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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BBFORB THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OE THE PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK . 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con, Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 35 

PROCEEDINGS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

^-^-5 JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 35 
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946 






^ 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gau FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 






/I ''■ 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
W^iLLiAM D. Mitchell, General Counsel < // ^ 

Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel f-~ r / 

JULE M. HAXXAFORD, Assistant Counsel / / S^ (^ 

John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel ^ j- — 

(After January 14, 1946) ^-^O'^ . '^ O 

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel ^ >-> 

Samdel H. Kadfman. Associate General Counsel — '^X*''^ '^'^ 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel / 

Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19. 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-IHustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commi.ssion Proceedmgs. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5080-5089 
""3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

"418-423" 
"451-464' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 



'sY-'b" 

205 

"B22S-224" 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


S 1 Iiiiii i 1 1 1 1 i M 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

(Navy Court 
of Inquiry, 
July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

179-184 
"" 105-1 14" 

96-105 

74-85 

"'368-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


coo 1 iCO lOCOOO 1 1 ICO—'OI 1 1 1 i(N 100 1 1 1 ICO 

00-^ 1 it^ lOC'CDOS 1 1 ITJ<1>0 1 1 1 ifO ICO 1 1 1 iiO 

E-^CO 1 1^ ,,-H«£)'-i 1 1 lOOiOiO 1 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 If- 

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Tt* CO 1 1 1^ 1 1> lO 1— 1 1 1 1 00 CO lO IIII ICO 1 1 1 1 Tt< 

11.— Ill— ICO III kO IIII 1 iiiit^ 

II,— 11,-lrH III ^H IIII 1 ||||,_1 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

DiUon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold," Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenbury, Carhsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


oiiiiiiocoiiiiii ^~_ro 1 1 

CO! OcOiiii Sn^oii 

ioiiiiiiocoiiiiiiiiiiiE2?5;<Nii 
uoiiiiii'*! iiiiii ^z:o'' 

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0,10 00 1 1 iS2^ 1 1 

lO Ttl llS^"''' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


COKNiii iiMii II 

iiiiiiOiCSiiiiiiiiii'tiii II 
•» iOi(Niiii iT-iii II 

1 J^ ic!, ;:::;.;;;: ;i 1 : : i 

BlIIIIITjtiOO Tjlli II 

lOli-H Illll-Hll 11 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


III 111 1 1 

1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 C5 1 1 1 CO (N (N 1 

iitOiii—i ii0O(M Oi 

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tX, Oiiiiiiiiiii^ i 

111 1 1 ,,-1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


, 1 rH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

>^ ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904^918 

028-643 

""734^746" 
""852-885" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-269.5" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802' 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 



214-225 
363-307 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1146-1156" 

1156-1171" 

4^32" 
1068-1095 

1272-1285" 

"500^504" 

1793-1805" 

'"320-352," 
1648- 
1659 





Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 




Joint 

Committoe 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

"'387-388' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investiration, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
45-46 

"179-181" 

232 

76^77" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Chirko 

Investifjation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ i i i i i i ill i ill i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 lO 1 --,-^(M"t-'(M 1 1 CO 1 1 00 00 

1 lO 111 III ^I^ ^: ?2 00 CO iO 1 1-* 1 lOO 

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.& 1 Itt III 111 <=^^c4777 1 liri ! lot)7 

<ii 1 It- r^KI'^'^'-^ ' "-' 1 ir^^ 

I i-if III III ^f^roocoio 1 iTt< 1 iioos 

II 1 =^^0'-i'-iii iiO 

11 III 111 1— 1,— ii— III 111— 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968^1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to ■ 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 L-t^rtH 1 1 CO i,--,-,-00 1 1 ICO"^ 1 1 1 1 

1 itroool 1 1 »o ij5z:'>« • " loooo i i i i 
2 ' '^72 1 1 2 1«^^ ! ! l^f 1111 

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1 i^^g 1 ; g i^s 1 i ig i i i i 


a 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, WiUard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Maj 

PoweU, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, WiUiam S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


1 i§ i i i 1 lis 1 i§ i iilSli i 'M i i i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

dlewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

4-9 
"335-375" 

411-413 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69" 
195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


11 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 Ic^ 1 1 III 111 

t \\ . I j 1 j 1 1 i I i i I i j 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lO (N ^ilil ^-^-0 III 111 

il^ llllit^ OOilii^^rt III 111 

117 1 1 I I 17 2 1 ! ! iSc^^f 11! Ill 
^ \^ I 1 I 1 1?^ ti. 1 1 I lcI.o^ II! Ill 

1^ 1 1 1 1 ;"= 5 1 1 1 1 ^^ 111 II! 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
27S-54I, 
441 1-4445 

3265-3286" 



1539^1575" 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65" 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18. 1941. 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lOl^iOlilii ilNiiOOO 111 III 

ICONIC ■>*<iiOO 

" 1 r-4 CD -<* lllll 1 1> 1 1 T-H 00 111 III 
S,l|'-l| lllll 11-HIIT-Ht-H 111 111 

il^ 1 IM A 1 ' i 1 11' '11 

Dh iC0t>O lllll lOO 1 iCDiO 1 

i'-<'^illll iCOiiCOO 

ICO lllll il>iiT-(00 111 III 


1 


Short, Arthur T. 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN_. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Is.iao, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

StUphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

ConRressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

194G 


Pages 

'""1723-1911 

"'"3"2"3"3"-3"25"9", 
3303-3354 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""38^410" 

376^386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


O) 1 1 1 1 1 CD 1 

00 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 ! i ! i '7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

„o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t^ lO 1 1 

t, 1 1 1 1 1 1 .00 O 1 

1 <—i 1 1 1 1 1 1—1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

CommittPO 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ ! i ; i i i i i : i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1083-1090 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Uarhor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007" 
2456-2478 

134.5-1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683" 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379^382 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commi.s.'ion, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334^1340" 

""247-259" 

152.5-1538" 
1683-1705 


3 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichi.ser, Rea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wil.son, Erie M., Col 

Wirrxer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



n 



JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148 
[TOP SECRET] 



Keport of Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, 
FOR the Secretary of War, Sitpplementary to Proceedings of the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board 

contents 

Page ' 

ReiJort to Secretary of War by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, of investigation 

supplementary to Army I'earl Harbor Board 2 

Tab "A" — Copies of statements of Secretary of War, dated 1 December 1944 and 29 

August 1945, of Colonel Clausen's orders and of related documents 4 

Tab "B" — Copies of affidavits and statements obtained in Colonel Clausen's investiga- 
tion 38 

Tab "C" — List of additional documentary evidence comprising Exhibits "1" through 

"8" obtained in Colonel Clausen's investigation 233 

Tab "D" — Written periodic reports by Colonel Clausen 246 

Tab "E" — Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon 
Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in light of Colonel Clausen's 
investigation 279 

Tab "F" — Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and comment- 
ing upon certain asi)ects of his previous memoraniluni to the Secretary of War, 
dated 25 November 1944, in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation 296 

Tab "G" — Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War 

dated 25 November 1944 313 

top secret 
[2] Wae Department, 

Washington, H September 1945. 
Memorandum for the Secretary of War : 
Subject : Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel H^nry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the 

Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 

Board. 

Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the investigation 
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, mentioned in 
the public statements of the Secretary of War on 1 December 1944 and 29 August 
1945. Copies of these statements and of my orders and some related documents 
are attached as Exhibit "A". 

In the course of this investigation, I travelled over 55,000 miles by air and 
interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian i^ersonnel at the following places : 

Berlin, Germany London, England 

Blenchley Park, England Luzon, P. I. 

Boston, Massachusetts Manila, P. I. 

Cannes, France Neuenahr, Germany 

Casserta, Italy New York, New York 

Frankfurt on Main, Germany Paris, France 

Guam Potsdam, Germany 

Honolulu, T. H. Saipan 

Langley Field, Virginia Versaille, France 

Leyte, P. I. Washington, D. C. 

Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat in 
active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his public state- 
ment of 1 December 1044 would be necessary. 



^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pages of original exhibit. 



79716— 46— Ex. 148- 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded 
their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit 



General George C. Marshall 
General Douglas MacArthur 
[S] Lt. General Richard K. Suther- 
land 
Major General John R. Deane 
Major General Charles D. Herron 
Major General Sherman Miles 
Major General C. A. Willoughby 
Major General Ralph C. Smith 
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts 
Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder 
Brig. General Morrill W. Marston 
Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop 
Brig. General Charles K. Gailey 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton 
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft 
Colonel George W. Bicknell 
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen 
Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury 
Colonel Moses W, Pettigrew 
Colonel Joseph K. Evans 
Colonel Edward F. French 
Colonel Edward W. Raley 

The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records of 
my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B" : 



Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow 

Lt. General Walter B. Smith 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler 

Colonel Rex W. Minkler 

Colonel Harold Doud 

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN 

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN 

Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN 

Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN 

Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett 

Major Edward B. Anderson 

Captain Howard W. Martin 

Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane 

Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, 

USN 
Miss Mary J. Dunning 
Miss Margaret McKenney 
Miss Louise Prather 
Miss Mary L. Ross 
Mr. George W. Renchard 
Rr. Robert L. Shivers 
Mr. John F. Stone 



Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USN 
Mr. Harry L. Dawson 
Mr. John E. Russell 



Brigadier General C. A. Powell 
Colonel O. H. Thompson 
Lt. Colonel Byron M. Muerlott 
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN 

I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list of this 
is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented herewith. 

Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written reports 
are attached as Exhibit "D". 

There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge Advocate 
General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous 
memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my 
investigation. 

6 Incls Henry C. Clausen, 

1. Ex. "A" Henry C. Clausen, 

2. Ex. "B" Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 

3. Ex. "C" 

4. Ex. "D" 

5. Ex. "E" 

6. Ex. "F" 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



[/,] EXHIBIT A 

Investigation bt Lt. Colonet. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of 
War; Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Peart. Harbor Board 

1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of 

War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of 
Pearl Harbor. 

2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1 

December 1944. 

3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C. 

Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation. 

4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning 

unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel 

concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 

6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, 

concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 

7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945, 

in reply to letter 6 February 1945. 

8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March 

1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen. 

9. Movement Orders for Major C. Clausen, 14 March 1945. 

10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific 

Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major 
Henry C. Clausen. 

11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, South- 

west Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made 
by Major Henry C. Clausen. 

12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting change 

in movement orders. 

13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding OflScer, 

1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders 
of Major Henry C. Clausen. 
[5] 14. Memorandum, of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May 
1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. 

15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945. 

16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945, 

concerning investigation. 

17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August 

1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. 
Clausen. 

18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11 August 

1945. 

19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29 

August 1945. 



[6] [Public Law 339 — 78th Congress] 

[Chapter 247 — 2d Session] 

[S. J. Res. 133] 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases. 

Resolved ty the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assemUed, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all 
statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prose- 
cution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor 



4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

catastrophe of Dwoniber 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent 
dereliction- of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate 
to prevent the court ni.-irtial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or 
persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the 
Pearl Harboi- catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible 
or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, 
are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the exten- 
sion provided for in Public Law 20S, Seventy-eighth Congress. 

Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally 
directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into' the facts surrounding 
the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings 
against such persons as the facts may justify. 

Approved June 13, 1944. 
[7] War Department 

bureau of public relations 

press branch 

Tel. —RE 6700, Brs. 342.5 and 4SG0 

December 1, 1914. 
Immediate Release 

Statement by the Secretary of War 

The following i5 the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, 
Secretary of War : 

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an 
investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of Decem- 
ber 7. 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts 
might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this 
resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to 
this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1941, a I4t>ard of three 
general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating 
to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 
7 December 1&41 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper." 

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking 
investigation._ It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington 
It has examined a total of l.jl witnesses and received many exhibits. I have 
read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General 
of the Army, at my direction, has al.so examined the reiDort and the record and 
has given me fully the benefit of liis views. 

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision 
taken as to what, if any, action is to lie instituted against him and, after weigh- 
ing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and 
fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far 
as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclu- 
sions are as follows : 

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or 
other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the 
War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or 
exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the 
recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. 

So far as the Conunanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I 
am of the opinion that his error.s of judgment were of such a nature as to demand 
his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11. 1942, and in 
itself is a serious result for any ofiicer with a long record of excellent service, and 
conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence 
now recorded, it is sufficient action. 

P^irtherniore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such 
inadequacies of cither personnel or organization as were shown to exist either 
in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. 
My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does 
not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the 
Army. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 5 

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided 
that my own investigation should he further continued until all the facts are made 
as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of 
material facts can he obtained, and I have given the necessary [8] direc- 
tions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may he much delayed 
where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My 
present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally 
completed. 

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would he highly prejudicial to the success- 
ful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during 
the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is 
based. 

STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS 

I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the 
evidence now recorded not to institute further pi'oceedings against any officer of 
the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster. 

The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of 
June 14. 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl 
to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore 
Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to 
the I'earl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report 
bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further in- 
vestigation, ' 

I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review 
that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any 
alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyiUty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Con- 
structors, the organization with which he was connected. Colonel Wyman, or 
others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not tind that there is 
any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any in- 
formation to the enemy. 

As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and 
others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing 
of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate 
General. 

Distribution : Aa, Af, B, Da. Dd, Dm. N. 

5 : 00 P. M. 



SECRET 

[9] Wait Department, 

Washington, 23 Noveinhcr 191flf. 
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
Subject : Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a num- 
ber of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. 
I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, 
JAGD. 

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and 
information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to ad- 
vise all ofticers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible 
cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and 
the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have 
knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries. 

In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret 
or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary not- 
withstanding. 

Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of A¥ar. 
A true copy. 

Henry C. Clausen, 

U. Colonel, JAGD. 



6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

top shxjket 

110] Headquarters, Army Service Forces 

office op the judge advocate general 

Washington 25, D. C. 

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. 
Subject : Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am sug- 
gesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advanta- 
geously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. 
The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed 
as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation. 

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can 
be investigated : 

a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department 
notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the 
order. 

b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor. 

c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington. 

d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part 
of the fleet to remain in harbor. 

e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired 
back for its meaning. 

f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy 
Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies 
thereof. 

g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative 
of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were 
believed required by the situation. 

h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, author- 
ized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of 
the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department. 

i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February 1941. 

[11] j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their 
training and the possibility of continuing training luider Alert 2 or 3. 

k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britian 
and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised pf this agreement 
or discovered its existence. 

1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of 
the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan (Rep. 
41). 

3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain : 

a. The exact date and time of first translation. 

b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some 
of the most vital messages. 

c. Who got each message, when and in what form. 

d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed 
thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy. 

e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept. 

4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored: 

a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now 
probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning 
of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed 
of it. 

b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army. 
(Tr., SafEord C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, 
as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether 
the transmission was received. 

[12] c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain 
Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which 
case they would have known that a "War with Britian" message would neces- 
sarily have involved the United States in war. 

d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britian" was brought to 
Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 7 

of Naval Operations and the Chief of StafC did know of the Joint Action Policy. 

e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefiort 
of the implementation intercept? 

f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating 
"Winds" message? 

g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board 
failed to examine? 

h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message 
directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether 
there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the 
warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds" 
message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities. 

Myron C. Cramer, 
Myron C. Cramee, 
Major General, USA, 
The Judge Advocate General. 



SECRET 

[i3] WAR Department 

Washington, 6 February 1945. 
Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned : 

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 
December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investi- 
gation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and 
information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the 
fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen 
should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer 
any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any 
papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him. 

Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 



SECBET 



[i^] 6 Feibeuaby 1945. 

Deae Mr. Secretary: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my 
public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is con- 
ducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board. 

Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be 
available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major 
Clasen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part 
that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster. 

I will apprecitae it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all perti- 
nent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing 
such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply 
strictly with the instructions I have stated above. 
Sincerely yours, 

HeNry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 

Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy. 

MO'B. 
Hon. James V. Forkestal, 
Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington, D. C. 
hhb/mob 

A True Copy. 

Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 

[15] The Secretary of the Navy 

Washington, 10 Feb. 19.',5. 
Dear Mr. Secret-ary : I liave .voiir letter of 6 February 1945 advising tliat Major 
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary 
to the i>roceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be 
given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the 
opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood 
that you have instructed him to'limit his inqtiiry strictly to matters which have 
a bearing on that part that Army iDcrsonnel, organization, or action may have had 
in the disaster. 

I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that 
we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, 
authorize us to make available (o each other information in our respective Depart- 
ments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to coui 
ply with your request, and suggest that Ma.ior Clausen commxmicate with Lt. Com- 
mander John F. Sonuett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to fur- 
nish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy 
Department. 

Sincerely yours, 

James Fobrestal. 
Hon. Henry L. Stimson, 
Secretary of War, 

Washington, D. C. 



[i6] 3 March 1945. 

Memorandum for The Adjutant General. 
Subject : Request for Orders. 

1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War, 
dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation 
by' Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of 
War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about 
12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and 
(c) then return to Washington, D. C, and (d) authority to make such successive 
trips from Washington, D. C, and to travel to such othei" place or places, and to 
make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said 
mission. 

3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft. 
Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircaft, commercial steamship, rail 
or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accom- 
plishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 
pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft. 

4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of $7.00 
be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Wash- 
ington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference is made to the de- 
termination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day 
limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 200, 1944, is not applicable 
in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith. 

/s/ H. C. Clausen. 
H. C. Clausen, 



Approved : 

/s/ Harvey H. Bundy, 

Harvey H. Bundy, for the Secretary of War. 
/s/ Myron C. Cramer, 
Myron C. Cramer. 
The Judge Advocate General. 
A true copy. 

Henry C. Clausen. 

Major, JAGD. 



Major, JAGD. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 9 

[17] 

RESTRICTED 

AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Honry C. EAD/bls/2231 Mu 

(12 Mar 45) Br. 76520 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's OFFitE, 
Washinfft07i 25, D. C, IJ, March 19.',5. 
Subject : Movement Orders. 

To : Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD 

4731 Munitions Building 
Washington, D. C. 

1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March 
1945 from Washington, D. C, to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of 
approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Fair- 
field, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Connnanding 
Officer, 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shatter, T. H. Upon 
arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army 
Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months 
for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty 
he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02, 03, 
212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes no. 9), and 
is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR-2-331156- 
ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal ef- 
fects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), 
is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the 
provisions of War Department Circular 260, 1944 apply ; outside continental 
United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply. 

3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as 
may be necessary for the iierformance of this mission. 

4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamplilet No. 38-6, 
"Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of 
aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions. 

5. Special instructions : Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, 
California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to 
Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will 
be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as 
special official courier. 

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR : 

E. A. Davis, Adjutant General. 
[18^ 3 Incls. 
AG Ltr 4 July 1944 
AG Form 43 
Travel Book 
Distribution : 

Officer (10) 

Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO 

Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu. 

Lt. Stump, lC-931, The Pentagon. 

APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2) 

Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort IMason, Calif. 

Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD. WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon 

Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The Pentagon 

P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va. 

CG, T^SAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California 

Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif. 

CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (8) 



10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SEOBEX 

119] 24 Makch 1945. 

Memorandum for the Commanding General, I'acific Ocean Areas. 
Subject : Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 
December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen,, JAGD, is conducting for me the 
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Com- 
mand within the next thirty days. 

It Is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, 
and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist 
in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtain- 
ing statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information 
in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of Navy. 

Henby L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 
hcc/es 
A true copy. 

Henry C. Ciausen, 
Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 

SEC3KET 

[20] 24 Maeoh 1945. 

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater. 
Subject : Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 
December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the 
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Com- 
mand within the next thirty days. 

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, 
and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist 
in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtain- 
ing statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information 
in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of Navy. 

Henky L. Stimson. 

Secretary of War. 
hcc/es 
A true copy. 

Henry C. Ciausen, 
Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 

[21] Wab Depaetment 

aemy service forces 

office of the judge advocate generrvl 

24 March 1945. 
Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett) 

1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached) 
as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to 
report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended 
to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26 
Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 
April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank. 

2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await 
certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henby C. Clausen, 
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD. 

Rm. 4741 Munitions 

Ex. 78922 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION H 

[22] EAD/ED/ ed/2331 Mu 

27 Mabch 1945. 
AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C 77723 

(27 Mar 45) 
AGO Personnel Officers Assignment SPXPO-A 

Room 2323 Munitions 
CO 

1504 AAFBU PP 

FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF 
FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA 

Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907613 

JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 26 March 45 

from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN 

AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG. 

Official : 

, Adjutant General. 



SECRET 

[23] 24 May 1945. 

Memorandum for The Adjutant General. 

Subject : Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. 

1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1945, to Lt. Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945. 

2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen direct- 
ing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1945 to Headquarters, SHAEF, and to such 
other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and 
frequency as may be necessary for the purpose of conducting investigation in 
accordance with Secret instructions of the Secretary of War. 

3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders, dated 
3 March 1945, be considered applicable hereto and that a one priority be assigned 
for air travel. 

Haevey H. Bundy, 
For the Secretary of War. 
A true copy. 

Hknry C. Clausen, 
Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 



BESTEICTED 

EAD/laf/fcs/2323 Mun 
Br. 76520 

Wab Depabtment, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 
[24] Washington 25, D. C, 25 May 19^5 

AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C 

(24 May 45) 

Subject: Movement Orders 

To : #Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD 

1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or 
about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. C. to Headquarters, SHAEF, European 
Theater of Operations, Versailes, France, and to such other points in the theater, 
and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be neces- 
sary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of 
conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions ol the Secretary of 
War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base 
Unit, Air Annex #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for process- 
ing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Wash- 
ington, D. C. to "Versailles, France, reporting upon arrivel to the Commandirig 
General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this 
temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03 
212/50425. Travel by air (APR-l-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2) 
AK 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg- 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

eiicy war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all 
personal effects, and an execess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is author- 
ized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United 
States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35—1820, 19 April 1945 apply: outside the conti- 
nental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 35-4820, 19 April 
1945. apply. 

3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to 
proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of 
this mission. 

4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD 
Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will 
be issued at the aerial port of embarkation. 

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, % Postmaster, New 
York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to 
Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately 
upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier. 

By Order of the Secretary of War : 

Capt. E. a. Davis. AGO, 

Adjutant General. 
Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec 
[25] 3 Incls : 

AG Ltr 4 Jul 44 - • 

AG Form #43 

Travel Book 
Distribution : 

Officer (10) 

Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun 

APS, 4A-514. Pentagon 

OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2) 

Lt. Stumn, lC-931, Pentagon 

CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746. Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3) 

Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun 
Destination Commander : 



SECRET 

[26] 

Dear Mk. Sbxretary: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to 
thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 
JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain 
Navy personnel. 

I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Naty 
representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your 
investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited 
to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization 
or action may have had in the disaster. 
Sincerely yours, 

, Secretary of War. 

Honorable James Forrestal, 

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
A true copy. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
hhb/mob 



[27] 7 August 1945. 

Memorandum for the Adjutant General : 

Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, 
dated 25 May 1945. 

It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of 
temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read "four months." 

Harvey H. Bundy', 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. 
A true copy. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 13 

RT.STRICTED 

[2S] RHO/laf/inm/2323 Mun 

Br. 76520 
. War Department 
The Adjutant General's Office 

Washington, D. C, 11 August 19Jf5. 
AGPO-A 201— Clausen, Henry C. 
(7 Aug. 45.) 

Subject : Amendment of I\Iovement Orders, 
To : Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD. 

So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May 
45. Subject : Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, O-907G13, JAfJD as reads : ''Temporary r)uty of approximately 
two (2) months" be amended to read: "Tempcjrary Duty of approximately four 
(4) months". 
By order of the Secretary of War : 

E. A. Davis, Adjutant General. 
Distribution : 
Officer (10) 

Offs" Br Rec Sec AGO, Rm 1528 Mun 
APS, Rm 4-A 514, Pentagon 
OIC, Einb APO 464 Lexington Ave, NY, NY (2) 
Lt. Stump, IC 931, Pentagon 

CO. 503D AAFBU, WPAE, Rm 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Ptd, DC (3) 
Judge Advocate General, Rm 2734, Mun. 
Destination Commander : 



[29] Official Report of the Secretary of War Regarding the Pearl Harbor 

Disaster 

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with 
an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of 
December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as 
the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed 
in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me 
to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three 
general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to 
the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 
December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper." 

On December 1, 1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter 
as follows : 

"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking 
investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. 
It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have 
read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record 
and has given me fully the benefit of his views. 

"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision 
taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing 
all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and 
fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as 
they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions 
are as follows : 

"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary 
or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in 
the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill 
or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the 
recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. 

"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is con- 
cerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature 
as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on Januai'y 11, 
1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent 
service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, 
or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action. 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such 
inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either 
in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. 
My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded 
does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer 
in the Army. 

"In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have de- 
cided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts 
are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [50] every wit- 
ness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the neces- 
sary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much 
delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. 
My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally 
completed. 

"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the suc- 
cessful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public 
during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which 
it is based." 

Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry G. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was 
Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate 
knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and 
I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the 
action to be taken was correct. 

Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to 
disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and espe- 
cially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the 
Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and. others. From 
these same sources there came to the Government additional information which 
resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan. 

The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more 
fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious 
danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. 
It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have 
directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public 
except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The con- 
clusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. 
The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress 
the full reports and the record of the testimony. 

My conclusions are as follows : 



The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island 
of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the 
Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. 
Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General 
Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers 
of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabili- 
ties for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the per- 
formance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army 
authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsi- 
bility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed 
successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various 
theaters of oi)eration. Thus each theater commander is charged with the prep- 
aration of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense 
operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the 
appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are siibject to any 
changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary 
responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the com- 
manding officer familiar with the local [31} situation and conditions. 
Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian De- 
partment had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint 
Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an 
emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary respon- 
sibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 15 

demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese 
attack. 

I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until 
the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical 
events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 
27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that 
an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were 
possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his 
command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that 
he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he 
deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Wash- 
ington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous 
reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness 
of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the 
policy for a responsible commanding oflicer to anticipate and to be prepared 
for the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military 
estimates from his own stafP as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that 
a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii. 

I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War 
Department and which was not made available to General Short vshich would 
have modified the essence of the above information which was s ent to him 
or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance af id alertness 
thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given 
him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later 
pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties 
more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but 
I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of 
being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan. 

I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received 
adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situa- 
tion demanded ; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of 
the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the 
attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for 
reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime 
necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its recon- 
naissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnais- 
sance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiarcraft defenses 
sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded. 

This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience 
of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz : the failure to comprehend the 
necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he 
had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than 
be actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was 
carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming 
the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such consider- 
ations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station 
against Japan was his paramount duty. 

[32] The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's 
confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him 
it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone con- 
cerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He 
was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology 
which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and par- 
ticularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short 
also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better 
informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their 
operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. 
The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to 
operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. 

Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the 
large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the Wnr 
Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning 
also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the 
fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 
1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this 



16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

should be roguvded as a tacit approval of liis failure to alert against other dangers. 
I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Dei^art- 
nient warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian popu- 
lation, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, 
confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and 
might disregard all others. 

But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do 
not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against 
an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improb- 
able, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for 
use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility 
of such an attack was his own definite responsibility. 

To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warne<I by Washington that 
there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an 
attack from within liy sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against 
both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense 
against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from 
without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as 
not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require 
several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense. 

To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from 
another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed 
than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible 
defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his 
duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack 
on that outpost to the opinion of another service. 

Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Depart- 
ment of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such 
a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from 
his independent responsibility as a theater commander. 

I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my 
statement of December 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation 
does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any 
action beyond that which has ali'eady been taken. 

II 

[33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the super- 
vision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known 
as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the 
General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and mes- 
sages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved 
by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and 
under him various officers had specially assigned duties. 

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of col- 
lecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections 
of the War Department and to the theater commanders. 

I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him 
adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and 
the development of the situation ; that he was warned that Japanese future 
action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and 
that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also 
expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures — the all-important measure 
to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that 
any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered 
by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible 
enemy action was not also his duty. 

There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to 
General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's 
attention or emphasized further the invminence of war. Some part of this 
information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the ride that all 
such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl 
Harl)or, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information 
coinnmnicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While 
Adjniral Kimmel and (ieneral Siioi-t were on very friendly terms and in frequent 
communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other 
respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 17 

The information available to the War Department on or Ijefore December 7, 
I?F41, which was not passed on to General Short included the following : informa- 
tion available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government 
insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by Novem- 
ber 25, 1941, later extended to November 20, 1941 ; information available De- 
cember 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United 
States that Japan would yield no further ; and information available the morn- 
ing of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster 
that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States 
at 1 : CO P. M., December 7, 1941. and that the remaining cipher and code machines 
in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed. 

The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had 
earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war wtih Japan 
was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to 
General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, 
was that the War Department had information through secret sources of infor- 
mation that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London. Washington 
and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The addi- 
tional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this 
information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be 
borne in mind also that General Short had been [3//] fully advised by the 
War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at 
anr time. 

The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not 
forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu 
was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other 
somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates 
in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Depart- 
ment as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the 
American Navy as far as possible. 

Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to 
what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be 
and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. 
There is no dispute, however, that General Mar.shall did not get this infcnination 
until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War 
Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 
he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the 
Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Divi- 
sion, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the 
additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified 
that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty 
officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investiga- 
tion showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message o,n 
December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9 : 00 
A. M. on the morning of December 7. 

When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the 
morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the 
effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Govern- 
ment at 1 : 00 P. M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher 
and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a mes- 
sage giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that 
this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was 
the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after the 
attack. 

Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which 
General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo 
about November '^o. 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect 
that in case of severance of diplomatic relatit)ns or war with the United States, 
Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report 
would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be 
destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Shoit or his 
command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed 
signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subse- 
quently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contra- 
dictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, 
information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as 
above discussed. 

79716— 46— Ex. 148 3 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe 
the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short 
more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation od 
the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the signifi- 
cance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack 
specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War 
Department [35] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all 
times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals 
in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation 
and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the 
event. 

Again, as I have pointed out. General Short in response to a message which 
had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for 
a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was 
susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only 
and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this 
interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, 
nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the 
messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Di- 
vision of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well 
have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates 
knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. 
General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. 
A clear and satisfactoi'y reply should have been required. This was not done 
and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a 
careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no 
room for ambiguity permitted. 

It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the 
responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many the- 
aters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, suf-h 
as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be 
pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the svibsequent disaster, but 
it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they 
were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct 
must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, 
such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and 
vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been 
chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by 
consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. 
Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which 
warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the 
War Plans Division. 

Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized 
and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received 
other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the 
performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps 
were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as 
were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time 
of the Pearl Harbor disaster. 

Ill 

The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General 
Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the 
Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pear] 
Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Stalf as being responsible 
for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have 
just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It 
arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff 
and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It 
is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally 
supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the 
General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secre- 
tary of War, and to make plans for [86] and supervise the organization, 
equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and 
himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the 
many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental 
and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 19 

lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a 
Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by 
which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts. 

It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties 
efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the re- 
sponsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective or- 
ganization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered 
and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor dis- 
aster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff 
which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent 
results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. 
The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to 
the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he 
acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency. 

IV 

The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors 
of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts 
Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans 
Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the con- 
clusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go 
into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the respon- 
sibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the 
conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with 
the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion 
in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt. 



In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with 
responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be con- 
strued as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of 
the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have pro- 
longed the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better pre- 
pared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts 
at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect 
was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry. 

VI 

There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investiga- 
tion of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wynian, as 
expressed on December 1, 1944, were as follows : 

[37] "I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from 
this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or 
caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the 
Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected. Colonel 
Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find 
that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction 
gave any information to the enemy." 

The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no 
further evidence which would in any way modify my decision. 

I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and 
neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred 
the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of 
War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report, 
I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman. 

♦This Commission consisted of Mr. .Justice Roberts ; Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired ; 
Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired ; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired ; and Major General 
Joseph T. McNarney. 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[38] EXHIBIT B 

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, For The Secretary 

OF War 

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEaCDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 

1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24 January 1945, 

at "Washington, D. C. 

2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February 1945, at 

Washington, D. C. 

3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses AV. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washing- 

ton, D. C. 

4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February 1945, at 

Washington, D. C. 

5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washing- 

ton, D. C. 

6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 

7. Affidavit of Margaret ]\IcKenney, GSC, G-2. 22 February 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 

8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 

9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945, 

at Washington, D. C. 
10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 
n. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945, at 

Washington, D. C. 

12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at Wash- 

ington, D. C. 

13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February 1945, at. 

W^Lshington, D. C. 

14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2. 1 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 

15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, 

Vii'ginia. 

16. Affidavit of General Charles K. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at Wash- 

ington, D. C. 

17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, 8C, 22 March 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 
[39] 18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., 

Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also statement of 
Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 

20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 

21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Hono- 

lulu, T. H. 

22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 

23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J. 

Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 

24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945, at 

Himolulu, T. H. 

25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at 

Honolulu, T. H. 

26. Statenjent of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at 

Honolulu, T. H. 

27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam. 

28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 

29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Hono- 

lulu, T. H. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 21 

30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emauual, USN, 27 April 1945, at 

Honolulu, T. H. 

31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 

6 May 194.'). at Manila, P. I. 

32. Affidavit of General of the Army Dougla.s MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at 

Manila, P. I. 

33. Affidavit of Ma.ior General C. A. Willoughbv, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 

8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 

34. Affidavit .of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Hono- 

lulu, T. H. 

35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at 

Frankfurt on Main, Germany. 

36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, (yS, SHAEF, 15 June 1945, at 

Frankfurt on Main, Germany. 
U,0] 37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CO, 15th Army, 20 
June 1945, at Cannes, France. 

38. Affidavit of Colenel Roliert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy. 

39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England. 

40. Affidavit .of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England. 

41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam, 

Germany. 

42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France. 

43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 

44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at 

Washington, D. C. 

45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston, 

INIassachusetts. 

46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC. 21 August 1943, at Washington, D. C. 

47. Affidavit ,of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945, 

at Washington, D. C. 

48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington, 

D. C. 

49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Wash- 

ington, D. C. 

50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Wash- 

ington, D. C. 

51. Affidavit of Miss INIary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washing- 

ton, D. C. 

52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washing- 

ton, D. C. 



[^1] Heauquarteks, Army Seevice Forces, 

Office of the Judge Advocate Genebal, 

Washington 25, D. C, 2^ January IDJfS. 
Memorandum for the files. 
Subject : Intervievp of General Fielder. 

Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell 
on 8 January 1945, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4DS52. Pentagon, 
on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clear- 
ances with General Bissell which permitted General P^ielder to answer all my 
questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a 
witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with 
respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would 
be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail 
considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the 
specific points indicated. 

1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington 
since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely 
to counterintelligence matters and that had "nothing to do with combat." 

2. He stated he was not very well aqnainted with Commander Joseph J. Roche- 
fort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know 
of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward 
Railey. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U" (called Rl." 

3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October 
1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief 
of Staff and General Short. 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Wash- 
ington Gr-2, 27 November 1941, warning. , 

5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December 
1941. 

G. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton 
D. 289-291 ) and that it was "circulated" as something he "used to get." 

7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache mes- 
sage of 5-6 December 1941. 

142] 8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conduct- 
ing long distance reconnaissance. 

9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington Gr-2 message to the Hawaiian 
Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message, 
he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it "might have come in as 
routine." 

10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew 
that the Navy was intercepting such information, he stated at first that he knew 
of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he 
knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes. 

Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were 
asked. 

General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without 
recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to 
obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
H. C. C, 

ifajor, JAOD, 
Assistant Recorder. APHB. 



TOP SECRET 

[JfS] Affihavit of Captain Joseph J. Eochefort, United States Navy 

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of 
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn, 
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the 
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy 
personnel and records, does depose and state: 

During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat 
Intelligence Oflicer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, 
which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio 
intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Peai-1 
Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence 
OflScer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder sta- 
tion, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. 

My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. 
Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were 
made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelli- 
gence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to 
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discus- 
sions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T. 
Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including 
the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, 
meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements. 

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 
did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese 
political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done 
mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions 
I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have 
read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret 
Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 
1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and 
SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's 
date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I re- 
ceived concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 23 

was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in 
which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and 144] and which 
came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that 
Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our 
common interests. 

[Written:] Note. — This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accord- 
ance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort. 
Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard 
is distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items 
of intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and 
SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an 
implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the 
latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing 
message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning 
those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the 
substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert 
L. Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 
1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the de- 
struction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honlulu, which information 
I gave to my head office in Washington. 

Joseph J. Rochefort, 

Captain, V8N. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 



top secret 
145] War Department 

washington 
Affidavit of Colonei. Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS 

Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the 
nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secre- 
tary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was 
required, deposes and says : 

From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence 
Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington ; that from November 1939 to August 
1941 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2, 
War Department ; 

That while performing said duties in Gr-2, he read various intercepts of diplo- 
matic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies ; that these inter- 
cepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19 ; 

That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941, 
while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and 
SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been 
identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly re- 
ferred to as the "Winds Code" ; 

That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 De- 
cember 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the 
Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger; that 
in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the imple- 
mentation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had 
prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Ha- 
waiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now 
recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached. 

That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in pos- 
session of the same information he had received in Washington ; that he reached, 
this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does 
not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information 
that Washington had ; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii 
under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these inter- 
cepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent ex- 
change of intercept translations as a check one against the another. 

[.'/()] That on "• December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii 
would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret tele- 
gram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have 
been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information ; that 
affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he 
prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that 
the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written tliereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 
and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner ; that affiant 
believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel 
Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed by Lt. Colonel 
C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch; 

That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was 
dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number 
which was given only in the ordinai'y course of procedure when a message was 
dispatched ; 

Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said 
message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department ; 

That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from 
May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department ; that while in the 
performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed 
that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time ; that the Army had 
a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining inter- 
cepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in 
the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to 
obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Mor- 
rill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was 
succeeded by Colonel Fielder ; 

Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with 
Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2DS41, Pentagon, Extension 5851, questioning 
of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and check- 
ing records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel 
Powell. Also, interviews with Colonel C. C. Duisenbury, MID, former assistant 
to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston. 

Moses W. Pettigrew, 
Moses W. Pettigrew, 

Colonel, MIS. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 

SECRET 
[47] Standard Form No. 14A 

Approved by the President 
March 10, 1926 

Texegram 

OFFICIAL business — GOVERNMENT RATES 

Sent No. 519, 12/5 

December 5, 1941. 
AS.SISTANT Chief of Staff Headquartfjss, 
G2, Haivaiian Department, 

Hotiolulu, Territory Hawaii: 
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval 
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. 

Miles. 

I certify that this njessage is on official business and necessary for the public 
service. 

Ralph C. Smith, 

Colonel, O. S. C, 
Executive Officer, 0-2. 
Secret Cablegram 
las 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 25 

TOP SECRET 

[JfO] Wak Depaktment, 

Washimjton. 

Affidavit of Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbuky, GSC 

Colonel Carlise Clyde Dnsenlmry, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence, 
Southeast Asia Cctnnnand. Kandy. Ceylon, on temporary duty in Weshington, 
being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scoiie of the investiga- 
tion by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary 
to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his right 
to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says ; 

To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5 December 
1941 secret cablegram reading: 
"Sent No. 519, 12/5 

December 5, 1941. 
Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, 
G2 Haicaiiaii Department, 

Hotwtiilu, Tcnitonj Hawaii: 
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen 
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. 

Miles." 

I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse 
side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or following consultation 
with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS. For 
several months prior to and following 7 December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was 
on duty as Executive Officer, Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active 
member of the Far Eastern Section when the message of 5 December originated. 
His duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving 
outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret cable- 
gram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by G-2, 
especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the United States and also, 
because there was believed to be lack of confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy 
Intelligence Officer as to Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. 

It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts, includ- 
ing the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii, which had 
been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in WashingtoiL I 
understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval personnel in Hawaii 
doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the Japanese diplomatic codes. 

[50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having 
reported to him in August 1940, and continued as bis assistant until and after 7 
December 1941. Far the four or five months immediately following August 1940, 
Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the translated intercepts of Japa- 
nese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide 
of the Secretary of War ; John Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull ; Colonel 
Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. and Colonel 
Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Cohniel Bundy in OPD. The pro- 
cedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all 
copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed, 
and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who 
receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby 
were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and 
the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the inter- 
cepts which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months 
period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in 
assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about 
7 December 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting 
and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my 
knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was 
kept because of the top secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically 
each message which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained 
elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department may 
have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about 
fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five 
for distribution. 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS 
No. 25S43, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on 
duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in 
and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and 
went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for 
the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was 
received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the 
next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen 
parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept 
about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State 
Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. 
When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel 
Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to 
that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the 
morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel 
Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night ; 
furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish 
to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see 
the implications of immediate hostilities. 

It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the 
Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to 
the Navy prior to receipt by the Army. 

[51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, 
being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States 
at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December 
1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he 
arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m. 

Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, 
Carlisle Clyde Dusenbtjby, 

Colonel, O. 8. C. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washing- 
ton, D. C. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clattsen, 

Major, JAGD. 

Top Secret 

[52] Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefobt, Unitei> States Navy 

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of 
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn, 
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the 
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel 
and records, does depose and state : 

During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat 
Intelligence OflScer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, 
which was a field unit to the home oflSce at Washington. I was attached to the 
Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties in- 
volved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in 
Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a 
District Intelligence Officer. 

My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to 
December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior 
to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the 
purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of 
mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose 
I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. 
During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained 
more cordial and close relations, meeting informally. 

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did 
not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political 
or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments 
relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me 
by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B"'. I did not know the substance 
of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 
25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 27 

written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave 
him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents 
and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the Informa- 
tion of importance in which the Ai*my and Navy were jointly interested and which 
came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel 
Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common 
interests. 

[53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with 
respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the 
substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn 
so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during 
the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing 
message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning 
those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the 
substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. 
Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. 
This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of 
secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to 
my head office in Washington. 

Joseph J. Rochefort, 
Joseph J. Rochefort, 

Captain, U. S. Navy. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, J A GD. 

at Washington, D. C. 

[54] Affidavit of Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Am Corps, AUS 

Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (0475864), presently assigned to the 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces, 
Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by 
Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to 
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, 
deposes and says : 

That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instruc- 
tions, I made diligent seai'ch of all War Department pertinent files, and especially 
those in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General 
Staff, and its predecessor. War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, 
covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941, to ascertain whether a 
Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General 
Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received 
in the War Department before 7 December, 1941 ; that among other things I per- 
sonally searched or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the 
War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to 
have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure, 
including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H. 
Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge 
of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS ; that 
this search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received 
by the War Department at Washington, D. C, until March of 1942 ; that I ques- 
tioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing 
Operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the 
Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941, 
and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject ; that I also questioned 
General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with 
respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months 
immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to rememlier, 
whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not ; that the net result of 
my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Proce- 
dure was first received at Washington, D. C, in March, 1942, at the time it was 
receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy of receipt ; that 
the reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume. Register No. 45, 
Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat- 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies 
said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating 
Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941 ; tliat a letter dated 
r> November 1941, attacbed to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 
1941, directs tbe collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative 
Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 
November, 1941. provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 
of Section II. as follows : 

[55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) 
Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a De- 
partment order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f 
(8) below. 

"14. ALERT NO. 1. — a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and 
uprising within the islands, with no threat from without. 

* * * * * * * 

"15. ALERT NO. 2. — o. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious tlian 
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air- 
craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided. 

******* 

16. ALERT NO. 3. — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions 
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations 
on outlying islands. 

****** *" 

Signed : Claeence G. Jensen. 
Suljscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henky C. Clausen. 

Alajor, JAGD. 



Secret 



[56] . Headquarteks Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January l9Ji2. 

In reply refer to : WPD-.381— Haw Dept (1-29-42) 

AG 311.5— OHD-41. Auth : CG, Haw Dept 

Initials OMM A. G. 
Date : 29 Jan 1942 

Subject: Operation Oi'ders Hawaiian Department, 1941. 
To: War Plans Division, War pepartment General Staff, 
Washington, D. C. 
Herewith Register Nos 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941. 
Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below. 
By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS : 

O. M. McDole, 
O. M. McDoLE, 

Major, A. G .D., 
A.ssistant Adjutant General. 



Incls : Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41. 
March 10, 1942. 



TOP SECRET 

[57] ArFinAviT of Margaret McKenney 



J. L. McKee, 
J. L. McKee, 
Col, G. S. C. 



Mai-gai-et McKenney, civilian clerk in charge. Cable Section, Office of the As- 
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C, being first 
duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, 
J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army 
I'earl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: 

That during the month of Decembei-, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian 
clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 29 

G-2, War Departnieiif, Washington, D. C., which section collects and delivers 
incominji and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the af- 
fidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best in- 
formation and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge 
of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the f) Decendier 1941 
secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff. Head- 
quarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy 
of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of 
Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy oidy if the 
message was sent, (2) the notations of the number Hig thereon indicates that 
the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it 
was received from G-2; that the message was then incoded and sent and that 
then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, CA) that the stamp 
(m the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel 
Moses W. I'ettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the 
Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in 
the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth 
message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables 
receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. RosS; 
(5) that the said G^-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable 
messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question thei cu.s- 
tomary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the 
daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the 
designation, classification, time received in the Cable Section, nund)er 82 being 
Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer 
and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the 
receipt liook shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps 
cqde room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the pagei of 
the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by 
the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and 
received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519 
tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Departm»*jnt 
in receiving messages nmst account for the sequence by numbers and if a number 
were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing mes- 
sage; that since no check backs were received with respect to luimber 519, the 
system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and 
(7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [.58] of which 
is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the 
handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew ; that I assisted in the collection 
of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor 
and at subsequent interviils and for that reason nay memory is clear on the 
points in which I herein state I have knowledge. 

Signed : Maegabet McKennett. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen. 

Major,,!. A. G. D. 
at Washington, D. C. 



top secret 
[59] War Department 

Washbiffton, 25 February lOJ/S. 

Afyiuavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I. 

Colonel George AV. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS. Washington, 
D. C, having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Maj(u- Henry 
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes 
and says : 

I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelli- 
gence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel 
Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this 
connection had served under General Nolan. 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources 
of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose 
offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J. 
Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence 
Unit, Pearl Harbor ; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th 
Naval District ; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific 
Fleet ; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. 
Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. 
I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that 
Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept 
radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in 
Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such 
as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the 
public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands. 

Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned 
that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from 
Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false 
weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war 
or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United 
states, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their 
secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" 
shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have 
initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part 
of November, 1941, I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio 
station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain 
intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which 
I was looking. 

[60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code informa- 
tion when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 
December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War De- 
partment, Washington, D. C, in substance as follows: 

"December 5, 1941. 
Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, 
G2, Hawaiian Department, 

Honolulu, Territory Hawaii. 
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen 
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. 

Miles." 

On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to 
ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was moni- 
toring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was 
also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu. 
The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which 
had been given me. 

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy 
sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic repre- 
sentatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and else- 
where. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C, 
in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain 
L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed 
with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that 
the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, 
Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and 
destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at 
the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told 
those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned con- 
cerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and 
stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved 
reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent 
and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had 
previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed 
and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G-2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, 
Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G-3, Hawaiian Department; 
FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 31 

between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly 
estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I 
have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying 
the pertinent information to interested parties. 

In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI 
had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then 
living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected 
with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been 
recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was 
alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message con- 
cerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversa- 
tion as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of dis- 
cussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the 
party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, 
and references to "hibisqus" and "poinsettias." My Gr-2 sense told me that 
there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy 
and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt 
very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind 
the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I 
reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu 
was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted 
elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the informa- 
tion I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes 
and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in 
execution of the "Winds" code. 

I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5 : 15 p. m., 6 December 
1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and 
General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of 
utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going 
to dinner at Schofleld Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter 
had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I though it was too important 
to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could 
get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make 
it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who 
read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated 
that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message 
seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My 
conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and 
seemed to last only for about five minutes. 

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify 
before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to 
me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever hap- 
pens you were right and I was wrong." 

On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused 
all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for 
which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to 
be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did 
not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort 
for our joint investigatory action. 

As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and 
custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack 
Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning 
the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 
1941 by the British SIS, Manila ; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel 
Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned. 

George W. Bicknell, 
George W. Bicknell. 

Colonel, M. I. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. G. 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[63] Amendment to Affidavit of Colonel George \V. Bicknell 

Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. 
Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amondment to his affidavit of 25 February 
1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation: 

I wish to state further that prior to 7 December l'.)41, namely about October 
1941, I made and practised, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elab- 
orate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of 
war witli Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called "A", 
"B" and "C". They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which 
should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan "C" was put into execution immediately 
on the proclamation of martial law. 

In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates 
given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 
1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October, 
1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a 
teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the 
Hawaiian Islands with the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. 

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which 
Gerald Wilkinson of the Britisli Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry 
Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this tile which are marked for me, were received 
by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group 
are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November 
and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 No- 
vember and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received 
by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of 
each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides. 

The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including 
that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941, 
as well as any pertinent information I received in coimection with my G-2 activ- 
ities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in one form or another. Reference is 
made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available 
in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on 
the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 
1941. 

George W. Bicknell. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen. 

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. 
at Washington, D. C. 

[64] War Department 

washington 
Affidavit of Major Edward B. ANDEassoN, T. C. 

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C, presently on duty with the OHice of the 
Transportation Conis, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of 
the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen. JAGD, for the Secretary of War, 
supplementai-y to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that 
top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

My attention has lieen called to a photostatic copy of a secret teleguam dated 
5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. On 
the (late of this message I was assigned to the OflSice of The Adjutant (ieneral, 
Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the then Major McDole. 
The customary and usual practice with respect to such messages was for 
them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, to the oflSce in 
which I was assigned, Ofiice of The Adjurant General, Hawaiian Department, 
and r)y our office to the addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies 
to our ofiice. One of these was .sent by our office to the action addressee, and 
if it was returne<l it was filed in a sul)ject file. The other copy was retained 
in our ofiice and u.sed for the imri)ose of checking against the sequence of luim- 
bers whidi was a system in use at the time for assuring that we received all 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 33 

messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal 
Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having seen 
the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall either having 
occasion at the time to have indications of a missing number. 

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief Warrant 
Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapi). and personnel of the Signal Office, Hawaiian 
Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Office, 
Hawaiian Department, .should indicate whether the message was received. 

Edward B. Anderson, 
Edward B. Ander.son, 

Major, T. C. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Mujoi\JAGD. ^ 

At Washington, D. C. 



\65] War DtJ'ARTMENT 

washington 

Affidavit of Brigadier Genp^ial Robert H. Dunlop 

Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of The 
Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of the 
investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, 
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that 
top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and 
including December 1941 and thereafter. 

I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940. So 
far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance thereof 
did not materially alarm the civilian population. 

My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the 
Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen 
has shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations Orders, 
Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter dated 5 
November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of sending any copy 
of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 
1941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, to Washington, 
D. C, or having these sent to Washington, D. C, before 7 December 1941. 

On 27 November 1941. I was in the office of Lt. General Short, Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of 
the Hawaiian Department, at about 2 : 30 p. in. entered the room, excused him- 
.self for the interruption, and said that he had come in to show the Commanding 
General a very important message from General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the 
Army, Washington, D. C, which he had just received. General Short read this 
message and said in effect that it certainly was a very important me.ssage, and, 
it is my impression that, directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to 
put into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 
November 1941. At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 Novem- 
ber 1941 was in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or 
later that the message from Washington read in general as follows: 

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest iwssibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile 
action ix)ssible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be 
avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This 
policy should not, repeat not, be constructed as restricting you to a course of 
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action 
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other 
measures as you deem necessary, but the.se measures should be carried out 
so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report 
measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned 
in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this 
highly secret information to minimum essential officers." 
79716— 46— Ex. 148 4 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff meeting 
to which I had been called. The message was read to us and Colonel Phillips 
stated that the Commanding General had ordered into operation Alert No. 1 of 
the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for questions and as I recollect 
there was only one question put. It concerned the message from General Mar- 
shall, but the details of which I cannot now recall. There was no further dis- 
cussion. There was no mention then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7 
December 1941, as to what had been the effect upon the civilian population of the 
alert ordered by General Herron the preceding year to wliich I have referred. 
The staff meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes. 

I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941, the 
one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the 
affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest that a search of the records 
of The Adjutant General and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made 
since the receipt or non-receipt should have been recorded and the record thereof 
preserved. 

Kobert H. Dunlop, 
RoBEET H. Dunlop, 

Brigadier General. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 



[67] War Department, 

Washington, 28 February 1945. 

Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C. 

Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief, Signal 
Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of 
the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, 
supplementary to the proceedings of the Ai'my Pearl Hai'bor Board, and that top 
secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a civil- 
ian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytical Unit Signal 
Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department, Washington, D. C. My immedi- 
ate superior was Major Harold S. Doud who was assistant to Colonel Rex W. 
Minckler, Chief of tlie Signal Intelligence Service, who in turn was under Colonel 
Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and whose superior 
was the Chief Signal Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese 
Diplomatic Solution Activities. 

I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic intercepts which 
had been deciphered and translated, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown 
me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of Major Clausen I have attempted 
to compile from original records presently in the possession of the Signal Corps 
information concerning the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of 
interception; (2) dates of the messages ; (3) dates of interception ; (4) dates of 
translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the activating mes- 
sage in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available in places to which I 
now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I prepared which refers to vari- 
ous of the intercepts by the Signal Intelligence Service number and gives some 
of the requested information which I have been able to obtain. My search has not 
disclosed any "Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was 
supposed to have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall com- 
ments to the effect that it had been intercepted. 

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel Minckler, 
Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr. Friedman, among others. 

Frank B. Rowlett, 
Frank B. Rowlett, 

Lt. Col., S. C. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



35 



[68] SIS No. 


Sources* 


Date Msg 


Date Int 


Date translated 


Honolulu 


23260 


S 


24 Sept— 


24 Sept 


9 Oct 


No 


23570 


7 


14 Oct 


15 Oct 


16 Oct 


No 


23616 


2, S, 7, M, 3 . - 


14 Oct 


14 Oct - 


15 Oct 


No 


23631 


1 


16 Oct 


16 Oct 


17 Oct. 


No 


23859 


2,7, 1 - 


22 Oct 


22/23 Oct-.. 

6Nov 

? . . . 


23 Oct 


No 


24373 


S (teletype) 


5 Nov 

14 Nov 


5 Nov 


No 


25322 


Navy Radio 

S 


26 Nov.. 


No 


25644 


16 Nov. 


? 


3 Dec. -.-. 


No 


24878 


S 


16 Nov 

18 Nov 


17 Nov 


17 Nov 


No 


25773 


S - . 


18 Nov 


6 Dec 


No 


25817 . - . 


1,2 


18 Nov 


18/19 Nov 

?-.- 

? 


6 Dec 


No 


25392 


s . 


19 Nov . . . 


26 Nov 


No 


26823 . 


S 2 

s'(tefetype)""]""] 
S (teletype) 


29 Nov 


6 Dec 


No 


25040 


19 Nov 


? . . 


20 Nov 


No 


26432 


19NoV-.._ 

22NOV 


7 

22Nov. 


28 Nov 


No 


26138 


S.- 


22NOV 

28 Nov.. - 


No 


26135 


1, 6. . 


26 Nov. . 


26 Nov 

26 Nov 


No 


25344 


S -. 


26 Nov 


26 Nov 


No 


26349 


? . 


26 Nov 


26 Nov 


26 Nov 


No 


25444 


1,2 


26 Nov 


27 Nov 


28 Nov 


No 


26480 


1,2 


26 Nov 


26/27 Nov 

26 Nov 


29 Nov 


No 


25436 


1 


26 Nov 


28 Nov 


No 




S,6 

S (teletype) 


28 Nov 


28 Nov 


28NOV 


No 


26496 


29 Nov 


29 Nov 


30 Nov... 


No 


26554 


Navy Radio 

J, Navy Rad 

J, Navy Rad 

? 

Navy Radio.. 

British 


30 Nov 


30 Nov 


1 Dec 


No 


25553 


30 Nov 


1 Dec 


1 Dec. 


No 


25552 . 


30 Nov 


1 Dec 


1 Dec 


No 


25497 


30 Nov - 


30 Nov 


30 Nov 


No 


25565 


30 Nov. 


30 Nov. 


1 Dec 


No 


26787 


1 Dec 

1 Dec 


? 


5Dec 


No 


26605 


S (teletype) 


1 Dec 


1 Dec 


No 


25545 .. 


S (teletype) 


1 Dec 


1 Dec 


1 Dec 


No 


25727 


S, 1 


1 Dec 


? 


4 Dec 


No 


25783 


S, Navy Radio 

1,2,7 


1 Dec 


?— 

2 Dec 


4 Dec --- 


No 


25659-B...; 


2 Dee 


3 Dec 


No 


26660 


7 


2 Dec 


2 Dec 


3 Dec -. 


No 


26640 


X, 2 „ . 


2 Dec 


2Dec 


3 Dec 


No 


25785 


7 


3 Dec 


9 

5 i)ec ........ 


5 Dec 


No 


25807 


W . 


4 Dec 


6 Dec 


No 


27065 


S, 5 


2 Dec 


2 Dec 


30 Dec 


Yes 


26843 


S (teletype) 


4 Dec 


? 


7 Dec 


No 


25836 


S (teletype) . 


6 Dec 


? 


6 Dec 


No 


25838 


S 


6 Dec 


6Dec 


6 Dec 


No 


26843 . . . 


S 


6 Dec 


6 Dec 


6 Dec 


No 


26168 


1, 5 


6 Dec 


? 


