transposition shall be based on the key word, x To f/onowra, having nine
letters as a unit. In the case of index of SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "O"
CODE, it is the opposite to that of "WA" code. The same uniform consonant shall
be placed as the first, third, and fifth letters, and the same vowel picked at random
shall be placed as the second and fourth letters. As the first, third, and fifth
letters of the index for (a) either I or r shall be used. For instance, lolol, rurur.
X means this was suspended after 7-15.
(b) Transposition shall be based on the key word, x Odanohunaga, having
eleven letters as a unit. Either t or d shall be used as first, third, and fifth letters
of this index. For Instance, totot, didid.
X means this was suspended after 7-15.
(c) Based on key yord, Eanayoridango, having thir x teen letters as unit.
Either h or f shall be used first, third, and fifth letters of the index. For instance,
Jiahah.
*Hanayoridango is crossed out and following inserted : SOKOKUNOTAMENI
(d) Based on key word, Kinokuniyabunzaomon, having nineteen letters as
unit. As index, either k or g is used as first, third, and fifth letters.
(Annotation) When based on this SPECIAL METHOD OF USE, the index of
the ordinary method shall absolutely not be attached to either "WA" code or "O"
(or "WO") code.
♦The following word is inserted in the margin :
KI N O KUNI Y ABUNZ I AEM ON
7 5 10 14 8 16 11 6 18 1 3 17 12 19 2 4 9 15 13
3. Method or arrangement of end of cryptograms (code ?), The following
methods should be expressly used in arranging the ends of both SPECIAL
METHOD OF USE OF "WA" CODE and SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "O"
(or "WO") CODE.
(a) When transposing based on five letters as a unit, if fillers are necessary
for the end words, after using fillers, (on fillers refer to (c)) arrange the five
letters of the end word(s) according to day telegram is dispatched in the fol-
lowing manner :
(A) day with 1, 6 54321
(B) day with 2, 7 43215
(C) day with 3, 8 32154
(D) day with 4, 9 21543
(E) day with 5, 10 15432
460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) When transporting with eseven or more letters as nnit :
(A) When presrribod transposition ends exactly at the end of the crj-ptograms :
(1) When this ends at the end of one word (five letters), the method in (a)
is not necessary.
(2) When this ends in the middle of one word, fillers shall be used to make
it into five letters, and the arrangement should be according to the method in
(a). Therefore, a portion of the end word shall have twofold transposition.
(B) When at the end of tlie cryptogranus) there originates an incomplete
number which falls short of filling up the unit :
(1) When the end of the porrion with completed transposition comes exactly
at the end of one word, an incomplete number will result. In regard to the
portion which has incomplete transposition, five letters each shall be arranged
according to the method in (a). (When fillers are necessary, use them in the
last word.)
(2) When that portion with completed transposition ends in the middle of a
word, five letters each shall be arranged according to (a) excepting (in ?) that
end portion with transposition completed but not attaining one word (five let-
ters) and that p<">rtion which has incompleted transposition. (In other words,
the end portion witli transposition completed shall be transposed twice. Further-
more, in case of necessity for the use of fillers, using them in the last word is
same as in the case of (a).
•This paragraph is unclear even in the original text. — Transhitor.
(c) For fillers in this SPECIAL :METH0D OF USE. the fillers prescribed in
the code book(s> are not used at all. Appropriate letters which do not make
sense should be selected and used. However, in cases where two or more fillers
are necessary, l>e sure to mix and use vowels and consonants. Moreover, be care-
ful not to reiieat the same letter or place it one after another, or use them over
and over again, or arrange them in "alphabet" order.
(d) The last word (not the last word in the text of the telegram) of a cryjito-
gram which is arranged in tlie foregoing manner should always be placed at the
beginning of the cryjitogram (not at the beginning of the text of the telegram).
In other words, place the last word of the cryptogram next to to the index. (This
can be done easily if at the time of dispatching a telegram, a space for one word
is left vacant next to the index and after wording of the crj-ptograra which be-
gins directly after the space is completetl the facant space is filled.
4. Telegrams based on this method shall all be handled as strictly confidential.
Consequently, the word "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL" which in the past was
inserted at the beginning of the cryptogram or at the end shall be omitted from
this method of usage.
*In the right hand corner of first page is inscribed the date "1939."
ExHreiT 5
[i] Dispatched: April 19. 1930
Received : INIay 13. 1939
From : Minister ARITA
To : Consul-General MIZUSAWA
Re: RECORDING OF CERTIFICATES OF CUSTODY, CATALOGUES OF
TRANSFER OF DOCUMENTS, CATALOGUES OF MANUSCRIPTS DE-
STOYED BY BURNING.
Code type: (.\N)-YU-G0-^5
In the past the names of codes and numbers on telegraphic codes, certificates
of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues
of manuscripts destroyed by burning, have been written as is and transmitted.
Since this is very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of protection of the codes
when such official me.ssages are opened and detected, hereafter you should revise
the method for recording certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of
transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning and
also the method for recording oflicial messages pertaining to the foregoing as
designated below.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 461
1. The following names of countries will be attached to the various codes
presently in possession:
Code Type N ame of country
I (as in JIM) BRITAIN
HO FR AN( E
HEN GERMANY
CHI ITALY
RI SOVIET RUSSIA
NU (or DO) BELGIUM
RU POLAND
0 (or WO) TURKEY
WA UNITED STATES
KA BRAZIL
YO CHINA
REN SPAIN
SO PORTUGAL
NE HOLLAND
KE SIAM
G CANADA
1 (as in DIME) CUBA
J MEXICO
L PERU
O CHILE
Q ARGENTINA
W MANCHUKUO
R EGYPT
Y HUNGARY
[2] 2. In the case of numbers of the codes, instead of numbers designate
them by using katakanu (sinii>lest Japanese letters) as follows:
0 se
1 ka
2 1
3 ni
4 wa (or ha)
5 wo
6 to
7 na
8 he
D ru
Example: #127 ka-i-no (or kaina)
3. Pursue the following procedure when designating "from .... to ... .":
Select any letter out of the word, KASUMI, and place it between the numbers
which will be recorded according to (2) above.
Example : from #.306 to #300 i copies
NisetoSniseru (number of copies will
not be indicated)
Code type NU. from #98 to #103
BELGIUM-ruheMkaseni 6 copies
4. Certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents,
and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning will have no indices to indi-
cate that they are such. Name of the code and the number is to be recorded as
illustrated in (3) above. Phrases such as "custody," "transfer," and "destroyed
by burning" will not be recorded at the end. Only, the date ( month, day, year) and
the official title and name of the custodian shall be recorded and their private seals
impressed. (In case of transfer of documents, the official titles and names of
the former custodian and his succes.sor shall be jointly recorded.)
o. In deliveries of certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer
of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning, the name of
the subject (RE:) will be recorded as "1999-IU-00-#5."
462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S] **** Remarks :
1. In the upper margin on page 1 is a rectangular enclosure within which
is inserted the word, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
2. The following are notes recorded in upper margin of page 3 :
Code type TSU COLUMBIA
#1 RULES FOR USAGE OF SAME (?) MATSU NICARAGUA
#2 RULES FOR USAGE OF SAME COSTA RICA
(this portion appears in the upper margin directly overhead section 1 of fore-
going translation. — Translator.)
3. Refer to Telegram from the Minister YU-GO-#260 dated 8-17-40)
(the above note appears in the upper margin on page 3 following that of (2)
directly above. — Translator.)
CONFIDENTIAI.
File 336.92
Headquabtees CPBG
G-2 [CID]
Box S, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif,
Japanese Consulate & Consular Agents — Translation of Japanese Consulate
Radio Log Book
U]
Exhibit 6
catalogue of telegraphic codes
(Connected with Foreign Office)
Type 6f code
Number
Copies
1. NE Holland
2. G Canada
3. I (eye) Cuba
4. I. Peru
6.
6. I (sit) Britain
7.
8. HO France
9.
10. HEN Germany
11.
12. 0 Turkey
13.
14. YO China
15.
16. NU (or DO) Belgium
17.
88
147
147
146
hehe
kahana
kahana
kahato
189 to 191
kaheruNkaruka
54
woha
129 to 130
kairuKkanise
232 to 234
iniiSiniha
40
base
363 to 365
nitoniSinitowo
18.
19. Revised-L Peru
20.
55 to 56
wowoKwoto
21. SO Portugal
138
kanihe
/A, 1 \
IB, 1
22.
23.
24.
25. TSU Colombia
172
kanai
fMATSU, 1
UME.l
SAKURA, 1
FUJI, 1
26.
27.
[2] 28. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU"
(MATSU)-#1
NICARAGUA
29. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU"
(MATSU)-!!f2
COSTA RICA
30.
31. TO NICARAGUA
32. f32, 33 for general use— 2 copies
33. NEW ZEALANl)-!
34. X«4, 35 for personal affairs — 2 copies
35. NEW ZEALAND-2
36. lac, 37 for nnaiiees— 2 copies
37. NEW ZEALAND-3
172
.172
kanai
kanai
HAQL 1
KIKU.l J
1
1
195 to 196
195 to 196
195 to 196
190 to 196
karuwoKkaruto
karuwoSkaruto
karuwoMkaruto
karuwoUkaruto
2
6
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
CATALOGUE OF TELEGRAPHIC CODES— Continued
463
Type af code
Number
iOopies
38.
RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU"—
REVISED EDITION #2 '
HONDURAS
14
kaha
39.
Z AFGHANISTAN
88
hehe
40.
TA VENEZUELA
13
kani
41.
DEI PANAMA
114
kakaha
42.
SPECIAL COMMUNICATION
NUMBER TABLE-1
76
43.
NUMBERS CHART-1
114
44.
45.
46.
NUMBERS CHART-1
114
U(put)URUGUAY
176 to 177
kahatoKkanena
47.
HATO (former name: CODE BOOK
12 (old number: 35)
"RO" FOR JOINT USE BY
FOREIGN OFFICE, WAR MIN-
ISTRY AND NAVY MINISTRY)
48.
RULES FOR USE OP ABOVE
(HATO)
12
49.
EXPLANATION OF RULES FOR
USE OF ABOVE
12
50.
MIXED NUMBERS TABLE FOR
ABOVE (HATO)-l
12
51.
MIXED NUMBERS TABLE FOR
ABOVE-2
12
52.
MIXED NUMBERS TABLE FOR
ABOVE-3
12
[S] 53.
JI NORWAY
81
heka
54.
ENCODING AND DECODING
TABLE ATTACHED TO
ABOVE
81
55.
ATTACHED ENCODING AND
DECODING TABLE FOR TEL-
EGRAPHIC CODE "TA"
PARAGUAY
13
keni
Exhibit 7
Holland
Turkey
hehe
ininiSiniha
Canada
China
kahana
base
Cuba
Belgium
kahana
nitoniSnitowo
Peru
Peru
kahato
woto
Britain
Portugal
kaheruMkaruka
kenihe
France
Colombia
woha
kenai
Germany
Nicaragua
kairuKkanise
kanai
Note: This sheet is identical with the foregoing one except that alongside
PERU is "wowoKwoto". The second sheet is also identical with the foregoing
one except that alongside PERU is "wowo."
Exhibit 8
Turkey
Peru
i-ni-i (or inii)
wo-wo (or wowo)
(Month) (Day) (Year)
Nagao Kita,
Consul-Oeneral at Honolulu
Note : The word "three copies" is inserted in the upper right hand margin.
Exhibit 9
Page 1 :
1. Uruguay
Page 2 :
Panama
kakaha
464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 10
Costa Rica
New Guinea
New Zealand — 1
New Zealand — 2
New Zealand — 3
kanai
karumoKkaruto
karuwoSkaruto
karinvoMkaruto
karuwoUkaruto
Honduras
Afghanistan
^'enezuela
Panama
kaha
hehe
kani
kakaha
Special Communication Number Table — 1 #76
Numbers Table— 1 #114
Numbers Table— 2 #114
Uruguay kanatoKkanana
Telegraphic Code Type "Kato" #12
Exhibit 11
Afghanistan hehe
Venezuela kani
Panama kakaha
Special Communication Number Table — 1
Numbers Table — 1
Numbers Table — 2
Uruguay kanatoKkanana
Telegraphic Code Type "Hato"
Rules for Usage of Same
Explanation of Rules for Usage of Same
Mixed Numbers Table of Same — #1
Mixed Numbers Table of Same — #2
Mixed Numbers Table of Same — #3
Norway heka
Attached Encoding and Decoding Table
Paraguay kani
1 copy
1 copy
1 copy
#76
1 copy
#114
1 copy
#114
1 copy
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#81 1 copy
(Month)
■ (Day") "'
(Tear)
Nagao Kita
GonsuTrQeneral at Honolulu
Exhibit 12
Holland
hehe
Italy
kaseruUkakase
Canada
kahana
Turkey
iniiSiniha
Cuba
kaliana
China
base
Peru
kahato
United States
kaheselkaheka
Chile
kalto
Belgium
nitoniSnitowo
Britain
kaheruMkaruka
Peru
wowoKwoto
France
woha
Spain
kanaha
Germany
kairuKkanise
Portgual
kanihe
Soviet Russia
JiakaseAkakaka
9-8-39
KosAKU MizTjSANA, Covsul-General
BiNJiRo Kudo, Acting Consul-Oeneral
Exhibit 13
Holland
hehe
Italy
kaseruUkakase
Canada
kaliana
Turkey
iniiSiniha
Cuba
kahana
China
base
Peru
kahato
United States
kaheselkaheka
Chile
kaito
Belgium
nitoniSnitowo
Britain
kaheruMkaruka
Peru
wowoKwoto
France
woha
Spain
kanaha
Germany
kairuKkanise
Portugal
kanihe
Soviet Russia
kakaseAkakaka
12-31-39
BiNjiRo Kudo
Acting Consul-Oeneral
Note: Writing
on upper right hand
corner of margin
on
page 1 reads : "thr
copies."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
465
Exhibit 14
Holland
hehe
Italy
kaseruUkakase
Canada
kahana
Turkey
iniiSiniha
Cuba
kahana
China
hase
Peru
kahato
United States
kaheselkaheka
Chile
kaito
Belgium
nitomiSnitowo
Britain
kaheruMkaruka
Peru
wowoKwoto
France
woha
Spain
kanaha
Germany
kairuKkanise
Portugal
kanihe
Soviet Russia
kakaseAkakaka
3-13-40
Acting Consul-Oeneral : Binjibo Kubo
Consul-General : KiicHi Gunji
Exhibit 15
Holland
hehe
Turkey
iniiSiniha
Canada
kahana
China
hase
Cuba
kahana
United States
kaheselkaheka
Peru
kahato
Belgium
nitoniSaitowo
Chile
kaito
Peru
wowoKwoto
Britain
kaheruMkaruka
Spain
kanaha
France
woha
Portugal
kanihe
Germany
kairuKkanise
Colombia
kanai
Soviet Russia
kakaseAkakaka
Nicaragua
kanai
Italy
kaseruUkakase
Costa Rica
kanai
9-11-40
[1] HoUand
Canada
Cuba
Peru
Chile*
Britain
France
Germany
Soviet Russia*
Italy*
Turkey
China
United States*
KiiCHi GuNji, Consul-Oeneral
Oto.tiro Oktjda, Acting Consul-General
Exhibit 16
Belgium
Peru
Spain*
Portugal
Colombia
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Nevp Guinea
New Zealand-1
New Zealand-2
New Zealand-3
Honduras
hehe
kahana
kahana
kahato
kaito
kaheruMkaruka
woha
kairuKkanise
kakaseAkakaka
kaseruUkakase
iniiSiniha
hase
kaheselkaheka
nitoniSnitowo
[2] 12-31-40
Consul-General: KIICHI GUNJI [seai,]*
Acting Consul-General: Otojiro Oktjda [seal]
•Indicates that these are crossed out.
wowoKwoto
kanaha
kaniha
kanai
kanai
kanai
karuwoKkaruto
karuwoSkaruto
karuwoMkaruto
karuwoUKanito
kaha
ExHlBIT 17
Holland
hehe
Peru
wowoKwoto
Canada
kahana
Portugal
Kenihe
Cuba
kahana
Colombia
kanai
Peru
kahato
Nicaragua
kanai
Britain
kaheruMkaruka
Costa Rica
kanai
France
woha
New Guinea
karuwoKkaruto
Germany
KairuKkanise
New Zealand-1
karuwoSkaruto
Turkey
iniiSiniha
New Zealand-2
karuwoMkaruto
China
hase
New Zealand-3
karuwoUkaruto
Belgium
nitoniSnitowo
Honduras
kaha
3-14-41
Acting Consul-General :
Otojiro Okuda [seal]
Consul-General :
Nag AG Kita [seal]
79716—46-
-Ex. 148 31
466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 18
Rules for use of same
Explanation of rules for use of same
Mixed numbers table #1 of same
Mixed numbers table #2 of same
Mixed numbers table #3 of same
Norway
Attached encoding and decoding table
Paraguay
12-2-41
copy
Nagao Kita,
ConsuTrQeneral at H&nolulu.
Remarks : This page of which there is one original and two carbon copies ap-
pears to be a continuation of another sheet or sheets which are not in possession
of the Honolulu Office.
Exhibit 19
Plans for emergency disposition of telegraphic business
1. Cryptographic code
(a) Burn in case of emergency.
(b) Draw up a CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE
beforehand.
(c) Things to be left to the last and brought home to this Ministry :
3 copies of CATALOGUE OF TRANSFER OF BUSINESS dated 3-14-41.
3 copies of Records of Transfer of Secret Books in 1941.
3 copies each of CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY
(1)
(2)
(3)
FIRE
Exhibit 20
Catalogue of manuscripts destroyed by fire
Name of book
Military secrets-
Number
Copies
Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping
(A).
Naval Code Book "S"
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#154.
Navy Ministry— confidential #25
Navy Ministry— confidential #26.
Navy Ministry— confidential #27
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#117.
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#118.
Strict military secrets
2435
173
173
173
173
173
4547
647
647
1
1
Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"— #1..
#1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code
Book "S"— #1.
Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"— #2..
#2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book
"S"-#l.
Temporary Usage "S" for Navy
1
1
1
1
1
Naval Code Book "S"— C
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#197.
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#202.
1
Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book
"S'-C (#1).
1
The foregoing were burned Dec. 2, 1941.
A letterhead in red in lower left hand corner reads:
at Honolulu.
Japanese Consulate General
12-2-41
(from) Nagao Kita, Consul-General at Honolulu
(to) Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry
Printed words in red in lower left hand corner reads: Japanese Consulate
General at Honolulu
This manuscript appears to be the rough draft of "CATALOGUE OF MANU-
SCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE" the translation of which has already been
completed. However, since no names were mentioned in the translation, a
translation is herewith made of the second page as it might supplement the
completed translation.
The foregoing were burned
(Month) (Day) (Year)
Kagao Kita,
Oonsul-Oeneral at Honolulu.
to : the Aide-de-camp — Navy Ministry.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
Exhibit 21.
Record of transfer of secret books for the year 1940
467
Name of book
Military secrets— iS'
Number
Copies
Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping..
Strictly secret — Navy — #25 _
1475
97
97
97
173
173
173
173
173
1
Overseas Code Book
1
Regulations for Usage of Overseas Code Book.
Encoding and Decoding Table for Overseas
Code Book.
Naval Code Book "S"..
Military secrets— Navy— #539-A.
M ilitary secrets— Navy —#539-B
Navy Ministry— confidential #25
Navy Ministry— confidential #26
Navy Ministry— confidential #27
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#117.
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#118.
1
1
1
Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"— #1..
#1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book
"S"-#l.
Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"— #2..
#2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book
"S"— #1.
1
1
1
1
Notification of above is hereby made.
3-13-40
Former custodian: Bynjiro Kudo, Acting Consul-General
New custodian: Kyichi Gunji, Consul-General
Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu
To: the AIDE-DE-CAMP
Navy Ministry
Remarks
'four
1. The scribbling at the upper right hand corner of the page reads,
copies".
2. The last work in the title, 1939, is changedj with ink to 1940, and this date
is the one inserted in the translation.
3. Also in the title, the words "presently in possession" are crossed out and
changed to "transfer of" which term is used in the translation.
4. The date at the end of the record, namely 12-31-39, is crossed out and
changed to read 3-13-40, and this is inserted in the translation.
Exhibit 22.
Record of transfer of secret books for year 1 989
Name of book
Military secrets — No.
Numbed Copies
(This portion is identical with the one
above.)
Notification of above is hereby made.
9-8-39.
Former custodian: Kosaku Mizusawa,
Consul-General.
New custodian: Binjiro Kudo,
Acting Consul-General.
To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.
468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 23
Certificate of custody
Naval code book "S"-B (strict military secret — Navy Ministry — #197)— — #647
MiXcHl nuiubei's table ot uaval code book "S"-B (strict military secret —
Navy Ministry— #202 #647
The foregoing are being preserved.
8-2-41.
Custodian: Nagao Kita [peivate seal],
Consul General at Honolulu.
To : the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.
Exhibit 24
Certificate of custody
Copies
1. Naval Code Book "S" (Navy Ministry— Confidential #25)
2. Regulations for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"— #1 (Navy Ministry— Con-
fidential #26)
3. #1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S" (#1) (Navy Ministry-
Confidential #27)
4. Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S" — #^(Navy Ministry — Confidential
#117)
5. #2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S" (#1) (Straight Military
Secrets— Navy Ministry— #118)
The foregoing are being held by this office.
KosAKU Mizusawa,
Consul-General at Honolulu.
To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.
Exhibit 25
Record of secret books in hand for year 1938
Name of booK
Military secrets—
Number
Copies
Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping..
Overseas Code Book . . _
Strictly Secret— Navy— #25
Alilitary Secrets— Navy— #525
Military Secrets— Navy— #539-A
Military Secrets— Navy— #539-B
1475
97
97
97
1
1
Regulations for Usage rf Overseas Code Book.
EncodiD^ and Decoding Table for Overseas
Code Book.
1
1
Notification of above is hereby made.
12—31—38
Custodian: KOSAKU MIZUSAWA,
Consul General, Honolulu.
To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry.
Record of transfer of secret books for the year 1939
Name of Book
Military Secret
Number
Copies
Secret Telegraphic Regulations for Ship-
ping-(A).
Overseas Code Book..
Strict Military Secret Navy Minis-
istry— #1J4.
Military Secrets— Navy — #525.
2435
97
97
97
173
173
173
173
173
4547
1
1
Rules for Usage of Above
]\Tihtary Secrets— Navy— #539- A
Military Secrets- Navy— #539-B
Navy Ministry— Confidential #25
Navy Ministry— Confidential #26
Navy Ministry— Confidential #27
Strictly Military Secret— Navy Min-
istry—#117.
Strict Military Secret— Navy Min-
istry—#118.
Strict Military Secrects
1
Encoding and Decoding Table for Same
Naval Code Book "S"
1
1
Rules for Usage of Same — #1
1
#1 Mixed Numbers Table for Same-1 ..-
1
Rules for Usage of Same — #2 .
I
#2 Mixed Numbers Table for Same-1
1
Temporary Usage "S" for Navy
1
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
469
Notification of foregoing is hereby made.
9-11-40
Former custodian: Kiighi Gunji,
Consul General
New custodian: Otojiro Okdda,
Acting Consul-General
Japanese Consulate-General at Honolulu
To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry
Exhibit 27
Record of secret books of 1940 presently in possession
Name of book
Military secrets-
Number
Copies
Secret telegraphic regulations on shipping (A) .
Overseas code book ..
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try—#154.
Military secrets — Navy #525 .
2435
97
97
97
173
173
173
173
173
4547
I
1
Rules for usage of overseas code book
Military secrets— N avy— #539-A
Military secrets— Navy— #539-B
Navy Ministry— Confidential #25
Navy Ministry— Confidential #26
Navy Ministry— Confidential #27
Strict military secrets— Navy Min-
istry—#117.
Strict military secrets— Navy Minis-
try-#118.
Strict military secrets.
1
Encoding and decoding table for overseas
code book.
Naval code book "S" ..- _ ._
1
1
Rules for usage of naval code book "S"— #1
#1 mixed numbers table of naval code book
"S"— #1.
Rules for usage of naval code book "S"— #2_ . .
#2 mixed numbers table of naval code book
"S"-#l.
Temporary usage "S" for Navy
1
1
1
1
1
Notification of above is hereby made.
12-31-40
Otojiro Okoda,
Acting Consul-General
Japanese Consulate General At Honolulu
To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry
Exhibit 28
Record of transfer of secret books in 1941
Name of Book
Military Secrets— #
Number Copies
(this portion is identical with the one above)
Notification of above is herebv made.
3-14-41
Person formerly in charge: Otojiro Okxjda,
Acting Consul-General.
Person presently in charge: Nagao Kita,
Consul-General,
Japanese Consulate,
General, Honolulu,
To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry
470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 29
[1] The margin bears the date 9-21-40 written in ink with the 9-21 crossed
out with pencil and the date 12-31 inserted with pencil adjacent to the crossed
out date.
Transfer of business catalogue
1 copy of
"NE" code
#88 (hehe)
Holland
1 copy of
"G" code
#147 (kahana)
Canada
1 copy of
"I" code
#147 (kehena)
Cuba
1 copy of
"L" code
#146 (kahato)
Peru
1 copy of
"0" code
#126 (kaito)
Chile
*The word
Chile
is crossed
out with red pencil and in
the
margin above is
inserted the words "burned 11-26".
3 copies of "I" code #189 to #191
( kaheruNkaruka )
*"I" code — I as in it ; "I" is a pronunciation of a Japanese letter.
1 copy of •'HO" code #54 (woha)
2 copies of "HEN" code #129 to #130
(kairuKkaniso)
2 copies of "RI" code #110 to #111
( kakasoAkakaka )
*This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.
8 copies of "CHI" code #109 to #110
( kaseruAkakaso )
*This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.
3 copies of
1 copy of
8 copies of
3 copies of
2 copies of
"O" (or "WO")
code ,
"YO" code
"WA" code
"NU" (or "DO")
#232 to #234
(iniiSiniha)
#40 (base)
#180 to #181
(kaheselkaheka)
#363 to #365
(nitoniSnitowo)
#55 to #56
(wowoKwoto)
#174 (kanaha)
Britain
France
Germany
Russia
Italy
Turkey
China
United States
Belgium
Peru
Spain
Portugal
REVISED "L"
code
1 copy of "REN" code
*This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.
2 copies of "SO" code #138 (kanihe)
(Sections A & B)
[2] 6 copies of "TSU" code (MATSU, UME, SAKURA, FUJI, HAGI, KIKU)
#172 (kanai) Colombia
1 copy of "TSU" code (MATSU) Use regulations #1 #172 (kanai)
Nicaragua
1 copy of "TSU' code (MATSU) Use regulations #2 #172 (kanai)
Costa Rica
2 groups of "TO" code— code for use in relaying telegrams) #195 to #1996
(karuwoKkaruto) New Guinea
2 groups of "X" code — telegraphic code #195, #196 (karuwoSkaruto)
( karuwoMkaruto )
New Zealand 1, 2, 3
"TSU" code — revised regulations #2 for use of telegraphic
code Honduras
1 copy of
12-31^0
(Signed) Otojieo Okuda,
Acting Consul-General, Honolulu.
[5] The page with writing in ink crossed out in pencil reads :
The above transfer of business has been completed.
9-11-40
Person transferring business :
Person taking over duties :
Zenichi Gunji,
Consul Oeneral.
Otojibo Okuda,
Acting Consul-Qeneral.
U]
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
Transfer of duties catalogue {3-14-41)
471
Number
Number
of copies
"NE" code
(Holland)
88
1
"Q" code
(Canada)
147
1
"I" code
(Cuba)
147
1
"L" code
(Peru)
146
1
••"I" code
(Britain)
189 to 191
3
"HO" code
(France)
64
1
"HEN" code
(Germany)
129 to 130
2
"0" (or "HO") code
(Turkey)
232 to 234
3
"YO" code
(China)
40
1
"NU" (or "DO") code (REVISED)
(Belgium)
3G3 to 365
3
REVISED "L" code
(Peru)
55 to 56
2
"SO" code
(Portugal)
138 (A— 1 copy)
(B— 1 copy)
2
"TSU" code (MATSU, UME,
(Colombia)
172
6
SAKURA, FUJI, HAQI,
KIKUUl copy of each)
"TSU" code (MATSU) REQU-
(Nicaragua)
172 *
1
LATIONS FOR USE-iSfl
"TSU" code (MATSU) REGU-
(Costa Rica)
172
1
LATIONS FOR USE-#2
"TO" code— code for relaying tele-
(New Guinea)
195 to 196
2
grains
"X" code
(New Zealand)
195 to 196
6
♦"I" as in sit ; Japanese pronunciation.
[5] "TSU" code Regulations for use of telegraphic code — #2 — revised
(Honduras) 14 1
The above transfer of business has been completed.
3-14-41
Person transferring business:
Person taking over business ;
Codes destroyed "by burning
Otojiro Okuda,
Acting Consul-Oeneral.
Nagao Kita,
Consul-Oeneral.
Telegraphic code "O"
Telegraphic code "WA"
Telegraphic code "RI"
Telegraphic code "WA"
Telegraphic code "REN"
11-26-40
#126 (kaito) (Chile) 1 copy
#109 to #110 (kaseruAkakase)
(Italy) 8 copies
#110 to #111 (kakaseKkakaka)
(Soviet Russia) 2 copies
#180 to #181 (kaheseWkaheka)
(U. S.) 8 copies
#174 (Kenaha) (Spain) 1 copy
(Signed) Otojiro Okuda,
Acting Consul-Oeneral, Honolulu.
Exhibit 30
Telegraphic code survey chart
Note: The following is a translation of the first column on the left reading
from top to bottom.
1940
End of July
End of August
September 11 (Transfer)
End of September
End of October
End of November
End of December
End of January 1941
End of February 1941
Note : The word in the upper right corner of the chart is "TOTAL;
March 14 (Transfer)
Last day of March
Last day of April
Last day of May
Last day of June
Last day of July
Last day of August
Last day of September
Last day of October
472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 31
Page 1 — Drafted January 4, 1941
Gontidential
Re : Official Orders TU-G0-#5 1939
Please examine the three enclosures we are submitting in reference to this
matter.
Page 2
Re: SUBMISSION OF RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940.
PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and also RECORD OF TRANSFER OF
SAME.
Since 2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940
PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and 4 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF
SAME is herewith submitted as follows, . . . (following page missing)
Pages 3 and 4 — Drafted January 4, 1941
Confidential
To : Minister
Re : SUBMISSION OF RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR YEAR 1940 PRES-
ENTLY IN POSSESSION and also RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME
2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY
IN POSSESSION and 4 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME as follows,
and we hope you will dispose of the matter at your own discretion.
1. 2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR YEAR 1940 IN POSSES-
SION
2. 2 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SECRET BOOKS 3-13^0
3. 2 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SECRET BOOKS 9-11-40
Exhibit 32
Date: 12-2-jl
From : Foreign Minister Togo
To : Consul General Kita
Re : Burning of code books.
Code type: (AN)-GO-2445
{Strictly confi.dential)
Be careful so that outsiders will not find out (?) and immediately take the
following steps :
1. Leave one each of code type O (or WO) and RYAKU (type L) and burn all
telegraphic codes (including code books used in common by the three Ministries
and code books connected with the Navy).
2. Simultaneous with the burning, telegraph the one word, HARUNA.
3. Burn all secret documents containing records of incoming and outgoing
telegrams.
4. After taking precautions so that no outside suspicion will not fall, dispose
of all secret documents in the same manner.
Since the foregoing measures are in preparation for and in consideration of an
emergency, keep this matter to your Consulate alone, and we hope that you will
hereafter carry out your duties with calmness and care.
This letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA and the name OKUDA (the Vice-
Consul OTOJIRO OKUDA).
(Note) : Register of messages transmitted reflects that message #359 is in
"re burning of codes".
Exhibit 83
The following translation was prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence,
Honolulu
19 November, 1941
From : Consul General Muto
To : /not stated/
Subject : Overseas broadcasts in the event of international crisis involving
Japan
Ordei- #297 (Memorize)
Foreign Minister Order No. 2253 (19 ). Code for chief of consulate/
legation, &e.
As a result of pressure of international situation when we may reach the
most critical condition at any moment — in such circumstances, because it is a
time when telegrams between Japan and opposing countries will be stopped
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 473
when an international crisis is near, in onr overseas radio broadcasts directed
to all points in the middle and at the end of Japanese language news a weather
]'eport will be made :
1. If concerning America-Japanese relations : "Kigashi no kaze, ame".
2. If concerning Japan-Rnssian relations : "Kita no kaze, kumori".
3. If concerning Japan-English relations (including invasion of Thailand,
Singapore, Malay, N.E.I., Eastern India) : "Nishi no kaze, hare".
By i-epeating these (phrases) as sliown above, it is desired that you make
suitable disposition of books and codes.
It is desired that you handle this with the greatest secrecy. It is desired
that you, according to this information /pass this news along immediately/?/.
Exhibit 34
11-2-41
From : Foreign Minister
To : Consul General Kita
RE: Disposition of ANGO (type of code). Code type L (AN) — Urgent —
#118 Handler (handling?) of code of head of Consulate
In reference to your telegram, #232, the instructions of the transmitted
telegram GO-#23.jo do not mean that the ANGO (type of code) should be
burned immediately. Tiie point of the broadcast of this matter is than when
the vrorst is about to come about the opposing nation is expected to suspend
communication by means of coded telegrams and this (broadcast) is aimed at
informing the diplomatic establishment in that nation about this situation
without recourse to telegrams. Regardless of what the actual situation is at
the place you are stationed, do not dispose of the ANGO unqualifiedly. As far
as the real situation pei'mits, preserve it to the very last.
Note: The following are inserted in the margin on page 1:
1. Seal of Consul General KITA.
2. Signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA.
3. The number 827 in the upper left margin.
Exhibit 35
[1]
Date: 11-27-41
From: Consul General Muto at San Francisco
To : Consul General Kita
Re: Method of communication (on masters) pertaining to the situation.
Code Type: (AN)-GO-307 4-1
Telegram from the Minister to this Consulate #GO-2409 (4-1) 27th, P. M,
Very urgent
Handler of Kanoho Fugo (code of head of establishment) :
At a time when the situation is tense, we are going to use IMMEI DEMPO
(telegrams in which names are mentioned, which names are to have certain
meanings) in the following manner as method of communication to cope witli
the critical situation. We hope you will understand.
Since we shall use the names on the left column and compose an appropriate
ordinary telegraphic message (plain wording) in order to telegraph contents on
the column at the right, we hope that there will be no mistakes in operation (of
the code).
Illustration :
"Japanese and Russian troops clashed." This message will be dated the 15th
and will read as follows : "Secretaries HIZIKATA and KUBOTA have been
ordered to service at your Consulate STOP"
Telegrams in the future which will he based on this method shall always have
the word, STOP, inserted at the end of the telegraphic wording so as to dis-
tinguish them from the rest of the telegrams. (Consequently, the last word will
not be used in other telegrams.)
[2] Date: 11-27-41 P. M.
From : Consul General IMUTO at San Francisco
To : Consul General KITA
Code type: GO-307 (4-1)
Telegram from the Minister #2409 (very urgent)
Arimura code communication prohibited
Asai communicate by means of "Radio" broadcasts.
474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Asakura
Asikaga
Azuma
Edoguti
Haoabusa
HanazoDo
Hatakeyama
Hattori
Ibaragi
Inagaki
Tsukikana
Kashiwagi
Kobayakawa
[5] Kodama
Komiyama
Koyahagi
Kubota
Kuribara
Kusunoki
Matutani
listen cai'efully since communication will be done by
means of "radio" broadcasts.
unable to listen in on the overseas broadcasts due to
interferences.
pressure on Japan steadily increases,
prepare to evacute
evacuation preparations completed
make preparations to entrust protection of Japanese
rights and interests to appropriate foreign representa-
tive (Consul).
diplomatic relations between Japan and
severed.
relations between Japan and imperilled.
send reply telegram on forecast of severance of diplo-
matic relations with Japan by the country in which
you are serving. ''
are you in receipt of matter pertaining to ?
am in receipt of matter pertaining to
started positive action against
suspend altogether (granting of) entry and transit
visae to
Japan
China
Britain
Soviet Union
France
Germany
Italy
Date: 11-27^1 P. M.
From : Consul General in San Francisco
To : Consul General KITA
Code type: (AN)-GO-307 (4-3)
(very urgent)
Telegram from the Minister GO-2409
Hizikata
Hosino
Minami
Miwata
Miyazaki
Morokosi
Motizuki
[4] Ka gamine
Nakazato
Nango
Nogi (Teigi?)
Ogawa
Okumura
Onizuka
Onodera
Otani
Onisi
Siboya
Simamaka
Sakakibara
Sigenori?
Sanzyoo?
Ichiro
Nisaku
Santaro
Yoichi
Goroo
Masaroku
Simetaro
Yasokiti
Hisamatsu
Atumi
Japanese ti-oops and clashed.
Japan and are about to start full-scale war.
United States ,
Canada
Mexico
Brazil
Panama
Argentina
Thailand
French Indo-China
Netherlands East Indies
Malay
Australia
South African Union
enemy nation
today
year
next year
this year
month
day
hour
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 475
Exhibit 36
the following teanslation was prepaeed by the office of naval
intelligence, honolulu
158 16 -36
To: CONSUL GENERAL MUTO, SAN FRANCISCO
From: CONSUL GENERAL KITA, HONOLULU
Matters relating to ( ) telegram indicators (aiithenticators).
(memorize, : confidential?)
Paraphrase:
Instruction by mail #148.
Telegram #383 from the Ambassador.
Telegram #1586 from the Minister (of Foreign Affairs?)
In the future, on The Telegrams originated by this Department, the indi-
cator Kongo should be placed in front of the beginning number of urgent tele-
grams, and the indicator Hyuga in front of the beginning number of routine
(ordinary) telegrams. At the end, in urgent Telegrams, use the indicator
Takao and for ordinary Telegrams use Atago at the end.
/Can't decipher all the last line, but it may be/ —
Circular telegram should be like Ordinary reports (information).
Exhibit 37
September 20, 1941.
From Consul-General Muto at San Francisco.
To Consul-General Kita
(Subject) Matter concerning revision of handling urgent wire.
"AN" (designation used for a certain class of wire — ^probably cryptograph)
GO #209
Wire order #2040 from the Minister (20th, P. M.)
(strictly secret)
Although there are reasons for sending outgoing wire GO-#1767, recently
the number of outgoing and incoming wires have finally decreased. For in-
stance, today's incoming wires have reached a point where it was possible
to make a general interpretation. Consequently, henceforth, when attaching
"urgent" or "very urgent", give consideration to its content and its urgency.
In case very urgent action or reply wire is necessary due to misuse of an
urgent report (telegram?), care should be taken so as not to cause important
error in its disposition. In this connection, also with the idea of economizing
the telegraphic fees in mind, following revision in the handling of urgent and
very urgent wires has been made and it has been decided to put it into practice
from October 1. Hence, please follow out the above.
NOTE
1. Emergency wire. (Japanese word used is KINKYU, giving sense of emer-
gency) Matter that I'equires immediate disposition in spite of the fact that
it is late in the night (the word "urgent" should be written on the wire draft).
The work KINQU (urgent) should be written at the very beginning of the text.
2. Very urgent wire. (Japanese word used is SHIKYU, giving sense not as
urgent as KINKYU). In case a matter is received late in the night and could
be taken care of early the next morning.
The word DAIQU (very urgent) should be written at the head of the text.
3. Urgent wire (Japanese word used is SHIKYU, giving a sense that it
should be takea care of as soon as possible. In other words, it is urgent, but
its urgency is not as strong as when the word KINKYU, mentioned in Note 1
is used.)
Matter that should be disposed of according to priority without regard to
the order of the prefix.
The word SIKYU (urgent) should be written at the head of the text.
Please notify immediately with special wire as informed.
The above letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA, the Consul-General and
the name of OKUDA (OTAJIRO OKUDA, the vice-Consul).
476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Exhibit 38
April 26, 1941: Out.
May S, WJfl. In.
From : Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles.
To : Consul-General KITA.
(Subject)
Concerning attendance of representatives of the National Christian Council
of Japan at the special meeting of the Federal Council of Churches in America.
"AN" (designation for a certain class of wire), (code Type) YU-GO #23.
To: The Minister, Number 53 (26th, P. M.)
Regarding your message "25
The meeting ended as scheduled and the gist of it is as follows :
1. The main subjects of discussion were : the question of uniting the Christian
churches of .Japan ; the Shinto temple question in Korea ; and the question of
improving the America-Japan relations.
2. Furthermore, a change was made to extend the meeting about a mouth and
dividing the group into tour branches, such matters as concrete plan of improving
America-Japan relations which are now confronting them, the religious questions
relating to the United States and Japan, and the measures that should be taken
by the churches as churches will be studied by a conference of mixed group con-
sisting of the Japanese and Americans.
3. A joint communique will be issued by this Council within a few days.
4. A consultation will be held at New York on May 13 and the last meeting will
be held in Chicago for 3 days, starting from May 29.
Furthermore, the party, with the exception of KAGAWA, is scheduled to leave
for Japan on June 5.
Above has been sent by "AN" (certain type of wire) to the Ambassador in
America and other offices in America.
The above letter boars the seal of NAGAO KITA, Consul General and the name
OKUDA (OTOJIRO OKUDA, Vice-Consul).
Exhibit 39
Translator's note : The red stamp is KITA's seal. ODUDA.
June 9, 1941. Out.
June 19, 1941. In.
From : Consul NAKAUCHI of Los Angeles
To : Consul-General KITA
(Subject) Matter concerning strike by employees of North American Aircraft
Plant :a__
"RYAKU" (designation used for a certain class of wire — probably code) #33.
To: Minister. #92 (9th, P. M.)
Regarding the outgoing wire #67.
(JORD — probably means information A)
Later developments of the strike is as follows :
1. At the big meeting (general meeting) held in the afternoon on the 8th
by the employees, FRANKENSTEIN who was sent by the AUW headquarters
read of MURRAY, CIO president, THOMAS, UAW president, and PERKINS,
Secretary of Labor, to return to work and urged to quit the strike, but he was
forced to get down from the platform in the midst of his speech and the employees
decided to continue the strike.
2. Against this measure, the head of the air corps in the western, division,
Lt. Colonel BRANSHAW, receiving an order from Washington, declared that
"By virtue of the authority of the President and by order of the Secretary of War,
the Army will take over the said plant and its business." Simultaneously, lead-
ing 3,500 armed soldiers, aided by SCO policemen equipped with tear-gas broke up
the picket lines and declared that the plant will be reopened immediately under
the Government control.
Special wire was sent to the Ambassador in American and code wires were
sent to other offices.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 477
Exhibit 40
Page 1
6-17-41
From : Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To: Consul General KITA
Re : Meeting courier YAMAZAKI
Code type: (RYAKU)-#rr
Request member of Consulate to meet courier YAMAZAKI. passenger on board
the NITTA MARU which sailed from here on the 17th, since papers (letters) to
your Consulate have been entrusted in his care.
*In the margin are the following :
1. Seal of NAGAO KITA (the Consul-General)
2. Signature of OKUDA (the Vice-Consul)
3. Scribbling which reads :
a. Ml-. YUGE please go to meet the boat.
6. TAKEO YAMAZAKI (?) arrives in port <5-2(;.
4. #259
Page 2
7-9-41
From : Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To : Consul General KITA
Re: SURVEY OF ASSETS OF JAPANESE IN CONTINENTAL UNITED
STATES
Code type: (AN)-#6
In reference to your telegram G0-#12, in accordance with the annual business
survey, survey is being conducted through organizations.
*In margin are the seal of Consul General KITA and the signature of Vice-Consul
OKUDA. Also the number, 315.
Pages 3, 4, 5
Dispatched : 6-6-41
Received : 6-19-41
From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To : Consul General KITA
Re: STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES OF "NORTH AMERICAN" AIRCRAFT COM-
PANY.
Code Type: (RYAKU)-YU-GO-#32
To the Minister #87 (the 6th, P.M.)
(Report A)
Concerning the threatened strike for higher wages (raising of minimum wages
from 500 to 750 or a uniform increase of 100 in wages) by 9,000 employees of
the local "North American" Aircraft Company who are also members of the
"United" Automobile Workei's' Union of the CIO, negotiations have been going
on through the good offices of the National Defense Mediation Board in Wash-
ington for the past two months. However, since the board is believed to be
working in league with the company and deliberately postponing settlement, the
strike was .started early on the morning of the 5th with a "picket" line posted, and
work by all employees numbering 12,000 has been stopped. Because of this, the
Army Air Corps at "March Field" has taken out 8 completed B-25 bombers (5
more planes were taken out on the 6th) and 21 AF6A training planes. The local
AFL intends to wire the Office of Production Management that the majority of
the majority of the workers are being victimized by the radical element of the
CIO. (Concerning the relation between the AFL and the CIO, refer to CONFI-
DENTIAL—#4.54 dated 5-10.)
The company at present, putting those of the United States and Britain to-
gether, has orders for warplanes amounting to $200,000,000 and produces monthly
225 planes, and is said to manufacture 25% of the total production of planes iii
the United States.
This report has been wired to the Ambassador and has been sent by coded
telegrams to the various diplomatic establishments in the United States.
(Note: In the margin is inserted the number, 263, and also the seal of Consul
General KITA and the signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA.)
478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pages 6, 7
Dispatched : 6-11-41
Received: 6-23^1
From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To : Consul-General KITA
Re: STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES OF "NORTH AMERICAN" AIRCRAFT COM-
PANY.
Code type (RYAKU)-YU-GO-%34
To the Minister #95. (11th ; P. M.)
Reference : Outgoing telegram #92
(Report A)
The Military took over the factory and the strike ended on the niglit of the
10th. From the 10th to the 11th the major portion of the employees returned to
their work and began day and night production. During the strike there was a
decrease in production of about forty planes. Armed troops guarded the inner
and outer premises of the factory, and not only did they give personal protection to
the workers, but also it is reported that three of the strike leaders have been
fired and seven others are being held.
Details will be reported by mail.
The Ambassador is in receipt of this relayed telegram and the various diplo-
matic establishments liave been notified by coded messages.
Exhibit 41 >
The head of the office— KITA's seal. Person in Charge — OKUDA.
Written— July 5, 1941.
To: San Francisco
To : Los Angeles
From : Consul-General KITA.
Subject — Investigation of the assets of the Japanese in America.
"AN" (designation used for a certain type of wire) Order #12.
Regarding order #599, strictly secret to America, from the Minister, in view
of the times there are reasons which make investigation of this mattery by this
office within its jurisdiction considerably difficult and delicate. So, please send
a return wire informing this office as to how the matter is being handled in
your office.
This wire is addressed to San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Exhibit 42
Head of Office— KITA's seal. Person in Charge— OKUDA.
Written— May 12, 1941.
To : Consul ITO at New Orleans.
From : Consul-General KITA
Subject^ — Mourning for Representative YAlMAJI's death.
"HEI" (designation used for a certain class of wire — probably ordinary
wire) #2.
To : Representative SHIMIZU, as follows :
We sincerely express our condolence over the death of Representative YAMAJI.
Exhibit 43
The writing in red pencil reads :
MATTER PERTAINING TO CENSUS REGISTRATION AND ANNOUNCE-
MENT OF SAME.
1. Curtsy to gatliering (Greeting to assembly).
2. In accordance with orders of the Japanese Government
3. All came according to official orders ; thank them for their assistance and
coopei'ation.
4. Personally thank all for their friendship (the consular staff and their
families.)
5. Not to visit each island.
6. Have self-confidence that Japan has been right in her acts.
a. In the Far-Eastern problem leading up to the present situation.
6. In the origin of the Chinese Incident.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 479
c. Against present attitude of the United States towards Japan.
7. Actual abilities (power). (Words erased read: Power of Japan.)
*S. "Rieki Daiho" (meaning now known) Represent interests (of Japan ?).
Note: (by D.C.) Ricki daihyo refers to the representation of Japanese interests
here after the breakoff of relations with the United States. It developed later
that Sweden took over the representation of Japanese interests in the islands
while Spain assumed this function in the rest of the United States.)
9. Request take custody of Consulate.
10. United States understanding. (Probably "with understanding of the
U. S." meant.)
11. Emergency committee.
12. United Japanese Association, Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Jap-
anese ?).
18. Census registration. f
14. Method of making remittances to Japanese residents of Plawaii in Japan.
15. Development of perseverence and independence (sympathy towards lirst
and second generation Japanese.)
a. In comparison with Japanese residents of China.
h. Avoid unnecessary friction.
16. Do not blacken the Japanese name (would lower the position of the
Japanese.)
17. Thank all officials and the public.
18. Pray for health.
19. Families in Japan will be protected.
20. Instructions to consular staff.
21. Announcement of census registration.
confidential
Headquarters CPBC
Q-2 (CTD)
Box 3, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
FILE 004.5 — ^PHOTOGRAPHY.
Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate
1st Ind Contact Office D. S. O. 2 Apr 42.
1. Transmitted herewith are 156 photographs composing a complete copy of the
"Register of Incoming Messages" and 124 photographs of a "Register of Messages
Received", maintained by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu,
Ends : as noted. G. W. B.
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice 206 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu, T. H., April 2, 19Jt2.
Lt. Col. George W. Bicknell,
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2
Army Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
Re : Japanese Activities, Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Sib: I am forwarding hex'ewith 156 photographs composing a complete
copy of the "Register of Incoming Messages" and 124 photographs of a "Register
of Messages Received," maintained by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.
These should be considered with the translations previously furnished your
office.
Very truly yours,
(s) R. L. Shivers,
R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.
cc ONI, with enclosure
Enc.
480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Clausen In\'estigation Exhibit No. 5
Investigation hy Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAOD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
The following documents were obtained from the District Intelligence Office,
14th Naval District, Honolulu.
a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cablegrams
from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and numbers of
cablegrams in date order : 363, 3 December 1941 ; 364, 4 December 1941 ; 365, 4
December 1941 ; 221, 5 December 1941 ; 368, 6 December 1941 ; and 369, 6 Decem-
ber 1941.
b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November
1941 to the following addresses : Shagro, San Francisco ; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young
Hotel, Honolulu ; Growsumida, Honolulu ; and Shokin, Honolulu.
c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November
1941 to the following addresses: Rev. Hire Higuchi, Waipahu Community
Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H. ; American Consul, Papeete ; Y. Watanabe, Box
511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H. ; and Shokin, Honolulu.
d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 No-
vember 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.
e. Four confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the Japanese Consulate, Hono-
lulu— Espionage Activities, dated : 9 February 1942, 14 February 1942, 15 June
1942, and 15 February 1943.
f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a
copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941,
Japanese time.
g. An Analysis of the Japanese Er^pionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands
prepared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND,
dated 20 April 1&43.
h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg)
T. W. Joyce.
hl-h35. Various evaluations and related paper from 14ND, Honolulu.
12/3/41
From: Kita
To : FM Tokyo #363
Wyoming and two seaplane-tenders departed third.
12/4/41
#364
From: Kita
To : FM Tokyo
PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning
fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X
fueled?
Immediately after arrival enlisted rating (s) received mail from British
Consulate
12/4/41
# 365
From: Kita
To : FM Tokyo
USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th
12/5/41
#221
From: Kita
To : FM Tokyo
In reply to Number 221 (Banker)
Auditing accounts with Government expenditures only not completed X Upon
settlement of above will have balance of $16,224.13
(Special students expenses $2010 ?????????
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 481
6 Dec. 41
#368
From : Kita
To : F. M. Tokyo
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC
on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability
of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any prepara-
tions for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel prepara-
tions were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even
if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby
Hickman Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have
been dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo
defense of battleships and will report further.
Delivered 1248
Transmitted 1304
6 Dec 1941
Delivered to RCA— 1801
Transmitted— 1807
No. 369
From : Kita
To : Washington — Tokyo
On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and sweeper entered port.
Ships moored on the sixth are as follows :
BB— 9
CL— 3
DD— 17
am — 3
Ships in dock :
CI— 4
DD— 2
(CA and CV all )
PS— CV cannot be found in the fleet ( ?)
11/27 2.33 PM
Shagro San Francisco
Two hundred screenings reply price
(S Hata Shoten)
11/27 7.31 AM
ZL HU17 Mexico City 13 1130AM 27th
Dr Holmes 45 Young Building, Honolulu
We stay here expecting you.
Fathee
11/27 9.14 AM
ZL HU 36 San Francisco 35 1105AM 27th
Growsumida Honolulu
Recable yesterday advice positively best possible would not have sent cable
yesterday unless all possibilities extending contract had been exhausted must
have immediate cable authorization and amendments lettercredit othenvise can-
not prevent cancellation
11/27 9.01
ZL OHU39 New York 17 155 PM 27th
Shokin Honolulu
TODORIYORIDEN KONOSAINARUBEKU TASUUKITYOOSESI MURUKO-
TOSIKARU BESITOOMOWARURU NITUKIHUUYOONA RABANISEIYATOSI
RETOONIYORITUGO OTUKEHOKUBEIKA KUTENISSEIGENIN HAIRYO-
NEGAITASI SIMEISIKYUUDEN POONOKENKAKUTEN ETOKUHOKUSEYO
Shoken
79716— 46— Ex. 148 32
482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
11/25 6.55 AM
RH 014 Los Angeles Calif 15 905AM 25th
Rev HiRo HiGUCHi
Waipahu Community Church
Waipahu Oahu.
Richard Currier died last night pneumonia
Hank
11/25 10.30 AM
W 054 Washington DC USG 88 FST 55 3.15 PM 26
American Counsul Papeete
Twentyflfth Swiss interests your August 25 eight am Swiss Legation has in-
formed department that in letter dated September 20 Paul Nordmann stated that
he has been temporarily released from internment to consult physician at
Papeete Legation received prisoners post card dated September 25 signed by
Nordmann stating that he was in bad health and still detained by police author-
ities at Papeete Legation is particularly anxious to learn reason for expulsion
decree against him on July 31 please make informal inquiry and report by
telegraph
Huix
11/25 12.35 PM
SB HU70 Los Angeles Calif 24/23 230PM 25th
NLT Y Watanabe Box 511 Wailuku Maui
Gladly received your letter air mailing $500 today depending everything on
you wire when ship
Mayeda
11/25 1.58 PM
w 83 New York 18 5.50 25
Shokin Honolulu
TODORIYORIDEN KINZITUHONPOOSE NKITIMUKESYUPPA NSUBE-
KINITUKIKO NOSAIZAIBEIKAKU TENINSAISYOOGEN DONIKIRITUME-
SEI ZEI TASUUKITYOO SURUYOOTOKUBETU NAIRYONEGAI TASI
NAODOOSENNITEKI TYOOSIUBEKISIME ISIKYUUTODORIE HENDEN-
SEYO
Shokin
Mackay Radio
1941 NOV 19 PM 8 47
NLT HACHIYAEINOSUKE
TOKYOMITUKOSI
GOANCHAKUO SHUKUSU REINOKENWA KOSHOCHU KINJITY KAI-
KETUNOMIKOMI JUSHOWA TOMO HONOLULU EIBUNWA TOKETU-
KANNO KYOKAWOETE OKURUYOCHUIARI ASUSIRASU
Araki
Translation:
INOSUKE HACHIYAE,
TOKYO MITSUKOSHI
FELICITATIONS ON SAFE ARRIVEL IN REGARD TO CERTAIN MATTER
NOW IN NEGOTIATION LOOKS LIKE DECISION IN NEAR FUTURE
RESIDENCE STILL HONOLULU ENGLISH WORDS TO BE SENT AFTER
PERMIT FROM FREEZE OFFICE. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED WILL LET
YOU KNOW TOMORROW
Akaki
Note : If this was sent by Joe ARAKI it deserves attention. SS
United States Navai, Intelligence Service
investigation reports
ConHdential
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date : 9 Feb. 1942.
Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson,
USNR.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 483
jPeriod covered : 5 Dee., 1941-9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending in 14ND.
Origin of Case: Receipt by DI0-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese
Ambassador, Washington.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures: and References: (See first page of details.)
14ND (3)
Copy to: ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Com 14 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)
Source File No. : 14ND #54A. ONI File No. :
Synopsis : On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, trans-
mitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths,
fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near
the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure
of U. S. Naval units from Pearl- Harbor. The system was conceived, and sub-
mitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German sub.iect and ex-oflicer of the
German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dis-
positions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches
or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).
Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at
night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has
been found that KUEHN'S signal system ever was employed.
The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as
FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts
to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.
KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941 will be
charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.
Deductions : Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941,
was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto
KUEHN, a German subject.
Approved :
J. H. Maytield
Captain, U. 8. Navy
District Intelligence Offlcer
WBS/zw
IID
[i] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
liof GrGncGS *
(a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
(b) Coml4 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
(c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
(d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
UN, 5-1-41.
(e) DI0-14ND Conf. Ltd. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI),
5-31-41.
(f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
UN, 7-17-41.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKI, 2-3-42.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
(j) IND Investigation4 Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-
SHIRODO, 2-8-42.
Enclosures :
(A) Table Showing Number of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers,
Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Ves-
sels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.
(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at
Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.
1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoi'oughly reliable confidential
informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain com-
mercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao
KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages
were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu,
that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA,
in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.
484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible
to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first
of sucli messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed
verv important.
[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced
immediately, but this taslc was not completed until the morning of 11 December.
When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence
Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel
George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in
charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special
agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with
regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial
radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were
effected. )
4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign
Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the biisis of subsequent extensive
investigation by the three intelligence agencies :
From : Kita • /
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
( Secret Militai'y Message No. • — )
(By Chief of Consulate's Code)
To : Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.
From : Fujii
Re Signals I Wish to Simplify Communications as follows :
(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) Battle Force, including Scouting
Force, are about to put to sea —
1. Several Aircraft Carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
[3] 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
8.
(2) Signal
1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night — one light from 8 PM to 9 PM
indicates "1", from 9 PM to 10 PM indicates "2". The below signals until
midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time,
indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".
When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight
and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5",
"6", "7", '8".
2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 AM imtil noon every hour
one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen
cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".
3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offiug) a star boat
with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates
"5", "6", "7", "8".
4. Liglit in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 PM to 1 AM every
hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".
5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9 : 45 AM —
(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale — apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3"
or "6".
(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7".
(c) Beauty opei-ator wanted — same— indicates "5" or "8".
in the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from
Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located
between tlie lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala
Road wliirh can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of
Maui, until tlie receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be
repeated for several days : A small fire on tlie high peak — 7 PM to 8 PM
indicates "3" or "6" ; 8 PM to 9 PM indicates "4" or "7" ; 9 PM to 10 PM
indicates "5" or "8".
[41 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three in-
telligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 485
December was made :
1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu ; but, the FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Con-
sulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the
Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.
2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable,
there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.
3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a
window of this tyije in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German sus-
pect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December,
1941.
4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have
been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and there-
after still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet
units from Pearl Harbor.
In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of
3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such
signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks :
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or
more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent
information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house".
(The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investiga-
tion on Otto KUEHN and members of his family. )
2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama
and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the
indicated markings.
[5] 3. The District Intelligence Ofiice was to send two or more agents to
Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding
signalling fi'om a "Lanikai beach House" ; and, in addition, to conduct an
appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala,
island of Maui.
6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P.
McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of
11 December. On the following morning, an oflicer messenger flew to Wailuku,
Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch
Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case
there.
7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than
seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only tv^^o had clothes lines
on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that
one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN,
whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Un-
der a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available resi-
dents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It waa
determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the
Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in
the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them
answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.
8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December,
the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer
by Agent McCarthy :
"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded
to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.
"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all
residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might
possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals re-
ported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach
at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua.
It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and
Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to
Schofield Hospital.
"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's
house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15.
Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any commu-
nication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their
appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported
that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or
could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of
the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second
house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6: 45 A. M. on the morning
of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on
the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have
been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and
Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or furnish any
additional information concerning his identity.
"The inquires made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the
period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the
part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related
generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the pres-
ence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the
three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sail-
ing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are
boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen
near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out by many of the
residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather,
these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon
the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remem-
bered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the
owner.
"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used
in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning
these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in
traveling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were
examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what resi-
dence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence
could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with
automobiles headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thank.sgiving by
Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could
have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described.
Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally
concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they are a very reputable
family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known
to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.
"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the
use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending
over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.
"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept
for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without
results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were
found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in
this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of fur-
ther attention to this office."
[S] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9
December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak
of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of
the following pertinent incident :
"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected
esiponage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.
"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was
spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was tele-
phoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in
the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft
proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the i)erson
flashing the light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took
place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in
the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is
subject of a recent confldential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will
be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUPLAWA recently at
Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel
Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the
Incident ad have also been given all information available here, in regard to
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 487
FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Follow-
ing our report to Army authorities this day. FURUKAWA subsequently has made
an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While
I'^URUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of hs attempted suicide, no mditary
orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."
This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investiga-
tion of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak
of war because of the latter's cossible connection with Lieutenant Commander
Sadatomo OKADA, UN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of
[9] 1941. FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).
10 On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer re-
ceived from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regard-
ing investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region :
"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance
from nightfall to past midnight— actual observation of the area being conducted
personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game
Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis
Fernandez and Chas. Ledward. »
"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated
point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping
this office advised.
"On the night of 14 December 1941, the reporting officer in Company with Mr.
Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which
were interpreted as signals :
"At 8 : 25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and oit every few seconds
in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off
in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire
signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes.
At 8 :40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light
at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.
"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire
in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.
"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe
fire signal seen.
"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a
week a sampan — "Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained
by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island-
where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin
has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe.
Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under
armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle. Col. Lyman will notify this office
if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the
boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.
"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the Island
have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has
added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have
been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.
"However, there is one such report of interest : On the night of 11 December,
1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelli-
gence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate
this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a
report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we
have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person
signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On
10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could
not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident
may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case,
our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."
11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further
report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in
part:
". . . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was
interviewed.
[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 18 December,
1941, she saw fiashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole
occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light
488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanitorium grounds. Sub-
ject's room faqes the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A
check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was
questioned by Miss Dupont about tbe matches and he stated that lie had lit
them to see wliat the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not
actually see subject light any matches."
12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the
activities of Sliigeo FUKUKAWA, since the latter's hospitalization at Kula
Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report
being prepared on PURUKAWA.
13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYARLA,
who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai,
but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house
high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After
advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30
December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate IMARUYAMA
to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also
to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.
14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to
MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could
have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation
point, no evidence bas been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the
part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent
Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person
in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships
at sea.
15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the
sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is
Ichio Fujii.
[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of
the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the
only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi
FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from
Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, lOil.) Former
clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three
intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.
17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu,
were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Hono-
lulu, from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of
inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was fovmd that FUJII was born at
Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to
Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated
that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found
in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been
discovered.
18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with refer-
ence to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI,
was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the
case is continuing.
19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed
at the Japanese (Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three in-
vestigative agencies : Special Agent F. G. Tillman. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion; Captain Frank O. Blalce. JMilitary Intelligence Division; and. Lieutenant
George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.
20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all
informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment
at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday,
8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation
or otherwise given notice to the Con.sulate.
[IS] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:
Miss Kimie DOUE
Takaichi SAKAI
Katsukichi MURAOKA
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
Kanaye SAHARA
Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 489
22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate,
was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal,
history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her
position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors
to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be
slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and
impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering ques-
tions.
23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that
Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived
from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the
expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that
work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORI-
MURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA,
where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation
work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision
of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work
were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.
24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two
hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the
afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941J when he did not
come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a
taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the
same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal
Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vinyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 8290), and
it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions. Miss
DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [I4] business hours
with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks.
Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times
they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them
came back for the rest of the day.
25. According to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which
he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE
stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She
had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.
26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g),
also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE
said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and
his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.
27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set
forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or
third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which
hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning
MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accomp-
panied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On those
occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that
he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what
he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they
were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained
relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA
and KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as
to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO
had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.
28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's
background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication
containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials.
He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member
of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just
recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three
secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and
Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.
[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTO-
SHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking to-
gether as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not
strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and
clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both
were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9
. January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details
of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report.
In substance this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTO-
SHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of
reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTO-
SHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations
of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with
MORIMUURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose,
by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and
addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from
KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered
by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities w;ere ob-
tained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.
31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names
of frequent visitore to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul
Genei'al and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese
business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7
December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama
Specie and Sumitome Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line).
According to Miss DOUE, those men would go directly into the office of the
Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference.
None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these
men and the consular officials.
32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above,
visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business. Miss
DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went
several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she
described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked
somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man,
the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Conisul General's
private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was
about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the
morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the
Consulate.
33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former
consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention
quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling
Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been
completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE
was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation
in a nearby room.
34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the
unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of
November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been
KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe
a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before.
Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN
was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss
DOUE immmediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper
over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.
35. After KUEHN was taken back to tlie room where he was being questioned.
Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being
conducted. She was thereupon asked whether slie had ever seen the person
who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance
that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the
Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same
man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish
appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate
but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on
days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in
front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were
peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 491
[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written state-
ments obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and
Allen, is submitted for information :
37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April,
1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until
captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until
December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the
World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927,
he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the
United, States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police
of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was
born 6 Jul.v, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN
claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered
for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position
was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in
Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.
38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language,
and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan.
In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established
permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three
months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September,
1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he
engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated
a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama and
one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty
shop brought in only about $80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the
Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was
rented.
39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money
from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his
father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned.
Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. Ac-
cording to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money
out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through
a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel
firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased
the [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for $40,000.00. Part of this
consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu
in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was $6,000.00, but his wife, who
was questioned later, said it was $9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of
$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI,
purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.
40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN land is
contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942 :
41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul
OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr.
HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims pre-
viously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to
HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a re-
quest to send the balance of the $40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible.
When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him
that he was acting for the Japanese Government and liad an important message
for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it
was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of
the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave
OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as com-
pensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally
agreed to send the message.
42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first con-
tacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending
money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice
Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However,
in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about
the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN ad-
mitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941,
and stated that he called in the mornings.
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
43. It was developed that on his second oi- third visit, either KUEHN or Con-
sul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining
information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do
what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of
Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor.
Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven
battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-
seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The informa-
tion which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can
be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were
prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data
furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the fig-
ures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "these figures were purely ficti-
tious, as far as I knew."
44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet move-
ments was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's
• statement of 1 January, 1942 :
"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave
transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also
outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish informa-
tion relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left.
This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were
to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could
have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows : One light between 6 and
7 meant battle fleet in harbor ; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force
in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one
light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between
10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave ; one light between 11 and 12
meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant
battle fleet left between one and two days ago ; one light between 1 and 2 meant
scouting force left one to two days ago ; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant
aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m.
meant battle fleet left three to four days ago ; two lights between 8 and 9
p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago ; two lights between 9
and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago ; two lights
between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago ; two lights
between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago;
two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to
six days ago.