12 Dec 


Yes 


26846 


2 (teletype) 


6Dec 


6 Dec 


7 Dec 


No 


25864 


s 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


No 


25850 


S 

S (teletype) 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


No 


25856 . 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


No 


25866 


2, Navy Rad 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


7 Dec 


No 













*Navy: J=Jupiter, Fla. S=Bainbridge Island. Wash. "W= Winter Harbor, Me. Navy Radio-Navy 
Overseas Intercept or British, X-photographs of original messages 

Army: l=Ft. Hancock, 2=San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama, 5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7= 
Fort Hunt, Va. 



[69} 



Wab Department 
washington 



AFFIDAVIT OF Major Genekal Railph C. Smith 

Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the Assistant 
Chief of StafE, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn 
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the 
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was 
Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, 
D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941, Colonel Carlise Clyde 
Dusenbury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern 
Branch, G-2. Up to a few weelvs before 7 December 1941, it was customary for 
either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury to bring to me, for the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2, Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted, 
deciphered, and translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this 
time I would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to 
the Assistant Chief of Staif, G-2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941, pursuant 
to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to the Assistant Chief 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury 
would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the intercepts and gave 
the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During the period when I was 
reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch to General Miles, as stated, 
the pouches containing the intercepts were almost always delivered to me by 
Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recollect specifically 
whether Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the 
pouches, I do recall clearly that as a customary practice it was either one, 
or the other. 

I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6 Decem- 
ber 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entrained at about 6 p. m., 
for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the Infantry School which 
I then commenced. I recall as being on the train with me en route to Fort Ben- 
ning, the evening of 6 December 1941, Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore, 
following the time stated, namely about noon on (3 December 1941, receive any 
pouch containing intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2, or any other person. 

Ralph C. Smith. 

Ralph C. Smith, 

Major General. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
Washington, D. C. 

[70] Affidavit of Mary L. Ross 

Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2. War Department, Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn, and informed 
of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., for the Secertary of 
War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that 
top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in the • 
Cable Branch in the Ofiice of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, 
Washington ; that in said month of December, 1941, in connection with my duties 
I was assigned the number "32" and said number was used in said office to 
designate me. 

That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December 
1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Head- 
quarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of which is hereto 
annexed ; that I recall the circumstances and my actions with respect to said 
cablegram ; that the yellow copy of said cablegram, of which the attached exhibit 
is a photostatic copy, was brought to me with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of 
which is attached, and on which at the bottom is written a message in the hand- 
writing of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew ; that I recall that the person who brought 
me the cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its 
immediate dispatch was urgent ; that on receiving the yellow copy and said 
buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables receipt book, 
a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also attached hereto ; that 
the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed therein by myself as indicated 
by my number 32 in the colunni for the clerk; that I put a red priority tag on 
the copy of the cablegram and took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed 
it to the clerk who receipted for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of 
said receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that there- 
after, pi-oI)ably the next day, the yellow copy was returned wth the notation 
thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5"; that the said number 519 was as- 
signed the message by the Signal Corps and was then \yritten on a page of our 
receipt book as is indicated on the attached photostatic copy ; that the procedure 
in the Signal Corps code room was to assign a number and then after the message 
was sent to write on the yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow 
copy of the message in question as heretofore indicated. 

That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paraphrase kept in the 
G-2 olfice and which has thoreon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941 32"; 
that this latter notation ,on said photostatic copy was placed thereon by me to 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 37 

indicate that it had been transmitted by tlie Signal Corps; that the initials in 
the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the handwriting of 
Colonel Pettigrew. . 

That my memory with respect to the foregoing is clear because soon [il\ 
after Pearl Harbor and at intervals thereafter I was questoned concerning the 
foregoing and the Ofiice of (i-2 assembled pertinent papers among wliich were 
the documents, pliotostatic copies of wliicli there are attached ; that I assisted 
in the assembly of these papers. 

Signed : Mary L. Ross. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 1st day of March 1945. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
at Washington, D. C. " 

[72] 

Standard Form No. 14A 

Approved by the President 

Marclil0,1926 

SECEET 

Telegram 
official business — government rates 

Sent No. 519, 12/5 

December 5, 1941. 

Assistant Chief of Staff, 

Headquarters 02 naicaUan Department, 

Hoiwluln, Territory Hawaii 
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen 
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather 

MILES 

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public 
service. 

Ralph C. Smith, 

Colonel, G.S.G. 
Executive Officer, 0-2. 
Secret Cablegram 



[731 Intelligence Branch— IMISV—WDGS 

FROM : TO ; 

The A. C. of S., G-2 
Executive Officer, G-2 
Chief, Intelligence Branch 
Executive, Intelligence Branch 

Administrative 

Field Personnel 

Drafting and Reproduction 

Stenographic Pool 
Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch 

Situation 

Contact 

Dissemination 
Air Section 

British Empire Section 
Central European Section 
Eastern European Section 
Southern European Section 
Western European Section 
Far Eastern Section 
Latin American Section 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH 

Military Attache Section 

Foreign Liaison Section 

Coordinating Section 

Finance Section 

Personnel Section 

Record Section 

Translation Section 

Mimeograph Room 

Chief Clerk 
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 
SPECIAL STUDY GROUP 
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH 
INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH 
W. D. MAP COLLECTION 
FOR Necessary Action 
Preparation of reply 
Recommendation or remark 
Information and guidance 
Note and return 
Number and return 

[Written :] Important— Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD 

(The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables men- 
tioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, supra^ will be found repro- 
duced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen In- 
vestigation. These illustrations will be found bound together follow- 
ing the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.) 



SECRET 



[75] Paraphrase of an outgoing. Drafting Section : Far Eastern G2/I. 

Secret XX Drafting Officer : RSB. 

Cablegram XX No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941 

DEOEMBEm 5, 1941. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, 
Territory of Hawaii. 
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some 
information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that 
you must obtain. Contact him at once. 

MlI.ES. 



[76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va., being 
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, 
JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, deposes and says : 

On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceoding I was G2, Hawaiian Air 
Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the 
Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Comdr. 
Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian 
Air Force. During this jwriod of about one year I had not more than six con- 
versations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These 
conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the 
last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton before 7 Dec 1941 was about October 
1941. 

The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He 
stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge, 
and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only 
specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible 
Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. 
I believe this was at least two months before 7 Dec. 1941. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 39 

[77] Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to 
my Commanding General, General Martin. 

On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was 
then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached that hos- 
tilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They ap- 
parently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin. Attached are portions 
of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct 1941, concerning this conference. 

I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the 
civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian 
population. 

Edward W. Raley, Col. AC. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Va. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 

[7S] Thursdiay Afternoon, 2 October, 1941. 

Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had 
Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who is on 
intelligence duty down town ; and Major Meehan from the post — and their wives, 
of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at the club. We assem- 
bled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a few and then we adjourned 
to the club where we had dinner and danced a bit. We thought a good time was 
had by all and in your immortal phrase, it "was a good party." 

The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was anxious 
to get Bicknell's and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation. You 
might gather from the public prints that United States — Japanese relations had 
been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't think so. It seems to me that Japa- 
nese — U. S. relations never were in a more critical state than they are at this 
moment. I don't say [79] there necessarily will be a war between the 
two countries right now, but I do say that never in the past has there been a time 
when it would be easier to have one. 

I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and he made 
me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion and then, in 
the fewest number of words possible, he summed up the situation in a fashion 
that was just about perfect. I would have been very proud of myself if I had 
had the situation as well ordered in my mind and was capable of expressing it as 
well as he did. I've never heard anything so concisely and comprehensively ex- 
pressed. 

Daddy. 

[Hand written :] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942. 

EWR. 



[80] War Department 

washington, d. c. 
Atfidavtt of General Charles K. Gailey 

General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the Operations 
Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C, being 
duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, 
JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was 
Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of Japanese diplo- 
matic messages which had been deciphered and translated it was the customary 
practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these 
to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Gerow. They would be 
given me and I would get them to General Gerow as soon as practicable. I 
recall that these intercepts were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or 
Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing 
them I do remember that it was either one or the other as a customary practice. 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not recall 
having i-eceived any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusen- 
bury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow did not receive 
any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December 1941, I am certain that 
they were not delivered to me as, if they had been, I would have given them to 
him. 

Chas. K. Gailey, 
Charles K. Gailey, 

Brigadier General. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
at Washington, D. C. 



[81] War Department- 

Washington 

Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French 

Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief 
Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, being duly sworn and informed of the investi- 
gation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supple- 
mentary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top 
secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was 
Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington, D. C. 

I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5 
December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses 
W. Pettlgrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my opinion 
that the message was sent to the addressee for the following reasons : The 
notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" indicate that the message 
was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was assigned the "#519" and 
that the message was then encoded with the code room sequence number as 
the first word in the text of message. The coded text message, original and 
carbon copy, was then sent to the message center. The carbon copy bearing the 
time stamp of the message center acknowledging receipt was then returned to 
the code room and checked with the original clear text message. The Signal 
Center time stamp date -was then placed on the original clear text message, 
which was returned the following morning to the office of origin. 

In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time stamped, 
was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and then the 
message was word counted and placed at the operating position, where it re- 
ceived a channel sequence number at tlie time of transmission which was 
checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of the message 
the operator put his initials and time of transmission on the face of the 
message, which was later collected by a clerk who verified the "black number" 
by a check off sheet before sending the message to file. This was a further 
guard to assure the transmission of the message. At midnight these sequence 
channel numbers were and still are verified with the distant end of the circuit 
to assure that all messages as transmitted were received. This sequence 
check was and is known as a "good night service." 

Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have been 
made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break in the 
sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of checking 
sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure and guard 
againt lost messages. 

[82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In 
fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal Center, and 
from my own experience prior to 7 "December 1941, the loss of a coded message 
could not be recalled. 

I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in possession 
of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy is attached to the 
affidavit of Colonel Pettlgrew. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 41 

I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable receipts 
book page for 5 December 1041 attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. The 
entry shown thereon bearing serml No. 4 indicates that the clerk in the Signal 
Corps code room receipted for the message by the initials "DG", which I recognize 
as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves who was employed as a clerk in the Signal 
Corps code room on r> December 1941, and whose duties included receipting for 
such messages. 

Edward F. Frencli, 
Edward F. Fkench, 

Colonel, S. C. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of IVlarch 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 
at Washington, D. C. 



[83] War Department 

washington 
ArriDAvrr of Colonel Joseph K. Evans 

Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as the 
Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and informed of the 
investigation by Ma.ior Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, sup- 
plementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top 
secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, 
Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was 
Assistant G-2, Philippine Department. 

There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between 
the Army and the Navy at INIanila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities 
for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each 
Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were 
encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted 
at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and desig- 
nated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at 
Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese 
information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to par- 
ticular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, 
Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Eosie" Mason, 
USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For 
example, see Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Eoom 
3501, 630 Fifth Avenue. Rockefeller Center. 

I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States 
by Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received in- 
formation, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret 
Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United 
States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were 
concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the 
convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct 
route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through 
the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival 
in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 
matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. 
Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these discussions I told 
Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information [S.^] I had received 
and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received tliis infoi'- 
mation and at the same time. 

Joseph K. Evans, 
Joseph K. Evans, 

Colonel, OSC. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen. 

Major, JAGD. 
at Washington, D. C. 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

185] Memorandum to : Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen. 
From : Mr. Jolin E. Russell, President 

Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H. 
You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential 
information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble 
in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment 
to that Territory. 

My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. O. V. Bennett, 
Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all 
outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands and to endeavor to stop 
sliipments that were en route there. 

I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw 
a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson ( then working secretly for 
the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested 
the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, 
is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorangum, and states that after show- 
ing this message to me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield 
and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records 
of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941. 
On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows : 

"Tliank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders. 
It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps 
on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precau- 
tions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why 
I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one 
gets at times." 
I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but 
believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating 
in the light of diplomatic exchanges than taking place. I do not believe that the 
message said that trouble would begin on December 7th ; but as I told you today 
the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in 
the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a con- 
siderable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. 

I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw [86] light on 
this subject ; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. 
Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject ; but I can say 
that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I 
have given you herein, 
jer-m. 

John E. Russeu,, 
President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd. 
April 10, 1945. 
At Honolulu. 



CONFIDBNTIAI, 
[81A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941 

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments 
in Indo-China : 

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways. 

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and 
considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm). 

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Wash- 
ington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here. 

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities 
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia 
at present but will act in South. 

You may infoi-m Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu. 

CO. Col. Bicknell 
. Mr. Shivers 
Capt. Mayfield 

[87^] On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message re- 
ferred to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945, 
which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons 
indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941. 

Honolulu, T. H. Harry L. Dawson. 

April 16, 1945. John E. Russeli,. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 43 

[88} Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers 

Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, being 
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. 
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says : 

On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, 
T. H. 

During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr. Joseph 
J. Rocht'fort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet. 
Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Capt. 
Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. 
Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell, 
MID, Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt. 
Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the fore- 
going persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings 
with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes 
be present. 

I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr. 
Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted [89] of an 

intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical 
units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss witli me his opera- 
tions, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, 
until after 7 Dec. 1941. 

Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was aware 
of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements 
and break in diplomatic relations ; and said to me if I suddenly call you and 
say I am moving to the East side of the Island (Oahu) or north, south, or west 
sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in 
those directions from Japan. J passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell, 
on that date. At no time did Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such 
movement. 

On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his informa- 
tion that the Japanese Consul [90] General at Honolulu was burning his 
codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveilance of the Consulate had 
disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he was referring to information 
intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and 
London. This latter information was given me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7 
Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec 
1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese 
Consulate & a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this 
person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. 
This was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to 
Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt. Mayfield 
what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this 
information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff meeting on 6 Dec. 1941. 

On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, 
Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the US & Japan 
were breaking down & to be on the alert at all [91] times as anything 
could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt. Mayfield Sr 
Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information 
from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C. 

About the period 8 Dec to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a paraphrase 
copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec 1941, of a radiogram 
sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office 
at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul 
General, through which the movement of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could 
be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui. 

Robert L. Shivers. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
at Honolulu 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[02] Amendment to Affidavit of Robert L. Siiivebs 

CoiicerJiiiii,' the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., sijiiu-d Marshall, 
(lilted 12 Dec. 1J;41, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding 
that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this in- 
formation from Col. Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in 
Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to 
which it relates. Comdr. Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given 
him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on 
7 Dec. 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 
7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, 
we got the original from the Mackay Radio Co. 

Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian i)opulation 
of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way. 
because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give 
the impression it created. 

Concerning the AflSdavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945, I 
talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans arrived in 
Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the details of our con- 
versation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the 
information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit. 

Robert L. Shivers. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 



[9.{] Amendment to Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, Who States Further: 

Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P. I., 
called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific 
area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British government, reporting 
direct to the British Foreign Office at London ; that he had established Mr. Harry 
Dawson, an English citizt^n and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as 
the operative representative of the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. 
Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands, 
but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertain- 
ing to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to 
Hawaii from Japan ; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 
at Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other 
SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affect- 
ing Japan ; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were 
made for the receipt of such information [95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2 
at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as propo.sed during the period 
from July to and including December, 1941 ; that the files of the information so 
furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon 
which appear my initial ; 

Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascer- 
tained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several 
years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate, 
did not in fact cover one line to the cook's quarters ; I therefore covered this line, 
which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his 
important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified ; that 
I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 
1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was 
stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December, 1941, at the order of the 
District [96] Intelligence Officer ; that had I known such ONI coverage 
had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement. 

Robert L. Shivers. 
Robert L. Shivers. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945. 
Henry C. Claitsen, 

JA. Colonel, JAGD. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 45 

[97] Telegram 
Gov Jus 
Hoover 
FBI Justice 
Washington, D. C. 

RLS:PB 

Honolulu, T. H., Deceml)er 5, 19ff5. 
Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage confile J. Japanese consul 
general Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers. 

Shivers. 
Official Business. 



[98] Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command 

office of the assistant chief op staff for military intelligence 
counter intelligence division 

Box 3, APO 456 

In reply refer to : 

16 April 1945. 
Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. 

Subject : Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible hostilities with 
Japan. 

1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C. W. 
Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, 
and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area, on 29 
November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with 
information contained in a Secret Radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
from the War Department, dated 27 November 1941, which advised that negoti- 
ations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that 
subversive activities might be expected. 

2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 
29 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the 
context of the above-referred to radio message, and it was suggested to them that 
all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage 
of Air Force installations and equipment. 

Byron M. Meurlott, 
Byron M. Meurlott, 

Lt. Colonel, M. /., 
Assist. A. C. of 8., G-2 (CID). 
At Honolulu 



[99] Headquarters United States Army Forrces, Pacific Areas 
office of the commanding general 

APO 958 

In reply refer to: 17 April 1945. 

Memorandum : 

Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 519, 5 Dec 1941. 

On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General's Office 
requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or record of receipt, 
of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5 December 1941. The under- 
signed instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in charge of the AG Classified Records 
Division, to make the search and assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible. 

The following is a brief account of the search made : 

a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were in.spected and it was determined 
that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on or about 25 January 
1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who was on duty in the division 
at that time. 

b. A search was made of the AG decimal files and no record was found of the 
subject radio. 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

c. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, oflScer in charge of the Signal 
Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record was kept 
of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept. 

d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was assumed 
that distribution in this headquarters would be made to Gr-2. Capt. Bosworth, 
accompanied by Col. Clausen, went to G-2 and contacted Major Maresh of that 
section. A thorough search was made of tlie Gr-2 Files by Major Maresh, in the 
presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record was found of the radio. 

e. Col. Clansen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on 
duty in the AG CRD at the time. 

As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of this head- 
quarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl Harbor Investigation 
Board's visit and no record was found at that time. 

O. N. Thompson, 
O. N. Thompson, 



at Honolulu. 



Colonel, AGD, 
Adjutant Oeneral. 



[100] Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfeed 

J. Holmes, USN. 

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl 
Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (ret.) presently on duty with 
JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of the investiga- 
tion by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the Secretary of War, supple- 
mentary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority 
of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Naval personnel and records, and 
that top secrecy is required, do depose as follows : 

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several 
months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, 
Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT, and was in charge of the 
radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHEFORT, ; that his duties included the 
daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for distribution by Captain 
ROCHEFORT ; that copies of the said radio traffic analysis summaries covering 
the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941, taken from the 
file of FRUPAC entitled "Communication Intelligence Daily Summary", are 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; that he did not maintain 
or conduct any liaison with any Army officer, or exchange any information per- 
taining to his functions or duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this 
regard, he did not maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information 
with Kendell J. FIELDER, G-2, Hawaiian Department. 

Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for several 
weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, 
Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the scope and extent 
of his duties during said period included only the preparation of plots of posi- 
tions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels, flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes 
and positions of Japanese ships based on call analysis ; that these plots were dis- 
seminated only to CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on 
7 December 1941, and several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to 
the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain 
HOLMES and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows : 

That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months 
immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room, was 
assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to 
Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT ; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor 
concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, referred to in the affi- 
davit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT given Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN 
and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch dated 28 November 1941 from 
CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by British and ComSixteen for a 
certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 29 November 1941 from OpNav [101] 
to CinCPac concerning .Japanese broadcast schedules and, dispatch 1 December 
1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPac concerning certain important Japanese 
news broadcasts which dispatches have been microfilmed and are contained in In- 
coming Code Book No. 1 ; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concern- 
ing the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 47 

of Captain ROCHEFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to 
CinCPac concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Wash- 
ington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and 
by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple machines, which dis- 
patch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1 ; that 
the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in 
Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from Com- 
FOURTEEN to OpNav of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 No- 
vember 1941, from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information 
that Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6 
December 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese con- 
sulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system ; that the Communica- 
tion Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and 
including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit "A" herewith attached and 
made a part hereof, and consist of a resume or evaluation showing the results 
of traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications 
only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHEFORT with copies thereof dis- 
seminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A", 
only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer ; that on 7 
December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by 
Captain ROCHEFORT did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese 
diplomatic radip messages which required the use of a machine and the USN 
decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the 
on'y machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and cov- 
ert d a Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time. 

Thomas A. Huckins, 
Thomas A. Huckins, 

Captain, USN. 
Wilfred J. Holmes, 
Wilfred J. Holmes, 

Captain, USN. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Col, J/A/O/D. 
at Honolulu, T. H. 

Read and approved. 
J. S. Holtwick. 
J. S. Holtwick, 

Cdr. U. 8. N. 



[102] Morrill W. Marston, 07626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being first 
duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen for 
the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that 
top secrecy is required, reposes and says : 

My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 
15 Feb. 45 ; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, 
Hawaiian Department ; and had information, that the Navy had a cryptoanalytic 
unit ; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison 
with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts 
of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the 
local (MWM) development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occa- 
sions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by 
the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to 
the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings ; 

Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observa- 
tions there was no alarm of the civilian population. 

Morrill W. Marston, 

Brig. Oen. U. 8. A. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Col. JAGD. 
at Honolulu. 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[103] Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed Soutli Pa- 
cific Base Conimand, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed of the in- 
vestigation by Lt. Col. Henry G. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and that top secrecy 
is required, deposes and says : 

Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record of this 
message by looking carefully through the classified files and journals of incoming 
messages covering said date; said files and journals being available this date at 
Hq., POA, Ft. Shaffer and consisting, among others, of tlie following: 

Classified, A. G. Binder 1 ; 370.2 Battles & Ileports of; 
Classified, A G Binder 1 ; 091 Japan ; 
Classified, A G Binder 1 ; 2S3.4 Espionage ; 
Classified, A G Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information ; 
Classified, A G Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298; 

no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message could be 
found, although it was the practice to [lOJf] set forth in said journals the 
War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent number in this case, 
519, could not be found as having been entered, but the preceding numbers 517 
and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers 520 and 521, pertaining to mes- 
sages dated during the time in question. 

I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the file copy 
shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial. 

LoTJis R. Lane, 

CWO USA. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
at Honolulu. 



[105] Fourteenth Nav^l District, 

District Intelligence Office, 

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel. 
Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 19^5. 
Sefret 

Statement for Proceedings Supplementary to the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor 

Board 

This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. 
Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is 
based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, 
and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my 
knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement. 

The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, 
the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintainecl by the District Intelligence 
Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received 
almost daily transcripts and tran.slations of conversations monitored. 

About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a 
telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge 
of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself 
in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some em- 
ployees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported 
their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casu- 
ally passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone 
company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance 
had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On 
receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly 
to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence 
had been breeched by the DIO's having been given information concerning an 
FBI tap. 

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI 
protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to 
consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be 
a serious breech of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of 
Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and 
thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 49 

ducted, Captain Mayflield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all tele- 
phone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not 
resumed until the [106] morning of 7 December. 1941, following the 
Japanese attack. 

It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District 
Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such surveillances were being 
conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from 
gaining any currency in the organization. 

Donald Woodnim, Jr., 
Donald Woodrum, Jr., 

Lieutenant, USNR. 



[107] Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN 

25 April 1945. 

[lOS] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, being first duly sworn and informed 
of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 
JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: 

On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence 
Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, 
correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to desig- 
nated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet ; to provide Plan.s 
and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of 
current estimates ; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within 
the U. S. Pacific Fleet ; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy 
Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of 
Fleets of potential Allies ; to supervise projects concerning aerial ph(?tographic 
reconnaissance. 

Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally 
lie effected through established channels, i. e.. the Naval shore liaison or repre- 
sentative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify 
the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the 
Combat Intelligence Officer. Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Roche- 
fort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Cap- 
tain Mayfield) : Captain Mayfleld was the District Intelligence Officer and 
responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director 
of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage 
and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct 
liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth 
Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence 
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communica- 
tions Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces 
of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander 
in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, 
I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, 
there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies 
through that officer. 

About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called 
at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an 
Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, 
Netherlands East Indies, Australian Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific 
Ocean airports and airways information. I furnished him with 1109] all 
the information was possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Air- 
ways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, 
or his assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence 
material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers 
and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency. 

By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources, 
including Dutch. British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that 
Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular 
Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from 
other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of 

79716— 46— Ex. 148 5 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along 
the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South 
China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Haley and 
we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance 
thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my 
recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every 
other day. 

During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, 
without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I im- 
parted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had 
previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previ- 
ously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the 
true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath 
by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized 
to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would 
make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his 
Cotomanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General Hawai- 
ian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, 
I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as 
follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro- 
Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese 
landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that 
Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North 
Mayana, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, 
the pro-Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call 
upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand 
and an invasion of Malaya. 

To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" informa- 
tion that' we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included 
in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic rela- 
tions or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely, 
America or Britian or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or re- 
ceived at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him 
of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic 
Officials were destroying their Purple Machines. 

[110] In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious 
equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to in- 
forming Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable 
information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a 
considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battle- 
ships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. 1 distinctly 
recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in 
late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China 
coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had 
sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh 
Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very 
strict secret. 

Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by 
the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise. 

I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a 
telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He 
said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I 
should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied : "We cannot do 
anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until 
toinorrow morning." 

In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands : 
Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, 
,1 made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in 
the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Jap- 
anese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very ap- 
parent. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins 
concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Sur- 
face and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High 
Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations. 

When the U. S. Army projiosed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain 
of the Japanese Mandates in late Noveniber 1941, I held a series of conferences 
with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 51 

(#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso 
that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the 
reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed 
on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not 
carried in aircraft. Colonel Kaley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on 
all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots 
on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This recon- 
naissance did no materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him 
of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the 
Mandated Islands. Exhibit "B" is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulle- 
tin #45-41. 

[Ill] I do not specifically recall the term "A, B, C Block" or discussions 
with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations 
concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could 
not permit Jap penetration. 

My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel 
Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of 
us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far 
East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct 
liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the 
Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters per- 
taining to shore-side business. 

From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders 
returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's oflSce to 
give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. 
I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I 
believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference 
with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. 
During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location 
and activity of the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was 
known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also 
discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated 
Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with par- 
ticular emphasis on the Marshalls. 

I had no oflBcial liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel 
Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison 
that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a sub- 
ordinate Command of the Commanding General, HaWaiian Department. His 
statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers 
of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the War 
Plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian 
Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other 
liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance 
with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew 
there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Oflicer Lt. Burr USN from Head- 
quarters, Fourteenth Naval District, x)ermanently attached to the Headquarters, 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct 
liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of the information that 
I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any 
intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941. 

I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to 
at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission in 
December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in 1944) , I am unable 
to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with 
the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda. 

[J12] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen, 
marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of 
these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 
on which I have written my initials and today's date. 

E. T. Layton, 
E. T. Layton, Captain, USN, 

Combat Intelligence Officer, 
Staff, Commander U. 8. Pacific Fleet. 

Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Colonel Henry C. Clausen, J/A/G/D. 
At Guam. 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[113] United States Pacific Fi^et, 

Secret U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship, 

Pearl Har'bor, T. H., November 28, 19.',!. 
Memorandum for: Atlmiral. 
Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight lOver Mandates Islands. 

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air 
Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this after- 
noon at 1430. 

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet 
Intelligence Bulletin No. 45^1, giving the general summary of the installations 
and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised 
me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circula- 
tion except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders 
of the Army squadrons tO' be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document 
will not be carried in any aircraft. 

3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the IVIARSHALLS, TRUK 
and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK, 
KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP. 

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference 
and is working up meteorological data in Gonjunction with the proposed recon- 
naissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of 
medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and 
fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that 
hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective. 

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive 
armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day, depar- 
tures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be 
practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installa- 
tions in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective 
of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The JALUIT plane returning 
via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and POKAAKKU. The 
TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These return objec- 
tives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, 
and existing conditions at the time. 

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to 
Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI 
(Greenwich Island). 

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences 
after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots 
on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff. 

/s/ E. T. Layton. 

ExhiUt "A" 



[llJf] United States Pacific Fleet, 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. HRK 

AA/FFl/(25) 
Serial 01954 

Peael Hakboe. 
November 21, lOJfl. 

Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To: PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41. 

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin. 

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information. 

2 BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE 
AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IM- 
PORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CARE- 
FULLY PRESERVED. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 53 

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been repro- 
duced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request 
for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief 
and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence. 

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bullettin should be retained for 
study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the 
present National Emergency. 

' P. C. Crosley 
P. C. Ceosley, 

By direction. 
DItiTRIBUTlON: (7CM-41) 
List I, Case 3 ; P., X. 
Atlantic Fleet Al ; 
Asiatic Fleet Al ; 
One copy each to : 

FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11^ND14, 
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab. 

Exhibit "B" 



[U5\ TOP SECRET 

Confiderttidl 

Intelligence Bulletin No. ■l.'j-41 

CONTENTS 

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS I'ages 1 to lli inclusive. 

Major Fleet Commands Page 1. 

Combined Fleet and First Fleet '" 2. 

Combined Fleet and Second Fleet " 3. 

Third Fleet " 4. 

Fourth Fleet " 5 and 6. 

Fifth Fleet " 7. 

Sixth Fleet — (Submarine Fleet) " 7. 

Carrier Fleet : " 8. 

Combined Air Force . " 9. 

Train for Combined Fleet " 10. 

Japanese Naval Forces in China " 11 and 12. 

(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS, Pages 

13 and 14. 

General Situation. 

Air Distribution. 

Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in Mandates 

(2 pages to be pasted together). 
Sketch of PALAO (PELEW). 
Sketch of MALAKAL Harbor, etc. 
Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc. 

[116] TOP secret 

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941. 

(10574) 

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and 
replaces the former report on this subject. 

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet 
commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and 
seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of siiecial task 
forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regroup- 
ing has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as 
shown below. 



54 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



I. Combined Fleet 

1. First Fleet 

2. Second Fleet 

3. Third Fleet 

4. Fourth Fleet 

5. Fifth Fleet 

6. Sixth Fleet 

7. Carrier Fleet 



MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS 

(Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 

Desrons 
(Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc. 

(Blockade & Transport Small craft. 

Force) 
(Mandate -Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and 

many small units. 
? ? 

(Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons 

(Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs 



8. Combined Air (Seaplane tenders, etc.) 4 Airi-ons, & shore based 



Force 
II. Japanese Naval Forces ( Staff Headquarters) 
in China. 

1. First China Exi)ed, (Central China) 

Fleet. 

2. Second China (South China) 

Exped. Fleet. 

3. Third China (North China) 

Exped. Fleet. 

4. Southern Exped. (Saigon) 

Fleet 



planes. 
1 PG and 3 DD's 

Gunboats 

1 CA, 1 CL and small 

craft. 
Torpedo Boats, etc, 

1 CL, transports and mine 
craft. 



[117] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service 
than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and 
the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. 
The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly 
increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing. 

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET 

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral) 

MAGATO, Flagship 

FIRST FLEET 



Batdiv One 

NAGATO (F) 
MUTSU 
YAMASHIRO 
Batdiv Two 
FUSO (F) 
ISE 

HYUGA 
Batdiv Three 
HIYEI (F) 
KONGO 
KIRISHOIA 
*HARUNA 
Crudiv Six 

KAKO (F) 
FURUTAKA 
AOBA 
KINUGASA 
Desron One 

ABUKUMA (F) 
Desdiv 6 

IKAZUCHI (F) 
INAZUMA 
SAZANAMI 
HIBIKI 
Desdiv 21 

NENOHI (F) 
HATSUHARU 
HATSUSHIMO 
WAKABA 



Desron One (Cont'd) 
Desdiv 21 

SHIRATSUYU (F) 
ARIAKE 
YUGURE 
SHIGURE 
Desron Three 

SENDAI (F) 
Desdiv 11 

FUBUKI (F) 
SHIRAYUKI 
HATSUYUKI 
Desdiv 12 

SHIRAKUMO (F) 
SHINONOME 
USUGOMO 
MURAKUMO 
Desdiv 19 

ISONAMI (F) 
SHIKINAMI 
AYANAMI 
• URANAMI 
Desdiv 2o 

AMAGIRI (F) 
ASAGIRI 
YUGIRI 
SAGIRI 
Total : 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD. 



•Note ; The HAKDNA b^s been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major 
repairs. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



55 



urn 



COMBINED FLEET 
SECOND FLEET 



TAKAO, Flagship 

Crudiv Four Desron Two (Cont'd) 

TAKAO (F) Desdiv 16 

ATAGO HATSUKAZE 

CHOKAI • YUKIKAZE 

MAYA AMATSUKAZE 

Crudiv Five* TOKITSUKAZE 

MYOKO (F) Desdiv 18 

NACHI KASUMI 

HAGURO ARARE 

Cnidiv Seven KAGERO 

KUMANO (F) SHIRANUHI 

MOGAMI Desron Four 

MIKUMA NAKA (F) 

SUZUYA Desdiv 2 

Crudiv Eight YUDACHI (F) 

TONE (F) MURASAME 

CHIKUMA HARUSAME 

Desron Tioo SAMIDARE 

JINTSU (F) Desdiv 9 

Desdiv 8 ' ASAGUMO 

ASASHIO (F) YAMAGUMO 

ARASHIO MINEGUMO 

OSHIO NATSUGUMO 

MICHISHIO Desdiv 2-'t 

Desdiv 15 KAWAKAZE (F) 

KUROSHIO YAMAKAZE 

OYASHIO SUZUKAZE 

NATSUSHIO UMIKAZE 

HAYASHIO Total : 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD. 

♦Note : There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5. 

[119] THIRD FLEET 

TAKAHASHI Ibo— Vice Admiral 

NAGARA, Flagship 

NORTHERN BLOCADE FORCE 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE— Con. 

CHOGEI (F) Desron Five 

Subdiv Desdiv 34 

HAKAZE 

AKIKAZE 

YUKAZE 

Subdiv TACHIKAZE 

1st BASE FORCE 

Maru (F) 

Minelayer Divisron 

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE ITSUKUSHIMA 

Desron Five AOTAKA 

NATORI (I') HATSUTAKA 

Desdiv 5 Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21 

ASAKAZE AM-1 AM-7 

HARU0AZE AM-2 AM-8 

MATSUKAZE AM-3 AM-9 

HATAKAZE AM-4 AM-10 

Desdiv 12 AM-5 AM-11 

SATSUKI AM-6 AM-12 

FUMITSUKI Ounboat Division 1 

MINATSUKI 6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing 

NAGATSUKI Vessels) 



56 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THIRD FLEET— Continued 



2nd BLOCKADE FORCE— Con. 
SUBCHASER SQUADRON 
(F) 

Subchaser Division 1 and 11 
PC-1 PC-7 

PC-2 PC-8 

PC-3 PC-9 

Subchaser Division 21 and 31 
PC-4 PC-10 

PC~5 PC-11 

PC-6 PC-12 

27 AP-Naincs Unknown 



2nd BASE FORCE 

Maru, (F) 

Minelai/er Division 17 
SHIRTAKA 
YAEYAMA 
KUNAJIRI 
At least 5 other men of war, and 17 
merchant ships. 
•Total : 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS. 6SS, GCM, 
12 AM, G XPG 12 PC, 46, AP. 



\I20] 



FOURTH FLEET 

HiRATA — Vice Admiral 
KASHIMA, Flagship 



Cnidiv Eighteen 
TENRYU (F) 
TATSUTA 
KASHIMA 
Desron Six 

YUBARI (F) 
Desdiv 29 

OITE 

HAYATE 

ASANAGI 

YUNAGI 
Desdiv 36 

MUTSUKI (F) 

KISARAGI 

YAYOI 

MOCHITSUKI 
Subron Seve)i, 
JINGEI 
Snbdiv 26 

R0-6(1 

RO-61 

R0-«2 
Siibdiv 27 

RO-Gf) 

R0-6(; 

RO-67 
Subdir 33 

RO-63 

R0-(i4 

RO-68 
Siibdiv 

S XPG 
[121] 4th BASE FORCE 

Truk, Headquarters 

IMaru (F) 

Guard ^Division Jf 

Maru (F) 

4AP()rAK 



FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ- 
TRUK 

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 
cluding Air Group #17 and 
Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. 
Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th 
Def. Force, Olol Detachment of 
4th Def. Force, Greenwich De- 
tachment 4th Def. Force, Mort- 
lock Detachment 4th Def. Force, 
Pingelap Detachment 4th Def. 
Force, Puluwat Detachment 4th 
Def. Force, Lamortek Detach- 
ment (Hall ?) of 4th Def. 

Force. 
5th BASE FORCE 

Saipan, Headquarters 
SHOE I MARU (F) 

Giiard Division 5 

Composition unknown 
Minelayer Division 19 
OKINOSHIMA (F) 
TOKIWA 
Subchapter Division 56 
KASHI (F) 
XPG 561 (?) 
XPG 562 (?) 
XPG 563 (?) 
Gunboat Division 8 
Composition unknown 
9 AP or AK 
FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-SAI- 
PAN ) 

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 
cluding Air Group #18. 
Tenian Detachment, 5tli Defense 

Force 
PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense 

Force 
Snrveif and Patrol Division 
KOSHU 

KATSURIKI (CM) 
KOMABASHI (AS) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



57 



FOURTH FLEET— Continued 



FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE— Con. 
Repair and Salvage Division 
MATSUEI MARU 
NAGAURA (MARU) 
Srd BASE FORCE 

Palao, Headquarters 

Maru (F) 

Guard Division 3 

Maru 

Subdiv 6 
RO-56 
RO-57 
RO-58 
RO-59 
Subchaser Division 55 

Maru (F) 

XPG 551 (?) 
XPG 552 (?) 
XPG 553 (?) 
XPG 554 (?) 
THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ 
PALO A) 
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 
cluding Air Group #16 and TOBI 
detachment of 4th Defence Force 
Detach. 4th Def. Force - 

Estimate these unknown loca- 
tions to be SOROI, HELEN 
REEF, ULITHI, YAP and AN- 
GUAR). 
6th BASE FORCE 

Jaluit, Headquarters 

TAKUHAN MARU (F) 



6th BASE FORCE— Continued 
Mine Siccepcr Division J(J 
NAGATA IMARU ( F ) 
CHOKAI MARU 
DAIDO MARU 
IKUTA MARU 



Maru 
Maru 
Maru 



(This may 
be the 
SALVAGE 

Unit known 

to be in 

6th Base 

Force) 



Subchaser Division 5 
PC-51 
PC-52 
PC-53 
SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ- 
Jv^LUIT) 

KAIKEI Maru 
#5 FUKU Maru 

Maru 

Miscellaneous Forces ashore in- 
cluding AIR GROUP #19 at 
IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and prob- 
able Air Groups at WOTJE and 
KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. 
( Kwajalein Atoll ) . Detach- 
ment 6th Defence Force KWA- 
JALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), 
TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll), 
ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok 
Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENY- 
BOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI 
Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE 
Atoll— Detach, of 6th Def. Force, 
UTIRIK Atoll— Detach, of 6th 
Def. Force. 
Total : 4 CL 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS. 1 Sur- 
vey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM, 
41 AP or AK. 



[122] 



FIFTH FLEET 
CL (F) 



The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. 
The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru. 

SIXTH FLEET 

(Submarine Fleet) 

KATORI, Flagship 



Subron One 

TAIGEI (F) 

Subdiv 1 
1-9 
1-15 
1-16 
1-17 

Subdiv 2 
1-18 
1-19 
1-20 



Subron Two 

KITAGANI (F) 

Subdiv 7 
I-l 
1-2 
1-3 
1-7 

Subdiv 8 
1-4 
1-5 
1-6 



58 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FIFTH FLEET— Continued 



Subron Three 

NAGOYA MARU (F) 
Subdiv It 

1-74 

1-75 
SiiMiv 12 

1-8 

1-63 

1-69 

1-70 
SiiMiv 20 

1-71 

1-72 

1-73 
Supbron Five 
YURA (F) 
Subdiv 28 

1-59 

1-60 
Sttbdiv 29 

1-61 (Sank 10-2-41) 

1-62 

1-64 
Subdiv 30 

1-65 

1-66 

•Note : The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned. 



Subron Six 
KINU (F) 
Subdiv 9 
1-123 
1-124 
Subdiv IS 
1-121 
1-122 
Subron Ten 

KARASAKI (F)* 
Subdiv IS 
1-53 
1-54 
1-55 
Subdiv 19 
1-56 
1-57 
1-58 
Subdiv 21 
RO-33 
RO-34 
Total : 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS. 



[123] 



CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs) 
CV KAGA Flagship 



Cardiv 1 


Cardi/v Jf 


AKAGI 


ZUIKAKU 


KAGA (F) 


SHOKANU 


Desdiv 7 


Desdiv 3 


OBORO (F) 


HOKAZE 


USHIO 


SHIOKAZE 


AKEBONO 


NAMIKAZE 


AKATSUKI 


NUMAKAZE 


Cardiv 2 


Cardiv 


SORYU (F) 


CV KORYU 


HIRYU 


CV KASUGA (MARU) 


Desdiv 23 


Total : 10 CV, 16 DD. 


UZUKI 




KIKUTSUKI 




MIKATSUKI 




YUZUKI 




Cardiv _ 




RYU JO (F) 




HOSHO 




Desdiv 11 




ISOKAZE 




URAKAZE 




HAMAKAZE 





um 



COMBINED AIR FORCE 
Kanoya 'Naval Air Station, Edqtrs. 



Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The oi-ganization provides for great 
mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the 
Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups 
(e. g the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely 
wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air 
groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



59 



Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accord- 
ingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings 
into which the various units may be combined. 



Ship-Based Squadkons 



Shoke-Based Aib Groups 



Air Ron 6 




8th Air Group 




KAMIKAWA MARU (F) 




10th Air Group 




FUJIKAWA MARU 




11th Air Group 




KENJO MARU 




12th Air Group 




(Has been working with the 


3rd 


14th Air Group 




Fleet) 




16th Air Group 




Air Ron 7 




17th Air Group 




CHITOSB (F) 




18th Air Group 




CHIYODA 




19th Air Group 




MIZUHO 




23rd Air Group 




(Has been working with the 


1st 


Chichijima 




Fleet) 




Chinkai 




Air Ron 2-i 




Genzan 




KAMOI (F) 




Hyakurihara (or 


Moribara) 


1 XAV 




Iwakuni 




Yokohama Air Graup 




Kanoya (Hdqtrs.) 




Chitose Air Group 




Kashima 




(Has been working with the 


4th 


Kasumigaura 


Sasebo 


Fleet) 




Kisarazu 


Suzuka 


Patrol Squadron 2 




Kure 


Takao 


NOTORO 




Maizuru 


Tateyama 


(Formerly with Air Ron 6) 




Oita 


Tsukuba 






Ominato 


Usa 






Omura 


Yatabe 






Saeki 


Yokosuka 



TOTAL : 5 AV, 3XAV, 35 Air Groups. 



U25] 

SHIRETOKO 

SATA 

TSURUMI 

SHIRTYA 

IRQ 



TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET 



ONDO 

HAYATOMO 

NARUTO 

MAMIYA 

ASAHI 



AKASHI 

MUROTO 

OTOMARU 

SETTSU 



Total : 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship. 



[126] 



JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA 
KOGA, Mineichi — Vice Admiral 



IZUMO, Flagship 



Shanghai Base Fokce 



ASUGA 
TSUGA 



KURI 
HASU 



Shanghai Harior Affairs Section 
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai 
Nanking Base Force 
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking 

Central China Fleet, or First 
Expeditionary Fleet 



KOMATSU, Teruhisa- 
UJI, Flagship 
Patrol Division 11 

ATAKA 

SETA 

KATADA 



-Vice Admiral 



Patrol Division 11 — Continued 

HIRA 

HOZU 

TOBA 

ATAMI 

FUTAMI 

FUSHIMI 

SUMIDA 

HASHIDATE 
Air Oroup 10 
Hankow Base Force 
Kiukiang Base Force 
Gunboat Division ? ? 

SHINFUKU MARU 

HITONOSE 

CHIKUBU 
Total : 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP. 



(F) 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA— Continued 

South China Fleet, or Second [127] North China Fleet, or 
Expeditionary Fleet Third Expeditionary Fleet 

SUGIYAWA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral 
NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral IWATE, Flagship 

ISUZU, Flagship Patrol Dwision 12 
Crndiv 15 IWATE (F) 

ISUZU (F) MANRI MARU 

ASHIGARA Torpedo Boat Division 11 
Patrol Division I4 HATO 

SAGA SAGI 

AM-17 KARI 

AM-18 KIJI 

Torpedo Boat Division 1 Torpedo Boat Division 21 
OTORI CHIDORI 

HAYASUSA MANAZURI 

HIYOBORI . TOMOZURU 

KASASAGI HATSUKARI 

G^itard Divisio7i 15 KARUKAYA 

Guard Division 16 Gtinboat Division 1 

Canton Base Force Gunboat Division 2 

Ammj Base Force Gunboat Division 13 

Haitian Is. Base Force Gunboat Division IJf 

13 Special Service Ships Tsinqtao Base Force 

Total : 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM, Southern Expeditionary Fleet 
13 INIisc. KASHII (F) (CL) 

SHIMBUSHU (CM) 
AP 
Total : 1 OCA, 1 DD, S TB, 1 AP. 

[128] (B) Japanese Forces and Installations in the Mandated Islands. 

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently 
administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons 
units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative 
jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly re- 
sponsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the head- 
quarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating 
base. 

2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, 
the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense Forces ("special Landing 
Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed 
to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison 
force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil 
Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working 
in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, 
navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of 
naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high 
frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities in- 
creased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries eraplaced on strategic 
islands of key Atolls. 

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of 
facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, 
probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of 
naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex- 
merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased 
in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traftic, 
the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some 
forty odd vessels. 

4." The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the 
Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil 
Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered 
at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka 
as the Mandates are in the First (HQ— YOKOSUKA) Naval District. 

5. The Conunanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate 
commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet ; they iiave a designated Flag- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 61 

ship ;uul M Hea(l(iu;ir(ers oi- Adniiiiistraf ive Section, the latter remaining ashore 
at the home base regardless of the movements of the connnand or the Flagship. 
Piach Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of which are sta- 
tioned on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have 
been reported to be attaclied to the PAIiAO BASE FORCE. 

\ t'29] a. Consideralile air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, 
PALAO-PELELIU, TRIIK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close 
cooperation has l)een noted between the Defence Forces and tiie Aircraft activi- 
ties at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been 
subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes. Bombers and 
Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, 
have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI- 
TARI, and BERU). 

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in tlie Mandated 
Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may 
be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this 
subject. In addition to those listed in Table A. there are a number of potential 
bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, v^'hich may be 
used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for ''priority two" development. 

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present 
distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical dispo.sition 
rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is : 

Identiflcatioti Location Includes 

Airron 24 Marshall Area (AV) KAMOI 

(AV?) Maru 

ex-CHITOSE Air Group 
ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group 
11th Air Group PALAO Area 

16th Air Group PALAO Area 

17tb Air Group TRUK 

18th Air Group • SAIPAN 

10th Air Group IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit 

Atoll) 
Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE 
Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN 
? AIR GROUP TRUK 

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of 
total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely : 62-268 planes. 

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41. 

(Pages 130, 131, 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A show- 
ing tlie distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the 
Mandates, a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These 
pages will be found reproduced as Items Nos, 2, 3, 4, and 5, EX- 
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Chuisen Investigation. These ilhis- 
ti-ations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits 
of tlie Clausen investigation.) 

[loJf] Notes to Accompany Sketch of Jalu;t 

1. Aviation Facilities. — Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of 
housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated 
between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel 
fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air 
fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940). Eighty planes reported based here 
(November, 1940). 

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp 
and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as 
present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is. 

2. Headquarters — Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of 
Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post 
Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. 
Good bituman and powdered coral roads. 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Radio towers. — Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet 
high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940). 

4. Shore Batteries — Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile water- 
front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 
but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Bar- 
racks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now). 

Mobile Batteries — Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed 
trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940). 

5. Oovemment Pier — 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped 
with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end 
of pier (1940). 

6. Mole — 150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW. cor- 
ner of J ABOR (1933). 

7. Co»spfc?/OMs red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936). 

8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY 
Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938). 

9. Two tuildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from 
one of them (beaching gear? — small marine railway?). A gasoline storage lo- 
cated near the two buildings. (1936.) 

(Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be 
found reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound to- 
gether following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.) 

[iS6] Exhibit "A" 

U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 

Box 103— Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, % Fleet Post Office, 

San Francisco, Calif. 

18 APRIL 1945. 
Received from Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages 
covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1 November 
1941 through 6 December 1941. 



[i37] Communication intelligence summary, 1 November W^l 

General. — Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but 
traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls 
only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed 
that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so 
state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change 
amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but 
it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. 
All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls 
were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the 
major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this sum- 
mary will deal only with general impressions. 

Combined Fleet. — The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. 
The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to 
addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement 
of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little 
tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM. 

Carriers. — The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from 
Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast. 

Submarines. — Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined 
up yet. 

Third Fleet.— This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST 
BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy 
with Tokyo. 

China.— The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several 
messages from Saigon. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 63 

[138] Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 19^1 

Qeneral. — Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair 
but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call 
system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system 
not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. 
The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. 
So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet. 

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic 
is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating 
many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and 
BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus 
are originating periodic despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. 
There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet 
commanders as addressees. 

[iS9] Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941 

Qeneral. — Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Re- 
ceiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to 
emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and 
the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities 
of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports 
to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent 
on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI 
messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified). 

Combined Fleet.— Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message 
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelli- 
gence Tokyo ,the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Pei'sonnel. Com- 
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the 
mandates, principally RNO PAliAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined con- 
tinues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines. 

Third Fleet. — Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement re- 
port by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third 
Fleet for information. 

Air.— A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The lit- 
eral reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new 
organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate 
that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7)- while never identified seemed 
to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon 
movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 
with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a 
command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occured before but 
under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air 
Force continues at a high level. 

[140] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical 
traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tac- 
tical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Com- 
manders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one 
other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet. 

Air. — High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air 
despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO in- 
cluded for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addi'essed to SANCHOW 
Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an 
addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to 
SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two 
unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Comman- 
der in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO and others. The Com- 
mander Combined Air Force addressed a messaged to Commander in Chief Third 
Fleet. 

Mandates. — The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander 
in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. 
The PALOA weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the 
islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change 
in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted. 

Submarines. — No activity noted. 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[/.}/] Commnnication Intelligence Summary, 5 Novemher lOJfl 

General. — Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving 
conditions were fair to good. TOKYO vxey active as an originator, sending 
out many messages of general address. Two WIAVI messages in Kana Code 
sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified) respectively. 
The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many 
despatches passing between the two. 

Third Fleet. — T\vo units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. 
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and Y0A2) it is not known 
how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander 
in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected 
that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from 
him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the 
Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved. 

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CAKDIV 4 appeared today at 
BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd 
Section ?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The 
Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several 
dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, 
TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAI- 
HOKU originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China 
Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Em- 
bassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo 
China Forces. 

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet 
Commanders. 

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from 
TOKYO. 

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there 
is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which 
will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and 
will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown 
extent. 

[l-'i2'\ Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 Novemhcr, 19.'il 

General. — Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were 
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered* somewhat. 
Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly 
Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a 
member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are 
addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. 
The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance 
in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this 
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be 
the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo 
addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and 
Submarine Force. 

Takao-Bako Area. — It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concen- 
tration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force 
including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an 
unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet 
were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now en route 
BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second 
Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South 
China «Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses. 

Comhined Fleet. — A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing 
with secret (tactical) calls in use. 

Mandates. — The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth De- 
fense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active 
units. 

[i^.?] Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 Noi-cmher, lO'/l 

General. — ^Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use 
of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all 
Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which at- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 65 

tached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet 
forces, many of wliich have not yet been definitely identified or associated with 
known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix 
"JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that 
a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are 
participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill." 
Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to 
congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentra- 
tions in that area. 

Air. — Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly cen- 
tered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates in- 
cluded in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Com- 
mand included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate 
activities in long headings. 

Fleet. — Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications 
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifica- 
tions are not sufficiently certain to confirm this. 

^ireatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to 
facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet 
traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped. 

[144^ Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 19^1 

General. — Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing 
on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff 
Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a 
despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air 
Force, unidentified fleet unit. Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This 
may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the ludo- 
China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were 
used vei-y little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were 
heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air 
Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits 
were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate 
addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end 
and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included 
in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base 
Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air 
movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. 
Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with 
the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him 
as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth 
Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or 
will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth 
Fleet in the lower island areas. 

Fleet. — Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. 
Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main 
force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha 
area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC 
Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander 
and to movement oflices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic 
from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese i-adio station 
at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore 
at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted. 

Air. — Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area 
between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly 
concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of 
a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be 
nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval 
Minister, Commanders of CarDivs, Combined Air Force, First [14^] Fleet 
and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. 
This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a 
number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly .some 
units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force 
highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much 
traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at pres- 
ent most traffic includes Palao. 
79716— 46— Ex. 148 6 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[/ 'i(l\ Couimnnication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, J9.'fl 

(l(')iir(il.~-Tviiffie volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but 
lieavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Min- 
ister' sent several messages of general address including one to all First and 
Second class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general messages carried 
SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and 
there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from 
Takao. The P^lagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. 
Some tactical tratJic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The 
association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may in- 
dicate operations of that unit in the Mariaunas. The JINGEI was communi- 
cating with SAMA, HAilNAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China 
Force is in Tokyo. 

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAI- 
ZURU for delivery but this is believed a comumnication error. The Third Fleet 
appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic 
passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth 
Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The 
Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps. 

[///7] Commnnication Intelligence Summary, 10 'November, lO'/l 

General. — Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer 
general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence 
still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Man- 
dates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progress- 
ing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast. 

Combined Fleet. — Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of Bat- 
Div Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this wliole division is 
there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two 
cruiser divisions. 

Third Fleet.— The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several 
movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted 
other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC 
Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet. — Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk 
with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Sub- 
marine Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit. 

Fifth Fleet. — One imit of this fleet located at Chichijima. 

Air. — The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the 
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Car- 
rier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier 
Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still 
in Takao. 

[IJfS] Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition 
about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with 
most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net 
was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators 
have conunented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of 
the major naval activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over 
this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite 
lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still 
sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic 
has been mostly from the technical bureaus. 

Combined lleet. — The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. 
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates 
stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which 
places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their 
position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No 
subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV 
are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of 
this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet 
remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 67 

^ir.— CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. 
Most of .air activity confined to dispatclios between carrier and shore establisli- 
inents. 

Fifth fleet. — Nothing to report. 

Fourth fleet. — The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volnnio 
of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Connnander Submarine Force 
is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addres.sed a message there. 
AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Com- 
munication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. 
YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO. 

China. — The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo Cliina Forces and 
bases continues. 

[1^/9] Communication Intelligence Summary J3 Noremher IDJ/L 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several mes- 
sages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are : 

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief 
of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval 
Station. 

2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Stafl: Fourth Fleet. 

3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, 
INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet 
and SAMA, HAINAN. 

4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet. 

5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above. 

6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined 
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet. 

7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, 
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Com- 
bined Fleet. 

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelli- 
gence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet In- 
telligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders. 

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near 
CHINKAI) , JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports. 

Combined Fleet. — The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is oper- 
ating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BAT- 
DIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is com- 
municating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division 
remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they 
are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser 
Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that 
area. 

Third Fleet. — Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been 
active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief 
Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several mes- 
sages but no indication of change of location. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with 
the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He appears 
to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUB- 
RON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement 
r^wrt, but no indication of direction. 

[150] Air. — Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with 
them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined 
AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level be- 
tween its component Air Corps still exists. 

China. — The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO 
TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI. 

[,1511 Communication Intelligence Summary, IJf November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving 
conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav 
dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today. 

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, 
information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA. 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, 
Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO. 

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified 
unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Air Force. 

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in 
addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount 
of activity. 

Conihined Fleet. — Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still 
operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet 
units appear active in the traflBc. They are DesRon Three (normally in First 
Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second 
Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traflJc with the South China 
Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China 
area in near future. 

Third Fleet. — Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo 
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic 
It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the 
Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been 
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air 
units be embarked in ships of the Base Force? 

Fourth Fleet. — No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the 
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were 
addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations. 

Siihmarines. — No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and 
S-ubmarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo 
and Yokosuka originators. 

Air. — One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN, 
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation 
of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in 
port. 

1152] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 Nove^nier 1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages 
originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, 
U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and 
Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Com- 
munication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore 
addi'esses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to 
D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication 
Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were 
detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements 
for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one 
Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel 
and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and 
shore. Significance is not determined though it is belieA'ed possible that a fur- 
ther partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air 
station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet 
originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication 
Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv 
Three flagship. 

Combined, Fleet. — ^Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One 
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC 
Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging 
operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units. 

Third Fleet. — Inactive. 

Fourth Fleet. — Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or 
underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth 
traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) 
and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, 
direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified 
Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely. 

Suhmnrine Force. — Little activity detected. It is believed that some sub- 
marine activity is operating or preparing to opei'ate in the Marshall area, from 
communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 69 

Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has 
been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure 
associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have 
been made. 

[153] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 19^1 

Air. — Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron 
(formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees 
in traflic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed 
to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force. 

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of 
traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of 
alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes avail- 
able for research. 

[15^] Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 Novemler 1941 

GENERAL. — Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A 
new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted 
on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch 
appeared ; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried 
in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all 
in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading 
fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table. 

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets 
and general addresses to this effect : 

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a 
decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows : 

1. Resolution of House of Peers — (Expressed deepest thanks and 
emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period 
to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle. 

2. Resolution of House of Representatives — Expressed thanks, etc., 
to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4% 
years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the estab- 
lishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of 
all hands, etc. ." 

First and Second Fleets. — Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain 
in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most 
active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be : 

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class) 

Carrier Division Four 

Destroyer Squadron Seven 

Destroyer Squadron Three 

Battleship Division Three 

Cruiser Division Seven. 
It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role 
in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some 
*of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo- 
China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have 
thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other 
dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Di- 
visions and the Mandates. [155] It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron 
One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division 
Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been 
operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch fo the ATAGO, 
Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises 
in that area. 

Third Fleet. — Believed inactive in Sasebo — Kure area. 

Fourth Fleet. — FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an 
unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinG. Combined Fleet, Com- 
munication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, 
CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEC 66, believed to be a shore based 
air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area. 

Fifth Fleet. — Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of 
the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval aux- 
iliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the com,- 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

posit(in of tliis mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating 
in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Mai'cus. 

Suhmarincs. — Little activity. Communication Oflicer. Submarine Force orig- 
inated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined 
Fleet Communication Oflicer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet 
Commands continues. 

[156] Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 November, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal \iith receiving conditions good. More trafiic 
with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches 
numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the 
call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour 
and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. 
It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. 
Since none of this traflic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated 
in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. 
Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan 
controlling. 

Combined Fleet. — No movement from the Kure area of any major jwrtion of 
the First or Second Fleets. The CinC, Second Fleet very active as an originator 
today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his com- 
mand. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Paloa Forces, and the Chief 
of Staff Fourth Fleet. 

Third Fleet. — Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third 
Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Paloa. 

Fourth Fleet. — The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered 
about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both 
these activities originated traflic. 

Air. — The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was 
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by 
the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the 
exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area. 

China. — Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet 
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku ad- 
dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, 
and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force. 

[151] Communications intelligence summary, 18 November 194I 

General. — Traflic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions 
fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address 
emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL 
and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet flor 
information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an 
urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff 
South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, 
believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, 
Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. 
MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and 
for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent 
three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active 
today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent 
one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China 
Force. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator 
and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every 
important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he 
is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and 
the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was 
addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dis- 
patch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dis- 
patches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two 
destroyer squadrons have been associated in traflic. Several dispatches occurred 
today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in 
several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 71 

to liini. Theso form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be iu command 
of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some 
carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home 
waters has been noted. 

Third Fleet. — The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears 
to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, informa- 
tion to CiuC. Third Fleet. There wore other units tentatively placed in Third 
Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an 
addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area 
in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic 
with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transi)orting air units or 
equipment. 

Fourth Fleet. — Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between 
this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit. 

[158] Communicatimi Intelligence Sutnnianj, 19 'November 19^1 

Qrnei'al. — Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates 
w^as noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. 
Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There was been a 
noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. 
Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both 
within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently 
addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has 
subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the 
past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Sec- 
ond Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for 
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy 
Minister .sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with 
all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to 
major commanders. 

Combined Fleet. — The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today 
at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer 
Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second 
Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, 
French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. 
• Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago 
and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed 
the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The 
Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CiuC. French Indo 
China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five. 

Third Fleet. — Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and 
of the Ba.se Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. 
CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo. 

Fourth Fleet. — Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base De- 
fense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet 
was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has 
been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it 
appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is 
not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at 
Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error. 

Fifth jF?ee?.— Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared 
in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen. 

[159] Communieation Intelligence Summary. 20-21 November WJfl 

General. — Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. 
Tokyo originators active with haessages addressed to all major commanders. 
N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of 
Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become 
very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The 
activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his i-ecent high 
volume of messages vdth a long four part message addressed to all major com- 
manders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, 
indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The 
traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that 
the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch. 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Combined Fleet. — Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area 
and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three 
still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues 
abnormally high. A list of units addres.'^ed by him or who sent traffic to him 
and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows : 

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) ENO 7 (Unidentified) 

TAE 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit) 

KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified) 

TAWI (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified) 

KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified) 

RESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified) 

AKI (Desron 4) KONA (Unidentified) 

TIYA 7 (Co'mdr. 1st Base For) NOTU 6 (Unidentified) 

SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified) 

YOMO 9 (Desron 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified) 

REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified) 

KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentified) 

MIMO 3 (Air Unit?) MARE 5 (Unidentified) 

TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus. 

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but 
only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with 
the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now 
in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made 
up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second 
Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will 
either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it 
will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out — so far there 
has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets 
in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has 
not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Man- 
dates traffic. 

[160] Commnnication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 'Novem'ber 191fl 

Mandates and Fourth Fleet. — ^The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have 
remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken' 
to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the 
Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the 
R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it 
may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just 
which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is 
no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force 
which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed 
there and the IMaru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. 
With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday repjorted as either a carrier unit or sub- 
marine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine 
Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than 
that existing at Palao. 

[ifii] Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical 
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now 
completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other 
messages, one to CinC, Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Sub- 
marine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to 
CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed 
Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka. 
Another ilnidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority" message to all major flags 
and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed 
one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second 
Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Com- 
mander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. 
Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? 
While the Drection Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more 
bearings than usual for that station, 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 73 

Combined Fleet. — ClnC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidenti- 
fied calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet 
was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined 
Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders 
was very great. One message addressed many units as follows : 

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE5 (Crudiv?), K002 (SubronsS) TIYU 66 
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), 
RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and 
unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), 
Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1( ?) (at Kure), SATU 8 ( ?) (at Kure), META 
(AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU2 (?), NARI 33 
CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. 
Comb. Fleet). 
Third Fleet.— CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN- 
BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief 
of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces 
with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association with Com- 
bined Air Forces. 

Fourth Fleet. — CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base 
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at 
Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. 
He also received one from Commander Submarine Force. 

China. — The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. 
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secre- 
tary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, 
Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet. 

[162'[ Comnmnication Intelligence Simimary, 23 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has. increased. Some 
of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed : 

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore 

Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Southern Expedi- 
tionary Force. 

Precedence 

NIKA-WIWI 

2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information 

Combined and Southern Expeditionary 
Force Chief of Staff. 
NIK A 

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern 

Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN- 
KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan. 
WIWI 

4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship 

NWA 2, Information Tadio Tokyo and 
Second Fleet flagship, 
NIKA 

5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure, 

Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao. 
KIU 
Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, 
Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio 
in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI." 

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio 
circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following : 
KENU 3— CruDiv 7 Flagship? 
. HOWI 2 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. 
EKE 8 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. 
MUSE 5 — Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet. 
The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by 
CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the 
forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of 
fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter- 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in sum- 
maries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most 
active unit in today's traflfic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway 
[163] in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force 
and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. 
For.) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air 
Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence mes- 
sages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that 
area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. 
Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. 
With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more sub- 
marines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to defi 
nitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange 
between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet 
with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and 
that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to 
relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various 
frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while 
the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive. 

Air. — Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the 
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate 
area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three 
definitely associated with Second Fleet operations. 

China. — CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air 
Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from 
Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed 
questionable. 

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days 
and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or 
actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces oper- 
ating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gather- 
ing in the Palao area. 

[164] Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 'Noveniber, 1941 

General. — Ti-affic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. 
Traffic analysis impresses are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficul- 
ties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and 
fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. 
If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the 
assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, 
the following impressions are worth something : 

(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses. 

(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage 
of what appears to be movement reports. 

(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat 
addresses. 

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary 
Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch 
traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force 
Commander with the latter. 

Fir.it find Second Fleet.s. — Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call 
believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch 
to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Connnander South- 
ern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The 
CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a 
large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three 
.-i.nd Combined Air Force imits. 

Third Fleet. — Largo number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some 
of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet ap- 
pears as information addresse on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet 
units indicates that these two fl(>ots will be closely associated in any future 
operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 
Three with Cine. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet nnd Mandates.— Yom-ih Fleet appears to be concentrated in 
Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have 
''Otue from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of 
subTiiarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 75 

Subinarines. — Comparatively little activity. 
China. — Comparatively quiet. 
CarriGrs. — No definite indications of location. 

Combined Air Force. — Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. 
Otherwise no change. 

\_165] Commtmication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over 
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. 
Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, 
CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus 
Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. A 
Direction Finder Not, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being 
sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to 
the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet 
complete. 

Combined Fleet. — Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet 
remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and 
South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron 
arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously 
arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates 
the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchang- 
ing messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and tlie 
Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One. 

Air. — Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has 
been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined 
Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this 
is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the 
Mandates. ' 

Fourth Fleet. — CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications 
with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Car- 
riers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base 
Forces. 

[166'i Communication Intelligence Su/mmary, 26 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo- 
Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past 
week. Intra-fieet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching 
AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed 
a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second 
and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was 
first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today 
than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet 
and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the 
ISUZU (fiagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations 
directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys). 

Combined Fleet. — Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via 
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indica- 
tions were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this 
unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present) alt 
Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the 
traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker 
HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well 
as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the 
newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the 
Combined Air Force still continues at its high level. 

Fourth Fleet. — No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communi- 
cation with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Sub- 
marine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima. 

Fifth Fleet. — The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of 
the Second Fleet and is as.sociated with the new Task Force. 

Submarines. — As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima 
area. The Submarine Squadron NETES's location is somewhat uncertain today 
due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is 
doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her 
previous association with Cruiser Division Seven, 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

China. — Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today. 
Third Fleet. — Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from 
the Sasebo area. 

[167] Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the 
frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. 
Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active 
as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of 
Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of 
Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief 
of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence 
activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction 
Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including 
the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days. 

COMBINED FLEET. — No further information as to whether or not Destroyer 
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division 
Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from 
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several 
messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator 
lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined 
Air Force, and Bako. 

THIRD FLEET. — Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, 
South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses 
is increasing, those occurring today were : 

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku) 

"KOROKUKITISIKI" 

"KIZUKEYAMASTTABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO) 

"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU" 
There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet. 
FOURTH FLEET.— CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to 
the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Com- 
mander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps 
held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering 
Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. 
Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating 
in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division 
Five in the Mandates. 

AIR. — An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU 
and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of 
further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan. 

SUBBIARINES. — Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area. 

[168] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 19-^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China 
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has 
been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and 
is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages 
to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the 
Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to • NRE0 (the TOKYO 
D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This 
Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Com- 
manders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating 
at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS. 

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the 
Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. 
The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent 
one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, 
Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The 
BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air 
Corps at SAIPAN. 

Conihined Fleet. — ^No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. 
Commander in Chief Second Fleet oi-iginated his usual number of despatches to 
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to 
by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 77 

DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO 
(CA). 

Third Fleet. — Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander 
in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present 
wth the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. 
The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the 
Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and 
are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO. 

Fovrth Fleet.— Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief 
Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth 
Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held 
communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI. 

South China. — SAMA sent several me.ssages to shore addresses in the Empire. 
SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went 
for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the 
Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China P'orce and 
Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and 
YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON 
originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The 
Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed 
his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Com- 
mander in Chief Third Fleets. 

Submarines. — Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two des- 
patches there was no submarine activity today. 

[169] Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very 
high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Hokyo-Takao circuit but 
was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up 
of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages 
during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio in- 
telligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. 
In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in 
reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direc- 
tion Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much 
activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Com- 
mander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual 
two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, 
Third Fleets Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has 
been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose 
address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has 
no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR 
FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI 
is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is un- 
known. 

Combined Fleet. — The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is con- 
firmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor 
denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the 
immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet : 

CARDIV THREE DESRON TWO 

SUBRON FIVE DESRON FOUR 

SUBRON SIX THIRD FLEET 

CRUDIV FIVE FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE 

GRUDIV SEVEN 

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet 
definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and 
South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Com- 
mander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. 
Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was 
addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. 
The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet. 

Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron 
Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One 
and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Com- 
mander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made 
movement reports. 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fourth Fleet. — Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in 
Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. 
He is still in TRUK area. 

[170] Submarines. — Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed 
through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday. 

South China. — CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but 
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed 
several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander 
in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and 
the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. 

[171] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic con- 
sisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. 
No reason can be given for tlxe retransmission of these messages unless the 
high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of des- 
patches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The 
only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several IVIARUs. 
The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major 
Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, 
Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force ; 
Submarine Force and China Fleets. 

Combined Fleet.— The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet 
are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not 
at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander 
in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and 
Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them 
as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no 
longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two davs. The RNO 
PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN 
Army Headquarters). 

Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to 
COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second 
Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief 
Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander 
in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway. 

Fmirth Fleet. — Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Mar- 
shalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Sub- 
marine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of 
JALUIT and Commander SiAmarine Force plus his known progress from the 
Empire to CHICHIJUMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the 
Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls 
some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a sub- 
marine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration 
of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of 
the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA 
AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations 
from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers 
indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this 
has not been confirmed. 

South China.— BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, 
Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming 
more and more active as an originator witli despatches to the Ta.sk Force. 
He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information 
addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was 
addressed at Shanghai today. 

[172] Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December lO'jl 

General. — ^All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 
December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or 
more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service 
calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing 
for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior 
to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from 
one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 79 

more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December 
indicates tliat an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that 
promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dis- 
patches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large 
number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make 
it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. 

First Fleet. — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside 
of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet 
is operating with the Second Fleet Task I'orce that this fleet has ceased to 
operate in a prominent role. 

Second Fleet. — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in 
the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play 
an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that 
this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force 
are definitely in the Indo-China arua (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer 
Squadron Three most prominent). 

Third Fleet. — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, 
Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces 
continues. 

Fourth Fleet. — No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area. 

Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report. 

Suhmarines. — Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the 
area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere 
in this general area. 

Carriers. — No change. 

Combined Air Force. — No change, 

[i75] Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941 

General. — The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent con- 
fusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. 
There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after 
it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the 
same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and 
Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these 
fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, 
there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In 
several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Sum- 
ming up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of 
Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close 
enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to 
Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from 
making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. 
To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable 
amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the 
Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in 
Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh 
Bay. This gi'oup is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, 
which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included re- 
peatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations. 

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by 
major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao 
and Third Ba.se Force is holding the same relative importance. 

First Fleet. — Despite the lack of positive identification, the First Fleet appears 
relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have 
been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may 
be two supreme commanders with stales. As an example, traffic routing indicates 
one Combined F'leet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and appar- 
ently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with 
the Second and Third Fleets. 

Second Fleet. — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. 
This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the 
belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser 
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three ai'e unlocated and unobserved 
since change of calls. 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[174] Third Fleet. — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect 
way in some of the Third Fleet traffic. 

Mandates. — Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some 
traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through TrulJ. 

Carriers. — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. 
Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. How- 
ever, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the 
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is 
evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb. 

Combined Air Force. — This force continues to be associated closely with Second, 
Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have 
undoubtedly left the Takao area. 

[175] Communication Intelligence Stimmary, 3 December 1941 

General.— Traf&c volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state 
of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The 
extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification 
of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The 
Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC 
COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Toyko Intelligence originated 
nine despatches to the same addresses. 

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed 
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is 
indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo 
he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both 
SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio 
Intelligence means. 

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including 
some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. 
The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC 
FOURTH. 

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement 
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the 
RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander. 

No information on submarines or Carriers. 

[176] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 Decem'ber 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio 
today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so 
that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few mes- 
sages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of 
urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major co&manders. 
Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of 
Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South Cliina Fleet, French Indo- 
China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major 
commanders. 

Combined Fleet. — The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes- 
sages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously 
very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not 
yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed 
to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now 
believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the 
apparently conflicting evidence is due ,to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU 
broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet 
sent one message to an unidentified imit for information to Third Base Force 
Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet.— The CinC. Fourt Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron 
Twenty-four, Tliird Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No 
further clieck could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the 
Marslialls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with 
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed 
to be an oil tanker). 

South ChiHa.—Bi\\io continues as an active originator addressing many mes- 
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Com- 
manders, all units in that area quiet. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 81 

[177] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broad- 
cast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. 
There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working 
SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traflic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic 
to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic 
for these units also. It is noted that some traflic being broadcast is several 
days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio or- 
ganization. 

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused 
by the jammed condition of all circuits. 

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to 
Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Po- 
litical Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what 
you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are 
doing, specific orders will be issued soon." 

Comhined Fleet. — Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have origi- 
nated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving 
their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther 
south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic 
from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either. 

Third Fleet. — In one WE address a "Chief of Stall:" sent a message to "Com- 
mander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYON- 
GUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been address- 
ing the CINC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer 
of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression 
that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South 
China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the 
Commander Second Fleet. 

South China. — SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO 
continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third 
Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the move- 
ment of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are 
moving, probably to Indo-China. 

[178] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941 

General. — TraflSc volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being 
transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This 
is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of 
confusion In traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now 
holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), 
SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO. 

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with 
the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of 
TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes of high priority. 

Combined Fleet. — Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. 
These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The 
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, 
Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK 
area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that 
some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite 
close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in 
South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff 
of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being 
almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose 
command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO 
weather observer. 

Fifth Fleet. — This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO 
broadcasting traffic for this unit. 

Submarines. — The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to 
his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is 
definitely in the MARSHALLS. 

South China. — Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAQ still sending 
many messages to the Task Force. 
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 7 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[/7.9] top secret 

Hk.\i)(;uarters United States Army Forces 
pacific ocean areas 

APO 958 

In reply to : 

POSIG-483 27 April 1945 

Memorandum : To Lt. Col Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. 

1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you 
handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief tliere are no copies 
of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal Center, 
Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in Ihe Signal 
Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear 
traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are 
no records, including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any 
information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. 
Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as to whether this 
message had been received and they have been negative. 

2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept num- 
bered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to 
said intercept at the time stated was as follows : 

Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the 
Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they 
were intercepted, I have this to report: 

There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show 
whetlier or not these intercepts w^ere made by MS-5. The fact that Wash- 
ingtoii gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept 
was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an 
indication to the contrary. 
As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report : 

Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via 
airmail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of intercept 
each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an index sheet. 
The entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular date was then fastened 
together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper. Upon 
notification of the impending departure of the Clipper all accumulated 
air-mail trafiic together with a letter of transmittal and a classified docu- 
ment receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department 
Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files 
section of the Department AGO. 

[180] The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing 
Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately c^nce each 
week, but this schedule was frequently internipted because of weather con- 
ditions. It is known that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship because 
of the long delayed departure of a Clipper. The only messages transmitted 
to Washington by radio were those specially selected in accordance with 
instructions from the Chief Signal Officer. The message in question was not 
within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been 
included in the special instructions. 
My search in this regard included: 

A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication Service, 

Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such records as 

have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station #5 

at the time in question show that this station was intercepting traffic 

between Japan, Asia and Euroi>e. 

In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning the 

originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington, 

and received this information. 

"Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign 
does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 014037 appears on 
traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Inter- 
cept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941". 
A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic 
forwarded are available previous to 1943. 

3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to 
the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 83 

not monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters 
were used on the Trans-Pacific radiopliones circuit between Honolulu and the 
mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between 
Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and 
design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December 
1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using 
a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this 
installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu 
terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much 
more complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old in- 
verters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the 
A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. 

Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the 
Tokyo teclinical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a 
new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able 
to understand the conversation. 

[181] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had .lust 
been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell 
Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that 
Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone 
circut. 

C. A. Powell, 
C. A Powell, 
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, 

Signal Officer. 
At Honolulu 



top secret 

[182] United States Pacific Flekt 

Radio Unit 
commandant, navy 128 
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. 
JSH/rec 
EF37/A6(1) 
Serial Z-4225 
Top Secret 

27 April 1945. 
Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. Clausen. 
Subject: Information. 

1. I regret that results of search 'for amplifying information on the subject we 
discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing. 

2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) 
Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A. Cole, USN. and 
Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieu- 
tenant Lankf ord 

8. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for question- 
ing. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan 
Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and 
used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in prac- 
tically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broad- 
casts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs 
of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, 
split-phone watches were used. 

4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government 
Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to 
those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which usually contained weather in- 
formation. 

5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at any 
time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was naturally 
secured immediately after it became obviously redundant. 

J. S. Holtwick, Jr., 
J. S. Holtwick, Jr., 
Commander, U. S. Navy, 

By Direction. 
At Honolulu 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[183] Affida\t:t of Theodore Emanuel, USN 

Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C, 
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. 
Calusen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says : 

Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I vras assigned to the District Intelli- 
gence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with 
Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was called to active duty, about 
1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of 
mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my 
understanding that [ISJf] Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and 
activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originat- 
ing in and going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at 
Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from 
January 1941 to dnd including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some 5 or 6 
lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and 
reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This 
traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The trans- 
lator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr, USNR. 



Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAOD. 



Theodore Emanuex 
Chief Ships Clerk, V. 8. N. 



top secbet 

[JSo] Affidavit of Lieutenant General 

Richard K. Sutherland 

Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ, 
Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the investi- 
gation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of 
War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor, and that 
top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE. 

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit 
"B", consisting of a file^ of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To 
the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of 
the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those 
relating to the negotiations at Washington, D. C, of Kurusu. I did not see 
the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or imple- 
menting message, I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the head- 
quarters. 

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 
1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelli- 
gence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald 
Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and, 
as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, ACofS, 
G-2. 

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept 
station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic 
messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence 
Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted 
and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were 
delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the 
Hq. USAFFE. 

Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were re- 
ports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures 
of ships in Manila Harbor. 

Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination 
was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels. 

R. K. SUTHFJJLAND. 

Subscribed and sworn to befoi-e me this 6th day of May 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Lieutenant Colonel, JAOD 
at Manila, P. I. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 85 

top secret 
1186] Affida\t:t of Genekal of the Akmy Douglas MacAkthub 

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander, 
Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation 
by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supple- 
mentary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy 
is required,, deposes and says : 

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding Greneral, USAFFB. 

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Ex- 
hibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. 
I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see thei 
messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing 
message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. 
USAFFE. 

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 
and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this 
intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being trans- 
mitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H. 

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept 
station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic 
messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at 
Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these 
messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS' oflScer who delivered 
them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages 
was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned 
the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had 
facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this 
intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army 
I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the 
hands of the Navy. 

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information 
and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on 
a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941. 

Douglas MacAkthur. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen. 

Lieutenmit Colonel, JAGD. 
at Manila, P. I. 



[1S7] Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby 

t, Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ, 
Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation 
by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the.Secretary of War, supple- 
mentary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy 
is required, deposes and says : 

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE. 

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designed as Top Secret Ex- 
hibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. 
I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before, 
except isolated fragments of the Kurusu diplomat message series. Concerning 
those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone 
else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any acti- 
vating or implementing' message, nor any notice that such a message had been 
transmitted or received. 

Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 
1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the 
basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appeal's to have been 
disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British 
Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. 
USAFFE, and as such had contact with me an<i my predecessors, in 1941. (See 
Appendix A). 



86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army 
in the I'hilippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, 
translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The 
Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for 
decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code 
messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple" 
machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the 
Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the 
Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. 
USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and 
source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. 
(Siee Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were 
handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C, now deceased, who was the Army liaison 
with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries 
from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States 
military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the 
Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on 
which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed. 

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this 
intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was 
exclusively a Navy function. 

C. A. WlLLOUGHBY. 

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henky C. Clausen, 

Lieut. Colonel, J. A. O. D. 
at Manila, P. I. 

2 Ends : 

Appendix "A" — Re Col G. Wilkinson. 

Appendix "B" — Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service. 



TOP SECEET 

[188] Appendix "A" 

affidavit 

8 May 1945. 

The British SIA messages, their purjwrt and evolution and the curious role 
played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this 
investigation, in my opinion. 

The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of infor- 
mation and a sort of E. Phillipps Oppenheim international intrisue. 

Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law, 
in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years ; hence, the casual reference to a 
"Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, 
suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson 
combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a 
secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information ; contrary to U. S. 
Lavs', he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, 
in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine 
Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, 
he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed ; the intelligence ma- 
terial he desired to file with me ; they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap mili- 
tary data and some sprinkling of China-based i-eports. It became apparent to 
me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he 
possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became con- 
vinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army- 
Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition 
but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and 
executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide ; it is still 
in operation ; I employ botli STA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one 
but themselves and the Empire. 

My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high — a horse- 
trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents 
not all of the messages sent ; the commercial deductions are obvious : Davies can- 
celled sugar shipments in the nick of time. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 87 

Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a mili- 
tary status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the 
outbreak of the AVar, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the 
Japanese-occupied city ; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for tlie 
duration. 

We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to 
Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report "home" though his stuff was 
severely edited by me ; the General hnally sent him to Wavell's Headquarters, 
as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system ; he then made his way deviously 
to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his "status" with 
GHQ, USAFFE; he was "promoted" to Colonel and attempted to return to our 
Headquarters, as a "liai.son" ; he even had the support of the Prime Minister ; 
with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side, 
except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly de- 
moted and attached to duty with the British Ofiice of Information at Washington- 
New York. 

C. A. Willoughby, 
C. A. Willoughby, 
Major General, O. S. C, 
Asst. Cfiief of Staff, 0-2, 
General Headquarters. 8WPA. 

top secret 
Affidavit 
1189] Appendix "B" 

8 May 1945. 

In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly eflficient cryto-analytical 
service, specializing in Japanese material ; though the Army had notably parti- 
cipated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained 
a lead ; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed on almost monopolistic - 
privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though evei-y modern 
nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole 
enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the 
whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue : 
as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, for- 
warded via 7th Fleet D. N. I. ; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of 
Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, 
and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection 
is as evident now as it was in 1941. Tlie only excuse the Navy has is that its 
field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other 
incidental traffic. This collateral traflSc is not always understood or correctly 
interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion. 

The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, inter- 
locking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the 
freest interchange of messages and interpretation. 

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent 
intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with 
November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl 
Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or 
November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was 
involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie. 

C. A. Willoughby, 
G. A. Willoughby, 
Major General, G. S. C, 
Assst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 
General Headquarters, SWPA. 



[190] Statement 

Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly sworn 
and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War, supplementary 
to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is 
required, deposes and says : 

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months 
prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organiza- 
tion of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows : a 
small administrative section of one officer, two clerks ; a public relations section 
of two officers and three clerks ; a combat intelligence section of two oflBcers and 
several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency ; a counter-intelli- 
gence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that 
time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt Col George Bicknell and located 
in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 Section 
was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the 
section was small and the duties varied. 

2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest 
of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and on 
interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British 
SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese 
communications. 

3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard against 
internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication 
certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was cus- 
tomary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office 
where summaries and estimates were prepared.^ Prior to December 7, 1941, 
the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with sub- 
versive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the 
Territory of Hawaii of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to 
me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing 
should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the 
public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week 
of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military 
establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by 
other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall 
of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications 
should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about 
friction between local Filipinos and Japanese. 

[1911 4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned 
somewhat as a special staff section : the Contact Officer, Lt. Col Bicknell, had 
direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this sub- 
section of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was 
known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section". I refer to attempting to ob- 
tain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the 
Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat. 

5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, 
usually on Saturday morning : at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief 
summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented 
the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of in- 
formation to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 
December 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my 
attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at 
headquarters and were in contact many times each day. 

6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their com- 
bat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of in- 
formation between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do 
primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me 
by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Jap- 
anese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that 
relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, 
but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for 
Hawaii. 

7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by G-2 
in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander 
Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broad- 
cast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The Winds" message. J 
have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it 
come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col Bicknell 
for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 89 

Captain Mayfleld, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer ; particularly since 
the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly 
important. The contents and details of "The Winds" message were never made 
known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferi-ed with Com- 
mander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not 
tell me if he did. 

8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies 
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific 
Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and 
assumed that if any information which [192] I needed to know was pos- 
sessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now -that had I 
asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not 
have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned 
any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have 
given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt Col Bicknell. 
The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified princi- 
pally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti- 
aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. 
The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the 
Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that 
prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt Col Raley, was in 
liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific 
Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Com- 
manding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until 
after the war started. 

9. I have been shown by Lt Col Clausen a file containing information received 
by Lt Col Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a re.sponsive chord 
in my memory but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention 
prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my 
attention. 

10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence 
Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given 
to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who 
according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any 
of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming 
from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was getting 
the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Roche- 
fort did not give it to me direct. 

11. Col Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit 
"B" which are intercepted Japanese despatches. I had never seen any of them 
before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to 
December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and 
papers which was related by Col Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 
1941. I gave this latter information to General Short the same day. With re- 
spect to Top Secret Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior 
to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that 
he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General 
Short had seen these messages prior to December 7. 1941, he would have ordered 
Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Com- 
manding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff. 

Kendall J. Fielder. 

[193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henky C. Clausen, 

Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD. 
At Honolulu, T. H. 

[194] TOP SECBEH^ 

Affidavit of Beigadieu General Thomas J. Betts 

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Asssistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first duly sworn 
and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the 
Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive 
Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence 
Division, War Department General StalT, Washington, D. C. 

In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the nsajor 
intelligence problems confronting the Militai'y Intelligence Division and with 
a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of 
the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentalized the handling of all Ultra 
messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton 
was assisted by Major Duseiibury. GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel 
Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both 
from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed 
Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the 
War Depatment. 

In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, 
from whomi they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form 
or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during 
the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question 
Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the 
Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed 
me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I 
further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message im- 
plementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been i-eceived. I do not recall 
that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further 
believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would 
have remember it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person in- 
formed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an imiplementing message had been 
received. 

Thomas J. Beits. 

Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945. 
Heni-y C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen. 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 

Frankfort on Main, Germany. 



[195] supreme headquarters 

Allied Expeditionaey Force 
office of the chief of staff 

15 June 1945 

Affidavit of Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith 

Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF, being 
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry 
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Wash- 
ington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that 
capacity and during the iieriod mentioned, I received from representatives of 
Gr-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret in- 
formation which I later learned included various Intercepts of Japanese radio 
diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then 
called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose 
to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the 
Chief of Staff. I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what 
messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribu- 
tion or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always 
given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would 
always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If 
received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as 
he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered 
to him at his liome when the A. C. of S.. G-2, considered the contents lu'gent. 
The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected with these 
intercepts, but T do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall 
specific details. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 91 

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the 
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect: 

1. On ") Dec l!J41, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information 
from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese 
"Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic [196] 
relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over 
with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the 
information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the 
Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have 
had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, 
and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division 
had acted I did not want to. discuss the matter further ; 

2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always 
in person to the officers concerned ; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, 
lie delivered the pouches to me for delivery to The Chief of Staff ; 

3. During November and December 1U41, Colonel Bratton reminded me that 
the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown 
the Chief of Staff without delay ; 

4. On Dec 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the 
Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese 
Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. 
(I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the 
effect that instead of giving these to me it "'may have been one of others.") 

My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows : 

1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, 
since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the 
A. C. of S.. G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct 
access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or 
authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to 
intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an 
"Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any informa- 
tion to support his contention that I should step out of [197] my rather 
minor province. 

2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other otficer of G-2 delivered the 
pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever As- 
sistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. 
When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was 
to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, 
or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the 
contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were 
so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat 
would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he hap- 
pened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally 
sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in 
the absence of a Duty Officer. 

3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches 
contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown 
to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division 
who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of 
Staff's office as indicated above. 

4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time on the eve- 
ning of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I 
am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted 
radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to 
the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which 
I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so in- 
formed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its con- 
tents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra". 
If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have 
been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either 
by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself. 

W. B. Smith, 
W. B. Smith, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. A. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Heney C. Clausen, 

Lt. Col., JAGD. 
at Frankfort on Main, Germany. 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[19S] Affidavit of Lieut. Genekai. Leonard T. Gebow 

Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, 
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and 
says : 

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, 
War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, 
D. C, some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which 
had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered 
in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representa- 
tives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I 
received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts 
were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no 
evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form 
of intelligence. 

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, desig- 
nated Top Secret Exhibit "B". I recall the general substance of some of these 
messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate 
dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 
23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to 
reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and 
coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to the Navy, I 
assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this informa- 
tion in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with 
other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection 
is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and 
disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and 
Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places. 

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been 
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect : 

1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's 
attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy 
their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and 
then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas com- 
manders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following 
this. Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion 
he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to 
confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds 
Code." 

2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, informed General 
Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal 
breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that 
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow 
replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent. 

3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered 
to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. 



[199] My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows: 

1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that 
if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite prop- 
erly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief 
of Staff, G-2, wlio had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a 
matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and 
if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief 
of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose. 

2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mis- 
taken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal 
Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or in- 
terpreation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information 
of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the atten- 
tion of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by 
a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 93 

prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing 
message to tlie Japanese "Winds Code." If I Iiad received such a message or 
notice tliereof, I believe I would now recall* tlie fact, in view of its importance. 
It is possible tligit Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or 
that he had received some tentative information which was subject to cpn- 
firmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in 
either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be 
more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so 
many major events have intervened. 

3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until 
the morning of 7 December 1041, when a conference was held with the Chief 
of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 
1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and in- 
formed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was * 
always open to me. 
In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any 
written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl 
Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan 
or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions 
receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent 
events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis 
powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United 
States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my 
staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involv- 
ing possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by 
the Axis powers. 

I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warn- 
ings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respec- 
tive commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice 
to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared 
for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. 
The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in 
efl'ect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in 
the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates 
[200] with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to 
writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great 
deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for tha<r 
purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military 
opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. 
Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully 
cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary 
threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his 
thinking, and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice 
ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit 
pr^arations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the 
War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department esti- 
mates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these 
estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that 
he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established 
military practise. I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy 
was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the 
Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments 
to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at 
Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that 
information sent by either Department which would be of use -to the other 
service would be exchanged between tlie two commanders at Hawaii. 

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 37 November 
1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and 
Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well 
as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my under- 
standing that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, 
was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports 
and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, Gr-2 had 
available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not 
included in Top Secret Exhibit "B." 

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully 
against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how 
it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the policy of the 
War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom 
of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed infor- 
mation, or if the actual intercepts, bad been sent to Hawaii, then the same 
procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas com- 
manders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. 
This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this 
highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us 
for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's 
intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolonga- 
tion of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible 
defeats. 

L. T. Geeow, 
Lieut. Gen. V. 8. Army. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. 
at Cannes, France. 

TOP SECRET 
[201] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONE2r. ROBEET E. SCHUKRAFT, SC 

Colonel Robert E. Schukraf t, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence 
Service, Signal Section, MTOUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy, being first duly sworn, 
and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for 
the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Wash- 
ington, D. C, in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War 
Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio inter- 
cept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties 
I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and 
decoded and translated. 

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the 
time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", numbered 
25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Fi'ancisco intercept station 
to intercept all plain test Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from 
Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and reports in to me. To the 
best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. 
I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and 
a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts 
in Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25349 and 25497, but in which the person 
at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said 
something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I 
refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept 
or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. 
I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." 
I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was 
i-eceived from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2. 

As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of 
my former superior Colonel Minckler ; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and 
Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel 
Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams. 

Robert E. Schukraft. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at Caserta, 
Italy. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 95 

[202] George W. Reucliard, presently on duty at the American Embassy 
to the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and in- 
formed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for 
the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 
13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July 
7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and incorporate 
herein the allegations thereof as my statement in response to similar questioning. 

Geobgd W. Rexjohard. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1945. 

Henry C. Clausen, _. 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 



[2031 John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London, 
England, being first duly swoi-n and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant 
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to 
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolu- 
tion of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, 
DEPOSES AND SAYS : 

During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time there- 
tofore, I was a Foreign Service OflBcer and a personal assistant to the Secretary 
of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during this period from two 
United States Army officers named Bratton and Dusenbury, who were then I 
believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels, allegedly representing the Assistant Chief 
of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C, various intercepts of official 
Japanese messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were 
handed to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also 
handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr. George W. 
Renchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of State, and were 
at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representa- 
tive of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of my recollection, complete trans- 
lations of the deciphered code texts. I do not recollect that except for possibly 
a few instances receipts were required when they were of course always given. 
If, however, delivery was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged 
representative of [20 Jf] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary 
of State was normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that 
any copies were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned 
while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the time 
of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery of and the 
volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my recollection of any specific 
details regarding any one or several deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact 
time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept 
indicating the possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and 
the United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my 
attention. 

Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in question 
by the alleged representatives of G— 2 as mentioned, the function was performed 
period icallv by officers of the United States Navy, presumably of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, and it is my recollection that on one or more occasions 
information of this type was brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by 
a Naval officer subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army 
officers undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I recollect 
no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer prior to the attack 
on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I interpreted as indicating the 
possibility of said attack. 

John F. Stone. 

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAOD. 
at London, England. 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

top secret 
[203] Affidavit of Major Genebal John R. Deane 

John R. Deane, Major General, USA, being first duly sworn and informed of 
the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of 
War, supplementary to proceedinjis of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that 
top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the 
War Department, Washington, D. C, as Assistant Secretary, General Staff; 

On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other 
l>erson, any pouch for the Chief of Staff ; 

On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the 
same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was between 
9 and 9 : 30 a. m. 

John R. Deane, 
Major General, USA, 
Commanding General, U. S. Mil Mission mith U. 8. S. R. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
at Potsdam, Germany. 

TOP secret 
[206] Affidavit or Coi.onei, Rufus S. Bratton 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, 0-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S. HQ., 
BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation 
by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary 
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint 
Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is 
required, deposes and says : 

Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testi- 
mony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements and 
afladavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W. Pettigrew, 
Colonel ; Ralph C. Smith, Major General ; Charles K. Gailey, Brig. General ; 
Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General ; Walter B. Smith, Lieut. General ; Leonard T. 
Gerow, Lieut. General ; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel ; John F. Stone and George 
W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the yarned persons to 
Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned. 

During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto, 
as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2, I 
received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of Japanese 
diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and distributing to au- 
thorized officials such of these intercepts as were matters of military intelligence 
value. In the period of about October to December, 1941, the volume of these 
intercepts increased to such an extent that with the permission of General 
Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major 
or Lieut. Colonel Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in 
processing, assembling and distributing tliis material. These were distributed 
in the raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation 
to the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed by 
the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December, 1941, au- 
thorized by the Chief of Statf, were, so far as G-2 distribution was concerned, 
the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief, 
War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By agreement between 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, (j-2, and representatives of the Office of Naval In- 
telligence, the President was served by representatives of the Navy. The normal 
procedure was to secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Aide to the 
Secretary of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the 
Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed and 
thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by the repre- 
sentatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then burned with the 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 97 

corresponding receipts^ which wero given to assure the ultimate destruction 
of the material. During the period October to November, 1941, the G-2 received 
daily about fifty to seventy five of these intercepts which were sorted to about 
twenty per cent for distribution, and which twenty per cent represented sucli 
of the documents as had intelligence value. 

It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so that the 
various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I am unable to 
recall at this time except as may be hereinafter [207] mentioned, and there 
are no records to show, who delivered what to whom during this period, with any 
degree of accuracy. 

Concerning the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall a meeting about 5 
December 11)41 with General Miles and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, at which 
Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a 
possible implementation. There had been several "false alarm" reports to this 
same effect. In view of an intercept which had already been received and trans- 
lated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy of Japan at Washington to 
destroy their codes, in my opinion an implementation message to the "Winds 
Code" was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose would be 
to effect a destruction of the codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I 
verified that the Japanese Embassy at Washington wei'e burning what appeared to 
be important papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting men- 
tioned, to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation 
message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese. Colonel Sadtler 
never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any additional information 
on the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether Colonel Sadtler. after getting 
the purporte<l implementation message mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then 
Secretary of the General Staff, or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War 
Plans Division, and in effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more 
warning. I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's 
report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by rea- 
son of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, 
were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any imijlementing 
message to the "Winds <_'ode" indicating Japanese aggression against Great 
Britain. 

At no time prior to 7 December 1041, although a thorough alert in this regard 
was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the 
"Winds Code". In connection with testimony of Captain Safford on this subject 
to the effect that two copies of such a message was sent by the Navy to the Army, 
it was the customary practice for the Navy when sending the Army material of 
this character, to send six copies. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the 
Navy had discussed with me several "false alarms", but no one in the Navy had 
discussed with me, nor to my knowledge with any one else in Gr-2, the message 
supposed to have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford. 

The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington, 
to destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for distribution to the authorized 
recipients. 

The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 
25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when 
I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the oflBce. We assembled and studied 
the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock p. m. After re- 
ceipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe 
was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likeli- 
hood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was' not, as 
there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then as- 
sembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. 
[208] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff 
to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home 
in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock p. m. The sets of these thirteen parts 
for the ACofS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of War were not de- 
livered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7 
December 1941, with the fourteenth part. They were not given to General 
Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General Galley or General Ralph 
C. Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were they given that night to General 
Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of StaflC the morning of 7 December 
1941, he then had the fourteen part message, which I had not given him. About 
ten o'clock p. m. on 6 December 1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the 
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 8 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to the night 
duty oflScer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the night duty oflScer 
was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest importance that the papers 
be placed in the hand of the Secretary of State at once. He assured me that 
this would be done. This was the only delivery I made that night. I then 
went home to bed and returned to the office the following morning between 
7 : 30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteenth part of the message came to 
my desk about the time I reached my office. It was processed at once and 
about 8 : 30 a. m. it was sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I 
did not deliver any material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Wash- 
ington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at 
1 p. m,/1941, Japan's reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave to 
the Chief of StafE between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning. The 
last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for delivery by 
either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my opinion the fourteen 
part message mentioned was relatively unimportant, in view of the other mes- 
sages which preceded it, especially the one ordering the destruction of the 
Japanese codes and ciphers and the one ordering the delivery of the fourteen 
part message at one p. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteen part message was 
merely the formal announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break 
which, from the evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed 
the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles 
the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the fourteen 
parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 
December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came into his possession. 

Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my 
statements here, including among other things as to the processing and de- 
livery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and considered 
changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now repre- 
sents my best recollection of the matters and events set forth, and a better 
recollection than when I previously testified before the Army Pearl Har- 
bor Board, and is made after having my memory refreshed in several ways and 
respects. 

RtJTUS S. Beatton, 

Col., G. 8. O. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris, France. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lieut. Colonel, JAOD. 

{2091 Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtleb 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on duty 
at Washington, D. C, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation 
by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary 
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board pursuant to Joint Resolution of 
Congress, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given me 
on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that following my 
second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth on 
page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of proceedings of the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, I did nothing further to ascertain from /Vdmii-al Noyes or any 
other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which he had 
conveyed to me, and as far as I know nothing further was done to get further 
information from Admiral Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information 
before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned me was an intercept which would, 
according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the 
Army. 

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 De- 
cember 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 2.")4 of the ti-anscript mentioned, without 
getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and 
without informing any reijresentativos of G-2. I was alarmed by the series of 
Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a 
considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 99 

Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with 
General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified hefore the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building, 
and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be 
sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows 
and quoted herewith from memory : 

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii — Panama. Reliable information indicates war with 
Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repeti- 
tion of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall." 

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recol- 
lection of the drafting of this pi'oposed warning message. I did not show it to 
anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no copy at the 
time. After I had typed this message I conferred with General Gerow and Gen- 
eral Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did 
not [210] show them the warning message I had typed. 

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in aflidavits 
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, re- 
ferring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my con- 
ference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the 
comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits 
mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows 
concerning this subject : 

General Gerow. — "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel 
Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely 
a Signal Corps oflBcer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or 
interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of 
such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of 
the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps 
oflScer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 
1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese 
"Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I 
would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel 
Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative 
information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be 
written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the 
fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this 
time, especially so since so many major events have intervened." 

General Smith. — "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has 
stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of 
opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, 
both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I 
had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler 
would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since 
I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for 
him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step 
out of my rather minor province." 

I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention whii'h 
pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941. The 
actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that the Panama 
Canal would be the surprise attack target. 

[Hand written : Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col. 
Bratton, Genl. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whoever may have been in Gen. Miles' office 
at the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7, 1941 I did not give any 
other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.] 

[211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending 
such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", and 
so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War 
Department. 

I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative 
of Gr-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders, and I deny 
the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman given to General Carter W. 
Clarke on 13 July 1945. 

I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the 
effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiter- 
ate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute ujessage 
mentioned by Admiral Noyes. 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the 
effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deiwsit box concerning 
the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have imt collected any such material in k safe- 
deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do have possession of the 
testimony given by me before General Carter W. Clarke on two occasions, 16 
September 1944 and 14 July 1&45, which was given to me by General Clarke, 
and is now in a private box in my home. 

Otis K. Sadtler, 
Otis K. Sadtleb, 

Colonel, S. C. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clatjsen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 

[212] Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herkon 

Major General Charles D. Heri'on. presently assigned to the Office Chief of 
Stafif, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation 
by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplemen- 
tary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolu- 
tion of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, desposes and says : 

Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 
1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General 
Short to relieve me as Conunanding General, Hawaiian Department, which com- 
mand I had held since October 1937. I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could 
with my experience and knowledge of affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was 
to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time 
in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. 
Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I 
sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material 
relating to the connnand, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of 
five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. 
Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether 
he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers 
and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco 
but that he had not given them much time while en route. 

I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining 
to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This 
included my giving him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my 
estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that 
Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, 
efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him 
my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the 
Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my 
experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on 
receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated 17 June 1940, 
reading as follows : 

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible 
trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public 
hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest 
maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret 
communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnish you shortly. 
Acknowledge." 

[213^ I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed 
with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the 
assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. 
I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations and gave 
him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island. 

Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, 
he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the 
subject of command and related problems. 

Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 
1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise a 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 101 

War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting 
to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take 
whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the 
War Depai-tment at the earliest possible moment. 

Charles D. Herron, 
Charles D. Herkon, 
Major General, U. S. A. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
HE^^RY C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 

[214] Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles 

MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First 
Service Command, being tirst duly sworn and informed of the investigation by 
Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary 
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of 
the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 
1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any 
statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived 
from Top Secret sources then called "Magic", or any intimation that such sources 
existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my api)ear- 
ance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter 
W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the 
Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any 
facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form 
of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accord- 
ingly, I obeyed that instruction. 

My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light, therefore. 
In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available to the War and 
Navy Departments in Washington, D. C, intercepts of Japanese radio messages to 
their diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world. These were 
inteix-epted, decrypted, decoded and translated by the two services in Washington, 
D. C, under arrangements for mutual assistance in this regard and for their 
dissemination. So far as the Army was concerned. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who 
was the head of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was 
G-2, War Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from 
this source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieuten- 
ant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which contained information 
valuable from a military intelligence standpoint. The latter was then distrib- 
uted by these officers to various officers and persons who had theretofore been au- 
thorized to receive them. Those on this authorized list, in the several months 
immediately preceding 7 December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by 
the officers mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the 
Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases. The brief cases con- 
tained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate destruction of the material 
thus delivered. The cases were returned to Colonel Bratton's office when they had 
been read, the receipts they contained having been initialed by the authorized 
officers. The material and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This in- 
telligence was distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are 
any records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the 
dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I do not 
think that any such records were made at the time. 

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top Secret Ex- 
hibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date I am unable to 
recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any particular messages translated 
prior to that date, except those bearing Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373, 
25322, 24878, 25432, 25138, 25435, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727, 
25545, 25640, 25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages 
contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The remainder 
of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Ajmy serial numbers 25874 
and 25877, summaries of which were shown me by Colonel Clausen, nor do I know 
how these two happened to be omitted from the Top Secret Exhibit "B", in the 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

preparation of which I was not iii any way concerned. I must add, however, that 
I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 19il, all the messages contained 
in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated prior to that date except number 
25843. ily belief is based on the fact that they were of such importance that my 
oflacers would have assured themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do 
not recall simply do not register in my mind after nearly four years. 

Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the Jap- 
anese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship move- 
ments in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into districts for such 
reporting, I would like to point out that such messages were primarily of Naval 
interest and what might have been expected. Of course the Japanese were fol- 
lowing the movements of our major ships, as best they could, as we were doing 
with regard to their ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages 
mentioned also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured 
four years. 

Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit 
"B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc, or members 
thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement. 

The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in the Top 
Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts, were known to 
me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about because I was dining at 
the home of my opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral 
Bearsdall the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, 
who transmitted it to me. 

Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief in the 
period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting, decrypting, 
decoding and translating this material, consisting of Japanese diplomatic and 
consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in connection with the fleet. I was given 
so to understand by Naval sources, but I do not recall who told me. 

Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with Colonel 
Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning information re- 
ceived by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible "Winds Code" execute 
message, I cannot specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the 
information stated. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute 
message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities. In the event of the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit 
it immediately to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of 
G-2 was especially alerted to watch for this message since receiving information 
of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of vital 
cotncern. I have some recollection that there were several messages intercepted 
which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not 
to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It is my 
belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred, 
concerned such a message. It may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about 
Commander Rochefort, on that date. 

As to the meeting the morning of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of Staff, 
according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made shortly thereafter, 

I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at the Munitions Building at about 

II a. m. 

On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible surprise 
attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my service in the Hawaiian 
Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3. It was while so assigned 
that I [216] prepared and disseminated a General Staff study, afterwards 
disseminated further by General Wells, on the defense of Oahu. This study em- 
phasized the advantages which an attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might 
give Japan. The usual assumption in war planning during my assignment was 
that of a surprise attack made with little warning in the nature of strained re- 
lations internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one situ- 
ation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday morning. 

During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J. Clear 
to be sent to the Far East for undercover work for G-2. He made reports to 
G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through Colonel Brink at Sing- 
apore. 

My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman, given 
to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the Navy the 
type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War by Colonel Clau- 
sen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 103 

Hai'bor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person. 
Specifically, to my knowledge. General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any 
copies of a possible "Winds Code" execute message. Nor, to my knowledge, were 
any records of Gr-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor and derogatory to the "War De- 
partment, destroyed. While serving as Gr-2, I would have known of any de- 
struction of records ordered by any competent authority. 

Concerning the question as to whether correct military practise, current in 
1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas command, such 
as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War Department estimates of 
the situation, such as were contained in War Department messages prior to 7 
December 1941, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, 
my answer is that the Commanding General v;as responsible for the successful 
execution of his mission ; he could act contrary to War Department estimates of 
the situation, but at his own risk ; and that custom and doctrine of command 
would require him to report his action and the x'easons therefore promptly to 
bis superiors. 

In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short, 
prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941, were 
definitive directives that a war alert was required by the situation, and that there 
was an immediate threat from without as well as danger from sabotage. 

Sherman Miles. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at Boston, 
Mass. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. 



[217] Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Mincklee, SC 

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training. Camp Crowder, 
Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceed- 
ings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to joint resolution of the Con- 
gress, and that TOP SECRECY is required, deposes and says : 

On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at 
Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel 
Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the 
Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my 
superior. My dilties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dis- 
semination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I 
saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which 
had been decrypted and translated. 

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and 
at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top 
Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action 
which was taken under my supervision to moniter for the execute message 
contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic 
execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It 
is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were 
one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives 
of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message 
had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My 
opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily 
contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for 
such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message 
had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me. 

The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and 
Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies. 

Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial num- 
bers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 
1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypt- 
ing and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting 
and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code 
indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the 
intercepts [218] were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they 
were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and addi- 
tional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination. 

Rex W. Minckler, 
Rex W. Mincklee. 

Colonel, HC. 
Subscribed and sworn to before nie this 21st day of August 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henky C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 



[219] \ffidavit op General George C. Marshall 

GENERAL GEORGE C. ]\L\RSHALL. presently Chief of Staff, War Depart 
ment, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretai-y of War, supplementary to proceed- 
ings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the 
Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add 
that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript lot Proceedings before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising- the voting 
members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grunert, Major General Henry D. 
Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session 
with me from 11 : 10 A. M. to 12 : 07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indlicated 
on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this 
closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of infor- 
mation which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources 
then called "Magic". I told them, among other things, that the source of this 
information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which 
were decrypted, decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal 
Coi'ps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source 
thereof should be made public because it would result in at least tempo- 
rarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would 
have meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their 
systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital 
source of information which has continued to be available up tx) the present 
hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would 
have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been 
so compromised. 

I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 
and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", prior 
to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I 
personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence 
and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the 
"Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the 
Army officers concerned were authorize<l to go into all the details regarding 
"Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at 
length the general problem concerning the method of including "Magic" in the 
report of the Board and also the availabilit.v to the Board of any officers concerned 
for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the 
investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 
37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in 
Washington for that purpose. 

[221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my under- 
standing in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this infor- 
mation from facilities available in his command. 

Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7 Decem- 
ber 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at the time for 
General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was shown, about 3 
December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, to the Navy at 
Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C" Transcript 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 105 

of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of Captain 
L. F. SafCord, USN, which reads as follows : 

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent 
instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular 
posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London 
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other 
important confidential and secret documents." 
It is customary and expected that information of this character would be 
exchanged between tlie respective Services at Hawaii. 

Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and 
myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to him 
dated 7 Februaryl941 and 5 March 1941 as follows : 

[222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no 
serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, there- 
after the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard 
of an att'ack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid 
by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, 
I do not see any lauding threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have 
air superiority." 

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian 

Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of 

a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a 

matter of first priority." 

Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the War 

Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7 December 1941 

with replies and sent communications to the War Department which indicated 

that he was then alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against 

Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. 

At no time did General Short inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the 

War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department 

estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to 

expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with 

Japan. 

The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of 
an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act contrary 
to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless he believed such 
action to be dictated by necessity and unless he immediately reported and gave 
full details and reasons to the AVar Department. 

» George C. Marshall 

Geoege C. Maeshaix. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this i:8th day of August 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 



top secret 
Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doxjd 

COLONEL HAROLD DQUD, presently with the Allied Translator and Intel- 
ligence Service, GHQ, AFPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of the inves- 
tigation by Lt. Colonel Heiu-y C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, sup- 
plementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint 
Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Wash- 
ington, D. C, in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was 
the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the 
solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of 
these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese 
messages which had been intercepted. 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Regarding the so-called Japanese ''Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time 
of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432. I recall that 
when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the 
execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute 
message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such exe- 
cute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called 
to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Stafford, USN, to the effect that I may have 
some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis 
for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an 
execute message. 

[22^] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 
13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and 
evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen 
the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solu- 
tion. I went on duty on the aftternoon of 6 December and came off duty some- 
time on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall. 

Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the Japanese 
radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average 
time required was at least two days. 

I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates of receipt. 
Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to 
show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and 
diseminations. 

Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any 
current Japanese military codes. 

Harold Doud, 
Haeold Doud, 

Colonel. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAQD. 
At Washington, D. C. 

[225} Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett 

LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security 
Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel 
Henry C. Clausen, ,JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, 
and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese 
system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 
November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which 
were actually published were included in the data on which the average was 
calculated. 

No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military At- 
taches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts 
were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military 
system. 

a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the 
exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco 
by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building. My recollection is 
that the first call to initiate the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed 
sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from 
Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air 
mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them 
to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by 
teletype. [226] This preparation required some time because tapes had to 
be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it 
was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the 
Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco. 

b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward 
traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped 
to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the prelimi- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 107 

uary discussions in wliich traffic was requested and also in receipting for the 
traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present 
and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we 
operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and 
this also tended to impress the matter on my memory. 

Frank B. Rowlett, 
Frank B. Rowlett, 

Lt. Colonel, 8C. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 



[227] Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin 

CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency, 
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry 
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and 
that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are true : 

At approximately 8 : 00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at 
Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on 
duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype 
machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted 
traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other per- 
sonnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station 
immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained 
copy, as the original traffic had been air-mailed to Washington at approximately 
4 : 00 p. m. on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed 
Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am 
certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and 
the hours as given are approximately correct. 

[228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time. 

Howard W. Martin 
Howard W. Martin 

Captain, SC 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington. D. C. 



TOP SECRET 

[229] Affidavit of Mary J. Dunning 

MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly 
sworn and informed of the investigaton by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, 
for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top 
Secrecy is required, deposes and says : 

On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1 : 00 p. m., the 
regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 
tliat afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office, re- 
questing me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the hour by the length 
of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 
3 : 00 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the 
hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time 
on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5 : 00 p. m. instead, since 
I had made plans to spend the day out of town. 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I can't recall' being told why we were called hack to work, but the general 
assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japan- 
ese Ambassador was in conference with the President. 

I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was proc- 
essed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) 
where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think that as I entered 
the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been in- 
stalled, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few 
hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly 
visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that 
representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation 
of the machine. After that we spent some time practicing. 

It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always 
seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco 
at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the 
room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minck- 
ler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just 
long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because 
we joked about my teaching him to operate the teletype. To the best of my 
knowledge, we were in communicat-ion with our intercept station in S. F. not 
later than 7 : 00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had 
any traffic for us at that time. 

I believe I went home around midnight or 1 : 00 a. m. and I recall processing 
some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, how- 
ever, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had 
been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was 
traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines. 

I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941. 

Mary J. Dunning 
Mary J. Dunning. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me ths 12th day of September 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 
At Washington, D. C. 

[2S2] Affidavit of Louise Prather 

Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly 
sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, 
for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Array Pearl 
Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy 
is required, deposes and says : 

To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit 
traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941. 

This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circum- 
stances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit 
was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for 
work at 7 : 00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at th<; 
office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and 
the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as 
rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given 
Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, tlie transmission 
of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This 
further served to impress the event on my memory. 

Louise Prather. 
Louise Prathkr. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. 
Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAC'D. 
At Washington, D. C. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 109 



[233] 



TOP SECRET 

EXHIBIT C 



Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secketaky of 
War, Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board 

The documents referred to in the Report are listed on the inclosed cover 
sheets to Exhibits "1" through "8". 

1234] Exhibit "1" 

a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on 

7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 December'', 
which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time. 
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters 
and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted. 

b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General, 

. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941. 

c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy Yard, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941. 

d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japanese 

War Policy". 

e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is 

initialed by General Short. 

f. Memorandum re ''Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August 

1941. 

g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of 

Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report 

of Sir George Paisn. 
h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General 

Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C, dated 6 September 1941. 
i. Photostated copy of reixtrted talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel 

in Honohdu SUir-BuUetin dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo. 

H. Davies & Co., Ltd. 
J. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941, 

initialed by General Short. 
k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo, 

dated 17 October 1941. 
1. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of Tdiriku, Japanese magazine, 

for May 1941. 
m. Inter-statt" routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941. 

re "Estimate of Japanese Situation", 
n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreii:n Dolicy. 
[236] o. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25 

October 1941, initialed by General Short. . 
I). Letter from Brig General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. 

Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum 

containing information received from Orient, 
q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941, 

initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell. 
r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain 

information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable. 
s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander 

(L C), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British, 
t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November 

1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell. 
u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from 

Navy. 
V. Transcript of telephone conversation. 1 December 1941, obtained from 

Navy. 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from 

Navy. 
X. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI. 
y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian department, 

27 November 1941. 
z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 

29 November 1941. 
aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, 

D. C., Hawaiian Department, 27 December 1911. 
dd. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December 

1941. 
ce. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 

7 December 1941. 
dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941. 
ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C, 

7 December 1941. 

ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H, 8 
December 1941. 

gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 Decem- 
ber 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter 
aircraft by Carrier". 

[236] hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529. 

ii Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941. 

jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 
December 1941. 

kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C, 

8 December 1941. 

11. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, 

T. H., 9 December 1941. 
mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, 9 December 

1941. 
nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Department, 

Washington, D. C, 9 December 1941. 
00. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11 

December 1941. 
pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio — Merle Smith". 
qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941. 
rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11 

December 1941. 
ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and 

destruction of their code machine", 
tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian 

Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air 

Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers. 

[237] ExliiUt "2" 

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Ha- 
waiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H. 

a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Con- 

tact Office, Honolulu, T. H. 

b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial 

detention of persons connected with shrines. 

c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum), 7 September 

1944, to C. G.. POA, re Documentary Evidence. 

d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Do- 

mestic Conditions, 1 December 1941 (2 copies). 

e. Exhibit I — A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands 

Before, On, and After December 7, 1941. 

f. Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through 

the Eyes of the Press. 

g. Hawaiian Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a. m., 7 December 1941, 

dated 22 December 1941. 
h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori, 
i. Radio froiD War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese 
negotiations, 27 November 1941. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 111 

.i. Informal report re Thailand. 

k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asma Maru and con- 
ditions in Japan. 
1. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13 
November 1941. 
m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941. 
n. Army Contact Office memorandum), 2 May 1941, re Comments on observa- 
tions of a missionary, 
o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situ- 
ation During the Period 26-31 July 1941. 
p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941. 
q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip x-e Information re Japanese Situation. 
[238] r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache 
Shanghai, 
s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population 

to unite and serve empire, 
t. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department trans- 
mitting letter from F. B. I. re info rasa tion on Japan's entry into war 
dated 28 July 1941. 
u. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report 

No. 23 dated 3 November 1941. 
v. G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New 

Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo. 
w. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Deten- 
tion Plan (Japanese). 
X. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Ac- 
tivities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and M. A. 
report attached.) 
y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of 

T. H.— Loyalty of— ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached). 
z. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George 
Parish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies), 
aa. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 I'e 

French Indo-China. 
bb. MID. War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 

re Formosa. 
cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents. 
dd. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft 

(Continued), 
ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan, 
ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1941 re Fornsosa. 
gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan, 
hh. M. A. Report dated 2.5 September 1941 re French Indo-China. 
ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand. 

jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations, 
kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Aus- 
tralasia. 
11. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 August 
1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area. 
[239] mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries 

In Pacific Area, 
nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 Feb- 
ruary 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
00. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Jap- 
anese Spy Activities. 
pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama. 
qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate 

Activities. 
rr. Copy of radio "638 12th." 

ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND Report dated 9 Feb- 
ruary 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at. 
tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo, 
uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities, 

Maui, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.). 
w. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho. 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

WW. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and Kalaraa to observe 
unusual activities. 
XX. Memorandum date 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John Water- 
house house at Kailua. 
yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi. 
zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939 — "The Spy Game". 
aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji. 

[240] Exhibit "3" 

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, 
Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K. 

a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 7 October 1941 

re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru. 

b. M. I. D., Washington, Letter of transmittal dated 28 August 1941, w/letter 

dated 3 August 1941 from George Paisn to President Roosevelt re Japanese 
in Hawaii ; summary of information dated 30 September 1&41 re letter, and 
H. H. D. letter dated 30 September 1941 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply 
thereto attached). 

c. M. I. D., Washingtou, letter of transmittal dated 16 September 1941, w/letter 

from M. I. D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese. 

d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to 

General Short dated 25 July 1941. 
-e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled 
"Three-Power Alliance and American- Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, 
w/note attached. 

f Inter-staff routing slip dated July 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines re- 
ported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Molokai, w/G-2, H. H. D. 
letter of transmittal dated 25 July 1941 re Activities of Foreigners in 
Country— Mexico. 

g. F. B. I. report dated 6 November 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama. 

h. F. B. I. report dated 9 October 1940 re Rev. I'n ji Hirayama. 

i. 14ND report dated 15 February 1943 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu- 
Espionage Activities. 

.1. 14ND report dated 15 June 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage 
Activities. 

k. 14ND report dated 14 February 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Es- 
pionage Activities. 

1. F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Washington, 28 March 1942, re notes found on desk 
pad at Japanese Consulate. 

m. F. B. I. letter, 19 March 1942, re translations made of coded and confidential 
material from Japanese Consulate. 

n. luter-stafC routing slip dated 14 March 1942 re Translation of a Register of 
Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter of transmittal 
dated 13 March 1942 and report same subject attached. 

[241] Exhibit "4" 

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Ha- 
waiian Department, as noted on the cover sheet L and M. 

a. G-2 H. H. D., letter of transmittal to G-2, Washington, dated 7 March 1942 

re translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Intcr-staff 
routing slip dated 7 March 1942 and F. B. I. report dated 2 March 1942 
re same subject. 

b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Register 

of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject. 

[242] Exhibit "5" 

The following documents were obtained froni the District Intelligence Office, 

14th Naval District, Honolulu. 

a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cable- 
grams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and 
numbers of cablegrams in date order : 3G3, 3 December 1941 ; 364, 4 De- 
cember 1941 ; 365, 4 December 1941 ; 221, 5 December 1941 ; 368, 6 December 
1941 ; and 369,6 December 1941. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 113 

b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941 

to the following addresses : Shagro, San Francisco ; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young 
Hotel, Honolulu ; Growsumida, Honolulu ; and Sliokin, Honolulu. 

c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941 

to the following addresses : Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church, 
Waipau, Oahu, T. H. ; American Consul, Papeete ; Y. Watanabe, Box 511, 
Wailuku, Maul, T. H. ; and Shokin, Honolulu. 

d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 Novem- 

ber 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae. 

e. Four confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the Japanese Consulate, Honolu- 

lu — Espionage Activities, dated : 9 February 1942, 14 February 1942, 15 June 
1942, and 15 February 1943. 

f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy 

of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941, Japanese 
time. 

g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands pre- 

pared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND, 

dated 20 April 1943. 
h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg) T. 

W. Joyce. 
hl-h35. Various evaluations and related papers from 14ND, Honolulu. 

[243] Exhibit "6" 

The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165, 
from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at 
Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained 
from their respective files. 

They comprise reports diuing the period from June to December 1941. 

[2U] ExMUt "7" 

a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 

of radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and 
which were not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board. 

b. The documents following those mentioned in a above are the intercepts which 

comprise Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred 
to in their affidavits. 
[245] "Exhibit "8" 

The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources. 
They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 
22 December 1941. 



797]()— 46— E.X. 148- 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TOP SECBEnr 

EXHIBIT D 

Investig-ation by Lt. Colonel Henry C Clausen, JAGD for the Secretary of 

War 

SuPPIJiMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE AkMY PeARL HARBOR BoARD 

1. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 17 February 1945, concerning investigation of 

Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

2. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 3 March 1945, concerning investigation of Major 

Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

3. Receipt from the District Intelligence Office 14ND of designated material, 

19 April 1945. 

4. List of Photostated copies of C. I. D. files furnished to Lt. Colonel Clausen, 

19 April 194C>. 

5. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 23 May 1945, concerning investigation of Lt. 

Colonel Clausen supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

6. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 1 August 1945, fourth progress report of Colonel 

Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

7. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 12 September 1945, fifth progress report of Colo- 

nel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

top secret 
[247] War Department, 

Washington, 12 September 1945. 
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy. 

Subject: Fifth progress report of Lt. Colonel Clausen's investigations supple- 
mentary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
1. Since 1 August 1945 I have concluded the investigations of the following : : 

a. Army Personnel interviewed: 

General George C. Marshall 
Major General Charles D. Herron 
Major General Sherman Miles 
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler 
Colonel George W. Bicknell 
Colonel Rex W. Minckler 
Colonel Harold Doud 
Colonel Harold G. Hayes 
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett 

b. British Army personnel interviewed: 

Colonel Gerald Wilkinson 

c. Civilians interviewed: 

Miss Mary J. Dunning 
Miss Louise Prather 

d. Related conferences: 

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy 

Major General Myron C. Cramer 

Commodore Inglis, ONI 

Brig. General Carter W. Clarke 

Brig. General Thomas North 

Colonel Ernest W. Gibson 

[248] Colonel William J. Hughes 

Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USN 

Mr. John F. Sonnett 

Mr. A. T. Klotz 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 115 

e. Affidavit evidence obtained: 

General George C. Marshall 

Major General Sherman Miles 

Major General Charles D. Herron 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler 

Colonel Rex W. Minckler 

Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett 

Captain Howard W. Martin 

Miss Mary J. Dunning 

Miss Louise Prather 

Henry Q. Clausen, 
Henky C. Ci-AtrsEN, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 

top seceet 

1249] Wae Depabtment, 

Washington, 1 August 19^5. 
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy. 

Subject : Fourth Progress Report of Colonel Clausen's Investigation Supple- 
mentary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
1. Activities Reported: Investigations at Blandford, Blenchley Park, London, 
England; Cannes, Marseille, Paris, "Versaille, France; Casserta, Italy; Berlin, 
Frankfurt on Main, Potsdam, Germany ; and Washington, D. C, were conducted 
during 15 May to 1 August 1945. 

a. Army Personnel Interviewed: 

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow^ 
Lt. General W. B. Smith 
Maj. General John R. Deane 
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts 
Colonel George W. Bicknell 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton 
Colonel Warren J. Clear 
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft 
Major Louis Stone 

b. British Navy Personnel Interviewed: 

Captain Edward Hastings 

c. Civilians Interviewed: 

Dr. Stanley Hornbeck 
George W. Renchard 
John F. Stone 

d. Related Conferences: 

Harvey H. Bundy 

General Thomas T. Handy 

Maj. General Myron C. Cramer 

Maj. General Otto Nelson 

Brig. General Carter Clarke 

[250] Bi'ig. General Thomas North 

Brig. General G. Bryan Conrad 

Brig. General Marion Van Voorst 

Colonel C. W. Christenberry 

Colonel R. W. Hauenstein 

Colonel F. W. Hilles 

Captain Wm. T. Carnahan 

Captain Edmund H. Kellogg 

John F. Sonnett 

Admiral Henry K. Hewitt 

e. Affidavit Evidence Obtained: 

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow 
Lt. General W. B. Smith 
Maj. General John R. Deane 
Colonel George W. Bicknell 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton 
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft 
George W. Renchard 
John F. Stone 
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

f. Dwinncntanj Evidence Obtained: 
British radio intelligence material 

2. Siiinificant Features of Additiomil Evidence Developed: 

(a) Cohmcl Bratton's Testimony Before APHB: Colonel Brattou admitted to 
me that his testimony given to the APHB was incorrect on some very important 
subjects, and should be revised accordingly. These changes include the following 
points : 

1. He previously testified that the top secret radio intelligence material, con- 
tained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", had been delivered to the President, the Secre- 
tary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

But, in his affidavit to me made when his memory was more refreshed, he 
admitted that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy, and that there 
were no records to show who delivered what to whom during the period in 
question. 

[251'\ 2. He previously testified that he personally delivered the top secret 
radio intelligence material to the officers concerned. 

In his affidavit to me, however, he admitted that in addition to himself, de- 
liveries were made by Major or Lt. Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieu- 
tenant Schindel. 

3. He previously testified that on the evening of 6 December 1941 he delivered 
to the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the office of the Secretary of State, the thirteen; 
parts of the fourteen part Japanese rejily to the settlement conditions which the 
Secretary of State had given the Japs on 26 November 1941. He had also testi- 
fied that he put the thirteen parts of this message on the desk of the Chief of 
Staff. He had further testified that on 6 December 1941 he had given sets of 
the thirteen parts to Lt. General W. B. Smith for the Chief of Staff, to Brig. 
General Galley for Lt. General Gerow, and to Maj. General Miles as G-2, and 
that it was his recollection that these officers received these sets that night. 
He had also testified that on 6 December 1941 he discussed the thirteen part 
message with General Miles. 

But in his affidavit to me he admitted that the only set of the thirteen parts 
message he delivered on 6 December 1941 was to the duty officer of the Secretary 
of State ; that the sets for the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., were not delivered the night of (5 
December 1941 ; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December 1941 to 
General Smith, General Gerow or General Miles; that Jie could not recall having 
discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December 1941 ; that he did not 
know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession, although he 
claimed that he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver it on 6 December 1941 
to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury admitted in his affidavit 
to me that he received the messages on 6 December 1941, but that he did not 
deliver any until after 9 : 00 A. M. on the morning of 7 December 1941. 
[252^ 4. He previously testified that on the morning of 7 December 1941 he 
arrived at his office about 7 : 00 or 8 : 00 A. M. and telephoned the home of the 
Chief of Staff at about 9 : 00 A. M., and that the Chief of Staff arrived at his office 
at 11 : 25 A. M. 

In his affidavit to me, he fixed the time at which the Chief of Staff was in his 
office on 7 December 1941 as being between 10 : 30 and 11 : 30 A. M. 

The affidavit of Maj. General Deane fixed the time at which Colonel Bratton 
arrived at his office on 7 December 1941 as between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 A. M., which 
also agrees more nearly with the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury. 

Affidavits mentioned in previous reports, as well as the new affidavits of Generals 
Gerow, Smith, Deane, and Messrs. Stone and Renchard, tend to support the revised 
testimony of Colonel Bratton. 

(b) "ivinds Code'' Message: Investigation at British sources failed to reveal 
that the British ever intercepted an implementation message. Apparently, the 
evidence to date of the existence of such an implementation depends primarily 
on the recollection of certain Navy witnesses, and among whom there is a conflict. 
Colonel Schukraft claimed to have seen an implementation in a form different 
from that testified to by the Navy witnesses. On this subject it should be recalled 
that the action to be taken by the Jap Consular and diplomatic agents on receipt 
of an implementing message, namely, destruction of codes, actually was ordered 
by Tokyo in a radio which was intercepted about 4 December 1941. As I pre- 
viously reported, this information was given to Short prior to 7 December 1941, 
according to his G-2 and Assistant G-2. Short testified before the Navy Court of 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 117 

Inquiry, however, that he did not get this information, and that to him it would 
have been the only important part of the message which the Chief of Staff sent 
him by radio on 7 December 1941. Assuming that the recollections of Short's 
two members of his Staff are correct, then Short had received prior to 7 December 
1941 the ultimate in available information according to his own statement of what 
should have been given him for a different alert than that which he had ordered 
on 27 November 1941. 

[253] (c) Sufflciencii of War Department Warnings to Short: General 
Gerow in his affidavit to me sets forth detailed reasons why in his opinion the 
overseas commanders were given adequate information of impending events. 
Also why the radio intelligence messages were not sent to the couunanders. 
In this regard, testimony should be recalled to the effect that, for security 
reasons, the Army was restricted by the Navy from sending these messages, and 
that representatives of the Navy had stated that the Navy unit at Honolulu 
w\ns getting the messages from their own facilities. 

(d) Conflicts in Testimony: Many of the points heretofore in doubt and 
hereinbefore mentioned have been sufficiently developed to I'each appropriate 
conclusions. A number of conflicts I'emain, however, which it is planned to 
resolve by completion of the investigation. 

3. Progress and Objectives: The investigation will be concluded by explora- 
tion of the remaining leads and. the making of a final and comprehensive report. 
This will involve : 

(a) Intei'views with Generals Marshall, Herron and Miles, Colonels Bicknell, 
Doud, Minkler and Sadtler, INIajor Bash, Messrs. Roberts, Hoover, Friedman, 
and Wilkinson, and Misses Adams, Cave, and Prather. 

(b) Examinations of the testimony given Admiral Hewitt by Admiral May- 
field Captain McCoUum, Commandei'S Kramer and Mason, and other Navy 
witnesses if necessary ; the engagement book of former Secretary of State 
Hull : the statement by General Smith ; and the recent Gt-2 examination involv- 
ing Mr. Friedman, resulting from Navy disclosures. 

(c) It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War 
direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give 
me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, any copies of 
affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes or papers 
which may be in their possession or under their control, they to advise me in 
writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, and that 
they be advised that these records will be available in the War Department 
in the event access thereto is ever required. 

Henry C. Clausen. 
Henry C. Clausen. 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 



[254] TOP SECRET 



War Department, 
Washington, 23 May 1945. 



Memorandum for Mr. Bundy : 

Subject : Investigation of Colonel Clausen 

Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
1. Activities Reported: Investigations at Honolulu, Guam, Saipan, Leyte, and 
Luzon were conducted during the period 26 March to 12 May, 1945. 
a. Army Personnel Interviewed: 

General Douglas INIacArthur 

Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland 

Major Gen. C. A. Willoughby 

Major Gen. Spencer B. Aiken 

Major Gen. C. L. Ruffner 

Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder 

Brig. Gen. C. A. Powell 

Brig. Gen. J. J. Twitty 

Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston 

Colonel O. N. Thompson 

Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott 

Major H. H. Henderson 

Major Maresh 

Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. 2favy Personnel Interviewed: 

Captain E. T. Layton 

Captain Harper 

Captain W. J. Holmes 

Captain T. A. Huckins 

Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr. 

Commander Burr 

Commander Carr 

Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr. 

Cnief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel 
[255] c. Civilians Interviewed: 

D. K. Dawson 

Robert L. Shivers 

Harry L. Dawson 

John E. Russell 

d. Related Conferences: 

General Richardson 
Admiral Nimitz 
Admiral McMorris 
Admiral Towers 
Mr. H. H. Bundy 
Gen. Carter W. Clarke 
Gen. Myron C. Cramer 
Commander John F. Sonnett 

e. Affidavits and Statements Obtained: 

General Douglas MacArthur 
Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland 
Ma.1. Gen. C. A. Willoughby 
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder 
Brig. C. A. Powell 
Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston 
Colonel O. N. Thompson 
Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott 
Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane 
Captain E. T. Layton 
Captain W. J. Holmes 
Captain T. A. Huckins 
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr. 
Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr. 
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel 
Mr. John E. Russell 
Mr. Robert L. Shivers 

f. Documentary Evidence Obtained: 

1. British intelligence material (SIS) consisting of more than 200 reports 
from Gerald Wilkinson at Manila to Honolulu, from July 1941 to and including 
December 1941. 

2. Files of the Hawaiian Department, G-2, Army Contact Office. These are 
set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945. 

[256] 3. Nflvy District Intelligence Office files, set forth on the attached re- 
ceipt dated 19 April 1945. 

4. Files of the Hawaiian Department, AG. These include photostats of file 
copies of pertinent communications received before 7 December 1941. 

5. FBI records of telephone intercepts and British SIS reports. 
2. Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed: 

a. Short's Defenses: Assumption that Navy knew the whereabouts of the 
Jap fleet : Actually, as could have been ascertained from plots prepared by Cap- 
tain Holmes, USN, and daily Communication Intelligence Summaries prepared by 
Captain Rochefort (see affidavit of Captain Huckins), the Navy did not have such 
information. 

Claim that War Department acquiesced in reply of Short to radio of 27 No- 
vember 1941 signed "Mar.shall", and thereafter did not give him additional informa- 
tion : The reply of Short also stated "liaison with Navy." Attention is invited 
to new evidence of items of intelligence possessed or available to Short. 

Claim that a more effective alert would have interfered with training and 
would have alarmed the civilian population : Evidence shows there was no civilian 
alarm when the Herron all-out alert of 1940 was ordered and Short did not order 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 119 

the radar into 24 hours operation and did uot order any visual lookouts or sound 
detectors against a possible air attacli ( See notes on Navy court testimony) . 

b. Intelligence and Information available to Short: Short and his G-2 testified 
in effect that they were almost v?holly dependent on the War Department for 
information and that they actually received very little. New evidence indicates 
that the Hawaiian Department received a great deal more military and diplomatic 
information than has been previously developed. For example, the British SIS 
reports (See Russell & Shivers affidavits), the intercepts of telephone conversa- 
tions in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Emanuel, Shivers and Woodrum affi- 
davits), some commercial radio traffic in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Mars- 
ton and Shivers affidavits), information from the Navy District Intelligence Office 
and the Fleet Intelligence Officer (See fijes and affidavit of Captain Layton). 
Much material was gathered from observers, travellers, and Washington sources, 
and evaluated and disseminated by the Army contact office. 

[257] Various papers dealing with this intelligence were initialed by Short. 
For example, see the Inter-Staff Routing Slip, 11 September 1941, concerning infor- 
mation from the Tokyo Naval Attache as to Japan's intentions ; the Slip, 6 No- 
vember 1941 ; the War Department Military Attache Report, 3 November 1941 ; 
the Special Intelligence Report, 17 October 1941 ; the memo of Colonel Bicknell, 21 
November 1941 ; the War Department G-2 Rejwrt, June 1941, regarding the lurk- 
ing of small submarines in Hawaiian waters preparatory to attacks on Pearl Har- 
bor ; the War Department G-2 Report, 28 August 1941, of a warning by one George 
Paisn ; the Contact Office Report and Estimate, 25 October 1941 ; the report 19 
June 1941 of Japanese books. 

A detailed study of the foregoing and other items of intelligence, in relation to 
testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, will be made on com- 
pletion of the investigation. 

Incidentally, a special investigation by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, 9 July 1941, 
reported to General Short many deficiencies of his Command. Amohg other things, 
the report set forth that the attitude of mind in the Hawaiian Department, the 
Hawaiian Air Force and Hickman Field was deficient as to "the immediate need 
for jwsitive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and 
ordered sabotage," and further "it is found that a considerable portion of the 
Command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing 
between inter-continental theaters of war and our local sphere of action." The 
report further stated that the Command was not alert to : 

"(a) The i)Ossibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to 
an overt hostile act either near or far away. * * * 

"(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia." 

The report found the cause for this attitude of mind was, among other things, 
traceable : 

" ( 1 ) To the ingrained habits of peace-time. 

"(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical 
island garrisoned by large forces. * * * 

"(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions 
as compared to that given to operations and supply functions. * * * 

[25S] "(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of 
the above first needs. * * * 

"(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive wait- 
ing attitude. 

"(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which 
to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern 
for the future." 

The report concluded : 

"(a) That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of 
instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of 
subversive activities within the command ; although such a condition naturally 
provides a move fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities." 

Under Appreciations, the report stated : 

"(a) Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, 
Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation." 

c. Imminence of War with Japan: Short testified that if this had been known 
to him he would have ordered a different alert. The affidavit of Fielder and the 
documentary evidence mentioned shows that Short was so informed. For in- 
stance, see the estimates dates 17 October 1941 and 25 October 1941 by Colonel 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bicknell, initialed by Short ; the memo of Bicknell, dated 21 November 1941 ; and 
tlie speeches of Short and Kimmel, reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 
18 September 1941, a copy of which is attached. 

d. '-Winds Code" Message: Contrary to Short's testimony and the findings of 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, this information was given the Army at Honolulu. 
See the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell. It should be 
noted that in the documentary evidence is a translation of the Jap Consul's desk 
pad. He had written thereon several wave lengths of Jap broadcasts on the date 
the Winds Code was broadcast. No evidence was found however, that the code 
was implemented (see statement of Holtwick), other than the 3 December 1941 
British SIS report to Honolulu, copy of which went to Colonel Bicknell, read- 
ing in part : 

[2J.9] "(C) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early 
hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack 
Russia at present but will act in South." 

Significantly, the date 3 December 1941 agrees with the testimony of Captain 
SafEord as to when he saw an implementing message to the code in similar 
terms. 

e. 5 December 1941, War Department 0-2 Message: See affidavits of Fielder, 
Powell, Thompson and Lane. In view of previous statements recently obtained 
from Colonel Bicknell and personnel of G-2, it is a reasonable certainty that the 
message was received by the Army in Hawaii on 5 December 1941. 

. f. Destruction by Japs of Codes: Short denied receiving this information and 
claimed that he would have considered it most important, calling for a different 
alert order. But Fielder states in his affidavit that he gave his information to 
Short on 6 December 1941. See also the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of 
Colonel Bicknell. 

g. Pearl Harbor as attack target: If the Jap Consul commercial radio traffic, 
which was available at Hawaii to the Navy especially from the latter part of 
November 1941, included the reports as to ships in the harbor, then it was similar 
to that received at Washington. Several messages are contained in the docu-. 
mentary evidence above which are indicative that some such traffic was available 
at Hawaii before 7 December 1941. Further details are being explored in con- 
junction with the Navy. The availability of these messages is confirmed by the 
affidavits of Shivers, Marston, and testimony of Captain Rochefort. 

It should be noted that the Jap inquiries as to ships movements included re- 
ports at many other places, such as Manila, Seattle, etc. Also, so far as Hawaii 
specifically was concerned, intercepts of telephone conversations at the Jap Con- 
sulate revealed that in 1940 a Jap agent was collecting information om ship 
movements. 

Another item of intelligence which pointed to Pearl Harbor was the 3 Decem- 
ber 1941 message from the Jap Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, giving the visual 
signals devised by Otto Kuhn to report ship movements. This message falls into 
the category stated as requiring further exploration as to its availability before 
7 December 1941. 

[260'] As to the Army Signal Intelligence Service activities at Hawaii, see 
the Powell affidavit. Two of the most vital messages, intercepted before 7 
December 1941, were sent in to Washington by Hawaii. General Powell, how- 
ever, states he was not aware of the contents. 

In the documentary evidence mentioned there is correspondence from War 
Department to Hawaii in June 1941 concerning a report of the Military Attache 
at Mexico City as to the Jap intentions to strike Pearl Harbor with midget sub- 
marines at the outbreak of hostilities. 

h. Jap Navy Task Force in Marshalls: Short testified that he did not have 
this information. But, the contrary might well be true in view of the affidavits 
of Layton, Huckins and Shivers, in addition to the proof previously reported. 

i. Sufficiency of War Department warnings: General MacArthur, who received 
information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after re- 
viewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and 
complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war. 

Colonel Bicknell told Shivers the Army had been alerted when Shivers men- 
tioned the alert he received from Hoover on 28 November 1941. (Shivers affi- 
davit) . 

j. Possible alarm to civilian population: The affidavits of Marston and Shivers 
confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the ex- 
perience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 121 

3. Miscellaveous: Many rumors relating to Pearl Harbor had been circulated 
concerning information available to General MacArthur, reports by him to 
Hawaii, and the War Department warnings to him. These are set at rest by the 
aflSdavits of MacArthur, Sutherland and Willoughby. 

4. Wymflin-Rohl investigation: Concurrent with the foregoing, evidence was 
obtained at Hawaii and Leyte in exploration of certain leads. 

5. Progress and objectives: I propose to complete the interviews of overseas 
witnesses by going to the ETO to develop some very important and promising 
leads. Those to be questioned on the Pearl Harbor phases include, among others, 
General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General T. J. Betts, Colonel Rufus Bratton, 
Colonel Harold S. Doud. Colonel R. E. Schnkraft and Colonel W. H. Tetley. This 
would include an investigation of new matters as well as of [261] those 
items previously discussed. It is felt desirable to leave as soon as possible in 
order that interrogation be done before the witnesses are further scattered or 
are perhaps unavailable later. 

Certain overseas witnesses pertinent to the Wyman-Rohl investigation would 
also be interviewed, thus completing the overseas phase of that investigation 
also. 

I am keeping in touch and cooperating in a reciprocal manner with the Navy 
on additional investigation. 

When my investigation is completed I shall make a comprehensive critique 
and report of all the new evidence then developed in relation to the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board Secret and Top Secret Reports. 

Henry C. Clausen. 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAG. 



[262] confidental 

Headquarters Centrai, Pacific Base Command 

office of the assistant chief of staff for military intelligence 

counter inteixigence division 
Box 3, APO 456 ' 

In reply I'efer. to: 

19 April 1945. 
Memorandum : 
Subject : Photostated copies of C. I. D. files. 

1. The following photostated copies of C. I. D. files were furnished to Col. 
Claussen as directed bv the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, 
CPBC : 

G-2, Hawn Dept. list Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Hono- 
lulu, T. H. 
G-2, CID memo dtd 9/12/44 re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of 

persons connected with shrines. 
War Dept., Hq Army Pearl Harbor Board memo dtd 9/7/44 to CG, POA re 

Documentary Evidence. 
G-2, Hawn Dept report re Japan, Foreign Relations & Domestic Conditions. 

(2 copies) (1 Dec 41) 
Exhibit I — A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands 

Before, On, and After December 7, 1941. 
Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through 

the Eyes of the Press. 
Hawn Dept. Summary of the Situation As of 7 : 30 A. M., 7 December 1941, 

dtd 12/22/41. 
Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori. 
*Radio from War Dept to G-2, Hawn Dept re .Japanese negotiations, 

11/27/41. 
Informal report re Thailand. 
Army Contact Office memo dtd 8/1/41 re Asama Maru and Conditions in 

Japan. 
Radio from Short to AG, Wash, dtd 11/13/41. 
Brief re Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July 1941. 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Army Contact Office ineino dtd 5/2/41 re Comments on observations of a 

missionary. 
Memo for Col. Bicknell dated 8/1/41 re Local Japanese Situation During the 

Period 26-31 July 1941. 
Copy of radio received 11/27/41. 

Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation. 
Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asst N:iva] Attache Shanghai. 
[26.^] Ritdio re speeches made by Militny Naval Oflicials urging popula- 
tion to unite and serve empire. 
War Dopt Itr (ltd 8/5/41 to G-2, Hawn Dept ti-:insmitting Itr from F. B. I. re 

Info on Japan's entry into war dtd 7/28/41. 
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Nov. 1941 re JMililarv Attatlie Report No. 23 dtd 

11/3/41. 
G-2; H. H. D. Six>cial Intelligence Report (ltd 10/17/41 re New Japanese 

Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo. 
Ai-my Contact Office memo dtd 11/21/4] re Seizure and Detention Plan 

(Japanese). 
luter-Statf Routing Slip dtd Jan. 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities 

of Foreigners in Conntry. Mexico." (Distribution list and M. A. report 

attached). 
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.— 

Loyalty of— ONI report dtd 1/26/42 (attached). 
Ltr from Hq. Second Corps Area dtd 11/28/41 re George Paish (Paisn). 

w/FBI report same Subject attached. (2 copies.) 
M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re French Indo- 

China. 
M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re Formosa. 
M. A. Report dtd 8/14/41 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area. 
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re General 

Report, Japan and China. 
M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australia. 
M. A. Report dtd 9/10/41 re Japan and Japanese Relations. 
M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re Thailand. 
M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re French Indo-China. 
M. A. Report dtd 10/2/41 re Japan. 
M. A. Report dtd 10/23/41 re Formosa. 
M. A. Report dtd 10/28/41 re Japan. 

M. A. Report dtd 11/3/41 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued). 
M. A. Report dtd 11/18/41 re Japan, IVIilitary Agents. 
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 w/14MD report dtd 2/9/42 re Fifth 

Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
Cable re movements of fleet and return to Japan of members of diplomatic 

staff. 
Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio #628, 12/12/41 re Japanese Spy 

Activities. 
Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama. 
14ND report dtd 2/9/42 re Espionage Activities at Japanese Consulate, 

Honolulu. 
FBI memo to ONI dtd 1/4/42 re Japanese Consulate Activities. 
Ltr dtd 12/3/41 from Kita to Foreign Minister. Tokyo. 
Extract from ONI report dtd 12/9/41 re Activities on Maui, Uanai i&; Molokai, 

since 7 December 1941. 
[264] Report dtd 12/12/41 by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho. 
Memo re ON'I and FBI agents to Lanikai & Kalama to observe unusual ac- 
tivities. 
Memo dtd 12/17/41 from R. A. Cooke Jr. re John Waterhouse House at 

Kailua. 
Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi. 
Extract from Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39 — The Spy Game. 
Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji. 
Army Contact Office memo for Col. Bicknell dtd 10/7/41 re Japanese Arrival 

In and Departure From Honolulu on Taiyo Maru. 
M.I.D., Wash, ltr of transmittal dtd 8/28/41, w/ltr dtd 8/3/41 from George 

Paisn to Pres. Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii, Summary of Information 

dtd 9/30/41 re ltr, and H. H. D. ltr dtd 9/30/41 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area 

(reply thereto attached). 
M. I. D., Wash, ltr of transmittal dtd 9/16/41, w/M. I. D. Summary of In- 
formation re Alleged exodus of Japanese. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 123 

luter-Staflf Routing Slip (ltd Aug. 1941, w/ltr from Admiral Bloch to Gen. 
Short dtd 7/25/41. 

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book Entitled 
"Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, 
w/note attached. 

Inter-Staft' Routing Slip dtd Jul 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines re- 
ported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Malokai, w/Gr-2, H. H. D. 
Itr of transmittal dtd 7/25/41 re Activities of Foreigners in Country-Mex- 
ico. 

F. B. I. report dtd 10/9/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama. 

F. B. I. report dtd 11/6/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama. 

F. B. J. Itr dtd 3/19/42 re translations made of coded & confideutial material 
from Japanese Consulate. 

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/14/42 re Translation of a Register of Radio- 
grams sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. Itr of transmittal dtd 3/13/42 
and report same subject attached. 

F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Wash. 3/28/42 re notes found on desk pad at Jap- 
anese Consulate. 

14ND report dtd 2/14/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Ac- 
tivities. 

14ND report dtd 6/15/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Ac- 
tivities. 

14ND report dtd 2/15/43 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu — Espionage Ac- 
tivities. 

G-2, H. H. D. Itr of transmittal to G-2, Wash, dtd 3/7/42 re Translation of 
Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-Stafl: Routing Slip dtd 
3/7/42 and F. B. I. report dtd 3/2/42 re same subject. 

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 4/2/42 re Photographs of Message Register of 
Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. Itr dtd 4/2/42 same subject. 

[265] The aforementioned files were furnished to 

on the th day of 1945. 



M. H. Sheward 
M. H. Shewaed 

2nd Lt., M. I. 
Receipt acknowledged. 



SECEET 



\_266] Fourteenth Naval Distbict, , 

District Intelligence Office, Sixth Floor, Young Hotel, 

Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 April 19Jf5. 

Receipt From the District Intexligence Office 14nd Is Hereby Acknowledgeu 
Fob the Following Materia^: 

1. Five (5) Secret Photostats (one positive and one negative of decoded cable- 
grams, from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. 

Listed are the dates and numbers of the above cablegrams in date order. 

Date of Cablegram Number of Cablegram 

(a) 12/3/41 #363 

(b) 12/4/41 #365 

(c) 12/4/41 #364 

(d) 12/5/41 #221 

(e) 12/6/41 #368 
(f) 12/6/41 #369 

2. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 
11/27/41, to the following addressees : 

(a) SHAGRO, San Francisco 

(b) Dr. HOLMES, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu 

(c) GROWSUMIDA, Honolulu 

(d) SHOKIN, Honolulu 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



3. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 
11/25/41, to the following addressees. 

(a) Rev. Hiro HIGUCHI, Waipahu Conimiuiity Church, Waipahu, 

Oahu, T. H. 

(b) AMERICAN CONSUL, Papeete 

(c) Y. WATANABE, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H. 

(d) SHOKIN, Honolulu 

4. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 
11/19/41, addressed to Inosuke HACHIYAE. 

5. Four (4) Confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the JAPANESE CON- 
SULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities, dated as follows : 

(a) 9 February 1942 

(b) 14 February 1942 

(c) 15 June 1942 

(d) 15 February 1943 

6. One PHOTOSTAT (positive and negative) of each of the following 
SECRET intercepts: 

(a) 1-540; 11/30/41 & 12/1/41 

(b) NYK-38; 12/2/41 

(c) 6-1 ; 10/11/41 
7. One Photostat (Positive and Negative) of the following: (Page 

indicate DIO file page.) 

Wilkinson report dated IS October 1941 — (No. DIO file page number.) 

Wilkinson report dated 10/6/41, pg. 174. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/16/41, pg. 173. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/22/41, pg. 172. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/17/41, pg. 171. 

Cable received from Wellington, 11/25/41, regard Pacific Raider Intel- 
ligence, pg. 168A. 

Memo for the files, dated 12/3/41, in reference to Wilkinson report 
dated 10/6/41, pg. 168. 

Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 166. 

Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 162. 

Confidential letter to DNI from Coml4, dated 10/14/41, Ser. #0965916, 
Subj. : "Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence 
Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence 
Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Agent in Manila — Information 
received from), pgs. 160-159. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/3/41, pg. 158. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 157. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 156. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 155. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 154. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 153. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/11/41, pg. 152. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/2/41, pg. 151. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/29/41, pg. 150. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 149. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/26/41, pgs. 148-147. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/24/41, pg. 145. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 144. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/23/41, pgs. 143-142. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/14/41, pg. 140. 

Wilkinson report dated 9/10/41, pg. 139. 

Wilkinson report dated 8/28/41, jig. 134. 

Wilkinson report dated 8/25/41, pg. 133. 

Wilkinson report dated 8/23/41, pg. 132. 

Wilkinson report dated 8/21/41, pg. 131. 

Memo by T. W. Joyce, dated 11/5/41. (Notes & Connnents), pg. 130. 

Wilkinson report dated 10/4/41, pg. 129. 

14ND card #1536, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French Conces- 
.sion — Japanese Designs on", pg. 121. 

14ND card #1534, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Thai— Japanese Activities 

in", pg. 120. 



[267] 
numbers 

(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 



(11 
(12 
(13 
(14 
(15 
(16 
(17 
(18 
(19 
(20 
(21 
(22 
(23 
(24 
(25 
(26 
(27 
(28 
(29 
(30 
(31 
(32 
(33 

(34) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 125 

[268] (35) 14ND card #ir..'ir., dated 9/23/41, Sul)j. : "Fdrmosa— Heito 

Airdrome", pg. 120. 

(36) 14ND card #1533, dated -0/31/41, Subj. : 'Japan— General Intelli- 

gence", pg. 119. 

(37) 14ND card #1531, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Fleet Organiza- 

tion", pg. 118. 

(38) 14ND card #1532. dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Indo-Cluna— Japanese 

Moves in", pg. 118. 

(39) 14ND card #1528, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japan— Ordnance Produc- 

tion", pg. 117. 

(40) 14ND card #1530, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Far East Exports to Ger- 

man.v", pg. 117. 

(41) 14ND card #1526. dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "China Blockade— Smug- 

gling", pg. 116. 

(42) 14ND card #1527, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa— Coastal De- 

fenses", pg. 116. 

(43) 14ND card #1525, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa (Takao)— Gen- 

eral Military Intelligence", pg. 115. 

(44) 14ND card #1523, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Formosa— Conscription", 

pg. 114. 

(45) 14ND card #1524, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa— Troop Move- 

ments", pg. 114. 

(46) 14ND card #1520, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Japanese— Troop Move- 

ments", pg. 113. 

(47) 14ND card #1521, dated 9/23/41, Subj. : "Japanese Troop Move- 

ments", pg. 113. 

(48) 14ND card #1522. dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa— Supplies", pg. 

113. 

(49) 14ND card #1518, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria— Travel Re- 

strictions", pg. 112. 

(50) 14ND card #1519, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Mancdiuria— Censorship", 

pg. 112. 

(51) 14ND card #1516, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Mobilization", 

pg. 111. 

(52) 14ND card #1517, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Construction", 

pg. 111. 

(53) 14ND card #1482, dated 9/12/41, Subj.: "Hongkong— Prospective 

Disorders", pg. 97. 

(54) 14 ND card #1468, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", 

pg. 95. 

(55) 14ND card #1470, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese— Siamese Rela- 

tions", pg. 95. 

(56) 14ND card #1466, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Manchuria— Japanese Troop 

Movements", pg. 94. 
(.57) 14ND card #1467, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: ".Japanese Foreign Policy", 

pg. 94. 
(58) 14ND card #1465, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria— Railways, 

Buildings, etc.", pg. 93. 
[269] (59) 14ND card #1463, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French 

Concession — Japanese Designs On", pg. 92. 

(60) 14ND card #14.56, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Formosa-Japanese Airplane 

Movements", pg. 90. 

(61) 14ND card #1457, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa-Japanese Troop 

Movements", pg. 90. 

(62) 14NR card #1453, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japane,se Naval Ordnance", 

pg. 89. 

(63) 14ND card #1454, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Factory", pg. 89. 

(64) 14ND card #1455, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troops in Indo 

China", pg. 89. 

(65) 14ND card #1450, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : ".Japanese Troop Movement", 

pg. 88. 

(66) 14ND card #1451, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Naval Construc- 

tion", pg. 88. 

(67) 14ND card #1452, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Naval Construc- 

tion", pg. 88. 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



(68) 14ND card #(?), dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Aircraft Factory", 

pg. 87. 

(69) 14ND card #1448, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Spratley Island— Japanese 

Construction", pg. 87. 

(70) 14ND card #1449, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "German Raiders in Pacific", 

pg. 87. 

(71) 14ND card #1444, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan— Kobe Navy Yard", 

pg. 86. 

(72) 14ND card #1445, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Submarine Con- 

struction", pg. 86. 

(73) 14ND card #1446, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese Aerial Bomb Fac- 

tory", pg. 86. 

(74) 14ND card #1442, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", 

pg. 85. 

(75) 14ND card #1443, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japan— Airdrome at Kama- 

kura", pg. 85. 

(76) 14ND card #1440, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japan— General Military and 

Naval Information", pg. 84. 

(77) 14ND card #1441, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan— Underground Air- 

drome at Takarazuka", pg. 84. 

(78) 14ND card #1438, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", 

pg. 83. 

(79) 14ND card #1439, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Philippine— Japanese Propa- 

ganda In", pg. 83. 

(80) 14ND card #1435, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Dutch East Indies— Japanese 

Propaganda In", pg. 82. 

(81) 14ND card #1436, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Saigon", pg. 82. 

[270] (82) 14ND card #1437, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Philippine-Japanese 
Business In", pg. 82. 

(83) 14ND card #1434, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Japanese National Policy", 

pg. 81. 

(84) 14ND card #1433, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Anti-American Measures by 

Japanese in Occupied China", pg. 80. 

(85) 14ND card #1431, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Indo-China", pg. 79. 

(86) 14ND card #1432, dated 9/9/41, Subj. : "Formosa", pg. 79. 

(87) Conf. Ltr. to DNI from DIO, 14ND, dated 9/20/41, Subj. : "British 

Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with", pg. 78. 

(88) Extract #61 for Honolulu, dated 8/8/41, pg. 71. 

(89) Extract #59 for Honolulu, dated 8/10/41, pg. 69. 

(90) Extract #57 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 67. 

(91) Extract #54 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 64. 

(92) Extract #52 for Honolulu, dated 8/21/41, pg. 61. 

(93) Extract #35 for Honolulu, dated 8/18/41, pg. 42. 

(94) Extract #33 for Honolulu, dated 8/16/41, pg. 40. 

(95) Extract #27 for Honolulu, dated 8/12/41, pg. 34. 

(96) 14ND card #1420, dated 9/2/41, Subj. : "Japanese Repatriation", pg. 

30. 

(97) 14ND card #1421, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr.", 

pg. 30. 

(98) 14ND card #1417, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "DAKAR— Military Exer- 

cises", pg. 29. 

(99) 14ND card #1418, dated 9/2/41, Subj. : "DAKAR— Attitude of Na- 

tives", pg. 29. 

(100) 14ND card #1419, dated 9/2/41, Subj. : "MOROCCO— Outgoing visas 

from", pg. 29. 

(101) Conf. Ltr. to Hd. of Domestic In tell. Branch, ONI, from DIO, 14ND, 

dated 8/22/41, Subj. : "British Secret Agent in Manila ; information 
received from", pg. 27-26. 

(102) Extract #24, Subj. : "HULL, Amos Tyler", pg. 21. 

(103) Extract #20, dated 8/1/41, Subj. : "German S/S RAMSES", pg. 19. 

(104) 14ND card #13.S3, dated 8/15/41, Subj.: "JAPANESE MILITARY 

ARMOR", pg. 14. 

(105) Japan Military Body Armour, pg. 13. 

(106) 14ND card #1334, dated (?), Subj.: "Japanese Industrial Manage- 

ment", pg. 12. 

(107) Extract from letter from Manila, dated 7/12/41, pg. 10, 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 127 

(108) Factual Information regarding Japanese Professions, pgs. 9-7. 

(109) Extract #9 for Honolulu, dated 7/3/41, pg. 6. 

(110) Extract #10 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 5. 

(111) Extract #11 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 4. 
[271] ( 112 ) Extract # 12 for Honolulu, dated (?) , pg. 3. 

(113) Extract #13 for Honolulu, dated ( ?) , pg. 2. 

(114) Extract #14 for Honolulu, dated ( ?), pg. 1. 

B. One (1) Photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a 
copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 12/8/41 (Japanese time). 

Henby C. Clausen 
Lt. Col., JAQD, V. S. Army 
For Armv Pearl Harbor Board. 



top seceet 

[272] War De^pabtment, 

Washington, 3 March 19^5. 
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy : 

Subject : Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor 
Board. 

1. Activities reported: Report is made of my investigation for the Secretary of 
War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, during the 
period 17 February-3 March 1945, as follows: 

a. Army personnel interviewed as leads: 

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C. «^ 

Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I. 

General Robert H. Dunlop, A. G. 

Colonel Edward F. French, S. C. 

Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C. 

Lt. Ann Long, S. C. 

Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2. 

General Thomas North, OPD 

Miss Mary L. Ross, G-2 

Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C. 

Mr. Smith, S. C. 

General Ralph C. Smith, G-2 

b. Navy personnel intervieiced as leads: 

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort 

c. Affidavits obtained: 

Major Anderson 
Colonel Bicknell 
General Dunlop 
Colonel Jensen 
Miss McKenney 
Captain Rochefort 
Miss Ross 
Lt Colonel Rowlett 
General Smith 
[273] d. Conferences additional to foregoing: 
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy 
General Carter W. Clarke, G-2 
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD 
Mrs. Foley, OPD 
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN 

2. Significant features of additional evidence developed: 

a. "Winds" code message: General Short contended and the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board concluded that no information concerning this intelligence was available 
to General Short in the Hawaiian Department. For example. General Short 
stated in a letter to the Secretary of War : "Such information was not made avail- 
able to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islan(ds." But it now 
appears probable that before 7 December 1941, both his (j-2. Colonel Fielder, 
and his Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, received information of the "Winds" 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

code, and that his Assistant G-2 took action for the purpose of intercepting an 
execution message. If it is a fact that General Short did have available in his 
Hawaiian Department the information from the Navy as to intercepts of the 
' Winds" code message, this confirms the impression of General Marshall and 
Admiral Turner. 

b. Destruction by Japanese of codes: General Short also contended that this 
information was not available to him. He attached more importance to this than 
almost any other intelligence. He testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry 
that had he received this information he would not have been led to attach much 
importance to not alarming the civilian xwpulation. In response to a question 
as to whether he would have gone into a different alert if he had received by 
telephone the 7 December 1941 message from General Marshall, he testified : 

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about 
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made 
■much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code ma- 
chines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this 
advantage also : I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving 
that out, the code machine would have been very significant, the destruction 
of the code machine tvould have been very significant to me. I would have 
been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * * 
I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." 
It now appears probable that both General Short's G-2 and his Assistant G-2 
were informed before 7 December 1V>41 of the destruction by the Japanese of 
their secret codes and papers at Washington, London, [27//] Hongkong, 
Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, and his Assistant G-2 saw the Navy Depart- 
ment message which so informed the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It will be re- 
called that this Assistant G-2 reported to Short's staff on the morning of 6 
December 1941 'that the Japanese Consuls were destroying their secret papers. 
He, also, in the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, brought to the attention 
of General Short and his G-2 the fact that the FBI had intercepted a telephone 
message between a Japanese agent in Honolulu and a purported newspaper 
correspondent in Tokyo referring to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, 
weather conditions, "hibiscus" and "poinsettias" in the Hawaiian Islands. This 
information was not given to the War Department. It should be observed that 
the "'Winds'' code was to be implemented by a false weather broadcast as a 
signal for the Japanese Consuls and diplomatic agents to destroy codes and 
papers. Hence, knowledge of the "Winds" code ariTingement, coupled with later 
information that the Japanese were destroying their codes and papers, would 
indicate that the "Winds" code had been implemented. Colonel l^ratton sent 
the 5 December 1941 warning wire to the Hawaiian Department because he had 
received information ot the destruction by the Japanese of their codes. This 
was an inferential notice of implementation of the "Winds" code. Since it now 
appears probable, subject to additional investigation, that Short's G-2 and his 
A.ssistant G-2 knew of the "Winds" message and of the destruction by the 
Japanese of their codes, it follows that there may have been available in the 
Hawaiian Department the same information possessed by the War Department. 

c. Inquiries and Reports on Ships in Pearl Harbor: These were jjerhaps the 
most telling indications of the Japanese intentions. Two, which were very sus- 
picious, dated 2 and 6 December 1941, were intercepted or received by the Army 
Signal Corps at Honolulu and mailed to Washington. The message dated 2 
December 1941 was not received at Washington until 23 December 1941. Trans- 
lations of these were therefore not available in time to be of any use as fore- 
warning to Washington. Inquiry will be made at Honolulu as to all the cir- 
cumstances, and whether anyone in the Hawaiian Department had prior knowl- 
edge of the tenor of these or similar messages. In this connection, I have 
discovered evidence that more than a week before 7 Decend»er 1941 the Navy 
arranged to receive and did receive copies of some conmiercial cables from the 
Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, which tied into the radio intercepts. 
Some were decrypted and translated before 7 December. Others, supposed to 
be the more suspicious ones, were not decrypted and translated until later. 
(Copies of these are supposed to be at Honolulu. Short's Assistant G-2 was 
aware befoi-e 7 December 1941 that the Navy had made arrangements for receiv- 
ing these copies. 

d. 5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department: Colonel Fielder de- 
nied receiving this message. But it now appears probable that it was sent by 
Washington and received in Honolulu on 5 December 1941. The importance of 
this fact is that it was the War Department method of informing the Hawaiian 
Department of the "Magic" messages. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 129 

[275] e. Alarm to civilian population: General Short contended that this 
caution had been urged upon him by the War Department and was one of his 
reasons for his No. 1 alert. It now appears that General Short did not inquire 
of his staff, and ascertain in the experience of those on duty in 1940, as to what 
effect the Herron alert of 1940 had on the civilian population. Had he done so, 
he would have learned that the Herron all-out alert did not materially alarm 
the civilian population. 

f. Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November 1941: General Short testified 
that the War Department had this in Washington when he sent his reply 
to the 27 November 1941 message from General Marshall. It now appears that 
the Standing Operating Procedure was not received in Washington until March 
1942, and hence the War Department cannot be charged with prior knowledge 
thereof. 

3. Miscellaneous items: Several administrative matters pertaining to the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board have been coordinated. 

4. Wyman-RoM activities: Exploration of further leads has been held in abey- 
ance pending completion of Washington matters. 

5. Progress and objectives: I shall develop some very important and promising 
leads in Hawaii and elsewhere when the studies in Washington have been com- 
pleted, which is expected to be within the next two weeks. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 

top secret 

[276] Headquabtees, Army Sebvice Foeces, 

Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
Washington 25, D. C, 11 February 1945. 
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy : 

Subject : Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary 
to Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. Activities reported: During the period 3-17 February 1945, in pursuance of 
directives, I conducted for the Secretary of War investigations at Washington, 
D. C, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as 
follows : 

a. Army personnel interviewed as leads : 

General Carter W. Clarke, G-2 
Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, G-2 
General Charles K. Galley, Jr., OPD 
General Thomas T. Handy, D. C. S. 
General Thomas North, OPD 
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, G-2 
Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C. 
Colonel Eric H. F. Svensson, G-2 
Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2 

b. Navy personnel interviewed as leads : 

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort 

c. AflSdavits obtained: 

Colonel Dusenbury 

Colonel Pettigrew 

Captain Rochefort (being completed) 

d. Conferences: 

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy 
Major Henry A. Correa, lADB 
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD 
Colonel William J. Hughes, Jr., JAGD 
General H. I. Hodges, G. S. C. 
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN 
[277] e. Studies of Navy Court of Inquiry and Army Pearl Harbor Board 
records, reports, and exhibits. 

2. Significant features of additional evidence developed: 

a. Colonel Bratton had testified that he delivered decrypted and translated 
Intercepts to various distributees immediately preceding 7 December 1941. 
Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit that it was he who, almost exclusively, 
delivered the intercepts immediately preceding 7 December 1941. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 148 10 



130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. Colonel Bratton had testified that he wrote the 5 December 1941 message 
from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, requesting that 
Commander Rochefort be contacted regarding a "Winds" broadcast. Colonel 
Dusenbury and Colonel Pettigrew stated in affidavits that this message was 
written by them. 

e. Colonel Bratton testified that the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to 
Hull, called by some witnesses a Japanese declaration of war, intercepted 6 
December 1941, were delivered by him to the usual distributees on the evening 
of 6 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in an affidavit that he was on 
duty and waited that night for the receipt of the parts of this message and that 
when about half of it had come in, Colonel Bratton left for his home. Colonel 
Dusenbury further stated that none of the parts were delivered that night and 
that he, Colonel Dusenbury, delivered them the following morning, 7 December 
1941. 

d. Colonel Bratton testified that the Japanese message to deliver the Japanese 
reply to Hull at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by him between 8 : 30 
and 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941, and that he then called the home of the Chief of 
Staff. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit his impression that this mes- 
sage was received by Colonel Bratton between 9 and 10 a. m., 7 December 1941. 
This confirms the recollection of the Chief of Staff as to when Colonel Bratton 
made the telephone call to his quarters. This latter time element is also sup- 
ported by testimony of Navy witnesses. 

e. Colonel Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, stated he had no recollection 
of receiving the 5 December 1941 message from Washington asking him to com- 
municate with Commander Rochefort regarding the "Winds" message. He 
stated he did not have any knowledge of the "Winds" message. Commander 
Rochefort stated to me, and an affidavit to this effect has been prepared and 
submitted to him for execution, that since the Fall of 1941 he had very close 
liaison with his opposite number, Colonel Fielder ; that he. Commander Roche- 
fort, was monitoring at Hawaii for the implementation of the "Winds" message 
before 7 December 1941 ; that since this was of interest to the Army he did, 
before 7 December 1941, discuss with Colonel Fielder the "Winds" message as 
well as the destruction by the Japanese of their code and cipher machines in 
London and in Washington, and of secret papers in Honolulu, and any other 
important information of that character. 

1278] 3. Miscellaneous items: 

I have coordinated several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board 

Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 6 February 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy 
requested a copy of the record of the Navy Court of Inquiry and an examination 
of the record of the Army Board of Investigation. The Secretary of the Navy 
replied by letter dated 12 February 1945 that the request so far as the Navy Court 
of Inquiry is concerned should be denied because courts of inquiry and other 
investigative bodies are convened for the purpose of informing the convening 
authority or higher authority of facts attending the matter inquired into, and 
furthermore, that the investigation has not been completed. So far as the Army 
Board of Investigation is concerned, the Secretary stated that this is a matter 
over which the Navy Department has no authority. 

4 Wymnn-Rohl activities: 

In conjunction with the foregoing, investigations and conferences have been 
conducted and held by me on phases involving Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. 
These do not pertain to responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but some of 
the persons to be interrogated are in the same locations as those to be questioned 
in connection with the foregoing unexplored leads. The Under Secretary of War 
and The Judge Advocate Genei-al have directed that I conduct the appropriate 
additional investigation, including the development of leads suggested by the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

5. Progress and objectives: 

It is intended to complete the examination of the Navy Board of Inquiry pro- 
ceedings, to interview and confer with such other persons as are available locally, 
and then to gather such information elsewhere as is essential. When concluded, I 
shall correlate, digest, and, interpret the additional facts in relation to the Army 
Pearl Harbor Secret and Top Secret Reports. 

Henry C. Clausen, 
Henry C. Clausen, 

Major, JAGD. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 131 



TOP SECRET 

[2791 EXHIBIT E 

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secbetary 

OF War 

Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board 

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the 
Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of my investiga- 
tion. 

[280] TOP SECREH' 

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES, 

Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
Washington 25, D. C, 14 September 19I[5. 

Memorandum for the Secretary of War. 

Subject : Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

This vpill confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally. 

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified 
as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as top secret 
and consisted of one volume. 

I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained 
by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel 
that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret 
Report require modification. 

In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and one page 16 : 

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our 
potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United 
States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments 
in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete 
disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know 
what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against 
the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts 
as to the enemy's intentions. 

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in Novem- 
ber absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to 
every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to 
give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war. 

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only 
a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian 
Department based upon this information except the 'Do-Don't' message of No- 
vember 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, 
ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive direc' 
tives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3. 

"This was not done. 

"Under the' circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions 
to be taken by field commanders, and [281] this information cannot be 
disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon 
the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to 
the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the 
War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the com- 
petent field commanders. 

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster 
of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were 
available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting 
those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this 
information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War 
Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself 
having selected the right alert. 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either 
to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it." (Pp 1 & 2) 

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 
1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and 
Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of 
the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack." (P 16) 

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I 
have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in the light of Colonel 
Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with 
the new and additional evidence. These revisions inclulde the following: 

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on 
page 2 : 

"Story of the Information as to tlie Japanese Actions and Intentions from Sep- 
tember to December 19^1. The record shows almost daily information as to the 
Japanese plans and intentions during this period. 

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been 
fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese oflfensive military op- 
erations. (R. 86)" 

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the 
proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes 
A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its 
report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows: 

TOP SECRET 

[2821 "On the 24th day of November we learned that November 29, 1941, 
Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations 
of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for 
the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that 
date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds." 