[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on
the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight
meaning battle fleet in harbor ; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting
force ie harbor ; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in
harbor ; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave ;
one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave;
one sheet between 11 a. ra. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to
leave ; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two
days ago ; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one
to two days ago ; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft
carriers left one to two days ago ; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m.
meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago ; two sheets on line between
8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago ; two
sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three
to four days ago ; two sheets on line between 10 a. ra. and 11 a. m. meaning
battle fleet left five to six days ago ; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and
12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago ; two sheets on line
between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.
"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too com-
plicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One
or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden
by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time.
About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system
of signalling, on what I think was D(!cember 2, 1941. This set of signals con-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 493
tained only eight combinations, as follows : No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared
to leave ; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave ; No. 3 meaning battle
fleet left one to three days ago ; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three
days ago ; No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago ;
No. 6 meaning battle lieet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force
left four to six days ago ; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days
ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One
liglit between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1 ; one light between 8 and D meaning
No. 2 ; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3 ; one light between 10 and
11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two
lights between 8 and 9 p. lu. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have
been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been
used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m.,
meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. ni. meaning No. 2 ; one between 10 and 11
a. m. meaning No. 3 ; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4 ; two pieces
between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5 ; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning
No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my
Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1 ; one between 8 and 9
p. m. would mean No. 2 ; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6 ;
one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7 ; one between 11 and 12
p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.
"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been
used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain
hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning correspond-
ing signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that
position. I do not i-ecall the exact combinations that were to have been used
to indicate each signal.
"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning
the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 it a Chinese rug was
advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised
for ; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate
numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this
system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality be-
tween certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire
between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth.
In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described
to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located.
I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui
which showed the names of the two roads M'hich border that, locality and which
names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein
the fire signals were to be effected.
"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short
wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact
me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box
No. 1476 at Honolulu.
"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope
by me about 8 : 30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was
accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went
to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another
envelope containing $500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in
Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation
with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.
"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted
to the Japanese Counsulate are probably not identical in every detail with those
actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as
those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours
stated for the signals to be given.
4: 4: 4: * 4: 4t 4:
"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no
further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have
I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives.
Apparently [23] no efifort was made by the Consulate to carry either of
the proposed plans into effect through me.
494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor
purchased any property there. I never had a short-vpave transnaitter, and my
Lauikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BAS-LER
had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter
of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about
September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for
one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai
residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30
and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both o|f
whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot
recall the names of these individuals at the present time."
45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the
TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that
vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard
containing $14,000.00 in $100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated
to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his
statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as
follows :
"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one
afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to
Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son
that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son
came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked
me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for
you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where
he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other informa-
tion for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet
of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I
would be willing [2^] to make a test at a certain stated time which was
on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was type-
written and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope
and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite
nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew
what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for
the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted
the money. There were $14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new $100.00 bills,
some $20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make
with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking
me to make this radio test and burned it up."
46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he
had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to
Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHI-
RODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there
MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Maluniu Avenue
in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several
blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo
Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reap-
peared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from the direction in which he had dis-
appeared. (It is. noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later
rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the
Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO
directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above men-
tioned, and identified the places.
47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by
Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese
had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on
either ^3 8 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person
is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORI-
MURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very similar to the
Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was
very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25]
photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it wa« quite similar
to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him ; that he is positive he has
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 495
seen the person represented in 'the photograph before, and believed it probably
was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still
contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him
had been sent by Dr. ROMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in
Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese
liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived
in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco
the following day. , ,,
48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than
himself and the Japanese who delivered the $14,000.00 to him, in any of the
activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that any-
one, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction
with KUEHN. ^ ^
49 In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Con-
sulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth
in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3
December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are
the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated
by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the
advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a
complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of
radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24
November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box
1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the
Honolulu postofflce.
50. Of the original $14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, $5,000.00 in new
$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of
Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also
was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given $2,000.00, in similar denominations,
to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth Kuehn). This money also
was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These
funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, to determine [26"] the persons or agencies through whom they were
transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through,
Honolulu banks.
51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named
therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and
his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District
Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly
suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.
52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July,
1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following informa-
tion appeared on the suspect card :
(Occupation)
"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu None at present
Formerly (1918) officer in Germany Navy; cultivates acquaintances among
officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money
from European source ; frequent trips to Japan ; Mrs. KUEHN recently
(May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable
sum of money with her ; has failed in business but owns considerable real,
estate."
53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District
Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows :
"KUEHN, Friedel— Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of
being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr.
and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are
reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."
496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" we^e furnished to the District In-
telligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated
that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the
request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy
The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general
requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels
and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed!
but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with
an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that
the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information
they furnished according to its value.
55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concern-
ins: "]Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency
failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager
description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto
and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was ob-
tained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs
had contacted the Japanese Consulate.
56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance
in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus
M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has pre-
pared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sec-
tions 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will
be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General,
Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of
the case before the Military Commission.
57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN
conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20
November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, informa-
tion to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of
the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN,
and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed
by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28
November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and
furnishing the same to the consular officials ; and preparing and submitting to
the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals
previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to
the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.
[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50,
and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of
obtaining Information respecting the national defense, and with intent and
reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury
of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan,
unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States
naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.
59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50,
and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted
the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Govern-
ment, through the Consulate.
60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative
•agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would estab-
lish as a fact that any attempt was made, either befoi'e or after 7 December,
1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for
the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still
are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other
person or i)ersons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.
61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period,
1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this
office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report
supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)
Pending — 14ND.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
497
6 February, 1942.
Enclosure {A) : Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers,
aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor,
at OSOO and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.
Date
11/22
11/23
11/24
11/2,5
11/26
11/27
11/28
11/29
11/30
Time
0800
1800
0800
1800
OSOO
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
Types of ships
BBS CAs CLs CVs SSs DDs DMs AVDs (#)
Key: BB— battleship; CA— heavy cruiser; CL— light cruiser; CV— aircraft carrier; SS— submarine;
DD — destroyer; DM — lidht mine layer (destroyer type^; AVD— seaplane tender (destroyer type).
(#) Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their pres-
ent use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.
[1]
Enclosure (B) : Table of nntnber and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor,
by types, at various times between 0600 and ISOO, 28 November, J9Jfl
BATTLKSHIPS (BBS)
0600— At moorings (ARIZONA, NEVADA, OKLAHOMA) 3
0658— NEVADA underway 3
0705— ARIZONA underway 3
0748— NEVADA cleared 2
0801— ARIZONA cleared 1
1045— PENNSYLVANIA entered 2
1053— CALIFORNIA entered 3
1102— MARYLAND entered L 4
1110— TENNESSEE entered 5
1323— WEST VIRGINIA entered 6
1155— PENNSYLVANIA moored 6
1210— CALIFORNIA moored 6
1232— MARYLAND moored 6
1240— TENNESSEE moored 6
1306— WEST VIRGINIA moored 6
1547— UTAH moored (#) 7
1648— UTAH moored (#) 7
1800 — At moorings 7
( # ) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and
used as a target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a
ba ttleship.
HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)
0600 — At moorings 11
0625— NORTHAMPTON underway 11
0632— CHESTER underway 11
0040— SALT LAKE CITY underway 11
0718— NORTHAMPTON cleared 10
0727— CHESTER cleared 9
0735— SALT LAKE CITY cleared 8
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 33
498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LIGHT CBUISEES (CLS)
0600— Underway in harbor (DETROIT) 1
0637— DETROIT cleared 0
113&— HELENA entered 1
[2] 1131— HONOLULU entered 2
1148— ST. LOUIS entered 3
1200— PHOENIX entered 4
1212— RALEIGH entered 5
1250— HELENA moored 5
1300— HONOLULU moored 5
3300— RALEIGH moored 5
1305— PHOENIX moored 5
3328— ST. LOUIS moored 5
1350— DETROIT entered 6
1510— DETROIT moored 6
1800 — ^At moorings 6
AIRCEAi'T CAEBIEES (OVS)
0600— At moorings (LEXINGTON, ENTERPRISE) 2
0735— ENTERPRISE underway 2
0838— ENTERPRISE cleared 1
1800 — ^At moorings 1
SUBMABINES (SSS)
0600 — ^At moorings 4
1254— ARGONAUT underway 4
1300— TROUT underway 4
1340— ARGONAUT cleared 3
1350— TROUT cleared 2
1800— At moorings 2
[S] DESTEOYERS (DOS)
0600 — ^At moorings or underway 26
0602— MUGFORD cleared 25
0605— GRIDLEY cleared 24
0608— MAURY cleared 23
0612— BAGLEY cleared 22
0617— HENLEY cleared 21
0620— CRAVEN cleared 20
0621— PATTERSON cleared ^'—^ 19
0623— BALCH cleared 18
0625— HELM cleared 17
0628— RALPH TALBOT cleared 16
0630— FANNING cleared 15
0632— McCALL cleared 14
0640— DUNLAP cleared 13
0641— BENHAM cleared 12
0647— CONYNGHAM cleared 11
1205— WORDON entered 12
1221— ALYWIN entered ■ 13
1228— CONYNGHAM entered 14
1232— CASSIN entered 15
1236— HULL entered 16
1248— DALE entered 17
1245— REID entered 18
1247— DOWNES entered 19
1254— DEWEY entered 20
1300— MONAGHAN entered 21
1308— TUCKER entered 22
1318— CONYNGHAM moored 22
1330— FARRAGUT entered 23
1333— CASE entered 24
1336— MAoDONOUGH entered 25
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 499
1340— PHELPS entered 26
1345— CASSIN moored 26
1350— ALYWIN moored 26
1350— REID moored 26
1407— DOWNES moored 26
1412— TUCKER moored 26
1425— WORDEN moored 26
1435— DALE moored 26
1440^CASE moored 26
1446— MONAGHAJSr moored 26
1446— HULL moored 26
1459— DEWEY moored 26
1459— FARRAGUT moored 26
1515— PHELPS moored 26
1530— MacDONOUGH moored 26
1800— At moorings 26
[4] MINESWEEPERS (DMS)
0600— At moorings 8
0610— GAMBLE underway 8
0612— MONTGOMERY underway- 8
0615— BREESE underway 8
0625— RAMSAY underway 8
0652— GAMBLE cleared 7
0655— MONTGOMERY cleared 6
0657— BREESE cleared__ 5
0700— RAMSAY cleared 4
1800 — At moorings 4
SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)
0600— At moorings 3
1800— At moorings 8
United States Naval Intelligence Service
investigation report
Confidential
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activies.
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14tli Naval District Date : 14 Feb., 1942.
Report made by : Lieutenant ( jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending.
Origin of Case :
Receipt of DI0-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul
General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Wash-
ington.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul
General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval
subjects.
Copy to:
ONI
(5)
CinCPac
(1)
C0M14
(1)
FBI-Hon
(2)
MID-H
(2)
14ND
(3)
Source File No. : 14ND #54A
Synopsis: During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General,
Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval
vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such
facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which
ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.
Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl
Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of
battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very in-
accurate as to destroyers.
500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data
gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside tlie Navy
Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was
engaged in this espionage activity.
The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets
were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.
Deductions : Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in
many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor,
absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to
protect battleships in the harbor.
Approved ;
I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence OMcer.
WBS/zw
[i] Confidential 14 Febeuaby 1942.
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
References: (a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject 2-&-42.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI
KOTOSHIRODO, 2-8^2.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAJNII,
2-6-42.
1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a).
It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence trans-
mitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and
(b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.
2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese
Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the Dis-
trict Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation by reliable conlidential informants. Only such of those communi-
cations that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report.
As stated in reference (a), topics of the despatches hereinafter discussed were
received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on
5 December, 1941, but were in code or ciplier and could not be evaluated immed-
iately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December,
1941.
3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to
date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor,
and their entry and departure thereform, was gained by the simple expedient of
observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard.
From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by
Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consu-
late ; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl
Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of
reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of
reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA per-
sonally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting ob-
servers who lived in that vicinity ; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned
in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate
to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the
Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for
the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings
to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA and other Consulate ob-
servers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.
4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following des-
patch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo :
WYOMING and two seaplane-tenders departed third.
(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where
obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy
Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December,
1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above des-
patch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1
December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 501
tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December,
clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the barbor on 5
December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further
reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was
no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the
UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.
5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister
TOGO by the local Consulate :
USS HONOLULU arrived 1300/4th.
From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS
HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300,
on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese
attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either
entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at
Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, be-
tween 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.
6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request
has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message
was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:
The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth,
entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day
the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships
were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth : 8 battleships ; 3 light cruisers ;
16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2
destroyers.
The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One
(ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between
0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed
by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled
to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch
to Tokyo.
7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts.
The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with
the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735,
the same morning.
8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December,
and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight
battleships moored in Pearl Harbor : PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARY-
LAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA.
The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore,
correct.
9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light
cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the
vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU. HELENA, ST.
LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the
heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that
afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.
10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were
twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed,
before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in
theharbor. proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the
harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon
of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.
11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been
able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now
used as mine-layers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as
to all destroyer-type ships are presented : At 0800. on 5 December, 1941, there
were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor.
Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered,
and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of
destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, be-
tween 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between
a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.
12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four
cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that after-
502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
noon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon on 5 December, the four
HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there
since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in,
on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on
the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class
until after the Japanese attack As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels
entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.
13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch
from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of
interest :
Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships
after the fourth.
There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when
the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet move-
ments. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was
not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941,
14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following
message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington :
On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper entered
port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows : 9 battleships ; 3 light cruis-
ers ; 17 destroyers ; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock : 4 light cruisers ; 3 de-
stroyers. (CA and CV all ) PS — CV cannot be found in the fleet.
The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts :
The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl
Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.
15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the
following are the true facts : If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should
be in this situation., where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYO-
MING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.
16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW
ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU,
HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.
17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels
in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of de-
stroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0800,
6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two
more destroyesr entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and
there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of
twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December,
as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In
addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day —
four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three sea-
plane tenders (AVDs) — which to the untrained observer might have appeared
also to be destroyers.
18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in
Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered
at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again
at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the
harbor.
19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms
"moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at
moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in
dry dock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was
determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at
moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was
in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were
moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the
two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was :
nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.
20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there
were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of
the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact,
the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.
21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at
1248, which called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not
yet been found in the Consulate traffic) :
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 503
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123 :
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp
Davis, N. C, on the American mainland. They considered (at that time)
the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Pana-
ma. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations
selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No
evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded
that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually pro-
vided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa
Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for
torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.
[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above
despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the
message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further
comment thereon is offered.
22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts
which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local
Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being
used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on
the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above
despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet
been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.
23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the move-
ments of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen
and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.
24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following
message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco :
Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the
mainland on second. Lurliiie arrived from San Francisco on third.
The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LUPiLINE
is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having
left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.
25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the
following message for transmission to Tokyo:
On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and
departed early on the fourth, about 1100 tons ; one stack ; and had a four-inch
gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and
were receiving mail at the British Consulate.
[S] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian
merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and
departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE
ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul
for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could
give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the
Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks.
That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT'S crew went
ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.
26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December,
1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars :
A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure
of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)
B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 14.)
C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU.
(Paragraph 5.)
D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting
only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9) .
E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on
5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)
F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs
6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)
G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at
moorings. (Paragraph 14.)
27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it
is concluded that :
504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship
movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTO-
SHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other
evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.
B. The observers were relatively untrained, with tlie possible exception of
MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9]
to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the er-
roneous reports.)
C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly
from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING
(whereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily available in Honolulu,
clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her turrets and the UTAH not to
have them), and from the fact that all battleships were reported on 6 December
to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.
D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is
concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was
surprisingly inaccurate.
28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature
have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, re-
porting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival
of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral
H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through
Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been
collected and are appended hereto in enclosure ( A) .
Pending
[i] 14 Februaky 1942.
ENCLOSURE (A) : Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul
General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and
naval subjects.
21 MABCH, 1941
(To Tokyo ; by code mail to Washington)
According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn
and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland
on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark,
Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney — both groups on a friendly
visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return
to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane.
Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and
that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th,
that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The
maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.
29 APBIL, 1941
(To Tokyo)
The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons
of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the
morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading
2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and
she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting
troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.
14 MAY, 1941
(To Tokyo)
With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing
the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General
Emmons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived
Hickman Field at 0558 the 14th.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 505
7 JtTNE, 1941
(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)
1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started
conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance
seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an anoiincement by Navy Department oflBcials Admiral Kim-
mel brought plans for sending units [3] of the fleet back to the mainland
for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels
to return were not announced.
13 JUNE, 1941
(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)
Reference San Francisco Msg #92 :
SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hun-
dreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the llth and sailed the
12th.
26 JUNE, 1941
(To Tokyo)
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.
27 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo)
Chungking — Burma Road — trucks
28 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)
Danial Arnstein, Hai'old Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4]
Managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the
28th via Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road
from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).
8 JULY 1941
(To Tokyo and Washington)
A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that
American pilots are joining the China Air Force: The local Chinese Consul
General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local
air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attache
in Washington (makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English
(language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone
(?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.
15 JULY, 1941
(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)
On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the
effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the
West coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test
gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.
26 JULY 1941
(To Washington and Tokyo)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral
Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in
506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harhor for the purpose of in-
specting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same
plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the
purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese
assets here.
2 SEPTEMBER 1941
(To Washington and Tokyo)
On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship
(called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked
by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) enter port
hei-e enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics.
Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance
party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and
they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.
23 SEPTEMBER 1941
(To Tokyo)
Magruder to Chungking via Manila.
18 NOVEMBER 1941
(To Tokyo) '
Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000 — 2 ton trucks.
United States Naval Intelligence Service
investigation report
Confidential
Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — ^Espionage Activities.
Report made at: 14ND— Honolulu, T. H. Date: June 15, 1942
Report made by: Lieut, (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Wood-
rum, USNR
Period covered : February 15 — June 15, 1942 Status of Case : Pending — ^14ND
Origin of Case: General investigation of espionage activities of Japanese Con-
sulate General, Honolulu. See reference (a).
References : See first page of details.
Character of Investigation : Espionage
Enclosures: None
Copy to:
ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Coml4 (1)
MID-HD (2) Zone II (1)
FBI-Hon (2) Zone III (1)
14ND (3)
Source File No. : 14ND/#54-A ONI File No. :
Synopsis: Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu,
indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu
in March 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the
movements of U. S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.
MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he
would attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do.
His work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office,
involved poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not
known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much
time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City
peninsula and Aiea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa
beach (a potential landing place), Kaneohe Bay (across from the Naval Air
Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives
around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 507
MIKAMI, regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHIRODO
alone to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5, 1941.
MORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned.
Deductions: Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in
reference (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA.
Approved :
I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. 8. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.
WBS/cop
W\ June 15, 1942
Subject : Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Activities
References :
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9.
1942.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14,
1942.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated Febru-
ary 3, 1942.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated
February 3, 1942.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated
February 3, 1942.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Richard Masayuki KOTO-
SHIRODO, dated February 8, 1942.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated Janu-
ary 29, 1942.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated June
15, 1942.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI,
dated February 6, 1942.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kenzo MAEHARA, dated
May 11, 1942.
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ryuichi MORIBE, dated
March 6, 1942.
(1) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ikuzo SATO, dated May 16,
1942.
This report has been prepared to supplement references (a) and (b), and to
demonstrate, insofar as is known to this office, the means by which the Japanese
Consulate General, Honolulu, gathered information relative to ship movements.
1. In paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of reference (a), it was stated that, when
interrogated. Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist and typist at the Consulate,
and subject of reference (c), stated that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secre-
taries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the
ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate,
but did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days
following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned to a desk
in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work
there was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about
1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk
in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October or
November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE
often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100, and
she would not see him again the same day. The [2] staff of the Consulate
usually called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South
Vineyard Street, Honolulu, (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORI-
MURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshie
MIKAMI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions,
Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Con-
sulate clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and
other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions,
neither of them came back for the rest of the day.
2. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of
Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time.
508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the
map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his
desk.
3. Takaichi SAKAI, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (d), when interro-
gated, corroborated Miss DOUE's statements about MORIMURA's failure to
concern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the
Consulate during business hours.
4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e), also
was interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the
middle or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand
was without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said
concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours
with KOTOSHIRODO, adding the KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport)
shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.
5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to "important
places", and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said "military places."
On being asked why he though they were going to such places, SAHARA said
it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan,
and because neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention
of where they had gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added
that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.
6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's
background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Oflice publication
containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular oflBcials.
He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if [3] he is a regu-
lar member of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not
at his age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told
Sakae TNAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedai University.)
7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO
were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they
entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not
strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and
clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about
the same age and seemed to enjoy one another's company.
8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHIRODO was interviewed, and his per-
sonal history is set forth in reference (f). (It should be noted that none of the
Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections
with the Japanese Government.)
9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to receive and
open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He usually logged
in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were actually opened
by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he wrote
down the date of receipt and the number of each item from the Foreign Office,
which was addressed to the Consul-General, but he did not see the actual letters,
as those usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI Vi-ould take this mail in to
Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there is would go into the Consul's office. Each
letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was signed and returned to
the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to SEKI from the Vice
Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter the subject of each
letter and its date in a record book.
10. SEKI's predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to
Japan late in 1940. (It was recentlv learned that while he was in Hawaii,
IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)
11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two
types — that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and
letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive
numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths,
marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the
circular letters addressed to all Consulates, would arrive by post, and would be
picked up at the Consulate's post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered
by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. This
would be opened in the telegraph [4] (or, coding) room by Samon
TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail
in a suitcase, and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accom-
panied by the Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remem-
ber the same courier ever coming twice, and lie added that one would not neces-
sarily arrive every time an N. Y. K. liner called at Honolulu.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION • 509
12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not
logged in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign OflSce, other
Japanese Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of the
local mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine reports.
13. OflJce supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted
as treasurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar
with the purchasing. Most office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu
Paper Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTO-
SHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK
STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minora FUJUWARA, the manager.
NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Confidential In-
formant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA
was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was
no evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was
noted that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down,
with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual — one might
say, unique — coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKA-
MURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of
business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information
of any nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned.
14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his
activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not
altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived
at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new
secretary over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Hono-
lulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Waipahu,
a plantation town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the
Middle Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious
to visit a tea house called the SHIOYU, which was oft the higliway to the left
below the high school, and which was noted for its balloon fish soup. KOTO-
SHIRODO had been there before. The Consulate chauffeur, Ichitaro OZAKI,
advised that it was impossible to get service there without prior reservation,
but MORIMURA insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said,
"Let's not go," and MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following
this admission, KOTO- [5] SHIRODO displayed a reluctance to remem-
ber any further trips with MORIMURA outside of town, but was finally per-
suaded to recall trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii.
15. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul
OKUDA. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Hono-
lulu, at 8 : 00 a. m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui
airport an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The
driver was a second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with
MORIMURA. MORIMURA spoke little English and had difficulty understanding
the local Nisei brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this
driver for the two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded
to the TOMEDA HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast
port of Maui. KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with
a "funny eye" (elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). INIORIMURA
talked to the owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced
himself. (The TOMOEDA HOTEL was operated by one Itsuo HAMADA. A
report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
dated March 10, 1941, described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either
injured or made of glass. HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an
agent for the Nippu Jiji, a Honolulu bilingual (Japanese-English) daily news-
paper. HAINIADA is now in custody.)
16. It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo
FURUKAWA, the activities of whom were reported in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and
12 of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sana-
tarium. Maui, were found in FURUKAWA'g possession, and it is known that
HAMADA visited FURUKAWA. at Kula, a number of times. It was also re-
ported that the two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA's
letters was a forceful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide
from his mind. FURUKAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two
attempts at suicide following the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked
of Japanese poetry, FURUKAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before
entering Kula Sanatarium, FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the
Nippu Jiji, of which HAMADA was the Kahului representative.
510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at HAMADA's
hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not stay because
the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove to the Grand
Hotel in Wailuku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They i*egistered here, and then
drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the United States Fleet,
when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They stopped at a fountain
shop for a while, then drove back to Wailuku. From here they drove to Spreckles-
ville, a few miles from Wailuku. There KOTOSHIRODO went to a [6]
Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul General KITA had re-
quested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the i)erson to whom it was ad-
dressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package contained a gift of
some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the woman to whom it was
addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils. A report from the
Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated April 11, 1942,
states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language school at Spi'eckels-
ville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years, and had served
as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was taken into cus-
tody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee Hearing Board
at Wailuku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While KOTOSHIRODO
was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in the car. Alter
leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then returned to the
hotel in Wailuku about 4 : 00 p. m. After dinner they took a walk, saw a
swimming meet, and about 9 : 00 p. m. dropped down to the fairgrounds hall
where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did not
dance. They returned to the hotel about 11 : 00 p. m.
18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited lao Valley,
located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they
drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10,000 feet
above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained
at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Kula
Sanatarium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the sana-
tarium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO ad-
mitted taking a photograph of the building which he still has in his album. He
insisted that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to
anyone else at the Consulate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao
district, in central Maui, and arrived at the airport about 3 : 30 p. m. The
plane took off at 4 : 00 p. m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5 : 00 p. in.\
(The fact of MORIMURA's interest in the Kula region should be read in con-
nection with the information reported in paragraphs 4, 9, 10, and 11 of reference
(a).)
19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO. was made October 13-17,
1941. Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO accompany
MORIMURA. They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving in Hilo
about 10 : 00 a. m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during their
entire visit. His name was NARIKAWA. employed by the ABC TAXI COM-
PANY (probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kameliameha Avenue, Hilo).
MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated
by the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned
Room 8. After lunch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilauea Volcano, and
spent the entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO
PHOTO STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and
of the tehna flower. The [7] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO
STUDIO was then Kenzo MAEHARA, subject of i-eference (j), who has been
placed in custodial detention, principally for his association with officers of
Japanese naval and other public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On Oc-
tober 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOS'HIRODO drove to the Kona district (west
side of Hawaii), via Kilauea Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA
HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor
of the hotel bearing his surname, this office has no derogatory information.)
At Kona. they stayed at the KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa. but according to
KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien
Japanese, proprietor of the KONA HOTEL (has no adverse record in the files
of this office.) On the evening of the 14th, IMORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO
went to a motion picture show at Kainaliu, about seven miles from Holualoa.
20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are a
number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODA preferred
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION ' 511
to stay at the Nauiloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is
the most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in
three and one-half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must
have been made, inasmuch as Waiohinu is only a little more than half way between
Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Nauiloa, the Kona lun,
also operated by luter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and catering
to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese hotel.
21. On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to
see cattle shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the immense Parker Ranch, and
other smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaau,
in the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked
to an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man
told them about the birth and childhood of Kamehameha (probably Kamehameha
I, (1758-1819), first king of Hawaii.) Directories show the proprietor of this
hotel to be one Yoshio HOIII. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only to
view Akaka Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night, after
dinner, they went to the Hanauoya Tea House where they met two Japanese
girls. The chauffeur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about
4:00 a. m.
22. Tlie following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the
Pligh School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow
Falls, the Country Club golf course, Puumaile Home (county hospital for tuber-
cular patients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the Tokiwatei. They re-
turned to Hilo about 2 :00 p. m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya
Tea House, but left at 11 :00 p. m.
[S] 23. On October 17th, they checked out of the hotel and went directly
to the airport, taking the 10 : 00 a. m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in
Honolulu at 11 : 45 a. m.
24. KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver and the
old man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaau were the only persons they contacted
on the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled money
which was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui trip he
was given $110,000, and on the Hawaii trip, $300.00. On the latter trip they
spent $65.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them $55.00.
25. KOTOSHORODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points
on Oahu with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks
after MORIMURA's arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him
motoring to the Kaneohe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned
into the Kokokahi road which runs along Kaneohe Bay (across from Kaneohe
Naval Air Station) . They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach
pavilion. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the pai-k on the ocean side
of the pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the Kailua
Theater, and then turned left on the road running to the Waimanalo district.
Here they stopped near the old wharf on Waimanalo beach. They walked over to
the wharf where several people were fishing. After about ten minutes, they got
back in the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the Consulate about 4 : 00
p. m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA again made a
trip to the Kaneohe district. This time they went in MIKAMI's taxi. Again they
followed the Kokokahi road along Kaneohe Bay, and at one point MORIMURA
told MIKAMI to slow down. Further, along the road they stopped at a roadside
stand and purchased two watermelons. This stand was near a pine grove (KOTO-
SHIRODO evidently mistook ironwood trees for pines), on the mauka (towards
the mountains) side of the road. They drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI
had breakfast, while MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer.
They were served by a waitress of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty
minutes they returned to the Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.
26. On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary Ceme-
mony, when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO and
MORIMURA to Waianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out beyond
Waianae to Makua Cave, where the road ends. They departed from town about
ten in the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a Chinese store
in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to Haleiwa, on the
northwest coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first trip was made in
the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near a ballground, for
about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both the trip to, and
[9] the trip from, Haleiwa were made via Wahiawa. The second trip oc-
512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
furred some time in May ; the tliird in July. On neither trip did they get out
of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the mauka-ewa (towards
the mountain— towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl City intersection
for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA talked with any-
one on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae and Haleiwa
beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy troops might
first attempt landings.
27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTOSHI-
RODO up on Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out of
the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used
binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November
they again drove to Aiea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO's
car, and they were thei-e about ten o'clock in the morning. MORIMURA di-
rected thefp to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom
he was visiting was a Mrs. MATSUO. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the
house, too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to
her, and asked here about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese
people in that district. Mrs. MATSUO hesitated, and refused to give a definite
answer, stating that there were other people in the district who knew more
about such matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORI-
MURA said that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about
20 minutes. Afterwards they drove directly back to the Consulate.
28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hono-
lulu, and Lieutenant G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO
concerning MORIMURA's visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a ni.sci whose husband, now
deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered
the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember
their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate.
She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated.
She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolulu Plantation were
being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if tliey weren't "suspected". Mrs.
MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were
not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO
wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agents
concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs. MAT-
SUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO's house an excellent
view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.
29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove to the
top of Punchbowl about 8: 30 a. m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which
overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely
looked at the view and drove down again.
[10] 30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely
as KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO
only after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to
various areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with
MORIMURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of all
he had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been reari'anged
in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.
31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to
the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they went
in MIKAMl's taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car. On the peninsula
proper they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water
stand belonging to Teisaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However,
they did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old.
His soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this
spot, one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.
32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a
taxi and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his
arrival, SEKI accompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clipper
landing at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from
SEKI.) About a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive
him to the peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO's car. Thev got out of the car and
bought soft drinks at ETO's stand. MORIMURA talkal to the ETOs, both the
old man and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had
been situated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORI-
MURA had a previous introduction to the ETOs, or had merely struck up an
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 513
acquaintance. KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA
speak uf ETC. They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amus-
ing that an alien Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a
naval base.
33. Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese
who worlved at a store on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the high-
way at the junction of Kamehameha Highway and Pearl City Road. MORI-
MURA would talk to this Japanese while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball
■machines. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six
times a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last
time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in September,
1941. When KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl City junction, he identi-
fied the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken to
the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify
any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat
as the person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was
owned and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.
ill\ 34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April, 1941, all the
Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a
picnic at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went
to their destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way
to the WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalanianaole Highway around
Koko Head. They started out about 9:3U a. m. and arrived about 10:80 a. m.
They lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served
coconut juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a
middle-aged Hawaiian couple. At about 3 : 00 p. m. they left for home, returning
to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali. They reached the Consulate shortly before
4 : 00 p. m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam
WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKU-
RADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently
arranged the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on accasions,
and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is located,
through a Mrs. BECKLEY, who arranged luaus (Hawaiian feasts). MIKAMI
sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its desti-
nation. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, housekeeper
for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAMI
arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.
35. KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps
at the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of
the Island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice
Consul study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on
this map, or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a
new Geological Survey map of Oahu (192S edition), and he believed that this
was identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO
also stated that he had seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific
Ocean with a compass and protractor.
36. In light of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the
KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on Janu-
ary 6, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake
of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated
that he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shop-
ping, to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. He added
that while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. He
had been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely
reluctant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was ob-
tained. He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where
views were obtained of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. He said that several
times MORIMURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view
could be obtained. At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes.
MIKAMI believed that [12] MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but
was unable to say whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO
went along with them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion
he had driven MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island.
They stopped at "Sato's restaurant" in Haleiwa. ("Sato's restaurant" has been
identified as the SEAVIEW INN, owned by Ikuzo SATO, subject of reference
(1). It is known that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 34
514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese naval officers, a stop was made at the SBAVIEW INN, usually to eat
lunch. While such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW
INN is the logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it
should be noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach,
which is considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt
a lauding.) :MIKAMI went on to state tliat lie had driven MORIMURA to
Wahiawa on two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Scho-
field Barracks, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because
MIKAMI's taxi did not have proper identitieatiou plates. He also stated that
on one occasion, he drove Tomoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK
STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consulate, to Waipalu;.
They saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was.) (When
question separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such
a trip.) MIKAMI also confirmed the irip to Waianae mentioned by
KOTOSHIRODO.
37. MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and also
admitted having stopped at ETO's stand at the end of the Pearl City peninsula.
However, he claimed that he did not know ETO's name. He stated that sometimes
he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He remembered hearing
the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet had just gone out, and that
his business prospered when the fleet was in, but fared otherwise when the fleet
was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball machines while MORIMURA con-
versed with ETO. When taken out to ETO's stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large
pile of lumber on the east side of the boat landing. He stated that this occupied a
spot to which he and MORIMURA once walked in order to obtain a better view of
the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.
38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimano
Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles to a
point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At this
particular point, and in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The view
of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which probably
accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once.
39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honouliuli. Here MIKAMI indicated a
Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated MORI-
MURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA
[13] to Honouliuli only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil in-
stallation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main highway,
which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted that this same
highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort Weaver and
the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI denied that
he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.
40. At Aiea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Aiea Heights to a
point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of
Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot to which the agents had previ-
ously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIKAMI stated that he had taken
MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least one occasion,
MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes observing
Pearl Harbor.
41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA to
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort Shafter
and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway. MIKAMI
stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030. Other ships,
led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but he could not say
how many battleships were in the line. However, he remembered that the ship
behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large, and the other ships were
strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl Harbor that afternoon.
(In paragraphs 0 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted that prior to the arrival of
the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl Harbor on December 5.
1941, there were five battleships already moored. The ARIZONA. NEVADA, and
OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys of Pearl Harbor between
0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)
42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORI-
MURA to ETO's stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and
MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO
to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked
if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about
his mission. MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 515
ships. When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would say
only that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to see
the Naval base.
43. In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again interrogated.
He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about four times
without INIORIiMURA, the last time in the latter part of November, 1941. He
usually received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA, who would
direct him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any [lJf]>
change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTOSHIRODO
stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission. On this
last trip, as well as on certain other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO had gone to
Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the latter made a
rough sketch of the harbor showing the approximate locations of the usual
battleship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. Not much efnphasis was placed on
the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip KOTO-
SHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking to.
anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the
Pearl City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford
Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the mooring
on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of thef penin-
sula pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."
43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his
own car, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor.
This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he
made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July to
November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November
27 or 28. 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same
week. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time
during December. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that MORI-
MURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending a
good deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate
paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and
repair bills he paid himself.
44. On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO Jane's Fight-
ing Ships. One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was
that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and
that MORIMURA had used the word "yagura" /literally, "turret"/ to describe
the cage masts on certain battleships.
45. KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Consulate,
he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as
he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kailvia, as described
in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone
outside of the Consulate. ■
46. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGE-
NAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. IMORIMURA took KOTO-
SHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to
Washington and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that
MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and
seemed to know them. (The [15] VENICE CAFE drew the largest part
of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an
alien, about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of
Japanese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photo-
graphs of high Japanese naval ofiicers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as
a photograph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips
to Japan. In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the
Shore Patrol, to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE,
flagship of a Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Com-
mander Dix accepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the
Japanese Consulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHI-
GENAGA arranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the
Japanese oflicers present, from the Adm.iral on down, as equals. SHIGENAGA
has been interned for the duration of the war.)
47. On February 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of
the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant Kimball
interrogated Kimika ASAKURA. who v>'as employed as a maid at the Consul
General's residence from June 16. 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA
is a dual citizen who was born at Alea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA
516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home
on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate.
She had never seen FUJITA before, but she believed that he knew her father.
She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Pauoa Valley, Hono-
lulu. He drove her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to
Ichitaro OZ.\KI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokichi SEKI, who en-
gaged her services. Miss ASAKURA's duties at the Consulate were to clean
the Consul General's living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The
Consul General lived upstairs in a building which is on the niakai (towards the
sea) side of the ofhce building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a
room with Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which
MORIMURA lived.
48. Miss ASAKURA's predecessor at the Consul General's residence was a
girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had
been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from
Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul's
employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.
49. Consul General KITA's most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA.
IMORIMURA w.ould drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a
month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about
treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had
never lieard MORIMURA discuss business matters with KITA.
[16] 50. The mauka (towards the mountains) residence in the Consulate
residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and his
family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one
of the residences facing on Kuakini Street, while Kyonosuke YUGE, another
secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur, and
his wife, lived above the garage.
51. Miss ASAKURA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul
General about 8:30 a. ;u. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA
was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast. Miss
ASAKUR.\ did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual v,-ay of serving that
meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help himself.
She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the ofhce building
to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the morning, reporters
came to the residencp and asked for KITA. When the maid could not find him at
the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might be at his office. There-
after, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and assisted in serving members
of the staff, who were all living in the office building. She stated that her services
as an interpreter were frequently used by the detectives who were placed on guard
duty at the Consulate from and after the morning of December 7th.
52. On February 11. 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshio KIKKAWA.
Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her- position at the Consulate
through Toyoki FUJITA. who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised
flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA.
Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate
grounds facing Kuakini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters
in the Consul General's house with INIiss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated
that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o'clock in the morning, had breakfast at
nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o'clock. He
lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office about
three. After that, MQRIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds with
other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened to the
radio, or went out with friends.
53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would
get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about
three in the afternoon with KOTOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several
hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions, KOTO-
SHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She stated that
Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to see MORIMURA
after dinner. Sakae TANAKA. a former maid at the Consulate, came to see
MORIMURA several [/7] times in the evening after she had left the
Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to MORIMURA's house
several times in the evenings, and remained two or three hours. On eight or nine
occasions, after attending tea hou.se parties, MORIMURA slept until noon. Each
morning, MORIMURA had to be wakened. In September, 1&41, MORIMURA
went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about noon, he was still drunk, and he
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 517
made considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA went to the Consulate office
building and informed SEKI, who came over and induced MORIMURA to go back
to bed and sleep off his drunken condition. Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study,
and in this was a wooden desk which he kept locked. On several occasions. Miss
KIKKAWA saw letters written by MORIMURA, but the characters were too diffi-
cult for her to read, she said. She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA
to a girl at a tea house. This letter she couhl read ; it was a love letter written
to a girl named Tomoyoko. (Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball
later interviewed "Tomoyoko", a geisha. She admitted her association with
MORIMURA, and told of a golf game she and another (jeisha once played with
MORIMURA and Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left
Honolulu for Japan on the Taiyo Maru, November 5. 1941.)
54. On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the
agents, left the Consulate about 11 : 30 a.m. She had set breakfast on the table
for MORIMURA about 8:30 a.m. There was a slip of paper on the table direct-
ing her to put breakfast on tlie table and then go home. MORIMURA usually
left such messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing noticeably dilferent
about his activities just prior to December 7th, she said. Miss KIKKAWA
emphaticallv stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that he was "awful" and
said "nasty'things." MORIMURA told miss KIKKAWA that he had lost the tip
of his linger "on account of love". (It has been noted from several sources that
one of MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or third linger, was cut off at
tile first knuckle. However, the various observers have been uncertain which
liand was mutilated.) Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA was quite
friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter for the Honolulu Star-
Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone MORIMURA, and on
one occasion that she knew of, they went to a tea house together.
55. Also on February 11, 1&42, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the
agents. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her
father, Yokichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on
March 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941.
She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she
liad obtained her job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words,
"he put me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with
the cook, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open.
Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA.
She [18] stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he
refused to tell her anything about it. She often went toi the house where
MORIMURA lived, to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there. MORIMURA
told here that he could not, and would not, let her go into his study room.
5tJ. One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA
over tv Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while
Miss TANAKA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with
MIKAMI in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. After
the boat trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to
Honolulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA asked MIKAMI
questions about Coconut Island, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not
remember any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While
at Kaneohe they drove by Dr. Iga MORI'S country place and stopped and looked
at it. However, Dr. MORI was not there, so they did not go into the house.
(Dr. MORI is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu,
and was an advisor to the Consulate. He was taken into custody following the
outbreak of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition,
subsequently was released.) Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going
to the Kaneohe district, they had driven up Aiea Heights in MAKAMI's taxi.
57. Robert Orion Glover, Cy (AA) USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio
(-'elisor, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORI-
MURA, having met him through his membership in the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU
KAI. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction
of Dr. Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATARIUM, Hono-
lulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A kendo (fencing)
gruup, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941.
One George HAMAMOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared
that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAMAMOTO
introduced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORI-
MURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the
518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before,
and that he was an accomplished kendo man. In his kendo matches and instruct-
ing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described
by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA
stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had
proved best in the China "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak
English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to under-
stand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in the haoles
(whites) in the kendo elass, and asked them many questions as to who they
were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions.
Besides Glover, there wei'e two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c,
USNR, and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman. Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor. MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of
his wild parties, but the invitation was not accepted.
58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around
Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he
was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much.
MORIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with
a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep
sea fishing on sampans.
59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose
professional name is "Sadako", also was interviewed by the investigators. She
stated that MORIMURA and Ryuichi MORIBE, subject of reference (k), once
held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is
not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been in-
terned, is. a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Honolulu.
He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General KITA,
Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close to the
Consulate. )
60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who
had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agencies,
and new leads are fi'^m time to time uncovered in the investigation of seemingly
unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The same will
be developed in further reports imder the general title of this case, or under
individual case titles, as may be appropriate.
PENDING— 14ND
United States Inteixigence Service
Confidential investigation report
Fourteenth Naval District
Subject : Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Activities
Reporr made at : 14ND— Honolulu, T. H. Date : Feb. 15, 1943
Report made by: Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.
Period covered : June 15, 1942-Feb. 10, 1943 Status of Case : PENDING— 14ND
Origin of Case : Investigation of espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu
Character of Investigation : Espionage
Enclosures: (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHI-
RODO, dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kauai". (Photostat to ONI ; copies
to others.)
Copy to: ONI (5)
14ND (3)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)
Zone II (1)
Zone III (1)
Zone IV (1)
CinCPae (1)
Coml4 (1)
Source File No. 14ND/54(c) ONI File No. :
Synopsis. — Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were re-
interviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 519
Review of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate
was concerned only in "legal" espionage ; that is, that which could be discovered
by observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted area. Interest
was displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and any
new construction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power plant
on Kauai. Kicliard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July, l'J41, to
collect information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken by Secre-
tary Tadasi MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made for
general survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these individuals
established contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evidence
that Vice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui.
Other information indicates that the Consulate was granted an allowance for
"Korean Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close con-
tact with Korean nationalist movements.
Deductions :
Appioved
I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.
By direction
WBS/cop
\U February 15, 1943,
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
References :
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard
Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Takaichi
SAKAI.
(f ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi
MURACKA.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye
SAHARA.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 19421, subject John Yoshiye
M IK AMI.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro
MATSUO.
(j) FBI-Honolulu report, file 97-274, dated November 12, 1942, subject Noah
Kwang Won CHO (available at Washington and Honolulu),
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Isuke HORI-
KAWA.
(1) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji HIRA-
YAMA.
(m) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi KA-
WAZOE.
(n) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 3, 1942, subject Kenneth
Kilsoo HAAN.
(o) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject
Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles,
and Honolulu),
(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
(q) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford
KONDO.
(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO,
(s) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OH-
TOMO.
(t) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE
POSTAL EMPLOYEES.
(u) FBI-Honolulu Confidential Report, file 65-414, dated April 25, 1942, sub-
ject JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H. (CONFILE).
(v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF
JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.
( w ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimie DO! JE.
520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set
forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1942,
all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still avail-
able were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by
the Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Honolulu ; and the District Intelligence Office. In addition, a number of
other individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the
espionage activities of the Consulate were interviewed.
2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the
interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu :
Military Intelligence Division :
Captain Frank O. Blake
Special Agent William T. Hiraoka
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu
Special Agent J. Harold Hughes
Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa
District Intelligence Office
Lieutenant G. P. Kimball
Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson
Ensign Don Woodrum
3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office by
representatives of the three agencies :
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO — Formerly employed as a clerk at the
Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).
Joan Kimie KOTOSHIRODO— Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
Takaichi SAKAI — Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate,
subject of reference (e).
Katsukichi MURAOKA — Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Con-
sulate, subject of reference (f).
[3] Kanaye SAHARA — Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese
Consulate, subject of reference (g) .
Yasumasa IVIURATA A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.
Miss Kimie DOUE — Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese
Consulate; subject of reference (w).
John Yoshiye MIKAMI — Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of
reference (b).
Albert Shuichi HAYASHI — Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
Koreshige KUDO — Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
Shotaro NIIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO — Regular taxi driver for Keilzi
KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y'. K. line. He is the subject
of reference (i).
ICHITARO OZAKI— Consulate chauffeur.
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA— Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasi MORI-
MURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Maui.
4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intelli-
gence Division alone :
U] Shingo NARIKAWA— Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and MORI-
MURA on the occasion of their trip to the Island of Hawaii.
George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO— Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was
visited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.
Toshimasa MINATOYA— Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on
the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kauai.
Namlko FUKUSHIMA — Recipient of a present from Consul General KITA
which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke SONE,
a foritsuffinin at Puunene, Mari.
Mrs. Tetsunosuke SONE — Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of
her husband, who is now interned on the mainland.
5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation :
Noah Kwang Won CHO — A Korean Christian minister who rendered various
services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of
reference (j).
6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intelli-
gence Office :
Lawrence NAKATSUKA — Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin
who coveretl the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 521
[5] * TKIPS MADE TO VAEIOUS PARTS OF OAHU
Pearl Harhor Area
7. The information set fortli in this report concerning the various trips made
by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the in-
formation thereon already set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO ampli-
fied certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story
except on a few minor points.
8. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice
Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kokichi SEKI, one of the Consolate secre-
taries, to Pearl City and Aiea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose
of these trips was to determine the number and types of ships in Pearl Harbor,
and to keep the Consul General informed of the movements of United States
Naval vessels. KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge,
the personnel of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December,
1940, or in January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence
that any agent of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor,
except upon official invitation.)
9. To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was early in 1941, prob-
ably January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and
SEKI) should start "motoring around." KOTOSHIRODO also remembered
having heary KyonosuTie YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time,
that all Consulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to "public
places" such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the
like. KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to January, 1941, he had never seen
any evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and
SEKI and MORIMURA subsequently did.
10. For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO re-
membered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan
at one time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation because of his
health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of,
naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of
trips to Pearl Harbor together.
11. When Tadasi MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORI-
MURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTO-
SHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to
identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifying
characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.
12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate went
out to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEKI
appears to have been of the opinion that observations should be made more
often.
[6] 13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe
the ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped
any place on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see
while driving at 25 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the
Navy Yard boundaries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or
with MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHORODO always was asked to state how
many ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the
number of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types
of ships.
14. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and
anchorages of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, cor-
rectly, that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island ; that car-
riers berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing.; that
destroyers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waiau. He further stated
that MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway
between Aiea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could
be obtained. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo
net was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.
15. KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which
the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Aiea and Pearl City
regions for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a
girl friend in Aiea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked
KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Aiea or Pearl City "who could
522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be trusted". KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had
succeeded in this plan.
16. MORIMPRA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a
jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor. He
would get off at Aiea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according to
his story, MORIMURA sot off the jitney at Aiea and walked back along the
Karaehameha Higliway, finally coming to a Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO
was unable to state whether tliis was the Submarine Base gate or the main gate;
however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA inquired about
getting employment in the Navy yard. The sentry referred him to an office
downtown. MORIMURA ahso told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed around"
17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl Har-
bor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Consulate
taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having driven
SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTO-
SHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.
KaneoJie Bay Area
18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO
drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence around the
Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the
Kaneohe Naval [7] Air Station. At the Kailua' Beach Pavilion, they
parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving Kai-
lua they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along the
highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach, near
the old" pier. This time thev got out of the car and walked out on the pier.
However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he
could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five
or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They
made no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORI-
MURA make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wailupe.
19. Shortly after their trip to Maui (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and
KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu
Pali. As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road,
and drove to the Kalama Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had
MIKAMI drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field
glasses with him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORI-
MURA had used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing
that all the hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORI-
MURA had no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing
MORIMURA with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kalama Road, they
stopped at a watermelon stand on the side of the road aw^ay from the beach.
Then they proceeded to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and
KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to
no one but the waitress at the tavern. From there tliey returned to Honolulu
via the Nuuanu Pali highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half
hours. KOTOSHIRODO believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe
Kaneohe Naval Air Station.
20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate
at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Oahu, about the middle of
April, 1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate,
recalled two such picnics, an earlier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA
was Acting Consul General. On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended.
They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordered OZAKI to drive
to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour) . They parked at Kaneohe
and everyone in the party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe
Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occa-
sion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour,
but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.
21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which
was detailed in paragraph 46 of reference (a). This trip was made in the latter
part of October, 1941. (KOTOSHIRODO was unable to remember, however, if
this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the depar-
ture of, the TATUTA MARU, .lapanpse evacuation ship which was in port
October 23-24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 523
in the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the
other two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was
given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go
when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely in- [S] structed him to "just
keep on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went directly to
Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed KOTO-
SHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to the
first or second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop the
car, and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove down
the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told
KOTOSHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be
back in about 15 minutes.
22. KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced
in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in
such a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it.
When MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport)
shirt. He wore no coat, and his short was hanging outside his trousers. He had
nothing in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went.
When the latter failed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIRDO suggested that
they return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After
an absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the
same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him.
When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or something
similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.
23. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven
MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO
came along on some of these occasions ; at other times, MORIMURA was alone.
On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which
commands an excellent view of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station.
24. According to the statement made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the
Consulate, the Consul General's official car was never used for exploring the
island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used
by the Consulate. It was used primarily by the Consul General himself, or by
OZAKI when he drove around town on errands. - The only time it was used for a
trip to Windward Oahu was on those occasions when the Consul General escorted
some visiting dignitary on a sighseeing tour of the island. The itinerary for
these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waimanalo,
then return to Honolulu via the Nauuanu Pali.
Other Parts of Oahu
25. The reinterrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little infor-
mation concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition
of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some
miscellaneous items are of interest.
26. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had
made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrivel (March 27, 1941).
KOTOSHIRODO believed that IMIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this occa-
sion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the island
with MORIMURA.
[9] 27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of
staying overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details,
and the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were
unknown to KOTOSHIRODO.
28. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a "nice girl" at
Wahiawa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORI-
MURA did not reveal her name.
29. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one
trip to the Haleiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Haleiwa Park,
by the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not
get out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned
that it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other
kindred subject of possilile military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO
had no idea why MORIMURA made this trip to Haleiwa.
30. KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion,
they were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave.
524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On the second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former's
car, and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.
31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between
Waialua and Kaena Point.
32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORI-
MURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Beaches as potential landing
spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the
Kaneohe Naval Air Station wei'e discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other '
airfields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air
strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly
accurate is reflected in the Navy Department's communique of December 5, 1942,
which revealed tliat there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the
morning of December 7, 1941.)
TRIPS TO OTHER ISLANDS
Kauai
33. During the course of the reinterrogation, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that
he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941.
KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation.
He and his wife made tiiis trip together ; they were not accompanied by any
other representative of the Consulate.
34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai
with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about
10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagi'eement
arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had
made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself,
and because of this, friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To
settle the argument, OKUDA decreed tliat neither should go. Instead, he told
KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a "front".
35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with
OKUDA in the latter's office, and received the following instructions:
(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands
Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed
KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there ;
(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawilawili port,
taken about 1939, and instructed the latter to note any changes ;
(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not
remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some
use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if
any, of Naval activity there;
(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the
airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity
there ;
(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Wainiha
Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed
KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the
power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this
map was a United States Geological Survey map. edition of 1912.)
OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed
was caution. He was to tell n.o one that he was from the Consulate. He was
to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact
no fi-iends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could
see with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him
to treat the trip as a vacation and have some fun.
36. KOTOSHIRODO and his wife departed for Kanai by airplane on Saturday
morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records
of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their
home at 0715 and were driven to the airi)ort i^i MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers
Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu
on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th. as he had planned, so he decided to
return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday
morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived
at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.
37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when
KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 525
so KOTOSHIRODO approached him. The driver has been identified as Toshi-
masa MINATOYA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should use
only Japanese drivers when "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO told MINATOYA
that he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both sides of
the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he agreed to
and paid $25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price was
$35.00. Records of the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's em-
ployer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)
38. From' the airport, they drove directly to Waimea Canyon, getting out at
the tourists' observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up
the road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA's suggestion, they turned
back here. They returned to the Waimea Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTO-
SHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and luuclied together. How-
ever, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.
39. They left the Waimea Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands.
They had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA's infor-
mation that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA
mentioned tliat there was a new airport at Barking Sands. Tliey drove as far
as a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and
walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and keawe (algaroba)
trees. They remained at Barking Sands for about 15 minutes, and then departed
in the direction of Lihue about 1530. Enroute to Lihue they stopped at the
Spouting Horn for five for ten minutes, and the Ancient Hawaiian Battleground.
Both these spots are well known points of tourist interest. They arrived at
Lihue about 1730. They registered at the Lihue Hotel under their proper names,
and dismissed MINATOYA with instructions to pick tliem up again the following
morning. However, after KOTOSHIRODO and his wife had eaten dinner at the
Lihue Hotel, they decided to go to a movie, so they called MINATOYA to drive
them. All three went to the Lihue Theater, KOTOSHIRODO paying for the
tickets.
40. One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew
to Kauai was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (k). HORIKAWA, who
was taken into custody in April, 1942, was suspect because he was the owner of
the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage center prior to
the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel, and was one
of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identified with a
number of pro-Japanese activities on that island prior to the war. KOTOSHI-
RODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA's presence on the
same plane, but KOTOSHIRODO main [12] tained that this was pure
coincidence. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the Lihue Hotel,
they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers earlier that
day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having seen him
at tlie Japanese Consulate on two occasions.
41. On Sunday morning, July 13th KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate breakfast
at the hotel. At the suggestion of MINATOYA, they had the hotel pack them
a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the east coast
of Kauai. They went first to Wailua Falls, then to a grass shack at a heiau
(ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist spots, and
finally arrived at Haiialei about noon. Tliey ate their picnic lunch at the Hanalei
Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He noted only that the
water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very cahn, and that there was no sign
of any construction work going on. About 1245, they drove to Haena where they
visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist attractions.
42. From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a point near the power plant.
They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below the power
plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted that tlie
power plant was small, and had tv/o lead-in water pipes, each about three feet
in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside the road, and
that the plant was unfenced.
43. On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is ofC
the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTOSHI-
RODO believed tliat he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.
44. From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the wharf
where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He saw at
once that there had been no new construction since the picture in OKUDA's pos-
session had been taken ^1939), so they left immediately. He did note, however,
the Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks there.
526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They
dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater
and saw a movie.
46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport
twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were
some Army tents pitched in camp.
47. The following morning, July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about
0800. The KOTOSHIRODOS checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINATOYA
drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu about
0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for them, and
drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her dressmaking shop,
and he went back to the Consulate.
[IS] 48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour con-
'ference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk.
KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA
finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not
present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had had
a good time, but also commented that it was "wa.ste time" just to "look from
the road for things that were meant to be hidden".
49. On October 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a state-
ment regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith
forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed
facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other disseminees.
50. Toshiraasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a repre-
sentative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his
story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel
and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear
this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO
and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a
camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were
examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either
innocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO
stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary
tourist cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory.
He made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his
ob.servations.
51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about $100.00 for his
expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about $7.00 or $9.00.
However, he stated that his expenses were: $50.00 for the air fare, $20.00 for
the hotel bill, and $25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure
actually was $35.00.)
Maui
52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA
made to the Island of Maui in May, 1941. These details were substantially the
same as those set forth in paragraphs 15-18 of reference (c). The only change
is that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA
visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui ; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on
re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not
visited either.
53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map
of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that
is. what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTO-
SHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were :
[1J/] (a) Puunene Air Field (Navy) ;
(b) Kahului Harbor ;
(c) Lahaina Bay;
(d) National Guard Camp.
54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off
Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later
that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea
Aii-port, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului.
MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was
told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit.
MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough com-
pared to that of Lahaina.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 527
55. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making
a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and neces-
sitates traveling over bad roads.) IMOIIIMUIIA also asked if there were an
air field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that
the road was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the
limited time MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.
56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then
to Kula Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTO-
SHIRODO took a picture; MORIMURA commented on being able to see the
ocean both on the Wailuku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley.
They stayed at Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they
drove to the National Guard Camp at Waihee, about ten minutes out of
Wailuku ; however, they saw no troops. They drove along the coast a little
farther, and' then turned back and drove to the Puunene Arijwrt where they
boarded a plane for Honolulu about 1000.
57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born Nisei, 26 years old, who was expatriated
from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that
being when he was five years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKA-
MIYA, when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO's description
of the trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would
indicate that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two
men from the Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui
were with Itsuo HAMADA, as set forth in paragraphs 15-16 in reference (c),
and with Tetsunosuke SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).
58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious,
nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was any-
thing more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representatives
of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details concerning
the contact made with Tetsonosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they
had visited SONE, who was a toritsuginin and principal of the Japanese language
[15] school at Spreckelsville, and had delivered to him a package sent by
Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be given to a
Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall) who lived at
Spreckelsville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question was Miss
Namiko FUKUSHIMA. Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated that she
had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1938, and during that
period she had become very well acquainted with a Yosuko ISHII, daughter of a
Consul General ISHII, said to be a prominent member of th^ Japanese consular
corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA maintained a
personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had requested
KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA's coming to Honolulu
as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKUSHIMA
produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battledore. She
stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONEl.
59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA,
failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO's story.
60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their trip
to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the only
mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the coastline
just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indicate that
the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, unsuitable for
landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any written notes.
OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about tlie trip. Later MORIMURA ob.served
to KOTOSHIRODO that "there wasn't much going on" on Maui. KOTOSHIR-
ODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photograph the places they
regarded as "important". The camera was used merelv to add to their pose as
tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had cost between $115.00
and $130.00.
61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the
confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent
collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed
this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him. SEKI
said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not have the
funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate treasurer, and
presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA had a secret per-
528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sonal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA expected him to
tell OKUDA every secret, but the "Vice Consul was not so "open-hearted" with
MORBIURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since OKUDA and
MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that OKUDA
would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that contirnied MORIMURA's
suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their return from that
island : Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he had seen any moor-
ing buoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he had seen none, but
OKUDA contradicted him and said that there ivere some buoys there. MORI-
MURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same question of the clerk,
but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there either. MORIMURA
concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the contrary information.
IIG] 62. Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts con-
cerning the Maui trip : MORIMURA conducted that mission very laxly. He did
not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He traveled
no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the windward coast,
he omitted more than half the road running north from Wailuku. He did nothing
to observe the Puunene Naval Air Station field othei- than pass it going to and
coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot of highway
along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's contact on Maui
may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Hompa Hongwanji who resided
at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7, 1941. It is known
that HIRAYAINIA, who is the subject of reference (1), was requested on at least
one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed of any movements of
the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed that he compiled with this
request.
Haicaii
63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA
made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the
facts of the trop substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19-24 of refer-
ence (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version principally
concerned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on Hawaii.
64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTO-
SHIRODO that he wanted to see :
(a) Hilo harbor;
(b) Kilauea. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilauea,
it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there prior
to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airjwrt in the
lava flats) ;
(c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of con-
struction ;
(d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at Upolu.
65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilauea Volcano, and
MORTIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road
toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu — INIilitary Reservation".
They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around
and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from out-
side the gate.
66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver.
The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only [i7]
paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in
the Kohala district they also insjiected Kawaihae, the landing from which cattle
are swum out to the inter-Island steamers.
67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo,
seeing Rainbow Falls, Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club, and
Puumaile Home (for the tubercular).
68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact
anyone on the Island of Hawaii ; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined
not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a per-
sonal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her
candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her that
he was staying at the Naniloa Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes. However,
after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with MORIMURA,
George KAWAMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been told by his
wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him to MORI-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 529
MURA. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited them to
the Hilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went home.
69. A representative of tlie Military Intellisence Division, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTO-
SHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's
wife, and he gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO
and his wife in 1940. Apparently this ti'ip was merely a vacation. However,
there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that
KAWAMOTO was interrogated concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO
and MORIMURA to Hawaii.
70. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also inter-
viewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and
KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length,
NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the story
given by KOTOSHIRODO.
TADASI MORIMURA
71. From the information tliat has been collected from the Consular clerks
and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that MORIMURA was
something of a mystery man. All agreed that he had special privileges. He was
frequently drunk, often had women in his quarters overnight, came to work late
or not at 'all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and gen-
erally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused
much comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.
72. Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an
officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however.
SEKI denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved,
and that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.
[18] 73. It was publicly announced MORIMURA's arrival that he had been
sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takaichi SAKAI, .senior
clei'k at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation mat-
ters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of
helping with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was here, but had
done none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work.
74. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, who. although uneducated, has given himself an
amazing self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA, and
emphatically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart gait
of a Japanese military or naval officer.
75. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in
the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary
being the highest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and Samon
TSUKIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, remark that
eighth rank scretaries were usually sent to the least desirable posts in the con-
sular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according to climate.
Most of the less desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the ether hand,
was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular service. It was
usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was unusual
for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in Hawaii.
They believed this to be MORIMURA's first assignment abroad, since his name,
at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular roster of
the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he was recently
admitted to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrination period in
Tokyo before coming to Honolulu.
7G. KOTOSHIRODO stated that INIORIMURA never talked about his past life
except of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORI-
MURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He called
the coolies the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO to
believe that MORIMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.
77. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of
MORIMURA's background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard
a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had re-
marked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Ehime-ken
on Shikoku, in Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving his
mother in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable
land. Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the
Foreign Office in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although
79716— 46— Ex. 148 35
530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion
he had been discharged from the Foi-eign Office for excessive drinking, but his
mother had written to a prominent official abont the matter, and through this
connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.
78. Whatever his background, MORIIMURA was not popular with the rest of
the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position,
[19] and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted
that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gather-
ing data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had been
relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited pi-ofessional jealousy, often
telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was doing.
The change in plans for the Kauai trip was cited as an example of this dissen-
sion. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI and
MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering
work. Further information about MORIMURA's background is to be found on
pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).
79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new
secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO
stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese news-
papei-s, particularly the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORJ-
MURA had many friends at the Nippu Jiji, but until questioned at length showed
no great willingness to "remember" who they were. Finally he admitted that
of all the men at the Nippu Jiji, Shigeo PURUKAWA, the advertising manager,
was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by
the information contained in paragraphs 9^11 of reference (a). Paragraph 16
of reference (c) should aLso be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated
that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corrob-
orates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain
the .common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed
out that FURUKAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a
business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and pre-
ferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the geishas. KOTO-
SHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played go (Japanese check-
ers) together at the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also
knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate
"beat" for the Nippu Jiji. Other Nippu Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew
were Shoichi ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsuichi KAWAMOTO, the business
manager. All these men have been interned.
80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very
rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought
Nippu Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the
Consul General.
81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MORIMURA was
Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery. TAKA-
GISHI was the subject of an intensive invistigation by this office prior to his
departure for Japan aboard the Taiyo Maru on November 5, 1941. TAKA-
GISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial Japanese
Navy. (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japanese Navy;
this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father of TAKA-
GISHI's wife.) TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese Consulate,
and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA. and
Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where TAKAGISHI re-
sided. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the friendship of
MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funny", because TAKAGISHI loved golf so
much and MORIMURA did [20] not play the game. However, KOTO-
SHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used to "chase women"
together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actually was engaged in
espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial evidence points to the
conclusion that he was so engaged.
SEKI AND MORIMURA DISCUSS ESPIONAGE
82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between
MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with him
individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as SEKFs
assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's assistant
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 531
in collecting information outside the office. Because of this situation, KOTO-
SHIRODO was in close contact with both men.
83. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over
the world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing
"illegal things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORI-
MURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate
and apart from the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo,
collected such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This
would include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA ob-
served that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor
would the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate
would know nothing of this outside system, he said.
84. MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents
(meaning those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied
that he did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what the
facts were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know
the manner in which such an outside system would operate.
85. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage
on one occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a
"good man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this
requirement would be diflScult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Terri-
tory of Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORI-
MURA and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the
local population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to carry on espionage.
However, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese were
too poorly educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on this
point, claiming that the toritsuginin (the so-called local consvilar agents) were
no good for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii was "just trash" and
insufficiently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii
as laborers and were therefore uneducated, where the Japanese on the Mainland
of the United States were much better educated.
86. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then
(1941), all nations "use other kind. of people" (i. e., non-nationals of the country
employing [21] them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that
Japan sometimes used non- Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO
never heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORI-
MURA once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo" that
Japan had long had a British naval officer acting as an espionage agent in China.
(Whether this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or against
both China and Britain, or only against Britain, was not stated). MORIMURA
had said that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he com-
mented on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. He said that the
first time such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but after
that the law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the employer
would pay the same price for mere driblets. He also stated that it was safer and
less costly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more valuable
information could be obtained by non- Japanese, although at a greater cost to
Japan.
87. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate es-
pionage system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii
at the present time, and sending information from Hawaii to Japan. KOTOSHI-
RODO exiiressed surprise that such an operation was considered possible, saying,
"How can?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection was that
MORIMURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-wave radio
for getting information out of Hawaii after war started because of "a device"
the Americans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location of a radio
transmitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and knew of
Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur radio
stations. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk about
the subject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town
who operated an amateur short-wave radio station.
88. KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked
to SEKI that Hawaii would be a fine place from which to watch a Japanese-
American war. Either' SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no
way for a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to
the risk of discovery by radio detection equipment.
532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
89. Apparently one of the "legal" methods of collecting information indulged
in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily ne\Aspapers. Yasumasa
MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers
were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this
work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as lie desired and pass
them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two — occasion-
ally three — clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to Japan,
and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used to
receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his
home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Con-
sulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO's home, two blocks away, was near enough
to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep
close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (re-
viewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.
[22] SECUEITY MEASURES
90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the first
rule in "information collecting" was "no get caught". He was told never to go
out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired objective
from the highway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the highway
to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities and
questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely "sightseeing",
KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORIMURA's poor
command of English.
91. He was told never to take pictures of "important places". Although he
took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a "prop" to carry out their
pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures
of air fields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His
snapshots were only of the usual scenic palaces, he said.
92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts
of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was
extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941
at SEKI's insistence. Prior to that time, tliere had been no field glasses at the
Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by
Toro NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji ji. (NISHI-
KAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.)
93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made
written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate after
"sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes himself.
Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had seen to
MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of KOTO-
SHIDORO's reported observations.
94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps
which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, tliey
carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only
occasion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui, see
paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as reported in paragraph
42 of reference (c), KOTOSHORODO stated that on trips he made alone to the
Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the positions of various warships on rough
maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO's
extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which
happened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise
known to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO's statements and admissions
generally reliable.)
95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate
(1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk about
Consulate business to strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make
trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.
[23] CHRISTMAS PRESENTS GIVEN BY THE CONSIXLATEl
90. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christmas
presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that he
personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs Inspectors Carl F. EIFLER,
George W. SPENCE, Andrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually
consisted of merchandise orders of $20.00 to $30.00 drawn on M. Mclnerny, Ltd.,
or the Liberty House, both large Honolulu retail stores.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 533
97. The Honolulu harborninster, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank J.
UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.
98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA. an alien Japanese, foreman
of the registi'y section of the United States Post Office, Honolulu. Comment has
been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t).
99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact
that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was
unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did
remember that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHI-
RODO also remembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of
persons.
MIKAMI'S NAVAL KNOWLEDGE
100. The interrogating officers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye
MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that he
speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver for
the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since that
time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.
101. During the course of the interi-ogation (September 28, 1942), it became
apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with
current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor.
MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never
seen before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA,
had arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA
actually had arrived.)
102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left
Pearl Harbor — for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had
recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer move-
ments.
103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing "the same old battleships" return to
Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen
before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the
WASP, on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Office, Pacific
Fleet, was seasonably [241 informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI,
an internee, was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the intern-
ment camp on Sand Island.)
104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He
mentioned "anti-torpedo nets", knew their purpose, and stated he had never
seen them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also men-
tioned "anti-airplane balloons" which he thought were impractical for use around
Pearl Harbor because they would give away the exact location of the objective.
MIKAMI also discussed the "balance of naval power" theory, and expressed
the opinion that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a
naval race between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion
that the United States would beat Japan only when she had beaten the Japanese
Navy.
105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval
subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about
three years, naming Our ^"^avi/. Life, and the Naval Institute Proceedings. He
said he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old
copies away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because
"they tell big lies". However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent
(though perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines
in a language in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains
a matter of conjecture.
KORRVN CONTACTS
10(!. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made
a point of keeping stationed in ELawaii one secretary who could speak Korean.
There were two reasons for this practice : First, to handle various Korean
matters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate ; second, to use the
Honolulu Consulate as a "listening post" regarding various Korean nationalist
movements. The Japanese apparently regai-ded Honolulu as an excellent place
for keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.
107. Takaichi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was employed
there from 1927 until the outbreali of war, recalled that during his time secre-
taries Takeo KASHIMUBA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyonosuko
534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs atjhe Consulate.
(For some reason SAKAI "forget' 'to mention YUGE, the most recent of these
secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent interview.
All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties, they having been
instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine.)
108. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having
seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the
subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of which is refer-
ence (n). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1938,
stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at
the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.
[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu field
office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the originals,
in Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate
General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set
forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925, the Consulate was
allowed $100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1931,
the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this field.
Following that time, the Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations
from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that
the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate :
Kwang Won Cho
110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent vis-
itor of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the
name, Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment
of $87.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of $20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the
subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of
which follows :
"Subject /CHO/ born October 21, 1897 in Korea ; came to Hawaii in 1923 as
Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean
Mission, Honolulu. He, became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931; how-
ever his entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently
residing in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source
reveals Subject paid $37.00 in May, 1934, and $20.00 in August, 1934, by Japa-
nese Consulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained
in which Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and begin-
ning about September, 1939, and extending to April 1, 1941. He admits having
performed work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities; further, that
during the latter period approximately $200 was paid him by the Consulate for
his services which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers.
Subject claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate under
threat to bring harm to his family in Korea ; however, his acceptance of remu-
neration makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any
payments in 1934."
111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that
the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU
on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance that a fellow passenger aboard
the ASAMA MARU was Sanjia ABE, subject of reference (p), former Terri-
torial senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during
which he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, and also
made an overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan's war effort in
China. Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujiro KONDO,
subject of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuzo SATO, subject of reference
(r), now in custody; and Kenju OHTOMO. subject [26] of reference
(s). OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men's Buddhist Association,
Honolulu, and who.se repatriation hais been requested by the Japanese govern-
ment, has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to
internal security. Ten other of Reverend CHO's fellow passengers are now in
custody, and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous
by this office. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons trav-
eled on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may
be worth.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 535
Doo Ok Chung
112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received $80.00 on May
22, 1933. A review of the files of this office indicates that he is a 54-year-old
alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army and Navy
Y. M. C. A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilsoo HAAN's SINO-
KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly chair-
man of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN, dated June 22, 1942, described CHUNG
as one of "the cornerstones of our League".
113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that
CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three sous
serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his wife, and
his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in Korean political
circles since 1915, when he joined tlie KOREAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION.
He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE
LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter organization. The KO-
REAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE have been comparatively inactive since 1929,
and eventually he joined the SIXO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. He denied,
with seeming sincerity, his ever having had contact with, or accepting money
from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be no other individual
in Hawaii of a similar name.
Won Sam Kim
114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following
payments :
September 10, 1985 $20.00
May 28, 1934 15.00
July 24, 1934 25.00
September 10, 1934 30. CO
May 31, 1936 20.00
April 13, 1936 10. OO
May 2, 1936 10.00
June 6, 1936 10.00
March 29, 1937 18.00
Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was
born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter bv
trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDE-
PENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1989, in Honolulu, and his widow
denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese
Consulate.
Sang Ho Lee (Yee)
115. LEE was paid $100.00 on March 31, 1932, and $20.00 on August 19, 1933.
Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the
Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339 North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later
directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs.
Sang Ho LEE, 1355 Miller Street, Honolulu.
116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE
was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States
on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from
July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on
February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.
Ok Nam Shin
117. The translation indicates that this individual received $50.00 on March
31, 1932, and $3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation revealed that SHIN, a groceryman, was born in Korea in 1901,
came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to
Honolulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never
returned.
536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Kylsoo Haan
118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, vpho is
usually referred to as Kilsoo HAAN :
May 25, 1936 $60.00
August 15, 1936 40.00
August 25, 1936 10. 00
Chin Ho Tough
119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of $80.00 from the Consulate.
TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has
been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory
in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession.
He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as
a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Molokai.
He has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When in-
teri-ogated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occa-
sion, that being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his pass-
port stamped.
[28] OTHER CONSULATE CONTACTS
Ensei (En jo) Kohayashi
120. On March 15, 3932, KOBAYASHI received $8.00 from the Consulate.
An alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese lan-
guage school principal, and a toritsuginin at Hawi, Kobala, Hawaii, T. H. He
was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned.
He is reported to be at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning
for repatriation to Japan.
Katsuichi Miho
121. MIHO received the sum of $27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March
15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the MIHO
HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H., and was a toritsuginin for that district. He
was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned at
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
Minoru Murakami
122. MURAKAMI received the sum of $10.00 from the Consulate on March 15,
1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative
for the Nippu Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-
Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7,
1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Appar-
ently he desires to repatriate to Japan.
Masao Sogawa
123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of $50.00. He was editor
and publisher of the Hawaii Shimpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published
in Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-
Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 14,
1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.
Wade Warren Thayer
124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of $40.00 from
the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese
Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known
why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence
Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some permanent
financial arrangements with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 537
[29] THE CONStTLATE PREPARE>S FOB WAR
125. Takaif'hi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 the Consulate began
to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about the same
time, tlio clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told not to
talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the back
yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers shortly
before the war started, although he did observe that the number of visitors to
the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie Bank in-
creased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors sometimes carried
handbags with them.
126. Miss Kimie DOUE, foi'mer receptionist at the Consulate, remembered
that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials
came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA's room, where they
stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihei MIYAMOTO, sub-
manager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in
the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO
and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the
Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She added
that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had never done
this.
127. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffuer for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1&41,
the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appearing
books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his depar-
ture for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI ex-
plained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10
years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that
be helped carry these books from the Vice Consul's office to the yardmen, who
would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus
burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and
Rokuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate
staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeze order
against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned
a considerable amount of material at that time.
128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan
were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He
stated that in the code room of the Consulate was a small brazier, and when
papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming
out of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of
this room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941)
than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was
burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo
SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAWA, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was
always present during this operation.
129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding
room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other
[SO]' material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that
he put out this fire about 1900, just before darkness fell. He noted that every-
thing had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all the
time, so he was unable to state how often code room material was burned. The
incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove the
material from the code room.
130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to play
golf with Tsunetaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He remem-
bered that MlKAMI's taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the two offi-
cials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate. MIKAMI
requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did. However,
OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because he, OKUDA,
probably would be unable to play golf that day.
131. OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to and
subsequent to December 7, 1941, that Consul General KITA had no foreknowledge
of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul General had
received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of December 7th.
(This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-American and Japa-
nese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon its receipt, KITA had
538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel, two blocks from the
Consulate grounds, and insisted that the latter come to the Consulate immediately
to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of this incident from SEKI
about a week or two after the attack. CZAKI stated that TSUKIKAWA was at
the Consulate at the time of the attack.
132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when
the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing smoke
come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatriated
(February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a big
tub filled with ashes.
133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about
0900 on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find
out what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKI-
KAWA were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a
little later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTO-
SHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA
wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not
allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about
1000.
CONSULATE DOMESTICS
134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the
domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA,
a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with the
[SI] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops to
which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one
Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers.
He secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Con-
sulate chaulfeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate.
FUJITA first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On
one occasion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like
to cook at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA.
(Results of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52-54
of reference (c).) Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic,
OZAKI asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJI-
TA was able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set
forth in paragraph 55-56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs
47-51 of reference (c).
JAPANESE NAVY TANKERS
135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at
Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more
with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would
leave the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One
Ishichi MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old
Aala Market, often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occcasions
by representatives of this office to have carried a mail bag onto the boat.
SAKAI explained that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post oflBce
pending the arrival of the tankers, and carry it aboard. Presumably this was
a labor of love. SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes
left the tankers here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honolulu at a future
date. However, SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further
disclaimed all knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where
they lived while here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), para-
graphs 42-43.)
toritsuginin
136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term soryojikan toritsuginin was not
accurately translated as 'consular agents". He believed the more correct trans-
lation to be "Consulate General 'go-between' men". He remembered Vice Consul
OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the toritsuginin were not agents of
the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute re-
quiring such agents to register with the State Department.
137. It should be remembered that the status of the toritsuginin was never
clarified by .iudlcial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only in a
very loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Con-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 539
sulate, and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military
espionage on the part of a toritsuginin has been proven to the satisfaction of
this office only in one case, that of Unji HIRAYAMA, subject of reference (1).
Economic [32] espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases.
However, the basic motive in placing all toritsuginin in custody immediately
after the attack of December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were ex-
tremely pro-Japanese, and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen
to be toritsuginin on the basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one
who was not engaged in a number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his
duties as toritsuginin.
Pending— 14ND.
[1] TRIP TO KAUAI
One day in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will be
sent on a trip to Kauai in the near future Sometime after that Seki told me that
he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that both of them
wanted so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the situation was between
them. After several days (few days before we left) Morimura suddenly told me
that he is not going and said that I will be sent. After hearing that frpm
Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki said that they (Mori-
mura and Seki) had some kind of misvmderstandings. I told Seki why he
( Seki) himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go so much. But Seki said
he is not going and told me to take my wife with me. He told me to go and have
a good vacation. And then Okuda called me to his desk and told me to go to
Kauai with my wife and also told me to see Seki about the money. Seki gave me
about $100, and the following day I went down to the airway company office to
buy our tickets. The day before we left Okuda called me at his desk and gave
me the following instructions. (1) See the things that could be seen from the
highways: (2) Not to talk to anyone: (3) He said that he knew the air held
project at the Barking Sand is going on. He told me to see that if it could be seen
from outside: (4) See the Lihue airport if there is any improvements: (5) See
the Hanalei bay if anything is being done. He said he saw in a newspaper that
the U S Navy is planning to use the bay for small boat base: (5) He showed me
the geological survey map of Kauai and told me to see the Wainiha power plant.
[2] He said that it is the source of power used on Kauai : (6) He showed me a
photograph of Port Allen and Nawiliwili harbors. He told me to see any change
has been added. He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I
can see. I called up Nikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport
next morning.
Next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife
and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a. m.
and reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a. m. I noticed Horikawa was one of
the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I hap-
pened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show us around
the island. He said the auto fare will be $25. Then we started out immediately
for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking' Sand. He said we cannot
go there in the morning because the Army usually practice bombing there. We
went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon. We got out of the
car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued our drive to Kokee and
we went as far as the place where there were some residences. Since Minatoya
said there isn't anything more to see further up we turned back and came back
to Waimea. Minatoya suggested to have our lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we
went in and all three of us sat at one table. He then introduced himself and said
he is working for some transportation company. He talked about his having
brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We, my wife and I, introduced ourselves
too, but I didn't say I was from the consulate. Soon after lunch we left the
hotel and started for the Barking Sand. We didn't stopped at anywhere on the
way and [3] reached the Barking Sand. We got off the car then walked
up the sand hill and tried if the sand really barks. I took a picture of my wife
there. I looked from the sand hill if there was any work going on for the air
field, but I couldn't see anything at all. Only things I saw were sandy beach and
keawe trees. After staying there about 20 minutes and started back the same
road to Lihue. On the way back to Lihue, we passed through Kukuiolono park
and stopped at the Lawai beach to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to
540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Koloa beach where we got off the car aud walked around the saudy beach seeing
many human skeletons. After staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue
without stopping anywhere. It was about 5 p. m. wluni we reached the Lihue
hotel. We registered there antl sliown to our room. We had our dinner at the
dining hall. 'After dinner my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so
we called up Minatoya on the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon
after and we went to the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the
title of the picture was "Strawberry Blonde". After show Minatoya took us
back to the hotel. We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some
kind of party at the hotel that nite. The follftwing morning Minatoya came to the
hotel at about 8 a. m. After breakfast I happened to see Horikawa in the kitchen
so I went in just to say hello. I introduced myself aud my wife. All he said to
us was that ''You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sight-
seeing tripV" Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9
a. m. We went to see the Wailua fall. We didn't go near to the fall but just saw it
far from the hill. Then we went to see L^J] the Grass shack where we got
off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drum and sandals. From there
we went to see the Slipery fall. We got elf the car and walked down to the fall.
After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direction. We didn't
stopped anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our lunch. We ate our
lunch in the pavilion. I didn't see anything been done at the bay. After staying
there about 45 minutes we started to Haena. On the way I asked the driver if
we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing it on the way back. We went
way back we went up the Wainiha valley aud went as far as the power plant was.
I expected to see something large but All I say were two pipes running down aud
one small power house building. Without stopping the car we just turned back
from there and stopped about Yz mile down on the same road and picked up some
mountain apples. After staying there about 15 minutes we started back anddidn't
stopped anywhere before we reached Kilauea lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of
seeing the lighthouse since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of
the lighthouse came and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climbed the stairs
aud saw the large lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors' signature
book. From there started back and didn't stopped anywhere before reaching
Lihue. On the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn't got
off the car. Minatoya said pointing one office building that was his company
office. We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p. m. After dinner at the hotel my wife
and I thought of going to see [5] Japanese movie and walked to the theatre.
I don't remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the hotel) It hap-
pened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing, the show we
went back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning Minatoya came
at about 8 a. m. we checked out the hotel at about 8 : 30 a. m. I remember I paid
$20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe airport. We left the Hana-
pepe airport at about 9: 30 a. m. and reached Rogers airport at about 10 a. m.
Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my wife to her shop and went to
the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked me how was the trip. They
asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I couldn't see much. Seki said it's
natural that I didn't see much. He said many things couldn't be seen from the
highways. Then Okuda called me at his desk and asked me to tell him what I have
seen. I told him I didn't see anything at the barking sand. I told him it was so
quiet and I even never seen a plane flying. I told him there wasn't anything at
the Hanalei bay. All I noticed was the sea was calm and it was a large bay.
He asked me how was the reef of the bay but I said I couldn't see any reefs. I
told him threr were two pipes running down the mountain at the power plant at
Wainiha and one building. He asked me anything more so I said none. I told
him there wasn't anything new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Allen harbor. I
told him at the Lihue airport I didn't see anything but some army tents. I didn't
tell him that I talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about
the trip. [6'] When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. Mori-
mura just said "There isn't anything big going on it seems".
On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn't bring any letter or notes
to anybody and I didn't bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.
Oct. 1, 1942.
/s/ richaed m. kotoshibodo
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 541
[i] Station JZI Program
Date 12/8/41 (Japan Time)
Frequency 9535 Kilocycles
With our army and navy entering in a state of war with England and America
at dawn of the 8th, an Imperial declaration of war against England and America
was announced. Our army and navy, hence, has entered in a state of war
with England and America. In regard to this, the Imperial army and navy
headquarters at 6 am on the 8th announced tliat our army and navy entered a
state of war with England and America in the Western Pcific at dawn today,
the 8th. At the same time, the brilliant achivements of our armed forces, too,
were announced by the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters, as follows: (1)
Our Imperial Navy at dawn today, the 8th made a death-defying raid upon the
American naval and air strength in the Hawaiian area. (2) Our Imperial
Navy at dawn today sanl? the British gunboat (sounded like
Petrol) and captured the American gunboat (sounded like Nice)
at Shanghai. (3) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today raided Singapore and
achieved great results. (4) Our imperial Navy at dawn today bombed enemy
military establishments at Davao, Wake and Guam. (5) Our Imperial Army,
upon entering into a state of war at dawn today, attacked Hongkong. (6) Our
Imperial Armv, cooperating closely with our Imperial Navy, undertook a landing
operation in Malaya at dawn today and is obtaining great results.
Furthermore, according to a Domei dispatch from the front, our imperial air
force at eight this morning carried out its first raid on Hongkong and retui"ned
safely back to their base. Immediately afterwards, a second raid reportedly
was carried out.
Then, a Domei dispatch from Honolulu reported that our naval air force raided
Honolulu at 7 am Hawaiian time, which is 3 : 05 am Japan time.
According to an announcement made by the White House, the casualty in-
flicted by our air force's raid was very great and the oil storage tanks on Guam,
which is presently being beseiged by our Imperial Navy, are throwing up large
amounts of smoke.
A British gunboat was sunk and an American gunboat was captured. This
news was announced by the Imperial headquarters, but according to the announce-
ment made by the headquarters of our fleet in China waters at 9 am today,
the 8th, our Commander-in-Chief of the fleet in the China waters sent his staff
oflicers to the British Gunboat Picadelli (phonetic) and the American Gunboat
Wills (phonetic), respectively, immediately after our country entered in a state
of war at 5 : 40 am and requested them to surrender for the peace and order of
Shanghai. Since the British gunboat refused to surrender, we were compelled
to sink it. The American gunboat was captured with
Thus read the announcement
[3] to respond to your will. On behalf of the government and the Army
and Navy, we, Hideki and Shigetaro, your subjects, respectfully make this re-
ply. December 8, 1941.
(Signed) Hideki Tojo,
Minister of War.
Shigetaro Shinada,
Minister of Navy.
Since our Army and Navy has started a war against England and America
in the Western Pacific at dawn today, our Government at 7 am today held an
emergency session of the cabinet at the premier's residence. Outside of Foreign
Minister Togo, all the cabinet ministers were present. Firstly, Minister of Navy
Shimada reported the developments of war against England and America and
based on this report, the course to be taken by the government was decided,
whereupon Premier Tojo called on the Emperor and reported the decision.
According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo re-
ported by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull
at 1 : 00 P. M. on the 7th, 3 : 30 A. M. of the 8th Japan time, and present our
government's official reply to the American note of the 26th. At the same time.
Foreign Minister Togo invited American Ambassador to Japan, Grew, to his
official residence at 7:30 A. M. today and handed him an official note similar
to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7 : 45
A. M., he invited British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him
the text of this reply.
542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with
England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic
relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our gov-
ernment at 11 : 45 A. M. today declared war against England and America. At
the same time, an order for the convocation of a two days special session of
the Diet on the 15th was issued. At the emergency session urgent bills of
appropriations and other nature will be presented and, at the same time, the
governments policy to cope with the unprecedented emergency is expected to be
explained by Premier Tojo and other ministers.
(Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather
forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow me to espe-
cially make a weather forecast at this time, 'West wind, clear'." Since these
broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.)
At 8 : 30 A. M. today, our government made the Foreign Ministry announce
the results of the Japanese-American negotiation and the Japanese-American
notes. The announcement made clear the real facts of the effort exerted by
our government till the very last minute to preserve the peace of the Pacific.
Japan's note to America was an official reply to America's note of the 26th and
notified the fact no settlement can be expected even if the negotiation were to
be continued. It actually was a final notice
!|: ***** *
[5] Pacific has been brought about by America and England. It should
be definitely stated at this time that President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill
has undertaken the Pacific war without consideration of the war's havoc on
humanity as one of their program for the domination of the world. In the course
of the four and a half years of the China incident, each and every Japanese has
shed tears of indignation against England and America's wicked hostile attitude,
but has remained patient for the sake of the peace of the Pacific as well as the
world. This patience, today has reached its limit. The time has come to rise
unitedly and risk the fate of the nation for the cause of righteousness.
At dawn today, December 8, the announcement of the Imperial Army and
Navy headquarters to the effect that our Imperial Army and Navy will enter a
state of war against American and British forces in the Western Pacific at dawn
today was made public throughout our country through the radios and news-
papers. Every one throughout the country has now further strengthened their
determination that the inevitable has at last come and instantaneously, our peace
loving idea has been transformed into a determination to punish the evil and
cut off the sinister hands of the outrageously wicked England and America.^
Today, the sky over Japan was clear and devoid of even a speck of cloud 'and
under this blue sky, which seemed to be congratulating the promising future of
Japan, who has risen to fight for the establishment of a new order of East Asia
as well as of the world just like the brilliant i-ays of the sun, our excellent alir;
forces, as an indication of our strong air defense, is flying about everywhere!
When I received this report that war on the Pacific had broken out, I hurried
to my * * * and on my way, I saw reflected upon the passers-by as! well
as those working, a hereto unseen expression of seriousness. Then with the
issuing of the Imperial decree declaring war at 11 : 45 A. M., the nation's deter-
mination to march forward and support the emperor's will gushed forth. Not
long afterwards, Premier Tojo's confident determination of our country was
announced over the radio, and, at the same time, the achievements of our Navy,
which is carrying on operations against American and British forces from Malaya
to Honolulu with an overflowing amount of iwwer as though the Pacific were too
small, were reported throughout the nation. Hence, the confidence and spirit
to rise against England and America and to secure Asia as the haven of the
Asiatic race through the establishment of a new order of the world has been made
to flare up within the heart of the people.
The next is a Domei despatch of the 8th from Stockholm, which states that
according to a Renter's dc'^patch of the 7th from AVashington, official sources in
Washington believe that Germany will declare war against America in the next
24 hours.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 543
At this time, let me again make a weather forecast "West wind, clear." (Re-
peated this forecast.)
Now, let us broadcast to you the talk of Major General Yoshizumi.
An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Pkoblbm in the Hawaiian Islands
pkepabed by the counter intelligence section, district inteixigence office,
fourteenth naval district
April 20, 1943
Foreword
The Counter Intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, which is charged with counter-espionage responsibility in the Naval Service,
recently promulgated a new operating plan, from which the following is extracted :
"In accordance with the new concepts of intelligence and counter intelligence,
the Counter Intelligence Section actively seeks primary data and no longer
passiveli/ waits for it to be received.
"This aggressive method of operation permits the Navy to detect and combat
espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities directed against its war effort
'before the fact, rather than merely to establish an historical record of facts after
the damage is done." (#)
One of the functions of the Counter Intelligence Section is to "delineate pat-
terns of subversive thought and activity." (#) This is likewise a function of
the Counter Intelligence Section (B-7) of the District Intelligence Office, Four-
teenth Naval District, which section has prepared the within analysis.
This analysis is intended to present facts and considered opinions pertaining
to Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the correlative counter-espionage measures,
both before and during this war. In formulating the analysis, deficiencies in
existing counter-espionage methods and measures have been noted, and sugges-
tions for the alteration or supplementation of existing methods and measures
have been made.
No attempt has been made to analyze the related topics of sa.botage and counter-
sabotage. This analysis has been confined simply to espionage and counter-
espionage, with only the necessary incidental introduction of other intelligence
subjects.
Attention is invited to Appendix "A", which sets forth references to much of the
source material pertaining to facts and opinions included in this analysis, and
which particularly shows the sources of all quotations set forth herein.
A statement or paragraph footnoted to Appendix "A" is indicated by the symbol
"(#)" at the end of the documented portion.
Particular places on the Island of Oahu which are mentioned in the analysis
• can be seen with reference to one another by consulting the map attached as
Appendix "B".
The within analysis perhaps will be revised at a later date to include relevant
facts hereafter discovered. Criticisms and suggestions are therefore especially
requested.
I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.
Distribution :
O. N. I.— Copies Nos. 1-10
Com 14— Copy No. 11
CinCPac— Copy No. 12
DI0-14ND— Copies Nos. 13-50
Copies handed to Col. Twitty G-2 and to Mr. Thornton F. B. I.
544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Table of Contents
Pai-agraphs
I — Introduction 1- 5
II — Factors required in the operation of a wartime espionage system G- 14
(A) Security 8
(B) Mobility 9- 10
(C) Flexibility 11- 12
(D) Simplicity 13
(E) Deception 14
III^Fuuctions of an espionage system 15- 80
(A) Collection of information 16- 30
(1) Observation 1 17- 21
(2) "Loose talk" and rumors 22- 23
(3) "Pumping" 24
(4) "Inside" information 25- 20
(5) "Planted" agents 27- 28
(6) Overt criminal action 29- 30
(B) Evaluation of information 31- 84
(C) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination 35- 80
(1) General considerations 35- 41
(2) Shore-to-ship contact : 42- 56
(a) Blinker-tube signalling 43- 49
(b) Personal contact ' 50- 52
(c) Sonic devices . 53
(d) Water caches 54
(e) Land caches 55- 56
(3) Radio 57- 65
(4) Commercial radio station transmissions 66- 69
(5) Trans-Pacific and inter-island telephone ; radiograms 70- 72
(6) Cablegrams 73- 75
(7) Air mail ; ordinary mail ; parcel post ; cargo ; railway express 76- 77
(8) Courier 78- 79
(9) Carrier pigeon 80
IV— Japanese espionage activity in Hawaii prior to the war 81-106
(A) Type of information collected 81- 86
(B) Personnel 87- 94
(C) Operational methods 95-106
(1) Collection of information 95- 99
(2) Evaluation of information 100-103
(3) Transmission of information to Japan 104-106
V — Present Japanese espionage activity in Hawaii 107-153
(A) Introductory 107-113
(1) Evidence of enemy espionage 107—108
(2) Espionage activity as affected by the state of diplomacy 109-113
(B) Personnel 114-124
(1) Selection of personnel prior to the war 114-117
(2) Type of personnel used 118-124
(C) Operations 125-153
(1) Functional units of the espionage organization 125-141
(a) Directive unit 126-127
(b) Collection unit 128-132
(c) Evaluation unit 133-135
(d) Communication unit 136-141
(2) Use of a business firm as a "front" 142-146
(3) Finances of the espionage organization 147-150
(4) Instructions from Japan in wartime 151-153
VI — Counter-espionage measures in Hawaii 154-218
(A) "Counter-esponage" defined and distinguished 154-158
(B) Various approaches to the espionage problem 159-173
(1) Introductory 159-162
(2) The "Suspect" Approach 163-169
(8) The "Functional" Approach 170-173
(C) Responsible agencies 174-196
(1) Military Intelligence Division 175-179
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation 180-183
(3) District Intelligence Office 184-180
(4) Federal Communications Commission 187-188
(5) National Censorship 189-194
(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii 190-192
(b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu 193-194
(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu 195-196
(D) Investigation procedure 197-205
(1) Prior to December 7, 1941 197-199
(2) December 7. 1941, to March 27, 1942 200-201
(3) Since March 27, 1942 202-205
(E) General considerations 206-221
(1) Intelligence personnel 206
(2) Coordination 207
(3) Shoreline coverage 208-210
(4) Travel control 211-215
(5) Lack of coordination among domestic intelligence, combat intelli-
gence, and operations activities 216-218
VII — Conclusion 219-221
Appendix "A" — Source Material (references and documentation by paragraphs).
Appendix "B" — Map of the Island of Oahu.
Appendix "C" — Schematic Diagram : Pattern for Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands.
I
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 545
[i] S-E-C-E-E-T
An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem
IN THE Hawaiian Islands
I. INTBODUCTION
1. This analysis is predicated upon tlie premise that accurate l^nowledge of
the United States naval and military activities in the Hawaiian Islands (and
particularly those in and around the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor) is of inestimable
value to Japan. It may not be an overstatement to say that no single place in
the world is of greater interest to Japanese naval leaders.
2. It is assumed that Japan, many years ago having foreseen the possibility
of war with the United' States, and fully realizing the importance of Pearl
Harbor as a naval base, had arranged for an adequate espionage system to
operate in Hawaii during wartime.
3. It is believed that Japan has, over a period of more than 30 years, collected
complete information concerning the geography and hydrography of the Hawaiian
Islands, and has studied the military and naval necessities arising therefrom.
(See paragraph 81.)
4. At the present time, Japan is assumed to be primarily interested in the
offensive, as distinguished from defensive, strength of forces of the United
States based in or from Hawaii. The specific matters of interest to the enemy,
in what is judged to be their present order of importance, are :
(a) Departures and arrivals of Naval task forces and units, and the disposition
of Naval units in Pearl Harbor and in other Hawaiian ports and waters.
(6) Status of readiness and repair of Naval units, and specifically, information
concerning damage to vessels and estimated time of repairs.
(c) Character and strength of Marine forces in Hawaii, and particularly,
departures of Marine forces.
{(I) Movements of military aircraft from and to the Hawaiian area.
[2] (e) Movements of merchantmen and troop convoys.
(/) Military and air strength of the Hawaiian Islands, particularly Oahu,
and specifically, new airfield construction.
5. In any event, the matter of primary interest to Japan is the offensive
sti'ength and disposition of United States Naval forces in these Islands. If
this assumption be correct, it is accurate to state that any Japanese espionage
organization now operating in the Hawaiian Islands is primarily concerned with
reporting naval information.
[3] H. FACTORS EE3QUIRE1D IN THE OPERATION OF A WARTIME ESPIONAGE SYSTEM
6. An espionage system functioning in hostile territory in wartime is of neces-
sity much more carefully set up than its peacetime predecessor. The restric-
tions imposed in wartime by the creating of new restricted areas, additional
patrolling of vital installations, the invoking of censorship, and the promulgation
of curfew, blackout, and alien control regulations all contribute to the situation.
New means of communication with the enemy overseas must be put into opera-
tion ; previously untapped sources of information must finally be utilized ; agents
possibly "uncovered" prior to the war, because of their known proximity to
military and naval installations, their alien status, or their contact with known
enemy centers or agents, must be discarded.
7. It is believed that any espionage organization functioning in the Territory
of Hawaii in wartime must consider and balance the following factors to pro-
duce a workable equation :
(A) Security
8. It is axiomatic that any espionage group in enemy territory must remain
undetected to continue proper functioning. It must provide maximum security
for the organizational nucleus, sacrificing, if necessary, le.ss important members
to preserve the heart and brains of the system. Only the most necessary risks
must be taken in gathering information and communicating the same to Japan.
Agents of the espionage system should be known to one another only to the
extent absolutely necessary, limiting so far as possible the ability of one agent
to expose the whole system. Agents who have no need to know each other should
not know each other. In short, a strict echelon system should be maintained,
with each agent knowing only the superior to whom he reports and the operative
or operatives he directs.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 148 36
546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(B) Mobility
9. There must be sufficieut mobility of the espionage group to permit the
ready collection and transmission of information, as well as to allow the neces-
sary intercourse among agents of the group. This requires that movements of
agents be unobtrusive, often necessitating the careful selection of pretexts. It
must be anticipated in advance of war that movements in certain vital areas
(for example, [4] the Honolulu waterfront) will be restricted in war-
time. Hence, plans must be well laid to maintain the espionage organization
normal mobility in such areas.
10. Therefore, the espionage agents must be able to reach without apparent
effort all information within public view, and to have other information brought
to them by "insiders," as far as is possible. Such mobility obviates the necessity
of information-gathering agents having to expose themselves as such.
(C) Flexibility
11. Wartime conditions are inherently unstable and unpredictable. The con-
tinued functioning of an espionage organization often may depend upon its ability
to adapt itself to changing conditions. Proper security measures taken to
prevent and detect espionage can be overcome only by a highly adaptable espion-
age organization — one which is prepared to use Caucasian agents as well as
Orientals, women as well as men, and agents "planted" inside vital areas as well
as those mingling with the general public outside.
12. It must reasonably have been anticipated by Japan that war with the
United States in all probability would cause the Hawaiian Islands to be put
under martial law, the exact nature of whose application could hardly have been
anticipated. That the enemy, Japan, have a highly adaptable wartime espionage
system was therefore particularly required in Hawaii.
(D) Simplicity
13. It is a basic requirement that the espionage organization should be as
simple as possible. Simplicity makes for security and efficiency in such an
organization. Too elaborate an organization is likely to place various portions
of the mechanism at tlie whim of uncontrollable outside factors, as well as increase
the likelihood that if one agent is discovered and "talks," the whole system will
be exposed.
(E) Deception
14. As a means of achieving security, mobility, flexibility, and simplicity in its
operations, the espionage organization must employ deception generally, as well
as in specific operations. Its agents must, in the main, be [5] able to
discharge their duties casually and without apparent illegality. Transfers of
money necessary for the running of the organization must not arouse suspicion.
The existence of a "front," possibly in the guise of a legitimate business house,
is therefore necessary to afford cover to many of the activities of the espionage
group. How a business "front" could be utilized will be noted later. (Para-
graphs 142-146).
[6] m. FUNCTIONS OF AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM
15. For the purposes of this analysis, the functions of an espionage system
opei'ating in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime are assumed to be :
(a) Collection of information;
( b ) Evaluation of information ;
(c) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination.
(A ) Collection of information
16. In the Hawaiian area, information of value to the enemy can be collected
by any or all of the following methods, which vary in risk, according to the
circumstances indicated :
(1) Observation
17. From the Naval standpoint, the most important island of the Hawaiian
group is Oahu, and unfortunately the geography of Oahu is such that observation
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 547
of the movements of Naval vessels cannot be prevented. The arrival and depar-
ture of ships at Pearl Harbor in the daytime is visible, to anyone interested, from
a number of places not in any restricted area and where the presence of an
observer would not arouse suspicion. For example, every vessel entering or
leaving Pearl Harbor by daylight can readily be seen (and by a trained observer,
identified as to type and class) from many buildings in downtown Honolulu.
18. The number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, whether in drydock, at
berths, or at moorings, can be determined with a higli degree of accuracy by
anyone living on, or visiting, Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. The
fact that a field glass is required in aid of such observation is but a small obstacle.
19. It is known that employees of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu.,
who were designated to observe and report on arrivals and departures of Naval
units at Pearl Harbor, and the number of vessels there, prior to the outbreak of
war, did much of their observing from Aiea Heights and areas nearer to Pearl
Harbor, but at a lower elevation. (#) Likewise, many Japanese naval officers
who visited Honolulu in recent years made sightseeing trips to Aiea Heights and
the envii'ons of Pearl Harbor. (#) It is also known that [7] at least
one of the two-man Japanese submarines that participated in the attack on Oahu,
on December 7, 1941, had aboard a panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor, which
later was found to have been photographed from Aiea Heights — not by an
espionage agent, but by a commercial photographer, who sold prints thereof openly
in Honolulu. (#)
20. There are many ways, less direct than those noted above, where acute and
intelligent observations will reveal information concerning Fleet dispositions.
The number of officers and men on leave in Honolulu often will provide a clue
to the number and identity of Fleet units in port. Where officers or men who
maintain residences in Honolulu are known to be attached to a given ship, an ob-
server will be able to state with reasonable certainty that if a certain officer or man
is at home in Honolulu, his ship is in port and not at sea.
21. Thus, unless the observer enters a i-estricted area without right, or uses
visual or photographic equipment whose use is illegal, his activities in collecting
information of naval value by observation alone can easily go wholly undetected.
(2) "Loose talk" and rumors
22. No matter bow extensive a campaign may be to prevent "loose talk" and
rumor-mongering concerning military and naval subjects, it seems impossible to
restrain either entirely. Since much of what passes as rumor often contains
germs of truth, the trained enemy agent, referring what he hears to a competent
evaluator, can make this a profitable source of information for the enemy. Many
stories — for example, the sinking of the aircraft carriers LEIXINGTON, YORK-
TOWN, and WASP, and the impending Battle of Midway — were common gossip in
Honolulu before official announcement of the facts.
23. "Loose talk" is of two types — that which is offered gratuitously, and that
which is "pumped" from one having knowledge of the facts. The distinction is
obvious and is esi)ecially important in the operation of the espionage organization
from the standpoint of risk.
(3) "Pumpinfr
24. This type of information-gathering consists of eliciting facts from the
possessor thereof, by pretext, use of force, or sensuous or intoxicating induce-
ment. The [8] person imposed upon does not consciously and willingly
betray his trust, but may be brought to do so by the enemy agent's use of force,
misrepresentation, or proffer of food and drink, narcotics, or women. (#)
(4) "Inside" information
25. This is the type of information generally bought and paid for by the enemy
agent, who need not (and generally cannot) obtain the information himself, but
who commissions someone else to provide him with the information. Unless,
however, the espionage organization has developed a source of "inside" information
prior to the outbreak of war, it may find it difficult to do thereafter because of the
extreme risk involved in approaching a person with a proposition that he commit
treason in wartme. ( # )
26. There is no evidence that any person in a position of military or naval
trust in the Hawaiian Islands, either before or during this war, has supplied
information to enemy agents. However, history teaches that vigilance against
treason must be maintained.
548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK '
(5) "Planted" agents
27. As distinguished from the traitor already in a place of trust who sells
information to the enemy, a "plant" is an agent installed in a place of confidence
(usually within a restricted area) who himself gathers all available information
of value to the enemy. Less valuable and less likely to be used, but possible, is
a person (for example, a domestic) "planted" in the home of any military, naval,
or civilian official likely to have considerable knowledge of vital information.
28. Less likely to be found, but not to be dismissed, is the possibility of enemy
agents using "planted" mechanical devices for the gathering of important infor-
mation. Telephone wires over which vital information is transmitted may be
"tapped." Microphones may be arranged in conference rooms and offices.
(6) Overt criminal action
29. Unable to secure desired information by any of the foregoing methods, the
enemy espionage organization may resort to actions more easily detected, and
therefore carrying a greater risk. Among the more direct methods would be
murder, assault, forgei-y, burglary, and larceny (to secure [9] writings,
maps, charts, and code books) and i)erjury, impersonation, and trespass (to
secure entry to restricted areas). Murder -and arson might be indulged in to
destroy the evidence of other crimes incident to espionage activity.
30. It is believed, however, that under present conditions in Hawaii, it is
unnecessary for the enemy to resort to overt criminal activity to carry out its
espionage mission here.
(B) Evaluation of information
31. Since, as will be discussed below, the chief obstacle confronting an espionage
organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime is that of communicating
information to Japan, it is desirable that all information collected by enemy
agents be evaluated and digested locally as far as possible, so as to provide the
shortest possible messages for transrnission, whatever the means of communica-
tion may be.
32. While before the war broke out the Japanese Consulate General, Hono-
lulu, was able to send lengthy intelligence reports and newspaper articles to
Japan in the consular pouch, and was able to send encrypted radiograms and
cablegrams without undue Jimit of length, it is assumed that the transmission
of information to Japan is at the present time sufliciently diiricult to prohibit
the sending by most means of any great volume of information without great
risk of detection. (#)
33. Therefore, it is believed necessary that the enemy have a competent
evaluator (or evaluation unit) in the Hawaiian Islands, so that all available
information can be digested to its important essentials. This presupposes one
or more individuals highly intelligent and trained in military and naval
subjects.
34. It is also believed likely that the chief evaluator of the espionage organ-
ization will be found to be the principal organizer and primary directive force
of the group.
(C) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination
(1) General considerations
35. In executing its ultimate function — that of communicating vital infor-
mation to the enemy^ — the espionage organization, in all probability, exposes
itself to a far greater risk than it does in discharging its other functions..
[10] 36. It is quite possible that more than one means of transmission of
information is used. In general, it may be said that the more rapid types
of communication involve the most risk, and that the sender will, therefore,
use such means only when the value of data transmitted justifies the assump-
tion of the greater risk.
37. "Spot news," such as the departures of a Naval task force. Marine force,
bomber squadron, or a convoy, would merit the most speedy means of communi-
cation. Such intelligence obviously would lose its value if delayed too long
in reaching the effective enemy destination.,
38. On the other hand, more "durable" information, such as that concerning
new construction (airfields, hangars, and ammunition dumps, for example),
relating to conditions of a static and permanent nature, would be of value
to the enemy even if delayed months in reaching Japan.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 549
39. It must also be noted that certain information may be unsuitable for
transmission telegraphically, and may have to be transmitted manually. Arti-
cles such as maps, charts, ordnance, or a bomb sight are of greatest value
to the enemy only if received intact.
40. Certain information, although capable of telegraphic transmission, may
be so lengthy as to make anything other than manual transmission impracti-
cable and dangerous. Detailed intelligence monographs and stolen code books
would be examples.
41. The problem of transmission of information has been thoroughly con-
sidered, chietly for the reason tliat it is believed that there is mure likpliliood
of discovering tlie enemy's espionage organization through its communication
facilities than in any other way. The organization exposes itself most openly
when exercising its communication function. The possible ways in which it is
thought that enemy agents might send information from here so as to directly
or ultimately reach Japan, are the following:
(2) Bhore-to-ship contact
42. Under this heading, there are a number of different methods by which
communication between an enemy agent in the Hawaiian islands and enemy
submarine off shore can be effected. While there is no conclusive proof that
such communication has existed during the war or immediately preceding the
attack on Pearl Harbor, there are two significant [11] facts which strongly
suggest the possibility :
(«) It has been learned since the outbreak of war that the local Consulate had
a plan for signalling by various means from the islands of Oahu and Maui. This
plan emphasized visual signalling from the windward coast of Oahu, presumably
to submarines. ( # )
(&) Since the outbreak of war, enemy submarines have appeared off various
of the Hawaiian Islands, at night and close to shore. Evidence that such craft
K^ave appeared close oft" windward Oahu at various times is strong. However,
enemy submarines have not engaged in combat activity in that area, nor could
they have effected reconnaissance of United States Fleet units there (since that
sea area is off the regular sea lanes and at the opposite side of Oahu from
Pearl Harbor). It therefore appears that with the presence of enemy sub-
marines off windward Oahu should be associated the possibility that they were
there to receive communications from, or send them to, enemy agents on shore-
more likely the former — or to make physical contact with agents on shore.
(See paragraphs 47-48.)
(a) Blinker-tube signalling
43. The hills rising sharply from the shores of the Hawaiian Islands contain
many natural signal positions. These hills are cut my many deep valleys, most
of which open almost directly into the sea, rather than into plains lying between
the main mountain ranges and the sea. A blinker-tube signalling device (easily
improvised from a flashlight and a cylindrical tube, pipe, or can) operated from
one of the valleys and brought to bear upon a prearranged sea area cannot be
seen unless the observer is on an almost direct bearing with the tube.
44. Since the outbreak of war, local intelligence offices have received many
reports concerning suspicious lights, flashes, and flares — some well inland, some
on laud near the sea, and some off shore. In the many cases investigated, no
instance of signalling to the enemy has been established, but neither have all
cases been satisfactorily explained.
[12] 45. The killing of Giichiro UYENO, a Japanese alien by an Army sentry
at Waimanalo (windward Oahu) shortly before midnight, July 25, 1942, is worthy
of particular note. UYENO was discovered close to a machine-gun emplacement
on the beach. Several tircses challenged by the sentry, UYENO failed to make
himself known and took flight, whereupon the sentry shot him. While attempting
to flee, YENO discarded a flashlight which he had been carrying. Examina-
tion of the flashlight indicated that it had once been "blacked out" with colored
cellophane, but that the cellophane had been removed. According to available
evidence, UYENO previously had always been in his quarters at a private home
(where he was employed as a yard caretaker) by 8: 00 o'clock each night, com-
plying with the Military Governor's curfew for aliens. He was a recluse, but
considered sane.
46. At the time he was first seen near the machine-gun emplacement, UYENO
was approximately 400 yards from his quarters, in a place he had no legitimate
550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
reason to be. He was abroad at night in violation of the Military Governor's
order, was illegally in the vicinity of military emplacements, was carrying an
unblacked flashlight (though unlighted), and failed to heed the sentry's chal-
lenges. In those circumstances, it is reasonable to say that UYENO knew he
was risking death. The probability is that his mission at the time justified
assuming that risk. It is conceivable that UYENO was proceeding to, or return-
ing from, a point of vantage from which signalling would have been, or was,
accomplished with the use of the undimmed flashlight. In this connection, it is
relevant to quote the following entries from the log of the Army Contact Office
(M. I. D.), Honolulu, for July 26, 1942:
"0040 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus) : Several 'Radar' plots indicate
a strange surface vessel (or surfaced submarine) off Kaneohe Bay
"0O45 Ph. from For'd Echelon ( Lt. Porteus) : Reports that a guard at Bellows
Field shot and killed a Japanese man ; CO asked to identify himi."
The deceased Japanese later was identified as UYENO. The place where he was
shot was approximately ten miles, on a straight line, from Kaneohe Bay. {#)
47. It is relevant to observe that during the latter [13] part of July,
1942, considei'able suspicious offshore activity was noted in the windward
Oahu area, near the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay. The following is a
recipitulation of events, as related by a highly reliable informant :
On the first appearance in the last week of July, 1942, the Japanese sub-
marine was seen to be sending signals toward the shore by means of blinker.
The submarine was located at this time near the entrance of Kanehoe
Harbor just off the Mokapu peninsula. On its second appearance, probably
July 26, 1942, the submarine was fired on by^the shore batteries with no
effort. On its next appearance, July 27, 1942, it was reported tliat all shore
batteries had fired on the enemy submarine, with at least one shot hitting
its mark. The submarine retired to a position behind Moku Manu island.
This position rendered safety to the vessel since it is characterized by two
cliffs which rise from the water on either side of the channel between the
two islands. The submarine's position in this channel rendered it imjwssible
for direct shots to be thrown at it. It was also understood that airplanes
took off to drop bombs on the submarine, but because of conditions, were
unable to make satisfactory runs.
Coincident with the retiring of the submarine on this latter date, the figiire
of a man was seen to be swimming in the channel in Kanehoe Bay, emerging
from the water close to the old Navy Pier, Kahaluu landing, which is near
Koolau. A company of soldiers was dispatched to head this individual off,
but because of the nature of the terrain, which is characterized by swamp
and heavy underbrush, he was able to evade this group. Footprints inspected
showed that this man was wearing rubber-soled shoes. ( # )
In connection with the foregoing report must be considered the following
memorandum, dated July 30, 1942, from the Intelligence Unit, Naval Air Station,
Kaneohe Bay :
"For the past several months the U. S. Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay,
has been menaced by attack from enemy submarines. Numerous radar plots
of such submarines have been recorded and our aircraft, destroyers, and
coast artillery have been brought into action against enemy [I'f] sub-
marines as recently as July 27. 1942."
48. More recently, similar enemy activity has been apparent off Kaneohe Bay.
On April 15, 1943, the District Intelligence Officer received the following report
from the same Intelligence Unit :
"On the night of April 6, 1943, in addition to radar contacts, the station
crash boats, in search of survivors from a plane crash in the area outside
of Kaneohe Bay, saw an object identified as a submarine conning tower.
(There were no such friendly craft in this area at this time.)
"At 1100 on April 10, 1943, planes from the Naval Air Detachment, NAS,
Kaneohe, saw a submarine off Kahuku Point, (later identified as enemy),
break surface and shortly, on his approach, submerge. At 2100 that same
evening radar contacts were made off Kaneohe Bay, bearing 345°, range
7000 yards. At 2200 the station gun batteries illuminated with star shells
and fired upon the conning tower of a submarine, range 7000 yards, bearing
342°, proceeding rapidly to bearing 345° when it submerged.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 551
"On April 11, 1943, a plane was dispatched from this station to search for
an enemy submarine observed off the northeast coast of Maui."
49. Sight, sonic, and radar plots of enemy submarines and unidentified objects
ofE windwai-d Oahu (particularly in the area off Waimanalo to Kaneohe Bay)
have been recorded during the war. These usually have been at night. These
facts, together with the incidents involving UYENO and the unidentified swimmer
in Kaneohe Bay, cast the highest degree of suspicion upon the windward Oahu
region. The coincidence of several such events in the last week of July, 1942,
coupled with particularly active suspected enemy submarine activity at that
time, makes the situation doubly noteworthy. It is clearly possible that sig-
nalling to enemy craft has been, and still is, carried on in that region. Further,
the possibility of actual physical contact between enemy submarines and enemy
agents on shore is apparent.
(b) Personal contact.
50. The waters and beaches of much of the coastal areas [15^ of the
Hawaiian Islands ure such that a reasonably good swimmer can swim from
the beach to a submarine, or vice versa. This provides the enemy with a method
not only of receiving written, graphic, pictorial, and oral information from
shore, but of putting ashore instructions, equipment, and new personnel for use
by the espionage organization.
51. The landing of Nazi saboteurs on the Atlantic Coast of the United States
and a spy in Canada, and the report referred to in paragraph 47, above, illus-
trate the possibilities of effecting physical contact with shore. ( # ) With even
greater ease, enemy agents can be landed or picked up on islands of the Hawaiian
group other than Oahu.
52. Before the war, there was speculation as to whether Hawaiian fishing
sampans (largely manned by alien Japanese) might be making contact with Jap-
anese vessels in or near the Hawaiian area for subversive purposes. Such meet-
ings were never proved. ( # ) Contacts of local sampans with enemy vessels are
not likely at present, due to the strict patrolling of all such craft in Hawaiian
waters and the limited distance from shore within which they must operate.
Furthermore, persons of Japanese ancestry are no longer allowed to fish in boats
off shore.
(c) Sonic devices
53. Sonic equipment for underwater signalling is mentioned as a possible,
though not probable, means of communication between enemy agents in small
craft in Hawaiian waters and submerged enemy submarines. The latter, of
course, carry sonic signalling apparatus as standard equipment.
(d) Water caches
54. The coastal areas of the Hawaiian Islands in some places have shelves
outside the reefs, the shelves being at relatively shallow depths. This is true
to a large extent of the Weimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area and the north shore of
Oahu. For many years it has been the practice of local fishermen (many of
whom are alien Japanese) to lay fish traps in those waters without buoys or
markers attached, later picking them up by dragging or diving. The waters
in which this type of fishing has been practiced are in many cases deep enough
to permit a submarine to navigate close to shore, where it could recover a cache.
[16] (e) Land caches
55. There are a dozen or more small islands or rocks off windward Oahu, vary-
ing in height above the sea from 20 to 360 feet. Several lie parallel to the shore-
line and are long enough to conceal a submarine off shore from the view of ob-
servers on shore. Several lie in the Waimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area. Espionage
agents from shore could visit such islands or rocks with comparative security and
leave intelligence pouches in prearranged places, such pouches to be later picked
up by enemy submarines.
56. The use of land and water caches as a means of transferring information
of any type to the enemy has a singular advantage over many of the other means
of communication. Where caches are used, the transmitter can choose the time
of day most appropriate to the performance of his task, and the recipient can
do likewise. The times of their respective actions need not, and probably would
not, be the same.
552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Radio
57. The use of this means of communication would be highly desirable to the
enemy espionage organization, from the standpoint of rapidity of communication,
but involves a high degree of risk. By radio, information could be sent directly
to Japan, or, with less power, to Japanese stations in the Mandated Islands or
to enemy surface units or submarines considerably closer to the Hawaiian
Islands, for re-transmission.
58. Pi'operly used, however, this method of communication could give the sender
a fair degree of security, taking into consideration the following safeguards or
operating procedures :
(a) Transmissions on a given frequency to be of short duration ;
(b) Varying frequencies to be used;
(c) Use of a mobile transmitter, hidden in a truck or automobile ;
((Z) Use of frequency modulation ;
(e) Use of directional transmitting antenna;
(/) Use of ultra-high frequencies.
[i7] 59. In this work, small sets operating only with a key could be used.
It is known that Japanese landing forces in the Orient have used portable ultra-
high frequency field sets only 8" x 8" x 10" in size. By using the transmitter
carefully, changing frequencies rapidly, and employing mobile equipment, a
maximum degree of protection against detection could be achieved.
60. Frequency modulation transmissions would be chiefly of value in this work
for its freedom from detection by ordinary (that is, amplitude modulation)
receivers. Frequency modulation transmission in the higher frequencies is re-
ported to have a service range of about twice the distance from the point Of
transmission to the horizon. Thus, a transmitter located at an elevation of 500
feet could send to an enemy submarine almost 30 miles away. (#)
61. In conjunction with frequency modulation or other type of transmission,
the use of a directional antenna would greatly improve the security of the
espionage activity by limiting the area within which monitoring equipment, fixed
or mobile, would be able to intercept signals. Directional transmission in the
higher freqviencies, with their limited service ranges, would be used to best
advantage with a fixed rather than mobile transmitter.
62. A strong objection to the use of radio is the imsatisfactory equation be-
tween the operator's vulnerability and his importance to the espionage organiza-
tion. His technical skill would be a great asset, yet during periods of transmission
he wo'^ld be the most exposed member of the organization.
63. Other than an unidentified message intercepted by an Army radio unit
on the morning of December 7, 1941 (following the attack on Oahu), w|ii<fli
message was partly in German and partly unintelligible, and which reported in
a very general way the damage caused by the Japanese attack, there has come
to the attention of this oflSce no instance of communication by radio from the
Hawaiian Islands to the enemy. (#)
64. However, in line with what should always be the basic operating premise
of the counter-espionage agent — to assume the worst and work against it — it
must be assumed that the enemy has carried on radio communication from these
Islands. On January 10, 1942, the senior FCC representative in Hawaii wrote:
[iS] "It is generally believed and logical to assume that radio is being
used to convey information to the enemy in this area. The fact that no
illegal operation has been discovered here to date means that the enemy
is clever and that there is inadequate radio coverage. . ." ( # )
After specifying the existing monitoring facilities and requesting additional
equipment and personnel, the same writer believed that FCC would still be unable
to cover the field completely, saying :
". . . Those recommendations constitute a practical compromise with the
requirements for theoretically perfect coverage."
On January 16, 1942, the Director of the Federal Bureau 'of Investigation wrote :
"In regard to present conditions in the Hawaiian Islands, it is apparent
that illicit shortwave radio transmissions are being sent from clandestine
stations operating in the islands themselves, in communication with mobile
units of the Japanese Navy, through which intelligence information is being
reported to the enemy. . ." (#)
65. Opinion is divided as to whether the enemy espionage organization would
use radio as a frequent and usual means of communication with Japan, or use it
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 553
only in the rarest and most urgent cases. The answer to the question will depend
directly upon the amount of risk apparently involved in such transmission and
upon the suitability of other, less risky means of communication. Fixed and
mobile FCC monitoring stations in the Hawaiian Islands maintain a constant
watch for suspicious radio signals, and constitute a serious threat to any illicit
sender. However, it is believed that such monitoring is not, and could not be,
complete. Transmissions in the higher frequencies from certain portions of the
island of Oahu cannot be received at certain other parts of the island. Emana-
tions from a high-frequency transmitter located in a valley formed by sharply
rising mountains usually might only be received within the valley or beyond its
entrances, the mountains acting as a shield against lateral transmission. Using
a directional antenna with a transmitter so situated, the field of interceptability
could further be reduced, eliminating almost entirely the possibility of intercep-
tion by at least the fixed monitoring stations.
[19] (4) Commercial radio station transmissions
66. In the Consulate communications plan already referred to (paragraph 42
(a)), this type of commu^jication was provided for — a radio want ad offering
for sale a Chinese rug was to mean that several aircraft carriers had left Pearl
Harbor; one advertising a complete chicken farm for sale, that all aircraft car-
riers had sailed ; and, one offering to employ a beauty operator, that the whole
battle force had sailed. If used, these transmissions were to have been sent
over Radio KGMB, Honolulu, at about 9:45 o'clock on any morning. No such
advertisements were in fact ever placed.
67. Such a method of code transmission is entirely feasible, although normally
there would be a delay of at least a day in reporting information in this manner,
since Honolulu radio stations generally require that advertising copy be sub-
mitted at least the day before it is broadcast. Commercial radio transmissions
of KGU and KGMB, Honolulu, while probably not to be heard at all hours of
the day in the Mandated Islands probably could be heard there at night. Day-
time broadcasts could be heard by Japanese vessels cruising between there and
the Hawaiian Islands, and by them be relayed to Japan.
68. The type of code to be used in conjunction with radio advertising would
be simple to conceive and should create no suspicion in the minds of censors or
the public, because it would use only words well known to the trade of the
advertiser. The use of nouns representing trade names or products would be
stressed in this code, to escape the effects of any ordinary paraphrasing that
censors or radio station operators might impose. An internal indicator could
be used to differentiate ordinary advertisements from those intended to convey
information to the enemy.
69. While the use of spot ads of the type mentioned in the Consulate com-
munications plan would arouse suspicion at the present time, it should be men-
tioned that there are a considerable number of commercial firms (some of them
operated by Japanese aliens) who regularly advertise over the local commercial
radio stations, and have done so since before the war. One of these firms might
well be a "front" whose radio advertising could be used to transmit code
messages.
[20] (5) Trans-Pacific and inter-island radio telephone; radiograms
70. These means are grouped together because they each are interceptable by
the enemy. There is good evidence that trans-Pacific telephone communications
between Hawaii and California can be intercepted in Japan, but whether they
are intelligible there depends on whether the Japanese have a suitable inverter
("unscrambler"). As to all of these means, however, sound counter-espionage
practice requires that it be assumed that the Japanese can intercept such com-
munications and render them intelligible.
71. Where these means are used to transmit information directly to an intercept
station, a simple code similar to that which could be used in radio advertising
would be appropriate. Here, again, the use of a business house as a "front" would
add security for the espionage organization. Examination of trans-Pacific
telephone censorship extracts indicates that many such calls are of a business
nature, and involve conversations concerning products and brand names.
72. In addition, these means can be used for the pui-pose of communicating
directly with other Japanese espionage agents, on the Mainland. Their use for
that purpose would be essentially the same as the use of commercial cable, air
mail, regular mail, and courier, which are discussed below.
554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(6) Cablegrams
73. Assuming the existence of Mainland "post offices" to which intelligence
messages might be sent, the use of commercial cable as a means of getting vital
information out of the Hawaiian Islands is quite feasible. This practice pre-
supposes the existence of an information relay system, whose task it would be
to re-route the information through any of many possible channels to an Axis
country or to an Axis agent in a neutral state, for relay to Japan.
74. This method of communication requires only a simple code, perhaps of as
few as 100 words a.nd numerals, together with code designations for geographical
sections on a grid map. If this means of communication were used often, several
codes could be used to avoid the possibility of detection through repetition of
the same code words.
75. Although the use of cablegram eliminates to some extent the time lag
incident to transmissions by air mail [21] and ordinary mail, there are
some obstacles interposed by censorship, inasmuch as the immediate censor might
take a fancy to paraphrase a message or suppress it entirely (in which case the
sender would not necessarily be notified). However, it is believed that the use
of proper codes, especially designed to avoid censoi'ship and the effect of para-
phrase, would make this a useful means of communication.
(7) Air mail; 07\lmary mail; parcel post; cargo; railway express
76. These media of transmission have several advantages not possessed by some
of those previously discussed : First, the permitting of transmission of bulkier
reports, in more detailed and more secure code; second, the opportunity for use
of secret inks, grids, and other hidden writings ; third, the transmission of mai>s,
charts, plans, and other matter that must be represented graphically or pictori-
ally, rather than verbally ; and fourth, the transmission of physical objects of
intelligence value, and written reports that have been reproduced on microfilm.
77. The great time lag between the happening of an event and the time a report
of it reaches the effective enemy designation by one of the above means is the
most serious disadvantage here. However, certain durable information (for
example, that relating to the location of new airfields, drydocks, ammunition
dumps, and especially the estimated dates of completion of construction in pro-
gress) would be only slightly diminished in value if so transmitted.
(S) Courier
78. The use of agents who are officers or crewmen of commercial airlines or
the merchant marine has been suggested. (#) Such means would i)ossess two
advantages : First, in allowing the transmission of information by word of mouth ;
and second, the handling of physical objects.
79. However, because of the vagaries of merchant marine sailing these days,
an agent on a certain ship could not be expected to call at Honolulu regularly.
This would necessitate having couriers on a large number of vessels, requiring
the espionage organization to become too large in proportion to the benefits to
be gained by the use of couriers. Also, the factor of time required in such trans-
mission is an additional adverse condition. It is much more likely that officers
or crewmen of Pan American Airways, whose clippers make fairly regular trips
between Hawaii and California, or [22] other commercial airlines, would
be sought to act as couriers.
(9) Carrier pigeon
80. Simply because it might be used for the carriage of information between
islands of the Hawaiian group, this possibility is mentioned. However, it is
considered relatively insecure, and perhaps vain, since inter-island mails are not
censored and can therefore be used to better advantage than homing pigeons.
[23] IV. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII PRIOR TO THE3 WAR
(A) Type of information collected
■ 81. An alien Japanese internee, who claims to have engaged in espionage for
Japan in Hawaii 30 years ago, has stated that Japan started its espionage
coverage of the Hawaiian Islands shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. (#)
Initial study is said to have been made of the geography, topography, and
hydrography of the Islands, so that by World War I, Japan had a rather com-
plete compilation of all basic data concerning those subjects.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 555
82. As indicated in Paragraph 19, the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu,
was particularly interested in the movements of United States Naval vessels
in and out of Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence that such movements were
especially watched and reported by the Consulate prior to the summer of
1940. This probably is accounted for by the fact that until that time the status
of relations between the United States and Japan did not demand such re-
porting and that up to that time Fleet movements were publicized in the press-
83. Of particular importance to the Consulate in 1941 was information con-
cei-ning new airfields in the Islands. Persons attached to the Consulate trav-
elled to the islands of Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii particularly to look for new
aii-field construction, while new fields on Oahu were constantly sought. (#)
The importance of such information is readily apparent when one considers the
attack of December 7, 1941.
84. Arrivals of new air squadrons and troops to strengthen Hawaii's defenses
in 1941, and the passing through Honolulu of men and materiel destined for
China, also were closely watched and reported by the Consulate to Tokyo. (#)
85. Data concerning beaches, reefs, anchorages, tides and currents, and the
like, undoubtedly were gathered chiefly by alien Japanese fishermen who almost
exclusively manned Hawaii's sampan fishing fleet. Those beaches most suit-
able for enemy landing operations were' closely studied, both by Consulate
personnel and visiting Japanese naval officers on sightseeing trips.
86. The Consulate is also known to have been interested, but to a lesser
degree, in the waterfront facilities on the four main islands ; and, in the
case of Kauai, the electric powerhouse at Wainiha was the object of scrutiny by
a member [24] of the Consulate staff sent to the Island of Kauai for
that purpose in July, 1941. ( # )
(B) Personnel
87. Upon the basis of known facts, persons who have engaged in e.spionage
in the Hawaiian Islands for the benefit of Japan may be classified as (a) officials,
(b) agents, and (c) volunteers. For instant purposes. Consulate staff members,
employees, and toritsnginin ("go-betweens," popularly called "consular agents")
are denominated officials. Other local residents — the self-appointed spies — are
classed as volunteers.
88. It is believed that the Vice Consul, at Honolulu, was ex ofiflcio responsible
for the conduct of espionage operations of the Consulate. Certain Consulate
secretaries (alien Japanese) and one local-born clerk (a dual citizen) are known
to have collected military and naval information for the Consulate, in each in-
stance reporting their finding to the Vice Consul. In another instance, a consular
agent who was a Buddhist priest at Lahaina, Maui, was called upon by the
Vice Consul to report the movements of the Fleet at Lahaina Roads, (#)
Other consular agents were asked to report economic matters.
89. When interrogated after the outbreak of war, the local-born Consulate
clerk above referred to stated that he had heard one Consulate secretary (who
also was engaged in espionage in Honolulu) state that it was Japan's policy
to maintain two espionage systems in countries abroad — one system run by
consulates, and the other separate from the consulates and entirely unknown
to them. Whether any such extra-consulate espionage system was active in the
Hawaiian Islands is not known. The difference in functions of the two systems
was said to be that a consulate would indulge only in such espionage activity
as could be carried on without compromising diplomatic and consular relations
(such as the gathering of facts from newspapers, viewing ship movements from
places of vantage not in any restricted area, and observing airfields and beaches
from public highways), whereas an extra-consulate organization would carry
on "illegal" espionage (such as trespassing restricted areas and the buying of
confidential information).