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the 
Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944, 
for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an 
excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examina- 
tion of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain 
Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 
1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. 
This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing 
an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it 
stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things 
are automatically going to happen." 

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian 
Department. 

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony 
of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our minds." 

The Board further found : 

"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' inten- 
tions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. 
(R. 87)" (P2) 

"* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indi- 
cated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. R. 
123-124) • * *" (P 5) 

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell 
to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123-124)" is to the 
testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was 
asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which 
he mentioned in his testimony to Admiral Hart. He stated he could not then 
recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had in- 
formation that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the 
United States and probably against Russia. He gave ns a basis for this informa- 
tion his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was a circular 
message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony 
of Captain Snfford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was 
the so-called .Japanese "Winds Code" message. 

[28S1 Colonel Clau.sen's investigation shows that this Information reached 
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 133 

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified 
before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that 
the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese "Winds Code." He took 
immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further 
testified that his attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on 
the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 
5 December 1941, asking that the G-2 Hawaiian Department, communicate with 
Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. 
This obviously refers to the "Winds Code." Colonel Bicknell further testified 
that he also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert 
L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and iufoi-mation that Commander 
Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also 
monitoring for the execute message. 

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General 
Kendall J. Fielder, G— 2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained 
liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General Fielder 
such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplo- 
matic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the 
Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the 
course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the 
latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" 
intercept. 

The Board found : 

'<« * ♦ War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 
that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the 
Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action." (PP 2 & 3) 

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as 
he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents" which 
he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows : 

"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a con- 
centration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from 
Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine 
activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands." (P 87) 

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 Decem- 
ber 1941. 

[28//] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Lay ton. Captain 
Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Commander Holtwick, of the 
Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short 
was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The 
Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, 
Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelli- 
gence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the 
increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelli- 
gence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercept- 
ing, decrypting and analyzing radio tratfic of the Japanese navy. The Daily 
Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, 
during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable 
Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval 
forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Col. Clausen's 
Report. ) 

The Board found : 

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources 
that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would 
maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)" (P 3) 

This, again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart 
Examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Colonel Bratton, 
as follows : 

"General Russell. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 
1st message, Colonel. 

"Colonel Bratton. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. * * *" 
(P 88) 

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of 
Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e., 
the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code" message and a message from 
Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and 
stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at 
Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated : "I attached little or 
no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming 
since 1936." 

As shown above, the "AVinds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian 
Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that 
Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States. 

[285] The Board stated : 

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to 
war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were 
destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as 
meaning immediate war. (R. 280) * * *" (P 3) 

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy 
sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in 
Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been 
instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from 
the Navy Department, dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows : 

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent 
instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts 
at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy 
most of their codes and cipliers at once and burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents." 

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel 
Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J. 
Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that 
Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in HonoluliT had intercepted a telephone mes- 
sage from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese 
Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also 
shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference 
conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this 
information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was pres- 
ent at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General 
Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his 
codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staif, and gave this 
information to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General 
Short any pertinent information that came to his attention. 

The Board further stated : 

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up : 

'The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, 
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War 
Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was 
being painted over a period of weeks if not months.' (R. 243-244)" (P 3) 

[286] "* * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had 
was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agen- 
cies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary 
of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, 
copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the 
Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 
297)" (P 3) 

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel 
Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, however. Colonel Bratton 
corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified 
in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testi- 
mony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he pi'e- 
viously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the char- 
acter mentioned and wliich were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" be- 
fore the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the 
Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he 
stated that he could not x-ecall with any degree of accuracy what material was 
delivered to whom during the peripd in question, and that there were no records 
to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously 
testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned. 
But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries 
as were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then 
Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel. 

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 135 

revised in accordance with ttie corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Sim- 
ilarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4 : 

"All of this important infoi-mation which was supplied to higher authority 
in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go 
out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occa- 
sional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups 
in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)" 

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence 
must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel 
Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Claii- 
sen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian 
Department before 7 December. 

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the 
effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under 
instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he aslied [287] 
General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that 
General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following this, according to 
the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose 
suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds Code." 

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the inci- 
dent, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could 
quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to 
General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance. 

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general t.vpe of information which, 
according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November 
and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that 
Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the 
deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 
29 November ; and also information available at Washington on 28 November 
In the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advis- 
ing that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the 
"proposal" in toto, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, 
negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be 
called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and suggesting 
that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between 
the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation 
of the Netherland's Indies by the United States and the English which would 
make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese 
envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further 
referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as 
related by Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the 
"Winds Code." 

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. 
However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945, 
analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War 
Department sent to General Short. 

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional 
information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the 
tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings 
of war. 

The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and 
Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel 
Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [288] which is men- 
tioned in his report to the Secretary of War. Once such dispatch from Manila, 
given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth 
prophetically : 

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with 
Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present 
but will act in South." 

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplo- 
matic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute 
message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message. 

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period 
of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Con- 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in 
the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report. 

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic 
out of the Japanese Consulate. 

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment G-2 contained much material gathered from observers, travelers, and 
Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and informa- 
tion mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the 
Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report 
to the Secretary of War. Some are initialed by General Short. 

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 
25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable 
moves of Japan. 

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department 
cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they 
were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his 
cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most com- 
plete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6) 

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, 
"it was well known that relations witli Japan were severely strained and that 
war seemed imminent." 

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific 
intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command simi- 
lar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual 
intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel [289] Clausen that 
this type of information and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most care- 
fully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have in- 
cluded not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders and that 
this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would 
spread the information into too many hands. There has been considerable evi- 
dence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before 
Colonel Clausen, 

". . . Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would 
have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so 
compromised." 

The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Doug- 
las MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department informa- 
tion as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen, 

"Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information 
and advice for the purpose of alerting: the Armv Command in the Philippines on a 
war basis, which was done prior to 7 Decem1)pr 1941." 

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information 
that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however, 
that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department, which are con- 
tained in Top Secret Exhibit "P>" before the Board, there were others which, in 
retrospect and with tlie benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl 
Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and 
the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements 
in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The re- 
quests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more 
frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. T^vo intercepts, which 
were not decrypted and translated until S December, were part of the series 
mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. 
They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, Japa- 
nese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached 
to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel 
Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and 
transmitted to Washington by telet.vpe on fi or 7 December. They were not in the 
code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype 
between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 
6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between re- 
ceipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was 
less than the normal time required of 3.5 days. 

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he 
could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attack target in the event 
of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [290] that the 
Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 137 

shoi'tly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the 
Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traflic of the Japanese Consulate at 
Honolulu. Some of this traflic included the same types of reports as were inter- 
cepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. 
It is not entirely clear just what commercial traliic was decrypted and translated 
by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being 
made, to Toliyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, 
attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu 
were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Jap- 
anese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached, 
and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. 

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at 
pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sadtler 
that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called him 
and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then con- 
ferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investi- 
gation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, 
who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Col- 
onel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall 
having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel 
Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 
December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. 
He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercepts which 
was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned. 

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a 
Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese "Winds 
Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen's investiga- 
tion discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I 
understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by 
testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt. 

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the 
Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or some equiva- 
lent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence Service 
and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila and, in turn, from 
Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the 
British Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete 
file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the 
Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's 
query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the docu- 
mentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report. 

[291] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and Gen- 
eral Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based 
on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and General 
Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also 
testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows : 

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in afiidavits 
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, refer- 
ring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my con- 
ference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the 
comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the aflfidavits 
mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows 
concerning this subject : 

''General Gerow: — 'I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel 
Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely 
a Signal Corps ofiicer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination 
or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy informa- 
tion of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the atten- 
tion of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a 
Signal Corps oflScer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 
7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to 
the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, 
I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible 
that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received 
some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, 
there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Depart- 
ments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's 



138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

meiuoi-y at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.' 

'•General Smith: — 'I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has 
stated. However, since the matter in question was ohviously a difference of 
opinion between the A. C of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, 
both of whom liad direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I 
had any nvsponsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadt- 
ler would have asked' me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly 
since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impos- 
sible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I 
should step out of my rather minor province.' " (P 2 - Affidavit of Colonel 
O. K. Sadtler) 

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board 
meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort mes- 
sage of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [292] of receipt 
of an execute message to the '"Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified 
that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information 
derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their 
codes and important pai^ers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the C-2 
warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, 
Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony Colonel 
Clausen, however, General Fielder stated : 

»* * * I jjave no recollection of having received the War Department radio, 
but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. 
Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close 
liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer : particu- 
larly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or 
particularly important. * * *" 

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on or about 5 December 
he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he 
then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent infor- 
mation and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the 
execute message of the "Winds Code." 

It shoidil be l)orne in mind tliat the execute message to the "Winds Code" was 
to notify the .Tapanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the 
United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representa- 
tives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same 
information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more 
direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investi- 
gation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941. 

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings con- 
cerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo 
to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes : 

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9 : 00 and 10 : 30 
p. m., December 6, as follows : 

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a 
locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General 
Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and 
General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see 
the contents. (R. 307) 

"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the 
message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R. 
239-241.) He stated that [293] General Miles did nothing about it as 
far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles. 

'Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow's executives in 
the War Plans Division. (R. 238) 

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Depart- 
ment for the Secretary of State and did so between 10 : 00 and 10 : 30 p. m. 
(R. 234, 239) ~ 

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had 
urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General 
Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading 
the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none 
by General IMiles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation 
until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12) 

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to 
see that the contents of the 18 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 139 

known in detail to the Wax- Department, completely translated and available in 
plain English, by not later tlian between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 
6 or approximately Honolulu time. Tliis information was taken by the Oflicer 
in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally 
in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff 
to General Eisenhowei-, who was then Secretary to tlie General Staff, and he M'as 
told that tlie message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It 
Was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to 
the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the Wai- Plans Division, each of whom was 
advised of the vital importance of this information tliat showed that the hour had 
struck, and tliat war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock tliat night, this same 
oflBcer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty 
officer. 

"General ISIarshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as 
vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either 
Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows." (P 16) 

These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The 
basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying 
before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony; 
that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of December was to 
the duty oflicer for the Secretary of State ; that the sets for the Secretary of War, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Divi- 
sion, were not delivered the night of 6 December ; that these sets were not given 
the night of G December to General Gerow, General Smith or [29.',] General 
Miles ; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles 
on 6 December ; and that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came 
into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on 
the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliv^er the set to the 
home to the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen 
that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any 
until after 9 : 00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury stated 
Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received. 

On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the 
testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General 
Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and 
General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 Decem- 
ber. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general 
contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home 
of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, 
the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who trans- 
mitted it to General Miles. 

The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton tele- 
phoned General Marshall's quarters at 9 : 00 a. m. the morning of 7 December 
to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages 
directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 Decem- 
ber, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General 
Marshall did not come into his office until 11 : 25 a. m. 

These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of addi- 
tional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before Colonel 
Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which would be 
in the office of the Chief of Staff "between 10 : 30 and 11 : 30 that morning." 
Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morn- 
ing of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Build- 
ing until between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel 
Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December 
in his ofl[ice at about 11 : 00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel 
Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the 
United States at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton 
until "after he arrived that morning, between 9 : 00 and 10 : 00 a. m." 

The Board further found : 

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 
and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, 
December 6 and 7, was \295] clear-cut and definite." (P. 15) 

The evidence does not seem to justify any suQh conclusion. There was not 
received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information 
which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department 
received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the 
Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most 
suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near 
future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other 
information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in ad- 
dition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was informa- 
tion received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular 
posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed 
out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources 
in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be 
delivered at 1 : 00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore 
pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not 
a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time. 

The Board further found : 

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were 
planning to do was known to the United States except the final message in- 
structing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the pre- 
ceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very 
hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor." (P 18) 

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japa- 
nese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the 
fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement. 

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top 
Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has 
since testified was information he should have received. General Short testi- 
fied before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General 
Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by 
the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different 
alert if General Marshall had given him this message by telephone. General 
Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone 
on a different alert : 

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about 
the destruction of the code machines. The other ^natter wouldn't have made 
much of an impression on me." (Underscoring supplied) 

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from 
his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the Japa- 
nese Government held sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to 
destroy certain of its codes and important papers. - 

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Mar- 
shall included in his message which read as follows : 

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code ma- 
chine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this com- 
munication." 
My Conclusion: 

The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based 
upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its 
reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed 
herein. 

Mybon C. Ceamee, 
Myron C. Cramer, 

Major General, 
The Judge Advocate General- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 141 



TOP SECRET 

EXHIBIT F 

Investigation by Lt. Colonex Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, fob the Secbejtary 

OF War 

Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Peakl Harbor Board 

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and commenting 
upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War, 
dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation. 

The previous memorandum mentioned is attached at the end of Exhibit "F." 

top secret 

[297] Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 

Officb; of the Judge Advocate General, 

Washington 25, 14 September 19^5 
Memorandum for the Secretary of War. 
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally. 

Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to 
your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl 
Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course 
of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to 
whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing 
the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires 
m.odification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of 
fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In 
my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional 
data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact, 
however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as 
a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require 
clarification in some respects. 

The "Winds" Message: 

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the 
War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so- 
called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese 
diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that 

" 'In case of emei'gency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)', 
a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the 
Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows : 
'(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: 

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND BAIN) 
'(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: 

KIITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY) 
'(3) Japan-British relations : 

NISHINO KAZB HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)' " 

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed. 

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal 
to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941. 
However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [298] Harbor Board left 
in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever 
received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army 
codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" message indi- 
cating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was 
not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of the testimony of Captain Saf- 
ford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. p. 25). 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that 
an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese 
relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United_ States was ever received 
by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, 
Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in 
November and December 1941, stated: 

"I did not see any ext>cute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know 
there was no shch execute message received in the War Department." (Affid., 
Col. Harold Doud) 

.Captain Edwin T. Lay ton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testi- 
fied no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. 
Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Roche- 
fort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of 
Comdr. J. S. Holtwick) 

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Signal CoTps, in charge of Signal Intelligence 
Service at the time, stated: 

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either 
before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent." 
(Affid., Col. Kex W. Minckler) 

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with repre- 
sentatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in the Navy was Captain 
L. P. SafEord. 

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time, did not recall 
meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which 
meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes' 
telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) 
General Miles stated : "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic 
execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak 
of hostilities." (Affld., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated 
that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the 
activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated 
there were several [299] messages intercepted which were thought at 
first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He 
thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 
1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, 
p. 2) 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers 
in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 1941, stated that when 
he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D., Top 
Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral 
Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that 
according to standard practice, it would be transmitted withoiit delay to G— 2 
(Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel 
Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and Colonel Bratton about 
Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning 
as follows : 

"C. G-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with 
Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repeti- 
tion of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall." 

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and 
he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According to 
his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell 
Smitli about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted 
draft but stated he did suggest that a' warning message be sent the overseas 
connnanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top 
Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen 
(Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith 
had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such 
recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that 
Colonel Sadtler was " purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not con- 
cerned with the dissemination and interpretation of 'INIagic' " messages (Affid., 
Gen. Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise had no recollection of Colonel 
Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was 
not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the 
"Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible for 
Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. 
Bedell Smith) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 143 

[300] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that 
other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a "false 
alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the "Winds Code" and, so far 
as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He 
at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative^ of G-2 to send 
a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 3) 

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before 
Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter, denied the 
receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message. 

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, 
recalled a meeting 5 December 19 11 with General Miles and Colonel Sadtler at 
which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had received from Admiral 
Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, 
as there had been several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as 
he knew, Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional 
information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of 
Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith. Colonel Bratton 
never brought Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff. 
(Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2) 

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever 
see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code." As to the 
testimony of Captain Safford of tlie Navy to the effect that two copies of such a 
message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but 
six copies of any such message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, 
the inference being that no copies at ali were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941, 
representatives of the Navy liad discussed with him several "false alarms" relative 
to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with 
him the message supposed to have been sent to the Array according to Captain 
Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton) 

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for 
the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testi- 
fied that on receipt of the original "Winds" message, [301] he directed 
the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating 
message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message 
was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft) 

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testi- 
mony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from Admiral 
Noyes has already been discussed (See affidavits. Gen. Gerow, p. 2 ; Gen. W. Bedell 
Smith, p. 3). 

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief, 
Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the 
source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic") messages concerning Japan 
was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He in- 
quired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message 
had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall receiving any such in- 
formation from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would 
have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" 
message prior to 7 December 1941 (Alfid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts). 

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he 
had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit 
B (see my first memorandum of 2.5 November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the 
"Winds Code" nor any activating or implementing message. He believed he had 
seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas 
MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testi- 
fied to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland) Major General 
C. A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had 
never seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments 
of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to his knowledge 
were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. 
C. A. Willoughby) 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that imme- 
diately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to 
the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War 
Department, Washington, D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, 
Signal Corps, War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

activating "Winds" message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank 
B. Rowlett.) 

[302] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the 
testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the "Winds" message, discussed by 
me in my memorandum dated 25 November 1944, is that the most diligent search 
fails to reveal that any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received 
by the War Department. In this connection. General Marshall's testimony will 
be recalled, "I find that no ollicer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton 
that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received by the Navy." 
(Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, p. 38) 

The Rochefort Message: 

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony 
that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo 
to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, 
he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after 
discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas command- 
ers. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given and Gen- 
eral Miles stated he was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, how- 
ever, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed 
it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCoUum stated that as 
Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth 
Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listen- 
ing for the second or implementing message, a radiogram be sent to General 
Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton 
thereupon drafted a radiogram, signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, 
reading as follows : 

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth 
Naval Di-strict regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather" 

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or 
in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message. 
However, realizing its importance. Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investiga- 
tion examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant 
Gf-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. 
General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radio- 
gram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2) 

As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, 
independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified : 

[303] "My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of 
their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage 
of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had 
to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given 
to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the 
Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known 
that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed Imminent, 
but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for 
Hawaii." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2) 

General Fielder further said : 

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies 
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific 
Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and 
assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy 
agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for infor- 
mation obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been 
given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to 
me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some 
different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian 
Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend 
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft bat- 
teries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter 
being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy 
constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to 
December 7, 1941. the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Haley, was in liaison 
with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Com- 
bat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding 
General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the 
war started." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8, p. 2) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 145 

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese 
messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included the "Winds" mes- 
sage (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Aflad., Brig. Gen. 
Fielder, par. 11, p. 3). 

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact 
Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close [SOJf] 

liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the 
latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During 
the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the 
Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to 
have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the 
execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). 
His attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 
he saw on General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General 
Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General 
Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel 
Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the 
pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring 
for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L. 
Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu. 

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelli- 
gence Branch, Gr-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort 
message, contains heresay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything 
in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds" mes- 
sage), the source of which was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. 
His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Com- 
mander Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for inter- 
cepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would 
receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 Decem- 
ber merely as a precautionary, measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew) 

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not 
mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the 
Navy had guardedly advised him of this message or its equivalent prior to 7 
December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the 
Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a 
break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would 
inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this informa- 
tion on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal. (Affid., 
Robert L. Shivers) 

Mr. Shivers testified: 

"Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he 
disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 
7 December." (Affid., Robert L. Shivers) 

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell. 

[305] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affi- 
davit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied 
that he received it. General Fielder stated : 

"I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who 
according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any 
of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming 
from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting 
the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Roche- 
fort did not give it to me direct." (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 8) 

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the 
"Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the 
receipt of information other than that he admitted he received. 

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that 
the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either 
through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence 
Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short re- 
ceived equivalent information will now be considered. 

Other Information Possessed by General Short: 

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, 
testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to 
the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to 
Whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said : 

79716 — 46— Ex. 148 11 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about 
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made much 
of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, 
you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also : 
I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the de- 
strtictian of the code machine icould have been very significant to me. I would 
have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * * 
I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." (Italics 
supplied) 

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equiva- 
lent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum 
of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel 
Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the 
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was [306] "destroying its codes and burn- 
ing its papers," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. 
This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's 
staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by 
General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 
10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short 
(Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19) . 

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the 
FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December 
1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him, 
asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in 
Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI 
intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and 
a Japanese in Honolulu, durin.g which the cook stated that the Consul Genez*al 
was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave 
this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise tele- 
graphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
"Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important 
papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November 
1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotia- 
tions between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the 
alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this informa- 
tion to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already re- 
ceived similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., 
Robert L. Shivers) 

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by 
the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by 
Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder 
testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affid., 
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3) 

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy 
sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representa- 
tives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This 
apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850. dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval 
District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows : 

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy 
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confiden- 
tial and secret documents." (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183) 

rS07] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, 
p. 2) 

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and 
told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their 
important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2) 

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent informa- 
tion which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of such papers had a 
very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen 
somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to 
the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. .30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tran- 
script, p. 8084-3685) Colonel Bicknell also fpstified further relative to giving 
General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 147 

on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11). Their 
reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell : 

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 
'intelligence conscious' and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, 
and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short 
and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about 
five minutes. 

"Following 7 December 1941, 1 met General Short while waiting to testify before 
the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me 
words to the effect, 'Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens 
you were right and I was wrong.' " (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3) 

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl 
Harbor Day by General, Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three, 
of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate 
in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however, 
I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memo- 
randum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and 
Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying 
its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not 
mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burn- 
ing and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean 
codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. 
Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his sttaement that he 
evaluated tihe Dr. Mori message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the 
light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Con- 
suls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testi- 
mony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the 
Jap Consul was [308] burning his "codes and papers." (Affid., Brig. Gen. 
Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3) 

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the 
information that the Japanese Consul Genera] in Honolulu was destroying his 
codes, as distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his 
secret papers and not some but all such papers at that .iuncture of world af- 
fairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had 
adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-American situation. While it may 
be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers," 
of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are 
quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact 
remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the 
destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by 
the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme sig- 
nificance. 

The Manila Warning Message: 

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. 
Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies & Co., Honolulu, 
one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Com- 
pany, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member 
by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British 
Government as a secret agent in INIanila. The cablegram received by the Davies 
Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows : 

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following develop- 
ments in Indo-China: 

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways. 

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and 
considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm). 

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Wash- 
ington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here. 

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hos- 
tilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack 
Russia at present but will act in South. 

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence 

Honolulu." 

[309] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of 

Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable volume of orders for 

delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and 
Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of 
Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit) 

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover 
activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul 
in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson 
arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. 
Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 
1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2- 
of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities. 

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cable- 
gram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained 
in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell) 

In addition to the cablegram above referred to. Colonel Bicknell stated he 
obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson, 
which he brought to the attention of General Short, in one form or another. 
(Amend, affid.. Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this information is attached 
to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items 
struck a responsive chard in his memory, but he could not remember if they were 
brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information 
was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. 
Fielder, p. 3) 

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly 
important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila. 
The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel 
Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated : 

"Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, with- 
out any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting betweeni 
Bangkok and Singapore." 

A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain 
Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short 
"in one form or another." (Amend, affid.. Col. George W. Bicknell) 

[310] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell: 

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel 
Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, 
to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain 
Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be 
discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing 
of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports 
found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which 
he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. Geoi-ge W. Bick- 
nell) 

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN: 

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor 
disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel 
Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief 
of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. 
Haley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten 
days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel 
Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, 
which included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show a 
general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army pro- 
posed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands 
in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about 
the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with 
Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. 
(Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USN) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts 
with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him over the 
entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. Pie told Captain Layton and Colonel 
Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. This was in 
October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He also reported this to 
General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 149 

Comment on Information Which Beached Oeneral Short: 

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as 
to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional informa- 
tion possessed by the War Department whicli was not sent him, I said: 

"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, 
Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that 
there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations." 
(P. 30) 

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortiiied me in my conclusions above 
stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject 
''Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on 
this subject. 

[311] Short's SOP Against Attack: 

In my memorandum of 2.5 November 1944, I stated : 

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General 
Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert 
No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 
2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation 
of field positions as in Alert No. 1 ; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against 
sabotage and uprisings within the Islands 'with no particular threat from with- 
out.' It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts 
of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in para- 
graph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative 
draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, SJiort expressly recognized the necessity 
for preparation for 'a surprise hostile attack.' " (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics 
supplied) 

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the 
radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour 
ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with 
no threat from without." Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much 
of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he 
sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with 
the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of 
5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that 
time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against 
sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the 
War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabo- 
tage, be brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his 
SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431) 

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short 
transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around 
that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War 
Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C, was 
specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of 
receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files 
of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, 
and made specific inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. 
His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department 
until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to 
the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clar- 
ence G. Jensen) 

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the Hth Part of the Japanese 
Intercept of 6-7 December 1941: 

[312] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you 
of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the 
above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place. 

Conclusion: 

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative 
to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, General Gerow 
and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

investigation I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's investigation which leads me 
to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum 
of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with 

the present memorandum. 

Myron C. Cramer, 
Mybon C. Cramer, 
Major General 
The Judge Advocate Oeneral. 

1 IncI 

Copy memo from TJAG 
to S/W, "Top Secret 
Report, Army Pearl 
Harbor Board." 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 151 



ISm EXHIBIT G 

Investigation bt Lt. Colonel Henky C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secbetaky 

OF War 

Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board 

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War dated 25 

November 1944 

top secret 

[314] Memorandum for the Secretary of War : 

Subject : Army Pearl Harbor Board Report. 

You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have 
examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The 
pi-esent memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to 
the conduct of Colonel Tlieodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in 
the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944. 

Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings: 

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. 
As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of 
War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as 
amended and supplemented, in order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed 
in Public Law 389, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed 
judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in 
their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were like- 
wise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and 
submit information. 

Board's Conclusions in Oeneral: 

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise 
to all concerned : the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, which caught tlie defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and 
to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, 
the Board states, (a) to the failure of General Short adequately to alert his 
command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of 
the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert ; and 
(c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United 
States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the 
inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these gen- 
eral conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief 
of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297- 
300). The Board makes no recommendations. 

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report is to take 
up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions 
later. 
[3^5] Board's Conclusion As to General Short: 

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed 
in his duties in the following particulars : 

"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a 
war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information 
which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was suflBcient to warn him 
of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and 
that hostilities might be momentarily exi)ected. This required that he guard 
against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it 
might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst foiin of 
attack that the enemy might launch. 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreemeut with the Admiral command- 
ing the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Nayal District for 
implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in exist- 
ence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods 
by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement 
of the responsible commanders. 

"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnais- 
sance being conducted by the Navy. 

"(d) To replace inefficient staff oflacers." (Rep. 300) 

Short's Defences: 

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the po- 
sition of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked : it is a question of the 
validity of his defenses. 

Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed 
"Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which 
his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from with- 
out." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) He did this without con- 
sulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the 
Navy. (Tr., Short 262, 395) 

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only 
from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297, 4442) 

[316] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 No- 
vember wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr., 
Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) His failure to provide for an outside threat 
was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the 
attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the 
ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and 
military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he 
did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this 
regard "I was wrong." (Tr., Short 4440) 

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an 
outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 
2618, 2655 ; Farthing 838-839 ; Gerow 4274 ; Hayes 268 ; Herron 238 ; King 2700 ; 
Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throck- 
morton 1395-1396; Wells 2731 ; Wilson 13S0-1381) 

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the 
Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample 
time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55 ; Tr., 299, 300, 451, 
452; cf. Kimmel 1769) ; (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 
27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage 
and the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him addi- 
tional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 306) ; (3) 
that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with 
training (Ex. 1, p. 10), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the 
civilian population (Ex. 1, p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, 
and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; 
Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57) 

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the where- 
abouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him 
for his failure to take precautions again.st an outside threat. In the same 
way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt tlie necessary alert against 
an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or disclosure of possible intent, or 
possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his train- 
ing program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadow- 
ing danger of a possible air attack. 

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient informa- 
tion as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what informa- 
tion he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278- 
281, 291, 4427) 

The Board in its conclusion stated : 

"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was 
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the 
Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected." (Rep. 
300) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 153 

[317] General Short took command 7 Febi-uary 1941. That very day the 
Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the 
Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated : 

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities 
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl 
Harbor." (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied) 

Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" 
warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to 
withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *." The letter proceeded : 

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- 
sidered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, 
(4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire." (Roberts 
Report, p. 5) 

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satis- 
factory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army 
consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy 
defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts 
Report, p. 5) Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing 
Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369) 

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter 
containing the following statement: 

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first six Jiours of knoitm hostilities, thereafter the existing 
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk 
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, 
constitute the real perils of the situation, frankly, I do not see any landing 
threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority." (Tr., Marshall 
17) (Italics supplied) 

On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying: 

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian De- 
partment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satis- 
factory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of 
first priority." (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied) 

[S18] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation 
at length and stating : 

"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability 
of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack." (Tr., Marshall 21) (Italics 
supplied) 

Short further stated : 

"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning 
that would exist on the mainland." (Tr., Marshall 24) 

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent 
General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark : 

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air 
force and the anti-aircraft defense." (Tr., Marshall 27) (Italics supplied) 

General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job." 
(Tr., Marshall 27) 

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of 
the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had deter- 
mined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against 
Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely 
ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan 
to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese 
shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being 
requisitioned. (Tr., Marsliall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055) 

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack. Short sent General 
Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts. Alert No. 
1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions ; Alert No. 2 being 
applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field 
positions as in Alert No. 1 ; and Alert No. 8 being a defense against sabotage 
and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." 
It will be noted that these alerts are in inver.se order to the actual alerts of the 
final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 
of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of 
the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for prep- 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

aration for "a surprise hostile attack.'' (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics 
supplied) 

[319] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War De- 
pai'tment that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War 
Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, 
and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation be- 
tween his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, 
that all such data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington 
and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to 
avoid duplication of effort. (Tr.. Bratton D. 292-293) 

On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese 
Cabinet resignation created a grave situation, that the new cabinet would probably 
be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly pos- 
sible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the 
present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack those two 
powers. The radio concluded : 

"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such 
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute 
provocative action against Japan." (Tr., Short 279) 
Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278) 

Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to 
Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055) 

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the 
Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan 
would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which 
might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an 
unparalled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that 
probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the 
Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a 
simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise 
her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated 
that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers 

<<* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan con- 
siders war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against 
Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval 
program is completed." (Tr. 3688) 

[320] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short : 

"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese. situation for your 
information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained 
but no. repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems im&inent." 
(Tr., Short 412^13, Main 3307, Gerow 42.56, 4264) 

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 
October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation 
since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of 
the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by tlie fall of the Japanese Cabinet, 
that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the 
United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It 
predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her 
potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter 
part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur 
before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694) 

On 5 November, the War Department Gr-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head 
of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that 

"* * * "War with the United States would best begin in December or in 
February. * * * rpj^g ^^^^ cabinet would likely start war within sixty 
days. * * *" (Tr., Bratton D. 289-291) 

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his 
Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that 

"* * * from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii ' 
it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November 
or, if not, then not until spring." (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440) 

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, testified he 
believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force 
and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, ves- 
sels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came 
from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 155 

Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the 
Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had 
been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Lay ton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041) 

[321] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacitic Fleet, that. 

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with 
Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and 
movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a sur- 
prise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philip- 
pines of Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and con- 
curs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) 
inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary 
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. 
Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch." (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 
1503-C) 

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his 
estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with 
Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059) Short said, "I do not think I ever got the 
message. * * * j might have seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten 
about it." (Tr., Short 414) 

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short : 

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special 
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while simultane- 
ously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and 
number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and navals vessels including 
submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are 
fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (Tr., Gerow 4259) 

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which 
arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows : 

"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be ^terminated to all practical pur- 
poses with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might 
come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hos- 
tile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be 
avoided. United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy 
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that 
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are di- 
rected to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem neces- 
sary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the 
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities 
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to 
Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum es- 
sential officers." (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281) 

[322] This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed 
Short's G-2 as follows : 

■ "Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears 
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. 
Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may 
begin." (Tr., Gerow 4260) (Italics supplied) 

The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy 
Department, reading as follows : 

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number 
and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates 
an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula 
or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory 
to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 40X. Inform District and Army 
authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spanavo 
infoi-m|ed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take ap- 
propriate measures against sabotage." (Tr., Gerow 4262) 

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469) 

The following day, 28 ISiovember, The Adjutant General sent Short a long 
radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken 
immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 
293, Scanlon 4176) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against 
sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

November. (Tr., Short 422) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the 
various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage 
(Tr., Short 294-296) 

[323] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, 
dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra 
Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fort- 
nightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, 
which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly 
that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval 
and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769^1770) An FBI or War 
Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes 
and secret papers was given to Short's Gr-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., 
Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that 
Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning 
secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) There were two Navy messages on 
4 December 1941, the first an information copy to Kimmel of aklvice to certain 
naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1614), the 
second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event 
of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safiord C. 187) 
Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation 
naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy 
confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C 189, Bloch 1514) 

In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's Gr-2 
on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval crypto 
graphic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broacasts from Toky< 
"that you must obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This 
had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully 
later. (Tr., Bratton B. 62, D. 283) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff 
advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning 
papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413) 
Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. 
(Tr., Fielder 2986) 

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military 
Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Ha- 
waiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had 
ordered the execution of Plan A-2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese 
naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507) Lieutenant 
Robert H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Lega- 
tion, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rain- 
bow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512) The message in question was supposed to be 
relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509) The record does not show 
whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code 
had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510) Colonel Merle-Smith, 
had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order 
that there should be no delay. 

[32^] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, 
informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversa- 
tion between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo 
who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and 
"poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military 
significance" as Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell 
testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416) 

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would 
be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises 
against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the 
Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of 
which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability 
of "air surprise." (Tr., Short 387-388) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agree- 
ment (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state: 

"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of at- 
tack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * * 

"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be deliv- 
ered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that 
it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow 
to start * * *." 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 157 

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise 
air attack. (Tr., Short 388) 

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff np to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., 
Hayes 242) testified that he. General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral 
Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable 
enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in 
Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 
267-268) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 
1929), testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed 
"many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1061-1963) Short had at least one air 
defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he 
conducted an air raid drill as late as 20 November 1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727) 

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him 
to imdertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote 
that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full 
responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance "* * *." (Tr., Short 
4442) 

[325] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington 
did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in 
mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these 
messages. 

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and 
that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against 
Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr. 279-281) and that when the 27 November 
message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that 
differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 261) He likewise interpreted the 27 
November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm 
the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio 
to him of 28 November. ( Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54 ; Tr., 293-294) As Short testified : 

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that 
there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *." (Tr., Short 437) 

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War 
Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for 
defense. The planes arrived in this condition during the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, 
p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471) 

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Wash- 
ington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on 
his part. Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., 
Short 453) 

Tlie Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General 
Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300) 

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as 
confiicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared 
for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This 
precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was 
adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary 
outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility 
of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and 
where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set 
forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, 
namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruc- 
tion to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows : 

[326] "* * * This policy should not, repeat not be construed as restrict- 
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defenses. * * *" 
(Tr., Short 280^281) 

Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have 
been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert 
against threats both from within and from without. . 

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." 
This reads: 

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Short, 
Ex. 1, p. 16;Tr. 286) 

As previously pointed out. Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes 
after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting 
the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed 
to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities 
might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962) 
Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that 
he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report 
contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall." 

He testified : 

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there 
was going to be anything more than sabotage ; and, as I have explained, we had 
a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went 
into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the re- 
quirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me 
to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I re- 
ported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or 
too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it." (Tr., 
Short 437) 

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison 
with the Navy" meant, he replied : 

"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the 
Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing. 

"General Gruneet. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to 
carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? 

[327] "General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent 
that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agree- 
ment which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." (Tr., Short 
380) 

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency 
and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated : 

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. . . . Execute an appropriate 
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. 
Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the 
War Department. . . ." (Tr., Gerow 4262) 
The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512) 

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. 
(Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. 
(Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department 
was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile 
action jwssible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbi'eak of hostilities 
the tajiks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain 
to Japan. The Implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of recon- 
naissance refers to paragraph 18 (i) of the Plan which provides that the Navy 
shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr., Kimmel 1745) 

Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy 
responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380, 383, 393-394, 
4443-4444) because it only becomes a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint 
Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put 
it into effect even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676. Short 4437, 4441) 

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified : 

"... A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message 
of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division 
to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat 
as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint 
Coastal Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval 
District." (Tr., Gerow, 4283-4284) 

[328] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with 
the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that 

"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures 
in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic 
Plan. . . ." (Tr., Gerow 4289) 

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only 
that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures 
were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the 
Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the 
Plan provides : 

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to 
M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon 
by local commanders." (Tr., Bellinger 1584) 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 159 

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Di- 
vision should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief 
report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that 
he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military 
commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that re- 
sponsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 
27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which 
intervened fi'om 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore 
quoted, which called for his re-examination of his decision. 

Reconnaissance ; Means Available: 

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his 
action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiving the message in 
question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only 
from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis. 
(Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the 
most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. 
The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such 
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for 
twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian De- 
partment did not have sufficient aircraft for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is 
clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour 
operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. 
(Tr.. Short 470) 

[329] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance recon- 
naissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 2S4, 385), but 
he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., 
Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like 
way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, 
p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to 
the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for train- 
ing purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 3.o9- 
360, 384; Bloch 1527; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 1725; Kimmel 1773, 1794r-1796; 
1802; McMorris 2885 ; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16) 

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and 
could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted 
to Washington, * * * jt ^^s clearly stated that we had to know the time 
of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an 
effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few 
days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * • *." 
(Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for 
naval reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel stated : 

"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against 
aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from 
Oahu, around a 360 degi-ee arc, if you want a full coverage, and this mil take 
about 84 planes, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * *" (Tr., 
Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied) 

How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears 
that the Navy had 81 patrol planes : 

"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as 
might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army 
could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in 
the fleet was 81, all told. Of these approximately between 50 and 60 were in the 
Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * and 
they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific 
Fleet * * *." (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied) 

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, 
Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such recon- 
naissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494) 

[S30] According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were 
needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees." (Tr., 
Martin 1872) 

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, 
with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought 
the total of heavy bombardment to 180." (Tr., Martin 1873) 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 
180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short testified that he 
believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting 
reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385 ; cf. Roberts 
Report, p. 16), and that the ta.sk force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles 
wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses 
would have been needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 
374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 
1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 
1598, 1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of those could have been used for re- 
connaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the 
then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-20's, and 54 
B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, 
but as General Martin says, 

"* * * They could be used for reconnaissance, but * * * were always 
recognized as not being a. combat ship." (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied) 

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance 
a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress. 

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes 
in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes 
were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing 
repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that 
a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could 
have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel 
and Short that the number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for re- 
connaissance must be taken with some qualifications. 

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, 
D. 12) : 

[331] "Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan be- 
came effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating 
from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no 
distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. 
The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the 
island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes 
conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, 
constituted but small areas of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a 
radius of 700 miles. 

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded 
a measure of security against a surprise air attack. 

"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, 
but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War 
and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnais- 
sance, if any, being conducted by the Navy." 

Information Not Received By Short; In General: 

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important informa- 
tion prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him 
and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under 
these circumstances, where vital infoi'mation cannot be disclosed by the War 
Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department 
to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to those commanders. (Top 
Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present 
case. 

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the 
Roberts Report shows, the Vv^ar Department possessed no information definitely 
pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date 
of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper 
stories. Indeed, aside from the Top Secret information which will now be con- 
sidered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short 
said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, 
(Tr., Short 499^50), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, 
there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not 
transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with 
having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short 
received important information from his Gr-2 of which the War Department was 
not informed. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 161 

[S32] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that 
it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis refer- 
ences to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate 
that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions 
or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses 
is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus 
received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out 
of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from 
day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts 
are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian 
Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the 
War Department was that it had possession of information which indicated war 
at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclu- 
sively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top 
Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that 
the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and 
elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and 
confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, 
and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the 
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning 
its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant 
war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel 
Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War 
Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed 
of his own G-2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told 
Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr., 
Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was 
given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii 
had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents 
in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according 
to Short's Gr-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton 
D. 292-293) 

The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top 
Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally 
between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order 
to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary 
briefly to recite the contents of thes.e various messages : 

24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting re^ 
ports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various 
subdivisions for that purjwse. 

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to 
Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner ; Turner suggesting 
Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradu- 
ally withdraw Jap troops from China. 

[333] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October, Toyoda, Foreign 
Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. 
might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-Power 
agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the 
Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the 
above. 

22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. 

Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved. 

5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost 

secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging 

renewed effort. 

14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating 
that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and 
American power in China. 

15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Hono- 
lulu stating: 

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week." 

16 November, translated 17 November, Tokyo to Washington. Referring 
to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations 
with the U. S. 

79716— 46— Ex. 148-^12 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bring- 
ing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of 
eight destroyers entering harbor. 

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises 
to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be 
secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off." 

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving 
three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap- 
U. S. -Russian-British relations should become dangerous. 

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends 
time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is 
absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen." 

[3341 26 November, translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura 
and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering 
"the proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations 
will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. 
"Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of 
present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and U. S. 
but would be followed by U. S. and English military occupations of Nether- 
lands Indies, which would make war inevitable. 

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating 
"the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too 
long." Contains code for future telephone conversations. 

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and 
Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no 
progress. 

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great 
danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon Japan 
and suggesting plan to avoid this. 

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating 
that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a 
humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations" ; 
.therefore answer will will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after 
which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to 
give impression negotiations are broken off. 

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have 
been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will 
you also report even when there are no movements." 

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instruct- 
ing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach. 

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's 
adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting 
proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and 
Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others, 
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for nego- 
tiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has 
decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." 

[335] 30 November, translated 1 December, Tokyo to Berlin. 
Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured — broken" and 
to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments ; that England 
and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to 
move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by Japan, 
that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that 
"the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone 
dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the 
most absolute secrecy." 

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between 
Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out 
negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt. 

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing de- 
struction of code machine and to confirm this by cable. 

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in 
deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly sus- 
picious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note 
will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested, but in 
Washington only. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 163 

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising 
when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for 
that purpose. 

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising 
continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders then 
those lower down. 

1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that 
it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British 
and American Consular rights would not be recognized. 

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting 
conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein 
Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and 
expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 
26th. Japs convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement 
which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American 
proposals. 

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly 
Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and 
destroy all secret documents. 

[336] 8 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. 
Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great 
Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty. 

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain 
members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated. 

5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruc- 
tion of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request 
delay in destruction of one code machine. 

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance 
notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare 
to present it when directed. 

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating 
that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet 
Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap- 
American war. 

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. 
Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan 
to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, 
also all secret documents. 

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 

6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a 

British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break 

out on the 7th." 

The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail 

later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States 

Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, 

thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth 

part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B" ; Tr., Safford C. 154) The 

Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and 

the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the 

negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same 

day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this 

note to the United States at 1 :00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

[337] The Winds Message: 

The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, inter- 
cepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the 
effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" 
a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily 
short-wave news broadcasts as follows : 

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: 

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN) 
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: 

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY) 
"(3) Japan-British relations : 

NISHINO KAZE KARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)" 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Ex- 
hibit "B", 19 Nov., S. I. S. 25432 ; Tr., Marshall A. 35 ; Sadtler D. 250 ; Safford C. 
125-126) 

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 
November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25432) The Army, 
Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced 
a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, 
Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge 
of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, 
Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan 
and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General 
Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing 
Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was. General Miles stated : 
"Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel 
Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no 
time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time 
but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to 
keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253) Colonel Sadtler then advised 
General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations 
including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have 
had pletty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed 
Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, 
of the message and that be had talked to G--2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith 
did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254) 

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message 
apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel 
Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes 
was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. 
(Tr., Sadtler D. 252) According to [53S] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 
ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see 
also Marshall A. 36-38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel 
Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertainted the exact meaning of the Navy 
activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry 
of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On 
this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated : 
"I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that 
any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations 
would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39) 
It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted 
by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall 
A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel 
Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great 
Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252) Apparently, therefore, the source of the 
activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy. 

The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, 
head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December 
the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieu- 
tenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of 
it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message 
was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain 
Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. 
(Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to 
the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department 
Gr-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army 
Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr., 
Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found 
in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. 
The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department 
and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr., Saffdrd 
C. 133, 13&-138, 172) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that 
this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford O. 136-138) ; the same is true as to its 
getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138) 

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty inter- 
cepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession 
of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr., Safford C. 139-140, 152) Whether these 
include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 165 

Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present r^ord. 
Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he 
suhmitted S. I. S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the( 
Japanese reply at 1 : OO p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it 
saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly 
a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167) 

[339] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating mes- 
sage with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he 
became worried and teleplioned Commander McCollum and asked him whether 
Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. 
McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having 
sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of 
the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been 
instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated 
he also arranged for four additional messages to be sent out to various naval 
attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., 
Saft'ord C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same 
effect was also sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information 
copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford 
C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford O. 188-190) 

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a 
statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval 
authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." 
(Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by 
Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of vari- 
ous witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, 
in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford 
C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document. 
General Russell stated : 

"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that: 

'On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warn- 
ing message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, 
summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Mes- 
sage", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.' 

"Now, this is on the 4th day of December : 

'Admiral Wilkinson approved this message' — 

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely, 

— 'and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the 
message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p. m., 
Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What 
do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult 
to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, 
"I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man." 

and so forth." (Tr., Russel A. 33-34) 

[340] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral 
Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr., 
Gibson D. 276-277) 

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message trans- 
lated 4 December, ffom Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes 
and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and Gen- 
eral Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated 
sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General 
Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt 
that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, con- 
tinued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department 
where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that 
further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Roche- 
fort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for 
the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their diflSculty 
a wire be sent to the Army Gr-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., 
Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK 
this message which was sent 5 December to Short's Gr-2 and read as follows: 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, 
has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are men- 
tioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283) 

In addition to the "Winds" message, the slieaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top 
Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 
19 November 1941, reading as follows : 

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the follow- 
ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts : 

"(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations 

'HJGASHr 

"(2) Japan Russia relations 

'KIT A' 

"(3) Japan British relations; (including Tliai, Malaya, and NEI) 'NISHF " 
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392) 

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to 
whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. 
(Tr., mil Bratton B. 60-71; Salford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See 
also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This 
conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan 
might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized 
this. (Tr., Short 456-457 ; see also Stimson 4061) 

There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher oflScers in the War 
Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or 
the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single 
code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic rela- 
tions became dangerous, (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392) 

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit "B", a sheaf 
of forty-seven messages, stated : 

"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to 
the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. . . . The oflBcials 
to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division." (Tr., Brat- 
ton D. 297) 

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any 
one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. 
Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any 
showing of the form in which they received them. Sucli general testimony as 
that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted — relying, as it apparently does, entirely 
on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions — cannot be re- 
garded as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge 
of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a 
specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of 
having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211) 

Discussion of Foregoing Information: 

It is obvious that those Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration 
in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was 
specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time 
and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, how- 
ever, are very pointed ; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 
October, from Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor 
and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose ; the radio of 15 
November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, requesting that the 
"ships in harbor" [3^2] report be made twice a week in view of the 
critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December, 
from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in "Pearl 
Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering tlie harbor; the radio 
of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a 
"ships in harbor" report even whene there were no movements. The above 
appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this 
inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an imimag- 
inative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves 
advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on 
ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, tlie radio of 5 
November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting of 25 
November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November, 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 167 

translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; 
the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 
25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically 
going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which 
was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early 
attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Mar- , 
shall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Mar- 
shall A, 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department wit- 
nesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United 
States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated 
the same day ; 2 December, translated 3 December ; 5 December, translated 6 
December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, and secret papers. 
There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These 
messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been 
warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. 
Whether, had General Short received these mesages, he would have altered his 
view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message 
clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely, the radio of 2 December 
from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there 
were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there 
were provided with anti-mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 
December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ey "B", S. I. S. 
27065) 

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of 
the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there 
is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 
that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25350 instructing the Jap Ambas- 
sadors to present the Japanese reply at 1 : 00 p. m., he sent along a [3^3] 
note stating "This means a sunrise attack at Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford 
of C. 167). Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy respon- 
sibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department. 

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available 
in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence 
sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, 
along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might 
have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl 
Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to 
make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the 
light of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance which 
was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that sub- 
stantially all the definite information received as to Jap naval movements 
pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia. 

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred 
to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in 
operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjectui'e. The fact that 
Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that 
the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers 
(which meant war to Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what 
Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he 
did not get. 

As'I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington 
than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible 
commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make 
preparations. To the same effect was the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., 
Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton 
D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 2.53), General Miles (Tr., Miles 
127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-2.54; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., 
Marshall A. 7-8, 14 ; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277 ; 
Rus.sell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep. 
pp. 18-21) 

Comment on Short's Defenses: 

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no 
escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with 
the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were 
threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form 
of attack which he could expect was a surprise air attack, he cannot now 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S-}4] be heard to say that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the 
exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is 
obvious that General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change 
the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and 
stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into 
the fall of 1941, that a surprise air attack was a primary threat. It is equally 
obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not 
amount to a communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived 
at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which excluded a surprise 
air attack as a then present basic threat. 

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held 
by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing" 
(though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short 
continually stressed the possible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a 
threat from without. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the 
idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have in- 
terpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor, 
an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this 
would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind 
the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and 
Short's claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample 
time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would 
have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent 
and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General 
Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt 
act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might 
jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, 
at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. 
It should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard 
against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the 
civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an ex- 
perienced commander. 

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that 
Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for 
war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the 
information which Short had was incomplete and confusing. 

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his 
duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for 
joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record. 
I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not 
informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being 
conducted by the Navy. 

[345] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these 
Various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under mili- 
tary law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's various failures were 
not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of sei*ious errors of judgment. His 
first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he 
made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack 
Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was 
his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly 
improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the 
result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not 
constitute a criminal neglect of duty. 

Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers: 
The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff offi- 
cers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of 
the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far 
too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep. 74) 

A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for 
Its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain witnesses were asked as to 
their opinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied from complete 
reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel 
was unqualified. (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered 
Phillips "one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to 
confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise — the average, 
run-of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 169 

of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not 
"feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time 
of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that 
he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977- 
1978) 

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' 
training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket 
conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The Board adds, however, that 
Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception of his duty and what he did and 
failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is suf- 
ficient evidence of the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to 
support this finding is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interfer- 
ence with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases 
of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an air attack, 
[346] what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short 
ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, 
and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. 
(Tr., Phillips 1134-1144) 

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as a Chief of Staff, 
as he had not been appointed until 5 November 1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and 
that Short did not treat Phillips as a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having 
him present at important Navy Conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no sub- 
stantial evidence that Phillips was ineflBcient to a degree that would require his 
removal by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way 
a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that 
can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully 
qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigateiJ by the 
Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the 
disaster on 7 December 1941. 

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record 
as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3, or G-4. Short's G-2, 
Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either 
from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold 
Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst that can be said against Fielder is that 
he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that 
Japanese Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, 
this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about 
these matters. 

The Board also stated that 

"While the varous assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the 
results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of 
requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their 
testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short." (Rep. 74) 

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, 
Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony 
when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed 
under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what 
happened on December 7." (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no 
substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff. 

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short 
failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified. 

[3^7] Board's Conclusions as to General MarshaV 

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations vnth the 
Hawaiian Department in the following particulars : 

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully ad- 
vised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an in- 
creasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an 
abundance and Short had little. 

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize 
the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly 
that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of Novem- 
ber 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war. 

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early 
morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate 
break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITTACK 

"(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Com- 
mand between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat 
of war." (Rep. 298-299) 

Adequacy of Oeneral MarshalVs 27 November Warning Message: 

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" 
should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese 
and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission. 
(Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197) 

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of 
the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) overlooks the fact that the 27 November 
message signed "Marshall" pictured the Japanese-United States situation ac- 
curately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department 
at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese 
representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued 
up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggests the possibility that they may 
have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and witli evident hope of a 
peaceful settlement. 

[348] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washing- 
ton to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in carrying 
out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a 
breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic state- 
ment, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, the Japanese negotia- 
tors would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they were doing their 
best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington, suggesting 
a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret 
Ex. "B") 

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated : 

"Judging from my interview witli Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my 
considei'ations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peace- 
fully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would 
like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this 
fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my 
separate wire #1233." (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruc- 
tion of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top 
Secret Ex. "B") 

Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability 
of war : 

"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would 
have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when 
I beUeved the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the 
reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be 
the result of war. * * « jsjo-^y ^j^g question at that time was whether they 
would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that 
question definitely and linally prior to the outbreak of war." (Tr., Grew 
4213-4214) 

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. 
Grew replied : 

[3^9] "I could not put my finger on any particular date. General. My own 
position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to 
prevent war ; and I did everything in my power to prevent it ; and, not being a 
•defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to 
the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 
7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable." (Tr., Grew 4199) 

With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were 
"two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and reported 
directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. 

"I think it is perfectly possible that the cabinet was not informed of the plans 
for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is — well, I won't say confirmed, but it is 
increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister 
at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about 
three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the 
nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 171 

Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces 
me personally that he didn't know. * * *" (Tr., Grew 4214-4215) 

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by 
Japan, Mr. Grew stated : 

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, 
that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides 
war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our 
views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could 
readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have 
relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think 
that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it 
didn't happen." (Tr., Grew 4218) 

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, General 
Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War Department 
was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It was first thought 
that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. When the 
time was extended to 29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall 
A. 4) "November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December without 
anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which 
we' could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed 
quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) 

[S50] In the light of all information possessed by the War Department at 
that time the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note breaking ofE negotia- 
tions, and the direction to the Japanese representatives to present the fourteen 
parts at 1 : 00 p. m. (Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that 
day, it is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall"! was an 
accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was 
sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in 
the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short. 

General Marshall's Views on Warning: 

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred 
not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that "very remarkable 
things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading 
an actual act of war." (Tr. Marshall A. 45-46) W^ith respect to other informa- 
tion of the Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and influ- 
enced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that 
while it may have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to 
Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., 
Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what has hap- 
pened, * * * the situation might well have been helped by translating that 
information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of his decision at the 
time, however, he stated : 

"In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the 
two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army Alert, 
(messages to Short from War Department and Navy Department) were sufficient 
for any Commander with a great responsibility ; and in addition to that you must 
remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, 
convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. 
Nobody could look at that without realizing that something very critical was in 
the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way 
we were — the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, par- 
ticularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii — without giv- 
ing such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our 
stalling off this affair. 

"Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their 
decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a certain period 
of time, it would be too late: we would have gained the necessary strength to 
make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act. 

TOP SECRET 

[351] "All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only 
the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commer- 
cial shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Every- 
thing was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how — I never have quite 
understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know 
what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it." (Tr., 
Marshall A. 46-47) 

As already indicated. General Marshall had no information of any kind which 
Indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28) 

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had atlequate weapons, ammunition, 
and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., 
Marshall A. 27) He also was under the belief in late November and early Decem- 
ber of 1941 that Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the 
desired reconnaissance. In this regard, he testified : 

"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of 
other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry 
out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in 
the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel." (Tr., Mar- 
shall A. 27) 

The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance 
by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A. 26) 

The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places 
on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best prepared that we had." 
(Tr., Marshall A. 25) He stated : 

>i4: * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, 
Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska 
and the Aleutians completely negligible." (Tr., Marshall A. 23) 

The Chief of Staff continued : 

"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * *" (Tr., Marshall 
A. 26) 

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the over-all 
supervision which was required of him from a global perspective, the Chief of 
Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal Department: 

[352] "* * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course 
they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable 
way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii." (Tr., Marshall A 13-14) 

General MarsMlVs 7 December Message: 

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff 
should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning 
of 7 December of an almost immediate break with Japan, the Chief of Staff 
testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated such a break until 
about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6) He then immediately con- 
ferred with appropriate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a message to 
be transmitted to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when 
completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense 
Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine 
command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required 
for coding was "a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as 
the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to 
the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to 
the procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could be 
expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of Staff did not 
understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he with Colonel Bundy was 
sent back for additional information. (Tr., Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy 
was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff in charge of matters 
pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr., Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and 
Colonel Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the 
message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that 
moment. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff 
as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy 
back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply confirmed 
that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) 

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients 
before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall A. 14) 

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message 
to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to Hawaii via Radio 
Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio was not able to get 
through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further delay, which was also 
unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the nonoperation of a teletype at 
Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 173 

it was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bomb- 
ing and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) 

[353] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, 
In the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr., Marshall 
A. 13) The Chief of Staff testified : 

"• * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have 
called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience, my 
own experience, even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * * * ^e 
now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone." (Tr., 
Marshall A. 13-14) 

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message 
for delivery to the Message Center : 

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the 
message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the 
message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means, 
* * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed 
me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the 
addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with 
Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about 
three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the ad- 
dressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw 
that it was 11: 50 a. m." (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (This would be 6:20 a. m. 
Honolulu time) 

Colonel French testified that : 

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would 
take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to 
4.5 minutes to transmit the message to its destination." (Tr., French 196) 

Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than 
the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a warning without waiting 
for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the morning of 7 December, the following 
testimony by the Chief of Staff is pertinent : 

"General Russell. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than your- 
self with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders 
a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and in- 
cluding the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly 
as to the substance of this message of December [35^] 7th relative to the 
delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines? 

"General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer con- 
cerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal 
affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment 
of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff was here, if the head of the War 
Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff Gr-2 were aware 
of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to 
answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a great 
catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way." (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212) 

Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall: 

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in 
his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short fully advised 
of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of which information he had 
an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as already indicated, that General 
Marshall's radio to Short of 27 November, considered along with the other mes- 
sages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then 
existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military com- 
mander was required to take the information contained in this radio from his 
Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further informa- 
tion or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in the position of 
carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a sub- 
ordinate what the situation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces 
itself to a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length and 
in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that 
there was only a bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and 
that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at 
any moment. 