90. The Consulate undoubtedly had a few paid agents, although in the one
outstanding case, it does not appear whether the agent who received pay through
the Consulate was receiving the same for services rendered at the direction of
[25] the Consulate or of someone in Japan. This agent, Otto KUEHN, an
alien German, is known to have received $14,000.00 through the Consulate in
October, 1941, but the money seems to have been transmitted directly from Japan,
with the Consulate acting merely as delivery agent. However, subsequent to
fhat time, KUEHN did commit overt acts of espionage and report his work to
556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Consulate dii'ectly, for which acts he has since been tried by a military
commission, found guilty, and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. The Con-
sulate is known also to have paid certain other persons who appear to have been
chiefly engaged in propaganda work, but who may well have engaged in espionage,
also. (#)
91. Much information of value to Japan is believed to have been gathered by
Japanese espionage agents who came to Hawaii for relatively short periods of
time, as non-quota immigrants or in the guise of visitors — in either case, seem-
ingly having no connection with the local Consulate. One case is known of a
Japanese agent who, around 1932, stayed in Hawaii for about four months,
evidently to perform a specific mission. With the help of a Japanese bookstore
owner (who had been naturalized as a United States citizen following his service
in the United States Army in World War I), the visiting agent conducted con-
siderable observation of the Island of Oahu and its points of naval and military
interest. ( # )
92. Espionage agents, or observers, who stayed but a short time in Honolulu
were chiefly those military and naval officers of Japan who were passing through
Honolulu on commercial or naval vessels. In the cases of visiting Japanese naval
training squadrons, the officers invariably made sightseeing trips around Oahu,
taking them within full view of Pearl Harbor, certain Army reservations, air-
fields, and strategic beaches. Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, UN,
expelled from the United States in the summer of 1941, is reliably reported to
have come ashore here and to have driven with the Japanese Vice Consul to the
vicinity of Waianae, long considered a possible landing beach. ( # )
93. It is also believed likely that when Japanese naval oil tankers used to call
at Honolulu (up until 1941), tanker personnel occasionally would be left in
Honolulu on specific missions, and would take a later vessel back to Japan. No
adequate control of the personnel of such vessels was ever effected here. Tallies
made by other Government agencies of the number of persons leaving and going
aboard such ships here often would show that more persons had gone ashore
than had returned before sailing, but the accuracy of these tallies [26]
cannot be positively asserted. A Japanese clerk of the Consulate who had been
engaged in espionage activities stated, when interrogated, that he once heard
that Japanese tankers would sometimes leave some of their personnel in Hono-
lulu, but he could not state the source of his information. ( # )
94. In an effort to "make face" with Japan's officialdom, several local Japanese
residents (aliens and citizens) have gratuitously, and in some instances volun-
tarily, engaged in espionage or propaganda activities beneficial to Japan. The
Japanese bookstore owner preivously refered to was found to have gathered exten-
sive military information (of dubious value, however). He also willingly
obliged a visiting Japanese, since found to have been an espionage agent, by
driving the latter to points of military importance on the island of Oahu. On
other occasions (1936-1941), in response to requests received while visiting
Japan, he sent to Japan large quantities of maps, charts, and hydrographic
publications on sale in Honolulu. The full volume of what he transmitted is not
known, but his effects show that he sent at least 43 ocean charts, 6 air charts,
and 51 maps, as well as several publications. (#) Many other local Japanese
residents, over a period of 20 years, voluntarily (and in most cases, proudly)
volunteered to drive visiting Japanese naval personnel to points of interest on
the various islands at which such personnel called. One Japanese alien residing
on Aiea Heights, whose home has an unsurpassed view of Pearl Harbor, is known
to have been visited on occasions by officers of Japanese naval vessels whicti
called at Honolulu prior to the war. ( # )
(C) Operational methods
(1) Collection of information
95 From the facts at hand, it must be said that almost all military and naval
information known to have been transmitted from Hawaii to Japan, either by
the Consulate or agents sent here on special missions, was gathered by the simple
expedient of open observation, without trespassing restricted areas. (Sfie Para-
graphs 17-21) In this connection it will be remembered that an anp lysis of
the military and naval data found in the effects of Lieutenant Con^mander
Itaru TAOHTP.ANA, UN. prior to his expulsion from the United State; in the
summer of 1941, revealed that about 70% of the national defense information
was compiled from public reading material. ( # )
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 557
96. In only a few instances were Consulate observers known to have used
binoculars to observe Pearl Harbor and tbe [27] Naval Air "Btation,
Kaneohe Bay, and even then, not illegally.
97. In the few cases of trespass to Government reservations and defensive
sea areas that were investigated before the war, none were investigated beyond
the point necessax'y to secure a conviction for trespass. It was therefore never
established that the trespassers were or were not trespassing incident to espion-
age activity.
98. Accurate maps and charts of the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent waters
long were on sale in downtown Honolulu, and available to any purchaser.
Tourist maps showed the approximate location of many military and naval
installations. ( # )
99. Photographs of many strategic places on Oahu were on sale in Honolulu
stores — even panoramic views of Pearl Harbor. (See Paragraph 19.) With
the exception of the highly suspicious activity of seven Japanese seen photo-
graphing from various points on the shore of Kaneohe Bay, looking toward the
Naval Air Station, on November 4, 1941, no outstanding cases of suspicious
photographing have been noted. (#) The Kaneohe Bay incident is signifi-
cant, however, because construction work then in progress at the Naval Air
Station could not readily be seen from any point close to the station, the same
being on a peninsula. Photographs taken from across the bay, however, would
have provided excellent information.
(2) Evaluation of information
100. Since nothing is known of the contents of intelligence reports transmitted
to Japan by couriers, it cannot be said whether the information therein was
evaluated by the Consulate as to its over-all value, or as to reliability only, nor
whether information sent through the Consulate was digested before transmis-
sion. However, according to former Consulate clerks, where reports were sent
by commercial radio or cable, they were always predigested. Where a news-
paper was the source of information transmitted by radio or cable, that fact
would be stated.
101. It is believed that in general the Vice Consul was responsible for making
close initial evaluation of all intelligence transmitted to Japan. While he
rarely made observations himself, it was he who questioned the Consulate staff
members who were sent to view ships in Pearl Harbor or to observe vital installa-
tions on Oahu or the outlying islands. He also seems to have been the person
through whom reports from all available sources filtered, and in one specific
[28] case he is reported to have told a secretary that the latter's observa-
tions on a certain matter were wrong (presumably basing his conclusion on what
he considered better evidence from another source). (#)
102. Considerable information transmitted to Japan was clipped from local
newspapers, all of which were personally studied and marked for clipping by the
Vice Consul. (#)
103. With regard to facts not of a military or naval nature, but affecting the
Japanese residents of Hawaii (and possibly Japan's international relations with
the United States), these generally were discussed by the Consul General and
the Vice Consul, in consultation with prominent alien Japanese residents who
acted as advisors to the Consulate.
(3) Transmission of information to Japan
104. While vessels of the N.T'. K. Line were running regularly through Honolulu
(until mid-summer, 1941), much of the Consulate correspondence was trans-
mitted to Japan by diplomatic couriers, who made regular trips between Tokyo
and the embassy in Washington, and return. The captains of N. Y. K. liners
and of Japanese naval oil tankers also carried ix)uches from the local Consulate
to Japan.
105. However, in 1941, a large volume of commercial radio and cable messages
was sent to Japan, most of the messages encrypted. ( # ) These means of com-
munication were particularly necessary in the fall, when only one ship, which left
Honolulu on November 5th, went to Japan.
106. Although there were many amateur radio operators of Japanese ancestry
in Honolulu who might have been used for the purpose, there is no evidence that
any Consulate traffic ever was sent to Japan through them. ( # ) Commercial
communication facilities being open for that purpose, there was no need to
jeopardize a potential source of wartime espionage transmission. Neither is
there any evidence, nor was there ever any reason to believe, that the Consulate
maintained its own radio transmitter for direct communication with Japan.
558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[gS] V. PRESENT JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAH
(A) Introductory
(1) Evidence of enemy espionage
107. In the earlier sections of this analysis, there are set forth certain facts
tending to show specific instances of enemy espionage activity. Properly func-
tioning counter-espionage organizations must assume the existence of such enemy
activity at the present time, for the contrary cannot be proved.
108. It is believe;] that there have been sufficient unexplained suspicious activi-
ties in the past 16 months to warrant the assumption that Japan is carrying
on some form of espionage in the Hawaiian Islands. Assuming that the unidenti-
fied craft that have been detected at night close off Oahu and Maui since the
outbreak of war were Japanese submarines and were in Hawaiian waters
primarily on combat or reconnaissance missions, their presence here for either
or both of those purposes alone cannot be reconciled with the fact that they
have unnecessarily exposed themselves in waters close to shore — particularly in
waters outside fruitful combat and reconnaissance areas. It is tactically unsound
for submarines to have oi^erated in many of the areas in which the unidentified
craft were detected, except if they were there for some other reason — to put
agents ashore, receive communications from shore, and the like.
(2) Espionage activity as affected by the state of diplomacy
109. It should be mentioned, in passing, that espionage activity must be, and
in Hawaii has been, affected by the state of diplomatic relations between the
Uniteji States and Japan. The three usual states of international relations are:
(a) Period of normal diplomatic relations.
(&) Period of ruptured diplomatic relations, or non-diplomacy.
(c) Period of belligerency.
110. In the recent history of United States-Japanese relations, -the period of
normal diplomatic relations ended on December 7, 1941. During that period,
espionage in Hawaii was largely handled through the Consulate, which could
[30] expeditiously report its intelligence to Japan in encrypted despatches
and by commercial cable and radio.
111. It is believed that the Japanese contemplated that a period of ruptured
relations would exist before war was started, and appropriately planned a system
of communication to be used in that period. Reference has been made to the
signalling system of the Consulate. (See Paragraph 42 (a) ). This system was
designed and submitted to the Consulate by KUEHN, referred to in Paragraph
90. It is not known whether the signalling system was ever used.
112. The third phase in which an espionage system would have to work is the
period of war, in which period all Japanese consulates and Japanese (foreign-
owned) business houses, which formerly might have collaborated in the gather-
ing and transmission of intelligence to Japan, would be closed.
113. It is believed that, in all likelihood, the espionage organization which
would go into action in wartime would not have been operative as such before
the war. At least, it would have maintained no connections with the Consulate
or leading alien Japanese business houses, for fear of attracting the attention of
counter-espionage agencies. The remainder of this analysis will dwell upon what
is believed to be a workable pattern of Japanese wartime espionage in Hawaii.
(B) Personnel
(1) Selection of personnel prior to the war
114. The successful operation of an espionage organization in the Hawaiian
Islands in wartime implies a considerable amount of forethought and planning.
The key personnel of the system nnist have been in the Islands, prepai'ed to
execute their basic orders under such conditions as might develop.
115. Appendix "C" is a schematic diagram setting forth the various functional
units of an espionage organization. It will be noted that the organization is di-
vided into the directive, collection, evaluation, and communication units. Pre-
sumably the key men in the Islands when war broke out included the heads of
each of these units. In discussing the matter of the probable or possible Jap-
anese espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands, it is not intended that
the use of the singular should imply that it is believed that only one such system
might exist. The possibility must always be considered, that there are two or
more systems, working [Si] jointly or separately.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 559
116. It is not necessary that all personnel ultimately needed in the organiza-
tion should have been recruited before the war. In many of its functions, the
espionage system will use in the most exposed positions persons recruited from
time to time, either because of their loyalty to Japan or for their love of money
or revenge. It is quite possible that in past years the local Japanese Consulate
General, through its toritsuginin (themselves appointed because of their loyalty
to Japan), had established lists of loyal Japanese who could be called upon at
any time to aid Japan's cause. (Giichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46,
may have been a loyal Japanese so selected. )
117. Also presumably available to the vpartime espionage organization would
be a list of all persons, Japanese and non- Japanese, who might ever have been
used by the Consulate in any criminal or subversive capacity. This group should
contain many persons loyal to Japan, or otherwise disaffected. In addition, such
persons are likely to be more valuable because of their prior experience.
(2) Type of personnel used
118. Opinion is varied concerning the nationality and race of personnel in the
wartime espionage system. The operating premise of counter-espionage agents
must embrace three conceptions of the possible composition of the Japanese
espionage organization, namely, that it uses :
(o) Individuals of Japanese ancestry only; or,
(b) Only non-Japanese; or,
(e) A combination of Japanese and non-Japanese.
The concensus of those who have carefully considered the problem is that the
third possibility is the most likely.
119. It is reasonable to assume that Japan would have preferred to have built
her wartime espionage organization in Hawaii wholly around Japanese of laiown
loyalty to Japan. However, certain considerations might deter the adoption of
such a policy :
(a) Upon the outbreak of war, all Japanese in Hawaii immediately would
invite the greatest degree of suspicion.
[32] {!)) Japan could not foresee the attitude of United States authorities
in Hawaii towards resident Japanese, for the excellent reason that no policy
concerning control of resident Japanese was formulated until after war began.
(c) Therefore, Japan had no reasonable assurance that any person of Japanese
ancestry would retain freedom of movement in wartime. Japan might well have
assumed that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be denied access to vital
areas in wartime, that many such persons (possibly all alien males) would be
interned, that stringent curfew, travel control, and communications restrictions
would attach to all such persons, and that mass evacuation or relocation measures
might be invoked to remove virtually all Japanese from at least the island of
Oahu.
If the foregoing facts were so considered by Japan, she would never have built
her local espionage organization entirely around a nucleus of Japanese.
120. On the other hand, Japan may have reasoned that the magnitude of the
Japanese problem in Hawaii, in terms of sheer numbers (160,000 Japanese resi-
dents), was such that the United States authorities would have to allow many
Japanese to remain at liberty. If this were the reasoning, one might expect to
find that the espionage agents include American-born Nisei, probably expatriated,
who have negative records of pro-Japanese activities and positive recoi'ds of
pro-Amei'icanism. They might well be informants of the counter-espionage or
law enforcement agencies. They could reasonably expect to be among the last
Japanese to be evacuated or interned. It is therefore pertinent to observe that
many of the Japanese so described are still at large and are able to carry on
their appointed tasks.
121. Variations of the above two -extremes are equally possible. For purposes
of security, the vital core of the organization might be composed of non-Japanese.
As the extent and eiTectiveness of United States security and counter-espionage
methods became more apparent, the espionage leaders would be able to draw
upon loyal Japanese personnel to the extent deemed pi-udent and necessary.
Contrariwise, the central unit might be under instructions to use no Japanese.
[33] 122. On the other hand, the nucleus of the organization may be com-
posed of Japanese, who will make use of non-Japanese as the need and oppor-
tunity arises. This group might even have available a non-Japanese whose
sole function would be to assume direction of the espionage organization in
case the members of the original core are immobilized or rendered ineffective
by security or counter-espionage measures.
560 CONGRESSIONAI; INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
123. The Japanese already have used individuals of other racial groups to
collect information. In Hawaii, during the last few weeks of peaceful relations,
the Japanese Consulate General requested KUEHN, an alien, to submit a plan
for shore-to-ship signalling. The Farnsworth and Thompson cases may also be
cited. A former clerk of the local Consulate, when interrogated, told a story
given him by one of the Consulate secretaries, that for years Japan had been
purchasing information from a British naval oflicer stationed in China. (#) Re-
ports from Mainland Naval Districts indicate that the Japanese contemplated
using disaffected Negroes for espionage work. It is entirely plausible, then, that
the Japanese espionage organization may be using Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos,
or members of other racial groups represented in the Territory of Hawaii.
124. A clear distinction must be made between the concept of a Japanese
espionage organization which employs non-Japanese, and the concept of a German
espionage unit operating here for the benefit of Japan. The existence of the
latter type of organization, while possible, is deemed doubtful. Germany has
little immediate military interest in Hawaii, and lacking that, it is doubted that
it would risk the services of trained German agents to aid a not completely
trusted Axis partner. If a German espionage unit is functioning in Hawaii, it
probably exists merely as an observational check on information which Japan
from time to time undoubtedly supplies Germany regarding military and naval
operations centering around or emanating from Hawaii. There is the possibility
that German and Italian agents might before the war have recruited personnel
for the wartime Japanese espionage organization, and it is known that an Italian
courier system was operating across the Pacific, through Honolulu, prior to the
closing of the local Italian Consulate in July, 1941.
(C) Operations
(1) Functional units of the espionage organization
125. Reference to Appendix"C" will show that the functional [34] divi-
sions of the espionage organizations are believed to be four :
(a) Directive unit;
{!)) Collection unit;
(c) Evaluation unit;
(d) Communication unit.
The word "unit" is intended to mean functional, rather than personal, unity in
operation, although a single i)erson might in some cases be the entire personnel
of one or more units. It is intended to stress the functions of the organization,
rather than the number of personnel.
(a) Directive unit
126. This is the person or section of the organization which directs all opera-
tions. It is assumed that well in advance of war, the head of this unit received
explicit instructions as to the nature of information to be gathered in Hawaii
in wartime, the relative importance of different types of intelligence, and the
manner in which the same should be reported. The directive unit would be
responsible for the entire espionage organization, centralize the authority therein,
and keep the machine functioning.
127. Probably but not necessarily, the head of the directive unit of the organiza-
tion would also be directly in charge of the evaluation unit.
(b) Collection imit
128. The function of this section is to cull from available sources (see Para-
graphs 16-30) such information as is known to be of value to Japan. The
director of this unit m'ay confine his activity to collection work alone, or may
supervise that in addition to other duties. Conceivably, the directive head of
the whole organization might pei'sonally direct the collection unit.
129. In all pi-obability, the collection unit was partially organized before the
war. In order to be able to best utilize certain sources of information in war-
time, previous prepai-ation would have been necessary. For example, to effect
ready and constant observation of Pearl Harbor, it would be desirable to have a
home on Aiea Heights occupied by an agent of [35] the espionage organi-
zation. (#) Agents could more readily be "planted" in the Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, and in other vital areas, and disaffected persons could more readily be
developed as sources of "inside" information, before the war then thereafter.
130. The prime requisite of an agent operating for the collection unit is that
he have access to the information he desires without creating suspicion. Not
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 561
all agents can collect Information at their normal places of work or abode;
some must travel to obtain it. For the latter, unobtrusive mobility is a necessity.
131. While much information of value can be learned in the course of a
normal day's activity in the city of Honolulu proper, regular trips around the
whole island of Oahu imdoubtedly would be of great value (and perhaps be
considered absolutely necessary by the directive unit). Travel around Oahu
in the daytime is virtually unrestricted, and the trained observer can readily
determine the location of many new plane dispersal points, searchlights, radar
installations, machinegun emplacements, and landing fields. For example, the
new airfield at Kualoa, Oahu, extends across the around-the-island highway, so
that private vehicles drive across the runway of the field, and planes land across
the highway. Automobiles on the highway are required to drive slowly in this
area, but are not allowed to stop, unless planes are landing or taking off, when
automobiles must stop. Normal driving speed, however, affords ample oppor-
tunity, on two or three trips, to locate most of the camouflaged revetments, esti-
mate the length of the field, and locate wooded areas in which planes are hidden
or being overhauled, and where fuel trucks are parked.
132. It would also seem likely that observers have been placed on the outside
islands of the Hawaiian group (principally Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai), in order
to make available to the head of the espionage organization (presumably on
Oahu) military and naval information available on those islands. No censorship
of mails transmitted between islands is maintained, and travel of civilians (in-
cluding Japanese) by air is considerable, so that transmission of the information
from outside islands would present no great difficulty. It is possible, though
improbable, that agents on outside islands would communicate their informa-
tion directly to Japan. More likely still is the possibility that information may
be sent from Oahu to outside islands for re-transmission to Japan.
[36] (c) Evaluation unit
133. This section of the organization probably would contain one or more
trained operatives familiar with military and naval matters. In order to dis-
charge its duties, .the evaluation unit would have to be cognizant of the basic
instructions of the organization as to the tyi)e of intelligence required to be
reported to the enemy.
134. This section would evaluate and digest all information of value to the
enemy, determine what information should be communicated, and probably the
manner of its communication — subject to the general supervision of the directive
unit.
135. Where coding of messages is required, the same probably would be handled
by this section, and not by the communication unit. This would be in keeping
with the principle that, insofar as possible, the workings of the organization and
the product of its work be known by as few persons within the oi-ganization as
possible.
(d) Communication unit
136. The function of the communication section is to transmit information
from the Hawaiian area to the enemy, utilizing any or all of the means indicated
in Paragraphs 42-80, subject to the general supervision of the directive unit.
Since the manner of transmission to be employed in each case will vary with
the nature and urgency of the information to be sent, presumably the directive
unit would determine what means of communication would be used.
137. A technical communication section is not required for all types of trans-
mission. While the use of short-wave radio would require technicians, the use
of other means might require only an expert cryptographer, who might be a mem-
ber of the directive or evaluation units. However, there are many amateur radio
operators in Honolulu (a large number of them Japanese), from whom could
possibly be drawn the necessary technicians for short-wave radio work. Many
communications might be released in different ways through a business "front."
138. Since it is believed that the espionage organization exposes itself most
while communicating information, it is felt that those most exposed agents are
the agents most likely to be securely insulated from the directive center. The
organization should be so constructed that the apprehension of a communication
agent would not lead to exposure of the whole system. Following the usual
echelon pattern, the [37] agent farthest from the hub would know no
one but the agent from whom lie receives his instructions (and preferably not
even him). Various ways of effecting liaison between agents who do not know
one another have been discovered in the past history of espionage and new
79716— 46— Ex. 148 37
562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ways may be devised by a directive head having a good imagiiii^tion and a reason-
ably good knowledge of prevailing counter-espionage measures in a given
locality.
139. In the shore-to-ship sub-unit of the communication section (see Appendix
"C") men of known loyalty to Japan, but not necessarily possessed of better
than average intelligence, could be used to good advantage. These persons might
be denominated "action men," whose only function it would be to conduct blinker-
tube signalling, or to swim or row to a submarine ofif shore, or to arrange land or
sea caches. These persons would know little or nothing of the rest of the
organization ; they need not be told the meaning of messages they might be
directed to transmit, nor the contents of pouches they might deliver.
140. Perhaps Giichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46, was an "action
man." Immediately before he was killed, his actions were those of a person
who might have been proceeding to a point of vantage from which to conduct
visual signalling to a submarine off shore. He was a recluse, living in such a
manner and at such a place that suspicion was not likely to be attracted by a
person calling upon him to give him instructions with regard to signalling. Had
he been captured, rather than killed, he likely would not, and perhaps could not,
have named the person or persons who had given him instructions.
141. Anticipating that all local stocks of radio equipment might be com-
mandeered for military use in the event of war, or that the purchase of suitable
transmitting equipment during wartime would arouse suspicion, the organization
certainly would be well supplied beforehand with such equipment, as well as
with technicians and operators.
(2) Use of a tusiness firm as a "front"
142. As previously stated, the espionage organization must employ deception
to cover many of its activities. Private individuals cannot, without good reason,
engage in the ramified work of the espionage organization without soon inviting
suspicion. Therefore, a "front" of some kind for the organization, most likely
the use of a business firm is required. It is not assumed, however, that the
"front" [38] would have to be a business house.
143. A glance at Appendix "C" shows the many activities that the espionage
organization may engage in. The use of a business firm in discharging the com-
munication function is stressed in the diagram, although it is obvious that
the same "front" could be used also in the collection of information. For
example, deliverymen of many Honolulu firms have access to certain restricted
areas on Oahu ; salesmen and collectors regularly make the around-the-island
road trip in dealing with customers ; workmen of all types have regular access
to the Honolulu waterfront.
144. The heads of the directive or evaluation units, or both, might be managers
of the business "front." Among customers patronizing such business house
might be agents of the espionage organization who call there to meet with their
cliiefs, either to receive instructions or to report information. Deliverymen
and salesmen of the firm could in the normal course of their work contact with
members of the espionage organization who never visit the business house.
145. An established business house whose volume of business warranted the
same would be in a position to use regular commercial radio advertising as a
medium for the transmission of intelligence to the enemy ; similarly, overseas
telephone calls, radiograms, cables, and mail.
146. An important advantage to be found in the use of a suitable business
"front" would be the availability to it of large sums of cash, the procurement of
which the ordinary individual in Hawaii at the present time would find most
difficult.
(3) Finances of the espionage organization
147. An espionage organization must have available to it at all times large
sums of money for a number of purposes, among which may be mentioned :
(a) Payment of agents' salaries ;
(6) Maintenance of a business "front" ;
(c) Purchase of supplies and equipment;
id) Purchase of information.
It will be recalled that the eight Nazi saboteurs captured in [39] the
United States in 1942 were supplied with currency amounting to more than
$100,000.00 for their operations.
148. Currency control measures instituted in the Territory of Hawaii since the
war began could well have seriously affected the enemy espionage organization's
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 563
financial structure. First, the Military Governor ordered that all persons in the
Hawaiian Islands should turn in to banks all currency in their possession in
excess of $200.00, and that they might thereafter draw no more than $200.00 cash
a month. Corporations and businesses requiring larger sums of cash on hand
were given special licenses. Second, the Treasury Department called in all stand-
ard United States currency circulating in the Hawaiian Islands and issued new
like currency bearing the word "Hawaii" overprinted thereon. The overprinted
currency may not be taken from the Islands and is not legal tender elsewheie.
Standard United States currency can no longer be used as legal tender in Hawaii,
except when presented by United States Navy personnel arriving from outside
the Territory.
149. Since it is difficult to smuggle into Hawaii in quantity money which is
legal tender here, telegraphic and draft transfer of credits is the only feasible
means of supplying the espionage organization with funds from without. These
means afford little opportunity for the transfer of large amounts of money with-
out suspicion, because of the close watch kept on all such transfers by censorship
authorities. (#)
150. It is possible that the espionage organization might have foreseen that
drastic currency control measures would be put into effect in the Hawaiian
Islands in wartime, and to have planned accordingly. This could have been done
in some measure by the purchase before the war of readily realizable assets, such
as high grade securities and readily marketable real estate.
(4) Instructions from Japan in wartime
151. The general operating instructions of the enemy espionage organization as
formulated prior to the war must have specified definite types of data that should
be gathered during wartime and the manner of communicating the same to Japan.
However, the course the war might take would affect these matters, necessitating
new directives to the organization.
152. Code messages over Radio Tokyo are known to have been among the
contemplated means of disseminating information to Japanese consulate abroad,
just about the time of the outbreak of war. (#) This is still considered
a likely means of ViO] communicating with agents in Hawaii.
153. For the transmission of detailed instructions, new operating codes, or the
introduction of new outside personnel into the organization, physical contact by
enemy submarines with Hawaiian shores is feasible.
[^1] VI. COUNTEK-ESPIONAGE MEASURES IN HAWAII
(A) "Counter-Espionage" defined and distinguished
154. "Counter-espionage" is that intelligence activity which "has as its objec-
tive the denial of information to the enemy," and which "includes the supervision,
coordination, and active operation of all investigative measures intended to
prevent espionage." ( # )
155. Counter-espionage does not include the functions of maintaining internal
security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, or iso-
lating disaffected persons. However, agencies charged with the latter functions
and the counter-espionage agencies must work in close cooperation and maintain
a constant exchange of information I'egarding subversive trends, persons, and
groups.
156. As used in this analysis, "internal security" does not refer to the security
of the Naval Establishment, but to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands
generally. The maintenance of such internal security is chiefly a problem of
population control, and, from the intelligence viewpoint, is simply a matter of iso-
lating from the general public enemy sympathizers and disaffected persons whose
future actions may be detrimental to good public morale or injurious to vital
installations. (#) The maintenance of the internal security of the Hawaiian
Islands, under martial law, is the responsibility of the Military Governor, but
the Navy has a fundamental concern in its maintenance :
"The Navy has a vital and paramount interest in maintaining the internal
security of these Islands. This interest arises from the fact that, from a military
point of view, the sole function of the Islands is to afford the United States an
advanced Naval base." ( # )
It must be emphasized, however, that the problems of internal security (that is,
population control) and espionage (enemy information-gathering activity) are
essentially dissimilar, and must be approached from entirely different angles.
564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
157. The District Intelligence Officer has in the past investigated both espionage
and internal security cases in the civilian population. Still a third class of cases,
which now occupies the greatest portion of the investigative efforts of this office,
is made up of the so-called "Naval security" cases, which concern the loyalty of
Naval personnel and employees and other persons having access to Naval ships,
[-^2] stations, and other areas under Naval jurisdiction.
158. The functions of maintaining internal security or Naval security, pre-
venting sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, and countering
espionage are not unrelated. It often develops that an espionage investigation
will uncover persons whose activities or sympathies are inimical to the United
States and its internal security, but do not necessarily involve espionage activity.
In the I'espective cases, prompt dissemination of information is required, so that
the officials properly charged with responsibility in the premises may pursue their
own courses of action. This avoids having counter-espionage agents doing
internal security and police work, and of having internal security and police
officials working in the counter-espionage field.
(B) Various approaches to the espionage proMem
(1) Introductory
159. Historically, espionage is a military operation, not a cringe. The laws
of war have always classed espionage as a permitted military practice, at the
same time recognizing the right of nations spied upon to punish individual spies
for their gathering or communicating of information to an enemy. ( # ) However,
since the adoption of the Espionage Act of 1917 in the United States, whereby
espionage was for the first time in this country defined as a civil (as distinguished
from military) crime, there has been a tendency to class espionage as just
another, albeit "glamorus," Federal criminal offense.
160. Because of the popular fallacy that espionage is just a crime, there has
seemingly developed another popular (and costly) belief that the way to catch
spies is to apply proven crime solution methods in counter-espionage work. This
has not been wholly beneficial. While the skilled investigator's services are
needed in counter-espionage work, his detective viewpoint (that is, crime solu-
tion rather than crime prevention) is a seriously diverting influence. By ti'ain-
ing, his mission has been to solve a crime that has already been committed. Fig-
uratively, the detective's work is half done when he starts, because at least
he knows that a crime has been committed, and he need only find the person or
persons responsible. Therefore, as a detective, he thinks in terms of starting
an investigation only when evidence of a crime is shown him (that is, when
he learns of the corpus delicti), usually by m-eans of what he calls a "complaint."
161. But, there is seldom a visible corpus delicti of [^3] espionage. By
their very nature, espionage operations are conceived to be imperceptible if pos-
sible, and they rarely leave any evidence of their commission : A photograph taken
of a warship leaves no tangible trace on the subject photographed ; the irresponsi-
ble person who divulges confidential information is not warned when his utter-
ances reach enemy ears ; a secret code book is not marred by photostatting. The
professional detective, however, attempts to adapt himself to this new field by
considering the suspect himself as the corpus delicti. Thus, he opens a case on
the basis of a specific or vague complaint, concerning a known or unknown
person who "has been acting suspiciously," "spends too much money," "keeps
his ear cocked when there is talk about ships at Pearl Harbor," "owns several
cameras and does his own developing." and the like. He cannot appreciate the
lesson of experience, that spies, unlike criminals, do not commit espionage in
the sense that ordinary crimes are committed, nor do they generally "act sus-
piciously" in the presence of the good citizens who generally are the informants
in these cases.
162. In the rare instance where an espionage agent gets his desired infor-
mation by overt criminal action (for example, by stealing classified matter),
there is generally a discernible corpus delicti. From that point on, sound police
investigation methods can be employed with a normal expectation of success
of determining who committed the theft. However, counter-espionage is only
incidentally interested in "catching the criminal"— it uses the immediate crim-
inal as a guide to other members of the espionage system, with the thought in
mind of eventually uncovering the whole network. Then, and only then, should
any thought of prosecution (and its necessary, but undesirable, concomitant,
publicity) be considered. Here, again, the police detective adopted into the
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 565
counter-espionage fold is at a disadvantage, for he has been used to looking
for newspaper recognition for his successful solving of cases.
"The disclosure of these /foreign espionage/ services is the main purpose
of counter-espionage work and the roost difficult problem which confronts the
Intelligence agent. Law enforcement or police procedures are entirely inap-
propriate for this work. Experienced counter-espionage agents have long since
learned the futility of attacking espionage services by routine methods of
investigation which may have proved successful in ordinary crime detec-
tion ..." (#)
[J/Jf] (2) The "Suspect" Approach
163. The "suspect" approach in counter-espionage is that which concerns
itself with the investigation of one or more persons suspected of being espio-
nage agents. For purposes of exposition, these suspects may be divided into
three classes:
(a) "Logical" susijects
(6) "Complaint" or "reported" suspects
(c) "Developed" suspects
164. The logical suspects are those persons who, because of the very nature
of their occupations, are known or assumed to be engaged in espionage of one
sort or another. In this class are diplomatic and consular oflBcials, military
and naval attaches, and visiting foreign government officials. Investigation
of such persons may be made to determine whether in fact they are engaged
in espionage, and, if they are, what other persons in contact with them are
likewise engaged.
165. The reported suspects are those who are investigated on the basis of
a specific complaint or report alleging that they are suspicious or subversive.
(See Paragraph 161) Approaching the espionage problem chiefly through the
investigation of reported suspects is costly in effort and largely unproductive.
It represents the police detective approach to a non-police problem.
166. Trying to identify the enemy's espi^onage organization by this approach
alone generally is successful only if the original report is accurate and has
been properly evaluated. Unfortunately, the intelligence offices are deluged
with complaints, of which proper evaluation can generally only be made after
some investigation. In practically all such cases, the complaints are found
groundless. In many cases, the allegations made can b6 neither proved, dis-
proved, nor explained. The fact that a person is engaged in espionage can
be established in most cases only after intensive and discreet surveillance.
Obviously, surveillance cannot be used in the investigation of every complaint.
167. The "complaint approach" psychology is fatal to effective counter-
espionage, because it causes the investigator to depend mainly upon the incidental
scraps of information supplied by voluntary informants who are mainly un-
trained. Trained informants, paid or voluntary, are relatively few. Enemy
agents are not likely to create suspicions in the minds of untrained [45]
informants, and rarely will they leave themselves open to detection by even the
most trained informant.
168. Because complaints are not likely to be received concerning the vital
matters which the counter-espionage services should know, those services will
continue to remain ignorant of espionage activity as long as they depend upon
receiving complaints before instituting counter-espionage measures of which
investigations are but a part. And, as long as counter-espionage agencies con-
tinue to function principally on the "complaint basis," they are easy prey for the
enemy espionage agents, who will provide diversions in the form of false reports
(i. e., "complaints") to the intelligence services, causing the counter-espionage
agents to waste a great deal of valuable time. Every investigative man-hour
wasted on a false "lead" is an additional hour of security for the eiSipioaage
organization. (#)
169. What we have chosen to call the "developed" suspects are those persons
who have been for all practical purposes established as enemy agents, either
after investigation, or by chance. The development of a suspect to the point
where he becomes a known enemy agent then presents a situation where further
counter-espionage measures may be taken along either the suspect or the func-
tional lines, or both.
(3) The "Functional" Approach
170. The functional approach in counter-espionage work is that imaginative
approach which, utilizing a full knowledge of all known facts concerning the
566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
modus operandi of enemy agents and reasonably estimating the objectives of the
enemy's espionage, seeks to detect, counter, and neutralize enemy espionage
functions. This approach is essentially a screening operation, the purpose of
which is to throw both an observational surveillance and a protective cordon
around places and things it is believed the enemy agents will try to learn about.
It is the same in principle as the putting of cheese in traps to attract and catch
rats, thereby saving the tremendous effort of seeking out the rodents individually
without having a clear idea of where to find them.
171. The difference between the functional approach and the suspect approach
can be illustrated in a simple situation: Assume that on the island of Oahu
there is a hill that affords the best possible location for visual signalling from
shore to ship. Using the functional approach, a surveillance should be placed
around the hill to ascertain what persons, if any, visit the locale either to en-
gage in signalling or for no apparent [^6] valid reason. When a likely
suspect is noted in this manner, further investigation along appropriate lines
can be made. On the other hand, using the suspect approach in the same situa-
tion, the counter-espionage agents would sit in their offices, not thinking of the
hill more than anything else, and await reports from informants concerning un-
usual occurrences or suspicious persons, some of which reports might possibly
involve the hill.
172. Constant patrol or observation— the active seeking of information, as
distinguished from the passive receiving of it — is another manifestation of the
functional approach. Thus, the continuous monitoring work of the Federal
Communications Commission radio intelligence units in Hawaii is essentially a
functional approach to the problem of detecting enemy transmissions. If the
FCC monitors were to take action only upon the receipt of specific reports or
complaints of suspicious radio activity — the suspect approach — the situation
would be patently absurd.
173. It has been asserted that in discharging its communication function, the
espionage organization is most vulnerable. Communications, above everything
else, should be attacked vigorously and functionally. It is foolhardy to sit back
complacently and await reports from informants who believe they have noticed
a suspicious transmission, whether by radio, visual signal, or otherwise. Rather,
all avenues of possible communication should be under constant observation.
Then, if the enemy agent indulges in communication, he must cross the field of
observation, thereby risking detection ; and, if he does not attempt communica-
tion, the ultimate purpose of counter-espionabe has been fulfilled, for no informa-
tion has been transmitted to the enemy.
(C) Responsible Ag&icies
174. The United States Government agencies which before, or during, the
pre.sent war were, or are, charged in some way with denying information to the
enemy in the Hawaiian Islands are:
(1) (Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. (MID)
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu. Field Division. (FBI)
(3) District Intelligence Ofllce, Fourteenth Naval District. (DIO)
[^7] (4) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division.
Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area). (FCC)
(5) National Censorship :
(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii.
( J) ) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.
(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu.
The functions of each of these agencies is discu.ssed briefly below :
(1) MiUtary Intelligence Division
175. The Assi.stant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department, is in charge of
both combat intelligence and domestic intelligence staff functions. Active direc-
tion of domestic intelligence activities is delegated to an officer designated as the
Contact Officer, whose office is in downtown Honolulu, proximate to all other
agncies above named.
176. Until the declaration of martial law in Hawaii on December 7, 1941,
MID had no investigative responsibility in counter-espionage matters except in
cases wherein the subjects were persons in the Army, employed by the Army, or
having access to Army reservations. (#) However, upon the outbreak of war,
the Army Department Commander assumed the Military Governorship of Hawaii
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 567
and MID took over active direction of intelligence work affecting the general
civilian population.
177. On February 9, 1942, at Washington, the heads of MID, FBI, and ONI
signed a new delimitation agreement, wherein it was provided that in areas under
martial law the military commander should be responsible for domestic intelli-
gence coverage. As to Hawaii, the new agreement has been interpreted to mean
that the Department Commander (Military Governor) is the military commander.
The Contact Officer, MID, derives his authority from the Military Governor and is
actively responsible for such intelligence coverage.
178. Tlie Contact Officer is in close and frequent consultation with the Special
Agent in Charge, FBI, and the District Intelligence Officer. He has a subordinate
designated as liaison with FCC for radio intelligence work. In lesser degrees,
the Contact Officer is in touch with the work [48] of the District Postal
Censor and the Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.
179. Except in cases of espionage "directed solely against" the Navy and for
subversive activities occurring within areas under Naval jurisdiction, or involv-
ing Naval personnel or employees or Naval contractors' personnel, the Contact
Officer is responsible for counter-espionage planning and coverage in the Hawaiian
Islands.
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation
180. The Special Agent in Charge heads the Honolulu Field Division, FBI,
which field division embraces the Hawaiian Islands and not Honolulu alone.
181. Prior to December 7, 1941, FBI had investigative responsibility in all cases
of subversive activity (including espionage) involving the general civilian popu-
lation. In cases of Japanese subjects, FBI and DIO had concurrent authority
and responsibility. FBI supervised the formulation of a list of persons con-
sidered dangerous and who should be taken into custody in the event of war.
Persons on whom the Attorney General of the United States had authorized the
issuance of custodial detention warrants were promptly apprehended on Decem-
ber 7th or as soon thereafter as possible by squads of FBI, MID, and DIO agents,
and local police. Other persons on whom the Attorney General had not
issued such warrants were apprehended under the authority of the Military
Governor.
182. Even though the pre-war delimitation agreement (among MID, FBI, and
ONI) remained in force until February 9, 1942, on the outbreak of war FBI in
effect deferred to MID in the matter of counter-espionage responsibility and
direction because the superimposition of martial law on the Hawaiian Islands
effected such a radical change of circumstances as to make the then existing
delimitation agreement inapplicable to conditions of martial law.
183. Under the present delimitation agreements, FBI has no responsibility for
counter-espionage coverage in the Hawaiian Islands, but does cooperate with
MID and the DIO in intelligence matters. However, FBI does in fact conduct
some investigations of possible espionage suspects, seeking to determine whether
certain pei*sons have acted as foreign governmental agents without having
properly registered with the Secretary of State. Even though the investigation of
such suspects might also be of counter-espionage concern, the delimitation
agreements do not make reference thereto.
[49] (3) District Intelligence Office
184. The District Intelligence Officer is in charge of this organization and is
directly responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the
Director of Naval Intelligence. The District Intelligence Office is composed of
a main office in downtown Honolulu, three zone offices on outlying islands, and ten
intelligence units operating within Naval stations on (,)ahu, Maui, and Midway.
185. Prior to December 7, 1941, the DIO had investigative authority in all coun-
ter-espionage matters where the subjects were Navy personnel and employees and
Naval contractors' employees, and concurrently with FBI, counter-espionage re-
sponsibility in cases of Japanese subjects. Upon the outbreak of war, the DIO
also deferred to MID, when the Contact Officer took over active direction of in-
telligence matters concerning the general civilian population. The DIO con-
centrated its efforts on Naval security cases, assisting MID insofar as possible in
internal security matters.
1S6. Under the new delimitation agreement of February 9, 1942, the Military
Governor was charged with intelligence coverage, including the coordination of
the facilities of other agencies with MID. Cognizance over strictly Naval, cases
has been retained by the the DIO, who has also lent all ayailable assistance to
568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MID. Under a local agreement signed by the Military Governor, District Com-
mandant, and the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, on March 27, 1942, there was
reserved to the DIO authority over "All matters pertaining to espionage and
sabotage, directed solely against such naval units or installations or fleet units,
and all matters pertaining especially to Fleet and Naval Intelligence, both domestic
and beyond the Hawaiian area," as well as cases involving personnel of ships tied
up at territorial and privately-owned piers. ( # )
(4) Federal Communications Commission
187. The Radio Intelligence Division of FCC maintains a Radio Security Cen-
ter (Hawaiian Monitoring Area) in downtown Honolulu. This FCC activity has
close liaison with MID, as well as with Army and Navy communications offices;
Other investigative agencies, including the- DIO, refer information concerning
suspicious radio activity to FCC.
188. The FCC is actually a counter-espionage organization, for its duties in-
clude :
[50] (a) Detection of violations of the Espionage Act, as far as it relates to
the use of radio for subversive purposes.
(6) Investigation of complaints and/or other information received alleging
illegal and subversive radio activity.
(c) Detection of violations of rules and regulations established by the Director
of Censorship relating to the operation of radio stations.
(d) Aiding other agencies of the Federal Government and representatives of
the Allied Governments having an interest in operation of radio stations by
espionage agents throughout the world as well as other related radio intelligence
matters. ( # )
(5) Natiotial Censorship
189. Functioning under the Director of Censorship, in Washington, the National
Censorship organization has two main divisions in Hawaii, the Postal Censor and
the Cable & Radio Censor. The primary mission of wartime censorship is to
deny information to the enemy. Because of this, censorship is primarily a coun-
ter-espionage function.
(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii
190. Censorship of the mails leaving the Territory of Hawaii has existed since
December 7, 1941. Such censorship is peripheral only, and does not extend to
local or interisland postal carriage.
191. MID, FBI, and the DIO maintain close liaison with the Postal Censor,
who supplies those and other interested offices with comment sheets concerning
postal intercepts deemed to have intelligence value.
192. Postal censorship is not operated under the authority of the Military
Governor, nor is it affected by any of the delimitation agreements previously
referred to.
(b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu
193. Censorship of overseas radio-telephone calls, radiograms, and cablegrams
was invoked by the District Intelligence [51] Officer on the morning of
December 7, 1941. On March 1, 1942, he was relieved of this censorship function
by the Cable & Radio Consor, Honolulu, who is responsible directly to the
Director of Censox'ship, Washington.
194. The Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, has supervisix)n over only those
communications leaving the Hawaiian Islands through commercial facilities.
Inter-island radio-telephone and wireless traffic is censored by a representative
of the Department Signal Officeii, Hawaiian Department.
(6) Collector of Custom,s, Honolulu
195. Inasmuch as certain of his work is concerned with the enforcement of
statutes and executive orders whose purpose is to deny information to the-
enemy, the Collectoi- of Customs must be included as a counter-espionage
officer.
196. In this field, the Collector's principal wartime function is to enforce
the Trading with the Enemy Act. He has the right to examine any cargo
leaving the United States not under government control, and enforces the
requirement that export declarations be filed concerning exports. He is also
responsible for seeing that persons other than accredited United Nations
couriers, entering the United States through the Hawaiian; Islands, do not
carry on their persons or in their effects censorable matter not pi*eviously
passed by competent authority.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 569
(D) Investigation procedure
(1) Prior to December 7, 19Jfl
197. Prior to the outbreak' of war. investigations within their respective
spheres of authority were made by FBI, MID, and the DIO of Japanese,
German, Italian, and Communist subjects. Whether the investigations were
denominated "espionage" or "internal security" cases was of little import, for
the manner in which either type of case was handled was generally the same.
Most cases were opened on the basis of a "complaint" or specific report, alleg-
ing that a person was "acting suspiciously," was "pro-Nazi" or "pro-Japanese,"
had served in the Japanese Army, and the like. The investigative process
normally would include some or all of the following steps:
(o) Check files of FBI, MID, DIO, Honolulu Police Department, and credit
agencies (in most cases).
(&) Check files of Immigration & Naturalization [52] Service or other
Government agencies (in appropriate cases).
(c) Interview or re-interview original informant.
((?) Interview subject's employer, business associates, and neighbors.
(e) Check bank accounts.
if) Consult confidential informants.
ig) Surveillance (rarely).
The type of investigation indulged in was well suited for the purposes of
internal security, that is, determining whether certain persons in wartime
would likely be loyal to, or sympathize with the cause of, or give to, nations
at war with the United States. It was not suitable for counter-espionage
purposes.
198. In a few instances was the espionage problem in Hawaii attacked from
the functional standpoint. This was largely, not not entirely, the fault of the
responsible local agencies. There was a serious shortage of trained person-
nel available for counter-espionage work. Inadequately staffed, in numbers,
FBI was hard put to investigate all prospective custodial detainees. The
DIO devoted a majority of its investigative time to investigation of Naval
personnel cases, including applicants for the Naval Intelligence Service, and
civilian employees of the Navy and Naval contractors. While there was full
cooperation between FBI and the DIO, insofar as assisting one another upon
request, there was not close coordination of their work in attacking the Jap-
anese espionage system here.
199. In the several instances of functional approach to the Japanese es-
pionage problem, FBI and the DIO generally worked jointly. Together, they
maintained a partial survellance of the activities of the Japanese Consulate
General and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line), utilizing informants
on the spot. FBI's investigation of the activities of the Italian Consul, in
which the DIO assisted, was similarly conducted, with fruitful results. When
the last Japanese "evacuation liner," the Taiyo Maru, was in Honolulu. No-
vember 1-5, 1941, FBI, the DIO, and Customs closely coordinated their ef-
forts in effecting scrutiny of passengers returning to Hawaii from Japan, in
searching persons leaving for Japan on the liner, and in maintaining a
surveillance of the ship and activities on the nearby docks while the Taiyo
Maru was in port. In furtherance of [53] the purpose of this inves-
tigation, representations were made to the Postmaster General, in Washing-
ton, with the result that he ordered that no mail other than second class
matter (newspapers, magazines, etc.) be put aboard the Taiyo Maru for car-
riage to Japan. (#)
(2) December 7, 1941, to March 27, 19^2
200. Almost immediately upon the outbreak of war, the Contact Officer,
MID, assumed general direction of intelligence work concerning the general
civilian i)opulation, with FBI and DIO assisting. In this period, intelligence
agents devoted almost all their time to the handling of internal security cases,
apprehending persons who had been designated for custodial detention, con-
ducting searches and interrogations, and investigating hundreds of specific
complaints and rumors concerning alleged subversive activity.
201. A joint investigation of the past espionage activities of the Japanese
Consulate General was instituted by MID, FBI, and the DIO (and still con-
tinues) in the hope of gaining some 'indication of what Japan's wartime es-
pionage organization in Hawaii might be like and what personnel it might
employ. (#) Information gained in this investigation aided the FBI in its
570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
investigation of Otto KUEHN, and established the latter's connection with the
Consulate. The product of this joint investigation, added to the facts as-
certained by the pre-war partial surveillance of the Consulate, illustrates the
value of the functional approach to the espionage problem.
(3) Since March 27, 191,2
202. After the signing of the local delimitation agreement on March 27, 1942,
FBI ceased to investigate internal security and espionage cases as such, but
continued to make available to MID and the DIO all information in its files or
thereafter acquired. The DIO also ceased opening its own internal security
cases in the general civilian field and opened about 2,000 security cases on i)er-
sons of Japanese ancestry employed on Naval projects. DIO Zone Offices have
continued to conduct internal security investigations when i*equested to do so
by Army S-2 officers in their respective zones, to the extent of available time
and personnel.
203. On the islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, preliminary hearing
boards, usually of three men (one each from MID, FBI, and DIO), hear nearly
all cases where custodial detention of a person is considered. The function of
the boards is to supplement investigations by interrogation, and [54] to
advise the appropriate Army authority whether a warrant of detention should
issue. From time to time, in Honolulu, special investigating groups of MID,
FBI. and DIO personnel are convened to interrogate persons likely to have im-
portant information concerning local Japanese subversive activity.
204. On three occasions, special investigating parties, composed of MID, FBI,
and DIO representatives, generally totalling about 20 men, have flown to outside
islands to aid resident intelligence personnel in conducting internal security
investigations in large volume.
205. Cooperation of the three intelligence agencies in internal security work
has been excellent. However, there has been virtually no effective work done
in the filed of counter-espionage. A small number of the cases investigated in
this period (and since the war began) are entitled "espionage," but in few has
there been anything other than an "internal .security" approach to the problem.
In nearly every instance, the emphasis has been on the personalities and their
utterances, criminal and credit records, and probable nationalistic sympathies.
There have been few cases approached in light of the functional bases of
espionage.
(E) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1) Intelligence personnel
206. Much of the failure to cope with the espionage problem in Hawaii lies
in the fact that sufficient trained personnel have not been assigned to this area.
MID and DIO ofhces have grown greatly since December 7, 1941, without many
additions of much needed trained counter-espionage agents. The number of
trained FBI agents in Hawaii has been reduced during the war.
{2) Coordination
207. While there exists close coordination in the field of internal security cases,
because the Army has complete responsibility therefor and either conducts itself
or requests DIO Zone Offices to conduct such investigations, the same cannot
be said of counter-espionage efforts. This is perhaps attributable to problems
presented by the local delimitation agreement of March 27, 1942.
(3) Shoreline coverage
208. It is believed that no agency has been paying adequate [o5^ atten-
tion to the coasts of the Hawaiian Islands, insofar as domestic intelligence cov-
erage is concerned, nor is there known to be any plan for such coverage.
209. Insofar as this office has been advised, investigations of suspicious activi-
ties near or close off shore have been conducted by trained intelligence personnel
in but a few cases. In some instances of reported suspicious activity, which
activity might indicate that persons on shore were making contact with the
enemy, the immediate investigation has been made by Army fieW personnel
(sometimes working under the S-2 officer), but with no follow-up, detailed in-
vestigation by trained investigative ijersonnel. (#)
210. The former Coastal Information Section (B-8) of the DIO functions
under the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and has been separated from the
DIO since before the outbreak of war. What coastal intelligence work it has
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 571
done has been confined to the operational or combat implications of happenings
off shore.
(4) Travel control
211. Civilians entering and leaving the Territory of Havpaii have not been
subject to careful scrutiny, interrogation, or search, nor required to identify
themselves. Until only recently, almost any person not under surveillance could
leave the Territory without the knowledge of the intelligence or law enforce-
ment agencies.
212. Several months ago, the DIO established the Naval Travel Control Office
under the Commerce and Travel Section (B-5). The Naval Travel Control Office
processes all persons leaving the Territoi-y by Pan American Airways clippers,
excepting military and naval personnel of the United Nations travelling under
ofiBcial orders, diplomats in diplomatic status, and United Nations civilian officials
traveling on official business. The function of the processing office is to malie sure
of the identity of every commercial air traveller, and to apprise interested official
agencies of what individuals are leaving the Territory. It is estimated that
2y2% of the persons whose passage has been validated by the Naval Travel Con-
trol Office were of more than nominal interest to the intelligence agencies.
213. It is anticipated that in the near future, the Military Governor of
Hawaii will promulgate a general order establishing a similar travel control
office whose function it will be to process all travellers leaving the Territory
[56] (save those exempt because of official status), whether passage is taken
by air or surface.
214. In the past, several violations of censorship have been detected in situa-
tions where persons leaving the Territory have carried uncensored censorable
matter (principally letters) on their persons or in their effects upon going aboard
ships sailing from here. In the discovered cases, however, no indication of
espionage activity has appeared, the violations involving personal motives
only. ( # )
215. That enemy couriers could with ease enter and leave these Islands, carry-
ing vital information on their persons or in their effects (or, better still, in their
minds), is apparent. It is anticipated, however, that when surface as well as
air travellers are processed before leaving, the risks to couriers will be increased.
(5) Lack of coordination among domestic intelligence, combat intelligence, and
operations activities
21G. Before and during this war the flow of information has been almost
entirely from the domestic intelligence agencies to combat intelligence and
operations activities, with little flowing from the latter to domestic intelligence.
While it is true that combat intelligence and operations offices have the primary
interest in operational data and are vitally interested in the security thereof,
it is not true that they have an exclusive interest in all such information. For
example, the domestic intelligence agencies are, or should be, greatly concerned
with all information indicating the presence of enemy units (particularly sub-
marines) close off the Hawaiian Islands.
217. As previously stated, tlie presence of an enemy submarine close to
shore, in an area and at a time inappropriate for combat action or reconnais-
sance, should be assumed to present a situation wherein the enemy is attempting
to effect contact with agents on shore. The responsibility for destroying or
repelling the enemy craft off shore lies with combat activities ; the responsibility
for detecting who are tlie enemy agents on shore lies with domestic intelligence.
But, domestic intelligence will not know that there is a specific instance of
possible enemy contact or signalling which it should investigate, unless the pres-
ence of enemy (or unidentified) units off shore is reported to it.
218. When there are operational movements in the Hawaiian [57] area
of such imi)ortance that enemy observers would be likely to report the same to
the enemy — such as the facts concerning arrivals and departures of Naval task
forces — the counter-espionage agencies should be made cognizant of such move-
ments. Knowing ivhat the enemy agents are likely to be interested in provides
a clue as to ivlien enemy communications may be made. The security of oper-
ations would not be endangered by providing counter-espionage agencies with
this type of information, for it would be desired only in casPs where an enemy
agent on shore could by simple observation learn it himself. It is reasonable
that such information should be given to the counter-espionage agencies, other-
wise they will have to go to the absurd extreme of stationing their own observers
to obtain in the same manner that enemy agents do the information concerning
ship movements.
572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[58] vn. CONCLUSION
219. The criticism implicit in the foregoing analysis is inescapable. It is in-
tended to be wholly constructive. The effect of the criticism is not directed
against any one intelligence agency any more than any of the others. While
there has been excellent cooi)eration among the agencies, coordination of plans
and measures to deal with espionage in Hawaii has not been what it could have
been.
220. Whereas this analysis is the result of studies made by one of the intelli-
gence agencies, the District Intelligence Office (Counter Intelligence Section),
and is believed to be based upon all available pertinent facts, it is felt that little,
if any, progress can be made until the three principal agencies jointly approach
the problem discussed herein. It would be highly desirable to have a small
group of officers and agents — possibly only one or two from each agency, who
should be the best suited for the task involved — appointed to study the question
of espionage in Hawaii. Such a joint study should enable the representatives
to make intelligent and comprehensive recommendations for the improvement of
counter-espionage technique and procedure in this area.
221. Unless vigorous, astute and coordinated counter-espionage measures are
placed in operation in Hawaii, the primary task of Counter-intelligence — denial
of information to the enemy — will never be performed.
[A-1] Appendix "A": Source INIateiual
This appendix has been prepared chiefly for the benefit of readers in the Office
of Naval Intelligence, who may wish to pursue further certain topics mentioned
in the foregoing analysis. No attempt has been made to supply disseminees of
this analysis with copies of all reports and other materials referred to below.
Immediately below are listed, as references, a number of investigation reports
and other official correspondence which are cited in support of certain portions of
the analysis. Following the list of references are explanations or citations of
authority, arranged in the numerical order of paragraphs of the analysis.
EEFEEENCES
(a) DNI Conf. Ltr. A8-2/EN3-10, Serial 02525216, dated November 11, 1942,
subject : Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Activities.
(b) ONI Counter-intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) Operating Plan, dated Octo-
ber, 1942.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, subject: JAPANESE
CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 7, 1942, same subject.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, same subject.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 6, 1941, subject: JAPANESE
EVACUATION SHIPS.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 15, 1941, same subject.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 25, 1941, same subject.
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 1, 1942, subject: Ernest
Shigeru MATSUSAKA.
[A-2] (1) 14ND Summary Report, dated April 30, 1942, same subject.
(ni) 13ND Investigation Report, dated May 1, 1941, subject: Lt. Comdr.
Sadatomo OKADA, UN.
(n) 12ND Investigation Report, dated July 17, 1941, same subject.
(o) 14ND Investigation Report, dated August G, 1942, subject: Oliver Albert
KIRKEBY.
(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated Julv 30, 1942, subject : Giichiro UYENO.
(q) DNI Conf. Memo., dated October 1, 1942, subject: GERMAN SABOTAGE
AGENTS.
(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject: Richard
Masayuki KOTOSHlRODO.
(s) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject: Yoshiye
MIKAMI, alias John MIKAML
(t) DNI Secret Memo., Serial 02304616, dated November 3, 1942, subject: JAP-
ANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 573
(u) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject: Rev. Unji HIRA-
YAMA.
(v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 2, 1942, subject: Otto Carl Ferdi-
nand JAENTSCH.
(w) 12ND Investigation Report, dated May 30, 1942, same subject.
(x) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 11, 1942, same subject.
(y) 12ND Information Card, dated June 19, 1942, same subject.
(z) 14ND Investigation RejMrt, dated December 24, 1942, subject: Louie
SLATON.
(aa) 5ND Investigation Report, dated May 19, 1942, subject: Espionage, Vis-
able Sliore Signals and Enemy Radio Activity.
(bb) DNI Conf. Memo., Serial 01398716, to DI0-8ND (copies to DIOs-10-11-
12-13-14-15 NDs), dated June 3, 1942, subject: Flashing Lights and Suspected
Signals Along the Coast — Investigation of.
[A-3] (cc) IIND Investigation Report, dated October 8, 1941, subject: Itaru
TACHIBANA.
(dd) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject: Visits of
Japanese Public Vessels to the Island of Oahu.
DOCUMENTATION BY PABAGRAPHS
Foreivord.— All quotations are from reference (b). Pars. 1215-1216 and 1003.
Par. 19. — Reference (e) ; Reference (g) ; Reference (r) ; Reference (s), pp. 2-5.
Reference (dd) . The panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor and ships therein
was taken by E. J. PARISH, Honolulu photographer, about 1937. An almost
identical photograph, taken by PARISH in 1938, is contained in the files of this
oflSce. In 1937 or 1938, before offering such photographs for sale to the public,
PARISH called at the District Intelligence Office to obtain official permission
for sale. At that time, PARISH was told that while the Navy objected to the sale
of such pictures, there was no law prohibiting such publication.
Pars. 24-25. — Reference (o) presents a case in point, illustrating how a Navy
enlisted man was first "pumped" for Naval information, then developed as a
source of "inside" information, for which he was paid in "loans". KIRKEBY's
offenses were committed in 1936-1937, and he was met by Japanese espionage
agents both in San Francisco and in Los Angeles.
Par. 32. — For examples of the type of information reported by the Consulate
to Japan in 1941 by cable and wireless, see reference (d).
[A-J,] Par. 42 a/. — The Consulate signalling system referred to is set forth
in Reference (c), Par. 4.
Pars. 45-46. — A preliminary report of the UYENO case, containing only the
details of the shooting but nothing concerning UYENO's possible motives, was
received fi'om the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, shortly after the
incident. The investigating agent recommended further investigation, but a
check of the files of the Army Contact Office on February 15, 1943, revealed no
further reports, and at that time a representative of the District Intelligence
Officer was informed that the case was closed. UYENO is subject of reference
(P).
Par. Jp. — Informant who furnished the information in the two indented para-
graphs is given reliability "A" by this office. His report was not rendered until
four months after the events reported. A copy of informant's report was for-
warded to the Army Contact Office, which returned to the District Intelligence
Officer the following comment from another Army activity (not naming it) :
"* * * As to a man swimming ashore and the finding of prints in the sand,
there is no record on this * * *
"It is very improbable that the events described in this report could have
happened without being recorded at this Headquarters."
Par. 51. — Reference (q) reports the landing and eapture of eight Nazi sabo-
teurs in the United States, 1942.
Par. 52.— Investigation by the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.) of former Japa-
nese sampan fishermen in Hawaii has revealed that many of the fishermen
entered the United States illegally and are extremely pro-Japanese, but has pro-
duced as yet no specific evidence of espionage activity by such fishermen.
Par. 60. — See article on frequency modulation : "This New FM", Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings, February, 1942.
Par. 63. — The suspicious radio message was intercepted as follows :
[A-5] RAUMIG HINDERUST SINDEN ZURCH REMSCHED REMSCHIE
OWES ZAE MERE MSCHE ID DECK SEDWIG CGER DECK ORENE
574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EL ZELMB MELZEN HAFNO ANN EDLMANN ISAR ISAR SETZE UME IIS
MEUWEG SIEDEN IN GELS
Source of above information was Combat Intelligence, 14ND, who reported :
"This transmitted Sunday A. M. /December 7, 3&41/. Apparently local station
to local station. Received from Army." A very free translation of understand-
able parts of the message was also submitted by Combat Intelligence:
Extensive areas have been completely razed .... Oriental ....
Edlmann /proper name/ .... Set oil and machinery fires one after another
in which many were killed.
Par. 6//.— FCC writer referred to is Mr. Lee R. Dawson, supervisor, Hawaiian
Monitoring Area. Quotations are from Mr. Dawson's letter of January 10, 1942,
to Chief of National Defense Operations Section, FCC, subject: Additional Sec-
ondary I\Ionitoring Units Needed in the Hawaiian Area. (Copies of this letter
were indicated for Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department.)
Quotation of the Director of the FBI, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, is from his letter
of January 16, 1942, to Hon. James Lawrence Fly, chairman of FCC. (Copies of
this letter were sent to G-2, War Department, and ONI, Navy Department.)
Par. 78. — The Japanese are known to be using couriers among officers and
seamen of merchant vessels plying between United States and South American
ports: reference (t).
Par. 81. — Reference is to Tamotsu MATSUMURA, interned alien Japanese,
who was at one time a paid informant of this oflSce. Before coming to Hawaii
prior to the first "World War, WATSUMURA was in the Japanese overseas
colonization service, being a civil secretary to the governor-general of Formosa.
He admits having transmitted information of strategic value, concerning Hawaii,
to Japan prior to 1914. In recent years, especially 1937-1940, he was a leading
propagandist for Japan in Hawaii.
[A-G'\ Par. 83. — This appears from the admissions of Richard Masayuki
KOTOSHIRODO, formerly a clerk at the local ConsiUate, who visited the islands
of Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii in 1941 on espionage missions for the Consulate:
reference: (g).
Par. 84. — See enclosure (A) of reference (d).
Par. 86.— From KOTOSHIRODO's admissions: reference (g).
Par. 88. — Buddhist priest referred to is subject of reference (u).
Par. 90. — Propagandists referred to are Frank VON HEILAND and Rev. Paul
Junichiro TAJIMA. Paid informants of the Consulate, among them some
Koreans, are discussed in reference (g).
Par. 91. — Japanese agent who was in Hawaii in 1932 was Rinzo SHIMURA,
mentioned in references (k) and (1), and Japanese bookstore owner was Ernest
Shigeru MATSUSAKA, subject of those reports.
Par. 92. — OKADA is the subject of references (m) and (n).
Par. S.3.— The Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.
Par. 94- — For a detailed description of the Information gathered by MATSU-
SAKA and transmitted to Japan, see enclosui'es to reference (k).
The alien on Aiea Heights is Shigeichi TAKAFUJI. A report of the activities
of personnel of Japanese Naval vessels while visiting Hawaii before the war is
contained in reference (dd).
Par. 95. — Report concerning information gathered by TACHIBANA is coir-
tained in reference (cc).
Par. .98.— When KOTOSHIRODO and Consulate Secretary Tadashi MORI-
INIURA made observation trips to tlie outside" islands of the Hawaiian group in
1941, they carried with them only the innocuous-looking Hawaii Tourist Bureau
cartographic maps. According to Consulate clerks interviewed, the maps and
charts u.sed by the Vice Consul in his office were standard U. S. Hydrographic
Office and Coast & Geodetic Survey publications.
\A-7] Par. 99. — The photographing incident was referred immediately to FBI,
Honolulu, but no report of FBI's investigation of this case was written. The driver
of the car which carried the seven Japanese has not been interned, but is serving
a prison term for violation of a general order of the Military Governor regulating
the amount of currency an individual may carry on his jierson.
Par.^. 101-102.— KOTOSHIRODO related the information reported In these
paragraphs: see reference (g).
Par. 105. — See references (c) and (d).
Par. 106. — Army Contact Office, Honolulu, for some time past has been investi-
gating all local Japanese known to have operated radio transmitters in Hawaii
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 575
prior to the war. To date, the DIO has not been informed of any oi)erator who
has been found to have used his transmitter for subversive pui'poses.
Par. i23.— Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.
Par. 129. — Japanese aliens still live on Aiea Heights and on Pearl City Peninsula
(which juts into Pearl Harbor to a point only several hundred yards across open
water from a carrier berth).
Par. i>}5.— While considerable amounts of "Hawaiian currency" have turned
up in Mainland banks, it is believed that such currency could not be purchased
from those banks because of prevailing legal restrictions.
Par. 152. — First sentence : source secret, but known to ONI. In this connection,
it is interesting to note that the Central Executive Committee of the Kuoming-
tang (Overseas Department) is currently using regular short-wave broadcasts
from China for the transmission of instructions in code to Kuomingtang repre-
sentatives in the United States. ( See Postal Censorship Records No. SF-8y91. )
Par. 15If. — F^rst quoted clause is from reference (b), Par. 1005; second is from
ONI-T-8-10, Sec. 21203 (2).
Par. 156. — The distinction between the maintenance of internal security and the
countering of enemy espionage seems to have been kept clearly in mind in a recent
War Department pub- [A-8] lication : War Department Counter Fifth
Column Plan (1942 Revision), promulgated November 2, 1942. Therein, the task
of countering the Potential Fifth Column is esssentially the task referred to in
the foregoing Analysis as the maintenance of internal security in Hawaii. While
the Counter Fifth Column plan seems not deemed to be applicable to Hawaii (for
the Hawaiian Department commander is not on the distribution list), it is
significant that the Plan and its study and improvement are the responsibility
of the Provost Marshall General, and not of the Military Intelligence Service.
This is a clear recognition of the fact that Counter Fifth Column planning is a
police, rather than a counter-espionage function.
Quotation is from "A War-Time Problem, THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII, An
Analysis", ^age 1, by Lt. Comdr. C. H. Coggins, MC, USN, District Intelligence
Office, Fourteenth Naval District (April, 1942).
Par. 159. — "War cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the
forces and the intentions of the enemy, and about the character of the country
within the zone of military operations. To obtain the necessary information,
it has always been considered lawful to emi^loy spies, and also to make use of
the treason of enemy soldiers or private enemy subjects, whether they were
bribed, or offered the information voluntarily and gratuitously. Article 24 of
the Hague Regulations enacted the old customary rule that the employment of
methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country is
considered allowable. The fact, however, that these methods are lawful on the
part of the belligerent who employs them does not protect from punishment such
individuals as are engaged in procuring information. Although a belligerent
acts lawfully in employing spies and traitors, the other belligerent, who punishes
them, likewise acts lawfully . . ." Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th
ed., 1935), Vol. II, Sec. 159, p. 337.
Par. i62.— Quotation is from ONI-T-8-10, Sec. 23201.
Par. 168. — While there is no positive evidence of the fact, it appears that several
false reports concerning alleged Japanese espionage in Hawaii were given to the
U. S. Naval Attache, at Mexico City, in early 1041. Each report cf)n- [A-9]
tained some important known facts, around which apparently were spun many
false statements. While ONI gave the reports very low reliability rating, the
reports were of such a serious nature as to require investigation.
Par. 176. — Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, entered into by FBI, MID,
and ONI, governed the respective spheres of responsibility of the three agencies
in Hawaii until the outbreak of war.
Par. 186. — Copy of local agreement of March 27, 1942, was sent to ONI as
enclosure to DI0-14ND (IHM/w) Conf. Ltd. (Personal) to Rear Admiral
T. S. Wilkinson, USN, dated June 20, 1942.
Par. 188. — Statemenet of FCC duties taken verbatim from memorandum of
E. K. Jett, Chief Engineer, FCC; to all offices of the FCC Radio Intelligence
Division, dated June 3, 1942, subject: Jurisdiction of the Radio Intelligence
Division.
■ Par. 199. — Reports on Japanese "evacuation liners": see references (h), (i),
and (j).
Par. 201. — Reports of the joint investigation of the Japanese Consulate: see
references (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).
576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Par. 209. — Reference (aa) sets forth the manner in which coordinated shoreline
coverage by plane, surface craft, in automobiles, and on foot was effected on
the North Carolina coast. This procedure could well serve the same purpose in
the Hawaiian Islands. Reference (bb) indicates the interest and approval of
ONI in that procedure.
Par. 21Jf. — In one case, a merchant marine captain cabled his wife, "Happy
birthday", to indicate the fact that his vessel was about to sail from Honolulu :
references (v), (w), (x), and (y). In another case, the second officer of a carg«>
vessel used a simple code in ordinary correspondence to reveal movements of
his ship prior to sailing: reference (z).
(Pages 197D and 198D of Exhibit 5, being an outline map of the
Island of Oahu — Appendix "B" — and a chart captioned "Pattern for
Espionage, Hawaiian Islands" — Appendix "C" — will be found repro-
duced as Items Nos. 10 and 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found botind to-
gether following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)
FOTJBTEaSNTH NaVAL DISTRICT,
DiSTBiCT Intelligence Office,
Sixth Flooe, Young Hotel,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 3 Decetnber 1941
Confidential
MEMO FOE the FILES
Reference : Wilkinson Report, 6 October 1941.
During the past 3 years in North China I had considerable official and social
contact with various German firms and their representatives in North China, and
with reference to the Wilkinson Report of the 6th October 1941, the following
information is submitted for what it may be worth.
1. The German merchants in occupied China are given very little preference
over other foreign (i. e. American, British, etc.) merchants and their businesses
are being interfered with to practically the same extent by the Japanese military ;
except in such cases as the military directly benefits. The German merchants
fully realize they are only being used to the advantage of the Japanese and what
preference they receive is only on sufferance.
2. The average German definitely detests the Japanese military clique and
Japanese businessmen in China and much prefer to do business with the Chinese.
They consider their future is with China rather than Japan.
3. In March 1941, one (Willhelm?) Dunsing (official Nazi representative in
Northern Shantung) the Chefoo manager for Niggeman & Co., had just been forced
by the local Japanese Gendarmerie to sell something like 90,000 bags of flour
(U. S. goods) at a considerable loss; remarked to me, "never mind we (meaning
Germany) are only playing with them for the time being, we will get even, etc., etc.
They will be chased from country (China) and put where they belong. It is
all planned". Dunsing then pointed to a map of the world on office wall and
saying, "here is our first step", drew an arc starting from Germany with the vertex
passing through the center of the Caspian Sea, and ending in the vicinity of
Karachi. Dunsing was extremely angry at this time and while talking was
intermittently cursing the Japanese in general.
4. I had known DUNSING for about four years and am sure that he was
sincerely expressing himself. This same sentiment has been expressed to me by
other German merchants in China, and particularly by Helmut Lanz, owner and
manager of the Shantung Traders Inc. of Chefoo ; Rollo Miss of A. H. Anz & Co.
Chefoo (German Consular Agents) ; Waldemar Balthaser of Krauch & Co., Shang-
hai, China, representatives of Deutsche- Stickstoffhandelsgeselschaft.
T. W. Joyce
Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce
Copy sent to M. I. D. on 12-5-41. S.
Attention Ens. Stevenson
Nov. 5th, 1941
notes — comments
I suggest that the number of German advisors and technicians appearing in
these reports is somewhat exaggerated. I have met several of them in China
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 577
during the past year and up to May of present year— and was given the impression
that Germany is reluctant to send as many as Japan asks for— also they are
mostly erectors or mechanics supervising installation of Germtui designed arms
and machinery, etc., and move about from yard to yard.
T. W. Joyce.
(Handwritten in margin:) this info, too old to be of use— if Jap C G has
arrived— fact will be reptd by U. S. Consuls— or friendly Consuls.
COPY
Navy Department,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washington, Octoher Ih, I941.
Op-16-F A8-4/EP13 Serial No. 0965916
From : Director of Naval Intelligence
To : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent
in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th
Naval District. (British Secret Agent in Manila— Information re-
ceived from)
Reference : (a ) DIO-14 letter IHM/ba, dated August 22, 1941,
(b) OPNAV dispatch 072049, October, 1941.
(o) OPNAV dispatch 061720, August, 1941.
1. In paragraph 1 of reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer stated that
a British secret agent in the Far East suggested that an arrangement be effected
whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent could be carried in
special locked compartments of the Pan-American Airways clipper between Hono-
lulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation, the British agent in the
Far East would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military In-
telligence Division with information of particular interest to the United States
Army and Navy as gathered by him or his agents in the Far East.
2. In reference (b), the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, were authorized to arrange for the trans-
mission of correspondence between accredited British intelligence officers in the
Far East and in the Fourteenth Naval District by locked compartments or locked
boxes in the Pan-American Airways service between Honolulu and Manila when-
ever space and other considerations within the discretion of the Commander in
Chief, Asiatic Fleet and of the Commandant, Fourteenth Na^al District, render
such service practicable.
3. It is to be understood that this service is not to be considered in exchange
for information gathered by the British Intelligence in the Par East and sent to
the Fourteenth Naval District via clipper for transmission to the District In-
telligence Officer. Such transmission is decidedly cumbersome, slow and im-
practical. Any such information should be transmitted by the British repre-
sentatives to representatives of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, for his
information and further transmission at his discretion. The .proper British
authorities in Washington have been informed of the foregoing and requested to
make arrangements accordingly.
4. As a matter of interest to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, he is
advised that the information contained in enclosure (A) with reference (a) was
not of importance or of particular interest to the Division of Naval Intelligence,
because it was too detailed in its nature, too local in its application and too
late in its' reception.
5. It is to be noted that reference (b) cancels i-eference (c).
(Signed) A. G. Kibk.
Copy with copy of ref. (a) to : CINCAF
Shanghai French Concession — Japanese Designs on.
14ND #1534
Rating "C"
Ref: 14ND C rd #1463
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : Japanese Government is "contem-
plating" taking over French Concession of Shanghai in the name of Nanking
Government. Japanese Army wishes to take action immediately but is not in
complete agreement with Japanese Naval landing party. Meanwhile, Nanking
79716 — i6— Ex. 148 38
578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Government is going ahead selecting personnel for future administration in
what will be called "Shanghai Special Administrative Area". Iniormant be-
lieves that Nanking's action is more wishful thinking, but states that both
Japanese and Nanking elforts at penetration of the Shanghai French Concession
lately has been intensified.
FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAO coml4
14ND #1534
Eating "C"
Thai-Japanese Activities in
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: (A) In the middle of August, 1941,
thirty aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to
CHIENG-MAI airdrome; (B) Investigations are being carried out by Japanese
Special Service Department agents into the number of lighters and their ton-
nage in the Gulf of Siam ; (C) The following proposal was said to ha\e been
presented to the Prime Minister of Thai on August 18 by the Japanese Min-
ister: (1) SxVTTAHIB Naval Base to be loaned to Japan; (2) 6 airdromes in
north, south, and west Thai to be lent to Japan, who will undertake to improve
them; (3) Double tracks to be laid on the railway from ARANH to BATTAM-
BANG ; (4) Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thai;
and (5) Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces; the foregoing
proposals to be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival at
Thai. FBI and MID cognizant.
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAO C0M14
14ND #1535
Rating "C"
Formosa — Meito Airdrome
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 27 August, 1941 : On 18 June
the following left for unknown destination — 3 3-engine monoplane bombers, 9
twin-engine monoplane^ bombers, 4 fighters, 2 reconnaissance. On 28 June fol-
lowing left for Hainan under command of MIYASAKI — 15 twin-engine mono-
plane bombers, 11 single-engine monoplane fighters, 8 single-engine bi-plane
reconnaissance. On 3 July 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO left
for Hainan.
FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAO C0M14 •
14ND #1533
Rating "C"
Confidential
JAPAN — General Intelligence
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of 1 September, 1941 : (A) 5 new
(reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service in Manchuria;
(B) All forces in Korea other than two divisions are to be in process of moving
into Manchuria and to North Korea; (C) 3 new mechanized divisions have been
added to Kwangtung Army as well as chemical warfare units trained in Japan
by German instructors; (D) Training of parachute troops is being intensified
but is considerably delayed by lack of transport airplanes ; passenger airplanes
from a commercial air line are being used for training purposes; (E) Informant
reports unverified information to the effect that two Japanese Capital Ships will
bie completed and commissioned in the battle fleet by tlie end of 1941 and that
two airplane carriers will be completed in March and July, 1942, respectively.
FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant
From : 14ND 9-23-41 i
To : ONI CINCPAC COMl.
14 ND #ir)31
Rating "C"
Cottfidential
Japanese Fleet Organization
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That from and after June. 1941, Japa-
nese Navy was to have been divided into four fleets, with Admiral KATO as Com-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 579
mander-in-Chief. The first fleet will be stationed near Indo-China, Thai, and
Hainan ; second fleet will be the main force for the southward advance ; third
fleet to be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and oppose the American Fleet ; and,
fourth fleet to be engaged in transport (convoy?) work. FBI and MID cognizant.
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAC C0M14
14ND #1532
Rating "C"
Indo-China — Japanese Moves In
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports receipt of information to the effect
t!iat the Japanese Navy intends to construct a submarine base at CAMRANH
BAY. Japanese are reported to be taking steps to completely suppress all pro-
Chunking elements in Indo-China, and to encourage Annamite independence
movement which would be definitely pro- Japanese and anti-French. It is believed
tihat object of Japanese moves is to create internal domestic trouble in Indo-
China, thus providing further excuse for expansive Japanese control.
PBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAC C0M14
14ND #1528
Rating "D"
Japan — Ordnance Production
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Chinese staff Secret Booklet of
October, 1940, contains following information on Hiroshima Iron Works — Yearly
production 9 anti-aircraft guns, 3 tanks, unknown number of Naval and Military
guns. Monthly production of shells 300. Raw materials are obtained from
Yawata, Kyeshu. 2,000 men and women employed.
FBIliON, G-2HD are cognizant.
Co7ipdential
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
From : 14ND 9-23-41
14ND #1520
Rating "C"
Japan — Indication of Action in Malaya
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : That Japanese Army is calling up
all English and Malay-speaking Japanese irrespective of age. Some Japanese
born and educated in the Straits Settlement have left for Ai-my service in Japan.
FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant
Confidential
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC coml4
14ND #1530
Rating: "C/'
Far East Exports to Germany
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (as of 23 July, 1941) : German firms
in the Far East have received instructions from the Commercial Counsellor In-
structing them that they must keep all goods purchased for export to Germany
for a period of at least five months, since it can be expected that transport via
Siberia will be resumed at the expiration of that period. Firms encoimtering
difficulty over storage space are advised to ship goods to Dairon for storage.
Further, all purchases of goods in the immediate future for export to Germany
must be of "non-perishable" kind. FBIHON and G-2ND are cognizant.
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
14ND #1526
Rating "C"
China Blockade — Smuggling
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 28 June, 1941, Asaji FASAHARA,
Commanding Officer of the Destroyer ACHI (or ASHI) of the Japanese Thir-
teenth Destroyer Flotilla, was found guilty of having allovred smuggling in his
blockade area and was replaced by his second-in-command. The ACHI was
patrolling off Hainan Island at the time. Admiral Seiichi SHIMOMI (or
HIIMI), Commanding the Japanese South China Fleet, is suspected by his subordi-
nate officers of being financially interested in the South China smuggling racket,
580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
When Chin-Tins- AVah, puppet magistrate at Chungahan, was assassinated re-
cently in Macao, it was extensively rnmorerl that SHINOMI's personal demarche
with the Governor of Macao was brought about by the consideration that CHIU
had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking the
blockade which the latter himself M'as responsible for maintaining. FBI and
MID cognizant.
Confidential
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
14ND #1527
Rating "C"
Formosa — Coastal Defenses
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : The seacoast at Chinchiku has been
strengthened by 46 machine gun posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards
and each is manned by six to eight men. They were i*ecently erected in great
haste. 4,000 troops, with 6 tanks and 8 armored ears, are stationed at Taichu.
FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Formosa (Takao)— General Military 14ND #1825
Intelligence
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : Transport #174 arrived at Takao on
17 June with large quantities of military personnel, equipment (uniforms, steel
helmets, respirators, etc.), all of which were sent by rail to Tainan. Sixty Ger-
man Naval, Military, and Air Force experts and over thirty Japanese officers ar-
rived on same vessel, but soon after landing they all left via SS HOSAN MARU
for the Pescadores. It is reported that all of these men will soon be transferred
to South China. On 21 June, 260 Mountain Artillery, together with local re-
cruits, left Tainan for Koshun for maneuvers. On 25 June, 6 armored cars and
3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate in coastal defense exerc . On 28
June, about 800 recruits from Koshun Sector were sent to join Labor Corps at
Tainan. These men were given a complete set of uniforms and equipment but no
rifles. Their ages were from 35 to 45. On 6 June, they returned to Koshun for
further training.
FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Formosa — Conscription 14ND #1523
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : Governor of Formosa has received or-
ders to recruit within the next month (by 5 September, 1941) 100,000 men between
the ages of 35-45 for service in Labor Corps. It is reported that an additional
150,000-200,000 recruits in Formosa are to be mobilized for Intensive military
training.
FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Formosa — Troop movements 14ND #1524
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : From 23 to 29 June, 1941, 500 troops
of Taihoku Infantry were exercised in coastal defense near Shinchiku. On 25
June, 180 Artillery arrived at Karenko from Taihoku, together with 6 anti-aircraft
guns drawn by trucks and 4 anti-aircraft machine guns. 25 June, Transports
#141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked military siipplies and provisions.
They both sailed for Hainan on 27 June.
FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 581
Japanese Troop Movements 14ND #1520
Rating "B"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : On 25 June, 1941, six hundred troops of
Nakaua Armored Car Unit arrived, togetlier with tliree hundred Service Corps
Troops with unliuowu number of armored cars and motorcycle combinations, all
embarking on two transports at Shibaura, Tokyo, bound for Formosa. On 5 July,
one thousand men of 32nd Infantry Regiment embarked in two transports at
same port for Formosa. FBI and MID cognizant.
Confidential
From : 14ND 0-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Japanese Troop Movements 14ND #1521
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : On 16 June, 1941, one transport arrived
at Shikama (Port of Himeji) from Shanghai and discharged 20O wounded of the
11th Mixed Brigade, and 100 boxes of ashes. Wounded were sent to Tsuyama,
Okayama-Ken. Reinforcements which left Japan in May and June, 1941, for
North China were drawn from Sendai, Kanasawa, Yamagata, and Yonasawn. Re-
inforcements for the same period for South and Indo-China were drawn from
Kanasawn, Kyushu, Kagoshima, Kurume, Saga, and Kumamoto. FBIHON G-
2HD cognizant.
Confidentia I
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Formosa — Supplies 14ND #1522
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 17 June, 1941 SS MORAI MARU ar-
rived at Keeluug from Japan with about 400 cases of military uniforms and steel
helmets. 200 cases were sent to Karenko by SS FUKUSEI MARU and the re-
mainder to Taihoku by train. 19 June, Transport #140 arrived at Keelung from
Japan with military supplies which were sent by rail to Taihoku and Taichu.
This Transport left again on 22 June with a full load of copper ore. 20 Jtme,
Transport #135 arrived at Karenko with 600-700 tons of petrol from Japan via
the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount of petrol). FBIHON,
G-2HD cognizant.
Confidential
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Manchuria — Travel Restrictions 14ND #1518
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August 1941 : New regulations
affecting all Europeans and most Chinese were introduced as of Augu^st 1, 1941
in Manchurian Frontier Regions. Permits for all travel must be obtained from
Police Headquarters. Restrictions are especially severe in Mulin District, while
travel in the interior is prohibited. Special control has been established at
Mulin and Suisenho. Early in 1941 pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners
in Jehol Province, and many left. Remaining foreigners, about twenty-five mis-
sionaries, are not now permitted to travel beyond the city. Tarter businessmen
have been told to remove their business to Mukden area, the reason given being
that Jehol is not safe. Garrisons in this area have been greatly augimented,
large troop movements are taking place, considerable road construction is in hand,
and it is not desired that aerial maneuvers should be witnessed by foreigners.
FBIHON and G-2HD are Cognizant
Confidential
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAC C0M14
Manchuria — Censorship 14ND #1519
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : All the correspondence from within
Manchuria, addressed to China, is now censored. FBIHON and G-2HD are
cognizant
Confidential
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To : ONI CINCPAC C0M14
582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
14ND #1516
Manchuria Mobilization Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of August 15: Whole population,
men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese Eastern Railway District has
been mobilized as "militia" for defense and anti-aircraft work; all are regis-
tered and may not leave their villages without permission from Staff Head-
quarters. Fresh units of Japanese troops arrived in Mulin District the end of
July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Troop movements at night.
Police forbade population lu visit villages or to engage in fishing or other occu-
pation in vicinity except under special permit, this applying even to normal agri-
cultural labor. FBIHON, G^-2. Cognizant. ConfldeiiUal
From : 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI C0M14 CINCPAC
14ND #1517
Manchuria — Construction Rating 'C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August, 1941 : New barracks
near Mulin Coal Mines are now occupied by troops recently arrived. Ma-
neuvers in which tanks participated have been held. Work has commenced on
new highway from Irikte througli Chola-Arabanu District. Cossacks, residing
in this district, are engaged in the work. 1,500,000 Manchurian dollars have
been allocated for hospitals, barracks, and other works at Teian-Heiho. Several
European firms at Harbin have been permitted to tender work in the Tiamosi
District and for work in connection with the Tiamosi-Madalsian Railway which
opened two years ago. 3,000,000 Mongolian dollars have been allocated for Gov-
ernment Buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. All employees must be
certified. Work to be completed not later thnu June 1, 1942. FBIHON, and
G-2HD are cognizant. Confidential
From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI- CINCPAC C0M14
IHM/MB
Septembeb 20, 1941.
Confidential
From : District Intelligence OflBcer.
To : Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
Subject : British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with.
Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th Itr. dated 27 June, 1941. Subject Mr. Gerald H.
Wilkinson.
(b) OpNay Despatch on same subject.
(c) DIO conf. 14th ND Itr. dated 22 August, 1941. Subject British
Secret Agent in Manila, information received from.
1. Subject British Agent in Manila continues to forward information via
Lock Box in Pan American Clipper planes to the District Intelligence Officer,
Fourteenth Naval District. Much of this information is of value to the Military
Intelligence in Hawaii, and to this ofiice, as well as to the office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed by numbers some of the cards
containing this information which have been disseminated by the office of the
DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.
2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the District Intelligence Officer
considered this information to be valuable and requested authority by despatch
to permit the sending of information by the local representative of Subject
agent to Manila in the lock compartment of Pan American Airways planes.
3. The despatch reply requested in paragraph five of reference (c) has not
been received to date.
I. H. Mayfield.
Hongkong — Prospective disorders, No. 1482
(Rating "C")
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Japanese are preparing to
create strikes, disturbances, and riots when and if Japan breaks with England.
Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese agents
are being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that it is through this chan-
nel a large quantity of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hongkong. An agent
in the employ of FURUKAWA, Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macao,
has been recruiting 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 583
iiuisance activities in Hongkong on the outbreak of hostilities. A large number
of these street-sleepers are already receiving financial assistance from the Jap-
anese. The follovping Chinese are said to be actively engaged in the foregoing
work in the pay of Japan : JOHN LUX, a senior member of the Shanghai Tai
Fing Insurance Co. His headquarters are at 19/20 Connaught Iload, West, 3rd
Floor (next to Ping On Hotel) where he operates as the Chun Kin Firm. He
visited Shanghai in July 1041 and was said to be planning a triiD to. Singapore
thereafter. CHENG SAI-HOI, son of the Chief Detective of Amoy, is one of
Lui's close associates. TAM KWOK-WA has made many visits recently to Hong-
kong and is said to be employed by the Special Service Department of Japanese
Intelligence at Macao, to act as Liaison between Macao and Hongkong. CHAU
WING TING has been in the employ of the Japanese for the past ten years, op-
erating mainly in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed to be residing in
Connaught Road, West (number of house unknown.) FBI, MID cognizant.
From: 14ND 9-12^1.
To : ONI ; All ND's ; CiucPac ; Coml4.
Japanese Foreign policy. 14ND #1492
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far Bast, reports: Admiral NOMURA (Ambassador to
the U. S.) has been instructed to work for a modification of the American em-
bargo policy and to offer re-ad.iustment of American-Japanese relations on the
basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recog-
nized as foreign spheres of influence of the United States and of Britain. FBI-
Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To : ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. Coml4.
Japanese-Chinese Relations. 14ND #1470
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : "A. Japanese movement is consider-
ably perturbed by the ''insincerity of the Siamese Government". B. .Tapanese
Government states that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Min-
ister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromis-
ing attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that is clearly due to
British and American intrigue and influence. C. Instructions have been sent
to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong repre-
sentations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter. D. FEI WEN CHUAN further
stated Japanese Government in carrying out its programme in French Indo-
China is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that
unless latter changes its attitude towards Japan and her co-prosperity pro-
gramme Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into
line." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.
14ND #1466
Manchuria — Japanese Troop Movements. Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : "A. Between 10 July and 17 July aboirt
50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden proceeding north * * * car-
ried full war kits. (Note. No means of checking numbers, which should be
accepted with reserve). B. During period named a total of 75 troop "specials"
passed tbrough Mukden. Flat cars carried artillery and tanks. C. On departure
from Mukden on 21 July source was told by Japanese station master of South
Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop
specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was ■
short of cars these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan and
Peking-Hankow lines. D. On 20 July troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden.
They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTZE on Peking-Mukden line.
Source saw great activity at Tangku Tun junction." FBI-Hon and G2-liD
cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC CoM 14.
584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
14ND #1467
Japanese Foreign Policy. Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : Admiral TOYODA (Japanese Foreign
Minister) already has informed German Ambassador OTT the Japan is ready
to re-adjust its political i*elations with the Reich at a pre-requisite for closer
economic accord upon which will be founded the future economic relations be-
tween Asia and Europe. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1&41.
To: ONI (2) AUNDs CINCPAC COM 14.
FOTTRTEENTH NavAL DISTRICT.
DISTRICT INTEa^LIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOTJNG HOTEL
Honolulu, Hawaii
i4ND #1465
Manchuria — Railways, Buildings, etc. Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : "A. It is reported that the following
railways in Manchuria are now regarded as military lines on which number of
passenger trains has been reduced to minimum: Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara and to
Korea via Tumeu, Harbin Peian-Heiho, Hsingchiang-Taonan, Taonan-Doekk
Arshan, Tsltsihur-Peiau, Tsitsihar-Budhedu-Hailar and Manchouli, Turaen-
Mudadzian, Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi, all railways in Jehol. B. Since end of
June 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang
Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations for storage. C.
In Kwangtung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guarding
bridges station, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures.
Japanese War OflSce has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin
and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity
demands." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.
Fourteenth Naval District
district inteiiligence office, sixth floor, young hotel
Honolulu, Hatoaii
14ND #1463
Shankhai French concession, i Rating "D"
Japanese Designs On.
Ref : 14 ND card #1462 (Tientsin French Concession)
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : That a plan similar to that stated on
the reference card for Tientsin is said to be in order for Shanghai French Conces-
sion, with the Nanking Government said to be ready to assume control of the
concession before 10 October, 1941. It is rumored that there is a committee study-
ing this matter under the chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and
General KAGESA, and that their recommendations have been forwarded to Tokyo
for consideration. FBI (Hon) and Gf-2(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
'J'o : ONI ; All NDs ; CincPae ; Com 14.
Formosa-Japanese Airplane Movements ' 14ND #1456
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 25 July, 1941 following aircraft
left OKAYAMA Airdrome for HAINAN : 24 twin-engine monoplane, heavy B ;
15 monoplane fighters ; 3 reconnaissance. 28 July following left for Indo-China :
6 three-engine monoplane, heavy B ; 9 single-engine monoplane, light B. 26
July, 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin-engine monoplane, heavy bombers,
arrived KAGI from Japan and left 29 July for Indo-China. 1 August, 9 heavy
bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China. Parachute troops are being
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 585
trained daily at TOGO airdrome, 8 aircraft being used. FBI (Hon) ; G-2 (HD)
cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September 1941.
To : ONI ; All NDs ; CincPac ; Coml4.
Formosa- Japanese Troop Movements. 14ND #1457
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : 20 July, 1941 the following left
KARENKO for INDO-CHINA— 24,000 TAKAHASHI Infantry ; 1200 ISE Artil-
lery ; 600 KONDO and FUKASE, A. F. V. Units with IG armored cars, 15 light
tanks, 40 motorcycles, and 32 field guns. FBI-Hon ^nd G2- HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) ; All NDs; CINCPAC; C0M14
Japanese Naval Ordnance. 14ND #1456
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3) ; Naval guns are
being made at Osaka Arsenal under German supervision. On 8 May, 1941 war-
ships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted out with new guns from this arsenal.
FBI-Hon and G2- HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To : ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japanese Factory, 14ND #1455
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports the following concerning the AICHI
Aircraft Factory at NAGOKA. Beginning 3 April, 1941 German engineers ar-
rived at this factory from the DORNIER works. They are said to be supervising
construction of a new type of fighter. This is described as K.22 type twin-
engine 2 seater, which is still in the experimental stage. 2600 laborers are
working 24 hour shifts, and the production schedule aimed at is 50 planes per
month. FBI-Hon and G2- HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To : ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japanese Troops in Indo China. 14ND #1455
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 August 1941 the strength
of Japanese troojis in southern Indo-China numbered about 80,000, composed of
units of : Guards ; 28th Division ; 38th Division ; Formosan Army Corps ; Naval
landing party. Lieutenant General HDA is the Army High Commander, Major
General KWANGI for air, and Vice-Admiral HIRATA for Navy. FBI-Hon
and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To : ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japanese Troop Movement.
14ND #1450
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East reports that on 8 June, 1941, 12,000 men left
French Indo-China. He stated that it is rumored that they were bound for Man-
churia, but he takes this with great reserve. On 14 June the following units
of the 11th division, totalling 3300 men left Haina for an unknown destination :
HIROSE Infantry Regiment, NAKAMURA Medium Artillery Battalion, HIROKA
Transport Company and YOSHINO and KUNO Cavalry Squadrons. FBLr-Hon
and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japanese Naval Construction.
14ND #1451
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (with considerable reserve) that 20
vessels of the following type were in July 1941 under construction at HARIMA
Shipyard, OSAKA : Displacement 100 tons ; dimensions 200 f t x 28 f t x 5 f t 6" ;
586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
speed 30 knots ; armamGiit G machine guns. These vessels were to be completed
by the end of July 1941. Informant's source stated that these ships were to be
used as troop landing craft in the Southern expansion movement of Japan.
FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
14ND #1452
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-4) : That Japan is con-
structing "Pocket Destroyers" by building the new craft inside some old htdks
that have been emptied of machinery and equipment. He stated that as a further
aid to secrecy the positions of these hulks are changed from time to time by
being towed from one place to another. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japanese Aircraft Factory. 14ND
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a factory situated at KAWAGUCHI
in OSAKA, in May 1941, started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts
of fuselage for the AICHI Factory, NAGOYA. It is estimated that a labor force
of 2,GO0 working ten hours a day, under supervision of 3 German advisers, is
producing wings and fuselage for 100 fighter planes per month. FBI-Hon and
G2-Hd cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Island — Japanese Construction. 14ND #
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 April, 1941 two armed
merchantmen left KOBE for — ISLAND. These ships had aboard
400 men of a naval landing party and 160 coolies. On 19 April these same ships
had arrived at KOBE and unloaded scrap material and 1,800 caskets of ashes
and were loaded up with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft compo-
nents. The above measured about six by eight feet. FBI and.G2-ND cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
German Raiders in Pacific. 14ND #1449
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 20 Apr, 1941 two of the German
vessels lying at KOBE left for KURE. Ginis were to be fitted and the ships were
to be ready for sea again at the beginning of August. FBI-Hon and G2-ND cog-
nizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. C015I4.
Japan-Kobe Navy Yard. 14ND #1444
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3) : The flating dock
at Kobe, capable of accommodating ships of 18,000 tonts, is expected to be trans-
ferred to Hainan. At the end of May 1941 an aircraft tender was under repair
in this dock, 2,000 workmen working day and night shift were engaged on the
aircraft tender and reconditioning the deck. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDS. CINCPAC Coml4.
Japanese Submarine Construction. 14ND #1446
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3) : In collaboration
with German advisers the constmction of 75 submarines is projected in .Japan.
Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 ships and the Osaka Iron Works is to
build 4. FBI-Hon andG2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 587
Japanese aerial bomb factory.
14ND #-
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that there is a Japanese aerial bomb
factory named HAKABE Heavy Industrial Works, located in Hlmeji. In mid
May 1941 this factory was said to have had a working force of 600 laborers and
4 German engineers, producing monthly 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares.
FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japanase National Policy. 14ND #1442
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a competent British observer has
rendered the following report : "When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea,
this writer took the view that he is a convinced northern expansion, as opposed
to southern expansion believer; and that his appointment was therefore to be
interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria,
Korea being the lirst reserve pool for Manchuria. A technically competent ob-
server in Hongkong now confirms this view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly
C-in-C, South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of the Japanese forces in
China, is of the same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the
north, therefore, however tempting the easy gains in the south may be at the
moment. Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something
to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such
as September 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a
war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis
partners. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long term ob-
jectives, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it out,
secrecy in that respect being a habit with them." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cog-
nizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.
Japan — Airdrome at Kamakura. 14ND #1445
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : A large airdrome is under construc-
tion near Kamakura (believed to be identical with Totsuka airdrome). The
field is 3,500 yards long and 3,500 yards wide and was to have been completed
at the end of August, 1941. 8,000 laborers were said to have worked on the field
inider the siipervision of 18 German engineers. 3,000 parachute troops voder
training there. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14.
Japan — General Military and Naval Information 14ND #1440
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3) : "A There are naval
bases or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMA-
KURA and TOYOHASHI. B. Source states that at end of June there was con-
siderable movement of Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takahachi
and that between 26 and 28 June, 1941 numerous tramloads of young men arrived
at Zusi. C. At Runiit source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders
and also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflaged gun plat-
forms. D. At HAMAMOTO he observed 97th, 72nd and 8th divisions. E. At
Wushizu 22nd Division. At OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA 2nd and 4th Divisions.
New oil storage tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized.
(Comments : All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has
had military training hp is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of
cross-examining him. Valuation therefore C-3). F. Area between Kobe, AWAJI
and SAKAI heavily fortified. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
588 CONGRESSIOISrAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japan — Underground Airtirome at Takarazuka 14ND #1441
Rating "?"
British Secret Agent, Far East, was informed by a Polish refugee journalist,
who was in Japan at the end of June 1941, that the latter had seen great earth-
works, indicating underground airdrome, with planes landing at TAKARAZUKA.
FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) AllNDs CINCPAC C0M14
Japanese National Policy 14ND #14S9
Rating "B"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation B-2) : That a fairly reliable
informant of his states that his Japanese business associates (who include local
heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe that
present Japanese threats of future southward expansion are merely a "war of
nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight
Great Britain or America. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) AllNDs CINCPAC CpM14
Philippine — The Japanese Propaganda in 14ND #1439
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, Reports (Valuation C-3) : That an informant
of his, a Sakdal candidate for the next Philippine election has stated that local
Japanese agents have recently cultivated him closely and volunteered the follow-
ing information : That 650-700 airplanes are now assembled on Formosa ; that an
attack on the Philippines and Singapore will take place simultaneously about the
end of August ; that the campaign in the Philippines will begin with a rising in
Mindanao and the bombing of Manila ; that the attack on Singapore will be over-
land through Siam where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support the
Japanese; that heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan.
Informant states that he has given the names of the alleged Japanese agents to
American Military Intelligence. He gives his own information on the Valuation
C-3 and states "This looks like a wispering campaign." FBI-Hon and G2r-HD
cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
Dutch East Indies — Japanese Propaganda in 14ND #1435
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : "It was reported 12 July that in
Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I. following is now being said : 1. In
MENADO. Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken
off in vessels from Polao. a. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and
aircraft to N. E. I. from eastward of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capntulate
before aid from U. S. arrives. 3. Japanese will not be evacuated as evacuation
would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack," FBI-Hon and G2-HD cog-
nizant.
rrom : 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
Saigon 14ND #1436
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-2) : "Following from
Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8th: A, S. S. FRANCOIS
LOUIS DREYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower
hold marked "Tokyo." Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Fran-
cisco." B. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER and
the submarine PEGASE. C. S. S. SAGITARE has turned back near Cape of Good
Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with
her cargo of rubber." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September. 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
Philippine — Japanese Business in 14ND #1437
Rating "B"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A-1) : "A. Local Agents
Tokyo Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15th from
Tokyo instructing them : 1. To accept no new business or renewals until further
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 589
notice. 2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty. 3. To persuade local Japanese
clients to insure direct with Japan if possible. B. This company's 1940 premium
income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds)." FBI-
Hon and G2-ND cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAO C0M14
FOUBTEENTH NaVAL DISTRICT
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
HONOLULU, HAWAII
Japanese National Policy 14ND #1438
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : "A translation of a letter from In-
formation Section of Concordia Society to local branch of same, dated 2 July,
which states that on that day the national policy in connection with Russo-
German war was decided at a liaison conference between the Government and
High Command. The following general principles were stated to have been de-
cided upon : A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles
her national safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order
in East Asia. B. Japan must depend only upon her own strength and resources
and concentrate her attention upon East Asia problems. 0. She must use every
means to further her own aims but always take into consideration the constantly
changing international position and must not allow herself to be detracted from
her present course by any claims, I'equests or suggestions, if even slight risk of
wasting her power and resources is involved," FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
Fourteenth Navax Distkict
District iNTKLLiiSENCE Offices
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
honolulu, hawaii
Anti American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China 14ND #1433
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : 27 July, 1941 Japanese High Command
at Canton discussed retaliatory measures against American and British freezing
of assets, and the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to Tokyo
for approval : 1. Ascertaining financial holdings of Americans and British in
South China ; 2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied
zone and possibility of expulsion ; 3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tight-
ening of blockades. (The Nanking Government to be forced to co-operate in
this measure) ; 4. Expedition of plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese
personnel in British forces; 5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and
KULANGSU to the Nanking Government. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.
From : 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
Fourteenth Naval District
Indo-China 14ND #1431
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports ("Valuation C-3) : "A. Between July
25th and July 29th 12,000 troops left Bangkok for Indo China frontier. B.
Partial confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which stated
590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that infantry, artillei-y, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special mission
units left for frontier of July. C. An order has been placed with Japa-
nese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 warships probably torpedo boats to replace
3 vessels sunk by Fi-ench. D. 500,000 TICULS' have been paid on accound of
this order." FBI-Hon and G-2-D cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCtAC C0M14
14ND #1432
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent Far East, reports: A. OKATANA Airdrome: Between
7 and 13 July, 1941 about 25 aircraft have been arriving here nightly from
Japan. On 19 July the following aircraft were based here : 40 tri-motored
monoplanes, heavy B ; 40 twin-engined monoplanes, Medium B ; 40 single-en-
gined monoplane, light B ; 6U monoplane fightei's ; 20 reconnaissance ; 4 four-
eugined transports. This airdrome is about one mile square and is the largest
in Formosa. B. 14 July, 1941, 6 fighters arrived at TAIKONU from QUODY
Island. C. 10 and 11 July, 1941, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan. D. 15
July, 1941, 15 monoplane fighters arrived at KETTO from . E. 12
fighters reported at QUEMOY. F. Japanese Naval Units from PESCADORES
laid mines, — June, 1941. G. 11 July, 1941, 200 mines and 120 torijedoes landed
at from Japan. FBI-Hon and G2-D cognizant.
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC C0M14
Confidential IHM/ba
August 22, 1941.
From : The District Intelligence Officer.
To : Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.
Subject : British Secret Agent in Manila ; information received from.
Reference :
(a) DIO Conf. Ltr. dated 27 June, 1941" on same subject.
(b) Opnav despatch same subject.
Enclosure: (A) 14ND Cards Nos. 1345-1348, inclusive, and 1351-1355 inclusive.
1. In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer ovitlined the proposal of
a Mr. Wilkinson, a British Secret Agent in the Far East, that an arrangement
be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent, Mr.
Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compartments of Pan-American
Airways clippers flying between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accom-
modation Mr. Wilkinson would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the
Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by himself and his aides
in the Far East and of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy.
It was proposed that the District Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth and
Sixeenth Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements with Pan-
American Airways.
2. Reference (b) stated that the Department could not authorize the above plan
at this time because of the status of the matter and the small amount of informa-
tion submitted. The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of the
Department's decision and has declined to forward any further correspondence
from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson. However, every clipper from the Orient
brings confidential mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the
District Intelligence Officer. Sixteenth Naval District.
3. By despatch from the District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District,
the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was informed that Mr. Wilkinson
was thoroughly reliable and trustworthy. Investigation in HonoluUi discloses
that Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager in Manila for Theo.
H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his wife is a grand- [2] daughter of the
original Mr. Theo. H. Davies. This company is one of the five largest corpora-
tions in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated as an Hawaiian
corporation, the majority of its stock is held by members of the Davies family
who are British subjects and live in England.
4. Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship depart-
ment of Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, a British subject, and British
vice-consul for Hawaii.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 591
5. The District Intelligence OflBcer considers the information received from
Mr. Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by despatch to effectuate
the arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.
6. Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been fur-
nished the Director of Naval Intelligence on Fourteenth Naval District dissemina-
tion cards Nos. 1240, 1322-1326 (inclusive), 1333, 1334, 134.5-1348 (inclusive),
and 1351-1355 (inclusive). The last nine cards listed are forwarded herewith
as Enclosure (A).
I. H. Mayfiet.d.
14ND #1333 Rating "B" Japanese Military Armor
British Secret Agent. Far East, reports that the Tohuku Imperial University,
Japan, INIetallurgical Laboratory, has compounded an excellent bullet resisting
steel, said to be more efficient than similar foreign steel. According to the patent
announcement the steel is com'posed of: 0.15-0.35% carbon; 0.5-1.5% chrome;
0.6-2.0% manganese ; 0.2-1.0% molybdenum ; 0.2-1.0% cobalt of vanadium ;
0.S% silicon ; remainder iron. Discoverers of the steel are K.ONO and S. CAHIBA.
FBL (Hon): IMID (HD) cognizant.
From 14 ND 8-15-41
To: ONI (2) CIXCPAC (2) COM 14 (2)
Japaii Military Body Armour
An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the IMetallurgical Laboratory
of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. HONDA. According to the
Patent Announcement, the steel is composed of the following?
0.15-35% of carbon, '
0.5-1.5% of chrome.
0.6-2.0% of manganese,
0.2-1.0% of molybdenum.
0.2-1.0% of cobalt of banadium,
0.8% of silicon
and the remainder iron.
Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the
best foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs. K. ONO and
S. CAHIBA.
14ND #1334 Rating "B"
Japanese Industrial Management
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports information on above subject, which
is I'elated verbatini: A. Controller. Decides all quantities of all materials required
by factory under his control. Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc.
Can even control development and study of prototype. Decides all promotions,
changes in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes.
Supervises allotment of salaries, wages, bonuses. His control is complete and
his decisions are final. B. Trained Engineers. All certificated engineers from
Imperial L'niversities of Tokoyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for Naval, military
or aviation factories. Engineers with certificates from private universities (such
as Waseda) may work in other defence industries. Factories which are not
working for national defense get no certificated engineers. Numbers are care-
fully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 Imperial University graduates
per annum. System extremely unpopular amongst students. C. Limitation of
Salaries. Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of
1440 Yen. Graduates from private university get 1170 Yen annually. Rises
only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 2,000
Yen per annum. D. Artisans. Avei'age wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with
exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of
12 hours, this works out at higher salaries than that of certificated engineers.
Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this work is
often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and have taken
a week or fortnight's holiday. Ei Discipline. No factory personnel may change
their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller. Manage-
ment is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will
accept no supervision. They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.
F. Naval and Military Friction. This extends to an astonishing degree, even
when the same article is being made for both services. Files of all drawings
have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy. All com-
ponent parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with
692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the result that double checking and control service has to be established. Two
distinct trial and reception services have to be established. Wastage involved
in this duplication is incalculable. FBI-Hen and G-2HD are cognizant.
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 6
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War —
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165, from
the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at Manila
to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained from their
respective files.
They comprise reports during the period from June to December 1941.
~ Urgent cable received from Manila night of Dec. 3, 19^1
We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments
in Indo-China :
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and I'ailways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional lOO.OQO repeat 100,000 troops and con-
siderable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington
Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with
Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present
but will act in South.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Navay Intelligence Honolulu.
CC. Col. BlCKNETX
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Matfteld
Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 1941
Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,
A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1,
without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between
Bangkok and Slngajxtre.
B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main land-
ing point to be in Songkhla area.
Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 per cent prob-
able accuracy).
American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.
Copies to : Mr. Shtvees
Capt. Matfieu)
Col. BiCKNELL
Cable reed, from Wellington 25.11.41
Pacific raider intelligence.
(1) On 6th November U. S. A. "Capillo" sighted surface vessel in 003° 20'
South 177° 32' East. Vessel is thought to have been raider G number 41 believed
to be "Steiermark" of HAPAG Line.
0355Z/25
Extract from Manila
To : Capt. Mayfield
Mr. Shivers
Col. BiCKNEIX
Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good con-
nections in Japan.
A. German ambassador Tokio is concentrating :
1. On breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over
to pro-Axis views the head of the .Japanese fleet who ai'e anxious to avoid con-
flict with America.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 593
2. On destroying the purely Japanese prejudices whicli have so far prevented
the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis and Right army groups into a united
front.
B. Encouraging higher officers of the KWANGTUNG and Korean armies to
adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.
B. German ambassador Tokyo has exercised considerable influence over General
SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA,
Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among civilians were SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU
TOYAMA, KENSO ADACHI.
C. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.
D. In Korean and Kwantung forces following are known to be influenced by
German ambassador: Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General
MITSUNAMI and Lt.-General TAItAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at
work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in far east on basis that Japan
cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. Govei'nment
resulting in a guarantee of the INVIOLABILITY of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers
and, as a consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby Soviet High Com-
mand could reinforce the West bv withdrawing forces from the East.
(Values.)
Index : German Ambassador, activities in Tokio.
Extract No. 182 for Honolulu
27th October, 1941
To : Col. BICKNELL
Capt. Maytield
report October 6th.
A. September 17th 9 repeat 9 twin-engined bombers left Kagi for West (destina-
tion not known).
B. September 18th 12 repeat 12 bombers, 3 repeat 3 fighters and 8 repeat 3 uni-
dentified aircraft left TAIHOKU for Swatow.
C. TOSHIYEN (TAKAO) 2 repeat 2 seaplane hangars, each 160 repeat 160 by
50 repeat 50 by 45 repeat 45 feet have been erected. Rails run from hangars to
sea wall where a crane is used for transfer of aircraft into sea.
D. A trial coastal reconnaissance unit of 50 repeat 50 reconnaissance and
fighter aircraft is being organised in Formosa. Base of operation and particulars
under investigation.
E. Paratroop training is still being carried out at KOGO and ROKKO.
F. Conscription and military training in Formosa has now reached the figure
of 300,000 repeat 800,000, about one third of these are already receiving active
training which will last over a period of four repeat four months.
O. A new fortress is under construction at SHOZAN (mountain overlooking
Takao harbour). Due to utmost secrecy it is not yet known if guns, are yet in
position.
% H. A small arms factory is being built at KOCHIYE ( — degrees 15 north 120
degrees 32 east) where a new wharf and six new warehouses have been com-
pleted. This place is becoming an important port and a number of large merchant
ships have called here. A new motor road connects with TAICHU.
/. At KAKENPH, four repeat four new wharves have been completed bringing
total to six repeat six. Lengths vary from 130 repeat 130 to 250 repeat 250 feet.
Total of warehouses (130 by 50 feet) number ten repeat ten.
October 2, 1941
Capt. Matfield
Mr. R. Shivers
Col. BiCKNELL
Following is a result of enquiries and information given in strict confidence
from ex Chinese official whose Japanese wife died a few months ago.
A "CHRYSANTHEMUM Society" is a very secret patriotic organization mem-
bers of which are Japanese wives, mistresses, and female employees of aliens.
B. Unquestionable loyalty to Emperor is shown by them secretly supplying in-
formation on a variety of subjects likely to be of assistance in extending power
of impire.
C. Members living outside the empire with relatives at home and unable to
report direct to their own authorities do so by code letters to homeland. Failure
to carry out this sacred duty may result in reprisals against their families.
D. Any confirmation of above would assist further further enquiries.
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 39
594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Value 2.)
Index — Japanese srdjects loyalty to Emperor.
Note: It is common knowledge, in the far East that such activities are being
carried out by servants wives or mistresses of Aliens however it is usually sur-
mised that this is done more or less independently of any organization other than
the Police in Japan and consulates elsewhere.
Confidential
J S. B.
OcrroBEB 22, 1941.
Capt. Mayfield
Mr. R. Shivers
Col. BiCKNELL
Following is a result of enquiries and information given in strict confidence from
ex Chinese official whose Japanese wife died a few months ago.
A. "CHRYSANTHEMUM Society" is a very secret patriotic organization mem-
bers of which are Japanese wives, mistresses, and female employees of aliens.
B. Unquestionable loyalty to Emperor is shown by them secretly supplying in-
formation on a variety of subjects likely to be of assistance in extending power
of empire.
C. Members living outside the empire with relatives at home and unable to
report direct to their own authorities do so by code letters to homeland. Failure
to carry out this sacred duty may result in reprisals against their families.
D. Anv confirmation of above would assist further enquiries.
(Value 2.)
(Not Carded)
October 18, 1941.
Capt. Mayfield
Mr. R. Shivees
Col. BiCKNELL
The most important problems for the Chinese Army, Government and Party are
the lack of planes, heavy artillery and the maintenance of the goods prices.
The Chinese Government intend to construct a road from Sikang to British
India. This road is to begin at Sichang in the province of Sikang, passes through
Yungning and Teching in Yunan, Tenching and Chayu in Sikang up to Sadiva,
the terminus of the railway in the province Assam. The length will be about a
thousand kilometers. The traffic along the Burma-Yunnan road which was orig-
inally calculated to be about 3000 tons a month has increased with 7000-10,(X)0
tons a month. At Rangoon and along this road about 20O,(X)O tons are still wait-
ing for transport.
The war Ministry consents to publish gradually the list of killed and wounded
men. The estimated loss of the enemy is about two million.
Since the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia the relations between
the Kuomintang and Communists are becoming better.
The West road from Ho-erh-kwo-ase near the Chinese Russian frontier to Chung-
king has a length of 4406 kilometers. Tlie transport along the Burma-Yunan road
is about 15,000 tons a month. The road is repeatedly bombed. The Kungkwo
bridge has been bombed 16 times, the Huitung bridge 6 times, the Changnan
bridge 5 times. Damage has not been repaired. Now ferry-boats, pontoon-
bridges and wire ropes are used. In ordinary times traffic goes on, but during
the rainy season it will be diflicult and traffic will probably have to be stopped.
Value not known.
This data well known.
Periodically reported by official U. S. observers on the spot.
Index : Chinese Army Intelligence.
J LB
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell
October 17, 1941.
[Hand written :] Not carded.
INDO CHINA— Persecution of Chinese
The Chinese Embassy at Vichy was informed by Chungking that the Saigon
police have arrested a number of Chinese men and women, some for taking part
in a patriotic action, some for being suspected to be communists and others because
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 595
they refused to pay their taxes to the enemy." The Ambassador must discuss
this question with the French Government and asli them to instruct the Govern-
ment of Indo-China :
1. To allow respite to those who are behind in paying their taxes.
2. To liberate the suspected people against whom there is no convincing
evidence ;
3. As the people who took part in the patriotic action are most wealthy
merchants and as their arrest and the order to expel them from the country
have already caused a repercussion in local business, the Ambassador
should request to have them released and the order to expel them cancelled.
Value 1.
[Hand written:] No value & may be reported by U. S. Consul. Not carded.
To Capt. Mayfleld
Extract No. 167 for Honolulu
14th October, 1941.
Informer revisited Sasebo Dockyard in February and reports the following
hearsay information.
A. 6,000 ton cruiser was launched in the summer of 1940; and there were then
rumours current that her tonnage was, in fact, 10,000 tons.
B. A new cruiser was laid down about January 1941.
This is said to be a sister ship of the vessel mentioned in paragraph A above.
C. A "special type destroyer" is being built here.
D. Aircraft carrier, formerly reported as completed has now left Sasebo.
E. A floating dock, described as "the largest and most modern in Japan" has
recently been completed here.
F. In February 1941, 24 repeat 24-hour shifts were being worked and source
was told that the yard was mainly employed on refits and repairs.
Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 165 for Honolulu
14th OcrroB3ER, 1941.
[Hand written :] rating C
A. — — confirms construction of naval small craft at the following yards
only : URAGA, FUJIMAGATA AND HARIMA.
B. This is only hearsay, but note that we now have independent reports from
three different agents regarding construction at HARIMA yard.
C. — — also quotes a Japanese press report that the destroyer TANIKAZE
was launched at HARIMA at end of 1940.
Comment (There has always been great confusion regarding this particular
destroyer.) The old TANIKAZE was still in commission up to 1935: and in
1937 we reported her as still at sea, having been rearmed and reconditioned.
D. Source was told that destroyers have recently taken 8 repeat 8 months to
build from laying down to completion.
To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 163 for Honolulu
14th Octobek, 1941.
reports on ENOSHIMA Peninsula, 17 kms. V7NW of YOKO-
HAMA, in July 1941.
A. 4 oil tanks have been completed here and 8 are under construction, total 12.
B. 300 repeat 300 labourers are engaged in defence works.
C. A naval ferry service running from HIRATSUKA to YOKOSUKA calls
here.
To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 159 for Honolulu
13th October, 1941.
obtained following hearsay information on Yokosuka dockyard
from 3 entirely independent sources.
First sul) source, a Tokyo merchant.
A. Capital ship, 43,000 tons launched in summer of 1940.
B. Capital ship, sister ship to above, on slip.
596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C. Heavy cruiser, over 10,000 tons, on slip.
D. One vessel newly laid down, class unknown.
Second sub source, a Yokohama electrical engineer. ~-
E. Capital ship, over 40,000 tons, on slip.
F. Heavy cruiser, 15 to 25,000 tons, on slip.
Third sub source, a Tokyo journalist.
G. Capital ship, over 40,000 tons, launched June 1940.
H. Capital ship, sister ship to above on slip.
I. Heavy cruiser, 15,000 tons, on slip.
J. Comment. All 3 sources seem agreed that there are 2 heavy ships still on the
slips at Yokosuka. (See 14ND card 1824)
Otherwise, all above information is given with jitmost reserve.
To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 158 for Honolulu
13th Octobeb, 1941.
About 300 workmen from Nagasaki dockyard were employed at Kure from
October 1940 to February 1941. following report is based on conversa-
tions with these men.
A. The Capital Ship, Nisshin, of over 40,000 repeat 40,000 tons, is now being
completed here. Note:
Comment : Contradiction of agent's previous report that the Nisshin was a
10,000-ton cruiser.
B. Another Capital ship of over 40,000 tons on slip.
C. One heavy cruiser of unknown displacement on slips.
D. One 20,000 repeat 20,000 ton aircraft carrier on slips.
E. Further coutirmatiou of continuous submarine construction, which is now
being carried out under supervision of considerable numbers of German tech-
nicians, who are constantly to be seen, both in Kure and the surrounding country
side.
F. Although we do not repeat not regard the above information as accurate,
it agrees remarkably closely with that given by the American Intelligence.
11th Octobeb, 1941.
To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 157 for Honolulu.
having revisited Nagasaki in February and received additional infor-
mation up to May, reports as follows : — •
A. No. 1 Slip. The Kashihara Maru (tonnage of 27,700 tons confirmed) and
her sister ship Itsumo Maru building at Kawasaki Yard, Kobe, are both being
converted for use by the Fleet Air Arm.
Note. It is quite uncertain whether these are to be aircraft carriers, seaplane
tenders or "aviation transports".
B. No. 2 Slip. A liner was laid down after launch of Kasuga Maru (April
1941).
Told she was towed to SASEBO on 1st May for conversion to aircraft carrier.
C. No. 3 Slip. A 12,000 tons merchant vessel was laid down after launch of
Kobe Maru.
D. No. 4 Slip. A 12,000 ton merchant vessel was laid down here after launch
of Nitta Maru.
NOTE. Source was told that vessels building on both No. 3 and No. 4 slips
had been taken over by the Navy but that up to February 1941 no repeat no
alterations had been made to constructional plans.
E. No. 5 Slip. Note. This was formerly mistakenly reported as No. 4 slip.
A "new type destroyer" is believed to be under construction here but slip
has been screened.
F. No. 6 Slip (previously reported as No. 5 slip). Capital ship under con-
struction here, was launched on 23rd October, 1940.
Source saw this vessel at a great distance in February 1941 and said it did not
look like an aircraft carrier, as there was a heavy forward superstructure and
a long low superstructure amidships.
Source was told that this vessel was towed to Sasebo in February, 1941 for
completion.
A new naval vessel (class unknown) is now under construction, and the slip
is still screened.
G. 24 rejDeat 24 hour shifts are now being worked at Nagasaki.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 597
Source was told that Kasuga Maru was not repeat not launched until April
1941 and that she was then towed to Sasebo on the 1st May for conversion to
"an aircraft carrier".
See note to paragraph A above.
10th October, 1941.
Col. Bicknell only
Extract No. 176 for Honolulu
It was I'eported that 500 paratroops trained in the Chiba area by German
instructors recently left Sasebo for French Indochina in the destroyer Yukihaze.
Value 5.
IOth October, 1941.
To : Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 178 for Honolulu
It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North
China to proceed Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate
against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok.
Value 4.
To: Capt. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Extract No. 175 for Honolulu
8th October, 1941.
It was reported on 12th September that:
A. German and Japanese S. I. S. have reached AGREEMENT whereby the
Germans operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Japanese except
Burma, Malaya, Indochina, N. E. I., and Philippines which are operated by the
Japanese.
B. Inspite of this agreement Germans intend to operate in all far eastern
countries under the cover of the D. N. B. In Indochina the D. N. B. and Domei
will operate private W/T stations.
C. The Germans in Shanghai are operating, for political information, a Gestapo
type of organization.
Value 2
To : Mr. Shivers
Col. Bicknell
Capt. Mayfield
Extract from Manila
It was reported on 12th September that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of Japanese
S. I. S. organization in Shanghai has been appointed Military Attache to Rio de
Janeiro in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German
S. I. S. and officials.
Value 2
Extract No. 174 for Honolulu
To : Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
8th October, 1941.
It was reported on 12th September that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of Japnaese
S. I. S. organization in Shanghai has been appointed Military Attache to Rio de
Janeiro in which capcaity he will act as a link between Japanese and German
S. I. S. and officials.
(Value 2)
Extract No. 173 for Honolulu
Col. Bicknell only
7th October, 1941.
reports the following alterations in dispositions of Germans working in
Japan.
A. Kure. 5 working in shell factory, and 4 in shipbuilding yard.
B. Yokosuka. 18 working in munitions factory, 26 in shipyard, 6 at aerodrome.
C. No change.
D. Maizuru. 5 working on A. R. P.
598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
E. No change.
F. Totsuka. 18 aviation and parachute instructors, two constructional engi-
neers.
G. Shirahama. 8 working on aerodrome.
H. Nakamita. 10 working at aerodrome.
I. Nagoya. 4 working at Aichi aircraft factory,
J. Himeji. 5 working at chemical warfare factory.
K. 3 Germans, living in Osaka, pay periodic visits to Nankia Heavy Industries
Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.
L. Source was told that 125 German.s, en route for Japan, were detained by
U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-Geruian hostilities.
M. Note please we have already reported movement of 30 German personnel
from Japan to Indo China.
N. Source was further told that there were 11 German aviation and parachute
instructors stationed at Nanking, and a total of 84 attached to Japanese forces at
Shanghai, Hankow and Nanchang, but this is given with reserve.
Extract No. 172 for Honolulu
6th Octobeb, 1941.
Col. BiCKNELL only
Source re\ isited Shirahama aerodrome and reports as follows.
A. Area has now been extended to 600 by 750 yards repeat 600 by 750 yards.
B. A sea wall is being built along the northern boundary and further construc-
tional work is in progress at the North East corner.
Total of 1,200 labour force are still employed here.
C. Following buildings have now been erected to south of areodome :
1 large single storey workshop.
Two storey office.
Five oil tanks.
There are an additional five tanks on two small islands about one mile to
west of aerodrome.
D. All 10 tanks are described as about 40 feet in diameter and built partially
underground with only 4 feet in height projecting above the surface.
E. Parachute training centre. All wounded have now been removed from this
establishment which is in full occupation by air force personnel and candidates
for parachutist numbering in all 3,400.
F. A small proportion of these are attending lectures in fighter tactics, but the
great majority are undergoing elimination tests before commencing training as
para troops.
These candidates include a considerable proportion of men formerly engaged in
various technical trades such as plumbers and mechanics.
G. 8 German advisers are attached, two supervising aerodrome construction
and six instructing in parachute work and aviation.
H. 50 women are employed in folding parachutes.
Extract No. ISO for Honolulu
6th October, 1941.
To : Col. BiCKNELL
Capt. Mayfield
Mr. Shivees
It was reported that — Head of Otto Wolff informed source that acting under
instructions from Hamburg headquarters he is buying up materials of which
Germany is or will be in great need, e. g. wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular
they are interested in purchase of supplies of these in Siam where it is pro-
posed that they shall be stored under innocuous cover names until such time as
they can be delivered to Germany.
(Value 2.)
Extract No. 181 for Honolulu
6th October, 1941.
To. Col. BiCKNELL
Mr. Shivebs
Capt. Mayfield
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 599
N. E. I. — JAPANESE SUSPECT OKANO TETSUO
On board the Kitano Maru the Japanese political agent OKANO TETSUO
returned to the N. E. I. OKANO who lived in the Netherlands Indies from 1915,
is in the possession of a settlement permit and therefore does not need a visa.
According to a police report OKANO was employed by a high Japanese oflacial
during his stay in Japan.
During his former stay in the Netherlands Indies OKANO was in close contact
with manv suspected Japanese.
(Value 1.)
Oct. 6, 1941.
Capt. Mayfield
Mr. R. Shivers
Col. BiCKNEa:x
It was reported that —
A. Source reports that opinion is being quietly expressed in German circles that
Japanese authorities fear that Germany may attempt to resume friendly relations
with Chungking Government after defeat or collapse of U. S. S. R. forces.
B. Japanese are alleged to fear that Germany may attempt to supply arms to
Chungking via the ALMA ATA route in barter exchange against important
Chinese products, and
C. To fear a German-Russian-Chinese commercial bloc since German indus-
tries and commerce circles are persistently demanding such a combination in the
future since it would ensure to German industries the supply of raw material
and would constitute a permanent market for her finished goods.
(Value 3.)
Extract No. 132 for Honolulu
4th October, 1941.
Capt. Mayfield, only
It is reported that — Japanese Consul KAWABACHI with a staff of five is
expected to arrive DILLY, TIMOR, by flying boat on 9th or 11th October.
(Value 2.)
Extract No. Ill for Honolulu
3rd OcnxMBEB, 1941.
Col. BicKNEXL only
reports further on aerial bomb section of Himeji factory in July.
A. Labour force 700 repeat 700, male and female.
B. This factory is having difficulty in increasing its labour force owing to
dangerous nature of work.
C. Three German technicians are attached.
D. On 14th June an order was received for 10,000 flares from the Military Air
Department.
E. One ton repeat one ton bombs are now under production and 2,000 repeat
~ 2,000 of these have already been stored.
Extract No. 110 for Honolulu
3rd October, 1941.
Col. BicKNEiix only
• reports on Aichi Factory Nagoya in July (following information ob-
tained from a new sub source).
A. 4 German technicians now attached.
B. Labour force increased to 6,000 repeat 6,000.
C. Junkers Jumo engines are being fitted to single engine, single seater army
fighters, 25 repeat 25 of which are being completed every month.
D. Experiments on large 3 repeat 3 engiued bomber are still being conducted
under supervision of German advisers.
600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract No. 169 for Ho)iolulu
Col. BiCKNELL only 3i-d Octobeb, 1941.
reports on Nauki Heavy Industries Corporation,
A. Only about 300 repeat 300 of the parachutes produced here every month
are of satisfactory quality (i. e. only 50 per cent, but this is given with
reserve) .
B. Experiments with hemp fibre for parachutes have not repeat not proved
satisfactory.
C. Babbed wire is also under production here.
D. Labour force 1,100 repeat 1,100 working 1 shift of 10 hours.
Extract No. 128 for Honolulu
To: Mr. Shiveks
Col. BicKNELL Octobeb 3rd, 1941
reports that Japanese proprietor of TRIANGULO Studio, Manila, re-
cently sought him out in order to tell him following: —
A. 500,000 men and 3000 tanks now in Forniiosa.
B. Aerial attack on Philippines to start October 12th.
C. Japanese Navy preparing to intercept 27 American ships en route to
Vladivostok.
The circumstances of presentation of this report, as well as its contents,
indicate resumption of whispering campaign.
Note similarity to reports on same subject from N. E. I.
Extract No. 153 for Honolulu
Capt. Matfield, only 2nd Octobee, 1941.
My telegram of 26th September, paragraphs D and E.
(Both jobs H. 1. and V. G. appear to be going to have three turrets, two
forward and one aft.)
(Add to No. 149; rate c.)
Extract No. 179 for Honolulu
To: Col BiCKNEIX
Mr. Shivebs
Capt. Mayfield 2nd Octobeb, 1941.
Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good
connections in Japan.
A. German ambassadpr Tokio is concentrating : —
1. On breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning
over to pro-Aixis views the head of the Japanese fleet who are anxious to avoid
conflict with America.
2. On destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far pre-
vented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis and Right army groups into
a united front.
3. Encouraging higher oflicers of the KWANTUNG and Korean armies to
adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.
B. German ambassador has exercised considerable influence over General
SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA,
Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among civilians were SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU
TOYAMA, KENSO ADACHi.
C. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.
D. In Korean and Kwantung forces following are known to be influenced
by German ambassador: Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-
General MITSUNAMI and Lt.-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be
quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in far east on
basis that Japan, cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S.
S. R. Government resulting in a guarantee of the INVIOLABILITY of Soviet
Far Eastern frontiers and, as a consequence of this, provide the possibility
whereby Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces
from the East.
(Value 3.)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 601
Extract No. 145 for Honolulu
A. Source reports that on September 20th he met a certain CIIU CHE SHENG,
a head of a certain department of the Nanking Ministry of War.
B. Latter stated, appropos of announcement over the radio of sentence passed
on a Japanese in Singapore for possession of seditious literature that ''not long"
General HATA had very secretely approached head of War Ministry, of Nanking,
requesting his co-operation in enlistment of Chinese agents for vpork in Thailand,
Burma and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure
FUKINESE or Chinese speaking dialect of that province.
C. Chiu Che Sheng stated that a certain number of men were recruited and
despatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated
Chinese. Those chosen, in all cases, ahd some previous military knowledge gained
through service at one time or another with Chinese forces. According to source
CHEN KUANG is responsible directly to Japanese military H. Q. at Nanking
and to all their authority.
D. Source endeavours to follow up. It is sent merely because Chiu Che Sheng's
statements were spontaneous but it is not known if they have any foundation in
fact.
(Values.)
The following is a report obtained October 1 from an American Shipping Agent
from Kobe enroute to San Francisco.
1. He reports about September 10, 800 trucks assembled in the Sports ground
Kobe and loaded soldiers. He could not state regiments since no civilians allowed
near but he had opiwrtunity to count the trucks. Their destination was sup-
posedly Dairen.
2. Supplies of lub oil and gasoline are stored in valleys at Itozaki near Naval
base, off the Inland sea. These valleys are dammed either end with concrete
blocks — the whole stored area covered with soil and grass planted. A stevodor-
ing superintendent told him Japanese navy has oil reserves for 2 years.
3. Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai reported to be still importing gasoline and oil
from U. S. which is then transhipped to Japan.
4. In early September a Frenchman from Saigon told him the Japanese were
bluffing regarding troop numbers in French Indo China to divert public attention
froKi the huge numbers being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The French-
man estimated Japanese troops in French Indo China were only 35,000.
5. He reports the intense anti-American and British feeling in both Kobe and
Yokohama. Every obstacle is put in the way of these nationals trying to complete
formalities to leave the country. Both British and Americans have to stand in
line in the streets for houi's awaiting their applications to local police or prefecture
officials examination, only to be told to come again next day. Personal search is
made, particularly of British before they leave. One man, a Canadian (CPR
Agent) was forced to lower his pants before embarking whilst police examined
his body for hidden money. ,
(Valuation C2.)
Extract No. 135 for Honolulu
30th September, 1941.