So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is 
concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's Con- 
clusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately pictured 



-174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity that Short be on 
the alert against threats from within and from without. The most that can 
be said is tliat the War Department did not transmit to'Short the Top Secret 
messages, but these were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the 
messages actually sent Short over a period of months, hereinbefore referred to. 
While the War Department was possessed of more information than Short 
received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the qui vive. That 
Hawaii had already been sutliciently alerted was [355] the opinion of 
Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 27&-277), 
of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler 
D. 253. Bratton D. 283), of General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General 
Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253) 

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Mar- 
shall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages. (Tr., Mar- 
shall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772) The Navy messages of 24 and .27 November spe- 
cifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 30, D. 306; Short 358, 363) Captain 
Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed with General Short in per- 
son the message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. 
(Tr., Layton 3058-3059) 

Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of 
the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear instructions from the 
Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from within and from without, and 
for eventualities which could be momentarily expected. 

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Mai'^hall failed in his relations 
with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional instructions to 
Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of Short's 27 November 
reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short had misunderstood General 
Marshall's radio and had not alerted his command for .war, (Rep. 298) this 
statement is a non sequitur. But, in addition, there was no testimony before 
the Board that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified 
that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the presumption 
would be that I had seen it." (Tr., Marshall 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall 
C. 201) It is significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though 
initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not initialed 
by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the corresponding radio from 
General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39) The reply itself was indicative that 
Short had taken precautions against sabotage and in stating "liaison with the 
Navy" was susceptible of the interpretation that Short had also ordered defense 
measures in accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that dis- 
tant reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to 
General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply, was en- 
titled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his 
reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered 
that Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 Novem- 
ber to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled to believe that 
his order would be obeyed. 

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch 
with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." 
(Tr., Short 380) He also stated that this phrase indicated he expected the 
Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long distance reconnaissance. 
(Tr., Short 380) General Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief 
of Staff, testified that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy" 
led to the reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out recon- 
naissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This 
would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * *". (Tr., Gerow 4289) 
In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely advised by this reply of 
Short that Short had made no preparations against an outside threat. 

[356] -In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that 
while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications calling 
his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no time, so far as the 
record shows, questioned this estimate by a communication to the Chief of Staff. , 

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Depart- 
ment that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would be a most 
anomolous situation if a theater commander could be heard to say that because 
he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had replied with a fragmentary 
report that ipso facto he was relieved of his responsibilities and that these respon- 
sibilities were then fastened upon the Chief of Staff. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 175 

Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 Novem- 
ber, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff testified it was SOP 
to exchange (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772), the silence of Short after the 
message of 28 November would indicate to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready 
to meet all threats, both those from within and those from without. 

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the 
Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in-Chief and, in point of truth, 
personally warned the Hawaiian Department, with prophetic accuracy, against 
the very type of attack which occurred. 

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did 
not include the duty of personally directing and siipervising the detailed ad- 
ministration of the various sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff. His pri- 
mary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and the President, to plan and su- 
pervise the organization, equipment, and training of the Army, to make decisions 
and give advice concerning the over-all and vital problems of military strategy 
from the perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then 
confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the 
War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent vic- 
tories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose records justi- 
fied the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the prime responsibility is 
on the theater commander. No duty could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff 
to check personally on the Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to 
the stated fundamental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department 
for any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy 
and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in 
preparation for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced 
from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid 
his responsibility in the event his organization is ineffective. There is a dis- 
tinction, however, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the 
performance of duties by members of his staff. 

[3o7] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep. 298) that 
General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt 
of Short's reply, is not justified. 

As to Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short 
on the evening of 6 December or tlie early morning of 7 December the critical in- 
formation indicating an almost immediate break with Japan "though there was 
ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes entirely clear that Genera] 
Marshall personally did not receive this information until late in the morning of 
7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately but failed 
because of circumstances beyond his control. 

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate 
and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between 27 
November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether this was the personal 
duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already indicated that General Marshall 
was entitled to rely upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that 
elaborate preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formu- 
lated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander in 
accordance with the traditional American military policy. General Marshall had 
seen General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate 
plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29) 

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to Genera] 
Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report (Roberts 
Report, p. 19-20). 

Board's Conclusions as to General Geroiv: 

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows : 

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately 
informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the sub- 
stance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2. 

"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on 
November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive ; on the contrary he approved the 
message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements. 

"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the 
November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to 
take corrective action. 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and 
agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two 
services in the manner contemplated." (Rep. 299) 

[55S] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding 
General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy beach- 
head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities as Chief or Act- 
ing Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in 
question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of the General Staff was charged 
with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and super- 
vision of the Chief of Staff. 

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was 
given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the 
situation with the Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese future action, 
the imminence of hostilities, and that under no circumstances should any limita- 
tions or qualifications expressed in the messages jeopardize his defense. He was 
also ordered to establish reconnaissance. 

But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to 
an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received sub- 
stantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that 
had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might have convinced 
him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a 
surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any sub- 
stantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alterna- 
tive, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General 
Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination 
in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it 
could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed 
lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese 
intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu 
requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into 
various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to 
Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further message 
of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship 
movements. (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imagina- 
tive person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the 
significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and 
preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at 
the head of the War Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illus- 
trates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret informa- 
tion to Short. 

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending 
Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear and 
concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers to this 
radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In my opinion 
this is an erroneous characterization of the message. I fails to take into account 
the very essence of the situation which then presented [359] itself. Those 
in authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted at that 
moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations 
which had been taking place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese 
emissaries had practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the 
Japanese might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew 
that the United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month 
of delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very iday — 
27 November 1941 — the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations of 
the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United States, 
urging him to postpone any action that might precipitate war as long as possible 
because we were not ready. Confronted with this situation, those in authority 
in the War Department, including the Secretary of War, participateid in the 
preparation of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which 
were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express as ac- 
curately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of 
the possibility of an attack at any moment and that nothing must be omitted to 
Jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance 
of not doing anything that would precipitate war on our part. This naturally 
presented a delicate problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of 
the facts and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into 
the language. There was no other course except to present this problem just as 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 177 

It was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate situation conflicting 
factors are bound to exist. It is because it requires wisdom and judgment to 
deal with them that only men supposedly qualified are given posts of such re- 
sponsibility. In any event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, 
beginning "This is a war warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. 
(Tr., Gerow 4261-5262) 

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's 
reply arid to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer ground, General Gerow 
admitted that while it was physically impossible for him to check every message 
(Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered the War Department gave Short 
adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by assuming 
that the reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant Gen- 
eral of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he 
failed also to follow up on the demand in the radiogram of 27 November signed 
"Marshall", for a report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified : 

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval 
of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important 
problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through." 
(Tr., Gerow 4290) 

[360] In fairness to General Gerow Is should also be mentioned that 
Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge of 
the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific matters. 
(Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291) 

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the 
failure of his Division to function with the eflSciency that would have made 
impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans Division 
is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although its functions are 
not comparable to those of a commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on 
post, is charged with specific responsibilities. 

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required 
.«iteps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant to 
their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these agreements for joint 
defensive action could be put into effect by the two commanders in Hawaii 
when they deemed It advisable. (Tr., Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 
4440) General Gerow assumed and had the right to assume that, warned by 
the threat of hostile attack contained in the 27 November message, the two 
commanders would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 
(Tr., Gerow 4289) or at least such portions thereof as would assure adequate 
reconnaissance. 

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing 
to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by 0-2 is, in the 
light of after-events, to a degree justified. (Rep. 299) At least it was a pre- 
cautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too 
with the Board's conclusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was 
culpable in failing to check on Short's reply to the November 27 message signed 
"Marshall." I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General 
Gerow in approving the 27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, 
concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately 
and adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite instructions. 
I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to 
take the required steps to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War 
Plan. General Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two 
commanders would themselves put these plans into effect. 

Miscellaneous Statements of Board: 

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, 
are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure to discuss 
such matters should not be regarded as indicating my agreement with these 
conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider such irrelevant matters in 
arriving at my conclusions. 

[361] Unexplored Leads: 

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further in- 
quiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advan- 
tageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probabil- 
ity, in my opinion, affect the result ; at the same time in order to complete the 
picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. 
79716 — 46— Ex. 148 13 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose ; 
the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter. 

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in 
detail with the officer selected by you. 

Recommendations : 

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclu- 
sions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous. 

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the 
Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, 
and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November message signed 
"Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against 
General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not check- 
ing Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors 
and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field 
command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action. 

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that 
Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war 
in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) in 
failing to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in 
Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation ; and 
(c) to inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance 
being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in the above 
respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by 
court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) above that Short in failing to 
put into operation the proper alert was not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as 
of a serious error of judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form 
of a neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered the various 
alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert. 
The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into consideration 
certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the primary threat, or that 
he failed to subordinate certain other factors such as possible alarm of the civil 
population does not remove the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. 
Those mistakes simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong 
alert. The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision 
to establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the 
concept of a neglect of duty. 

[362] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an 
agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and 
Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of being 
a terrible offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now of record, 
this question is answered by what has been said above. Short's failure stemmed 
from a mistake of .iudgment on his part. 

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing 
to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being 
conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as he indicated in the present 
proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a Navy function. Whether he was 
entitled to rely upon the fact that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its 
ability, such reconnaissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do 
not feel that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I 
believe the timer picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly 
what was apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally 
no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial 
at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are still using some 
of the code systems in which various intercepted messages were sent and that 
information of great military value continues to be obtained from present day 
intercepts sent in these code systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result 
in disclosing these facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary 
court of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous wit- 
nesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the 
world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is out of 
the question. 

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be 
considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would adjudge. 
As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 179 

various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he re- 
sponded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, in- 
complete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as 
to the suflBciency of the action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads 
me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence 
in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim 
that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 16, p. 21) 
There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's re- 
fusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. 
(Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore 
forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in 
his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sen- 
tence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand. 
[36S] As, on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if 
it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am inclined 
to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by a trial should be made 
rather than to permit the case to linger on as a recurrent public irritation. 
I suggest therefore that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review 
of the Board's proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of 
errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that 
this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event 
fijrther investigation should disclose a dilTerent situation the matter could later 
be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence. 

Myron O. Ceamee, 
Majoi' General, The Judge Advocate Qeneral. 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



CONTENTS 

Page 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 1 181 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 2 253 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 3 341 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 4 428 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 5 480 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 6 592 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 7 645 

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 8 668 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 181 



EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 1 

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of 
War Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbob Board 

a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of slieets 2 and 55, showing that 

on 7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 Decem- 
ber", which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time. 
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters 
and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise 
noted. 

b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding Gen- 

eral, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941. 

c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy 

Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941. 

d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japa- 

nese War Policy". 

e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is in- 

itiated by General Short. 

f. Memorandum re "Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August 

1941. 

g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report 
of Sir George Paisn. 

h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General 
Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C, dated 6 September 1941. 

i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kim- 
mel in Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 September 1941, obtained from 
Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd. 

j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 
1941, initialed by General Short. 

k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki 
To jo, dated 17 October 1941. 

1. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of Tairliku, Japanese maga- 
zine, for May 1941. 
m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 
1941, re "Estimate of Japanese Situation". 

n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy. 

0. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25 October 
1941, initialed by General Short. 

p. Letter from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, 
Hqs. Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding mem- 
orandum containing information received from Orient. 

q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 
1941, Initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell. 

r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of 
certain information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable. 

s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Com- 
mander (I. C), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from 
British. 

t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November 
1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell. 

u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from 
Navy. 

V. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from 
Navy. 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from 

Navy. 
X. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI. 

y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, 27 November 1941. 
z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 29 
November 1941. 

aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washing- 
ton, D. C, 27 November 1941. 

bb. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 Decem- 
ber 1941. 

cc. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, 7 December 1941. 

dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941, 

ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, 
D. C, 7 December 1941. 

ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 
8 December 1941. 

gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 De- 
cember 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch 
fighter aircraft by Carrier". 

hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529. 
ii. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb. JAGD, 10 December 1941. 
jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 
December 1941. 

kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C, 

8 December 1941. 
11. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, 
T. H., 9 December 1941. 
mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, 9 December 
1941. 

nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Depart- 
ment, Washington, D. C, 9 December 1941. 

00. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11 
December 1941. 

pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio — Merle Smith." 

qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941. 

rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 11 
December 1941. 

ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and 
destruction of their code machine". 

tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian 
Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air 
Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers. 

SECRET 

278/242/10/des/13/j 
Affixed to 2/1 : 

Caution on Handling 

1. This book will be handled by staff officers, the commanding officers eoncerned 
and higher officers. 

2. For the benefit of persons directly responsible for communications, supply 
and related matters, these subjects have been treated. 

rS. As in the case of code books, care must be taken that the publication does not 
fall into enemy hands should the ship sink or be damaged. 

5 Nov 41 

Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet 

Page 2/1 : Combined Fleet Ultbasecret Operation Order 1 

Flagship NAGATO (*1),SAEKI (*2) WAN (TNBay.) 

5 Nov 41 

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku (*3) 
Commander in Chief, 
Combined Fleet 

145 of 700 copies 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 183 

Combined Fleet Order 

Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT 
BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the 
Separate Volume. 

SECRET 

278/242/mab 
Page 2/120-124 : 

Editor's Note: Document pages 2/120-124 inclusive comprise the errata indicated 
throughout the text in translator's notes. Document pages 2/125-150 duplicate 
2/64-94 (G, Supply) and are omitted. Document page 2/151 (Appended Table 5, 
Organization of Supply Forces of Combined Fleet) follows 2/94. 

Combined Fleet Ulteasecket Operation Order 2 



rage 2/152 : 

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI V7AN 7 Nov 41 



145 of 600 copies 

Combined Fleet Order 



7 Nov 41 

YAMAMOTO, Osoroku 
Commander in Chief, 
Combined Fleet 



First preparations for war 
Y Day 8 December 

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 7 

Page 2/154 2/155 : 

Flagship NAGATO, off HASHIRA SHIMA (*1) 

22 Dec 41 

YAMAMOTO, Osoroku 
Commander in Chief, 
Combined Fleet 
confidential 

Hawaiian Department Service Command, 

Kauai District, 
lAhue, T. H., 29 March 1941. 

Subject : Japanese attitude on Kauai. 

To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

1. Enclosed is a copy of the English translation of a speech delivered by the 
Rev. Hiseki Miyasaki, Buddhist Priest of Lihue, Kauai during a send-off recep- 
tion for selectees of the Lihue district on March 27, 1941. 

2. The sentence inclosed in red brackets has been expurgated in press reports, 
since it was felt that reactionary Japanese groups would attack Mr. Miyasaki for 
such a statement. 

3. The speech was given first in Japanese and then the English translation was 
read. 

4. The words of Mr. Miyasaki express very well the attitude taken now by the 
majority of first and second generation Japanese on this Island. 

5. It is becoming more and more apparent that as long as the local Japanese 
population is not antagonized by fools of other races, it will as a whole be loyal and 
peaceful. 

6. The peace in the community and the loyalty of the Japanese are only en- 
dangered by persons like Mr. Cedric Baldwin, Manager of McBryde plantation — to 
mention only the worst offender — who delight in insulting the Japanese people 
without the slightest provocation. 

1. Incl. : Copy of speech 

Eugene J. Fitzgerald, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, 

D. 8. C. 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



10 July 1941. 
G-2: •?. 2 Exec. 
Assistant G-2: ?. 
Subject : Japanese War Policy. 

]*^ile : To be filed in #2 safe and noted in "Current Estimate" Japan — in Record 
Room. 

confidential, 

29 May 1941. 
Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. N., 

'Savy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
My dear Admiral : In order that you may be acquainted with the steps taken 
by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with Colonel 
Throckmorton this morning I desire to inform you that during the holiday and 
week-end I have increased the guard over important installations, and have 
arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard during this period. Every 
attempt will be made not to bring this action into the limelight so that the 
community as a whole will not be aware of the increased surveillance. 

I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is 
concerned. 

With kindest personal regards, 
Very sincerely yours, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 



SECRET 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 



inter-staff routing slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the 
Department C/A and the B & LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff 
inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to 
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception 
that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General 
unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip 
will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying 
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the respon- 
sible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered 
in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign 
for him. 

AG 091/2 

Statement A. — World tank-ship fleet, Dec. 31, 1945, versus Sept. 1, 1930 



No. of Ind. 
From and Date 



To 



Subject: W. D. Radio #924, 8 July 41 
"Japanese War Policy" 



1st Ind. AQ9 July 41... 



C/S. 



1 Incl. File — Dept. Comdr. informed. 
Paraphrased copy furnished Dist. 
Intell. B. 14 N.D. Mura 10 July 41. 



1989 R. H. D. 
1941. A. G. 



9 July 



Signal Corps, United States Abmy 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ In CODE. 

Washington DC 152A July 8 1941 
Secret 

94 WAR BC 207 WD 
CG Hawn Dept Fort Shaffer TH : 

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information 
from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



185 



policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups 
Period. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable 
aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian 
garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that 
Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period Opinion is 
that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and 
development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance 
against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period Neutrality 
pact with Russia may be abrogated Period They have ordered all Jap vessels 
in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period Move- 
ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant 
vessels are being requisitioned. 

Adams. 
334P/720P/8 
Received as a secret communication. 
(Strilfe out two) 
Decoded by : 

Capt C J Habbison SC 
818A Jtoy 9, 1941 

Headquabtebs Hawaiian Depabtment 
intes-staff bouting slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be 
sent to subordinate commanders. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to 
another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General 
Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The 
Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 
1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subse- 
quently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. 
Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer 
In charge or an officer authorized to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. From and 
Date 


To 


Subject: Traffic on Burma Road 




1st Ind. Contact Office, 
7-18-41. 

2nd G-2, 7-18-41 

3rd Ind. C/S, 7-21-41.... 


G-2 

CS 

G-2 


To note and return. Subject matter 
will be included in next foreign intelli- 
gence report. 

Please note. The increase in traffic and 
the high freight rates are of consider- 
able interest. 

Noted . Incls ; n/c. Contact office 


By G. W.B. 

Mum. 

W.D.T. 
H. E. 



Philip Hayes, 
Colonel, a. S. C, Chief of Staff. 



1740 FoET Stbeet, Victobia, B. C. 
Deae Me. Andeew: Herewith a few notes on the arrival of Burma Road 
trucks. The salt trucks arriving at Kunming originate in China a short distance 
down the Burma Road, but tlie figures for the trucks exclusive of salt represent 
imports from Burma & the steady increase in the average daily arrivals is 
interesting. Tonnage arriving at Chunking is negligible. 

I also enclose a few figures on freight rates which I hope you will be able 
to follow. 

Yours sincerely, 

J. K. GOBESFIELD. 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

BuBKATT Road Taxes 

1) Central Oovemment Yunnan MgMcays tax (payaUe each trip): 

N$0.12 per tonAm. based on 960 kms. Wanting/Kunming i. e. : 

1 ton truck outwards N$115. 20 return 230. 40 
li/a " " " 172.80 " 345.60 

2 " " " 230.40 " 460.80 
2V2 " " " 288.00 " 576.00 

3 " " " 345.60 " 691.00 

2) Yunnan Provincial Oovemment Highways tax: 

N$0.10 per tonAm based on 975 kms. Wanting/Kunming 
Up to 2 tons Outwards N$195. 00 return 390. 00 
21/2 to 3 " " 292. 50 " 585. 00 

31/2 to 4 " " 390. 00 " T80. 00 

(N. B. Fractions of a ton are regarded as 1 ton) 

3) CM. Customs duty — 5% ad valorem — plus 5% Consular fee 

4) Number plates and seasonal tax (quarterly): 

2 Plates N50.00 and N$28.00 per quarter 

5) Yunnan consumption tax (payable once only) : 

N$802.50 per truck 

1 & 2 for Shippers account — if trucks overloaded weight of cargo is used 
as basis for calculating tax. 

Weight rates Lashio/ Wanting /Kunming /Chungking 



Distance 



Rate 



Approx. 
exchange 



US $ per 
ton 



Lashio/Wanting 

Wanting/Kunming 

Kunming/Chungking. 
Chungking/Kweiyang 
K weiyang/Kiinming . . 



119 miles 
959 Km- 
1150 Km. 
488 Km. 
662 Km. 



$39 per ton, $2 fee to Truck Control 

NC$2.92pcr ton/Km 

NC$2.4? per ton/Km 

NC$2.06 per ton/Km 

NC$0.87 per ton/Km 



334 
25 
25 
25 
25 



12.28 
112. 01 
111.32 
40.21 
23.04 



Note: 1) Rate Wanting/Kmiming recently increased from NC$2.12 to NC$2.92 

2) Rate Kunming/Chungking recently increased from N C$2. 12 to NC.$2.42 

3) Where no return cargo Kunming/Wanting Government rate for "empty despatch" allowance 

NC$1.62 per ton/Km @ Exchange 25 = US$62.14 per ton. 

4) Above rates include Highway Taxes shown on separate list. 

5) No recent information regarding rates from Chungking available and rates vary with different 

types of cargo. 

6) Rates shown from Lashio onwards are now paid for 1st class cargo e. g., gasoline. 

HONO Kong, IMh June 1941. ■ 

Burma Road 



Period 



9/10/40-17/11/40- 
8/11/40-17/12/40. 
8/12/40-17/1/41.. 
8/1/41-17/2/41... 
8/2/41-17/3/41... 
8/3/41-17/4/41... 
8/4/41-17/5/41... 
8/5/41-12/6/41... 
8/5/41-7/6/41.... 



Total. 



Truck arrivals at Kunming 



Including salt 



No. of trucks 



Total 



3360 
3112 
3815 
4226 
3958 
6802 
5858 
5074 



35205 



Aver- 
age per 
day 

112 
104 
123 
136 
141 
187 
195 
195 



148 



Total 

tons 

carried 



9756 
9529 
11762 
12843 
12130 
18189 
18172 
15604 



107985 



Excluding salt 



No. of trucks 



Total 



1740 
1720 
2448 
2914 
2855 
4519 
4794 
4207 



25197 



Aver- 
age per 
day 

58 
57 
79 
94 
102 
146 
160 
162 



106 



Total 

tons 

carried 



5220 
5677 
7849 
9100 
8981 
14195 
15065 
13071 



Arrivals at Chungking 



No. of trucks 



Total 



456 
464 
439 
459 

438 
505 
421 



344S 



Aver- 
age per 
day 



Total 

tons 

carried 



1368 
1392 
1317 
1377 
1314 
1515 
1263 



798 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 
NUMBEE OF TRUCKS PASSING FRONTIER AT WANTING 



187 



From 
China 




December 
January. - 
February, 

March 

April 



Hongkong, 19th June, 1941. 

Army Contact Office, 

fedeb^^l buiujing, 
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941. 

Memorandum : Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan. 

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2: 00 P. M., and docked at Pier 
#8 at 3 : 30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles 
at 9 : 00 A. M., 1 August 1941. 

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route 
were as follows : From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to 
receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them ; they were also prevented 
by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 
July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west 
until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 
180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog 
banks ; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during 
which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on 
the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu ; 
then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been 
ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. 
In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that 
the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued 
on into this port. 

It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was 
taken freezing credits. 

Rcliablo buaincag ffteft fepei^l- tfesrfe Japan is very shor t ea carbo n fela:efe7 aftd 

uIIiIt ^n^y' 'iIttVC SOmO S uO O IC Ot i^lxGi' DC tlPifigS Oil ilclll(J.y OU u riGl TjiIGF uIlC IIilXLCi llXiy II Ol 

fa eilitica fof pfe ducing them, ftftd -tliftt aay o hortagc e# tfeis item would ee rioualy 
hamper their airpl a ne production, ^hoy a#e Gollccting «4i eefftp H^ft m citica, 
even including ifee fcncco Oftd ornamental irons ea buildings. - Other items 
re ported %e fee s hort fti=e high s tab le cotton; rubber supplie s , - high test aviation 
gaooiinc, sugar, flour, icathcr, wool, Oftd anasthctics. 

it is reported t here a#e many ^ crm ofts m ali public e fficcs ift Japan, even ie- 
ciLiuift^ police QopftrtJinC'fitSj pos^ orfiCGSy ftnci iiriRncc oiiiooS'j uiicsc moR ftrC bhiq t^o 

WftftP civil] flfi ClOullifi^j ■OtJrxf Wit) 11 ft liXF^C "JcVftSi OIllDiGfft ift ■trrtCi^' COfto iftpClr "ri-C^Ulil'"^ 
•f 1 /"mn f^.T*^^ nn i r1 ^,r\ r^^ Ty\ t^inr^ 4-tye\r^ n\c\ 4--i.^*-»t-i f y/^yii TT^frnln i'loyin n n o rl i x\ \ -tf^'v I'W fl Tl Vi ■ 4-)yt ^ 

J«ly 1011 ttffee German raiders p«t ift at Y okohama, which were [sic] 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
201 (Paisn, George) 



CI 
WAH 



CONFIDENTIAL 



Wab Department, 
War Department General Staff, 
Military Intelligence Division, G-2, 

Washington, D. C, August 28, 19.'fl. 
Subject: Letter of transmittal. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department. 
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such 
action as you consider advisable. 

Sherman Miles, 
Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army, 
Acting Assista7it Chief of Staff, 0-2. 
1 Enclosures; 

201 — Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in 
Hawaii : dtd 8/3/41. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

MID 201 (Paisn, George) 
Strictly private and 
confidential. 

The Boreas, 

Blue Ridge, 
New York State. 
Aug 3 1941. 

Dear Mb. President, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter 
on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance 
that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return. 

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii 
and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that 
inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of 
some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live 
in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give 
the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to 
anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger 
of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be 
overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the 
American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan 
destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would 
be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might 
arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers 
and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly 
trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes 
would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken 
American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to en- 
able the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. 
Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would 
be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that 
the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution 
against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth 
columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can 
be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the 
disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precau- 
tions. 

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with 
renewed health. 

Very sincerely yours, 

/s/ George Paisn, 
The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt. 

8/21/41. 

Copies to: 
G-3 
Haw. 
VSR/lge 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 189 

CONFIDENTIAI, 

EHG/td 

Headquabtebs Second Cobps Abea, 
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G}-2, 
Governors Island, New York, NovemJ)er 28, 1941. 
Subject: George Paish (Paisn). 
To : Assistant Chief of Staflf, G-2, 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Fort Shafter, T. H, 

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, 
there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation regarding subject. 

2. This is transmitted for your information and records. 
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 : 

F. J. Pearson, 
F. J. Peabson, 

Lt. Col., Q. 8. C, 
Executive Officer, 0-2. 
1 Incl.— (dupl.) 
cpy FBI rept. 

OONFIDENTIAI, 

Copy op FBI Repobt 

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact Mr. PAISN at the 
address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned 
from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD G. PAISH, that his true name is SIR 
GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Moun- 
tain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that 
address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was inter- 
viewed, at which time he furnished the following information : 

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture 
tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, 
he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to 
world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world 
trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace 
to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the 
United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken 
in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name 
at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations 
which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people 
at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced 
and otherwise entertained the gathering. 

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and 
during the course of the evening he turined the trend of conversation to any spirit 
of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the 
Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possibility 
exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United 
States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a 
Japanese promise of "liberation". 

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be 
Inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon 
the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or 
otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on 
the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind 
but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that 
the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it 
incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard 
and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened 
due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department. 

SIR GEXDRGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of 
Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's 
Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining 
his publications and ability as a lecturer. 

It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming 
conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference 
to pre-World War associations, characters aud historical events. 
I am furnishing the above for your confidential information. 

confidential 

Headquaktees Hawaiian Depaetment, 
Office of the Assistant Chiei' of Staff 

Fob Militaey Inteij.igence, 
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 30 September 1941. 
In reply refer to : 
336.8— (Japanese). 

Subject: Letter from George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii. 
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors 
Island, New York. 
1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your identification, with the request that 
Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concern- 
ing the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese 
Government, and the native Hawaiians. 

Kendall J. Fieldeb, 
J Lt. Colonel, Inf., 

Acting A. C. of 8., G-2. 
confidential 

War Department 
M. L D. 

Intelligence Section, Contact Office, 

215 Dillingham Building, 
Honolulu, T. H., 30 September 194t. 
Subject : Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt. 
Summary of Information : 

Dear Mb. President, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on 
your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I 
feel compelled to write without awaiting your return. 

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii 
and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that 
inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some 
kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, 
the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of 
this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be 
trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these 
reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and de- 
mand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval 
and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and 
these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the 
Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of 
supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard 
these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of 
these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any 
risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard 
might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his 
purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be pre- 
pared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may 
be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials 
have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the 
Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, 
but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves 
should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from 
failure to take the necessary precautions. 

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with 
renewed health. 

Very sincerely yours, /s/ Geokge Paisn. 

The Honorable E'. D. Roosevelt. 

Evaluation 
- of source ~ of information 
X Undetermined X 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 191 

CONTIDENTIAL 

WCG/cjo 

Headquai;tp;rs Second Corps Area, 
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 
Oovernors Island, New York, October 15, 19^1. 
Subject : Letter From George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii. 
To: Assistant Cliief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Fort 
Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, 

1. Reference is made to your communication of SOtli, September, with above 
subject title. 

2. Before tliis office can comply with request contained therein to interview the 
subject, it is requested that this office be supply with Mr. PAISN'S address, inas- 
much as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indi- 
cate that he is a resident of this Corps Area. 

For the A. C. of S., G-2 : 

F. J. Peabson, 
Lt. Col., G. 8. C, 
Executive Otficer, 0-2. 
1st Ind. 
336.8 (ACQ). 

Intelligence Section, Contact Officer, 

214 Dillingham Building, 
Honolulu, T. H., 5 November 1941. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, N. Y. 
1. Mr. Paisn's address as shown on his letter to the President was "The Boreas, 
Blue Ridge, New York State". This address was inadvertedly omitted in S/I of 
30 September 1941. 

Geobge W. Biokneu:., 
Lieut. Colonel, O. S. C, 

Asst. A. C. of 8., G-2, 

Contact OJficer. 

confidential 

Headquartees Hawaiian Depabtment, 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff foe Military Intelligence, 

Fort 8hafter, T. H., 6 September IdJfl. 
In reply refer to : 

350.05 (G-2). 
Subject: Summaries of Information. 

To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Infox-mation received from 
your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have 
already been furnished this office by the Navy. 

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Depart- 
ment, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dis- 
patch of information to the respective Washington offices. 

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are 
other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your 
office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort. 

Kendall J. Fielder, 
Kendall J. Fielder, 

Lieut. Colonel, Inf., 
Acting A. C. of 8., G-2. 

(Item I of Exhibit 1 being pages 28E and 29E is a photostatic copy 
of a portion of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 September 1941, 
relating to reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel. 
This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 7 and 8, EX- 
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illus- 
trations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits 
of the Clausen Investigation.) 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAI- 

Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D. 

Army Contact Office 
Honolulu, T.H. 

Date: 17 October 1941.— 1200 

G-2 Estimate OF International (Japanese) Situation 

1. Summary of Situation 

a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the 
Pacific reached a, new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due 
to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiation between America and Japan, 
and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result 
of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of 
Japan by the ABCD group. 

8. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still 
necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has 
not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is avail- 
able as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the atti- 
tude of the cabinet as a whole will be. 

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is 
fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will 
remain unchanged ; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her de- 
cision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might 
oppose the execution of said policies — irrespective of what means she may choose 
to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement. 

2. Conclusions 

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the 
near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary 
reasons for such a, move or moves are believed to be as follows : 

d. Capabilities 

1. Desperate economic conditions internally — making it perhaps preferable 
to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution. 

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any 
appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the 
Axis — for the time being. 

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse 
of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with 
chances of minimum resistance — that is, when the strength of the Axis is at 
it maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized. 

If. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block. 
6. Probable Moves. — The most likely moves which Japan may make in the 
near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows : 

1. Attack Russia from the east. 

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way 
of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation. 

5. Attack British possessions in the Far East. 
-J. Defend against an American attack in support of the British. 
5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might prom- 
ise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages. 
0. Reasons Justifying These Moves. — The basis for each of the above possible 
moves are considered to be as follows : 

1. Attack on Russia. — (a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense 
as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential 
aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power. 

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that 
Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control east- 
ward to the Pacific). 

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known 
to be in Siberia. 

(d) To secure effective control over, or i)erhaps stamp out, communism 
in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 103 

(e) A possibility that an attaclv on Russia at this time can be undertaken 
with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States ; 
and that even the British might not resort to active military action in sup- 
port of Russia in the Pacific, due to the tact that both the Americans and 
British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither povi'er has any genuine 
desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again 
plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism. 

(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coor- 
dination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against 
other Pacific powers. 

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive 
the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the sojith. 

2. Pressure French Indo-China mid Thailand. — Pressure on French Indo- 
Chiua and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guar- 
antees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may 
either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, 
in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the 
north is being achieved ; and to afford her moi'e and better strategic bases 
from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communication, 
and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes 
necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, 
to secure additional raw materials, food, etc. 

3. Attack on British Possessions in the Far East. — Following the principle 
of defeating one opjwnent at a time — famous with her Axis partner, Hitler — 
it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance 
to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a 
simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding 
agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action 
against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to 
support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in 
ease of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to 
fight the United States within a relatively short time. 

4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers. — While a simultaneous at- 
tack on the AJBCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it 
cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers 
war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against 
Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our 
naval program is completed. 

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost 
certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the pos- 
sibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever 
points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advan- 
tages over her opponents. 

5. In Conclusion 

Barring unforseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any 
quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is be- 
lieved that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take 
and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will 
be, as generally predicted, "strongly military" and will support the present 
demands of the "rightists" elements which were largely responsible for the fall of 
the Third Konoye cabinet. 

George W. Bicknes^l, 

Lt. Colonel, G. S. C, 
Asst. A. C. of S., 0-2, 

Contact Offlcer. 
Distrihution 

C/S H. H. D. 

G-2, H. H. D. 

G-2, H. A. F. 

G-2, Scofield Barracks (3 copies) 

G-3, H. H. D. 

F. B. I., Honolulu (2 copies) 

O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies) 



79716 — 46— Ex. 148 14 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D. 

Army Contact Office 
Honolulu, T. H. 
Date: 17 October 1941. 

Special Inti-xugence Report 

Subjects : New Japanese Premier 
Hideki or Eiki Tojo 
Lieutenant General; Director General of Militai-y Aviation. Born December 
18§4, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919; 
instructor Military Staff College, 1922 ; Chief of Mobilization Section ; Commander 
Infantry 1st Regiment ; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer ; Commander 24th 
Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Chief 
Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, May 
1988-December 1938 ; JNIinister of War since December 1938, 

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-time 
cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941. 

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss 
Kasuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who 
returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conserv- 
ative among the members of the army clique". 

Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated 
that he is a conservative. 

George W. Bicknell, 

Lt. Colonel, G. S. C, 
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2, 

Contact Officer. 
Distribution 

C/S H. H. D. 

G-2, H. H. D. 

G-2, H. A. F. 

G-2, Schofield Barracks (3 copies) 

G-1, H. H. D. 

F. B. I., Honolulu 

O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies) 

JAPANESE POLICY FOR EAST ASIA 

An enlightening statement of Japanese policy is contained in an article entitled 
"The present stage of our great continental policy," written by Takehiko Okuhira, 
an instructor in Keijo Imperial University and published in Tairiku ("Great 
Continent") Magazine for May, 1941. A summary of the English translation of 
this article is as follows : 

1. The great continental policy of Japan originated with the Korean problem 
of 1868. It has been consistent fr.om beginning to end and has been guided by a 
spirit of universal concord. But it is based on the defensive point of view of wiping 
out any menace from the outside to our national defense. 

The continental debouchment of Japan's economic power was first started in 
Korea. Then it was extended into China. But it was after the Russo-German 
war that it made its great progress and came to hold an important position in 
our great continential policy. It has taken a natural course, differing essentially 
from the agressions of the Western European countries. 

It was necessary for Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy, 
countries which are facing similar critical situations, due to the political upheaval 
in the world, and both of whom possess a common world view. 

Our great continental policy in the present stage is also our world policy, 
and is based on the v.orld view harbored by us. For not only does it aim at the 
expansion and development of our national power, but also signifies our proposal 
for a world administi'ation. 

2. Japan's policy aims at the creation of a new world order and the establish- 
ment of a gi-eater East Asia mutual prosperity sphere. It has entered a new stage 
through the conclusion of the tripartite alliance. These three nations, which 
occupied opposite seats at the Paris Peace conference, have come to harbor the 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 195 

same historical mission, the same economic circumstances, and the same political 
aim. They have banded together against the serious opposition of the nations 
advocating the maintenance of the status quo. The creation of new orders in 
Europe and Asia are not only their war aims, but also the guiding principle of 
the creation of a new world. 

The principle acting as the support for the creation of a new world order has 
been provided by the words, "to regard the acquisition of appropriate territories 
by each of the nations as the sine qua non (necessity) for lasting peace." This 
principle is the correct basis for world partition, rather than the recognition 
of possession as legal from the fact that a nation got there first. The principle 
advocates the acquisition of appropriate territories by every nation of the world 
to enable it to exist on earth and not be shut off from space. It sets forth an 
idea of systematized order in place of the anarchical world order and world 
partition of today. 

Another fundamental support for the creation of a new world order is the 
mutual i-ecognition of the right of leadership for nations. Leadership as an 
ideology of order has definitely taken the place of the old idea of balance of power. 
In Europe, Germany and Italy are carrying on a war to wipe away the influence 
of Great Britain and put an end to her traditional policy of balance of power. 
Japan, who is the stabilizing power in East Asia, is showing a resolute determina- 
. tion and power to wipe away America's interference in the changing of the 
political situation. Their aims are the same. 

3. The great continental policy and the Pacific policy are inseparable. It was 
hoped that America would understand this ; but America gradually took over the 
receeding British interests, and after the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance, 
America denounced the Axis as aggressors and strengthened her aid to Britain. 
She has been rushing headlong toward war. An agreement has been concluded 
between Great Britain and America for America to oppose Japan's navy, with 
quotations from Prof. Fieldhouse of Canada and Prof. Whitney Griswold to prove 
it. This has brought Japan's sea supremacy to the front. Japan's great con- 
tinental policy aims to wipe away the intervention of third powers aiming to 
encircle Japan, dominate the China Seas, and also to terminate the clashes 
between the races of East Asia and their conquest by Europeans. 

4. The Sino-Japanese treaty of Oct. 30, 1940, concluded at Nanking, for the 
readjustment of relations, failed to bring aboiit complete peace despite the efforts 
of Wang Ching-Wei. But, as the manifestation of the pro-Japanese centralized 
government's collaboration toward the establishment of a new order in China, 
it unfolded a new phase in East Asia. The treaty does not discriminate between 
the winner and the loser and is based upon equality between Japan and China. 
It has furthered the formation of the East Asia bloc and strengthened the axis 
connecting Japan, Manchukuo and China, expanding their defense industries, 
building up their economy by acquiring and developing natural resources, and 
formed a union between Japan and China just short of military alliance. During 
the past half year the Chinese government has made progress by solving her finan- 
cial problems, monetary system, peace, and order problem, cultural problem 
(establishment of Nanking Central University), and is making great strides 
toward the resurection of a new China. There are many obstacles in the path 
of the Chinese government : to overcome the feeling of dependence upon Britain 
and America. But the penetration of the great Asiatic principle, proclaimed by 
Wang Ching-Wei, and the withdrawal of British and American influences, which 
actually can be seen, will make the people of China realize that they are the 
descendents of a great and free i)eopIe. 

Chungking has been continuing her resistance, hoping for America's support. 
But President Roosevelt's special envoy, Carey, must have detected that conditions 
in Chungking are very different from propaganda sent to America. Her economic 
power is exhausted, transportation routes are deficient, is in conflict with Chinese 
Red Army, and estranged from her emigrants abroad. She is being made to 
dance to the tune of the dying embers of the mistaken nationalism of the intellec- 
tual class and America's political expediency of regarding her as a stone of the 
anti-Japanese cordon. 

5. In August of last autumn, the landing of our troops in French Indo-China 
wrote a new page in the annals of the history of Asia. Loss of French influence 
led to demands by Thailand for the return of Laos and Cambodia territory. Be- 
hind the scene of Thailand and French Indo-China were Britain and America, with 
threats and warnings, siding with French Indo-China. Their attempts at recon- 
ciliation were rejected and America stopped the shipment of airplanes ordered by 
Thailand. A friendly neutrality agreement was signed between Japan and 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Thailand, since which relations have drawn closer, with the opening up of an 
airway, trade agreements, and use of Japanese technicians. Our country, which 
is determined to maintain the peace and tranquility of the greater East Asia 
sphere at all cost, proposed to arbitrate and mediate the clash between Thailand 
and French Indo-China, and when this was accepted, held the peace conference 
at Tokyo. After about a month, this resulted in the acceptance of an impartial 
peace on March 11. This had profound significance, strengthening the tie among 
the three nations and making Japan's position of leadership in greater East Asia 
firmer and unshakable. Moreover, it enhanced the racial consciousness of the 
oppressed races of Southern Asia and installed in them hope. Thailand was able 
to push aside Britain's influence. Thailand is the spear to stab at Malaya and 
the Dutch East Indies, which are embraced within Japan's greater East Asia 
policy, and to the north of Thailand lies Burma, which is the gateway of India, 
while to the east lies Indo-China, which is an undeveloped treasurehouse and 
embraces Camranh Bay. All of the races of southern Asia have been robbed 
of their real eyes by the propaganda of Britain and America. But since they 
commonly entertain a righteous indignation against the conquerors and oppres- 
sors, it is exi)ected that a time will come when they eventually will revolt. 

6. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and mediation of the 
Thailand-French Indo-China border clash, which occurred during the past 
half year, after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement, have made a great 
stride toward the creation of a new world order. Our relations with the Dutch 
East Indies are still being negotiated. Our country has decided to break 
with the status quo of Britain and America and fight resolutely against their 
antagonistic interference. The most urgent matter for us is to pay strictest 
attention to changing phases of the International situation and not take our 
eyes away from the political, economic, and military attacks against the Axis 
nations. America's anti-Japanese policy is of an unprecidented positive nature, 
and is changing from economic oppression to military coercion. Our conti- 
nental policy should be made the core of our national defense. So long as the 
execution of our peaceful southward expansion is not threatened, our country 
will leave their military bases (such as Singapore )i alone. More important 
than anything else is making the western Pacific and the South China sea 
"our waters", impi-egnable to the enemies. We should be aware of the fact 
that not only does the supremacy of the seas depend upon the actual strength 
of our fleet, but upon the number of naval bases and their position, our mer- 
chant fleet, our production power, and our strategic raw materials. Since that 
which would likely happen in the event of an emergency is protracted blockade 
warfare, it is an urgent matter to include the south in the generalized economy 
plan of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. The first work should be to awaken 
within the races of East Asia, who are suffering from the exploitation and 
oppression of the American and Englishman, their racial consciousness as 
Asiatics and encourage them to combine and unite. 

The consummation of the Sino-Japanese treaty is to Wang Ching-wei like 
the discovery of a lighthouse. He is advancing along these brilliant rays 
toward lasting peace. But there are several hundred million people of Asia 
still wandering about in darkness. But their eyes are fixed on our moves to 
bring about the creation of a new order in East Asia, even through the smoke 
screen spread by the Englishman and the American. If a light to which 
th^ can really turn is not hung out today, our mission of resurrection of 
East Asia will become exceedingly diflicult. Foreign Minister Komura's 
diplomatic plan embraced the resurrection of the races of East Asia. I think 
the arousing into action of a leader burning with the spirit of an adventurer 
from the races under bonds! is not far away, and I cannot help but look for- 
ward to the glorious day of welcoming him. 

SECRET 

Headquarters Hawahan Department 
inter-staff routing slip 

The Inter-J?taf£ Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the 
Department C/A, the B & LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be 
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Ofl5ce 
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, witli the 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 197 

exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant 
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a 
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement (list 
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made 
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon 
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer 
authorized to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. From and Date 


To 


Subject: WD Radio, 20 October 1941, 
of Japanese Situation". 


"Estimate 




1st Ind. AG 20 Oct 41 


C/S 

AG 


1 Incl - 


R. H. D. 


3rd Ind G-2 21 Oct. 41 


Noted. Unci. N/C 


K. J. F. 









Signal Corps, United States Army 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE. 

Secret 

8 WVY EC 47 WD WASHN DC 1234P OCT 20 1941 

20th Following War Dept estimate of Japanese situation for your informa- 
tion stop tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no! 
repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent 

Adams. 

1937A 

Keceived as a secret communication. 

Decoded by : LT G E HAVEN 1150A OCT 20 1941 
• Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 20th." 



To : Contact office noted by General Short & Col Phillips, new Acting C of S. 
C/S HHD 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D. 
Army Contact Office, 
Honolulu, T. H. 
Time and date : 1200 25 Oct. 1941. 

G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation 

1. Sunmiary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the Inter- 
national (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no funda- 
mental changes in the iuteruatioual situation, centering on Japan, since the 
time mentioned ; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with con- 
temporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known _ 
to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. 
However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this 
time: 

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the 
Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly 
precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapproachement negotiations be- 
tween America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightest" elements 
who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful 
opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia. 

ft. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together 
with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate 
the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye 
cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost imme- 
diately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo. 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared 
their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — which automatically underscores 
Japan's policies with "intensified aggression" ; definitely places Japan in a camp 
hostile to the United States and other democracies ; makes all protestations of 
peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into 
a state of constant vigilance — but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent 
that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done. 

2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. 
However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to 

take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course 
of events in question in the near future. These are : 

a. The formation of a new Japanese ''War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Min- 
ister, General Tojo. 

b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three 
Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded 
Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands. 

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations 
with the United States. 

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic 
ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai. 

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladi- 
vostok as a part of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of 
Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments. 

/. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation 
with the new cabinet. 

3. Justifications for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evalua- 
tion of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as con- 
clusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situa- 
tion as subsequent events and special situations are preented : 

a. New Calinet. Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other 
noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that 
General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man 
considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave 
olf any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become 
definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rap- 
prochement negotiations with tlie United States. 

b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to per- 
mit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded 
nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as 
a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and 
military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove 
Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military 
operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Jap- 
anese nationals from America and American territories. 

c. Rapprochement Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has 
openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — definitely our 
enemy — we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations 
as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential 
enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be 
preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously con- 
sidered. 

d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. This action on 
the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also 
appears fully justified — realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an 
exponent and ally of Hitler. 

e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two 
issues are here involved-: 

(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue 
to face Hitler across the English channel, across the Atlantic, or on American 
shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to 
hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. 
Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on 
incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts 
for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



199 



would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet 
in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been 
entirely ruled out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be 
not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later. 

(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivos- 
tok lias been one of the major issues' between America and Japan recently, the 
abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a 
longer period ; and, in case of an unforseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, 
might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan 
desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis were useless, 
and that a compromise with the democrocies has become inevitable. 

Confidential 

f. Nomura's report to 'New CaMnet. This is considered a very noi'mal pro- 
cedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a 
review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American 
attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he 
may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not 
even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a 
subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity 
of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction. 

Remarks. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question. When will 
Japan move? — a question which no one dares predict with certaifity. However, 
the following points are considered to be wortlj^' of mentioning : 

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for 
approximately another month are: . 

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded 
nationals of both countries to their respective homelands. 

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the 
new cabinet. 

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue 
.rapprochement negotiations. 

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against 
Russia very risky before spring. 

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did 
immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the 
"rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again 
hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a 
tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow 
(?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a 
rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow. 

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito 
to coavoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at 
which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on 
international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's 
message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations. 

6. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made 
before the latter part of November — in any direction — with a chance that the 
great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring. 

George W. Bicknell, 
George W. Bicknexl, 

Lt. Col., G. 8. O., 
Asst.A.C.ofS.,G-2, 

Contact Officer. 
Distribution : 

C/S H. H. D. 

G-2 H. H. D. 

G-3 H. H. D. 

G-2 Schofield Barracks 

G-2 24th Div. 

G-2 25th Div. 

F. B. I. (2) 

O. N. I. (2) 

Capt. Bryan, Trans. Sect. 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

27 Oct. 1941. 
Subject G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation 
G-2 IJL 
Assistant G-2 
C/I DBL 

Public Relations HGU 
Contact Officer Bofile 
File C/S & G-3 Dept. direct 
Remarks Nothing re Hawaii. 
G-2, HHD 

CONFIDENTIAIi 

Issuing Office : G-2, H. H. D., 
Army Contact Office, 
Honolulu, T. H. 
Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941. 

- Gr-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation 

1. Summary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the Inter- 
national (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no funda- 
mental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the 
time mentioned ; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with con- 
temporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are knovni 
to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. 
However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this 
time : 

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the 
Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly 
precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations be- 
tween America and Japan, and by exti'eme pressure from "rightist" elements 
who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful 
opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia. 

&. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, to- 
gether with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to ac- 
centuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the 
Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost 
immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General 
Tojo. 

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared 
their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — which automatically under- 
scores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression" ; definitely places Japan 
in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies ; makes all pro- 
testations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion ; and forces 
America into a state of constant vigilance — but at least clarifies the situation 
to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what 
should be done. 

2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. 
However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take 
place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of 
events in question in the near f utui'e. These are : 

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minis- 
ter, General Tojo. 

&. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three 
Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded 
Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands. 

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with 
the United States. 

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic 
ports in the north Pacific, including Shangliai. 

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivos- 
tok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Arch- 
angel as the sole point of entry for such shipments. 

/. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return' to Japan for consultation 
with the new cabinet. 

3. J ustift cations for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evalu- 
ation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as con- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 201 

elusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusion on the general situa- 
tion as subsequent events and special situations are presented : 

a. New Cabinet. Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other 
noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that 
General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the 07ily man 
considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave 
off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become 
definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapproche- 
ment negotiations with the United States. 

&. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to permit 
three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of 
both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure 
to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. 
It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals 
from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that 
section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from 
America and American territories. 

c. Rapprocliement 'Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has 
openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — definitely our 
enemy — we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as 
her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. 
From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by 
concrete evidence of sincerity before the can be seriously considered. 

d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. -This action on 
the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also ap- 
pears fully justified — realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an ex- 
ponent and ally of Hitler. 

e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two 
issues are here involved : 

(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to 
face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, 
centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold 
the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys 
to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental 
to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the 
remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would be re- 
quired over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, 
any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled 
out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake 
a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later. 

(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok 
has been one of the major issues between American and Japan recently, the aban- 
donment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer 
period ; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might 
provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to 
change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a 
compromise with the democracies has become inevitable. 

f. Nomura's report to Neiv Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure 
with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review 
of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word in the American attitude. 
If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return 
to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assvmiption that he may not even be re- 
placed. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate 
to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situ- 
ation. This is not, however, a prediction. 

Remarks. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question. When will 
Japan move? — a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, 
the following points ai*e considered to be worthy of mentioning : 

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for 
approximately another month are : 

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of 
stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands. ■ 

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the 
new cabinet. 

(3J. Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue 
rapprochement negotiations. 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against 
Russia very risky before spring. 

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did 
immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the 
"rightists" 'who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again 
hesitate to take the final plimge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus 
a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow 
(?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a 
rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow. 

^6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to 
convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at 
which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on 
international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's 
message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations. 
6. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made 
before the latter part of November — in any direction — with a chance that the great 
break, if it comes, will not occur before spring. 
Distribution : George W. Bicknell 

C/S H. H. D. George W. Bicknell, 

G-2 H. H. D. Lt. Col., G. S. C, 

G-3 H. H. D. ■ AssT. A. C. of S., G-2, 

G-2 Schofield Barracks Contact Officer. 

G-2 24th Div. 
G-2 25th Div. 
F. B. I. (2) 
O. N. I. (2) 
Capt. Bryan. Trans. Sect. 



JVIID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept. 

Confidential 

War Department, 
War Department General Staff, 

MlUTABY INTEXLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2, 

Washington, D. C, November 5, 1941. 
Subject : Letter of transmittal. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department 
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such 
action as you consider advisable. 

Sherman Miles, 
Sherman Miles, 
Brigadier General, V. S. Army, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2. 
1 Enclosures : 

336. 1903-41) — MID Summ. of info, re Information received from the 
Orient : dtd. FMH 



16 
FMH 

Confidential 

WAR DEPARTMENT 
M. I. D. 

November 3, 1941. 
Subject : Information Received from the Orient. 
Summary of Information : 

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, 
is considered reliable : 

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon 
Society, told of an onder issued by War Minister TO JO (now Premier) "to 
complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 203 

All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The 
full preparation to be completed in November." 

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States 
would best begin in December or in February." 

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet 
would likely start war within sixty days." 

G2 Note : Full name of iridividual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is 
reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and 
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section. 
Distribution : Evaluation — 

All Corps Areas of source : X Reliable 

All Departments . of information : Credible X 

Alaska 

FBI 

ONI 

STATE 

File 

Source: Dr. Cho 

Date of original paper 10/28/41 

p. m. s. 

I. B. Cognizant 



Urgent Cable Received From Manila Night of Deo. 3, 1941 

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments 
in Indo-China : 

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways. 

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and con- 
siderable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm). 

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washing- 
ton Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here. 

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities 
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at 
present but will act in South. 

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu, 
cc. Col. Bicknell 

Mr. Shivers 

Capt. Mayfleld 

TOP SBKREJT ULTRA 

From London, 31st August 1945 

ULTRA IMPORTANT 

GOR 682 from GCCS 11279 
Following from C. S. S. for Jones. 

A. Colonel Wilkinson who was stationed at Manila and is now with 48000 and 
temporarily in U. K., was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. 
Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department U. S. Army, in connection with 
investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbour disaster. 
He carried credentials from Secretary of War. 

B. He brought copies of 2 telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November 
26th and December 2nd, which were as follows : 

1. "November 26th, 1941. Most Immediate. Secret Source (usually relia- 
ble) reports: 

( a ) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st with- 
out any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bang- 
kok and Singapore. 

(b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. 
Main landing point to be in Songkhla area valuation for above is number 3 
repeat 3 (i. e., only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy). American 
military and naval intelligence Manila informed." 

2. "December 3rd, 1941. Most Immediate. 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(a) We have received considerable intelligence confirming following devel- 
opments in Indo-China: 

(I) Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways. 

( II ) Arrival since November 10th of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops 
and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 mm) . 

(b) Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed to 
Washington November 21st by American Military Intelligence here. 

(c) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities 
with Britain and United States. Japan does not repeat not intend attack 
Russia at present but will act in south. You may inform Chiefs of American 
Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu." 

C. Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para. C. of telegram of December 
2nd, and in particular, whether this was in "fepecial" category. In point of fact, 
para C. loas based on a B. J. Wilkinson was unaware of source and passed informa- 
tion to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications. 

D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agent's re- 
ports, but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C. 

E. You should consult with G-2, as security Ultra at stake if this evidence 
made public. 

Wt 55959/7940 30m 3/45 Wa & Co 51/3 

Reference Sheett 

Personal 
Admiralty 

TOP SECRET 

From: Commander (I. C), Admiralty, Dated: 16th July, 1945. 
S. W. I. To : Captain Hastings. 

A/2277 
Herewith copies of both messages referred to on the telephone this morning, 
Monday. 

Commander (I. C.) 

Secret message IN 

From : C. O. I. S. Singapore. Date 8.12.41. 

Received: 0113 
Naval Cypher (D) by W/T 

Addressed Admiralty (for D. of N. I.) Navy Board Melbourne. Navy Boiard 
Wellington, S. O. (I) Hong Kong. N. S. H. Q. Ottawa. 

AID AC 

Information received at 2010Z 7th by Hong Kong that severence of Japanese 
relations ? admitted imminent. 

2312Z/7 
D. N. I. (4) 
O. I. C. (3) 
D. S. D. 9 
File X 



Most Secret message IN 

1746Z/7th December. 
From : C. O. I. S. Singapore Date 7.12.41. 

Reed. 2112 
Naval Cypher O. T. T. by W/T 

Addressed Admiralty (D. N. I.) 
Immediate 

Personal from Consular Special Intelligence dated 7th December. Tokyo 
inform all Consulates that relations between Japan and Great Britain and United 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 205 

States are critical. Comment. Message from codeword from table for warning 
telegram. ' 

1746Z/7 
Advance copy sent O. I. C. 

D. N. I. (4) Personal 
O. I. C. (3) 
D. S. D. 9 



Copy of Cable Received Nov. 27, 1941 

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that, 

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1, 
without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between 
Bangkok and Singapore. 

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main land- 
ing point to be in Songkhla area. 

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 percent probable 
accuracy). 

AMerican Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila, informed. 
Copies to : Mr. Shivers 

Capt. Mayfield 

Col. Bicknell. 



6-1 

Saturday, 11 October 1941 

23251 /To KIMURA at P. Hotel, on private line:/ K. and girl, /reception 

poor/ They are apparently very good friends. Their conversation is 

about the dispatch of ships to the U. S. K says that X has rSceived 

a cable re these ships. The Sumitomo Bank and certain other firms 

will send staff members back. Perhaps TAKAGISHI will go, too. K. 

goes on to say in English that it may happen "at any moment". /She 
says goodbye and hangs up. He waits quite some time before hanging 
up. It is apparent that K. is drunk and not in full possession of whatever 
faculties he possesses. There was no lovey-dovey talk, however, as in 
the case of TAKAGISHI. K. is convinced that he may be recalled at 
any moment and is very sad about it./ 

END 



l-5.',0 



SECRET 

Sunday, November 30 
No activity 

• Monday, December 1, 1941 

1000 to RCA, for messenger 

1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be 
sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. $45.82. 
They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but 
SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not 
being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation 
is. (Doubt if S does either !) 

1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi de- 
spatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. 
First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not 
had any information from Tokyo to prepare for possible closing (he 
says). He saw "a few lines" in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks 
the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self. 