Only to Col. Bicknell
INDO CHINA — AVIATION LANDING GROUND AT: CAP. ST. JACQUES
(Cap. St. Jacques Town— 107 "06 East 10°21 North)
It will be noticed that the centre arm of the "T" has been somewhat extended,
and that parts of the old landing Ground have been neglected and short scrub
is now growing there.
Surface. The ground is reported as not suitable for Heavy Bombers.
Surface is sandy and not liable to flooding.
Source considers that the surface would be firmer after rain than during dry
weather.
Buildings : Nil.
Activities: There is, at present, little activity and the Landing Ground is not
being used.
A small Japanese guard is, however, on duty at nights.
(Valuation B 1.)
C02 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
September 29, 1941.
To: Col. BlCKNEXL
Mr. Shiveks
It wns reported that Admiral Decoux
A. Expressed his surprise at the many facilities accorded to Japanese in
southern Indo China and his intention to put a stop to it. From personal ob-
servation in Saigon it was stated that sometiiing appears to have been done.
B. Stated that he had given instructions to Press to cease attacks on Britain
and U. S. This was confirmed by E'ditor of '"Breton" who states these instruc-
tions were given to a Press Meeting on 20th September.
(Value 2.)
Extract No. 151 for Honolulu
29th September, 1941
Capt. Mayfield, only
revisited Kure at beginning of July but was unable to enter dockyard
himself owing to increased security measures.
We are of course unable to interrogate his sub source directly and following
inl'ormation is therefore given with reserve.
A. Jol) FS. Construction of upper works has been commenced.
B. Jobs C. 96 and C. 91. Vessels are expected to be launched in October and
completed in January 1942.
C. German merchant ships. Two German merchant ships of 6,000 and 4,000
tons respectively w^ere being overhauled and refitted, having arrived from Kobe
on 2nd June. (Add 117 of #152)
([omit] Their structure was said to have deteriorated to such an extent as
to make them unable to carry the guns for which they had been designed and
they would therefore be with lighter guns than had originally been intended.)
Source was told that these vessels would probably operate as troop transports
under Japanese flag.
D. Labour force. Has recently decreased to 6,300 repeat 0,300: this is believed
due to shortage of raw materials : and superfluous labour was released for work
in rice fields. (Miroshima is a rice growing district.)
One 10 repeat 10-hour shift is being worked on all shipbuilding jobs.
E. New shell factory. Labour force has been Increased to 2,400 repeat 2,400
working in three shifts.
F. German technicians. Five repeat five are attached to shell factory and
four to shipyard.
(Rate C.)
To : Col. BiCKNELL
Mr. Shivers
29th September, 1941.
It was reported that—
A. The better class Annamites are pro French and anti Japanese and will not
.ioin Pan Asiatic League the Japanese are forming. The Japanese are obtain-
ing recruits for this League from the unemployed clerk class and from among
hired car drivers who are employed by them.
B. The Chinese more than any other community are inclined to cooperate
with Japanese especially when their pockets gain.
C. There is talk of the formation of a Buddhist League.
Valuation 2
Extract No. 150 for Honolulu.
27th September, 1941.
Only to Col. Bickneix
A. Army Air stations.
ASAHIGAWA: pin point 43 degrees 44 minutes North, 142 degrees 28
Minutes East. (Hokkaido)
FUKAYA: pin point 36° 9' North, 139° 16' East.
MIKATAGAHARA : pin point 34° 47' North, 137° 35' East.
B. Naval air stations.
KURIDA: pin point 35° 37' North 135° 7' East.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 603
V. Commercial Aviation Fields.
NOSHIRO : pin point 40° 10' North, 140° 01' East.
D. Landing fields with little or no equipment.
NAIRO : South East coast of Sakhalien : pin point 49° 06' North, 142° 57'
East.
AKKESHI : pin point 43° 05' North, 144° 50' East.
HIROO : pin point 42° 22' North, 143° 21' East.
TAKENOHARA: 39° 8' North, 141° 3' East.
KOFU: 35° 42' North, 138° 28' East.
TO TORI : 35° 36' North, 134° 16' East.
SHIBUSHI : 31° 32' North, 131° 9' East.
Extract No. I49 for Honolulu
26th September, 1941.
Capt. Maytield, only
revisited Maizuru dockyard at end of June and reports as follows :
A. Pocket battleship afloat, "KISHU." Vessel is still berthed near the slip
from which she was launched.
Source was told that although the (rateD) Naval authorities were not repeat
not satisfied with her performance, improvements could only be effected by
extensive reconstruction. The authorities have decided not repeat not to under-
take this, and vessel would therefore shortly join the sea-going fleet.
B. Pocket battleship on slip. Work still suspended.
C. Two small vessels on slips. Work still suspended, and hulls appear to
have been put in a state of preservation, painted black and covered with canvas.
D. Job H.I.
Forward Superstructure: 6 stoi'eys have now been completed and source was
(old there were to be 11 in all.
Midship superstructure. A row of steel girders has been erected on the after
section. The section adjacent to the after superstructure has been increased In
height, and what appears to be the stump of a mainmast is now visible.
Aircraft hangar. Source was told that the low structure immediately aft of
the forward superstructure was to be the aircraft hangar.
Note. Source has previously reported that this ship was identical with "Job
45" at Yokosuka, and this resemblance appears to be growing.
E. Job V.6.
Forivard superstructure. 7 storeys are now completed and work has com-
menced on the 8th.
Source was told this superstructure would also have 11 storeys.
F. (Rate D.) Source was told that lauuching.of both these vessels had been de-
layed until December, but that it was expected to complete them by April. He
volunteered the explanation that the short period required for completion was
made possible by the advanced state of construction before launching.
He was also told that the difference at present to be seen between these two
ships would disappear when they were completed.
G. 10 repeat 10-hour shifts were being worked on both ships.
H. (RateD.) 2 new destroyers projected. Source was ioM that, although blue
print plans for these vessels had arrived in the yard, work had not repeat not
commenced, due to the inability of Yawata Iron Works to supply constructional
steel.
He was told that at lease one of the destroyers would be built in dry-dock.
I. 4 repeat 4 submarines (2 identified as 1.57 and I.M) were in harbour.
J. Labour force in shipyard was reduced to 5,300 repeat 5,300 during June.
About 7,000 repeat 7,000 Korean labourers are engaged in defence works otUside
the dockyards.
K. A. R. P.
Source was told that 5 Germans were supervising A. R. P. organization.
He saic 4 large cases of sound locators arrive by train.
He was told that all important archives had been shifted from this dock-
yard, in anticipation of bombing attacks in the event of war with
Russia.
Extract No. 152 for Honolulu
25th September, 1941.
Japan Naval Kuee Dockyabd
Capt. Maytield, only
604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Increased Security Measures
1. Source was unable to visit tlie dockyard in person, owing to increased security
measures, and all the following information has been secured from a contact of
Ms who had access to the yard. This sub-source has not been interrogated and
his information is therefore given with reserve.
2. At the end of May a new permit for entry into the dockyard was issued and
several arrests were made of unauthorized persons in the vicinity of the dock-
yard.
3. This was partially due to the increased troop movements from Ujina. Sub-
source reports on dockyard at the beginning of July : —
Job F. 8
4. Work was progressing on the upperworks.
2 DESTROYERS. C.96 and C.97
5. Vessels expected to be launched in October and completed in January 1942.
Oerman merchant ships
6. Two German vessels, 6,000 and 4,000 tons respectively, arrived in the yard
on 2nd June from Kobe for overhaul and refitting, and were still here at the begin-
ning of July,
No card — reported in #151
add to #151
7. It was found that the ships were in poor condition. They are therefore being
more lightly armed than originally planned.
8. Sub-source was told tliat these vessels, on completion of refitting, would
operate as transports under the Japanese flag.
Note : This last item is given with the utmost reserve.
Labour force
9. Decreased to 6,300.
10. One 10-hour shift is worked on all shipbuilding jobs.
11. Decrease in labour force has been due to shortage of raw materials, and
superfluous labour has been released for work in the ricefields. (Hiroshima is
a rice growing district).
Shell factory
12. Labour force increased to 2,400 working in 3 shifts.
GERMAN TECHNICIANS. 5 are attached to shell factory, 4 to shipyard.
Extract No. 146 for Honolulu
Capt. Mayfieild, only
25th September, 1941.
A. Our telegram of 24th September, paragraph C. suggests that the ship
launched is the pocket battleship which we have previously reported as building
at Yokouska, but regarding which no further information was obtainable on
■ last trip.
B. Please note this is only conjecture, and we have no repeat no definite evi-
dence to support it.
To : Col. Bicknell
Capt. Maymeld
SeptEmbeb 25, 1941.
reports.
A. 2 new types of Japanese heavy bombers have recently appeared in North
China. They are described as "type 98 and type 99' Naval."
B. Only specifications available and which apply to both types are :
Duration of flight, when not repeat not carrying maximum load, 10 repeat 10
hours.
Speed not repeat not mox-e than 250 miles repeat 250 miles per hour.
Service ceiling 35,000 repeat 35,000 feet.
C. The Hitachi aircraft works and the Ikegai Iron works are both producing
German Jumo Junkers aero engines.
Combined output of these two works is 40 to 50 Jumo aero engines per month.
Note : Both these factories are located in town of Kawasaki vphich is mid-way
between Tokyo and Yokohama and should not repeat not be confused with factory
at Kobe.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 605
D. Air force connections have recently been replaced by new men : this in-
formation is therefore not repeat not as reliable as that formerly obtained from
same source and should be accepted with reserve pending confirmation.
Extract No. 133 for Eo7ioltiIu
24th Septembee, 1941.
Capt. Mayfield only
A. revisited Yokosuka dockyard at beginning of June but, owing to greatly
increased security measures was unable to walk about the yard as on previous
occasions.
B. He was obliged to remain in the waiting room in the administrative build-
ing, but was able to see the two large ships, jobs A45 and F15, both of which
were still on the slips.
C. Note please that this contradicts reports by that one heavy ship was
launched here in the Spring ; but discrepancy can be explained, if his statement
in report under reference that three heavy ships are building here is correct.
D. Job A^5. Main alternation of appearance is in forward superstructure
where 7th storey has been completed, 8th storey has been added and 9th storey
has been begun.
Source was told that there were to be 11 repeat 11 storeys in all, a fire control
top being the 11th.
Source was also told that the aircraft hangar was situated in the low structure
immediately aft of the forward superstructure.
Source was also told that this ship was due to be launched in October repeat
October and to be completed in April, 1942. Note. Very short time for com-
pletion may be explained by the unusually advanced condition in which this
ship is apparently being launched.
B. Jol) F15. Forward superstructure. 6th storey has been completed and
work has commenced on a 7ih storey which is built in at the after end.
Source was informed, but not rei)eat not definitely, that launch would take
place about the same time as capital ships.
F. 24 repeat 24 hour shifts are still being worked on both these vessels.
G. Source was told that there was a total of 26 German technical advisers in
the ship building department of which 4 were supervising the fitting out of these
two vessels, particularly as regards the following points.
1. Mounting of new type of anti-aircraft gun.
2. Construction of fire control tower.
3. Improved method of catapulting aircraft.
H. Destroyers. Source was told that work on the two destroyei-s under con-
struction here had been held up by shortage of steel produced by the Yawata
Iron "Works.
Source was told that 4 submarines and one transport were being refitted here
in June.
J. Labour force. Total labour force in shipyard estimated at 8,800 repeat
8.800.
K. A. R. P. Source saw 9 air raid shelters near the main offices : constructed
of concrete and estimated to be 120 feet by 60 feet by 11 feet high, of which 4
feet was below ground level.
Extract No. 113 for Honolulu
Only to BiCKNEii
24th September 1941.
Indo China Aviation Landing Groltnds
Tlie following are less important Landing Grounds in South Indo China, but
worthy of mention :
1. BARIA (107 11 East 10 31 North) 245 x .SOO metres.
2. HON QUAN (106 36 East 11 37 North) 600 x 130 metres.
3. LONG THANH (108 17 East 11 7 North) 400 x 180 metres.
4. NUI BARA— 500 x 350 metres.
5. TRANG BANG (106 22 East 11 1 North) 400 x 400 metres
6. VIN CHAU (105 54 East 10 10 North ) 580 x 270 metres.
7. VO DAT (107 36 East 11 14 North) 600 x 750 metres.
8. SOCTRANG (105 31 East 9 32 North) 510 x 250 metres.
606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Of the above the following is known :
No. 5. Cannot be enlarged owing to nature of surrounding country.
No. 7. Of earth and grass surface, Liable to flooding during rains.
No. 8 SOCTTRANG. Situated 2 kins to tlTe SW of SOCTRANG on the road to
I'AI XAU. Ideal for enlargement as it is surrounded by flat land. Japanese
have purchased the surrounding land and intend to enlarge and build an important
aerodeome there.
Valuation B. 2
(Page 53C of Exhibit 6 is an outline map of Thailand and French
Indochina and will be fonnd reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation/ These illustrations will
be found Ijound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen
investigation. )
Japanese air bases in Indo-China
No. of
hangars
Landing Area
in yards
Runways
Remarks
TONGKING
?Bacninh
Qialam (Hanoi) ^._
Haiphong (Cat Bi)
?Laichau
Langson .._
Laokay.-
Phulangthuong
Phutho .-
ANN AM
Nhatrang
Tourane _
COCHIN— CHINA
Bienhoa
Kompong Trach i.
P hnompenh
Siemreap (Angkor)
Soctrang
Tansonmhut (Saigon)
(?)
(?)
1220 X 1220.
2400 X 440..
660 X 250.-..
(?)
2(600 X 44).
(?)
2
(small)
0
800 X 500..
1300 X 220.
660 X 660_.
780 X 200.
550 X 300.
(?)-
2(1300x44)...
1100x770.
880 X 44....
(?)
990 X 880 X 660.
2700x1900...,.
1100x880
1100x880
3(880 X 44).
2(1300 X 44).
Always serviceable.
Fuel & repairs. W/T.
Fuel & repairs. W/T.
Fuel. Minor repairs.
W/T Flooded July-Aug.
Fuel. Minor repairs.
Fuel. Minor repairs.
Fuel. Minor repiars.
Liable to flood.
Fuel & minor repairs.
Always serviceable.
Fuel & repairs.
Liable to flood.
Fuel. Minor repairs.
Always serviceable.
Fuel. Repairs. W/T.
Fuel. Minor repairs.
Always serviceable.
Fuel. Minor repairs.
Fuel. Repairs.
Always serviceable.
Fuel. Repairs. W/T.
Always serviceable.
? Not certain if Japanese have actually used this base.
Only to Col. BicKNELL
Extract No. 136 for Hoiiolvln
24 th September, 1941.
INDO CHINA AVIATION LANDING GECUNDS
The following is a list of other Landing Grounds mentioned as existing in
I^ido China in 1938 :
Province of Annan.— AN-KUE; BA NGOI : BA METHUOT : DAK TO:
DALAT: DONG HOI: DRAN : HA CO: PHAN RANG: PHANTHIET : PHU
CAT: QUANG NGAI : QUANG TRI : TAM KY : TAN . MY : THANH HOA :
VINH : VINH HAO : TUY HOA : VAN XUAN : CANH DUONG :
Province of CAMBODIE.—CUROVI SRADAN : HAUT CHLONG : KOIMPONG
CHNANG : POMPONG THOM : KRATIE : MUONG OU DONG : PREY VENG :
PURSAT : SAMBOR : SISCEHON : SOAI RIBNG :
Province of LAOS.— BAN DON: BAN NA XALA : BAN NONG BOA: PHON
PHO : BAM THOUEI : BUN KHONG : LA KHONE PENG : LAK SAO : LUANG
PRABANG: MUONG SINH : NAPE: PAKSANE : PAKSE : SAM NBUA :
SAVANNAKET-: KIENG KHOUANG :
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 607
Province of TONKIN.— BACKAN : CAO BANG: DIENBIENPHU : DONG
GIAO: FORT BAYARD: HA GIANG: KEP HA: LAI CHAU : LANG SO
LAOKAY: MONCAY : NAM DINH: NGUYEN BINH : PHU LANG THUONG:
HPU THO: QUYNH NHAl: SON LA: THAT KUE : TONG : VINH YEN:
In all cases where any of these Landing grounds have not Ijeen referred to
in previous reports, it can be assumed that they are small. State of preserva-
tion, if still in existence, is unknown and doubtful.
Capt. Mayfield, only
Extract No. 154 lor Honolulu
23rd September, 1941.
JAPAN NAVAL MAIZURU DOCKYAKU
Source revisited Maizuru dockyard at the end of June and reports as follows:
(A) POCKET BATTLESHIP AFLOAT— "MSHV"
1. This vessel was seen berthed near the slip from which she was launched.
2. No work was going on, but source saw the large crane had been moved
near her.
3. He was told that it was expected that this vessel would soon be sent to
join the fleet, although the (Naval Authorities were not satislied with her. This
was because improvements could only be made by extensive reconstruction,
which could not be authorized.)
(B) POCKET BATTLESHIP ON SLIP
4. Work was still suspended on this vessel.
(C) TWO SMALL VESSELS ON SLIPS
5. No further work on these vessels.
6. Entire keels have been covered with canvas, and painted black. Source
was told that this was to preserve the steeL
(D) JOB "H. I."
Fonrard Superstructure :
7. Six storeys have been completed and work has begun on the seventh.
8. Source was told that there were going to be eleven storeys in all.
Note. — This agrees with what he was told concerning the A.45 at Yokosuka.
Midships Superstucture :
9. A row of steel bars has been put up in the after section.
10. The section adacent to the aft superstructure has been increased in height,
and a post or mainmast is visible.
Aircraft hangar
11. Source was told that the low structure immediately aft of the forward
superstructure was the aircraft hangar.
(E) JOB V. 6.
Foricard Superstructure
12. Seven storeys now completed and work has commenced on the eighth.
13. Source was told that this vessel, also, was to have eleven storeys.
H. 1. and V. 6 GENERAL
14. Soui'ce was told that launch of both these vessels had been delayed until
December, but that it was expected to complete them by April, this brief period
for completion will be made possible by the advance state of construction before
launching.
15. In conversation with dockyard employee, source commented on dissimi-
larity of forward superstructure on these two vessels, and on that of the A. 45 at
Yokosuka. Ke was told that on completion these differences would disappear.
16. 10-hour shifts were worked on these vessels.
(F). PROPOSED TWO NEW DESTROYERS.
17. Although the plans of these vessels had arrived at the yard, work had not
commenced, owing to the inability of the Yawata Ii'on Works to supply steel.
608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL H.\RBOR ATTACK
18. Source was told that at least one of the destroyers would be built in a dry-
dock.
(G) . MISCELLANEO VS.
Vessels refitting.
19. Four submarines were seen moored in the harbour, two of which were seen
to be I. 57 and I. 64.
20. One large armed trawler was seen in dry dock.
Labour Force:
21. This was reduced to 5,3000 repeat 5,300 in the shipyard in June.
22. About 7,000 Korean labourers are engaged In the preparation of defence
works outside the dock yard.
yULITARY POLICE:
23. A unit of 35 gendarmes is stationed in the dockyard.
A. R.P.
24. Source was told that five Germans were attached to assist in A. R. P.
matters.
25. At the end of June, source saw four large eases of sound locators arrive
by train.
26. He was told that important documents had been shifted from the dockyard
in anticipation of war with Russia. Should this occur, it is expected that
Maizura will be bombed.
SEPTEilBEB 23rd, 1941.
Extract No. 99 for Honolulu
reports September 5th, Hainan Island.
A. Among instructions issued by General TERAUCHI SHOICHI (DQU ANR
COM AAB) to forces in this area were:
1. Black out exercises to commence from September 10th.
2. To complete by end of October the construction of 5 repeat 5 small arms
factories. They are imder direction of engineer Colonel HARAKAMI (ACT
AAG).
B. Following are principal Intelligence Agents appointed at : —
Hainan Island, SANO (AFQ TAK).
Indo-China, TSUKADA (CIG JTS).
Canton, YOSHIMOTO TAIGIRO (BAD GOK CQU MAY SQU).
C. August 24th 500 repeat 500 cases of bombs, 1,200 repeat 1,200 cases of
shells and 300 repeat 300 cases of aircraft spares landed at TU LIN KAN from
Japan.
September 23rd, 1941.
Extract No. 100 for Honolulu
D. August 25th 22 repeat 22 timn engine tombers, commanded by Colonel
MORIYAMA (HDU DYA) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome from Formosa
(stated to be dive bombers but this is to be accepted with reserve and source
is being questioned on this type).
E. According to air force gossip it has been decided that with the advent of
foggy season at Chung-King aircraft at Hankow will be transferred to the
southern area and that after September 500 repeat 500 bombers are to be
based in Indo-China.
To Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers
Extract No. 136 for Honolulu
23ed September. 1941.
japanese daily notes, yamamoto goro, aisa befttsed
September 6th, 1941— YA]\L\MOTO Goro, member of the ilitsubishi Shoji
Kaisha applied for a visa at the Netherlands consulate general at Bangkok.
He has been in the Netherlands Indies from February 19, 1940, till June 17,
1941, as a representative of the aforesaid firm, but travelled over West and
Middle Java with YOSHIDA Toshio, naval officer and Major FUKUDA Nasuo,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 609
a medical officer. He now explains that his former stay at Java was connected
with the audit of the accounts of the Mitsubishi concern (Batavia and Soera-
baja branches). However he never applied for a labour permit.
As there is no sufficient reason now for a renewed audit of the accounts after 4
months, visa was recommended for refusal.
Valuation 1.
Only to Col. Bicknell
Ex-tract Nu. 13/f for Honolulu
20th September, 1941.
japanese troops in indo-china
A. Partial confirmation as to presence of puppet troops in Indo-China is af-
forded from Free French sources, who put tiieir proportion of total very much
lower, i. e. 40 repeat 40 per cent Chinese and 10 repeat 10 per cent Manchukuo
or Korean.
B. Onr opinion (based on experience in Formosa, Hainan and South China)
is that proportion of puppet troops to Japanese in always greatly exaggerated
and \\i\H very seldom proved to be more than 20 repeat 20 per cent.
For Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers
September 19, 1941.
Survey of the Political Situation in Japan
Excellent survey for Sept. 19
According to a well-informed Japanese, the army as well as about fifty ultra-
nationalistic, pan-Asiatic organizations brought heavy pressure upon the Jap-
anese government and the Navy in order to attack the oil tankers from
America Vladivostokward. The Navy refused positively, maintaining that it was
not up to her to force Japan's national policy, being however prepared to carry
out the policy decided by tlie Emperor with all its might.
The Japanese Navy seems as yet to be opposed to provocate America and is
aware to be no match for the combined America-Allied Forces in the Pacific.
The army is firmly determined to continue to assist Germany in accordance
with Tripartite Pact by binding the Allied Forces in South-East Asia through
its occupation of Indo-China, which country Vichy handed over to the Japanese
by the order of Hitler and through concentration of big military forces (about
one million) at the Manchukuo frontier in order to lighten the pressure on
Germany's East front.
The army was absolutely convinced that the Russian resistance would be
soon annihilated, being much impressed by the reports of the Japanese militai-y
mission to Germany under Lt. General MATSUSHIMA. Thae army therefore
expected soon to be able to occupy Siberia and the Maritime Provinces.
The army authorities and the majority of the Japanese people however
gradually realize that a quick destruction of Russia's army cannot be counted
on, with the result that the army is holding back for the present.
The recent speech of General Baron Sadao ARAKI concerning the necessity of
internal unity against the thi-eatening danger from abroad, really has the dif-
ference of opinion between the army and navy about Japan's immediate policy as .
its background.
Admiral Sankichi TAKAHASHI, Cabinet-adviser and one of the most powerful
Navy leaders, published recently an article in which he doubted whether
Germany will win the war and which should be considered as a hint, that
the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was a blunder.
The dispute between Army and Navy is supposed to have strengthened the
position of KONOR and the entourage of the Emperor, giving the present
cabinet a chance to maintain itself and to withhold the army from bringing
about an armed conflict.
However, all this by no means implicates that Japan directly will turn its
back on Hitler, nor will Japan be inclined to negotiate about the withdrawal
of its troops from Indo-China. This is considered impossible, firstly in view of
the fact that the Axis-Pact was announced by Imperial Decree and secondly •
because of the vital importance of the stranglehold on Indo-China by Japan,
both economically and strategically.
79716— 46— Ex. 148— — 40
610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Another questiou to be reckoned with is the mission to Indo-China of Ambas-
sador YOSHIZANA and his suite of Army, Navy, and other officials, which
actually prepared Yoshizawa's appointment to Governor-General of Indo-China.
September 18, 1941.
To : Capt. Mayfleld, Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers
It is reported on 7th September, that.
A. Japanese Consul General Batavia stated that Japanese Government intend
to attach the courier NOMOTO TATSUO to the Consulate for two months after his
return from Singapore.
B. Consul General ISHIZAWA stated that N. is cipher expert attached to give
instructions on use of the new complicated Japanese code.
C. N. told Immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at various
Japanese Consulates and would serve as a temporary cashier at Consulate General.
D. It was stated KAWASAKI YOSH?AKI, who sailed from Japan on 11th
September, was registered as a secretary to Consulate General but was in reality
a code expert in service of Japanese Navy.
Septembee 17, 1941
To : Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
It was reported on September 14 that General WU YI PING, who returned
that day from Tokio after a special visit on behalf of Nanking Government
stated : —
A. KONOYE Cabinet was experiencing much dithculty as a result of increasing
criticism from extreme right-wing elements who were secretly demanding ener-
getic measures to be taken to conceal Japan's position in the TIEH YO.
B. If it was true Premier had strengthened his position by obtaining support
of the so-called "court groups" it was doubtful if this support was powerful enough
to keep despotism of Rightists in full check. Main argument of the latter is that
Japan, in order to gain any real results from conversations with America and
democracies in general, will have to make definite concessions, not only in both
China and Far East questions in general, but most probably in connection with
her future relations to Axis.
C. Equally the Government understands that such concessions (particularly in
relation to the China incident, which was started by the Army extremists) may
lead to open insubordination of extreme Right groups and adoption of a provoca-
tive policy by them, either in norths or south, which will finally identify Japan's
fate with that of Germany.
D. Cabinet's policy is therefore to drag out conversations with America to the
utmost possible limit and to profit by any easing in the Far East situation to
strengthen its own jposition.
E. Cabinet is also exercised as to the final effects of I'ritish and American
economic policy and while it is putting on a bold front at present it realizes that
the Japanese people are becoming anxious as to the future. This anxiety has
been further increased by tlie inability of Germany to force a quick decision
against Russia and thus help to remove the menace of the Soviet forces in the
Far East.
Value 3
Extract No. 123 for Honolulu
17th September, 1941.
reports:
A. Important fortifications with heavy calibre guns "facing south" at Keishu
(22 degrees 29 min North 120 degrees 36 min. East) .
Comment. This position appears to be about 4 miles from the sea and the
purpose of such fortifications is hard to understand.
B. Calibi'e of largest guns mounted at Kotobuki Y'^aina (Ape Hill: northern
defences of Takao : subject of numerous reports in 1936 and 1937) is 14 inch repeat
14 inch.
Extract for Honolulu
Sept. 17, 1941.
July 18, 1941
From cen.sorshlp we learned that an AGARIE Saburo at Pelew (writing to a
fisherman at Ambon) employed by the Japanese Navy Ministry "gathered sand
and stones."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 611
"As you know" thus he writes further to bis friend, "there are starting this
year, 100 persons enlisted yearly as "celestial storming troops" destined for the
Netherlands Indies. Although I should like to take part in it, I abandoned this
plan, as I earn monthly 200 and 300 yen."
It is very remarkable that some time ago a similar letter concerning the train-
ing on the Island of Yap of storm troops destined for the Netherlands East
Indies came to our attention.
July 19, 1941
Reference S. B. Japanese Notes frona 9th July 1941, concerning KOSUGI
Nichinori, director of Ishihara Sanyokoshi, who wished to make a tour of
inspection of the I. S. K. Mines in Jahore and Trankanu.
To this person, formerly managing director of Nanyo Koshtsu Kaisha at New
Guinea, entrance was refused to this country because of bis devising plans to at-
tack this country, as was revealed from his writing during a home search at the
N. K. K. office at Nanokwari. According to him the Nanyo Kobatsu Kaisha
was an outpost of the Japanese southward move, and his employees were the
stormtroops. In connection with the discovery of this compromising correspond-
ence he was dismissed by his company just as was (for the same reason) IWOUE
Yoshio administrator.
It is not without interest that this arduous southward expansionist now en-
tered the service of the notorious Ishihara !
Only to Col. Bicknell
Extract No. 1J,2 for HonoJuhi
16th September, 1941.
It is reported that —
A. 40 of the 80 Japanese aircraft at Tienho and Pakwan received orders to fly
tn Indo China on 20th August.
Airplane movements.
B. 7,000 Korean conscripts who were training in Heito Formosa were sent to
Hainan middle August.
Japan troop Hainan (Runin).
C. Passed with reserve. Untried source.
Value 4.
Mr. Shivers
Col. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell
(CONFIDENTIAL
September 16, 1941.
It was reported that,
A. During conversation with a Japanese source in YAMASHITA line it was
learned that owing to the acute shortage of shipping available for carrying
Japanese goods from Japan to Shanghai, Japanese were considering pos-
sibility of chartering foreign flag vessels for Yokohama and Kobe Shanghai runs.
Same source also reports investigation of a market in Avhich he is personally
interested, i.e., export of Japanese manufactured imitation Panama hats, fibi-e and
paper hoods to United States shows Japanese are making contracts with third
parties here to sell their goods in order to obtain U. S. currency.
B. Goods in question are imported from Japan marked "Made in China" and
sold by third parties hereto importers in U. S. against cash U. S. dollars or against
letter credit to foreign exporters.
NoTTi:
1. It has been consistently rumored on China coast that this is being abbited by
British merchants in Hongkong — -
2. It is a fact that much of this goods moves through Hongkong.
Extract No. 122 for Honolida
14th September, 1941.
has supplied a sketch map of Yokosuka dockyard.
Points of interest are : —
A. One new building slip in position between No. 3 and No. 4 dock, as shown
in sketch map.
B. 2 new, ve.ry small, slips in basin adjacent to railway station, on each of
which one motor torpedo boat is being built.
C. No repeat no alterations in dry docks.
D. Confirms position of small repair slip astern of "Mikasa already reported
by agent in November, 1940.
612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract No. 120 for Honolulu.
13th Septembek, 1941.
reports.
A. Appearance in South China area of new type of high altitude bomber built
in Germany.
B. Described as Heinkel-land (IHA OMR GYH OYK) type 98 repeat 98.
C. Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.
Extract for Honolulu
September 12, 1941.
Between August 7 and August 10 mine layers for Pescadore laid further mines
off TAX AN KEI.
August 13, 9 repeat 9 destroyers and 4 repeat 4 gunboats arrived KEELUNG
and 3 repeat 3 destroyers arrived TAKAO from Japan and sailed after refueling.
August 9, 100 repeat 100 mines and 10 repeat 10 motor launches were loaded on
transport which left for Indo-China.
Extract No. 9S for Honolulu
11th Septembee, 1941.
JAPAN ECONOMIC — EFFECT OF ALLIED PRESSURE ON JAPAN IN N. E. I.
Concerning the economic pressure on Japan the following can be remarked.
IMAGAWA Yoshitochi, Director of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Batavia, is
rumoured to have said that the economic retaliatory measures taken by England,
America and the Netherland East Indies were a heavy blow for Japan's economic
position, but, in view of the good relations with Thailand, Indo-China, Manchuria
and occupied China, Japan would quickly recover from it.
The difficult point was always and would remain whether the oil supplies would
be stoi)ped or not. The Japanese ambassadors in America and England had
received instructions to do their utmost to prevent the stopping of these supplies.
In the other case Japan would not hesitate but immediately take the necessary
steps to occupy Borneo.
In the latter case (provided the Japan Japs had not attacked the other islands)
England and America would only protest and not intervene).
According to a report from Soerabaja some big Japanese tirms as for instance
the Naayo Veem (Southern Godown Company) dismissed already members of
their staff. In view of a report in Japanese newspaper the Japanese Consul at
Soerabaja wrote this newspaper that the Japanese banks and firms did not intend
to close down following the Netherlands economic measures. A similar letter he
addressed to the head of the local Government of Soerabaja.
Valuation C 0.
Extract No. 119 for Honolulu.
11th Septembeib, 1941.
has again visited Himeji but has not repeat not been able to obtain
any satisfactory confirmation of the location or existence of the aerial bomb
and poison gas factory previously reported.
Extract No. 116 for Honolulu
10th September, 1941.
while in Japan, was given the following information by Formosan
friends from Takao area regarding Toshiyen Naval Base.
A. 4 repeat 4 dry docks completed.
B. Submarines are based here.
C. New aerodi'ome completed.
Extract No. 117 for Honolulu
10th September, 1941.
reports that the underground hangars at Okayama aerodrome re-
ported in my telegram of Septeniber 3rd, paragraph C, are built to a similar
design to that of Kasumigaura aerodrome and that they have a capacity for 50
repeat 50 aircraft.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 613
Extract No. 97 for Honolulu.
10th Septembee, 1941.
NETHEKLANDS BIAST INDIES AND SOUTH SEAS
JAPANESE ESPIONAGE TRAINING.
From censorship we learned that MURAKAMI Shogo, employee of the Tjijoda
Department Store, Soerabaja, in possession of a temporary residence permit dated
8.4.34, No. 434, being on furlough in Japan, follows a course at school of great im-
portance for the National Policy" where he received lessons from officers of the
Army and Navy, and from officials of the Ministry, of Overseas affairs.
The name of the School he indicates as "XXX Institute, the teachers are marked
in the same way XXX officers of the Army etc.,
Undoubtedly the School in question is one of the "Southward Expansion" schools
where Japanese colonists are trained for their future take task of propaganda
and espionage.
Moreover Murakami is a great admirer of the German "Kultur", as we in
February already learned from censorship. He has made a study of the German
language and intended to go to Germany.
In connection with the above his temporary residence permit was cancelled by
Government Order as he is considei'ed dangerous for public peace and order.
Value C 9.
Extract No. 118 Honolulu.
10th Septembee, 1941.
reports the construction of a new aerodrome at Toko, which affords
independent confirmation of telegram of 15th May.
Extract No. 94 for Honolulu
9th Septembee, 1941.
N. E. I. ; JAPANESE — ^BEPEESENTATIVES OF OSAKA MAINICHI AND TOKYO NIOHI NICHI
FOECED TO LEAVE N. E. I.
ISHIBASHI Tsuneyoshi and TOBISHIMA Sadashireo, representatives of
the Osaka Mainichi and Tokio Nichi Nichi were forced to leave the country. In
the future no reporters of the above mentioned Japanese newspapers will be
allowed to enter the Netherlands Indies. The aforesaid nseasure was enforced
on account of the systemic anti-Dutch press campaign in these papers.
ISHIBASHI, moreover, made photo's in forbidden areas and violated the alien
registration ordnance.
Value 1.
Extract No. 95 for Honolulu.
9th Septembee, 1941.
N. E. I. JAPANESE ACTIVITIES AND APPLICATIONS FOE VISAS
ARAKI Keijiro, managing director of Toyo Bosuifu Manufacturing Co. applied
for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Tokio. He intends to stay
here for 3 months to inspect a rubber factory now under construction at Soerabaya
following up his visit to this country in December in connection with the erection
of a factory of waterproof cloth at Soerabaya. Although this matter is still
under consideration and for this purpose MASHIBA Tetsuo, a proxy of this
firm, is already in this country, it was advised to grant the visa under condition
however that the duration of his stay is limited.
SHIGITA KENZO, exporter of automobile parts, accessories, etc, applied for
a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Shanghai. He intends to make a
2 month's business trip over Java. Applicant paid already a visit of about 14
days in April 1940 and a visit of about 20 days in January-February 1941 to Java.
No objection.
HAYASHI Junjiro, acting manager of Nomura & Co. Singapore, who on 29th
July left this country by plane after having paid a short visit to Batavia, again
applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Singapore, as he has
614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to negotiate ouce again with the directoi' of the Batavia Branch of this firm.
It was advised to grant the visa provided the duration of his stay is fixed
previously.
Extract No. 9G for Honolulu
9th Septembee, 1^1.
n. e. 1. : japanese evacuation of women
In connection Avith the growing political tension between Japan and the
Netherlands Indies 180 Japanese women and children of Batavia, Samarang
and Soerabaya are reported to have embarked on 1st August on board of the
HARUNA m'aRU to return to their home country. From conversations heard
during this embarkment it appeared that these families do uot intend to return
to this country before the war is over (which would be witiiiu 6 mouths according
to some optimistic Japanese).
Tlie employees of the Domei Agency in this country get also telegraphic
consent from Tokio to repatriate their families. The Japanese Consul-General
at Batavia is reported to have sent a circular to the Japanese colonLsts in order
to advise them to speed up the evacuation of their wives and children. The
"Nanyo Kaium" received permission from the Japanese Government to double
the passengers accommodation of the next two ships (Nichirau Maru and
Burma Maru) for evacuation ijurposes. The Nichiran Maru is leaving Soerabaya
on the 12th August.
In Semarang it is rumoured that the German women who from the Netherlands
Indies intended to return to Germany via Japan and Russia are working in
Japanese munition factories.
Valp. 1.
Extract No. 112 for Honolulu
9th September, 1941.
reports regarding aerodromes which are in the vicinity of, and may
perhaps be identical with those already reported by R. A. F. Intelligence.
A. SUNOSAKI (IGD EAB) Naval aerodrome and seaplane base.
Pin point 34° 58' North, 139° 49' East.
6 kilometres East of promontory of the same nan*e and 4 kilometres west of
town of Joje (VHA HAL).
Area about 100 acres repeat 100 acres.
Possibly identical with Tateyama aerodrome.
B. FUNAHASHI (OJL HOP) Military aerodrome.
Pin point 35° 42' North, 139° 56' East. West of and adjacent to railway station
of same name.
Area about 106 acres repeat 106 acres.
Buildinffs: 4 hangars, also barracks.
300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army headquarters undergoing training
here under German supervision.
Source states "there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians
attached".
I'erhaps identical with Shinosaki aerodrome.
('. AKITSU (LTAIFX) Military aerodrome.
Pin point 35° 49' North, 139° 29' East. One and a half kilometres North of
I'ailway station of same name.
Area about 170 acres repeat 170 acres.
Total of 3000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion are
believed to be paratroops being trained by German instructors.
Perhaps identical with Sayama aerodrome.
D. SHINAGAWA (BGU ECB) aerodrome and seaplane base.
Position approximately 35° 38' North, 139° 44 and a half minutes East.
One and a half kilometres south east of railway station of same name.
Area about SO acres i-epeat 80 acres.
Possibly identical with Shibata aerodrome, "already reported.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 615
Extract No. ll-i for Honolulu
9th September, 1941.
reports on the following neio aerodromes in Japan.
A. Yokkaido (BYO, PON, Sill) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 35° 40' North,
140° 09' East. One kilometre North West of railway station of same name.
Area 7.5 i-epeat 75 acres.
B. Mio (AAF AHU) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 35° 0' North, 138° 31'
East. Small number of paratroops from Shidzuoka Military formations are
under training here.
C. S'uma (UHN LIL) Naval Aerodrome. Still under construction. Location
approximately 5 kilometres west of Kobe. Area about 325 acres repeat 325 acres.
Extract No. 115 for Honolulu
9th September, 1941.
E. Kauoya (UZH DUW) Militartj Aerodrome. Pin point 31° 25' North, 130°
51' east. Locally known as Kasanohara (MEN TAK AYO) Aerodrome. Area
about 325 acres repeat 325 acres. Parachute unit being trained by German
instructors. Aircraft factory in vicinity employing several thousand workmen.
Possibly identical with Kanoya Naval Aerodrome.
Extract No. 113 for Honolulu.
9th September, 1941.
furnishes following information regarding aerodrome already
located by R. A. F. Intelligence.
A. Tsudanuma (IFX, JYS, lEC) Military Aerodrome. Area 75 repeat 75
acres. Paratroops of 1st repeat 1st Division under training here.
B. Yokaichi (BYO, GAZ, ECK) Military Aerodrome. Locally known as
Kawai (ECB, BAC) aerodrome. Area 125 repeat 125 acres.
To : Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers
9th September, 1941.
Source reports that a meeting of important Japanese was held on August
SI in Yokohama Specie Bank Shanghai which was addressed by a certain Major
Kuno. He spoke —
A. Japanese-American conversations at Washington were commenced at urgent
request of German Government conveyed to Admiral Toyoda through German
Ambassador.
B. German Government's view was that only through such conversation would
it be possible to discover real intention of Great Britain and U. S. A. following
upon occupation of Iran and before opening of Moscow conference.
C. Ott in his message to Toyoda stressed that it should be possible for Japan,
in discussing question of American aid to Russia via Vladivostock, to discover
quantity and exact nature of cargoes which it is intended to send to Russia, num-
ber of vessels to be used, whether they would be convoyed and nature of at least
certain clauses in agreement for America assistance to Soviet.
D. He thought also, it should be possible to discover whether or not Americiui
aid would be sent via Iran.
E. He admitted that in its greater measure such information would be of
more value to Germany than to Japan but held also that Japan would through
the conversations obtain a clear indication of Anglo-American decisions and
future plans in Pacific area and the degree of solidarity of the A. B. C. D. front.
F. He admitted that to gain such invaluable information Japan would have
to adopt a conciliatory attitude but this coupled with astute diplomacy would
probably cause American statesmen to reveal more than they realized.
G. KUNO stated German Government's proposals were fully discussed at
urgent meeting of Supreme Command. The results were conveyed by Prince
Konoye to the Emperor who then authorized fonner to address his recent mes-
sage to American President.
Comment. I do not know what interpretation of value to place on this report.
It may be a clever fabrication ; on the other hand it is not inconsistent with
616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBQR ATTACK
"SLICK" methods of German diplomacy and FACTUAL information and indi-
cations souglit would be of much value to Reich if obtained.
Source was not repeat not at meeting but obtained the above information from
Minutes of the Meeting filed at CONCORDIA Association. Comments would be
of great value to us.
Your comments would be appreciated.
Extract for Honolulu September 6, 1941.
JAPAN— AIR
NOTES ON MISCELLANEOUS AERODROMES
Following is some miscellaneous information mostly hearsay on Japanese
aerodromes :
A. SXJNOSAKI ( )
1. Naval aerodrome and seaplane base.
2. Locations. Entrance Yokohama Bay. 34°58' north, 139°49' east. 6 kilo-
nsetres east of promontory of same name. 4 kms. west of town of HOJO ( )
and TATEYAMA. NOTE: R. A. F. Intelligence thinks this is Tateyama aero-
drome, located by them 34°59' N. 139° 53' E.
by
3. Area. 120,000 tsubo, i. e. about 100 acres.
4. Aircraft. Aircraft stationed here include Messerchmitt ME 110 and Piaggio
P. X. I. R. C. 40. Heavy bomber.
B. FUNABASHI (E. OF TOKYO 6 MILES)
.5. Military aerodrome.
6. Locations. 35°42' north, 139°58' east. West of and adjacent to town and
railway station of this name.
NOTE : This might be the same aerodrome as that reported by R. A. F. Intelli-
gence as Shinosaki ; 35M3' N. 139°54' E.
7. Area. 130,000 tsubo, i. e. about 106 acres.
8. Parachute Training. 300 troops' of the Eastern Section Army H. Q. are under
training here as parachutists under German supervision.
9. There is one parachute training tower.
10. Buildings. Four hangers. Barracks for parachutists and aviation per-
sonnel.
11. Aircraft factory. Source states "there is an aircraft factory here with a
few German technicians attached." This is hearsay only and no further infor-
mation is available.
C. TSTIDA NUMA
12. Military adrodrome.
13. Location. 35°41' North, 140°01' East. West of and adjacent to railway
station of same name.
NOTE : R. A. F. Intelligence gives location as 35°39' N, 140°05' E.
14. Area. 90,000 tsubo or 75 acres.
15. Parachute training. Parachute troops of 1st division are under training
here.
16. There is one parachute training tower.
D. YOKAIDO
17. Military aerodrome..
18. Location. 35°40' North, 140°09' East. 1 kilometre N. W. of town and rail-
way station of same name.
19. Area. 90,000 tsubo or 75 acress.
E. AKITSU
20. Military aerodrome.
21. Location. 35°49' north, 139 29' east.
1 and a half kms. north of railway station of same name.
22. NOTE : TTiis might be the same aerodrome as that reported by R. A. F.
Intelligence as Sayama ; 35°44' N, 139°28' E.
22. Area. 200,000 tsubo, i. e. about 170 acres.
23. Parachute training. Paraclmte training is carried out here under the
supervision of German advisers.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 617
24. There are tivo parachute jumping towners.
25. PersonneU Total of 3,000 men are based here, inclusive of aviation person-
nel and parachutists.
F. TOKAICHI
26. Military aerodrome.
27. Location. 35°06' north, 136°13' east. 3 kms. E. S. E. of town of same name.
NOTE : R. A. F. Intelligence gives location as 35°10' N. 136°15' E.
28. Source states that name of aerodrome is known locally as Kawai, although
YOKAICHI is the nearest town.
29. Area. 150,000 tsubo or 125 acres.
30. Parachute training. There is one parachute training tower here.
G. MIO '
31. Military aerodrome.
32. Location. 35°00' north, 138''31' east.
33. Parachute training. A small number of parachutists from SHIDZUOKA
Units is under training here. There is one parachute training tower.
H. SUMA
34. Naval aerodrome. A new aerodrome is under construction at SUMA.
Location. Approximate 5 kms. west of KOBE.
35. Area. 400,000 tsubo, i. e. about 325 acres.
I. TOKYO
36. There is an aerodrome and seaplane base one and a half kms. S. E. of
SHINAGAWA railway station. Position is approximately 35°3S' N, 139 °44 and a
half minutes East.
37. Area. 100,000 tsubo, i. e. about 80 acres.
38. Comment. This may possibly be the SHIBATA aerodrome reported pre-
viously
J. KANOYA
39. Location. 31°25' north, 130°51' east.
Note: (a) Source states that this is a military aerodrome, whereas R. A. F.
Intelligence says it is Naval, and located at 31°*2' N., 130°53' E. It is probable
that our source was misinformed as to the service, but it is possible that there
are 2 separate aerodromes in the vicinity.
(b) Source also states that aerodrome is known locally as the KASANOHARA
aerodrome.
40. Area. 400,000 tsubo. i. e. about 325 acres.
41. Parachute training. There is a parachute unit here being trained by Ger-
man instructors. There are two parachute jumping towers.
42. Aircraft factory. Source was told that there was an aircraft factory here
employing several thousand workmen.
Extract for Honolulu : September 5, 1941.
reports considerable air traffic passing through Waichow Island from
East to West, including a large proportion of twin-engined monoplane bombers.
Septembeb 5, 1941.
Some idea of the intensity of paratroop training at KOGO can be formed from
the fact that 8 aircraft have been in daily use since the middle of July for this
purpose.
Valuation B 2.
Extract No. 125 for Honolulu.
4th September, 1941.
JAPAN
MrUTABT
Unfamiliar Type of Armoured Car
An old and well-established Source, who can generally be relied upon to use
his eyes with accuracy, has reported seeing- at TAKAO an unfamiliar type of
armoured car which he describes as follows :
618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. 20 ft. long, 9 ft. high, and six wheels witk three wheels at the front and
back. (i. e. three wheels abreast).
3. This is given with all due reserve, but we should be interested to know
whether it fits in with any new type of vehicle in use elsewhere.
3bd Se3>tembeb, 1941.
Extract No. 124 for Honolulu.
gives following information on Japanese Naval Air units in China. (Com-
piled in April, 1941).
A. North China. Tsingtao Naval Squadron : Two light bomber squadrons.
B. Central China. 2ud Combined Air Unit. YAMAMOTA KAWAHIRA (DYA
GOK ECB EKU).
1. 12th Naval Air Squadron, Location unknown. FURUSE KIKI (AZK
IRX RAW DIH). Three light bomber, three fighter squadrons.
2. 13th Naval Air Squadron, Location unknown. KIKUCHI ASAZO (OPR
ICK GOB AAF). 4 Heavy bomber, 1 reconnaissance squadron.
3. "Detached Air Unit". Location unknown. 2 light bomber squadrons.
C. Soutli China. 1st Combined Air Unit. YAMAGUCHI TAMON (DYA AZG
CPA CBZ).
1. Kanoya Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. Three heavy bomber squadrons.
2. Takao Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. Three heavy bomber squadrons.
3. Kisarazu Naval Air Squadron. Waichow Island. Four heavy bomber,
one fighter squadron.
D. Third Combined Air Unit. ONISHI TAKI-HRE (CQE PZA ISE 1KB SQU).
1. 14th Naval Air Squadron. Sanoho Island. 3 light bomber, 1 recon-
naissance squadrons.
2. 15th Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. YAMAMOTO CHIKAO ( DYA GOK
QALUBR). 3 heavy bomber squadrons.
3. 16th Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. 2 heavy bomber, 1 fighter squadron.
E. 2nd Air Unit. KAGA. 3 light bomber, 1 fighter squadron. RYUHO. 2
light bomber, 1 fighter squadron.
P. 3rd Air Unit. NOTORO and KAMOI. 2 reconnaissance squadrons each.
G. 4th Air Unit. CHIYODA and MOZUHO. 2 reconnaissance squadrons each.
H. Total aircraft 590 repeat 590.
JAPANESE REPATRIATION 14ND #1420
Rating "A"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A-1) : "372 Japanese resi-
dents of Philippines have booked and paid for passage on SS MARECHAL
JOFFRE due leave Manila for Shanghai August 13th." This is reported to be
about four times the usual volume of Japanese departures. FBI (Hon) ; G-2
(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) ; all NDs ; CincPac; Com 14
Confidential
HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr. 14ND #1421
Rating "C"
Ref : ONI card 8-13-41, 14ND card #1390, same subject.
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports : "A. Employed by R. K. O. Pictures.
B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period from
Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has openly
stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese. C.
Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that HULL was in Japanese employ."
FBI (Hon) ; G-2(HD) cognizant.
To: ONI (2) ; All NDs; CincPac; Coml4. 9-21-41
Confidential
DAKAR — Military Exercises
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2) : ''Dakar air forces
carry out combined exercises with fleet from Monday or Tuesday, to Friday, of
each week, but seldom on weekend." FBI (Hon) ; G-2(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) ; all NDs; CincPac; Com 14
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 619
Confidential
DAKAR— attitude of natives .14ND #1418
Rating "C"
Britisla Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2) : "Hatred of Germans,
indifference to Britisli. Frencla community would prefer intervention in Dakar
by America to intervention by Britain." FBI (Hon) ; G-2(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To : ONI (2) ; all NDs ; CincPac ; Com 14
Confidential
MOROCCO— Outgoing visas from 14ND #1419
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-1) : "Morocco outgoing
visas granted only after approval of German authorities." FBI (Hon) ; G-2(HD)
cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To : ONI (2) ; all NDs ; CincPac ; Com 14
\
Confidential
DAKAR— Commercial Airlines 14ND #1414
Rating "C"
Bi-itisli Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valviation C-1) : "Air-France Service
operating twice weeklv in both direction.s—MARIGNANE— CASABLANCA-
FORT ETIENNE— DAKAR. General BERGERET, in charge of French Aviation,
^isited Dakar regarding project to extend Air-France service to Brazil, stating
that South American service could be , re-established if German air service was
allowed to pass through Dakar once a week. Governor BOYSSON refused this
and matter was shelved." FBI (Hon), G-2(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) ; all NDs; CincPac; Com 14
Confidential
DAKAR— Airdromes 14ND #1415
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2) : One Dakar airdrome
on the Medina plateau at OUAKAM with 2 asphalt runways (1000 x 80 and 1300 x
150 meters). Another airdrome near RUFISQUE. Seaplane hangers at BEL-
AIR, a little beyond arsenal. FBI (Hon), G-2(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To : ONI (2) ; all NDs ; CincPac ; Com 14
Confidential
DAKAR— munitions 14ND #1416
Rating "C"
British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2) : "Local French officer
(Dakar) told source that Navy has supplies but that Army is short." FBI (Hon) ;
G-2(HD) cognizant.
From : 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) ; all NDs; CincPac; Com 14
Confidential
Extract No. 71 for Honolulu September 1st, 1941.
reports August 20th.
A. In the middle of August, 30 repeat 30 aircraft of various types were trans-
ferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI aerodrome.
B. Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department
agents into numbers of lighters and their tonnage in the gnlt of Siam.
620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C. On August 18th the Japanese minister presented the Prime Minister with the
following requests: —
1. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
2. 6 repeat 6 aerodromes in north, south, and west will be lent Japan who
undertakes to improve them.
3. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
4. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
5. Japan to co-operate in improving Thai armed forces.
D. The above will be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival
from Japan.
Valuation O. 2.
Message ends.
Extracts for Honolulu Sept, 2, 1941,
reports August 20.
A. In the middle of August, 30 repeat 30 aircraft of various types were trans-
ferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI aerodrome.
B. Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department
agents into numbers of lighters and their tonnage in the gulf of Siam.
C. On August 18 the Japanese minister presented the Prime Minister with the
following requests :
1. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
2. 6 repeat 6 aerodromes in north, south and west will be lent Japan who
undertakes to improve them.
3. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
4. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
5. Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces.
D. The above will be taken up by the new Japanese ambassador on his arrival
from Japan.
Valuation O 2.
Message ends.
Extracts for Honolulu Sept. 1, 1941.
reports he recently met brother of Mayor of — who returned from
Japan on 19th instant, later stated.
A. 5 new (reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service in
Manchuria.
B. All forces in Korea other than two divisions are to be in process of being
moved into Manchuria and to North Korea.
C. 3 new mechanized divisions have been added to Kwangtung army as well
as chemical warfare units trained in Japan by German instructors.
D. Training of para troops is being intensified but is considerably delayed by
lack of transport aeroplanes. Passenger aeroplanes from commercial air line are
being used for training purposes.
E. Source stated he heard that 2 capital ships will be completed and commis-
sioned to battle fleet by end of this year and that 2 aeroplane carriers will be
completed in March and July 1942 respectively (it should be noted that this was
merely overheard in conversation).
F. Above passed with reserv^ as I am not in position to estimate reliance of
original source.
30th August, 1941.
Extract No. 110 for Honolulu
independently reports on UDA (NYI .TYS) aircraft factory.
A. Location 3 kilometres south of Kasumigaura aerodrome.
Pin Point : 35 degrees 59 minutes North 140 degrees 14 minutes East.
Note: This disagrees with report who states it is in Tokyo, but Kasumi-
gaura might loosely be called "near Tokyo".
B. This factory has been producing aircraft for the last 3 years.
C. Labour force 3,500 repeat 3.500.
D. Production — 45 repeat 45 aircraft per month.
Note: We think that this factory is only used for assembling aircraft.
E. The German Messerschniidt M. E. 110 is under production here.
F. On 20th May source saiv 6 or 7 Messerschmidts on the adjacent Kasumigaura
aerodrome.
Extract No. 102 for Honolulu 29 T. H. August, 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 621
JAPAN
Air
Kasumigaura Aerodrome
Location:
1. On the shore close to western corner of Lake KASUMIGAURA, East of and
adjacent to AMI Village.
2. Latitude 36°, 02' North. Longitude 140° 14' East.
Sise and Shape:
3. Roughly rectangular, total aerodrome area, inclusive of buildings, about
1200 X 2000 yards. Source was informed that south edge of landing field had
been extended about 300 yards.
Surface:
4. Sand and grass.
Barracks and offices:
5. 26 buildings on the east side provide accommodation for Headquarters, oflaces
and barracks. These are two storey buildings painted in camouflage patches of
brown and green.
Hangars and Repair Shops:
6. There are two steel hangars cum workshops on the north edge, about 200
by 90 feet high.
7. Source was told that aircraft were stored in three layers in these hangars.
8. A new large circular hangar about 250 yards in diameter was completed at
the end of 1989 in the south-east corner.
9. This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above the ground at its highest
point and is believed to extend some distance below ground level.
10. It is built of reinforced concrete and covered with earth and grass.
11. There are 8 doors to this hangar.
W/T
12. The W/T station is situated on the south edge.
Seaplane and Flying boat facilities:
13. Hangar accommodation is believed to be provided by the two hangars on
the north edge.
14. A number of mooring buoys were seen off shore.
15. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on the water's edge, north
of the aerodrome.
Aviation School: 16. Source was informed that there is an aviation school here
with 600 students.
Personnel: 17. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed here.
Parachute Training:
18. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge.
19. Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but
it is believed that this large number is being tested out as to suitability and
only a small proportion will be retained for training.
Oerman Advisers: 20. 10 Germans are attached to this aerodrome and to the
neighboring UDA Aircraft Factory.
Aircraft: 21. Source saw about 20 aircraft along the south edge, including 6 or 7
Messerschmitts Me 110.
Valuation B. 2.
Extract No. Ill for Honolulu 29th August, 1941.
reports.
A. On 28th May at a naval air demonstration at Misaki near Yokohama he
saw two 3-engine repeat 3-engine monoplane aircraft and 18 twin-engine mono-
plane aircraft.
B. Concerning the three-engined aircraft he was told:
C. These were Italian "Piaggio P. XI. RC 40" bombers manufactured in Japan.
D. The engines are 14, repeat, 14 cylinder 1,000, repeat, 1,000 horsepower.
E. Load capacity : 4,200 kilogrammes, repeat, 4,200 kilogrammes.
622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
F. Camouflage on under wings was light blue, grey and pale green in large
irregular patches.
G. Reference paragraph C above. It is suggested that these aircraft are fitted
with Italian engines and for this reason are named after them.
H. Concerning the ttcin engine aircraft he teas told:
I. These were German Messerschmidt M. E. 110 lighters manufactured in the
UDA factory.
J. These aircraft gave a demonstration of low level dive bombing.
K. Source noted, however, that both these types of aircraft had single, repeat,
single rudders and stuck to this statement even when shown pictures in Jane's.
L. Both these types of aircraft are based on the Sunosaki naval aerodrome,
near the promontory of the same name on the South West tip of China peninsula.
Extract for Honolulu
August 29, 1941,
reports.
A. On June 25 600 troops of NAKANO ( AAW TAK) armoured cars unit arrived,
300 service corps troops witli unknown number of armoured curs and motor
cycles combinations, embarked on 2 transports at SHIBAURA, Tokio and left
for Formosa.
B. On July 5, 1000 repeat 1000 men of 32d repeat 32d infantry regiment em-
barked in 2 transports in Shibaura for Formosa.
Source of paragraphs A and B above was a friend of source whose
ship was in dock at Shibaura for 14 days.
C. On June 16 I transport arrived SHIKAMA (Port of HIMEJI) from Shang-
hai and discharged 200 wounded of 11th mixed brigade and 100 boxes of ashes.
The wounded were sent to TSUYAMA (OKAYAMA KEN).
D. Reinforcements leaving Japan in May and June for north China have been
drawn from following districts.
SENDAI, KANAZAWA, YAMAGATA and YONEZAWA.
E. Reinforcements during same period for south and ludo China were drawn
from: KANAZAWA, KYUSHU, KAGO^HIMA, KURUME, SAGA AND
KUMAMOTO.
Valuation C 2.
Extract No. 109 for Honolulu
28th August, 1941.
reports on Yokosuka dockyard in June.
Valuation C.2.
B. Capital ship. This was launched in Spring of 1941.
C. Armament will consist of:
9 16 inch (40cm)
20 5 and a half inch
10 anti-aircraft.
D. Name Takamatsu.
E. A sister-ship is under construction at Maizuru dockyard.
F. Heavy Cruiser. This vessel is still on the slips.
G. Name Chichibu.
H. Displacement variously given as 10,000 tons to 25,000.
Note that this disagrees with who states that it is 19,00 and
who says "between 15,000 and 25,000" tons.
I. 2 Destroyers are being armed in the bay. Source was unable to state whether
these vessels were launched here or not.
J. Four repeat four fast motoboats are under construction. They are about
10 tons and have one gun mounted forward.
Source was told that similar vessels were under construction in many Japanese
shipyards. A merchant from Formosa informed him that private shipyards in
Takao were building the wooden hulls only of these ships for fitting out in Naval
yards.
K. A 7,000 ton cruiser and a destroyer were in dry dock.
L. One cargo boat was undergoing alterations.
M. On 10th Juno there were concentrated here : —
8 cruisers, 1 seaplane carrier, 11 destroyers, over 10 submarines and 18 trans-
ports.
N. Two of these transports were fitted with degaussing apparatus (described
by source) and were destined for conveyance in the Sea of Jpan.
O. About 20 German technicians travel daily to Yokosuka from Tokyo.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 623
Extract for Honolulu August 28, 1941.
Following is a summary of report dated August 15 on Manchurian frontier
conditions :
A. IMobilization : Troop movements.
1. Whole population, men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese
Eastern Railway district has been mobilized as "militia" for defensive and
anti-aircraft work, all are registered and may not leave their villages with-
out permission from staff headquarters.
2. Fresli units of Japanese troops arrived in MULIN district as from end
of July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Police forbade popula-
tion to visit villages or engage in fishing or other occupation in vicinity
except under special permit, this applying even to normal agricultural labour.
Troop movements took place at night.
B. Construction.
1. New barracks near Mulin coal mines are now occupied by troops recently
arrived. Manoeuvres in which tanks participated took place.
2. Work has commenced on the new highway from IRIKTE through
CHOLA-ARSHANU district. Cossacks resident in this district are engaged .
on the work.
3. PEIAN-HEIHO. Manchurian dollars 1,500,000 has been allocated for
this work which includes hospitals, barracks, etc.
4. TIAMOSI. Several European firms at Harbin have been permitted to
tender work in this district and for work in connection with the TIAMOSI-
MUDALZIAN railway (opened two years ago). Construction s
Government buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. Total allocation
said to be Mongolian dollars 3,000.000. All employees mi;st be certified.
Work to be completed not later than June 1, 1942.
C. Travel restrictions.
1. New regulations, affecting all Europeans and most Chinese, were intro-
duced as from August 1 in Manchurian frontier regions. Permits for all
travel must be obtained from Police H. Q.. travel in interior prohibited.
Restrictions especiallv severe in Mulin district. Special control established
at IMulin and SUIFENHO.
2. In spring of this year pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners
in JEHOL Province and many left. Remaining foreigners — about 25 mis-
sionaries— are not now permitted to travel beyond the cities. Tarter business
men have also been recommended to remove their business to MUKDEN
area. Reason given is that Jehol is not safe — that troops have been greatly
augmented, large troop movements are taking place, considerable road con-
struction is in hand and it is not desired that aerial manoeuvres should be
witnessed by foreigners.
D. Censorship. Private correspondence from within Manchuria addressed to
China is now censored.
Extract for Honolulu August 27, 1941.
reports on HEITO aerodrome.
A. On June 18 following left for unknown destination :
Three, 3 repeat 3 engine monoplane bombers.
9 twin engine monoplane bombers.
4 fighters
2 reconnaissance
Total 18
B. On June 28 following aircraft left for Hainan under MIYASAK.''.
15 twin engine monoplane bombers.
11 single engine monoplane fighters.
8 single engine biplane reconnaissance. '
Total 34
C. On July 3, 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO (HDU NYA CQU
SQU) left for Hainan.
"Valuation C 3.
Extract for Honolulu
August 26, 1941.
A. It is reported that SEDES BEY, secretary of , tokio, and now in
Shanghai, confirmed contents of this telegram in its entirety. He
in addition that German influence in Japan is increasing in strength on account
d24 congressional investigation pearl harbor attack
of fact of diversity of Japanese circle. It is now realized that the many instruc-
tors and advisors in navy, army, air force, propaganda service, Home Office, etc.
have come to stay for at least the vi^ar period and their services are indispen-
sable.
B. of Germany Embassy is reported to have stated that Japanese
mobilisation vpill have reached a sufficiently advanced state by end of August/
beginning September that Japan will be able to move North or South as she wishes.
C. In connection with southward movement he stated "Japan's conversations
with Thailand are proceeding slowly but it is a practical certainty that Thailand
will side with Japan."
D. Germany Embassy in Tokio are protesting to the Japanese Gove?nment con-
cerning delivery of coal (particularly) and other commodities to Axis opponents
from French Indo China.
E. Germany has guaranteed to VICHY that Japanese occupation of Indo China
will be temporary only and Japan has agreed. Germany made this guarantee in
order to secure close collaboration with VICHY.
Extract No. 107 for Honolulu
25th AXTGUST, 1941.
reports regarding Pelew Islands.
A. A black-out practice is carried out monthly.
B. The construction of underground hangars is being pressed forward.
C. Source: Japanese pearling luggers based on Pelew and operating off the
Australian coast.
Extract No. 108 for Honolulu
25th Atjgust, 1941.
_- reports :-
A. HANEDA (NYI, JYS) Aircraft Factory, Tokyo has recently produced 100
repeat 100 Italian 3 repeat 3 engine mid wing monoplane bombers.
Note: Agent gives above characters for name of factory, but gives romanisa-
tion as UDA, characters for this are (UCO, JYS) which resemble those given by
him.
B. These aircraft have been delivered to Army and have been seen in the Air
over Tokyo.
C. Valuation C.3.
Extract No. 106 for Honolulu.
23rd August, 1941.
independently rejwrts on Kawasaki Dockyard, Kobe.
A. Work on clearing civilian houses surrounding Kawasaki. Dockyard com-
menced on 10th July.
B. A factory controlled by the Dockyard for the construction of complete air-
craft will be erected on this site.
C. German engineers are supervising plans and installation of machinery.
Valuation C. 2
Extract No. 105 for Honolulu
2Srd August, 1941.
reports on SMMta aircraft factory.
A. Under the supervision of German engineers, this factory has produced a 2
repeat 2 engine monoplane fighter.
B. Armament 2 fixed machine guns (cannon guns?) and 4 moveable machine
guns.
C. Tests have proved very satisfactory.
D. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as the "16th
Year of Showa" (1941) type.
Valuation C. 3.
August 21, 1941
reports on low Angle defences in Pescadores.
A. Gycote Island, 2 12 inch.
B. Koseisho Island, 2 6 inch.
C. Near Komokusei village, 2,000 yards north of Make.
2 6 inch
2 4.7 inch
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 625
D. Near Kokutsutan village, % of a mile north of Make.
2 8 inch
2 6 inch
E. Taishoku.
East Fort, 2 12 inch
West Fort 2 6 inch
F. Sensan 2 6 inch
2 4.7 inch
G. 19 A.A. guns have been located at 13 places.
"Valuation C 2
Extract for Honolulu
August 21, 1941
reports August 6.
A. OKAYAMA aerodrome.
July 25 following aircraft left for Hainan :
24 repeat 24 twinengine monoplane heavy B.
15 rei)eat 15 monoplane fighters.
3 repeat 3 reconnaissance.
July 28 following left for Indo-China :
6 repeat 6 thi*ee engine monoplane heavy B.
9 repeat 9 single engine monoplane light B.