1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. 
This morning /it was set ?/ at 9:30 — no 10. At X? Yes. /This con- 
versation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./ 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling. 

1326 o YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the 

ofBce. /Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/ 
1330 for NAKASHIMA. Date with her. 
1352 o to a girl. NI 
1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out When back? 8 or 4. Well then please 

/have him call me? First part was missing/. 



NYK-S 



SECRET 
TXJESDAY, Decembee 2, 1941 



0830 ? Discussion of the diflJcult situation i-esulting from the suspension /of 
trade?/ Seems to shift to boats or planes. One says something about 
"doing it on the 14th" and the other says the Matson sailings of the 5th 
and the 19th are out. Also the airways present a financial problem. The 
next Matson sailing after is in January. There are no $110 rooms. Some 
more talk, most of which I can't get, but I think they are talking about 
what to do with special reference to getting away. Part with the admo- 
nition by one "not to talk too much about war." 

0950 i His girl to YOSHIOKA. Stolen sweets are the best, but the boss came 
back in the midst ! 

1052 i YOSHI. Gives girl number 98471 and name Shizuto NISHI /Mrs. Nishi's 
husband). 

1119 i YOSHI from pal /to play something or do something/ "Not today." 
Tomorrow? OK/ 

1155 o to girl. This is NYK. Can you come to the ofBce. 

1158 ordering oyako dombun and other food. 

1435 to FUKUDA from YOSHIOKA. Not in /He was !/ 

1436 i to YOSHIOKA from FUKUDA about insurance. Personal. 
1457 i Mr. Lee calling for Mr. Nishi. 

At 4 p.m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December 2nd 
inst. I bade my adieu to you my friend of 22 months standing. Darn if 
I won't miss you ! ! 

Requiescat in Peace. 

Y-1 J-1 



20 Apr 45 
FBI files 

6.5-414 phone intercepts 19 Aug-2 Dec. 41. 
65-414 " " 18 Aug-1 May 41. 

65-414 " " 30 Apr 41-2 Dec 40. 



2-291— 

Monday, November 17, 1941 

0945 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse re- 
actions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K./ K. says /I think/ 
that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas px'opa- 
ganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have. 
Not in Japanese either. 

1117 i FPM. Fragment 

1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. $10,000, $12,000 /the amount they 
have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they 
figure the taxes, the bond, and all. 

1817 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very 
brief, 

— WND — 



NYK-S 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 207 



Monday, November 24, 1941- 



0847 o YOSHIOKA for ? NYK has received a confidential dispatch. Dictates. 
Translation of the dispatch was made with further details eked out 
from the NJ for 11-24-41 as follows. 

As soon as preparations are completed, the government has de- 
cided to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to Los Angeles, Balboa and 
the southern regions, the exact time of departure and other 
details to be announced later, but the Jiji story says she will sail 
from Yokohama by the end of the month. The Jiji story men- 
tions the 380 Japanese of Panama who are the "victims" of the 
shut out policy of the government. Anyway, it is clear that a 
boat will be sent. 
0902 o To RCA from YOSHIOKA— NYK. Mrs. NISHI has left, so if there is 
any wire after hours, please call Mr. T. YOSHIOKA, 75055. If not 
home, call T. TAKEI, Makiki Hotel 67692 (private line). 
0908 o To Commercial Pacific Cable Co. from YOSHIOKA explaining same 

thing as above. 
0933 o YOSHIOKA to girl in Togawa's office. Mostly friendly chatter, but he 
tells her that a boat is going to L. A. and BalbOa. She says she can- 
not talk too much /probably the boss is around!/ What's he going 
to do? Oh he'll work around. Y. thinks things are going to be all 
right now since the Tatsuta is coming. 

KNO 



Signal Cokps, United States Army 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE. 
Secret 

PI WAR PRTY WASHN DC 611PM NOV 27 1941 
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH 

472 27th Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might 
come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictible but 
hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat 
cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first 
overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as 
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop 
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnais- 
sance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be 
carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or dis- 
close intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will 
carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop 
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential 
officers. 

Marshall. 
116P/27 

Decoded by : Lt. J. H. Babcock, SC, 222P Nov 27, 1941. 

Received as Secret communication. 

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 472 27TH." 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 Novemher 1941. 
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General : 

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority. 

Thomas H. Green, 
Thomas H. Green, 
Lt. Col., J. A. G. D., 
Department Judge Advocate. 
Sent as Radiogram No. 986— 29th. 

Approved for Transmission : 

O. M. McDole, 
O. M. McDoLE, 

Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL 
WAR DEPARTMENT ' 
WASHINGTON D C 

Re your secret radio four eight two AG 383.4/13 twenty eighth comma full 
precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of 
investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid so 
thirty dash forty-five end paren and military establishments including personnel 
and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of mili- 
tary reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway 
bridges comma this lieadquarters by confidential letter dated June Nineteen Nine- 
teen Forty One requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers 
vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in 
effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military 
and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to pre- 
vent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc 
stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June Twentieth 
confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to fur- 
nish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary 
to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith 
comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the 
Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military pro- 
tection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this con- 
nection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of 
Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which per- 
mits the Commanding Genei'al Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or 
restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and 
county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action 
necessary in the interest of national defense stop The authority thus given has 
not yet been exercised stop Relations with FBI and all other federal and terri- 
torial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given 
on all pertinent matters. 

Shoet. 

ENC SEC BY 

LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC 
2 : 45P 29 NOV 41 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 209 

Headquahtebs Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 21 November 1941. 
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General : 

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority. 

Walter C. Phillips, 
Walter C. Phillips, 

Colonel G. 8. C, 

Chief of Staff. 
Sent as Radiogram, No. 959— 27th. 
CHIEF OF STAFF 
WAR DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON DC 

Reurad four seven two to C/S 27 Nov 41 twentyseventh report department 
alerted to prevent sabotage Period Liaison with Navy 

Short. 
ENC SEC BY 

LT JOS ENGELBBRTZ SC 
5 : 40P 27 NOV 41 

Secret Routing 4 December 1941. 

#1033^th 

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES 

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in Agwar four 
eight four dash twenty eighth colon instructions contained in subject radiogram 
issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on 
twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received 
comma and continues to receive detailed and comprehensive attention as result 
of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July forty one 
Stop Para 

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram sub- 
stantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions 
of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of 
stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December stop In- 
crease in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite 
overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress 
Stop This entire departmeni is now operating and will continue to operate 
Under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para 

Secrecy discipline being given all emphases practicable through official and 
quasi official agencies Stop Wort? has actually begun on essential protec- 
tive fencing and flood lighting projects Stop Para 

With reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather 
than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squad- 
ron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possible in 
form of development and expansion of foreword to soldier's handbook comma FM 
twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of 
relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citi- 
zen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government 
comma structure of Government comma place of military establishment in the 
structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international 
comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to Demo- 
cratic form Stop Signed Martin End 

Short. 

Signal Cokps, United States Army 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE. 
Secret 

1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P 
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH 

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today 
what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code 
79716— 46— Ex. 158 15 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we 
do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of 
this communication 

Marshall. 

Decoded by : Lt J H Babcock, 251P, Dec. 7, 1941. 

Received as a secret communication. 

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th." 



Heim>quarters Hawaiian Db^'Artment, 

Fort Shaffer, T. H., 7 December 1941. 
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General : 

Request that the following secret ofBcial radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority. 

C. A. FowEix, * 
Lt. Coh, 
Dcpt. 8ig. Off. 
Sent as Radiogram No. 1057 — 7th. 
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL 
WAR DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON D C 

Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field 
Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least 
three hangars Wheeler Field three hangers Hickam Field and to planes caught on 
ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over one hour Stop 
Unconfirmed report that three ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Stop 
Marine airfield EWA also badly damaged Stop More details later. End 

Short. 
ENO SECRET URGENT BY 
LT G LENNOX SO 
950A 7 DEC 1941 



Headquarters Hawail^n Department, 

Foi-t Shafter, T. E., 7 December 1941. 

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General: 

Request that the following secret oflScial radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority. 

Earnest Moore, 

3Iajor, A. C, 
Actng., Chief of Staff. 
Sent as Radiogram No. 1068— 7th. , " 
CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES 
WASHINGTON DC 

Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor attacked simultaneously by Japa- 
nese dive bombers for one hour beginning eight oclock seventh December damage 
severe Stop Have left seven repeat seven B dash seventeen comma six repeat 
six B dash eighteen comma eight repeat eight A dash twenty comma forty repeat 
forty pursuit Stop Main part dpot destroyed but limited repair and supply 
facilities remaining Stop Runways Hickam not damaged Stop Request all 
possible reinforcement heavy bombardment fully equipped Stop Planes to ar- 
rive here during hours of darkness Stop Additional ground personnel will be 
needed as large part of Air Corps troops are being used in close in defense and 
anti sabotage guards Stop Additional fighters should be immediately dis- 
patched by carrier together with such dive bombers as can be made available 
Stop Spare parts should be furnished for all types as there are no stocks on 
hand Stop Signed Martin. 

Short. 
ENC SEC BY 

LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC 
6:50P7DBC41 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



211 



Signal Corps, United States Akmy 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE. 
Secret 

P 10 WAR HS 70 WD PRIORITY WASHINGTON DC llOp SEC 8 1941. 
COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FT SHAFTER T H 

543 8th TO SHORT PROM ARNOLD ALL REPORTS SHOW THIAT IN 
JAPANESE ATTACKS NUMBERS OF OUR PLANES HAVE BEEN DE- 
STROYED ON THE GROUND STOP TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS AT 
ONCE TO AVOID SUCH LOSSES IN YOUR AREA INCLUDING PROMPT 
TAKEOFF ON WARNING COMMA DISPERSION TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE 
EXTENT COMMA AND CONSTRUCTION OF PARAPETS 

Adams. 
930P/8/3 

[Written:] Ans to the radio delivered to M/C CP 11:55 am Dec 10th. for 
dispatch. 

Rie 

Decoded by : LT. G. E. Haven, 1005P Dec 8 1941. 

Received as a secret communication. 

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 543 8th" 



Headquarters Hawaiian Department 
inter-staff routing slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the 
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be 
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office 
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the 
exception that matters concerning personnel wiU be routed through the Adjutant 
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a 
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list 
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made 
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will 
be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer 
authorized to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. From 
and Date 



1st Ind.: AQ, 9 Dec 41.. 



2d Ind.: 

C/S, 12/9/41. 
A/0, 12/9/41. 



To 



C/S.. 

AirO 

CS... 



Subject: WD Radio #541, 8 Dec 41 
"Ground Personnel needed & re 
impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft 
by Carrier" 



Radio referred to attached. 2 Incl.: 
WD Radio #541-8, HHD Radio 
#1068-7. 



Information. 
Noted 



4773, R. H. D. R. H. D. 
6 Dec 1941. A. a. 



W. C. P. 

J. A. M. 



Radio WD529 Received Filed at Wash D C 12 : 18 P M Washington tiime 
(or 6: 48A Haw time) (ac RCA 1549WS) 

Received by RCA at Honolulu 7 : 33 A M 

Delivered to Signal Office at 11 : 45 A M not marked priority. Other priority 
mesages handled first 

Delivered to decoding officer 2 : 40 P M decoded and delivered to Col Dunlop 
2 : 50 P M 

Delivered to Capt Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P M 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Re your five four nine. 

Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning 
seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh 
paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered 
message received by adjutant general HqHawDept two fifty eight, afternoon 
seventh (received by Chief of Staff HqHawDept three o'clock afternoon seventh 
all Hawaiian) 

Shoet. 

10 Dec 1941. 
Statement of Wm. B. Cobb, Capt. J. A. G. D. 

On the evening of Sat. Dec. 6th, 1941, Mrs. Cobb and I had returned from 
Schofield Bks., about midnight, and were invited to spend the night at Hickam 
Field, with some friends, Lt. F. O. Brown, and his sister, at their quarters in 
that post. We were awakened at 7 : 55 the following morning by the attack 
by enemy planes on Pearl Harbor and Hickman Field. The attacks Gontinued 
intermittently thruout the morning, and we assisted in such ways as we could, 
to care for fhe dead and wounded, until about noon. At that time, I left Hickam 
Field and proceeded to Ft. Shafter, reporting upon arrival, to my superior, Col. 
T. H. Green, Dept. Judge Advocate. Volunteer nurses were needed at Tripler 
General Hospital, and Col. Green made the arrangements for Mrs. Cobb to help 
there in that work. After taking her to the hospital, I was directed to report 
to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., at Ft Shafter, for duty, which I did 
at 1 : 20 P. M., Dec. 7th, 1941. 

Upon assuming my duties in the office of the Chief of Staff, I immediately 
began to keep a personal record of the activities in the office, pursuant to rosy 
instructions, and as a matter of ordinary oflice routine, which record I now 
have. The telephone system was explained to me, and I was occupied for some 
time, becoming familiar with the office. The situation was of course, very 
intense, and numerous officers were calling on the Chief of Staff throughout 
the afternoon. Col. Green, accompanied by Maj. Hanley, of the Judge Advocate's 
office were in about 2 P M, and shortly thereafter, left to go to the Crater, t^ 
confer with Gen. Short. Col. Phillips was busy with long distance phone calls 
to Washington, at least one of which I understood to be completed. Some 
officer, whose name I do not know, called in person to report to the Chief of 
Staff on the situation at Hickam Field. At about 3 P. M., a secret radio message 
was received by the Chief of Staff, which was shown to me, and which referred 
to the fact that the Japanese were serving what amounted to an ultimatum, 
at one o'clock P. M. that day. We were unable to understand the mesasge, 
inasmuch as the Japanese had made and concluded their assault on Pes^rl 
Harbor and Hickam Field, approximately seven hours previously. In discussing 
the message with Col. Phillips, he remarked that this "must be the message to 
which Gen. Marshall was referring, and which he asked me if I had received." 
As I recall, the message was dated and stamped as having been sent from Wash- 
ington at 12 : 18 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941. I am positive that the message was not 
received by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department before 2 : 55 P. M. Dec. 
7th, 1941, at the earliest. Shortly thereafter, I heard the Chief of Staff phone 
the contents of the message to Gen. Short at the Crater, near Ft. Shafter. 



An additional message was prepared by Col. Phillips, the contents of which 
I do not know, and I was directed to proceed to Pearl Harbor with the secret 
message and the second message, and deliver both to Admiral Kimmel. I left 
Ft. Shafter in an official car atj 5 : 42 P. M. and rushed to Admiral Kimmel's 
headquarters, where I delivered both messages to his Chief of Staff, Capt. Davis, 
with whom I conversed for some time. There was more discussion about the 
time of the secret message and we attempted to account for the delay in trans- 
mittal. Thereafter. Admiral Kimmel wrote, in longhand, a message to Gen. 
Short, consisting of three pages of notepaper about 5 by 7 inches in size, the 
last of the three being about one half filled with the writing. This message he 
showed to two other Admirals who were conferring with him, sealed the same, 
and delivered to me with instructions to deliver it to Gen. Short at once. Before 
I left Pearl Harbor, an officer whose name is Delaney, but whose rank I do not 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 213 

know, as he was in civilian clothes, gave me a message concerning the naval 
vessels which were to enter the harbor that night, so that our coastal batteries 
would not fire on them. I then returned, with the three messages — the pink 
secret message, the Admiral's note, and Delaney's advice, to Ft. Shatter, where 
I arrived at 4 : 16 P. M. I delivered the messages to CoJ. Phillips, who opened the 
Admiral's note, and after reading it, again sealed it with sealing wax, with the 
assistance of Mr. Emmons in the office, and directed me to take it to the General 
in the Crater at once, which I did. After reading the message. Gen. Short called 
Col. I'hillips and told him in substance, "I've read the Admiral's note, and will 
keep it in my personal possession." He then asked me my name, which I gave 
him, and he directed me to return to Ft. Shafter. The time of my arrival there 
was 4 : 40 P. M., after which my attention was occupied by other matters. 

Wm. M. Cobb, 
Capt. JAGD., Ft. Shafter. 

Signal Corps, United Statks Army 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE 

Secret 

103 WAR HS 144 WD WASHIN DC 112SP DEC 8 1941 
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH 

541 Sth Attention General Fred Martin Stop Clarify ground personnel needed 
as requested in secret radio one zero six eight dated December seven Stop 
The Commanding General Hawaiian Department has been informed of status 
of ground reinforcements Stop Close in defense and antisabotage guard 
should be supplied by Commanding General Hawaiian Department Stop State 
whether personnel I'equested is Air Corps or ground personnel Stop It is im- 
possible to dispatch fighter aircraft by carrier Stop Additional P dash forty 
and P dash thirty nine types of aircraft are crated for shipment Stop Final 
decision reference heavy bombardment for Hawaii is being made this date Stop 
Notification later. 

Adams. 
955P/8/8 

Received as a secret communication. 

Decoded by: S Sgt D L Smith, S CI 115A 9 December 1941. 

Answer should me marked "Answer to Code Message No. 541 Sth." 



Headqttaiitees Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 19U- 
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General. 

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority. 

E. Moore, 
E. Moore, 
E. Moore, 
' Major, Air Corps, 

Chief of Staff. 

Sent as Radiogram No. 1078 — Sth. 

Chief op the Army Aib Fobices, 

Washington, D. C: 
More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold semicolon 
command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dis- 
persion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers comma bombers 
can not be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint 
agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for 
help when thought necessary Stop Of planes in ferry flight all landed Oahu 
two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gun 
fire and one badly damaged Stop Attack was a perfectly executed surprise 
attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bombing was highly 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

accurate Stop Every effort made with few bombers left to locate carriers without 
success Stop Casualties dead six officers two hundred seven enlisted comma 
wounded some seriously three sixty seven enlisted Stop Morale high End 
Martin. 

8HOBT. 

Enc Sec by 

Lt J H Babcock. (Handwritten :) J. B. 

526P Dec 8 1941. 

Note : 

(Handwritten :) RCA-1549 WS. Delivered to Sig Office 11 : 45 not marked Pri- 
ority to decoding Officer 240P. 

Signal Cokps, United States Akmy 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code: 

Secret Confidential Restricted 

P 3 WAR L 54 WD 1 EXTRA URGENT WASHINGTON DC 219P DEC 9 1941 
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER T H 

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our 
number five two nine Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact 
time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by what staff 
office received. 

CoLTON, Acting. 

(Handwritten:) 529 delivered to C/S 300 PM 7 Dec— receipted for by capt 
Trueman delivered by Mr Hough ; 2.58 PM Col Dunlop) 733A Honolulu, T. H. 

Received as a secret communication. 

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910 AM Dec 9 1941. (Handwritten:) LGF 

(Handwritten:) Filed 12:18 PM Wash or 6:48 Hon time. Received RCA 
Honolulu 7 : 33 A. 



Hel&dquakteks Hawaiian Depaetment, 
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 9 December 1941. 

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General. 

Request that the following Secret — Extra Urgent official radiogram be sent. 
This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either 
in the clear or having a different security classification. 
This message is priority. 

Walter C. Phillips, 
Walter C. Phillips, 

2:00 P. 
Sent as Radiogram No. 1087 — 9th. 

Approved for transmission : 

U. M. McDole, 
U. M. MoDoLE, 
Major, A. G. D. 
Assistant Adjutant Oeneral. 
Chief Signal Officer, " 

Washington, D. C: 
Re your five four niiie radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA seven 
thirty three morning seventh Stop. This message delivered signal office Fort 
Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but 
within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant 
general Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh. 

Short. 
Enc. Sec. Extra Urgent by 
(Handwritten:) LGF 
Lt L G Forbes SC 
315P Dec. 9 1941 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 215 

HJEIADQUAKTEES HawAHAN DePAETMENT, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 9 Decemlter I941. 

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General. 

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is priority. 

Walter C. Phillips, 

Walter C. Phillips, Col., GSC. 

Chief of Staff. 
Sent as radiogram No. 1094 — ^9th. 

Major General H. H. Abnoid, 

War Department, Washington, D. C: 
Re telephone conversation today with Phillips am satisfied. 

Shoet. 
Enc Sec by 

Lt G Lennox, S O, 
730 p 9 Dec. 1941 

Headquabteks Hawahan Department, 
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 1941. 

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General. 

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is priority. 

Walter C. Phillips, 

Walter C. Philups, Col., GSC. 

Chief of Staff. 
Sent as radiogram No. 1112 — 11th. 
The Adjutant General, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. : 
Reference is made to employment of troops at Christmas comma Canton 
comma Fiji and New Caledonia Stop. Is the prohibition in Public Resolution 
number ninety six forbiding the use of units and individuals outside the limits 
of the United States and possessions thereof rescinded by the declaration of 
war End. 

Short. 
Enc Sec by D. E. G. 

(Handwritten:) Lt De George SO ' 

1930 11 Dec 41 



secket 

Headquarters Hawaiian Depabtment 

intek-staff routing slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including 
the Department C/A and B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental 
Staff inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office 
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the 
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant 
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a 
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list 
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made 
by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer 
authorized to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. From 
and Date 



To 



Subject: Radio — Merle Smith 



1st Ind., AO, 12/11/41... 
2d Ind., C/S, 12/11/41... 



C/S. 
AG. 



1. The attached radio reed thru HAF 

facilities. ■ 
File , 



R. L. M., W. G. 
W. C. P. 



SECRET 



Signal Cokps, United States Aemy 



A-64 



11 Dec. 1941. 



1 F8U2 PY IMPORTANT GR231 
To : Commanding General Honolulu. 
From : Merle Smith 18 11th December. 

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy loss 
and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the 
Kota Baru. Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Baru, 
Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak by 
order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF 
bombed Tobi Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact lost Kure (Ocean 
Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air force 
at Saigon comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon same of 
combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama same of South China Fleet near Hong 
Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop 

Slightly garbled 

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor 
130 miles South Sama one battleship 8 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya 
Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat 
MILID as my 31 Merle Smith (garble). 

0845 Z / 11 
130A 

Slightly garbled. 
Decoded by AB. Time 815A. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 11 December 1941. 
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General. 

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the 
clear or having a different security classification. 
This message is priority. 

Walter G. Phillips, 
Walter G. Phillips, 

Colonel, G. S. C, 

Chief of Staff. 
Sent as radiogram No. 1110 — 11th. 
Message center No. 21. 
Time filed 1110. 
The Adjutant General, 

Washington, D. C: 
Following is Paraphrase of Paper #23 this file radio eleven December Forty 
one received Quote 
A-64 

1F8U PY IMPORTANT GR231 
To: Commanding General Honolulu. 
From : Merle Smith 18 11th December. 

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy 
loss and indication of enemy trooi) reinforcements and British reinforcements 
to the Kota Baru, Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south 
Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri 
Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruc- 
tion Stop RAAF bombed Tobi Helen Reef Stop Naru bombed again contact 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



217 



lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief 
combined air force at Saigon Comma same of southern expedition force prob- 
ably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama Same of South 
China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop 

Slightly garbled 

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor 
130 miles south Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya 
Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat 
MILID as my 31 Merle Smith (Garble) 

0845 Z/11 
130A 

Slightly garbled 

Unquote end of message. 

Short. . 

Enc sec by 

Lt. J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B. 

150P Dec 11 1951 

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

INTER- STAFF ROUTING SMP 

SECRET 



The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, Including the 
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist, Engr. It will be 
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office 
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the 
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Ad- 
jutant General unless a policy has been established. The staff section origi- 
nating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorse- 
ment list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently 
will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorse- 
ments hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in 
charge or an officer authorized to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. Form and 
Date 



To 



Subject: WD SEC Kadio 529 7th re 
Ultimatun by Japanese and destruc- 
tion of their code machine. 



1st Ind. C/S14Dec41.... 



AG. 



Forlflle.TilncirSubject radio- 



Walter Phillips, Colo, 
nel G. S. C, Chief of 
Staff. 



confidential 

hb3adquaeteks hawaiian ale foecb, 
Office of the Air Force Commander, 

Fort Shatter, T. H. 9 July ISJ,!. 
In reply refer to : 
Subject: Special Report. 
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shaf ter, T. H. 

1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted 
pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War De- 
partment, Washington, D C., to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, dated March 26, 1941, subject : "Provisions for Security of Installation", 
and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the De- 
partment and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Depart- 
ment Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently 
declared unlimited emergency. 

2. Estimate of the Situation: 

a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and in- 
stallations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding 
Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive 
preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered 
sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsi- 
ble oflBcers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate. 

b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, 
consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate 
Hickman Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that 
the controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for 
the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal de- 
terrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been 
operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted 
sabotage has as yet ieen ordered, or contrawise, that orders, without doubt 
are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the 
growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should 
be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action 
for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan 
may not have been discovered. 

[2] c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent 
to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confront- 
ing Germany in her war With Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of 
the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now 
existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action. 

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick 
movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy 
reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all 
heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases 
are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such 
incipient events as ; 

(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our 
part to an overt hostile act either near or far away. 

(b) Or, of a final break with the German-Italian Axis. 

(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting inter- 
ests in the Caribbean or South China Seas. 

(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to 
Russia. 

(e) Or a repercussion in consequence of the recent occupation of Iceland. 

(f ) Or an occupation of the Galipagos Islands as a result of the conflict 
between Peru and Ecuador. 

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from 
which to reenforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the main- 
land or from which to reenforce Manila with B-19"s and the belief that 
Hickam will be fully spot-lighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully 
comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint. 

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn 
up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents 
acting jointly in support of her tri-parte pact. 

(4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution 
of secretly prepared plan for sabotage. 

[3] (5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile 
powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reenforcing our far- 
flung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the 
the narrow seas that can be employed en mass within tactical times over 
strategical theatres of 2500 miles extent. (As an illusti-ation of the precept 
in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 9, 1941.) 

d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect 
all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be 
preconceived now and receive first consideration over all other types of military 
field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, air-borne infantry trans- 
ports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next 
highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become 
the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army 
or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national 
defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize 
an immediate state of air readiness and seek first, by any and all means, to destroy 
the opposing state of air-readiness. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 219 

3. General Findings: 

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly 
acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to suc- 
cessful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently 
assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and 
Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having 
inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, or- 
ganization and management which are now required to master the present border- 
line war situation. 

6. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is 
faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly 
unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training 
to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without dis- 
rupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city as 
Hickam Field. 

c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due : 

(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time. 

(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropi- 
cal island garrisoned by large forces. 

(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time 
occupancy instead of war-time security. 

[^] (4) To the relative inattention accorded in peacetime to intelli- 
gence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions. 

(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on 
sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for 
information. 

(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily in- 
creased routine administration. 

(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air 
Force. 

(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the 
quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland 
to construct buildings and grounds. 

(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning 
reserve officers to activate new units. 

(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting 
new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature. 

(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the 
above first needs. 

(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new 
projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily 
post duties. 

(18) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now 
existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for 
reliability of all civil service employees. 

(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive 
waiting attitude. 

(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from 
which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical 
concern for the future. 

(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of 
labor and materials required to meet the needs of all arms and services. 

[5] d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control 
has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, 
departments, and daily mass details, due in turn : 

(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodi- 
cally to the mainland. 

(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve 
officers within the past year. 

(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained 
men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead 
growth of higher echelons. 

(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training. 

~ (5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical 
school courses at Wheeler and Hickam Fields. 

(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill 
and ground security missions. 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of sev- 
eral thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks. 

(8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying is- 
lands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments 
in the Department. 

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics. 

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a 
proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary re- 
cruit and technical school training. 

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained special- 
ists from the Service Departments and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, 
drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a com- 
mand that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate 
specialized divisions, departments, and sections. 

(12) To tlie culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth 
over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and 
an over-complicated administration of it. 

[6] 4 Special Findings: 

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to 
the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must possess a practical 
working knowledge of each and every man under its immediate legal jurisdic- 
tion — this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience, and 
"trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each 
man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the 
present set-up: 

(1) Five or more different applications of the War Department's pre- 
scribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration 
centers exist in the Department. 

1st — At Schofield, one regiment centralizes separate company per- 
sonnel units in regimental headquarters. 

2nd — Another regiment centralizes composite battalion units in regi- 
mental headquarters. 

3rd — Another regiiDent centralizes the separate specialized functions 
that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters. 

4th — Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the 
Wing Headquarters. 

5th — Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three 
Group Headquarters (i. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th 
Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the 
Wing are attached. 

(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, pay- 
rolls, reports of changes, etc. 

(3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and 
sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc. 

(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees. 

(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is imprac- 
tical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron 
roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat. 

[7] (6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts 
during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly 
upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of 
numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and 
who report to Squadron Headquarters v/hen and if absences in attendance 
occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such 
changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes 
required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Head- 
quarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to 
the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters — but in the interim of two, three or 
more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the 
Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air 
Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special 
ordei's which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing 
calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the 
Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for 
the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily 
emergency dictates. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 221 

(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive 
varying details from various squadrons, vphile one of numerous squadrons 
may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control 
obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is 
physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily 
management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself. 

(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all 
intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further 
complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Com- 
manders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 
intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel 
functions. 

(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not 
relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that 
the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be 
coordinated regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to 
insure daily security. 

(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 
and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and the 
front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the 
separate variation in the timing of Jhe mass of personnel, operations, mate- 
riel, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Depart- 
ment to the Squadron and the Squadron to the [8] Department, the 
undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination 
throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a 
necessity. 

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simpli- 
fied by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uni- 
formly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all 
echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rear- 
range existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural 
operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "op- 
erations control oflSce" and "grand security troops" as a basis. 

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and 
important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the 
Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in 
the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which 
the lower echelons have no direct control. 

5. Detailed Findings: 

a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part 
were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding 
General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and 
with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conunction with the 
Inspector General's report. 

6. Command Division: 

(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of 
the (I!ommanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the i)ersonal attention 
of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to 
required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the 
guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer. 

(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one 
necessitating a formal 'regard for the serious legal consequences involved. 

(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions 
of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, 
(3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelli- 
gence. 

[9] (4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished 
a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection 
and report. 

(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized 
as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, 
under the direct control of the Wing Commander. 

(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and 
separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in per- 
sonnel, operations, and materiel divisions. 

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed 
to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered 
morale of the junior officer and private soldier ; this in order to separate the 
effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive 
agents. 

c. Personnel Division: 

(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the 
Hawaiian Air Force. 

(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam 
Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detach- 
ment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian 
Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter. 

(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a 
semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, 
grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy. 

(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by 
the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the re- 
currence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder. 

(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated 
with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trait" analysis and report to 
S— 2 

(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swim- 
ming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program 
with estimated dates of completion. 

[10] (7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, 
Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian 
Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition 
of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now 
in use, etc. 

(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical 
location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons. 

(9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school 
courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function 
as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Head- 
quarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purjwse to the Hawaiian 
Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center. 

(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, -be set up 
for each service division, department and section of the Base which con- 
stitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether 
or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto. 

(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all 
men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, 
service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency 
report and the recommendation of the operating departments. 

(12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours 
of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in 
the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the 
station. 

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and 
security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably 
of infantrymen. 

(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison-Officer, 
Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the 
type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered ; 
also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side-arms. 

(15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories 
necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check 
the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post. 

[11] (16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on 
extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people 
of either sex when on duty. 

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be 
furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of 
controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 223 

(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and 
patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that 
no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to 
remain over-night on the station. 

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of prin- 
cipal departments be issued pistols. 

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may 
be taking civilian flying instruction. 

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge care- 
fully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, 
cane or small fires at a distance beyond quick recall. 

(22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young ofiicers for 
autos and uniforms be re-checked. 

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Ex- 
change and Non-commissioned Oflicers' Club be re-checked. 

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records 
be returned to the mainland. 

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive in- 
creasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be re- 
checked. 

(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for 
dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the 
distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men. 

(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal dis- 
tribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades 
and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made 
the subject of a special study and repoit with the view of creating a more 
uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital 
specialties [12] such as squadron mess, communications, armament, 
maintenance, without adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for 
first priority of flying pay. 

(28) That S-1 oflices, officers and functions be separated organically 
from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons. 

(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice 
of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married non-commissioned officers 
and civilian employee families of Hickam Field. 

d. Operations Division: 

(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of 
Oahu be re-checked and numbered. 

(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked 
and numbered. 

(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to recheck the proposed 
use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and 
defense plans to prevent conflict. 

(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be 
re-checked in connection with Plans for Ground Security, Alert Plans and 
Plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the 
successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders. 

(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training 
be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the 
Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights 
and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally re- 
sponsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety 
and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted 
higher commanders. 

(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting 
of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft 
be expedited. 

(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio 
operators be reduced to writing. 

(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ord- 
nance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at 
outlying fields and for the safe-guarding [13] of bombsights on over- 
night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions. 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(9) That the storage and shortage of water, and exposed pipelines at out- 
liying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a 
ground security viewpoint. 

(10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced 
to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and 
vaults. 

(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires be- 
tween Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and fre- 
quent practice. 

(12) That the question of developing ^n auxiliary mobile message cen- 
ter in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, 
wire and repair men, be considered. 

(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal OflScer 
in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re- 
submitted and receive favorable action. 

( 14) That additional measures, such as voice code, be prescribed and tested 
to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and 
that private soldiers be excluded from duty of transmitting imortant 
verbal orders of serious purport. 

e. Materiel Division: 

(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system, to include periodic 
chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in writing as 
a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards 
against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of 
lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooper- 
ation and technical advise, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Ha- 
waiian Air Depot, be solicited. 

(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickman Field dock at 
the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that 
will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under 
the dock. 

(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man- 
holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and com- 
munications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project. 

[14] (4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and 
prepared by Wing S-4, of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are con- 
sidered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures 
under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main 
control cables, the connection ot control cables with the servo drums of 
the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuse- 
lage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc. 

(5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps 
Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include 
such a selected list of "critical" items. 

(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required 
of the Engineer Corps in the Wing Plan for screening, lighting and fencing 
of Hickam Field be prescribed, particularly, by special order. 

(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be 
rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of mainte- 
nance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when 
the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the 
Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been 
available to the Engineers,' for several months, be put on a prescribed 
priority list by the Department. 

(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply 
reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop 
management from breaking the completion of daily work orders. 

(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective con- 
sideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons. 

(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were 
stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the 
Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unob- 
structed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be 
smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as 
well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of 
the Depot. , ^ , 

(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and 
gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 225 

[15] (12) That copies of the detailed findings of the Hawaiian Air 
Depot at Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise 
be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with 
request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished. 

(13) That additional measures for night-time security be prescribed 
to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or 
military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to 
spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the 
shops, hangars and dead-line. 

(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, 
Supply, Fire Department, etc. who control nearly all utilities that can 
tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving 
them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance 
social morale. 

(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length 
of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited. 

/. Flight Division: 

(1) That fight and; airplane commanders, especially of B-17 type of 
bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility* of a 
commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in 
Army Regulations. 

(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally respon- 
sible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in fiight. 

(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally 
responsible for the related functions of his fiight plan, the coordination of 
flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, 
dress, discipline, and tactical reports. 

6. Conclusions: 

a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of in- 
stability, bias, or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects 
of subversive activities within the command ; although such a condition 
naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities. 

6. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is 
required for the Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organiza- 
tion for the Air Base Group. 

[16] c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects for Hickam 
Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Depart- 
ment Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to 
insure compliance within prescribed time limits. 

7. Recommendations: 

That the Department Commander authorize a board of general ofl5cers of the 
Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and 
standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing 
emergency. 

8. Appreciations: 

a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, 
Assistant Gr-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 

6. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of 
Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and 
Major A. W. Meehan, Gr-3, is acknowledged. 

c. The spirit of open honesty and helpfulness displayed by Brigadier General 
J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the neces- 
sary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, 
is considered worthy of commendation. 

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above^ it is appreciated that the pres- 
ent status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense 
of responsibility is at issue. 

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding 
General, 18th "Wing, with a x-equest that he register any dilference of facts or opin- 
ion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already 
been initiated by his headquarters. 

H. S. Burwell, 

H. S. BUBWELL, 



79716— 46— Ex, 148 16 



Colonel, A. C, 
Special Inspector. 



226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Headquaeters Hawauan Department, 
Office of the DEyABTMENT Commandeb, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 1 May 1941. 
In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6 
Subject : Provisions tor Security of Installations. 

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Fort 
Shafter, T. H. 

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 
on the above subject. 

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect to see if air- 
planes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded. 

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as 
to the result of your inspection. 

By courier, 1 May 1941. 

Cabl Geosse, 
Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General 



confidential 

Headquaetees Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Depaetment Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 19^1 
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6 

Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To : Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H. 

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, 
request information as to when a reply may be expected. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT : 

O. M. McDole, 
O. M. McDoLE, 

Major, A. O. D. 
Assistant Adjutant General, 
let. Ind. 

AG 383.4 (7-15-41) 
24 

HQ. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., July 17, 1941.— To : Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a 
verbal reply. 
For the Commanding General: 

Edward Jenkins, 
Edwaed Jenkins, 
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry, 
Acting Adjutant General. 

confidential 

Headquaetees Hawauan Department, 
Ojfice of the Depaetment Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 August 1914. 
In reply refer to : AG 3S3.4/6 

Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam 
Field, T. H. 

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, 
and follow-up letter 15 July 1941, request that reply be expedited. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT : 

Robeet H. Dunlop, 

Colonel, A. G. D., 
Adjutant General. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



227 



SECRET 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 
inter-staff routing slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department of Staff, including the 
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be 
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communications. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff OflSce to 
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the excep- 
tion that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant Gen- 
eral unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing 
slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying 
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the respon- 
sible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be num- 
bered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized 
to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. From and 


To 


Subject: Provisions for Security of 




Date 




Installations 




1st Ind. AG 18 Nov 


C/S 


Herewith reports from major echelon 


R. U. D. 


41. 




Commanders in compliance with 3rd 
R/S Indorsement C/S to AG, 29 April 
41, in file marked "HERE". 
6 Incls: 

#1— Report General Murray. 

#2— " Colonel Walsh. 

#3— " Colonel Capron. 

#4— " General Gardner. 

#5 — " General Martin. 

#6— AG file 383.4 (Secret). 




2d Ind. C/S. 11/18/41, 


0-2 


Study & Report 


W. D. 


#117. 
3d Ind. G-2 16 Jn 


AG 


For file. No report made 




42. 









confidential 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

intee-staff routing slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the 
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff 
inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office 
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the 
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant 
General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a 
routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list 
accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made 
by the responsible office at the end of its endorsement. Indorsements hereon 
will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer 
authorized to sign for him. 



No. of Ind. 


To 


Subject: Provisions for Security of 




4259 


From and Date 


Installations 






1st Ind. Air 0. 11/17/41.. 


C/S 


There is attached special report on 
Hickam Field together with comments 
thereon by the Hawaiian Air Force StaS 
and General Martin. 


M. 








1 Incl.: Chart showing Burwell Re- 


J. A. M. 


02792 






port, General Martin's Comments and 










Stafl Comments. For the Air Officer: 






2nd Ind. C/S 11/18/41, 

#118. 
3Ind. Q-2016Jn42.... 


Q-2 


Study and report. 


N. CO. 




A. G.I.... 


For file— no report made. 


KJF. 





228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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230 CONGRESSIOiSTAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(AG-1) 
Headquaeters Hawaiian Ant Foeoe, 
Office of the Air Force Commandek, 
Hickam Field, T. H., 11 November 19U. 
In reply refer to : 

Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter AG 383.4/6, Headquarters 
Hawaiian Department, 1 May 1941, subject : "Provisions for Security of Installa- 
tions", there are inclosed special reports on Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and 
the Hawaiian Air Depot. 

2. These reports have been carefully studied by this headquarters and those 
deficiencies susceptible of correction have been corrected. Many of the opinions 
expressed by the inspecting officer are in conflict with established policies and 
Army organization and as such cannot receive remedial action by local commanders. 

3. The vital installations on all Air Force stations are believed to be adequately 
guarded and all commanders are fully cognizant of their responsibilities. 

F. L. Martin, 
F. L. Martin, 
Major General, U. 8. Army, 

Commanding. 
3 Incls. 

#1 — [Report on Hickam Field 

#2 — Report on Wheeler Field 

#3 — Report on Hawaiian Air Depot 



Headquarters 14th Pursuit Wing, 
Office of the Commanding Genesial, 

Wheeler Field, T. H., 29 Jtilij 1941. 
Refer to : 

Subject : Special Report On Wheeler Field, T. H. 
To : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H. 

1. Authority: 

a. See paragraph 1, attached copy of Special Report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian 
Air Force, 9 July 1941. 

2. Estimate of the Situation: 

a. See attached report, paragraph 2 a, 6, c, and d. 

(Due to the recent^ freezing of Japanese credits, it is estimated that security 
measures for pursuit aviation have increased in importance to the extent that 
Wheeler Field, as an Advanced Depot, should now be prepared to take up the 
shock in case the Hawaiian Air Depot is incapacitated.) 

3. General Findings: 

a. See attached report, paragraph 3 a, b, c, also copy of memorandum to Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Air Force, 10 July 1941. 

(Reference the verbal authority of the Department Commander to create 
and test an experimental maintenance command in the Hawaiian Air Force, 
it is believed that the uniform and common grouping of responsibilities now in 
eifect at Wheeler Field may be used as a guide in stabilizing the control of 
personnel.) 

4. Special Findings: 

a. See attached report, paragraph 4 a (1). 

(Wheeler Field has centralized all squadron units in a Wing Headquarters 
Personnel Administration Center. Investigation indicates that this set-up may 
be well employed as a standard.) 

5. Detailed Findings: 

a. The following detailed findings contained in attached report apply construc- 
tively to the 14th Wing: Paragraph 5 a, paragraph 5 b (1), (2), and (3), para- 
graph 5 c (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), 
(18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29); paragraph 5 d (1), 
(2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 e (1), (3), 
(4) (reP-40s), (5), (12), (13), (14) ; paragraph 5/ (1), (2), and (3). 

(In order to instill an adequate attitude of mind throughout the lower echelons 
of the command on the subject of intelligence, the undersigned finds that all squad- 
ron intelligence officers need an intelligence manual composed of specific details 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 241 

such as those contained in paragraph 5, attached report. The Commanding 
General and Staff of the 14th Pursuit Wing fully appreciate the desire of the 
Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Hawaiian Air Force to 
effect, quickly, a change from the previous peace-time status to the present 
borderline war-time status, and have fully coopeiated by preparing a detailed 
plan of action.) 

(Special attention is invited to the need for continued and increasing daily 
coordination between the Corps of Engineers at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler 
Field.) 

(It is believed that there is an urgent security need for "satellite" fields adja- 
cent to or in the near vicinity of Wheeler Field. ) 

6. Conclusions: 

a. See attached report, paragraph 6 6, c. 

(Special attention is invited to the need for an organic maintenance command.) 
(Special attention is invited to the needs of Wheeler Field for priority con- 
sideration and early action on the recommendations of the Commanding Gen- 
eral, 14th Wing, in reference to fencing, lighting, facilities at Wright Gate, 
further military control of the public highway through Wheeler Field, and to 
required safeguarding of all paint, oil, and gas dumps. 

7. Recommendations : 

a. See attached report, paragraph 7 o. 

8. Appreciation: 

a. See attached report, paragraph 8 a, 6, d, e. 

(The spirit of helpfulness extended by the Commanding General and Staff, 
14th Wing, to the undersigned, in the preparation of the required changes from 
a peace-time status to a critical borderline condition, is considered worthy of 
commendation.) 

&. A copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 14th 
Wing, with a request that he register his concurrence or his difference of opinion, 
and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been 
initiated by his headquarters. 

H. S. Burwell, 
H. S. Btjkwbll, 
Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector. 



confidential 

Headqttarthjbs Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 15 July 1941. 
In reply refer to : 
AG 383.4/6 

Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To : Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam 
Field, T. H. 
With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, 
request information as to when a reply may be expected. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT : 

O. M. McDolh, 
Major, A. O. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 

confidential 

Headquarters Hawauan Air Force, 

Office of the Air Force Commander, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 2 June 19^1. 
In reply refer to : 
Subject : Special Report. 
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Pursuant to instructions contained in attached War Department letter the 
following special report on the Hawaiian Air Depot is submitted: 
1. General Comments: 

a. Officers of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force and 
of the F. B. I. were previously interviewed reference general policy. 
79716— 46— Ex. 148 17 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

&; All commissioned officers and foremen of the Depot were personally inter- 
viewed reference their knowledge and familiarity with the names, faces, and 
reputation of all employees. 

c. Headquarters personnel records are inspected for upkeep and statistical 
data. All warehouses, storerooms, shops and jrrounds were inspected personally. 

d. Critical locations were examined carefully. 

2. Judged by standards required in peace time, conditions were found as follows : 

a. Airplanes: 

(1) Officers, superior. 

(2) Crews, competent and trustworthy. 

(3) Planes, excellent condition, locked at night, spot lighted. 

(4) Guards, trustworthy. 

(5) History of aircraft evidenced in Form #41 reveals no evidence of 

previous untoward instances. 

(6) Technical inspections, complete. 

(7) No cases of carelessness noted. 

6. Buildings and Grounds: 

(1) Offices, superior. 

(2) Chief clerk and superintendent, especially intelligent. 

(3) Foremen, competent and trustworthy. 

(4) Technicians, skilled and conscientious. 

(5) Workers, industrious. 

(6) Shop inspection, thorough. 

(7) Equipment, good condition. 

(8) Buildings, carefully locked at night. 

(9) Guards, trustworthy. 

(10) Machinery, clean. 

(11) Supplies, stored orderly. 

(12) Fire apparatus, good condition. 

(13) No cases of carelessness noted. 

c. Related Factors: 

Badges are being worn. Action being initiated on photo badges. Employees 
are being check in and out at the main gate. Foremen and workers wear sepa- 
rate, distinctive unifoi-ms. The Depot -Commander, the Supply Officer and Chief 
Engineer, Lieutenant Colonels Hurd, Montgomery and Lewis, respectively, are 
giving intelligent and commendable attention to local responsibilities concerned 
on the subject of this survey. 

2. Conclusions: 

Based on standards required in time of an unlimited emergency: 

a. That the general opinion of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment and the Hawaiian Air Force, to the effect that the requirements prescribed 
for guards at the gate, the interior watchman system and the inspection of iden- 
tification badges, should be progressively increased during the present unlimited 
emergency and that this conclusion is appreciated by subordinate officers in the 
Depot who are initiating a plan of action to effect a compliance. 

&. That progressive and increasing attention be given by every foreman to 
insure a more intimate knowledge of every employee's name, face and character- 
istics and to this end that his intelligence test, physical test, trade test, experience 
test and, most importantly, his "trait" test data be systematically compiled and 
maintained. 

c. That the vital G-2 aspects of the above test-data be increasingly coordinated 
with the S-1 office. 

d. That the present degree of cooperation between the Depot and the Civil 
Service, also between the Depot and the F. B. I. are considered to be excellent. 

e. That existing conflicts between the communications plan of organization and 
operation as contained in the Hawaiian Air Force Feld Orders and prescribed 
degrees of readiness in the security, alert and local defense plans be made the sub- 
ject of a special survey by a Signal specialist or a technical communications ex- 
pert, in order to insure a coordinated execution of the plan. 

f. That all anti-sabotage plans carefully separate requirements that are actu- 
ally on hand and issued, from plans which deal with future or projected needs ; 
or, in other words, that anti-sabotage plans emphasize the need for an organiza- 
tion "in being" with material "on hand" for instant utility at any time. 

g. That increasingly systematic inspection of the aqua system throughout, to 
include a chemical analysis of both gas and oil, be further intensified. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 243 

h. That, during the period of the present unlimited emergency, all employees be 
further indoctrinated with a semi-military spirit of morale and discipline and to 
this end that further stress upon social gatherings, restaurant facilities, personal 
medical attention, and picnics be encouraged. Also that periodical and orderly 
assemblies such as roll calls, fire calls, etc., be further encouraged. 

i. That critical attention be given to selecting critical items. 

(1) The electrical fuel pumps on the B-17's may be considered as a critical 
item. 

(2) The aqua system and the fire hazard incident to the storage or leak- 
age of gas and oil in the warehouses and storerooms may be considered as 
critical items in the supply department. 

(3) The power, compressed air, water, and sewage lines or connections 
may be considered as critical items in the engineering shops ; also the pollu- 
tion of lubricating machine oil be considered as critical. 

(4) The main highway through the Depot, the isolated engine test stands, 
the engineer lumber dumps adjacent to the runway and food in the I'estau- 
rant be considei'ed as critical items in general. 

6. Recommendations: 

a. That a regularly assigned Depot S-2 and Intelligence Plans Officer be 
appointed. 
" 6. That a Depot Inspector and an Intelligence Plans OflQcer be appointed and 
directed to prepare a combined inspection, security, alert and defense plan for 
the Depot and that two administrative reserve officers be assigned to the Depot. 

c. That a travelling nurse, qualified as a psychologist, be assigned to the Depot 
and be authorized to attend employees' families. 

d. That the lumber stacked at the end of the main runway be removed on the 
grounds that it constitutes a flying hazard and furnishes a close-up screen to the 
edge of the Depot as well as a concealed position from which a saboteur without 
detection could easily shoot up and hit a plane during its glide, especially at night. 

e. That the interior watchman and guard system be increased progressively 
from the present strength of 21 men to a strength of 42 men and that patrols be 
instructed to w^ork in units of two men or to keep in regular and frequent con- 
tact with each other. 

f. That employees in the various shops and warehouses of the new buildings, 
when completed, be furnished distinctive arm bands, or colored shoulder straps, 
or caps, to aid in controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel between 
separate buildings and between separate sections within buildings. 

g. That priority of screening, as recommended by the Depot, be approved and 
that this priority be considered as urgent, especially as it refers to the screening 
of the motor test stand and a high man-proof screen required between the main 
depot road and the depot warehouse that contains highly inflammable stores 
such as gas, oil and chemicals. 

h. That written instructions be issued to the guard verifying the present park- 
ing plan and verbal orders reference the daily inspection of all cars entering 
and leaving the Depot, this to insure that no unauthorized personnel or material 
is hidden in the back of cars, and also to insure that no unauthorized personnel 
remain hidden overnight in the shops. 

i. That the subject of locks and keys which may have been in use for a long 
time be made the subject of a special survey with the purpose of requiring all 
locks and keys to be changed periodically, and that all men possessing keys to 
vital installations be listed and systematically checked. 

/. That, in the absence of daytime guards, the civilian chief clerks, superin- 
tendents and foremen be issued pistols. 

k. That all plats or diagrams of water, electrical, sewage and gasoline systems 
be checked and numbered. 

I. That the Depot Commander maintain a list of all employees who may be tak- 
ing civilian flying instruction. 

m. That a confidential general directive be issued by the Hawaiian Air Force 
to subordinate commanders to the effect Ihat higher authority reposes special 
trust and confidence in their employees ; that the present "unlimited emergency" 
requires a quick appreciation of the difference between "peace" and "emer- 
gency" conditions; that hostile saboteurs prepare most ingenious plans of ti7e 
and destruction and effect them with bold and ruthless determination ; tbat our 
previous habitual sense of peace and security must be realistically tempered; 
that local commanders are directly responsible for the preparation and super- 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

vision of internal security plans which now should be based on the premise that 
at least a hundred saboteurs might act by criminal intention and stealth at any 
time, at any hour, even today or tonight ; that no matter how far-fetched such a 
basic premise may seem in peace time or how much it may stretch peace-time 
credulity, that nevertheless the command responsibility for intelligence requires 
such a day by day sense of prevention. 

H. S. Burwell, 

H. Si. BUBWELL, 

Colonel, A. C, Special Inspector. 
1 Incl. 

Ltr. TAG, 3/26/41 
"Provisions for Security 
of Installations" 

Istlnd. (A-1) 

Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 June 1941. 
To : Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H. 

1. For careful consideration and recommendation on putting into being each 
item of paragraph 6 of this report. 

2. Paragraph 6 7i. to be interpreted that parked cars of employees be main- 
tained under constant surveillance that nothing detrimental to security be re- 
moved therefrom or placed therein while these cars are in their parking areaS. 

By command of Major General MABTIN : 

Cheney L. Bertholf, 
Chenet L. BebthoiJ', 

Lt. Col., A. G. D., 

Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. n/c 

confidential 

Headquaktees Hawaiian Department, 
Office op the Department Commandee, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 JVIay 1941. ^ 
In reply refer to : 
AG 383.4/6 

Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To: Major General Fulton Q. C. Gardner, U. S. A., Hawaiian Separate Coast 
Artillery Brigade, Fort De Eussy, T. H. 

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 
1941 on the above subject. 

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect your instal- 
lations to see if they are adequately guarded. 

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as 
to the result of your inspection. 

Carl Grt)sse, 
Carl Gbosse, 
Major, A. O. D., 
Assista7it Adjutant Oenerah 



confidential 

Wae Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, March 26, 1941. 

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M. 

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, 

Corps Areas, and Air Forces; Chief of the Air Corps; Chief of Ordnance; 

and The Quartermaster General. 
1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spas- 
modic, attemps at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing 
daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the gi-owing number of airplanes 
and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such 
dangers more acute. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 245 

2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all cortsmanders to provide ade- 
quate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible. 

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and 
lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must 
be maintained. The effective functioning of counter-subversive measures pur- 
suant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will mate- 
rially aid in the accomplishment of security. 

4. Necessary counter-subversive measures are a responsibility of command 
and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. 
Department and Corps Area Commanders are responsible for the coordination 
of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including 
activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

S/ E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 

confident! ai, 

Headquarters Hawaiian De2'artment, 
Office of the Department Commandeb, 

Fort Shaffer, T. H. 1 May 1941. 
In reply refer to : 
AG 383.4/6 

Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To : Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 
1941 on the above subject. 

2. The Commanding General desires that you nsake a personal inspection to 
see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded. 

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him 
as to the result of your inspection. 

Carl Gbosse, 
Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, AG 383.4/6, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security 
of Installations.") 

383.4 1st Ind. 

HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Ft. DeRussy, T. H., June 28, 1941. 
To OG Haw. Dept. 

1. As the result of a personal inspection of the installations of this command, 
the following comments are submitted : 

a. In general the nature and the extent of these installations are such as tp 
preclude the practicability of maintaining continuously sufficient guards to assure 
the protection of all such installations against determined and well organized 
saboteurs. 

b. In my inspection special attention was devoted to the matter of the storage 
of directors and height finders for antiaircraft artillery batteries. Where fixed 
seacoast battery emplacements with protected magazines are available (at Fort 
Kamehameha, Fort DeRussy and Fort Ruger) these instruments are kept stored 
in the magazines. At Fort Weaver they are stored in one of the concrete maga- 
zines. At Fort Barrette they are stored in the protected plotting room. In the 
case of the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) they are stored in one of the concrete 
storehouses at the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. At Camp Malakole and at Sand 
Island, where no protected or fireproof storage is available, they are stored in 
the barracks. 

2. Plans recently submitted in connection with the construction required for 
the augmentation of the antiaircraft artillery garrison include provision for con- 
crete storehouses for the storage of directors and height finders at Schofieldi 
Barracks, Fort Weaver, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Fort 
DeRussy, Ulupau, Fort Barrette and at Camp Malakole. Recommendations will 
be submitted in the near future for the construction of a similar storehouse at 
Sand Island, 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. In general all fixed batteries and all vital installations are guarded either 
by sentinels or by local guards quartered at these installations. 

4. It is believed that, upon the completion of the concrete store houses referred 
to in paragraph 2 above reasonably effective security will be provided for all 
important installations of this command. 

Fulton Q. C. Gardner, 
Fulton Q. C Gardner, 
Major General, U. 8. Army, 

Commanding. 

confidej^tial 

Headqttarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shaffer, T. H., 1 May 1941. 
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6 
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort 
Armstrong, T. H. 

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 
1941 on the above subject. 

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse 
area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are 
adequately guarded. 

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him 
as to the result of your inspection. 

Carl Grosse, 
Major, A. O. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
1st Ind. 
QM 383.4/6-A 
Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H., 

8 August 1941. 
To : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaf ter, T. H. 

1. I have personally inspected the warehouse area of this depot and in order 
to provide a greater degree of protection I have fenced the entire area with a 
9 ft. cyclone fence and increased the lights in this area. 

2. Return of this paper has been delayed pending a thorough study of the 
requirements of the guard detachment of this depot. Recommendations for an 
adequate guard detachment were submitted August 7, 1941. Favorable action 
on this request is considered imperative for the proper protection of this 
installation. 

Roland Walsh, 
Colonel, Q. M. C, 

Commanding. 



confidential 

He^adquarters Hawaiian Dbipartment 

intee-stafp kouting slip 

The Inter-Stafe Routing Slip is for use of, the Department Staff including the 
Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff 
inter-communication. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to 
another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the excep- 
tion that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant Gen- 
eral unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing 
slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying 
papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the respon- 
sible oflSce at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered 
in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign 
for him. 

DOO 600.96/13 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



247 



No. of Ind. 

Froru and 

Date 


To 


Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations. 




1st Ind. 
DOO 

5 Jul '41 


AG 


1. A report was presented in person by the undersigned to tlie Com- 
manding General, 2 May 1941. As a result an Infantry Company has 
been detailed as a permanent guard for the Ammunition Storage Area. 
This question was reviewed by the Inspector General who concurred in 
my recommendations, and the actual change was effected May 9. 








2. A project has been submitted to the Chief of Ordnance and approved, 
covering an interior lighting installation. Funds for the consummation 
of this work have been promised us shortly after the beginning of the 
present new fiscal year. 








3. A detailed estimate is under preparation covering the lighting of the 
peripheral fence around the Crater. This project will be submitted to 
the proper authorities when it has been drawn up in complete detail. 








4. It is regretted that nu formal written report was submitted on this 
matter but it was felt that havmg presented the report in person to the 
Department Commander, and having taken prompt Radio action where 
indicated, no such written report was necessary. 


W. A. C. 



confidential 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 1 May 1941. 
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6 
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 
To : Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 
19411941 on the above subject. 

2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to 
see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded. 

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him 
as to the result of your inspection. 

Carl Grosse 
Carl Grosse, 
Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
2nd Ind. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Air Depot, 

Hickam Field, T. H., 13 June 11941. 
To : Commanding General, Haw^aiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

1. Judged by the new situation and standards required in consequence of the 
recently declared unlimited national emergency, it is considered that the con- 
clusions and recommendations of the Special Inspector are necessary and cover 
the question constructively. In this respect and in concurrence with the Com- 
manding General's desires, every effort was made by this Headquarters to assist 
the Inspector by suggestions and cooperation. 

2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of basic communication 
are concurred in. 

Re para, a and h: Priority action is requested on the assignment of two admin- 
istrative oflacers to the Depot for assignment as Intelligence Plans OflBcer and 
Depot Inspector, as recommended in paragraph 6 ft, basic report. These admin- 
istrative and supervisory duties are being handled at the present time by Depot 
ofl5cers in addition to a large number of other executive type of duties. 

Re para c: The Depot First Aid Station has been expanded with the employ- 
ment of an additional Nurse in order to allow the former Nurse to act as a 
Traveling Nurse and thus keep in more intimate and helpful contact with 
employees and their families. 

Re para, d: The lumber stacked at the end of the main run-way #4 has been 
removed by the District Engineer, which action has removed one of the more 
serious flying and sabotage hazards. 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Re para, e: Due to the lack of available civilian guards and consequent diffi- 
culty in employing additional civilian guards of trustworthy character, the 
Depot has called upon Hickam Field for enlisted guards. It is believed that the 
Guard Roster may have to be materially increased, even beyond 42 men. 

Re para, f: Full compliance with this recommendation will, of necessity, be 
progressive and will be completed when the Depot is moved into its new buildings. 
In the meantime, this Headquarters has initiated action on making badges and 
distinctive colors, which are in the process of procurement and issue. 

Re para, g: Prepared plans include the screen fences mentioned in the Inspec- 
tor's recommendation. 

Re para, h: Detailed guard duties governing the parking plan have been pre- 
scribed in writing to insure that no unauthorized material is brought into or 
removed from the shops, also to insure that all personnel, other than the au- 
thorized guards, are required to leave the shops and parking area promptly after 
working hour^. This special problem will be simplified upon completion of the 
proposed fence. Then all personnel en route to and from the parking lot, which 
will be located outside the fence, will be checked in and out of the new gate, 
recommended hereinafter in paragraph 3 &. 

Re para, i: Survey has been initiated. 

Re para, j: Pistols have been issued to Section offices for use in case of internal 
riot or disorder. 

Re para, k: Action has been initiated. 

Re para. I: Action has been initiated. 

Re para, m: Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous 
peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters 
is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of 
planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of build- 
ings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of addi- 
tional administrative oflicers and the priority requested for protective fence and 
lights is recommended. 

3. Conclusions: a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated 
and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. 
Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance 
with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot- 
Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and 
man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional 
safeguards in this respect. 

&. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for 
the separate entrance and exit of Depot -personnel. 

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombard- 
ment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical 
items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection 
of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small 
electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian 
of keys and locks in the fuselage doors. 

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel 
traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to 
effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference 
to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly- 
employed common laborer.s. 

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, sjiecial attention to any leak- 
age of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating 
machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the insi)ector 
and additional safeguards provided with the conciirrence of the inspector. 

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facili- 
ties, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic 
association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union. 

Leland C. Hurd 
Lei-and C. Hurd, 
Lt. Col., Air Corps, 

Commanding. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 249 

1st Ind. 
AG 383.4 (7-15-41) 
24 Hq. Schofiexd Baeracks, T. H., 

July n, 1941. 
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaf ter, T. H. 

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a 
verbal reply. 

For the Commanding General : Edward Jenkins, 

Lieut. Colonel, Infantry, 
Acting Adjutant General. 



CONFIDENTIAI, 

Commanding General Hawaiian Department. 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, March 26, 19^1. 
AG 383.4 (3-21-41 )M-B-M 
Subject: Provisions for security of Installations. 

To : The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps 
Areas, and Air Forces ; 
Chief of the Air Corps ; 
Chief of Ordnance ; and 
The Quartermaster General. 

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, 
attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The 
multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces 
of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more 
acute. 

2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide ade- 
quate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible. 

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, 
but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be main- 
tained. The effective functioning of countersubversive measures pursuant to 
instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in 
the accomplisliment of , security. 

4. Necessary countersubversive measures are a responsibility of command and 
are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Depart- 
ment and Corp Areas Commanders are responsible for the coordination of secur- 
ity measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities 
at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

E. S. Adams, 

Major General 
The Adjutant General. 

confidential 

Headquaetees Hawaiian 'Depaetment, 

Office of the Depabtment Commander, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 15 J^ly 1941. 
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6 
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort 
Armstrong, T. H. , 

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, 
request information as to when a reply may be expected. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT : 

O. M. McDole, 
O. M. McDole, 
Major, A. Q. D., Assistant Adjutant Oeneral. 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1st Ind. 
AG 383.4/6 

Headquaeters, Hawahan Quakteemasteb Depot, 

Fort Armstrong, T. H., 16 July 1941. 
To : Major O. M. McDole, Asst. Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
Information pertaining to the above subject may be expected on 25 July 1941, 
For the Commanding OflScer : 

B. F. Modisett, 
B. F. Modisett, 
Major, Infantry, Executive Officer. 



CX)NFIDENTIAL 

Headquakters Hawahan Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 19^1. 
In reply refer to : AG 383.4/6 
Subject : Provisions for Security of Installations. 
To : Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H. 

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 
on the above subject. 

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse 
area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded. 

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him 
as to the result of your inspection. 

Carl Grosse, 
Major, A. O. D., Assistant Adjutant Qeneral. 
By Courier 1 May 1941 CG 



confidential 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

inter-staff routing slip 

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be 
sefit to subordinate commanders. 

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one' Staff Office to 
another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff 
section may route papei's to another General Staff section direct. The Staff sec- 
tion originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st 
Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subse- 
quently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. In- 
dorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in 
charge or an officer authorized to sign for him. 

AG 383.4/6 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 



251 



No. ef Ind. 

From and 

Date 


To 


Subject: Ltr WD TAG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, 26 March 1941, "Pro- 
visions for securityjof installations." 


971 


1st Ind. 

AG 

26 April 41 


G-2 


Two (2) copies received, one copy retained in AG files, 
llncl. 


C. Q. 


W-76 








2d Ind. 

0-2 

22 APR 41 


C/S 


1. For your information. 

2. I propose to send ditto copies of this communication to all G-2 and 8-2 
oflJcers, Hawaiian Department, for information and necessary action, 
and to check with Commanding Officers of Posts especially with regard 
to paragraph 4, and report to this office. 








Incl. No change. 


M. W. M. 


3d Ind 

C/S 
4/29/41 


AG 


The Department Commander desires that copies of this letter be fur- 
nished to General Martin, General Murray, Lt. Colonel Walsh, Q. M. C, 
General Gardner, and Colonel Capron, 0. D.; a wrapper letter to Gen- 
eral Martin, directing him to personally inspect to see if airplanes, sup- 
plies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded; a wrapper 
letter to General Murray, directing him to personally inspect the 
warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately 
guarded; a wrapper letter to Lt. Colonel Walsh directing him to person- 
ally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the 
warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to 
General Gardner directing him to personally inspect his installations to 
see if they are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Colonel Capron, 
directing him to make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and 
Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded— all to make a report to Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department as to the results of their 
inspections. 

Incl: N/C 




4th Ind 

AG 
1 May 41 


G-2 


For notation of action taken and return. 




W-80 








5th Ind. 
G-2 

2 May 41 


A.G. 


Noted. 
Incl: N/C. 


M. W. M. 



CONFIDENTIAL 

AGW/amh 
AG 383.4 ( 3-15-41 )M-B 

March 19, IMl. 
Subject : Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation 

Corps. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Attention is invited to tbe inclosed copy of an agreement between the 
War Department and the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps relative 
to the responsibility for investigations dealing with espionage, counter- 
espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the CCC. 

2. The Counter-Subversive system, including the selection and designation 
of informants within the ranks of the CCC, is being made the subject of further 
study and will not be placed into effect at this time. 

3. Correspondence and reports relative to CCC investigations will be accom- 
plished and distributed in the same manner as currently prescribed for military 
activities. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

, Adjutant General. 

1 Incl. 
Cy., CCC agreement, 
2-26-41. 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAI, 

1st Ind. AG 3 April 41 G-2 

AG 383.4/5 

Ltr. WD AGO 383.4 (3-15-41) M-B, 19 March 1941, "Investigation of Sub- 
versive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps." 

Basic communication received in duplicate, inclosure in single copy, one 
copy of basic retained in AG files. 

C. G. 

1 Inch 



Re para m: 

Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status 
and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further 
opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and 
directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and 
grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional ad- 
ministrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is 
recommended. 

3. Conclusions: 

a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in 
by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent 
to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the 
Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam 
Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes 
with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in 
this respect. 

6. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for 
the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel. 

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type 
bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination 
of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, 
connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against 
hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check 
on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors. 

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel 
traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to 
effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference 
to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly- 
employed common laborers. 

2nd Ind. to CG HAF 6/13/41 

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any 
leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of 
lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to 
the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the 
inspector. 

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social 
facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, 
athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union. 

Leland C. Hurd 
Leland C. Hued, 
Lt. Col., Air Corps, 

Commanding 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 253 

Clausen Investigation' Exhibit No. 2 

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Heney C. Clausen, JAGD — Fof the Secretary of 
War — Stjpplbmentahy to Proceedings of the Abmy Pearl Harbor Board 

The foUovping papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawai- 
ian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H. 

a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Con- 

tact Office, Honolulu, T. H. 

b. Gr-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial 

detention of persons connected with shrines. 

c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 Sep- 

tember 1944, to C. G., POA, re Documentary Evidence. 

d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Do- 

mestic Conditions, 1 December 1942 (2 copies). 

e. Exhibit I — A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands 

Before, On, and After December 7, 1941. 

f. Exhibit II — December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands 

Through the Eyes of the Press. 

g. Hawaiian Department Summary of the Situation as of 7 : 30 a. m., 7 

December 1941, dated 22 December 1941. 
h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori, 
i. -Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese 

negotiations, 27 November 1941. 
j. Informal report re Thailand, 
k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asama Maru and 

conditions in Japan. 
1. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, 
13 November 1941. 
m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941. 
n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observa- 
tions of a missionary. 
~ o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Sit- 
uation During the Period 26-31 July 1941. 
p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941. 

q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation. 
r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asistant Naval Attache Shanghai. 
s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to 
unite and serve empire, 
bb. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department trans- 
mitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war 
dated 28 July 1941. 
t. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Re- 
port No. 23 dated 3 November 1941. 
u. C}-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New 

Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo. 
V. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and 

Detention Plan (Japanese), 
w. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled 
"Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and 
M. A. report attached. ) 
y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of 
T. H.— Loyalty of— ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached). . 
aa. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George 
Palsh (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies). 
z. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 
re French Indo-China. 
dd. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 

re Formosa, 
cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents. 
X. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft 

(Continued), 
ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan, 
ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1041 re Formosa, 
gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan, 
hh. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re French Indo-China. 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand. 

jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations. 

kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Austra- 
liasia. 
11. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 
August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area, 
mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific 
Area. 

nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 Feb- 
ruary 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Hai"bor, T. H. 

CO. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w,/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Jap- 
anese Spy Activities. 

pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama. 

qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate 
Activities. 

rr. Copy of radio "638 12th". 

ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/l4ND Report dated 9 Feb- 
ruary 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at. 

tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo. 

uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities, 
Mauri, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.). 

w. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho. 
WW. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and-Kalama to observe 
unusual activities. 

XX. Memorandum dated 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John 
Waterhouse house at Kailua. 

yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi. 

zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939— "The Spy Game", 
aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

A 

Headquarters CPBC 

G-2 [CID] 

Box S, APO 456 — c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif. 

Private File — Lieutenant Col. B. M. Meurlott — No File Number 

Cf-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports 

Prepared at Army Contact Office, Honolulu 



No. Date 



General Nature of Contents 



I 24 June 1941. 



2 14 August 1941. 



3 19 August 1941 

4 19 August 1941 

5 26 August 1941 

6 5 September 1941 . . 

7 10 September 1941 . 

8 25 September 1941. 

9 25 September 1941. 

10 25 September 1941. 

11 25 September 1941. 



General for Pacific area: Burma Road, New Caledonia mining, New Zealand 
troop training, Thailand Japanese merchants, Australia propaganda, eco- 
nomic and troop training, Japanese economic pressure in N. E. I., petro- 
leum, agriculture, banking in N. E. I., Japan propaganda, economic war- 
fare, petroleum, agriculture, banking, harbor defense, airways. 

General for Pacific area: Japan propaganda, general economic, harbors, man- 
dated islands; Australia petroleum; N. E. I., petroleum, airports; Burma 
Road. 

China, general economic; Formosa harbor defense. 

Airports in S. W. Pacific: Canton I., Fiji, New Caledonia, Australia, New 
Guinea, N.E.I. 

Spratly and Adjacent Islands and reefs. 

Burma Road. 

Japan and Japanese relations. 

Thailand: Japan attempting to dominate Thai thought, business and govern- 
ment. 

French Indo-China: Gloomy picture of present conditions. 

China: Shanghai economic conditions, Burma Road, Suggling, casualties, air 
alarm system, raids. 

Japan: foreign relations, economic conditions coal, iron, ironworks, foreign 
advisors, mobilization, conscription in Formosa, Palau, Yap, Manchurian 
frontier, troop movement, naval organization, construction, movement, 
mine laying, airways, air movement. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 
0-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports — Continued 



255 



No. 


Date 


General Nature of Contents 


12 


25 September 1941 . . 


Dakar. 


13 


29 September 1941,. 


Japan: aerodromes. 


14 


29 September 1941.. 


Japan: movement northward, profits at Shanghai, intelligence services, war 

policies. 
Japan: treatment of foreigners, petroleum, troop movements, troops in French 


15 


2 October 1941 


'' 




Indo-China. 


16 


3 October 1941 


Fiji: summary from South Seas Weekly re RAF selectees, military training, 
military hospital. 


17 


3 October 1941 


New Guinea Mandate: capital removed from Rabaul to Lae. (Summary 
from P. I. M.) 


18 


9 October 1941 


China: oil fields near Suchow, transportation, airways, inhabitants. 


19 


11 October 1941 


Dutch East Indies: political conditions. 


20 


23 October 1941 


Formosa: foreign relations, volunteers to army, loyalty to Japan, fortifica- 
tions, war planes, air raid precautions. 


21 


28 October 1941 


Japan: foreign relations, raw materials and manufacture, oil, gasoline, iron, 
tungsten, rice, rubber, lampblack, steel, motor cars, rubber products, 
motorcycles, concrete, war morale of civil population, troop mobilization, 
embarcation points, airports, anti-aircraft, para-troops. 


22 


1 November 1941... 


French Oceania: political situation. 


23 


3 November 1941... 


Japan: aerodromes and aircraft factories, types of aircraft. 


24 


6 November 1941 


French Indo-China: airfields. 


25 


18 November 1941.. 


Japan: Japanese agents and military activities abroad; German agents and 
advisers in Japan; German raiders. 


26 


19 November 1941.. 


Japan: aerodromes, aircraft factories, types and movements of aircraft, para- 
troop training. 


27 


26 November 1941.. 


Australian air force and repair facilities. 


28 


1 December 1941 


Japan: foreign relations and domestic conditions. 


29 


9 January 1942 


Japan: vital points in Nagasaki city. 


30 


14 January 1942 


Japan: Island of Kyushu, vital points in communication system. 


31 


23 February 1942... 


Trans-Pacific air route suggested. 


32 


1 June 1942 


Korea: large factory at Honan. 


33 


26 June 1942... 


Japan: Aluminium plant at Shimizu. 




3 January 1942 


Memorandum on the Loo Choo Islands as a possible point of allied attack., 
(Spencer.) 



Reports produced by Army Contact Office, Hq. Haw. Dept., Honolulu 
Digest of Contemporary opinions on current topics in the Japanese Press. 
(Biweelily up to Nov. 5, 1941; final issue, Nov. 29, 1941, covered period Nov. 
6-25,1941.) 

Distribution : 
G-2 WD, 3. 
S-2 Scho. Bks. 1. 
G-2 24tli Div. 1. 
G-2 25th Div. 1. 
F. B. I. (Hon.) 2. 
O. N. I. (Hon.) 2. 
File. 
G~2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation. 

Last estimates produced were : 17 October 1941, 25 October 1941. 
Distribution : same as for Digest, above. 
(Extracts from the above are given in Exhibit herewith.) 
Military Intelligence Reports (periodic). 
(See list and sample copy herewith.) 
Counter-intelligence Estimates. 350.05 at Shafter 1941 to 1942. 
No. 7 was issued for period 16 to 30 November 1941. 

Distributed to all M. I. Sections of Hawaiian Dept., 10 copies to ONI and 
5 to FBI. 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

confidential 

Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command 

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence 

Counter Intelligence Division 

Box 3, APO 456 

In reply refer to : 

12 September 1&44. 
Memorandum for Major Meurlott: 

Total Shinto Shrines — 55 (about 12 of these are independent shrines) 
OK per Capt. Iwai. 

Total Shinto Priests 49 (about 15 of these individ- 

" " Priestesses , 9 uals were connected with 

" " Asst. Priests 24 the independent shrines) 

OK per Capt. Iwai. 

82 
Total in Custodial Detention 38 

Priests 

CD on mainland 20 

Paroled on mainland 3 

Paroled in T. H 2 

CD and then repatriated to Japan 4 

29 
Priestesses 

CD on mainland 3 

Paroled in T. H 1 

CD and then repatriated to Japan 1 

Released 2 

7 
Assistant Priests 

CD on mainland 1 

Paroled in T. H 1 



Total deceased \ -n^- 4. rr t^ „i,„ inyii 

> Prior to 7 December 1941 



War Departme^^t, 
Headquarters Akmy Pearl Harbor Board, 

7 September 1944. 
Memorandum : , 

To: Commanding General, USAFPOA. 
Subject: Documentary Evidence. 

1. It is requested that you make available to the Board, named by War Depart- 
ment, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese 
armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following 
documents, to wit : 

a. All data in whatever form, relating to the Japanese-American relations 
received by the Hawaiian Department from the War Department during the 
period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941 ; including movements of the Japanese 
armed forces and probable Japanese actions. 

b. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same i)eriod 
from and through the Navy. 

c. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

d. All reports relating to Japanese activities, both military and civil, made 
by G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, or others for said period, including Gr-2 summaries. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 257 

e. All messages take from the Japanese Consulate on December 7, 1941, or 
subsequent to said date. 

f. Documents captured from Japanese invading forces on or about December 7, 
1941. 

g. All correspondence or other writings relative to the alert of June 17, 1940. 
h. All orders for close-in reconnaissance by aircraft or other agencies for the 

period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941. 

i. Secret report of Colonel Capron describing damage to structures in Honolulu 
on December 7, 1941. 

j. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941. 

k. Report of Colonel Berquist upon his return from school in 1941 in w^hich 
he discussed air warning service, stations and information centers, and generally 
the employment of Radar. 

1. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii, 
m. Pattern of bombings by Japanese. 

n. Copy of record of trial against Kuhn in Hawaii, 
o. Herron's Field Order #1. 

p. Complete file of O. N. I. of message taken by F. B. I. from Hawaii R. C. A. 
file. 

q. Army's A — B lists in 1941. 

r. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in the Marshalls. 

2. It has come to the attention of the Board that an exchange of information 
by the O. N. I. and G-2, Hawaiian Department was made during said period by 
means of teletype. Are there any records of these exchanges? 

3. Procedure for obtaining the described documents desired to be used as 
evidence by the Board can be agreed upon. 

/s/ George Grunert, 
George Grunert, 
Lieutenant General, 

President. 



Classification : Confidential 
Enclosures: No. 

Military Intelligence Division 

War Department General Staff 
Military Attach^ Report 

reported by g-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

Subject : JAPAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS & DOMESTIC CONDITIONS. 
Source and Degree of Reliability : 

Business men, journalists, and missionaries returning fronCi Far East. 

Reliability believed good except as indicated. 
Summarization of Report 
When required : 

1. Japan's relationship with Dutch East Indies, China, U. S. S. R., and 
New Caledonia. 

2. Japan's internal conditions : Tojo cabinet, conditions in Korea, con- 
ditions in Japan. 

1. foreign RELATIONS 

A. With Dutch East Indies. A. D. E. I. officials, en route from Singapore to 
Dutch West Indies, stated on 26 November that there is a strong feeling against 
Japanese in D. E. I. and that the attitude on the part of the Japanese has been to 
"clear out" as quickly as possible. Source is certain that there were about 7,000 
Japanese in D. E. I. in October 1941. Early in November 2,000 Japanese were 
evacuated, principally from Java. In mid-November 1,500 more were preparing to 
leave. Practically all of the Japanese were "business men", no laborers. 

B. With China. American journalist, returning from Far East, reports that 
there are many military leaders of the Japanese army in China who do not want 
the "China incident" to end. They are making big money, and this war in China 
has developed into "the biggest racket the world has ever seen". On the other 
hand, the navy resents the army's opportunity for graft and is attempting to 
plug the smuggling holes. 

79716— 46— Ex. 148 18 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

C. With V. 8. 8. R. Vladivostok is a more important base than Singapore or 
Manila from which to launch an attack on Japan, according to an American 
journalist. The Soviets have 110 submarines there. Estimates made in Tokyo 
gave the Ruissian forces east of Lake Baikal as about 600,000 men before the 
start of the Russo-German vpar. Since then this eastern front steadily has been 
reinforced until novp the number is estimated to exceed one million. Some of these 
may be recruits replacing vpithdravpn veterans. But it was believed in Japan 
that an actual withdrawal of men and planes would have to be made before a 
Japanese invasion would be practicable. Source believed that the establishment of 
an American expeditionary force at Vladivostok could change the whole situation. 

D. Witli, New Caledonia. Evidence is accumulating to indicate an offer on the 
part of Japanese to gain a "peaceful" footing in New Caledonia. A Japanese 
line of freighters is said to be carrying unmelted nickle ore to Japan in spite of a 
Franco-British agreement that the entire output be sold to Britain. The Japanese 
consulate in Noumea is believed to be primarily a "listening post". TOKITARC 
KUROKI in Consul. He is said to have asked the N.Y.N, agent in Honolulu 
to interest Vuric in Hawaii to move to New Caledonia. In July, 1941, Georges 
Peloea, chief engineer of a new Calendonia nickle mine, stated that there were 
about 2,000 Japanese "businessmen" in New Caledonia. Most of them had come 
as contract laborers, but now were small merchants, etc. "Le Bulletin de Com- 

. merce", Noumea, 7 August 1941, estimated the Japanese in New Caledonia to 
number 1074 men and 52 women. Of these 316 men and 31 women lived in 
Noumea. It is believe that Free French authorities in New Caledonia dare not 
make reprisals or economic discrimination against Japan because lack of mili- 
tary or naval protection leaves the island open to Japanese attack and occupation. 

2. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS 

A. The Tojo Cabinet. An American journalist from Japan states that the fact 
that General TOJO did not resign from the army before accepting the premiership 
is noteworthy. It tends to bring the army out into the open as the real rulers of 
the government. Now the army itself must be responsible to the people for 
governmental activities. The problem now is what can TOJO do with the army 
group. Only a ranking army oflicer would be able to keep the extremists in hand. 
TOJO is believed to be more anti-Russian than anti-British and American. 

Premier Konoye's admission of "blame" for the China incident was thought to 
be a well understood hypocritical statement, pointing the finger of blame directly 
at the army group. Hence,' the "tears in the eyes" of the War and Navy ministers. 

B. Conditions in Korea. An American missionary, resident of Secul since 1917, 
gives the following information : 

The attitude of Koreans toward the Japanese is one of hopeless acquiescence. 

They are afraid to talk, even among themselves, as they do not know who may 
be spies. Japanese surveillance of the schools is very rigid. Once or twice 
a day an under^cover official would come to the schools to inquire about various 
matters. Japanese language was stressed as a cultural subject. Teachers were 
made to reprimand children talking Korean, even on the athletic field. In August 
1940, all school children had to have Japanese names. Any meeting that is held 
must be reported to the police and a permit obtained for even the smallest gather- 
ing in a private home. Police representatives always are present. 

The position of missionaries has been harder and harder. The pressure is not 
direct, but upon anyone associating with them. This has made the missionaries 
realize that they were doing more harm than good to the people they are trying 
to help. In November, 1941, there were only 12 missionaries left out of several 
hvuidred. Permits to missionaries are for one year only, and are not subject to 
renewal if they do not "play ball" with the Japanese. At times direct pressure 
has been brought to bear on missionaries. In one instance a woman missionary 
was "detained" for questioning for about a month in a dark cell. Physical pun- 
ishment has been occasional, but it is uncommon for Japanese to give punishments 
which leave marks of any kind. 

Confidential 

Strict censorship with the outside world prevents word of true conditions from 
getting through. Source states that it takes mail about three months to get out. 

Present conscription by Japan of Korean youths Is called "voluntai-y", but is 
far from it. In the summer of 1940 the Japanese called for a volunteer regiment, 
but obtained a bare 200 enlistments. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 259 

Source stated that many of the poorer class of Koreans were selling everything 
they had and were moving north into Manchukuo where they hoped to enjoy a 
better status as Japanese subjects. From this group the Japanese have been 
enlisting men to do their "dirty work", such as smuggling, spying, dope peddling, 
etc 

Source recommended that organization engaged in collecting money in the 
United States for Korean nationalist programs should be watched carefully, as 
he believed that the funds fell into private hands and were not being used for 
purposes for which intended. 

O. CONDITIONS IN JAPAN 

(1) An American missionary who lived many years in Japan up to last August, 
reports as follows : 

The government does not like to have Japanese soldiers return from Chma, 
being afraid they will talk. The few who come back do not talk about the war. 
None of the seriously wounded soldiers are sent back to Japan. They are sent to 
Formosa. No casualty lists are posted in Japan. Parents are informed after 
about three months of the death of a son. Source believes that only about one- 
third of the parents are so informed. Source stated that many returning soldiers 
are intolerable and are unable to settle down to normal life. Many of them are 

CliSGclSGCl. 

All telephone calls from city to city have to be carried on in Japanese. One 
English word would cause the operator to cut in on the line and remind you of 
the" regulations. Even on the streets, if a Japanese person speaks to you in 
English it is likely that some other person will tell your friend that his language 
is good enough. Source believed that Germans are handling the censorship, 
especially of mails. 

The average Japanese is said to feel more friendly toward Americans than 
toward any other foreigners. They dislike the British very much. Germans also 
are much disliked, especially as they make no pretense of covering up their con- 
tempt for the Japanese. 

Source believes that food restrictions are handled very well by the government. 
At such times as New Years, restrictions are eased, so that people forget their 
hardships and praise the Government. Such relaxing of restrictions builds up 
morale in the people when it is most needed. Last July no food could be taken 
from one province to another. 

Travel was restricted the latter part of last July. Special permits had to be 
obtained to get railroad tickets to go from one province to another on business. 

The government first gave advice in regard to limiting amusements. When 
this was not taken seriously, the government issued bans on various amusements, 
such as dancing, and curtailed the movies. Students at high schools and universi- 
ties were made to wear their school uniforms at all times. They could attend 
movies only on Saturdays and Sundays. They were forbidden to go into certain 
parts of the city, principally armament areas. 

In Osaka (residence of source) blackouts were staged about twice a year 
and lasted about two weeks. The city was divided into about ten zones, each 
further subdivided into smaller units, the smallest being a group of ten houses. 
Meetings were held frequently amongst the members of this smallest group, the 
chairman being chosen by representatives of the ten houses. Each house had 
a bucket of water and box of sand on hand at all times. Each house paid dues, 
•according to their means, to buy fire-fighting equipment. The next larger divi- 
sion, about one or two city blocks, purchased the equipment. Each house has 
three fiags to be hung out in front: a red flag warns that enemy raiders are 
overhead, red and white that the raid is lessening, and yellow, all clear. This 
— (copy illegible) — word from house to house if communications break down. 

(2) A returning American business man states that Indo-China rice is dis- 
tasteful to the people of Japan ; but the supply is adequate to meet all their 
needs. The people are willing to let the army have the best food and other 
supplies, because the army has the popular reputation of being made up of 
patriots. The people of Japan have little knowledge as to the graft and cor- 
ruption which exists among Japanese army officers in China. 

There have been no new motor cars in Japan since the start of the China 
incident. Gasoline is so closely guarded that sampan owners are unable to get 
enough to go fishing, hence, a shortage of fish. 

(3) Shortage of gasoline indicated. Master of a tanker reports the con- 
spicuous absence of Japanese fishing vessels, in October, from waters near the 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Jlarshall Islands where on previous voyages he had seen numerous fishing 
sampans. He believed that it was caused by lack of fuel. 

Kendall J. Fielder, 

Lt. Colonel, O. S. C, 

A. C. of S., 0-2. 
G-2, HAWN. DEPT. 
Copies furnished to 
ONI 
FBI 
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 
Report No. 28. 
Page — 
Date: 1 December 1941. 



[1], Exhibit I. — A Study of the StrevEKSivE Activities in the Hawaiian 
Islands Beioke, On, and After Decembeb 7, 1941 

1. espionage 

a. Agents and Agencies. — In an examination of documents and confidential 
publications of various government departments, there appears the common 
declaration that Japanese espionage activities have largely been centralized 
in the Consular Ofiices, in addition to the more specialized Army and Navy 
intelligence functions. There were more than two hundred Japanese Consular 
Agents strategically located throughout the islands. Potential assistants, agen- 
cies, etc., are discussed hereafter in detail. 

6. Sources of Infonnation. — Obtaining of information was done mainly through 
multitudes of observations, reports and studies of thousands of commercial 
travelers, students, tourists, purchasing commissions, as well as agents in the 
guise of "priests", hundreds of thousands of photographs, a most comprehen- 
sive and minute analysis of practically any subject, and by Japanese Language 
School principals. 

c. Transmission of Information. — Apparently all information of an urgent 
character was handled through the local Consulate, and transmitted by coded 
radio to Japan up to and including the evening of December 6, 1941; and it 
somewhat significant that local Japanese who might have had desirable infor- 
mation were apparently contacted at their homes or places of business by 
members of the Consulate staff. 

[2] d. Analysis of principal sources and type of information. — An analysis 
of the infojination available to agents of Japan and which was largely used in the 
December 7th attack, was obtained through casual observation, publications 
and periodicals, as well as from various Territorial and Federal published 
reports. Maps and circulars issued by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, the Chamber 
of Commerce, Territorial Planning Commission and other similar bodies, fur- 
nished accurate and complete details as to roads, public utilities such as water 
mains, electric power networks, telephone cables, and other such vital data. 

High level vantage points on the surrounding hills offered ideal spots for 
photography which would show, in completed detail, the layout of Pearl Harbor, 
in complete detail, with the complete berthing arrangements of vessels when 
the Fleet was in port. Layouts of the principal airfields were equally accessible 
to photography and sketching operations. 

A drive around the island of Oahu afforded full details of beaches, possible 
landing points, some of the coast defense installations, and landmarks such as 
prominent buildings, churches and chimneys and other such data. 

In summation — other than for details as to technical description of equip- 
ment, war plans, and other classified data — an espionage system, as such, was 
not required to fulfill their needs under existing local conditions. 

\_3\ From all of the foregoing, it can be assumed that any trained espionage 
group, other than that made up of various members of the consulate staff and 
visiting Japanese officials need not have been organized because of its non- 
necessity. There was the usual chain of Consular Agents, Shinto priests, language 
school principals and outstanding alien business leaders upon whom the Consulate 
could call for such meager details required to fill any gaps in each analysis of 
geographic, economic, political, or strategic subjects. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 261 

The seizure and holding in custody of the group outlined in the foregoing 
paragraph, in addition to other individuals who were suspected of subversive 
activities would logically appear to include the majority of possible leaders for 
such an espionage system. This action has been taken. 

2. SABOTAGE AND FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES 

As regards the question of planned sabotage or Fifth Column activities, it is 
significant to note that no local investigational agency has been able to determine 
any single fact which would definitely indicate that such activities have been 
planned or existed. 

While we see definite, long-term activities and plans in such localities as the 
Dutch East Indies, which date back to 1915, none of these can be found in 
similar form here in Honolulu. 

There have been but few purely Japanese businesses solely dependent upon 
the Japanese Government for support here in Honolulu as was the case in the 
Dutch East Indies. The N. Y. K. [Jf] had a most legitimate reason to 
exist here from a commercial transportation angle, the Sumitomo Bank and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank were also maintained on a somewhat logical economic 
reason due to the large Japanese population and the heavy trade with Japan. 
While other alien companies did exist, with some degree of Japanese control 
through stock ownership, they were relatively unimportant and did not involve 
large spheres of influence. 

Small merchants, businesses and professions were largely of Japanese nature 
but purely economic in their endeavor. Due to local patronage and the mainten- 
ance of large stocks of Japanese foodstuffs and supplies, these did a profitable 
business. 

It is quite true that the Japanese aliens held a large portion of the economic 
control of such endeavors, but this was largely due to local conditions, their 
liberties under American ideas of free trade and not through any exercise of 
control or endeavor on the part of the Japanese government. There was a certain 
amount of resentment and jealousy directed toward these successful aliens by 
certain white elements of the business community, but largely because they were 
successful, knew their rights under American laws and customs and insisted 
upon exercising them. It is but natural that a white distributor would resent 
being taken to task by an Oriental retailor, but usually the retailer was right 
and could force the distributor to acquiesce to his demand. This has resulted in 
the building up of a certain amount of anti-Japanese feeling [5] but this 
should not be interpreted as being caused by any disloyal or subversive acts on 
the part of the Japanese individuals concerned. 

There are also certain distasteful businesses which did not attract the local 
white population but which were profitable and lucrative. To the objectionable 
features the Japanese took no exception inasmuch as their sense of thrift could 
see the advantage. An example of this is the hog raising industry. The Japanese 
saw all of the possibilities and went in to the venture encouraged by the white 
population. As an adjunct the garbage collection system, to feed the hogs, was 
built up. The citizens were glad to receive small monthly payments for this 
waste material, and the City and County was greatly relieved in not having to 
maintain a large garbage collection department. In a comparatively short time 
these endeavors became a Japanese monopoly including collection of garbage 
from Army Posts and Camps. This was a most profitable business but it was not 
motivated by a Japanese nationalistic plot to obtain military information, as 
some would have it believed ; and because these individuals amassed money and 
property is no indication of Imperial Government subsidy to cover espionage 
activities carried on by ignorant, non-English speaking aliens. The possibilities 
of such, however, is not to be overlooked. It is x'ecognized that the very nature 
of tlieir work provided potentially good fields for gaining military information. 

[6] These presumably law abiding and legitimate business structures may 
be sharply contrasted to the activities of the Japanese Oceanic Bonito and Tunny 
Fishing Company and other similar Japanese government controlled and oper- 
ated organizations which arrogantly and openly defied the authorities of the 
Dutch East Indies. (Attached hereto as Appendix — are copies of reports made 
by several organizations to the local Japanese Consulate. ) 

There has been abundant evidence that visiting Japanese vessels have brought 
individual oflacials who openly did all possible to maintain nationalistic and 
cultural ties between the local Japanese and their homeland. Japanese Language 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Schools were allowed to flourish with their constant endeavor to impress on the 
second and third generation their fealty to the Fatherland. Many societies have 
been expected to aid in Japanese national endeavors, furnish comfort kits 
to the Army and offer financial aid to the Imperial Government in specific projects. 
While it is true that all of these activities have had their very objectionable 
features there appears no likelihood that any such endeavors have been di- 
rected toward the organization of Fifth Column elements or sabotage organiza- 
tions. ' 

[7] a. Japanese Press. — So far as this oflBce has been able to determine, no 
attempt has ever been made by the Japanese Government to control, financially 
or througli any channels, the publication of local newspapers. No campaigns have 
been initiated in the local Japanese language papers which would tend to unit 
the Japanese population against any other portion of the citizenry. 

There have been expressions of pro-Japanese sentiments and pro-Axis senti- 
ments, as well as some destructive criticisms and anti-American comments, but 
not in a manner or degree which could be termed a general anti-American 
attitude. 

In specific local cases when it appeared that Japanese nationals or descendants 
wei'e being discriminated against by proposed laws, regulations or rules these 
same papers did carry editorials and other comments in protest in much the same 
manner as would be true with any of the American press organizations. 

Speaking generally the attitude of the local Japanese press has been normal, 
with a considerable amount of pro-Japanese expression as regards the war with 
China, but this may have been largely due to economic reasons such as the 
maintaining of a high level of circulation and the sale of advertising space to 
alien individuals and firms. Their has been no indication however that their 
policy was controlled financially or otherwise by the Japanese government. 

[8] b. Political Control. — There is no substantial evidence of any Japanese 
attempts to control the local political situation other than such activities which 
were directed by white politicians and their Japanese or Japanese-descendent 
henchmen. It is true that legislators, supervisors and other officials in office 
have been elected by the Japanese-descendent citizen vote but the actual control 
of any legislation or selection of officials solely by a Japanese bloc has not 
been observed during the past years. Election of Japanese candidates solely by 
their own nationals vote has never occurred and no such candidate running on 
purely racial lines has ever been elected. In fact the contrary seems the case 
when Dr. Kurisaki ran for the position of supervisor and solicited the Japanese 
vote, even to the extent of having the priests speak in Japanese over the radio. 
He was defeated by a hugh vote, losing his own district. 

So far, the Japanese citizens have usually preferred to elect a white candidate 
as they apparently considered him to be "more suitable" as a political leader. 
Legislators claim that no single Japanese leader or member of the Legislature 
can obtain enough control to sway legislation even should they make an attempt 
(which they have never done). 

In recent sessions of the legislature, the Japanese opposed the Wages and 
Hours Act. This was for economic reasons due to its effect through the estab- 
lishment of a minimum wage which would greatly affect the small merchant, 
restaurant keeper, etc. They were unable to swing this opposition successfully, 
[9] hence traded their opposition to the Pier 15 Bill to the Dillingham inter- 
ests who in return supported their bloc of the Wages and Hours Act. 

It is regrettable to state, in connection with this phase of the discussion, that 
the Japanese vote has in the past greatly influenced the statements, actions and 
practices of many of the white politicians. While such an undesirable feature, 
as the continuation of the Japanese language schools, has been a subject of 
much investigation and proposed legislation, the matter has always been handled 
most gingerly and with a view toward the effect upon the individual's political 
future. It is believed that both protective and advisable precautionary measures 
have been, in the past, fogged and tabled because of such considerations. 

In conclusion, it might be pointed out, that despite the fact that so far there 
has been no evidence of establishment of Japan's political bloc control, and no 
indications of any political influence having been wielded by the Japanese people 
or officials which was motivated or dictated by the Japanese government, there 
is a distinct possibility that such may eventuate should Japanese cultural efforts 
be permitted to thrive without proper American supervision. The economic, 
political, and social subjugation of these islands could eventually be achieved by 
first providing an appropriate cultural foundation ; and is certainly within the 
realm of possible long-ranged Japanese planning. 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 263 

[10] At present we must reeed reckon with the fact that there is a certain 
amount of leadership exercised by the Japanese-descendent political leader over 
his particular group or supporters, hence they are potential "leaders". Whether 
such leadership would be subversive or detrimental to the defense of these islands 
in the event of an invasion is problematic, but a list of these individuals is pre- 
pared and they can all be seized immediately if such action would appear desirable 
to the Department Commander. 

c. Japanese Propaganda and Local Japanese. — This office is of the opinion that 
it is highly significant to note that Japanese official radio propaganda programs, 
which have been directed solely toward the Japanese in Hawaii, have been free 
from any actively dangerous propaganda both prior to and since December 7, 1941. 

We have observed the "softening" processes effected by this means of propa- 
ganda directed toward French Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, Dutch East 
Indies, Burma, India and even Australia. "In these instances there has been a 
definite attempt to drive wedges between the governments of those countries, the 
Japanese and tbe local inhabitants. Propaganda directed toward Australia has 
been designed to create dissention between the Australians and the British by 
showing how tlie Australian soldiers were victimized by the Home Government. 

[11] Programs directed toward Hawaii have not contained such propa- 
ganda. There have been the constant reminders, to the cliildren, of their loyalty 
to parents and the Emperor, the recitations of Japanese customs and culture, but 
no attempt to bring any anti-American feeling or active support to Japan. Appre- 
ciation of the Japanese soldiers for the comfort kits and letters from the Japanese 
children of Hawaii has been frequently expressed. 

It would seem that no one in Tokyo has thought of the amount of trouble which 
could be caused by calling the attention of the local-born Japanese to the lack of 
confidence which his adopted home (Hawaii) has toward him. There is every 
reason to believe that the war measures which have been put in effect and directed 
against these local people could form the subject of a radio program which would 
bring doubt, discord and mistrust more prominently into their minds. The 
reasons for such an ineffective policy are obsecure and may be the result of several 
logical deductions : 

(a) Distrust of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese elements by the Japanese 
government itself. 

(b) Hawaii considered to be outside of the present sphere of the "Greater East 
Asia" control plans. 

(c) That other more effective means for the accomplisliment of their objectives 
have been completed. 

(d) The assumption that any such prograros would be useless due to restrictions 
imposed on local short-wave reception. 

[12] (e) The knowledge or belief on the part of the Japanese government 
that the inciting of any dissention, sabotage or subversive activity would imme- 
diately result in the seizure and internment of Japanese and Japanese descend- 
ant residents of Hawaii. 

It seems that the first-mentioned deduction, (distrust of the local Japanese) 
should be given first consideration. It is most noteworthy to learn that the 
Japanese government has shown a marked suspicious attitude toward second- 
generation Japanese who have gone to Japan for a visit. Many of these have 
returned to Hawaii with stories of surveillance ; and their inability to properly 
speak the homeland tongue, unfamiliarity with customs and irksome practices, 
have resulted in a loss of any desire to ever again return to Japan. 

It must also be realized, by the Japanese government as well as it is by us, 
that many of the old aliens have no further interests in their land of birth, other 
than spiritually. Their children have been brought up under American ideals, 
culture and in association with white children, having only a small portion of 
their time spent in the language schools and under home influence. Their daily 
routine has brought them closer to American ways of life, freedom of thought, 
exposure to the American press and motion pictures, while their sports and 
reci'eations have been shared with other Ajnerican children, hence the prepon- 
derence of influence is contrary to the Japanese scheme of life. They have also 
intermingled freely [13] with young people of the various races common 
to Hawaii, and thus become far more cosmopolitan and democratic than their 
parents could ever become. 

There is much evidence to show that these old aliens have, in many cases, a 
genuine desire to provide for the safety and future welfare of their children 
here in Hawaii and hence have lost all idea of returning to Japan. For many 
years they have lived under American freedom, they liave prospered, their rela- 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tivos in Japan have died and the only future remaining for them is to see their 
children secure, and then pass out of the picture themselves. Any subversive 
action or act of sabotage on their part would bring discredit and disgrace, not 
to themselves necessarily, but to their children who have the interest of the 
United States more keenly at heart. 

All of the foregoing factors and considerations are quite contrary to those 
found in French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Burma, whei'e they 
consider themselves a superior race rather than inferior. 

It is therefore quite possible that the Japanese government could, with all 
propriety, question the 100% loyalty of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese. In 
other words, perhaps both governments find themselves in the same quandary 
when attempting to establish probability and degree of loyalty of these subjects. 

[IJf] It can therefore be easily assumed that Japan has little use for Hawaii, 
at present, in her "Asia for the Asiatics" policy other than that dictated by a 
purely military or naval point of view. 

There is nothing to be found here as compared to the oil and minerals of the 
Dutch East Indies, or the rubber plantations of Malaya and Burma. Hence, her 
ideas of domination of Hawaii could be discai-ded for the present save for its 
strategic value, which in the military control of the Pacific, is high. Whether 
this value is rated high enough, at this stage of affairs, to warrant another very 
costly attack is a question to be decided by the strategists but, from the propa- 
ganda point of view, this has not made any strong appearance- 
Considering the third reason for the lack of attention to the radio (that other 
more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been com- 
pleted), no evidence has been found which conclusively indicates any such plan; 
and to evaluate the possible existence of any such plans, we must first consider 
what their objective might be. 

Since the start of the war, the Japanese Government has fully realized that 
no large, alien radio audience would be allowed to listen to language programs 
enamating in Japan, [15] hence a great portion of the propaganda value 
of such programs would be wasted. Restrictions as to radio reception, which 
have been placed upon residents of Japan, have been reported as being severe and 
rigidly enforced ; and it is presumed that the Japanese would anticipate equally 
stringent regulations to be instituted by the government of the United States. 

Current programs from Japan indicate that the Japanese have anticipated a 
large proportion of their expected audience would be American, as they have been 
rendered in English with special emphasis on spreading confusion, doubt and 
misinformation in regard to the efforts made which are in contradiction to the 
policies of the United States government. The inclusion of personal messages 
from prisoners of war has been interspersed in an attempt to keep Americans 
listening to the entire program in order to be sure of hearing a message from 
a member of the family. There has not been any similar or substitute method 
for attracting the attention of the alien Japanese, or the American citizens of 
Japanese ancestry. 

[16] It is known that the radio broadcasting channels were to be used 
to transmit definite indications of decisive actions to come, prior to December 7, 
but this information was to be picked up only by the Consular staff and there 
is no reason to believe that any other persons, aliens or citizen, were aware of 
this secret code arrangement. This would tend to strengthen the supposition 
that the espionage system was built along lines to cover the situation up to the 
time when the attack was made but that no elaborate plans had been worked out 
for the continuation of such acts after the war had definitely begun. 

From the point of jwssible espionage, sabotage or subversive organization, there 
is no reason to believe that the Japanese government could anticipate the pro- 
tective action which we might initiate. There has been an abundance of open 
talk in that respect for many years past of which the entire Japanese population 
was well aware. Those rumored plans ranged from incai'cerating all such citizens 
on one of the outside islands to evacuation camps located in various valleys of 
the island of Oahu. 

In other words, there always has been great apprehension as to the drastic 
steps which would be taken against the Japanese in case of war. On this trend 
of thought we must be sure that the Japanese government was fully informed 
and therefore would be somewhat in doubt as to the effectiveness of any sub- 
versive organization after the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, there are 
the racial characteristics [17] involved, and no Japanese agent could 

carry on extensive secret, undercover, activities. With the entire population 
aroused as to potential sabotage and fifth column activities, the use of Japanese 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 265 

nationals or descendents would appear to be quite a hazardous undertaking. 
Because of this line of reasoning we have asumed, at all times, that any great 
amount of continuing sabotage or espionage activities would involve the use 
of low-class unprincipled, or traitorous individuals of either American or 
European antecedents. It is for this reason that especial attention has been 
directed toward the German, Italian and communistic elements of the local 
population. Concrete results have been obtained in the case of Otto Kuhn who 
definitely contacted the Japanese Consulate with subversive intent. 

These endeavors are subject to present and future close examination and 
investigation with a view to ascertaining any connection between the Japanese 
government and local paid agents. 

With regard to the tifth reason for the non-existence of any direct, dangerous 
radio propaganda, we may safely assume that the Japanese government believes 
that swift retribution would follow should any revolutionary or concerted sub- 
versive action be undertaken by the local Japanese population. This could 
quite possibly be contrary to the plan of Japanese strategy, as it. would seejn 
entirely preferable from the military point of view, especially the Japanese 
version, to have as many potential assistants, tifth columnists and guerillas 
available to assist in a lauding operation rather than have them inaccessible in 
concentration or detention camps. 

[18] d. Furthermore, the confusion of moving large numbers of Japanese 
citizens, the inability of troops to differentiate between local Japanese and 
landed Japanese troops not uniformed would be momentous. Aid and assistance 
granted to the invaders would be of enormous value and far greater than any . 
organized sabotage efforts made prior to such an invasion. We therefore do 
not discount this very possible angle and believe it may be one of the principal 
reasons why the radio propaganda has not been more actively dangerous up to 
the present time. 

Some effects of Japanese Radio Propaganda. — The effect to date of the radio 
propaganda which has dealt with the Japanese war effort as directed against 
the Hawaiian Islands has resulted in greatly nullifying its value on local resi- 
dents of Japanese origin. For example, the Japanese story of the great damage 
done by the submarine attack on Hilo, Hawaii, was clearly false and the Jap- 
anese residents of that city knew this to be a fact. In a comparatively 
short time these facts also became known to all the residents of other islands 
of the Hawaiian group. This was also true in the case of the sihgle plane night 
raid against the island of Oahu, March 4, 1942, when the Tokyo Broadcast 
falsely claimed extensive damage done at Pearl Harbor. Instances of this type 
have resulted in causing the local Japanese to greatly discredit propaganda 
emanating from that source. Hence, it is quite possible that they would seri- 
ously consider the authenticity of any effort put forth to initiate a program of 
subversion in these islands. 

[19] e. Japanese Families Divided in Thought. — A further argument 
against the possible existence of any subversive or sabotage ring among the 
Japanese, consideration must be turned again toward the second and third 
generation. 

It has been outlined heretofore that these younger members of the race are 
subjected to strong American influences. There have been large numbers of 
cases where it is known that open conflict exists within the families due to the 
fact that the younger members refused to see eye to eye with their parents on 
matters of Japanese loyalty. A great number of cases are recorded where the 
second-generation youth refused to file his claim for deferment of military serv- 
ice with the Japanese Consul and the father, or head of the family, has executed 
this act without the knowledge of the subject. We have also found numerous 
cases where the parents, or head of the family, have protested when the second- 
generation son has filed request for expiration of Japanese citizenship. 

In other words, we do know of many instances where the second-generation 
son has thrown his loyalty to the side of the United States, and even tried to 
sway the older member of the family to invest in American securities, follow 
American customs and disregard the established Japanese customs and ways of 
life. It would therefore be necessary that any plots or plans on the part of the 
older aliens be kept entirely secret from the younger generation which would be 
relatively quite a problem. 

;[,20] f. Miseellaneotis Reasons — Why no Sabotage? — Much argument has 
been indulged in as to the significance of there having been no single authenticated 
report of sabotage or subversive, activity on the part of the local Japanese on 
December 7, 1941, or since that time. 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

While rumors ran rampant and stories of such actions were sidely circulated, 
nothing has ever been substantiated by any investigative agency. To analyse 
this particular problem, it is necessary to scan the record of known facts, to piece 
this out with logical assumptions and apply the positive resillts of recent investi- 
gations. 

First of all, we can safely state that the objective of the attack was to cripple 
the naval and air arms in such manner as to prevent United States interference 
with Japan's program of attack in the Orient. The success of such a mission 
depended solely upon the element of surprise which enjoined absolute secrecy on 
the part of the enemy. Any one individual, Japanese or of any other nation- 
ality, who was made cognizant of these plans introduced a serious chance of 
exposure. Assuming such a case, it would first be necessary to convey the in- 
formation to such a hypothetical person. Radio, telephone, mail, or cable com- 
munication could never be trusted for such an important message (again assum- 
ing the fact that the Japanese government would never believe that we were naive 
enough to allow these channels of communications to continue without sur- 
veillance during a period of extremely strained relations). [21] It is most 
probable that such a message would have to be divulged only by veiled insinuation, 
special courier or coded data in commercial radio broadcasts emanating in 
Japan. 

We do know that there were messages received in the Japanese consulate 
which carried thinly veiled warnings that the situation was fast approaching the 
breaking point but no definite dates were mentioned. It was also apparent 
that the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu, on November 12, 1941, enroute to Wash- 
ington held possibilities of personal instructions being conveyed. His progressive 
engagements, held on the night of his presence in Honolulu, at various locations 
such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the Japanese Consulate, the Sunchoro Tea 
House, indicate that there was ample opportunity for important matters to 
be discussed with the Consul ; and his constant moving about gave rise to the 
thought that these matters were being carefully guarded. 

The only concrete evidence to the effect that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu 
had any idea as to when hostilities would begin was to be found in a notation 
on his private desk calendar under date of December 1, 1941, when he had written 
in Japanese "within the predictable future". We believe that it is thus safe to 
assume that he did not know exactly when operations would begin. It was 
quite possible that he was verbally informed of the general plan of the govern- 
ment but we seriously doubt that he had specific information that the attack 
on Pearl Harbor would be made at 7 : 55 a. m. on December 7, 1941. If such 
were the case, with the highest ranking and [22] most confidential agent 
of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small 
merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk 
and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew 
nothing of all the facts involved. 

Many of the above-mentioned facts are a result of investigations made since 
December 7, 1941. We know from examination of records that the Consulate was 
fully informed of fleet movements, names of ships, berthing positions and such 
similar data, and that this information was forwarded promptly by radio to 
Tokyo. This data was obtained, personally, by a member of the Japanese Con- 
sulate staff who visited vantage points on Pearl City peninsula to make the nec- 
essary observations. 

There is also the Mori case where vital military information was exchanged 
with Tokyo on December 5, 1941, under the guise of a press interview. It is 
particularly significant that this was via radio telephone. Both radio telephone 
telegraph and radio telephone traffic could logically have been intercepted by 
ships of the Japanese fleet between Hawaii and Japan. 

The fact that the Japanese Consulate was interested in getting information 
to ships laying off the Hawaiian Islands by I'adio, commercial broadcast adver- 
tisements, visual signals such as sheets, lights and fires has been made a matter 
of record through the evidence developed in the Kuhn case. Here we find our 
suspect German involved with the Consulate espionage system bearing out our 
previous suspicion of the use of some [23] of these means. 

g. Investigation of captured maps and other data bears out the contention 
that no extensive e.spionage system, other than that definitely centered in the 
Consulate staff and Consular agents, as heretofore outlined, was needed to obtain 
the material required for their compilation. 

Thus far we can see that the tactical plan was complete with no necessity for 
use of the weapon of sabotage to carry out the objective of the mission. Further- 



CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 267 

more, the attack was such a complete surprise, to the Japanese residents them- 
selves, that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days to follow. Casual- 
ties included a number of Japanese, property destroyed was not exclusive of 
that of Japanese ownership. There was no individual act, even fanatical, to 
indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of con- 
fusion or sabotage. 

The absence of sabotage on December 7, 1941, is not proof that plans for such 
could not exist but it is evident that there was neither necessity or intention 
to use this weapon for the objective in view by that particular operation. 

Japanese Leadership — Individual initiative Lacking. — In the consideration of 
any organizations with subversive policy, we invariably come back to the point 
of leadership. It has been found that the local Japanese inherently look for lead- 
ership to some single individual before any marked success is achieved even in 
peaceful pursuits. Japanese business partnerships hardly ever are successful 
when the corporations [23] stand much better chance of survival. Here 
again we find that leadership is required as it is practically impossible for the 
partners to agree long enough to produce any practicable results. 

These fundamentals go back still further in the demonstrated regimentation 
and control of the lives, fortunes and existence of the millions of poorly educated 
people in Japan. A fundamental respect for law and authority exists in the 
minds of every individual Japanese alien. An order issued by the appropriate 
authority finds more complete and blind acceptance among the alien Japanese 
than is the case with the other elements of the population of Hawaii. For this 
reason alone it is necessary to properly explain, translate and interpret any 
regulations published or issued by the Military Governoi*. 

T^is characteristic has been exemplified in their choice of white political 
leaders as mentioned heretofore, where the many Japanese feel that they are 
better qualified, more experienced and more able to successfully carry on politi- 
cal issues. 

An interesting consideration of this element of obedience in the mind of the 
alien Japanese can be found in the Hirada case on the island of Niihau, where a 
Japanese officer pilot, who was forced down, armed and equipped, informed 
Harada, a U. S. citizen Japanese, that he had taken that island, as Japan and 
the United States were at war. Harada knew nothing of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, the final outcome of the engagement [25] and had nothing to 
indicate to his simple mind any other fact than that the Japanese had landed 
on Niihau. There was probably no mental reaction, in his mind, of being loyal 
or disloyal to the United States because of his blind acceptance of the aviator's 
story and his complete obedience to his commands. There was no fighting, no 
conflict between forces of the United States and Japan, as far as he could 
see, hence it can only be said that he was immediately bound to obey Japanese 
leadership and domination in the form of the Japanese officer, but perhaps no 
question of loyalty to the United States entered his thoughts. 

h. Local Japanese 'between two fires. — The Japanese, in general, here in the 
Hawaiian Islands, cannot be said to desire Japanese domination and control of 
the territory. They have been free in their businesses, life and customs and 
many have prospered far beyond their expectations. Most of them are fully 
aware that should the control of the islands pass to the Japanese, all of those 
freedoms, successes and customs would disappear and they would be as fully 
controlled and regimented as are the Japanese in Japan. Their fear of personal 
safety, the safety of their families and children is the predominant feature at 
present. Some feeling exists that they are between two fires and will suffer 
either one way or the other in case of an invasion. If they are not harmed by 
the United States forces, in such an action, they feel very [26] uncertain 
as to the treatment which they may i-eceive in the hands of the Japanese in-* 
vading forces. It is also very apparent that such apprehension is rapidly spread- 
ing through the Japanese population, hence it is greatly doubted that any 
organized sabotage system could thrive in such an atmosphere. 

3. SOME OF THE MEASUKES WE HAVE TAKEN 

The daily drive and steady pressure being applied on the local Japanese com- 
munity, since the war began, also lessens any possible organization of subversive 
elements. None know exactly when they will be picked up for questioning, their 
premises seai'ched and careful examination made of the entire family background. 
Many are questioned and released who are required to return at sta