B. J'uly 26, 27 repeat 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin engine monoplane
heavy B arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.
C. August 1, 9 repeat 9 heavy B and 6 repeat 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-
China.
D. July 20 following left KARENKO for Indo-China :
24,000 repeat 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry.
1,200 repeat 1,200 ISE (AES AUI) artillery.
600 repeat 600 KONDO (SCY MRU) and FUKASE (IIU IRX) A.F.V.
units with :
16 repeat 16 armoured cars.
15 repeat 15 light tanks
40 repeat 40 motor cycles
32 repeat 32 field guns
E. Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome. '
8 repeat 8 aircraft being used.
Extract for Honolulu
August 21, 1941
reports.
A. Present strength in southern Indo-China about 80,000 repeat 80,000.
Composed of units of :
Guards: 28th repeat 28th division; 38th repeat 38th division, Formosan
ai-my corps ; naval landing party.
This is given with reserve pending confirmation.
B. High Commands are:
Lt. General IIDA — army
Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH)— air
Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS)— navy
August 19, 1941
reports.
SANCHO ISLAND
A. On August 2d, 500 naval landing party left.
B. Total garrison strength now 400 repeat 400 naval landing party and 200
puppets.
C. Present stock :
2,000 repeat 2,000 cases small arms ammunition.
900 repeat 900 cases shells.
D. At KUKOK Island are 200 repeat 200 KATSUMURA (AUE GPA) naval
landing party, 100 having left on July 22d.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 41
626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract No. 52 for Honolulu
August 21st, 1941
reports.
A. Present strength in southern Indo-China about 80,000 repeat 80,000.
Composed of units of : —
Guards.
28th repeat 28th division.
38tli repeat 38th division.
Formosan army corps.
Naval landing party.
This is given vi^itli reserve pending confirmation.
B. High commands are :^-
Lt. General IIDA — army.
Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH)— air.
Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS)— Navy.
Message ends.
Extract for Honolulu
August 21, 1941
A. It is reported that disembarkation at Dairen and ports in Korea of Chinese
troops from Japan is confirmed. One tank regiment with medium tanks and
one motorized infantry regiment, with new equipment observed, disembarking
atDaireii (no date given).
B.' Main regions of concentration rejwrted to be North Korea KIRIN —
TUNHUA, MUTANKIANG,— POGRANICHNAYA and MUTANKIANG— MU-
LIN— MISHAN areas.
C. In North China troops are being concentrated in KALGAN area.
Extract for Honolulu
August 21, 1941.
reports.
A. There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO repeat KOSHIRO,
TAKAHACHI repeat TAKAHACHI and ZUSI repeat ZUSI and air bases at
KAMAKURA repeat KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI repeat TOYOHASHI.
B. Source states that at end of June there was considerable movement of
Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takehachi and that between June 26
and June 28 numerous tramloads of young men arrived at Zusi.
C. At Numazu repeat Numazu source observed soldiers wearing green badges
on shoulders and also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflaged
gun platforms.
D. At HAMAMOTO repeat HAMAMOTO he observed 97th repeat 97th, 72d
repeat 72d and 8th repeat 8th divisions.
E. At WUSHIZU repeat WUSHIZU 22d repeat 22d Division. At OKOYAMA
and HIROSHIMA 2d repeat 2d and 4th repeat 4th divisions. New oil storage
tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized.
Comments.
All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has had
military training he is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of cross
examining him. Valuation therefore C 3.
F. was informed by Polish refugee journalist in Japan at end
June that he had seen great earthworks, indicating underground aerodrome,
with planes landing, at TAKARUZUKA repeat TAKARUZUKA. Valuation D 4.
G. Area between Kobe, AWAJI repeat AWAJI and SAKAI repeat SAKAI
heavily fortified. Valuation C 3.
Following from a responsible British source.
When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea, this writer took the view that
he is a convinced norther expansion, as opposed to southern expansion believer;
and that his appointment was therefore to be interpreted as a precaxition against
the need for big operations in Manchuria, Korea being the first reserve pool for
Manchuria. A technically competent observer in Hongkong now confirms this
view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C, South China, now Chief of Staff
at Nanking of the Japanese forces in China, is of the same persuasion. He may
be counted on not to neglect the north, tliei'efore, however, tempting the easy
gains in the south may be at the moment.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 627
Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to
happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such as
Sept. 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war
of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis
partners. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long yerm ob-
jectives, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it
out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.
Extract for Honolulu
August 20, 1941.
reports on Indo China.
A. Japanese strength in TONKIN area (August 1) approximately 25,000
repeat 25,000.
B. Strength in southern Indo-China (August 12) approximately 36,000 repeat
36,000.
C. Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and
it is believed that French troops are to be sent to the Yunan and KWANGSI
borders.
D. Quantities of railway equipment is being sent to PNOM PENH for the
construction of a railway to the THAI border,
August 21, 1941.
J. July 28 a transport left TOSHIYEN for Indo-China after loading 20 repeat
20 launches, 120 repeat 120 mines and a quantity of naval ammunition.
August 19, 1941.
A. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations Japanese delegates expressed concern
over Medagascar as controlling Atlantic Indian Ocean communications.
B. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company with a capital of
a million yen to start operations around island.
Extract No. 57 for Honolulu
19th August, 1941.
A. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations Japanese delegates expressed concern
over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic Indian Ocean comnnmications.
B. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company with a capital of a
million yen to start operations around island.
Extract No. 5^ for Honolulu
AUGUST 19th, 1941.
reports.
Sancho Island.
A. On August 2nd, 500 naval landing party left.
B. Total garrison strength now 400 repeat 400 naval landing party and 200
puppets.
C. Present stock : 2,000 repeat 2,000 cases small arms ammunition. 900 repeat
900 cases shells.
D. At KUKOK Island are 200 repeat 200 KATSUMMRA (AUE GPA) naval '
landing party, 100 having left on July 22nd.
Extract No. 35 for Honolulu
August ISth, 1941.
who was recently elected as a Sakdal candidate for next political
elections, states that local Japanese agents (whose names I have given to Ameri-
can Military Intelligence) have recently been cultivating him closely and volun-
teering following information :
A. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on Formosa.
B. Attack on Philippines and Singapore simultaneously, will take place about
end August.
C. Campaign in Philippines to begin with rising in Mindanao and bombing of
Manila.
D. Attack on Singapore to be overland through Siam. where at least 3 repeat
3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.
E. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. This looks
like a whispering campaign.
Valuation C 3.
628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract for Honolulu
August 18, 1941.
Report that his Japanese business associates (who include local
heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe that
present Japanese threats of further southward expansion are merely a "war
of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight
Great Britain or America.
Valuation B 2.
Extract No. 33 for Honolulu
August 16th, 1941.
A. Local Agents Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company received tele-
gram August 15th from Tokio instructing them :
1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.
B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded
200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds).
Valuation A 1.
Extract for Honolulu
August 16, 1941.
of German Embassy recently returned from Japan is reported to
have stated:
A. Mobilization continues in Japan and it is known that certain units are
being equipped for service in cold climate.
B. In the event of hostilities between Japan, America and Great Britain,
Japanese neutrality regarding Russia will not repeat not be maintained.
C. In this event Japan proposed to try to effect occupation of entire territory
north of Vladivostock up to Amur River, northern half of SAGHALIEN and
KAMCHATKA.
D. Object would be to lessen danger of air attack against industrial centres
in Japan and prevent American supplies reaching Russia through these areas.
E. Japanese policy in northwards threat and southern expansion is identical ;
to force democratic front to maintain forces in readiness to meet potential
danger. At the same time he added that it was not yet possible to say definitely
whether Japan's large scale preparations were merely to keep anti Axis powers
generally on the alert in Asia or whether they mean Japan is seriously con-
templating an active part in war.
F. Same source stated that anti British and anti American feelings were
growing as the population is suffering from lack of foodstuffs, with it materials
and certain essential commodities and fear of the introduction of card rationing
system in near future.
Extract for Honolulu
August 15, 1941.
A. It is reported that as a retaliatory measure for British and American
action against Japan Japanese military authorities discussed with Nanking
Government desirability of blockading International Settlement on lines of
Tientsin blockade of British Concession.
B. Japanese "business" Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation
of four representatives to interview General KAGESA at Nanking.
C. Latter assured delegation that if any steps were taken along lines sug-
gested at any time, every effort would be made to safeguard Japanese interests
operating in International Settlement. He further stated that they were not
contemplated in the near future as there was no complete accord between
Japanese naval and military authorities on matters.
August 10, 1941.
It is reported.
A. following completion of Japanese military occupation of Indo-China local
military have been considering possibilities of securing control of Tientsin
French Concession through puppet North China administration.
B. Local military circles consider if Tinetsin venture is accomplished similar
action might be taken through Wang-Ching-Wei Government at other points
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 629
in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all
non-Axis interests.
C. Above passed for it may be worth enquiries proceeding.
Extract for Honolulu
August 14, 1941.
Following from Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8. Valu-
ation C 2.
A. S. S. Francois Louis Dreyfus is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of
rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo." Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked
"San Francisco."
B. Vessel ivill he escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER repeat AMIRAL
CHARNER and the submarine PEOASE repeat PEGASE.
C. S. S. SAGITAIRE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have
gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.
Extract for Honolulu
August 13, 1941.
It is reported.
A. Paper plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai has been com-
pleted and provided future developments in general situation in Far East do not
necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government expected to assume control in
concession before October 10.
B. Committee studying this matter under chairmanship of HSU LIANG (For-
eign Minister) and General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to
Tokio for consideration.
August 8, 1941.
— ^ reports.
A. On July 31 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in Po On area
for "the German expeditionary engineer corps" and are as soon as possible being
sent to Germany.
B. According to a high puppet official further recruiting is being carried out.
Extract for Honolulu
August 13, 1941.
A. Between July 25 and July 29 12,000 repeat 12,000 troops left Bangkok for
Indo China frontier.
B. Partial confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which
stated that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special mis-
sion units left for frontier at end of July.
C. An order has been placed with Japanese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 repeat
2 warships probably torpedo-boats to replace 3 vessels sunk by French.
D. 500,000 TICULS have been paid on account of this order.
Valuation C-3.
Extract No. 27 for Honolulu
August 12, 1941.
At a meeting held by High Command at Canton on July 27th to discuss retalia-
tory measures on British and American freezing, following steps were decided
upon and forwarded to Tokio for approval :
1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.
2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possi-
bility of expulsion.
3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. The Govern-
ment to be forced to co-operate in this measure.
4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in
British forces.
5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Puppet
Government.
Extract for Honolulu
August 12, 1941.
N. Y. K. Tokio despatched confidential telegram August 9 to their Japanese
representative in Manila stating that Japanese Government have ordered :
A. S. S. ASAMA MARU (Now between Honolulu and San Francisco) to re-
turn to Japan.
630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
B. S. S. NITTA MARU to remain in Yokohama until further notice.
C. Through cargo loaded at Manila for United States on these vessels to be
discharged at Yokohama and Kobe respectively.
Valuation A-1.
Extract No. 23 for Honolulu
August 12th, 1941.
To : Capt. I. H. Maytield
Mr. R. SnrvERS
Col. Geo. Bicknell
A. 372 repeat 372 Japanese residents of Philippines have booked and paid for
passages in S. S. MARECHAL JOFFRE due leave Manila for Shanghai August
13th.
B. This is about four repeat four times the usual volume of Japanese
departures.
Valuation A 1.
Completely reliable source and information.
C. Okayama aerodrome,
1. Between July 7 and July 15 about 25 repeat 25 aircraft have been arriving
nightly from Japan.
2. Aircraft based here July 19 are: 40 repeat 40 3 engined monoplane heaby
B ; 40 repeat 40 twin engined monoplane medium B ; 40 repeat 40 single engined
monoplane light B ; 60 repeat 60 monoplane fighters ; 20 repeat 20 reconnaissance;
4 repeat 4 four-engine transports.
3. This is largest aerodrome in Formosa being about one mile square.
D. July 14 6 repeat 6 fighters arrived TAIHOKU from QUEMOY Island.
E. July 10 to July 11, 15 repeat 15 fighters arrived KAGI from Japan.
F. July 15, 15 repeat 15 monoplane fighters arrived HEITO from Kwangtung.
G. Aircraft reported at Quemoy 12 repeat 12 fighters.
H. June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores.
I. July 11 200 repeat 200 mines and 120 repeat 120 torpedoes landed at Takao
from Japan.
At a meeting held by High Command at Canton on July 27 to discuss retaliatory
measures on British and American Freezing, following steps were decided upon
and forwarded to Tokio for approval :
1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.
2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and pos-
sibility of expulsion.
3. Banningof exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. The Gov-
ernment to be forced to cooperate in this measure.
4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel
in British forces.
5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Puppet
Government.
Extract No. 59 for Honolulu
10th August, 1941.
It is reported.
A. Following completion of Japanese Military occupation of Indo-China local
military have been considering possibilities of securing control of Tientsin French
Concession through puppet North China administration.
B. Local military circles consider if Tientsin venture is accomplished similar
action might be taken through Wang-Ching-Wei Government ^t other points in
Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all non-
Axis interests.
C. Above passed for what it may be worth enquiries proceeding.
Extract No. 24 for Honolulu
August 9th, 1941
To : Capt. I. H. Mayfield
Mr. RoBT. Shivers
Col. Geo. Bicknell
Following is summary information to hand on HULL.
A. AMOS TYLER HULL, employed by R. K. O. Pictures.
B. Is known to have received special "facilities over a considerable period from
Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has openly
stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese.
C. Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that Hull was in Japanese employ.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 631
A. Local Agents N. Y. K. have today received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio
stating that all "overseas" service is now suspended.
B. "Ovei'seas" means all sailings except Japan-China ports.
Valuation A 1.
Extract No. 61 for Honolulu
8th August, 1941.
reports.
A. On 31st July 700 Chinese laborers vpere recruited by Japanese in Po On
area for "the German expeditionary engineer corps" and are as soon as possible
being sent to Germany.
B. According to a high puppet official further recruiting is being carried .out.
It is reported that the following railways in Manchuria are now regarded as
military lines on which number of passenger trains has been reduced to minimum.
A. Harbin-Lafa-Tuuhara and to Korea via Tumen.
B. Harbin Peian-Heiho
C. Hsingchiang-Taonan
D. Taonan-Doekk Arshan
E. Tsitslhar-Peian
F. Tsitsihar-Bnkhedu-Hailar and Manchouli
G. Tumen-Mudadzian
H. Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi
I. All railways in Jehol
J. Since end of Jime 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single
track Hsinghiang Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations
for storage.
K. In Kwangtung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guard-
ing bridges station, etc. have been replaced by permanent brick and cement
structures.
L. Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in
Harbin and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if
necessity demands.
Extract for Honolulu
August 7, 1941
It is reported.
A. Between July 10 and July 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through
Mukden proceeding north * * * carried full war kit. (Note. No means of
checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve.)
B. During period named a total of 75 troop "specials" passed through Mukden.
Flat cars carried artillery and tanks.
C. On departure from Jukden on July 21 source was told by Japanese station
master of South Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a
total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Man-
churian Railway was short of cars these would be drawn from Peking Mukden,
Peking Suiyuan and Peking Hankow lines.
D. On July 20 troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in
special troop trains via KOUPAUTZE on Peking Mukden line. Source saw
great activity at Tangku Tun junction.
August 5, 1941.
I. Admiral TOYODA ha? already informed German Ambassador that Japan
is ready to readjust its political relations with Reich as prerequisite for closer
economic accord upon which will be founded future economic relations between
Asia and Europe.
J. Admiral NOMURA has been instructed to work for a modification of * * *
American embargo policy and to offer readjustment of American Japanese rela-
tions on basis of mutal recognition on land sea and air of all areas defined and
recognized as for spheres of influence of U. S. A. and British.
Extract No. 21 for Honlulu
6th August, 1941.
To Capt. I. H. Matfield
Mr. Robert Shivers
Col. Geokge Bickneix
Following report on DAKAR given to by Free French business man
who was in DAKAR from February 5th till May 28th.
Valuation C 2 : — Casual observation believed reliable.
632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Battleship Richelieu could proceed at greatly reduced speed, but complete
i-epairs can not be carried out at DAKAR.
B. Other warships at Dakar: —
Cruisers Georges-Leygne repeat Georges-Leygne and Gloire repeat Gloire.
Escort Vessels D'ENTRECASTEAUX repeat D'Entrecasteaux and Bougainville
repeat Bougainville.
Also about 3 repeat 3 destroyers and 15 repeat 15 submarines.
C. Fortifications on island of GOREE have been modernized.Headland at end
of the "CORNICHE" also fortified. Fortifications of little strength at
RUFISQUE.
D. Troops totalled about 15,000 repeat 15,000 Senegalese tirailleurs, spahis and
Colonial infantry.
Oeneral BARRAU repeat BARRAU in command.
Extract No. 22 for Honolulu
For : Capt. I. H. Mayfield
Mr. Robt. Shivees
Col. Geo. BicKNEr,L
Following is continuation of report on DAKAR dated 6th August.
E. Air-France Service operating twice weekly in both directions MARI-
CHANE— CASABLANCA— FORT ETIENNE— DAKAR.
General BERGERET, in charge of French Aviation, visited Dakar regarding
project to extend Air-France Service to Brazil, stating that this South American
service could be re-established if German air service was allowed to pass through
Dakar once a week.
F. Governor BOYSSON refused this and matter was shelved (Valuation for
this and immediately preceding paragraph CI).
Reliable from new contact.
G. Morocco Outgoing visas granted only after approval of German author-
ities. (Valuation C 1).
H. Aerodromes at DAKAR one on the Medina plateau at OUAKAM with 2
asphalt runways (1000 metres by 80 and 1300 metres by 150).
Other aerodrome near Ruf isque.
Seaplane hangars at BEL-AIR, a little beyond arsenal.
Valuation C 2. Believed reliable from new contact.
I. Munitions. Local French officer told source that Navy has supplies but
that army is short.
J. Exercises. Local Air forces carry out combined exercises with fleet from
Monday or Tuesday, to Friday, of each week but seldom on weekend.
K. Attitude of natives :
Hati-ed of Germans indifference to British.
French community would prefer interven,tion in Dakar hy America to inter-
vention by Britain.
Valuation C 2.
Believed reliable from new contact
Extract No. 15 for Honolulu
5th August, 1941.
organization reports on Formosa for end of June.
A. Orders have been given to recruit 100,000 repeat 100,000 men between ages
of 35 and 45 for service in their labour corps.
B. Another 150,000 repeat 150,000 conscripts are to be mobilized for intensive
military training.
JAPAN MILITARY, FORMOSA
KEELXJNG
Supplies
1. On June 17 s. s. "Horai Maru" arrived at Keelung from Japan with about
400 cases of militai'y uniforms and steel helmets. 200 cases were sent to Kar-
enKo per s. s. "Fukusei Maru" and the remainder to Taihoku by train.
2. On June 19 Transport No. 140 arrived at Keelung from Japan with mili-
tary supplies wliich were sent by rail to Taihoku and Taichu. The transport
left again on June 22 with a full load of copper ore.
3. On June 20 Transport No. 135 arrived at Karenko with 600/700 tons of
petrol from Japan via the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount
of petrol ) .
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 633
Conscription
4. The Governor of Formosa has received orders to recruit within the next
month 100,000 men between ages of 35 and 45 for service in Labour Corps.
5. It is reported that an additional 150,000/200,000 recruits in Formosa are to
be mobilized for intensive military training.
Troop Movements
6. From June 23 to June 29 500 troops of the Taihoku infantry were exercised
in coastal defense along the coast near Shinchiku.
7. On June 25 ISO artillery arrived at Karenko from Taihoku together with
6 A. A. guns drawn by trucks and 4 A. A. machine guns.
8. On June 25 Transports Nos. 141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked
military supplies and provisions. They sailed together for Hainan on June 27.
TAKAO
9. Transport No. 174 arrived at Takao on June 17 with large quantities of mil-
itary personnel, equipment (uniforms, steel helmets, respirators, etc.), all of
which were sent by rail to Tainan.
10. 60 German naval, military and air force experts and over 30 Japanese of-
ficers also arrived by the same vessel. Soon after landing they all embarked in
s. s. "Hosan Maru" for the Pescadores. It is reported that all these men will
soon be transferred to South China.
11. On June 21 260 Mountain Artillery, together with local recruits left Tainan
for Koshun for exercises.
12. On June 25 6 armoured cars and 3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate
in coastal defence exercises.
13. On June 28 about 800 recruits from the Koshun sector were sent to join the
labour corps at Tainan. These men were issued with a complete set of uniforms
and equipment, but no rifles. Their ages were between 35-^5. On June 30 they
returned to Koshun for further training.
Valuation B. 3.
Secret booklet printed October 1940 by Chinese staff contains following infor-
mation on Hiroshima Iron Woi'ks :
A. Yearly production 9 repeat 9 A. A. guns, three tanks, unknown number of
Naval and Military guns. Monthly production of shells 300.
B. Kaw materials are obtained from Tawata, Kyushu.
C. 2,000 repeat 2,000 men and women employed.
July 30, 1941.
organization reports for middle of June.
A. All conscripts in Formosa have been called up for military training.
B. 4,000 troops are stationed at Taichu. These are of all arms and include
6 tanks and 8 armoured cars.
C. The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine guns posts.
These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each holds 6 to 8 mm. They wex-e
recently erected in great haste.
August 5, 1941.
A. It is reported that mobilization and reequipment of troops in Korea Kwang-
tung and Manchuria is quietly progressing in preparation of eventual movement
against the Soviet.
B. There has been a "tug of war" t)etween high ranking military officials as
to when move should be launched and that question is still not settled. It is
thought that the only event which would stop the move would be a decisive
German defeat at hands of Soviet.
C. High Japanese official has expressed some concern over Japanese anti-
aircraft defences and lack of air raid protection but no further details were
mentioned.
Report for Honolulu
August 2, 1941.
reports.
A. A large aerodrome is under construction near Kamaknra. Note: We
believe this is identical with Totsuka aerodrome.
B. Overall dimensions : 3,500 by 3,500 yards.
634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C. Labour force 8,000 repeat 8,000 iinaer supervision of IS repeat 18 German
engiueers.
D. Aerodrome expected to be completed in August.
E. 3,000 repeat 3,000 parachute troops are under training here.
F. Comment: Valuation C 3.
August 1, 1941.
reports on Kobe.
A. The fioating dock here, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000 tons, is
expected to be transferred to Hainan.
B. At the end of May an "aircraft tender"' was under repair in this dock.
0. Total of 2,000 repeat 2,000 workmen working day and night shifts are
engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock.
Valuation C 3.
Extract for Eonohilu
August 1, 1941.
japan naval construction of pocket destroyers
Secrecy surrounding construction of "Pocket Destroyers"
1. Following information is hearsay and is given with the utmost reserve:
2. Some old hulks have been emptied of machinery and equipment and the
"pocket destroyers" are being constructed within them.
3. As a further aid to secrecy the positions of this hulks are changed by towing
from one place to another.
Comment
4. This may be an exaggerated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but
there may something in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.
Valuation C 4
August 4, 1941.
reports.
A. Naval guns are ging made at Osaka arsenal under German supervision.
B. In May 8 warships at Yokosuka were being fitted with new guns from this
arsenal.
Valuation C 3.
To Capt. I. H. Mayfield
Mr. Robert Shivers
Col. George Bicknell
1st August, 1941.
reports
A. On June 15tli German S. S. Ramses had completed overhaul of engines in
Nagasaki.
B. Guns were being fitted and they are expected to be camouflaged as derricks.
C Ordnance supplies will be drawn from 0.saka arsenal.
D. Strength of crew 150 repeat 150.
Valuation C 3.
To Capt. I. H. M. Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. George Bicknell
1st August, 1941.
Extract No. 20 for Honolulu
reports.
A. On June 15th German S. S. RAMSES had completed overhaul of engines in
Nagasaki.
B. Guns were beilng fitted and they are expected to be camouflaged as derricks.
C. Ordnance supplies will be diawn from Osaka arsenal.
D. Strength of crew 150 repeat 150.
Valuation C 3.
July 31, 1941.
Extracts for Honolulu
A. It is stated that .Japanese Government is "contemplating" taking over
French Concession Shanghai in name of Nanking Government. Japanese military
wish to take action as soon as possible but it is not in complete agreement with
Extract No. 20
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 635
Japanese iiuval landing party. Meanwhile Nanking is going ahead selecting
personnel for future administration which is entitled "Slianghai Special Admin-
istrative Area."
B. I personally interpi-et Nankings action as wishful thinking but against this
French have warned me that both Japanese and Nanking efforts at penetration
of concession have lately been intensified.
August 5, 1941.
organization reports on Formosa for end of June.
A. Orders have been given to recruit 100,000 repeat 100,000 men between ages
of 35 and 45 for service in their labour corps.
B. Another 150,000 repeat 150,000 conscripts are to be mobilized for intensive
military training.
July 30, 1941.
japan naval ven.*lity of japanese naval officeks
1. On the 28th June the captain of the destroyer ACHI of the 13tb Destroyer
Flotilla, FASAHARA Asaji ( ). who was under suspicion of having allowed
smuggling in his blockade area, was found guilty and was replaced by his
second-in-command.
TAKADA.
2. The ASHI was patrolling off Hainan Island at the time.
3. SHINOMI (or HIIMI) Seiichi ( ), commanding the South China Fleet,
is suspected by his subordinate ofiicers to be himself financially interested in the
South China smuggling racket.
4. When Chiu-Ting-Wah, the puppet magistrate of Chungshan, was assissinated
recently in Macau, it was extensively rumoured that SHINOMI's personal
demarche with the Governor of Macau was brought about by the consideration
that Chiu had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking
the blockade which the latter himself was responsible for maintaining.
July 29, 1941.
From source not well placed July 25.
Japanese army is calling up all English and Malay speaking Japanese irrespec-
tive of age.
Noi'E. — Some Straits born and educated Japanese have left for army service
in Japan.
Value 3.
30th July, 1941.
Extract No. 73 for Honolulu
organization reports for middle of June.
A. All conscripts in Formosa have been called up for military training.
B. 4,000 troops are stationed at Taichu. These are of all arms and include
G tanks and 8 armoured cars.
C. The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine gians posts.
These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each holds G to 8 men. They
were recently ei'ected in great haste.
July 30, 1941.
Extract for Honolulu
It is reported :
A. Japanese Government is considerably perturbed by the "insincerity" of the
Siamese Government."
B. Japanese Government states that in spite of military "representations" by
.Japanese Minister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the
uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that it is '
clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence.
C. Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make
further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Ofiice on
matter.
D. FEI WEN CHUAN further stated Japanese Government in carrying out
its progi-amme in French Indo-China is most anxious that its relations with
Siam shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan
and her coprosperity programme Japan will take whatever steps she deems
necessary to bring Siam into line.
636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
August 20, 1941.
:. reports on oil fuel tanks in Pescadores.
A. A7isan Naval Base. — Large surface tank capacity 60O repeat 600 tons.
Small surface tank capacity 400 repeat 400 tons.
B. 1 underground at Taislioku Fort capacity 400 repeat 400 tons.
0. 1 underground tank at Keimo-U aerodrome capacity 300 repeat 300 tons.
D. Comment: It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between
types of oil fuel.
Valuation C 2.
Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell.
July 29th, 1941.
Extract No. 18 for Honolulu
A. Following is actual text of order issued on July 28th (but not published)
by K. OYAMADA for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs
obtained very confidentially.
Begins :
B. Shipments of exportation and interport export for America and England
and their colonies, Burma, French Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied area
of China of following goods are temj>orarily to be referred to me before release : —
Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton
piece goods and yarn: —
Except for Japan and North China : —
Signed K. Oyamada.
(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)
July 28th, 1941.
Extract No. 19 for Honolulu
A. June 16th 150 repeat 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for
parachute training and on June 18th 200 repeat 200 paratroops were transferred
from KOGO to ROKKO.
B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.
C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained.
July 26, 1941.
Extract for Honolulu.
It was reported July 24.
A. Thailand is secretly making preparations of a military character and' is
not releasing, as originally intended, certain classes called up over the Indo
China dispute.
B. The Thai delegates who have gone to the Indo China border to take over
the ceded territory have also been given a special mission which is presumed
to be connected with Japanese Southward move.
July 23, 1941.
It has further been reported that circular has been issued to German firms
by German Chamber of Commerce, on instructions from Commercial Counsellor,
instructing them that they must keep all goods purchased for export to Germany
for a period of at least five months (from middle of July) since it can be ex-
pected that transport via Siberia will be resumed before expiration of that
period. In the event of firms encountering difficulty over go-down storage
space they are advised to ship goods to Dairen for storage. Further all purchases
of goods in immediate future for export to Germany must be of "non-perishable"
kind.
August 5, 1941.
japan naval fleet organization
Following is passed with utmost reserve :
1. In June the Japanese Navy will be divided into 4 fleets with Admiral Kato
as Commander-in-Chief.
2. The 1st Flee;t will be stationed near Indo-China, Thailand and Hainan.
[2] 3. The 2d fleet will be the main force for the southward advance.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 637
4. The Sd fleet will be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and watch the
American Fleet.
S.The 4th fleet will be engaged in transport (? convoy) work.
6. Valuation C 5.
July 28, 1941.
A. It is stated that according to information obtained from local Japanese
source Japanese naval authorities intended to construct a submarine base at
CAMRANH BAY. Also, according to letters from Tokyo and Hanoi to local
Concordia Club it was clear that immediate steps were to be taken :
1. Completely to suppress all pro Chungking elements in Indo China.
2. To encourage Aunamite independence movement which would be definitely
pro Japanese and anti French.
He believes object of such a move is creation of internal domestic trouble
throughout Indo China which will provide further excuse for expansive Jap-
anese control,
(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)
July 25th, 1941.
Extract No. 16 for Honolulu
reports.
A. On June 8th following units of 12th repeat 12th division total strength
6,000 repeat 6,000 left Hainan for Manchuria.
46th infantry regiment.
48th infantry regiment.
24th artillery I'egiment.
B. On June 14th HIROSE (EGZ IRX) infantry regiment of 11th repeat 11th
division left Hainan. On June 30th this unit arrived Dairen and went on to
SCHEUNGKIANG in Manchuria.
G. reports that on June 24th 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division
arrived WHAMPOA from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.
Valuation C 3.
Message ends.
(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)
July 25th, 1941.
Extract No. 15 for Honolulu
reports July 25th.
A. July 18th 200 repeat 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.
B. July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK TTA) commander-in-chief
Formosan army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived Saigon with
30 repeat 30 German and Italian advisers.
C. On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st aid reconnaissance carried on
over Saignon by 6 aircraft.
D. July 20th one cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and four
repeat four transports packed with troops arrived CAMRANH BAY.
Message ends.
Extract No. 79 for Honolulu
23rd July, 1941.
It has further been reported that circular has been issued to German firms
by German Chamber of Commerce, on instructions from Commercial Counsellor,
instructing them that they inust keep all goods purchased for export to Germany
for a period of at least five months since it can be expected that transport via
Siberia will be resumed before expiration of that period. In the event of firms
encountering difficulty over go-down storage space they are advised to ship
goods to Dairen for storage. Further all purchases of goods in immediate fu-
ture for export to Germany must be of "Non-perishable" kind.
638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract for Honolulu
July 22, 1941
It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I.
following is now being said :
1. in MENADO. Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will
be taken off in vessels from Pelao.
2. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from
eastward of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S.
arrives.
3. Japanese will not be evacuated as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication
«!f pending attack.
Extract for Honolulu
July 16, 1941
hong kong — japanese sponsored subversive activities
Following infoi'mation is dated June 20, 1941.
1. WANG KI ( ), who was previously Wang Ching Wei's representative
in Hong Kong is now the Police Commissioner at Canton. The post of Wang's
representative has been taken over by LAM FEI ( ).
2. LAM FEI ( ) with 45 senior agents under him, is mainly interested
in the collection of military Intelligence in Hong Kong; they also recruit ques-
tionable characters for subversive activities.
3. The removal of the Japanese Military Attache's Department to Macau has
caused the Japanese great inconvenience. TAKEDA, of the Special Service
Section, has now been attached to the Japanese Consulate in Hong Kong to
control the intelligence section here.
INCITEMENT OF DISTURBANCES AND EIOTS
4. Plans are prepared for the creation of strikes, disturbances and riots when
and if Japan breaks with Britain. One of the principal agents employed in
this department is JOHN LTJI ( ), a senior member of the Shanghai Tai
Fing Insurance To. Lui's headquarters is established at 19/20 Connaught Road
West, 3rd floor (next door to the Ping On Hotel), where he is operating as the
CHUN KIN FIRM ( ). He left for Shanghai recently and a few days
ago returned to Hong Kong; it is believed that it is his intention to proceed
to Singapore in the near future.
5. One of Lui's close associates is the son of the Chief Detective of Amo.v,
CHENG SAI-HOI. Lui is also believed to have been the founder of the Tung
Man Alumni Association ( ).
6. According to information imparted to an agent in the employ of
FURI'KAWA ( ), Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macua, it is
learned that the Japanese hope to have recruited about 100,000 refugees street-
sleepers to take part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hong Kong on the
outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Japan.
7. A large number of refugee street-sleepers are already receiving financial
assistance from the .Japanese.
8. Japanese Agents. Other Chinese employed by the Japanese are:
TAM KWOK-WA ( ■ — ), who was employed by the Special Service Depart-
ment at Macau to act as Liaison between them and Agents in Hong Kong. In
this connection he made innumerable visits here.
CHAU WING TING ( ), who has been in the employ of Japanese for
the past ten years, mainly operating in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed
to be residing in Cannaught Road West (1st Floor — the number is at present
unknown and is being investigated).
ARMS SMUGGLING
9. Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese
agents are being permitted to enter Macau with arms, and it is through this
channel that a large quantity of illicit arms ai'e being smuggled into Hong
Kong.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 639
[Extract No. 13 for H] ^
Telegram from Hongkong of July Wth, I94I
reports June 15th.
.4. June 1st 150 repeat 150 mines and 60 repeat 60 torpedoes landed at
KARDRKO, E. Coast Formosa, 24° N 121° E, from Islands.
B. During June Pescadore Naval units carried out mine laying operations
along the Formosan coast. (Message ends.)
[Extract No. 14 for H]
Telegram from Hongkong of July IDtJi, 19J^1
reports June 15th.
A. June 4th 6 repeat 6 twin-engine monoplane bombers arrived KARENKO
from Japan en route for Hainan.
B. On June 7th 6 repeat 6 monoplane fighters arrived HEITO from Japan.
C. On June 11th 12 repeat 12 monoplane fighters left KAGI for QUEMOY.
(Believed all aircraft :at Quemoy had left for Hainan).
D. Aircraft based Heito June lOth :
9 repeat 9 twin-engine monoplane bombers.
IS repeat 18 monoplane fighters.
3 repeat 3 reconnaissance.
12 repeat 12 trainers.
3 repeat 3 transports (3 engine monoplanes).
E. Aircraft based KAGI aerodrome June 10th :
9 repeat 9 monoplane bombers.
18 repeat 18 monoplane fighters.
14 repeat 14 recoimaissance.
E. On June 8th 500 repeat 500 paratroops arrived KOQO from TAIHOKU for
training. Present number of paratroops at Kogo now about 1000 repeat 1000.
Message ends.
[Extract No. 12 for H]
Telegram from Hongkong of July llth, I94I
Commissioner of Customs Hongkong reports that on July IGth the following
were observed at BOCCA TIGRIS :
25 repeat 25 transports.
100 repeat 100 (approximately) landing barges (empty).
1 repeat 1 motor lauding craft. Message ends.
July 14, 1941
Extract for Honolulu
reports.
A. On April 19 two armed rnerchant men arrived Kobe and unloaded scrap
metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes and were loaded up with construction materials
and 40 cases of aircraft components.
B. The cases measured about 8x6 feet.
C. 400 men of a naval landing party and 130 coolies who had been segregated
until going on board embarked on April 21.
D. The ships left for Spratley Island on April 21.
July 14, 1941
reports.
A. On April 20, 2 repea^t 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for
Kure.
B. Guns to be fitted and ships will be ready for sea again at the beginning
of August.
July 15, 1941.
reiJorts on French Indo China and Hainan :
A. On June 8 12,000 men left French Indo China.
B. It is rumored that they were bound for IManchuria but this is given with
great reserve.
640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C. Ou June 14 the following units of the 11th repeat 11th Division, totalling
3300 repeat 3300 men left Hainan for unknown destination :
HIROSE (EGZ IRX) infantry regiment
NAKAMUEA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery Battalion
HIRAOKA (FEU DYJ) Transport Company
YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadrons
July 14, 1941
Extract for Honolulu
A translation of a letter from Information Section of Concordia Society to local
branch of same, dated July 2, which states that on that day the national policy
in connection with Russo-German war was decided at a liaison converence between
the Government and High Command. The following general principles were
stated to have been decided upon.
A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles her na-
tional safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order in East
Asia.
B„ Japan must depend only upon her strength and resources and concentrate
her attention upon East Asia problems.
C. She must use every means to further her own aims but always take into
consideration the constantly changing international position and must not allow
herself to be detracted from her present course by any claims requests or sug-
gestions if even slight risk of wasting her power and resources is involved.
July 12, 1941.
Extract for Honolulu
reports.
A. 20 repeat 20 of these vessels are under construction at Harima shipyard,
Osaka.
B. 24-hour shifts were being worked on these jobs in May.
C. Vessels are expected to be completed at end of July.
D. Specifications:
Displacement 100 tons.
Dimensions 200 ft. x 28 ft. x 5 ft. 6".
(Note that these dimensions will give displacement of well over that reported
and are therefore given with the utmost reserve) .
Speed : 30 knots.
Armament : 6 machine guns.
E. Source further stated that these ships are to be used as troop landing craft
in the Southern expansion movement.
Valuation B 3 for paragraphs A to C only.
Extract foi' Honolulu
■ July 9, IMl
reports.
A. In collaboration with German advisers the construction of 75 repeat 75
submarines is projected in Japan.
B. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 repeat 20 of these jobs of
which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4. •
C. Valuation C. 3.
July 11, 1941
reports from Japan on aerial bomb factory in Himeji.
A. Name of factory is Nakabe (AAW? SRY) Heavy Industrial AVorks.
B. Labor force in mid May 600 repeat 600.
C. Monthly production 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares.
D. 4 repeat 4 German engineers are attached.
July 11, 1941
reports mid May.
A. A Shadow factory situated at Kawaguchi in Osaka has now started man-
ufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the Aichi Factory,
Nagoya.
B. Labor force 2,600 repeat 2,600 working ten hours per day.
C. Estimate of production is wings etc., for about 100 fighters per month.
D. 3 German advisers are attached to the Kawaguchi Factory.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 641
Extract from letter from Manila 7-12-41
Commandeering of Japanese ships by the Japanese government
has reached significant proportions, — many vessels used wholly in Japanese
commercial interests and not running to U. S. ports.
Something seems to be brewing in Japan, and although anything except
watchful waiting by Tokio may make no sense to us the symptoms neverthe-
less indicate preparations for activity against either Russian Maritime Prov-
inces Indo China.
I think not a) because of the strength and separateness of the Russian
forces in the Far East and probably latter).
[It seems extraordinary that the Japanese should not now begin to turn
towards America and cease their irritating gestures — but the preparations
are proceeding and the removal of these profitable vessels is costing them
plenty in the meantime.] .
Gerald Wilkinson
[Copy]
A. Controller.
Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory under his control.
Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc.
Can even control development and study of prototypes.
Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and
adjustment of internal disputes.
Supervises allotment of salaries, wages and bonuses.
His control is complete and his decisions are final.
B. Trained, Engineers.
All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc.,
are earmarked for Naval, military or aviation factories.
Engineers with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may
work in other defence industries.
Factories which are not working for national defence get no certificated
engineers.
Numbers are carefully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 Imperial
University graduates per annum.
System extremely unpopular amongst students.
C. Limitation of Salaries.
Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen.
Graduates from private university get only 1170 Yen annually.
Rises only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is
2,000 Yen per annum.
D. Artisans.
Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands get-
ting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this works out at
higher salaries than that of certificated engineers.
Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this
work is often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and have
taken a week or fortnight's holiday.
E. Discipline.
No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without
consent from the controller.
Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personn^ is excessively sensi-
tive and will accept no supervision.
They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.
F. Naval and Military Friction.
This extends to an astonishing degree, even when the same article is being
made for both services.
Files of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army
and Navy.
All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and
Navy with the result that double checking and control service has to be estab-r
lished.
Two distinct trial and reception services have to be established.
Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable.
79716— 46— Ex. 148 42
642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract for Honolulu
July 7, 1941
Source reports that he has been informed by two separate Chinese sources that
they understood Japan promised Germany, in return for recognition of Wang
Ching Wei, to blockade Vladivostok and that action was likely at an early date.
July 12, 1941
reports on the Aichi Aircraft Factory, Nagoya.
A. Beginning of April 3 German engineers arrived at this factory from the
Dornier works.
B. Name of one is given as Andernich (DJI IZU DUN) .
C. They are supervising construction of a new type of fighter.
D. This is described as K.22 type twin-engine 2 seater. It is still in the ex-
perimental stage.
E. Production aimed at is 50 repeat 50 per month. {Note that production
figures of this aircraft coincide with those given for dive bomber reported as
being manufactured in this factory in January.)
F. Labor force 2,600 repeat 2,600 working 24-hour shifts.
Extract No. 9 for Honolulu
To London : 3rd July, 1941
A. A Chinese Maritime Customs cruiser which had been scuttled by the Chinese
in West River area has been salvaged by Japanese and put into commission for
the Kwangtung Defense Headquarters.
B. Name HIP LIK.
Length about 310 feet.
Armament one small gun at bow and stern and two machine guns.
C. Note please that this vessel has been definitely allocated to the Puppet
Chinese Naval Force.
Extract No. 10 for Honolulu
2nd July, 1941
To London :
A. There is no repeat not landing ground at Boryo.
Katosha is evidently identical with Kato and there is definitely a landing
ground with two hangars here.
There is also a landing ground at Suiteiryo, whicli is usually used in connection
with military training at Boryo.
B. Koko is believed to be the same as Kogo, but we do not repeat not agree
with longitude of the latter place as given by you (we make it 121 degrees 03
minutes East). Koko is believed to be the centre of parachute training in
Formosa.
My immediately following telegram.
Extract No. 11 for Honolulu
2nd July, 1941.
To London :
My immediately preceding telegram.
Shinchiku is an entirely separate aerodrome and we believe that naval air force
units are permanently based here.
C Agreed that Reigaryu is the same as Takao.
D. Tailwku aerodrome is equipped for night flying and has a civil aviation
school and a military aviation centre attached.
Matsityama was originally a civil aerodrome but barracks have recently been
built here.
E. Detailed summary and sketch maps of aerodromes in Formosa have been
despatched by bag.
Extract No. 2 for Honolulu
18th JtTNB, 1941
A. Controller. — Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory
under his control.
Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc.
Can even control development and study of prototypes.
Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and
adjustment of internal disputes,
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 643
Supervises allotment of salaries, wages and bonuses.
His control is complete and his decisions are final.
B. Trained Enghieers. — All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities
of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for naval, military or aviation factories.
Engineei's with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may
work in other defense industries.
Factories which are not working for national defence get no certificated
engineers.
Numbers are carefully fixed, e.g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 repeat 3
Imperial University graduates per annum.
System extremely unpopular amongst students.
Extract No. 3 for Honolulu
18th June, 1941
C. Limitation of Sala)-irs. Imperial University engineers draw total yearly
salary and bonus of 1440 Yen.
Graduates from private university get only 1170 Yen annually.
Rises only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is
2,000 Yen per annum.
D. Artisans. Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally
good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this
works out at higher salaries than that of certified engineers.
Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this
work is often lield up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and
have taken a week or fornights' holiday.
Extract No. 4 for Honolulu.
18th June, 1941
E. Discipline. No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of
work without consent from the controller.
Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensi-
tive and will accept no supervision.
They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.
P. Naval and Military Friction. This extends to an astonishing degree, even
when the same article is being made for both services.
Files of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army
and Navy.
All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and
Navy with the result that double checking and control service has to be
established.
Two distinct trial and reception services have to be established.
Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable.
Extract No. 1 for Honolulu.
JAPAN MILITARY BODY ARMOUR
12th OVne, 1941
Following item from dated 19th March, 1936, may be of interest in view
of recent reports of bullet proof vests, etc.
"An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the Metallurgical Laboratory
of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. Konda. According to tlie
Patent Announcement, the steel is composed of the following : —
0.15-0.35% of carbon,
0.5 1.5% of chrome,
0.6 -2.0% of manganese,
0.2 -1.0% of molybdenum,
0.2 -1.0% of cobalt of banadium,
0.9% of silicon
and the remainder iron.
Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the
best foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs. K. Ono and
S. Cahiba.
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, Aug. 9, 1941.
Honolulu Field Office.)
644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Extract No. 24
To Capt. I. H. Maytield
Mr. RoBT. Shivers
Col. Geo. Bicknell
Following is summary information to hand on HULL.
A. AMOS TYLER HULL, employed by R. K. O. Pictures.
B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period from
Japanese IMilitary in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has openly
stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese.
C. Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that Hull was in Japanese employ.
(#1421)
Extract No. S3 for Honolulu
A. Local Agents Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram
August 15 from Tokio instructing them :
1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.
B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded
200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds).
(Valuation A 1.)
To : Col. BiCKNEIX
Mr. Shiveks
A. Source reports that on September 20 he met a certain CHIU CHE SHENG,
a head of a certain department of the Nanking Ministry of War.
B. Latter stated, a propos of announcement over the radio of sentence passed
on a Japanese in Singapore for possession of seditious literature that "not long"
General HATA had very secretly approached head of War Ministry of Nanking
requesting his cooperation in enlistment of Chinese agents for work in Thailand,
Burma and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure
FUKINESE or Chinese specking dialect of that pi'ovince.
C. Chiu Che Sheng stated that a certain number of men were recruited and
despatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated
Chinese. Those chosen, in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained
through service at one time or another with Chinese forces. According to source
CHEN KUANG is responsible directly to Japanese military H. Q. at Nanking
and to all their authority.
D. Source endeavours to follow up. It is sent merely because Chiu Che
Sheng's statements were spontaneous but it is not known if they have any
foundation in fact.
(Value 3.)
Extract for Honolulu
Who was recently elected as a Sakdal candidate for next political elec-
tions, states that local Japanese agents (whose names I have given to American
Military Intelligence have recently been cultivating him closely and volunteering
following information.
A. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on Formosa.
B. Attack on Philippines and Singapore simultaneously, will take place about
end August.
C. Campaign in Philippines to begin with rising in Mindanao and bombing of
Manila.
D. Attack on Singapore to be overland through Siam, where at least 3 repeat
3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.
E. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. This looks
like a whispering campaign.
(Valuation C 3.)
[Japanese map]
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
645
[Jf]
Enclosure (B)
Translation of Data in Outer Margins of Map of Singapore Region.
1. Top Center : Singapore, Malaca, Benlf alis
2. Top Right :
Englisli colony ; Straits Settlements
Dutch colony : Sumatra
3. Righ Upper:
East Asia "World Map
West 7th "Vertical Segment
South 7th Horizontal Segment
Southern part
4. Right Lower: Form of map instituted in 29th year of Meiji (1896) for
for East Asia "World Maps
5. Bottom Right (scale) :
Boundary of West Coast Provinces of Sumatra+-+-+-1--+-+-+
Provincial Boundaries • •
Provincal Capitals : O
District Capitals: O
Sub-district Capitals : "
6. Bottom Right: (Seal) Imperial Japanese Government Land Survey
Department
Strategic Points : °
7. Bottom Center: 1,000,000 to 1
(left) Kilometers (right) Japanese "li"
8. Bottom left : Fixed Price — 20 sen
9. Left, Bottom: Possessor of Copyright for Printing and Publishing: Im-
perial Japanese Government Land Survey Department.
10. Left, Top :
Made Meiji 32 (1899)
Printed Meiji 34 (1001)
Railways added Meiji 43 (1910)
Printed Dec. 5, Meiji 43 (1910)
Published Dec. 10, Meiji 43 (1910)
11. Top, Left :
West
9th Vert.
Segment
West
7th Vert.
Segment
West
6th Vert.
Segment
SINGAPORE
South 7th
Horzontal
Segment
South 8th
Horizontal
Seg. (North H)
[2] (Surrounding place names, given to establish the identity of the re-
gion, appear in the 8 blank spaces, but are left untranslated. )
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 7
Investigation hy Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 of
radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and which were not
included in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
b. The documents following those mentioned in a above are the intercepts
which comprise Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred to
in their affidavits.
646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TOP SECRET
From : Hon.
To : Tokyo
Dec. 6, 41
PA-KY
#253 release p5 123a.
1. On American continent in Oct. Army began training barrage balloon troops
at Camp Davis, N. C, 400,500 balloons considering use in defense of Hawaii &
Panama. So far as Hawaii concerned though investigations made, they have not
set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected troops to man them. No train-
ing for maiutenence balloons. No signs barrage balloon equipment. "In addition,
it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any limits to barrage balloon de-
fense. "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
to take advantage of a surprise attack against these places.
In my opinion battleships do not have torpedo nets. Details not known ; will
report results of investigation.
Army 717S 25877 2a Trans. 12/S/41 (2-TT).
TOP SECEET
From : Hon
To : Tokyo
Dec. 6, 41
PA-K2.
#254
1. On evening 5th, among battleships which entered port — one sub tender. The
following ships observed at anchor on 6tli.
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 sub tenders, 17 destroyers, in addition 4 light
cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (heavy cruisers & airplane carriers all left.
2. "It appears that no air reconnaisance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."
Army 7179 25874 Trans. 12/8/42 (2-22) 3 a.
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To : Honolulu
September 24, 1941.
J-19
#83
Strictly secret.
Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along
the following lines insofar as possible.
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.
(We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you Uke.)
Ai-ea A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This
area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A. )
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you
report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves,
buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would
fike to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels
along side the same wharf.)
260 SECRET Trans. 10-9-41 (S)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple
#943 (Part 1 of 2)" (To be handled in Government Code)
I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told
me, it is this :
-For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 647
"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise.
Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a
definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be
made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament.
Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters in-
dependently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her
obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing
or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it
would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and
China for a gradual withdrawal."
He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally.
It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.
ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple
#943. (Part 2 of 2)''
He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany
offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England
would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important
position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand.
HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace
with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms,
this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE b told me that
HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert
for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by
the Isolationists. MOORE " reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS
that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he
hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part,
and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER "i
reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities
between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and
the United States are fifty-fifty.
f- — Part 1 of 2 not available.
b — Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.
c — American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.
"* — A Washington newspaper correspondent.
ARMY 5854 23516 SECRET Trans. 10-15-41 (7)
From: Toyko (Toyoda)
To : Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671
Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in
Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotia-
tions, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to
do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American
merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision
of the Neuti-ality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Gov-
ernment submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japa-
nese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to
attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably
arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the
other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties
envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join im-
mediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet,
submittted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations,
we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording
of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same
request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed
648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in
the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance
she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making
a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the cii'cumstances, we
can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in
such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japa-
nese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret
between me and you.
(Separate Wire)
The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American
Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the
prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the
recent tension in the German-American i-elations suffer aggravation, there
would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of
affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot
help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only
the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the pre-
vailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Gov-
ernment is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Govern-
ment.
ARMY 5901 23631 Secret
From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure
that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time
the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet
how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my
ears that this is^the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor
novice and who say that things will get better for me, but alas, their encourge-
ment is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are
also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls.
As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully.
Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones
of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving
other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but
as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please
send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your
forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in
the depth of my rudeness.
ARMY 6017 23859 Secret Trans. 10-23-41 (7)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#736
(Of utmost secrecy).
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
I realize that this is a difficult ordei', but under the circumstances it is an un-
avoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of
saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do
so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
JD-1: 6254 Secret (D) Navy Trans. 11-5^1 (S-TT
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 649
From : Tokyo
To : Hongkong
November 14, 1941
Purple
Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code)
(Strictly secret outside the Department)
Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-
American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the
negotiations collapse, the international situation 'in which the Empire will find
herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign
policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is :
a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and
interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even
though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it
become necessary.
In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhaust-
ing our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time
scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane,
we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has
become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in considera-
tion of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will en-
courage the activities of Important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied
[2] territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in coopera-
tion, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will
realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great
importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas).
In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity,
in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you
have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions
into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying
them out).
In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation.
We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep
absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have
been transmitted to you.
This message is directed to Nanso,* Hokudai," Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow,
Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai " will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsing-
tao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.
25322
JD 6801 Secret Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)
a — Kana spelling.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)
#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain
secrecy.
JD-1: 6991 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)
For your Honor's own information.
1. I have read your #1090," and you may be sure that you have all my
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs
by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did
before.
a — See JD- : 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3
not available.
650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and
I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you
to the fundamental policy laid down in ray #725.^ Will you please try to
realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what
turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say
that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the
solution of these negotiations in my #736,c and there will be no change.
Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do
not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any
further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your
best to bring about an immediate solution.
" — S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the
•Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the
United States.
" — S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
Army 24878 JD-1:6638 Secret Trans. 11A7/41 (S)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19
#113
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area
"N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,* and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make
your investigation with great secrecy.)
a — Probably means Mamala Bay.
Army 25773 7063 Secret Trans. 12/5/41 (S)
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To : Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#222
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in
my #219" on that day.
Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left
port.
Area C — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise,
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class,
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were
at anchor in Area D".
3. At 10 : 00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, S destroyers werci observed en-
tering the Hai'bor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance
of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in
Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time
roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these
destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern
side.
Relayed to
» — Available in ^lE code dated November 14. Code under study.
'' — Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
•^ — East Loch.
« — Middle Loch.
Army 25817 7111 Secret Trans. 12/6/41 (2)
From : Tokyo
To: Wa.shington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast :
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 651
(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger HIGASHI NO KAZEAME
(EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japau-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND
CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations : NISIII NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be giveju in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
See Supplementary Inforination File
(Voice broadcasts)
SIS 25432 JD-1: 6875 Secret Navy Trans. 11-28-^1
From : Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354
When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following
at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "NISHI"
The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning
and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.
SIS-25392 JD-1 : 6850 Secret Navy Trans. 11-26-41.
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
19 November 1941
(Purpl(^CA)
Re my #797*
The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan
have been made more definite" we imagine would naturally have reference to
the question of the thi-ee-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan
will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S.
will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for
the U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.
On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would
be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China,
merely on assiirances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored.
It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B**
proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance
that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of
the proposal in your message, then to pu.sh on for an understanding.
The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the pro-
posal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation
existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the
negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instruc-
tions, (after reading our #797*, #800,*** and #801****) will please present
our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can
be made.
If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be
broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best
efforts.
We note what you say in your #1133***** and, #1134*****, but in these nego-
tiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this
office. We would emphasize this.
S. I. S. #25040
JD-1 : 6658
*.TD-1 : 66.57
**JD-1 : 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1 : 6528.
***.TD-1 : 6660
»***.TD-1 : 6661
*****Not yet available.
(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT).
652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)
#812
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736."
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the
solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we
wanted to settle Japanese-A.merican relations by the 25th, but if within the
next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans;
if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you —
twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an under-
standing with Great Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if everything
can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it,
that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are auto-
matically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration
and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the
information of you two Ambassadors alone.
» — See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances
it is abi^ohitely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed
by the 25th of this month.
From,: Tokyo
To : Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple
#836. To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too
long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations
to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American
Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use
the following code :
Japanese English
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty
question) Nyuu Yooku (New
York).
Musabetsu Taignu Mondai (The question of non-
discriminatory treatment) Shikago (Chicago).
Shina Mondai (The China question) Sanfuranshisuko (iSan
Francisco),
Soori (Prpraier) Itoo Kun (Mr. Itoo).
Gaimudai.iin (Foreign Minister) Date Kun (Mr. Date).
Rikugun (The Army) Tokirgawa Kun (Mr.
Tokugawa ) .
Kaigun (The Navy) Maeda Kun (Mr.
Maeda).
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotia-
tions) __ Endan (Marriage pro-
posal).
Daitooryoo (President) Kimiko San (Miss Ki-
rn iko).
Haru (Hull) Fumeko San (Miss
Fumeko).
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation) Shoobai (Trade).
Jooho Sum (To yield) Yama Wo Uru (To sell
the mountain).
Jooho Se.zu (Not to yield) Yama Wo Urenu (Not
to sell the moimtain)
Keisei Kyuuten Snru (Situation taking critical
turn ) Kodomo Gaumareru
(The child is born).
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 653
For your iuforination, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as
follows :
Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence Ginza 1022
From : Washington
To : Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1180. (Part 1 of 2)
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation
remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably
be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humilia-
tion are complete. We miglit suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although
we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT
wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States
will cooperate f-or the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you
wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement
with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message,
thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Con-
sidering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to
bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation,
in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral
nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you
know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French
Indo-China and Thai.)
From : Washington
To : Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1180. (Part 2 of 2)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.
Again, you must remember -that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait
until the end of this world war beiore it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to
express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the
Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wire us back
instantly.
From : Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1190. (Part 2 of 2)''
To be handled in Government Code.
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with
the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize
that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for
our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, de-
liberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the
»— S.I.S. # 25444. (Part 1 of 2)
654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have
been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversa-
tions because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without
clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly
enter upon independent operations, there is great fear tliat slie may use such
a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing
tlae same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such
a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret ; conse-
quently, I thinli that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the
opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irre-
vocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy iu
Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumptions. I would
like, if such a course is followed; to make representations here at the same
time.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience
having to do with my interview with the President, should there by anything
that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me buck at once.
From : Washington.
To: Tokyo.
26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)
(Telephone Code)**
Transpacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto * from Kurusu :
Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they will not yield*** I sent a cable
expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is
just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable
you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding
I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my
meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."
Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued : "If that
method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no
other means we can use. It is very regrettable."
Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." after thank-
ing Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign
Minister is extremely difficult."
Kurusu : "I believe it is of no avail",
Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.
Kurusu : "I rather imagine you had expect^'d this outcome."
Yamamoto : "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to
the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."
Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress ?) at all. Some-
thing will have to be done to get out of this situation."
*Heacl of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
**See JD-1 : 6841, (SIS #25344), of this date.
***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The interceptor read this as "Sore . . . kesa"
(that . . . this morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause
before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to hii».
Verification will follow receipt of record.
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)
#844.
Re your #1189*.
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating pro-
posal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial
Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore,
with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American pro-
posal which I will send yon in two or three days, the negotiations will be de
facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish yon to give the
impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 655
are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government
are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government
has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of
peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering
and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has
been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations.
Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in
your #1180'' and he said that under the present circumstances what you sug-
gest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.
«— S.I.S. #25441, #25442,
"— S.I.S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.
From : Tokyo
To : Honolulu
29 November 1941
(J19)
#122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even when there are no movements.
JD-1: 7086 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
From : Toyko
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#857
Re my #844*
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following
lines:
The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial posi-
tion and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of
both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has
now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made
the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore
actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the
Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem,
what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made
the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we
would request careful self -reflection on the part of the United States govern-
ment.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead
to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)
*JD-1 : 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new
U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days
giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not
give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
JD-1: 6921 Secret (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code
Transpacific Radio TelepJwne
Note: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between
Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief
Yamamoto on Sunday night)
Kurusu : "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short
one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a
longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the
short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull'?
proposals. )
Yamamoto : "Yes. I see."
656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Kurusu : "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."
Y : "It there any special significance to this?"
K : "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having
strong repercussions here."
Y : "Is that so."
K : "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large
headlines over it ; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There
no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspaper are giving."
(Pause)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it
puts us in a very diflicult position. All of you over there must watch out about
these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."
Y: "We are being careful."
K : "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the corre-
spondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the
Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected
to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." ' (i. e.
Premier's speech.)
JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497
(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)
K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)
Y : "No particular — (one or two words faded out) — ."
K : "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"
Y: "Yes."
K : "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you ; but now you want
them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign
Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches. ! ! ! Do you under-
stand? Please all use more discretion."
Y : "Wlien will you see them. The 2nd?"
K : "Let's see. . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten.
That will be Monday morning here."
(Pause)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in
the South. You understand don't you?"
Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it he before the President gets back?"
K : "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4 : 00 this
afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."
Y: "Well then— Goodbye."
JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
#985. (Parti of 3) a
. Re my Circular #2387."
1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during
the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the
Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an
outline of developments in separate message #986°.) In the face of this, our
Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your
Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Min^
ister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the
developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have
taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to
move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevi-
tably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that
there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-
Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time
of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
a Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. # 25553.
*> Not available.
•^ See S.LS. # 25554 and 25555.
25552 JD 0943 Secret Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 657
From : Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#985. (Part 3 of 3)
4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about
our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude
toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present
moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and
that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and
resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might ;
however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time
being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.
5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under
all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without say-
ing. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how
important secrecy is.
6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to
the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI
and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with
the Germans and Italians, please let me know.
Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate
message.
25553 Secret Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
From : Tokyo
To : Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department)
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance
as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of tlie vicissitudes of the
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying
through these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive
of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the
Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as tlie
Empire of Japan was in allian-ce with Germany and Italy, there could be no
maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was
the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
Alliance. This was brouglit out at the last nieeting. That is to say that it has
only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually
more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue
negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation
of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)
79716— 46— Ex. 148 43
658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Tokyo
To : Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986. (Part 2 of 2)
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that
no matter what treaty either party enters into witli a third povper it will not be
interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely
the maintenance of peace. in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power
Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any
time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany
and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it
impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is
more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with
England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they do so repeatedly. There-
fore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and
has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
SECRET
From : Washington.
To : Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227
Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even
if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. How-
ever, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the
middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further de-
velopments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a
leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference
between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example,
Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former
Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the
Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway
point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy ofHcers should accompany these
representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using
as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.
We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.
AVe realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former
Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation,
it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility.
Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objec-
tives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this
matter.
We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face,
it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion
that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regard-
ing this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this
procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition,
then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin
and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the
government could make the official proposal.
Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.
25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)
SECRET
From : Tokyo,
To: Washington.
1 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2436
When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with
the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 659
for this purpose. The Attach^ should have been advised by the Navy Ministry
regarding this.
25545 JD-1:6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
SECRET
From: Tokyo
To : London :
1 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2443
Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immedi-
ately.
In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out
the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to
taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.
As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one vpord SETUJU in
plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions vpire the
one vpord HASSO in plain language.
Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YU GO
No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head
oflSce and the Ambassador resident in England.)
Message not seen but — British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple
machine in London, 26 April 1945. E. J. Layton.
25787 JD-1: 7091 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)
From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Pui-ple)
#893
In the event that Manchuria participates in the war .
in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause INIanchuria to partici-
pate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward Eng-
land and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.
A summary follows :
1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized
as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries
resident in Japan.
2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded
by Japan.
3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
offices and interests will not be recognized.
However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be ex-
ercised not to antagonize Russia.
Codes Manchukuo, etc.
JD-1: 7092 SIS 25783 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)
From : Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865
Re my #857*.
1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that
though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States,
the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).
660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make
the necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make
investigations into this matter.
*JD-l : G921.
**JD-1 : 6710.
*** Not available.
JD-1: 6963 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
Completed Translation
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232 (Part 1 of 2)
Re my #1231.
Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233''. Thereupon we said:
"Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the
troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that
such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November
20th." The Under-Secretary then said : "I want you to know that the stand the
United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the
world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have
pyramided economic pressue upon economic pressue upon us Japanese. (I
made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggres-
sion.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the
rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressue, and I
want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure
or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as
the situation in wliich all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year
incident in China ; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter
situation.
« — Not available
♦Original translation incomplete from this point on. Trans 12/3/41.
[i] From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232. (Part 2 of 2)
Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American
proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration
to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-
Secretary of State WELLES said : "I am well aware of that." J continued : "We
cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually
impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand.
Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th,
representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still
stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing,
it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration
to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy se-ttlement
of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our trooi^s from French
Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the
establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement
of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would
naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then
said : "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity
to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 661
here." [21 Then he continued : "In regard to the opinions that you have
expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."
I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan
in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much
room.
Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my con-
versations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peace-
fully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would
like to bi'ing about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind
this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and
to my separate wire #1233 *
a Not available.
25660 ARMY Trans. 12-3-41 (7)
From : Tokyo (Togo)
To : Washington
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#867 (Strictly Secret)
(CORRECTED TRANSLATION)
1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all
but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and
abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have
in your custody.)
2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.
3. When you 'have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".
4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files
of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.
5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence,
the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860" is no
longer recognized.)
» S.I.S. # 25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA
return to .Tapan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 2Sth. If this makes it impossible
for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to
KOSAKA's business in Mexico.
#25640 Translated 12-3^1 (X) Corrected 12-A-Al
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there
are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications
that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are
provided with anti-mine nets.
Note : This message was received here on December 23.
ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
From : Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1223
Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.
25785 JD-1: 7C98 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
#1410
In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would
like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others
(URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two
other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best
to this end.
ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)
From : Washington
To : Tokyo.
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#1268 Re your #8G7*
From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication
Section :
We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S-Japanese negotia-
tions are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for
a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.
25836 JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
* (Dated 2 December) JD-1 : 7017 (SIS #25640) : Directs Washington to destroy all
copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also dsetroy one code machine.
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Puri:>Ie
#901 Re my #844 ».
1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the
26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the
United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts
and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The
situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to
keep it secret for the time being.
3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,
I will wire you in a separate massage. However, I want you in the meantime
to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the
Ajnericans just as soon as you receive instructions.
ARMY 7149 25838 Secret Trans. 12/6/41 (S)
» See S.I.S. # 25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington that the Imperial Government
cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the
Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be
de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that
negotiations are brolien off.
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272.
In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL,
we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close
relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because
of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly
secret) . Up until this moment we have the following to report :
(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised
him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at
once between Japan and China. However, tlie President did not make known
what he had in mind. According to these men, tliis attitude of the President is
his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS
and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these
individuals.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 663
(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th
into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United
States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous
to us (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) .
ARMY 25846 7176 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram
MEMORANDUM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area
and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of
the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese- Ameri-
can relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concern-
ing the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as
the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan
during these eight months. ^
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability
of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to
find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China
to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for
the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent
the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in Septem-
ber last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
JD-1:7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish-
ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's
constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure
on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have
attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common
prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in ac-
cordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French
Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted
it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands govern-
ment to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing
economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile
attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfect-
ing an encirclement of Japan/ and have brought about a situation which en-
dangers the very existence of the empire.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 2.5843.
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941 .
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed,
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area.
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the
meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on
4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
idamental — (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted a
>posal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking
ly into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese
ws. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agree-
nt of vievF. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal,
derating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of
iculty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement.
t the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal,
led to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotia-
ri made no progress.
FD-l: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
Dm : Tokyo
: Washington
cember 6, 1941
rple
102 (Part 4 of 14)
rhereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
irting a crisis in Japanese-American I'elations, submitted on November 20th
[1 another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more
ential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipu-
ed the following points:
;i) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in
! Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
'2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisi-
n in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the
3 countries are in need.
;3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restoi-e commercial relations
those prevailing prior to the freezing of as.sets.
rhe Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity
oil.
[4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to meas-
'S and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general
ice between Japan and China.
^5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed
French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and
ina or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is
spared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
ina to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
FD-l: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6^1 (S) 25843
3m: Tokyo - *
: Washington
cember 6, 1941
rple
102 (Part 5 of 14)
is regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness
accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer"
peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an
dertaking on tlie part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the
itoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct
jotiations.
Che American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal,
t made known its intention to continvie its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in
te of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President
act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading
It time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to
pose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently main-
ned, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese
ims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
rD:l 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
i
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 665
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 6 of 14)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best
to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite
of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, ad-
vocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that
along with tlie actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Gov-
ernment would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China,
and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic
activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-
China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry
out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a
measure of easing the situation.
JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 7 of 14)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the
American government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theoi'ies
in disregard of realities, and refusing to j'ield an inch on its impractical principles,
caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude
of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the
attention of the American government especially to the following points :
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance
thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a
mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores
realities and Imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the pur-
pose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
7143 Secret 25843
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 8 of 14)
Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis
of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese gov-
ernment is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual condi-
tions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American govei'nment, to
attempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether-
lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security,
is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both gov-
ernments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any
third powers, shall be interpi-eted by it in such a way as to conflict with the
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of
peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision
has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations
666 CONGRESSIO]SrAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in
Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-&-41 (S) 25S43
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 9 of 14)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be
said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one
hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other
hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense,
Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in
Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which
the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area
through peaceful means.
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds,
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power.
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations
should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.
JD-1:7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From : Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 10 of 14)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Briain and other
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in
other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history, that one countr (4.5 letters
garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the status quo under the
Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the — — es
to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate
the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fun-
damental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
JD-1 : 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy.
That the six countries, — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Nether-
lands, China and Thailand, — excepting France, should undertake among them-
selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China
and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to
placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those,
six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the
position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such
an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China
of a system similar to the n (50 letters mission) sible for the present
predicament of East Asia.
JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 12 of 14)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 667
the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in
demanding Japan not to support militai-ily, politically or economically any
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation.
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demon-
strates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restora-
tion of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to
JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual
removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar
exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other
hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four
years of the Cliina Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages
its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese govern-
ment regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.
6. The Japanese government, in Its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other inter-
ested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. How-
ever, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th
as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Nether-
lands and Chungking, ANDND * presumably by catering to the wishes of the
Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL ■YLOKMMTT ** be concluded
that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's
position.
JD:1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
*Probably "and as"
♦Probably "China, can but"
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902 Part 14 of 14
(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this
part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish-
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at
war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Jap-
anese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacihc
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
JD-1: 7143 Secret (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT) 25S43
668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To : Honolulu
Deceuiber 6, 1941
PA-K2
#128
Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123'' the movements of the
fleet subsequent to the fourth.
ARMY 7381 26158 Secret Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
a Not available.
(Japanese)
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent — Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #902\
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p.m. on the
7th, your time.
ARMY 7145 25850 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
» JD-l : 7143 — text of Japanese reply.
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#910.
After deciphering part 14 of my #902^ and also #907^ #908" and #909^ please
destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in
like manner also secret documents.
a S.I.S. #25843— text of reply.
b S.I.S. # 25850.
•^ S.I.S. #25853.
■» S.I.S. #25858.
25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
From : Budapest
To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104
Re my #103 \
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of vpar vrould break
out on the 7th.
= Relayed to Berlin.
ARMY 25S66 7184 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)
Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 8
Investigation hi/ Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, Jagd, for the Secretary of War
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources.
They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to
22 December 1941.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 669
MOST SEOKET.
To be kept under lock and key : never to be removed from the oflSce.
Japanese Consul, Singapore, Requests Issue of Code Words.
No : 09T975
Date: 21st November, 1941.
From : Japanese Consul-General, SINGAPORE.
To : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 717.
Date : 17tli November, 1941.
Immediate :
Some day tlie British authorities will prohibit the use of cypher telegrams by
this office. To prepare for this eventuality please draw up secret code words
and send them by Consul-Genex'al OKAMOTO as diplomatic correspondence.
Please include in this secret code, words necessary for military intelligence,
evacuation of residents, the closing down of this office etc. Please see the
Naval Secret Code which I have received recently.
Director. F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. Colonial Office. M. I. 5.
Japanese Code Phrases for Broadcasting in Event of Emergency
No. 098127
Date : 25th November, 1941.
From : The Foreign Minister. TOKYO.
To : The Japanese Charge. LONDON.
No : 2363 Circular.
Date: 19th November, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.
The international situation is tense and we cannot tell when the worst may
happen. In such an event, communications between the Empire and the enemy
countries will immediately cease. Therefore when our diplomatic relations
are on the point of being severed, we shall broadcast, as the weather report, the
following phrases in the middle and at the end of the news in Japanese in our
ovei'seas broadcast service :
(1) If Japanese- American relations are in question: "Higashi no kaze ame"
(Easterly wind, rain).
(2) If JAPAN and the SOVIET are concerned: 'Kita no kaze kumori' (Nor-
therly wind, cloudy).
(3) In the case of JAPAN and BRITAIN (including the invasion of THAI-
LAND or an attack on MALAYA) : "Nishi no kaze hare" (Westerly wind, fine).
The appropriate phrase will each time be broadcast twice in a resolute voice
and you should accordingly [group corrupt : destroy by fire] codes documents,
etc.
The above is to be treated as strictly confidential.
From : The Japanese Charge, LONDON.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 700 Urgent of 21st November, 1941.
Reference your circular telegram No. 2353. (above).
Director. F. O. (3). F. L D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5
Sir E. Bridges,
, » Dominions Offlce.
670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Forcir/n Office View of Conversations With America
No: 998151
Date: 25th November, 1941.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : The Japanese Diplomatic Kepresentatives, ANGORA, &c
No: 2364 Circular.
Date: 20th November, 1941.
Confidential.
1. Since the formation of the new Cabinet the Government has started a con-
ference in daily contact with Imperial Headquarters and has been able to debate
a fundamental national policy to cope with the pressing situation of the day. At
the morning session on the 5th instant, a decision was taken on the policy to
be adopted for adjusting Japanese-American diplomatic relations.
2. The Japanese-American negotiations are to be pursued by considering the
adjustment of diplomatic relations on an equitable basis. These have been in
progress since the 7th, but there is a considerable difference of opinion between
the two parties, and in view of the progress made so far there is some doubt
as to whether a compromise will be reached. For our part, we are doing our
utmost to reach a compromise, but we cannot made any further concessions,
and the outlook is not bright. Should the negotiations break down, that part
of the situation in which the Japanese Empire is involved will be critical.
The foregoing is for vour exclusive information.
This telegram is addressed to BERNE, ANGORA and ^T.ADIYOSTOK.
BERNE will repeat to VICHY, MADRID, LISBON, STOCKHOLM, HELSING-
FORS and PRETORIA.
ANGORA will repeat to BUCHAREST, SOFIA and BUDAPEST.
Togo.
Director (3) P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Air Ministry.
Sir B. Bridges.
At this post there is nothing for it but to use the Navy's wireless. Details
have been telegraphed by the Naval Attache to the Admiralty. Please refer
to them and make the necessary arrangements.
Japanese Broadcasts: Reception in Rome.
No: 09S232
Date: 27th November, 1941.
From : The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No : 740.
Date: 20th November, 1941.
In regard to the general news broadcasts, not only JUO but JAP (which was
changed on the 20th) were generally impossible to receive. This was due to
inistable weather conditions at this time of year which made the note weak,
in addition to which there was much interference from miscellaneovis noises.
In view of the recent international situation the demand for [group corrupt:
? news ? information] is steadily increasing. We foresee no difficulty about
reception an-angements at this end but in present weather conditions good
reception will not be poesible on one wavelength only. It is essential that
simultaneous broadcasts he sent on two or three wavelengths. I understand that
the recently changed DOMEI broadcasts in English have begun simultaneous
broadcasts, and I ask that every effort be made for these simultaneous broad-
casts to be carried out.
For your information I will, till further notice, telegraph reception efficiency
every three days.
HORIKIRI.
Director. F. O. (3). P. L D. M. I. 5.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
671
Japanese Cypher Machines: Security Measures.
No: 098313
Date: 29th November, 1941,
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : BERNE, WASHINGTON, etc.
No: 2398 (Circular telegram).
Date : 25Lh November, 1941.
Mcst Secret :
Recently our cypher machines (the printing portion of "A" and the shift key of
"B") have been designated as a State Secret. Any leakage of information con-
nected therewith will incur the application of the National Defence Peace
Preservation Law. As regards the machine in your keeping, you are strictly
enjoined to take every precaution for safe and secret custody.
On the right-hand side of the number plate affixed to tlie printing portion and
shift key, please write the words "Kokka Kimitsu" [State Secret] in red enamel.
TTiis telegram is to be relayed, as the Foreign Minister's instructions, in the
following manner :
From WASHINGTON to MEXICO, RIO DE JANEIRO and BUENOS AIRES.
By cable.
BERNE to LONDON, VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. By cable.
VICHY to MADRID. By safe hand.
HANOI to SAIGON. By safe hand.
Director. F.O. (3). M.I.5.
Japanese Ambassador, Hanoi, Asks for Instruction in Event of Emergency
No : 098400.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
From: Japanese [? Ambassador], BLANOI.
To : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No : 118.
Date : 26th November, 1941.
[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
( Secret. )
To judge from what I hear from the Military, the American answer reached
us [ ? on the 24th]. If this is so the Cabinet Council will no douljt finally reach
a decision in a day or two and determine whether it is to be peace or war.
If Japanese-American negotiations are to be held we shall of course take in
hand progressively the various undertakings previously planned ; but if the
negotiations break down, as preparations for military operations are nearing
completion, an advance would be possible within ten days or so. In that event
considerable modifications would be necessary in the programme of undertakings
to be carried out under our present policy, and it will be necessary to initiate
measures and negotiations in keeping with our military operations. What causes
me most concern and [? anxiety] is whether, in the event of an outbreak of
hostilities, it is the policy of the Government and Imperial Headquarters to
carry on military operations leaving the status of the Government of INDO-
CHINA as it is at present, and on this point I require to be informed in advance:
and not only so bul I want to make necessary preparations witli all speed.
If, therefore, you have any views on the development of the Japanese-American
negotiations and the prospects alluded to I beg that you will telegraph them
at once. Moreover, while it goes without .saying that .secrecy must be preserved,
nevertheless, according to newspaper reports, AMERICA has been consulting
with BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, the NETHERLANDS and the Chine.se in
WASHINGTON, and these Governments are aware of the purport of the
Japanese-American negotiations. And what is more, the Military here, as the
result of comings and goings between here and TOKYO, are aware of the
nature of your instructions and of the ins and outs of the negotiations : in fact^
I have the impression that the only people who are left in the dark are Foreign
Ofiice officials. Seeing that the .situation is as tense as is indicated in your
circular telegram No. 2383 [our No. 098127], should be glad to receive your
instructions on these points as soon as possible, either by telegram, messenger
or some other method.
672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIOJST PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.LO. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.B. Major Morton. Sir E. Bridges,
Dominions Office.
From : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.
No : 93 of 26th November, 1941.
(Also in Chef de Mission cypher recyphered).
Reference your No. 118 (above).
My circular telegram *No. 2414 gives the course of the Japanese-American
negotiations and my circular telegram *No. 2416 tells of their present continua-
tion. Even in the event of the worst happening the Imperial Government has
not taken any special decision to make a change in the status of the Government
of INDO-CHINA. You may therefore take it that for the present our policy
is to maintain the status quo. Please do your best on this understanding.
Repeated to Paris and Berlin.
Togo.
[Dept. Note *Not yet decyphered].
Japan and the Axis: Plans in Event of Breakdown of Washington Conversations
No: 098413.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassadors, BERLIN and ROME.
No: 2387 Circular.
Date: 24th November, 1941.
[Very corrupt text. In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
For your own information only.
The Japanese-American negotiations [?] are [seem to be] approaching their
final stage .... [tvpo lines corrupt]. In the event of the breakdown of the nego-
tiations we shall be face to face with a rupture of relations with BRITAIN and
AMERICA, and the necessity is likely to arise for the sudden tightening up of
the relations which have hitherto prevailed for cooperation between JAPAN,
GERMANY and ITALY. My idea is that [? you] should then propose [two
groups] action to be taken: but [two groups] I shall ask Your Excellency to be
active during this month. It is possible that circumstances may necessitate your
having a special interview with Fiihrer HITLER (Premier MUSSOLINI), so
please bear this in mind. [Two groups] until you approach them you should
refrain absolutely from saying anything to the Germans (Italians). This for
your information and in haste.
At the moment the time is not ripe for a detailed report on the Japanese-
American negotiations. Please note, however, that we have taken every pre-
caution to obviate any obstacle to the maintenance of the Three Power Pact.
This telegram is addressed to BERLIN and ROME.
Togo.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Communications hy Naval Wireless in Event of Emergency
No: 098414.
Date : 1st December, 1941.
From : Japanese Charge, London. •
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
No: 778.
Date: 29th November, 1941.
In present circumstances it may happen that the despatch and delivery of
telegrams may be purposely delayed or completely held up and that we shall not
be able to depend on the reliability of communications. I therefore request you
to take steps to [? make simultaneous use of] the Naval wireless, as in my No.
760 [our No. 098127].
[Dept: Note: Cyphered in "X" and recyphered on the machine].
Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2).
Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 673
Japanese Plans: Instructions to Ambassador at Berlin
BJ/35.
No : 098452.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
Prom : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No : 93.5 Very urgent.
Date: 30th November, 1941.
[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
Reference my circular telegram No. 2387. [Our No. 098413].
1. The Japanese-American negotiations begun in April of this year under the
former Cabinet have now reached a stage at which a breakdown is inevitable, in
spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government. The Empire, faced with
this situation, has to take the most serious decisions. You should therefore see
Fiihrer HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP at once and give them an
outline of developments in confidence. At the same time you should tell tht :m in
confidence that the attitude of BRITAIN and AMERICA has recently been pro-
vocative and tliey have continued to move troops into all parts of Eastern ASIA.
To meet this we too have been compelled to move troops, and it is greatly to be
feared that an armed collision will occur and we shall find ourselves in a state
of war with BRITAIN and AMERICA. Ycu should add that this may happen
sooner than is expected.
[Here Part II is missing. It will be sent in later if received].
4. If when you make this communication questions are asked by the Germans
and Italians as to our attitude towards RUSSIA, you should tell them that our
attitude towards the SOVIET is as explained to them on 2nd July of this year,
thut we will of course not relax our restraint on the SOVIET as the result of our
action in the sourli; but that if the SOVIET, acting in cooperation with BRITAIN
and AMERICA, take hostile action apainst us, we are prepared to resist it reso-
lutely ; that it is on the South, however, that we lay most emphasis, and that we
propose to refrain from deliberately taking positive action in the North.
5. As all this concerns our plan of campaign it of course requires the utmost
secrecy, and you should make a special point of impressing tliis strongly on the
Germans and Italians.
6. With regard to telling the Italians, immediately after our Ambas.sador in
BERLIN has told the Germans, Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister
CIANO should be informed. As soon as the dates for the German and Italian
interviews are fixed please telegraph.
Please repeat to Rome as my instructions.
Togo.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. L D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese orders for destruction of cypher machine in London Embassy
Date : 3rd December, 1941.
No 698509.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, LONDON.
No: [? 2443 J Circular.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
Secret and Urgent.
Please take steps for the immediate disuse of the cypher machine at your
Embassy.
With regard to the steps to be taken, these should conform to the instructions
sent previously. Please exercise the greatest care and, in particular, with regard
to the methods of dismantling and breaking up the essential parts, carry them
out strictly in accordance with instructions.
On receipt of this, please telegraph immediately the one word "SETSUJU"'*
(Received) en clair, and, having carried out these instructions, telegraph the
word "HASSO"* (Despatched), also en clair.
With regard to the cypher connected with the machine, you are, of course,
also to burn your copy No. 26 of the YU code (machine code") (the settings for
use on the machine for communication between this Department and the Em-
bassy in LONDON).
79716— 46— Ex. 148 44
674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Dept. Note: *These messages received, dated 2nd December, 1941.)
Director (3). F. C. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2).
Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.
Japanese-Thai Relations: Japanese Ambassador, Berlvn, Care Thai Minister
No: 698525.
Date : 4th December, 1941.
From : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To : Foieign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1347.
Date: 20th November, 1941,
I received a visit from the Thai Minister on the 20th. He opened his remarks
by saying that he also was a soldier and would like to have a frank talk with
me as between men who had known each other for many years. He then referred
to a recent crop of rumours to the effect that JAPAN was to invade THAILAJ^TD,
and to reports of large Japanese troop concentrations on the Thai frontier of
French INDO-CHINA, and asked point blank whether there was any truth
in them or not. I replied that I had had no news from my home Government
on these matters but that my own belief was that JAPAN'S actions toward
all Far Eastern races were aimed at applying the principle of live-and-let-live,
the fact being that in cases such as that of the recent arbitration between
THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA JAPAN had done her utmost for THAI-
LAND for this very reason and would never invade THAILAND for the
purpose of aggression. But the facts were that GREAT BRITAIN and
AMERICA had set up the so-called ABCD front in opposition to JAPAN'S
establishment of a New Order, finally threatening the existence even of JAPAN
herself. JAPAN of course would be compelled to continue her course brushing
this aside, and that she wished to attain this and by peaceful uie^ns was obvious
from the mere fact of her having sent Mr. KURUSU to AMElilCA. However
if the worst came to the worst and it was unavoidable, JAPAN would have to
take the necessary steps for her own existence — not that there would be any
question of this happening if THAILAND soon understood JAPAN'S ultimate
purpose and displayed an attitude of cooperation with JAPAN ; she would
have to invade THAILAND only if that country should blindly follow the
lead of GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA and take up an attitude of opposition.
The Minister interposed by describing the position in which THAILAND was
placed and by stating emphatically that THAILAND would never oppose JAPAN
as an Anglo-American cat's-paw.
When suggesting his visit the Minister said that he wished to see me urgently,
and OMMINISI's view that he probably came on instructions from his home
Government.
The Germans are also extremely interested in Thai problems and I should
be glad if yon would inform me at once as to the latest situation.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. L Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Charg6, London, Submits Plans for Withdrawal of Embassy etc. Staffs
Date: 4th December. 1941.
No: 008539.
From : The Japanese Charge d'Aft'aires, LONDON.
T : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 781.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
It is feared that in the event of the situation becoming critical the exchange
of telegrams may become impossible. I therefore submit the following points
for your consideration and request instructions.
1. In view of conditions at this post, countries suitable for protecting our
Interests after the withdrawal of this Embassy are BRAZIL or SWITZER-
LAND. I suggest that the matter be discussed in TOKYO with the country
concerned, so that instructions may be sent by that Government to its Ambas-
sador (Minister) in LONDON.
2. Is there any ohjer-tion to burning the consular exequaturs at present held
in custody, viz :' LIVERPOOL, DUBLIN. RANGOON, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA,
BATAVIA, MACASSAR and VANCOUVER?
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 675
3. The stipulations for withdrawal of the Embassy etc. staffs and of resident
Japanese should be made with the British on a strictly reciprocal 'basis. If
this could be done it would be necessary to effect the exchange at a stipulated
place, each side providing a ship. An agreement would have to be drawn up
regarding the dates of departure etc. to prevent anything going amiss.
(In the case of GERMANY the exchange took place in HOLLAND, in ITALY'S
case it was at LISBON. If liostages are taken there is the danger that our
nationals will not be able to leave the country). The evacuees to be exchanged
are:
1st party : Embassy and Consular staff
2ud party: Newspaper correspondents
3rd party: Japanese Stalf of banks and c(mipanies
who were sent out from JAPAN (the 2nd and 3rd parties are not necessarily
in order of precedence). Exchange f<ir eacii party will be arranged separately.
As a principle I do not wish to include employees locally engaged and Japanese
residing here of their own wisli. Concerning the above negotiations should be
undertaken both here and in TOKYO and, if necessary, instructions can be given
via the countries who will protect our interests.
In round figures the nun.ber of persons is :
(a) Officials — 34 (including the Charge d'Affaires, secretaries, military and
naval attaches, advisory consuls, telegraphic ttaches, chancellors, special em-
ployees and their families ) .
(b) Newspaper correspondents — 6.
(c) Bank and Company employees — 30.
Director (3). F. 0.(13). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Otfice
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir R. Hopkins. M. E. W. (2).
Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office
Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc. in Washington Embassy
Date: 4th December, 1941.
No: 00S54O.
BJ/S7
From : Foreign IMinister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, WASHINGTON.
No: S67 Secret.
Date : 2nd December, 1941.
[Dept: Note: Compare our No. 09S.509].
Of the telegraphic cyphers with which your Embassy is provided you are to
burn all (including the cyphers of other Ministers in your charge) except one
copy each of the machine cypher now in use, cypher "O" and cypher "L".
2. You are also to discard* one complete cyphere machine.
3. As soon as this is done you should telegraph the one word "HARUNO".
4. You should deal with files of in and out telegrams and other secret docu-
ments in an appropriate and suitable manner at your discretion.
5. The syphers brought by Cyphei- • Officer KOSAKA [? should all be burnt].
(Consequently the need to get in touch witli MEXICO referred to in my tele-
gram No. 860 [not received] [last word corrupt] ).
[D^pt: Ni)te: *The worde used, "haiki", can mean "cease to use", "abolish",
"discard". It is not the normal word for "destroy"].
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Reports Rlhhcntrop's Statement on German
War Plans
No: 09S541
Date : 4th December, 1941.
From : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1393.
Date: 29th November. 1941.
(Chef de Mission Cypher).
I was to have had an evening meeting yesterday, the 28th, with RIBBEN-
TROP at his request, but he suddenly asked me to postpone it, and it was ten
at night before we met.
676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The reason for the postponement was that GOERING and leading Government
and Forces personalities met at the Fuehrer's official residence and held an
important conference lasting for many hours. Now that the objects of the Rus-
sian campaign have for the most part been achieved, and the results of inter-
views with the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the European countries col-
lated, they discussed the direction and policy of next year's campaign, and I
have no doubt that at this conference JAPAN'S action was also discussed.
1. First of all RIBBENTROP again asked if I had received any news about
the Japanese-American negotiations. I replied that I had not yet received any
official news. RIBBENTROP said JAPAN must not lose this opportunity of
achieving the establishment of the New Order in East ASIA, and never had
there been a time when close cooperation between the three Allies was more
imperative. If JAPAN hesitated and GERMANY carried through the New Order
in EUROPE alone, BRITAIN and AMERICA would turn the brunt of their
attack against JAPAN. He insisted that, as the Fuehrer had said that day,
the existence of JAPAN and GERMANY on the one hand and of AMERICA on
the other was fundamientally incompatible, and the Germans were in receipt of
reports that, owing to the stiff attitude of the Americans, there was practically
no possibility of the Japanese-American negotiations being successful. If this
was so, and if JAPAN determined on war against BRITAIN and AMERICA,
not only would this be to the common advantage of JAPAN and GERMANY, but
he believed it would be to JAPAN'S advantage also.
I said I know nothing of JAPAN'S plans and therefore could not answer; but
I asked whether His Excellency really thought a state of war would arise be-
tween GERMANY and AMERICA. He replied that ROOSEVELT was diseased,
and there was no knowing what he would do.
Considering that hitherto RIBBENTROP has always answered that AMERICA
would avoid war, and in view of recent speeches by HITLER and RIBBENTROP,
it seems to me that GERMANY'S attitude towards AMERICA is gradually stiffen-
ing, and that she has reached the stage where she would not shun even war with
AMERICA.
2. I enquired about the future of the war against RUSSIA. RIBBENTROP
replied that the Fuehrer had said that it was now his inflexible determination to
sweep away and crush the SOVIET once and for all. The most important military
operations had been concluded, and a large part of the army would be withdrawn
to GERMANY. They would, however, continue operations in the CAUCASUS,
a;id next Spring with a part of it thev would make an attack on and beyond the
URALS and chase STALIN into SIBERIA. I asked when approximately this
was to be, and he said it was intended that the attack should start in about
May of next year.
I next observed that I gathered from what he said that they were quite de-
termined on attacking the SOVIET, and the thing I should like done as soon
as possible was the creation of air communications between MANCHURIA and
GERMANY. He replied that the Germans had been thinking of this for some
time i)ast. and he thought that next Summer it would not be impossible to fly in
one hop from somewhere near the URALS to MANCHURIA.
3. I asked abont plans for an attiick on BRITAIN. Pie said that before the
landing in BRITAIN thev would chase British influence clean out of the NEAR
EAST, AFRICA, GIBRALTAR and the MEDITERRANEAN. I gather from this
statement by RIBBENTROP that they attach even more imrportance than before
to this area. I asked if thev intended to carry on without, attacking the BRIT-
ISH ISLES. RIBBENTROP said that GERMANY was of course making prepa-
rations for this: but according to I'eports reaching GERMANY the internal
situation in BRITAIN was not any too good. For instance the split in the
Conservative Party, the lack of confldence in CHURCHILL and the revolutionary
ideas of BEVIN, the Labour leader, were making internal conditions quite diffi-
cult. There were of course some people who did not believe this ; but the
Fuehrer believed that conditions in BRITAIN were bad and thought that as the
result of GERMANY'S future operations, even, it might be, without an invasion,
BRITAIN would be beaten.
In any case, however. GERMANY for her part had no intention whatever of
makinc peace with ENGLAND, and the plan was to drive British influence out
of EUROPE entirely. After the War, therefore. BRITAIN would be left ab-
solutely powerless, and although the BRITISH ISLES would remain, all other
Briti.sh territory would be split up into three under GERMANY, AMERICA and
JAPAN. In AFRICA, GERMANY would, generally speaking, be satisfied with
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 677
her old colonies and would give a great part to ITALY. It was, he said, to ob-
taining (group corrupt) that GERMANY attached the most importance.
4. Remarking in conclusion that the very satisfactory progress of the War under
German leadership was fully recognised and that GERMANY naturally had to
extend the area of operations by regarding as enemies not oidy BRITAIN but also
countries under British inlluence and those helping BRITAIN, I asked him when
he thought the War would end. To this he replied that, although he hoped it
would be brought to a conclusion in the course of next year, it might possibly
continue till the following year.
He also said that if JAPAN were to go to war with AMERICA, GERMANY
would, of course, join in immediately, and HITLER'S intention was that there
should be absolutely no question of GERMANY making a separate peace with
ENGLAND.
At the end of this talk RIBBENTROP asked that the substance of it should
be kept strictly secret, so please pay special attention to its handling.
This telegram has been given to the Naval and Military Attaches and to Vice-
Admiral NOMURA and Major-General ABE, Please have it shown to the Army
and Navy.
OSHIMA.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War OfBce (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese instructions regarding cypher machines and codes
BJ/88.
No. : 098563
Date: 0th Decembek, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese ( ? Ambassador) , HANOI etc.
No : 2444 Circular. Secret.
Date : 1st December, 1941.
Instructions have been sent to LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE and
MANILA to discard the cypher machine, and BATAVIA's machine has been re-
turned to JAPAN.
Notwithstanding my circular telegram No. 2447 (see below), WASHINGTON
is retaining its machine and machine code.
BERNE to repeat to VICHY, BERLIN. ROME and ANGORA. WASHINGTON
to repeat to BRAZIL, ARGENTINE and MEXICO.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, ROME etc.
No : 2447 Circular of 2nd December. 1941.
Instructions have been sent to the following to burn all telegraphic codes except
one copv each of OITE and L :
North AMERICA (including HONOLULU), CANADA. PANAMA, (one group
corrupt), South S'oas (including (one group: ? Portuguese) TIMOR), SINGORA,
CHIENMAI, British possessions (including Embassy in LONDON), and Dutch
possessions.
Togo.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc
BJ/89.
No: 098577
Date: 5th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Consul, MOMBASA [and other posts unspecified].
No: 2446. Circular.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
(Secret).
Immediately on receipt of this telegram you are to carry out the following
instructions with the greatest care and as inconspicuously as possible.
(a) Burn all cyphers except one copy each of "O" and "L". As soon as
you have done this immediately telegraph the one word HARUNA en clair.
678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Burn all files of in and out telegrams and all secret and confidential
documents.
Those are precautions envisaging an emergency, and you should therefore
redouble [rest of test corrupt: ? precautions in the discharge of vour duties].
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. L D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India
Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions
Office.
Japanese Code Words for Telegraphing to Notify Critical Condition of Situation
No: 09S602
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO,
To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.
No: 2409 Circular.
Date: 27th November, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.
The following is the method of telegraphing secret code words to notify
the critical condition of the situation.
Using the names on the first colmun a plain language text will be made
up on some ordinary subject The second column will contain the information
which it is desired to send.
(Example:
"Collision between Japanese and Soviet armies" will appear in the text
under date* [? 15th] as "Junior Secretaries HIJIKATA and KUBOTA are
ordered for duty at your post. STOP").
Further telegrams sent by this method will all end with the word "STOP"
to distinguish them from other communications. The word "OWARI"
[ — "end"] will therefore not be used.
Arimura : cypher communications prohibited.
Asai : communicate by wireless broadcast.
Asakura : listen carefully for wireless communication by broadcast.
Asikaga :
Azuma :
Edoguti :
Hanabusa :
Hanazono :
Hatakeyama ;
Hattori :
Hijikata :
Hosino :
Ibaragi :
Inagaki :
Isliikawa :
Kashiwagi :
Kobayakawa
Kodama :
Komiyama :
Koyanagi :
Kubota :
Kuiibara :
Kusuiioki :
Matsutani :
Minami :
Miwata :
Miyazaki :
Morokoshi :
Motizuki :
Nagamine :
jamming by oversea broadcasts reception impossible.
pressure on JAPAN becoming greater.
prepare for evacuation.
evacuation preparations made.
proceed with preparations for requesting suitable
foreign envoy (consulate) to protect Japanese
'interests,
diplomatic relations severed between Japan
and
relations between JAPAN and .... are extremely
critical,
collision between Japanese and .... armies.
JAPAN is engaged with .... on the whole front.
telegraph time at which rupture of diplomatic rela-
tions between .JAPAN and country to which you
are accredited anticipated,
has telegram been received on the matter of ... .T
telegram received on the matter of ... .
positive action has begun against ....
stop granting; Japanese entry and transit visas to
.... nationals.
Japan.
China.
Great Britain.
IT. S. S. R.
France.
Germany.
Italy.
United States of America.
Canada.
Mexico,
r? Brazil].
Panama.
Argentine.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 679
Nakazato :
Thailand.
Nango :
England and America.
Teigi :
Dutch East Indies.
Ogawa :
Burma.
Okamoto :
Malaya.
Okiuiuira :
Australia.
Onizuka :
Union of [? South Africa].
Nodera :
enemy country.
Otani:
[? the individual in question]
Onishi :
year.
Sibuya :
next year.
Simanaka :
this yeai'.
Sakukibara :
month.
Sigeno I:
[? day].
San Zyo :
time.
Itiro :
one.
Nisaku :
2
Santaro :
3
Yoiti :
4
GorO:
5
[? Ma] Sa Roku:
6
Simetaro :
7
Yasokiti :
8
Hisamatu :
9
Atuml :
0 (zero).
Togo.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
From : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To : Japanese Consul-General, Singapore
[and other posts unspecified].
No : 2461 Circular of 3rd December, 1941.
Secret :
Duplicates of secret code words (including those for use in broadcasting*) are
to be kept until the last moment. If anyone has already burnt them he should
inform me by telegram and they will be telegraphed again.
Togo.
[Dept: Note: *These are presumably those given in our No. 098127].
Japanese orders for destruction of cyphers, etc.
BJ/90
No: 098603
Date : 6th December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To : Japanese Ambassador, London.
No : 244.5 Circular. ( Secret ) .
Date : 2nd December, 1941.
Please take the following action without delay and see to it that no word of
it leaks out to outsiders.
1. Except for one copy each of the O, E, H, P, G, and L codes and the Character
Code, all telegraphic codes (including the cypher books for intercommunication
between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine) to be burnt.
2. When this has been done, the one word "HARUNA" to be telegraphed.
3. The files of all incoming and outgoing telegrams and all other confidential
documents to be burnt.
4. Taking all possible care not to arouse outside suspicion, all secret documents
to be treated in the same way.
As these are precautions envisaging an emergency, you should communicate
this to no one but members of your staff and you should redouble your attention
to your duties and maintain your calmness and self-respect.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. A Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Japanese Chai*g6, London.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
No : 790 of 3rd December, 1941.
HARUNA [see paragraph 2 of telegram above].
Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation
No. 098604
Date : 6tli December, 1&41.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.
No: 2421 Circular.
Date: 29th November, 1941.
Additions to list given in my circular No. 2409 [our No. 09S602].
(To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher).
Kasima :
Kanoo :
Kikuti :
Katuno :
Kawasimo :
Kakao :
Tujikita :
Tabuse :
Saitoo :
Kakasaki :
Isezaki :
Wanami :
Yasu[?RYO]
Uno:
Itimata :
Have residents been interned?
All residents ai'e safe.
All residents have been interned.
Some residents have been interned.
General Information. Wave-length changed to
[day].
W
Director (3). F. O. (3).
(2). Colonial Office. War
Office.
k/cs from . . . [month]
General Information
change vpave-length.
General Information.
wave-length.
General Information.
wave-length.
General Information.
on . . . [day] from . .
General Information.
cast from . . . [day]
[time].
Hundred.
Thousand.
0,000.
00,000.
C00,000.
F. I. D. Admiralty.
Ministry. M. I. 5.
Sensitivity bad ; please
Please change to shorter
Please change to longer
Time of broadcast changing
. [time] to . . . [time].
Please change time of broad-
from . . . [time] to . . .
War Office (3). India Office
Sir E. Bridges. Dominions
Japanese code loords for telegraphing to notify critical condition of sitnation
No. 098608
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, RIO etc.
No.: 2432. Circular.
Date : 29th No_vember, 1941.
As the following additions have been made for use in connection with your
area only, please add them to the list already sent to you. (See our Nos.
098602 and 09SG04).
Asahima :
Date:
Kawahara :
tons of
Niwaii Quiti :
Makaniuta :
Mukakata :
Kazama :
Tokusima :
The supplying of fuel to Japanese ships putting into
Port has been stopped from .... (date).
Please telegraph what quantity of . . . can be
bought.
It is thought that about .
be bought.
Purchase of . . . impossible.
Negotiations for purchase of . . . in progress.
(? Please) communicate via . . . (name of coun-
try).
Communications (? to be carried out) via diplo-
matic mission in . . . (name of country).
Japanese sbip diie . . . (name of country) on
. . . (month) . . . (day).
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
681
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India
Oflice (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir K. Bridges. Domin-
ions Office.
Takemoiiti: Can a -Japanese ship visit . . . (name of country).
Yahagi : Impossible to despatch Japanese stiip to . . .
(name of country).
Tonagi : Japanese ship can be sent to . . . (n-inie of
country).
Takagi : Metal.
Sawamura : Lead.
Hasumi : Mercury.
Iwasaki : Coal.
Mikokata: Diamonds for industrial use.
lyami : Platinum.
Kada : Copper.
Makagawa : Carat.
Makhata : PEliU.
Masuko: t III LB.
Hakada : COLOMBIA.
Takekaka : ( V UR r 0 UAY ) .
Simazu : ( '/PARAGUAY ) .
Ihazawa : VENE/;UELA.
Fujikaka: SAN (? DOMINGO).
Hasimoto : ( ? ECUADOR) .
Simeo : HAVANA.
TaiiKi: (?RIO).
Tokawa: (? BOLIVIA).
Haseg iwa : River PLATE.
Iri— Ine: SANTOS.
Ksomoto: (Bauru, sic. ? PAULO).
Bappu : CURITIBA.
Tekamatu : ( ? BELEM ) .
Suatugu : BUENOS AIRES.
Suzuki : SANTIAGO.
Yamato : LIMA.
Uskgawa : BOGOTA.
Hara : CARACAS.
Isono : ?
Fukamati : ASUNCION.
Japanese-Amerwan negotiations account sent to Japanese Ambassador, Berlin.
No. 09S633.
Date : 7th December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No. 986.
Date : 30th November 1941.
(Dept. Note: First paragraph missing).
2. The present Cabinet has therefore continued the negotiations (with
AMEinCA) hitherto on an equitable basis though at the same time exercising
every care to safeguard JAPAN'S authority and existence.
Amongst the most knotty points in these negotiations has been the conflict in
the respective opinions regarding the question of withdrawing troops (with-
drawal of troops from CHINA and INDO CHINA was demanded) etc., but to
judge by circumstances in the negotiations hitherto, the fundamental obstacle
has been the traditional policy of AMERICA with regard to the conduct of
international relations, that is to say her adherence to the same fundamental
principles as were expressed in the recent Anglo-American talks at sea (? i. e.
the Atlantic Charter). In short, AMERICA'S real intention is to veto and
obstruct the establishment of the New Order in EUROPE and ASIA by JAPAN,
GERMANY, and ITALY (i. e. the purpose of the Tripartite Pact), their view
being that Japanese-American relations cannot be maintained on a friendly
basis so long as JAPAN makes common cause with GERMANY and ITALY,
and, acting on this view, they have to all intents and pui"poses demanded
JAPAN'S renunciation of the Tripartite Pact. This has brought the negotia-
682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions to their final stage, and, as the talks of the last few days have made this
matter still more clear, JAPAN has been compelled to realize that to continue
the negotiations any longer cannot be expected to serve any useful purpose.
3. Again, the proposals presented by the American Government on the 26th
made the above attitude even clearer, the clause affecting the Tripartite Pact
being worded : "It is agreed that any treaty which either of the two Govern-
ments may have concluded with a third country shall not be construed as con-
flicting with the principles of this treaty, in other words, with the maintenance
of peace in all regions of the PACIFIC . . . ." It is apparent that this was
planned with the object of restricting the interpretation of JAPAN'S obligations
under the Tripartite Pact, and thereby of making JAPAN refrain fi-om giving
support to GERMANY and ITALY in the event of American participation in
the (group corrupt. ! European) war, and to judge by this clause alone it has
been reali-sed that, quite apart from all other qiiestions, it would be impossible
for tlie American proposals to be made (group corrupt: ! the subject of) nego-
tiations. Moreover the fact is that the American Government held constanr
discussions with GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and the Dutch
before presenting their proposals, and hence it can be seen that AMERICA is
at present (? acting in conmion) with these countries and regards JAPAN as
an enemy together with GERMANY and ITALY.
Director (3). P. O. (8). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Ind. Ofiice
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges. Domin-
ion Office.
Japanese Ambassador, Rome, reports interview with Mussolini.
No: 098650
Date: 7th December, 1911.
From : Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To : Foreign Minister. TOKYO.
Date : 3rd December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine).
Reference your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 09S452).
Accompanied by ANDO I saw the Duce, MUSSOLINI. (CIANO also was pres-
ent) at 11 a.m. on the 3rd. I first gave him an outline of the Japanese- Ameri<"an
negotiations as set forth in your No. 988 to BERLIN four No. 098633). MUS-
SOLINI said he had been following the negotiations from their inception until
to-day with the greatest attention, and my communication had caused him no
surprise. Theie was no doubt that the present situation was the natural result
of the (? obstinacy) of the American Government and of President ROOSE-
VELT'S policy of intervention. The plutocrats of AMERICA aimed at the eco-
nomic exploitation of Eastern ASIA for their own benefit, and wanted to detach
JAPAN from the Axis and intervene in the European war. He had always
known from the beginning that JAPAN, who was faithful and loyal, would not
respond to such an attitude on AMERICA'S part, negotiations or no negotiations.
As I and my predecessor knew, he was a whole-hearted supporter of JAPAN'S
fundamental policy for the establishment of a New Order in East ASIA, and
as it was in the past, so it was in the present and would be in the future. He
firmly believed that JAPAN, as a natural right, would be the leader of Great
East ASIA.
Director (3). P. O. (3). P. L D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges. Domin-
ion Office.
I then spoke on the lines of your telegram under reference ( [This passage in
brackets is not clear. The sense seems to be: "With regard to paracrrarh 3 of
your telegram, it was to be done as one copy between ovir Ambassador in BERLIN
and RIBBENTROP and talks of some sort were in progress. I should like him to
ask the German Ambassador about it."] ). With regard to paragraph 2 in your
telegram MUSSOLINI said that if war broke nut ITALY would give military
support to the best of h"r power; thnt is to <5ay she wouVl do her best to keen the
British Navy in the MEDITERRANEAN. Moreover GERIVLANY and ITALY to-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 683
gether had recently established an air blockade and were trying to put further
pressure on BRITAIN in the RLEDITERRANEAN. Also with regard to [ ? 2 ? 31,
he was ready to sign to-day. I therefore asked further with regard to 2 if ITALY
would do this at once if JAPAN declared war on BRITAIN and on AMERICA.
He replied that in accordance with the Three Power Pact naturally she would.
As, however, it would be necessary to do it simultaneously with GERMANY, they
would have to go through the formality of consulting with GERMANY. With
regard to 3, I submitted the [one group] translation in your telegram No. 237
[not received], and asked which procedure he preferred, a single copy or separate
copies. He replied that it should be done simultaneously with GERMANY, but he
did not much mind what form it took. If it were possible a single copy would
give a greater impression of strength. He would at once consult MACKENSEN
on this point.
At this meeting MUSSOLINI asked me questions about the Russian question,
and I therefore did not refer to it.
Repeated to BERLIN.
HoEiKiai.
Japan and the Axis, Proposed Three-Power Pact.
No: 098651
Date: 7th December, 1941.
From : The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No : 782.
Date : 5th December, 1941.
Reference my telegram No. 775. [Not received].
Accompanied by ARDO I had an interview with the Foreign Minister CIANO
on the 5th at his request.
CIANO showed me the Italian text of the draft of a Three-Power Pact to which
GERMANY and ITALY have agreed, (BERLIN will have telegraphed this to
you, I imagine), regarding participation in tlie war and not making an independ-
ent armistice or independent peace. He said that if the Japanese would agree
to this it could be signed at any time. The procedure could be arranged by con-
versations between BERLIN and TOKYO and then all the parties could sign.
Repeated by telegram to BERLIN.
HORIKIRI.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir H. Bridges. Dominions
Office.
Japanese Foreign Minister s View of Washington Conversations.
No: 098671.
Date: 8th December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN, etc.
No : 2416 Circular.
Date: 28th November, 1941.
[Dept: Note: Very corrupt text].
(Chef de Mission cypher).
With regard to the Japanese-American negotiations, the counter-proposal made
by the Americans on the 27th ignores the position of JAPAN and cannot be con-
sidered for a moment. It seems, therefore, that there is nothing for it but to
discontinue the negotiations. The situation is that it is impossible to guarantee
that within a few days from now there will be no [ ? change in] the relations of
JAPAN with BRITAIN and AMERICA.
This is for your personal information only.
Togo.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D.
684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Broadcasting.
No: 098673
Date: Sth December, 1941.
From : The Japanese Ambassador, RIO DE JANEIRO.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 482.
Date: 30th November, 1941.
Recently at this post, we have been testing general news reception.
At present it is quite impossible [group corrupt : ? to hear] the 10.30 p. m.
Tokyo time, broadcast and, for the time being, please note that we are only
listening to JVJ"s [group corrupt : ? JZ.J's] broadcasts directed to American
states at 6.30 p. m., Tokyo time. The same, I understand, applies to Argentina.
Actually, reception conditions here are considered best between 4 a. m. and
6 a. m., Tokyo time, and I consider it would be most advantageous to \ise this
period for South American broadcasts. Two wave-lengths [of frequencies] be-
tween 10 and 15 magacycles [group corrupt: ? are suggested].
Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. M. I. 5.
Japanese Ambassador, Bangkok, Wishes to Burn Codes.
No : 098674
Date: Sth Dbcetwhee, 1941.
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 883.
Date : 30th November, 1941.
In view of the state of emergency, I should like to burn all telegraphic codes
except those set out below. Please wire at once whether you have any objection.
YO, KA, OITE, TO. TSU, FUJI, X. [Group corrupt]. MATSU with No. 1
rules for use, directions for using "B" machine (KO-OTSU [(a)-(b)]) and the
machine code — one of each of the above.
L, YAKKO [— NU]— two of each.
Further, I should like to burn all shipping codes, naval codes and codes for
use between the three Ministries. Please negotiate with the Departments con-
cerned and telegraph instructions.
Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2).
Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.
No. 098693
Date: Sth December, 1941.
From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No : 1416.
Date: oth December, 1941.
[Dept : Note: See our No. 0S8S51].
(Chef de Mission Cypher).
Reference my No. 1407 [not received].
I called on RIBBENTROP at his request at 3 a. m. on the Sth. He made a
formal reply that they accepted the two points put forward by us. My follow-
ing telegram gives the draft Treaty which he gave me in this connection.
OSHMA.
No: 1417 of 5tb December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission Cypher).
(1. The last part of the Agreement is in the same form as the Three Power
Treaty.
2. The place of signature is BERLIN. )
[Dept: Note: Translation follows at end of text].
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Of-
fice (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions
Office.
(Part of German text in original illegible.)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 685
Artikel 1
Falls zwischen Deutschland und Italien einerseits und den Vereinigten Staaten
vou Amerika andererseits der Kriegszustand eintritt, wird sich Japan eofort
auch seinerseits als im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten betindlicli be-
trachten und dieseu Krieg mit alien ihm zur Verfiigung stehenden Macbtmitteln
fiihren.
Artikel 2.
Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, im Falle eines gemass Arti-
kel 1 dieses Abkommens von den drei Miichten gemeinsam gegen die Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika gefiihrten Krieges ohne voiles rgegen]seitiges Einverstiind-
nis keinen Waffenstillstand oder Frieden mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu schliessen.
Sie iibernehmen die gleiche Verpflichtung auch hinsichtlioh eines Waffenstill-
stands oder Friedens mit England fiir den Fall, dass zwischen Japan und England
der Kriegszustand eintritt.
Artikel 3.
Die drei Regierungen sind dariiber einig, dass dieses Abkommen auf das
strengste geheim gehalten wird. Sie werden jedoch die von ihnen in Artikel 2
iibernommene Verpflichtung in einer noch zu verabrenden Form bekanntgeben,
sobald sich Deutschland, Italien und Japan gemeinsam im Kriegszustand mit
den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika oder England oder mit diesen beiden
Miichten befinden.
Artikel 4.
Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft vind bleibt
ebenso lange wie der am 27. September 1940 abgeschlossene Dreimjlchtepakt in
Geltung,
OSHIMA.
Translation
In view of the increasingly obvious desire of the UNITED STATES and
ENGLAND to bring to nought a just New Order with all the armed forces at their
disposal and to cut off the means of existence of the German, Italian and Japanese
peoples, the German Government, the Italian Government and the Japanese
Government have, in order to ward off these grave threats to the existence of
their peoples, jointly resolved on the following :
Article (1).
Should a state of war arise between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES,
GERMANY and ITALY for their part shall also consider themselves to be at war
with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces
at their disposal.
Should a state of war arise between GERMANY and ITALY on the one hand
and the UNITED STATES on the other, JAPAN for her part shall consider
herself to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with
all the armed forces at her disposal.
Article (2).
GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN bind themselves in the event of a war waged
jointly by the Three Powers against the UNITED STATii]S according to Article
(1) of this Treaty, not to conclude any armistice or peace with the UNITED
SltATES without full mutual agreement.
They undertake a similar obligation regarding an armistice or peace with
ENGLAND, should a state of war arise between JAPAN and ENGLAND.
Article (3).
The three Governments are in full agreement that this agreement shall be kept
most strictly secret. They shall, however, announce in a form yet to be decided,
the undertakings assumed in Article (2), as soon as GERMANY, ITALY and
JAPAN find themselves jointly at war with the UNITED STATES of AMERICA
or with ENGLAND or with both these Powers.
Article (4).
This agreement comes into force immediately on signature and remains in force
as long as the Three Power Pact concluded on 27th September 1940.
686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Notification of "Extremely Critical Relations with Great Britain and
United States
BJ/91
No. 098694
Date: Sth Decembee, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Embassy, LONDON, etc.
No. 2494 Circular. ,
Date : 7th December, 1941,
Relations between JAPAN and GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES
are extremely critical.
Japanese Fore:ign Minister.
[Dept. Note: This telegram was sent in plain language with the special code
words inserted given in our No. 098602. It was despatched from TOKYO at 1150
hours OMT on 7th December 1941, i. e. Japan Time 8.50 p. m. on 7th December
1941].
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Indian
Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions
Office.
Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.
No: 098696
Date: Sth Decembee, 1941.
From : The Foreign Minister, TOETYO.
To : The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No. 1004. Most immediate.
Date : 7th December, 1941.
[Dept:: Note: In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the macliine].
Reference your Nos. 1418 and 1419 [these telegrams were received in corrupt
and fragmentary form. The former appears to deal with Russian supplies and
the latter with the draft treaty].
We are in complete agreement with GERMANY'S counter-proposals. Accord-
ingly there is no objection to initialling right away and formally signing as soon
as the [group corupt : ? necessary] procedure has been completed. However, the
situation may take a sudden turn and we cannot tell whether a [group corrupt]
collision may not occur in the interval before the formal signing is performed.
Thus, supposing we initial now, it must be understood that for the actual sign-
ing, the text proposed by GERMANY may not apply to the existing circumstances
(for example, clauses like No. 1 will be unnecessary if GERMANY and ITALY
join in the war without delay).
[Two groups] I wish you to see RIBBENTROP immediately and explain the
above particulars confidentially to him. Also make clear that it is the expecta-
tion of tlie Imperial Government that if war breaks out between JAPAN and
AMERICA before the formal signature of the agreement, GERMANY and ITALY
W'ill immediately participate.
Director (3). P. O. (3). P. L. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India
Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Si;* E. Bridges., Dominions
Office.
As regards the text of the agreement, [group corrupt: ? please negotiate]
only for the stipuation concerning the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Re-
specting GERMANY, please refer to the text in my No. 997 (not received).
Further, discuss with GERMANY whether the formal signing should be made
public after GERMANY and ITALY have joined in the war and telegraph the
reply.
Please repeat to ROME.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 687
Far Eastern War: Question of Oerman and Italian Participation
RJ/92.
No: 098722
Date : 9th DECEMt;i:u, 1941.
From : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No : 1432. Most immediate.
Date : 8th December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission cypher) .
At 11 p. m. to-day, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities had broken
out between JAPAN and AMERICA, and at once called an RIBBENTROP. He
said that from reports which he too had received he thought this was true, and
that therefore, although he had not yet secured HITLEit's sanction, the im-
mediate participation in the war by GERMANY and ITALY was a matter of
course. The secret agreement had in consequence already become ? , and
[? they had decided] to drop it * * * [a portion is lost here] * * * Form
of German and Italian participation. RIBBENTROP said he would discuss
with me to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration
and so on.
RIBBENTROP rang up CIANO then and there and notified him of the
foregoing.
Director (23. P. O. (3). P. L D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir H. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Far Eastern War: Text of Japanese-Gcrman-Ifalian Agreement
BJ/98
No. 098760
Date: 10th Decembee, 1941.
From : The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No. 1440. Most Immediate.
Date : 8th December, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.
Reference my No. 1432. ( Our No. 0S8722 ) .
The text of the agreement, after consultation with GERMANY, is given below.
An explanation follows in my separate telegram.
In dem unerschiitterlichen Entschluss, die Waffen nicht niederz ilegen, bis der
gemeiusame Krieg gegen die Vereinigten Staateu von Amerika und England zum
erfolgreichen Ende gefiihrt worden i«t, haben sich die Deutsche Regierung, die
Italienische Regierung und die Japanische Regierung liber folgende Bestim-
mungen geeinigt :
Artikel 1. — Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden den ihnen von den Ver-
einigten Staaten von Amerika und England aufgezwungenen Krieg mit alien ihnen
zu Gcbote stelienden Machtmitteln gemeiiisam bis zuni siegreiciien Ende fiiliren.
Artikel 2. — Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, ohne voiles gegen-
seitiges EinverstJindnis weder mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika noch mit
England Waffenstillstand Oder Frieden zu schliessen.
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. L D. Admiralty War Office (3). India Office (2).
Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Artikel 3. — Deutschland, Italien nnd Japan werden nach siegreicher Beendi-
gung des Krieges zum Zwecke der Herbeifiihrung einer gerechten Neuordnung auf
das engste zusammenarbeiten.
Artikel J/. — Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft.
Zu Urkunde dessen haben die Unterzeichneten, von ihren Regierungen geiu'irig
bevollmachtigt, dieses Abkommen unterzeichnet und mit ihren Siegf^In versehen.
Ausgefertigt in dreifacher Urschrift in deutscher, italienischer und japanischer
Sprache, in Berlin am . . . Di^zember 1941 im 20ten Jalire der Faschistischen
Ara — entsprechend dem Tage des 12ten Monats des 16ten Jahres der Ara Syowa.
No. 1441 of 8th Dacember, 1941.
With reference to my telegram No. 1440 [see above].
688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From 5 p. m. to-day myself, RIBBENTROP, KASD, USHIDA, and GAUSS put
our heads together on this matter of the declaration of the non-conclusion of a
separate peace with a view to imparting to this declaration the loftiest possible
signiflcauce, and produced the text of the agreement contained in my telegram
under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal in regard to a
promise of nont'onclusion of a separate i3eace (Clause II) to the following extent:
(a) The Three Powers' firm intention to fight together against Anglo-American
aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.
(b) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the
war is promised in Clause III.
Thereby the significance of this war is elucidated, while at the same time
Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and
Italian cooperation when the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere is established
after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japanese
Government. I hope therefore that the above text will be adopted unless there
are any serious objections, and that the formalities for signature may be com-
pleted promptly. I would add that in the meantime the Germans have notified
me that the Italian Government is in complete agreement with this proposal.
2. Ribbentrop said that he would like the publication of this agreement to take
place on the 10th and immediately afterwards hoped to stage a big demonstration.
He was unable at the moment to say what kind of demonstration this would be but
it was sure to be something distinctly favourable to JAPAN, and he was most
anxious that signature should be on the 10th. I therefore told him that this could
not be undertaken in view of formalities in JAPAN, but as it is likely to be helpful
to us if we play our part in falling in with GERMANY'S intention I would sug-
gest that you push on with the formalities as fast as possible with a view to
prompt, signature. Should signature on the 10th not be possible please reply im-
mediately by telegram on what date it can be accomplished.
3. Just as this very talk was in progress RIBBENTROP received the Imperial
Headquarters report of the victory in which the American battleships were sunk,
and was greatly delighted and praised highly the daring of our Navy.
No : 1442 of 8th December, 1941.
Most immediate. Secret.
Reference my No. 1440. [See above.]
As the matter Is urgent, I have tentatively complied the Japanese text given
below. If you have no objections I should like to take this as the (Japanese)
text of the agreement. Please telegraph your reply at once.
The Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government
with the inflexible determination not to lay down their arms in the joint war
against the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE until final victory is
achieved have made the following agreement.
1. JAPAN, GER^TANY and ITALY will conjointlv prosecute the war forced upon
them by the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE will all the means
at their disposal until victory is attained.
2. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, except by mutual consent, undertake not
to conclude a separate [Dept. Note : the Japanese word used means literally
"arbitrarv" "solf-willpd''! armistice and/or peace with the UNITED STATES
and the BRITISH EMPIRE or with either of them.
3. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, after victory is atttained, will cooperate
closely in the establishment of an equitable New Order.
4. This agreement will come into force simultaneously with its signature. In
witness whereof, the undermentioned, having received competent authority from
their respective countries, have set their seals this — day of the 12th month of
the 16th year of the Showa Bra Era i. e. — December 1941 or the^ — day' of
December of the 20th year of the Fascist Era, in BERLIN, the said agreement hav-
ing been drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian.
Japanese Instructions to Embassy, Rio, etc. to turn cyphers etc
RJ/97.
From : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To : .Lnpanese Ambassador, Rio De Janeiro, etc.
No. 2318 Circular.
Date : 8th December, 1941.
No : 098786
Date: 10th December, 1941.
I
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 689
Immediate and Confidential
1. On receipt of this telegram please burn the following, leaving one copy of
each, NU, CITE, TSU, L and X. Depending on the situation, it will also be all
right to burn the remaining codes, but please keep TSU as long as ix>ssible and
leave CITE and L to the last.
2. Please leave one copy each of HIMOKI and the Machine Code in current use
(including the rules for use between our Embassy in England Cslc) and us
only MEXICO does not possess these). But if in view of the situation you wish
at any time to destroy them please telegraph me.
3. With regard to the files of my telegrams and other secret documents please
watch developments and adopt suitable means of destroying them.
4. In the event of your conpleting the above, telegraph me the one word
JUKYO. If you have destroyed TSU the word SHOTI, if CITE and L have
been destroyed the word ANZEN.
5. If vou have in your care telegraphic codes of other Posts please destrop them
all. •
Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office
(2) Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office. M. I. 5.
Japanese Codes to he Destroyed at Bangkok
No : 098800
Date: 11th Decb:mber, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
No: 881. Confidential.
Date : 2nd December, 1941.
In reply to your telegram No. 863. [Our No. 098674]. I agree with your re-
quest, to which there is no objection. But please transfer one copy of OITZ
to SINGORA for safe keeping. Please destroy the codes for use between the
three Ministries ; also all the nnval code books. The codes remaining after
consultation with the posts concerned and the cypher machine[s] please deposit
in the special safe. Please be sure that this is carried out.
Director. F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2).
Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Broadcasthui : Reception in Bangkok
No: 098801
Date: 11th December, 1941.
From : The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 902.
Date: 4th December, 1941.
At 10 : 30 p. m. J.A.P.'s selectivity is gradually improving.
We look for broadcasts at this hour and also for JUP at 6 : 30 p. m.
Director. F.O.{3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2),
Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.r). Dominions Office.
Japanese Consul, Dublin, Reports — Destruction of Cyphers
No: 098831
Date: 12th December, 1941.
From : The Japanese Vice-Consul, DUBLIN.
To : The Foreign IMinister, TOKYO.
Date: Tth December, 1941. 1040 hours.
*HARUNA,
Japanese Consul.
[Dept. Note: *See paragraph 2 of TOKYO circular telegram No. 2445 of 2nd
December, 1941, our No. 098803].
Director. F.O. (3). Dominions Office.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 148 45
690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Vice-Consul, Ouritiha, Reports — Destruction of Cyphers, etc.
No: 098832
Date: 12th December, 1941.
From : The Japanese Vice-Consiil, OURITIBA.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date : 10th December, 1941. 2040 hours.
*JURYO,
Konii}7e.
[Dept: Note: *See Toliyo circular telegram No. 2318 of 8th December, 1941.
paragi-aph 4, our No. 098786].
Director. F.0.(3). M.L5.
Japan and the Axis: Signature of Treaty
B J/101.
No: 098833
Date : 12th December, 1941.
From : The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No. 1451.
Date : 10th December, 1941.
(Dept : Note. See our No. 008760, BJ/98) .
Reference your telegram No. 1013. (Not received).
I have received the whole of the Japanese text. I called on the Foreign
Minister at noon to-day, lOth, and arranged for signature on the 11th at 1100 hours
Berlin time and for publication at 1600 hours. Accordingly please publish at 2300
hours in JAPAN. Oshima.
Director (-). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office,
(2). Colonial Office. Ministry. Sir B. Bridges. Dominions Office.
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, BERLIN, AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THREE-
POWER TREATY
No: 098846
Date : 12th December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1016.
Date: 10th December, 1941.
( Dept : Note : See our No. 098760) .
Most immediate.
To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.
My telegram No. 1013. (Not received).
For your information, the following is a translation into German of the docu-
ment giving you power and authority to sign :
(t'bersetzung).
TOKYO, den . . . Dezember des sechzehnten Jahres von Showa.
(Amtliches Insiegel).
Der Minister des Auswiirtigen Amtes, Shigenori TOGO.
An den Ausserordentlichen und BevoUmiichtigt Botschafter in BERLIN,
Herrn OSHIMA.
Seine Majestat de Kaiser haben nachdem die Beratung des kaiserlichen ge-
heimen Staatrates abgeschlossen ist, mit dem heutigan Datum den
Abschluss
Director.
F. — . (3).
P. L D.
Abschluss des Abkommens zwischen JAPAN, DEUTSCHLAND und ITALIEN
zu bewilligen geruht.
Sie sind bevollmachtigt, das oben genannte Abkommen zu unterzeichnen und zu
siegelu.
(Translation of German given above is as follows:-
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 691
(Translation).
TOKYO, the th December, in the 16th year of the Showa Era.
(Office Seal).
Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO,
To Mr. OSHIMA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at
BERLIN.
Upon the advice of the Imperial Privy Council, His Majesty the Emperor is
pleased to agree to the conclusion of a Pact, dated to-day, between JAPAN,
GERMANY and ITALY.
You are empowered to sign and seal the aforesaid Pact).
Japan and, the Axis: Text of Three-Poiver Treaty
Re:
Date: 12th December, 1941.
From : The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1010.
Date : 9th December, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.
At 9 p. m. to-day the German Ambassador called on me and we had a second
interview when he submitted the new draft of the text. You will already have
received this, I expect.
In regard to this text I said that this involved the 1st paragraph of Article 3
of the Three-Power Treaty, and suggested the removal of Article 3. At the
same time, I said, if GERMANY stuck to the retention of this Article, after the
words "an equitable New Order" in that same Article should be added "in the
Three-Power Treaty concluded on 27th September, 1940". Article 4 should
therefore be amended to read "This pact shall come into force at the time of its
signature and its period of validity shall be identical with that of the Three-
Power Treaty concluded on the 27th September, 1940".
The Japanese text is given in my immediately following telegram. ( See below.)
[The remainder of the telegram gives instructions for telegraphing the texts
in the three languages to enable the formalities in JAPAN to be concluded. See
Dept. Note: at end of TOKYO-BERLIN No. 1011 of 9th December, 1941. (See
below ) ] .
TOGO.
Director (3).
F. O. (3).
P. I. D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3). [Continued overleaf].
India Office (2).
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry.
Sir E. Bridges.
Dominion Office.
No. 1011 of the 9th December, 1941.
Reference my immediately preceding telegram No. 1010. (See above).
(To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher).
Pact between JAPAN, GERINIANY, and ITALY.
In the inflexible resolve not to lay down their arms till the joint war against
the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND has been successfully concluded, the
Japanese, German, and Italian Governments have jointly agreed as follows :
Article 1.
JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will fight together with all the resources at
their command until victory is achieved over the UNITED STATES and
ENGLAND.
Article 2.
JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY undertake not to make a separate armistice
or separate peace with the UNITED STATES or ENGLAND without full mutual
understanding.
692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Article 3.
JAPAN, GER^LVNY, and ITALY will after the victorious conclusion of the
war collaborate closely in establishing an equitable New Order in the spirit of the
Three-Power Treaty signed on 27th September, 1940.
Article 4
This Pact shall come into force at the time of signature.
As witness whereof the undermentioned plenipotentiaries etc.
Signed in triplicate in Japanese, German and Italian at BERLIN (dates).
TOGO.
(Dept. Note: The German and Italian versions of the above were cabled to
TOKYO from BERLIN as Nos. 1450 and 1453 respectively, dated 10th December,
1941).
MOST SECRET.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY: NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM
THE OFFICE.
JAPANESE BROADCASTS OF GENERAL INFORMATION REPORTS.
No. 098971
Date : 16th December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, AMGORA, etc.
No : 2548 Circular. Secret.
Date : 11th December, 1941.
From 10.30 p. m. 11th December, general information reports will be sent on
the 9450 wavelength [? with the call sign] JUO.
TOGO.
Director.
P. O. (3).
P. I. D.
Admiralty.
War Oftice (3).
Air Ministry.
M. I. 5.
Sir E. Bridges.
JAPANESE NAVAL PLANS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC
No. 099199
Date : 22iid December, 1941.
From : Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To : Japanese Ambassador, Buenos Aires.
No. 288.
Date : 9th December, 1941.
[The first part of this telegram recounts the events that led up to the outbreak
of war from the Japanese point of view — Japanese patience and A. B. C. D.
encirclement. Part II follows].
2. The Imperial Japanese forces, however, right at the outset and in one
heavy attack, have achieved the following: two battleships sunk, four severely
damaged, four heavy cruisers severely damaged (three are confirmed), one air-
craft-carrier sunk and over one hundred aircraft destroyed. It may be said that
the main strength of the American Pacific Fleet has been practically annihilated.
From now on the Imi>erial (Japanese) Navy will be able to extend the scope of
its (? activities) little by little to the South Atlantic and South Pacific and it is
clear at least that we shall obtain command of the seas in the South Pacific
before long. Even, therefore. If economic intercourse between JAPAN and the
.South American States bordering the Pacific be cut oft" for the time being, it will
not be long before conununication Is restored. Not only so, but intercourse with
ARGENTINA and BRAZIL by merchant ships in convoy will be urged upon these
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 693
two countries, while sea conmninication with BRITAIN, AMERICA, and Latin
AMERICA will, on the other hand, be severed (? shortly) by the Imperial (Japa
nese) Navy.
Director (3).
F. C. (3). (D.'pt. Note: Part III of this telegram missing)
P. I. D.
Admiralty.
War Ofiice (3).
India Office (2).
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry. ,
M. E. W. (2).
Sir E. Bridges.
Dominions Office.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 695
INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses
following the description)
ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION
1. Page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in the
affidavit of Mary L. Ross. (Exhibit B, p. 74.)
2. Table A (p. 1) showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel
forces in the Mandates. (Exhibit B, p. 130.)
3. Ibid, (p. 2). Exhibit B, p. 131.)
4. Map of Palao Islands. (Exhibit B, p. 132.)
5. Sketch of Malakal Harbor. (Exhibit B, p. 133.)
6. Sketch of Jaluit Harbor. (Exhibit B, p. 135.)
7. Photostatic copy of a portion of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 Sep-
tember 1941 relating to reported talk of General Short. Exhibit 1,
p. 28E.)
8. Photostatic copy of a portion of the Honolwlu Star-Bulletin (undated)
relating to reported talk of Admiral Kimniel (Exhibit 2, p. 92.)
9. Copy of a routing slip of Latin American Section, Rlilitary Intelligence
Division, War Department, dated 30 June 1941. Exhibit 2, p. 92.)
10. Outline map of the Island of Oahu — Appendix B (Exhibit 5, p. 197D.)
11. Chart captioned 'Pattern for Espionage, Hawaiian Islands"— Appendix C
(Exhibit 5, p. 198D.)
12. Outline Map of Thailand and French Indochina. (Exhibit 6, p. 53C.)
1^
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